[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SURVEILLANCE, SABOTAGE, AND STRIKES: INDUS-
TRY PERSPECTIVES ON HOW DRONE WARFARE
ABROAD IS TRANSFORMING THREATS AT
HOME
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-21
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-404 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Tony Gonzales, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Member
Elijah Crane, Arizona Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Gabe Evans, Colorado Al Green, Texas
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Vacancy
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Paul Churchill Hutton, IV, Chief Growth Officer,
Aerovironment, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Tom Walker, Founder and CEO, DroneUp, LLC:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Brett Feddersen, Vice President, Strategy and Government
Affairs, D-Fend Solutions:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Michael Robbins, President and CEO, Association for Uncrewed
Vehicle Systems International:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
SURVEILLANCE, SABOTAGE, AND STRIKES:
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON HOW DRONE WARFARE ABROAD IS TRANSFORMING
THREATS AT HOME
----------
Tuesday, July 15, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Gimenez, Garbarino, Crane, Biggs
of South Carolina, McIver, Kennedy of New York, and Carter of
Louisiana.
Also present: Representative Pfluger.
Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come
to order.
Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee
in recess at any point.
Today's hearing is examining how drone warfare tactics used
abroad are transforming threats to our homeland.
From Ukraine to the Middle East, our adversaries are
deploying increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities that
can be adapted by terrorists, lone actors, or State proxies
within the United States.
This hearing will explore how industry leaders are
innovating to help close critical security gaps and better
protect our transportation systems and infrastructure.
Without objection, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger,
is permitted to sit with the subcommittee and ask questions of
the witnesses.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning. I want to thank everyone for joining us for
today's hearing, which will examine how drone warfare overseas
is reshaping the threat environment here at home.
In recent years, the use of unmanned aircraft systems--or
drones--by foreign adversaries, terrorist groups, and proxy
forces has grown significantly.
Once confined to distant battlefields, these platforms are
now being deployed in ways that challenge traditional security
assumptions and expose critical vulnerabilities across our
homeland.
Drones have become essential tools of modern warfare. On
the battlefields of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces
are deploying thousands of drones not only for surveillance and
artillery targeting, but for direct offensive operations.
These include quadcopters assembled from commercial parts,
long-range loitering munitions, and first-person-view kamikaze
drones enhanced by open-source software. They are low-cost,
adaptable, and increasingly precise.
Just weeks ago, Ukraine launched a deep strike inside
Russian territory using a coordinated wave of drones, damaging
strategic bombers thousands of miles from the front lines.
Russia continues to rely on Iranian-made Shahed drones to
bombard Ukrainian energy infrastructure, saturate air defenses,
and inflict lasting psychological and economic harm.
In the Middle East, Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah
and the Houthis have demonstrated the operational reach and
lethality of these systems. They have targeted U.S. service
members, international shipping, and critical infrastructure.
The drone strike that killed 3 American service members in
Jordan in early 2024 underscored just how dangerous and
asymmetric this threat has become.
More recently, during a 12-day conflict last month, Israel
launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Iranian
military sites, some originating from launch points within Iran
itself, illustrating how even layered air defense systems can
be bypassed using prepositioned commercial technologies.
What makes these developments more alarming is the
accessibility of the technology. Many of the systems deployed
abroad are constructed using commercially-available components
and open-source software.
These tools are not limited to nation-states. Lone actors,
extremists, networks, and transnational criminal organizations
can easily acquire and weaponize drones with minimal cost and
training.
Here in the United States the warning signs are emerging.
Reports of unauthorized drone activity near airports and other
critical infrastructure are becoming more frequent. Hundreds of
sightings have been documented near military installations and
sensitive energy facilities in the past year alone.
The potential for a coordinated drone attack on an airport,
seaport, or mass gathering is a credible and growing threat.
My home district in South Florida is particularly exposed.
With major transportation hubs like Miami International
Airport, the Port of Miami, and a dense network of energy and
telecommunications infrastructure, we are a high-profile
target.
A single drone equipped with an explosive device or
electronic warfare payload could cause significant disruption,
physical damage, and wide-spread panic.
We cannot afford to be reactive. The time to act is now.
Another concern is the wide-spread presence of Chinese-
manufactured drones operating within the United States.
DJI, a company based in Communist China, commands a
significant share of both the global and U.S. commercial drone
market. Its platforms are used by private industry, lobbyists,
and even some public safety agencies.
In fact, even several DHS components have--inexplicably--
used DJI's AeroScope system to monitor drone activity near
sensitive locations.
While AeroScope may offer affordable situational awareness,
it also raises serious concerns about the national security
risks posed by Chinese-linked technology, especially regarding
data access, remote control capabilities, and potential
sabotage during a future crisis or conflict with China.
Today's hearing will explore what the private sector is
experiencing on the front lines of drone security, the counter-
UAS tools that are currently available, and the extent to which
Federal, State, and local authorities are equipped with the
legal and operational capabilities to address these threats.
At present, the Department of Homeland Security has limited
authorities to disrupt or disable malicious drone activity.
Most State and local law enforcement agencies have no authority
whatsoever.
This is a glaring gap in our national preparedness, one
that we must urgently address as we prepare to host globally
significant events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028
Summer Olympics.
We'll also hear testimony on the broader risks posed by
Chinese-made drones collecting sensitive location data across
the United States. These systems could be used for surveillance
or even to carry out attacks.
This is not simply a question of data privacy. It's a
matter of homeland security.
Our adversaries are adapting rapidly. Our defenses must
keep pace. That means updating our legal authorities, investing
in next-generation detection and mitigation tools, and
partnering closely with industry and State and local
stakeholders.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee today and for their continued efforts to keep our
Nation secure. Your perspectives will help inform the
committee's work as we seek to close dangerous gaps before they
are exploited.
I look forward to your testimony and to a productive
discussion. Thank you.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos Gimenez
July 15, 2025
Good afternoon. I want to thank everyone for joining us for today's
hearing, which will examine how drone warfare overseas is reshaping the
threat environment here at home.
In recent years, the use of unmanned aircraft systems, or
``drones'', by foreign adversaries, terrorist groups, and proxy forces
has grown significantly. Once confined to distant battlefields, these
platforms are now being deployed in ways that challenge traditional
security assumptions and expose critical vulnerabilities across our
homeland.
Drones have become essential tools of modern warfare. On the
battlefields of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are
deploying thousands of drones not only for surveillance and artillery
targeting, but for direct offensive operations. These include
quadcopters assembled from commercial parts, long-range loitering
munitions, and first-person-view kamikaze drones enhanced by open-
source software. They are low-cost, adaptable, and increasingly
precise.
Just weeks ago, Ukraine launched a deep strike inside Russian
territory using a coordinated wave of drones, damaging strategic
bombers thousands of miles from the front lines. Russia continues to
rely on Iranian-made Shahed drones to bombard Ukrainian energy
infrastructure, saturate air defenses, and inflict lasting
psychological and economic harm.
In the Middle East, Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah and the
Houthis have demonstrated the operational reach and lethality of these
systems. They have targeted U.S. service members, international
shipping, and critical infrastructure. The drone strike that killed 3
American service members in Jordan in early 2024 underscored just how
dangerous and asymmetric this threat has become.
More recently, during a 12-day conflict last month, Israel launched
a series of drone and missile strikes against Iranian military sites,
some originating from launch points within Iran itself, illustrating
how even layered air defense systems can be bypassed using
prepositioned commercial technologies.
What makes these developments more alarming is the accessibility of
the technology. Many of the systems deployed abroad are constructed
using commercially-available components and open-source software. These
tools are not limited to nation-states. Lone actors, extremist
networks, and transnational criminal organizations can easily acquire
and weaponize drones with minimal cost and training.
Here in the United States, the warning signs are emerging. Reports
of unauthorized drone activity near airports and other critical
infrastructure are becoming more frequent. Hundreds of sightings have
been documented near military installations and sensitive energy
facilities over the past year alone. The potential for a coordinated
drone attack on an airport, seaport, or mass gathering is a credible
and growing threat.
My home district in South Florida is particularly exposed. With
major transportation hubs like Miami International Airport, the Port of
Miami, and a dense network of energy and telecommunications
infrastructure, we are a high-profile target. A single drone equipped
with an explosive device or an electronic warfare payload could cause
significant disruption, physical damage, and wide-spread panic. We
cannot afford to be reactive. The time to act is now.
Another concern is the wide-spread presence of Chinese-manufactured
drones operating within the United States. DJI, a company based in
Communist China, commands a significant share of both the global and
U.S. commercial drone market. Its platforms are used by private
industry, hobbyists, and even some public safety agencies. In fact,
even several DHS components have, inexplicably, used DJI's AeroScope
system to monitor drone activity near sensitive locations.
While AeroScope may offer affordable situational awareness, it also
raises serious concerns about the national security risks posed by
Chinese-linked technology, especially regarding data access, remote
control capabilities, and potential sabotage during a future crisis or
conflict with China.
Today's hearing will explore what the private sector is
experiencing on the front lines of drone security, the counter-UAS
tools that are currently available, and the extent to which Federal,
State, and local authorities are equipped with the legal and
operational capabilities to address these threats.
At present, the Department of Homeland Security has limited
authorities to disrupt or disable malicious drone activity. Most State
and local law enforcement agencies have no authority at all. This is a
glaring gap in our national preparedness, one that we must urgently
address as we prepare to host globally significant events like the 2026
FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics.
We will also hear testimony on the broader risk posed by Chinese-
made drones collecting sensitive location data across the United
States. These systems could be used for surveillance or even to carry
out attacks. This is not simply a question of data privacy. It is a
matter of homeland security.
Our adversaries are adapting rapidly. Our defenses must keep pace.
That means updating our legal authorities, investing in next-generation
detection and mitigation tools, and partnering closely with industry
and State and local stakeholders.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee
today and for their continued efforts to keep our Nation secure. Your
perspectives will help inform the committee's work as we seek to close
dangerous gaps before they are exploited.
I look forward to your testimony and to a productive discussion.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening
statement.
Mrs. McIver. Good morning. Thank you so much, Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.
Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, I want to
offer my condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones
of the children and other victims lost in the devastating
floods in Texas last week. My thoughts and prayers are with all
those impacted.
As the affected communities begin to recover from this
tragedy, I hope our committee will soon have the opportunity to
examine what went wrong and ensure our Government can better
respond to future disasters.
I also want to thank the brave first responders who helped
prevent further loss of life, including Coast Guard Petty
Officer Third Class Scott Ruskan of New Jersey and the other
Coast Guard members on board helicopter 6553 who helped save
many lives from the floodwaters.
The emergency response in Texas is actually relevant to
today's hearing as one helicopter involved in the rescue and
recovery operations had to be grounded after a collision with a
private drone flying in restricted air space.
The incident goes to show the threats drones can pose even
when operators have no ill intent and the need for more robust
Government capabilities to address such threats.
In recent years, drone usage has become commonplace across
a wide range of applications, from emergency response to
photography and news coverage. Drone operations provide
benefits to businesses and hobbyists alike.
As drone activity increases, we must ensure the Government
has the authorities and resources necessary to take action
against drone operators who do not follow the rules, including
both careless and clueless operators, as well as those who may
seek to use drones to carry out attacks.
Though such large-scale attacks have yet to occur within
the United States, our critical infrastructure, mass
gatherings, and Government facilities are vulnerable to being
targeted, especially by lone-wolf actors.
With the World Cup coming to the United States next year,
including to MetLife Stadium in my home State of New Jersey, as
well as the Olympics coming in 2028, the need for Congress to
extend and expand the Government's counter-drone authorities
have never been more pressing.
In October 2018, Congress passed legislation providing the
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice with limited
authorities to detect, track, intercept, and seize drones.
However, just a few months later, incidents at Gatwick
Airport in England and my home airport, Newark Liberty
International Airport, displayed the inaccuracy of CUAS
capabilities as drones shut down airport operations, disrupting
travel for thousands of passengers.
Given this subcommittee's jurisdiction over transportation
security, I am hopeful that any expansion of authorities
provides a path forward for protecting airports from drones.
Last year, New Jersey was again the focus of media
attention as the public reported spotting large numbers of
drones and unknown aircraft flying over our State.
Further investigation revealed that the aircraft were most
likely authorized flights. But, nevertheless, the incident
revealed the Government's lack of domain awareness and
capabilities for protecting the national air space.
Moving forward, Congress must act to extend and expand
authorities in a matter that provides the capabilities needed
to counter the threats we face.
At the same time, we must ensure counter-drone systems are
operated in a safe and responsible manner that does not impact
the safety of commercial flights or violate individual privacy
rights and civil liberties.
I hope the Republican majority will prioritize moving
legislation to address counter-drone authority soon.
Thank you again for our witnesses for joining us today.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver
July 15, 2025
Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, I want to offer my
condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of the children
and other victims lost in the devastating floods in Texas last week. My
thoughts and prayers are with all those impacted.
As the affected communities begin to recover from this tragedy, I
hope our committee will soon have the opportunity to examine what went
wrong and ensure our Government can better respond to future disasters.
I also want to thank the brave first responders who helped prevent
further loss of life, including Coast Guard Petty Officer 3d Class
Scott Ruskan and the other Coast Guard members onboard helicopter 6553,
who helped save many lives from the flood waters.
The emergency response in Texas is actually relevant to today's
hearing, as one helicopter involved in rescue and recovery operations
had to be grounded after a collision with a private drone flying in
restricted air space. The incident goes to show the threats drones can
pose even when operators have no ill intent--and the need for more
robust Government capabilities to address such threats.
In recent years, drone usage has become commonplace across a wide
range of applications, from emergency response to farming to
photography and news coverage. Drone operations provide benefits to
businesses and hobbyists alike. As drone activity increases, we must
ensure the Government has the authorities and resources necessary to
take action against drone operators who do not follow the rules--
including both ``careless and clueless'' operators, as well as those
who may seek to use drones to carry out attacks.
Recent drone attacks by Russia, Ukraine, and Israel have displayed
how drones can be used in warfare to deadly effect. Though such large-
scale attacks have yet to occur within the United States, our critical
infrastructure, mass gatherings, and Government facilities are
vulnerable to being targeted, especially by lone-wolf actors.
With the World Cup coming to the United States next year--including
to MetLife Stadium in my home State of New Jersey--as well as the
Olympics coming in 2028, the need for Congress to extend and expand the
Government's counterdrone authorities has never been more pressing. In
October 2018, Congress passed legislation providing the Departments of
Homeland Security and Justice with limited authorities to detect,
track, intercept, and seize drones.
However, just a few months later, incidents at Gatwick Airport in
England and my home airport of Newark Liberty International Airport
displayed the inadequacy of C-UAS capabilities, as errant drones shut
down airport operations, disrupting travel for thousands of passengers.
Given this subcommittee's jurisdiction over transportation
security, I am hopeful that any expansion of authorities provides a
path forward for protecting airports from drones. Last year, New Jersey
was again the focus of media attention as the public reported spotting
large numbers of drones and unknown aircraft flying over our State.
Further investigation revealed that the aircraft were mostly authorized
flights, but nevertheless, the incident revealed the Government's lack
of domain awareness and capabilities for protecting the national air
space.
Moving forward, Congress must act to extend and expand authorities
in a manner that provides the capabilities needed to counter the
threats we face. At the same time, we must ensure counterdrone systems
are operated in a safe and responsible manner that does not impact the
safety of commercial flights or violate individual privacy rights and
civil liberties. I hope the Republican Majority will prioritize moving
legislation to address counterdrone authorities soon.
Mr. Gimenez. I want to thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 15, 2025
I want to begin by offering my condolences to those impacted by the
tragic floods in Texas. The loss of life is devastating, and my
thoughts are with the victims, survivors, and their families and loved
ones. Sadly, the damage wrought by the floods was exacerbated by the
Trump administration's mismanaged response. I have called on Chairman
Green to immediately convene a hearing to examine the administration's
actions to undermine FEMA and our preparedness for the remainder of
hurricane season. I hope he will answer that call soon.
In the mean time, today we are here to discuss a different threat
to the homeland: the threat posed by unmanned aerial systems or drones.
In 2018, Congress enacted the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018,
which provided the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice with
targeted authorities to detect, track, and mitigate unauthorized drones
that pose a threat to certain facilities, assets, and events. These
authorities have allowed the Federal Government to begin to develop the
testing, policies, and processes to procure and deploy effective
counter-UAS systems and technologies.
DHS and DOJ have had some significant successes in protecting high-
profile National Special Security Events from unauthorized drone
incursions. However, the use of drones has continued to proliferate
rapidly, both domestically and abroad. Drones are used for a wide
variety of purposes across many sectors, including in emergency
response, agriculture, law enforcement, photography, and package
delivery. Drones have also been used in warfare by the United States
and our allies and adversaries alike, providing militaries and
intelligence agencies with a novel tool for intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, interference, and kinetic attacks. Though the vast
majority of drone use within the United States is harmless and law-
abiding, the use of drones in warfare abroad makes clear the potential
threats drones may pose to the homeland.
The potential for bad actors to use drones to carry out attacks on
mass gatherings, critical infrastructure, and other targets
necessitates the extension and expansion of authorities for the Federal
Government and law enforcement partners to detect, track, intercept,
and seize unauthorized drones flying in restricted air space. The
Government must have the ability to respond to developing threats and
prevent attacks. At the same time, authorities must be expanded in a
manner that protects individuals' privacy and due process rights, as
well as the safety of the national air space. Already, we have seen the
potentially damaging effects counter-drone technologies can have when
operated without appropriate coordination.
