[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FROM CARTELS TO COASTLINES: AN EXAMINA-
TION OF U.S. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CONFRONT
ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WATERS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME
SECURITY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-341 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Tony Gonzales, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Member
Elijah Crane, Arizona Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Gabe Evans, Colorado Robert Garcia, California
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Al Green, Texas
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT
Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman
Tony Gonzales, Texas J. Luis Correa, California,
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Julie Johnson, Texas
Brad Knott, North Carolina Vacant
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Vacant
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border
Security and Enforcement....................................... 6
The Honorable Delia C. Ramirez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Illinois, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border Security and Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Witnesses
Mr. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and
Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie, Assistant Commandant for Response
Policy, U.S. Coast Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. James C. Harris, III, Assistant Director, Countering
Transnational Organized Crime, Homeland Security
Investigations:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director of Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
FROM CARTELS TO COASTLINES: AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
CONFRONT ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WATERS
----------
Tuesday, June 10, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation
and Maritime Security, and the
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m.,
in room 360, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos Gimenez
[Chairman of the subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime
Security] presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs,
McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.
Present from the Subcommittee on Border Security and
Enforcement: Representatives Guest, Crane, Biggs, Correa,
Ramirez, and Johnson.
Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, and
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement will come to
order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee
in recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the evolving
tactics, geographic patterns, and operational strategies
employed by transnational criminal organizations, including
Mexican cartels, to exploit U.S. maritime borders for drug
smuggling, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, and other
illegal activities. We will also evaluate the Department of
Homeland Security's interagency efforts, operational posture,
and resource allocations for maritime interdiction, with
particular emphasis on the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Air and Maritime Operations, and Homeland
Security Investigations.
I would like to thank our colleagues from the Border
Security Enforcement Subcommittee for partnering with us on
this joint hearing, and I recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Good morning. I want to thank everyone for being here
today. I especially want to thank Chairman Guest and the
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement for working
with us to hold this joint hearing on a matter of growing
importance and security for the American homeland.
Transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, remain agile and
persistent adversaries. For years, these groups have exploited
vulnerabilities at our Southern Border, our southern land
border, where drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal
immigration surged to historic levels under the Biden
administration. Since the beginning of 2025, however, public
data suggests a notable decline in many of these illegal flows.
That progress is due in large part to the renewed focus and
decisive actions being taken under the current Trump
administration to restore control and enforce our laws.
But as we improve security on land, we must not allow our
maritime domain to become the next weak point. Increasingly,
criminal networks are turning to the sea, where vast distances,
patchwork jurisdictions, and limited real-time visibility offer
TCOs a lower risk of detection and a high reward for moving
contraband. Though maritime routes account for a smaller share
of illegal migration and narcotics trafficking compared to land
routes, the threat remains serious. TCOs and other criminal
actors are leveraging everything from go-fast boats, fishing
vessels, and narco submarines to container ships and commercial
cargo fleets to move cocaine, synthetic drugs, weapons, and
human cargo into the United States. The first half of this
fiscal year alone, the U.S. Coast Guard has already seized and
offloaded more cocaine than it did in all of fiscal year 2024,
a clear indicator that illicit maritime activity remains a
persistent challenge despite improved enforcement efforts.
The scale and sophistication of these operations require an
equally coordinated and capable response. As a representative
of the Florida Keys and much of South Florida, I know first-
hand how vulnerable our maritime borders can be. From the
Caribbean to the Straits of Florida and up to the Atlantic
coast, our region has long been a strategic target for
smugglers and cartels seeking to enter the United States
undetected. The threat to our ports, shipping routes, and
coastal areas is not theoretical. It directly affects the day-
to-day security and economic viability and stability of South
Florida.
Moreover, while most fentanyl still enters the United
States through land ports of entry, we cannot ignore the
possibility that maritime routes are being used to transport
precursor chemicals or synthetic opioids manufactured abroad.
This is particularly concerning given the well-documented role
that entities based in the People's Republic of China continue
to play in supplying the chemical building blocks used to
manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. These synthetic opioids are
then trafficked into American communities, often with
devastating results. Tens of thousands of Americans are dying
each year from fentanyl.
Beijing is complicit in incentivizing the distribution of
these chemicals world-wide, which is responsible for the crisis
that now claims the lives of tens of thousands of Americans
each year. It is unknown what role, if any, the Mexican
government has had in this crisis as they have failed to stop
the flow of these deadly chemicals into the United States.
To its credit, the Trump administration has made maritime
security a greater priority by investing in interdiction
efforts, revitalizing partnerships with key regional allies,
and applying needed pressure on adversarial regimes that
threaten the safety of the Western Hemisphere. These steps mark
a welcome shift in our posture. But as this hearing will show,
we must do more. We need a comprehensive maritime security
strategy that includes enhanced detection capabilities, more
robust interagency coordination, and expanded use of advanced
technology to monitor, interdict, and deter illicit maritime
activity. Today's hearing is an opportunity to access how
Federal agencies are responding to these evolving maritime
threats. We will hear from those on the front lines about what
is working, where the challenges remain, and what resources or
authorities may be needed to close remaining gaps.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. I
look forward to your insights and a productive discussion of
how we can better protect our coasts, our communities, and our
country from illicit activity at sea.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
June 10, 2025
Good morning. I want to thank everyone for being here today. I
especially want to thank Chairman Guest and the Subcommittee on Border
Security and Enforcement for working with us to hold this joint hearing
on a matter of growing importance to the security of the American
homeland.
Transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, remain agile and
persistent adversaries. For years, these groups have exploited
vulnerabilities at our southern land border, where drug smuggling,
human trafficking, and illegal immigration surged to historic levels
under the Biden administration.
Since the beginning of 2025, however, public data suggests a
notable decline in many of these illegal flows. That progress is due,
in large part, to the renewed focus and decisive action being taken
under the current Trump administration to restore control and enforce
our laws.
But as we improve security on land, we must not allow our maritime
domain to become the next weak point. Increasingly, criminal networks
are turning to the sea, where vast distances, patchwork jurisdictions,
and limited real-time visibility offer TCOs a lower risk of detection
and a high reward for moving contraband.
Although maritime routes account for a smaller share of illegal
migration and narcotics trafficking compared to land routes, the threat
remains serious. TCOs and other criminal actors are leveraging
everything from go-fast boats, fishing vessels, and narco-submarines to
container ships and commercial cargo fleets to move cocaine, synthetic
drugs, weapons, and human cargo into the United States.
In the first half of this fiscal year alone, the U.S. Coast Guard
has already seized and offloaded more cocaine than it did in all of
fiscal year 2024, a clear indicator that illicit maritime activity
remains a persistent challenge despite improved enforcement efforts.
The scale and sophistication of these operations require an equally
coordinated and capable response.
As the Representative of the Florida Keys and much of South
Florida, I know first-hand how vulnerable our maritime borders can be.
From the Caribbean to the Straits of Florida and up the Atlantic coast,
our region has long been a strategic target for smugglers and cartels
seeking to enter the United States undetected. The threat to our ports,
shipping routes, and coastal areas is not theoretical. It directly
affects the day-to-day security and economic stability of South
Florida.
Moreover, while most fentanyl still enters the United States
through land ports of entry, we cannot ignore the possibility that
maritime routes are being used to transport precursor chemicals or
synthetic opioids manufactured abroad. This is particularly concerning
given the well-documented role that entities based in the People's
Republic of China continue to play in supplying the chemical building
blocks used to manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. These synthetic opioids
are then trafficked into American communities, often with devastating
consequences.
Whether through negligence or indifference, Beijing has failed to
stop the flow of these chemicals, contributing to a crisis that now
claims the lives of tens of thousands of Americans each year.
To its credit, the Trump administration has made maritime security
a greater priority by investing in interdiction efforts, revitalizing
partnerships with key regional allies, and applying needed pressure on
adversarial regimes that threaten the safety of the Western Hemisphere.
These steps mark a welcome shift in our posture. But as this hearing
will show, more must be done.
We need a comprehensive maritime security strategy that includes
enhanced detection capabilities, more robust interagency coordination,
and expanded use of advanced technology to monitor, interdict, and
deter illicit maritime activity.
Today's hearing is an opportunity to assess how our Federal
agencies are responding to these evolving maritime threats. We will
hear from those on the front lines about what is working, where the
challenges remain, and what resources or authorities may be needed to
close remaining gaps.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. I look
forward to your insights and to a productive discussion on how we can
better protect our coasts, our communities, and our country from
illicit activity at sea.
Mr. Gimenez. I recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening
statements.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. Good morning to everyone.
Today's hearing provides an opportunity to discuss how
Trump's reckless orders are undermining homeland security and
making our communities less safe. Over the weekend, we saw
Trump Federalize the National Guard to respond to protests in
Los Angeles and threaten to deploy Marines on U.S. soil against
Americans. Trump is using every possible excuse to escalate the
situation and manufacture unnecessary confrontations.
In January, Trump and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi
Noem ordered the Coast Guard to triple its presence at U.S.
borders in an attempt to carry out their reckless immigration
policy. This redirection of troops to the border comes at great
cost to the Coast Guard's other critical missions. At a time
when levels of maritime migration are already down due to this
administration's essential ending asylum in the United States,
the Coast Guard is pulling assets and personnel from around the
globe to sit at the U.S. border. Critically, the Coast Guard
has redirected deployments from Indo-Pacific and Arctic
regions, from Congress has invested heavily on a bipartisan
basis in the Coast Guard's capacity to counter aggression from
China and Russia. Reducing our activities in the Indo-Pacific
and the Arctic undermines our long-term strategic interests and
ultimately makes us less safe.
Worse yet, the Trump administration is diverting the Coast
Guard's limited aviation fleet to assist with deportations. The
Coast Guard is flying immigrants internally within the United
States to relocate them to staging areas for deportation. This
is not the Coast Guard's mission. I repeat again, this is not
the Coast Guard's mission. These flights place major strain on
our Coast Guard aviation fleet, which already struggles to meet
the service's needs. Many Coast Guard aircrafts are from the
1980's and 1990's and suffer major maintenance and reliability
issues. Instead of replacing the oldest planes and helicopters
in the fleet, Secretary Noem is looking to acquire a new $50
million Gulfstream jet to replace 1 of 2 she already has
available for her use. Coast Guard aircraft were already
available for the service to use less than 70 percent of the
time before accounting for the new demands this administration
is making.
These planes and helicopters are essential to the Coast
Guard's mission from search and rescue to drug and migrant
interdictions. Operating flights in service of other agencies'
missions is the last thing the Coast Guard needs. Of course,
the Coast Guard is not the only agency diverting resources to
deportations above all else. The list of agencies reportedly
taking personnel away from their primary mission to focus on
deportation goes on and on, from Customs and Border
Protections; Homeland Security Investigations; the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Drug
Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives; the State Department's Diplomatic
Security Service; and the Internal Revenue Service. These
agencies are all pulling resources from their missions to help
deport immigrants, the vast and vast majority who are
nonviolent contributing members of our communities.
When it comes to undocumented immigrants, it does not
matter if they are elderly grandparents, sick children, or
Cubans, Haitians, or Venezuelans seeking refuge from violence.
Trump's orders are to try to deport them all, no matter the law
and no matter the cost. Is this really what the American people
want? I have my doubts for sure.
To those watching this hearing, I ask you, are you hoping
the Government will find and save you if you are stranded on a
roof during a hurricane season? I think you do. But sorry,
under Trump, the Coast Guard plane that would otherwise help
might be busy flying law-abiding immigrants away from their
communities.
Are you hoping the Government will investigate wealthy tax
cheats and make them pay their fair share? I am sure you hope
so. But sorry, under Trump, many of the agents who are supposed
to do that are busy deporting local farmers, construction
workers, community leaders, and caregivers.
Are you hoping Federal agents will investigate and stop the
worst of the worst, drug traffickers, armed smugglers, human
traffickers, and even child abusers? I am sure you do. But
sorry, under Trump, many of the agents who are supposed to do
that are busy deporting your friends and your neighbors. Those
are apparently the Federal Government's priorities with Trump
and Republicans in charge.
I want to thank our witnesses again for being here and I
look forward to today's discussion. With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver
June 10, 2025
Today's hearing provides an opportunity to discuss how President
Trump's reckless orders are undermining homeland security and making
our communities less safe. Over the weekend, we saw President Trump
nationalize the National Guard to respond to protests in Los Angeles
and threaten to deploy Marines on U.S. soil. Trump is using every
possible excuse to inflame the situation and manufacture unnecessary
confrontations.
In January, President Trump and Secretary Noem ordered the Coast
Guard to triple its presence at U.S. borders. This surge comes at great
cost to the Coast Guard's other critical missions.
At a time when levels of maritime migration are already down due to
this administration effectively ending asylum in the United States, the
Coast Guard is pulling assets and personnel from around the globe to
sit at the U.S. border. Critically, the Coast Guard has redirected
deployments from the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic--regions where
Congress has invested heavily on a bipartisan basis in the Coast
Guard's capacity to counter aggression from China and Russia.
Reducing our activities in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic
undermines our long-term strategic interests and ultimately makes us
less safe. Worse yet, the Trump administration is diverting the Coast
Guard's limited aviation fleet to assist with deportations. The Coast
Guard is flying immigrants internally within the United States to
relocate them to staging areas for deportation. This is not the Coast
Guard's mission.
These flights place major strain on the Coast Guard aviation fleet,
which already struggles to meet the service's needs. Many Coast Guard
aircraft are from the 80's and 90's and suffer major maintenance and
reliability issues. Instead of replacing the oldest planes and
helicopters in the fleet, Secretary Noem is looking to acquire a new
$50 million dollar Gulfstream jet to replace 1 of the 2 she already has
available for her use.
Coast Guard aircraft were already available for the service to use
less than 70 percent of the time before accounting for the new demands
this administration is making. These planes and helicopters are
essential to the Coast Guard's missions, from search and rescue to drug
and migrant interdictions. Operating flights in service of other
agencies' missions is the last thing the Coast Guard needs.
Of course, the Coast Guard is not the only agency diverting
resources to deportations above all else.
The list of agencies reportedly diverting personnel away from their
primary mission to support deportations goes on and on:
Customs and Border Protection
Homeland Security Investigations
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The U.S. Marshals Service
The Drug Enforcement Administration
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
The State Department's Diplomatic Security Service
The Internal Revenue Service.
These agencies are all pulling resources from their missions to
help deport immigrants--the vast, vast majority of whom are non-
violent, contributing members of our communities. When it comes to
undocumented immigrants, it does not matter if they are elderly
grandparents, sick children, or Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, or
Venezuelans seeking refuge from violence. President Trump's orders are
to try to deport them all, no matter the law and no matter the cost.
Is this really what the American people want? I have my doubts. To
those watching this hearing, I ask:
Are you hoping the Government will find and save you if you are
stranded on a roof during hurricane season?
Sorry--under President Trump, the Coast Guard plane that would
otherwise help just might be tied up with flying law-abiding immigrants
away from their communities.
Are you hoping the Government will investigate wealthy tax cheats
and make them pay their fair share?
Sorry--under President Trump, many of the agents who are supposed
to do that are busy deporting your local farmers, construction workers,
cleaners, and cooks.
Are you hoping Federal agents will investigate and stop the worst
of the worst drug traffickers, arms smugglers, human traffickers, and
child abusers?
Sorry--under President Trump, many of the agents who are supposed
to do that are busy deporting your friends and neighbors.
Those are apparently the Federal Government's priorities with
President Trump and Republicans in charge.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to Ranking Member McIver.
I now recognize the Chairman for the Subcommittee on Border
Security Enforcement, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Guest, for his opening statement.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by
responding to the opening statement of Mrs. McIver. I want the
record of this committee to be crystal clear that I and my
fellow Republicans, that we strongly condemn the senseless
violence and lawlessness that we have watched unfold in
California since last week. I want to commend the brave men and
women of our State, Federal, and local law enforcement, as well
as our National Guardsmen and our United States Marines who
have stepped up at a moment's notice to restore order and to
protect America from chaos while we reaffirm the rule of law.
It is a sad state of affairs when simply enforcing longstanding
immigration law is used to justify violent riots. Even more sad
that the far left is standing not with law enforcement, but
with rioters and with illegal aliens.
Today's hearing provides an opportunity to examine the
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to deter, detect, and
disrupt illicit maritime activities that have threatened our
national security and have undermined the rule of law. I want
to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today. Your
expertise in your field is vital as we examine the challenges
and as we seek to find solutions in securing America's vast
maritime domain.
