    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                   FROM CARTELS TO COASTLINES: AN EXAMINA-
                    TION OF U.S. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CONFRONT
                   ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WATERS

    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON

                             TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME
                                    SECURITY

                                    AND THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT

                                     OF THE

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 10, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-18

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-341 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                     Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
    Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
        Chair                                Ranking Member
    Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Eric Swalwell, California
    Michael Guest, Mississippi           J. Luis Correa, California
    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Shri Thanedar, Michigan
    August Pfluger, Texas                Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
    Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Daniel S. Goldman, New York
    Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
    Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
    Morgan Luttrell, Texas               LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
    Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
    Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma                  Member
    Elijah Crane, Arizona                Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
    Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Nellie Pou, New Jersey
    Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
    Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Robert Garcia, California
    Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Al Green, Texas
    Brad Knott, North Carolina
                        Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
                      Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                           Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
                                     ------

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                      Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
    Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
    Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member
    Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
    Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
        officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
                                             (ex officio)
                 Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
               Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                                     ------

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT

                      Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman
    Tony Gonzales, Texas                 J. Luis Correa, California,
    Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member
    Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
    Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Julie Johnson, Texas
    Brad Knott, North Carolina           Vacant
    Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Vacant
        officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
                                             (ex officio)
                    Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
      Transportation and Maritime Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     3
    The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Transportation and Maritime Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5
    The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border
      Security and Enforcement.......................................     6
    The Honorable Delia C. Ramirez, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Illinois, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Border Security and Enforcement:
      Oral Statement.................................................     8
      Prepared Statement.............................................    10
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Prepared Statement.............................................    11

                                   Witnesses

    Mr. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and
      Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
      Oral Statement.................................................    13
      Prepared Statement.............................................    14
    Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie, Assistant Commandant for Response
      Policy, U.S. Coast Guard:
      Oral Statement.................................................    18
      Prepared Statement.............................................    19
    Mr. James C. Harris, III, Assistant Director, Countering
      Transnational Organized Crime, Homeland Security
      Investigations:
      Oral Statement.................................................    22
      Prepared Statement.............................................    23
    Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director of Homeland Security and Justice,
      U.S. Government Accountability Office:
      Oral Statement.................................................    26
      Prepared Statement.............................................    28

     FROM CARTELS TO COASTLINES: AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
              CONFRONT ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WATERS

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, June 10, 2025

                 U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
                                Subcommittee on Transportation
                                 and Maritime Security, and the
               Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m.,
    in room 360, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos Gimenez
    [Chairman of the subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime
    Security] presiding.
        Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and
    Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs,
    McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.
        Present from the Subcommittee on Border Security and
    Enforcement: Representatives Guest, Crane, Biggs, Correa,
    Ramirez, and Johnson.
        Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security's
    Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, and
    Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement will come to
    order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee
    in recess at any point.
        The purpose of this hearing is to examine the evolving
    tactics, geographic patterns, and operational strategies
    employed by transnational criminal organizations, including
    Mexican cartels, to exploit U.S. maritime borders for drug
    smuggling, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, and other
    illegal activities. We will also evaluate the Department of
    Homeland Security's interagency efforts, operational posture,
    and resource allocations for maritime interdiction, with
    particular emphasis on the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection, Air and Maritime Operations, and Homeland
    Security Investigations.
        I would like to thank our colleagues from the Border
    Security Enforcement Subcommittee for partnering with us on
    this joint hearing, and I recognize myself for an opening
    statement.
        Good morning. I want to thank everyone for being here
    today. I especially want to thank Chairman Guest and the
    Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement for working
    with us to hold this joint hearing on a matter of growing
    importance and security for the American homeland.
    Transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, remain agile and
    persistent adversaries. For years, these groups have exploited
    vulnerabilities at our Southern Border, our southern land
    border, where drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal
    immigration surged to historic levels under the Biden
    administration. Since the beginning of 2025, however, public
    data suggests a notable decline in many of these illegal flows.
    That progress is due in large part to the renewed focus and
    decisive actions being taken under the current Trump
    administration to restore control and enforce our laws.
        But as we improve security on land, we must not allow our
    maritime domain to become the next weak point. Increasingly,
    criminal networks are turning to the sea, where vast distances,
    patchwork jurisdictions, and limited real-time visibility offer
    TCOs a lower risk of detection and a high reward for moving
    contraband. Though maritime routes account for a smaller share
    of illegal migration and narcotics trafficking compared to land
    routes, the threat remains serious. TCOs and other criminal
    actors are leveraging everything from go-fast boats, fishing
    vessels, and narco submarines to container ships and commercial
    cargo fleets to move cocaine, synthetic drugs, weapons, and
    human cargo into the United States. The first half of this
    fiscal year alone, the U.S. Coast Guard has already seized and
    offloaded more cocaine than it did in all of fiscal year 2024,
    a clear indicator that illicit maritime activity remains a
    persistent challenge despite improved enforcement efforts.
        The scale and sophistication of these operations require an
    equally coordinated and capable response. As a representative
    of the Florida Keys and much of South Florida, I know first-
    hand how vulnerable our maritime borders can be. From the
    Caribbean to the Straits of Florida and up to the Atlantic
    coast, our region has long been a strategic target for
    smugglers and cartels seeking to enter the United States
    undetected. The threat to our ports, shipping routes, and
    coastal areas is not theoretical. It directly affects the day-
    to-day security and economic viability and stability of South
    Florida.
        Moreover, while most fentanyl still enters the United
    States through land ports of entry, we cannot ignore the
    possibility that maritime routes are being used to transport
    precursor chemicals or synthetic opioids manufactured abroad.
    This is particularly concerning given the well-documented role
    that entities based in the People's Republic of China continue
    to play in supplying the chemical building blocks used to
    manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. These synthetic opioids are
    then trafficked into American communities, often with
    devastating results. Tens of thousands of Americans are dying
    each year from fentanyl.
        Beijing is complicit in incentivizing the distribution of
    these chemicals world-wide, which is responsible for the crisis
    that now claims the lives of tens of thousands of Americans
    each year. It is unknown what role, if any, the Mexican
    government has had in this crisis as they have failed to stop
    the flow of these deadly chemicals into the United States.
        To its credit, the Trump administration has made maritime
    security a greater priority by investing in interdiction
    efforts, revitalizing partnerships with key regional allies,
    and applying needed pressure on adversarial regimes that
    threaten the safety of the Western Hemisphere. These steps mark
    a welcome shift in our posture. But as this hearing will show,
    we must do more. We need a comprehensive maritime security
    strategy that includes enhanced detection capabilities, more
    robust interagency coordination, and expanded use of advanced
    technology to monitor, interdict, and deter illicit maritime
    activity. Today's hearing is an opportunity to access how
    Federal agencies are responding to these evolving maritime
    threats. We will hear from those on the front lines about what
    is working, where the challenges remain, and what resources or
    authorities may be needed to close remaining gaps.
        Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. I
    look forward to your insights and a productive discussion of
    how we can better protect our coasts, our communities, and our
    country from illicit activity at sea.
        [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
                    Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
                                 June 10, 2025
        Good morning. I want to thank everyone for being here today. I
    especially want to thank Chairman Guest and the Subcommittee on Border
    Security and Enforcement for working with us to hold this joint hearing
    on a matter of growing importance to the security of the American
    homeland.
        Transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, remain agile and
    persistent adversaries. For years, these groups have exploited
    vulnerabilities at our southern land border, where drug smuggling,
    human trafficking, and illegal immigration surged to historic levels
    under the Biden administration.
        Since the beginning of 2025, however, public data suggests a
    notable decline in many of these illegal flows. That progress is due,
    in large part, to the renewed focus and decisive action being taken
    under the current Trump administration to restore control and enforce
    our laws.
        But as we improve security on land, we must not allow our maritime
    domain to become the next weak point. Increasingly, criminal networks
    are turning to the sea, where vast distances, patchwork jurisdictions,
    and limited real-time visibility offer TCOs a lower risk of detection
    and a high reward for moving contraband.
        Although maritime routes account for a smaller share of illegal
    migration and narcotics trafficking compared to land routes, the threat
    remains serious. TCOs and other criminal actors are leveraging
    everything from go-fast boats, fishing vessels, and narco-submarines to
    container ships and commercial cargo fleets to move cocaine, synthetic
    drugs, weapons, and human cargo into the United States.
        In the first half of this fiscal year alone, the U.S. Coast Guard
    has already seized and offloaded more cocaine than it did in all of
    fiscal year 2024, a clear indicator that illicit maritime activity
    remains a persistent challenge despite improved enforcement efforts.
    The scale and sophistication of these operations require an equally
    coordinated and capable response.
        As the Representative of the Florida Keys and much of South
    Florida, I know first-hand how vulnerable our maritime borders can be.
    From the Caribbean to the Straits of Florida and up the Atlantic coast,
    our region has long been a strategic target for smugglers and cartels
    seeking to enter the United States undetected. The threat to our ports,
    shipping routes, and coastal areas is not theoretical. It directly
    affects the day-to-day security and economic stability of South
    Florida.
        Moreover, while most fentanyl still enters the United States
    through land ports of entry, we cannot ignore the possibility that
    maritime routes are being used to transport precursor chemicals or
    synthetic opioids manufactured abroad. This is particularly concerning
    given the well-documented role that entities based in the People's
    Republic of China continue to play in supplying the chemical building
    blocks used to manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. These synthetic opioids
    are then trafficked into American communities, often with devastating
    consequences.
        Whether through negligence or indifference, Beijing has failed to
    stop the flow of these chemicals, contributing to a crisis that now
    claims the lives of tens of thousands of Americans each year.
        To its credit, the Trump administration has made maritime security
    a greater priority by investing in interdiction efforts, revitalizing
    partnerships with key regional allies, and applying needed pressure on
    adversarial regimes that threaten the safety of the Western Hemisphere.
    These steps mark a welcome shift in our posture. But as this hearing
    will show, more must be done.
        We need a comprehensive maritime security strategy that includes
    enhanced detection capabilities, more robust interagency coordination,
    and expanded use of advanced technology to monitor, interdict, and
    deter illicit maritime activity.
        Today's hearing is an opportunity to assess how our Federal
    agencies are responding to these evolving maritime threats. We will
    hear from those on the front lines about what is working, where the
    challenges remain, and what resources or authorities may be needed to
    close remaining gaps.
        Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. I look
    forward to your insights and to a productive discussion on how we can
    better protect our coasts, our communities, and our country from
    illicit activity at sea.