Earlier this year, the U.S. Secret Service allegedly operated a C-
UAS system without clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration,
resulting in inappropriate automated alerts to several pilots flying
aircraft near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, which could
have undermined flight safety. Over the past several years, I have
worked in a bipartisan manner with colleagues across the committees
with shared jurisdiction to develop legislation to extend and expand
counterdrone authorities in a significant yet thoughtful manner. Last
Congress, Chairman Green introduced H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS
Authority, Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act, which I supported
as a cosponsor.
The bill would have extended and expanded C-UAS authorities in
several key ways, including by establishing a DHS pilot program for
State and local law enforcement agencies to receive counterdrone
mitigation authorities. The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
reported the bill with bipartisan support last September, but House
Republican leadership never called the bill up for floor consideration.
I have continued to work with my colleagues to refine the legislation
and expect we will reintroduce a version of it soon. I hope the
Republican Majority will act swiftly to advance the bill to the floor,
through the House, and ultimately into law.
The threats posed by drones are too critical for Congress to wait,
especially given the need to protect upcoming events including the
World Cup and the Olympics. Thank you again to our witnesses for
joining us today to discuss these critical challenges.
Mr. Gimenez. I'm pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this critical topic.
I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you, and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Mr. Church Hutton serves as AeroVironment's chief growth
officer, a role he assumed in May 2025 to lead the company's
strategic expansion and long-term growth initiatives.
Prior to this, he served as senior vice president of
government relations, marketing, and communications beginning
in 2024 where he played a key role in shaping AeroVironment's
public profile and strengthening relationships with government
stakeholders.
A retired Army officer and combat veteran, Mr. Hutton spent
a decade in senior staff positions on Capitol Hill, including
on the professional staff of the Senate Appropriations and
Senate Armed Services Committees.
Mr. Tom Walker is the founder and chief executive officer
of DroneUp, a leading U.S.-based drone technology company
specializing in advanced American-made unmanned aerial systems
and integration services.
Under his leadership, DroneUp has become a key industry
innovator, supporting a wide range of mission-critical
operations, including border security, emergency response,
infrastructure monitoring, and last-mile logistics.
Prior to founding DroneUp, Mr. Walker served nearly 17
years as a U.S. Navy officer where he led efforts to modernize
digital systems and enhance operational support for the United
States and allied special operations forces.
Mr. Brett Feddersen serves as the vice president for
strategy and governmental affairs at D-Fend Solutions, where he
oversees the company's strategy, public policy, and engagement
with U.S. Government agencies, policy makers, and regulators.
Prior to joining the private sector, he held senior
executive roles across the Federal Government, including the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense, and
the White House. He is also a retired U.S. Army lieutenant
colonel and a former Pennsylvania State trooper.
Mr. Michael Robbins is president and chief executive
officer of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International, the world's largest trade association for
uncrewed systems, robotics, and autonomous technologies,
representing companies in both the commercial and defense
sectors.
He joined the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International in 2020 and previously served as chief advocacy
officer. Michael is also presently serving as an officer in the
United States Navy Reserve.
I thank each of our distinguished guests for being here
today.
I now recognize Mr. Hutton for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF PAUL CHURCHILL HUTTON, IV, CHIEF GROWTH OFFICER,
AEROVIRONMENT, INC.
Mr. Hutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on drone warfare abroad and how it's informing domestic
investments that will help us prepare for threats here in the
United States.
I commend the committee's focus on these challenges and
your efforts to enhance the safety of the American people and
U.S. transportation systems.
My name is Church Hutton. I serve as the chief growth
officer at AV, formerly AeroVironment. It is my pleasure to
testify alongside my industry partners in highlighting the
challenges and opportunities of providing effective
capabilities to our service members and first-line responders
in light of the lessons learned from drone warfare abroad.
By way of background, AV is the top producer and supplier
by volume of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, to the Department
of Defense, as well as the leading provider of counter-UAS
solutions deployed overseas actively protecting Americans,
allies, and critical infrastructure abroad. This gives us a
holistic view of UAS threats, mitigation tools, and the
implications for both to U.S. homeland security.
With major public events on the near horizon, including the
World Cup, as you said, Chairman, America's 250th anniversary
celebrations, and the 2028 Summer Olympics, we have a
collective need to apply these lessons to address threats to
U.S. infrastructure and public safety.
Collaboration between Congress and industry is essential to
ensure the safety of the American people and critical
infrastructure from the evolving threat.
Effective collaboration has a few basic tenets. The first
is that we learn the lessons of the foreign drone experience;
that authorities are granted to Federal and State agencies to
deploy safe and effective UAS solutions in what are clearly
complex jurisdictional scenarios; and finally, that Congress
provide flexible funding so that Government agencies can
validate and adopt technology quickly.
State and non-State actors have increased access to drone
capabilities and have demonstrated their ability to achieve
lethal effects.
The rapid evolution of small drone systems in conflicts, as
demonstrated by Operation Spider's Web in Ukraine and of course
Israel's recent campaign against Iran, emphasized the need for
agile real-time collaboration to field detection and
interdiction tools.
These threats, of course, are not limited to overseas
conflicts. UAS increasingly threaten U.S. critical
infrastructure with techniques like drone swarming and GPS and
radar jamming.
Recent aerial intrusions highlight the need for advanced
detection and mitigation technologies to protect our space and
maritime domains.
Additionally, acquisition processes must evolve to deliver
necessary capabilities. We advocate for agile development and
deployment of affordable open systems, clear operational
authorities, and Government-industry partnerships to address
these threats effectively.
U.S.-based defense innovators have developed systems to
detect, track, and counter these threats that you'll hear about
today.
To meet these challenges, the defense industrial base
requires strong demand signals, enabling policies, and
streamlined authorities. We must act decisively to prevent
foreign battlefield lessons from becoming domestic threats.
AV and other innovative companies stand ready to
collaborate and provide solutions, but policy inertia and
acquisition drag remain significant obstacles.
Collectively, we'll either address these issues now, before
we suffer a major drone attack in the homeland, or we'll
address them afterward, but certainly we will have to address
them.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Churchill Hutton, IV
8 July 2025
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to testify on
how drone warfare abroad is transforming and informing domestic
investments to prepare for threats here in the United States. I commend
this committee's focus on these national security challenges along with
your efforts to enhance the safety of U.S. transportation systems. The
collaboration between Congress and industry is essential to keeping the
American people and critical national infrastructure safe from today's
rapidly-evolving drone threats.
AV has a unique vantage point in this space as the top producer and
supplier of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to the Department of Defense
(DoD) coupled with our layered counter-UAS solutions deployed to
multiple conflict zones abroad. This gives us a holistic view of the
UAS threats, mitigation tools, and relevant implications for homeland
security. The lessons we have learned from operations abroad underscore
the urgent need to address this threat with greater speed and resolve
to protect critical U.S. infrastructure and public safety including at
high-visibility events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America's 250th
birthday celebrations, and the 2028 Summer Olympics. In order to
accomplish this goal, we believe it is vital that the U.S. Government
and Industry have 3 key things in place: (1) a resolve to adopt lessons
learned from real operational feedback; (2) flexible sources of funding
to modify or scale up the production and delivery of new, software-
defined platforms that can be updated in response to evolving threats,
and (3) the necessary authorities to allow Federal and State government
users to employ technology solutions in what we know are complex
jurisdictional scenarios.
threats and evolving environment
As a former soldier who benefited from DoD's nascent UAS arsenal
over 2 decades ago, I commend this panel for bringing awareness to the
American people regarding the proliferation of UAS technology--
particularly how its capability, lethality, availability, and quantity,
when combined, can enable malign actors to threaten unprotected
infrastructure and lives.
Looking abroad, Ukraine's recent ``Operation Spider's Web'' against
Russia's strategic bomber infrastructure demonstrated the precision,
reach, and destructive ability of small UAS. Spider's Web highlighted
the rapid evolution of small drone system capabilities at an affordable
cost. The reports of covert Ukrainian launches from inside Russia
emphasize the need for agile, real-time Government and industry
collaboration to develop detection systems and interdiction tools here
at home. Municipal, State, and Federal agencies need to adequately
prepare for unmanned and increasingly autonomous systems in their
public safety and security strategies.
More recently, in June 2025, during a 12-day conflict with Iran,
Israel coordinated a drone and missile campaign targeting Iranian air
defenses, ballistic missile platforms, and command infrastructure.
While Israeli fighter jets visibly degraded Iran's missile sites and
attacked military personnel, Israeli drones, pre-positioned
quadcopters, and internet-connected launch platforms operated from
within Iran, showcasing this new frontier of drone warfare.
The implications for the defense of our homeland is significant.
The use of drones built from commercial parts and operated with minimal
infrastructure is increasingly plausible by proxy networks or lone
actors on domestic soil. Techniques like drone swarming, GPS jamming,
and antiradar flights, perfected abroad, could be adapted to threaten
critical U.S. infrastructure.
In the maritime environment, UAS pose a significant threat to
shipping in vital trade chokepoints. From 2023 to 2024, there were over
50 UAS incidents in the Red Sea, many involving direct attacks or
surveillance of commercial vessels. The increasing frequency and
sophistication of these drone operations, by state and non-state actors
alike, highlight the urgent need for improved countermeasures to
protect critical maritime infrastructure.
Closer to home, unidentified aerial objects have reportedly entered
U.S. air space off the East Coast and have raised national security
concerns. From 2021 to 2024, over 30 incidents were reported, with
objects demonstrating advanced maneuverability and speed. These
incursions underscore the critical need for advanced detection and
mitigation technologies to protect key maritime regions and ensure U.S.
air space security.
Activities at the Southern Border continue to pose a direct threat
to our homeland, as transnational criminal organizations, gangs, and
extremist organizations adopt UAS to aid in their transport of illicit
material into the United States. The defense industrial base is poised
to work with Congress and our Executive branch counterparts to ensure
we are prepared for UAS incursions and possible attacks through our own
borders.
Many of your industry partners recognize these threats and are
developing robust countermeasures today. Although these investments are
taking place, many challenges remain--requiring Congressional, Federal
Executive, plus State, local, and municipal action.
challenges
Traditional defense acquisition processes are inadequate to deliver
the capabilities necessary to outpace the fast-evolving UAS threat. We
can no longer afford multi-year requirements development followed by
lengthy science and technology experimentation cycles. Government and
industry must work together to develop and field new agile counter-UAS
programs, and pair these programs with key authorities designed to
protect critical infrastructure.
Effective solutions require affordable, open, and adaptable
technologies rather than high-cost, proprietary systems. Operational
clarity and streamlined authorities are essential for establishing
guidelines for UAS detection and defeat within domestic air space.
Government and industry partnership will benefit all parties,
maximizing innovative and delivering cost-effective solutions.
Solutions must be tailored to meet the unique demands of countering
UAS threats. To succeed, we need acquisition reform--but we also need
operational clarity. Homeland security stakeholders must work together
to establish operational directives that define authorities for UAS
detection, identification, and defeat in domestic air space and enable
responsible action under clearly-defined legal and safety parameters.
The rapid increase in UAS lethality--as demonstrated in the Ukraine
conflict, where drones now cause the majority of casualties--serves as
a stark warning. Our traditional defenses and authorities have not kept
pace, and we must act swiftly to prevent similar threats against our
infrastructure and population.
opportunities
U.S.-based defense innovators are developing promising systems to
detect, track, and defeat UAS threats. Soft-kill techniques, such as
jamming or radio frequency (RF) manipulation, have dominated this space
in the past 5 years. In an effort to combat these defensive tactics,
adversaries increasingly employ drones guided by fiber optics,
preprogrammed autonomy, various frequency bands, or cellular signals. A
few systems, like ours at AV, have capabilities against GPS. The
existing authorities make it difficult to utilize these advanced
technologies, so we are expanding our ability to counter peer threat
capable systems. In parallel, we must continue the development of hard-
kill solutions--systems that physically destroy or disable drones.
As has been heard in testimony before other House committees, the
President's budget requests critically-needed investments in drone
technologies and policy changes to improve acquisition and production
of drone systems, at scale. The Government is poised to be able to take
advantage of fast-moving private-sector innovation to field low-cost,
attritable, kinetic, and non-kinetic UAS and counter-UAS systems.
Detection technologies, directed energy (laser) and kinetic defeat
capabilities offer a promising path forward. The U.S. Army, for
example, has demonstrated the effectiveness of high-energy laser
systems deliver hard-kill effects with minimal collateral damage. When
combined with acoustic sensors, passive radar, and software-defined
radio receivers, this creates an integrated drone shield that can be
safely deployed in mixed civilian environments focused today on small
and medium-sized UAS at close range. Kinetic alternatives, like the
Army's Next Generation Counter-UAS Missile, complement directed energy
solutions, allowing affordable defense at greater range, elevation, and
weather scenarios, though the employment of these systems would be
limited in accordance with the sensitivity of the protected
infrastructure and public safety requirements. Kinetic solutions are
more effective against large UAS, which have been used extensively in
Ukraine and the Middle East. These offerings provide alternatives to
the unsustainable practice currently employed of shooting down low-cost
drones with multi-million-dollar weapons systems, which are expended
upon use and difficult to replace.
These technologies are ready, but they require strong demand
signals, enabling policies, and streamlined authorities to mature and
scale. Without decisive action, the United States risks trailing our
adversaries' rapid innovations. We need expanded authorities for UAS
defeat operations inside U.S. borders, clear operational doctrines, and
funding structures that reward responsiveness. With additional
authorities and funding, the defense industrial base can meet the needs
of the country. Affordable, attritable platforms at mass are
transforming the way in which we fight and are rapidly evolving in a
way that necessitates we take advantage of solutions available today,
both custom and commercial. We commend the DoD's continued efforts to
eliminate overly bureaucratic processes and fund the fielding of
systems across all domains.
AV, alongside other forward-leaning, innovative U.S. companies,
stands ready to meet this challenge. However, policy inertia and
acquisition drag--not technology--remain our most significant
obstacles. It is encouraging to see agencies like DoD, DHS, and Members
of Congress and committees like yours begin to take steps to rectify
the issues we face today. All parties understand that we must act now
to prevent foreign battlefield experiences from becoming domestic
tragedies.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Hutton.
I now recognize Mr. Walker for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF TOM WALKER, FOUNDER AND CEO, DRONEUP, LLC
Mr. Walker. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and
Members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity
to testify this morning.
My name is Tom Walker. I am the CEO of DroneUp and a former
U.S. Naval officer, and I lead one of the Nation's top drone
technology companies.
Over the past decade, I've been proud to play a part in the
evolution of uncrewed systems from novelty tools to essential
elements of our critical infrastructure.
Today, we've all seen that these systems are also emerging
as national security threats.
DroneUp has operated one of the most significant drone
services operations in the United States with tens of thousands
of operators. We also built one of the most extensive drone
delivery networks in the world.
Through our work with the FAA and the national defense
agencies, we have gained direct operational insight into both
the extraordinary promise and the real dangers of drone
technology.
Today, our air space faces an urgent threat. In the first
quarter of 2025 alone, the FAA recorded more than 400 illegal
drone incursions over U.S. airports, representing a 25 percent
increase over the same period last year. The military
documented or reported 350 unauthorized flights over more than
a hundred bases.
These are not isolated events. They are growing, sustained,
and increasingly malicious.
In one case, persistent hostile drone activity forced the
relocation of F-22 Raptors at Langley Air Force Base in
Virginia. Despite weeks of investigation by the Pentagon, the
FBI, and NASA, the operators were never identified.
As a veteran, it scares the hell out of me to imagine if
something like that had happened during Operation Midnight
Hammer.
Just 2 weeks ago, as the Ranking Member mentioned, during
high-intensity search-and-rescue operations amid the July 4
flash floods in Texas, a privately-operated drone struck a
rescue helicopter over Kerr County forcing it to land and
taking it out of service while dozens were still missing.
Fortunately, no one was injured in the accident. However,
the incident could have had very different outcomes. It's the
latest reminder that these are not hypothetical threats. They
are happening now in active emergency zones and putting lives
at risk.
These threats now affect nearly every sector that is
exposed to air space misuse, including commercial aviation,
critical infrastructure, prisons, and public events. Drones
have recently collided with manned aircraft and in some cases
have grounded emergency response efforts.
Criminals have used drones to drop contraband into
correctional facilities. They have conducted surveillance on
energy facilities and seaports.
This is no longer theoretical. The systems meant to stop
this are simply not up to the task.
The root problem is simple: We do not have an integrated
national framework for drone oversight. The system we were
promised still does not exist.
We rely on fragmented tools. We rely on unconnected
sensors. We rely on outdated approval processes. This creates
blind spots. It slows response time and it leaves critical
infrastructure exposed.
But the solutions are within reach. The technology to keep
Americans safe exists today.
We must mandate a national real-time flight information
exchange. We need a low altitude air space coordination system
that provides law enforcement, regulators, and commercial
operators with a real-time view of what is flying, where it is,
and its intentions.
We must unify all flight authorizations into a single
secure process. We must bind pilot, drone, and mission data
together, using cryptographic credentials to prevent spoofing.
All aircraft, manned and unmanned, should electronically
broadcast their position to reduce collision risk and remain
visible in our air space.