From the Gulf of America to the shores of Alaska, the
United States' maritime border spans thousands of miles of
coastland. It is comprised of waterways, shipping routes, and
ports that facilitate commerce and play a vital role in our
national security defense. While our national maritime
geography is a strength, it also presents challenges. The
Caribbean and Pacific regions in particular have become prime
targets for cartels and criminal organizations. They use fast
boats, fishing vessels, semi-submersibles to evade detection
while moving narcotics, weapons, and human cargo into the
United States.
While President Trump has strengthened security along our
land border, achieving a remarkable 95 percent decrease in
daily border encounters within the administration's first
hundred days, we must continue to remain vigilant to the fact
that cartels are agile, they are adaptive. As enforcement
strengthens on land, these criminal networks are shifting their
operations to the sea. To counter these threats, the Department
of Homeland Security employs a whole-of-Government approach,
incorporating its Federal law enforcement partners on joint
maritime border security operations. Each of the components
with us today play a critical role in that effort.
The Coast Guard is our Nation's oldest continuous seagoing
service and is a cornerstone of maritime border security. With
a unique blend of military, law enforcement, regulatory, and
humanitarian roles, the United States Coast Guard is often the
first and only presence in remote maritime areas. It interdicts
vessels far from the United States' shore, often before threats
reach the homeland, and seize hundreds of thousands of pounds
of illicit drugs each year.
CBP's Air and Marine Operations is the Nation's only
Federal agency dedicated to aviation and marine law
enforcement. With a fleet of high-speed interceptors, coastal
patrol vessels, fixed-wing surveillance aircraft, and unmanned
aerial systems, AMO conducts complex interdiction missions
across the air and sea. Its mission is to safeguard the
American people and AMO is on the front lines of maritime
border security, providing critical intelligence and rapid-
response capabilities.
Homeland Security Investigation also plays a critical role
in maritime border security, primarily serving as the
investigative arm for transnational criminal activity. HSI
investigates transnational criminal organizations involved in a
broad range of crimes, such as trafficking narcotics and human
smuggling. This is truly a team effort with each agency
bringing in a unique skill set.
Success also relies on us working with our international
partners. To enhance these efforts, I have been working with
committee staff and intend to introduce legislation that would
enhance the presence and operation of CBP in foreign countries
working alongside other law enforcement agencies. This bill
would greatly expand CBP's capability for targeting threats
abroad before they reach our shore.
Let me be clear, border security does not stop at our land
border. DHS maritime operations have resulted in an untold
number of vessels being interdicted with aliens attempting to
illegally enter our country, as well as hundreds of thousands
of pounds of illicit drugs seized annually at our maritime
border. Securing our maritime border is essential to protecting
our national security. Confronting these threats protects the
safety of our families and communities across this great
Nation. I look forward to today's discussion and working with
my colleagues to find solutions that enhance and prioritize
maritime border security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Guest. I now recognize the
Ranking Member for the Subcommittee on Border Security
Enforcement, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, for
her opening statement.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez. Good morning. I
want to first start by thanking our witnesses for being here
today.
Despite the administration having so much to answer for,
today in our committee it is one of our first hearings with
Government officials outside of Secretary Noem that was with us
a couple weeks ago. I find it shameful that it took until June
for my colleagues to request that administration officials
appear before us, but I am certainly glad that you are finally
here.
Look, I agree that maritime security is important and we
certainly should be discussing how we are redirecting resources
to use them outside of the mission, as Mrs. McIver so
eloquently stated in her opening remarks. I would support
having a full hearing to discuss that if we were not in
extraordinary times. However, we are in extraordinary times.
Our communities, and I want to make sure we visualize this
because I know my colleagues are going to try to say the
opposite here, are being terrorized by the weaponization of the
Government and the military against U.S. citizens. The Trump
administration is using authoritarian tactics to incite fear
and chaos in our communities. Why? So they can further
weaponize the Government to exert control and suppress dissent.
Let's look at Los Angeles. Heavily-armed, masked agents
conducted military-style raids at places like Home Depots, a
donut shop, and a clothing wholesaler. These are purposely
inflammatory tactics meant to escalate violence and justify
further violations of our Constitutional rights and our civil
liberties. These kidnappings are targeting mothers, children,
and law-abiding neighbors who have contributed to our
communities for years and have complied with the course
requirements, attending check-in appointments when asked to do
so.
Do you know why I can tell you this with confidence?
Because that is what is happening in Chicago. I texted law-
abiding members of our community for unscheduled check-ins and
were told that within days they had to present themselves for a
check-in. When they showed up, many of them mothers, their case
was immediately dismissed, followed by ICE agents waiting for
them at the door to handcuff them, put them in freight
elevators, and rush them out in order to shove them into vans
while wearing masks. Can you imagine that was happening to one
of your family members? They are using text messages to call
people in to arrest the exact immigrants who are demonstrating
their commitment to the law by complying with ICE's
instructions. To me, that runs counter to every claim the Trump
administration has made, but it is consistent with reporting
that the administration's actual intent is to simply maximize
arrest.
For this administration let me be very clear, the terror is
the point. They are kidnapping people. They are tearing
families apart. They are deporting United States citizens,
including United States citizen children with cancer. They are
ignoring our right to due process and, in doing so, are making
mistakes they call administrative errors as they arrest and
deport people. Just last week, DHS had to return a Guatemalan
man wrongfully deported to Mexico, despite fearing he would be
persecuted there. They finally returned Kilmar Abrego Garcia to
the United States, who now faces what could be trumped-up
charges.
We have all heard about the others disappeared to a prison
in El Salvador based on allegations of being in a gang,
including Andry Hernandez Romero, a gay makeup artist, who
legally arrived to the United States the way many others have
for generations, seeking asylum. The only so-called evidence
this administration has given of him being in a gang is tattoos
of his parents' names with crowns.
But this administration's obsession with persecuting
immigrants and achieving their mass deportation means they are
using every resource they can, instead of keeping their
community safe, to terrorize them. We are seeing the CBP and
law enforcement agencies like FBI, DEA, and ATF focus on
rounding up law-abiding, contributing immigrants in their
communities. The message sent to our communities through these
actions are the Trump administration does not care if you are
complying with the law because they don't respect the rule of
law. They don't care if you have Constitutional rights because,
let's be honest, they don't respect the Constitution. They only
care about the arbitrary deportation quotas that have been set
by who? Stephen Miller.
Not only are these officers not doing the jobs they were
hired to do, you know, like pursuing child abusers,
investigating sex trafficking, or weapons smuggling, they are
terrorizing our communities while wearing masks. You know who
else wears? People committing crimes, executioners, prison
guards in CECOT, Klansmen, people who don't want to be held
accountable for what they do because they know their actions
violate the foundations of our shared humanity.
So, yes, we need oversight of this administration. The most
urgent need is to rein in the abuses of power that make all of
us less safe all over this country. Today, let me be clear,
they are violating immigrants' Constitutional rights. They are
stripping our communities of due process, and they are seeking
to separate us from our humanity. But here is what is
happening. They are testing our limits now because they intend
to use the same playbook next on anyone they deem undesirable.
This committee's responsibility is to oversight, not to the
President of the United States of America.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Ramirez follows:]
Statement of Honorable Delia C. Ramirez
June 10, 2025
Despite the administration having so much to answer for, today is
one of our committee's first hearing with Government officials, outside
of Secretary Noem a few weeks back. It is shameful that it took until
June for my colleagues to request that administration officials appear
before us. I am certainly glad that you are finally here.
I agree that maritime security is important. And we certainly
should be discussing the resources are being redirected outside of the
mission. And I would support having a full hearing to discuss this if
we were not in extraordinary times. However, we are in extraordinary
times. Our communities are being terrorized by the weaponization of the
Government and the military against U.S. citizens.
The Trump administration is using authoritarian tactics to incite
fear and chaos in our communities so they can further weaponize the
Government to exert control and suppress dissent. Let's look at Los
Angeles: Heavily-armed, masked agents conducted military-style raids at
places like Home Depot, a donut shop, and a clothing wholesaler. These
are purposefully inflammatory tactics meant to escalate violence and
justify further violations of our Constitutional rights and civil
liberties.
And these kidnappings are targeting mothers, children, and law-
abiding neighbors who have contributed to our communities for years and
have complied with the courts' requirements, attending check-in
appointments when asked to do so. Do you know why I can say that with
confidence? Because that's what is happening in Chicago.
ICE texted law-abiding members of our communities for unscheduled
check-ins and were told that within days they had to present themselves
for a check in. When they showed up, many of them mothers, their cases
were immediately dismissed followed by ICE agents waiting for them at
the door to handcuff them, put them in freight elevators, and rush them
out in order to shove them into vans while wearing masks. Can you
imagine if that happened to one of your family members?
They are using text messages to call people in to arrest the exact
immigrants who are demonstrating their commitment to the law by
complying with ICE's instructions. This runs counter to every claim the
Trump administration has made--but is consistent with reporting that
the administration's actual intent is to simply maximize arrests. For
this administration, let me very clear--the terror is the point.
They are kidnapping people. They are tearing families apart. They
are deporting U.S. citizens, including U.S. citizen children with
cancer. They are ignoring our right to due process and, in doing so,
are making mistakes they call administrative errors as they arrest and
deport people. Just last week, DHS had to return a Guatemalan man
wrongfully deported to Mexico despite fearing he would be persecuted
there.
And they finally returned Kilmar Abrego Garcia to the United
States, who now faces what could be trumped-up charges.
We've all heard about the others disappeared to a prison in El
Salvador, based on allegations of being in a gang--including Andry
Hernandez Romero, a gay makeup artist who legally arrived to the United
States seeking asylum. The only so-called evidence this administration
has given of him being in a gang is tattoos of his parents' names with
crowns.
But this administration's obsession with persecuting immigrants and
achieving their mass deportations means they are using every resource
they can to, instead of keeping our communities safe, to terrorize
them. We're seeing the CBP and law enforcement agencies like the FBI,
DEA, and ATF focus on rounding up law-abiding, contributing immigrants
in our communities.
The message sent to our communities through these actions are:
The Trump administration does not care if you are complying with
the law because they do not respect the rule of law. They do not care
if you have Constitutional rights because they do not respect the
Constitution. They only care about the arbitrary deportation quotas set
by Steven Miller.
Not only are these officers NOT doing the jobs they were hired to
do--like pursuing child abusers, investigating sex trafficking, or
weapons smuggling--they are terrorizing our communities while wearing
masks . . . You know who else wears masks--people committing crimes,
executioners, prison guards in CECOT, Klansmen. People who don't want
to be held accountable for what they do because they know their actions
violate the foundations of our shared humanity. So, we need oversight
of this administration. And the most urgent need is to rein in the
abuses of power that make all of us less safe all over this country.
Today, they are violating immigrants' Constitutional rights,
stripping our communities of due process, and they are seeking to
separate us from our humanity. They are testing the limits now because
they intend to use this same playbook next on anyone they deem
undesirable. This committee's responsibility is to oversight and not to
the President of the United States of America.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members of
the committee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 10, 2025
I am glad the subcommittees are holding this hearing to help
examine how the Trump administration's policies and practices are
affecting illicit maritime activities. I have sat on this committee
since its inception. I believe deeply in the Department of Homeland
Security's mission statement which states, ``With Honor and integrity,
we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.''
I wish the Trump administration believed in this mission as strongly as
my fellow Democrats and I do.
The actions of this administration are completely devoid of honor
and integrity, and our homeland is less safe as a result. Just this
past weekend, we witnessed President Trump send the military to the
streets of Los Angeles to stop protests against immigration raids.
This is the same President who, in 2021, sat on his hands and
laughed as actual insurrectionists stormed the Capitol Building, beat
cops with weapons, broke windows, destroyed property, and looked to
capture and kill elected officials. Trump would not call the National
Guard when the police who protect this Capitol were being beaten to a
pulp, but he did not hesitate to unnecessarily send them to Los
Angeles.
Additionally, over the weekend, the Ranking Member of our Border
Security and Enforcement Subcommittee, Congressman Correa, along with
several other Members, were turned away from an ICE facility when they
arrived to conduct oversight, in yet another example of the Trump-Noem
DHS not following the law.
We are also witnessing the Trump administration pulling agents and
officers off their regular duties to focus on deporting non-criminals--
which takes them away from investigations into actual criminals and is
making us less safe. Under this administration, HSI agents have less
time to investigate child traffickers, gun smuggling, drug running, and
other crimes because they are dedicated to deportations. The
administration's direction for the Coast Guard is likewise misguided.
Secretary Noem stated in the Coast Guard's new Force Design 2028
plan that the Coast Guard ``is fragile, in crisis, and on a path to
failure . . . The Service is in a downward readiness spiral that is
unsustainable. Without change, the Coast Guard will fail''. So, what
changes has Secretary Noem implemented to address this crisis and keep
the Coast Guard from failing?
Most immediately, Secretary Noem is trying to have the Coast Guard
fund a new $50 million Gulfstream V jet for her to use, even as the
service has many older aircraft in more urgent need of replacement. For
an administration that is supposedly uncovering waste, fraud, and
abuse, this request reeks to high heaven. Beyond that request,
Secretary Noem has directed the Coast Guard to surge its limited
resources away from its many critical missions, including in the Indo-
Pacific and the Arctic.
Instead of using all available resources to counter Russia and
China, the Coast Guard is now in the shuttle service business, flying
gardeners, cooks, farmhands, and housecleaners from ICE detention
centers to deportation staging facilities. It is a disservice to our
constituents to divert our brave Coast Guard service members from life-
saving missions to make them operate the Greyhound of the sky.
The Trump administration is placing deportations above all else,
which undermines our homeland security and makes us all less safe. This
administration does not represent the values on which this country was
built, nor those on which the Department of Homeland Security was
founded. To put it in maritime terms, President Trump and Secretary
Noem have missed the boat. We in Congress need to help DHS correct
course to meet its mission.
Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that
our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Jonathan Miller is the executive assistant commissioner for Air
and Maritime Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Mr. Miller brings over 28 years of Federal law enforcement and
leadership experience. He began his career with U.S. Border
Patrol in San Diego, serving on the Special Response Team and
Border Patrol Tactical Unit before transferring to the Miami
sector for maritime patrols. That is a pretty nice sector. In
2007, he joined Air and Marine Operations in Miami, advancing
through various roles, including vessel commander, marine
instructor supervisor, marine interdiction agent, and several
senior executive positions before assuming his current role.
Rear Admiral Adam Chamie assumed the role of Coast Guard
assistant commandant for response policy in May 2024,
overseeing strategic doctrine and policy for 7 of the Coast
Guard's 11 operational missions, including law enforcement and
maritime security. A 1996 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy,
Rear Admiral Chamie has commanded 3 Coast Guard cutters and
served on 3 others, conducting operations from the Bering Sea
to the Arabian Gulf. His prior ashore assignments include
commander of Sector Key West, chief of Congressional affairs,
and Coast Guard liaison to the House of Representatives.
James C. Harris is the assistant director, Countering
Transnational Organized Crime at Homeland Security
Investigations. In this position, he develops and executes
strategies aimed at disrupting and dismantling criminal
networks and works alongside policy makers to improve laws and
regulations that strengthen HSI's efforts in combating
transnational organized crime. Prior to this assignment, Mr.
Harris served as the director of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security's Center for Countering Human Trafficking.
Heather MacLeod is a director in the Government
Accountability Office, Homeland Security and Justice Team. She
oversees Coast Guard and maritime security issues, including
Coast Guard work force and strategic planning efforts, and
maritime port and supply chain cargo security. Heather joined
GAO in 2002, and has led projects examining aviation safety,
airline competition, transit programs, and highway bridge
management.
I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here
today.
I now recognize Mr. Miller for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN P. MILLER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Miller. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking
Member McIver, Ranking Member Ramirez, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before
you today on behalf of the men and women of Air and Marine
Operations, or AMO, to discuss our critical role in the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's comprehensive approach to
maritime border security.
The maritime domain presents unique national security
challenges. Unlike air and land environments, coastal waters
are vast and less restricted. Countless vessels enter or
operate in U.S. territorial waters every day, making detection
of illegal activity and apprehending associated smugglers
challenging. Many smuggling crafts hide in plain sight amongst
legitimate traffic while others transit remote areas far
offshore, trying to elude detection altogether.
Smugglers also use a variety of vessels tailored to the
area and amounts of contraband they are smuggling to best evade
detection. Vessels are also much faster than they were 20 years
ago today, often leaving law enforcement little time to
interdict them before reaching our shores.
