[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MASS GATHERING EVENTS: ASSESSING SECURITY
COORDINATION AND PREPAREDNESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-339 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Tony Gonzales, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Member
Elijah Crane, Arizona Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Gabe Evans, Colorado Robert Garcia, California
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Al Green, Texas
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
Dale W. Strong, Alabama, Chairman
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York,
Gabe Evans, Colorado Ranking Member
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Julie Johnson, Texas
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director
Lauren McClain, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Dale W. Strong, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Management and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Management and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Donald Barnes, Sheriff-Coroner, Orange County Sheriff's
Department, On Behalf of the Major County Sheriffs of America:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. John Junell, Chief Security Officer, Live Nation
Entertainment:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Jeremy Hammond, Assistant Commissioner, Southeastern
Conference:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
For the Record
The Honorable Gabe Evans, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Colorado:
Statement of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International (AUVSI)........................................ 23
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeremy Hammond........ 33
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for John Junell........... 35
Questions From Honorable Nellie Pou for John Junell.............. 37
MASS GATHERING EVENTS: ASSESSING SECURITY COORDINATION AND PREPAREDNESS
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Wednesday, May 21, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Management
and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dale W. Strong
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Strong, Evans of Colorado,
Mackenzie, Kennedy of New York, and Johnson of Texas.
Also present: Representatives Correa, and Pou.
Mr. Strong. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come
to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
The purpose of this hearing is to assess security best
practices, highlight challenges, and understand how the Federal
Government, State government, local law enforcement, and the
private sector coordinate with one another for mass gathering
events.
Without objection, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa, and the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Pou, are
permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions to the
witnesses.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us today. I also
would like to take the time to thank the staff for their hard
work on this hearing.
Today we will discuss the important and timely topic of
security preparedness and coordination for mass gathering
events. By their very nature, these events draw large crowds in
concentrated areas, making them attractive targets for
malicious actors.
Ensuring their safety requires complex coordination among
Federal, State, and local authorities, including law
enforcement and emergency services. It also requires close
collaboration with partners in the sports and entertainment
industries.
I witnessed the scale of these challenges first-hand when I
led a Congressional delegation to New Orleans to serve a
security preparation for the Super Bowl, following the New
Year's Eve attack on Bourbon Street.
That incident and others like it serve as a stark reminder
that terrorist threats persist and underscore our
responsibility to safeguard such gatherings.
These events will only continue to grow in prominence and
frequency. In the year ahead, the United States will host
several major international sporting events, including the 2025
FIFA World Cup, the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and the 2028 Summer
Olympics and Paralympics in Los Angeles.
These events present enormous opportunities, delivering
economic benefits, while also showcasing our great Nation on
the international stage.
But they also bring significant security challenges. Take
the 2026 World Cup, for example. Seventy-six matches will be
played in 11 U.S. cities, with an estimated 6.5 million fans
traveling to the United States, not to mention it will also be
played in the midst of the celebration of America's 250th
anniversary.
To meet these unprecedented demands, DHS has convened an
all-hands-on-deck approach to ensure they are safe and secure.
CISA is working to secure critical infrastructure. The
Office of Intelligence and Analysis is sharing threat
information, and CBP and CIS are carefully vetting and
processing international travelers.
I am also proud of this committee's leadership in
addressing this topic. Three weeks ago, the committee passed
its budget reconciliation recommendation, including $625
million in additional preparedness funding for the 2026 World
Cup and $1 billion for the 2028 Olympics.
I support these measures, and I hope funds can be
distributed as quickly and effectively as possible.
Additionally, following President Trump's Executive Order,
convening a White House task force on the FIFA World Cup, this
committee established its own bipartisan Task Force on
Enhancing Security For Special Events in the United States.
I applaud Vice Chairman McCaul, who will be chairing the
task force, and Chairman Green for their leadership on this
issue, and I'm honored to have been selected to join this task
force.
I hope today's hearing will offer valuable insight and
inform future task force discussions.
Many challenges must be addressed to improve security
preparedness for these major events. As we discussed last
month, unmanned aerial aircraft systems can act as a force
multiplier for DHS's mission.
However, they can also be used for evil and unlawful
purposes. You may remember in 2017, a drone dropped leaflets
over 2 sporting stadiums, in violation of temporary flight
restrictions.
It doesn't take very much to imagine, to see how the same
technology could've been used for a much deadlier purpose.
As for--I previously mentioned, the New Orleans attack
demonstrated the danger that vehicles pose to mass gatherings
and the need to ensure effective countermeasures are in place.
Additionally, the fan behavior at these events can be
erratic as seen during the 2024 Copa America match when
thousands of fans breached physical security barriers and
overwhelmed law enforcement.
These examples reflect the importance of robust security
planning to ensure events are conducted peacefully, that all
spectators remain safe, and everyone has a good time.
I'm thankful for the participation of our witnesses today.
I look forward to their perspective, as well as what Congress
and the Federal Government can do to support these events.
Again, thank you all for being here, and I hope we can have
a productive and bipartisan discussion, as we seek to improve
security ahead of these mass gathering events.
[The statement of Chairman Strong follows:]
Statement of Chairman Dale Strong
Good afternoon and thank you for joining us.
I would also like to thank the staff for their hard work on this
hearing.
Today, this subcommittee will discuss the important and timely
topic of our security preparedness and coordination for mass gathering
events.
By their very nature, these events draw large crowds in
concentrated areas, making them attractive targets for malicious
actors.
Ensuring their safety requires complex coordination among Federal,
State, and local authorities--including law enforcement and emergency
services.
It also requires close collaboration with partners in the sports
and entertainment industries.
I witnessed the scale of these challenges first-hand, when I led a
Congressional delegation to New Orleans to survey security preparations
for the Super Bowl following the New Year's attack on Bourbon Street.
That incident, and others like it, serve as stark reminders that
terrorist threats persist, and underscore our shared responsibility to
safeguard such gatherings.
And these events will only continue to grow in prominence and
frequency.
In the years ahead, the United States will host several major
international sporting events, including:
The 2025 FIFA Club World Cup,
The 2026 FIFA World Cup, and
The 2028 Summer Olympics and Paralympics in Los Angeles.
These events present enormous opportunities--delivering economic
benefits, while also showcasing our great Nation on the international
stage.
But they also bring significant security challenges.
Take the 2026 World Cup for example: 78 matches will be played in
11 U.S. cities, with an estimated 6.5 million fans traveling to the
United States.
Not to mention, it will also be played in the midst of celebrations
for America's 250th anniversary.
To meet these unprecedented demands, DHS has convened an ``all-
hands on deck'' approach to ensure they are safe and secure.
CISA is working to secure critical infrastructure; the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis is sharing threat information; and CBP and
CIS are carefully vetting and processing international travelers.
I am also proud of this committee's leadership in getting ahead of
this challenge.
Three weeks ago, the committee passed its budget reconciliation
recommendations, including $625 million in additional preparedness
funding for the 2026 World Cup and $1 billion for the 2028 Olympics.
I support these measures, and hope funds can be distributed as
quickly and effectively as possible.
Additionally, following President Trump's Executive Order convening
a White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup, this committee
established its own bipartisan Task Force on Enhancing Security for
Special Events in the United States.
I applaud Vice Chairman McCaul, who will be chairing the task
force, and Chairman Green for their leadership on this issue.
I'm honored to have been selected to join the task force.
I hope today's hearing will offer valuable insights to inform
future task force discussions.
There are many challenges that need to be addressed to improve our
security preparedness for these major events.
As we discussed in our hearing last month, Unmanned Aircraft
Systems--or UAS--can act as a force multiplier for the DHS mission.
However, they can also be used for evil or unlawful purposes.
You may remember in 2017 a drone dropped leaflets over 2 sports
stadiums in violation of the Temporary Flight Restrictions.
It doesn't take very much imagination to see how the same
technology could have been used for a much deadlier purpose.
As I previously mentioned, the New Orleans' attack demonstrated the
danger that vehicles pose to mass gatherings--and the need to ensure
effective countermeasures are in place.
Additionally, fan behavior at these events can be erratic, as seen
during the 2024 Copa America match when thousands of fans breached
physical security barriers and overwhelmed law enforcement.
These examples reflect the importance of robust security planning
to ensure events are conducted peacefully, that all spectators remain
safe, and everyone has a good time.
I'm thankful for the participation of our witnesses today.
I look forward to their perspectives, as well as what Congress and
the Federal Government can do to support these events.
Again, thank you all for being here, and I hope we can have a
productive and bipartisan discussion as we seek to improve security
ahead of these mass gathering events.
Mr. Strong. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statements.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much, Chairman, and good
afternoon everyone. It's great to see you all here today this
afternoon.
I'd like to start on a somber note by remembering our
colleague and good friend, Congressman Gerry Connolly, who
passed away earlier this morning.
Gerry was a passionate public servant, a tireless champion
for working families, and a defender of democracy. His loss
will certainly be felt deeply in Congress and in Virginia's
11th District.
He was actually one of the first Members that I met when I
came here to Washington, DC. I believe he was the first Member
to stop by my office, before I was sworn in last year, to say
hello. He welcomed me as a fellow Irishman and offered me a
kindness that I'll never forget.
We all knew him as a consummate gentleman and certainly a
leader and, again, a dear friend.
So our thoughts are certainly with his wife Cathy, their
daughter Caitlin, and the entire Connolly family on this
difficult day.
Now, turning to today's Emergency Management and Technology
Subcommittee hearing on mass gatherings, I want to thank all of
the witnesses for joining us here today.
I also want to extend my gratitude to the staff for their
efforts in making today's hearing come together.
My thoughts, and I believe all of our thoughts and
concerns, are with those in Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana,
Virginia, and everyone who was impacted by the tornadoes and
storms that hit just over this past weekend.
Nearly 30 lives were lost in the devastation, and we know
far too often natural disasters are continually posing
significant threats to our Nation, and we have to ensure that
we are as prepared as possible to respond and meet the moment.
Shortly after the storm, it became clear that the local
National Weather Service office in Kentucky is 1 of 4 offices
nationwide without enough staff.
National Weather Service offices, in part, are the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration offices as well, and
those are the offices that provide critical tornado forecasting
that is then transmitted into emergency alerts so that
communities can prepare.
The future of emergency management in this country is
dependent on the kinds of investments we make in these missions
and the staff that keep them running.
So I am certainly concerned that the President's budget
request cuts NOAA by at least 27 percent, and I fear that this
will only increase the level of devastation that we saw this
past weekend when it comes to future emergencies.
Additionally, we are days away from the start of hurricane
season, and the chaos at the Federal Emergency Management
Agency continues to hinder our ability to support communities.
So this won't just affect responses to natural disasters.
FEMA's preparedness and grants administration will have a
direct impact on the security of mass gatherings, like the 2026
FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympics.
We know that mass gatherings don't happen in a vacuum, and
having strong emergency management infrastructure that can
respond is going to be essential to ensuring that the 2
premier, once-in-a-generation sporting events that we're
discussing today, among other mass gathering events, are as
seamless as possible.
In preparing for these mass gathering events, State and
local first responders across the country are scaling up, and
in some cases, like the 2 major events--the Olympics and the
FIFA World Cup--these are historic visitations, record
investments for the communities and States, and potential high-
security risks.
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis conducts the annual Homeland Threat
Assessment, and its publication for 2025 warned that the
terrorism threat environment throughout our country remains
high.
Given this, it's critical that the Federal Government make
good on its promise to provide States and local communities
with FEMA preparedness grant funding, so we're ready to respond
and mitigate any threats during these high-profile events.
Again, I'm concerned that President Trump's budget proposes
a $646 million cut to FEMA's non-disaster grant programs.
Cuts like these severely undermine our ability to detect
threats, support our local law enforcement partners, and
prepare for major events and mass gatherings.
Now it's time to shore up the FEMA grant program, like the
Homeland Security Grant Program, which includes the State
Homeland Security Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative,
and Operation Stonegarden.
I look forward to hearing about the importance of these
programs from our witnesses as well as ways that we can
continue to partner with each and every one of you, supporting
law enforcement, supporting the private sector and Federal
agencies in a collaborative, collective way so that we can
secure these mass gathering events and make them as safe as
possible for those in attendance and those in the vicinity.
Again, thank you all for your service to our country, to
your respective communities, and I look forward to our
conversation.