        Mr. Gimenez. I recognize the Ranking Member, the
    gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening
    statements.
        Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman. Thank you to our
    witnesses for being here today. Good morning to everyone.
        Today's hearing provides an opportunity to discuss how
    Trump's reckless orders are undermining homeland security and
    making our communities less safe. Over the weekend, we saw
    Trump Federalize the National Guard to respond to protests in
    Los Angeles and threaten to deploy Marines on U.S. soil against
    Americans. Trump is using every possible excuse to escalate the
    situation and manufacture unnecessary confrontations.
        In January, Trump and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi
    Noem ordered the Coast Guard to triple its presence at U.S.
    borders in an attempt to carry out their reckless immigration
    policy. This redirection of troops to the border comes at great
    cost to the Coast Guard's other critical missions. At a time
    when levels of maritime migration are already down due to this
    administration's essential ending asylum in the United States,
    the Coast Guard is pulling assets and personnel from around the
    globe to sit at the U.S. border. Critically, the Coast Guard
    has redirected deployments from Indo-Pacific and Arctic
    regions, from Congress has invested heavily on a bipartisan
    basis in the Coast Guard's capacity to counter aggression from
    China and Russia. Reducing our activities in the Indo-Pacific
    and the Arctic undermines our long-term strategic interests and
    ultimately makes us less safe.
        Worse yet, the Trump administration is diverting the Coast
    Guard's limited aviation fleet to assist with deportations. The
    Coast Guard is flying immigrants internally within the United
    States to relocate them to staging areas for deportation. This
    is not the Coast Guard's mission. I repeat again, this is not
    the Coast Guard's mission. These flights place major strain on
    our Coast Guard aviation fleet, which already struggles to meet
    the service's needs. Many Coast Guard aircrafts are from the
    1980's and 1990's and suffer major maintenance and reliability
    issues. Instead of replacing the oldest planes and helicopters
    in the fleet, Secretary Noem is looking to acquire a new $50
    million Gulfstream jet to replace 1 of 2 she already has
    available for her use. Coast Guard aircraft were already
    available for the service to use less than 70 percent of the
    time before accounting for the new demands this administration
    is making.
        These planes and helicopters are essential to the Coast
    Guard's mission from search and rescue to drug and migrant
    interdictions. Operating flights in service of other agencies'
    missions is the last thing the Coast Guard needs. Of course,
    the Coast Guard is not the only agency diverting resources to
    deportations above all else. The list of agencies reportedly
    taking personnel away from their primary mission to focus on
    deportation goes on and on, from Customs and Border
    Protections; Homeland Security Investigations; the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Drug
    Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
    Firearms, and Explosives; the State Department's Diplomatic
    Security Service; and the Internal Revenue Service. These
    agencies are all pulling resources from their missions to help
    deport immigrants, the vast and vast majority who are
    nonviolent contributing members of our communities.
        When it comes to undocumented immigrants, it does not
    matter if they are elderly grandparents, sick children, or
    Cubans, Haitians, or Venezuelans seeking refuge from violence.
    Trump's orders are to try to deport them all, no matter the law
    and no matter the cost. Is this really what the American people
    want? I have my doubts for sure.
        To those watching this hearing, I ask you, are you hoping
    the Government will find and save you if you are stranded on a
    roof during a hurricane season? I think you do. But sorry,
    under Trump, the Coast Guard plane that would otherwise help
    might be busy flying law-abiding immigrants away from their
    communities.
        Are you hoping the Government will investigate wealthy tax
    cheats and make them pay their fair share? I am sure you hope
    so. But sorry, under Trump, many of the agents who are supposed
    to do that are busy deporting local farmers, construction
    workers, community leaders, and caregivers.
        Are you hoping Federal agents will investigate and stop the
    worst of the worst, drug traffickers, armed smugglers, human
    traffickers, and even child abusers? I am sure you do. But
    sorry, under Trump, many of the agents who are supposed to do
    that are busy deporting your friends and your neighbors. Those
    are apparently the Federal Government's priorities with Trump
    and Republicans in charge.
        I want to thank our witnesses again for being here and I
    look forward to today's discussion. With that, I yield back.
        [The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]
                  Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver
                                 June 10, 2025
        Today's hearing provides an opportunity to discuss how President
    Trump's reckless orders are undermining homeland security and making
    our communities less safe. Over the weekend, we saw President Trump
    nationalize the National Guard to respond to protests in Los Angeles
    and threaten to deploy Marines on U.S. soil. Trump is using every
    possible excuse to inflame the situation and manufacture unnecessary
    confrontations.
        In January, President Trump and Secretary Noem ordered the Coast
    Guard to triple its presence at U.S. borders. This surge comes at great
    cost to the Coast Guard's other critical missions.
        At a time when levels of maritime migration are already down due to
    this administration effectively ending asylum in the United States, the
    Coast Guard is pulling assets and personnel from around the globe to
    sit at the U.S. border. Critically, the Coast Guard has redirected
    deployments from the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic--regions where
    Congress has invested heavily on a bipartisan basis in the Coast
    Guard's capacity to counter aggression from China and Russia.
        Reducing our activities in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic
    undermines our long-term strategic interests and ultimately makes us
    less safe. Worse yet, the Trump administration is diverting the Coast
    Guard's limited aviation fleet to assist with deportations. The Coast
    Guard is flying immigrants internally within the United States to
    relocate them to staging areas for deportation. This is not the Coast
    Guard's mission.
        These flights place major strain on the Coast Guard aviation fleet,
    which already struggles to meet the service's needs. Many Coast Guard
    aircraft are from the 80's and 90's and suffer major maintenance and
    reliability issues. Instead of replacing the oldest planes and
    helicopters in the fleet, Secretary Noem is looking to acquire a new
    $50 million dollar Gulfstream jet to replace 1 of the 2 she already has
    available for her use.
        Coast Guard aircraft were already available for the service to use
    less than 70 percent of the time before accounting for the new demands
    this administration is making. These planes and helicopters are
    essential to the Coast Guard's missions, from search and rescue to drug
    and migrant interdictions. Operating flights in service of other
    agencies' missions is the last thing the Coast Guard needs.
        Of course, the Coast Guard is not the only agency diverting
    resources to deportations above all else.
        The list of agencies reportedly diverting personnel away from their
    primary mission to support deportations goes on and on:
       Customs and Border Protection
       Homeland Security Investigations
       The Federal Bureau of Investigation
       The U.S. Marshals Service
       The Drug Enforcement Administration
       The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
       The State Department's Diplomatic Security Service
       The Internal Revenue Service.
        These agencies are all pulling resources from their missions to
    help deport immigrants--the vast, vast majority of whom are non-
    violent, contributing members of our communities. When it comes to
    undocumented immigrants, it does not matter if they are elderly
    grandparents, sick children, or Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, or
    Venezuelans seeking refuge from violence. President Trump's orders are
    to try to deport them all, no matter the law and no matter the cost.
        Is this really what the American people want? I have my doubts. To
    those watching this hearing, I ask:
        Are you hoping the Government will find and save you if you are
    stranded on a roof during hurricane season?
        Sorry--under President Trump, the Coast Guard plane that would
    otherwise help just might be tied up with flying law-abiding immigrants
    away from their communities.
        Are you hoping the Government will investigate wealthy tax cheats
    and make them pay their fair share?
        Sorry--under President Trump, many of the agents who are supposed
    to do that are busy deporting your local farmers, construction workers,
    cleaners, and cooks.
        Are you hoping Federal agents will investigate and stop the worst
    of the worst drug traffickers, arms smugglers, human traffickers, and
    child abusers?
        Sorry--under President Trump, many of the agents who are supposed
    to do that are busy deporting your friends and neighbors.
        Those are apparently the Federal Government's priorities with
    President Trump and Republicans in charge.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to Ranking Member McIver.
        I now recognize the Chairman for the Subcommittee on Border
    Security Enforcement, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
    Guest, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by
    responding to the opening statement of Mrs. McIver. I want the
    record of this committee to be crystal clear that I and my
    fellow Republicans, that we strongly condemn the senseless
    violence and lawlessness that we have watched unfold in
    California since last week. I want to commend the brave men and
    women of our State, Federal, and local law enforcement, as well
    as our National Guardsmen and our United States Marines who
    have stepped up at a moment's notice to restore order and to
    protect America from chaos while we reaffirm the rule of law.
    It is a sad state of affairs when simply enforcing longstanding
    immigration law is used to justify violent riots. Even more sad
    that the far left is standing not with law enforcement, but
    with rioters and with illegal aliens.
        Today's hearing provides an opportunity to examine the
    Department of Homeland Security's efforts to deter, detect, and
    disrupt illicit maritime activities that have threatened our
    national security and have undermined the rule of law. I want
    to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today. Your
    expertise in your field is vital as we examine the challenges
    and as we seek to find solutions in securing America's vast
    maritime domain.
        From the Gulf of America to the shores of Alaska, the
    United States' maritime border spans thousands of miles of
    coastland. It is comprised of waterways, shipping routes, and
    ports that facilitate commerce and play a vital role in our
    national security defense. While our national maritime
    geography is a strength, it also presents challenges. The
    Caribbean and Pacific regions in particular have become prime
    targets for cartels and criminal organizations. They use fast
    boats, fishing vessels, semi-submersibles to evade detection
    while moving narcotics, weapons, and human cargo into the
    United States.
        While President Trump has strengthened security along our
    land border, achieving a remarkable 95 percent decrease in
    daily border encounters within the administration's first
    hundred days, we must continue to remain vigilant to the fact
    that cartels are agile, they are adaptive. As enforcement
    strengthens on land, these criminal networks are shifting their
    operations to the sea. To counter these threats, the Department
    of Homeland Security employs a whole-of-Government approach,
    incorporating its Federal law enforcement partners on joint
    maritime border security operations. Each of the components
    with us today play a critical role in that effort.
        The Coast Guard is our Nation's oldest continuous seagoing
    service and is a cornerstone of maritime border security. With
    a unique blend of military, law enforcement, regulatory, and
    humanitarian roles, the United States Coast Guard is often the
    first and only presence in remote maritime areas. It interdicts
    vessels far from the United States' shore, often before threats
    reach the homeland, and seize hundreds of thousands of pounds
    of illicit drugs each year.
        CBP's Air and Marine Operations is the Nation's only
    Federal agency dedicated to aviation and marine law
    enforcement. With a fleet of high-speed interceptors, coastal
    patrol vessels, fixed-wing surveillance aircraft, and unmanned
    aerial systems, AMO conducts complex interdiction missions
    across the air and sea. Its mission is to safeguard the
    American people and AMO is on the front lines of maritime
    border security, providing critical intelligence and rapid-
    response capabilities.
        Homeland Security Investigation also plays a critical role
    in maritime border security, primarily serving as the
    investigative arm for transnational criminal activity. HSI
    investigates transnational criminal organizations involved in a
    broad range of crimes, such as trafficking narcotics and human
    smuggling. This is truly a team effort with each agency
    bringing in a unique skill set.
        Success also relies on us working with our international
    partners. To enhance these efforts, I have been working with
    committee staff and intend to introduce legislation that would
    enhance the presence and operation of CBP in foreign countries
    working alongside other law enforcement agencies. This bill
    would greatly expand CBP's capability for targeting threats
    abroad before they reach our shore.
        Let me be clear, border security does not stop at our land
    border. DHS maritime operations have resulted in an untold
    number of vessels being interdicted with aliens attempting to
    illegally enter our country, as well as hundreds of thousands
    of pounds of illicit drugs seized annually at our maritime
    border. Securing our maritime border is essential to protecting
    our national security. Confronting these threats protects the
    safety of our families and communities across this great
    Nation. I look forward to today's discussion and working with
    my colleagues to find solutions that enhance and prioritize
    maritime border security.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Guest. I now recognize the
    Ranking Member for the Subcommittee on Border Security
    Enforcement, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, for
    her opening statement.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez. Good morning. I
    want to first start by thanking our witnesses for being here
    today.
        Despite the administration having so much to answer for,
    today in our committee it is one of our first hearings with
    Government officials outside of Secretary Noem that was with us
    a couple weeks ago. I find it shameful that it took until June
    for my colleagues to request that administration officials
    appear before us, but I am certainly glad that you are finally
    here.
        Look, I agree that maritime security is important and we
    certainly should be discussing how we are redirecting resources
    to use them outside of the mission, as Mrs. McIver so
    eloquently stated in her opening remarks. I would support
    having a full hearing to discuss that if we were not in
    extraordinary times. However, we are in extraordinary times.
        Our communities, and I want to make sure we visualize this
    because I know my colleagues are going to try to say the
    opposite here, are being terrorized by the weaponization of the
    Government and the military against U.S. citizens. The Trump
    administration is using authoritarian tactics to incite fear
    and chaos in our communities. Why? So they can further
    weaponize the Government to exert control and suppress dissent.
        Let's look at Los Angeles. Heavily-armed, masked agents
    conducted military-style raids at places like Home Depots, a
    donut shop, and a clothing wholesaler. These are purposely
    inflammatory tactics meant to escalate violence and justify
    further violations of our Constitutional rights and our civil
    liberties. These kidnappings are targeting mothers, children,
    and law-abiding neighbors who have contributed to our
    communities for years and have complied with the course
    requirements, attending check-in appointments when asked to do
    so.
        Do you know why I can tell you this with confidence?
    Because that is what is happening in Chicago. I texted law-
    abiding members of our community for unscheduled check-ins and
    were told that within days they had to present themselves for a
    check-in. When they showed up, many of them mothers, their case
    was immediately dismissed, followed by ICE agents waiting for
    them at the door to handcuff them, put them in freight
    elevators, and rush them out in order to shove them into vans
    while wearing masks. Can you imagine that was happening to one
    of your family members? They are using text messages to call
    people in to arrest the exact immigrants who are demonstrating
    their commitment to the law by complying with ICE's
    instructions. To me, that runs counter to every claim the Trump
    administration has made, but it is consistent with reporting
    that the administration's actual intent is to simply maximize
    arrest.
        For this administration let me be very clear, the terror is
    the point. They are kidnapping people. They are tearing
    families apart. They are deporting United States citizens,
    including United States citizen children with cancer. They are
    ignoring our right to due process and, in doing so, are making
    mistakes they call administrative errors as they arrest and
    deport people. Just last week, DHS had to return a Guatemalan
    man wrongfully deported to Mexico, despite fearing he would be
    persecuted there. They finally returned Kilmar Abrego Garcia to
    the United States, who now faces what could be trumped-up
    charges.
        We have all heard about the others disappeared to a prison
    in El Salvador based on allegations of being in a gang,
    including Andry Hernandez Romero, a gay makeup artist, who
    legally arrived to the United States the way many others have
    for generations, seeking asylum. The only so-called evidence
    this administration has given of him being in a gang is tattoos
    of his parents' names with crowns.
        But this administration's obsession with persecuting
    immigrants and achieving their mass deportation means they are
    using every resource they can, instead of keeping their
    community safe, to terrorize them. We are seeing the CBP and
    law enforcement agencies like FBI, DEA, and ATF focus on
    rounding up law-abiding, contributing immigrants in their
    communities. The message sent to our communities through these
    actions are the Trump administration does not care if you are
    complying with the law because they don't respect the rule of
    law. They don't care if you have Constitutional rights because,
    let's be honest, they don't respect the Constitution. They only
    care about the arbitrary deportation quotas that have been set
    by who? Stephen Miller.
        Not only are these officers not doing the jobs they were
    hired to do, you know, like pursuing child abusers,
    investigating sex trafficking, or weapons smuggling, they are
    terrorizing our communities while wearing masks. You know who
    else wears? People committing crimes, executioners, prison
    guards in CECOT, Klansmen, people who don't want to be held
    accountable for what they do because they know their actions
    violate the foundations of our shared humanity.
        So, yes, we need oversight of this administration. The most
    urgent need is to rein in the abuses of power that make all of
    us less safe all over this country. Today, let me be clear,
    they are violating immigrants' Constitutional rights. They are
    stripping our communities of due process, and they are seeking
    to separate us from our humanity. But here is what is
    happening. They are testing our limits now because they intend
    to use the same playbook next on anyone they deem undesirable.
    This committee's responsibility is to oversight, not to the
    President of the United States of America.
        With that, I yield back.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Ramirez follows:]
                    Statement of Honorable Delia C. Ramirez
                                 June 10, 2025
        Despite the administration having so much to answer for, today is
    one of our committee's first hearing with Government officials, outside
    of Secretary Noem a few weeks back. It is shameful that it took until
    June for my colleagues to request that administration officials appear
    before us. I am certainly glad that you are finally here.
        I agree that maritime security is important. And we certainly
    should be discussing the resources are being redirected outside of the
    mission. And I would support having a full hearing to discuss this if
    we were not in extraordinary times. However, we are in extraordinary
    times. Our communities are being terrorized by the weaponization of the
    Government and the military against U.S. citizens.
        The Trump administration is using authoritarian tactics to incite
    fear and chaos in our communities so they can further weaponize the
    Government to exert control and suppress dissent. Let's look at Los
    Angeles: Heavily-armed, masked agents conducted military-style raids at
    places like Home Depot, a donut shop, and a clothing wholesaler. These
    are purposefully inflammatory tactics meant to escalate violence and
    justify further violations of our Constitutional rights and civil
    liberties.
        And these kidnappings are targeting mothers, children, and law-
    abiding neighbors who have contributed to our communities for years and
    have complied with the courts' requirements, attending check-in
    appointments when asked to do so. Do you know why I can say that with
    confidence? Because that's what is happening in Chicago.
        ICE texted law-abiding members of our communities for unscheduled
    check-ins and were told that within days they had to present themselves
    for a check in. When they showed up, many of them mothers, their cases
    were immediately dismissed followed by ICE agents waiting for them at
    the door to handcuff them, put them in freight elevators, and rush them
    out in order to shove them into vans while wearing masks. Can you
    imagine if that happened to one of your family members?
        They are using text messages to call people in to arrest the exact
    immigrants who are demonstrating their commitment to the law by
    complying with ICE's instructions. This runs counter to every claim the
    Trump administration has made--but is consistent with reporting that
    the administration's actual intent is to simply maximize arrests. For
    this administration, let me very clear--the terror is the point.
        They are kidnapping people. They are tearing families apart. They
    are deporting U.S. citizens, including U.S. citizen children with
    cancer. They are ignoring our right to due process and, in doing so,
    are making mistakes they call administrative errors as they arrest and
    deport people. Just last week, DHS had to return a Guatemalan man
    wrongfully deported to Mexico despite fearing he would be persecuted
    there.
        And they finally returned Kilmar Abrego Garcia to the United
    States, who now faces what could be trumped-up charges.
        We've all heard about the others disappeared to a prison in El
    Salvador, based on allegations of being in a gang--including Andry
    Hernandez Romero, a gay makeup artist who legally arrived to the United
    States seeking asylum. The only so-called evidence this administration
    has given of him being in a gang is tattoos of his parents' names with
    crowns.
        But this administration's obsession with persecuting immigrants and
    achieving their mass deportations means they are using every resource
    they can to, instead of keeping our communities safe, to terrorize
    them. We're seeing the CBP and law enforcement agencies like the FBI,
    DEA, and ATF focus on rounding up law-abiding, contributing immigrants
    in our communities.
        The message sent to our communities through these actions are:
        The Trump administration does not care if you are complying with
    the law because they do not respect the rule of law. They do not care
    if you have Constitutional rights because they do not respect the
    Constitution. They only care about the arbitrary deportation quotas set
    by Steven Miller.
        Not only are these officers NOT doing the jobs they were hired to
    do--like pursuing child abusers, investigating sex trafficking, or
    weapons smuggling--they are terrorizing our communities while wearing
    masks . . . You know who else wears masks--people committing crimes,
    executioners, prison guards in CECOT, Klansmen. People who don't want
    to be held accountable for what they do because they know their actions
    violate the foundations of our shared humanity. So, we need oversight
    of this administration. And the most urgent need is to rein in the
    abuses of power that make all of us less safe all over this country.
        Today, they are violating immigrants' Constitutional rights,
    stripping our communities of due process, and they are seeking to
    separate us from our humanity. They are testing the limits now because
    they intend to use this same playbook next on anyone they deem
    undesirable. This committee's responsibility is to oversight and not to
    the President of the United States of America.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members of
    the committee are reminded that opening statements may be
    submitted for the record.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                                 June 10, 2025
        I am glad the subcommittees are holding this hearing to help
    examine how the Trump administration's policies and practices are
    affecting illicit maritime activities. I have sat on this committee
    since its inception. I believe deeply in the Department of Homeland
    Security's mission statement which states, ``With Honor and integrity,
    we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.''
    I wish the Trump administration believed in this mission as strongly as
    my fellow Democrats and I do.
        The actions of this administration are completely devoid of honor
    and integrity, and our homeland is less safe as a result. Just this
    past weekend, we witnessed President Trump send the military to the
    streets of Los Angeles to stop protests against immigration raids.
        This is the same President who, in 2021, sat on his hands and
    laughed as actual insurrectionists stormed the Capitol Building, beat
    cops with weapons, broke windows, destroyed property, and looked to
    capture and kill elected officials. Trump would not call the National
    Guard when the police who protect this Capitol were being beaten to a
    pulp, but he did not hesitate to unnecessarily send them to Los
    Angeles.
        Additionally, over the weekend, the Ranking Member of our Border
    Security and Enforcement Subcommittee, Congressman Correa, along with
    several other Members, were turned away from an ICE facility when they
    arrived to conduct oversight, in yet another example of the Trump-Noem
    DHS not following the law.
        We are also witnessing the Trump administration pulling agents and
    officers off their regular duties to focus on deporting non-criminals--
    which takes them away from investigations into actual criminals and is
    making us less safe. Under this administration, HSI agents have less
    time to investigate child traffickers, gun smuggling, drug running, and
    other crimes because they are dedicated to deportations. The
    administration's direction for the Coast Guard is likewise misguided.
        Secretary Noem stated in the Coast Guard's new Force Design 2028
    plan that the Coast Guard ``is fragile, in crisis, and on a path to
    failure . . . The Service is in a downward readiness spiral that is
    unsustainable. Without change, the Coast Guard will fail''. So, what
    changes has Secretary Noem implemented to address this crisis and keep
    the Coast Guard from failing?
        Most immediately, Secretary Noem is trying to have the Coast Guard
    fund a new $50 million Gulfstream V jet for her to use, even as the
    service has many older aircraft in more urgent need of replacement. For
    an administration that is supposedly uncovering waste, fraud, and
    abuse, this request reeks to high heaven. Beyond that request,
    Secretary Noem has directed the Coast Guard to surge its limited
    resources away from its many critical missions, including in the Indo-
    Pacific and the Arctic.
        Instead of using all available resources to counter Russia and
    China, the Coast Guard is now in the shuttle service business, flying
    gardeners, cooks, farmhands, and housecleaners from ICE detention
    centers to deportation staging facilities. It is a disservice to our
    constituents to divert our brave Coast Guard service members from life-
    saving missions to make them operate the Greyhound of the sky.
        The Trump administration is placing deportations above all else,
    which undermines our homeland security and makes us all less safe. This
    administration does not represent the values on which this country was
    built, nor those on which the Department of Homeland Security was
    founded. To put it in maritime terms, President Trump and Secretary
    Noem have missed the boat. We in Congress need to help DHS correct
    course to meet its mission.

        Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of
    witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that
    our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
    answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.
        I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
    Jonathan Miller is the executive assistant commissioner for Air
    and Maritime Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
    Mr. Miller brings over 28 years of Federal law enforcement and
    leadership experience. He began his career with U.S. Border
    Patrol in San Diego, serving on the Special Response Team and
    Border Patrol Tactical Unit before transferring to the Miami
    sector for maritime patrols. That is a pretty nice sector. In
    2007, he joined Air and Marine Operations in Miami, advancing
    through various roles, including vessel commander, marine
    instructor supervisor, marine interdiction agent, and several
    senior executive positions before assuming his current role.
        Rear Admiral Adam Chamie assumed the role of Coast Guard
    assistant commandant for response policy in May 2024,
    overseeing strategic doctrine and policy for 7 of the Coast
    Guard's 11 operational missions, including law enforcement and
    maritime security. A 1996 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy,
    Rear Admiral Chamie has commanded 3 Coast Guard cutters and
    served on 3 others, conducting operations from the Bering Sea
    to the Arabian Gulf. His prior ashore assignments include
    commander of Sector Key West, chief of Congressional affairs,
    and Coast Guard liaison to the House of Representatives.
        James C. Harris is the assistant director, Countering
    Transnational Organized Crime at Homeland Security
    Investigations. In this position, he develops and executes
    strategies aimed at disrupting and dismantling criminal
    networks and works alongside policy makers to improve laws and
    regulations that strengthen HSI's efforts in combating
    transnational organized crime. Prior to this assignment, Mr.
    Harris served as the director of the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security's Center for Countering Human Trafficking.
        Heather MacLeod is a director in the Government
    Accountability Office, Homeland Security and Justice Team. She
    oversees Coast Guard and maritime security issues, including
    Coast Guard work force and strategic planning efforts, and
    maritime port and supply chain cargo security. Heather joined
    GAO in 2002, and has led projects examining aviation safety,
    airline competition, transit programs, and highway bridge
    management.
        I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here
    today.
        I now recognize Mr. Miller for 5 minutes to summarize his
    opening statement.