Immediately following the President's declaration of a
national emergency at the Southern Border, AMO, in concert with
other CBP and DHS partners took action, realigning vessels and
aircraft patrols in anticipation of increased maritime activity
due to the decrease in illegal crossings at the land borders.
In Southern California, we've seen a 30 percent increase in
vessel seizures and over 100 percent increase in maritime
apprehensions since January compared to the same time frame
last year.
Additionally, maritime drug smuggling activity is a
perpetual and dangerous threat to U.S. border security. Of the
234,000 pounds of drugs AMO seized in 2024, approximately 76
percent occurred in the maritime environment.
In addition to high maritime drug interdiction rates,
smuggler aggression and violence has also been on the rise.
Noncompliant boardings and instances where we forcibly disabled
the engines of smuggling vessels to get them to stop has
exponentially risen in the past few years. In November 2022, 3
of my Marine agents were shot and one of them, Michael Maceda,
was killed during a vessel stop of smugglers off the coast of
Puerto Rico.
AMO deploys a fleet of some of the most powerful law
enforcement marine interceptors in the world. Evolving to meet
today's threats, we've recently repowered these vessels and
made other modifications to this platform for a perfect mix of
speed, agility, and agent safety. I appreciate the committee's
support in these recapitalization efforts.
AMO also maintains a fleet of aircraft functionally
designed and outfitted for maritime detection and surveillance.
Our P3s, -8s, and MQ-9 UAS aircraft are capable of long-range,
high-endurance CONUS and OCONUS patrols, while the Super King
Air 350 further expands aerial surveillance in the littorals of
the United States and the Caribbean. AMO is heavily invested in
a variety of tethered aerostats, towers, and tactical systems
providing radar and sensor capabilities, significantly
increasing our domain awareness along our littoral borders, and
the maritime approaches around the continental United States,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning play a
critical part in filtering nefarious from legitimate traffic
activity and we've had success in using this technology to
build algorithms identifying patterns to filter the sheer
volume of traffic.
Once again, I'd like to thank the Members of this committee
for supporting these critical efforts and further acquisitions
that will ultimately enable 24/7 domain awareness of
prioritized maritime littoral approaches.
The scale and complexity of countering drug trafficking and
human smuggling in the maritime environment requires
partnerships and collaboration. In addition, to the U.S. Coast
Guard, AMO routinely works with Federal, State, local, and
foreign partners, and has been one of the largest contributors
of flight hours to Joint Interagency Task Force South,
supporting counter narcotics operations and the vast 42 million
square mile sourcing transit zones.
With few exceptions, AMO's maritime law enforcement
authority is limited to Customs' waters or 12 nautical miles
from the coastline of the United States. CBP continues to work
with Congress on legislative changes to extend the Customs'
waters from 12 to 24 nautical miles. This extension of law
enforcement authorities would enable AMO to expand patrols,
increasing our ability to save lives at sea, conduct
counternarcotics operations, support our partners, and carry
out the border security mission.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller
June 10, 2025
introduction
Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, it is a
privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), Air and Marine Operations' unwavering commitment to
interdicting illegal drugs, preventing human smuggling, and securing
our Nation's borders, maritime domain, and approaches. As a front-line
law enforcement component of CBP, Air and Marine Operations operates in
source and transit zones, between ports of entry, in coastal waters,
and interior waterways.
Born out of the legacy U.S. Customs Service, Air and Marine
Operations was established in 2006 as an integral part of CBP's
comprehensive border security mission and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-layered approach to national
security. Air and Marine Operations agents are Federal law enforcement
officers \1\ with a broad range of legal authorities, specialized
assets, and unique operational capabilities that enable them to detect
and interdict illegal activity at and beyond our Nation's borders in
the land, air, and sea domains, providing a critical layer of
continuity in border security operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 6 U.S.C. 211(f); 19 U.S.C. 1589a; 8 U.S.C 1357.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
state of the maritime border
While CBP reasserts control of our borders \2\ in accordance with
President Trump's directives, transnational criminal organizations and
foreign terrorist organizations continue their efforts to smuggle
people and contraband into our country. These organizations operate
with immense capability, capacity, and nearly unlimited resources.
Their smuggling operations are sophisticated, and they continually
adjust their tactics, techniques, and routes to circumvent detection
and interdiction by law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/04/28/100-days-most-secure-
border-american-history.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illicit activity in the maritime environment is a threat to U.S.
border and national security. The maritime domain is generally less
restricted than the air and land environments. Thousands of vessels
enter or operate in U.S. territorial waters every day. Detecting
illegal activity can be challenging, as many smuggling craft hide in
plain sight among legitimate traffic, while others transit remote areas
far offshore to try to elude detection. Additionally, smugglers use a
variety of craft tailored to the area and cargo they are smuggling,
including modified fishing boats, go-fast vessels, pangas,\3\ low-
profile vessels, and semi-submersibles. Vessels are much faster than
they were 20 years ago, often leaving law enforcement little time to
interdict them before reaching our shores.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A small boat, often used for fishing, and typically powered by
an outboard motor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Encounters with smugglers can also be extremely dangerous. Since
its creation in 2006, Air and Marine Operations has used disabling fire
on the engines of fleeing smuggler vessels nearly 350 times.
Additionally, in November 2022, 3 Air and Marine Operations Marine
Interdiction Agents were shot--and one of them, Michel Maceda,
tragically killed--during a vessel stop off the coast of Puerto
Rico.\4\ Precise engagement and rapid neutralization of risk is key to
safely resolving water-based law enforcement actions. Air and Marine
Operations continually refines its maritime interdiction capabilities
and tactics to meet ever evolving threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
air and marine operations' maritime border security operations
Air and Marine Operations remains at the forefront of the Nation's
efforts to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration through the
maritime domain. Immediately following President Trump's declaration of
a national emergency at the Southern Border, Air and Marine
Operations--in concert with our other CBP and DHS partners--took action
to expand its maritime enforcement efforts and safeguard the American
people.
With the historic decrease in illegal crossings in the land
environment, Air and Marine Operations realigned maritime aircraft and
increased patrols, resulting in a 90 percent increase in maritime
apprehensions of illegal aliens in Southern California.\5\ Since
January 21, 2025, Air and Marine Operations enforcement efforts across
all our maritime operational environments have led to the apprehension
of over 750 aliens, with 60 percent occurring in South Florida and the
Caribbean Sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ From January 21, 2025-May 19, 2025, compared to the same date
range in 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aliens attempting to make the journey to the United States along
maritime routes take an enormous risk, putting their lives in the hands
of transnational criminal organizations, foreign terrorist
organizations, or other human smuggling networks and often in unsafe,
rustic vessels. The weather at sea is unpredictable, and the vessels
that make it far enough for Air and Marine Operations to encounter are
often dangerously overloaded with illegal aliens. Air and Marine
Operations encounters with these vessels typically become rescue
missions in addition to apprehension actions. Just last month, Air and
Marine Operations responded to reports of an overturned panga-style
boat that washed ashore in San Diego.\6\ At least 3 people died,
including 1 child. Another child on board was never recovered and is
presumed dead. Not only was the vessel unsuitable for the quantity of
people on board, but it was also incapable of handling the perilous sea
conditions. This event was another tragic reminder of how smugglers
operate with total disregard for human life. Secretary Noem is seeking
capital punishment for these crimes.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/five-charged-human-
smuggling-event-led-least-three-deaths.
\7\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/05/06/secretary-noem-requests-
death-penalty-against-alleged-human-smugglers-whose-actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to responding to increasing numbers of maritime alien
encounters, Air and Marine Operations continues to intercept tons of
dangerous illicit drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and
communities. In fiscal year 2024, Air and Marine Operations enforcement
efforts led to the seizure of 233,662 pounds of illegal drugs.\8\
Approximately 76 percent of these drugs--including more than 160,000
pounds of cocaine, 15,000 pounds of marijuana, and 170 pounds of
methamphetamine--were intercepted in the maritime environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/
air-and-marine-operations-statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air and Marine Operations remains vigilant and continually adjusts
our operations as transnational criminal organizations, foreign
terrorist organizations, and human smugglers seek to shift their
criminal activities from long-standing land-based pathways to
alternative maritime routes.
maritime enforcement authorities
Despite Air and Marine Operations' unique cross-domain law
enforcement capabilities, in the maritime environment, Air and Marine
Operations' maritime law enforcement authority \9\ is generally limited
\10\ to areas within the historical ``customs waters''\11\--or 12
nautical miles from the coastline--of the United States. This
constraint limits Air and Marine Operations' ability to effectively
counter current and evolving modern threats in the maritime
environment. Specifically, as modern technology continues to change and
advance rapidly, the performance and speed of maritime vessels
improves, including those used to violate U.S. law or evade U.S. law
enforcement. These advancements render Air and Marine Operations'
authority to operate only within the 12-nautical-mile zone inadequate,
placing our law enforcement capability at a significant disadvantage
and often preventing Air and Marine Operations' interdiction of vessels
in time to prevent their escape.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See, e.g. 19 U.S.C. 1581, 1587, 1589a.
\10\ In certain circumstances, Air and Marine Operations is
authorized to operate on the high seas, for instance when enforcing
laws on U.S. registered vessels (19 C.F.R. 162.3), hovering vessels
(19 U.S.C. 1401(k); 19 U.S.C. 1587(a)), and vessels subject to hot
pursuit (19 U.S.C. 1581(d)). Additionally, beyond the customs waters,
Air and Marine Operations may enforce the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (46 U.S.C. 70501-70502), where appropriate.
\11\ 19 U.S.C. 1401(j), 1709(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP appreciates our continuing collaboration with Congress on
legislative changes that would extend the limits of customs waters.
Expansion of Air and Marine Operations' authority to operate, through
the extension of the 12-nautical-mile customs waters, would enable Air
and Marine Operations to better leverage its cross-domain authorities,
enhance its detection of and response to the modern and sophisticated
capabilities of smugglers and transnational criminal organizations, and
better support its law enforcement partners in the maritime
environment.
interdiction assets, capabilities, and technology
Air and Marine Operations is committed to its maritime security
mission and continues to make investments in its highly-trained agents,
vessels, aircraft, and technological capabilities to advance the
effectiveness of its operations. These investments not only support Air
and Marine Operations' on-going ability to effectively respond to
illegal drug activity in the maritime environment but also contribute
to other Air and Marine Operations enforcement actions, including those
that led to over 1,000 arrests as well as the seizure of 1,500 weapons
and $12.6 million in U.S. currency in fiscal year 2024.
Specialized law enforcement personnel are essential to Air and
Marine Operations' maritime border security mission. These highly-
skilled agents must be capable of not only enforcing a broad range of
U.S. laws, but also safely and effectively doing so in the complex--and
often dangerous--maritime environment. While recruitment for these
positions can be challenging, Air and Marine Operations is actively
pursuing opportunities to attract and onboard qualified talent at all
levels of experience. We are focused on maximizing the capacity of our
marine units in the Caribbean, South Florida, and Southern California
where we have a high tempo of maritime activity.
Vessels tailored for Air and Marine Operations' specific law
enforcement operations are a key aspect of its maritime border security
mission. For example, Air and Marine Operations deploys a fleet of
high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels engineered for rapid pursuit and
interdiction of non-compliant vessels. These vessels are crewed by
highly-trained agents authorized to use all necessary force, including
warning shots and disabling fire, to stop fleeing vessels.
In addition to our maritime interdiction efforts with our marine
interceptors on the water, we also contribute a significant amount of
air assets to these operations. Air and Marine Operations' fleet of
maritime patrol aircraft are functionally designed and outfitted for
maritime detection and surveillance. The P-3s and
DHC-8 aircraft provide long-range, high-endurance capabilities in
remote source and transit zones while the Super King Air 350 Multi-Role
Enforcement Aircraft further expand aerial surveillance, closing
detection and enforcement gaps in the Caribbean. Equipped with advanced
sensors, communications, and radar systems, these aircraft are credited
with the interdiction of 150,380 pounds of cocaine and 11,670 flight
hours within the Western Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2024,
which equated to 13 pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour.
The use of unmanned aircraft systems in the maritime environment
has also increased Air and Marine Operations' ability to effectively
identify, detect, monitor, and track conveyances involved in illegal
activity. In partnership with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate,
Air and Marine Operations modified 2 MQ-9s to Big Wing variants,
significantly increasing fuel capacity and flight endurance. These Big
Wing aircraft have the added ability to surveil surface targets much
longer while awaiting interdiction surface forces to arrive. Air and
Marine Operations has been employing unmanned aircraft systems in the
maritime environment since 2020, contributing to the seizure of over
81,000 pounds of cocaine and 46,000 pounds of marijuana.
Air and Marine Operations is heavily invested in a variety of
ground-based radars and sensors increasing maritime domain awareness
along our littoral borders. We strategically deployed several maritime
approach surveillance towers in the Caribbean Basin that overlap to
provide persistent wide-area surveillance and detection capabilities in
high-risk areas. Additionally, we've taken tethered aerostats
traditionally used for air detection and integrated maritime surface
radars to utilize them in support of maritime interdiction operations.
These tools have significantly increased our situational awareness of
the maritime approaches around Puerto Rico, South Texas into the Gulf
of America, and the Florida Straits. Other tower and ground-based radar
systems have provided additional radar detection around Puerto Rico and
U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, and the Great Lakes. Over the last
3 years, these systems have cumulatively contributed to the seizure of
over 17,200 pounds of cocaine, 15,600 pounds of illegally obtained
marine life from illicit fishing practices, and $2 million in U.S.
currency.
Advanced technology, including the BigPipe real-time video system
and the Minotaur mission integration system, link Air and Marine
Operations' tactical assets, aircraft, and vessels, thereby providing
Air and Marine Operations with a streamlined and efficient information-
collecting and -sharing capability. The Air and Marine Operations
Center simultaneously tracks, processes, and integrates multiple sensor
feeds and sources of information to provide comprehensive domain
awareness in support of CBP's border security mission.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning initiatives at Air and
Marine Operations are improving threat detection efforts by processing
vast amounts of surveillance data in real time. By leveraging
artificial intelligence, Air and Marine Operations is advancing the
efficiency and effectiveness of our maritime domain awareness. In areas
where there is a high concentration of recreational vessels, Air and
Marine Operations uses artificial intelligence technology to assist in
filtering nefarious from recreational traffic. We have had success in
using this technology to build algorithms that can identify patterns
among a high volume of tracks on the radar.
Air and Marine Operations will continue to modernize its fleet and
sensor systems to enhance its data analysis capabilities and
operational performance in diverse marine environments and increase its
ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the maritime border and
approaches to the United States.
operational coordination
Using a whole-of-Government approach, Air and Marine Operations
leverages interagency partnerships through the Global Maritime
Operational Threat Response Coordination Center including the U.S.
Coast Guard, Department of State, Department of Defense, as well as
collaborations with other State, local, Tribal, and foreign partners.
Air and Marine Operations works closely with DHS Joint Task Force East
and is one of the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint
Interagency Task Force South, supporting counternarcotics operations in
the 42 million square miles of source and transit zones spanning the
Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean. Frequent cooperation with foreign
partners is imperative. Over the last few years, Air and Marine
Operations has increased its focus on the Eastern Caribbean and
strengthened partnerships in the Lesser Antilles, creating a force
multiplier of surveillance and interdiction assets throughout the
southern approaches to Puerto Rico.
conclusion
Since its creation in 2006, Air and Marine Operations has evolved
into one of the world's largest civilian forces for aviation and
maritime law enforcement. A critical component of CBP's border security
mission, Air and Marine Operations monitors and patrols vast areas of
air, sea, and land around the clock, defending the United States
against threats at and beyond our borders.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
I now recognize Rear Admiral Chamie for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statements.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ADAM A. CHAMIE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Chamie. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman
Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking Member Ramirez, and
Members of the committee. I request my written testimony be
submitted for the record.
Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
Admiral Chamie. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your enduring
support for the Coast Guard and the men and women who volunteer
to serve. The Coast Guard is busier than ever and laser-focused
on border security. Following the President's declaration of a
national emergency at the Southern Border, the Coast Guard
surged aircraft, cutters, boats, and people. We tripled our
force laydown and we made it clear that our highest mission
priority was to achieve full operational control of the
maritime border.
The Coast Guard works closely with the DOD, Joint Force,
DHS components, and the U.S. interagency. Together, we
synchronize operations with the singular goal to protect our
territorial integrity and our Nation's sovereign interests. I'd
like to highlight 3 ways we control, secure, and defend our
U.S. borders and maritime approaches.
