[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BEIJING'S AIR, SPACE, AND MARITIME SURVEIL-
LANCE FROM CUBA: A GROWING THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 6, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-13
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-305 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Tony Gonzales, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Member
Elijah Crane, Arizona Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Gabe Evans, Colorado Robert Garcia, California
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Vacancy
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Dr. Ryan C. Berg, Director, Americas Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Andres Martinez-Fernandez, Senior Policy Analyst, Latin
America, Allison Center for National Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Leland Lazarus, Associate Director, National Security
Program, Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida
International University:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
For the Record
The Honorable Elijah Crane, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona:
Article, Florida Center for Government Accountability.......... 37
BEIJING'S AIR, SPACE, AND MARITIME SURVEILLANCE FROM CUBA: A GROWING
THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
----------
Tuesday, May 6, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Gimenez, Garbarino, Crane, Biggs,
McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.
Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come
to order.
Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee
in recess at any point. Today's hearing continues the important
oversight work we began in February by taking a closer look at
the Chinese Communist Party's growing footprint in Cuba and
implications for U.S. homeland security.
But Beijing wrapping up its economic military and
intelligence operations just 90 miles from our coastline, this
is no longer a distant challenge. It is an immediate concern
for the security of the American people. The United States must
urgently understand the full extent of this threat, ensure that
the Department of Homeland Security and its interagency
partners are equipped to address it and take a hard look at our
broader strategic partner throughout the Caribbean and Western
Hemisphere.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening
statement. Good morning, today's subcommittee convenes to
examine an alarming threat developing just 90 miles off our
coast. Mounting evidence suggests that the Chinese Communist
Party is expanding its strategic partnership with a
totalitarian communist regime in Cuba to build advance
surveillance infrastructure capable of targeting the United
States. This collaboration represents one of the most brazen
intelligence operations ever attempted near the American
mainland. And places our military operations, commercial
activity, and communications squarely the in the crosshairs of
a hostile foreign power.
Recent satellite imagery and open-source analysis suggests
the presence of several Chinese-funded signals and intelligence
facilities across Cuba. The possibility that these sites are
capable of monitoring U.S. military operations, commercial
shipping, space launches, and sensitive communications is
deeply troubling.
The southeastern United States is home to some of the most
critical assets in our Nation's infrastructure. From the space
launch center at Cape Canaveral to the headquarters of U.S.
Southern Command in Miami, this region plays a critical role in
our defense posture.
This region includes my own district, which has long been
on the front lines of threats emerging from the Cuban regime.
If the Chinese government is in fact leveraging a growing
partnership with Cuba to collect intelligence on our
activities, that is a threat that we can no longer ignore.
Cuba's government has a long history of working with
foreign adversaries to undermine the United States. What we are
potentially witnessing today is a new and dangerous phase of
that cooperation that is fueled by Havana's economic
desperation and Beijing's strategic ambition.
The Cuban regime remains a state sponsor of terrorism,
harbors fugitives from the U.S. justice system and relentlessly
suppress the rights of its own people. Its growing reliance on
foreign authoritarian powers like China only adds to the
danger.
Over the past several months, I've taken steps to raise
alarms about the malign activities of the communist government
of Cuba. In March, I sent a letter to the Department of
Homeland Security requesting an investigation into individuals
in the United States suspected of links to Cuban intelligence
and the Communist Party.
These networks have long operated on U.S. soil and may now
be intersecting with China's activities in the region. Shortly
after, in April I sent a letter to the Department of Treasury
calling for full suspension of U.S.-Cuba travel and
remittances, with appropriate humanitarian exceptions. It
should not be funding a regime that turns around and opens its
doors it our greatest adversaries. If reports of rising Chinese
activity in Cuba are accurate, and it is no longer just a
diplomatic issue, it is a direct security risk to the American
people.
This hearing is the first step in understanding the scope
of this threat. Today our witnesses will help us assess the
potential scale of the threat and what measures the Federal
Government should take to stay ahead of it. We need to be
clear-eyed about the risk and both swift and unified in our
responses.
The United States cannot afford to overlook the possibility
that a hostile foreign power is working hand-in-hand with a
Communist dictatorship in Cuba to employ advanced surveillance
capabilities on our door step. It is our responsibility to
ensure that the homeland remains secure and not just from what
we can see, but from what may be gathering just out of sight.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee. I look forward to a productive discussion on how
the United States can counter the Chinese Communist Party and
their suspected surveillance efforts in Cuba and prevent our
adversaries from gaining a strategic foothold so close to our
homeland.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
May 6, 2025
Good morning. Today, the subcommittee convenes to examine an
alarming threat developing just 90 miles off our coast. Mounting
evidence suggests that the Chinese Communist Party is expanding its
strategic partnership with the totalitarian communist regime in Cuba to
build advanced surveillance infrastructure capable of targeting the
United States.
This collaboration represents one of the most brazen intelligence
operations ever attempted near the American mainland, and places our
military operations, commercial activity, and communications squarely
in the crosshairs of a hostile foreign power.
Recent satellite imagery and open-source analysis suggest the
presence of several Chinese-funded signals intelligence facilities
across Cuba. The possibility that these sites are capable of monitoring
U.S. military operations, commercial shipping, space launches, and
sensitive communications is deeply troubling.
The southeastern United States is home to some of the most critical
assets in our Nation's security infrastructure. From the space launch
center at Cape Canaveral, to the headquarters of U.S. Southern Command
in Miami, this region plays a critical role in our defense posture.
This region includes my own district, which has long been on the
front lines of threats emerging from the Cuban regime. If the Chinese
government is in fact leveraging a growing partnership with Cuba to
collect intelligence on our activities, that is a threat we cannot
ignore.
Cuba's government has a long history of working with foreign
adversaries to undermine the United States. What we are potentially
witnessing today is a new and dangerous phase of that cooperation that
is fueled by Havana's economic desperation and Beijing's strategic
ambition.
The Cuban regime remains a state sponsor of terrorism, harbors
fugitives from the U.S. justice system, and relentlessly suppresses the
rights of its own people. Its growing reliance on foreign authoritarian
powers like China only adds to the danger.
Over the past several months, I have taken steps to raise alarms
about the malign activities of the Communist government of Cuba. In
March, I sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security
requesting an investigation into individuals in the United States
suspected of links to Cuban intelligence and the Communist Party. These
networks have long operated on U.S. soil and may now be intersecting
with China's activities in the region.
Shortly after, in early April, I sent a letter to the Department of
the Treasury calling for a full suspension of U.S.-Cuba travel and
remittances, with appropriate humanitarian exceptions. We should not be
funding a regime that turns around and opens its doors to our greatest
adversaries. If reports of rising Chinese activity in Cuba are
accurate, then this is no longer just a diplomatic issue. It is a
direct security risk to the American people.
This hearing is the first step in understanding the scope of this
threat. Today, our witnesses will help us assess the potential scale of
the threat and what measures the Federal Government should take to stay
ahead of it. We need to be clear-eyed about the risks, and both swift
and unified in our response.
The United States cannot afford to overlook the possibility that a
hostile foreign power is working hand-in-hand with a communist
dictatorship in Cuba to employ advanced surveillance capabilities on
our doorstep. It is our responsibility to ensure the homeland remains
secure, and not just from what we can see, but from what may be
gathering just out of sight.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee
today.
I look forward to a productive discussion on how the United States
can counter the Chinese Communist Party's suspected surveillance
efforts in Cuba and prevent our adversaries from gaining a strategic
foothold so close to the homeland.
Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening
statement.
Mrs. McIver. Good morning, thank you, Chair. Thank you to
our witnesses for joining us today.
The threats posed by the People's Republic of China toward
the United States requires serious attention, as China works
aggressively to gain foothold within the Caribbean.
In Cuba, China has provided almost $8 billion in monetary
incentives over the past 20 years seeking to strengthen ties
with a country just 90 miles from U.S. shores. China has
invested heavily in Cuba's infrastructure, technology,
communications, and biotechnology. Within the transportation
and maritime sectors, Cuba has benefits from China's
partnership by gaining security equipment for airports,
seaports, and customs facilities. Nuctech, a company, a Chinese
state-owned company has provided inspection technology to be
installed throughout much of Cuba's transportation networks.
The Department of Homeland Security has assessed that
Nuctech's screening systems likely have deficiencies in
detection capabilities and China--I'm sorry, excuse me. The
Department of Homeland Security has assessed that Nuctech
screening systems likely have deficiencies and detection
capabilities and that China could potentially access the
systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping manifest
and the passenger information.
In 2021, Cuba signed on to China's Belt and Road Initiative
and now China is further developing sites in Cuba to collect
intelligence on the United States through monitoring of ship
movement, emails, phone calls, and radio and satellite
transmissions.
The knowledge of these sites is not new, as U.S. security
officials have confirmed awareness of their existence since at
least the first Trump administration. The United States and our
partners face tremendous challenges in responding to China's
aggression. A solid partnership among the United States and
Latin America allies aids in advancing U.S. interests in the
region and strengthening our national security.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration is actively
undermining those efforts by suspending foreign aid and
dismantling USAID, the Trump administration has weakened our
national security, allowing China to apply influence within
Latin America without competition.
In year 2023, USAID dedicated $1.8 billion in funding to
the Western Hemisphere, including funding to support
independent Cuba media organizations providing objective,
uncensored journalism. The dismantling of foreign aid programs
benefits authoritarian governments, like the Cuban regime, by
undermining groups working to advance human rights and
Democratic ideals. To make matters worse, President Trump has
ceded significant power to an unelected billionaire in Elon
Musk, whose deep ties to the PRC are cause for great concern. I
am glad there is bipartisan agreement on the need to counter
China's aggressive activity in Cuba and Latin America.
That said, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle
to join me in speaking out about how the Trump administration
is actively undermining efforts to counter the PRC and advance
U.S. interests around the globe.