         STATEMENT OF JONATHAN P. MILLER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
       COMMISSIONER, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
                           BORDER PROTECTION

        Mr. Miller. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking
    Member McIver, Ranking Member Ramirez, and distinguished
    Members of the subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before
    you today on behalf of the men and women of Air and Marine
    Operations, or AMO, to discuss our critical role in the U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection's comprehensive approach to
    maritime border security.
        The maritime domain presents unique national security
    challenges. Unlike air and land environments, coastal waters
    are vast and less restricted. Countless vessels enter or
    operate in U.S. territorial waters every day, making detection
    of illegal activity and apprehending associated smugglers
    challenging. Many smuggling crafts hide in plain sight amongst
    legitimate traffic while others transit remote areas far
    offshore, trying to elude detection altogether.
        Smugglers also use a variety of vessels tailored to the
    area and amounts of contraband they are smuggling to best evade
    detection. Vessels are also much faster than they were 20 years
    ago today, often leaving law enforcement little time to
    interdict them before reaching our shores.
        Immediately following the President's declaration of a
    national emergency at the Southern Border, AMO, in concert with
    other CBP and DHS partners took action, realigning vessels and
    aircraft patrols in anticipation of increased maritime activity
    due to the decrease in illegal crossings at the land borders.
    In Southern California, we've seen a 30 percent increase in
    vessel seizures and over 100 percent increase in maritime
    apprehensions since January compared to the same time frame
    last year.
        Additionally, maritime drug smuggling activity is a
    perpetual and dangerous threat to U.S. border security. Of the
    234,000 pounds of drugs AMO seized in 2024, approximately 76
    percent occurred in the maritime environment.
        In addition to high maritime drug interdiction rates,
    smuggler aggression and violence has also been on the rise.
    Noncompliant boardings and instances where we forcibly disabled
    the engines of smuggling vessels to get them to stop has
    exponentially risen in the past few years. In November 2022, 3
    of my Marine agents were shot and one of them, Michael Maceda,
    was killed during a vessel stop of smugglers off the coast of
    Puerto Rico.
        AMO deploys a fleet of some of the most powerful law
    enforcement marine interceptors in the world. Evolving to meet
    today's threats, we've recently repowered these vessels and
    made other modifications to this platform for a perfect mix of
    speed, agility, and agent safety. I appreciate the committee's
    support in these recapitalization efforts.
        AMO also maintains a fleet of aircraft functionally
    designed and outfitted for maritime detection and surveillance.
    Our P3s, -8s, and MQ-9 UAS aircraft are capable of long-range,
    high-endurance CONUS and OCONUS patrols, while the Super King
    Air 350 further expands aerial surveillance in the littorals of
    the United States and the Caribbean. AMO is heavily invested in
    a variety of tethered aerostats, towers, and tactical systems
    providing radar and sensor capabilities, significantly
    increasing our domain awareness along our littoral borders, and
    the maritime approaches around the continental United States,
    Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
        Artificial intelligence and machine learning play a
    critical part in filtering nefarious from legitimate traffic
    activity and we've had success in using this technology to
    build algorithms identifying patterns to filter the sheer
    volume of traffic.
        Once again, I'd like to thank the Members of this committee
    for supporting these critical efforts and further acquisitions
    that will ultimately enable 24/7 domain awareness of
    prioritized maritime littoral approaches.
        The scale and complexity of countering drug trafficking and
    human smuggling in the maritime environment requires
    partnerships and collaboration. In addition, to the U.S. Coast
    Guard, AMO routinely works with Federal, State, local, and
    foreign partners, and has been one of the largest contributors
    of flight hours to Joint Interagency Task Force South,
    supporting counter narcotics operations and the vast 42 million
    square mile sourcing transit zones.
        With few exceptions, AMO's maritime law enforcement
    authority is limited to Customs' waters or 12 nautical miles
    from the coastline of the United States. CBP continues to work
    with Congress on legislative changes to extend the Customs'
    waters from 12 to 24 nautical miles. This extension of law
    enforcement authorities would enable AMO to expand patrols,
    increasing our ability to save lives at sea, conduct
    counternarcotics operations, support our partners, and carry
    out the border security mission.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look
    forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller
                                 June 10, 2025
                                  introduction
        Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
    Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, it is a
    privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP), Air and Marine Operations' unwavering commitment to
    interdicting illegal drugs, preventing human smuggling, and securing
    our Nation's borders, maritime domain, and approaches. As a front-line
    law enforcement component of CBP, Air and Marine Operations operates in
    source and transit zones, between ports of entry, in coastal waters,
    and interior waterways.
        Born out of the legacy U.S. Customs Service, Air and Marine
    Operations was established in 2006 as an integral part of CBP's
    comprehensive border security mission and the Department of Homeland
    Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-layered approach to national
    security. Air and Marine Operations agents are Federal law enforcement
    officers \1\ with a broad range of legal authorities, specialized
    assets, and unique operational capabilities that enable them to detect
    and interdict illegal activity at and beyond our Nation's borders in
    the land, air, and sea domains, providing a critical layer of
    continuity in border security operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ 6 U.S.C.  211(f); 19 U.S.C.  1589a; 8 U.S.C  1357.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          state of the maritime border
        While CBP reasserts control of our borders \2\ in accordance with
    President Trump's directives, transnational criminal organizations and
    foreign terrorist organizations continue their efforts to smuggle
    people and contraband into our country. These organizations operate
    with immense capability, capacity, and nearly unlimited resources.
    Their smuggling operations are sophisticated, and they continually
    adjust their tactics, techniques, and routes to circumvent detection
    and interdiction by law enforcement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/04/28/100-days-most-secure-
    border-american-history.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Illicit activity in the maritime environment is a threat to U.S.
    border and national security. The maritime domain is generally less
    restricted than the air and land environments. Thousands of vessels
    enter or operate in U.S. territorial waters every day. Detecting
    illegal activity can be challenging, as many smuggling craft hide in
    plain sight among legitimate traffic, while others transit remote areas
    far offshore to try to elude detection. Additionally, smugglers use a
    variety of craft tailored to the area and cargo they are smuggling,
    including modified fishing boats, go-fast vessels, pangas,\3\ low-
    profile vessels, and semi-submersibles. Vessels are much faster than
    they were 20 years ago, often leaving law enforcement little time to
    interdict them before reaching our shores.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ A small boat, often used for fishing, and typically powered by
    an outboard motor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Encounters with smugglers can also be extremely dangerous. Since
    its creation in 2006, Air and Marine Operations has used disabling fire
    on the engines of fleeing smuggler vessels nearly 350 times.
    Additionally, in November 2022, 3 Air and Marine Operations Marine
    Interdiction Agents were shot--and one of them, Michel Maceda,
    tragically killed--during a vessel stop off the coast of Puerto
    Rico.\4\ Precise engagement and rapid neutralization of risk is key to
    safely resolving water-based law enforcement actions. Air and Marine
    Operations continually refines its maritime interdiction capabilities
    and tactics to meet ever evolving threats.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-
    marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         air and marine operations' maritime border security operations
        Air and Marine Operations remains at the forefront of the Nation's
    efforts to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration through the
    maritime domain. Immediately following President Trump's declaration of
    a national emergency at the Southern Border, Air and Marine
    Operations--in concert with our other CBP and DHS partners--took action
    to expand its maritime enforcement efforts and safeguard the American
    people.
        With the historic decrease in illegal crossings in the land
    environment, Air and Marine Operations realigned maritime aircraft and
    increased patrols, resulting in a 90 percent increase in maritime
    apprehensions of illegal aliens in Southern California.\5\ Since
    January 21, 2025, Air and Marine Operations enforcement efforts across
    all our maritime operational environments have led to the apprehension
    of over 750 aliens, with 60 percent occurring in South Florida and the
    Caribbean Sea.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ From January 21, 2025-May 19, 2025, compared to the same date
    range in 2024.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Aliens attempting to make the journey to the United States along
    maritime routes take an enormous risk, putting their lives in the hands
    of transnational criminal organizations, foreign terrorist
    organizations, or other human smuggling networks and often in unsafe,
    rustic vessels. The weather at sea is unpredictable, and the vessels
    that make it far enough for Air and Marine Operations to encounter are
    often dangerously overloaded with illegal aliens. Air and Marine
    Operations encounters with these vessels typically become rescue
    missions in addition to apprehension actions. Just last month, Air and
    Marine Operations responded to reports of an overturned panga-style
    boat that washed ashore in San Diego.\6\ At least 3 people died,
    including 1 child. Another child on board was never recovered and is
    presumed dead. Not only was the vessel unsuitable for the quantity of
    people on board, but it was also incapable of handling the perilous sea
    conditions. This event was another tragic reminder of how smugglers
    operate with total disregard for human life. Secretary Noem is seeking
    capital punishment for these crimes.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/five-charged-human-
    smuggling-event-led-least-three-deaths.
        \7\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/05/06/secretary-noem-requests-
    death-penalty-against-alleged-human-smugglers-whose-actions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to responding to increasing numbers of maritime alien
    encounters, Air and Marine Operations continues to intercept tons of
    dangerous illicit drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and
    communities. In fiscal year 2024, Air and Marine Operations enforcement
    efforts led to the seizure of 233,662 pounds of illegal drugs.\8\
    Approximately 76 percent of these drugs--including more than 160,000
    pounds of cocaine, 15,000 pounds of marijuana, and 170 pounds of
    methamphetamine--were intercepted in the maritime environment.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/
    air-and-marine-operations-statistics.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Air and Marine Operations remains vigilant and continually adjusts
    our operations as transnational criminal organizations, foreign
    terrorist organizations, and human smugglers seek to shift their
    criminal activities from long-standing land-based pathways to
    alternative maritime routes.
                        maritime enforcement authorities
        Despite Air and Marine Operations' unique cross-domain law
    enforcement capabilities, in the maritime environment, Air and Marine
    Operations' maritime law enforcement authority \9\ is generally limited
    \10\ to areas within the historical ``customs waters''\11\--or 12
    nautical miles from the coastline--of the United States. This
    constraint limits Air and Marine Operations' ability to effectively
    counter current and evolving modern threats in the maritime
    environment. Specifically, as modern technology continues to change and
    advance rapidly, the performance and speed of maritime vessels
    improves, including those used to violate U.S. law or evade U.S. law
    enforcement. These advancements render Air and Marine Operations'
    authority to operate only within the 12-nautical-mile zone inadequate,
    placing our law enforcement capability at a significant disadvantage
    and often preventing Air and Marine Operations' interdiction of vessels
    in time to prevent their escape.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ See, e.g. 19 U.S.C.  1581, 1587, 1589a.
        \10\ In certain circumstances, Air and Marine Operations is
    authorized to operate on the high seas, for instance when enforcing
    laws on U.S. registered vessels (19 C.F.R.  162.3), hovering vessels
    (19 U.S.C.  1401(k); 19 U.S.C.  1587(a)), and vessels subject to hot
    pursuit (19 U.S.C.  1581(d)). Additionally, beyond the customs waters,
    Air and Marine Operations may enforce the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
    Act (46 U.S.C.  70501-70502), where appropriate.
        \11\ 19 U.S.C.  1401(j), 1709(c).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CBP appreciates our continuing collaboration with Congress on
    legislative changes that would extend the limits of customs waters.
    Expansion of Air and Marine Operations' authority to operate, through
    the extension of the 12-nautical-mile customs waters, would enable Air
    and Marine Operations to better leverage its cross-domain authorities,
    enhance its detection of and response to the modern and sophisticated
    capabilities of smugglers and transnational criminal organizations, and
    better support its law enforcement partners in the maritime
    environment.
               interdiction assets, capabilities, and technology
        Air and Marine Operations is committed to its maritime security
    mission and continues to make investments in its highly-trained agents,
    vessels, aircraft, and technological capabilities to advance the
    effectiveness of its operations. These investments not only support Air
    and Marine Operations' on-going ability to effectively respond to
    illegal drug activity in the maritime environment but also contribute
    to other Air and Marine Operations enforcement actions, including those
    that led to over 1,000 arrests as well as the seizure of 1,500 weapons
    and $12.6 million in U.S. currency in fiscal year 2024.
        Specialized law enforcement personnel are essential to Air and
    Marine Operations' maritime border security mission. These highly-
    skilled agents must be capable of not only enforcing a broad range of
    U.S. laws, but also safely and effectively doing so in the complex--and
    often dangerous--maritime environment. While recruitment for these
    positions can be challenging, Air and Marine Operations is actively
    pursuing opportunities to attract and onboard qualified talent at all
    levels of experience. We are focused on maximizing the capacity of our
    marine units in the Caribbean, South Florida, and Southern California
    where we have a high tempo of maritime activity.
        Vessels tailored for Air and Marine Operations' specific law
    enforcement operations are a key aspect of its maritime border security
    mission. For example, Air and Marine Operations deploys a fleet of
    high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels engineered for rapid pursuit and
    interdiction of non-compliant vessels. These vessels are crewed by
    highly-trained agents authorized to use all necessary force, including
    warning shots and disabling fire, to stop fleeing vessels.
        In addition to our maritime interdiction efforts with our marine
    interceptors on the water, we also contribute a significant amount of
    air assets to these operations. Air and Marine Operations' fleet of
    maritime patrol aircraft are functionally designed and outfitted for
    maritime detection and surveillance. The P-3s and
    DHC-8 aircraft provide long-range, high-endurance capabilities in
    remote source and transit zones while the Super King Air 350 Multi-Role
    Enforcement Aircraft further expand aerial surveillance, closing
    detection and enforcement gaps in the Caribbean. Equipped with advanced
    sensors, communications, and radar systems, these aircraft are credited
    with the interdiction of 150,380 pounds of cocaine and 11,670 flight
    hours within the Western Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2024,
    which equated to 13 pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour.
        The use of unmanned aircraft systems in the maritime environment
    has also increased Air and Marine Operations' ability to effectively
    identify, detect, monitor, and track conveyances involved in illegal
    activity. In partnership with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate,
    Air and Marine Operations modified 2 MQ-9s to Big Wing variants,
    significantly increasing fuel capacity and flight endurance. These Big
    Wing aircraft have the added ability to surveil surface targets much
    longer while awaiting interdiction surface forces to arrive. Air and
    Marine Operations has been employing unmanned aircraft systems in the
    maritime environment since 2020, contributing to the seizure of over
    81,000 pounds of cocaine and 46,000 pounds of marijuana.
        Air and Marine Operations is heavily invested in a variety of
    ground-based radars and sensors increasing maritime domain awareness
    along our littoral borders. We strategically deployed several maritime
    approach surveillance towers in the Caribbean Basin that overlap to
    provide persistent wide-area surveillance and detection capabilities in
    high-risk areas. Additionally, we've taken tethered aerostats
    traditionally used for air detection and integrated maritime surface
    radars to utilize them in support of maritime interdiction operations.
    These tools have significantly increased our situational awareness of
    the maritime approaches around Puerto Rico, South Texas into the Gulf
    of America, and the Florida Straits. Other tower and ground-based radar
    systems have provided additional radar detection around Puerto Rico and
    U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, and the Great Lakes. Over the last
    3 years, these systems have cumulatively contributed to the seizure of
    over 17,200 pounds of cocaine, 15,600 pounds of illegally obtained
    marine life from illicit fishing practices, and $2 million in U.S.
    currency.
        Advanced technology, including the BigPipe real-time video system
    and the Minotaur mission integration system, link Air and Marine
    Operations' tactical assets, aircraft, and vessels, thereby providing
    Air and Marine Operations with a streamlined and efficient information-
    collecting and -sharing capability. The Air and Marine Operations
    Center simultaneously tracks, processes, and integrates multiple sensor
    feeds and sources of information to provide comprehensive domain
    awareness in support of CBP's border security mission.
        Artificial intelligence and machine learning initiatives at Air and
    Marine Operations are improving threat detection efforts by processing
    vast amounts of surveillance data in real time. By leveraging
    artificial intelligence, Air and Marine Operations is advancing the
    efficiency and effectiveness of our maritime domain awareness. In areas
    where there is a high concentration of recreational vessels, Air and
    Marine Operations uses artificial intelligence technology to assist in
    filtering nefarious from recreational traffic. We have had success in
    using this technology to build algorithms that can identify patterns
    among a high volume of tracks on the radar.
        Air and Marine Operations will continue to modernize its fleet and
    sensor systems to enhance its data analysis capabilities and
    operational performance in diverse marine environments and increase its
    ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the maritime border and
    approaches to the United States.
                            operational coordination
        Using a whole-of-Government approach, Air and Marine Operations
    leverages interagency partnerships through the Global Maritime
    Operational Threat Response Coordination Center including the U.S.
    Coast Guard, Department of State, Department of Defense, as well as
    collaborations with other State, local, Tribal, and foreign partners.
    Air and Marine Operations works closely with DHS Joint Task Force East
    and is one of the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint
    Interagency Task Force South, supporting counternarcotics operations in
    the 42 million square miles of source and transit zones spanning the
    Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean. Frequent cooperation with foreign
    partners is imperative. Over the last few years, Air and Marine
    Operations has increased its focus on the Eastern Caribbean and
    strengthened partnerships in the Lesser Antilles, creating a force
    multiplier of surveillance and interdiction assets throughout the
    southern approaches to Puerto Rico.
                                   conclusion
        Since its creation in 2006, Air and Marine Operations has evolved
    into one of the world's largest civilian forces for aviation and
    maritime law enforcement. A critical component of CBP's border security
    mission, Air and Marine Operations monitors and patrols vast areas of
    air, sea, and land around the clock, defending the United States
    against threats at and beyond our borders.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
    answering your questions.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
        I now recognize Rear Admiral Chamie for 5 minutes to
    summarize his opening statements.

    STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ADAM A. CHAMIE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
                 FOR RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Chamie. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman
    Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking Member Ramirez, and
    Members of the committee. I request my written testimony be
    submitted for the record.
        Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
        Admiral Chamie. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your enduring
    support for the Coast Guard and the men and women who volunteer
    to serve. The Coast Guard is busier than ever and laser-focused
    on border security. Following the President's declaration of a
    national emergency at the Southern Border, the Coast Guard
    surged aircraft, cutters, boats, and people. We tripled our
    force laydown and we made it clear that our highest mission
    priority was to achieve full operational control of the
    maritime border.
        The Coast Guard works closely with the DOD, Joint Force,
    DHS components, and the U.S. interagency. Together, we
    synchronize operations with the singular goal to protect our
    territorial integrity and our Nation's sovereign interests. I'd
    like to highlight 3 ways we control, secure, and defend our
    U.S. borders and maritime approaches.
        First, we deter and interdict illegal aliens attempting to
    reach the United States by sea. The aliens typically depart
    countries like Haiti, Cuba, the Bahamas, and Mexico, but they
    vary in nationality from across the globe. They use everything
    from handmade wooden boats to sail freighters to speedboats to
    sport fishers to jet skis. Frequently, these smuggling ventures
    are organized by transnational criminal organizations or
    cartels. In the past 5 months, we've interdicted almost 1,000
    illegal aliens.
        The second way we defend our U.S. borders is by going toe-
    to-toe with the cartels who smuggle drugs into our country.
    This fiscal year, our crews have removed 160 metric tons of
    cocaine and detained over 300 smugglers. This past February, we
    surpassed the amount of drugs we removed in all of fiscal year
    2024. The cartels are working hard, but our Coast Guard crews
    are working harder.
        The interdiction of cocaine matters because the same
    cartels who smuggle cocaine produce and smuggle fentanyl. Once
    we detain the smugglers, we work with our partners and the
    intelligence community to determine who these criminals are and
    how and where these cartels operate. Cocaine is the cash crop
    for cartels. Their huge profits from cocaine fund other
    nefarious activities like human trafficking, weapons smuggling,
    and production of synthetic drugs. Fentanyl remains the leading
    cause of drug-related deaths in our country, but cocaine still
    kills upwards of 25,000 Americans every year.
        The third way the Coast Guard defends our border is at our
    ports and waterways in both physical space and cyber space. The
    United States is home to 361 commercial ports that facilitate
    $4.6 trillion in commerce--correction, $4.6 trillion in
    commerce each year. Our ports create incredible economic
    opportunity, but they also present a significant risk if not
    properly hardened. We work across the intelligence community
    and with partners, like Customs and Border Protection, to
    identify and mitigate those threats.
        Our Coast Guard men and women are doing a great job, but
    our efforts are not sustainable. We are at the lowest state of
    readiness since World War II. To overcome this crisis Secretary
    Noem has directed us to transform the Coast Guard into a more
    agile, capable, and responsive force. Without change, the Coast
    Guard will fail. We will not fail.
        The Secretary's plan to revolutionize the Coast Guard is
    called Force Design 28. Under this plan and with the support of
    Congress and the administration, we will transform from the top
    down. We will establish a service secretary like the other
    military services. We will streamline command and control to
    make us more agile, a more agile fighting force that empowers
    our operators to make decisions.
        We will grow our service by at least 15,000 people to
    restore readiness and operate new ships, aircraft, and
    technology to improve operations and deliver mission results.
    Finally, we will streamline our contracting and acquisitions to
    deliver the capabilities our crews need at speed.
        The Coast Guard is extremely grateful to this Congress for
    their support to include the $21.2 billion in reconciliation
    passed by the House. The Coast Guard's future depends on
    reconciliation and an increase in our top-line budget. Since
    1790, the Coast Guard has ensured our national sovereignty and
    protected our shores. With your support, we will do it for
    another 235 years.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Chamie follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie
                                  introduction
        Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
    Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify today. I am thankful for your
    enduring support of the United States Coast Guard and honored to be
    here today to discuss the Service's role in controlling, securing, and
    defending America's maritime border.
        The United States is a maritime nation with 95,000 miles of
    shoreline and 361 commercial ports connecting 25,000 miles of navigable
    channels facilitating the flow of $5.4 trillion dollars of maritime
    economic commerce. More than 90 percent of overseas trade cargo enters
    or leaves the United States by ship. As a vital instrument of national
    power within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard
    is 1 of the 6 military services, a Federal law enforcement agency, and
    member of the intelligence community. We control, secure, and defend
    the U.S. border and maritime approaches from maritime threats; ensure
    the safe and secure flow of commerce; respond to natural disasters; and
    save lives. I am pleased to share with you how we leverage our unique
    authorities, capabilities, and relationships with international,
    Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, and how we operationalize a
    layered approach to securing our maritime border and protecting our
    communities from Transnational Criminal Organizations and other
    maritime threats.
        Transnational Criminal Organizations pose a significant threat to
    our Nation's maritime border security, as they operate across national
    boundaries, smuggling illicit drugs like cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and
    methamphetamine into the United States, bringing violence, death,
    destruction, and crime into our communities. These commodities provide
    lucrative revenue streams that fund terrorism and other nefarious
    activities such as the trafficking of people, weapons, and illicit
    goods, destabilizing the region and promoting illegal migration--we
    must continue to take action against these organizations. No single
    agency can dismantle this threat alone.
         u.s. coast guard authorities, responsibilities, & capabilities
        The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law
    enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas; we share the
    lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with the U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The Coast Guard partners with the
    Department of Defense through Joint Interagency Task Force--South for
    detection and monitoring of illicit drugs bound for the United States.
    Coast Guard drug interdictions historically focused on cocaine and
    marijuana, and serve the whole-of-Government effort to combat
    Transnational Criminal Organizations. Cocaine interdictions at sea cut
    off a critical source of funding for the same Transnational Criminal
    Organizations that produce and smuggle fentanyl, and in turn impair
    their efforts to produce and smuggle fentanyl into the United States.
    Furthermore, our Coast Guard Intelligence personnel work closely with
    our Intelligence Community partners to combat Transnational Criminal
    Organizations that threaten the United States.
        Coast Guard forces deploy to the 2 major drug transit corridors in
    the Western Hemisphere, the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, to deter,
    detect, and interdict maritime drug trafficking events. Coast Guard
    deployments are complementary to U.S. Navy, Canadian, British, and
    Dutch naval deployments with embarked Coast Guard Law Enforcement
    Detachments, capitalizing on the Coast Guard's authorities and
    expertise to interdict narcotics before they approach our borders.
        These surface assets are supported by Coast Guard, CBP Air and
    Marine Operations, U.S. Navy, and Dutch fixed-wing aircraft, and are of
    critical importance to the detection and monitoring of these
    Transnational Criminal Organizations. This has proven to be a
    successful approach and asset composition.
        In addition to our at-sea assets and Law Enforcement Detachments,
    the Coast Guard maintains a physical presence in 30 countries around
    the world to serve in various capacities to include security
    cooperation officers, maritime advisors, attaches, liaisons,
    interdiction and prosecution team support, or technical experts.
    Through these integrated touchpoints, we work with our partners to
    identify challenges to overcome and opportunities to increase their
    capabilities to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations inside
    their own borders and maritime jurisdictional zones. The Coast Guard
    maintains more than 40 bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements
    that enable operations on partner-nation-flagged vessels suspected of
    illicit trafficking on the high seas and in waters subject to their
    jurisdiction. These types of international activities enable partner
    nations to increase the expertise of their workforce, enhance their
    maritime capabilities, and empower regional countries to lead
    coordinated efforts to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations at
    the source.
        Along the U.S. coast, the Service's sectors, boat stations, air
    stations, and patrol boat fleet provides an integrated law enforcement
    capability that protects our shores from invasion. These assets and
    skilled personnel work closely with interagency partners to identify
    and interdict illegal smuggling activities that seek to traffic drugs
    and aliens across the border.
        Approximately 80 percent of drug seizures each year occur in the
    maritime domain in operations executed by the Coast Guard and its
    interagency and international partners. Year-over-year, seizures by
    Coast Guard personnel account for roughly 50 percent of all drug
    seizures by U.S. law enforcement conducted in the transit and arrival
    zones. In fiscal year 2024, the Coast Guard removed over 106 metric
    tons of cocaine, bringing our 6-year total to 873.5 metric tons
    removed. To date in fiscal year 2025, the Coast Guard has removed 135
    metric tons of cocaine from the maritime domain, including a February
    offload of over 16.9 metric tons of cocaine worth over $275 million
    that will never hit the streets and poison the American people. Our
    layered approach to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations as far
    away from U.S. shores as practical is successful only through security
    cooperation and integrated deployments and engagements.
                     southeast border & maritime approaches
        The southeast maritime approaches to the United States experience
    significantly higher levels of irregular maritime migration than other
    maritime vectors and present the greatest risk of a mass migration
    event. Primary nationalities encountered in this region are Cubans,
    Haitians, and Dominicans. Cuban and Haitian aliens primarily use
    transit routes into Florida directly or via the Bahamas. Dominican and
    some Haitian aliens tend to transit routes across the Mona Passage to
    Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Common conveyances used in
    this region range from fishing vessels, coastal freighters, sail
    freighters, go-fast type vessels, or rudimentary vessels called
    ``rusticas.'' With the leadership of the DHS Secretary, the Coast Guard
    maintains an increased and active presence in these regularly-transited
    vectors to quickly respond to reports of suspicious vessels by
    international, Federal, State, and local partners, and deter departures
    from countries of origin.
                     southwest border & maritime approaches
        The southwest maritime border vector continues to record above-
    average illegal maritime migration events, but not to the same
    historical magnitude as in the southeastern maritime approaches.
    However, human smugglers rely primarily on ``panga''-style personal
    watercraft and makeshift vessels with a capacity of approximately 30
    aliens to continuously attempt illegal entries. Although aliens with a
    variety of nationalities are interdicted in this vector, the vast
    majority are Mexican. The Coast Guard relies heavily on CBP, our
    partners for processing.
                              the gulf of america
        In the Gulf of America, illegal maritime migration events are
    organized and facilitated by human smuggling networks. In response to
    the national emergency on the border, the Coast Guard surged assets to
    the Rio Grande and is leveraging the capabilities of our deployable
    specialized forces to assist the United States Border Patrol in
    detecting and deterring aliens attempting to illegally cross the river.
    In fiscal year 2025, the Coast Guard has interdicted or deterred over
    50 illegal aliens in the region. In these cases, the Coast Guard works
    with regional interagency partners to transfer interdicted aliens
    ashore to CBP.
        Due to a perceived lack of legal consequences, illegal fishing
    activity by Mexican small craft fishing boats (``lanchas'') in our
    Exclusive Economic Zone has continued to increase over the last 25
    years, with the recidivism rate of many offenders exceeding 90 percent.
    One recently apprehended offender was previously caught by the Coast
    Guard more than 40 times. The Coast Guard has worked diligently with
    the interagency over the last several months to address this issue by
    enabling criminal prosecution of lancha crews. In one of the first
    cases pursued with this new approach, on May 13, 2025, a grand jury in
    Brownsville, Texas indicted 4 suspects for illegally harvesting red
    snapper in U.S. waters.
                                northern border
        The Northern Border is expansive and diverse, with numerous islands
    and waterways. The short distances between United States and Canadian
    territorial seas create unique opportunities for nefarious actors to
    exploit vulnerable maritime areas with a relatively small law
    enforcement presence. Maritime security threats along the Northern
    Border include both illegal maritime migration and drug trafficking.
        To combat these threats and secure our Northern Border, the Coast
    Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have developed a program to
    train and designate law enforcement officers to co-crew boats and
    aircraft to enforce Canadian and United States Federal laws on either
    side of the shared border. These operations provide the ability to
    share encrypted Automatic Identification System data to vastly improve
    cross-border domain awareness and provide a common tactical picture.
    Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Mounted Police teams conducted 123
    cross-border operations in fiscal year 2024, resulting in over 500
    boardings, 15 violations, and actively deterred illicit activity. This
    program exemplifies the collaborative efforts between the Coast Guard,
    Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CBP, and other State and local law
    enforcement working in concert to prevent Transnational Criminal
    Organizations from exploiting our Northern Border and endangering the
    American people.
                              combatting fentanyl
        Combatting Fentanyl and its illegal precursors is one of the
    administration's top priorities and the Coast Guard has taken
    significant action. Fentanyl has been the leading cause of U.S. drug-
    related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70 percent of
    U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican Transnational Criminal
    Organizations are the primary source of synthetic opioid flow into the
    United States, predominantly across our Southwest Border. While bulk
    fentanyl has not been encountered in the maritime domain, the Coast
    Guard is leveraging our broad authorities, capabilities, and policies
    to seek out and interdict both fentanyl and illegal precursor
    chemicals. On January 31, 2025, the acting commandant directed
    immediate action to bolster operations to combat illegal fentanyl and
    the Service is seeking new ways to leverage our broad authorities and
    partnerships with other agencies.
                                   conclusion
        The Coast Guard provides the Nation a tremendous return on
    investment. We control, secure, and defend the borders and maritime
    approaches in direct support of President Trump's Executive Orders. In
    order to conduct these vital missions, we must continue to invest in
    our workforce, re-capitalize aging assets and infrastructure, and
    integrate new technologies to position the Service to dismantle the
    Transnational Criminal Organizations that threaten our citizens and
    interdict aliens attempting to illegally enter our country. Thank you
    for your continued support of the Coast Guard and our work to ensure
    the safety and security of the American people.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
    your questions.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Rear Admiral Chamie.
        I recognize Mr. Harris for 5 minutes to summarize his
    opening statements.

        STATEMENT OF JAMES C. HARRIS, III, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
      COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMELAND SECURITY
                             INVESTIGATIONS