First, we deter and interdict illegal aliens attempting to
reach the United States by sea. The aliens typically depart
countries like Haiti, Cuba, the Bahamas, and Mexico, but they
vary in nationality from across the globe. They use everything
from handmade wooden boats to sail freighters to speedboats to
sport fishers to jet skis. Frequently, these smuggling ventures
are organized by transnational criminal organizations or
cartels. In the past 5 months, we've interdicted almost 1,000
illegal aliens.
The second way we defend our U.S. borders is by going toe-
to-toe with the cartels who smuggle drugs into our country.
This fiscal year, our crews have removed 160 metric tons of
cocaine and detained over 300 smugglers. This past February, we
surpassed the amount of drugs we removed in all of fiscal year
2024. The cartels are working hard, but our Coast Guard crews
are working harder.
The interdiction of cocaine matters because the same
cartels who smuggle cocaine produce and smuggle fentanyl. Once
we detain the smugglers, we work with our partners and the
intelligence community to determine who these criminals are and
how and where these cartels operate. Cocaine is the cash crop
for cartels. Their huge profits from cocaine fund other
nefarious activities like human trafficking, weapons smuggling,
and production of synthetic drugs. Fentanyl remains the leading
cause of drug-related deaths in our country, but cocaine still
kills upwards of 25,000 Americans every year.
The third way the Coast Guard defends our border is at our
ports and waterways in both physical space and cyber space. The
United States is home to 361 commercial ports that facilitate
$4.6 trillion in commerce--correction, $4.6 trillion in
commerce each year. Our ports create incredible economic
opportunity, but they also present a significant risk if not
properly hardened. We work across the intelligence community
and with partners, like Customs and Border Protection, to
identify and mitigate those threats.
Our Coast Guard men and women are doing a great job, but
our efforts are not sustainable. We are at the lowest state of
readiness since World War II. To overcome this crisis Secretary
Noem has directed us to transform the Coast Guard into a more
agile, capable, and responsive force. Without change, the Coast
Guard will fail. We will not fail.
The Secretary's plan to revolutionize the Coast Guard is
called Force Design 28. Under this plan and with the support of
Congress and the administration, we will transform from the top
down. We will establish a service secretary like the other
military services. We will streamline command and control to
make us more agile, a more agile fighting force that empowers
our operators to make decisions.
We will grow our service by at least 15,000 people to
restore readiness and operate new ships, aircraft, and
technology to improve operations and deliver mission results.
Finally, we will streamline our contracting and acquisitions to
deliver the capabilities our crews need at speed.
The Coast Guard is extremely grateful to this Congress for
their support to include the $21.2 billion in reconciliation
passed by the House. The Coast Guard's future depends on
reconciliation and an increase in our top-line budget. Since
1790, the Coast Guard has ensured our national sovereignty and
protected our shores. With your support, we will do it for
another 235 years.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Chamie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie
introduction
Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today. I am thankful for your
enduring support of the United States Coast Guard and honored to be
here today to discuss the Service's role in controlling, securing, and
defending America's maritime border.
The United States is a maritime nation with 95,000 miles of
shoreline and 361 commercial ports connecting 25,000 miles of navigable
channels facilitating the flow of $5.4 trillion dollars of maritime
economic commerce. More than 90 percent of overseas trade cargo enters
or leaves the United States by ship. As a vital instrument of national
power within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard
is 1 of the 6 military services, a Federal law enforcement agency, and
member of the intelligence community. We control, secure, and defend
the U.S. border and maritime approaches from maritime threats; ensure
the safe and secure flow of commerce; respond to natural disasters; and
save lives. I am pleased to share with you how we leverage our unique
authorities, capabilities, and relationships with international,
Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, and how we operationalize a
layered approach to securing our maritime border and protecting our
communities from Transnational Criminal Organizations and other
maritime threats.
Transnational Criminal Organizations pose a significant threat to
our Nation's maritime border security, as they operate across national
boundaries, smuggling illicit drugs like cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and
methamphetamine into the United States, bringing violence, death,
destruction, and crime into our communities. These commodities provide
lucrative revenue streams that fund terrorism and other nefarious
activities such as the trafficking of people, weapons, and illicit
goods, destabilizing the region and promoting illegal migration--we
must continue to take action against these organizations. No single
agency can dismantle this threat alone.
u.s. coast guard authorities, responsibilities, & capabilities
The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law
enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas; we share the
lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The Coast Guard partners with the
Department of Defense through Joint Interagency Task Force--South for
detection and monitoring of illicit drugs bound for the United States.
Coast Guard drug interdictions historically focused on cocaine and
marijuana, and serve the whole-of-Government effort to combat
Transnational Criminal Organizations. Cocaine interdictions at sea cut
off a critical source of funding for the same Transnational Criminal
Organizations that produce and smuggle fentanyl, and in turn impair
their efforts to produce and smuggle fentanyl into the United States.
Furthermore, our Coast Guard Intelligence personnel work closely with
our Intelligence Community partners to combat Transnational Criminal
Organizations that threaten the United States.
Coast Guard forces deploy to the 2 major drug transit corridors in
the Western Hemisphere, the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, to deter,
detect, and interdict maritime drug trafficking events. Coast Guard
deployments are complementary to U.S. Navy, Canadian, British, and
Dutch naval deployments with embarked Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Detachments, capitalizing on the Coast Guard's authorities and
expertise to interdict narcotics before they approach our borders.
These surface assets are supported by Coast Guard, CBP Air and
Marine Operations, U.S. Navy, and Dutch fixed-wing aircraft, and are of
critical importance to the detection and monitoring of these
Transnational Criminal Organizations. This has proven to be a
successful approach and asset composition.
In addition to our at-sea assets and Law Enforcement Detachments,
the Coast Guard maintains a physical presence in 30 countries around
the world to serve in various capacities to include security
cooperation officers, maritime advisors, attaches, liaisons,
interdiction and prosecution team support, or technical experts.
Through these integrated touchpoints, we work with our partners to
identify challenges to overcome and opportunities to increase their
capabilities to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations inside
their own borders and maritime jurisdictional zones. The Coast Guard
maintains more than 40 bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements
that enable operations on partner-nation-flagged vessels suspected of
illicit trafficking on the high seas and in waters subject to their
jurisdiction. These types of international activities enable partner
nations to increase the expertise of their workforce, enhance their
maritime capabilities, and empower regional countries to lead
coordinated efforts to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations at
the source.
Along the U.S. coast, the Service's sectors, boat stations, air
stations, and patrol boat fleet provides an integrated law enforcement
capability that protects our shores from invasion. These assets and
skilled personnel work closely with interagency partners to identify
and interdict illegal smuggling activities that seek to traffic drugs
and aliens across the border.
Approximately 80 percent of drug seizures each year occur in the
maritime domain in operations executed by the Coast Guard and its
interagency and international partners. Year-over-year, seizures by
Coast Guard personnel account for roughly 50 percent of all drug
seizures by U.S. law enforcement conducted in the transit and arrival
zones. In fiscal year 2024, the Coast Guard removed over 106 metric
tons of cocaine, bringing our 6-year total to 873.5 metric tons
removed. To date in fiscal year 2025, the Coast Guard has removed 135
metric tons of cocaine from the maritime domain, including a February
offload of over 16.9 metric tons of cocaine worth over $275 million
that will never hit the streets and poison the American people. Our
layered approach to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations as far
away from U.S. shores as practical is successful only through security
cooperation and integrated deployments and engagements.
southeast border & maritime approaches
The southeast maritime approaches to the United States experience
significantly higher levels of irregular maritime migration than other
maritime vectors and present the greatest risk of a mass migration
event. Primary nationalities encountered in this region are Cubans,
Haitians, and Dominicans. Cuban and Haitian aliens primarily use
transit routes into Florida directly or via the Bahamas. Dominican and
some Haitian aliens tend to transit routes across the Mona Passage to
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Common conveyances used in
this region range from fishing vessels, coastal freighters, sail
freighters, go-fast type vessels, or rudimentary vessels called
``rusticas.'' With the leadership of the DHS Secretary, the Coast Guard
maintains an increased and active presence in these regularly-transited
vectors to quickly respond to reports of suspicious vessels by
international, Federal, State, and local partners, and deter departures
from countries of origin.
southwest border & maritime approaches
The southwest maritime border vector continues to record above-
average illegal maritime migration events, but not to the same
historical magnitude as in the southeastern maritime approaches.
However, human smugglers rely primarily on ``panga''-style personal
watercraft and makeshift vessels with a capacity of approximately 30
aliens to continuously attempt illegal entries. Although aliens with a
variety of nationalities are interdicted in this vector, the vast
majority are Mexican. The Coast Guard relies heavily on CBP, our
partners for processing.
the gulf of america
In the Gulf of America, illegal maritime migration events are
organized and facilitated by human smuggling networks. In response to
the national emergency on the border, the Coast Guard surged assets to
the Rio Grande and is leveraging the capabilities of our deployable
specialized forces to assist the United States Border Patrol in
detecting and deterring aliens attempting to illegally cross the river.
In fiscal year 2025, the Coast Guard has interdicted or deterred over
50 illegal aliens in the region. In these cases, the Coast Guard works
with regional interagency partners to transfer interdicted aliens
ashore to CBP.
Due to a perceived lack of legal consequences, illegal fishing
activity by Mexican small craft fishing boats (``lanchas'') in our
Exclusive Economic Zone has continued to increase over the last 25
years, with the recidivism rate of many offenders exceeding 90 percent.
One recently apprehended offender was previously caught by the Coast
Guard more than 40 times. The Coast Guard has worked diligently with
the interagency over the last several months to address this issue by
enabling criminal prosecution of lancha crews. In one of the first
cases pursued with this new approach, on May 13, 2025, a grand jury in
Brownsville, Texas indicted 4 suspects for illegally harvesting red
snapper in U.S. waters.
northern border
The Northern Border is expansive and diverse, with numerous islands
and waterways. The short distances between United States and Canadian
territorial seas create unique opportunities for nefarious actors to
exploit vulnerable maritime areas with a relatively small law
enforcement presence. Maritime security threats along the Northern
Border include both illegal maritime migration and drug trafficking.
To combat these threats and secure our Northern Border, the Coast
Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have developed a program to
train and designate law enforcement officers to co-crew boats and
aircraft to enforce Canadian and United States Federal laws on either
side of the shared border. These operations provide the ability to
share encrypted Automatic Identification System data to vastly improve
cross-border domain awareness and provide a common tactical picture.
Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Mounted Police teams conducted 123
cross-border operations in fiscal year 2024, resulting in over 500
boardings, 15 violations, and actively deterred illicit activity. This
program exemplifies the collaborative efforts between the Coast Guard,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CBP, and other State and local law
enforcement working in concert to prevent Transnational Criminal
Organizations from exploiting our Northern Border and endangering the
American people.
combatting fentanyl
Combatting Fentanyl and its illegal precursors is one of the
administration's top priorities and the Coast Guard has taken
significant action. Fentanyl has been the leading cause of U.S. drug-
related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70 percent of
U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican Transnational Criminal
Organizations are the primary source of synthetic opioid flow into the
United States, predominantly across our Southwest Border. While bulk
fentanyl has not been encountered in the maritime domain, the Coast
Guard is leveraging our broad authorities, capabilities, and policies
to seek out and interdict both fentanyl and illegal precursor
chemicals. On January 31, 2025, the acting commandant directed
immediate action to bolster operations to combat illegal fentanyl and
the Service is seeking new ways to leverage our broad authorities and
partnerships with other agencies.
conclusion
The Coast Guard provides the Nation a tremendous return on
investment. We control, secure, and defend the borders and maritime
approaches in direct support of President Trump's Executive Orders. In
order to conduct these vital missions, we must continue to invest in
our workforce, re-capitalize aging assets and infrastructure, and
integrate new technologies to position the Service to dismantle the
Transnational Criminal Organizations that threaten our citizens and
interdict aliens attempting to illegally enter our country. Thank you
for your continued support of the Coast Guard and our work to ensure
the safety and security of the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Rear Admiral Chamie.
I recognize Mr. Harris for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF JAMES C. HARRIS, III, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMELAND SECURITY
INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Harris. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest,
Ranking Member McIver, and Ranking Member Ramirez, and esteemed
Members. I appreciate the opportunity to present this vital
topic here today.
It is an honor to represent the exceptional and unwavering
efforts of the men and women of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, who are
steadfast in their commitment to protecting our Nation's
security, public health, and economy from criminal
organizations that seek to exploit and compromise our great
Nation, border security, economy, and critical infrastructure.
As a criminal investigative arm of the Department of Homeland
Security, HSI is firmly dedicated to safeguarding the United
States by detecting and dismantling transnational criminal
organizations that threaten our citizens, businesses, and
financial institutions. HSI has a formidable work force of
approximately 8,800 personnel across 243 domestic locations and
over 93 international sites. We leverage the expertise of more
than 4,500 task force officers from diverse Federal, State,
Tribal, territorial, local, and international agencies.
Our special agents are on the front lines identifying,
intercepting, and prosecuting those who exploit our maritime
borders and supply chains. We work in tandem with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard to execute this
vital mission. Every successful interdiction enables us to
leverage our investigative prowess to trace supply sources,
target distribution hubs, and disrupt financial networks with
the goal of dismantling the entire transnational criminal
organization.
It's important to emphasize that narcotics and dangerous
drugs are not the only contraband we confront in a maritime
environment. Given that most cargo entering the United States
arrive by sea, HSI routinely faces challenges from counterfeit
and mis-manifested cargo, which can devastate public safety and
the economy if allowed to enter our commerce.
Furthermore, maritime human smuggling poses a serious
threat to national security and human life. With smugglers
exploiting vulnerabilities along our maritime borders, they
frequently utilize overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels that
endanger the lives of migrants, with many being women and
children. Through our border enforcement security task forces
and transnational criminal investigative units, HSI is
relentlessly targeting criminal networks in the maritime
domain.
Globally, HSI leads 115 border enforcement security task
forces across the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Mariana
Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, engaging over 1,500 task
force officers and personnel from more than 200 Federal, State,
local, Tribal, international law enforcement agencies.
Additionally, we have over 600 foreign law enforcement officers
and prosecutors assigned to 18 transnational criminal
investigative units and 3 international task force units,
magnifying our capacity to disrupt criminal activity and defend
our homeland.
Executive Order 14159, signed by President Donald Trump on
January 20, 2025, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Attorney General to establish Homeland Security task
forces in every State and U.S. territory. These task forces,
spearheaded by HSI and the Federal Bureau Investigation, are
empowered to investigate, prosecute, and dismantle criminal
cartels, foreign gangs, and transnational criminal
organizations operating within the United States, with
particular focus on 8 newly-designated foreign terrorist
organizations. The HSTFs represent a united Government effort
to target the most dangerous and prolific transnational
criminal organizations.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and
for your on-going support of HSI in our relentless pursuit to
safeguard America and its citizens by disrupting and
dismantling transnational criminal organizations globally. I'm
standing by for any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. Harris, III
June 10, 2025
Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, on
behalf of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), we wish to express
our appreciation to you for inviting us to this hearing today as well
as for your time, attention, and steadfast commitment to protecting our
homeland security through your service in your respective committees.
I also thank you for the opportunity to discuss the exceptional and
exhaustive efforts the men and women of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations perform to
safeguard our Nation's security, public health, and economy against
those criminals who seek to exploit, victimize, and compromise our
great Nation, our industries, and our critical infrastructure. I am
truly honored to represent their exemplary service to our Nation, which
is proudly conducted in accordance with the principles of Honor,
Service, and Integrity.
ice homeland security investigations history and role
As one of our country's premier Federal law enforcement agencies,
Homeland Security Investigations stands dedicated to protecting the
United States through detecting and dismantling Transnational Criminal
Organizations targeting the American people, threatening our
businesses, abusing our financial institutions, and exploiting our
prosperity. With our unique authorities and footprint, Homeland
Security Investigations is perfectly situated to investigate and
dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations through the enforcement
of over 400 Federal laws. At Homeland Security Investigations, we are
comprised of approximately 8,800 personnel across 243 domestic
locations and more than 90 international locations, where we leverage
more than 4,500 task force officers from various Federal, State,
Tribal, territorial, local, and international partners. Homeland
Security Investigation's mission, as the principal investigative
component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is to
combat a wide range of transnational crimes, including terrorism,
illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, child exploitation, human
smuggling, and cyber crimes.
Under the Trump administration, Homeland Security Investigations
aggressively pursues investigations into criminal networks and
activities which compromise the global supply chain. A key focus among
these investigative efforts resides within the maritime environment.