Thank you again for our witnesses joining us here today.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver
May 6, 2025
The threats posed by the People's Republic of China toward the
United States requires serious attention, as China works aggressively
to gain a foothold within the Caribbean.
In Cuba, China has provided almost $8 billion dollars in monetary
incentives over the past 20 years, seeking to strengthen ties with a
country just 90 miles from U.S. shores. China has invested heavily in
Cuba's infrastructure, technology, communications, and biotechnology.
Within the transportation and maritime sectors, Cuba has benefited from
China's partnership by gaining security equipment for airports,
seaports, and customs facilities.
Nuctech Company, a Chinese state-owned subsidiary company, has
provided inspection technology to be installed throughout much of
Cuba's transportation networks. The Department of Homeland Security has
assessed that Nuctech screening systems likely have deficiencies in
detection capabilities and that China could potentially access the
systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping manifests and
passenger information.
In 2021, Cuba signed onto China's Belt and Road Initiative, and
now, China is further developing sites in Cuba to collect intelligence
on the United States through monitoring of ship movements, emails,
phone calls, and radio and satellite transmissions.
The knowledge of these sites is not new, as U.S. security officials
have confirmed awareness of their existence since at least the first
Trump administration. The United States and our partners face
tremendous challenges in responding to China's aggression. A solid
partnership among the United States and Latin American allies aids in
advancing U.S. interests in the region and strengthening our national
security.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration is actively undermining
those efforts. By suspending foreign aid and dismantling USAID, the
Trump administration has weakened our national security, allowing China
to apply influence within Latin America without competition.
In fiscal year 2023, USAID dedicated $1.8 billion dollars in
funding to the Western Hemisphere, including funding to support
independent Cuban media organizations providing objective, uncensored
journalism. The dismantling of foreign aid programs benefits
authoritarian governments, like the Cuban regime, by undermining groups
working to advance human rights and democratic ideals.
To make matters worse, President Trump has ceded significant power
to an unelected billionaire in Elon Musk, whose deep ties with the PRC
are cause for great concern. I am glad there is bipartisan agreement on
the need to counter China's aggressive activities in Cuba and Latin
America.
I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in
speaking out about how the Trump administration is actively undermining
efforts to counter the PRC and advance U.S. interests around the globe.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
May 6, 2025
Spy stations established in Cuba with Chinese support have the
potential to collect valuable intelligence on the United States, as
well as our allies in the region. Unfortunately, the Trump
administration's reckless actions and idiotic policies are exacerbating
the challenges posed by China and Cuba.
In just a short few months, Donald Trump and his Republican minions
have done tremendous damage to the United States' reputation as a
trusted ally and partner. Trump's cuts to foreign aid within Latin
America and across the globe have decimated essential programs aimed at
reducing hunger, corruption, poverty, and inequality. Trump's cuts have
undermined efforts to support U.S. national security and assist non-
governmental organizations that help counter autocratic regimes and
advance democratic values.
Currently, the Cuban government is undergoing one of its most
severe crises in decades, with increased repression and crackdowns
against political dissent. Under the Biden administration, the U.S.
Agency for International Development provided funding to support
independent media in Cuba, which is essential to pushing for democratic
reforms. Now, the Trump administration has illegally canceled that
funding.
Under the Biden administration, the ``CHNV'' parole program legally
allowed over 110,000 Cubans to flee their authoritarian government and
seek asylum in the United States. Now, the Trump administration has
tried to terminate that program.
Cubans who legally migrated to the United States are now
potentially facing orders of deportation and denial of asylum requests,
which will place them in danger. Thankfully, the rule of law has so far
prevailed, as a Federal district court has issued a nationwide
temporary order halting the termination of this program. The Trump
administration should focus on why these migrants are leaving Cuba
instead of blocking them from coming to the United States. Cuba is
facing its worst economic crisis since gaining independence in 1902.
It is high time for the United States to take a more surgical,
humanitarian approach to relations to Cuba, rather than the Trump
administration's chainsaw tactics of cutting any and all programs that
advance U.S. soft power in the region. The termination of humanitarian
programs and other foreign aid allows China to fill the void through
economic, diplomatic, and potential military support. The PRC is using
Cuba in its geopolitical strategy against the United States and seeking
to make inroads with other Latin American countries as well.
Trump's tariff wars and foreign policies will cause many
international partners to turn away from the United States and seek the
possibility of a more stable partnership with China. I hope my
colleagues across the aisle will open their eyes and recognize the
Trump administration is placing America last.
Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to hold a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that
our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative. Thank you and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Dr.
Ryan Berg is the director of the Americas program and the head
of the future of Venezuela initiative at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Berg specializes in
U.S. Latin America relations, strategic competition, defense
policies, and transnational organized crime. Previously he was
a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a
visiting fellow at Oxford's changing character of war program.
He holds a doctor of philosophy and master of philosophy in
political science, a master of science in global governance
from Oxford, as well as a bachelor of arts in government and
theology from Georgetown.
Andres Martinez-Fernandez is the senior policy analyst for
Latin America with the Heritage Foundation's Allison Center for
the National Security. In this role he leads the Heritage
Foundation's work on U.S. policy toward Latin America
conducting research and engaging audiences on topics such as
economic development, foreign aid, transnational organized
crime, and the maligned activities of communist China and other
extra regional actors.
Before joining Heritage, Andres was a leading analyst at a
leading global market intelligence firm where he advised top
executives from multinational companies on political and
macroeconomic risks in Latin America. He received his master's
degree in Latin American studies in international economics
from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and
his bachelor degree is in history from Florida International
University, a university which I represent.
Leland Lazarus serves as associate director of national
security at Florida International University's Jack D. Gordon's
Institute for Public Policy. He's an expert on China-Latin
America relations and manages a team of researchers and interns
that collect data analysis on U.S. national security and
governance in Latin America and the Caribbean.
From 2021 to 2022, Leland served as a special assistant and
speech writer to the commander of U.S. Southern Command. Before
that, Leland was a State Department Foreign Service officer
serving as deputy public affairs officer at the U.S. Embassy
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean. Council officer at the U.S.
counsulate general in Shenyang, China and Pickering fellow at
U.S. Embassy Beijing and at the China desk in the District of
Columbia. Fluent in both Mandarin and Spanish, he holds a
master of arts in U.S.-China foreign policy from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy and a bachelor of arts in
international relations from Brown University.
I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses for
being here today. I now recognize Dr. Berg for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statements.
STATEMENT OF RYAN C. BERG, DIRECTOR, AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Berg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
Ranking Member McIver, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I am honored to share my views with you on this
important topic this morning.
Near 90 miles off our shores, the United States' most
formidable 21st Century competitor, the People's Republic of
China, has found fertile soil to deploy its arsenal of
espionage, digital surveillance, and maritime competition. In
many ways, a moribund socialist system in Havana is Beijing's
perfect partner for threatening U.S. homeland, especially as a
response to U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to focus my oral testimony on
China's signals intelligence capabilities, while recognizing
that the relationship between Beijing and Havana runs much
deeper. I know my colleagues on this panel will cover other
aspects of the relationship, maritime telecommunications and so
on. I'm happy of course to discuss in our question period.
When Soviet influence diminished on the island following
the end of the Cold War, eyes, ears and antennas stayed. In
many ways, China filled the void. On June 8, 2023, the Wall
Street Journal first reported that Cuba hosted secret Chinese
spy bases in return for billions of dollars for the Cuban
regime. That same day, the Biden administration's defense
department denied the Wall Street Journal's reporting,
characterizing the report as quote, ``inaccurate.'' Three days
later however the NSC spokesperson, John Kirby, reversed course
and admitted that China's spy base is in Cuba, but said that
its presence had existed since 2019 out of the first Trump
administration, implying that the Biden admin had inherited
this challenge. Around the same time reports surfaced that
China was pursuing the construction of a military training base
in Cuba. CSIS then published a groundbreaking report called
Secret Signals, encoding China intelligence activities in Cuba.
The CSIS team scoured the island using commercially-available
satellite imagery, identifying 4 likely sites for signals
intelligence collection in that process. This was followed by a
Wall Street Journal exclusive confirming its earlier reporting
on the spy stations.
CSIS published another updated set of images in December 2,
2024 and has tracked China's progress at these 4 sites.
As part of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to
release some updated imagery. I think we have a slide show for
you to see. As you can see on this first side, Mr. Chairman,
CSIS has positively identified about 4 specific facilities as
highly likely sites supporting Chinese intelligence operations
targeting the United States. Three of these sites--Bejucal,
Wajay, Calabazar--are located around Havana. The fourth site,
El Salao, is a previously-unreported facility located on the
opposite side of the island, just east of Santiago de Cuba. In
response to reporting on the Cuba-China SIGINT nexus, high-
level Cuban communist officials either outright denied any
relationship or attempted to disarm our criticism with humor.
To coincide with this hearing, Mr. Chairman, we have some
updated imagery we can show you. Next slide please. After the
publication of our initial reports, construction progress at El
Salao, the site by Santiago de Cuba seems to have ceased,
according to the image captures dated April 18, 2025.
You can go to the next slide, please. The CDAA site appears
to have been abandoned for the moment, as evidenced by hitherto
well-trimmed and graded areas being taken over by grass.
On the next slide, the PRC appears to be enhancing its
SIGINT at a previously-identified facility at Bejucal. On the
next slide you can see an antenna field from the original CSIS
image captures. On our last slide, Mr. Chairman, you can see
the latest CSIS image capture shows those antennas have been
removed to make way for a large CDAA site, very similar to the
one that was originally visible at El Salao. The Bejucal
facility is very, very active, as evidenced by multiple image
captures in this process.
So as you can see, Mr. Chairman, our adversaries are at our
doorstep. I want to use the rest of the time remaining to
mention some brief recommendations for the committee to
consider.