Thank you, Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Kennedy follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Timothy Kennedy
May 21, 2025
First, I want to say that my thoughts are with those in Kentucky,
Missouri, Indiana, and Virginia, and everyone who was impacted by the
tornadoes and storms that hit over the weekend.
Nearly 30 lives were lost in the devastation. Natural disasters
continue to pose a significant threat to our Nation, and we must ensure
that we are prepared as a Nation to respond. Shortly after the storm,
it became clear that the local National Weather Service (NWS) office in
Kentucky is 1 of 4 offices nationwide without enough staff.
NWS offices, a part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), provide critical tornado forecasting that is
then transmitted into emergency alerts so that communities can prepare.
The future of emergency management in this country is dependent on the
kinds of investments we make in these missions and the staff that keep
them running.
I am deeply concerned that the President's budget request cuts NOAA
by at least 27 percent. I fear that this would only increase the level
of devastation we saw this weekend in future emergencies. Additionally,
we are days away from the start of hurricane season, and the chaos at
the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues to hinder our ability
to support communities. This won't just affect responses to natural
disasters. FEMA's preparedness and grants administration will have a
direct impact on the security of mass gatherings like the 2026 FIFA
World Cup and the 2028 Olympics.
Mass gatherings do not happen in a vacuum, and having a strong
emergency management infrastructure that can respond, for example, to a
mass gathering dealing with extreme weather, will be essential to
ensuring that the two premier, once-in-a-generation sporting events
that we are discussing today are as seamless as possible. To prepare
for the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics, State and
local first responders across the United States are scaling up for
historic visitation, record infrastructure investments, and the
potential for high security risks.
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis conducts an annual Homeland Threat Assessment, and its
publication for 2025 warned that the terrorism threat environment
throughout the country remains high. Given this, it's critical that the
Federal Government make good on its promise to provide States and local
communities with FEMA preparedness grant funding so that we are ready
to respond to and mitigate any threats during these high-profile
events.
I am concerned that President Trump's budget proposes a $646
million cut to FEMA's non-disaster grant programs. Cuts like these
severely undermine our ability to detect threats, support our local law
enforcement partners, and prepare for major events like the World Cup
and the Olympics.
Now is the time to shore up FEMA grant programs like the Homeland
Security Grant Program, which includes the State Homeland Security
Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, and Operation Stonegarden.
I look forward to hearing about the importance of these programs
from our witnesses, as well as the ways in which the Federal Government
can support local law enforcement, the private sector, and Federal
agencies in collectively securing mass events.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
May 21, 2025
While today's hearing is focused on mass gatherings, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) role in supporting first
responders cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the Trump
administration is creating a crisis at FEMA. Secretary Kristi Noem
appeared before this committee last week and doubled down on her
position that FEMA should be eliminated. She also admitted that she did
not have any written plan for addressing catastrophic disasters.
Those statements alone should be cause for concern. But coming just
days before hurricane season begins and amid reports that FEMA has lost
thousands of employees, they are profoundly irresponsible and
dangerous. Unfortunately, the explicit attack on FEMA is not an
isolated incident. It's part of a larger pattern under this
administration--dismantling preparedness, sidelining career experts,
and treating public safety like a partisan game.
Even as this administration undermines FEMA and emergency
preparedness, Trump's most loyal Republican allies are still lining up
to beg for Federal assistance when their States are hit by disaster.
While today's hearing focuses on upcoming large-scale events, local
communities across the country already face the challenge of preparing
with fewer resources.
That's because the Trump administration froze key Federal
preparedness grants, including the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI), the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), and the Securing
the Cities (STC) program. These grants fund everything from emergency
planning and training to equipment and exercises. Local officials rely
on this funding to prepare for mass gatherings. Yet, the Trump
administration delayed this money for months, only releasing portions
after Federal courts forced them to. Even now, several programs remain
in unlawful limbo, leaving cities and States stretched thin on funding
and unsure how to plan effectively for events like the World Cup.
At the same time, the Trump administration has weakened our
emergency preparedness on multiple fronts: slashing the Federal
workforce, stripping DHS of essential staff responsible for threat
assessments and emergency coordination, and shutting down training
centers for first responders.
The administration's proposed fiscal year 2026 budget goes even
further by eliminating key training programs for first responders
through the closure of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, a
group of 7 nationally-recognized organizations that provide specialized
training to emergency response personnel nationwide. Even more
dangerously, the Trump administration has scaled back Federal efforts
to address domestic violent extremism--the most lethal terrorist threat
facing the homeland.
The administration's proposed fiscal year 2026 budget continues
this retreat by eliminating the Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention (TVTP) program--an initiative focused on early intervention
and community-based prevention of radicalization and violence.
Defunding this life-saving work sends a dangerous signal: that the
Federal Government under Donald Trump is willing to abandon its
responsibility to confront the threats we know are growing. Together,
these actions by the Trump administration represent not just a neglect
of duty, but a systematic dismantling of the tools and partnerships
that keep Americans safe. Our communities, our responders, and our most
vulnerable are the ones paying the price.
I hope that today's hearing will be an honest conversation about
the Trump administration's actions and how Congress can better support
communities hosting mass gatherings.
Mr. Strong. I'm very pleased to have such an important
panel of witnesses before us today. I ask that the witnesses
please rise and raise their right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Please be seated.
Let the record reflect that all witnesses have answered in
the affirmative.
I would like now to formally introduce our witnesses.
Sheriff Donald Barnes is the sheriff-coroner of the Orange
County Sheriff's Department. He has served the Orange County
for over 35 years, having started in 1989.
At the national level, he is the Major County Sheriffs of
America's vice president for homeland security and also chair
of their intelligence committee.
Mr. John Junell is the chief security officer at Live
Nation Entertainment, where he leads their corporate security
program that helps keep employees, guests, and artists safe.
Prior to his work at Live Nation, Mr. Junell served as a
special agent with the United States Secret Service, where he
served as the Agency's Presidential Protective Division.
Mr. Jeremy Hammond is the assistant commissioner of the
Southeastern Conference where he plays a pivotal role in some
of the Nation's most high professional collegiate sporting
events, ensuring a seamless experience for fans, athletes, and
stakeholders alike.
Before joining the Southeastern Conference, Mr. Hammond's
held senior roles with organizations such as Ingress Events,
WWE, and the Georgia Dome, developing deep expertise in event
management, public safety, planning, and venue operation.
I thank the witnesses again for being here today. I now
recognize Sheriff Barnes for 5 minutes to summarize his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF DONALD BARNES, SHERIFF-CORONER, ORANGE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE MAJOR COUNTY SHERIFFS OF
AMERICA
Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Chairman Strong and Ranking Member
Kennedy, for holding today's hearing.
I'm here today representing the Major County Sheriffs of
America, the professional law enforcement association of the
largest sheriffs offices across the country. Our members serve
more than one-third of the United States population.
As sheriff of Orange County, I lead an agency of more than
4,000 people who provide exceptional public safety services to
the 3.1 million residents in Orange County.
As a major population center and popular tourist
destination on the Southern California region, mass gathering
events are a regular occurrence in our AOR. Nationwide,
managing the security for mass gathering events and addressing
associated public safety impacts largely fall on the shoulders
of sheriffs and our partners in city municipal police
departments.
Today's focus is on the once-in-a-generation events--the
FIFA World Cup, the Olympics--and other events, as mentioned,
that will be coming to our country.
It's been 3 decades since our Nation hosted these events so
close to each other. The FIFA World Cup of 1994 and the 1996
Olympics in Atlanta were significant moments for our country.
Thirty years later, we will host these events in Southern
California, and in a dozen other regions, under a much more
complex, rapidly-evolving threat environment.
We have greater technology available to assist us you know
with our security efforts, but risks associated with a cyber
attack are ever-present.
Our border is more secure since the beginning of the year,
but many of the nefarious actors who entered our country over
the last 4 years remain, and their locations are unknown.
An event that hosts visitors from all corners of the world
brings with it tensions from the multitude of conflicts
occurring around the globe.
We must always remember that we have no national security
or homeland security without local law enforcement efforts.
We can be successful in our goal of a safe World Cup and
Olympics if we use proven strategies and we are properly
resourced with the right mix of people and technology.
Strategies that are most worthy of this committee's focus
and efforts include, No. 1, communication among law enforcement
partners.
Sharing intelligence information across levels of
government is critical. This type of communication can best
occur through the network of fusion centers across our country.
In Orange County, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment
Center responds to college protests, concern in conflicts with
the Middle East. Fusion centers play a central role in
communicating intelligence to personnel on the ground,
resulting in safe conclusions of these events.
Continued and enhanced Federal funding is essential to
preparedness, providing support for strategic planning, and
maintaining operational and situational awareness.
The UASI and SHSGP grants mentioned in Operation
Stonegarden provide funding that supports intelligence sharing
through fusion centers, builds critical incident response
capabilities, and creates Federal local partnerships that
strengthen national security.
Second is the use of the Incident Command System. The
Orange County Sheriff's Department has long used ICS, known as
NIMS, SIMS, or whatever it might be at other levels, for
emergent events and planning for special events.
It's a standardized protocol that creates command control,
communication coordination at all levels of government.
It's been a proven, scaleable model that can be applied to
a variety of public safety incidents and events, and my
department has used it across our operational platform.
Law enforcement across multiple jurisdictions needs to be
on the same page particularly with regard to events like the
Olympics and World Cup.
Also, adaptation by Federal agencies would ensure better
integration when they work with State and local agencies during
these mass gathering events.
Briefly, unmanned aerial systems will also be part of any
security strategy. Drones have proven to be a successful,
beneficial tool for public safety and emergency response, and
we anticipate that drone capabilities will be leveraged
extensively to help the World Cup and Olympic sites.
Congressional support through legislation like H.R. 1058,
the DRONE Act, cosponsored by Representatives Correa and Nehls,
can help.
At the same time, the unauthorized misuse of drones
represents a significant security concern for mass events and
the public's safety.
Lawmakers must establish a legal framework that provides
broad-based but carefully regulated authority for locals to
deploy and operate counter-UAS systems. This framework must be
supported by funding, training, oversight, and transparency.
Finally, I ask for your support in alleviating resource
impacts on local law enforcement. The number of simultaneous
events in multiple cities will put tremendous stress on
resources across the country.
Federal grant funding to help offset these costs, which has
been provided during previous Olympics, will help us maintain
operations associated with these events while also fulfilling
our day-to-day law enforcement responsibilities to our
communities.
I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I'm
looking forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barnes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Don Barnes
May 21, 2025
Thank you Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy for holding
today's hearing.
I am here today representing the Major County Sheriffs of America
(MCSA), a professional law enforcement association of the largest
Sheriff's offices across the country. Our members serve more than one-
third of the United States population. Our membership is comprised of
Sheriffs Offices serving counties with a population of 400,000 or more
and employing over 700 personnel.
As Sheriff of Orange County, I lead an agency of more than 4,000
men and women who provide exceptional public safety services to 3.13
million residents. As a major population center and popular tourist
destination in the Southern California region, mass gathering events
are a regular occurrence in our area of responsibility.
Nationwide, managing the security for mass gathering events and
addressing associated public safety impacts largely fall on the
shoulders of sheriffs and our partners in city police departments.
mass gathering dynamics
There are several types of mass gathering events that present a
multitude of risks and security concerns. These mass gatherings can
occur daily at destinations like Disneyland in Orange County, CA or the
Disney World Resort in Orange County, Florida. There are annual mass
gathering events like the Coachella and Stagecoach Music Festivals in
Riverside County, California. This past year many of my colleagues were
responsible for ensuring the safety of those who attended the various
political events associated with the 2024 election. And there are
quasi-spontaneous events like protests. The unpredictable nature of
these events often makes them the most complex.
Finally, there are the once-in-a-generation events we are primarily
focused on today--the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics. It has been 3
decades since our Nation hosted these events so close to each other.
The FIFA World Cup 1994 and 1996 Olympics in Atlanta were significant
moments for our country. Neither were without their challenges. World
Cup games were hosted in Los Angeles just 6 months after the
devastating North Ridge Earthquake. The Atlanta Games featured
memorable scenes like Muhammad Ali lighting the Olympic Torch and Keri
Strug securing Gold for Team USA, but the Games were also marked by a
deadly terrorist bombing at Centennial Park.