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime
Administration, ``about 99 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves
the U.S. by ship. This waterborne cargo and associated activity
contribute more than $500 billion dollars to the U.S. GDP, generates
over $200 billion in annual port sector Federal/State/local taxes and
sustains over 10 million jobs.''\1\ This vast amount of cargo movement
allows Transnational Criminal Organizations the ability to exploit the
global supply chain to smuggle contraband into the United States and
around the globe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. DOT Maritime Administration updated February 21, 2025
(https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/maritime-transportation-system-
mts/maritime-transportation-system-mts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security Investigations works to identify, intercept, and
eventually prosecute those exploiting maritime transportation and cargo
supply chains. We utilize critical industry, open source, and law
enforcement data, along with collaboration and information sharing
among other Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement
agencies, to identify highly-effective information to support criminal
and civil investigations and enforcement activities primarily focused
on the smuggling of illicit narcotics, such as fentanyl and precursor
chemicals, weapons, sensitive U.S. military equipment, and dual-use
technology, and the prevention of human smuggling, human trafficking,
and drug trafficking.
Illegal drug smuggling is a global crime with local impacts.
Illegal drugs--such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and synthetic opioids
including fentanyl--largely come from other countries. Drug cartels and
other Transnational Criminal Organizations employ complex schemes to
evade detection as they attempt to smuggle their deadly products into
the United States. Once here, local networks distribute and sell those
drugs in our cities and on our streets--to our communities, our fellow
citizens, and our loved ones--with devastating effects. In fiscal year
2025 alone, HSI investigations are credited with the seizure of over
501,036 lbs. of cocaine, 192,225 lbs. of precursor chemicals, 7,897
firearms, and the arrest of over 23,972 individuals.
Homeland Security Investigations fights daily to stem this terrible
threat. Thanks to our efforts and those of our colleagues within DHS,
illegal border crossings at the U.S. Southern Border are at a historic
low. This has caused fentanyl seizures at our Ports of Entry to
continue to fall. And as DHS personnel tighten border security at our
land borders--cartels will continue to look for new ways to smuggle
contraband and people into the United States, including through
maritime means.
To combat those who seek to exploit our maritime environment,
Homeland Security Investigations special agents work closely with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard through
interdiction and investigative efforts. With every successful
interdiction--we leverage our expertise in conducting complex criminal
investigations to identify the sources of supply, target the
distribution hubs, and intercept financial networks to degrade and
dismantle the entire transnational criminal organization.
As just one example of Homeland Security Investigation's
prioritization of maritime investigations and our commitment to
partnerships, Homeland Security Investigations is a steadfast partner
in the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force's Panama Express
Strike Force. This prime example of a successful multi-agency operation
is comprised of 7 signatory partner agencies. Additionally, Panama
Express Strike Force collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of
Defense's Southern Command Joint Interagency Task Force--South.
As an intelligence-driven, criminal enterprise combatting strike
force, Panama Express Strike Force personnel have created and
maintained one of law enforcement's most robust, productive, and
reliable human intelligence networks ever operated in Central and South
America. The daily collection, analysis, and dissemination of highly
actionable intelligence targets Transnational Criminal Organizations
linked to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This intelligence
also identifies operators involved in large-scale drug trafficking,
money laundering, and related activities, primarily using maritime and
air transportation conveyances.
The cycle of human intelligence employed by Panama Express Strike
Force identifies Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in the
Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, disrupts their operations through
maritime and air interdictions, develops witnesses and intelligence,
and dismantles the Transnational Criminal Organizations through
strategic utilization of all developed evidence. This approach has
produced historical law enforcement results.
It is important to note that drugs are not the only forms of
contraband encountered in the maritime environment. Most of the cargo
entering the United States from foreign countries arrives via maritime
vessels. As such, Homeland Security Investigations routinely encounters
counterfeit and mis-manifested cargo, which, if allowed to enter the
commerce of the United States, can have devastating impacts on public
safety and the U.S. economy.
Additionally, maritime human smuggling continues to pose a serious
threat to both national security and human life. Human smugglers
routinely exploit vulnerabilities along the United States' maritime
borders, often utilizing overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels that place
migrants, many of them women and children, at significant risk. These
operations are frequently organized by Transnational Criminal
Organizations operating off the coasts of California, Florida, and U.S.
territories in the Caribbean. Homeland Security Investigations
prioritizes the investigation of high-impact smuggling organizations
through 2 key initiatives: Joint Task Force Alpha and the
Extraterritorial Criminal Travel program. In coordination with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Justice Criminal
Division, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, and other law
enforcement partners, these programs focus on dedicating investigative,
analytical, and prosecutorial resources to dismantle the highest
priority of human smuggling organizations and their affiliated
networks.
A recent example underscores the heartbreaking human cost of these
Transnational Criminal Organizations. On May 5, 2025, a panga-style
vessel carrying 16 migrants, including 2 minors, capsized and washed
ashore near Torrey Pines, San Diego. Rescue efforts managed to identify
6 survivors but tragically, 3 Indian nationals lost their lives and 7
others remain missing. Homeland Security Investigations is currently
investigating this smuggling event.
During this investigation, as with our other investigations,
Homeland Security Investigations targets every aspect of the criminal
enterprise, from the recruiters and transporters to the organizers,
financiers, and ultimately the leaders. This may include tracing the
illicit funds used to purchase vessels, the freezing or forfeiture of
connected bank accounts, the tracking of complicit commercial vessels,
or the interceptions of communication devices.
These techniques, along with many others, are often most notably
deployed through Homeland Security Investigation's capitalization of
our unique authorities to employ a multi-layered strategy that
integrates intelligence, operational coordination, and international
cooperation within the task-force methodology. Traditionally
exemplified through our Border Enforcement Security Task Forces units,
and our Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, Homeland Security
Investigations task forces bring together Federal, State, local, and
international partners to target criminal networks along U.S.
coastlines, among other threat areas. Additionally, we rely on U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine
Operations, and the U.S. Navy, to ensure the rapid response capability
and maritime intelligence sharing. Globally, there are 115 Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces units located across the United
States, Puerto Rico, Guam, Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, comprised of more than 1,500 task force officers and personnel
representing more than 200 Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
international law enforcement agencies, and National Guard units. There
are over 600 foreign law enforcement officers and prosecutors assigned
to 14 Transnational Criminal Investigative Units and 3 International
Task Force units operating in 17 countries worldwide. Together, these
partnerships exponentially multiply Homeland Security Investigation's
ability to affect investigative outcomes, disrupt criminal activity,
and protect the homeland and our allies.
Building upon these 2 highly-successful programs, under Executive
Order 14159, signed by President Trump on January 20, 2025, Homeland
Security Investigation and partners from the U.S. Department of Justice
have taken steps to establish Homeland Security Task Forces, in all
States and U.S. territories. Homeland Security Task Forces are charged
with investigating, prosecuting, and removing criminal cartels, foreign
gangs, and Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in the United
States. Homeland Security Task Forces coordination of activities comes
through a national coordination center in collaboration with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
other Federal law enforcement partners, U.S. Attorney's Offices, and
relevant State, Tribal, territorial, and local law enforcement
agencies. Each Homeland Security Task Force targets the most prolific
Foreign Terrorist Organization targets. The Homeland Security Task
Force network aligns with Executive Orders 14159 and 14157 and is
focused on dismantling cross-border human smuggling and human
trafficking networks, especially those involving children, and
enforcing U.S. immigration laws.
conclusion
Maritime security is especially challenging as the U.S. Government
must protect over 12,400 miles of maritime borders. Transnational
Criminal Organizations constantly probe maritime borders for gaps to
smuggle people, hundreds of thousands of pounds of illegal narcotics,
dangerous weapons, illicit proceeds, and other contraband into the
United States. Homeland Security Investigations uses this challenge to
embody the dedication and service the American people expect and
deserve. Our employees strive daily to achieve our mission and to
ensure the safety and security of this great Nation, its people, and
its economic prosperity.
Chairman Guest, Chairman Gimenez, and esteemed committee Members,
thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your
continued support of Homeland Security Investigations and our efforts
to safeguard America and its people by disrupting and dismantling
Transnational Criminal Organizations throughout the world. On behalf of
the men and women of Homeland Security Investigations, I would like to
extend an invitation to the Members of both committees and their staff
to visit our various facilities and engage with personnel from our
headquarters components located here in the National Capitol Region as
well as our domestic and international offices to garner first-hand
knowledge of Homeland Security Investigations' operations and the
diverse array of challenges we continuously face.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, I would
be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Harris.
I recognize Ms. MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER MACLEOD, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver,
Ranking Member Ramirez, and Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to be here to discuss GAO's work on
Federal efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. My
testimony today focuses on actions that DHS components could
take to help ensure U.S. maritime border security.
The illegal movement of people, drugs, and weapons into the
United States and the criminal organizations that traffic them
pose significant threats to national security. Securing the
Nation's borders is a key part of the Department of Homeland
Security's mission. Within DHS, Coast Guard, CBP, and HSI, law
enforcement efforts are vital to confronting and mitigating
illicit maritime activity.
In addition to their typical missions, these agencies, in
coordination with other Federal partners, also respond to
national priorities or emergencies. For example, in recent
years, Coast Guard and other Federal agencies were called on to
respond to an unprecedented migrant surge at the Southern
Border. This response impacted other missions. For example,
during the surge, Coast Guard almost entirely redirected assets
from its drug to migrant interdiction mission. Whether shifting
priorities or surging to respond to a crisis or emergency,
there is an impact on mission balance, assets, and personnel
tied to these Federal efforts. Resources surged to respond to a
crisis are not available for other missions, and people and
assets can become stretched.
Additionally, GAO has identified coordination and
operational challenges that may hinder these efforts. For
example, we examined DHS task forces that coordinate to detect
and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs being smuggled on
noncommercial maritime vessels, mainly on southern borders. Our
work in 2019 and 2024 has shown that task forces have not
consistently assessed their efforts. This is essential for
making decisions about priorities and resource allocations. We
have 7 recommendations pertaining to task forces that remain
unaddressed.
Illicit maritime activities also occur in the Arctic
region, including potential conflict with Russia or China or
illegal fishing. The Coast Guard plays a key role in Arctic
policy implementation and enforcement, but we found in August
2024 that the service does not have a way to measure progress
on its Arctic efforts.
Our prior work has also found the Coast Guard faces
significant operational challenges balancing tradeoffs among
its assets and personnel across missions. As Coast Guard
prioritized deploying assets for its migrant interdiction in
recent years, it conducted fewer drug interdiction operations.
Other missions were similarly impacted. The conditions of the
assets the Coast Guard manages for all of its missions have
been in a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown that
the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing at the same
time that their availability is decreasing. Declining
availability of these assets and delays in acquisition of their
replacements can affect Coast Guard's ability to conduct
missions. Our recommendations address how Coast Guard can
better manage asset challenges and acquisition programs for new
vessels and aircraft.
DHS law enforcement components also face personnel
challenges. The Coast Guard exceeded its recruiting goal in
2024 for the first time in 5 years by taking actions such as
increasing recruiting offices, marketing, and outreach efforts.
Despite these efforts, the Coast Guard remained about 2,600
enlisted members short of its work force target. CBP has also
fallen short of staffing targets for its law enforcement
position in recent years. In September 2024, we reported that
CBP has taken action to strengthen its recruitment, hiring, and
retention efforts. For example, each of CBP's operational
components have offered recruitment incentives for law
enforcement positions.
In conclusion, while DHS and its components play a vital
role in confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities,
it faces challenges in carrying out these missions effectively.
Actions are needed to ensure effective oversight and management
of assets and personnel. Addressing our open recommendations in
these areas will help ensure that the Department and its
components are operating effectively and efficiently, using
available resources to carry out these missions.
This completes my prepared statement, and I'd be pleased to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McLeod follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod
Tuesday, June 10, 2025
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-25-108525, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Border Security and Enforcement and the Subcommittee on Transportation
and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people,
illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key
part of DHS's mission. While there is increased attention to the
southwest land border, criminal organizations continue to use maritime
routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons into the United States.
The U.S. Government has identified transnational and domestic
criminal organizations trafficking and smuggling illicit drugs as a
significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national
security. In March 2021, GAO added national efforts to prevent, respond
to, and recover from drug misuse to its High-Risk List.
This statement discusses (1) key DHS resources to counter illicit
maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related to its
efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement is based
primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April 2025.
What GAO Recommends
In prior work GAO made dozens of recommendations in the reports
covered by this statement, including 23 to DHS. DHS generally agreed
with the recommendations. As of May 2025, 4 of the recommendations have
been implemented. GAO continues to monitor the agency's progress in
implementing open recommendations.
maritime security.--actions needed to address coordination and
operational challenges hindering federal efforts
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs assets--including
aircraft and vessels--and personnel across the United States and abroad
to secure U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure
maritime security and safety. Relevant DHS components include the Coast
Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations.
In prior work, GAO identified coordination challenges that hinder
U.S. efforts to confront illicit maritime activities and recommended
actions to improve oversight, measure effectiveness, and build
organizational capacity. For example:
In March 2025, GAO found that Homeland Security
Investigations had not fully implemented certain training
requirements due to disagreements over training content with
the Drug Enforcement Administration, with whom they coordinate.
Without doing so, the agencies cannot ensure that their agents
are properly trained to collaborate effectively on
counternarcotics investigations.
In February 2024, GAO found that DHS had not developed
targets for its coordinated efforts to combat complex threats
like drug smuggling and terrorism--limiting its ability to
assess the effectiveness of its efforts.
In April 2024, GAO found that the Coast Guard had not
assessed the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet
its mission demands, as part of an analysis of its assets.
Doing so could help ensure it has the necessary aircraft
capability to execute its missions in the coming decades.
DHS components and their law enforcement missions are vital to
confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities. Addressing
GAO's recommendations on setting targets and managing assets and
personnel will help ensure that DHS efficiently uses its available
resources to carry out its law enforcement missions to protect our
maritime borders.
Chairmen Guest and Gimenez, Ranking Members Correa and McIver, and
Members of the Subcommittees:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal efforts to
confront illicit maritime activities and challenges. Securing the
Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and
other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission. While there is
increased attention on the southwest land border, criminal
organizations continue to use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs,
and weapons into the United States.
The U.S. Government has identified trafficking of illicit drugs as
a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national
security. Use of these illicit drugs continues to impact tens of
thousands of Americans each year. For example, provisional data from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show about 80,000 drug
overdose deaths during the 12-month period ending in December 2024.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
reported provisional counts for 12-month ending periods are the number
of deaths received and processed for the 12-month period ending in the
month indicated. Drug overdose deaths are often initially reported with
no cause of death (pending investigation) because they require lengthy
investigation, including toxicology testing. As a result, reported
provisional counts may not include all deaths that occurred during a
given time and are subject to change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in figure 1, multiple Federal departments and agencies
coordinate on efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. Among
them is DHS, which is responsible for, among other things, securing
U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity while facilitating legitimate
trade and travel.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single lead agency
responsible for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime
transport of illegal drugs like cocaine and fentanyl into the United
States. 10 U.S.C. 124.
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service
within DHS. The Coast Guard describes itself as the lead Federal
maritime law enforcement agency and the only agency with both the
authority and capability to enforce national and international law on
the high seas, outer continental shelf, and inward from the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone to inland waters.\3\ Coast Guard
responsibilities include detecting and interdicting contraband and
illegal drug traffic; at sea enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and
policies; enforcing our Nation's fisheries and marine protected areas
laws and regulations; and other missions.\4\ It coordinates with DOD in
joint task forces to carry out its drug interdiction mission.\5\ In
particular, the Coast Guard is a major contributor of vessels and
aircraft deployed to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The term exclusive economic zone refers to an area up to 200
nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline where a country has
sovereign rights to natural resources such as fishing and energy
production.
\4\ See 6 U.S.C. 468.
\5\ 10 U.S.C. 124 designates DOD as the single lead agency of the
Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The Coast
Guard, within DHS, is the lead Federal agency for interdiction of
maritime drug smugglers in international waters. This is because the
Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the
United States has jurisdiction to prevent, detect, and suppress
violations of U.S. laws. See 14 U.S.C. 522.
\6\ Coast Guard aviation and vessel assets include a fleet of about
200 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, about 250 cutters, and more than
1,600 boats. GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce
Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard shares maritime law enforcement responsibilities
with other DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) Air and Marine Operations and U.S. Border Patrol,
while U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) investigates the illicit movement of goods,
including counternarcotics investigations, among other
responsibilities.