        Mr. Harris. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest,
    Ranking Member McIver, and Ranking Member Ramirez, and esteemed
    Members. I appreciate the opportunity to present this vital
    topic here today.
        It is an honor to represent the exceptional and unwavering
    efforts of the men and women of U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, who are
    steadfast in their commitment to protecting our Nation's
    security, public health, and economy from criminal
    organizations that seek to exploit and compromise our great
    Nation, border security, economy, and critical infrastructure.
    As a criminal investigative arm of the Department of Homeland
    Security, HSI is firmly dedicated to safeguarding the United
    States by detecting and dismantling transnational criminal
    organizations that threaten our citizens, businesses, and
    financial institutions. HSI has a formidable work force of
    approximately 8,800 personnel across 243 domestic locations and
    over 93 international sites. We leverage the expertise of more
    than 4,500 task force officers from diverse Federal, State,
    Tribal, territorial, local, and international agencies.
        Our special agents are on the front lines identifying,
    intercepting, and prosecuting those who exploit our maritime
    borders and supply chains. We work in tandem with U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard to execute this
    vital mission. Every successful interdiction enables us to
    leverage our investigative prowess to trace supply sources,
    target distribution hubs, and disrupt financial networks with
    the goal of dismantling the entire transnational criminal
    organization.
        It's important to emphasize that narcotics and dangerous
    drugs are not the only contraband we confront in a maritime
    environment. Given that most cargo entering the United States
    arrive by sea, HSI routinely faces challenges from counterfeit
    and mis-manifested cargo, which can devastate public safety and
    the economy if allowed to enter our commerce.
        Furthermore, maritime human smuggling poses a serious
    threat to national security and human life. With smugglers
    exploiting vulnerabilities along our maritime borders, they
    frequently utilize overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels that
    endanger the lives of migrants, with many being women and
    children. Through our border enforcement security task forces
    and transnational criminal investigative units, HSI is
    relentlessly targeting criminal networks in the maritime
    domain.
        Globally, HSI leads 115 border enforcement security task
    forces across the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Mariana
    Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, engaging over 1,500 task
    force officers and personnel from more than 200 Federal, State,
    local, Tribal, international law enforcement agencies.
    Additionally, we have over 600 foreign law enforcement officers
    and prosecutors assigned to 18 transnational criminal
    investigative units and 3 international task force units,
    magnifying our capacity to disrupt criminal activity and defend
    our homeland.
        Executive Order 14159, signed by President Donald Trump on
    January 20, 2025, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security
    and the Attorney General to establish Homeland Security task
    forces in every State and U.S. territory. These task forces,
    spearheaded by HSI and the Federal Bureau Investigation, are
    empowered to investigate, prosecute, and dismantle criminal
    cartels, foreign gangs, and transnational criminal
    organizations operating within the United States, with
    particular focus on 8 newly-designated foreign terrorist
    organizations. The HSTFs represent a united Government effort
    to target the most dangerous and prolific transnational
    criminal organizations.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and
    for your on-going support of HSI in our relentless pursuit to
    safeguard America and its citizens by disrupting and
    dismantling transnational criminal organizations globally. I'm
    standing by for any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of James C. Harris, III
                                 June 10, 2025
        Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking
    Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, on
    behalf of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), we wish to express
    our appreciation to you for inviting us to this hearing today as well
    as for your time, attention, and steadfast commitment to protecting our
    homeland security through your service in your respective committees.
        I also thank you for the opportunity to discuss the exceptional and
    exhaustive efforts the men and women of U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations perform to
    safeguard our Nation's security, public health, and economy against
    those criminals who seek to exploit, victimize, and compromise our
    great Nation, our industries, and our critical infrastructure. I am
    truly honored to represent their exemplary service to our Nation, which
    is proudly conducted in accordance with the principles of Honor,
    Service, and Integrity.
             ice homeland security investigations history and role
        As one of our country's premier Federal law enforcement agencies,
    Homeland Security Investigations stands dedicated to protecting the
    United States through detecting and dismantling Transnational Criminal
    Organizations targeting the American people, threatening our
    businesses, abusing our financial institutions, and exploiting our
    prosperity. With our unique authorities and footprint, Homeland
    Security Investigations is perfectly situated to investigate and
    dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations through the enforcement
    of over 400 Federal laws. At Homeland Security Investigations, we are
    comprised of approximately 8,800 personnel across 243 domestic
    locations and more than 90 international locations, where we leverage
    more than 4,500 task force officers from various Federal, State,
    Tribal, territorial, local, and international partners. Homeland
    Security Investigation's mission, as the principal investigative
    component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is to
    combat a wide range of transnational crimes, including terrorism,
    illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, child exploitation, human
    smuggling, and cyber crimes.
        Under the Trump administration, Homeland Security Investigations
    aggressively pursues investigations into criminal networks and
    activities which compromise the global supply chain. A key focus among
    these investigative efforts resides within the maritime environment.
    According to the U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime
    Administration, ``about 99 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves
    the U.S. by ship. This waterborne cargo and associated activity
    contribute more than $500 billion dollars to the U.S. GDP, generates
    over $200 billion in annual port sector Federal/State/local taxes and
    sustains over 10 million jobs.''\1\ This vast amount of cargo movement
    allows Transnational Criminal Organizations the ability to exploit the
    global supply chain to smuggle contraband into the United States and
    around the globe.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ U.S. DOT Maritime Administration updated February 21, 2025
    (https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/maritime-transportation-system-
    mts/maritime-transportation-system-mts).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Homeland Security Investigations works to identify, intercept, and
    eventually prosecute those exploiting maritime transportation and cargo
    supply chains. We utilize critical industry, open source, and law
    enforcement data, along with collaboration and information sharing
    among other Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement
    agencies, to identify highly-effective information to support criminal
    and civil investigations and enforcement activities primarily focused
    on the smuggling of illicit narcotics, such as fentanyl and precursor
    chemicals, weapons, sensitive U.S. military equipment, and dual-use
    technology, and the prevention of human smuggling, human trafficking,
    and drug trafficking.
        Illegal drug smuggling is a global crime with local impacts.
    Illegal drugs--such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and synthetic opioids
    including fentanyl--largely come from other countries. Drug cartels and
    other Transnational Criminal Organizations employ complex schemes to
    evade detection as they attempt to smuggle their deadly products into
    the United States. Once here, local networks distribute and sell those
    drugs in our cities and on our streets--to our communities, our fellow
    citizens, and our loved ones--with devastating effects. In fiscal year
    2025 alone, HSI investigations are credited with the seizure of over
    501,036 lbs. of cocaine, 192,225 lbs. of precursor chemicals, 7,897
    firearms, and the arrest of over 23,972 individuals.
        Homeland Security Investigations fights daily to stem this terrible
    threat. Thanks to our efforts and those of our colleagues within DHS,
    illegal border crossings at the U.S. Southern Border are at a historic
    low. This has caused fentanyl seizures at our Ports of Entry to
    continue to fall. And as DHS personnel tighten border security at our
    land borders--cartels will continue to look for new ways to smuggle
    contraband and people into the United States, including through
    maritime means.
        To combat those who seek to exploit our maritime environment,
    Homeland Security Investigations special agents work closely with U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard through
    interdiction and investigative efforts. With every successful
    interdiction--we leverage our expertise in conducting complex criminal
    investigations to identify the sources of supply, target the
    distribution hubs, and intercept financial networks to degrade and
    dismantle the entire transnational criminal organization.
        As just one example of Homeland Security Investigation's
    prioritization of maritime investigations and our commitment to
    partnerships, Homeland Security Investigations is a steadfast partner
    in the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force's Panama Express
    Strike Force. This prime example of a successful multi-agency operation
    is comprised of 7 signatory partner agencies. Additionally, Panama
    Express Strike Force collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of
    Defense's Southern Command Joint Interagency Task Force--South.
        As an intelligence-driven, criminal enterprise combatting strike
    force, Panama Express Strike Force personnel have created and
    maintained one of law enforcement's most robust, productive, and
    reliable human intelligence networks ever operated in Central and South
    America. The daily collection, analysis, and dissemination of highly
    actionable intelligence targets Transnational Criminal Organizations
    linked to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This intelligence
    also identifies operators involved in large-scale drug trafficking,
    money laundering, and related activities, primarily using maritime and
    air transportation conveyances.
        The cycle of human intelligence employed by Panama Express Strike
    Force identifies Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in the
    Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, disrupts their operations through
    maritime and air interdictions, develops witnesses and intelligence,
    and dismantles the Transnational Criminal Organizations through
    strategic utilization of all developed evidence. This approach has
    produced historical law enforcement results.
        It is important to note that drugs are not the only forms of
    contraband encountered in the maritime environment. Most of the cargo
    entering the United States from foreign countries arrives via maritime
    vessels. As such, Homeland Security Investigations routinely encounters
    counterfeit and mis-manifested cargo, which, if allowed to enter the
    commerce of the United States, can have devastating impacts on public
    safety and the U.S. economy.
        Additionally, maritime human smuggling continues to pose a serious
    threat to both national security and human life. Human smugglers
    routinely exploit vulnerabilities along the United States' maritime
    borders, often utilizing overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels that place
    migrants, many of them women and children, at significant risk. These
    operations are frequently organized by Transnational Criminal
    Organizations operating off the coasts of California, Florida, and U.S.
    territories in the Caribbean. Homeland Security Investigations
    prioritizes the investigation of high-impact smuggling organizations
    through 2 key initiatives: Joint Task Force Alpha and the
    Extraterritorial Criminal Travel program. In coordination with U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Justice Criminal
    Division, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, and other law
    enforcement partners, these programs focus on dedicating investigative,
    analytical, and prosecutorial resources to dismantle the highest
    priority of human smuggling organizations and their affiliated
    networks.
        A recent example underscores the heartbreaking human cost of these
    Transnational Criminal Organizations. On May 5, 2025, a panga-style
    vessel carrying 16 migrants, including 2 minors, capsized and washed
    ashore near Torrey Pines, San Diego. Rescue efforts managed to identify
    6 survivors but tragically, 3 Indian nationals lost their lives and 7
    others remain missing. Homeland Security Investigations is currently
    investigating this smuggling event.
        During this investigation, as with our other investigations,
    Homeland Security Investigations targets every aspect of the criminal
    enterprise, from the recruiters and transporters to the organizers,
    financiers, and ultimately the leaders. This may include tracing the
    illicit funds used to purchase vessels, the freezing or forfeiture of
    connected bank accounts, the tracking of complicit commercial vessels,
    or the interceptions of communication devices.
        These techniques, along with many others, are often most notably
    deployed through Homeland Security Investigation's capitalization of
    our unique authorities to employ a multi-layered strategy that
    integrates intelligence, operational coordination, and international
    cooperation within the task-force methodology. Traditionally
    exemplified through our Border Enforcement Security Task Forces units,
    and our Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, Homeland Security
    Investigations task forces bring together Federal, State, local, and
    international partners to target criminal networks along U.S.
    coastlines, among other threat areas. Additionally, we rely on U.S.
    Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine
    Operations, and the U.S. Navy, to ensure the rapid response capability
    and maritime intelligence sharing. Globally, there are 115 Border
    Enforcement Security Task Forces units located across the United
    States, Puerto Rico, Guam, Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin
    Islands, comprised of more than 1,500 task force officers and personnel
    representing more than 200 Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
    international law enforcement agencies, and National Guard units. There
    are over 600 foreign law enforcement officers and prosecutors assigned
    to 14 Transnational Criminal Investigative Units and 3 International
    Task Force units operating in 17 countries worldwide. Together, these
    partnerships exponentially multiply Homeland Security Investigation's
    ability to affect investigative outcomes, disrupt criminal activity,
    and protect the homeland and our allies.
        Building upon these 2 highly-successful programs, under Executive
    Order 14159, signed by President Trump on January 20, 2025, Homeland
    Security Investigation and partners from the U.S. Department of Justice
    have taken steps to establish Homeland Security Task Forces, in all
    States and U.S. territories. Homeland Security Task Forces are charged
    with investigating, prosecuting, and removing criminal cartels, foreign
    gangs, and Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in the United
    States. Homeland Security Task Forces coordination of activities comes
    through a national coordination center in collaboration with the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
    other Federal law enforcement partners, U.S. Attorney's Offices, and
    relevant State, Tribal, territorial, and local law enforcement
    agencies. Each Homeland Security Task Force targets the most prolific
    Foreign Terrorist Organization targets. The Homeland Security Task
    Force network aligns with Executive Orders 14159 and 14157 and is
    focused on dismantling cross-border human smuggling and human
    trafficking networks, especially those involving children, and
    enforcing U.S. immigration laws.
                                   conclusion
        Maritime security is especially challenging as the U.S. Government
    must protect over 12,400 miles of maritime borders. Transnational
    Criminal Organizations constantly probe maritime borders for gaps to
    smuggle people, hundreds of thousands of pounds of illegal narcotics,
    dangerous weapons, illicit proceeds, and other contraband into the
    United States. Homeland Security Investigations uses this challenge to
    embody the dedication and service the American people expect and
    deserve. Our employees strive daily to achieve our mission and to
    ensure the safety and security of this great Nation, its people, and
    its economic prosperity.
        Chairman Guest, Chairman Gimenez, and esteemed committee Members,
    thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your
    continued support of Homeland Security Investigations and our efforts
    to safeguard America and its people by disrupting and dismantling
    Transnational Criminal Organizations throughout the world. On behalf of
    the men and women of Homeland Security Investigations, I would like to
    extend an invitation to the Members of both committees and their staff
    to visit our various facilities and engage with personnel from our
    headquarters components located here in the National Capitol Region as
    well as our domestic and international offices to garner first-hand
    knowledge of Homeland Security Investigations' operations and the
    diverse array of challenges we continuously face.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, I would
    be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Harris.
        I recognize Ms. MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her
    opening statements.

    STATEMENT OF HEATHER MACLEOD, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND
             JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver,
    Ranking Member Ramirez, and Members of the subcommittee, thank
    you for the opportunity to be here to discuss GAO's work on
    Federal efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. My
    testimony today focuses on actions that DHS components could
    take to help ensure U.S. maritime border security.
        The illegal movement of people, drugs, and weapons into the
    United States and the criminal organizations that traffic them
    pose significant threats to national security. Securing the
    Nation's borders is a key part of the Department of Homeland
    Security's mission. Within DHS, Coast Guard, CBP, and HSI, law
    enforcement efforts are vital to confronting and mitigating
    illicit maritime activity.
        In addition to their typical missions, these agencies, in
    coordination with other Federal partners, also respond to
    national priorities or emergencies. For example, in recent
    years, Coast Guard and other Federal agencies were called on to
    respond to an unprecedented migrant surge at the Southern
    Border. This response impacted other missions. For example,
    during the surge, Coast Guard almost entirely redirected assets
    from its drug to migrant interdiction mission. Whether shifting
    priorities or surging to respond to a crisis or emergency,
    there is an impact on mission balance, assets, and personnel
    tied to these Federal efforts. Resources surged to respond to a
    crisis are not available for other missions, and people and
    assets can become stretched.
        Additionally, GAO has identified coordination and
    operational challenges that may hinder these efforts. For
    example, we examined DHS task forces that coordinate to detect
    and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs being smuggled on
    noncommercial maritime vessels, mainly on southern borders. Our
    work in 2019 and 2024 has shown that task forces have not
    consistently assessed their efforts. This is essential for
    making decisions about priorities and resource allocations. We
    have 7 recommendations pertaining to task forces that remain
    unaddressed.
        Illicit maritime activities also occur in the Arctic
    region, including potential conflict with Russia or China or
    illegal fishing. The Coast Guard plays a key role in Arctic
    policy implementation and enforcement, but we found in August
    2024 that the service does not have a way to measure progress
    on its Arctic efforts.
        Our prior work has also found the Coast Guard faces
    significant operational challenges balancing tradeoffs among
    its assets and personnel across missions. As Coast Guard
    prioritized deploying assets for its migrant interdiction in
    recent years, it conducted fewer drug interdiction operations.
    Other missions were similarly impacted. The conditions of the
    assets the Coast Guard manages for all of its missions have
    been in a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown that
    the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing at the same
    time that their availability is decreasing. Declining
    availability of these assets and delays in acquisition of their
    replacements can affect Coast Guard's ability to conduct
    missions. Our recommendations address how Coast Guard can
    better manage asset challenges and acquisition programs for new
    vessels and aircraft.
        DHS law enforcement components also face personnel
    challenges. The Coast Guard exceeded its recruiting goal in
    2024 for the first time in 5 years by taking actions such as
    increasing recruiting offices, marketing, and outreach efforts.
    Despite these efforts, the Coast Guard remained about 2,600
    enlisted members short of its work force target. CBP has also
    fallen short of staffing targets for its law enforcement
    position in recent years. In September 2024, we reported that
    CBP has taken action to strengthen its recruitment, hiring, and
    retention efforts. For example, each of CBP's operational
    components have offered recruitment incentives for law
    enforcement positions.
        In conclusion, while DHS and its components play a vital
    role in confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities,
    it faces challenges in carrying out these missions effectively.
    Actions are needed to ensure effective oversight and management
    of assets and personnel. Addressing our open recommendations in
    these areas will help ensure that the Department and its
    components are operating effectively and efficiently, using
    available resources to carry out these missions.
        This completes my prepared statement, and I'd be pleased to
    respond to any questions you may have at this time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. McLeod follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod
                             Tuesday, June 10, 2025
                                 gao highlights
        Highlights of GAO-25-108525, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
    Border Security and Enforcement and the Subcommittee on Transportation
    and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
    Representatives.
    Why GAO Did This Study
        Securing the Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people,
    illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key
    part of DHS's mission. While there is increased attention to the
    southwest land border, criminal organizations continue to use maritime
    routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons into the United States.
        The U.S. Government has identified transnational and domestic
    criminal organizations trafficking and smuggling illicit drugs as a
    significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national
    security. In March 2021, GAO added national efforts to prevent, respond
    to, and recover from drug misuse to its High-Risk List.
        This statement discusses (1) key DHS resources to counter illicit
    maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related to its
    efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement is based
    primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April 2025.
    What GAO Recommends
        In prior work GAO made dozens of recommendations in the reports
    covered by this statement, including 23 to DHS. DHS generally agreed
    with the recommendations. As of May 2025, 4 of the recommendations have
    been implemented. GAO continues to monitor the agency's progress in
    implementing open recommendations.
        maritime security.--actions needed to address coordination and
                operational challenges hindering federal efforts
    What GAO Found
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs assets--including
    aircraft and vessels--and personnel across the United States and abroad
    to secure U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure
    maritime security and safety. Relevant DHS components include the Coast
    Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations.
        In prior work, GAO identified coordination challenges that hinder
    U.S. efforts to confront illicit maritime activities and recommended
    actions to improve oversight, measure effectiveness, and build
    organizational capacity. For example:
       In March 2025, GAO found that Homeland Security
            Investigations had not fully implemented certain training
            requirements due to disagreements over training content with
            the Drug Enforcement Administration, with whom they coordinate.
            Without doing so, the agencies cannot ensure that their agents
            are properly trained to collaborate effectively on
            counternarcotics investigations.
       In February 2024, GAO found that DHS had not developed
            targets for its coordinated efforts to combat complex threats
            like drug smuggling and terrorism--limiting its ability to
            assess the effectiveness of its efforts.
       In April 2024, GAO found that the Coast Guard had not
            assessed the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet
            its mission demands, as part of an analysis of its assets.
            Doing so could help ensure it has the necessary aircraft
            capability to execute its missions in the coming decades.

        DHS components and their law enforcement missions are vital to
    confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities. Addressing
    GAO's recommendations on setting targets and managing assets and
    personnel will help ensure that DHS efficiently uses its available
    resources to carry out its law enforcement missions to protect our
    maritime borders.
        Chairmen Guest and Gimenez, Ranking Members Correa and McIver, and
    Members of the Subcommittees:
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal efforts to
    confront illicit maritime activities and challenges. Securing the
    Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and
    other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the
    Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission. While there is
    increased attention on the southwest land border, criminal
    organizations continue to use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs,
    and weapons into the United States.
        The U.S. Government has identified trafficking of illicit drugs as
    a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national
    security. Use of these illicit drugs continues to impact tens of
    thousands of Americans each year. For example, provisional data from
    the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show about 80,000 drug
    overdose deaths during the 12-month period ending in December 2024.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
    reported provisional counts for 12-month ending periods are the number
    of deaths received and processed for the 12-month period ending in the
    month indicated. Drug overdose deaths are often initially reported with
    no cause of death (pending investigation) because they require lengthy
    investigation, including toxicology testing. As a result, reported
    provisional counts may not include all deaths that occurred during a
    given time and are subject to change.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As shown in figure 1, multiple Federal departments and agencies
    coordinate on efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. Among
    them is DHS, which is responsible for, among other things, securing
    U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity while facilitating legitimate
    trade and travel.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single lead agency
    responsible for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime
    transport of illegal drugs like cocaine and fentanyl into the United
    States. 10 U.S.C.  124.