Thirty years later we will host these events in Southern California
and in a dozen other regions under a much more complex threat
environment. We have greater technology available to assist with our
security efforts, but risks associated with cyber attack are ever
present. Our border is more secure since the beginning of this year,
but many of the nefarious actors who entered our country over the last
4 years remain. An event that hosts visitors from all corners of the
world brings with it tensions from the multitude of conflicts occurring
around the globe.
Mitigating these risks falls to all those of us entrusted with
national security, homeland security and local public safety. We must
always remember that we have no national security or homeland security
without local public safety. We can be successful in our goal of a safe
World Cup and Olympics if we use proven strategies we know work and if
we are properly resourced with the right mix of people and technology.
successful strategies
Today I will highlight strategies my colleagues and I believe are
most worthy of this committee's focus and efforts.
Communication Among Law Enforcement Partners.--Sharing intelligence
information across levels of Government is critical. This type of
communication can best occur through the National Network of Fusion
Centers. Fusion centers are where local, State, Federal, and private-
sector partners collaborate to analyze and share threat-related
information. In Orange County, we use our fusion center regularly in
our work to help maintain safety at mass gathering events.
A recent example occurred in the Spring of 2024 when multiple
Orange County law enforcement agencies were called to respond to
protests at the University of California, Irvine centered on the
conflict in the Middle East. Activity associated with the protests was
deemed unlawful and necessitated action by law enforcement. The fusion
center played a central role in communicating intelligence to personnel
on the ground, resulting in a safe conclusion to the event.
This work highlights the need for those who work at the 80
recognized State and regional fusion centers around the Nation to
maintain access to local, regional, State, and Federal sources of
information at the Classified and unclassified levels. This includes
continued access to law enforcement records, criminal intelligence
databases, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the
Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), the FBI's Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS), the FBI Network (FBINet), DHS's Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS), and systems for collecting
and sharing tips, leads and threat-to-life data.
This access enables fusion centers to add local and regional
context to national intelligence, as well as provide information and
value-added intelligence to support counterterrorism and other criminal
investigations that would otherwise be difficult or unlikely for lead
Federal, State, or local investigative agencies to obtain through
traditional channels.
Use of Incident Command System (ICS).--The Orange County Sheriff's
Department has long used ICS to manage our response to emergencies and
plan for special events. ICS is a standardized approach to the command,
control, and coordination of a public safety response. ICS was
initially created by Southern California fire chiefs in 1968 to
organize their response to wildfires. It has proven to be a scalable
model that can be applied to a variety of public safety incidents and
events. My department has utilized ICS in response to barricaded
suspects, active shooters, and emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic.
We have also used ICS in the planning of large-scale events, like the
August 2008 Saddleback Civil Forum which featured the Presidential
nominees of both parties.
When used properly, ICS is particularly effective when multiple
agencies are involved in an event or response to an incident. The model
is rooted in the concept of defined roles, a common hierarchy, and a
commitment by all involved to the planning process. On July 13, 2024,
we saw the tragic results that can occur when roles are not clearly
defined. In reviews of the attempted assassination of then-former
President Trump, it was clear that several tasks and responsibilities
were not carried out due to lack of coordination. The ICS model is
designed to ensure coordination takes place and that all involved are
clear on their specific roles.
Embedded Personnel.--Federal personnel should be embedded with
local staff during events where they have a role. For example, in
Orange County we have had several events featuring the President, Vice
President, Presidential candidates, and other Secret Service
protectees. Having an embedded Secret Service agent with our personnel
has enhanced communication and filled information gaps that could be
exploited by bad actors.
recommendations for congress
Based on the success of these strategies I recommend this committee
work to support and implement the following:
Ensure Use of ICS Construct.--Law enforcement across multiple
jurisdictions need to be on the same page. If we all are utilizing ICS,
people will know their roles, responsibilities and easily integrate
with one another. In my view it is important that Federal agencies
adopt the ICS model for their incidents and responses. ICS is a
universal model used by public safety agencies throughout the Nation.
Adaptation by Federal agencies would ensure better integration when
they work with State and local agencies during mass gathering events.
Sustained Federal Investment in Homeland Security Funding.--
Continued and enhanced Federal funding is essential to preparedness,
providing support for strategic planning, and maintaining operational
readiness. The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland
Security Grant Program (SHSGP), and Operation Stonegarden provide
funding that supports intelligence sharing through fusion centers,
builds critical incident response capabilities, and creates Federal-
local partnerships that strengthen national security. These programs
have transformed our prevention, preparedness, and response
capabilities for both terrorist threats and natural disasters, creating
capacity that would not exist without Federal support. A major part of
our Nation's threat prevention and response capabilities are sustained
by FEMA grant funding--primarily through UASI and SHSGP. The
information access and analytical collaboration enabled by these grants
cannot be easily replicated. Therefore, it is a core Federal
responsibility to ensure these programs continue to support
capabilities that would otherwise be unavailable to the Federal
Government.
Direct grant funding to local agencies--bypassing State-level
intermediaries--would eliminate bureaucratic hurdles, reduce
administrative overhead, and deliver resources more effectively to
front-line departments where they matter most.
Counter-UAS Authority.--Drones have proven to be significantly
beneficial for public safety and emergency response, and we anticipate
that drone capabilities will be leveraged extensively to help protect
World Cup and Olympic sites. Congressional support through legislation
like H.R. 1058, the DRONE Act, co-sponsored by Representatives Correa
and Nehls can help.
At the same time, the unauthorized misuse of drones presents a
significant security concern for mass events. Mass gathering events are
vulnerable to unauthorized Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), which puts
both public safety and national security at risk. This was seen the
past summer when concerts were paused due to drone activity.
Current Federal law limits the use of counter-UAS technologies,
such as signal jamming, tracking, and drone interdiction, to just 4
Federal agencies. This legal gap is dangerous and must be addressed.
Lawmakers must establish a legal framework that provides broad-based,
but carefully regulated authority for locals to deploy and operate
counter-UAS systems. This framework must be supported by funding,
training, oversight, and transparency.
Alleviate Resource Impacts on Local Law Enforcement.--The number of
simultaneous events in multiple cities across the Nation will put
stress on our resources. We must remember that law enforcement presence
will be needed not only at the games themselves but also at the
locations that will house the millions of visitors traveling into and
around our country.
Much of what we do will fall on the shoulders of our existing
personnel. The overtime costs associated with filling shifts will put a
burden on our local agency budgets. Local agencies alone cannot
shoulder the burden for additional personnel, equipment, technology,
and supplies required to protect thousands of athletes and foreign
dignitaries, and secure Olympic housing and competition facilities
across hundreds of square miles. Federal grant funding to help offset
these costs--which has been provided during previous Olympic Games
hosted in the United States--will help us maintain operations
associated with these events while also fulfilling our day-to-day law
enforcement responsibilities in our communities.
These recommendations are the 4 best things Congress and the
administration can do to ensure the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028
Olympic Games are remembered as the safest and most secure on record.
Sheriffs stand ready and willing to work with you and your colleagues.
I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Sheriff Barnes.
I now recognize Mr. Junell for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements. Mr. Junell.
STATEMENT OF JOHN JUNELL, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, LIVE NATION
ENTERTAINMENT
Mr. Junell. Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and
other Members of the subcommittee, I'm John Junell, chief
security officer at Live Nation Entertainment. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss critical
safety issues facing the live entertainment industry.
Twenty-twenty-four marked an historic milestone for live
music. Live Nation hosted more than 54,000 events, including
137 festivals, welcoming more than 151 million fans. And 2025
is already on track to surpass those benchmarks with more
stadium shows scheduled than ever before and record demand for
both concerts and festivals.
As the scale and complexity of live events grow, we know
security measures need to enhance as well. I oversee the
development and implementation of security protocols and lead
the efforts to collaborate with local and Federal authorities
to help keep fans, artists, and workers safe.
Our commitment to safety is unwavering. We've continuously
advanced our protocols and technologies, the dedication that
earned us the SAFETY Act Designation Award from DHS, but we
recognize there are limits to what we can do, especially when
it comes to the emerging threats posed by drones.
As a private entity, we lack the authority to counter drone
activity, and law enforcement often lacks necessary
capabilities and authority to respond.
This is why it's essential that more events are covered by
FAA-issued temporary flight restrictions, or TFRs, and counter-
UAS authority be expanded to local law enforcement.
Drone use continues to grow rapidly. The FAA recently
reported that more than 1 million drones are now registered in
the United States, 160 percent increase since 2019. Given the
rise in usage in high-profile, drone-related incidents,
expanding TFR authority is needed.
With the context in mind, I'd like to highlight several key
areas where we believe Congress can take further action.
We commend Congress for passing section 935 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act last year which expands FAA authority to
issue drone-related TFRs for certain large-scale events.
The provision allows TFR coverage for stadium concerts with
at least 30,000 attendees and festivals with at least 100,000.
Live Nation was supportive of this provision but knows more
work must be done to mitigate the airborne threats at live
events.
To maximize the impact of section 935, it's essential that
the FAA, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and other
stakeholders are fully aware of this new authority and equipped
to utilize it.
Ultimately, success depends on the venue or local law
enforcement reaching out to Federal law enforcement agencies,
Federal law enforcement's willingness to request the TFR, and
the FAA's readiness to approve it.
Without coordination and follow-through, this new provision
falls short of its intention to create more secure live events.
Further recognition of this provision enhancement is
needed, including a clear, prominent, on-line process for
submitting a TFR request for all live events, including
concerts and festivals, and the addition of a dedicated
submission form to streamline the process for law enforcement
officials.
Additionally, we ask Congress to consider lowering the
current thresholds to ensure that more events can benefit from
the protective coverage of TFRs.
Last year alone, we had more than 1,000 shows in venues
with a capacity of 10,000. We ask Congress to lower the
attendance threshold to 10,000 for events taking place
outdoors.
These proposed adjustments would significantly expand
safety coverage for high-density events that are currently
excluded despite facing comparable security risks.
We also urge Congress to build on the progress made in last
year's FAA bill by strengthening air space protections to
include not only unmanned aircraft systems, but also small
manned aircrafts.
We appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan attention this
issue has received and appreciate members for recognizing these
evolving threats.
Finally, we urge Congress to grant mitigation authority to
qualified local law enforcement agencies. When a drone enters
restricted air space, rapid response is critical.
But Federal authorities may not always be positioned to act
quickly. Allowing trained local agencies to respond to the
Federal guidance would significantly enhance real-time
capabilities and strengthen the effectiveness of TFRs.
Similarly, we appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan
attention to this issue and commend Members for their efforts.
On behalf of Live Nation Entertainment, thank you all for your
leadership on these important issues, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Junell follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Junell
May 21, 2024
Chair Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, other Members of the
Emergency Management and Technology Subcommittee, I'm John Junell,
chief security officer at Live Nation Entertainment. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the critical safety
and security considerations in the live entertainment industry.
Twenty-twenty-four marked a historic milestone for live music--it
was the industry's biggest year to date. Artists toured the globe, and
fans showed up in record numbers. Live Nation hosted more than 54,000
events, including 137 festivals, welcoming more than 151 million fans.
Twenty twenty-five is already shaping up to surpass last year's
benchmarks--with more stadium shows scheduled than ever before, and the
demand for both festivals and concerts growing at an unprecedented
pace.
As the scale and complexity of live events grow, we are advocating
for security measures to enhance as well. As the chief of security at
Live Nation, I am responsible for leading the company's security
program working in close contact with local and Federal authorities to
help keep fans, artists, and workers safe. Our commitment to safety is
unwavering--we've continuously advanced our protocols and technologies,
a dedication that was recognized through our receipt of the Department
of Homeland Security's SAFETY Act Designation Award. Yet, there are
limits to what we can achieve on our own, particularly when it comes to
the emerging and rapidly-escalating threat posed by unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS). It's important to emphasize that Live Nation, as a
private entity, does not have the legal authority to mitigate drone
activity in air space, nor can we require our local law enforcement
partners to acquire and use the necessary surveillance systems or
counter-UAS technologies to prevent unauthorized activity. This
limitation underscores why it is critical that more events fall within
the scope of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-issued temporary
flight restrictions (TFRs).
With the continued rise in domestic drone usage--highlighted by the
FAA's recent report that the number of registered drones has surpassed
1 million,\1\ a roughly 160 percent increase since 2019's 385,000
reported,\2\--and in light of recent high-profile incidents that have
made national headlines, it is clear that an expansion of TFR authority
is urgently needed. Strengthening these protections is essential to
ensuring public safety and preserving the integrity of large-scale
events. With that context in mind, I'd like to highlight several key
areas where we believe Congress can take further action.