Remote ID signals must be authenticated and protected from
spoofing. Detection systems, such as radar, RF, and acoustic
tools, must be fused into a single integrated surveillance
picture.
The FAA should publish national mission priority tables.
This must digitally be enforced by the authorization system so
that emergency and critical flights are automatically
prioritized.
America must equip and empower local law enforcement by
expanding its counter-UAS authority. Today, only a handful of
Federal agencies are authorized to act against rogue drones.
That must change before the current authority sunsets in
September.
This is no longer a concern for the future. It's a present-
day crisis. Each delay increases our exposure to a serious
event. The technology is ready. What we need now is clear
direction and decisive action.
I stand ready to assist the committee in protecting our
national air space and ensuring the safe, responsible growth of
uncrewed systems in the United States.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Walker
July 8, 2025
introduction and purpose
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the
committee: I am Tom Walker, chief executive officer of DroneUp and a
former U.S. naval officer. Throughout my career, from military service
to leading one of the Nation's largest uncrewed aviation networks, I
have witnessed the rapid evolution of drone technology, both in its
ability to serve the public and in the emerging risks it poses to
national security.
My written testimony provides operational data and first-hand
insights from thousands of commercial drone missions conducted across
the United States. These missions have revealed consistent
vulnerabilities in our air space and infrastructure that warrant urgent
attention from the Federal Government.
I will also outline practical measures that government and industry
can take together to close these gaps, improve air space coordination,
and reduce the risks posed by uncrewed systems.
I appreciate the committee's leadership on this issue and stand
ready to support efforts to ensure the safety, security, and
scalability of U.S. air space.
background and qualifications
DroneUp was founded in 2016 to scale drone services nationwide. We
built what became the world's largest drone services network,
activating tens of thousands of independent drone pilots nationwide.
We subsequently launched the largest drone delivery operation in
the country at that time, with the capacity to serve nearly 4 million
households through partnerships with major retailers and State
governments.
As part of that effort, we operated 34 drone hubs in 6 States,
including Chairman Gimenez's home State of Florida. We obtained FAA
Part 135 Air Carrier Certification and gained first-hand insight into
both the operational potential and the technical limitations of drone
systems at scale.
As our operations expanded, it became clear that the most
significant constraint was not aircraft performance or logistics. The
limiting factor was the absence of a technological foundation to safely
integrate uncrewed systems into national air space. Ensuring future
aviation safety, protecting critical infrastructure, and maintaining
safe separation between crewed and uncrewed aircraft requires a
systems-level solution.
Today, DroneUp focuses on integrating autonomous air space using
AI-enabled technology. Our platform enables real-time deconfliction,
autonomous flight coordination, and persistent situational awareness in
dynamic and high-risk environments. We collaborate directly with
Federal regulators, defense agencies, and commercial operators to close
security and operational gaps that traditional aviation systems were
never designed to address.
This perspective is grounded in real-world operational experience
and technical development. It reflects what we are already observing in
the field and what must now be done to protect the air space.
overview of the threat landscape
As of mid-2025, the United States is facing a sharp escalation in
drone-related threats across aviation, infrastructure, and national
security. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the FAA recorded 411
illegal drone incursions near U.S. airports, a 25.6 percent increase
over the same period in 2024 (FAA).
Separately, U.S. Northern Command documented over 350 unauthorized
drone flights across more than 100 military installations in 2024 (Fox
News).
These are not isolated incidents. They are active, sustained, and
growing. They disrupt flight operations, interfere with emergency
services, and expose vulnerabilities at military and civilian
facilities nationwide.
This is not a domestic problem alone. Internationally, drones have
shut down major airports, penetrated secure sites, and been used for
espionage, sabotage, and targeted attacks. When drone activity shut
down London's Gatwick Airport for 33 hours in 2018, it disrupted 1,000
flights and stranded over 140,000 passengers (BBC). That type of
disruption is no longer hypothetical here. It is beginning to happen on
U.S. soil.
The threat is real, immediate, and growing faster than our ability
to contain it.
threats to aviation
Drones now pose a direct and rising risk to manned aviation in the
United States. In 2024, they accounted for nearly two-thirds of all
reported near-mid-air collisions at the Nation's 30 busiest airports,
according to analysis by the Associated Press and NASA's Aviation
Safety Reporting System (AP News, The Sun).
Pilots have reported drones within hundreds of feet of commercial
aircraft during takeoff and landing:
A quadcopter flew within 300 feet of a jetliner's cockpit on
approach to San Francisco International (AP News)
A drone was observed at 4,000 feet near Miami International
At Newark Liberty, a drone came within 50 feet of a
departing jet's wing.
The FAA continues to receive over 100 drone sighting reports every
month near U.S. airports (FAA).
The trend is accelerating, and these are not all near misses. In
January 2023, an F-16 fighter jet collided midair with a drone during a
training mission over Arizona (AZFamily). In January 2025, a drone
struck a Los Angeles County firefighting aircraft during an emergency
evacuation, tearing a 6-foot hole in the wing and grounding the
aircraft while 192,000 residents were under evacuation orders (ABC7,
AP).
The threat is global. In September 2023, a Virgin Atlantic Boeing
787 carrying 264 passengers narrowly avoided a drone collision just
after takeoff from Heathrow Airport. U.K. aviation authorities
described it as one of the closest calls on record (D-Fend Solutions).
Many of these drones are too small to appear on radar and are often
operated by individuals who may not be visible to authorities. Without
stronger detection systems, improved coordination, and apparent
enforcement authority, the risk to commercial and emergency aviation
will continue to grow.
threats to critical infrastructure
Military Installations
Drone incursions into U.S. military air space have reached
unprecedented levels. In December 2023, Langley Air Force Base in
Virginia experienced 17 consecutive nights of drone overflights.
Witnesses described formations as large as 20 feet long, traveling at
100 miles per hour, and reaching altitudes of 3,000 to 4,000 feet (Task
& Purpose). The incident forced the relocation of F-22 Raptor aircraft
and the suspension of training operations. Despite weeks of
investigation by the Pentagon, FBI and NASA, the drone operators were
never identified.
In December 2024, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was forced to
close its air space for 4 hours due to heavy UAS activity. Controllers
reported multiple unidentified drones operating over the facility (CNN,
The War Zone).
These are not hobbyist drones. These are sustained, strategic
incursions targeting sensitive national security infrastructure.
Energy Infrastructure
In 2024, over 13,000 drone incursions were detected at U.S. power
generation sites. Analysts estimate that 60 new vulnerability points
are added to the grid every day (E&E News, Dedrone). The Department of
Homeland Security has warned that extremist actors and foreign
adversaries have considered using drones for surveillance or sabotage.
In January 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency and the FBI issued a joint advisory warning that Chinese-
manufactured drones operating in the U.S. energy and telecommunications
sectors could expose sensitive data to foreign access (CISA).
Prisons
Drones are now a standard tool for delivering contraband into U.S.
prisons. From 2023 to 2024, Georgia reported 774 drone sightings at
State correctional facilities. Of these, 720 involved contraband drops,
including drugs, weapons, and cell phones. The incidents led to over
540 felony arrests. At Washington State Prison alone, authorities
intercepted 21 drone drops in 1 year, arresting more than 40
individuals linked to smuggling operations (WGXA News).
Public Events
In 2023, NFL stadiums reported 2,845 unauthorized drone incursions,
up from just 67 in 2018, a 4,145 percent increase (Reuters). The NFL,
Department of Justice, and FBI have all called on Congress to expand
detection and mitigation authority to protect public events.
Ports and Maritime Infrastructure
America's maritime transportation system underpins more than $5.4
trillion in economic activity and carries over three-quarters of all
U.S. trade, according to the 2023 Cyberspace Solarium Commission and
independent StateScoop reporting. (cybersolarium.org, Statescoop.com)
Yet ports remain attractive, under-protected targets. The Port of
Los Angeles blocked roughly 60 million attempted cyber-intrusions every
month in 2023, up from 7 million in 2014, its chief information
security officer told trade press and security researchers. (ajot.com,
amu.apus.edu)
At the same time, the U.S. Coast Guard warns that unauthorized
drone flights over sensitive maritime facilities have become ``a common
occurrence,'' and that most local authorities still lack the equipment
and legal authority to detect or interdict them. (hstoday.us)
These low-cost aircraft can hover above container stacks, record
ship movements, and capture other line-of-sight intelligence that
traditional perimeter systems cannot block, exposing a critical gap
between the economic value of U.S. ports and the security resources
dedicated to protecting them.
conclusion: a growing gap between threat and response
These incidents are not anomalies. They reflect an accelerating
pattern. Drone technology is becoming faster, cheaper, and easier to
operate, while our detection systems, legal authorities, and response
capabilities have not kept pace. From airliners and emergency aircraft
to power grids, prisons, and ports, drones are exposing fundamental
operational gaps.
If these vulnerabilities are not addressed with urgency and
coordination, it is not a matter of if they will be exploited, but when
and with what consequence.
the system we were promised still doesn't exist, and the gap is
dangerous
By 2017, NASA's UTM trials had demonstrated that data-driven
services, rather than radio calls, could safely manage low-altitude
drones. The industry told Congress that a nationwide system was
imminent. Every drone would file a digital plan, receive near-instant
clearance, and broadcast a trusted ID while shielding crewed aircraft
and sensitive air space.
Eight years on, that promise remains unfulfilled. LAANC automates
only the simplest flights; Remote-ID is little more than a broadcast
license plate; and the architecture intended to weave authorization,
intent, surveillance, and enforcement into a single safety net stalled
at the prototype stage. The low-altitude NAS is a patchwork of manual
waivers, siloed registries, partial awareness, and policy-only
defenses.
Nine critical gaps keep the system fragmented:
1. Patchwork Authorization.--Anything beyond basic flights slides
into slow waivers; approval pipelines don't share live pilot,
aircraft, or risk data, so regulators default to broad caps no
one can enforce.
2. Fragmented Identity.--Pilot certificates, hull IDs,
Authorizations, and Restrictions all live in different
databases. Nothing cryptographically binds drone + pilot +
mission.
3. No Live Intent Ledger.--While each DSS can expose only minimal
``need-to-know'' metadata, each USS keeps its complete plans
private. Multiple DSSs can overlap but federate only on a best-
effort handshake, with no cryptographic trust anchor or shared
governance in place. The result: no authoritative, real-time
ledger of intent, leaving controllers, law enforcement, and
defense without a complete situational picture or conformance
guarantee.
4. Prototype-level UTM Functions.--While basic constraint ingestion
has been proven, functions such as collaborative detect-and-
avoid, demand/capacity balancing, and dynamic rerouting remain
at the prototype stage, even as low-altitude drone activity
continues to rise faster than the supporting infrastructure can
keep pace.
5. Policy-only Protection.--Flight rules, TFRs, and NOTAMs depend
on voluntary compliance. The 2018 Gatwick shutdown demonstrated
how quickly policy can fail when authorities can't verify or
neutralize a rogue drone. The recent withdrawal of manufacturer
geofences further widens the exposure.
6. Thin Cooperative Detection.--Remote-ID has a limited range, can
be spoofed, and has experienced slow adoption; significant gaps
exist in conformance validation and law enforcement's ability
to respond.
7. Invisible Manned Traffic.--ADS-B Out is mandatory only in
controlled cores. Below 10,000 ft or outside Mode C veils,
numerous helicopters and general aviation aircraft fly
electronically dark. Drones must either hire human spotters or
stay grounded, while manned pilots receive no warning, creating
an asymmetric blind spot that endangers safety and national
security.
8. Siloed Non-cooperative Sensors.--Radar, RF, acoustic, and EO/IR
feeds terminate in siloed consoles. Without a consolidated
fusion layer that de-duplicates tracks, tags provenance, and
applies confidence scores, agencies lack an authoritative air
picture; low-signature threats slip through the seams while
false alarms drain resources.
9. Minimal Enforcement Tools.--Many agencies lack the resources,
statutory authority, or training to act; penalties rarely deter
non-compliance.
These gaps compound: the labyrinthine nature of authorizations,
weak identity, a missing intent ledger, and endless prototype tests and
deployments have left the NAS blind. Policy-only protection and scant
enforcement embed risk; asymmetric conspicuity and unfused sensors
hamper both safety and security. Domestic incidents, from prison
contraband drops to critical-infrastructure overflights, are
accelerating, and foreign actors already field swarm-scale, AI-directed
drone operations that would overwhelm today's fragmented defenses.
Without a fully digital, interoperable, security-grade low-altitude
traffic management and security backbone, we risk ceding safety,
commerce, and strategic credibility. Closing these gaps requires a
cohesive national program. One that unifies real-time authorization and
intent data, provides universal e-conspicuity for every aircraft, fuses
cooperative and non-cooperative sensor feeds, and ensures adequately
funded enforcement and training, so that every flight is known, every
risk is quantified, and every violation is actionable.
building a safe, trusted, and scalable low-altitude air space
What we need today is not theoretical. It is practical, achievable,
and urgent. The foundation is simple. If something is in the sky, we
should know what it is, who is operating it, whether it belongs there,
and how to respond if it does not.
establish a national low-altitude information & flight exchange
The exchange will provide every UAS Service Supplier and Government
stakeholder with a live, sub-second view of low-altitude air space by
requiring them to publish their flight data to, and subscribe to, a
common event bus protected by role-based access control. An immutable,
cryptographically-signed ledger will preserve each transaction,
enabling regulators, first responders, and counter-UAS systems to
verify provenance and reconstruct events with forensic certainty.
deploy a unified flight-authorization service
This service will replace disparate grids, waivers, and letters of
authorization with a single standards-based API. Operators will submit
an Operational Intent that describes their mission and objectives. The
service will automatically validate air space status, aircraft
performance, crew credentials, and relevant exemptions, and then issue
a digitally-signed authorization token. The token will be broadcast via
Remote-ID during flight and stored in the National Low-Altitude
Information and Flight Exchange, providing field personnel with instant
compliance checks and enabling the FAA with a tunable, permission-
verified control point for all mission types.
mandate digital credentials & binding
Verifiable credentials will cryptographically bind pilot, aircraft,
flight plan, and authorizations. Any mismatch or change in
authorization will block take-off and trigger immediate alerts. Public-
safety officers will resolve a Remote-ID signal to a licensed operator
with one query, and insurers will rely on tamper-evident evidence after
an incident.
require universal electronic conspicuity
All crewed and uncrewed aircraft will transmit a verifiable
position signal using on-board equipment or low-power beacons. Making
every aircraft electronically visible balances the see-and-avoid burden
and enables safe, scalable drone operations nationwide.
implement network remote-id & non-repudiation
Add a compact cryptographic signature to every Remote-ID packet,
broadcast or on-line, so the Unified Flight Authorization Service,
public-safety observers, and counter-UAS sensors can verify
authenticity within milliseconds. Spoofed or replayed identifiers will
be flagged instantly, while genuine packets will flow unchanged into
the National Low-Altitude Information & Flight Exchange as tamper-proof
evidence. Every legitimate drone in U.S. air space will thus carry a
verifiable, non-repudiable identity, providing regulators, integrators,
and first responders with the cryptographic certainty needed to
automate trust decisions at machine speed.
adopt a mission-priority rules engine
Embed a five-tier priority framework directly in the authorization
service so emergency, public-safety, and critical-infrastructure
flights automatically outrank commercial and recreational missions. The
engine will eliminate manual deconfliction and restore predictability
for time-sensitive operations.
build a sensor-fusion backbone for low-altitude surveillance
Fuse cooperative tracks from the National Low-Altitude Information
& Flight Exchange with radar, RF, acoustic, and electro-optical
detections provided by Government and commercial sources. Privacy
controls will permit graduated data disclosure, ensuring that all
authorized users, from airport towers to local law enforcement, use the
same trusted, continuously-updated common operating picture.
launch a friend-or-foe api
Provide authorized sensors and effectors with a one-call verdict:
COMPLIANT, UNKNOWN, or HOSTILE, plus confidence and priority metadata.
This API will shorten decision cycles, reduce friendly-fire risk, and
log every query for after-action accountability.
operate a flight-restricted-area service
Publish a single, near-real-time catalog of restricted air space,
2209 critical-infrastructure sites, stadium Temporary Flight
Restrictions, wildfire boxes, VIP security rings, and temporary
counter-UAS volumes, and push updates digitally within seconds. The
authorization service will validate the current catalog during planning
and periodically in flight. If a change is detected, onboard logic will
force a reroute or a safe landing, delivering geofence-like protection
in a standardized, manufacturer-agnostic format.
fund a local enforcement equip-and-train program
Supply State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies with multi-
band Remote-ID receivers tied into the National Low-Altitude
Information & Flight Exchange, a Friend-or-Foe-enabled mobile
application, and concise on-line training. Statutory amendments will
authorize certified officers to order landings or seize non-compliant
aircraft, transforming Federal data streams into actionable local
enforcement.
start a vehicle-to-vehicle spectrum & standards initiative
Kick off a technical and regulatory effort to identify and allocate
low-latency spectrum for direct detect-and-avoid messaging between
crewed and uncrewed aircraft, while deferring any equipage mandate
until the Unified Flight-Authorization Service and Universal Electronic
Conspicuity have operated long enough to reveal any remaining mid-air-
collision risk.
why time is critical
The pace of the drone threat is outstripping our national response.