According to the Coast Guard, in fiscal year 2023, the agency
intercepted more than 212,000 pounds of cocaine and 54,000 pounds of
marijuana.\7\ According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
the majority of the cocaine shipped to the United States. travels on
maritime routes from South America and through the eastern Pacific
Ocean and Caribbean Sea.\8\ Additionally, precursor chemicals may be
shipped from Asia to Mexico, sometimes as legitimate commerce, where
they may be combined into fentanyl or other controlled substances.\9\
Figure 2 shows maritime and land routes for precursor chemical and
illicit drug smuggling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, The Coast
Guard's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request, testimony before the House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 118th Cong.,
2d sess., May 23, 2024.
\8\ Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 2020 National Drug
Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21 (March 2021). The majority of
known maritime drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial vessels through
the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--a 6-million-square-mile area of
routes drug smugglers use to transport illicit drugs that includes the
eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, among other areas. See
GAO, Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations
in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-
527 (Washington, DC: Jun. 16, 2014).
\9\ Precursor chemicals are chemicals or substances that may be
intended for illicit drug production.
The U.S. Government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the
transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and
smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement,
and the national security of the United States. Further, given
challenges the Federal Government faces in responding to the drug
misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added national efforts to prevent,
respond to, and recover from drug misuse to our High-Risk List.\10\
Specifically, we identified several challenges with the Federal
Government's response to drug misuse, such as the need for more
effective implementation and monitoring, and related on-going efforts
to address the issue, including law enforcement and drug interdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to
Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP
(Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2021). We issue an update to the High-Risk
List every 2 years at the start of each new session of Congress. The
most recent update was issued in February 2025. See GAO, High-Risk
Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve
Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My statement today discusses: (1) key DHS resources to counter
illicit maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related
to its efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement
is based primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April
2025. For the reports we cite in this statement, among other
methodologies, we analyzed DOD, DHS, CBP, and Coast Guard policy,
documentation, and data, and interviewed officials from agency
headquarters and selected field units. More detailed information on our
scope and methodology can be found in the reports we cite in this
statement.
For this statement, we reviewed information on the status of agency
implementation of selected recommendations through May 2025. In
addition, we reviewed Coast Guard budget and performance documents
since 2018 to determine the extent the service reported meeting its
drug interdiction performance goals from fiscal years 2014 through
2024. We also analyzed Coast Guard operational hour data for each of
its 11 statutory missions, from fiscal years 2015 through 2024. We
found these data to be sufficiently reliable to report Coast Guard
operational hours for aircraft and vessels by statutory mission. To
determine the Coast Guard's operating expenses, we reviewed the
service's Mission Cost Model operating expense estimates for its 11
statutory missions. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable to
report Coast Guard operating expense estimates for its statutory
missions.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
dhs deploys aircraft, vessels, and personnel to address illicit
maritime activities
Coast Guard Resources
DHS employs assets--including aircraft and vessels--and personnel
across the United States and abroad to secure U.S. borders, support
criminal investigations, and ensure maritime security and safety.
Relevant DHS components include the Coast Guard, CBP, and HSI. Their
air and marine missions vary depending on operating location.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate on the deployment and
allocation of assets and specialized personnel with the DOD to reduce
the availability of illicit drugs by countering the flow of such drugs
into the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard is responsible for conducting 11 statutory
missions, 3 of which are maritime law enforcement missions codified as
homeland security missions--drug interdiction, migrant interdiction,
and other law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing). In some cases, the Coast Guard
coordinates its law enforcement missions with interagency partners.
The Coast Guard operates a fleet of about 200 fixed- and rotary-
wing aircraft, with more than 1,600 boats and 250 cutters.\12\ As of
fiscal year 2024, it employs approximately 55,500 personnel--including
active duty, reserve, and civilian.\13\ In addition, the Coast Guard's
shore infrastructure is comprised of nearly 40,000 assets, which
consist of various types of buildings and structures.\14\ For example,
within its shore operations asset line, the Coast Guard maintains over
200 stations along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out its
search-and-rescue operations, as well as other missions, such as
maritime security.\15\ Figure 3 shows Coast Guard operating locations
across the country, as of September 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO-24-106374 and GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address
Persistent Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime
Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024).
\13\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help
Address Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC:
Apr. 23, 2025).
\14\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: More Than $7 Billion
Reportedly Needed to Address Deteriorating Assets, GAO-25-107851
(Washington, DC: Feb. 25, 2025).
\15\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore
Infrastructure, GAO-22-105513 (Washington, DC: Nov. 16, 2021).
Our analysis of Coast Guard data showed more than a quarter of its
total estimated operating expenses were for law enforcement missions
related to homeland security. Specifically, from fiscal years 2015
through 2024, drug interdiction accounted for 15 percent of its average
estimated operating expenses, migrant interdiction 9 percent, and other
law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing) 3 percent. Figure 4 shows that the operating
expenses of these 3 missions annually averaged more than $2.1 billion
over this period.
CBP Resources
Within CBP, Air and Marine Operations and Border Patrol are the
uniformed law enforcement arms responsible for securing U.S. borders
between ports of entry in the air, land, and maritime environments.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ CBP's Office of Field Operations also has border security
responsibilities, such as inspecting pedestrians, passengers, and
cargo--including international mail and express cargo--at the more than
320 air, land, and sea ports of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's Air and Marine Operations operates a fleet of 250 fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft and about 300 vessels to secure U.S. borders, as
of March 2023.\17\ The majority of CBP's Air and Marine Operations'
activities support its law enforcement mission, including providing
surveillance capabilities to detect and support the interdiction of
illicit cross-border activity.\18\ For example, in May 2023, CBP Air
and Marine Operations personnel and Puerto Rico police forces seized
over 4,000 pounds of cocaine found inside a vessel that landed on the
southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. In addition, as of March 2024, CBP's
Border Patrol operates over 100 vessels along the coastal waterways of
the United States and Puerto Rico and interior waterways common to the
United States and Canada.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ CBP Air and Marine Operations owns and maintains CBP's 290
vessels, including riverine vessels that are operated by the U.S.
Border Patrol, as of March 2023. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Director
of Operations, Air and Marine Operations, CBP, Securing America's
Maritime Border: Challenges and Solutions for U.S. National Security,
testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, 118th
Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023.
\18\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All
DHS Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).
\19\ ``Border Patrol Overview,'' CBP, last modified: Mar. 4, 2024,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2024 we reported on staffing levels for CBP law
enforcement positions, including for Air and Marine Operations and
Border Patrol.\20\ We found that staffing levels for Air and Marine
Operations positions varied from fiscal year 2018 through the first
half of fiscal year 2024. In particular, staffing levels for the Air
Interdiction Agent position generally decreased and staffing levels for
Aviation Enforcement Agents and Marine Interdiction Agents generally
increased during this period. Regarding Border Patrol, we found that it
met its staffing targets from fiscal years 2018 through 2020 but fell
short from fiscal year 2021 through the second quarter of fiscal year
2024. Figure 5 shows CBP's Air and Marine Operations field structure,
which is divided into 3 regions--northern, southeast, and southwest--
and operating locations in these regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve
Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel, GAO-
24-107029 (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2024).
HSI Resources
HSI agents conduct Federal criminal investigations into the illegal
movement of people, goods, money, contraband, weapons, and sensitive
technology into, out of, and through the United States, including
narcotics. Specifically, as it relates to counternarcotics
investigations, HSI's mission includes tracking, intercepting,
investigating, and stopping illicit narcotics from flowing into the
United States through targeting criminal networks; strengthening global
partnerships; and enhancing domestic collaboration. HSI is also
involved in countering other illicit maritime activity. For example, in
November 2024, HSI, in coordination with the Coast Guard and other
Federal agencies, investigated the Gulf Cartel's involvement in
criminal activities associated with illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing, human smuggling, and narcotics trafficking in the
maritime environment. Illegal fishing is often a revenue stream for
criminal organizations, according to HSI, and is also a threat to U.S.
maritime security, as criminal organizations may use the same vessels
for smuggling narcotics and humans across borders.
As shown in figure 6, over a 7-year period--fiscal years 2017
through 2023--HSI initiated over 58,000 counternarcotics investigations
and referred over 35,000 counternarcotics cases for prosecution (an
annual average of over 8,000 initiated investigations and over 5,000
cases referred for prosecution). During this period, HSI was annually
staffed with about 5,600 special agents working on HSI's law
enforcement activities, including activities that work to combat
illicit drugs in the United States.
coordination challenges
Combating the trafficking of illicit drugs and other illicit
maritime activities is a Government-wide priority that requires a
coordinated effort by Federal departments and agencies. In prior work,
we have identified coordination challenges that hinder U.S. efforts to
confront illicit maritime activities and recommended actions to improve
oversight, measure effectiveness, and build organizational capacity.
Improve oversight.--DOD and DHS lead and operate certain task
forces--Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and DHS
Joint Task Force-East.\21\ For example, DHS components, including the
Coast Guard and CBP, coordinate with DOD on counterdrug missions
through the Joint Interagency Task Force-South. For example, the task
force is allocated assets, such as ships and surveillance aircraft,
from DOD and DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, as well as from
foreign partners. The task force coordinates these assets, in
conjunction with available intelligence, to detect and monitor the
trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, being smuggled north on
noncommercial maritime vessels across its area of responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ An additional task force--Joint Task Force-North--consists
solely of DOD personnel and does not generally operate in the maritime
domain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2019, we reported that the task forces generally coordinated
effectively using means that aligned with leading practices.\22\ These
included working groups and liaison officers, which helped to minimize
duplication of missions and activities. However, our recent work has
shown that these task forces and DOD should improve coordination and
assess their efforts.\23\ In 2024, we made 4 recommendations to improve
agencies' assessment efforts, including 2 recommendations to DHS to
improve oversight of Joint Task Force-East. DHS agreed with the
recommendations, which remain open as of May 2025.\24\ Fully
implementing them is essential for making decisions about priorities,
resource allocations, and strategies for improvements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See GAO, Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces
Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug
Activities, GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: Jul. 9, 2019). As established,
the DHS task forces aimed to, among other things, combat terrorism
threats, the smuggling of illicit drugs, unlawful migration, and other
security concerns along the Southern Border and approaches to the
United States.
\23\ GAO, Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and
Assessment of Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16,
2024) and Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to
Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 7, 2024).
\24\ GAO-24-106855. DHS agreed with the 2 recommendations and
identified on-going and planned steps to address them. Actions include
plans to review its performance measures for the task force and
document the methodology used calculate such measures, including
performance targets. See also GAO-24-106281.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measure effectiveness.--The Coast Guard and DOD also collaborate to
combat illicit maritime activities and mitigate risks in the Arctic
region. According to the Coast Guard's Arctic Strategy these risks
range from increased militarization of the Arctic region and potential
conflict with Russia or China, to the increased risk posed by greater
shipping traffic, and potential damage to the marine ecosystem from
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Officials from the Coast
Guard and DOD also told us they collaborate in several ways, including
sharing relevant information and expertise, providing operational
assistance and conducting joint exercises in the region. Further, they
reported collaborating on the development of their respective Arctic
strategies. However, we found in August 2024 that the Coast Guard's
Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan generally does not include
mechanisms to measure progress on its Arctic efforts. This may make it
difficult for the Coast Guard to plan activities, determine resource
needs, assess its progress toward strategic objectives, and ensure its
efforts are aligned with national efforts. As a result, we recommended
that the Coast Guard include performance measures with associated
targets and time frames in its implementation plan. The Coast Guard
concurred with our recommendation, and we continue to monitor its
progress.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ GAO, Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data
Would Better Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington,
DC: Aug. 13, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Build collaborative capacity through training.--While HSI agents
may obtain Title 21 authority in order to collaborate with DEA on
certain investigations of illicit activities, interagency disagreement
on training has hindered effectiveness.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Under section 873 of Title 21 of the U.S. Code, DEA can cross-
designate HSI agents with the authority to investigate the smuggling of
controlled substances across U.S. international borders or through
ports of entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2025, we made 3 recommendations, including that DEA and
ICE develop and implement the training.\27\ Without jointly developing
and implementing the training modules, DEA and HSI cannot ensure that
their agents are properly trained to collaborate effectively with each
other on counternarcotics investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See GAO, Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for
Coordinating Federal Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC:
Mar. 5, 2025). The agencies agreed with our recommendations. DHS
described planned actions to address the recommendation to HSI, stating
that HSI plans to work with DEA to develop and implement training
modules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Challenges
DHS assets, such as aircraft and vessels, and Federal personnel are
vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities.
However, our prior work has found that the Coast Guard faces
significant operational challenges balancing tradeoffs among its assets
and personnel across its 11 statutory missions where more work needs to
be done. By comparison, CBP has strategically addressed certain
operational challenges, such as recruitment and retention, through
incentive pay.
Coast Guard tradeoffs.--The Coast Guard faces challenges balancing
its varied mission priorities which have grown as it is called on to do
more with its resources. In particular, in recent years, the Coast
Guard has prioritized deploying its assets for its migrant interdiction
mission. In doing so, it has reduced its operational activities to
support other missions. The Coast Guard has not met its annual primary
drug interdiction mission performance target in any year from fiscal
years 2014 through 2024. Most notably, from fiscal years 2021 through
2023, the Coast Guard increased its migrant interdiction operations
considerably in response to the highest maritime migration levels in
the Caribbean in nearly 30 years. This tradeoff further challenges the
Coast Guard's ability to meet its drug interdiction mission demands.
As shown in figure 7, from fiscal years 2021 through 2023, the
Coast Guard increased its operational hours for aircraft and vessels by
66 percent for its migrant interdiction mission, while decreasing its
deployments for drug interdiction by 62 percent.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ From fiscal years 2023 through 2024, Coast Guard resources
deployed to support its migrant interdiction mission decreased, while
Coast Guard resources deployed to support its drug interdiction mission
remained at relatively low levels.
Coast Guard assets.--Moreover, the condition of the assets the
Coast Guard manages have been in a state of decline for decades. Our
work has shown that the Coast Guard's aircraft and vessels have faced
readiness and availability challenges in carrying out their statutory
missions.
For example, the Coast Guard relies on its Medium Endurance Cutters
for its drug interdiction mission. However, we reported in July 2012
that Medium Endurance Cutters did not meet operational hours targets
from fiscal years 2005 through 2011 and that declining operational
capacity hindered mission performance.\29\ In June 2023, we reported
that Medium Endurance Cutters were not consistently meeting operational
availability targets, and the Coast Guard noted that the declining
physical condition of the cutters puts them at significant risk of
decreased capability for meeting mission requirements.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ GAO, Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions
Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741
(Washington, DC: Jul. 31, 2012).
\30\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC:
Jun. 20, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its
cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft
generally did not meet the Coast Guard's 71 percent availability target
during fiscal years 2018 through 2022, as shown in figure 8.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ GAO-24-106374. GAO found that the Coast Guard had not assessed
the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet its mission
demands, as part of an analysis of its assets, among other things.
Coast Guard personnel.--Compounding deteriorating assets is a
shortage of personnel to operate them. The Coast Guard exceeded its
recruiting goal in fiscal year 2024 for the first time in 5 years by
taking actions such as increasing recruiting offices, marketing, and
outreach efforts. It also revised enlistment eligibility standards and
took steps to address a significant increase in medical waiver requests
in recent years. However, despite these efforts, the Coast Guard
remained about 2,600 enlisted members short of its workforce target.
The Coast Guard has taken steps to address its retention challenges
through monetary and nonmonetary incentives and in 2022 began to
require service members to complete a career survey to help identify
key issues affecting retention. However, survey response rates have
been consistently low. In April 2025, we recommended that the Coast
Guard take actions to address response rates and develop a clear plan
to gauge the performance of its initiatives.\32\ The Coast Guard agreed
with our recommendations, and we will monitor their implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ GAO-25-107869.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP personnel.--We reported in September 2024 that in recent years,
CBP has also generally fallen short of staffing targets for its law
enforcement positions, as shown in figure 9.\33\ We also reported that
CBP has taken action to strengthen its recruitment, hiring, and
retention efforts. For example, each of CBP's operational components--
the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, and Air and Marine
Operations--have offered recruitment incentives for law enforcement
positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ GAO-24-107029.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In particular, in 2024 Border Patrol offered recruitment incentives
of $20,000 per recipient, with an additional $10,000 for recipients
stationed in remote locations. CBP has also offered retention
incentives, relocation incentives, and special salary rates as part of
its efforts to improve retention of law enforcement personnel. For
example, Air and Marine Operations has offered retention incentives for
positions and locations experiencing high rates of attrition. CBP
anticipates a steep increase in attrition rates across all positions
starting in 2027 because a significant number of its law enforcement
personnel will become eligible to retire. CBP has a strategic plan to
address this expected retirement surge, and retention- and morale-
related efforts will be increasingly important to help mitigate the
loss of these personnel.