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\1\ https://www.faa.gov/node/54496.
\2\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/FY2020-40_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress took an important step in the right direction with the
passage of Section 935 in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Live
Nation was proud to be among the foremost industry advocates for
Section 935, which expands the FAA's authority to issue TFRs for drones
at large public gatherings, including stadium concerts with at least
30,000 attendees, and festivals with 100,000 people. Enactment of
Section 935 marked progress in protecting our events from airborne
threats. However, more work remains to ensure the provision is
effectively implemented and to further enhance its scope to broaden
protections for fans, performers, and event personnel at live events
across the country.
To maximize the impact of Section 935, it's essential that the FAA,
State/local law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders across the
country are fully aware of this new authority and equipped to utilize
it. Clear communication, interagency coordination, and proactive
outreach are critical to ensuring that TFR coverage for drones are
authorized in a streamlined and timely fashion. We support a seamless
TFR drone coverage application process by collaborating with our law
enforcement and venue partners to reach out to Federal agencies and
request a TFR on our behalf. Even as the producer of a show or
festival, we rely on our partners to request and grant any TFR.
Ultimately, success depends on the venue or local law enforcement
reaching out to Federal law enforcement agencies, Federal law
enforcement's willingness to request the TFR, and the FAA's readiness
to approve it. Without consistent engagement and follow-through, this
new provision falls short of its intention to create more secure live
events. Further education and acknowledgement of this provision
enhancement is needed--including mention of the change on the FAA's TFR
application webpage and the addition of a dedicated submission form to
streamline the process for law enforcement officials.
Additionally, we ask Congress to consider lowering the current
attendance thresholds to ensure that more events can benefit from the
protective coverage of drone-related TFRs. These current thresholds are
too high to address the wide range of large-scale events that still
face significant security risks but fall just below the current limits.
Many of our events occur at outdoor venues, which regularly attract
10,000 to just under 30,000 attendees. Last year alone, we had more
than 1,000 shows in venues with a capacity of 10,000. While these shows
fall below the current threshold, they still present significant and
similar security challenges due to their open-air design and dense
crowds. Similarly, Live Nation produces festivals across the country
that draw upwards of 85,000 festival goers, require more than 10,000
credentialed workers, as well as artists and their teams--yet are not
considered to meet the 100,000-person threshold. Given their scale,
visibility, and logistical complexity, they too warrant TFR protection.
Expanding eligibility to include these types of events is a necessary
reality to keep pace with the technologically-advanced risks at large-
scale events associated with aircraft activity.
As such, we respectfully ask Congress to lower the attendance
threshold to 10,000 for events taking place outdoors. These proposed
adjustments would represent a meaningful step forward--significantly
expanding safety coverage for high-density events that are currently
excluded, despite facing comparable security risks.
We also urge Congress to build on the progress made in last year's
FAA bill by further strengthening air space protections to include not
only unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), but also small, manned and
unmanned aircrafts. We appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan
attention this issue has received and commend Rep. Raul Ruiz and Sen.
Marsha Blackburn for recognizing these evolving threats by sponsoring
H.R. 2887, the Protecting Outdoor Concerts Act,\3\ which would expand
Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) coverage to include small, manned
aircraft. By doing this, there would be a critical gap closed in
current policy which would provide a more comprehensive security
framework for TFR eligible events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Senate companion bill expected to be introduced soon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We urge Congress to consider granting carefully-defined mitigation
authority to trained local law enforcement agencies. In the event of an
unauthorized or suspicious drone entering restricted air space,
response time is critical. While Federal agencies play a central role
in countering unidentified aircraft efforts, they are not always
positioned to respond immediately at the local level and/or do not have
the bandwidth to do so. Empowering designated local and regional law
enforcement agencies to take timely and proportionate action, under
clear guidelines and in coordination with Federal partners, would
strengthen real-time response capabilities and improve the overall
effectiveness of TFRs. We appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan
attention this issue has also received, and we commend Reps. Greg
Stuebe, Dina Titus, Rudy Yakym, Lou Correa, Cory Mills, Jill Tokuda,
Sens. Tom Cotton, and Jacky Rosen recognizing that empowering local law
enforcement is a necessary step to mitigate UAS risks by cosponsoring
H.R. 3207/S. 663, the Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing
Suspect Equipment (DEFENSE) Act.
On behalf of Live Nation, we appreciate your continued leadership
on these important issues and look forward to working with you to
advance the safety and security of live events across the country. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Junell.
I now recognize Mr. Hammond from the Southeastern
Conference for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JEREMY HAMMOND, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE
Mr. Hammond. Thank you, Chairman Strong and Ranking Member
Kennedy, and the honorable Members of this subcommittee, for
the opportunity to participate in today's hearing.
My name is Jeremy Hammond, and I have the honor of serving
the 16 member institutions of the Southeastern Conference as
assistant commissioner.
In my role, I lead our efforts to produce world-class
championship events, including the SEC Football Championship,
and I work with our member institutions to develop event
management policies and procedures including public safety best
practices.
I come to you today not only as somebody that is involved
in the day-to-day management of public events, but as someone
who's deeply invested in safeguarding the environments where
friends and families come together to celebrate traditions,
community, and competition--because that's really what we all
seek together.
However, we cannot share those experiences without the
assurance that we can enjoy them in safe, well-managed
environments.
Just as the rapid advancement of technology and weaponry
has evolved global conflicts, the same can be said for the
threats that we must protect against at our favorite sporting
event, concert, festival, or convention.
As cities across the United States prepare to host the
World Cup and the Olympics over the coming years, there is no
group of professionals better positioned or prepared, to plan
for, manage, and mitigate challenges than those we call friends
and colleagues here in this country.
The World Cup and the Olympics obviously are the 2 largest
international events in existence. They present a provocative
and highly-visible target for bad actors.
However, as my counterparts here today may agree, large
public events with high threat profiles are produced 365 days a
year in this country. Whether in metropolitan cities or small
college towns, college athletics welcomes fans week after week
from kickoff in late August to the last out in May.
Chairman Strong from Alabama can attest, in the SEC, we
like to say, ``It just means more.'' During Saturdays in the
fall our campuses grow to the populations of a midsize city.
In 2024, 5 SEC schools averaged 100,000 fans in their
venues at home football games. Accounting for schools in other
leagues, that number grows to 8 nationwide.
It's also routine that campuses host 50- to 75,000
additional fans who take part in the fanfare around the stadium
with tailgating and other activities.
Nowhere else in the world do you see that volume of fans in
such consistency. If you follow college athletics, you know we
love top 25 rankings, and the list of the largest sport venues
by capacity, college football in America accounts for 8 of the
top 10 globally.
Yet rarely to do of these events register on the SEAR
rating system higher than a 4 or 5, meaning they have limited
national importance to require Federal interagency support.
If I can just pause on that note for a second--the largest
events that are hosted in this country on a consistent basis
currently do not qualify for Federal interagency support.
I work with my colleagues at our member institutions to
identify emerging challenges to their operations, and I'd like
to share a few of those with you today. These topics fall in
the category of ``what keeps you up at night.''
Vehicle mitigation. Campus environments are full of soft
targets with tailgates and team walks surrounding the stadium.
A bad actor with a vehicle has become a hallmark of modern
crowd attacks.
Unfortunately, we saw that play out on January 1 in New
Orleans as fans prepared to enjoy the Sugar Bowl.
As has been mentioned multiple times today already, the UAS
or drone threat. The proliferation of drones in modern warfare
has exacerbated that concern and for that threat at full
stadiums across the country.
As it stands, our schools can spend upwards of $500,000 on
drone-tracking technology, but they have no legal authority to
intervene or mitigate a hostile drone.
We're encouraged by the efforts of both the Senate and the
House to introduce legislation that would allow Federal
agencies to deputize local officials with the authority to
mitigate drone threats with the proper training and the access
to the advanced technology.
Finally, access to intelligence, staffing, equipment, and
funding resources that modernize public safety posture at our
events.
In closing, to put it simply, the key to public safety is
communication, transparency among agencies, and access to the
appropriate resources.
As this committee evaluates the role of the Federal
Government in supporting the host efforts for large public
gatherings, please remember the schools, venues, promoters, and
local officials hosting large gatherings on a nightly and
weekly basis throughout the calendar year.
Please consider a review of the methodology of establishing
a SEAR rating.
We're encouraged by the work of this committee and the
collaboration and communication that will usher in some
progress. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammond follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeremy Hammond
May 19, 2025
Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and the
honorable Members of the Emergency Management and Technology
Subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing.
My name is Jeremy Hammond, and I have the honor of serving the 16
member institutions of the Southeastern Conference as assistant
commissioner. I am the Conference liaison to the event management,
operations, and facilities departments on our member campuses. I lead
our efforts to produce the SEC Football Championship, NCAA
Championships hosted by the Southeastern Conference, and support our
team at various other events.
Prior to the SEC, I held several roles spanning venue management
(Georgia Dome), tour management & promotion (WWE), and most recently as
vice president of live events at an event management and public safety
consulting firm (Ingress Events).
I appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective on the
pressing public safety challenges facing mass gathering events, and
particularly those unique to college athletics. I come to you today not
only as someone involved in the day-to-day logistics of managing public
events, but as someone deeply invested in safeguarding the environments
where friends and families come together to celebrate traditions,
community, and competition. However, we cannot share those experiences
without the assurance that we can enjoy them in safe, well-managed
environments.
Just as the rapid advancement of technology and weaponry has
evolved global conflicts, the same can be said for the threats we must
protect against at our favorite sporting event, concert, festival or
convention.
My message today is not one of doom and gloom. As cities across the
United States prepare to host the World Cup and the Olympics over the
coming years, there is no group of professionals better prepared to
plan for, manage, and mitigate challenges than those we call friends
and colleagues here in this country.
The World Cup and the Olympics are the 2 largest international
events in existence. They present a provocative and highly-visible
target for bad actors. However, as my counterparts here today will
agree, large public events with high threat profiles are produced 365
days a year in this country. Whether in metropolitan cities or small
college towns, college athletics welcomes fans week after week, from
kickoff in late August to the last out in May.
Chairman Strong from Alabama can attest, in the SEC we like to say
``It Just Means More''. During Saturdays in the fall, our campuses grow
to the populations of a mid-size city. In 2024, 5 SEC schools averaged
100,000 fans in their venues at home football games. Accounting for
schools in other leagues, that number grows to 8. It is also routine
that campuses host 50,000-75,000 additional fans who take part in the
fanfare around the stadium with tailgating and other activities.
Nowhere else in the world do you see that volume of fans in such
consistency.
If you follow college athletics, you know we love top 25 rankings.
In a list of the largest sports venues (by capacity), college football
in America accounts for 8 of the top 10 globally. Yet, rarely do any of
these events register on the SEAR rating system higher than a 4 or 5--
meaning they have limited national importance to require Federal
interagency support.
I work with my colleagues at our member institutions to identify
emerging challenges to their operations and I'd like to share a few of
those with you today.
Cost Management.--With a consistently-evolving threat
picture, the tactics and tools of the trade are rapidly
advancing. With that comes extreme growth in expenditure just
to maintain the status quo.
Staffing.--To activate a security deployment that is in line
with national standards, public safety officials on campuses
routinely draw from surrounding city labor pools to supplement
staffing needs. Spending on law enforcement personnel averages
several hundred thousand dollars per game for SEC schools.
UAS (Drone) Threat.--We are encouraged by the efforts of
both the Senate and the House to introduce legislation that
would allow Federal agencies to deputize local officials with
the authority to mitigate drone threats with proper training
and advanced technology. The proliferation of drones in modern
warfare has exacerbated concern for this threat at full
stadiums across the country.
Vehicle Mitigation.--As we experienced on January 1, 2025 in
New Orleans as fans prepared to enjoy the Sugar Bowl as part of
the College Football Playoff, a bad actor with a vehicle has
become a hallmark of modern crowd attacks. Campus environments
are full of soft targets at tailgates and team walks
surrounding the stadium.
Intelligence Sharing.--It is critically important that our
public safety officials on campus continue to receive and share
important intelligence information from and with State and
Federal agencies.
In closing, as this committee evaluates the role of the Federal
Government in supporting the host efforts for large public gatherings,
I'd respectfully request that we remember the schools, venues, and
promoters hosting large gatherings on a nightly and weekly basis
throughout the calendar year. We are encouraged by the work of this
committee and the collaboration and communication that will usher in
progress.