What was once a future-looking concern is now a present and growing
danger. The volume, complexity, and frequency of drone-related
incidents are rising across every major sector: commercial aviation,
military installations, public infrastructure, law enforcement
operations, and emergency services. Each passing month adds to the
evidence that we are operating in a risk environment that is evolving
faster than our laws, technologies, and authorities can keep up.
This urgency is not abstract. It is measurable in hard numbers and
operational strain. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, drone
incursions near airports increased by more than 25 percent compared to
the previous year. Security officials at military bases are now forced
to treat drone sightings as recurring operational threats rather than
one-off anomalies. Emergency response aircraft have been grounded mid-
mission. Correctional facilities and utility providers are managing not
theoretical vulnerabilities, but routine air space violations.
What makes the current threat especially urgent is that many of the
most critical policy tools to address it already exist on paper, but
have not been implemented. For example, FAA Section 2209, mandated
initially in 2016, was intended to create a process for restricting
drone flights over critical infrastructure. Nearly 9 years later, the
rule remains unfinalized, leaving power plants, refineries, and other
sensitive sites without the reliable Federal protection they need.
Similarly, the FAA's long-awaited rule to enable beyond visual
line-of-sight (BVLOS) drone operations remains delayed. This rule is
essential not only for commercial expansion but also for ensuring the
safe and scalable use of drones in emergency response and
infrastructure monitoring. Its continued absence has created both
operational inefficiencies and potential safety risks.
Most concerning is the limited authority for detecting and
neutralizing rogue drones. As of today, only a handful of Federal
agencies have narrowly defined counter-UAS mitigation authority. State
and local law enforcement, as well as most infrastructure operators,
remain legally barred from using even basic mitigation tools.
Bipartisan proposals to expand this authority have been repeatedly
drafted, but Congress has yet to act. If the current Federal authority
sunsets in September 2025 as scheduled, no agency, Federal or local,
will have a clear legal ability to respond to a malicious drone in real
time.
We are approaching a point where the probability of a serious
incident, such as a downed aircraft, a disrupted power grid, or a mass
evacuation triggered by an air space breach, is no longer low. Without
coordinated action, the current patchwork of regulations and
capabilities will leave critical gaps that adversaries, criminals, or
careless actors can continue to exploit.
The United States has the technological capacity to lead in the
safe and secure integration of drones. But every delay in closing these
policy and infrastructure gaps increases the risk to public safety and
national security. Time is not neutral. Inaction allows the threat to
mature, while preparedness becomes more difficult and costly.
We are not sounding the alarm in anticipation of a future crisis.
We are responding to the reality that the crisis has already begun. The
question before us is how quickly we choose to act.
conclusion and call to action
The vulnerabilities outlined in this testimony are not theoretical;
they are real and present a significant risk. They are documented,
active, and growing. The threats posed by uncrewed aerial systems to
aviation safety, critical infrastructure, and national security have
increased in frequency, complexity, and impact. At the same time, the
systems designed to detect, identify, authorize, and respond to these
threats remain fragmented, underdeveloped, and in many cases
unenforced.
The foundational technologies required to close these gaps are
already available. Real-time air space coordination, digital flight
authorization, cryptographically-verifiable credentials, secure
identity broadcasts, and integrated sensor fusion are not experimental.
These capabilities have been demonstrated in operational environments
and validated through collaboration between Government and industry.
What remains is the directive to implement them at scale.
To that end, I respectfully submit the following priorities for
immediate Congressional action:
1. Mandate the establishment of a national real-time low-altitude
air space coordination framework. This system must integrate
flight intent, identity, and enforcement data into a single
operational platform.
2. Require digital credentialing that binds pilots, aircraft,
missions, and authorizations. This will enable instant
validation of lawful flights and allow for automated detection
of non-compliant activity.
3. Implement a universal electronic conspicuity requirement for all
crewed and uncrewed aircraft operating below 18,000 feet. This
is essential for ensuring visibility and reducing the risk of
mid-air collisions.
4. Finalize FAA Section 2209 and direct the creation of a Federal
flight-restriction service. This service must provide a
machine-readable feed that all drones and autopilot systems
consult before and during flight.
5. Expand counter-UAS detection and mitigation authority to
qualified State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies.
Oversight and safeguards must be in place, but these agencies
need the authority to act.
6. Fund and deploy a local law enforcement equip-and-train program.
This program must provide officers with the tools, training,
and legal clarity to verify and respond to drone threats in the
field.
7. Require the FAA to implement a unified flight authorization
service. This service should support all drone operations
through a single digital process from request to real-time
verification.
Each of these actions addresses a core structural weakness that has
allowed unregulated drone activity to outpace national preparedness.
These are not isolated or speculative risks. They are recurring
incidents that have grounded emergency aircraft, disrupted commercial
aviation, penetrated military air space, and exposed key infrastructure
to surveillance and interference.
The time line for addressing these issues is urgent. As the pace of
drone innovation continues to increase, so does the risk of a high-
consequence event. The United States cannot afford to treat low-
altitude air space as an ungoverned or optional domain. It must be
protected with the same level of accountability and structure applied
to every other mode of transportation that affects public safety and
national defense.
Congress has both the authority and the responsibility to ensure
this system is put in place. The tools are ready. The risks are known.
The solution is feasible. What is needed now is coordinated direction
and the will to act.
I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide this written
testimony. I stand ready to support any effort that will help secure
the national air space system and enable the safe, scalable, and
responsible integration of uncrewed aircraft systems in the United
States.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
I now recognize Mr. Feddersen for 5 minutes to summarize
his opening statements.
STATEMENT OF BRETT FEDDERSEN, VICE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY AND
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, D-FEND SOLUTIONS
Mr. Feddersen. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking
Member McIver, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on matters
of critical importance to the national security and public
safety of our country and our citizens.
My name is Brett Feddersen. I am the vice president of
strategy and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, the
leading counter-drone manufacturer of radio frequency cyber
takeover solutions for drone threats, both domestically and
internationally.
I also serve as the chair of the Security Industry
Association's drone security subcommittee and have been working
on the drone and counter-drone problem set since 2008. During
my time in the military, as a Federal civilian, and in the
private sector, we've seen this problem grow.
Today, I hope to help the subcommittee better understand
how overseas drone operations are transforming domestic risk
vectors, the status of the U.S. capabilities and legal
frameworks, and offer targeted recommendations for Congress to
bolster detection, interdiction, and resilience against drone-
borne threats in the United States homeland.
Drones have transitioned from niche reconnaissance tools to
central components of modern warfare. Their wide availability,
small size, low cost, and modular payloads make them attractive
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as
destruction of critical infrastructure and effective delivery
of ordnance.
In conflicts outside the United States, inexpensive
commercially-available drones and do-it-yourself drones have
become the weapon of choice.
Alarmingly, these same drones are flown across the United
States every day. There are over 1 million drones registered in
the United States according to the FAA, and that number is
predicted to grow to 2.7 million by 2027.
The weaponization of private drones in the United States is
also a significant and growing concern. While drones have been
beneficial applications with public safety and various
industries, their potential misuse, especially when armed,
poses challenges for law enforcement and national security.
Battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures for drones
have proliferated through the internet and are ready to be used
today.
During my time at the FAA, we received several videos and
briefings showcasing drones outfitted with chainsaws,
flamethrowers, firearms, and makeshift chemical dispensers.
Just weeks ago, the world witnessed a historic shift in
small drone warfare. Ukraine's planning and execution of
Operation Spiderweb has rewritten the rule book on drone
threats: distance, cost, and autonomy no longer constraining
our adversaries.
The audacious plan involved Ukraine striking Russian air
bases up to 3,100 miles from the battlefield using small
commercially-available AI-enabled drones.
For context, this is equivalent to conducting an attack by
drone in Los Angeles, California, from your home in Cape Cod,
Massachusetts.
This attack demonstrates the capability to build and deploy
do-it-yourself drones at scale and at distance, accurately
delivering ordnance to create strategic impact and fast
destruction of significant assets.
An attack like this can be prevented today using current
safe and effective counter-drone technology, such as RF cyber
takeover technology which can detect, track, identify, and take
control of the drone, then landing it safely when and where law
enforcement or security want it to.
This type of technology is legal and safe to use. It does
not violate privacy laws or Fourth Amendment protections. And
it does not implicate Federal wiretap or pen trap statutes or
regulations.
According to the FAA data and previous DOD testimony, drone
incursions have steadily increased since the establishment of
the Federal counter-drone authorities in 2018. That 5-year
pilot program is now in its seventh year.
First responders report that drones are tailing SWAT teams,
dropping contraband into prisons, spying on neighbors, and
hovering over chemical plants.
While the threat is local, the legal tools remain
predominantly Federal in nature.
DHS, DOJ, the security industry, State and local law
enforcement, Tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies,
along with trained security professionals, have repeatedly
urged Congress to expand authorities to enable air domain
awareness and drone protection in American communities and over
our critical infrastructure.
Unfortunately, those requests have not resulted in any
expanded new authorities and limited authorities since 2018
have been periodically renewed only for short periods of time,
creating uncertainty for law enforcement and the industry.
To summarize, drone warfare abroad has evolved rapidly over
the past decade. Regrettably, U.S. legislation, regulation, and
policy has not. Today, we should acknowledge the topic of drone
threats in our homeland is neither timely nor new.
What we can say is that the threat is real, the United
States is vulnerable, and that without bold and immediate
legislative action the American public will remain unprotected
from a drone attack.
The industry agrees an attack is only a matter of time. It
is not a matter of if it will happen.
I strongly urge the subcommittee and the full committee to
take immediate action in meaningful bipartisan legislation.
The industry, public safety professionals, and American
public are calling for 3 simple actions that can be taken now
to make Americans and our skies safer.
Expand authorities to State and local law enforcement and
trained security professionals guarding our critical
infrastructure.
Develop and implement a counter-UAS training program using
a Federally-accredited curriculum.
Provide dedicated funding programs that enable critical
infrastructure operators to procure, train, deploy, and operate
counter-UAS systems.
Thank you for your leadership and the opportunity to appear
before you. I look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feddersen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett Feddersen
July 8, 2025
introduction
Chairmen Gimenez and Green, Ranking Members McIver and Thompson,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you on matters critically important to
the national security and public safety of our country and its
citizens.
My name is Brett Feddersen, and I am the vice president of strategy
and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, the leading counter-drone
manufacturer of radio frequency (RF)-cyber takeover solutions for the
drone threat, both overseas and in the United States. I also serve as
the chair of the Security Industry Association's (SIA) drone security
subcommittee and have been working on the drone and counter-drone
problem set since 2008, during my time in the military, as a Federal
civilian, and in the private sector. Today, I am honored to appear
before the subcommittee representing both D-Fend Solutions and the
drone security industry.
Bottom line up front: Drone warfare abroad has evolved rapidly over
the past decade, with State and non-State actors fielding drones for
surveillance, sabotage, and strikes in theaters from Eastern Europe to
the Middle East. Tactics refined in these conflict zones--persistent
reconnaissance, weaponized loitering munitions, and saturation swarm
attacks--are now manifesting as emerging threats to U.S. homeland and
national security.
These threats are here to stay and mean that things like our
critical infrastructure--such as power grids, water treatment plants,
transportation networks, and communication systems--is increasingly
vulnerable to threats from nefarious actors who can exploit drones'
capabilities, including surveillance, sabotage, and payload delivery,
to conduct physical attacks. Successful drone attacks on critical
infrastructure can lead to power outages, transportation disruptions,
communication failures, and substantial economic consequences. More
concerning is the potential for the loss of human life, for example, a
drone using aerosol dispersal or payload delivery over a mass gathering
can cause mass panic, causing serious injury or even death to
attendees. Confronting this reality requires a proactive and multi-
layered homeland defense strategy that includes early detection, safe
and effective mitigation technologies, and updated security protocols.
From local football games to open-air shopping centers, large
gatherings of Americans are part of our everyday lives and remain
incredibly vulnerable to drone-based threats. As the United States
prepares to host high-profile, global sporting events like the 2026
FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympics, I am grateful that the committee
is closely overseeing the threat environment and preparations for these
events and is willing to engage in difficult conversations surrounding
our real vulnerability and capability gaps.
Today, I hope to help the subcommittee better understand how
overseas drone operations are transforming domestic risk vectors, the
status of U.S. capabilities and legal frameworks, and offer targeted
recommendations for Congress to bolster detection, interdiction, and
resilience against drone-borne threats in the United States homeland.
modern drone warfare abroad and at home
Drones have transitioned from niche reconnaissance tools to central
components of modern warfare. Their wide availability, small size, low
cost, and modular payloads make them attractive for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, as well as the destruction
of critical infrastructure and the effective delivery of ordnance.
Just weeks ago, the world witnessed a historic shift in small drone
warfare. Ukraine's planning and execution of Operation Spider Web has
rewritten the rulebook on drone threats: distance, cost, and autonomy
no longer constrain adversary reach. Below are key counter-drone
lessons drawn from Ukraine's Operation Spider Web--an audacious
campaign in which Ukraine struck Russian airbases up to 5,000 km (3,106
miles) from the front using small, commercial AI-enabled drones. This
is farther than driving from New York City to Los Angeles.
Rear Areas Are Not Safe
Ukraine proved that ``strategic depth'' offers no immunity:
drones launched from deep inside friendly territory reached
ostensibly secure Russian airfields, destroying billions of
dollars' worth of aircraft. Defenders must extend coverage well
beyond the front lines to include logistics hubs, maintenance
depots, and forward operating bases.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ American University, ``Ukraine's Operation Spider Web Upended
Traditional Rules of War,'' June 5, 2025. Benjamin Jensen;
chathamhouse.org american.edu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense in Depth--Layer Every Segment
Traditional point-defense systems (e.g., local radar or a
single interceptor battery) were overwhelmed. Operation Spider
Web integrated covert logistics, telecom exploitation, and
ground infiltration to bypass singular defenses, underscoring
the need for a layered approach to counter-drone detection (RF,
radar, EO/IR) and mitigation (RF cyber takeover, electronic
warfare measures, and directed energy).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Counter-UAS Hub, ``Putting Operation Spider's Web in Context,''
June 20, 2025, Ben Connable; cuashub.comirregularwarfare.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resilience to Jamming and GPS Denial
Spider Web's drones used dead-reckoning navigation and
civilian cellular (SIM-card) links rather than GPS, making them
resilient to traditional GNSS jamming. Given this, counter-
drone systems should include extensive RF spectrum monitoring,
non-GPS-dependent geofencing, and safe mitigation techniques
that can detect, take control of, or disrupt alternate control
channels.
In conflicts outside the United States, inexpensive, commercially
available, and do-it-yourself (DIY) drones have become the weapon of
choice. Alarmingly, these same drones are flown across the United
States every day. There are over 1 million drones registered with the
FAA in the United States--a number that is predicted to grow to 2.7
million by 2027.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ FAA, ``Drones by the Numbers,'' updated April 1, 2025, https://
www.faa.gov/node/54496; ``Drone Operations,'' Government Accountability
Office, https://www.gao.gov/drone-operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The weaponization of private drones in the United States is a
significant and growing concern. While drones have beneficial
applications in public safety and various industries, their potential
for misuse, especially when armed, poses challenges for law enforcement
and national security. Battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures
for drones have proliferated through the internet, and the same drones
used in combat overseas are available and in use here in the United
States.
During my time at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), we
received several videos and briefings showcasing drones outfitted with
chainsaws, flamethrowers, firearms, and makeshift chemical dispersal
systems. We have witnessed rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) warheads and
grenades being dropped from simple commercial and do-it-yourself (DIY)
drones. Additionally, we have seen drones equipped with modified
shotguns used to shoot down other drones.
Key Concerns and Examples of Weaponization
Potential for Malicious Use.--Drones can be easily outfitted
with various weapons, including firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or even chemical or biological agents,
posing a risk to individuals, critical infrastructure, and
Government facilities.
Terrorism.--Terrorist organizations can adapt and exploit
drone technology to target public spaces and
infrastructure, potentially magnifying casualties and
damage. Cartels operating in Mexico along the U.S. Southern
Border are already using weaponized drones to drop munition
payloads.
Drone swarms.--Coordinated attacks utilizing drone swarms
can overwhelm traditional defenses and enhance the
effectiveness of sabotage operations.
Drone Incursions and Modern Espionage.--There have been
numerous drone incursions over sensitive sites, including
military bases and critical infrastructure, raising concerns
about potential threats. Drones can be used for corporate and
foreign espionage, including surveillance of facilities,
intimidation through observation, and even cyber attacks by
leveraging proximity to networks.
Smuggling and Criminal Activity.--Drones are used by
criminals for illegal drug shipments, delivery of contraband
into prisons, and counter-surveillance of law enforcement.
Privacy Concerns.--Drones equipped with cameras and other
sensors can be used for unauthorized surveillance and invasion
of privacy.
Interference with Public Events and Aircraft.--Unauthorized
drone flights can disrupt public events and pose a risk to
aviation safety, including the potential for collisions with
manned aircraft.
Common commercial drones have already been used in attempts to
destroy or damage critical infrastructure, and we continue to see
variations of weaponized drones attempting to attack the public in the
heartland and law enforcement in cities and on the border.
2020 Pennsylvania Power Substation Incident.--A modified
drone was discovered outside an electrical substation in
Pennsylvania. It was equipped with a copper wire, likely
intended to create a short circuit and disrupt power. The drone
crashed before reaching its target, but it highlights the
potential threat.