First, I think a Classified briefing to every Member of
Congress should be given, given the significance of these
developments to U.S. national security.
Second, the United States should consider strategic
declassification of images in its possession, given that El
Salao appears to have been abandoned after the CSIS publication
of its report. You may reasonably believe that transparency
efforts and public criticism do have the potential to derail
some of the PRC's ambitions.
Third, develop and articulate red lines. It may be
difficult to displace some of these existing facilities from
the island. The United States should be crystal clear that the
permanent installation of offensive military capabilities in
Cuba, or the basing of PLA combat assets would be seen as a
significant escalation and a red line for the United States. An
inability to deter a SIGINT facility should not be interpreted
by Havana as a green light for China.
Fourth, I think we need to harden sensitive infrastructure
against SIGINT collection by China. The CISA should spearhead
an effort to review which companies and facilities in the area
are most vulnerable to intelligence-gathering operations.
Last, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to enlist neighbors and
allies. These facilities do not just snoop on the United
States. CDAAs collect information omnidirectionally, meaning
that other countries in the Caribbean, including those that
Secretary of State Marco Rubio met on his recent successful
trip to the Caribbean, are also implicated.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. I look forward to the
committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ryan C. Berg
Tuesday, May 6, 2025
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I am honored to share my views with you on this
important topic. CSIS does not take policy positions, so the views
represented in this testimony are my own and not those of my employer.
In my testimony, I would like to reflect on the People's Republic of
China's historical and burgeoning role in Cuba, the Cuban Communist
Party's repressive tactics and China's role in regime security, as well
as China's use of Cuba as a staging ground for espionage activities
against the United States, including its signals intelligence.
``In my recent trip to Santiago, I heard reports from several sources
of big military installations under construction in mountains of
Oriente Province.''--Graham Greene, Our Man in Havana.
peering into the united states
Cuba has long served as a perch for great power rivals to the
United States. Indeed, the memory of those fateful days in October 1962
when the United States and Soviet Union came perilously close to a
nuclear exchange over the latter's stationing of nuclear-tipped
missiles in Cuba has tinged discourse about the island ever since. The
question of Chinese bases in Cuba touches on some of the same
sensitivities--that a rival of the United States might clandestinely
exploit the strategic position of Cuba to build up a military presence
directly under the nose of the United States, to the detriment of the
entire Western Hemisphere's security. A brief history of the PRC's
partnership with Cuba reveals worrying patterns.
When Soviet missiles left the island, eyes, ears, and antennas
stayed. From bases across the island, Soviet and Cuban intelligence and
military personnel worked together to gather information on the United
States. Of particular note was the Lourdes Signal Intelligence Complex
located near Havana. At its peak, the facility was reportedly home to
an estimated 1,500 operatives and supplied the USSR with 75 percent of
its military intelligence.\1\ But Lourdes was one of many such
facilities, all dedicated to gathering and processing the firehose of
signals coming from the southeastern seaboard of the United States. It
is telling that of the facilities identified and surveyed in CSIS's
analysis, just one, the new Circular Disposed Antenna Array in El
Salao, was not a preexisting signals intelligence (SIGINT) site left
over from the Cold War.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://irp.fas.org/congress/1996_hr/s960222d.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Cuba's strategic
importance for Moscow diminished, and finally in 2002, Lourdes was
shuttered as an intelligence facility and converted into the University
of Informatic Sciences.\2\ Along with a decrease in military presence,
the Soviet collapse engendered economic turmoil for Cuba, known as the
``special period,'' where a lack of subsidized fuel and economic aid
brought about shortages of critical goods and near-economic collapse
for the island. By the end of the 1990's, Cuba was desperately seeking
new partners to fill the void its former communist ally had left.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.uci.cu/en/university/history.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Into this breach stepped, partially, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). The CCP and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) had enjoyed strong
relations since the latter's inception, and as one of the few remaining
communist parties at the turn of the century, fell into China's foreign
policy category of both ``good friend'' and ``good comrade.'' While
Cuba's economic turmoil meant that it had little to offer by way of
trade, its strategic geography remained unrivaled. In February 1999,
China's Minister of Defense, General Chi Haotian, visited Cuba, where
he met with his counterpart, then-Defense Minister Raul Castro.
According to an article in El Nuevo Herald, the 2 reportedly signed an
agreement granting China access to a number of former Soviet listening
stations across the island, including the Bejucal base less than 10
miles from the old Lourdes station.\3\ Coverage also cited a leaked
Federal Communications Commission report claiming China had facilitated
the transfer of jamming equipment to help block signals from Radio
Marti reaching the island.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China-Cuba ties have continued to grow apace over the past decades.
In 2005, Raul Castro traveled to China to meet with President Hu
Jintao, and President Xi Jinping toured Cuba in 2014 as part of his
first official trip to Latin America as President of China and General
Secretary of the CCP.\4\ The PCC has been the No. 1 recipient in Latin
America of International Liaison Department Engagements, the CCP's
organ for foreign party-to-party diplomacy, helping further cement ties
between Cuban and Chinese leadership.\5\ In the military domain, China
and Cuba have continued to fortify their ties through high-level
delegations and at times more active measures. Havana was home to a
rare PLAN port call in the Western Hemisphere when 3 warships docked in
November 2015 to commemorate 50 years of China-Cuba relations. As
recently as April 2024, He Weidong, Vice Chairman of China's Central
Military Commission, and Cuban general Victor Rojos Ramos, proclaimed
an ``unbreakable friendship'' between the 2 nations. On January 1,
2025, Cuba officially joined the BRICS as an associate member, a major
boost for Havana as the alliance's efforts to weaken the hold of the
U.S. dollar over the global financial system are a boon to the
embargoed island.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
\5\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/exporting-autocracy.
\6\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-are-latin-american-dictators-
seeking-membership-brics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuba has received an estimated $369 million in development finance
from the PRC, but this pales in comparison to the island's true
financial needs.\7\ Venezuela's collapse has also made Cuba's other
historical partner unable to fill the void. Today, Cuba is in the midst
of its worst economic crisis since the Special Period, registering 30
percent inflation and a 2 percent decline in GDP in 2023. Last fall,
island-wide blackouts underscored the fragility of Cuba's dilapidated
energy infrastructure. Privately, Chinese officials have even
reportedly expressed frustration that the Cuban government has not
introduced more market-oriented reforms to ameliorate its deep economic
woes.\8\ Without much to offer China in terms of trade and raw
materials, Cuba has played one of its only cards: its strategic
location and relationships with senior CCP officials for support as the
regime seeks to weather the present crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://thedialog.org/china-latin-america-finance-databases.
\8\ https://www.ft.com/content/9ca0a495-d5d9-4cc5-acf5-
43f42a9128b4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
china and cuba's regime security
In addition to general financial and development support for the
Cuban regime, China has played a critical role in sharing authoritarian
best practices and transplanting those tactics in a phenomenon known as
``authoritarian export'' or ``authoritarian diffusion.'' For instance,
China built the island's telecommunications infrastructure. The primary
providers to Etecsa, Cuba's sole internet provider, are exclusively
Chinese: Huawei, TP-Link, and ZTE.\9\ The Swedish organization Qurium
discovered that Cuba uses Huawei network management software eSight to
help filter web searches.\10\ In doing so, China has built
telecommunications infrastructure capable of surveillance and
repression. This was visible in the July 2021 protests, when the Cuban
regime shut off the internet and telephone services, blocking the
island's protestors from communicating with the outside world. This is
just one example of how China supports the Cuban regime through the
diffusion of authoritarian practices and tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/how-china-helps-the-cuban-
regime-stay-afloat-and-shut-down-protests/.
\10\ https://www.qurium.org/alerts/internet-blocking-in-cuba-
silencing-dissent-in-the-name-of-moral-and-good-manners/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
strategic battleground
On June 8, 2023, the Wall Street Journal first reported that Cuba
hosted secret Chinese spy bases in return for billions of dollars for
the Cuban regime.\11\ That same day, the Biden administration's Defense
Department denied the Wall Street Journal's reporting, characterizing
the report as ``inaccurate.''\12\ Three days later, however, National
Security Council spokesperson, John Kirby, reversed course and admitted
to China's spy bases in Cuba, but insisted that its presence had
existed since 2019 under the first Trump administration, implying the
Biden administration had ``inherited'' the challenge.\13\ Around the
same time, reports surfaced that China was pursuing the construction of
a military training base in Cuba.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.wsj.com/world/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-
base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0; see also, https://www.politico.com/news/
2023/06/08/china-spy-on-us-cuba-00100990.
\12\ https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-dismisses-wsj-report-
china-spy-station-cubap-2023-06-08/.
\13\ https://www.wsj.com/politics/white-house-says-china-has-had-
cuba-spy-base-since-at-least-2019-42145596; see also, https://
www.politico.com/news/2023/06/12/kirby-nsc-china-balloon-cuba-00101575.
\14\ https://www.wsj.com/politics/beijing-plans-a-new-training-
facility-in-cuba-raising-prospect-of-chinese-troops-on-americas-
doorstep-e17fd5d1?mod=mhp; see also, https://www.politico.com/news/
2023/06/20/china-negotiating-with-havana-about-joint-military-training-
facility-in-cuba-00102636.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequently, CSIS published a groundbreaking report, ``Secret
Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence Activities in Cuba.'' The CSIS
team scoured the island using commercially-available satellite imagery,
identifying 4 likely sites for signals intelligence collection in the
process.\15\ This was followed by a Wall Street Journal exclusive
confirming its earlier reporting on the spy stations.\16\ CSIS
published another updated set of images in December 2024 as it tracked
China's progress at these 4 sites.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
\16\ https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-cuba-
suspected-spy-bases-da1d6ec9.