        The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service
    within DHS. The Coast Guard describes itself as the lead Federal
    maritime law enforcement agency and the only agency with both the
    authority and capability to enforce national and international law on
    the high seas, outer continental shelf, and inward from the U.S.
    Exclusive Economic Zone to inland waters.\3\ Coast Guard
    responsibilities include detecting and interdicting contraband and
    illegal drug traffic; at sea enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and
    policies; enforcing our Nation's fisheries and marine protected areas
    laws and regulations; and other missions.\4\ It coordinates with DOD in
    joint task forces to carry out its drug interdiction mission.\5\ In
    particular, the Coast Guard is a major contributor of vessels and
    aircraft deployed to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The term exclusive economic zone refers to an area up to 200
    nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline where a country has
    sovereign rights to natural resources such as fishing and energy
    production.
        \4\ See 6 U.S.C.  468.
        \5\ 10 U.S.C.  124 designates DOD as the single lead agency of the
    Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
    maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The Coast
    Guard, within DHS, is the lead Federal agency for interdiction of
    maritime drug smugglers in international waters. This is because the
    Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
    seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the
    United States has jurisdiction to prevent, detect, and suppress
    violations of U.S. laws. See 14 U.S.C.  522.
        \6\ Coast Guard aviation and vessel assets include a fleet of about
    200 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, about 250 cutters, and more than
    1,600 boats. GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce
    Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard shares maritime law enforcement responsibilities
    with other DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection's (CBP) Air and Marine Operations and U.S. Border Patrol,
    while U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security
    Investigations (HSI) investigates the illicit movement of goods,
    including counternarcotics investigations, among other
    responsibilities.
        According to the Coast Guard, in fiscal year 2023, the agency
    intercepted more than 212,000 pounds of cocaine and 54,000 pounds of
    marijuana.\7\ According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
    the majority of the cocaine shipped to the United States. travels on
    maritime routes from South America and through the eastern Pacific
    Ocean and Caribbean Sea.\8\ Additionally, precursor chemicals may be
    shipped from Asia to Mexico, sometimes as legitimate commerce, where
    they may be combined into fentanyl or other controlled substances.\9\
    Figure 2 shows maritime and land routes for precursor chemical and
    illicit drug smuggling.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, The Coast
    Guard's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request, testimony before the House of
    Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
    Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 118th Cong.,
    2d sess., May 23, 2024.
        \8\ Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 2020 National Drug
    Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21 (March 2021). The majority of
    known maritime drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial vessels through
    the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--a 6-million-square-mile area of
    routes drug smugglers use to transport illicit drugs that includes the
    eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, among other areas. See
    GAO, Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations
    in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-
    527 (Washington, DC: Jun. 16, 2014).
        \9\ Precursor chemicals are chemicals or substances that may be
    intended for illicit drug production.

        The U.S. Government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the
    transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and
    smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement,
    and the national security of the United States. Further, given
    challenges the Federal Government faces in responding to the drug
    misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added national efforts to prevent,
    respond to, and recover from drug misuse to our High-Risk List.\10\
    Specifically, we identified several challenges with the Federal
    Government's response to drug misuse, such as the need for more
    effective implementation and monitoring, and related on-going efforts
    to address the issue, including law enforcement and drug interdiction.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to
    Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP
    (Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2021). We issue an update to the High-Risk
    List every 2 years at the start of each new session of Congress. The
    most recent update was issued in February 2025. See GAO, High-Risk
    Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve
    Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, DC:
    Feb. 25, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My statement today discusses: (1) key DHS resources to counter
    illicit maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related
    to its efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement
    is based primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April
    2025. For the reports we cite in this statement, among other
    methodologies, we analyzed DOD, DHS, CBP, and Coast Guard policy,
    documentation, and data, and interviewed officials from agency
    headquarters and selected field units. More detailed information on our
    scope and methodology can be found in the reports we cite in this
    statement.
        For this statement, we reviewed information on the status of agency
    implementation of selected recommendations through May 2025. In
    addition, we reviewed Coast Guard budget and performance documents
    since 2018 to determine the extent the service reported meeting its
    drug interdiction performance goals from fiscal years 2014 through
    2024. We also analyzed Coast Guard operational hour data for each of
    its 11 statutory missions, from fiscal years 2015 through 2024. We
    found these data to be sufficiently reliable to report Coast Guard
    operational hours for aircraft and vessels by statutory mission. To
    determine the Coast Guard's operating expenses, we reviewed the
    service's Mission Cost Model operating expense estimates for its 11
    statutory missions. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable to
    report Coast Guard operating expense estimates for its statutory
    missions.
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
        dhs deploys aircraft, vessels, and personnel to address illicit
                              maritime activities
    Coast Guard Resources
        DHS employs assets--including aircraft and vessels--and personnel
    across the United States and abroad to secure U.S. borders, support
    criminal investigations, and ensure maritime security and safety.
    Relevant DHS components include the Coast Guard, CBP, and HSI. Their
    air and marine missions vary depending on operating location.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate on the deployment and
    allocation of assets and specialized personnel with the DOD to reduce
    the availability of illicit drugs by countering the flow of such drugs
    into the United States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard is responsible for conducting 11 statutory
    missions, 3 of which are maritime law enforcement missions codified as
    homeland security missions--drug interdiction, migrant interdiction,
    and other law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal,
    unreported, and unregulated fishing). In some cases, the Coast Guard
    coordinates its law enforcement missions with interagency partners.
        The Coast Guard operates a fleet of about 200 fixed- and rotary-
    wing aircraft, with more than 1,600 boats and 250 cutters.\12\ As of
    fiscal year 2024, it employs approximately 55,500 personnel--including
    active duty, reserve, and civilian.\13\ In addition, the Coast Guard's
    shore infrastructure is comprised of nearly 40,000 assets, which
    consist of various types of buildings and structures.\14\ For example,
    within its shore operations asset line, the Coast Guard maintains over
    200 stations along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out its
    search-and-rescue operations, as well as other missions, such as
    maritime security.\15\ Figure 3 shows Coast Guard operating locations
    across the country, as of September 2020.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO-24-106374 and GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address
    Persistent Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime
    Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024).
        \13\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help
    Address Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC:
    Apr. 23, 2025).
        \14\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: More Than $7 Billion
    Reportedly Needed to Address Deteriorating Assets, GAO-25-107851
    (Washington, DC: Feb. 25, 2025).
        \15\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore
    Infrastructure, GAO-22-105513 (Washington, DC: Nov. 16, 2021).

        Our analysis of Coast Guard data showed more than a quarter of its
    total estimated operating expenses were for law enforcement missions
    related to homeland security. Specifically, from fiscal years 2015
    through 2024, drug interdiction accounted for 15 percent of its average
    estimated operating expenses, migrant interdiction 9 percent, and other
    law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated fishing) 3 percent. Figure 4 shows that the operating
    expenses of these 3 missions annually averaged more than $2.1 billion
    over this period.

    CBP Resources
        Within CBP, Air and Marine Operations and Border Patrol are the
    uniformed law enforcement arms responsible for securing U.S. borders
    between ports of entry in the air, land, and maritime environments.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ CBP's Office of Field Operations also has border security
    responsibilities, such as inspecting pedestrians, passengers, and
    cargo--including international mail and express cargo--at the more than
    320 air, land, and sea ports of entry.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CBP's Air and Marine Operations operates a fleet of 250 fixed- and
    rotary-wing aircraft and about 300 vessels to secure U.S. borders, as
    of March 2023.\17\ The majority of CBP's Air and Marine Operations'
    activities support its law enforcement mission, including providing
    surveillance capabilities to detect and support the interdiction of
    illicit cross-border activity.\18\ For example, in May 2023, CBP Air
    and Marine Operations personnel and Puerto Rico police forces seized
    over 4,000 pounds of cocaine found inside a vessel that landed on the
    southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. In addition, as of March 2024, CBP's
    Border Patrol operates over 100 vessels along the coastal waterways of
    the United States and Puerto Rico and interior waterways common to the
    United States and Canada.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ CBP Air and Marine Operations owns and maintains CBP's 290
    vessels, including riverine vessels that are operated by the U.S.
    Border Patrol, as of March 2023. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Director
    of Operations, Air and Marine Operations, CBP, Securing America's
    Maritime Border: Challenges and Solutions for U.S. National Security,
    testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
    Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, 118th
    Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023.
        \18\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and
    Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All
    DHS Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).
        \19\ ``Border Patrol Overview,'' CBP, last modified: Mar. 4, 2024,
    https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In September 2024 we reported on staffing levels for CBP law
    enforcement positions, including for Air and Marine Operations and
    Border Patrol.\20\ We found that staffing levels for Air and Marine
    Operations positions varied from fiscal year 2018 through the first
    half of fiscal year 2024. In particular, staffing levels for the Air
    Interdiction Agent position generally decreased and staffing levels for
    Aviation Enforcement Agents and Marine Interdiction Agents generally
    increased during this period. Regarding Border Patrol, we found that it
    met its staffing targets from fiscal years 2018 through 2020 but fell
    short from fiscal year 2021 through the second quarter of fiscal year
    2024. Figure 5 shows CBP's Air and Marine Operations field structure,
    which is divided into 3 regions--northern, southeast, and southwest--
    and operating locations in these regions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve
    Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel, GAO-
    24-107029 (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2024).

    HSI Resources
        HSI agents conduct Federal criminal investigations into the illegal
    movement of people, goods, money, contraband, weapons, and sensitive
    technology into, out of, and through the United States, including
    narcotics. Specifically, as it relates to counternarcotics
    investigations, HSI's mission includes tracking, intercepting,
    investigating, and stopping illicit narcotics from flowing into the
    United States through targeting criminal networks; strengthening global
    partnerships; and enhancing domestic collaboration. HSI is also
    involved in countering other illicit maritime activity. For example, in
    November 2024, HSI, in coordination with the Coast Guard and other
    Federal agencies, investigated the Gulf Cartel's involvement in
    criminal activities associated with illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated fishing, human smuggling, and narcotics trafficking in the
    maritime environment. Illegal fishing is often a revenue stream for
    criminal organizations, according to HSI, and is also a threat to U.S.
    maritime security, as criminal organizations may use the same vessels
    for smuggling narcotics and humans across borders.
        As shown in figure 6, over a 7-year period--fiscal years 2017
    through 2023--HSI initiated over 58,000 counternarcotics investigations
    and referred over 35,000 counternarcotics cases for prosecution (an
    annual average of over 8,000 initiated investigations and over 5,000
    cases referred for prosecution). During this period, HSI was annually
    staffed with about 5,600 special agents working on HSI's law
    enforcement activities, including activities that work to combat
    illicit drugs in the United States.

                            coordination challenges
        Combating the trafficking of illicit drugs and other illicit
    maritime activities is a Government-wide priority that requires a
    coordinated effort by Federal departments and agencies. In prior work,
    we have identified coordination challenges that hinder U.S. efforts to
    confront illicit maritime activities and recommended actions to improve
    oversight, measure effectiveness, and build organizational capacity.
        Improve oversight.--DOD and DHS lead and operate certain task
    forces--Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and DHS
    Joint Task Force-East.\21\ For example, DHS components, including the
    Coast Guard and CBP, coordinate with DOD on counterdrug missions
    through the Joint Interagency Task Force-South. For example, the task
    force is allocated assets, such as ships and surveillance aircraft,
    from DOD and DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, as well as from
    foreign partners. The task force coordinates these assets, in
    conjunction with available intelligence, to detect and monitor the
    trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, being smuggled north on
    noncommercial maritime vessels across its area of responsibility.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ An additional task force--Joint Task Force-North--consists
    solely of DOD personnel and does not generally operate in the maritime
    domain.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2019, we reported that the task forces generally coordinated
    effectively using means that aligned with leading practices.\22\ These
    included working groups and liaison officers, which helped to minimize
    duplication of missions and activities. However, our recent work has
    shown that these task forces and DOD should improve coordination and
    assess their efforts.\23\ In 2024, we made 4 recommendations to improve
    agencies' assessment efforts, including 2 recommendations to DHS to
    improve oversight of Joint Task Force-East. DHS agreed with the
    recommendations, which remain open as of May 2025.\24\ Fully
    implementing them is essential for making decisions about priorities,
    resource allocations, and strategies for improvements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ See GAO, Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces
    Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug
    Activities, GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: Jul. 9, 2019). As established,
    the DHS task forces aimed to, among other things, combat terrorism
    threats, the smuggling of illicit drugs, unlawful migration, and other
    security concerns along the Southern Border and approaches to the
    United States.
        \23\ GAO, Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and
    Assessment of Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16,
    2024) and Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to
    Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:
    Feb. 7, 2024).
        \24\ GAO-24-106855. DHS agreed with the 2 recommendations and
    identified on-going and planned steps to address them. Actions include
    plans to review its performance measures for the task force and
    document the methodology used calculate such measures, including
    performance targets. See also GAO-24-106281.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Measure effectiveness.--The Coast Guard and DOD also collaborate to
    combat illicit maritime activities and mitigate risks in the Arctic
    region. According to the Coast Guard's Arctic Strategy these risks
    range from increased militarization of the Arctic region and potential
    conflict with Russia or China, to the increased risk posed by greater
    shipping traffic, and potential damage to the marine ecosystem from
    illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Officials from the Coast
    Guard and DOD also told us they collaborate in several ways, including
    sharing relevant information and expertise, providing operational
    assistance and conducting joint exercises in the region. Further, they
    reported collaborating on the development of their respective Arctic
    strategies. However, we found in August 2024 that the Coast Guard's
    Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan generally does not include
    mechanisms to measure progress on its Arctic efforts. This may make it
    difficult for the Coast Guard to plan activities, determine resource
    needs, assess its progress toward strategic objectives, and ensure its
    efforts are aligned with national efforts. As a result, we recommended
    that the Coast Guard include performance measures with associated
    targets and time frames in its implementation plan. The Coast Guard
    concurred with our recommendation, and we continue to monitor its
    progress.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ GAO, Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data
    Would Better Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington,
    DC: Aug. 13, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Build collaborative capacity through training.--While HSI agents
    may obtain Title 21 authority in order to collaborate with DEA on
    certain investigations of illicit activities, interagency disagreement
    on training has hindered effectiveness.\26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Under section 873 of Title 21 of the U.S. Code, DEA can cross-
    designate HSI agents with the authority to investigate the smuggling of
    controlled substances across U.S. international borders or through
    ports of entry.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In March 2025, we made 3 recommendations, including that DEA and
    ICE develop and implement the training.\27\ Without jointly developing
    and implementing the training modules, DEA and HSI cannot ensure that
    their agents are properly trained to collaborate effectively with each
    other on counternarcotics investigations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ See GAO, Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for
    Coordinating Federal Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC:
    Mar. 5, 2025). The agencies agreed with our recommendations. DHS
    described planned actions to address the recommendation to HSI, stating
    that HSI plans to work with DEA to develop and implement training
    modules.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operational Challenges
        DHS assets, such as aircraft and vessels, and Federal personnel are
    vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities.
    However, our prior work has found that the Coast Guard faces
    significant operational challenges balancing tradeoffs among its assets
    and personnel across its 11 statutory missions where more work needs to
    be done. By comparison, CBP has strategically addressed certain
    operational challenges, such as recruitment and retention, through
    incentive pay.
        Coast Guard tradeoffs.--The Coast Guard faces challenges balancing
    its varied mission priorities which have grown as it is called on to do
    more with its resources. In particular, in recent years, the Coast
    Guard has prioritized deploying its assets for its migrant interdiction
    mission. In doing so, it has reduced its operational activities to
    support other missions. The Coast Guard has not met its annual primary
    drug interdiction mission performance target in any year from fiscal
    years 2014 through 2024. Most notably, from fiscal years 2021 through
    2023, the Coast Guard increased its migrant interdiction operations
    considerably in response to the highest maritime migration levels in
    the Caribbean in nearly 30 years. This tradeoff further challenges the
    Coast Guard's ability to meet its drug interdiction mission demands.
        As shown in figure 7, from fiscal years 2021 through 2023, the
    Coast Guard increased its operational hours for aircraft and vessels by
    66 percent for its migrant interdiction mission, while decreasing its
    deployments for drug interdiction by 62 percent.\28\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ From fiscal years 2023 through 2024, Coast Guard resources
    deployed to support its migrant interdiction mission decreased, while
    Coast Guard resources deployed to support its drug interdiction mission
    remained at relatively low levels.

        Coast Guard assets.--Moreover, the condition of the assets the
    Coast Guard manages have been in a state of decline for decades. Our
    work has shown that the Coast Guard's aircraft and vessels have faced
    readiness and availability challenges in carrying out their statutory
    missions.
        For example, the Coast Guard relies on its Medium Endurance Cutters
    for its drug interdiction mission. However, we reported in July 2012
    that Medium Endurance Cutters did not meet operational hours targets
    from fiscal years 2005 through 2011 and that declining operational
    capacity hindered mission performance.\29\ In June 2023, we reported
    that Medium Endurance Cutters were not consistently meeting operational
    availability targets, and the Coast Guard noted that the declining
    physical condition of the cutters puts them at significant risk of
    decreased capability for meeting mission requirements.\30\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ GAO, Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions
    Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741
    (Washington, DC: Jul. 31, 2012).
        \30\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
    Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC:
    Jun. 20, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its
    cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft
    generally did not meet the Coast Guard's 71 percent availability target
    during fiscal years 2018 through 2022, as shown in figure 8.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ GAO-24-106374. GAO found that the Coast Guard had not assessed
    the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet its mission
    demands, as part of an analysis of its assets, among other things.

        Coast Guard personnel.--Compounding deteriorating assets is a
    shortage of personnel to operate them. The Coast Guard exceeded its
    recruiting goal in fiscal year 2024 for the first time in 5 years by
    taking actions such as increasing recruiting offices, marketing, and
    outreach efforts. It also revised enlistment eligibility standards and
    took steps to address a significant increase in medical waiver requests
    in recent years. However, despite these efforts, the Coast Guard
    remained about 2,600 enlisted members short of its workforce target.
        The Coast Guard has taken steps to address its retention challenges
    through monetary and nonmonetary incentives and in 2022 began to
    require service members to complete a career survey to help identify
    key issues affecting retention. However, survey response rates have
    been consistently low. In April 2025, we recommended that the Coast
    Guard take actions to address response rates and develop a clear plan
    to gauge the performance of its initiatives.\32\ The Coast Guard agreed
    with our recommendations, and we will monitor their implementation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ GAO-25-107869.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CBP personnel.--We reported in September 2024 that in recent years,
    CBP has also generally fallen short of staffing targets for its law
    enforcement positions, as shown in figure 9.\33\ We also reported that
    CBP has taken action to strengthen its recruitment, hiring, and
    retention efforts. For example, each of CBP's operational components--
    the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, and Air and Marine
    Operations--have offered recruitment incentives for law enforcement
    positions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ GAO-24-107029.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In particular, in 2024 Border Patrol offered recruitment incentives
    of $20,000 per recipient, with an additional $10,000 for recipients
    stationed in remote locations. CBP has also offered retention
    incentives, relocation incentives, and special salary rates as part of
    its efforts to improve retention of law enforcement personnel. For
    example, Air and Marine Operations has offered retention incentives for
    positions and locations experiencing high rates of attrition. CBP
    anticipates a steep increase in attrition rates across all positions
    starting in 2027 because a significant number of its law enforcement
    personnel will become eligible to retire. CBP has a strategic plan to
    address this expected retirement surge, and retention- and morale-
    related efforts will be increasingly important to help mitigate the
    loss of these personnel.