Attempted Attack in Nashville (2024).--A man was arrested in
November for planning to use a weapon of mass destruction to
attack an energy facility in Nashville. Court documents
indicated he planned to use a drone to deliver an explosive.
Suspicious Drone Activity Near Energy Sites (2024).--In
December, multiple energy sites requested temporary flight
restrictions due to unusual drone activity in New Jersey, New
York, and Maryland. Although the operators weren't identified,
this incident reflects the on-going concern about drone
threats.
What is Our Current Air Space Protection Posture?
Over the years, drones have evolved from simple weekend toys to
sophisticated tools used for smuggling, corporate espionage, and
terrorist surveillance. Unfortunately, Federal policies have struggled
to keep up with these emerging threats, leaving State, local, Tribal,
and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies in a challenging
position and their constituents unprotected. These agencies and trained
security professionals are on the front lines protecting critical
locations--such as stadiums, power plants, and city skylines--but they
face legal restrictions that prevent them from effectively addressing
drones that pose a danger to these sites and the American public.
As you know, only a few Federal law enforcement components in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Defense
(DoD)--have explicit legal authority under 6 U.S.C. 124(n) and 10
U.S.C. 130(i) to detect and mitigate (or stop) illicit drone
activities. Other entities, including State and local police
departments and trained security professionals, must rely on Federal
support or remain powerless, while unidentified drones fly dangerously
over parades, concerts, major sporting events, and critical
infrastructure. By their own admission, the DOJ and DHS can only
respond to less than 1 percent of the thousands of counter-drone
operational requests they receive each year.
According to FAA data and previous DoD testimony, drone incursions
have steadily increased since the establishment of Federal counter-
drone authorities in 2018. First responders report that drones are
tailing SWAT teams, dropping contraband into prisons, spying on
neighbors, and hovering over chemical plants. While the threat is
local, the legal tools remain predominantly Federal in nature.
In 2014, while serving as the National Security Council Director
for Aviation Security at the White House, we encountered drone
incursions on the White House and Capitol campuses. Subsequently, the
interagency met to develop a response plan for these ``non-traditional
aviation threats.'' As a result of these efforts, the FAA received
Congressional direction to begin testing counter-drone technology
systems in 2016. In 2017, the Department of Defense was granted
additional authorities. In 2018, Congress authorized a 5-year pilot
program for Federal law enforcement as part of the FAA Reauthorization
process to provide counter-drone authorities to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Seven
years later, these authorities remain unchanged.
DHS, DOJ, the security industry, and State, local, Tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies and trained security
professionals have repeatedly urged Congress to expand authorities to
enable air domain awareness and drone protection in American
communities and over our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, those
requests have not resulted in any expanded or new authorities, and the
limited authorities from 2018 have been periodically renewed only for
short periods of time, creating uncertainty for law enforcement and the
industry.
legislative recommendations and next steps
The President's recent Executive Orders are a good start to address
our legislative and regulatory inaction. However, Executive action
alone is not a permanent shield--it can be revoked by future
administrations or challenged in court. Congress must move now to
codify SLTT counter-UAS authorities with the same privacy safeguards
and oversight as outlined in President Trump's Executive Orders.
I strongly urge the subcommittee and full committee to take
bipartisan legislative action now. The industry, public safety
professionals, and the American public are calling for 3 simple actions
that can be taken immediately to make Americans and our skies safer.
1. Expand the current 6 U.S.C. 124(n) detection and mitigation
authorities to all SLTT-LE and trained security professionals,
safeguarding our critical infrastructure, and amend 49 U.S.C.
14501 to include an explicit ``Counter-UAS Exception,''
authorizing approved non-Federal entities to employ safe and
effective, non-kinetic mitigation under DHS oversight.
2. Develop, implement, and oversee a counter-drone operator
training regime, using a Federally-accredited curriculum
required for all counter-drone operators using approved
mitigation technology; and
3. Provide dedicated funding programs that enable critical
infrastructure operators to procure, train, deploy, and operate
counter-drone systems deemed safe and effective by the Federal
Government.
conclusion
The tactics developed in overseas drone conflicts--such as
persistent surveillance, sabotage using payload delivery, loitering
munitions, and swarm saturation strikes--are now poised to harm us at
home. The increasing number of drone incursions into sensitive air
space we've seen in recent years should serve as a loud and distinct
alarm bell, warning us of the immediate necessity for deploying safe
and effective counter-drone technology to enable rapid response
capabilities. While the industry has developed effective detection,
identification, and mitigation solutions, challenges such as legal
uncertainties, regulatory delays, and funding shortages are hindering
nationwide implementation. To address these issues, Congress should
clarify its legal authorities, streamline the approval process, and
establish dedicated funding. This will enable U.S. stakeholders to
effectively deter and counter drone-related threats before they reach
our shores. Now is the time to strengthen our defenses in the skies
before tomorrow's headlines report the first successful drone strike on
U.S. soil.
Thank you for your leadership and the opportunity to appear before
you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you Mr. Feddersen.
I now recognize Mr. Robbins for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ROBBINS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, ASSOCIATION
FOR UNCREWED VEHICLE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Robbins. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member
McIver and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It's an
honor to be with you here again today and to represent AUVSI
and our member companies that are providing solutions in
aviation and national security every day.
We're at a pivotal moment in aviation history. Drones and
advanced aviation are unlocking tremendous gains for safety,
security, technology, and economic opportunity.
These technologies, they're no longer theoretical. They're
delivering real-world value today across our economy and for
our Armed Forces.
Drones are enhancing public safety, enabling faster
emergency response, improving infrastructure inspections,
supporting precision agriculture, and expanding package
delivery networks.
Across the country, high-rate production facilities are
coming on-line, thousands of skilled manufacturing jobs are
being created, and these innovations are expanding access to
aviation careers.
But all of that progress and the significant national
benefit it represents is at risk today if we fail to address
the growing security threats posed by the malicious use of
drones.
We've long rightly been focused on aviation safety, but we
can no longer afford to ignore the security side of the
equation.
I actually entered this industry in direct response to a
drone incident. As mentioned by Ranking Member McIver, in
December 2018 London's Gatwick Airport, the second-busiest in
the United Kingdom, was shut down for nearly 24 hours because
of a drone--or possibly multiple drones--spotted near the
airfield.
The Government and the airport were paralyzed. Thousands of
flights across Europe were canceled or delayed. In the end no
one could say with certainty what happened, how to respond, or
if the drones were actually ever even there.
In the aftermath of that event, I formed and staffed the
Blue Ribbon Task Force on UAS Mitigation at Airports on behalf
of AUVSI and the Airports Council International--North America.
Our mission was simple: Make sure a Gatwick-style shutdown
never happens in the United States. The task force made dozens
of policy recommendations to Congress to help achieve that
goal. Unfortunately, most of those have still not been acted
upon.
In the years since, we've seen far more serious and
frequent drone incursions--in military installations, like, as
mentioned, at Langley Air Force Base, at commercial airports
and ports and power plants, prisons and disaster response
sites, stadiums, and even the White House complex. A Chinese
DJI drone was even used in the attempted assassination of
President Trump around this time last summer.
We've seen mass confusion over drones--or what some
mistakenly thought to be drones--in New Jersey last December,
resulting in significant media excitement and very few answers.
We've seen drone warfare evolve at a blistering pace
overseas, from Ukraine and the stunning Spiderweb swarm attack
last month, to the Middle East and Africa where small, low-cost
drones are being used to overwhelm air defenses and carry out
coordinated strikes with devastating efficiency.
Despite all of this, U.S. policy hasn't changed, not
meaningfully and not at the scale this threat demands.
This is not a technology problem. AUVSI member companies,
including the 3 at this witness table with me today, have built
and deployed proven, effective solutions for detection,
identification, and mitigation of rogue drones.
This is a policy failure, and that failure is putting
American lives, infrastructure, and national security at risk.
There is a great deal of finger-pointing whenever
unauthorized drones disrupt sensitive air space. But let me be
clear: Congress should not be pointing any fingers unless
holding up a mirror.
The last expansion of counter-UAS authorities was in 2018,
7 years ago, and the authorities granted are limited and
clearly inadequate for addressing the evolving threat. This is
an unacceptably long time line.
Furthermore, the lack of progress is unjust to local,
State, Tribal, and Federal authorities, including Capitol
Police, as well as infrastructure owners and operators, who
lack the tools and authorities to do much of anything in a
drone disruption situation.
We applaud the Trump administration's Executive Order
issued last month restoring American air space sovereignty
which begins to address these challenges. But executive action
alone is not enough. Congress must act.
We need legislation that expands detection authority
broadly, especially to those responsible for protecting
critical infrastructure and mass gatherings, and expands
mitigation authority narrowly, with strong training, oversight,
and accountability.
We cannot let perfection be the enemy of progress. We need
to start chipping away at the problem with urgency and resolve.
Congress can either shape the future with considered
proactive legislation or be forced to react to the next crisis
with confusion and regret.
Every time a drone is used to spy or disrupt or threaten,
it erodes public trust and jeopardizes the life-saving, job-
creating, future-defining promise of drone technology.
The time for action is long past. Congress must act to
ensure our air space, to secure our air space, empower those on
the front line, and ensure that innovation and security are
moving forward together.
Thank you, and I very much look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robbins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Robbins
July 15, 2025
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. My name is Michael Robbins, and I am the president and CEO of
the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), the
world's largest nonprofit trade association dedicated to the
advancement of uncrewed systems, autonomy, and robotics. AUVSI
represents a broad spectrum of stakeholders who are committed to the
secure, responsible, and innovative integration of drones and other
autonomous technologies into our national air space system and
associated infrastructure.
The topic of this hearing could not be timelier. Across the globe,
including on-going conflicts in Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East,
we are witnessing a transformation in modern warfare and at the center
of this transformation are uncrewed systems, in particular, unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS or drones). Drones transform battlefields because
they both extend operational reach as well as reduce the risk to human
life. As I have said on a number of occasions, including in recent
Congressional testimony, robots don't bleed.\1\
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\1\ AUVSI Testifies Before House Aviation Subcommittee on FAA
Reauthorization Implementation with Emphasis on Drone & Advanced Air
Mobility Regulations--AUVSI.
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But this hearing is not just about foreign battlefields. What
happens abroad is actively shaping the threat landscape here in the
United States. Unfortunately, to date, what is happening abroad has not
yet meaningfully changed our policy landscape to mitigate these
threats. Inexpensive, consumer, and commercial drones that are easily
accessible and widely available are being modified to carry out
surveillance, cyber disruption, espionage, and kinetic attacks against
critical infrastructure. State-sponsored and criminal actors are
increasingly looking to these platforms for asymmetric advantages
because they are accessible, inexpensive, adaptable, and often
undetectable by legacy air defenses. Drone warfare abroad has shown us
what's possible, and just as significantly, what's vulnerable.
As the title of today's hearing suggests, the same systems
transforming how we move goods, inspect infrastructure, and save lives
through public safety operations are also reshaping the threat
landscape. Drones are inherently dual-use. Their commercial potential
is vast and offers tremendous promise, yet their accessibility and
adaptability also make them attractive tools for malicious actors. It
is imperative that Federal policy both leverages the benefits of these
technologies and mitigates the emerging risks. Innovation and security
must advance in lockstep.
U.S. airports, maritime facilities, power plants, prisons,
amusement parks, sports stadiums, and even Statehouses have
increasingly seen incursions by unauthorized drones. While most are not
overt attacks, they are proof points of how porous our defenses remain.
Unfortunately, despite the many responsible drone users and operators
around our country, especially those operating under Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) rules including Part 107 and Part 135, there are
rogue actors looking to utilize these critical life-saving tools for
nefarious purposes.
Yet our domestic policy and regulatory framework has not kept pace
with the threat. There is no singular Federal authority to counter
uncrewed threats, no consistent framework for what technologies can be
deployed or by whom, and no mandated reporting of drone incidents that
could inform a national picture of risk. Congress has not updated our
Nation's UAS detection and mitigation authorities since 2018.\2\
Meanwhile, the air space has evolved tremendously, the threat landscape
has changed dramatically, and the number of drones operating in the
United States has expanded exponentially.
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\2\ https://www.auvsi.org/progress-on-domestic-uas-detection-
mitigation-is-required-for-public-trust-enabling-drone-regulations/.
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The lack of Federal action and investment has left a dangerous gap
in our ability to respond to reckless or nefarious drone activity.
Today, only 4 Federal agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD),
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), and
Department of Justice (DOJ), are authorized to detect and mitigate UAS
threats, and their authorities are very limited. State and local law
enforcement, airport and prison operators, and other critical
infrastructure entities are left watching and waiting while
unauthorized drones fly overhead.
Today, only a limited number of top-tier events are able to get
Federal support and equipment painting a clear picture of the air
space. If something catastrophic happens--a drone collision with a
passenger aircraft, an attack on a packed stadium, or an intrusion into
a sensitive Government facility--finger-pointing will be inevitable.
Congress, the White House, FAA, DHS, industry, and local authorities
will all scramble to assign blame. But pointing fingers won't prevent a
crisis, acting now will.
AUVSI applauds the Trump administration's recent Executive Orders,
Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty\3\ and Unleashing American
Drone Dominance,\4\ that addressed some counter-UAS (c-UAS) related
issues and showcased the importance this administration places on drone
issues, but Congressional action is still necessary to expand c-UAS
authorities.
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\3\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/
restoring-american-airspace-sovereignty/.
\4\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/
unleashing-american-drone-dominance/.
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The threats we're examining today demand a serious and coordinated
response, one that strengthens our ability to defend against malicious
use of drones while also preserving the critical benefits these
technologies bring. Every day, drones support law enforcement,
firefighters, energy providers, and emergency response teams in
protecting lives and infrastructure. As we enhance our national
security posture, it's essential that we also sustain the innovation
and trusted uses that serve our communities. Striking that balance is
not only possible, but also essential to both our security and our
continued progress.
the dual-use nature of drones: a strategic asset and a tactical threat
Events unfolding around the world are not just instructive, they
are sounding an alarm we cannot afford to ignore.
In Ukraine, the defense ministry's Operation Spiderweb \5\ clearly
showcased how swarms of small drones can be used to saturate enemy air
space, overwhelm air defense systems, and execute lethal strikes. These
low-cost, high-impact platforms are changing the dynamics of warfare,
not with brute force, but with agility, coordination, and volume. In
the Middle East, Israel has leveraged drones to preemptively disrupt
Iranian air defense networks, enhancing the safety and effectiveness of
manned and unmanned aerial operations.
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\5\ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Spiderweb.
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These examples demonstrate a common truth: even small,
commercially-available drones, when used in a strategic and coordinated
manner, can pose serious threats to fixed infrastructure. Ports,
bridges, shipping terminals, and maritime chokepoints are all
vulnerable to surveillance, sabotage, or disruption by hostile UAS
activity. These vulnerabilities do not only exist in active war zones.
They exist today, here at home, across the transportation and maritime
sectors that support our national economy and security.
In short, the tactics we are witnessing in modern conflict zones
are not constrained by geography. The barriers to entry are low, the
technology is widely available, and the intent of our adversaries is
clear. We must assume that the threat is already here, and we must act
accordingly to protect the systems and infrastructure that keep this
country not only moving, but safe.
drones in transportation and maritime security: a critical force
multiplier
Those very same drone systems that can be misused are also being
used daily to protect American lives, infrastructure, and supply
chains. Across the United States, transportation and maritime
authorities are leveraging drones as essential tools for homeland
security operations, providing perimeter monitoring, real-time subject
tracking, and as part of Drone as First Responder (DFR) public safety
programs. These applications allow rapid situational awareness and
response to developing threats or incidents.
When used by trusted operators, with secure platforms, drones offer
unmatched speed, agility, and visibility. They enable rapid situational
awareness, improve officer safety, and shorten response times during
high-risk incidents from port intrusions to natural disasters.
In infrastructure management, drones enable safe and cost-effective
inspections of bridges, railways, pipelines, ports, runways, and more,
tasks that would otherwise require human workers to operate in high-
risk, unsafe environments. They provide real-time imaging and data that
supports predictive maintenance and operational readiness. A
particularly powerful example of the utility of drones came in the
aftermath of the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse in Baltimore,
Maryland. Drones were immediately deployed by local and Federal
authorities to assist with damage assessment, guide search and rescue
teams, and coordinate the emergency response. These operations
illustrated the agility, speed, and value of drone systems in
supporting critical transportation and maritime missions.
This is the dual-use reality we face. While malicious actors may
seek to weaponize this technology, the overwhelming majority of use
cases, particularly in public safety and critical infrastructure, are
enhancing our ability to respond to threats and protect American lives.
As policy makers, it is vital to distinguish between threats and
trusted uses, and to ensure that our response to one does not hinder
our ability to leverage the other.
national security risks from people's republic of china (prc)-
manufactured drones
While drones are proving to be essential tools for homeland defense
and emergency response, not all systems are created equal, and some
represent an active and growing risk. Drones manufactured by companies
with ties to the PRC continue to be widely used by public safety and
other agencies, even in sensitive infrastructure environments. In some
cases, Federal agencies are still using these platforms. This is
largely due to the absence of consistent Federal procurement
restrictions or guidance and minimal oversight of mandates already
enacted into law as part of the American Security Drone Act and other
legislation.