\17\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although open-source research and satellite imagery have fueled
speculation about nearly a dozen potential SIGINT sites in Cuba, CSIS
positively identified 4 specific facilities as highly likely sites
supporting Chinese intelligence operations targeting the United States.
Three of these sites--Bejucal, Wajay, and Calabazar--are located around
Havana.\18\ A fourth site, El Salao, is a previously-unreported
facility located on the opposite side of the island, just east of
Santiago de Cuba.\19\ In response to reporting on the Cuba-China SIGINT
nexus, high-level PCC officials either outright denied any connection,
or attempted to disarm criticism with humor (see appendix for the
responses of Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez and President Miguel
Diaz-Canel to CSIS's reports).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
\19\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To coincide with this hearing, CSIS is releasing brand new imagery
updates. First, after the publication of CSIS's initial reports,
construction progress at El Salao appears to have ceased according to
image captures dated April 18, 2025. Furthermore, the CDAA site appears
to be abandoned for the moment, as evidenced by hitherto well-trimmed
and graded areas being taken over by foliage. Second, the PRC appears
to be enhancing its SIGINT at a previously-identified facility near
Havana, Bejucal. On satellite imagery, a new area of the site, some
antennas have been removed to make way for a large CDAA. The facility
is also active, as evidenced by multiple image captures showing dishes
moving positions to different angles and targets. Interestingly, the
Soviets also operated a CDAA not far from this exact spot.
motivation and capability
The CSIS open-source reports have brought unprecedented clarity to
the scope and capabilities of several suspected Chinese SIGINT sites in
Cuba, offering fresh insights into how they may be used to monitor
sensitive military, commercial, and government activity across the
region, but especially in the United States. Given its proximity to
both the wider Caribbean and the southern United States, Cuba holds
significant strategic value for signals intelligence collection in the
region. The United States maintains critical military installations
concentrated in States like Florida and Georgia, so Cuba's location
just 93 miles from the Florida Keys gives adversaries such as China a
prime vantage point to peer into the United States and intercept
sensitive communications.
Both China and Cuba stand to gain significantly from this
arrangement. Mired in a socialist nightmare, Cuba is currently facing
its worst economic crisis in decades. Presently, the government
presides over a moribund economy, daily power outages, and an exodus of
over 10 percent of the island.\20\ For Cuba, China's financial support
represents an important lifeline. For China, the proximity to the
United States and potential to access critical military and commercial
intelligence strongly incentivizes the PRC to engage in this strategic
arrangement with Cuba. Beyond the intelligence efforts, collaborating
with Cuba in this domain expands China's military and intelligence
footprint across the globe.\21\ By pursuing these objectives in
partnership with Cuba, China also reinforces the presence of a
communist ally in close proximity to the United States.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
\21\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
\22\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From a capability standpoint, SIGINT plays a pivotal role in
contemporary spy craft and intelligence gathering.\23\ Through the use
of antennas and specialized equipment, actors can configure SIGINT
systems for maximum effectiveness.\24\ As the technology leverages
antennas and gathers signals, distance and geography are essential.
Depending on the objective and scope of the intelligence-gathering
mission, facilities can be configured in various ways to maximize data
collection and operational effectiveness.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
\24\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
\25\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For optimal success, SIGINT systems rely on the beamforming
technique to ensure the antennas are properly assembled for the mission
efforts. The technique behind beamforming is used to enhance the
effectiveness and precision of antenna arrays.\26\ A single isotropic
antenna radiates energy in all directions, resulting in limited range
and greater vulnerability to interference. With just 2 antennas,
signals can be synchronized to constructively interfere, producing a
stronger, more focused beam. With more antennas, operators can fine-
tune the phase and amplitude of signals for even greater directional
control. When arranged in a grid, these arrays can steer the beam
electronically without physically repositioning the antennas, allowing
for flexible and efficient signals interception.\27\ Because these
antennas are gathering signals, it is imperative that SIGINT operations
are within range of their target, meaning Cuba is an ideal partner for
China's espionage efforts.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
\27\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
\28\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-
cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to Cuba's proximity to Florida, these facilities grant China
SIGINT coverage of around 20 key bases and installations on the
peninsula.\29\ The most significant military installations in and
around Florida include Naval Air Station Pensacola, Tyndall Air Force
Base, MacDill Air Force Base, Naval Air Station Key West, King's Bay
Submarine Base, Cape Canaveral, and of course, the United States
Southern Command.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
\30\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
policy recommendations
Offer Classified Briefing to Every Member of Congress.--This
development is significant enough to national security to justify
briefings for Members of Congress. All Members of Congress should be
able to receive a Classified briefing on the topic of China's SIGINT
operations in Cuba. Importantly, this should be made available to
Members of Congress on an on-going basis, to ensure updates on imagery
are also briefed.
Consider Selective and Strategic Declassification of Images.--Given
that El Salao appears to have been abandoned since the publication of
CSIS's reports, we may reasonably believe that transparency efforts and
public criticism have the potential to derail China's ambitions. The
United States should consider the strategic declassification of select
images at moments that could derail China's operations and apply select
pressure to these operations.
Develop and Articulate Red Lines.--Given Cuba's historically
outsized role in U.S. national security calculations and its close
cooperation with U.S. adversaries, ensuring clear communication is of
the utmost importance to reduce potential misperceptions. If the United
States believes China or Cuba to be credibly cooperating to share
intelligence with one another, the United States should make this clear
to both Havana and Beijing. Simultaneously, while it is difficult to
displace existing facilities from the island, the United States should
be crystal clear that the permanent installation of offensive military
capabilities in Cuba (as was reported as a possibility by the Wall
Street Journal around the same time as the original reporting on spy
bases), or the basing of PLA combat assets, would be seen as a
significant escalation and a redline for the United States. Passivity
in the face of SIGINT facilities should not be interpreted by Havana as
a green light to deepen Cuba-China cooperation.
Harden Sensitive Civilian Infrastructure Against SIGINT.--So long
as China's SIGINT facilities operate in Cuba, the United States cannot
be completely certain that no sensitive information will be obtained by
an adversary. While modern military communications are encrypted and
designed to prevent vital intelligence from leaking, civilian firms may
lack the knowledge, means, or resources to safeguard their own
infrastructure. Additionally, some private entities like SpaceX, which
launch rockets from Cape Canaveral within theoretical range of some of
the equipment observed in the CSIS reports, engage in highly strategic
activities. The Chinese are top competitors of the United States in
space. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency should
spearhead an effort to review which companies operating in range of
Cuban SIGINT sites are most vulnerable to this form of intelligence
gathering and develop a plan to help these firms bolster their
operational security. This could include training, basic encryption, or
financing to help acquire necessary security equipment.
Enlist Neighbors and Allies.--The presence of SIGINT facilities in
Cuba does not pose a risk to the United States alone. Tools like CDAAs
collect information omnidirectionally, meaning anything within range is
liable to be picked up. Regional allies may be even more vulnerable, as
they lack the same sophisticated encryption and stealth technology as
the United States, possibly allowing Cuba and any of its partners a
window into critical national security functions. As CISA works
domestically with private-sector actors, the State Department should
engage countries like the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica,
to highlight risks and steps these countries can take to reduce their
vulnerability to Cuba's SIGINT facilities.
Appendix of Images
public response of the cuban president and foreign minister to initial
revelations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
us military and sensitive installations within range of china's sigint
in cuba
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
imagery updates from the el salao site
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
imagery updates from the bejucal site
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Dr. Berg.
I recognize Mr. Martinez-Fernandez for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ANDRES MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST,
LATIN AMERICA, ALLISON CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez,
Ranking Member McIver. I appreciate the invitation and
apologize for my tardiness.
My name is Andres Martinez. I run the Latin America
portfolio at the Heritage Foundation. Since its inception, the
Cuban dictatorship has repeatedly proven itself to be a willing
partner and staging ground for anti-American extra-hemispheric
powers. Today, Havana offers itself as a partner for a new
patron, the Chinese Communist Party. Reporting by CSIS and
other organizations have once again unmasked the maligned
nature of the Beijing-Havana nexus, particularly the growing
footprint of Chinese intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba.
China's accelerating espionage partnership with Cuba poses
a major threat for U.S. and hemispheric security, bringing
together Beijing's resources and technology with Havana's
troubling capacity to penetrate U.S. agencies and security
institutions.
The growth of China's spying footprint in Cuba is also
indicative of Beijing's broader maligned presence in the
Americas. While economic engagement has led the way for China's
advance in much of Latin America and the Caribbean, Beijing's
influence has spread quickly into the political, clandestine,
and the military spheres.
China's broader influences also allowed it to expand its
regional intelligence-gathering capacities beyond Cuba,
including in Democratic nations. Indeed, Beijing has even
secured unusually sprawling embassies in the Caribbean such as
in Antigua, the Bahamas, and beyond with sites that are widely
considered to be active intelligence centers for China.
In Argentina and elsewhere in South America, Beijing has
also established deep-space monitoring facilities with worrying
military implications. China's strategic focus around dual-use
and critical infrastructure in the Americas highlights the
intrinsic military and security nature of China's hemispheric
encroachments. Chinese infrastructure projects across Latin
America and the Caribbean offer Beijing crucial vectors for
espionage and disruptive operations in and around the United
States. Control over ports and other infrastructure can even be
leveraged to impede the movement of U.S. warships, military
resources, or directly target U.S. assets and supply chains.
Beijing's inroads in the Caribbean may be the most
concerning aspect of its hemispheric encroachment. Geographic
proximity to the United States and around crucial U.S. maritime
routes make the Caribbean an outsized strategic importance for
the United States. China appears to recognize the strategic
importance, given the relative attention and engagement Beijing
has given to the region, both economically and politically. As
with specific islands, Beijing seeks to consolidate its
influence over strategically important island chains in the
Caribbean. The end goal of this effort is apparently
counterbalancing the U.S. presence in Asia and empowering China
to destabilize the United States through asymmetric means.