Mr. Strong. Mr. Hammond, thank you for your opening
statement. We're honored to have you here and each of our
people here before us.
It doesn't matter if you're a cat, a tiger, a dog, a
volunteer, whether you scream ``war eagle'' or ``roll tide''--
every one of our conferences definitely have a task to provide
safety for America.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning
may be called after all Members have been recognized. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning.
I'd like to begin by asking each of you, starting with
Sheriff Barnes, what can Congress and the Federal Government do
to better support security preparedness at mass gathering
events going forward?
Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Congressman. First, the
collaboration among Federal partners is key. The fusion
centers, and the funding that drive them, I think, is necessary
to maintain that, and I would even argue probably--argue for an
increase.
Counter-UAS capabilities, I think, is going to be an
imperative going forward, as mentioned before. Currently, we
can probably speak for an hour about the risks that we have
experienced by drones in our different areas of responsibility.
For example, in Orange County, we had an individual flying
drones within hundreds of feet from departing aircraft at John
Wayne Airport. Any one of those impacts would have undoubtedly
placed that jet at risk and all its passengers.
Fortunately, that was adopted by the U.S. Attorney's
Office. He was prosecuted, but we had no way to mitigate that
drone or locate it.
We found him through social media as he's posting his
footage on-line. If not for that, we probably would not know
who that person was.
We've had narcotics trapping the drones into our jails. We
had them intervene. We had the emergency response during
wildland fires. Sadly, if you followed the recent news, the
cartels, a foreign terrorist organization, are using drones and
counter-drone technology against the United States.
The cartels have advanced forward of local law
enforcement's capabilities, and we should anticipate that those
technologies will make their way CONUS, inside the United
States, and probably be a significant factor in any one of
these events as bad actors use these technologies against us
for legal law enforcement, overwatch efforts to any one of
these venues.
Last I would say that funding is critical. UASI, SHSGP,
Operation Stonegarden--which I do on behalf of the Federal
Government's Western Border of the United States, which being
impacted with maritime traffic again as a result of the
lockdown of the border--all of those have a significant issue.
But interagency collaboration, I think, is most important.
We all have to be at the table, and we have to be operating on
the same common operating platform, whether it's NIMS, SIMS, or
ICS, and make sure we have defined roles in a unified command,
working with our private-sector partners, I would add, to make
sure we put all of this in a good place, and we are ahead of
the planning stage now--and that needs to start today.
We can't do these things, you know, a year from now. We're
already behind the curve when it comes to counter-UAS
technologies and other planning.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
Mr. Junell.
Mr. Junell. Thank you, Chairman. I agree with the sheriff
on intelligence sharing, fusion centers, collaboration. Any
support to streamline the efforts would be greatly appreciated
from the private sector as well as the Government sectors.
But streamlining particularly the response capabilities to
UAS threats, if we could streamline the process, understand who
is eligible, lower the thresholds to where we can cover more
events, anything to do to streamline the process would be
greatly appreciated amongst all the shareholders.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
Mr. Hammond.
Mr. Hammond. Yes, I think 2 priorities from our
perspective--No. 1, a reevaluation of the SEAR rating system,
developing some additional consistency there in those
directives, and then as my counterparts here have stated,
streamlining that process to allow local authorities to
mitigate the drone threat.
I think those are the 2 most pressing issues on the minds
of our public safety officials on campus.
Mr. Strong. As we prepare to host these high-profile events
in summer--every weekend each of you, you're involved in this--
is it essential that the Federal Government double down on
planning and collaboration with State local law enforcement?
Mr. Barnes. I would say triple down, Congressman. We are
already behind the curve. These investments need to take place
now, and keep in mind, while all these things are happening,
FIFA World Cup, for example, you mentioned, at 11 locations, 7
events over a prolonged period of time.
The one other aspect we have is a drain on resources. We
still have CONOPS. Continuity of operations still has to happen
within all of our agencies to do the everyday job that we're
expected to do. So, yes, it needs to happen now, and we need to
get ahead of it today.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
Mr. Junell, we have seen too many concerts and sporting
events become the target of terrorist attacks. Can you describe
Live Nation's role in working with law enforcement and host
venues to ensure adequate security for event attendees and
artists and athletes?
Mr. Junell. Yes, Chairman Strong. We work very closely with
our law enforcement partners on a nationwide basis--everything
from the planning, communication, coordination, joint
understanding of risk, shared situational awareness, highly
encourage co-location during the events, sharing intelligence,
fusion centers, as the sheriff mentioned earlier, the Incident
Command System--to make sure that we're all on the same page
and able to plan for the foreseeable risk and be resilient to
those risks that may not be foreseen.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. I now recognize Ranking Member
Kennedy for 5 minutes for any questions he may have.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, thank you, Chairman. Sheriff Barnes,
thank you again for being here today.
In your testimony you make the case for sustained Federal
investment in Homeland Security funding. As you've mentioned
already, you know, that funding is critical, including $61
million through State Homeland Security Program, $156 million
through the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and $2 million
through Operation Stonegarden in fiscal year 2024, in order to
prepare for FIFA World Cup and the Olympics around the corner.
Can you just discuss how the threat prevention and response
capabilities enabled by these FEMA programs have helped your
community proactively prepare for these mass events, and
separately how that funding in such a robust manner helps these
programs in California and New York prepare for these upcoming
mass gatherings?
Mr. Barnes. Yes, thank you, Congressman. First, the funds
that are being provided through those 3 initiatives
specifically are essential in maintaining our posture of the 80
fusion centers nationally.
Our HIDTA programs are different funding, but that's been
stagnant, has a significant risk. Operation Stonegarden, I
already mentioned what would happen, but I'm going to turn the
corner.
Without those funds, this is what will happen. We have to
step back from our posture in our fusion centers which I think
has been the most beneficial national security initiative that
we maintained over the last 24 years--or 22 years, since 2003,
when they were stood up.
Operation Stonegarden stops, we don't protect our borders
and other initiatives that we have with those funds.
So without those funds--for example, I fund majority of my
fusion center out of local taxpayer dollars. It subsidizes some
of that program.
But the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center is
100 percent funded through FEMA grant opportunities, SHSGP and
UASI. That means that program stops.
They have a major initiative happening throughout the--
through the FIFA World Cup. That means no intelligence, no
vetting, no collaboration that would happen in that area and
other areas like it. So we've taken a huge step back of keeping
our Nation safe.
I will tell you, these have worked well because nothing bad
has happened. We've intervened, interdicted, acted left of bang
in numerous circumstances that has keeped our country safe.
This is not the time to step away from those programs.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Sheriff, again, a critical part of preparing for these mass
events is ensuring that first responders have what they need in
the event of an emergency. DHS programs train first responders
so they can respond more efficiently and effectively.
Troublingly, the Trump administration has closed the
National Fire Academy in Maryland, one of the Nation's premier
training facilities for first responders.
His proposed budget would eliminate the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium, a group of 7 nationally-recognized
organizations that provide training for FEMA and first
responders.
So, Sheriff, this program is hosting several trainings in
the greater Orange County area next month, dedicated to sport
and special event evacuation and protective actions.
As you prepare for the 2028 Olympics, how might these
expert trainings help the first responders and law enforcement
community in Orange County?
Mr. Barnes. Thank you again. I will tell you that I would
not speak how they went prospectively. Retrospectively, they
have been beneficial in our response platforms and protocols.
The American public never sees what we do behind the
scenes, and if we do it well, they never do see what we do
behind the scenes, because we invested in these infrastructures
and planning and logistics and resources and training, and all
that happens in the shadows.
But you can't step up or stand up a team to be responsive
on the fly. It has to happen in real time, multi-agency
collaboration, which we do routinely with our partners in
firefighting and other venues and platforms.
So it is an investment to be ready to respond, hopefully
that we don't need to, but this is also a huge investment on
resources and personnel that have to be on the ready, standing
in reserve in response to these venues. It's been that way for
decades.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Sheriff. As you likely know, we
have a Department of Homeland Security Secretary who has stated
that this administration's intent is to eliminate FEMA.
Are you concerned about the impact that that might have on
Orange County that you represent and the State of California,
as well as, you know, our responsiveness across the Nation?
Mr. Barnes. Yes. Once again, that is a great question.
Obviously I'm going to hypothesize, but if we start to draw
back on these investments, whether it be in Orange County,
California, nationally, we're turning a corner, and we're
actually, I would say, inviting something bad to happen without
our ability to be responsive or to interdict prior to that act
happening.
So I would say this is not the time that we should be
backing away from these investments. We need to maintain our
posture of readiness across the Nation.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Strong. The Ranking Member yields back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Evans.
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. Thank
you, of course, to all of our witnesses for coming.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to enter into the record this
statement from the Association of Uncrewed Vehicle Systems
International that includes some security recommendations for
mass gathering events that empower local law enforcement.
Mr. Strong. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI)
May 21, 2025
This limitation leaves stadiums, universities, concert venues, and
police departments with a dangerous gap between awareness and action.
Detection technologies may alert security personnel to a drone entering
restricted air space, but without the legal authority to act, they are
unable to interdict it, potentially until harm is already done.
recommendations for congressional action
AUVSI urges Congress to take the following steps to strengthen
stadium security and empower local partners with the tools they need:
1. Expand Counter-VAS (cUAS) Authority.--Congress should authorize
a narrowly-tailored expansion of cUAS authority to qualified
State and local law enforcement agencies and critical
infrastructure entities, including stadiums and event
organizers, under appropriate oversight and training
requirements.
2. Support Pilot Programs.--DHS and FAA should launch and fund
pilot programs that enable stadium operators, police
departments, and universities to test and evaluate cUAS
technologies in real-world environments with rigorous
Federally-administered training and oversight.
3. Invest in Detection Infrastructure.--Congress should appropriate
dedicated funding to help local jurisdictions acquire UAS
detection systems and integrate them with emergency response
networks.
4. Implement ARC Recommendations.--The FAA's UAS Detection and
Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), co-
chaired by AUVSI's president and CEO Michael Robbins, issued
recommendations in 2024 for minimum performance standards and
approval pathways for UAS detection technologies at airports
and critical infrastructure. These frameworks should be
expanded and adapted for stadiums and event venues.
5. Clarify FAA and DBS Roles.--Federal agencies should work in
tandem to streamline approval processes for deploying cUAS
tools around protected air space, including TFR zones, and
develop real-time data-sharing platforms between Federal,
State, and venue-level security stakeholders.
6. Working Together to Protect the Public.--Stadium operators, law
enforcement agencies, and event organizers are on the front
lines of ensuring public safety in an increasingly complex air
space environment. While Federal regulations like FAA TFRs play
a vital role, they must be coupled with on-the-ground
capability to detect and mitigate drone threats effectively.
AUVSI appreciates the committee's leadership in exploring how the
Federal Government can better partner with public and private entities
to secure mass gatherings. We stand ready to work with Congress, DHS,
FAA, and other stakeholders to modernize our national approach to
stadium security and UAS threat response.
Thank you for your attention to this urgent issue. We look forward
to continuing to support the development of safe, secure, and
innovative UAS policy that empowers and protects our communities.
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to the
witnesses. My first question will be to Mr. Barnes.
I spent a combined total of a little over 2 decades in
between both military and law enforcement. On the Army side I
was a Black Hawk helicopter pilot, so operating in the same air
space as a lot of the new and emerging UAS threats that we're
facing, both overseas and then also fighting fires and all of
the things that we use in the domestic operation space here in
the United States.
Then as a police officer, I got to lead our mobile field
force, and so I've been that, user-level, boots-on-the-ground
individual that's operating and having to make real-time
decisions whenever we have either mass gathering events that
were anticipated or if you have contingencies that emerge in
mass gathering events.
So my first question to you--I think we've talked a little
bit about fusion centers and lot of the preplanning and
intelligence that comes out of facilities like that--can you
talk a little bit more about the tactical level?
You've done your preplanning. The event is now in full
swing. What are those critical shortcomings at the tactical
level, specifically focusing on either equipment shortfalls,
training shortfalls, communications shortfalls during an event
that would potentially impact your ability to operate
efficiently with other Federal, State, and local partners?
Mr. Barnes. Thank you, and first of all, thank you for your
service. Your question is a good one. You look at preparedness,
and from a tactical perspective--you mentioned mobile field
force--mobile field force should be a national standard for
crowd control and maintaining order within our communities.