The national security implications are stark and well-documented.
Numerous assessments by DoD, DHS, and other Federal intelligence
agencies have documented how PRC-made drones present unacceptable
risks, including unauthorized data collection and transmission to the
PRC.
AUVSI has been the tip of the spear in urging the swift
implementation of Section 1709 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), which would add the communications equipment
and services of PRC drone manufacturers DJI and Autel Robotics (and any
of their subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, joint venture entities, or
entities with a technology sharing or licensing agreement with a named
entity) to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Covered List.
This will occur after a relevant national security agency makes a
determination on their unacceptable risk to national security, or, on
23 December 2025 as directed by Congress if action is not taken
sooner.\6\
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\6\ Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness.
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Despite these legitimate and documented concerns, many agencies
continue to procure and operate PRC platforms due to a lack of
consistent Federal policy, market incentives, and clear alternatives.
Allowing adversary-linked systems to operate in the heart of our
national infrastructure networks is a liability we cannot afford. To
defend against emerging threats, we must ensure that the platforms used
to secure our infrastructure are not themselves potential vectors for
surveillance, sabotage, cyber intrusion, or supply chain warfare.
This is not about cutting off access to drones, it is about
ensuring that the platforms used to secure the homeland are not
themselves Trojan horses. Allowing systems tied to adversarial
governments to operate within our most critical infrastructure networks
is a legitimate threat that we can address through common-sense action.
We cannot effectively defend against surveillance or sabotage if we
continue to operate systems that may be compromised from within.
Building a trusted, resilient domestic drone ecosystem is not just a
competitive advantage, it's a national security necessity here in the
United States. Congress must act to accelerate the transition to
trusted U.S. and allied systems, by setting clear procurement
standards, supporting domestic manufacturing, and incentivizing the
adoption of secure platforms.\7\
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\7\ AUVSI_Rethinking Acquisition to Unleash American Leadership in
Uncrewed Systems.
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advancing security solutions and maritime-specific applications
Several mature, scalable solutions are already available and in
use. Technologies such as Remote Identification (Remote ID), drone
detection and tracking systems, and defensive mitigation tools, both
kinetic and non-kinetic, have advanced significantly in recent years
alone. These tools allow security personnel to identify, assess, and,
when authorized, neutralize malicious drone activity.
While much of the public conversation has focused on protecting
airports, stadiums, and Federal buildings, our maritime and
transportation infrastructure remains significantly under protected.\8\
Shipyards, ports, offshore energy platforms, rail crossings, and inland
waterways are just as vulnerable to surveillance, sabotage, and
disruption; and in many cases, even more difficult to secure due to
their geographic scale and open access.
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\8\ AUVSI Testifies at Congressional Hearing on the State of
America's Maritime Infrastructure.
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Adaptation of these technologies for maritime domains, including
ports, shipyards, and offshore energy infrastructure, is both necessary
and feasible. These critical nodes in our logistics and energy networks
deserve the same layered protections that are being discussed for
airports, stadiums, and Government facilities.
Importantly, these efforts must be guided by clear Federal
frameworks that balance security with privacy, protect authorized drone
operations, and enable public-private coordination. AUVSI urges
Congress to support the deployment of scalable c-UAS solutions,
particularly in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of Transportation
(DOT). These agencies must be empowered and resourced to defend our
maritime and other infrastructure effectively.
the need for expanded c-uas authorities and thoughtful regulation
Today, the Federal Government's ability to detect and mitigate
rogue drones remains limited to a small number of agencies under narrow
statutory authorities. This patchwork is unsustainable in the face of a
growing and evolving threat.
I had the privilege of co-chairing the FAA's Section 383 UAS
Detection and Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee, which
brought together industry, Government, and civil society to assess the
legal and operational challenges of c-UAS deployments. One resounding
conclusion: More entities need clearly-defined, narrowly-tailored
authorities to engage in drone detection and mitigation activities,
especially those protecting high-risk infrastructure.
We urge Congress to act on the committee's recommendations, create
a legal framework for authorized detection and mitigation operations,
and ensure interagency coordination, privacy protections, and operator
transparency.\9\
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\9\ UAS Detection and Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking
Committee Final Report. January 9, 2024.
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Congress should pass the bipartisan Disabling Enemy Flight Entry
and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment (DEFENSE) Act which aims to protect
outdoor sporting events from unauthorized drones and enhances security
at major outdoor gatherings and sporting events by ensuring that State
and local law enforcement have the authority and tools necessary to
protect these events from aerial threats in real time, rather than
waiting for Federal intervention. The bill would give State and local
law enforcement the authority to mitigate threats posed by drones in
places where a temporary flight restriction is in place. This includes
large outdoor and sporting events. It would also require DOJ, FAA, FCC,
and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) to create a list of approved technology that local and State law
enforcement officers can use to address these threats.
Additionally, it is imperative that Congress consider broad c-UAS
legislation this Congress. Whether it is a refreshed version of the
Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act from
the 118th Congress,\10\ which this committee worked diligently on, or a
something akin to the Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed
by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act,\11\ our country and threat landscape
needs 3 critical things--modernization, protection, and progress.
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\10\ https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8610/
text/.
\11\ https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/4333/
text/.
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conclusion and recommendations
Drone technology is transforming the landscape of transportation
and maritime security, creating both unprecedented capabilities and new
avenues of risk. As we've seen on the global stage, drones can be tools
of war, espionage, and disruption. But they are also indispensable
assets in defending the homeland, securing our infrastructure, and
responding to emergencies with speed and precision.
As the threats are evolving rapidly, so must our policies,
capabilities, and posture. The time for Federal leadership is now.
To meet this call to action, AUVSI recommends that Congress take
the following actions:
1. Expand c-UAS authorities to additional Federal agencies and
delegate detection authorities to State, local, Tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) agencies operating at critical sites, with
appropriate and robust Federal training and oversight, and
delegate mitigation authorities in more limited instances,
again with significant Federal training and oversight.
2. Enact legislation restricting PRC-manufactured drones from use
in critical infrastructure environments, inclusive of a
suitable transition period, and a funding stream that provides
support for operators to transition their fleets away from
unsecure PRC platforms to secure domestic or allied
alternatives.\12\
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\12\ Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness.
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3. Support domestic drone production and adoption of secure,
trusted systems through advanced market commitments, grant
programs, tax incentives, loan guarantees, and other Federal
mechanisms.
4. Invest in detection, Remote ID, and mitigation technologies,
including maritime applications.
5. Promote interagency coordination through unified national
strategies and continued stakeholder engagement.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, as well as
the committee's leadership and focus on these urgent issues. AUVSI and
its members stand ready to support this committee and the broader
Congress in advancing smart, secure, and future-ready drone policies
that defend our homeland while enabling innovation and trusted use.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Robbins.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes
of questioning.
A lot of the testimony I think hits the point that we can
either be reactive when it happens or we can actually be
proactive now and start to address this issue.
Some 25 years ago, some manned aircraft systems were used
to perpetrate the largest terrorist attack in American history.
My fear is that in the not-too-distant future unmanned
systems will perpetrate the largest terrorist attack in
American history using drones, obviously.
This is not something that's new to me. In 2017, I traveled
to Israel when I was mayor of Miami-Dade County. We operate
Miami International Airport. I went there with the explicit
purpose of finding out from the Israelis what they did to
protect their airports from drones, AI drones. I know we can
protect ourselves from piloted drones, but AI drones.
Their solution at the time was eagles. I just don't think
we just have enough eagles to go around to do that.
So we haven't done much since then. Drone technology has
just gotten worse--I mean, gotten more and more advanced--and I
think the threat is expanding.
We talk a lot about authorities, and so let me put an
assumption to you.
If a drone, an AI drone, were to interfere or incur into an
airport, say, the airport space, would that airport have the
authority to deal with it in a kinetic fashion, in a way to
knock it down in whatever way?
If you can't do it through signal interruption, is there
any way that that airport, does it have the authority to bring
it down, even though they may know it poses an unbelievable
risk to their passengers?
Mr. Robbins. No, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. We do not have that authority?
Mr. Robbins. No, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. OK.
Does anybody have that authority?
Mr. Robbins. In a very limited fashion, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Department of Energy have the authority to
mitigate a rogue drone.
It's not a standing authority. They can't just be doing
that all of the time. The way Congress has restricted the
authority at the moment, it has to go through a very specific
approval process and requires a very high-level signature,
usually at like the deputy secretary level or higher.
Mr. Gimenez. Let me put an example to you. What happened in
Ukraine, what the Ukrainians did to the Russians, it should be
a wake-up call to us and a call to action, because had that
happened here in the United States, let's say a coordinated
attack on major airports, yes, there would be loss of life,
there would be injury, there would be a lot of damage.
But there's something else that we're not thinking about.
It's the economic damage that it does. In Miami-Dade County
alone, Miami International Airport is the single largest
economic generator of that county, 40,000 people directly
employed by that airport, 300,000 people indirectly employed by
that airport.
If you had that kind of attack in the United States and,
say, across the world, you could ground air transportation to a
halt--to a halt--and that would cause irreparable economic
damage.
So I'm committed and hopefully my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle should be committed to confronting this head-
on. We need to do this now. Because, like you said, also I live
in Miami and we have things called hurricanes. Hurricanes
aren't a question of if. It's a question of when. I consider
this threat by drones not to be a question of if. It's a
question of when.
The question is, then, are we going to be proactive against
it and try to mitigate that or are we going to say, ``Oh my
God,'' and then do all kinds of stuff after the fact.
So what kind of legislation do we need in order to break
through the barriers and actually give our State, local, and
Federal agencies the power that they need, the authorities that
they need in order to protect the American public?
Who would be best to answer that?
Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Chairman.
I think I would challenge the presumption that the
immediate need is to be able to develop a reactionary device or
a reactionary element to the strategy. I think a more important
component is that right now we don't have awareness of the air
space.
So we don't necessarily know whether the drone that's in--
recently, as you know, in Miami a drone was spotted at 4,000
feet above the Miami airport.
The question was: What was that drone? Who was flying that
drone? What was their mission?
So we can't automatically make the assumption that just
because a drone is operating within 3 miles or 5 miles of an
airport that it is necessarily hostile. So we need to start
with understanding what is in the air space.
Right now we have no integrated air space management
solution that tells us who's operating, what platform they're
operating, and what are their intents. Therefore, we also have
no way to be able to authorize those flights and deauthorize
those flights to be able to separate potentially hostile from
nonhostile or friend from foe.
So we have to start with: How do we identify what's in the
air space? Is it a threat? Then from that point determine what
we're going to authorize legislatively as the appropriate
response to those threats. I think we have to start there
first.
Mr. Gimenez. I will disagree on one point. I think we have
to do all of the above at the same time. We have to find out
what's out there, but also if it becomes--if we know it's
hostile, we need to take action against it.
So my time is up, and I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much.
Thank you all for your testimonies today.
Mr. Robbins, am I saying that right? Robbins?
Mr. Robbins. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. McIver. OK. Robbins. I want to make sure I get it
right.
Mr. Robbins. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you for joining us today again.
As you are well aware, expanding counter-drone authorities
to additional government agencies and potentially State and
local law enforcement is a complicated task. Agencies must
ensure careful coordination to avoid unintended consequences
that counter-drone systems can have on air space safety,
especially in urban environments and near airports.
In March, the Secret Service allegedly operated a counter-
drone system without appropriate coordination with interagency
partners, including the FAA. The system reportedly operated
outside of the approved frequencies, resulting in automated
alerts to the pilots of several aircraft flying around DCA
airport, which could have had an adverse impact to flight
safety.
With that being said, what can be learned from this
incident?
Mr. Robbins. Great question, ma'am. Thank you so much.
First and foremost, I think it's important that there is a
hot wash from that incident and that the lessons are understood
and distributed to all currently Federally-authorized users to
learn lessons from what occurred in that incident so it doesn't
happen again elsewhere in the Nation.
But I think one of the elements that we can also take is
training and delegating authority to State, local, Tribal,
territorial law enforcement is not entirely new to the Federal
Government.
There are programs that exist now that include explosive
ordnance disposal and SWAT team training that are typically
held at the Federal level and then delegated down to the State
level through training programs, as well as with Federal grants
as well.
There's training facilities at Quantico, in Huntsville,
Alabama, and other places around the country where State and
local law enforcement go and they learn from our Nation's very
best operators, and then they are deputized to go out and do
these kind of more difficult missions.
Not necessarily every public safety official, therefore,
should be a counter-UAS operator, but some should be and go
through very rigorous training.
Then it is incumbent upon Congress, in my view, to then
provide oversight of that program and how is it going. In the
same way that you're providing oversight on the Secret Service
incident, providing oversight on the future authorities that
are delegated down.
Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that. That was my Part 2
question about what can Congress do. But thank you so much for
that, because I am always preaching about oversight, which is
extremely important.
Mr. Feddersen, I understand you have experience working
within the Executive branch, including at the National Security
Council. What can we as legislators do to help ensure
appropriate interagency coordination within the Executive
branch?
Mr. Feddersen. I think the actual interagency coordination
is on-going and moving well. Obviously, there was a missed
connection with the last incident that you mentioned.
However, I'd like it to be known that out of the 5-year
pilot program for Federal law enforcement, now 7 years into the
program, that was the first and only publicly-broadcast issue
that they've had.
I know there is a concern with, again, moving that to
private security or moving it to State and local law
enforcement, but out of 7 years, 1 incident, and it was
deconflicted following the incident.
They have interagency processes in place to go ahead and
deal with an investigation, to follow up and correct those
issues.
So beyond that, I think it's just transparency between--I
know some departments and agencies are a little slow to respond
to Congressional requests for reports, but I think that is,
again, just transparency, communication, and coordination.
I know that the interagency is talking about this issue. I
know the interagency wishes that we'd have the expansion
authorities. DHS, DOJ, and the FAA have all commented on
expansion authorities.
I think, to wrap up that question, I think it's important
to understand that there is no reason today why detection
authorities and mitigation authorities cannot be expanded so
long as the individuals are properly trained.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you. Thank you so much for that.
I'm short on time for my next question about drones flying
over New Jersey. For some reason, they seem to love New Jersey.
But with that, I'll yield back, Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I'll recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you guys for showing up today.
Obviously, this is a very serious topic. I don't think that
most Americans have the slightest idea how warfare is evolving,
especially over in the Middle East and Europe right now when it
comes to drones, and that greatly concerns me as somebody who
sits on the Homeland Security Committee.
A couple weeks ago up here in the District of Columbia we
were down in the SCIF getting a secret briefing from several of
the agencies on our drone capabilities pertaining to many of
these major events that are coming up in the United States,
like the World Cup, the Olympics, et cetera.
One of the recommendations that I made was that we do
everything in our power to make sure that these events take
place in domes, with roofs over the top, for obvious reasons. I
think that would cut down a lot and seriously mitigate attacks
from drones and the effectiveness that they could have in
either dropping chemicals, dropping explosives, et cetera.
One of the gentlemen in there said he would put that in his
report, but he said he couldn't guarantee that it wouldn't be
stripped out of the report.
I did some research and there are 10 NFL stadiums within
the United States that have domes. I'll read those for you now.
We got the State Farm Stadium in Arizona; Mercedes-Benz Stadium
in Atlanta; AT&T Stadium, Dallas Cowboys; Ford Field, Detroit
Lions; NRG Stadium, Houston, Texas; Lucas Oil Stadium,
Indianapolis Colts; Allegiant Stadium, Las Vegas Raiders; SoFi
Stadium, Los Angeles; U.S. Bank Stadium, Minnesota Vikings;
Caesars Superdome in New Orleans.
Have any of you guys made any recommendations to the
interagency or any of the other groups that are responsible for
hosting these events about making sure that they do everything
in their power to hold these events in domes?
Go ahead, Mr. Hutton.
Mr. Hutton. Thank you, Congressman.
I would be happy to follow up in a Classified session to
talk about some of the things that my company and others have
done to support Federal law enforcement agencies at high-
profile events. We have not made that specific recommendation,
though it makes a lot of sense.
Mr. Crane. Why not?
Mr. Hutton. That's been outside of our remit. It makes a
lot of sense. It's entirely possible that at the action officer
tactical level that that recommendation has been made, but as a
company we have not. It has not come across our path. However--
--
Mr. Crane. Thank you for that.
Let me ask you a follow-up, Mr. Hutton. I know you can't
give me a specific here. But what percentage do you think that
that would cut down the threat if we were to host the Olympics
and these World Cup games in domes when it comes to drone
warfare?
Mr. Hutton. I think that would take a significant risk off
the table.
Mr. Crane. OK. Would you commit to pass that along and help
me amplify that message to FIFA and everybody involved in
homeland security and protecting Americans?
Because I also looked up the average stadium size for the
World Cup coming up, and it's between 64,000 to 105,000
Americans.
If we don't think for a second that terrorists and other
State actors who would be willing to commit an attack on U.S.
soil doesn't see that as a fat, juicy, vulnerable target, we're
out of our minds.
Would you commit to helping me amplify that, Mr. Hutton?
Mr. Hutton. I'd be happy to.
Mr. Crane. What about the rest of you guys?
Mr. Robbins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Feddersen. Yes.
Mr. Crane. OK.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank you and
Ranking Member McIver for holding this important hearing today.