As Beijing grows increasingly belligerent against Taiwan
and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must
assume that China will operationalize its presence and
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean against the United
States.
China's gains in the Caribbean and beyond pose an urgent
challenge for U.S. national security. The Trump administration
has clearly moved to confront the hemispheric vulnerablility
posed by China and its partnership with the communist
dictatorship in Cuba, among other actors. Confronting these
threats requires rallying pressure against Beijing and Havana
while bolstering partnerships with regional democracies across
economic, political, and security spheres. The United States
should bolster its security operation in capacities, in
particular within Latin America and the Caribbean, prioritizing
initiatives that mitigate risks posed to vital infrastructure
and other vulnerabilities.
At the same time, the United States should leverage its
under-appreciated territorial presence in the Caribbean. U.S.
territories, particularly including Puerto Rico can be better
used to counterbalance Chinese and Cuban maligned activities in
the Caribbean and across Latin America. Bolstering the U.S.
Coast Guard presence capacities in Puerto Rico, for example,
will support U.S. security in the broader Caribbean region amid
these growing threats.
U.S. territories can also be used as force multipliers in
bolstering broader U.S. economic engagements in Latin America
and the Caribbean through targeted measures that offset
regional dependence on China.
Thank you very much for the time. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez-Fernandez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andres Martinez-Fernandez
May 5, 2025
My name is Andres Martinez-Fernandez. I am the senior policy
analyst for Latin America at The Heritage Foundation. The views I
express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as
representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
havana's hostility
Since its inception, the Cuban dictatorship has repeatedly proven
itself to be a willing partner and staging ground for anti-American,
extra-hemispheric powers. During the Cold War, Cuba was an active
partner for the Soviet Union, even hosting Soviet nuclear arms and
military forces to target the United States. Much has changed in the
United States since the end of the Cold War, however unfortunately the
same cannot be said of Cuba.
The communist dictatorship in Havana remains as repressive as ever,
controlling every major aspect of Cuba's economy and the lives of the
Cuban people while denying their basic political freedoms and human
rights. Cuba's dictatorship also remains actively hostile to the United
States. Havana continues to launch clandestine operations and espionage
against the United States in an effort to harm U.S. interests. Indeed,
2 of the most damaging spies in U.S. history both worked as agents of
Havana and were both operating well after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Indeed, Manuel Rocha, who reached the top rungs of the U.S.
State Department while acting as a Cuban agent, was only arrested in
2023.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Martinez-Fernandez, Andres. ``Cuba Spy Scandal Reveals U.S.
Vulnerabilities.'' The Heritage Foundation, 9 Apr. 2024, https://
www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/cuba-spy-scandal-reveals-us-
vulnerabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, Cuba's communist dictatorship also offers itself as a
partner for a new extra-hemispheric patron, the China's Communist
Party. Analysis of the Center for Strategic International Studies and
others have revealed the growing footprint of Chinese intelligence-
gathering facilities in Cuba to undermine U.S. security. Indeed,
China's accelerating espionage partnership with Cuba poses a major
threat for U.S. and hemispheric security, bringing together Beijing's
resources and technology with Havana's unsurpassed experience in
penetrating U.S. agencies and security institutions.
The growth of China's spying footprint in Cuba is indicative of
Beijing's broader malign presence and operations in the Americas.
Washington should take note and respond to the anti-American alliance
between Havana and Beijing is consolidated just 90 miles off the U.S.
coast.
china in the americas
It is no secret that China has aggressively bolstered its presence
and influence across the Western Hemisphere in recent years. The
principal avenue for Chinese influence in Latin America is undoubtedly
economic engagement. Through substantial infrastructure investments,
offering market access, attractive financing offers, and more, China
has displaced the United States as the primary economic partner in
South America and increasingly Central America and the Caribbean.
While economic engagement has led the way for China's regional
approach, Beijing's influence has spread quickly into the political and
security spheres. Across the hemisphere, China's offering to the region
erodes sovereignty and stability while empowering the Chinese
government. Indeed, China's economic influence has secured for Beijing
important levers of influence in the Western Hemisphere, including
expanding strategic control of critical infrastructure while also
allowing China to increasingly use its economic power to influence
regional policies.
China's strategic focus around dual-use and critical infrastructure
in the Americas highlights the intrinsic military and security nature
of China's hemispheric encroachment. As Beijing grows increasingly
belligerent against Taiwan and U.S. forces in the Indo Pacific, China's
is likely to operationalize and militarize its presence and influence
in Latin America and the Caribbean against the United States. This
includes leveraging dual-use infrastructure such as ports for military
purposes.
Chinese infrastructure projects across Latin America and the
Caribbean offer Beijing crucial vectors for espionage and disruptive
operations in and around the United States. Control over ports and
other infrastructure can even be leveraged to impede the movement of
U.S. warships and military resources or directly target U.S. assets.
While some downplay the security threats posed by China's economic
presence, Beijing's own actions highlight the operational and even
military dimensions of its approach to Latin America and the Caribbean.
In Panama, for example, President Trump has highlighted the worrying
presence of Chinese-controlled infrastructure, including 2 ports
proximate to the Panama Canal. Given U.S. vulnerabilities to potential
disruption of the Panama Canal, through which over a third of U.S.
container traffic flows, the Trump administration has wisely sought to
extract the Chinese presence there.
In March, the Chinese firm CK Hutchinson agreed to sell the ports
to the U.S. firm Blackrock, however the Chinese Communist Party stepped
in to halt the sale. While the Chinese firm CK Hutchinson determined
that the sale of the ports was in its financial interests, Beijing
decision to halt the sale shows the Chinese government is clearly has
non-economic motivations to its presence in Latin America. Tellingly,
Chinese state media had called the sale of the Chinese ports,
``tantamount to handing a knife to an opponent.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Jackson, Lewis, and Jenny Su. ``Chinese State Media Blasts CK
Hutchison's Panama Port Deal in Soon-Deleted Post.'' Reuters, 29 Mar.
2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/chinese-state-media-likens-
ck-hutchison-panama-port-deal-handing-knife-opponent-2025-03-29/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, these vulnerabilities for the United States are not
limited to Panama. Elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean, China
has leveraged its influence and investments to secure worrying control
over dual-use infrastructure and vital trade arteries with little to no
oversight by local governments.
beijing's caribbean strategy
Beijing's inroads in the Caribbean and Central America may be the
most concerning aspect of its hemispheric encroachment. Geographic
proximity to the United States and around crucial U.S. maritime routes
makes the Caribbean of outsized strategic importance for the United
States. China appears to recognize this strategic importance given the
relative attention and engagement Beijing has given to the region, both
economically and politically. As with Pacific Island nations, Beijing
appears to seek the consolidation of its influence and presence over
strategically important island chains in the Caribbean with the goal of
counterbalancing U.S. presence in Asia and empowering China to even
destabilize the United States through asymmetric means.
In the Caribbean, China is also applying its ample experience at
consolidating influence over small island nations with strategic
importance for the United States. Indeed, China's Communist Party has
been waging wars of influence in small island nations across the world
for years, effectively leveraging a mix of economic engagement,
corruption, and subversion to assert its control.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Harding, Andrew. ``Time to Act: Strategic Benefits of Funding
the Compacts of Free Association (COFA).'' The Heritage Foundation,
2024, https://www.heritage.org/china/report/time-act-strategic-
benefits-funding-the-compacts-free-association-cofa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weak institutions and small and stagnant economies in the Caribbean
offer easy geopolitical gains for Beijing's influence, an opportunity
which the Chinese government has seized upon. In 2018, Trinidad and
Tobago opened a new path for Beijing in the Caribbean, becoming the
first island country in the world to join China's Belt and Road
Initiative. Today, over half of CARICOM member states are signatories
to the Belt and Road Initiative and China's economic engagement with
the Caribbean has seen dramatic growth.
As of 2023, Chinese investments in the Caribbean have surpassed $30
billion, with a broad presence across multiple industries, particularly
infrastructure.\4\ In some parts of the Caribbean, Chinese investments
come to dominate sectors, reflecting Beijing's long-term predatory
approach. Indeed, much of China's investments in the Caribbean are
dubious business propositions for any traditional lender or firm.\5\
However, Beijing's political impetus pushes these investments forward,
again revealing their geopolitical and strategic nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Hernandez, Carlos. ``China in the Caribbean: A Two-Faced
Dragon.'' Dialogo Americas, 4 Apr. 2025, https://dialogo-americas.com/
articles/china-in-the-caribbean-two-faced-dragona8/.
\5\ Baker, Peter. ``U.S. Warned That the Caribbean Is Becoming a
`Chinese Lake'.'' Newsweek, 2 May 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/us-
warned-caribbean-becoming-chinese-lake-2041296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While returns on investment may be lacking for China's Caribbean
investments, they have bought important influence for Beijing, as well
as control over infrastructure such as maritime ports and special
economic zones with little to no local oversight.
China's broader influence has also allowed it to expand its
regional intelligence-gathering capacities beyond Cuba, including in
the democratic Caribbean nations. Indeed, Beijing's has even secured
unusually sprawling embassies in the Caribbean, such as in Antigua, the
Bahamas, and elsewhere, with cites that are widely considered to be
active intelligence centers for China.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Baker, Peter. ``China's Growing Influence in the Caribbean: A
Challenge for the U.S.'' Newsweek, 3 May 2024, https://
www.newsweek.com/2024/05/03/china-caribbean-united-states-antigua-belt-
road-diplomacy-debt-chinese-xi-jinping-rivalry-1891668.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a path forward for the united states
The approach of China in the Americas highlights a set of worry
strategic goals that regional governments fail to recognize and that
even the United States has failed to fully appreciate. The Trump
administration has clearly prioritized addressing these hemispheric
vulnerabilities posed by China and its partnership with the Cuban
dictatorship, among other actors. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has
wisely prioritized engagement with the Caribbean, traveling twice
already to the region. Concerted political and economic engagement such
as this is a crucial element of confronting the hemispheric threat
posed by Beijing and Havana.