We've heavily invested in mobile field force in the county
of Orange and trained all the municipal agencies on mobile
field force tactics and response protocols, and it's worked
very well for us.
From tactics, it first starts with intelligence, getting
good information. We know there's mis-, dis-, and
malinformation campaigns we should expect over the next several
years, so getting good information in and being able to be
responsive to that.
There's a huge drain of resources when you have a tactical
element in reserve for a prolonged period of time, I think that
we agree.
This other resource is like bomb detection, canines, and
others that work in tandem with them that have a limited
utility that you have to replicate at a much larger platform.
So tactics, rapid response models, I think, are very key,
ability to have them ready to go out, but we just don't have
the depth. So I think investing in that now ahead of time and
making sure as a national standard we have these protocols in
place.
I stressed for a long time through FEMA to have resource
tasking for law enforcement. It's not as deep as it should be,
look at all the critical issues we have to face on a broad risk
environment that we have to be prepared for.
Mr. Evans. Thank you. Continuing down that train, I've done
a lot of the Federal training in places like Anniston, Alabama,
to make sure that we have that interoperability at the Federal,
State, and local level.
What do you see as far as communication shortfalls with
folks in your sheriff's office potentially having to work and
collaborate in real time with folks from other agencies,
particularly with regard to the communication equipment?
Mr. Barnes. Well, thank you for that question again,
Congressman. I'll start with, Orange County's had an
interoperable radio system for decades. 3.1 million people, all
the law enforcement agents can communicate at the same time
we're a dedicated channel.
That technology should be at least strive to advance it
nationally, or minimally have our Federal partners in the same
room on the same communications conduit so we're sharing
information in real time for the benefit of everybody.
That has not always been the case. We saw that happen in
Parkland High School, in Uvalde, recently in Butler. We have
learned a lot about what we need to do. We just have to make
sure we solve that problem before we go to forward and make
sure we're on the same communication platform.
Mr. Evans. Thank you. I got 1 minute and 5 seconds left, so
final question again will be to you, Sheriff, but drawing on
some of the comments from others about UASs and TFRs.
So flying on wildfires, of course, you have a TFR that's
going to be dropped over the wildfire area so that crews like
myself can go out and do our jobs. You still have drones that
come through. You got to shut down the fire TFR, ground all of
the aircraft until we can chase the drone out.
On that, again, tactical, user level, what do you think are
the most critical shortcomings to be able to actually
kinetically intervene in real time in the event that you have
malicious drone activity occurring?
Mr. Barnes. I'll start with the FAA Reauthorization Act or
legislation that would give local law enforcement or public
safety the authority to have that. If you look forward into
FIFA, there's not a depth for counter-UAS that can manage this
at a national scale.
I would say task force operators and locals that have dual
designation and training technology and access to the platforms
are most critical. You look at what happened with the Palisades
fire.
They took one of the most beneficial firefighting apparatus
out of the sky, because of an impact with a drone, for 3 days.
It could've contributed to a lot of structures being saved.
So we have to invest now. We can't wait a year or 2 years
or when FIFA's on our doorstep. That has to happen now, in my
belief, and I think we have the ability to spread that out
responsibly through good policy and protocols and have that
shared.
We have to do it now because the cartel's already ahead of
us, and we're going to be dealing with this domestically if we
don't prepare for it, not to mention if there's a mass drone
attack--a mass weaponized drone attack, we cannot be responsive
to that.
Sorry I went long, but the threat arises much broader, and
it's advancing beyond your capabilities if we don't get in this
game today.
Mr. Evans. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. The gentleman from Colorado yields.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Mackenzie, is recognized
for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
everybody being here today to discuss such a serious topic,
about how we can protect our communities and individuals who
are attending mass gatherings from terrorist attacks and other
threats.
My first question, I'd like to go to Mr. Junell from Live
Nation Entertainment. We are fortunate to have a venue that is
being operated in coordination with Live Nation in our local
community now. It's a midsize venue, I would characterize it.
So can you please talk to what, in particular, you are
doing for events like that, maybe not the high-profile events,
for the World Cup or anything like that, but communities like
mine are hosting music events and gatherings on a regular
basis. Tell me about what you're doing at midsize events like
that.
Mr. Junell. Yes. It's--sir, regardless of the size of the
event, the concern is the same. We want to make sure that we
are as prepared as can be, we are trained, facilitating all the
intelligence sharing and everything else through our Federal,
State, and local law enforcement partners and working highly in
a collaborative process to make sure that we have the
standards, we have a clear picture of the issues that we're
dealing with, understanding what our roles and responsibilities
are, and then what our partners will be bringing to the table
as well, so that we have that robust resilience around the
event regardless of the size.
Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you.
For all of our testifiers then, obviously the attention of
our country is going to shift next year to the America 250, the
World Cup, other big events like that, that are taking place
all across our country.
So for anybody on the panel, do you feel that we are
prepared at this point, or is there more work that needs to be
done, and if so, is it resources, training? What can we assist
with from a Federal level and as Members of Congress?
Mr. Barnes. I think we're working toward being prepared.
Those plannings are being put--committees are in place, and the
collaboration has started, especially on FIFA and also the
Olympics.
Club Cup is coming next year. That brings a different
clientele to the country that's different than the FIFA World
Cup, and they have a tendency to operate outside social norms
that we might consider in America, taking to the streets,
levels of intoxication, celebrations, fan fest that might be
problematic.
So, yes, we are in the planning stages, but it takes
resources. I look at that not as a cost. It's an investment
into the planning. The preparedness, the logistics, the
training, the tactics, the equipment, all of those things need
to start happening now or else we'll be behind the curve when
the time comes to be responsive and keeping our public safe.
Mr. Mackenzie. Do you feel at this point in time that we
are on track to be ready for those events?
Mr. Barnes. I think we are in the planning stage, which,
for the Olympics, I think we're on track. I think there's
already been some preplanning on Olympics with the Los Angeles
city and county that has had advance teams look at what's
happened in Paris and others.
The threat environment has changed, and it's ever-evolving,
so we have to be dynamic. I know that we look at mitigating the
threats as they change over time. They will change between now
and 2028, and we have to stay ahead of the curve and make sure
that we are well-planned and well-prepared to take whatever
threat comes next, especially in the area of cyber.
We should anticipate the cyber threat advancing well beyond
our capabilities. I'm not picking on the administration, but
stepping away from cyber at this time and putting it on the
shoulders of locals, we're going to have different response
capabilities across the country who can interdict, intervene,
and be responsive to cyber attacks, DDoS attacks, whatever it
might be that's going to change, not to mention traditional
attacks like bomb threats and swatting incidents, and then
intentional attacks and the normal crime that comes with these
events.
All of these things make this a very complex solution that
needs to be implemented over a prolonged period of time. It's
not doing any one thing. It's doing 100 things simultaneously
that's going to put us in a position of preparedness. That has
started, but I think we have a long way to go.
Mr. Mackenzie. Well, again, I'd like to thank all of you.
All law enforcement across the country put themselves in harm's
way every single day. We appreciate that work that you do, and
the preparedness that we are looking for as a country, I think,
we are in many ways on track.
I know there are some things that we want to continue to
work on. As you mentioned, threats evolve and the nature of
those threats change with time, and so we got to continue to
stay on top of those as we prepare for an incredible year next
year, again, celebrating America's 250 and also welcoming
people from around the world for the World Cup.
So thank you again, and with that, I yield back.
Mr. Strong. The gentleman from Pennsylvania yields back. I
now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Correa. Chairman Strong, thank you very much, and for
our Ranking Member, Mr. Kennedy, thank you for this hearing. I
want to welcome our witnesses today, Sheriff Barnes from our
good Orange County, Mr. Junell, Mr. Hammond.
Sheriff Barnes, let me turn to you first. Orange County
vibe--Disneyland, Knott's Berry Farm, the Olympics, the World
Cup, the Angels--you got a lot to defend, sir. So far, I think
you've been--the other guys have scored zero on you, so good
job.
How serious is the threat of international terrorism to
you?
Mr. Barnes. Congressman Correa, thank you very much, and I
appreciate your partnership over the years.
Not just international terrorism, foreign terrorist
organizations, CT, domestic terrorism, home-grown violent
extremists, extremist groups are ever present.
Again, going back to the fusion center, I have a fusion
center committed to Orange County, the Orange County
Intelligence Assessment Center, one of the 80 nationally
routinely recognized for our product and intervention
strategies.
All those things are happening in real time, and not to say
that bad things have been mitigated, but the last 4 years,
unfortunately, through the border, have undoubtedly let bad
actors into our country.
Without getting into any Classified information, we know
that we are looking for people CONUS, who may be accelerating
their plans because of actions in immigration trying to locate
them.
It is a completely different threat horizon that we've ever
faced, and so, yes, there are a lot of----
Mr. Correa. Sheriff Barnes, if I may interrupt you, you
talk about this fusion center, and I've had the opportunity to
go tour it. That's a center where you take information from all
sources--international, domestic, State, local, and you put
that together, and it gives you a picture of the threat
environment. Is that correct?
Mr. Barnes. Yes, and I would say, when fusion centers were
set up post-9/11, they were focused on foreign terrorism
abroad. They are all crimes, all hazards now. Our fusion
centers focus on domestic terrorism, bad actors, extreme
groups, narcotics trafficking, sex trafficking, human
trafficking. It's looking at everything and so----
Mr. Correa. Now you've got, on top of that, unmanned aerial
small aircraft?
You said propaganda, misinformation, artificial
intelligence, those are on top of the other things you're
doing? That's what the fusion centers have to challenge?
Mr. Barnes. Yes, Congressman, it is an all-inclusive, risk-
mitigation center and for the benefit of not just the region,
the State, but the Nation. We're putting product out for
everybody and sharing that information among fusion centers,
with our partners to make sure everybody's well-informed of
what the threats are and how they're evolving.
Mr. Correa. So if we want to play linebacker for you, make
sure that nobody scores, what is it that you would see from
us--more funding, legislative action to give you more
authority, for example, maybe to control, take down aerial
drones?
Mr. Barnes. Exactly that, Congressman. Maintaining the
funding for the fusion centers through the SHSGP, UASI,
Stonegarden, and other avenues for funding.
The HIDTAs, which is a different funding source, I think,
is not sufficient. Dealing with the worst time in our Nation's
history--narcotics trafficking, which does have a direct threat
to these venues through users consuming products that are
clandestine-produced and probably fentanyl, and also the
technology.
The technology needs to keep up with the times, and we, I
think, are--we're playing defense, and I don't like playing
defense. I want to be in the offense. So giving us the
technology that we can intervene appropriately. If any of these
things do happen through counter-UAS or other venues, we need
to be prepared for that.
Mr. Correa. You mentioned earlier that you would want us to
triple down on Federal funding for your fusion centers. Is that
correct?
Mr. Barnes. I think we need to not step away, but I think
there's opportunities to invest larger. If I lose those
funding, my fusion center is going to take a significant hit on
some of the all crimes, all hazards.
This is not just for Orange County. This is across the
Nation there's benefit.
Mr. Correa. So you're speaking for the Nation as a whole
when you talk about funding fusion centers, coordination with
the Federal Government, all it takes, resources that you need,
and other sheriffs across the country need, to keep Americans
safe?
Mr. Barnes. Not just sheriffs. If you look at the fusion
center network as it operates, there isn't any major city chief
that operates outside of a major county based on definition.
All the venues that are being proposed are happening in
major counties or major cities that are represented and
supported by the fusion center network. Especially for the FIFA
World Cup and Club Cup, the connectivity and sharing of real-
time information among that venue, which we did through the
elections recently, has to happen in real time as these threats
present themselves because they're likely to be replicated in
other areas as bad actors share their tactics to try to bring
this country down and do harm.
Mr. Correa. Sheriff, I want to thank you for your time, for
your efforts in being here, informing us here in Congress,
about the needs that you have on Main Street. It makes us
better policy makers. Thank you very much. Hope to talk to you
soon again. Thank you very much.
Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Congressman Correa.
Mr. Strong. The gentleman from California yields back.
I now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Pou,
for 5 minutes of questioning.
Ms. Pou. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. It's
wonderful to be back on this committee. Thank you. Thank you to
our Ranking Member Kennedy for also holding this meeting.