Up in New York, we have had many conversations about the
impact on drones, both positive for the communities across our
State as well as the potential threats that are coming with the
drones, in many ways incursions into air space. We know last
year the worry, the concern, and the fright that it caused up
in the Northeast, whether it be New York, New Jersey.
I'd like to know, especially being along the Canadian
border, my district, the 26 New York, Buffalo Niagara region, I
have 4 bridges into Canada in my district. We are also aware
that many of these foreign nationalists have used drones--when
I say negative--to smuggle narcotics across the border. It is
part of their network.
How do we balance as a Government the positive influence of
drones in our lives and the technology that society can benefit
from to the real negatives that oversaturation of drones is
bringing into our society?
Mr. Walker. I appreciate that question, and I think it goes
back to what we were discussing earlier. I appreciate the
Congressman's question about potentially moving everybody
indoors for safety and protecting against that capability.
But one of the things that you pointed out is very--is
probably the most critical point here, and that is we have both
good and bad actors in the air. Right now we can't identify
which is which.
Whether they're flying over a bridge for appropriate
purposes, not flying, flying across the border for appropriate
purposes, not flying, we have to start there. We have to start
by having an awareness and seeing our air space.
The NFL, for example, has reported a 4,000-percent
increase. I know you pointed out that there's 10 stadiums.
Ironically enough, there's 22 others and they have mostly
better teams, which I don't know if that has anything to do
with being indoors or outdoors.
So we have to be able to identify what's operating in that
air space, be able to control and protect and restrict those
operators from flying in those areas that we don't want, and
then and only then should we be able to effectively initiate
whether it's electronic or kinetic countermeasures.
I think that's where we have to start, and I think that
fixes the problem. It also establishes public trust.
Back to the Ranking Member's question about what happened
in New Jersey. The bigger issue there, I think we all know, it
turns out what was there was, if were it drones, was
authorized, but we didn't know that at the time and we probably
should have known that at the time.
So I want to just continue to reemphasize that we need to
understand what's happening, we need an integrated air space
management, we need to be able to be comfortable, you as
regulators, policy makers, our Americans as the general public,
and first responders and law enforcement.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Walker.
Thank you all for being here and your testimony.
But, Mr. Walker, thank you for taking that question head-
on.
As a leader in the industry, what are your thoughts on it?
How does the industry suggest that we regulate your own
industry to make it safer and to prevent these bad actors from
doing harm to our communities?
Mr. Walker. Well, the industry is working I think
aggressively to both grow the industry and create systems,
technologies, and our own individual policies at the operator
level that protect the general public.
But we're operating in silos. We're fragmented and we're
awaiting a set of standards that we can mutually agree upon
that both grant policies for how we operate and then regulatory
authorities for how we leverage the systems that we've created.
I think it's important--and I think Mr. Robbins said it
earlier, I think everybody up here that's witnessing now--the
technologies exist. This is not a technology problem. We keep
talking about it as though, how do we solve this problem?
We solve this problem by getting a Congressional mandate,
getting funding, and allow for innovative development programs
to start testing these solutions. They've been around.
So how do we do it? The industry is ready to come together.
I know we are. I know everyone else in our industry is. We just
need direction, we need authority, and we need funding.
Mr. Feddersen. If I can add to that, sir.
The issue is, like we said, is the technology is there and
there is safe technology. The FAA has been testing and
evaluating counter-UAS technology since 2019. Every one of our
vendors, every one of the industry members have to go through
several levels of test and evaluation at every agency, every
department, and every component. It's a burden on the industry
to have to do that because the Government can't share that
information.
But, regardless, there are safe technologies out there that
can detect, track, identify, and monitor air space and give us
air domain awareness, and it can be layered.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
In today's world, technology is rapidly advancing, and with
that progress comes new challenges for us in Congress, the
Federal agencies, and first responders at home.
Unmanned aircraft systems have become more prevalent in our
daily lives. We must ensure that the safety and security of
Americans are protected.
This is particularly true for my district, which covers the
greater New Orleans area, home to the Superdome. I thank Mr.
Crane for highlighting that we're a great place to have events.
Safe, secure. We recently hosted the Super Bowl without
incident, I might add. We have Final Four, Sugar Bowls,
countless conventions and festivals.
As I look forward and continue to work on this committee on
bipartisan legislation that empowers Federal agencies and local
governments to counter the threats drones pose, and as my dear
friend Mr. Kennedy just said, we know that there are great
applications, we also know that there are nefarious
applications. So we must continue to work to endeavor to
amplify those positive ones and discourage the negative ones.
Mr. Robbins, my district and the Gulf Coast will soon be in
the most active period of hurricane season. How do unauthorized
and unidentified drones interfere with disaster response
activities, such as search-and-rescue missions, using
helicopters and drones, and what are the potential consequences
for survivor recovery and response safety given the new
application?
Mr. Robbins. Thank you for that question, Mr. Carter, and
it's a serious problem. Ranking Member McIver mentioned it in
her opening statement as well, as did Mr. Walker.
The incident that occurred just a couple weeks ago down in
Texas in a similar situation during search-and-rescue disaster
response, an unauthorized rogue drone collided with a
helicopter. We had a similar incident in California last year
when a scooper airplane was doing water distribution on a
forest fire also was struck by a drone.
When that happens, it hurts public trust, it endangers
lives, and it damages the reputation of responsible drone users
across the country. We have to do better.
When there is an incident response, like a hurricane or a
wildfire or a flood, there is a temporary flight restriction
put in place. There is technology available that should be able
to restrict the flight from occurring if the operator is
responsible and looking at technology that the FAA makes
available to individuals who are operating these flights.
I also think it's important to distinguish between
responsible commercial operators and those that are flying
commercial off-the-shelf drones that maybe they bought on
Walmart or----
Mr. Carter. Are these Walmart-type commercial drones that
are purchased capable of being retrofit to do harm?
Mr. Robbins. They absolutely are, sir. The No. 1 seller of
those drones in this country is a Chinese company called DJI,
which used to restrict their drones from flying in spaces like
where there was a TFR in place or over an airport.
Last December DJI removed the geofencing on their drones,
giving the operators--these are not typically commercial
operators. Sometimes they are, but oftentimes they're just
random people who buy a drone and sometimes do stupid things
with them. They've removed the geofencing, so now they can go
into a zone, like the helicopter incident in Texas, that used
to not be able until DJI changed their own rules.
Mr. Carter. How can UAS intervention mitigate the dangers
of drones, particularly with the Port of New Orleans or major
sporting events, as I mentioned? We know these drones at large-
scale public events, free parties, Mardis Gras. I mean, I'm
deathly afraid of what could happen. How do we detect and
mitigate the dangers of that?
Mr. Robbins. Yes. As mentioned, it is not a technology
problem anymore. All 3 of these companies as well as many other
AUVSI member companies have technologies that provide a very
complex, intimate portrait of the air space to be able to
distinguish between authorized drones and unauthorized rogue
drones, and then as necessary be able to take action, whether
it's a kinetic or nonkinetic action, against a drone to remove
it from the unauthorized air space.
Mr. Carter. Real quickly, because I have about 29 seconds.
What can local and State government do to augment what we're
doing at the Federal level and what you're doing? We have local
players, our State police, our State sheriffs--local sheriffs--
--
Mr. Robbins. Presently not much. You can maybe find the
operator and ask him politely land the drone. But until
Congress extends and expands detection and mitigation
authorities and allows for delegation to State and local law
enforcement, unfortunately, those individuals, those great
public servants are left without many tools right now, and
that's unfair to them and it's unsafe to Americans.
Mr. Carter. My time is expired, but I'd love to dig deeper
into this, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Another time.
Thank you all.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Chairman. Perfect timing. Thanks
for holding this great hearing today.
As the Chair of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection, I'm especially concerned about the
potential for foreign-manufactured drones to be exploited by
adversaries to carry out cyber and physical attacks against
critical systems.
Many U.S. law enforcement and municipal agencies continue
to use DJI drones despite security warnings from the Department
of Homeland Security and CISA.
Mr. Walker and Mr. Feddersen, from your perspectives, what
are the cyber risks posed by these platforms? Do you believe
agencies understand the surveillance or data exfiltration
vulnerabilities they may be exposing themselves to?
Mr. Feddersen, if you want.
Mr. Feddersen. Yes. So I appreciate the question, sir.
The cyber effect obviously we've seen in different formats
and different forms capable of carrying a virus and injecting
it into the internet of things and different places. We've seen
this happen. We know it's happened several times. Anything that
can connect to WiFi, Bluetooth, or anything, that connect even
on the LTE bands, can inject some type of virus or some type of
cybersecurity vulnerability into the system.
This is something that I know the interagency is aware of.
They're trying to address it. But when it comes from all the
different threat vectors out there, a cyber attack from a drone
tends to fall low on the list.
It's not that it shouldn't be up on the list or it
shouldn't be considered, it's just a priority-based aspect of
things. But we know the potential's there. We know it's been
used in the past.
Mr. Garbarino. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Thank you.
It's a really good question, and it's a very important
matter. Essentially any time that we have interconnected
devices, internet of things, on a broad scale like this, you
have cybersecurity concerns.
One of the things that we proposed in our written statement
was that we need to have a digital flight-authorization service
that has cryptographic credentials for both the operators for
the platform and for their intention, and that only when those
3 elements are fused together in an appropriate manner will we
authorize that flight.
That is just one approach that we believe is appropriate to
ensuring that we are strengthening our cybersecurity wall
against potential vulnerabilities.
Mr. Garbarino. Mr. Feddersen, in your answer you said that
the interagencies are aware, you believe they're aware, and
they're trying to address it. Wouldn't addressing it just be
stop using the drones? Or, I mean, is there another way to
address it?
Mr. Feddersen. Honestly, the simplest way to do it is to
use detection and mitigation capabilities that are out there
today. I mean, the technologies and vendors that are out there
can identify and stop a drone from moving into an area that may
be sensitive or unprotected.
Again, when you talked about critical infrastructure,
though, I think it's important for us to remember that critical
infrastructure is protected by private security, not law
enforcement.
So when we talk about data centers, we talk about the
stadiums or anything else, or even power plants, even our
nuclear plants are private security, not State and local law
enforcement.
So the authorities that we talk about must be expanded to
them as well if we're going to actually take care of our
critical infrastructure.
Mr. Garbarino. I've had this discussion with the NFL and a
whole bunch of other people, saying these authorities need to
be expanded to local law enforcement when these issues arise.
Mr. Walker, did you want to add something else? You looked
like you were about to.
Any others? Do you want to add anything? OK.
Mr. Feddersen, as we've seen, our adversaries have utilized
unmanned aircraft system capabilities at various activities and
conflicts around the world.
Based on your work in intelligence and cyber operations,
how realistic is the threat of adversaries using unmanned
aircraft systems or platforms to preconflict-shaping
activities, such as mapping soft targets or collecting signal
intelligence inside the United States?
Mr. Feddersen. It's already being used, sir. I mean, you
just take a look at the borders. You take a look at the
cartels. You talk to the cells that we know are inside the
country. We know the agencies are actively pursuing them and
going after them. But the threat is here today.
Mr. Garbarino. It's just not the border. But what else are
they mapping out that we might not have--the public doesn't
know about yet or it's not on the top of their radar?
Mr. Feddersen. It's pattern of life. So they watch agents.
They watch officials, Government officials going to and from
their house. They figure out patterns of that. They can do
surveillance and figure out patterns at airports, other
critical infrastructure aspects of things.
We know--and particularly prisons are being infiltrated
every day with drones that are going back and forth. So, again,
it's being able to figure out guard shifts, patterns, different
things like that.
Mr. Walker. Yes. I would like to add to that, Congressman.
I mean, there's been 3,000 drone flights, unauthorized and
unidentified drone flights over power plants and power
installations in the last 24 months alone.
We don't know who flew it, why they were there, what their
intention was, and what data they collected. So sometimes it is
difficult to answer your question on specifically what we're
doing because we don't know who they are.
Mr. Garbarino. I had another question, but I've run out of
time. I yield back.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Gimenez. I thank the gentleman from New York.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Mrs.
Biggs.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The FAA has reported over 1 million registered unmanned
aircraft systems, more commonly known as drones, as of April
2025, with many more believed to be unregistered.
Unauthorized drone incursions are increasing in frequency,
particularly in proximity to sensitive sites, such as military
installations, nuclear power plants, which were just mentioned,
and airports.
Between 2022 and 2024, North American Aerospace Defense
Command and the Department of Defense documented more than 600
unauthorized drone overflights of U.S. military facilities.
Public reporting has also noted concerning incidents near
critical infrastructure, such as the appearance of low-altitude
drones over nuclear facilities and near commercial airport
perimeters in multiple States.
So I think all of you are perfectly capable of answering my
question, so I'll just leave it open.
But my first question is, what are some of the direct
impacts of unauthorized drone overflights at military
facilities, airports, and maritime ports?
Specifically for airports and maritime ports, could you
explain the potential cascading effects that such incidents
could or may have regionally or even nationwide?
Mr. Robbins. I'm happy to take that question,
Congresswoman, and thank you very much.
I think, first and foremost, obviously, there's with each
incident the potential for there being some sort of a
catastrophic event.
Thankfully, as mentioned, we haven't seen that in the
United States as yet, but we have seen it overseas, as the
topic of this overall hearing, of how drone warfare abroad is
changing the situation at home.
But even without those catastrophic events, each time one
of these incidents occurs it erodes public trust as well. It
also damages the public perception around the positive utility
of drones.
At AUVSI we represent companies that focus on the defense
against drones. But we also represent dozens of drone operators
that are doing lifesaving critical missions every day, whether
it's for public safety or package delivery or other really
important things for our economy and public safety. All of that
could go away if there's a very terrible drone incident that
occurs in the United States.
Again, as we've talked about today, this is no longer a
technology problem. The technology is in place. These 3
companies, as well as others, all have the ability to offer the
protection to all the different sites that you listed.
But Congress hasn't updated the rules since 2018.
Obviously, the landscape and the threat environment have
changed dramatically. It's incumbent upon you as lawmakers to
give Federal officials more authorities and to be able to
delegate those authorities with proper training and oversight
to local and State police as well.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much.
Mr. Feddersen. I think there's 2 things to add back on
there. I think one of it is really kind-of a lexicon we've had
for a while. We should get rid of careless and clueless. Just
like a vehicle on the road and our highways, you either drive
it legally or you drive it illegally. The enforcement aspect of
that needs to be understood.
I think also when we say counter-drone or counter-UAS, I
think sometimes that's a misnomer. Again, these systems provide
air domain awareness. They are a safety tool. More than
everything else, they provide safety to the general public, to
any of the events that we have.
The security element is there in mitigation which is also
necessary. It's making sure that you have the exact tools that
you need to enforce what crimes are being committed and then
take appropriate action through the judicial process.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for your insight.
Mr. Walker, I have a quick question for you.
From an industry perspective, what are the most effective
tools available today to detect and neutralize these threats
before they cause harm? Are private operators and owners of
critical infrastructure equipped to use them?
Mr. Walker. That's a very good question.
So first you have to understand that there are a variety of
technologies out there, from RF detection, acoustic, we could
go down the list of the various different ways to detect these
devices. Everybody's technology is--everybody's system is an
amalgamation of a very specific group of technologies.
But, no, not everybody has the availability of that. I've
spoken with multiple law enforcement agencies who don't even
know these technologies exist, much less have access to them.
So I think back to what everybody here has been saying.
First off, do we need to give--and I really appreciate him
pointing out that I think there's a fear about delegating
counter-UAS authority down to certain agencies because
everybody just assumes that that means we're going to be
shooting down drones or taking down drones and that's not
necessarily the case. It is the identification of whether or
not these are hostile or not hostile.
There's, again, we've said it enough, but I'm going to say
it one more time, it's not a technology problem. They exist.
Do the appropriate law enforcement agencies at all various
different levels have access to these technologies? They don't.
They don't have access to the training for them either.
So there's a lot Congress can do to help make this
situation a lot better and fast.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields back.
We're going to go through a second round of questioning
here, and I'll ask each of you to please answer this.
Mr. Hutton, are you worried about a catastrophic drone
attack happening in the United States?
Mr. Hutton. It's a very short space between the
inconvenience that we have seen to date--shutting down
airports, raising alarm bells--and a catastrophe.
Mr. Gimenez. Are you worried about a catastrophic drone
attack on the United States?
Mr. Hutton. It's very worrisome, yes. The answer is yes.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Feddersen.
Mr. Feddersen. Absolutely.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Robbins.
Mr. Robbins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Would you consider that--I mean, you're right,
that we've seen the enemy and probably the enemy is right here,
that we haven't given the authorities and we have a fragmented
defense system against drones.
There's 2 levels really. There's the reckless, the reckless
drone operator that puts life in danger, not because they're
nefarious, but because they're reckless. They're flying
somewhere they shouldn't be flying. Then there's nefarious.
There's different ways to deal with each one.
Will you help this subcommittee identify the different
agencies or different even committees of jurisdiction that we
need to bring into focus so that we have a comprehensive policy
in defense of our homeland? Would you commit to do that?
Mr. Hutton.
Mr. Hutton. Absolutely.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Feddersen.
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Robbins.
Mr. Feddersen. We recommend a tiger team so those
jurisdictions can actually coordinate in a rapid manner.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Robbins.