Conditioning economic engagement and investment on regional
cooperation to limit malign Chinese influence, for examples, should
help guide this renewed hemispheric engagement. At the same time, the
United States can and should bolster its security partnerships and
capacities in the Caribbean and more broadly across the Americas in
order to mitigate risks posed to vital infrastructure and other
vulnerabilities. To this end, Department of Homeland Security
partnerships that increase local oversight capacities and oversight
over port facilities and similar infrastructure should be prioritized.
At the same time, the United States should leverage its
underappreciated territorial presence in the Caribbean. U.S.
territories, particularly including Puerto Rico, can be better used to
counterbalance Chinese and Cuban malign activities in the Caribbean.
Bolstering the U.S. Coast Guard presence and capacities in Puerto Rico,
for example, will support U.S. security in the broader Caribbean region
amid these growing threats. At the same time, U.S. territories can be
force multipliers in bolstering economic engagement in the Caribbean
through targeted measures that offset regional dependence on China.
Confronting China's hemispheric encroachment poses a substantial
challenge for the United States. However, by recognizing the importance
of U.S. engagement and defending U.S. interests, the Trump
administration is already making substantial shift toward protecting
U.S. national security in our hemisphere.
______
The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no
funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any
government or other contract work.
The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in
the United States. During 2023, it had hundreds of thousands of
individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every
State in the United States. Its 2023 operating income came from the
following sources: Individuals, 82 percent; Foundations, 14 percent;
Corporations, 1 percent; Program revenue and other income, 3 percent.
The top 5 corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1
percent of its 2023 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited
annually by the national accounting firm of RSM US, LLP.
Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals
discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are
their own and do not reflect an institutional position of The Heritage
Foundation or its board of trustees.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Martinez-Fernandez.
I now recognize Mr. Lazarus for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF LELAND LAZARUS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, GORDON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Mr. Lazarus. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member
McIver, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the privilege to speak today. My name is Leland
Lazarus. I'm the associate director of Florida International
University's Gordon Institute for Public Policy and nonresident
fellow at the Atlantic Council's global China hub.
I come to you today not just as a researcher, but as
someone who has observed this threat to evolve first-hand.
First, from my time as a Fulbright scholar, studying the
Chinese Diaspora in Panama, to serving as the State Department
Foreign Service officer in China and the Caribbean, to serving
as a special assistant and speech writer to 2 combat commanders
at U.S. Southern Command.
So let me be clear, Cuba is not just an outpost of Chinese
influence, it's a strategic beach head. As my colleagues have
said time and time again, just 90 miles off Florida where I
live, where I reside, the Chinese Communist Party is executing
a 21st Century playbook of espionage, port infrastructure,
space surveillance, and digital authoritarianism. Havana is the
perfect laboratory for China. China has built signals
intelligence outposts aimed at Florida, as the CSIS report has
shown, but it has also installed airport scanners and
surveillance equipment using Chinese firms like Nuctech, as
Ranking Member McIver had mentioned. It's a state-owned
company, sanctioned by the United States for ties to the
Chinese military.
Nuctech systems are deployed across Cuban airports,
seaports, and customs facilities, giving Beijing privilege
access to sensitive data flows right on our doorstep. But
what's happening in Cuba is just one chapter in a much larger
story. Next week on May 13, Beijing will host the China CELAC
summit with nearly every country in Latin America and the
Caribbean represented in Beijing. It is a reminder that China
has a long-term strategy for this hemisphere, built on patient
investment, diplomatic cultivation, and evolving security ties.
The United States unfortunately by contrast still too often
operates from a crisis-to-crisis mindset in this region and has
yet to provide an affirmative long-term agenda for the region
at large.
The Chinese military and military scholars call countries
like Cuba strategic support points or Zhan lue Zhi dian in
Mandarin to sustain their far seas naval posture. They don't
need permanent basis, they need leverage. Cuba gives them
exactly that. It's close, politically reliable, and already
outfitted with Chinese tech.
When the United States sends warships through the Taiwan
Straits, Chinese academics now reply with references to their
own right to operate near Florida. That's strategic reciprocity
Beijing style. You touch our waters, we have the right to touch
yours.
China also aspires to build its Sitian space program to
expand its global space domain awareness. But space is also
crucial for signals intelligence and Cuba is a prime location
for China to target the United States. That's why we at Florida
International University have created the Chinese activities in
Latin America dashboard in order to track and expose China's
moves in almost real time. It maps everything, and I mean
everything from dual-use ports and signals intelligence
listening stations to companies like Nuctech that quietly
expand China's operational footprint across the region.
Our dashboard that we built is really built for you all,
U.S. policy makers, to make the best decisions about our
greatest strategic competitor. But it's also a warning. China's
not just coming to Latin America and the Caribbean--it's
already here and it's here to stay.
Members of the subcommittee, we cannot win a global
competition with China if we lose sight of our own hemisphere.
Strategic neglect is not just dangerous, it is a gift we give
to Beijing. We must meet this challenge together with our
allies and partners to make America and the Americas safer,
stronger, and more prosperous.
Thank you, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lazarus follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Lazarus.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning and I will recognize myself for 5
minutes of questioning. I'll start out with a comment in that
the United States for far too long, both Republican and
Democrat administrations have not paid close enough attention
to what's happening in our own hemisphere. It's allowed China
to make the inroads that it has and now we're just waking up to
the fact. So this hearing is part of that to try to awaken the
American people and the administration to the fact that we need
to pay close attention to what's happening in our own
neighborhood.
So with that, this is an open question. It's my estimation
that the Cuban regime itself is actually in one of the most
weakest positions that it has been in the past 60 years. Do any
of you share that opinion or do you disagree with that opinion?
I'll start with you Dr. Berg.
Mr. Berg. Thanks for the question, Chairman. I do share
that opinion. I think the Cuban regime is incredibly weak at
this point in time. We've seen that not just in protests from
the island but in rolling blackouts that occur seemingly on a
monthly basis, sometimes weekly basis, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Fernandez.
Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Yes, I agree. I think economically,
politically as well the regime is in a period of vulnerability.
I think also increasingly hemispheric as well as U.S. political
consensus is moving toward a recognition of the maligned nature
of the Cuban dictatorship as past attempts however poorly
conceived at engagements as we have seen from the United States
have fallen flatly and been rebuffed. The Cuban dictatorship
has at the same time again as we have discussed acted as an
active partner for enemies of the United States within our
hemisphere.
Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Lazarus, do you share that opinion that
the Cuban regime is at one of the weakest points in the last 6
years?
Mr. Lazarus. Sir, I would absolutely agree. Inflation is
over 30 percent for of the Cuban regime. There has been an
increased outflow of refugees coming out of Cuba and there has
been an increase in Cuban officials traveling to Beijing trying
to get more investment. I understand that now China is Cuba's
either largest or second-largest trading partner, counting from
roughly 30 percent of Cuba's imports and exports.
I think that Cuba's decreasing economic situation is
allowing it to become even more and more dependent
economically, increasingly security and political standpoint on
China.
Mr. Gimenez. I would like to discuss with the 3 of you off-
line and how we can accelerate Cuba's dictatorship their demise
so we can turn Cuba from a platform and a base for China and
make it actually a friend of the United States. I think we are
close to that. I also think that Cuba is the head of the snake.
When we talk about all the unrest that's happening in our
hemisphere in Venezuela and Nicaragua, Cuba is the head of the
snake and we need to do everything in our power to set the
Cuban people free but also turn Cuba from an enemy into friend.
Now lets talk about Cuba and the threat and the Chinese
threat in Cuba. The Russians have been operating there for
years, decades. Are the Chinese supplanting the Russians or are
they adding to the Russian threat?
Mr. Berg. I'm happy to take that, Mr. Chairman. I think
that they are both supplanting but also adding to. There is
still a residual Russian presence of course in Cuba. We saw
last year at the tail end of the Biden administration how the
Russians sailed a vessel through the Florida strait, ported
both in Cuba and in Havana. Importantly before porting in Cuba
displayed one of the Zircon hypersonic missiles in the
Atlantic.
But I would say in terms of the presence, Mr. Chairman, the
Chinese have supplanted them in terms of the more important
partner and quite literally some of these sites that we showed
were former Russian sites but are now occupied we believe by
the Chinese.
Mr. Gimenez. They have added to the capability, a new more
modern infrastructure, et cetera.
Mr. Berg. That's correct.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. So maybe some of my colleagues would be,
you know, surprised to know that not only is it Russia and
China but also Iran is here and North Korea is also here. So we
need to also stand up to those threats.
The training range that's just outside of Florida, it's the
largest training range that we have. It's the only training
range that actually can simulate battling the Taiwan Straits.
What kind of a threat do these facilities pose to those ranges
and what kind of intelligence could the Chinese get from
surveying those ranges in relation to our tactics, et cetera,
of how we may operate in the Taiwan Straits?
Mr. Berg. Mr. Chairman, the first slide that I showed in my
presentation showed just the number of facilities in your home
State that are easily within range of these facilities. It's my
understanding that military communications is of course
encrypted and protected in certain ways. But it is scooped up
by some of this equipment then it is available for the Chinese
to try to crack that communication. So that's why one of my
recommendations is doing an exercise to harden facilities and
figure out what our vulnerabilities are so that we can make
sure that we protect those very vulnerable secrets, both on the
commercial side and on the military side, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. My 5 minutes are up.