I'd like to begin by certainly indicating that, you know,
mass gatherings are unique opportunities to connect with others
and feel like we are a part of something bigger than ourselves.
Especially after the pandemic, there has been a renewed
appreciation for the value of a sold-out ball game or concert.
The FIFA World Cup will bring together hundreds of
thousands of fans. It is a time for friendship and celebration,
and I am so proud that the final match will be played in my
district in New Jersey.
I was recently named the co-chair of a new bipartisan task
force focused on enhancing security for special events like the
World Cup, and I look forward to the Chairman calling our first
official meeting and beginning our work.
With that being said, I'd like to begin my questioning and
indicate that, you know, as my district, as I've just
mentioned, ratchets up for security preparation for the World
Cup, our first responders and municipalities need resources
today to plan for next year.
I am deeply concerned by the Trump administration's illegal
withholding, or otherwise delaying, critical FEMA and anti-
terror grants.
These delays seriously undermine the ability of State and
local government to protect our communities and ensure that
large sporting events like the World Cup are safe and secure.
Last week I pressed Secretary Noem on when our communities
will receive guidance on the Homeland Security Grant Program.
Unfortunately, she did not give me an answer.
So, Sheriff Barnes, how do delays in critical grant
funding, like the State Homeland Security Grant Program or the
Urban Areas Security Initiative, impact your Department's
ability to keep communities safe, especially as they prepare
for high-profile events like the World Cup that I've just
mentioned?
Mr. Barnes. Yes. Thank you for the question. First, as an
adage in anything we do, you fail to plan, you plan to fail, so
planning is everything and preparedness goes into many facets
of equipment, tactics, training, tools, tabletop exercises,
red-teaming these events so we make sure that we're thinking
like our adversaries. It's all very critical and that planning
needs to start today.
Regarding the FIFA World Cup, there's one aspect, and I
love the partnerships we have with our private-sector
representatives here, but a lot of the response protocols are
beyond the venue itself. There's practice sites, hotels, other
things and areas that grow beyond that that are contemporaneous
to the actual event that spill over into local neighborhoods,
communities. Maybe even though it's beyond your Congressional
district that need to be protected in the plan that goes into
that as well, and those take resources.
Funding is essential. If we don't have the offset, this is
a planned event. It doesn't qualify for most mutual aid plans,
which means no reimbursement unless it's financed or funded up
front. For the ability to recover cost and planning, that needs
to take place in my opinion today to put those funds and make
those funds available for the planning stages.
Ms. Pou. Thank you. I can't agree with you more. Thank you
so very much for your answer. You know, I also would want to
speak about the home-grown violent extremists and domestic
terrorists that preys on events like the World Cup that brings
together different communities. That is why our New Jersey
office of Homeland Security identified attacks from these
groups as the highest threat to New Jersey.
Earlier this year, I traveled to New Orleans with the
Chairman and with some of our other colleagues here to learn
about the devastating attack on Bourbon Street carried out by a
homeland extremist. During this trip, we heard from local law
enforcement about the threats our Nation faces from home-grown
terrorism at highly-attended events.
Sheriff Barnes, if you would, please, what are the unique
threats posed by the home-grown extremists and domestic
terrorists to mass gatherings events and how are you working to
combat these threats?
Mr. Barnes. Yes. Thank you. I think you mentioned several
of those already. Vehicle rammings. They are mostly spontaneous
actors that are not even on the grid or even known to either
Federal authorities or locals, so spontaneous bad actors are an
evolving trend that we're seeing. Some of these people weren't
even, had a case open or had any threats.
Open-source information is important. That's why the fusion
centers play such a critical role. They're oftentimes trip-wire
events that we see immediately prior to postings or some things
that happen on open-source information, like social media.
Going back after 9/11 reinvigorated the ``see something, say
something'' campaign that worked so well several decades ago,
so people who do have information of individuals can be brought
to the attention of law enforcement.
I preface all of this with first and foremost the
protection of first amendment rights. When people do decide to
take to the streets and protest responsibly or have actions,
we're always focused on Constitutional rights of our citizenry
first, but have to be prepared when it crosses over into
illegal activities to keep our Nation safe.
Ms. Pou. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Strong. The gentlewoman yields back. I now recognize
the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson, for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. As a Member
of Congress serving the city of Dallas, you can see I'm very
interested in the FIFA World Cup and this will bring in
millions of dollars of revenue for small businesses in
surrounding communities and millions of new visitors to the
north Texas area and from around the world. We are thrilled to
be hosting 9 matches, which is the largest amount of matches in
the country.
We're also the broadcast hub for the FIFA World Cup and so
it's going to become not only a unique--it's a sustained
security need that we have, because we're going to have media
professionals throughout the world in the city for a prolonged
period of time, not just for the unique time lines of the
matches themselves.
I was thrilled to have the opportunity to travel with you,
Mr. Chairman, to New Orleans, and some of my colleagues on this
committee in advance to the Super Bowl, and we saw an immense
amount of planning that goes into these events to keep
attendees safe.
Meanwhile, Secretary Noem and President Trump are expected
to propose significant cuts to the FEMA preparedness grants,
funding that is critical for major event security. The proposed
budget also eliminates the national domestic preparedness
consortium, which has trained thousands of emergency response
teams. In just my district alone, they have trained almost
12,000 participants. These programs not only train our local
first responders at no cost to them or our cities, but also
partner with the city for domestic preparedness, FEMA, and
other Governmental agencies. When we do not have adequate
funding to keep these programs afloat. We will not have the
work force to keep the public safe. By cutting funding to these
programs, this administration is setting our cities up for
failure and putting the lives of attendees and our security
personnel at risk.
The World Cup is anticipated to bring in more than 6
million visitors from around the world in a time where
cybersecurity work force is significantly understaffed and
cyber attacks are on the rise. Illegal freezes on grant funding
and TSA agents are being terminated and we need to take a
serious look at how prepared we actually are in just 1 year
before the event takes place. I look forward to working
alongside my colleagues to ensure every step of the way.
You know, Mr. Chairman, I'm just really concerned that this
Congress right now--while having this hearing is fabulous, we
need to focus on the security of our country. We want to have a
successful Olympics. We want to have a successful World Cup. We
have the chance to see up close and personal just how much goes
into the planning of the Super Bowl. It was an enlightening
experience to see just the effort, the expense, and the
coordination that's required among so many agencies.
While we're shining that, we're talking about it, which is
fabulous, but on the other hand in this very building in the
Rules debate in our Capitol, we're having a budget that guts
all the funding for it. So how can we do that? How can we gut
all the funding and then still say we are prioritizing the
security?
So, you know, gentlemen, my question for you is, you know,
what potential threats do you see and do you have enough
resources? Are you--do you think that we have allocated enough
resources for this country and the visitors to come here to be
safe when they come for World Cup?
Mr. Junell. Congresswoman, whether it's the World Cup, the
Super Bowl, a large festival, or a smaller festival, we all
show the same concerns. What's concerning at this moment is the
threat persists from UAS, and at this time the thresholds are
too high. The authority to act upon the threats are very
limited, and it's--we just need a streamline process to help
facilitate the protection that is warranted.
Ms. Johnson. You know, I want to ask you a question about
that. So at a different hearing or actually maybe when we were
in New Orleans, one of the things that was brought up to us was
the lack of local law enforcement's ability to actually deal
with the drones. You had to go through just this crazy red tape
in order to take down a potential threat. Is that still in
place? Has that been corrected, or--and are you aware of
efforts on the table to correct that?
Mr. Junell. So the FAA Reauthorization Act was a step in
the right direction, but it is implemented inconsistently
across all the different events, and having the ability to work
with venues, to work with our law enforcement partners, to be
able to successfully apply for a TFR is challenging. Then
whether or not the Federal resources are available from the
agencies and then whether or not FAA approves, it's a
complicated process that really needs some attention to
streamline and make more consistent across all the events.
Ms. Johnson. Do you feel--and at Live Nation, you see lots
of stuff. I can only imagine. You see all the things, so
besides, you know, drones and besides this lack of coordination
between the agencies to give the men on the ground the ability
to deal with an immediate threat, besides that issue, what
other security threat issues are you concerned with in
particular to these large-scale events that are coming up?
Mr. Junell. Of course. It's home-grown violent extremists.
It's terrorism. It's just crime in general. Managing large
crowds. It's all the things that my colleagues have spoken
about today and making sure that we have coordinated
collaborated plans in partnership with all of our stakeholders
to include Federal, State, and local partnerships, and we're
all singing from the same sheet of music with planning,
operations, and response.
Ms. Johnson. Yes. Then at the same time, we're laying off
record numbers of FBI agents and we're going to make our
country less safe. Gentlemen, I think my time is expired and
thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Strong. The gentlewoman from Texas yields back. I thank
Sheriff Barnes, Mr. Junell, and Mr. Hammond for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of
the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in
writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeremy Hammond
impact of sear ratings on personnel, law enforcement, and federal
support
Question 1a. Mr. Hammond, you note in your written testimony that
while major international events like the World Cup and the Olympics
tend to dominate discussions around mass gathering events, large public
events with high-threat profiles are produced every day in this
country. You further specify that ``in a list of the largest sports
venues (by capacity), college football in America accounts for 8 of the
top 10 globally.'' On game day, college towns that are often small
communities expand by the tens of thousands, and your campuses,
infrastructure, and personnel need to be able to support this
population. Yet, you explain, rarely do any of these events register on
the SEAR rating system higher than a 4 or 5.
How have these SEAR ratings affected stadiums' abilities to acquire
the necessary personnel, law enforcement, and Federal funding for
games?
Answer. The SEAR (Special Event Assessment Rating) system, in its
current form, is helpful and necessary for major events but is
insufficient for capturing the real risks associated with major
collegiate sporting events. It no longer reflects the realities of
today's threat environment, or the scale of events routinely hosted on
college campuses. Despite hosting events that routinely exceed 100,000
attendees, most SEC football games are assigned a SEAR rating of 4 or
5--levels that do not trigger meaningful Federal assistance.
This has serious implications:
Federal Support is Limited.--Current SEAR ratings prohibit
the deployment of critical assets, such as counter-UAS
technologies, for regular-season games--even though drone
threats have escalated globally.
Personnel Shortages.--Due to nationwide law enforcement
attrition and limited mutual aid resources, several
universities have had to reduce key positions such as K9 units
and SWAT personnel--roles that require extensive training and
cannot be filled on short notice.
Funding Inaccessibility.--Institutions note that Federal
agencies are willing to collaborate, but the inability to
qualify for Federal financial support through SEAR leaves
campuses to shoulder the full burden of security for massive
events.
Without SEAR reform, the largest regular gatherings in the United
States--and the college towns that host them--will continue to operate
without the level of protection their risk profile warrants.
security posture impact from game-day campus-wide activities
Question 1b. With the additional activities occurring around the
stadium and across campus, how does this change the security posture
for a college game day?
Answer. College game days are no longer confined to stadiums. Game-
day operations now extend well beyond the stadium and encompass large
fan zones, tailgating, concerts, and other events.
Resource Strain.--Simultaneous events stretch law
enforcement, EMS, and support personnel. These overlapping
demands dilute the ability to secure the stadium itself.
Complex Incident Management.--Most institutions use unified
command approaches to manage these multifaceted environments,
but prolonged hours and resource limitations remain a concern.
Infrastructure and Response Delays.--At several
institutions, geographic separation between venues means
delayed response times during crises.
Growing Threat Surface.--More events mean more centralized
crowds and softer targets--with limited resources to scale up
security appropriately.
This wide-spread activity means:
Security resources are diluted, often pulled away from the
stadium--the primary target--to cover adjacent areas.
Law enforcement and security staff face extended shifts,
reducing peak readiness and resilience.
Increased vulnerability to threats, as larger crowds
concentrate in open, unsecured areas across campus.
Unified command structures and integrated risk assessments help
manage this complexity, but limited access to Federal resources
restricts how robust our security postures can be under growing demand.
is the sear system flawed? recommendations for improvement
Question 1c. Do you believe that the SEAR system as currently
devised is flawed, and how can a better methodology for determining
risk for special events be envisioned?
Answer. Yes, the consensus among institutions is that the SEAR
system is in need of modernization. Several key concerns include:
Outdated Threat Assumptions.--The system was designed around
high-profile, one-time events like the Olympics or Super Bowl.
However, regular college games now exceed those events in
attendance and frequency.