        In summary, DHS components and their law enforcement missions are
    vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities.
    Addressing our recommendations on setting performance measures and
    targets and managing assets and personnel will help ensure that DHS
    efficiently uses its available resources to carry out its law
    enforcement missions to protect our maritime borders.
        Chairmen Guest and Gimenez, Ranking Members Correa and McIver, and
    Members of the subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement. I
    would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this
    time.
    Appendix I: Related Open Recommendations to the Department of Homeland
                            Security as of May 2025
    Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
            Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr.
            23, 2025).
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
            Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response
            rates for its Career Intention Survey.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and
            Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its
            Career Intention Survey results.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program
            Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how
            retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and
            timeframes and milestones for implementation, to track progress
            and gauge program performance.
    Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for Coordinating Federal
            Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2025).
       Recommendation.--The director of ICE should work with the
            DEA administrator to develop and implement the 2 training
            modules in accordance with their January 2021 agreement, using
            agreed-upon dispute resolution mechanisms as appropriate.
    Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data Would Better
            Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, DC:
            Aug. 13, 2024).
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that District 17 collects and reports complete
            information about resource use and mission performance in
            accordance with Coast Guard guidance.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the Coast Guard's Arctic implementation plan
            includes performance measures with associated targets and time
            frames for the action items described in the plan in accordance
            with Coast Guard guidance.
    Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed,
            GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            establish procedures requiring the Coast Guard to uniformly
            collect and maintain air station readiness data.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air
            station readiness data.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet
            its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to
            meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires
            to meet its mission needs.
    Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
            Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:
            Feb. 7, 2024).
       Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
            ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and
            documents criteria for establishing a joint task force.
       Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
            ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and
            documents criteria for terminating a joint task force.
       Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
            ensure the Office of the Military Advisor, as it finalizes
            performance measures for Joint Task Force-East, establishes
            targets for those measures, as required.
       Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should
            ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and
            documents the methodology used in establishing the performance
            measures for Joint Task Force-East.
    Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
            Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC:
            Jun. 20, 2023).
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program officials
            develop a technology maturation plan for the davit prior to
            builder's trials. This plan should identify potential courses
            of action to address davit technical immaturity, including
            assessing technology alternatives should the current davit
            continue to face development challenges, and a date by which
            the Coast Guard will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a
            technology alternative.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype
            of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 1
            builder's trials.
       Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should
            ensure that the OPC stage 2 program achieves a sufficiently
            stable design prior to the start of lead ship construction. In
            line with shipbuilding leading practices, sufficiently stable
            design includes 100 percent completion of basic and functional
            design, including routing of major distributive systems and
            transitive components that effect multiple zones of the ship.
                              Related GAO Products
        Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service
    Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr. 23, 2025).
        Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for Coordinating
    Federal Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2025).
        Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: More Than $7 Billion Reportedly
    Needed to Address Deteriorating Assets, GAO-25-107851 (Washington, DC:
    Feb. 25, 2025).
        U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve Recruitment,
    Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel, GAO-24-107029
    (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2024).
        Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges
    Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-
    107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024).
        Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data Would Better
    Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, DC: Aug. 13,
    2024).
        Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and Assessment of
    Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16, 2024).
        Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments
    Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).
        Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to
    Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:
    Feb. 7, 2024).
        Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to
    Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC: Jun. 20,
    2023).
        Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore Infrastructure,
    GAO-22-105513 (Washington, DC: Nov. 16, 2021).
        Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and Marine
    Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All DHS
    Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).
        Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance
    Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities,
    GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: Jul. 9, 2019).
        Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in
    the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-527
    (Washington, DC: Jun. 16, 2014).
        Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions Reinforce Need
    for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741 (Washington, DC:
    Jul. 31, 2012).