I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from New
Jersey Ms. McIver, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lazarus, thank you once again for joining us today. In
your testimony, you discussed how China will be hosting a
summit with Latin America and Caribbean states next week. China
and Cuba also both belong to the BRICS group along with Brazil,
Russia, India and a total of 23 countries. BRICS has become a
serious political force as the nations belonging to BRICS now
account for almost 30 percent of the world's GDP, 40 percent of
the oil production and almost half the world's population. We
have seen what Trump's repeated tariff threats are doing to the
economy both at home and globally while eroding trust in the
U.S. dollar.
Trump's foreign policies are only making groups like the
BRICS more powerful as our geopolitical rivals work to fill the
void that President Trump has created with his America last
policies.
Mr. Lazarus, as America recedes from the world's stage, how
are BRICS and other multinationl groups exerting power and
influence?
Mr. Lazarus. Ranking Member, thank you so much for the
question. You're absolutely right, Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa when taken together they represent more
than 30 percent of the global GDP. They have really been using
that multilateral institution in order to create alternative
financial institutions to the Western-built ones, built right
after World War II. So you think the New Development Bank or
the BRICS bank that could fund various projects in the
developing world.
There is talk about them creating a BRICS currency that
could mean that they could settle trade accounts, not using the
U.S. dollars, which could potentially weaken the U.S. dollar's
dominance in the globe. But it goes to a larger narrative that
the Chinese and our other adversaries try to use in the global
south which is that the United States doesn't necessarily care
about the global south. All they care about is realist
ideology, especially in this region in Latin America and the
Caribbean there is this narrative that the Chinese try to say
that the United States only wants to impose the Monroe Doctrine
2.0. I am concerned that certain things, certain policies could
really allow the Chinese to continue to spread that narrative
in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that. Just to follow up, in your
opinion, do you think China ultimately stands to benefit from
the pause in foreign aid underneath the Trump administration?
Mr. Lazarus. Well, we are seeing already on a global scale
that China has already stepped up its foreign aid in countries
like Cambodia, Nepal. As I mentioned, next week they are going
to be hosting the fourth ministerial of the China-CELAC summit.
I expect that after that summit there's going to be a joint
action plan between China and CELAC on China increasing exports
of renewable energy and electric vehicles and solar panels.
Again, it is another way for China to project itself as a
reliable partner at a time where other countries are perceiving
potentially the United States' tariffing other countries. It's
also a way for China to project itself as the defender of
globalization and free trade going forward, that is a concern.
Ms. McIver. Thank you so much, Mr. Lazarus.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Crane. Thank you guys for coming today to talk about
this very, very important topic. So just to get this straight,
we have the Chinese partnering with Cuba, both Communist
countries and Cuba's roughly 90 miles from the United States.
Are we able to discern through these satellite imagery, human
intel, and signal intel what the capabilities of this
technology located on Cuba, the island of Cuba? Dr. Berg.
Mr. Berg. Chairman, we are able to speculate about it, but
again, this was used--discovered using commercially-available
satellite technology that we have the capability of using. I'm
sure and this is why I recommended a Classified briefing for
you all. On the high side, my guess is that there is a lot more
analysis available on capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Mr. Crane. Do we have the ability to jam and block the
surveillance technologies located on the island of Cuba, Dr.
Berg?
Mr. Berg. Congressman, it's my understanding that we do
have some of that capability. I'm not sure if it is being
deployed. Also as I mentioned some of the communications that
are sensitive in nature are also encrypted, but I'm happy to
talk to you off-line or answer questions further after this
hearing about those types' capabilities.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. Mr. Lazarus, you mentioned that the
Chinese could use these basis to project digital
authoritarianism, I believe that was the word you used. Can you
expand on that?
Mr. Lazarus. Absolutely, Congressman. Well, first and
foremost, Huawei and ZTE provide the digital backbone for
Etecsa, the Cuban telecommunications company. We saw in July
2021 when there was the large massive protests in Cuba against
the regime that the regime was able to really shut down the
protesters' communications so that they couldn't necessarily
collaborate with each other as easily as they otherwise would.
Our assessment was that they were able to rely on technology of
Huawei and ZTE or to shut that down. There's also again the
idea of Nuctech being in various seaports, airports in Cuba.
Nuctech is a state-owned enterprise. It is a subsidiary of
Tsinghua University's Tongfang.
China's national nuclear corporation has a 21 percent stake
in Nuctech and it provides all kinds of port scanning equipment
and the concern is that all the kind of information, whether it
be biometric, whether it be commercial, whether it be sensitive
data about supply chain roots and cargo flows, all that
information can go back to Beijing and that would constitute a
national security threat for the United States.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
Dr. Berg, is it true that a Chinese national was arrested
in January of this year in Miami's airport for conducting
espionage activities?
Mr. Berg. Congressman, I'll have to get back to you on
that. I'm not aware of that particular----
Mr. Crane. Yes, I'd like to enter this into the record, Mr.
Chairman. This is an article, ``Chinese National Targeted in
Federal Spy Investigation Arrested At Miami International
Airport''. According to the article, he had transmitted 47
pages that were schematics, graphs, diagrams related to nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Lazarus, I want to come back to----
Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Article From the Florida Center for Government Accountability
chinese national targeted in federal spy investigation arrested at
miami international airport
By Izzy Kapnick
January 17, 2025 at 4:54 PM ET
A Chinese traveler targeted in an FBI investigation of alleged
high-level industrial espionage in the United States was detained
Tuesday at Miami International Airport and charged with lying to
customs agents.
Chengzhe Wang, 29, is in Federal custody after allegedly making
false statements to Customs and Border Protection about his connection
to the Chinese government and the nature of a past trip to the U.S.,
according to an FBI affidavit obtained by the Florida Trident.
When a search of his electronic devices found he'd shared a nuclear
weapons research document on a Chinese app, Wang told agents he sent it
because he ``thought it contained porn pictures,'' according to the
arrest affidavit.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) intercepted the Chinese
national when he flew from Mexico City to Miami on January 14. He was
scheduled to board another flight, headed for Nicaragua, later that
day, according to the affidavit.
Customs agents detained Wang on the basis of a June 2023 tip to
Federal law enforcement that alleged operatives from Xugong Group, a
large-scale Chinese construction-equipment firm, were entering the
United States to ``conduct illegal activities,'' including ``spying on
intelligence'' and ``obtaining confidential technology in the same
industry.'' The tipster claimed those involved in the espionage
``received training from China's Security Intelligence Agency on how to
provide false information to deceive U.S. customs to enter the country,
and how to obtain intelligence in the U.S.''
Wang's name and passport number were included in the tip, which
specified he was an overseas product manager for a firm associated with
the Xugong Group called XCMG Construction Machinery Co., according to
the FBI. The Trident sent emails to both companies requesting comment
prior to publishing and will update with any response.
Though the tipster--who wasn't identified but is known by Federal
agents--detailed extensive spying activity, Wang is not currently
charged with espionage. The criminal complaint centers on the FBI's
claim that he concealed from customs agents that his firm is owned by
the People's Republic of China and that he's a member of the Chinese
Communist Youth League.
``When asked why Wang initially lied to CBP officers, Wang stated
that he initially denied any current association with the Youth League
because officials at XCMG advised him not to disclose membership to
U.S. authorities,'' FBI special agent Nolan Gallow wrote in the
affidavit.
The affidavit alleges that during a search of Wang's electronics
and cellphone, customs agents found that a document he shared in the
Chinese messaging app WeChat ``contained 47 pages of schematics,
graphs, and diagrams related to nuclear weapons research,'' with text
in Mandarin.
``An initial translation of the PDF document revealed the title as
`Atomic Bomb,' '' Gallow wrote.
When customs officers asked him to explain the document, Wang
claimed he was under the impression he was sharing a file with
pornography images, the FBI says. But a search of the document by the
FBI found no such material and Wang later admitted there was none,
according to the affidavit.
The search also turned up a photograph of a badge or credential
with Mandarin wording for ``Administrative Law Enforcement,'' according
to the affidavit.
``Based on my training and experience, this photograph appears to
depict an official credential or badge case likely for use by [People's
Republic of China] law enforcement or some other PRC government
agency,'' Gallow wrote.
Wang further claimed he was on vacation during a visit to Dallas in
September 2023. However, customs records showed he told agents at the
time that he was in the United States for business purposes that
included a visit to XCMG's warehouses in Houston, the FBI says.
``Wang's statements about his connection to a foreign government,
affiliation with the CCP, and purpose of his 2023 trip to Dallas were
materially false,'' wrote the FBI's Gallow.
The charge brought against Wang carries a maximum sentence of 5
years in prison for the base count, with an 8-year maximum if convicted
with aggravating factors.
About the author: Izzy Kapnick is reporter and editor based in South
Florida. He has worked as a journalist in the Miami metro area for more
than 15 years, covering crime, high-profile litigation, environmental
torts, politics, and public health.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lazarus, I want to come back to you. Do you believe the
Chinese are engaged in unrestricted warfare with the United
States, i.e. economic warfare attacks on critical
infrastructure, espionage, theft, et cetera?
Mr. Lazarus. Congressman, the--we've seen evidence time and
time again, whether it be the FBI under former director
Christopher Wray talking about how China-based hackers, whether
it be Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon has infiltrated critical
infrastructure throughout the United States. That would of
course be a national security concern and that they are
potentially prepositioning if there is ever a conflict with the
United States, say over the straits of Taiwan or the South
China Sea, that the Chinese could retaliate by shutting down
some of that critical infrastructure. The concern is that many
of the same tactics, some of the same companies that are
concerned here in the United States are also operating in Latin
America and the in the Caribbean.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy.
Sorry, he left.
OK. I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank our witnesses
for being here today.
I'm deeply concerned about the long-term consequences of
the Trump-Musk administration's systemic dismantling of USAID,
foreign aid, and other international development programs.
Actions that have significantly weakened America's global
influence, especially on our own hemisphere.
In the past several months, critical U.S. investments in
diplomacy and development have been slashed, frozen, or
redirected to serve narrow political goals. This isn't just bad
policy, it was a strategic mistake that has had real
consequences on a national security and regional stability.