Lack of Local Context.--Events in smaller towns place
outsized burdens on local public safety agencies, unlike larger
cities with greater infrastructure.
Insufficient Consideration of National Impact.--These events
often involve VIPs, including children of national leaders, and
are nationally televised--making them potential high-value
targets.
Media and Institutional Risk.--A single high-profile
incident on a college campus could produce devastating
reputational and financial consequences--potentially deterring
enrollment and participation for years.
Suggested Improvements:
Develop and implement a standardized risk matrix considering
stadium capacity, open vs. enclosed environments, concurrent
events, alcohol sales, available law enforcement resources, and
national/local threat levels.
Conduct preseason and per-event threat assessments jointly
with DHS to determine support levels.
Empower DHS and SMEs to re-evaluate gaps in State/local
capability and support legislative efforts to authorize broader
threat mitigation tools. Pursue legislative authority to enable
State and local law enforcement to deploy modern threat
mitigation tools.
ensuring support for events with lower sear scores
Question 1d. How can we ensure that large-scale events that are
determined to have lower-risk scores still receive the adequate help
that they need to deter threats?
Answer. Many large-scale events remain excluded from needed Federal
resources simply because of their lower SEAR ratings. To address this:
Prioritize Crowd Size.--Attendance should be a triggering
factor for support and access to counter-drone systems and
other Federal resources. Adopt policies similar to SETFR
(Sporting Event Temporary Flight Restrictions) which use venue
capacity (30,000+) to trigger protections, while closing the
loophole that excludes non-athletic events in the same venue.
Assess Local Capability.--Events should be judged not only
by symbolic threat, but by the community's capacity to respond.
Specialized Resource Pools.--Create mechanisms for campuses
to request limited but critical Federal resources--e.g.,
counter-drone teams, EOD K9s, or mobile security support--even
at SEAR 4 or 5 levels.
Establish a Threat-Based Best Practices Model.--Develop
guidelines for use of screening, drone mitigation, air space
control, and unified command based on evolving threats and
lessons learned by creating a Best Practices library.
dhs safety act and anti-terrorism technologies
Is the Liability Protection Sufficient to Incentivize Use?
Question 2a. The DHS SAFETY Act provides incentives for the
development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating
systems of risk and litigation management. Currently, more than 1,000
anti-terrorism technologies have now been approved for coverage under
the SAFETY Act.
Is the level of liability offered for the use of approved anti-
terrorism technologies sufficient to incentivize greater use of these
technologies?
Answer. The SAFETY Act provides helpful protections, but its
incentive value is limited by 2 factors:
High Costs.--Many SAFETY Act-approved technologies are
prohibitively expensive for university settings without Federal
grants.
Practicality Over Coverage.--Institutions adopt technologies
based on operational need, not liability coverage alone.
Is the Rate of Technology Approval Keeping Pace with Threats?
Question 2b. How effective is the current rate at which the Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate approves anti-terrorism technologies?
Is the rate of approval keeping up with the threat landscape?
Answer. The approval process is generally effective, but needs
improvement in priority areas, particularly:
Drone detection and tracking, which remains underrepresented
among approved technologies despite being one of the fastest-
growing threats.
Institutions recommend including end-users (i.e., campus law
enforcement and emergency managers) in the evaluation and
approval process to ensure solutions are operationally
relevant.
Are There Critical Technologies Still Lacking Approval?
Question 2c. Are there any critical anti-terrorism technologies or
groups of technologies which have yet to receive official approval
under the SAFETY Act?
Answer. The most critical unmet need across campuses is counter-
drone technology and the authorization for State and local law
enforcement to detect and mitigate drone threats. With the rise in
drone use for surveillance and potentially hostile purposes, U.S.
stadiums are high-profile, high-density soft targets that remain
unprotected and is an immediate concern.
conclusion
We strongly support efforts to modernize the SEAR system, expand
the scope of SAFETY Act technologies, and enable law enforcement to
meet today's rapidly-evolving threat landscape. The current SEAR
framework does not reflect this operational reality and leaves critical
vulnerabilities unaddressed. We support a modernized risk-based
approach that considers crowd size, community capacity, and current
threats.
We thank you for your commitment to public safety and we stand
ready to work alongside Congress, DHS, and educational leadership to
enhance safety and preparedness for all mass gathering events.
Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for John Junell
Question 1. Mr. Junell, last August, 3 Taylor Swift concerts were
canceled in Vienna after uncovering a terrorist plot against her shows.
Three teenagers were arrested after bomb-making materials were
discovered in their home, and an interview quickly revealed the attack
was inspired by ISIS. Over 150,000 tickets were sold between the 3
concerts.
The Eras Tour famously attracted tens of thousands of young fans.
These plots were clearly targeted to a specific audience and would have
inflicted unthinkable damage. The cancellation of these shows and
capture of the would-be perpetrators is a victory for international law
enforcement, and a testament to the necessity of information sharing.
Were there any lessons learned from the incident with the Eras Tour
shows in Vienna that would prevent these threats from manifesting?
Answer. Thank you for the questions, Chairman Strong.
Live Nation Entertainment (LNE) did not promote or operate Taylor
Swift's Eras Tour, including the Vienna shows in question, and we were
not involved in the decision to cancel them. Even though these events
were not LNE's, incidents like this reinforce the deployment of best
practice security measures we already prioritize in every country we
operate--including persistent risk assessment, close coordination with
law enforcement and all other public safety stakeholders, robust
intelligence sharing, and collaborative, layered security planning to
mitigate or manage identified or evolving risks posed to mass
gatherings. We're constantly learning from global threats, even if it's
not our event, and adjusting our protocols accordingly to help ensure
the safety of fans, artists, and staff.
Question 2a. The DHS SAFETY Act provides incentives for the
development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating
systems of risk and litigation management. Currently, more than 1,000
anti-terrorism technologies have now been approved for coverage under
the SAFETY Act.
Is the level of liability offered for the use of approved anti-
terrorism technologies sufficient to incentivize greater use of these
technologies?
Answer. Yes. From LNE's perspective, the liability protection
provided under the SAFETY Act plays a substantial role in driving the
adoption of innovative anti-terrorism technologies and practices across
the live events industry. The potential liability stemming from an act
of terrorism can be enterprise-crippling. For some organizations, the
risk of such liability is a deterrent to pursuing emerging
technologies, implementing bold operational procedures, or exploring
new services.
The SAFETY Act reduces that barrier by providing strong
protections, which gives organizations the confidence that not only are
the approved technologies and services effective but that the
organizations are protected for implementing them. One of the most
powerful aspects of the SAFETY Act is the flow-down liability
protection it affords to users of approved technologies and services.
This flow-down effect makes the protections not only possible but
practical--enabling venue operators like ours to confidently adopt
SAFETY Act-approved tools and processes and incorporate them into
baseline security standards across all venues.
Question 2b. How effective is the current rate at which the Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate approves anti-terrorism technologies?
Is the rate of approval keeping up with the threat landscape?
Answer. The SAFETY Act program is one of the most impactful tools
available to the Federal Government in promoting the private sector's
role in counterterrorism. From LNE's perspective, it serves as both a
legal incentive and an operational benchmark--encouraging organizations
to invest in technologies, services, and programs they may not
otherwise have pursued. The program's liability protections create a
unique value proposition that not only reduces risk but helps justify
security investments to corporate boards and leadership. It is no
exaggeration to say that the SAFETY Act has become a de facto standard
across much of the live entertainment and venue operations industry,
with many organizations aligning their security posture to meet its
expectations and protections
As a result, companies are doing more in the fight against
terrorism. They are adopting technologies sooner, refining processes to
meet rigorous SAFETY Act standards, and participating in internal and
external audits that drive accountability and continuous improvement.
These enhancements translate directly into better protection for the
public.
Despite this growing importance, the SAFETY Act Office has not
received a commensurate increase in resources. Over the last several
years, both the volume and complexity of applications have increased
significantly, yet the staffing and budget allocated to the program
have remained flat. This imbalance has led to extended review time
lines that now regularly exceed the Congressionally-established target
of 120-150 days. Delays of this kind not only create uncertainty for
applicants but also delay the deployment of advanced security
capabilities.
The program's impact could be significantly expanded with
appropriate resourcing. A more robustly staffed and funded SAFETY Act
Office would not only reduce delays but also allow DHS to more
proactively engage with sectors facing emerging threats--further
amplifying the program's value to homeland security and the private
sector alike.
Question 2c. Are there any critical anti-terrorism technologies or
groups of technologies which have yet to receive official approval
under the SAFETY Act?
Answer. Yes. From LNE perspective, there are several high-priority
security capabilities that have yet to achieve consistent or wide-
spread SAFETY Act coverage--despite their increasing importance in the
current threat environment.
Foremost among these is the deployment of drone mitigation
technologies. While venues have begun implementing systems to detect
unauthorized unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in their air space,
detection alone is not enough. The ability to identify a drone's
operator and--when necessary--safely bring the drone down before it can
cause harm is critical. Given the low cost, high accessibility, and
growing weaponization potential of drones, this represents one of the
most urgent and sophisticated threats facing mass gathering venues
today. Yet many drone mitigation solutions, particularly those capable
of countermeasure functions, face regulatory and legal uncertainty that
has delayed their pursuit of SAFETY Act coverage. Assisting in the
change of legislation to allow companies to even use drone mitigation
technologies would be an important start.
Expanding the SAFETY Act's application to high-priority categories,
such as drone mitigation systems, would have a meaningful impact on
public safety. It would also provide venue operators with the legal
protections and confidence needed to accelerate adoption and further
professionalize these critical capabilities.
Questions From Honorable Nellie Pou for John Junell
Question 1. What role, if any, will Live Nation have in the
security planning and/or broader planning efforts for the 2026 World
Cup and 2028 Olympics? Please provide details regarding any and all
involvement of Live Nation in these events.
Answer. Thank you for your questions, Congresswoman Pou.
Live Nation is not directly involved in the core security planning
for the 2026 FIFA World Cup or the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics. However,
certain affiliated companies are supporting aspects of these events and
as more events are being planned, we are more than willing to
coordinate and share best practices.
For example, Live Nation and Diversified Production Services (DPS)
are producing the FIFA Championship Game halftime show and the 39-day
Fan Fest for the FIFA NY and NJ Host Committee. In that role, Live
Nation and DPS are coordinating closely with the Host Committee and the
New Jersey State and local police on security and event operations.
We have also had conversations with representatives from the FIFA
World Cup and understand that they share similar concerns about gaps in
temporary flight restriction (TFR) coverage for their events. Like us,
they are focused on ensuring strong coordination with Federal partners
to address evolving threats, including the risk posed by unauthorized
drones.
If our venues are used for official events, concerts, or affiliated
programming during the World Cup or Olympics, we will fully coordinate
with all relevant security and public safety stakeholders to ensure a
safe experience for all attendees.
Question 2. On November 5, 2021, a tragic stampede at the
Astroworld Music Festival killed 10 people and injured hundreds more.
What lessons, if any, did Live Nation learn from the Astroworld and
other tragedies to prevent future security failures?
Answer. The tragedy at the Astroworld Music Festival on November 5,
2021, remains a sad and difficult memory for everyone who puts on
concerts. We continue to extend our deepest sympathies to the victims,
their families, and everyone impacted by the event. Live Nation
continues to take major steps to evolve and strengthen its approach to
event security through:
Industry-leading Safety and Security Standards.--Recognizing
that security measures must be continually assessed and
refined, Live Nation conducts on-going reviews of festival and
event operations and routinely updates its code of practice to
ensure consistent standards for crowd safety, security,
emergency response, and risk management aligned with global
best practices.
Incident Response Technology.--Live Nation has invested in a
comprehensive incident management system platform that has been
implemented across its global portfolio of venues and festivals
to streamline communication and improve coordination during
emergencies.
Research-driven Enhancements.--Live Nation has partnered
with MIT Lincoln Laboratory to assess and validate crowd
barrier deployment standards, and with the University of Sussex
to study crowd psychology and collective behavior.
On-going Training and Technology.--Live Nation continues to
invest in best-in-class security and counter-terrorism measures
as part of its on-going DHS SAFETY Act designation efforts. The
company also partners with leading crowd safety management
experts to deliver advanced training for operational teams and
supports on-going improvements in crowd management through
emerging technologies.
As public attendance at live events reaches historic levels, Live
Nation remains committed to advancing safety through data, technology,
and close coordination with public safety partners at every level.
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