        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod.
        Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
    5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes
    of questioning.
        I am going to go right to you, Ms. MacLeod. What I got from
    you is that the Coast Guard needs more ships and more people in
    order to carry out their missions because they are stretched
    thin right now. Pretty much?
        Ms. MacLeod. Yes. The Coast Guard has a history of making
    do. There are acquisition programs that are in place, but, as I
    mentioned, those are currently delayed. There are work force
    shortages across the Coast Guard. Although they met their
    recruiting goals, there remains a work force shortage.
        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Admiral Chamie, the reconciliation
    bill has how much more for the Coast Guard that will help, I
    guess, in this endeavor, try to give the Coast Guard the
    resources and the personnel it needs to carry out its mission?
        Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. We're grateful for the $21.2
    billion in the House-passed reconciliation, sir.
        Mr. Gimenez. You are confident that with that, and also the
    reconfiguring, reimagining of the Coast Guard, that the Coast
    Guard will be better able to carry out its mission in the
    future?
        Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. A combination of the
    reconciliation plus an increase in annual top line, that's
    critical for us to be able to get over some of the lingering
    issues, like shoreside infrastructure, the buildings that our
    crews operate out of.
        Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Mr. Harris, the cartels. The
    cartels that--were the cartels the same cartels, are they
    involved both in drug trafficking and human trafficking?
        Mr. Harris. Yes, the same cartels are involved in all
    those.
        Mr. Gimenez. Is most of the human trafficking you are
    seeing, are they somehow paying the cartels in order to be
    trafficked or do you see people just ad hoc getting into a boat
    and trying to make it to the United States?
        Mr. Harris. Both. Both. You see people going about it on
    their own, but you also see people utilizing transnational
    criminal organizations.
        Mr. Gimenez. Are they the same cartels that were working on
    the Southern Border?
        Mr. Harris. Yes, same cartels.
        Mr. Gimenez. So they are now--they are in the Southern
    Border and they are also at sea. Are they Mexican in origin?
    Are they Colombian in origin? Where do they come from?
        Mr. Harris. A lot of them are Mexico.
        Mr. Gimenez. OK. But the cocaine is actually produced
    Colombia, Peru, you know, so--and it somehow gets to the
    Mexican cartels and they are the ones that distribute it? Is
    that the way that the operation works?
        Mr. Harris. That is correct.
        Mr. Gimenez. All right. During the Biden administration
    years, when we had thousands and thousands and millions of
    illegals crossing through the Southern Border, were most of
    those people paying the cartels to cross the border?
        Mr. Harris. I don't think most of them. I think people were
    paying cartels, and people were doing it on their own through
    family, friends, or people in the community.
        Mr. Gimenez. How much were the cartels making from the
    human trafficking during those years?
        Mr. Harris. Investigations suggest that you can make a
    couple thousand per person.
        Mr. Gimenez. So how much were they making? Were they--I
    mean, our estimation was they were making a billion dollars a
    month. Is that far off?
        Mr. Harris. I'm not sure about that.
        Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. OK. So let's go now to China. The
    precursor drugs or chemicals are for fentanyl. What kind of
    success have we had in interdicting those precursor chemicals
    from reaching--I guess, it goes to Mexico, offloaded in Mexico?
    Then goes to the cartels who create the fentanyl and then ship
    it across the border. That fentanyl is killing Americans, is
    that right?
        Mr. Harris. That is correct. We've had a lot of success in
    that area, seeing the chemical precursors coming from Asia to
    Mexico and then find its way into the United States.
        Mr. Gimenez. Where's the success? I mean----
        Mr. Harris. Success is the--we've decimated, at least in
    fiscal year 2025, I'll speak to that, in fiscal year 2025 we
    decimated 13 clandestine labs in Mexico that was ran by some of
    the cartels.
        Mr. Gimenez. Yes, but those are the labs. I am talking
    about the ship that is coming with the chemicals from China. Do
    we interdict any of those at all or they all land in a Mexican
    port and then the chemicals are then shipped to the cartels?
        Mr. Harris. No, we interdict those as well.
        Mr. Gimenez. You do. But what percentage of that do you
    think you are interdicting?
        Mr. Harris. I'm unaware. I can take that back.
        Mr. Gimenez. OK. Well, would it surprise you if I tell you
    that the Chinese actually incentivize the companies that
    produce the precursor chemicals for fentanyl that kills tens of
    thousands of Americans? They incentivize them with tax breaks
    in China as long as they are for export, but they are actually
    illegal inside of China. So if they do that, would it lead you
    to believe that somehow this is done on purpose, that the
    Chinese are actually sending this stuff on purpose to kill
    Americans?
        Mr. Harris. With China, they have been a good partner in
    this quest to stop the chemical precursors.
        Mr. Gimenez. How can you say that when they are actually
    incentivizing the companies to create the chemicals that are
    only used for the creation of fentanyl?
        Mr. Harris. We've had success working with them, the
    government of China, as well as Mexico, in trying to stop some
    of this.
        Mr. Gimenez. In trying to stop them. We are not very
    successful at that, though, are we?
        Mr. Harris. We've seen some success.
        Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. My time is up.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member for her 5 minutes.
        Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman.
        Admiral Chamie, in January, Trump and Secretary Noem
    ordered the Coast Guard to triple its presence at the U.S.
    Border. However, despite some of our requests, the Coast Guard
    has not provided us information on exactly where the service
    has redirected assets and personnel from. Would you please
    commit to providing us with the full accounting of all assets
    and personnel that have been redirected since January 20,
    including their home port or station, as well as a description
    of all deployments and missions that were canceled or
    redirected?
        Admiral Chamie. Yes, Congresswoman. I'd be happy to come
    brief you on that.
        Mrs. McIver. Perfect. Thank you so much.
        I want to move to Ms. MacLeod. GAO has studied the Coast
    Guard's capabilities to carry out various missions, as well as
    its capacity to make resource allocation decisions effectively.
    In your estimation, does the Coast Guard fully understand the
    tradeoffs it is making when it redeploys assets and personnel?
        Ms. MacLeod. We've found both data limitations in
    acknowledging those tradeoffs, as well as strategic. Everything
    cannot be a priority. The Coast Guard, as I said, has a history
    of making do. Without accounting for the various tradeoffs
    among these 11 missions and various national priorities, it's a
    scattershot approach.
        Mrs. McIver. Thank you. What are some of the tradeoffs the
    Coast Guard needs to reconsider?
        Ms. MacLeod. Well, among its missions, we saw in our recent
    data analysis as the Coast Guard has shifted more resources to
    the drug interdiction mission, a steep decline in the migrant
    interdiction mission, just as an example. Then there's the
    search-and-rescue missions and other missions that are also
    being affected at the same time.
        Mrs. McIver. Got it. Thank you so much for that. Last year,
    GAO reported on the Coast Guard's aviation fleet and found that
    the service's planes and helicopters were only available 66 to
    68 percent of the time on average in recent years. Since then,
    the Trump administration started using Coast Guard planes,
    obviously to fly deportation staging flights. Secretary Noem
    requested to spend $50 million on a new executive Gulfstream
    jet.
        Given the existing challenges the aging Coast Guard
    aircraft fleet faces, how do these additional demands impact
    Coast Guard readiness?
        Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard's aircraft are not meeting the
    availability target. Since our report last year, this has
    become even more acute with grounding of additional aircraft
    within the fleet.
        Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member McIver.
        I now recognize the Chairman of the Border Security
    Enforcement, the gentleman from Mississippi, Michael Guest.
        Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Chamie, I want to read a few headlines of some of
    the great work that the United States Coast Guard has done
    since just February of this year. ``United States Coast Guard
    offloads more than 275 million worth of illegal cocaine in San
    Diego.'' That was February 13. March 6, ``Coast Guard offloads
    over 141 million in illicit drugs interdicted in the Caribbean
    sea.'' That is from March the 6. ``Coast Guard offloads over
    517\1/2\ million in illicit drugs interdicted in Eastern
    Pacific Ocean,'' March the 20. ``Coast Guard Cutter Calhoun
    offloads more than 140.9 million in illegal narcotics at Port
    Everglades,'' May 16. ``Coast Guard offloads more than 211
    million in illicit drugs interdicted in the Eastern Pacific,''
    May 29 of this year. Then just earlier this month, on June the
    6, ``Coast Guard offloads more than 138 million in illicit
    drugs interdicted in the Caribbean Sea.''
        If my math is correct, that amount is roughly $1\1/2\
    billion in narcotic seizures just this year. So to the men and
    women who serve under your command, I want to personally thank
    them for the job that they are doing.
        I want to ask you briefly, Admiral, can you talk about the
    importance of interdicting these drugs at sea before these
    narcotics come into the United States? Also talk a little bit
    about the impact that $1\1/2\ billion in seizures has on these
    transnational criminal organizations.
        Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman Guest, and
    thanks for your words complimenting our crews. Our commandant
    and the rest of our leadership team are very proud of them.
        To your question, sir, what we try to do is interdict the
    drugs in bulk quantity as far away from the shores of the
    United States as we can. Because the closer these bulk amounts
    get to the United States, they get broken up into smaller
    amounts that make them easier to smuggle in. So you could have
    a large load of, say, 2 tons that goes into the Dominican
    Republic, gets broken into small packages of 3 or 4 kilos that
    could fit in a backpack, and then they get smuggled further
    north. So that's one way. So we want to get them as far away
    from the shores as we can.
        The value in that is that those billions of dollars that
    you said, sir, that's the cash that fuels the cartel. So all of
    the other nefarious activities that they're doing, human
    smuggling, weapons smuggling, sex trafficking, you name it,
    that cash fuels it. These are poly-crime organizations. They
    don't care what they're doing as long as it makes them money.
        Mr. Guest. Mr. Miller, kind-of want to dovetail off of that
    a little bit. You say in your written testimony on page 3, you
    talk about the authority to operate the extension of the 12
    nautical miles in custom waters. You know, the admiral just
    spoke a little bit about the benefit of interdicting these
    narcotics or those individuals who are smuggling individuals in
    the country. The greater that you can extend that outside the
    United States border, the more opportunity you are going to
    have to be successful. So want to talk a little bit and ask you
    to please speak on that, about the importance of that extension
    to the 12 nautical miles.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for your support
    in these efforts.
        Yes, the Customs Waters Bill extending customs waters from
    12 to 24 nautical miles, it modernizes customs law with the
    speed of vessels these days, increases the area that we could
    potentially patrol where we make interdictions and save lives.
    We've drafted this legislation in collaboration with the Coast
    Guard. It gives us interdiction parity at sea so we may better
    assist each other.
        Mr. Guest. If Congress were to grant you that authority,
    would that make our community safer by the fact that you would
    be able to have an expanded area in which you have law
    enforcement, that authority?
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, it would. It would
    increase our interdictions. Like the admiral said, identifying
    and interdicting these narcotics loads before they get closer
    to shore and break up into smaller loads. Also with human
    trafficking as well, the farther out we can identify these
    before they get close to highly-congested areas is easier to
    interdict.
        Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe I am out of
    time, so I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Guest.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Border Security
    and Enforcement, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Harris, you represent ICE's Homeland Security
    Investigations as the assistant director for countering
    transnational organized crime, correct?
        Mr. Harris. That is correct.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Harris, do you assess that
    Tren de Aragua is engaged in transnational organized crime? Yes
    or no?
        Mr. Harris. Yes.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Mr. Harris, is HSI responsible for
    investigating Tren de Aragua, which includes collecting and
    providing intelligence about who is and is not a gang member
    for ICE enforcement and removal operations?
        Mr. Harris. Yes, we do investigate Tren de Aragua.
        Mrs. Ramirez. OK. Yes or no, are the tattoos part of that
    assessment?
        Mr. Harris. It can be.
        Mrs. Ramirez. OK. So I want to ask you a few questions.
    These are some real-life examples. If someone has a tattoo with
    hands praying, are they a gang member? Yes or no?
        Mr. Harris. I have to know more about that----
        Mrs. Ramirez. OK.
        Mr. Harris [continuing]. Than just a tattoo.
        Mrs. Ramirez. So let me ask you then another question. What
    about someone with an autism awareness tattoo? Are they a gang
    member?
        Mr. Harris. I would have to know more about the situation.
        Mrs. Ramirez. I would also agree with that. So let me ask
    you a question. What about a crown tattoo? Yes or no? A crown
    with a soccer ball.
        Mr. Harris. Same thing. I would not--have to know more
    about the situation.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Mr. Harris, I am going to ask you again for
    the record here, what about a tattoo across their chest
    perhaps?
        Mr. Harris. I'd have to know more about the situation.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Our Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, OK.
    Mr. Harris, are you aware of any instances in which relying on
    tattoos has resulted in wrongful ICE arrest or deportations?
    Are you aware?
        Mr. Harris. I oversee transnational organized crime. As far
    as deportations or removals----
        Mrs. Ramirez. You are not aware?
        Mr. Harris [continuing]. I'm not.
        Mrs. Ramirez. Well, thank you, Mr. Harris. Well, according
    to several resources, including on occasion, the administration
    has demonstrated that they have not done enough research and
    investigation. In addition to Andry Hernandez Romero's wrong
    gang tattoos, they said, of his parents name with crowns, Neri
    Alvarado Borges had a colorful tattoo of an autism awareness
    ribbon for his 15-year-old brother. Jerce Reyes Barrios had a
    tattoo of a soccer ball with a crown, a tribute to the logo of
    his favorite soccer team, Rio Madrid from Spain. Like them,
    there were so many more. I just showed you a number of them.
        DHS has wrongfully detained and deported immigrants and
    asylum seekers, all based on an arbitrary point system that DHS
    has created. They call it the Alien Enemy Validation Guide.
    Having a tattoo accounted for 4 points of the 8 needed deemed
    deportable. Their point system reflects a long legacy of using
    arbitrary criteria of predefined characteristics to be profile,
    criminalize, marginalize, and punish.
        The HS tattoo system reflects the same racist, arbitrary,
    ignorant activities of this administration's forbearers. We
    make court decisions about the freedom of Black people based on
    hair. In Hudgins v. Wright, hair was determined to reveal Black
    identity more than skin color. We targeted children in
    indigenous communities who wore Native cultural attire and sent
    them to boarding schools. We said anyone with long hair in the
    1960's was a radical and a communist. We identified gang
    members using baggy clothes, specific color combinations, and
    certain hat positioning in the 1990's.
        You see over and over again, the Government has proven that
    it can't be trusted with expeditious systems of justice based
    on arbitrary criteria defined by bigoted assumptions about
    people. Each of these arbitrary systems end up reflecting the
    worst of our biases. That is the point this administration may
    revel in, but I for one, am not comfortable with sloppy,
    radicalized biases condemning people to a life in CECOT.
        You see, we can have the Constitutional tool to do better.
    It is called due process. It is actually the only way to ensure
    that we minimize administrative errors and that arbitrary
    characteristics and bigoted assumptions do not ruin people's
    lives. It is why it is so important that when we are having
    these conversations in this committee that we understand that
    what we use to determine who we deport, who we don't, why we
    violate due process, when we violate due process, that it has
    real-life consequences and that our constituents, our children
    are watching.
        The idea that they deported parents at a kindergarten
    graduation this past week is unconscionable. I want to make
    sure that I remind people of that.
        With that, Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the panelists for coming today. I know you
    guys came here to testify about maritime activities in U.S.
    waters. I also want to apologize to you guys for the rants you
    are hearing from my colleagues about anything but what you guys
    came here to testify. I also want to point out the fact that
    the hypocrisy and the insanity coming from my colleagues on the
    other side of the aisle who created this problem when it comes
    to the border invasion and now they are kicking and screaming
    that the Trump administration is actually trying to clean it
    up.
        So now back to what we are here to talk about. Rear Admiral
    Chamie, last year, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a narco
    submarine in the Caribbean sea, seizing over 1,200 pounds of
    cocaine valued at more than 54 million. This semi-submersible
    vessel designed to evade detection is a stark reminder of the
    emergent sophisticated methods employed by drug cartels to
    infiltrate our border. My question to you, sir, is how many of
    these narco submarines has the Coast Guard encountered in the
    last 5 years?
        Admiral Chamie. Good morning, Congressman. I'll have to get
    back to you on the exact number, but as you said, it is common.
    The cartels, the transnational criminal organizations, they get
    more sophisticated in the ways that they will try to smuggle
    drugs. So they use a variety of vessels, and one of those, as
    you said, is to use a submarine.
        Mr. Crane. Are they buying these submarines from other
    foreign states? Are they making them on their own? Do you have
    any intelligence on that?
        Admiral Chamie. They typically build them themselves on
    land and then push them into the water.
        Mr. Crane. OK. Admiral, have you seen the cartels utilizing
    drones, either subsurface or aerial drones, out at sea?
        Admiral Chamie. I have not seen them myself, but we are
    aware that the transnational criminal organizations do operate
    drones, and it also presents a threat to our crews at the land
    border.
        Mr. Crane. Admiral, what new technologies, unmanned
    underwater vehicles, sonar nets, or satellite tracking are
    being deployed to detect these types of narco submarines before
    they make it to our shores?
        Admiral Chamie. So we're using a couple different types of
    technologies right now. One of them is an unmanned aircraft
    that we fly off our National Security cutter. We've been using
    the ScanEagle for some time. We're still operating that. Then
    we're starting to field a new vertical lift system called the
    V-BAT. What that enables us to do is get that up in the air for
    anywhere from 12 to 18 hours longer than we could typically fly
    a manned aircraft. These aircraft have sensors that provide us
    an increased ability to be able to detect what's on the water.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you. Mr. Miller, in your opening
    testimony, you talked about the increase in maritime
    interdictions. Do you believe what you are seeing with the
    increase in maritime interdiction is due to the adaptation of
    smuggling routes by the cartels to circumvent the work that
    this administration has done to secure our Southern Border?
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I do. We've
    certainly seen that in the Southern California AOR, where we've
    seen the biggest surge in maritime migrant smuggling activity.
    We suspect that's primarily due to the difficulty to be
    smuggled across the land border.
        Mr. Crane. OK, thank you. My next question is for the
    gentleman in uniform today. Have your organizations removed all
    DEI from training? I will start with you, Admiral.
        Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. We are in full compliance with
    the President's Executive Orders.
        Mr. Crane. Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. Yes, to my knowledge, Congressman.
        Mr. Crane. Is anyone in your organization that you are
    aware of in violation of President Trump's Executive Order on
    eliminating DEI?
        Mr. Miller. Not that I'm aware of, Congressman.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you. Ms. MacLeod, I want to go to you real
    quick. Your recent GAO report released on May 14 highlighted
    the Coast Guard's loss of more enlisted service members than it
    recruited from fiscal years 2019 to 2023, leading to a
    shortfall of approximately 2,600 enlisted personnel in fiscal
    year 2024. In your reporting, ma'am, and investigation, what
    was the major cause of the loss of enlisted sailors within the
    Coast Guard?
        Ms. MacLeod. We found a number of reasons, some of them
    having to do with work force challenges that the Coast Guard
    faces, such as the frequent moves, living in remote or in
    vacation areas that can be very high-cost, access to health
    care, you know, challenges with the missions, a range of
    reasons.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
        I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
    witnesses today.
        I want to just build on a little bit what my dear friend
    Mr. Crane mentioned. Just real rapid response, real quickly. Do
    any of you feel that diversity has hurt your operations?
    Starting on the far end, sir.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr. Carter. Just a yes or no. Has diversity hurt your
    operations?
        Mr. Miller. No, Congressman.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you. Admiral.
        Admiral Chamie. We're very proud of our diverse work force,
    sir.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you.
        Mr. Harris. I second that. Very proud of our work.
        Mr. Carter. Ms. MacLeod.
        Ms. MacLeod. We also are very proud of our diverse work
    force at GAO.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you. So I just find it difficult when my
    colleagues on the other side of the aisle somehow demonize the
    word ``diversity'' as if it is a bad word, as if there is
    something wrong with having diversity, equity, or inclusion and
    creating a broad swath of opportunities for individuals of
    varied backgrounds. So I just wanted to put that the record
    that we have to stop demonizing diversity as if it is some kind
    of a bad word.
        As a representative from New Orleans region, an area
    uniquely vulnerable to natural disasters and maritime
    disruptions, I want to stress how essential the Coast Guard is
    to our region's safety and economic strength. Rear Admiral, I
    want to personally thank you and the incredible work that the
    Coast Guard does in Louisiana, specifically. After Ida, you
    guys were instrumental. I can't say thank you enough for the
    incredible work of the men and women who were Johnny on the
    spot, who responded to the issues in the New Orleans region in
    the Louisiana region. So let me take this opportunity to say
    thank you to all of you for the incredible work that you do. We
    may not always agree on every single aspect of our discussions,
    but please know that the work that you do is appreciated.
        The Mississippi River moves more than 500 million tons of
    cargo annually, supporting thousands of jobs and billions in
    economic activity. The Coast Guard ensures that this trade can
    flow safely and securely. From maintaining aids to navigation
    to responding to emergencies and inspecting vessels, the work
    maintains this engine of American commerce. A delay in
    reopening the river after a storm doesn't just affect
    Louisiana. It raises the prices and disrupts supply chains
    nationally.
        In addition to relying on the Coast Guard for hurricane
    response and maintaining maritime commerce, the Coast Guard
    helps counter illegal, underreported, and underregulated
    fishing. Illegal international fishing undercuts U.S.
    fishermen, flooding the market with cheaper, untraceable, often
    unhealthy, sometimes through human trafficking and slave labor,
    undercutting our opportunities to provide resources to the
    world as our fisheries are the flow for the rest of the world.
    That is why we must be cautious about policies that shift or
    pull Coast Guard away from these core missions. Diverting
    personnel to other missions, this becomes a real issue.
        Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, could you share with me how often
    do you use the NOAA forecasters to predict and to address
    storms that are coming or inclement weather on people that you
    may be out to save?
        Admiral Chamie. Thank you, Congressman, and thanks for the
    kind words about our crews. We take great pride in responding
    to the hurricanes and being some of the first on scene.
        So we partner with--across the interagency and across the
    Government to get our weather information. We don't get it from
    just one singular source. We monitor. We just started last week
    and we'll continue into the fall, till the end of hurricane
    season, to track storms when they first start forming close to
    Africa and in the South Caribbean, and make sure we're ready
    when they make landfall.
        Mr. Carter. If we don't have an NOAA, I understand that
    there are multiple outlets that are used, how does that impact
    you?
        Admiral Chamie. Sir, we certainly find value in working
    with NOAA. I would just say that we'll continue to do the best
    we can.
        Mr. Carter. That is fair. Got it. We should always endeavor
    to give you more resources, not fewer.
        Ms. MacLeod, according to GAO's research, what impacts can
    we expect the diversion of Coast Guard resources have on its
    efforts to affect hurricane response, countering illegal,
    underreported, and unregulated fishing? We are now in the
    middle of hurricane season, a time that arguably we should be
    giving you all the resources to protect life, property, and
    assets of the Federal Government, and most importantly of those
    most vulnerable people. I know that I am over. Can you quickly
    just share with us an answer to that?
        Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard uses its assets and people for
    multiple missions, so any focus that they're shifting to would
    take away from other priorities.
        Mr. Carter. Any mission----
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Carter [continuing]. Takes away from the priorities of
    the Coast Guard.
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Carter. My time has expired. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South
    Carolina, Mrs. Biggs.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
    witnesses for being here today. I would just like to start off
    personally thanking each of you for your role and your
    dedication to your jobs and your duty.
        My first question is for Mr. Harris. What impact do
    sanctuary jurisdictions have on maritime import security? Do
    you feel that cracking down and enforcing the law on sanctuary
    jurisdictions would help secure our land as well as our
    maritime borders?
        Mr. Harris. Well, HSI investigative entity, we enforce any
    violations of U.S. customs laws and U.S. immigration laws. The,
    you know, the border, the sanctuary cities, we haven't seen,
    you know, from HSI--well, from a criminal investigator point of
    view, we haven't really seen any issues in what we're doing on
    our job. We have seen that on other parts of ICE enforcement
    removal operations, they're having some issues with enforcing
    some of their laws and in different jurisdictions.
        Mrs. Biggs. OK, thank you. So given that, and this question
    is also for you, given that an estimated 80 percent of fentanyl
    seized at the U.S. ports of entry between fiscal years 2019 and
    2024 was trafficked by U.S. citizens, and considering President
    Trump's recent designation of certain cartels as foreign
    terrorist organizations, what concrete actions are being
    implemented against those found to be aiding, abetting, or
    directly working for these terrorist organizations?
        Mr. Harris. It's the same thing that we've always done as
    far as investigating people or threats. You know, I said we
    investigate violations of U.S. customs law and U.S. immigration
    law, and we go after those people. Whether we interdict
    shipments along with our partners, we trace funds, you know, we
    trace illicit proceeds that these criminal organizations or
    these people acquire from contraband, we do that, and we all--
    you know, we arrest them and prosecute them. So we do exactly
    what we've always done.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much, Mr. Harris.
        As a proud member of Border Security and Enforcement and
    Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittees, I have seen
    first-hand the absolute necessity of fully equipping our
    Federal agencies with every tool that they need to secure our
    Nation. That is why I am introducing 2 vital pieces of
    legislation that directly confront the rampant involvement of
    U.S. citizens in cartel drug trafficking and the severe
    national security threats posed by radical sanctuary cities.
        My first bill, the Mobilizing Against Sanctuary Cities Act,
    it is simple. No Federal taxpayer dollars will flow to
    jurisdictions that refuse to uphold American law. This empowers
    the Trump administration to restore law and order in places
    that have actively undermined our immigration system for
    decades. The recent events in Los Angeles are a perfect example
    of why we can't wait any longer. We have seen in real time the
    chaos that results when cities refuse to cooperate with Federal
    immigration enforcement.
        We must also directly target the individuals who actively
    conspire with these cartels and terrorist groups. That is why I
    am also introducing the No Passport for Terrorists and
    Traffickers Act. It is critical legislation which will
    automatically revoke the passport of individuals found to be
    providing material support to these designated foreign
    terrorist organizations. By denying these individuals the
    ability to travel internationally, we strike a direct blow at
    their operational capacity and send an unmistakable message: if
    you choose to conspire with those who poison our Nation and
    threaten our security, you will lose the travel privileges of
    American citizenship.
        This isn't just about policy debates. It is about the
    safety and security of everyday Americans, like in the Third
    District of South Carolina that I represent. This is why we
    can't wait any longer. I urge every one of my colleagues,
    anyone who believes in American sovereignty and the rule of
    law, to sponsor these vital bills. Let's stand united and send
    a clear message. We will put America first and we will secure
    our Nation.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the gentlewoman from South
    Carolina.
        I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
        Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past 5
    months, we have seen high school graduates, doctors, children,
    and U.S. citizens detained and deported. These mass deportation
    efforts in the name of making America safe is only instilling
    fear and causing confusion and chaos for our local law
    enforcement, ultimately putting our communities at risk for
    greater harm. While the Trump administration is using valuable
    resources for your taxpayer dollars to make unlawful and
    unnecessary arrests, we have seen no serious effort to actually
    address our Nation's border crisis or the rising threats from
    our adversaries.
        If the Trump administration was serious about cracking down
    on the cartels and protecting our border, they wouldn't be
    cutting $495 million in funding and firing nearly 30 percent of
    the employees at CISA and our cybersecurity work force. They
    wouldn't be using resources from our U.S. Coast Guard to assist
    with their deportation efforts as our Coast Guard faces a lack
    of funding, overused aircrafts, where Acting Commandant Admiral
    Kevin Lunday openly stated, even though we can operate aircraft
    to the level we have, we should not be. We should be investing
    in new aircraft for the Coast Guard. They wouldn't be wasting
    time renaming the Gulf of Mexico and they wouldn't be deploying
    the U.S. military on U.S. citizens.
        If they were serious about the real border crisis, they
    would be going after gun dealers in States like Texas and
    Arizona that account for almost 50 percent of international
    firearms trafficking involving the cartels. There seems to be a
    lot of discussion, very concerned about the cartels, lots of
    messaging about that, but there is actually no real effort
    being done to actually rein them in. They wouldn't be calling
    to cut 1.2 billion to ATF that would terminate agents who have
    to work undercover in the gun trafficking rings connected to
    the cartel. They would be strengthening our relationships with
    our allies and not threatening trade wars, and would be
    providing the resources needed for agencies to execute their
    mission.
        President Trump said he was going after migrant criminals,
    illegal monsters, killers, and gang members. But yet we are
    wasting resources terrorizing communities by showing up masked
    at elementary school graduation ceremonies, work, and court
    hearings where people are presenting themselves to the
    immigration system to follow the rules, to go get their
    hearing, to have the right process. They are going to the
    courts of law. They are supposed to be safe places. Instead
    they are turning these sacred spaces into spaces of terror. It
    is absolutely outrageous.
        Mr. Harris, we have seen a drastic increase of ICE arrests
    at court hearings. I am a lawyer. I value the sanctity of the
    courtroom and people go to attend an immigration hearing and
    they are presenting themselves to go through the process
    legally. I have continued to voice my significant concerns over
    how ICE agents present themselves in the public. But this
    administration is content with ignoring the concerns of
    Congress and the American people.
        I recently asked Secretary Noem on this issue when she came
    in front of this very committee. Since that time, we have
    continued to see ICE agents dressed in plain clothes, wearing
    masks regularly, and not properly identified. When you are
    sitting on a street and some masked man jumps out of a car and
    isn't properly identified as law enforcement and comes running
    to you, that is not OK to me.
        My question to you, sir, is it OK with you and what are you
    going to do about it?
        Mr. Harris. Well, thank you for the question. We enforce,
    you know, any violation of U.S. immigration and customs laws.
    As far as the employees doing that at court hearings, I'm not
    of--you know, I know that it happens or it has happened. I'm
    not aware of the specific details of any of those matters. I
    would have to know more about that.
        Ms. Johnson. Well, it is all over the news. Every time in
    Texas, just even in Dallas a couple weeks ago, there were like
    15 people arrested at the immigration court. People who were
    going through the process legally, had filed the application,
    had an immigration hearing, were following the law, were not,
    you know, abject, horrible, dangerous criminals. These are
    people who are working, who are working in grocery stores, who
    are working in farms, who are working in gas stations, who are
    working in hotels, who are doing their part to contribute to
    our economy, and who are showing up for their immigration
    hearing, as they are required to do, and then being tackled in
    the hallway by unidentified agents who are not properly marked
    as law enforcement. That is within your agency's jurisdiction.
        I want to know, this has been widely reported, what are
    y'all doing to stop that?
        Mr. Harris. Again, I don't know the facts of that matter or
    the matters at the court hearing, so I can't speak general--or
    speak specifically on what's going on. But I will say with
    facial coverings and markings, they should have markings on.
    Facial covers, I believe, are reasonable right now for what's
    going on. The assaults that's taking place, the doxing that's
    taking place, that's a significant rise. The threats to family
    members, to employees, to loved ones. You know, they have to do
    that for officer safety reasons. Assaults are 400 percent--have
    increased 400 percent this year because of what's going on.
        Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
        I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
    and the Members for their questions, especially the Chairman of
    the Border Security and Enforcement Subcommittee, Mr. Guest,
    and the Ranking Member Ramirez.
        The Members of the subcommittees may have some additional
    questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to
    respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E),
    the hearing record will be open for 10 days.
        Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittees were
    adjourned.]

                                     [all]