In summary, DHS components and their law enforcement missions are
vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities.
Addressing our recommendations on setting performance measures and
targets and managing assets and personnel will help ensure that DHS
efficiently uses its available resources to carry out its law
enforcement missions to protect our maritime borders.
Chairmen Guest and Gimenez, Ranking Members Correa and McIver, and
Members of the subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement. I
would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this
time.
Appendix I: Related Open Recommendations to the Department of Homeland
Security as of May 2025
Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr.
23, 2025).
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response
rates for its Career Intention Survey.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its
Career Intention Survey results.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program
Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how
retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and
timeframes and milestones for implementation, to track progress
and gauge program performance.
Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for Coordinating Federal
Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2025).
Recommendation.--The director of ICE should work with the
DEA administrator to develop and implement the 2 training
modules in accordance with their January 2021 agreement, using
agreed-upon dispute resolution mechanisms as appropriate.
Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data Would Better
Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, DC:
Aug. 13, 2024).
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that District 17 collects and reports complete
information about resource use and mission performance in
accordance with Coast Guard guidance.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the Coast Guard's Arctic implementation plan
includes performance measures with associated targets and time
frames for the action items described in the plan in accordance
with Coast Guard guidance.
Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed,
GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
establish procedures requiring the Coast Guard to uniformly
collect and maintain air station readiness data.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air
station readiness data.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet
its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to
meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires
to meet its mission needs.
Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 7, 2024).
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and
documents criteria for establishing a joint task force.
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and
documents criteria for terminating a joint task force.
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
ensure the Office of the Military Advisor, as it finalizes
performance measures for Joint Task Force-East, establishes
targets for those measures, as required.
Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and
documents the methodology used in establishing the performance
measures for Joint Task Force-East.
Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC:
Jun. 20, 2023).
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program officials
develop a technology maturation plan for the davit prior to
builder's trials. This plan should identify potential courses
of action to address davit technical immaturity, including
assessing technology alternatives should the current davit
continue to face development challenges, and a date by which
the Coast Guard will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a
technology alternative.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype
of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 1
builder's trials.
Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
ensure that the OPC stage 2 program achieves a sufficiently
stable design prior to the start of lead ship construction. In
line with shipbuilding leading practices, sufficiently stable
design includes 100 percent completion of basic and functional
design, including routing of major distributive systems and
transitive components that effect multiple zones of the ship.
Related GAO Products
Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr. 23, 2025).
Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for Coordinating
Federal Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2025).
Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: More Than $7 Billion Reportedly
Needed to Address Deteriorating Assets, GAO-25-107851 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 25, 2025).
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve Recruitment,
Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel, GAO-24-107029
(Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2024).
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges
Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-
107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024).
Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data Would Better
Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, DC: Aug. 13,
2024).
Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and Assessment of
Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16, 2024).
Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments
Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).
Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to
Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 7, 2024).
Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC: Jun. 20,
2023).
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore Infrastructure,
GAO-22-105513 (Washington, DC: Nov. 16, 2021).
Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and Marine
Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All DHS
Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).
Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance
Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities,
GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: Jul. 9, 2019).
Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in
the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-527
(Washington, DC: Jun. 16, 2014).
Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions Reinforce Need
for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741 (Washington, DC:
Jul. 31, 2012).
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes
of questioning.
I am going to go right to you, Ms. MacLeod. What I got from
you is that the Coast Guard needs more ships and more people in
order to carry out their missions because they are stretched
thin right now. Pretty much?
Ms. MacLeod. Yes. The Coast Guard has a history of making
do. There are acquisition programs that are in place, but, as I
mentioned, those are currently delayed. There are work force
shortages across the Coast Guard. Although they met their
recruiting goals, there remains a work force shortage.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Admiral Chamie, the reconciliation
bill has how much more for the Coast Guard that will help, I
guess, in this endeavor, try to give the Coast Guard the
resources and the personnel it needs to carry out its mission?
Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. We're grateful for the $21.2
billion in the House-passed reconciliation, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. You are confident that with that, and also the
reconfiguring, reimagining of the Coast Guard, that the Coast
Guard will be better able to carry out its mission in the
future?
Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. A combination of the
reconciliation plus an increase in annual top line, that's
critical for us to be able to get over some of the lingering
issues, like shoreside infrastructure, the buildings that our
crews operate out of.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Mr. Harris, the cartels. The
cartels that--were the cartels the same cartels, are they
involved both in drug trafficking and human trafficking?
Mr. Harris. Yes, the same cartels are involved in all
those.
Mr. Gimenez. Is most of the human trafficking you are
seeing, are they somehow paying the cartels in order to be
trafficked or do you see people just ad hoc getting into a boat
and trying to make it to the United States?
Mr. Harris. Both. Both. You see people going about it on
their own, but you also see people utilizing transnational
criminal organizations.
Mr. Gimenez. Are they the same cartels that were working on
the Southern Border?
Mr. Harris. Yes, same cartels.
Mr. Gimenez. So they are now--they are in the Southern
Border and they are also at sea. Are they Mexican in origin?
Are they Colombian in origin? Where do they come from?
Mr. Harris. A lot of them are Mexico.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. But the cocaine is actually produced
Colombia, Peru, you know, so--and it somehow gets to the
Mexican cartels and they are the ones that distribute it? Is
that the way that the operation works?
Mr. Harris. That is correct.
Mr. Gimenez. All right. During the Biden administration
years, when we had thousands and thousands and millions of
illegals crossing through the Southern Border, were most of
those people paying the cartels to cross the border?
Mr. Harris. I don't think most of them. I think people were
paying cartels, and people were doing it on their own through
family, friends, or people in the community.
Mr. Gimenez. How much were the cartels making from the
human trafficking during those years?
Mr. Harris. Investigations suggest that you can make a
couple thousand per person.
Mr. Gimenez. So how much were they making? Were they--I
mean, our estimation was they were making a billion dollars a
month. Is that far off?
Mr. Harris. I'm not sure about that.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. OK. So let's go now to China. The
precursor drugs or chemicals are for fentanyl. What kind of
success have we had in interdicting those precursor chemicals
from reaching--I guess, it goes to Mexico, offloaded in Mexico?
Then goes to the cartels who create the fentanyl and then ship
it across the border. That fentanyl is killing Americans, is
that right?
Mr. Harris. That is correct. We've had a lot of success in
that area, seeing the chemical precursors coming from Asia to
Mexico and then find its way into the United States.
Mr. Gimenez. Where's the success? I mean----
Mr. Harris. Success is the--we've decimated, at least in
fiscal year 2025, I'll speak to that, in fiscal year 2025 we
decimated 13 clandestine labs in Mexico that was ran by some of
the cartels.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, but those are the labs. I am talking
about the ship that is coming with the chemicals from China. Do
we interdict any of those at all or they all land in a Mexican
port and then the chemicals are then shipped to the cartels?
Mr. Harris. No, we interdict those as well.
Mr. Gimenez. You do. But what percentage of that do you
think you are interdicting?
Mr. Harris. I'm unaware. I can take that back.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. Well, would it surprise you if I tell you
that the Chinese actually incentivize the companies that
produce the precursor chemicals for fentanyl that kills tens of
thousands of Americans? They incentivize them with tax breaks
in China as long as they are for export, but they are actually
illegal inside of China. So if they do that, would it lead you
to believe that somehow this is done on purpose, that the
Chinese are actually sending this stuff on purpose to kill
Americans?
Mr. Harris. With China, they have been a good partner in
this quest to stop the chemical precursors.
Mr. Gimenez. How can you say that when they are actually
incentivizing the companies to create the chemicals that are
only used for the creation of fentanyl?
Mr. Harris. We've had success working with them, the
government of China, as well as Mexico, in trying to stop some
of this.
Mr. Gimenez. In trying to stop them. We are not very
successful at that, though, are we?
Mr. Harris. We've seen some success.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. My time is up.
I now recognize the Ranking Member for her 5 minutes.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman.
Admiral Chamie, in January, Trump and Secretary Noem
ordered the Coast Guard to triple its presence at the U.S.
Border. However, despite some of our requests, the Coast Guard
has not provided us information on exactly where the service
has redirected assets and personnel from. Would you please
commit to providing us with the full accounting of all assets
and personnel that have been redirected since January 20,
including their home port or station, as well as a description
of all deployments and missions that were canceled or
redirected?
Admiral Chamie. Yes, Congresswoman. I'd be happy to come
brief you on that.
Mrs. McIver. Perfect. Thank you so much.
I want to move to Ms. MacLeod. GAO has studied the Coast
Guard's capabilities to carry out various missions, as well as
its capacity to make resource allocation decisions effectively.
In your estimation, does the Coast Guard fully understand the
tradeoffs it is making when it redeploys assets and personnel?
Ms. MacLeod. We've found both data limitations in
acknowledging those tradeoffs, as well as strategic. Everything
cannot be a priority. The Coast Guard, as I said, has a history
of making do. Without accounting for the various tradeoffs
among these 11 missions and various national priorities, it's a
scattershot approach.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you. What are some of the tradeoffs the
Coast Guard needs to reconsider?
Ms. MacLeod. Well, among its missions, we saw in our recent
data analysis as the Coast Guard has shifted more resources to
the drug interdiction mission, a steep decline in the migrant
interdiction mission, just as an example. Then there's the
search-and-rescue missions and other missions that are also
being affected at the same time.
Mrs. McIver. Got it. Thank you so much for that. Last year,
GAO reported on the Coast Guard's aviation fleet and found that
the service's planes and helicopters were only available 66 to
68 percent of the time on average in recent years. Since then,
the Trump administration started using Coast Guard planes,
obviously to fly deportation staging flights. Secretary Noem
requested to spend $50 million on a new executive Gulfstream
jet.
Given the existing challenges the aging Coast Guard
aircraft fleet faces, how do these additional demands impact
Coast Guard readiness?
Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard's aircraft are not meeting the
availability target. Since our report last year, this has
become even more acute with grounding of additional aircraft
within the fleet.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member McIver.
I now recognize the Chairman of the Border Security
Enforcement, the gentleman from Mississippi, Michael Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Chamie, I want to read a few headlines of some of
the great work that the United States Coast Guard has done
since just February of this year. ``United States Coast Guard
offloads more than 275 million worth of illegal cocaine in San
Diego.'' That was February 13. March 6, ``Coast Guard offloads
over 141 million in illicit drugs interdicted in the Caribbean
sea.'' That is from March the 6. ``Coast Guard offloads over
517\1/2\ million in illicit drugs interdicted in Eastern
Pacific Ocean,'' March the 20. ``Coast Guard Cutter Calhoun
offloads more than 140.9 million in illegal narcotics at Port
Everglades,'' May 16. ``Coast Guard offloads more than 211
million in illicit drugs interdicted in the Eastern Pacific,''
May 29 of this year. Then just earlier this month, on June the
6, ``Coast Guard offloads more than 138 million in illicit
drugs interdicted in the Caribbean Sea.''
If my math is correct, that amount is roughly $1\1/2\
billion in narcotic seizures just this year. So to the men and
women who serve under your command, I want to personally thank
them for the job that they are doing.
I want to ask you briefly, Admiral, can you talk about the
importance of interdicting these drugs at sea before these
narcotics come into the United States? Also talk a little bit
about the impact that $1\1/2\ billion in seizures has on these
transnational criminal organizations.
Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman Guest, and
thanks for your words complimenting our crews. Our commandant
and the rest of our leadership team are very proud of them.
To your question, sir, what we try to do is interdict the
drugs in bulk quantity as far away from the shores of the
United States as we can. Because the closer these bulk amounts
get to the United States, they get broken up into smaller
amounts that make them easier to smuggle in. So you could have
a large load of, say, 2 tons that goes into the Dominican
Republic, gets broken into small packages of 3 or 4 kilos that
could fit in a backpack, and then they get smuggled further
north. So that's one way. So we want to get them as far away
from the shores as we can.
The value in that is that those billions of dollars that
you said, sir, that's the cash that fuels the cartel. So all of
the other nefarious activities that they're doing, human
smuggling, weapons smuggling, sex trafficking, you name it,
that cash fuels it. These are poly-crime organizations. They
don't care what they're doing as long as it makes them money.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Miller, kind-of want to dovetail off of that
a little bit. You say in your written testimony on page 3, you
talk about the authority to operate the extension of the 12
nautical miles in custom waters. You know, the admiral just
spoke a little bit about the benefit of interdicting these
narcotics or those individuals who are smuggling individuals in
the country. The greater that you can extend that outside the
United States border, the more opportunity you are going to
have to be successful. So want to talk a little bit and ask you
to please speak on that, about the importance of that extension
to the 12 nautical miles.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for your support
in these efforts.
Yes, the Customs Waters Bill extending customs waters from
12 to 24 nautical miles, it modernizes customs law with the
speed of vessels these days, increases the area that we could
potentially patrol where we make interdictions and save lives.
We've drafted this legislation in collaboration with the Coast
Guard. It gives us interdiction parity at sea so we may better
assist each other.
Mr. Guest. If Congress were to grant you that authority,
would that make our community safer by the fact that you would
be able to have an expanded area in which you have law
enforcement, that authority?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, it would. It would
increase our interdictions. Like the admiral said, identifying
and interdicting these narcotics loads before they get closer
to shore and break up into smaller loads. Also with human
trafficking as well, the farther out we can identify these
before they get close to highly-congested areas is easier to
interdict.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe I am out of
time, so I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Guest.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Border Security
and Enforcement, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Harris, you represent ICE's Homeland Security
Investigations as the assistant director for countering
transnational organized crime, correct?
Mr. Harris. That is correct.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Harris, do you assess that
Tren de Aragua is engaged in transnational organized crime? Yes
or no?
Mr. Harris. Yes.
Mrs. Ramirez. Mr. Harris, is HSI responsible for
investigating Tren de Aragua, which includes collecting and
providing intelligence about who is and is not a gang member
for ICE enforcement and removal operations?
Mr. Harris. Yes, we do investigate Tren de Aragua.
Mrs. Ramirez. OK. Yes or no, are the tattoos part of that
assessment?
Mr. Harris. It can be.
Mrs. Ramirez. OK. So I want to ask you a few questions.
These are some real-life examples. If someone has a tattoo with
hands praying, are they a gang member? Yes or no?
Mr. Harris. I have to know more about that----
Mrs. Ramirez. OK.
Mr. Harris [continuing]. Than just a tattoo.
Mrs. Ramirez. So let me ask you then another question. What
about someone with an autism awareness tattoo? Are they a gang
member?
Mr. Harris. I would have to know more about the situation.
Mrs. Ramirez. I would also agree with that. So let me ask
you a question. What about a crown tattoo? Yes or no? A crown
with a soccer ball.
Mr. Harris. Same thing. I would not--have to know more
about the situation.
Mrs. Ramirez. Mr. Harris, I am going to ask you again for
the record here, what about a tattoo across their chest
perhaps?
Mr. Harris. I'd have to know more about the situation.
Mrs. Ramirez. Our Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, OK.
Mr. Harris, are you aware of any instances in which relying on
tattoos has resulted in wrongful ICE arrest or deportations?
Are you aware?
Mr. Harris. I oversee transnational organized crime. As far
as deportations or removals----
Mrs. Ramirez. You are not aware?
Mr. Harris [continuing]. I'm not.
Mrs. Ramirez. Well, thank you, Mr. Harris. Well, according
to several resources, including on occasion, the administration
has demonstrated that they have not done enough research and
investigation. In addition to Andry Hernandez Romero's wrong
gang tattoos, they said, of his parents name with crowns, Neri
Alvarado Borges had a colorful tattoo of an autism awareness
ribbon for his 15-year-old brother. Jerce Reyes Barrios had a
tattoo of a soccer ball with a crown, a tribute to the logo of
his favorite soccer team, Rio Madrid from Spain. Like them,
there were so many more. I just showed you a number of them.
DHS has wrongfully detained and deported immigrants and
asylum seekers, all based on an arbitrary point system that DHS
has created. They call it the Alien Enemy Validation Guide.
Having a tattoo accounted for 4 points of the 8 needed deemed
deportable. Their point system reflects a long legacy of using
arbitrary criteria of predefined characteristics to be profile,
criminalize, marginalize, and punish.