In Latin America, these decisions have been nothing short
of a gift to authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua. By retreating from our role as a champion of
democracy and development we left a vacuum that autocrats have
rushed to fill. We are tired of taking the lead instead of
supporting reformers and pro-Democratic movements; we left them
under-resourced and isolated, while despots like Nicholas
Maduro tightened their grip. Foreign aid is not a charity. It a
wise investment in stability, security, and American values.
When we help communities thrive and support Democratic
institutions, we make it harder for authoritarianism,
corruption, and extremism to take root. Cutting these programs
undermines regional security and contributes to the very
conditions violence, poverty, and political repression that
drive migration to our Southern Border.
Rebuilding USAID and reaffirming our commitment to global
development is not just morally right, it is strategically
necessary. America must lead again, not just with the might of
our military or the strength of our values and the reach of our
engagement.
Dr. Berg, given that maritime shipping is heavily dominated
by Chinese vessels, including those coming in and out of U.S.
ports, what kind of insight does that give the Chinese into
maritime traffic in the United States? How could China use this
information to our detriment?
Mr. Berg. Thanks for the question, Congressman. I think
we've seen multiple instances in which the Chinese have used
ports as infrastructure, not just to have the PLA navy make
port calls in some of the deep water ports, but all of that
data, that information that is contained in a port is important
for the Chinese. The comings and goings of ships, cargo
manifest, with what frequency, this is all very important if
we're talking about building safe and secure supply chains as
well.
I had the privilege of being before this committee in
February when we were talking about the very issue of ports.
This issue also came up then, specifically with reference to
the Panama Canal, that drew Hong Kong-based ports that are at
the strategic approaches to the canal. Also a critical issue,
Congressman.
Mr. Carter. In your testimony, you recommended enlisting
neighbors like Bahamas, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica to
combat intelligence gathering from China and Cuba. How can
Federal international development system programs help achieve
this goal?
Mr. Berg. Congressman, I would advocate that we build on
Secretary of State Rubio's very successful visit to the
Caribbean in recent weeks. I think it is important that the
Secretary of State has already taken 2 trips to the region. In
just over 2.5 months of his time in office. I think those
countries once made aware of extent of Cuba's espionage
activities and therefore their vulnerabilities would be quite
willing to partner with us. It is in their interest just as it
is in ours not to have Cuba snooping on their signal
intelligence.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Mr. Lazarus, how can China use its investments in Cuba to
disrupt shipping routes that lead to major U.S. ports? Like the
Port of New Orleans or the Port of South Louisiana in my home
State.
Mr. Lazarus. Well, I understand that those 2 ports in the
United States represent about 20 percent--more than 20 percent
of cargo entering the United States, and the concern is that
whether it be a Nuctech, whether it be a China Harbor
Engineering Company, because China Harbor and China
Communication construction corporation also have key projects
in Cuba.
Those companies that have direct ties to the People's
Liberation Army can gather information about U.S. port
operations, cargo flows, potentially see our supply chain
vulnerabilities. They can also use those areas a way to issue
cyber attacks or cyber disruptions in and around the port
operations. They could of course create plausible deniability
which is of course an MO that they've been doing for quite
sometimes as well.
Mr. Carter. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.
I recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Mrs.
Biggs.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
guests today for highlighting these important aspects of our
topic today.
So I have personally been to Key West and involved in
military training there so this topic really does catch my
attention. Also I would like to say that I'm excited about our
current administration, the idea of increasing our innovation
and rebuilding our military and strengthening our defense, our
very purpose of this.
U.S. intelligence officials, military strategists, and
regional experts have drawn parallels between China's current
activity and the Cold War-era use of Cuba by the Soviet Union
as a forward surveillance outpost. Yet the tools of today,
especially in digital surveillance, constitute a sophisticated
threat of a different order.
So my first question is for Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Are
China's activities in Cuba more reminiscent of Cold War-style
strategic encirclement or are they more aligned with a new
model of digital influence and persistent surveillance?
Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Thank you for the question,
Congresswoman. I think that there are many aspects of China's
engagement that are reminiscent of the Cold War-era engagement
by the Soviet Union. They align primarily with or often with
military and geo-strategic aims for those reasons.
I think certainly we're seeing an increased leveraging of
biotechnologies, as well as the more deep economic ties that
China has globally as compared to the Soviet Union. As part of
what's being leveraged in Latin America and the Caribbean and
with Cuba to create this broader surveillance and operational
infrastructure for China.
That raises any concerns because obviously we saw the
consequences and the risks during the Cold War of this presence
from hostile extra-hemispheric actors just 90 miles off--on our
shores. We're seeing that I think at a new level as I said
because of these new and in some ways expanded capacities that
the Chinese governments can employ because of its resources,
because of its capacities.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.
So my next question is for Dr. Berg. Could China's posture
in Cuba serve as a springboard for influencing or disrupting
U.S. diplomatic or military efforts outside the region such as
in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Berg. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I
think it's critical. We hope this never happens, but if there
is conflict in a different theater of the world, let's say
there is a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the United States if
it is to come for example to Taiwan's aid, will need to shift
forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China's ability to
disrupt that process could be done through its activities in
Cuba or as we heard at the February hearing at this very
committee through some of those controls of the ports of the
strategic approach to the Panama Canal.
There are multiple important critical choke points in this
hemisphere that would be a part of that surge, that transition
of forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific theaters where
China's presence in the Caribbean, as my colleagues have
pointed out, would be incredibly important. So they would have
the ability in my opinion to attempt at least to block some of
that shifting of force from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
Congresswoman.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Berg, China's state-owned tech companies like Huawei
and ZTE have played a key role in building Cuba's digital
infrastructure. These companies are known to have deep ties to
China's military intelligence services and their equipment has
been flagged globally for creating back doors enabling
surveillance. How likely is it that these Chinese-built
networks are enabling Beijing to conduct the same cyber
operations or espionage targeting U.S. Government or commercial
entities, either directly or by proxy through Cuban servers?
Mr. Berg. Congresswoman, I think it's--Congressman, excuse
me--I think it's very likely that that's what they are
attempting. Excuse me.
Mr. Garbarino. That's OK. I've been called worse.
Mr. Berg. Excuse me again. Congressman, I think it is very
likely that that is what's happening that Cuba is offering
China some of the best real estate that it can possibly have,
90 miles off, off U.S. shores. We've seen in multiple other
instances how Chinese state-owned enterprises like Huawei and
ZTE have provided a back door in other contexts such on the
African Union and other organizations. So I see no reason to
believe why we shouldn't believe that they are trying to do the
same against the United States, their principle competitor in
the 21st Century.
Mr. Garbarino. Has there been credible analysis of
confirmation that Chinese intelligence has used Huawei- or ZTE-
connected infrastructure in Cuba to intercept sensitive U.S.
communications or conduct cyber--I mean, we believe they are,
but has there been any analysis or confirmation?
Mr. Berg. Congressman, not on the open-source side. What
we've collected here is the facilities that we think are likely
the Chinese are using and we've done this in conjunction with
some of the public reporting that's been done.
In fact, going back to your previous question on Huawei and
ZTE, Politico and the Wall Street Journal are the 2 who are
first to report on this and felt that there was a high degree
of confidence that some of the facilities were in fact being
used by the PRC because our intelligence agencies, you know,
this is reported in the open source, were tracking individuals
from Huawei and ZTE coming and going at some of these
facilities.
But I think the answer to your question is more likely to
be found on the high side, which is again why I've recommended
in my testimony that all Members of Congress should be able to
get access to a Classified briefing on this topic.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much.
Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. the deeper China's tech
infrastructure is embedded in Cuban society, the harder it
becomes on-line. I mean, true for anywhere just look at London,
Huawei technology is all over London.
So this creates a long-term dependency that goes far beyond
hardware itself. What strategic leverage does China gain over
Cuba by controlling the architecture of its digital ecosystem.
Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Thank you for the question. I think
it's crucial. It's a central part of China's strategy, you
know. In Cuba, there's the more willing partner that doesn't
necessarily acquire this same level of active pressuring or
maligned influence, but certainly building up capacities over
critical infrastructure such as telecommunications for China
puts countries like Cuba and Democratic nations across the
Americas at a significant dependence on the Chinese Communist
Party.
That's the kind of thing that I think is a significant
vulnerability, particularly in the case of conflict, but as we
move, we've seen elsewhere the realm of economic and
infrastructure capacities and influence being leveraged beyond
that sphere going into the political and into the military
where this capacity is then used to push governments to make
decisions that are more favorable to the Chinese Communist
Party.
So it does create significant questions, particularly for
the longer term. If we are blessed with seeing a shift in Cuba
as far as a return to democracy, these would be challenges that
a future Cuban government would have to confront.
Mr. Garbarino. You mentioned actually in your answer about
how this could be in conflict. How could they leverage these
vulnerabilities in a regional conflict or confrontation
involving the United States?
Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. I think as far as
telecommunications this feeds into the present
telecommunication infrastructure, and this feeds into a broader
intelligence capacity for China which is substantial as we've
discussed as going into signals intelligence, even to deep fake
monitoring.
We also see a worrying build-up around critical
infrastructure, maritime routes where the capacity for
disruptive action and submersion is substantial and could
frankly cripple the U.S. economy in aspects of U.S. military
planning, even limiting the capacity for example of transit for
U.S. military resources and warships across for example, the
Panama Canal or other key points. So it's substantial.
Mr. Garbarino. I ran out of time so I yield back. Thank
you.
Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
This hearing kind-of whets our appetite and I think we're
going to take Dr. Berg's advice and we need to go into a
Classified setting to look at the depth of this issue and how
serious it is to American security and get us some folks that
can give it to us in a Classified setting.
So I want to thank the witnesses for your time and
testimony. Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E)
the hearing report will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]