Mr. Robbins. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Look, I put this hearing together, but I don't
know every single committee that has jurisdiction on this. I'm
sure the FAA, which is part of Transportation and
Infrastructure, and maybe Judiciary has it. But somehow we've
got a disjointed defense mechanism here, and we need to bring
it together.
This committee was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to
provide for the security of the homeland. We don't have all the
jurisdiction to provide for that. Absent that, we need to make
sure that we coordinate that with the other committees.
So I'm afraid that--and I hope not--but I hope that we
don't have to have an incident similar to 9/11 for us to come
together as a Congress and say these are the things that we
need to do to counter this threat, these are the things that we
need to do to counter cybersecurity threats that we have that
also can be quite devastating also.
So I want to thank you for volunteering. The staff of this
subcommittee will get with you all. Then we'll also have some
other--we'll contact other folks.
What it is that this subcommittee, this committee needs to
do in order to coordinate this so that we do come up with a
strategy and an adequate defense of the homeland? Because, as
you can tell, I'm really scared about this, and I think it's
just a matter of time.
Since we've already--9/11, you can say, ``Gee, nobody
thought about that.'' Well, we've thought about this now. If we
fail in this, it's our failure. We can't just sit in a room and
think about it. We are thinking about it and we need to do
something about it.
I yield the rest of my time back. I now yield to the
Ranking Member.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
This gives me the opportunity to talk about drones flying
over New Jersey.
As many of you know, last year we had the situation where
there were tons of drones flying over different parts of New
Jersey, which honestly sent people in a frantic. You can
understand why. Even to this day, there are still drones flying
over New Jersey.
My sister was driving down the Garden State Parkway the
other day, and she literally freaked out because she said she
saw like a drone flying so close to the parkway, and it was
just very scary. Honestly, it kind-of gave people a feeling
where it's like an aircraft out of space somewhere. You're
like, ``What is happening?'' because people are not used to
seeing drones just flying over them. So it continues to be a
problem in New Jersey.
We have been given information from the Government about
how these drones were not dangerous, they were OK, nothing.
But, honestly, I'm not even quite sure if they understood where
the drones--where they belong to, who they belong to, and can
say that they weren't dangerous. We just don't know.
It doesn't seem confident that there is concrete, really
good information coming from the Government about these drones
flying, especially when you have so many and you can't really
pinpoint where they are coming from.
So we've spent the last hour-and-a-half talking with you
all, all of you sharing your expertise of what we should be
doing, where we should be focused at. Hopefully, we lead this
committee to really put some meat to the bone on this matter.
When we come out of it, I think one of the things that one
of you said was about the oversight, having oversight. But I
just think we need a more in-depth situation and process of how
we are countering, especially these drones that we just cannot
determine where they are coming from.
So I would love to learn more or learn more from you, for
you to discuss--and anyone--honestly, I would love to hear from
each of you of what we've learned from these incidents in terms
of the Government's domain awareness and the public's
understanding, shall I say, with drone rules and regulations,
because that's a problem too.
Many people, if you see this thing flying over your
backyard, people just don't even understand what is happening,
what is the process, what is the procedure that these drones
should just be flying? Who should they call? Like who should I
call if I see this drone? First, they're getting on Facebook,
first of all, like tagging me and everyone else that they can
think of about what is happening.
But what is your input on that?
Mr. Feddersen. I appreciate the question.
I'd like to start with the idea that these processes are
already in place. Again, if anybody has issues in the
community, they call their local law enforcement. If there's a
security issue at a private site, security knows who to kind-of
call and kind-of run into it.
So, again, if State and local law enforcement or private
security would have had the technology in place at that point
and the authority to detect and the authority to mitigate, they
can identify drones and are able to call the FAA and find out
whether or not they're authorized or not authorized.
There is equipment, including ours, where you can whitelist
drones so you know whether a drone is actually authorized to
fly in a certain area or not authorized to fly in a certain
area. You can deconflict and focus your security efforts that
way.
But it has to be decentralized, it has to be pushed to the
lowest level in order for the process to work.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that.
Mr. Walker. Here is what you didn't know, and this is part
of the problem. Right now we have no integrated system which
ties the operator and their qualifications and their
certifications to operate digitally to the platform that they
are operating and to their intent where you can immediately
identify who that is operating. That's the point that we've
been trying to make for a long time, is, yes, it's great that
we can go out and we see that drone.
But to your point, you should have had no concern as a
Member of Congress or as a member of the general public that
that drone is operating appropriately and is authorized. There
should not be that fear.
If you go back to what happened earlier in New Jersey, the
answer was nobody knew because there was no system that
provided the regulators and the air space policy managers a way
to determine whether those flights were appropriate or
inappropriate. We have to start there.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that, Mr. Walker.
Mr. Robinson.
Mr. Robbins. Yes, I'd just add to that.
I think it also speaks to that erosion of public trust
around drones. The drones that are still flying in New Jersey
are more than likely doing some sort of important mission--
infrastructure inspection, public safety, package delivery,
things of that nature.
Compare the erosion of public trust in New Jersey, though,
to north Texas, where drone operations have been authorized in
a trial program by the FAA to do significant operations in the
north Texas area.
People are--like communities are fighting over who gets
drone delivery next, whose public safety agency is going to get
the drone operations to help extend the operational reach of
their local police.
So the inverse of that is when drones are authorized and
the community becomes familiar with them, they become a huge
asset to the community and a boost to public safety.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that.
Mr. Robbins. I wanted to call you Mr. Robinson. Again, I'm
sorry.
Mr. Robbins. It's OK, ma'am.
Mrs. McIver. I'm out of time. So forgive me, Mr. Hutton.
Thank you.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. The Ranking Member yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
this. This is a continuation of multiple hearings that we've
had, and I have been personally concerned about this for a
number of reasons.
But I'll start with just a statement about the fact that
the weekend's and last week's tragedies that happened in Texas,
which we were involved in, had several local and State law
enforcement officials reach out and say, ``What are we going to
do?'' Because the Chinese-made technology is allowing them to
do things like search and rescue. But, obviously, we're
concerned about that, and we have stated those concerns in this
hearing and for at least 2, maybe 3 or 4 years.
So not really a question so much as a statement of, like,
how do we go faster? How do we get to a point where we can keep
up with that technology?
Then I'll go to Mr. Hutton on the conversation of Ukraine,
which I've spent a lot of time studying.
The iterative nature of the drones that we are seeing in
that conflict is quite alarming. I'm not sure that we're
keeping up. So it's kind-of in the same vein as what I've
mentioned about some of our law enforcement needs.
But what features of these drones raise concern of similar
tactics, techniques, and procedures being used here against us,
whether it be critical infrastructure, military bases, or the
like?
Mr. Hutton. You put your finger on it, Congressman. Not
just the technology, but also the tactics, techniques, and
procedures are iterating at an incredibly fast pace.
As has been mentioned already, prior to your arrival, the
Operation Spiderweb in Ukraine demonstrated the control of
small UAS with kinetic payloads at 2,000 miles distance,
indicating that you wouldn't even have to be in the United
States or even on this side of the planet to be able to conduct
or execute a terrorist attack against U.S. critical
infrastructure. We're there.
Mr. Pfluger. So with that statement, Mr. Feddersen, let's
think about the truck, the 18-wheeler truck that the Ukrainians
deployed against the Russian airplanes and fighter aircraft.
Is that a possibility here? Do we have a possibility of
shipping containers being in our ports that have already those
types of drones that are ready to go preprogrammed?
Mr. Feddersen. We do. It's a scenario that's been,
obviously, discussed kind-of ad nauseam in the community as to
how it can happen. It can be at the ports. It can be an 18-
wheeler. But it can also just be a flatbed pickup truck or any
other truck that's driving around.
Mr. Pfluger. What resources do we need that we do not have
right now to both protect against some sort of critical
infrastructure, military or even civilian-type attack? What do
we need to think about legislatively? I will open that up. We
can just go down the line. We have a minute and 40 seconds.
Mr. Hutton. I'll move quickly.
You need a common integrated air picture. Three companies
before you all make competitive products in this space. There
is a supply of this capability.
Mr. Pfluger. Who would run that air picture?
Mr. Hutton. Well, that would depend. Probably it would have
to be delegated down to the operational users using a set of
standards and certifications and valuations provided for by the
Federal Government.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. I think the other thing that you need to think
about, sir, is the fact that it's easier to hide in a crowd.
Drones in our air space right now outnumber manned aircraft 4
to 1. That's going to double by 2027. That's going to double
again by 2030.
So as we're talking about the ability to defend against
these threats, we have to equally be thinking about, how do we
quickly identify those threats?
I know I sound like a broken record on that, but that's
going to become much more concerning and much more of a
challenge because we have to remember, of those drones in the
air, 99 percent or better of them are performing real valuable
missions that are saving and protecting American lives.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Feddersen. We'll have 30 seconds. Split it
with Mr. Robbins.
Mr. Feddersen. Yes, real quick on the whole concept.
It's integration. So we are collaborating to compete in the
space. We just need the policies to open up so that individuals
can figure out what they need--there is no one silver bullet--
so all the systems can talk to each other and be able to cover
each other in layers.
Mr. Pfluger. Last.
Mr. Robbins. As mentioned, the Congressional rules have not
been updated since 2018. Expand air space awareness detection
technology very broadly and expand the mitigation tools more
narrowly with vigorous training and oversight of that program.
Mr. Pfluger. We have asked, Mr. Chairman, I have asked
NORAD and NORTHCOM to come and testify. I think it's imperative
that they do that. Because if we're going to delegate those,
and we're going to integrate with the State and local level
with the common air picture, which I agree with, then they're
going to play a key role, and that positive identification is
absolutely key.
Thanks for holding this hearing. Yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from Texas yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter,
for a second round.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to follow up on the comments that my friend Mr.
Pfluger started.
You state in your testimony that swarms of small drones are
prevalent, like those that were used in Operation Spiderweb in
Russia, and can be used to saturate enemy air space, overwhelm
air defense systems, and execute lethal strikes.
How easy would it be for foreign governments to conduct
similar attacks as Operation Spiderweb did here on U.S. soil?
Mr. Robbins. Well, I will say I have great confidence in
our intelligence community and law enforcement that they're
doing excellent work every day to keep us safe and prevent such
an attack from happening in the United States.
But from a technology perspective, as mentioned, the
technology is there, it could be in this country already, and--
--
Mr. Carter. How easy is it for that to be conducted? Is it
something that is just farfetched?
Mr. Robbins. No.
Mr. Carter. Is it something, as our Chairman has just
suggested, something we really--let me try to finish first--
that we should not find ourself flatfooted thinking, ``Oh, wow
we know this has happened before''?
Chairman Gimenez has said very clearly shame on us if we
fall prey to another attack. My suspicion is, as it was done
there causing some $7 billion worth of damage, we are one
accident away from being a victim of it ourselves.
Mr. Robbins. Absolutely. Completely agree with you, sir.
Mr. Carter. I know it's been said over and over again. What
can we be doing? ISIS has actively encouraged lone-wolf attacks
targeting public--to target public civilian spaces. I know none
of these are easy questions, and I know neither of you have
easy answers for us. But because we are on a fact-finding
mission to determine how we can better empower you and others
to protect our homeland, what else we can be doing?
Any of you can jump in.
Mr. Hutton, would you?
Mr. Hutton. Three of us here in front of you provide
situational awareness and mitigation technologies. Those
Government agencies who would be our customers at the State and
local level--and often at the Federal level--cannot buy them,
they cannot--they do not have a forum to deeply learn about
them and understand what capabilities are there, and if they
did buy them would not have the authority to employ them.
Mr. Carter. Given that there's so many of them in the air,
you indicated, I think, Mr. Feddersen, that many of them are in
fact providing useful tools. Are we able to easily identify
those that have nefarious actions versus those who aren't?
The second part of the question is we know that--you
mentioned DJI, which is a Chinese-owned-and-operated company
that provides most of the commercial, I guess, recreational
drones.
Do we know if those drones are able to capture photograph
images, video, that an independent person is using perhaps just
for fun? Do we know if they have access with their technology
to actually use that information unbeknownst to the operator?
Mr. Feddersen. Every time they update the drone. Every time
it touches the internet, they get a new update to it, new
profile. All that information's in there.
Going back to the question, sir, about how easy is it. It's
coding and algorithms. People are doing it all the time with
Raspberry Pis, creating their own 3-D printed drones, putting
the control systems in there and figuring it out.
We see it with drone-like displays on a regular basis. I
mean, the technology to do those swarm attacks and things are
being used commercially in here.
I think one of the things that we were could all benefit
from, especially after all the testing and evaluation that the
U.S. Government has done on systems like ours, is to publish a
list of those that have already been deemed safe to operate,
safe to use, so that individuals, especially critical
infrastructure, can look at a menu of options as what they want
and we know that it's safe in the National Airspace System.
Mr. Carter. Forty-six seconds. Anybody else want to weigh
in on that?
Mr. Hutton.
Mr. Hutton. Federal agencies have to have a level of
certainty about the safety and reliability and effectiveness of
the systems. Without the authorities to employ the systems,
they don't get to the point at which they can determine whether
those systems are safe, effective, and reliable.
Mr. Carter. So the drone that looks like it's dropping off
a package and the drone that looks like it's dropping off a
bomb looks exactly the same, and that makes your job that much
more difficult.
My time has expired.
Mr. Feddersen. But that is why, again, law enforcement and
trained security professionals who go through training for
physical security and threat assessment are the individuals
that should have these tools in their hands today.
Mr. Carter. Well, I would encourage, Mr. Chairman, the
joint committees that are working on joint legislation, that we
step up our game, because every minute that goes by that we are
paralyzed by analysis we are an accident waiting to happen.
I want to be on record, along with the Chairman in this
committee, in urging that the joint committees truly push
forward. We cannot wait for the next accident and American
lives are lost.
I yield.
Mr. Gimenez. I fully agree. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple months back, I pulled in, asked for a meeting with
several of the agencies that were in charge of protecting the
Capitol for Inauguration Day. I was very concerned about the
President after 2 assassination attempts.
I was also concerned about just a drone attack here, or
another type of attack when you've got all the Members of
Congress, all the Cabinet executives, et cetera. That's a huge,
juicy target.
One of the things I learned is that Capitol Police doesn't
even have the authorization to mitigate and deal with drones.
So we introduced a bill. It's H.R. 3334. I would love it if
the Chairman would consider supporting this effort to give
Capitol Police the ability to take down drones. I realize there
is the Secret Service as well that has the capability and the
authorization to do so.
But if we're not even willing to give authorization to
protect the Capitol, I think that's a pretty key indicator that
we're not prepared to protect the rest of the country, which I
think needs to happen.
So I appreciate, Mr. Walker, you bringing up the integrated
air space management needed. I know you've been beating that
drum today, and I definitely appreciate it.
Back to Operation Spiderweb that we've talked about a lot
today where the Ukrainians flew drones over 2,000 miles--some
of the reporting says 2,800 miles--to attack Russian bombers,
very sophisticated operation.
I'm glad, Mr. Hutton, you brought up the fact that some of
our adversaries could launch an attack like that that mimics
that attack from outside the United States. Is that correct?
Mr. Hutton. Yes, it is.
Mr. Crane. They could do that from a country like--or a
city like Monterrey in Mexico or Ottawa or Calgary in Canada?
Is that correct?
Mr. Hutton. That's correct.
Mr. Crane. Have you guys done any assessments on--I talked
about the average stadium for the World Cup holding about 7,500
civilians. Have you guys done any analysis on what a drone
swarm could do to that many citizens just watching a soccer
game?
Mr. Hutton. We know from lessons learned in Eastern Europe
exactly what would happen. You could put all of them at risk,
every one of them.
Mr. Crane. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely.
Well, I appreciate you guys coming today. I want to--again,
I know I've talked about this in my first round--but I want to
publicly say that I think FIFA and Homeland Security should
absolutely host all of these events coming up, for a short-term
fix, in domes, because I think that that would greatly mitigate
the threats that we're talking about today.
Because when you host it in a dome, then you start
filtering people watching the games through magnetometers.
There is a whole new level of threats that you have to deal
with. But at least mitigate much of the drone capabilities that
some of these nation-states and bad actors have as far as
targeting large populations of people. We know that terrorist
groups love to do that.
So I want to make sure it's stated publicly.
Mr. Carter, I think he left, but I hope that my other
colleagues on the panel will consider sponsoring my bill and
working with industry leaders like yourself in making sure that
we're proactive and not reactive. Because as you guys know,
this place moves at a snail's pace, and it almost seems as if
most of the time we have to wait for a catastrophe to happen
before we actually move on anything.
So thank you.
Mr. Feddersen. Sir, I applaud the bill you and Mr. Perry
put forward. We wholeheartedly agree the critical
infrastructure here inside the NCR should be protected. We urge
that we should protect the other 50 State capitals in
legislation.
Mr. Crane. Absolutely. Absolutely. Thank you.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from Arizona yields.
I think we have really put a light on the issue and the
fact that we in Congress need to focus in. We're kind-of spread
out on our authorities. We need to kind-of focus this in.
You have my word that this subcommittee and the staff of
the subcommittee are going to work with you to identify those
areas and those other jurisdictions and other committees of
jurisdictions will need to work on in order to really protect
America, which is really what our job is.
As you also can see, this is a bipartisan effort. Both
sides of the aisle see the threat, and both sides of the aisle
are committed to try to resolve this problem before anything
happens.
So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in
writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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