The HS tattoo system reflects the same racist, arbitrary,
ignorant activities of this administration's forbearers. We
make court decisions about the freedom of Black people based on
hair. In Hudgins v. Wright, hair was determined to reveal Black
identity more than skin color. We targeted children in
indigenous communities who wore Native cultural attire and sent
them to boarding schools. We said anyone with long hair in the
1960's was a radical and a communist. We identified gang
members using baggy clothes, specific color combinations, and
certain hat positioning in the 1990's.
You see over and over again, the Government has proven that
it can't be trusted with expeditious systems of justice based
on arbitrary criteria defined by bigoted assumptions about
people. Each of these arbitrary systems end up reflecting the
worst of our biases. That is the point this administration may
revel in, but I for one, am not comfortable with sloppy,
radicalized biases condemning people to a life in CECOT.
You see, we can have the Constitutional tool to do better.
It is called due process. It is actually the only way to ensure
that we minimize administrative errors and that arbitrary
characteristics and bigoted assumptions do not ruin people's
lives. It is why it is so important that when we are having
these conversations in this committee that we understand that
what we use to determine who we deport, who we don't, why we
violate due process, when we violate due process, that it has
real-life consequences and that our constituents, our children
are watching.
The idea that they deported parents at a kindergarten
graduation this past week is unconscionable. I want to make
sure that I remind people of that.
With that, Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member.
I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panelists for coming today. I know you
guys came here to testify about maritime activities in U.S.
waters. I also want to apologize to you guys for the rants you
are hearing from my colleagues about anything but what you guys
came here to testify. I also want to point out the fact that
the hypocrisy and the insanity coming from my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle who created this problem when it comes
to the border invasion and now they are kicking and screaming
that the Trump administration is actually trying to clean it
up.
So now back to what we are here to talk about. Rear Admiral
Chamie, last year, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a narco
submarine in the Caribbean sea, seizing over 1,200 pounds of
cocaine valued at more than 54 million. This semi-submersible
vessel designed to evade detection is a stark reminder of the
emergent sophisticated methods employed by drug cartels to
infiltrate our border. My question to you, sir, is how many of
these narco submarines has the Coast Guard encountered in the
last 5 years?
Admiral Chamie. Good morning, Congressman. I'll have to get
back to you on the exact number, but as you said, it is common.
The cartels, the transnational criminal organizations, they get
more sophisticated in the ways that they will try to smuggle
drugs. So they use a variety of vessels, and one of those, as
you said, is to use a submarine.
Mr. Crane. Are they buying these submarines from other
foreign states? Are they making them on their own? Do you have
any intelligence on that?
Admiral Chamie. They typically build them themselves on
land and then push them into the water.
Mr. Crane. OK. Admiral, have you seen the cartels utilizing
drones, either subsurface or aerial drones, out at sea?
Admiral Chamie. I have not seen them myself, but we are
aware that the transnational criminal organizations do operate
drones, and it also presents a threat to our crews at the land
border.
Mr. Crane. Admiral, what new technologies, unmanned
underwater vehicles, sonar nets, or satellite tracking are
being deployed to detect these types of narco submarines before
they make it to our shores?
Admiral Chamie. So we're using a couple different types of
technologies right now. One of them is an unmanned aircraft
that we fly off our National Security cutter. We've been using
the ScanEagle for some time. We're still operating that. Then
we're starting to field a new vertical lift system called the
V-BAT. What that enables us to do is get that up in the air for
anywhere from 12 to 18 hours longer than we could typically fly
a manned aircraft. These aircraft have sensors that provide us
an increased ability to be able to detect what's on the water.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. Mr. Miller, in your opening
testimony, you talked about the increase in maritime
interdictions. Do you believe what you are seeing with the
increase in maritime interdiction is due to the adaptation of
smuggling routes by the cartels to circumvent the work that
this administration has done to secure our Southern Border?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I do. We've
certainly seen that in the Southern California AOR, where we've
seen the biggest surge in maritime migrant smuggling activity.
We suspect that's primarily due to the difficulty to be
smuggled across the land border.
Mr. Crane. OK, thank you. My next question is for the
gentleman in uniform today. Have your organizations removed all
DEI from training? I will start with you, Admiral.
Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. We are in full compliance with
the President's Executive Orders.
Mr. Crane. Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Yes, to my knowledge, Congressman.
Mr. Crane. Is anyone in your organization that you are
aware of in violation of President Trump's Executive Order on
eliminating DEI?
Mr. Miller. Not that I'm aware of, Congressman.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. Ms. MacLeod, I want to go to you real
quick. Your recent GAO report released on May 14 highlighted
the Coast Guard's loss of more enlisted service members than it
recruited from fiscal years 2019 to 2023, leading to a
shortfall of approximately 2,600 enlisted personnel in fiscal
year 2024. In your reporting, ma'am, and investigation, what
was the major cause of the loss of enlisted sailors within the
Coast Guard?
Ms. MacLeod. We found a number of reasons, some of them
having to do with work force challenges that the Coast Guard
faces, such as the frequent moves, living in remote or in
vacation areas that can be very high-cost, access to health
care, you know, challenges with the missions, a range of
reasons.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses today.
I want to just build on a little bit what my dear friend
Mr. Crane mentioned. Just real rapid response, real quickly. Do
any of you feel that diversity has hurt your operations?
Starting on the far end, sir.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Carter. Just a yes or no. Has diversity hurt your
operations?
Mr. Miller. No, Congressman.
Mr. Carter. Thank you. Admiral.
Admiral Chamie. We're very proud of our diverse work force,
sir.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Mr. Harris. I second that. Very proud of our work.
Mr. Carter. Ms. MacLeod.
Ms. MacLeod. We also are very proud of our diverse work
force at GAO.
Mr. Carter. Thank you. So I just find it difficult when my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle somehow demonize the
word ``diversity'' as if it is a bad word, as if there is
something wrong with having diversity, equity, or inclusion and
creating a broad swath of opportunities for individuals of
varied backgrounds. So I just wanted to put that the record
that we have to stop demonizing diversity as if it is some kind
of a bad word.
As a representative from New Orleans region, an area
uniquely vulnerable to natural disasters and maritime
disruptions, I want to stress how essential the Coast Guard is
to our region's safety and economic strength. Rear Admiral, I
want to personally thank you and the incredible work that the
Coast Guard does in Louisiana, specifically. After Ida, you
guys were instrumental. I can't say thank you enough for the
incredible work of the men and women who were Johnny on the
spot, who responded to the issues in the New Orleans region in
the Louisiana region. So let me take this opportunity to say
thank you to all of you for the incredible work that you do. We
may not always agree on every single aspect of our discussions,
but please know that the work that you do is appreciated.
The Mississippi River moves more than 500 million tons of
cargo annually, supporting thousands of jobs and billions in
economic activity. The Coast Guard ensures that this trade can
flow safely and securely. From maintaining aids to navigation
to responding to emergencies and inspecting vessels, the work
maintains this engine of American commerce. A delay in
reopening the river after a storm doesn't just affect
Louisiana. It raises the prices and disrupts supply chains
nationally.
In addition to relying on the Coast Guard for hurricane
response and maintaining maritime commerce, the Coast Guard
helps counter illegal, underreported, and underregulated
fishing. Illegal international fishing undercuts U.S.
fishermen, flooding the market with cheaper, untraceable, often
unhealthy, sometimes through human trafficking and slave labor,
undercutting our opportunities to provide resources to the
world as our fisheries are the flow for the rest of the world.
That is why we must be cautious about policies that shift or
pull Coast Guard away from these core missions. Diverting
personnel to other missions, this becomes a real issue.
Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, could you share with me how often
do you use the NOAA forecasters to predict and to address
storms that are coming or inclement weather on people that you
may be out to save?
Admiral Chamie. Thank you, Congressman, and thanks for the
kind words about our crews. We take great pride in responding
to the hurricanes and being some of the first on scene.
So we partner with--across the interagency and across the
Government to get our weather information. We don't get it from
just one singular source. We monitor. We just started last week
and we'll continue into the fall, till the end of hurricane
season, to track storms when they first start forming close to
Africa and in the South Caribbean, and make sure we're ready
when they make landfall.
Mr. Carter. If we don't have an NOAA, I understand that
there are multiple outlets that are used, how does that impact
you?
Admiral Chamie. Sir, we certainly find value in working
with NOAA. I would just say that we'll continue to do the best
we can.
Mr. Carter. That is fair. Got it. We should always endeavor
to give you more resources, not fewer.
Ms. MacLeod, according to GAO's research, what impacts can
we expect the diversion of Coast Guard resources have on its
efforts to affect hurricane response, countering illegal,
underreported, and unregulated fishing? We are now in the
middle of hurricane season, a time that arguably we should be
giving you all the resources to protect life, property, and
assets of the Federal Government, and most importantly of those
most vulnerable people. I know that I am over. Can you quickly
just share with us an answer to that?
Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard uses its assets and people for
multiple missions, so any focus that they're shifting to would
take away from other priorities.
Mr. Carter. Any mission----
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carter [continuing]. Takes away from the priorities of
the Coast Guard.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carter. My time has expired. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South
Carolina, Mrs. Biggs.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. I would just like to start off
personally thanking each of you for your role and your
dedication to your jobs and your duty.
My first question is for Mr. Harris. What impact do
sanctuary jurisdictions have on maritime import security? Do
you feel that cracking down and enforcing the law on sanctuary
jurisdictions would help secure our land as well as our
maritime borders?
Mr. Harris. Well, HSI investigative entity, we enforce any
violations of U.S. customs laws and U.S. immigration laws. The,
you know, the border, the sanctuary cities, we haven't seen,
you know, from HSI--well, from a criminal investigator point of
view, we haven't really seen any issues in what we're doing on
our job. We have seen that on other parts of ICE enforcement
removal operations, they're having some issues with enforcing
some of their laws and in different jurisdictions.
Mrs. Biggs. OK, thank you. So given that, and this question
is also for you, given that an estimated 80 percent of fentanyl
seized at the U.S. ports of entry between fiscal years 2019 and
2024 was trafficked by U.S. citizens, and considering President
Trump's recent designation of certain cartels as foreign
terrorist organizations, what concrete actions are being
implemented against those found to be aiding, abetting, or
directly working for these terrorist organizations?
Mr. Harris. It's the same thing that we've always done as
far as investigating people or threats. You know, I said we
investigate violations of U.S. customs law and U.S. immigration
law, and we go after those people. Whether we interdict
shipments along with our partners, we trace funds, you know, we
trace illicit proceeds that these criminal organizations or
these people acquire from contraband, we do that, and we all--
you know, we arrest them and prosecute them. So we do exactly
what we've always done.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much, Mr. Harris.
As a proud member of Border Security and Enforcement and
Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittees, I have seen
first-hand the absolute necessity of fully equipping our
Federal agencies with every tool that they need to secure our
Nation. That is why I am introducing 2 vital pieces of
legislation that directly confront the rampant involvement of
U.S. citizens in cartel drug trafficking and the severe
national security threats posed by radical sanctuary cities.
My first bill, the Mobilizing Against Sanctuary Cities Act,
it is simple. No Federal taxpayer dollars will flow to
jurisdictions that refuse to uphold American law. This empowers
the Trump administration to restore law and order in places
that have actively undermined our immigration system for
decades. The recent events in Los Angeles are a perfect example
of why we can't wait any longer. We have seen in real time the
chaos that results when cities refuse to cooperate with Federal
immigration enforcement.
We must also directly target the individuals who actively
conspire with these cartels and terrorist groups. That is why I
am also introducing the No Passport for Terrorists and
Traffickers Act. It is critical legislation which will
automatically revoke the passport of individuals found to be
providing material support to these designated foreign
terrorist organizations. By denying these individuals the
ability to travel internationally, we strike a direct blow at
their operational capacity and send an unmistakable message: if
you choose to conspire with those who poison our Nation and
threaten our security, you will lose the travel privileges of
American citizenship.
This isn't just about policy debates. It is about the
safety and security of everyday Americans, like in the Third
District of South Carolina that I represent. This is why we
can't wait any longer. I urge every one of my colleagues,
anyone who believes in American sovereignty and the rule of
law, to sponsor these vital bills. Let's stand united and send
a clear message. We will put America first and we will secure
our Nation.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the gentlewoman from South
Carolina.
I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past 5
months, we have seen high school graduates, doctors, children,
and U.S. citizens detained and deported. These mass deportation
efforts in the name of making America safe is only instilling
fear and causing confusion and chaos for our local law
enforcement, ultimately putting our communities at risk for
greater harm. While the Trump administration is using valuable
resources for your taxpayer dollars to make unlawful and
unnecessary arrests, we have seen no serious effort to actually
address our Nation's border crisis or the rising threats from
our adversaries.
If the Trump administration was serious about cracking down
on the cartels and protecting our border, they wouldn't be
cutting $495 million in funding and firing nearly 30 percent of
the employees at CISA and our cybersecurity work force. They
wouldn't be using resources from our U.S. Coast Guard to assist
with their deportation efforts as our Coast Guard faces a lack
of funding, overused aircrafts, where Acting Commandant Admiral
Kevin Lunday openly stated, even though we can operate aircraft
to the level we have, we should not be. We should be investing
in new aircraft for the Coast Guard. They wouldn't be wasting
time renaming the Gulf of Mexico and they wouldn't be deploying
the U.S. military on U.S. citizens.
If they were serious about the real border crisis, they
would be going after gun dealers in States like Texas and
Arizona that account for almost 50 percent of international
firearms trafficking involving the cartels. There seems to be a
lot of discussion, very concerned about the cartels, lots of
messaging about that, but there is actually no real effort
being done to actually rein them in. They wouldn't be calling
to cut 1.2 billion to ATF that would terminate agents who have
to work undercover in the gun trafficking rings connected to
the cartel. They would be strengthening our relationships with
our allies and not threatening trade wars, and would be
providing the resources needed for agencies to execute their
mission.
President Trump said he was going after migrant criminals,
illegal monsters, killers, and gang members. But yet we are
wasting resources terrorizing communities by showing up masked
at elementary school graduation ceremonies, work, and court
hearings where people are presenting themselves to the
immigration system to follow the rules, to go get their
hearing, to have the right process. They are going to the
courts of law. They are supposed to be safe places. Instead
they are turning these sacred spaces into spaces of terror. It
is absolutely outrageous.
Mr. Harris, we have seen a drastic increase of ICE arrests
at court hearings. I am a lawyer. I value the sanctity of the
courtroom and people go to attend an immigration hearing and
they are presenting themselves to go through the process
legally. I have continued to voice my significant concerns over
how ICE agents present themselves in the public. But this
administration is content with ignoring the concerns of
Congress and the American people.
I recently asked Secretary Noem on this issue when she came
in front of this very committee. Since that time, we have
continued to see ICE agents dressed in plain clothes, wearing
masks regularly, and not properly identified. When you are
sitting on a street and some masked man jumps out of a car and
isn't properly identified as law enforcement and comes running
to you, that is not OK to me.
My question to you, sir, is it OK with you and what are you
going to do about it?
Mr. Harris. Well, thank you for the question. We enforce,
you know, any violation of U.S. immigration and customs laws.
As far as the employees doing that at court hearings, I'm not
of--you know, I know that it happens or it has happened. I'm
not aware of the specific details of any of those matters. I
would have to know more about that.
Ms. Johnson. Well, it is all over the news. Every time in
Texas, just even in Dallas a couple weeks ago, there were like
15 people arrested at the immigration court. People who were
going through the process legally, had filed the application,
had an immigration hearing, were following the law, were not,
you know, abject, horrible, dangerous criminals. These are
people who are working, who are working in grocery stores, who
are working in farms, who are working in gas stations, who are
working in hotels, who are doing their part to contribute to
our economy, and who are showing up for their immigration
hearing, as they are required to do, and then being tackled in
the hallway by unidentified agents who are not properly marked
as law enforcement. That is within your agency's jurisdiction.
I want to know, this has been widely reported, what are
y'all doing to stop that?
Mr. Harris. Again, I don't know the facts of that matter or
the matters at the court hearing, so I can't speak general--or
speak specifically on what's going on. But I will say with
facial coverings and markings, they should have markings on.
Facial covers, I believe, are reasonable right now for what's
going on. The assaults that's taking place, the doxing that's
taking place, that's a significant rise. The threats to family
members, to employees, to loved ones. You know, they have to do
that for officer safety reasons. Assaults are 400 percent--have
increased 400 percent this year because of what's going on.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions, especially the Chairman of
the Border Security and Enforcement Subcommittee, Mr. Guest,
and the Ranking Member Ramirez.
The Members of the subcommittees may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E),
the hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
[all]