[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ELIMINATING WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY:
ADDRESSING THE BIDEN-HARRIS ADMINISTRA-
TION'S FAILURES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
of the
COMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-8
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-192 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Chair Ranking Member
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Tony Gonzales, Texas Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Morgan Luttrell, Texas LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Member
Elijah Crane, Arizona Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Gabe Evans, Colorado Robert Garcia, California
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Vacant
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Eric Heighberger, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma, Chairman
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Member
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Brad Knott, North Carolina Vacant
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Sang Yi, Subcommittee Staff Director
Lisa Canini, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Josh Brecheen, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oklahoma, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Ms. Kristen D. Bernard, Deputy Inspector General, Office of
Audits, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 22
Ms. Erika Lang, Assistant Inspector General, Office of
Inspections and Evaluations, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Office of the Inspector General:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 22
Panel II
Mr. Curtis M. Schube, Executive Director, Council to Modernize
Governance:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Mr. Mike Howell, Executive Director, Oversight Project, The
Heritage Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 55
Prepared Statement............................................. 56
Mr. John Roth, Private Citizen, Former Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 58
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
Mr. Andrew Block, Senior Counsel, America First Legal Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 64
Prepared Statement............................................. 66
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability:
Statement of Tammy L. Hull, Acting Chairperson, Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and Inspector
General, U.S. Postal Service................................. 45
The Honorable Josh Brecheen, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oklahoma, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability:
Statement of Associated Builders and Contractors............... 78
ELIMINATING WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECU-
RITY: ADDRESSING THE BIDEN-HARRIS AD-
MINISTRATION'S FAILURES
----------
Tuesday, March 11, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations,
and Accountability,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Josh Brecheen
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Brecheen, Greene, Strong, Ogles,
Knott, Thanedar, Ramirez, and Thompson (ex officio).
Mr. Brecheen. The Committee on Homeland Security regarding
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability will come to
order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine areas of
rampant waste, fraud, abuse of taxpayer dollars by the Biden-
Harris administration's Department of Homeland Security.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
committee in recess at any point.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Again, welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability, our very first hearing of
the 119th Congress, titled ``Eliminating Waste, Fraud, and
Abuse at the Department of Homeland Security: Addressing the
Biden-Harris Administration Failures.''
I'm honored to be the Chairman of the subcommittee, to be
joined by my colleagues, distinguished guests, and experts.
I also congratulate Ranking Member Thanedar for his new
role. There's a lot of work that we'll be doing in this
Congress, and this subcommittee is excited to be on the
forefront of assisting in the reformation of the Department of
Homeland Security.
We'd also like to thank full committee Ranking Member
Bennie Thompson for joining us today, who I know is not here. I
don't see him, but he will be here shortly.
For too long, the Federal Government has spent money on
programs, contracts, and grants that do not promote the
interest of the American people. For 4 years, under the Biden-
Harris administration, we've all watched taxpayer dollars
entrusted with the Department of Homeland Security become
subject to waste and abuse. There is no doubt that inefficient,
ineffective use of taxpayer resources undermined our national
interests.
Under new leadership in the last 2 years in the House,
under Republicans taking the Majority, this Oversight
Subcommittee did press hard for transparency, offered the
Biden-Harris administration solutions that fell on deaf ears.
The GAO, the Government Accountability Office, the Office
of Inspector General have also remained, providing many
recommendations, recommendations that could have saved taxpayer
money and assist the Department in mission success.
For the last several years, nonprofit organizations, like
The Heritage Foundation, America First Legal, the Council to
Modernize Governance, who will join us today on the second
panel of witnesses, had demanded transparency and
accountability, but were consistently stonewalled by the
Government.
Today, we will examine some of the rampant waste, fraud,
and abuse at the Department of Homeland Security that occurred
under the Biden-Harris administration and evaluate solutions.
We must defend against such waste of hard-earned taxpayer
resources.
Failures of the Biden-Harris administration are staggering.
Because the previous administration refused to enforce
immigration law, American sovereign borders have been in chaos.
From 2021 to January 2025, a 4-year period, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection encountered more than 11 million illegal
aliens nationwide. Most of these 11 million illegal aliens were
released and provided shelter, food, plane and bus tickets,
cell phones, and cash by nongovernmental organizations, known
as NGO's, who receive billions of American taxpayer money.
One Office of the Inspector General report found that DHS,
Department of Homeland Security, wasted under the Biden-Harris
administration at least $17 million paying one NGO for unused
bed space for illegal aliens in a hotel. That $17 million could
have been spent on agent salaries, better equipment for Federal
law enforcement, or improved training to help protect officers
and keep communities safe.
In an attempt to shield the immigration crisis from the
public, the Biden-Harris administration created a mass parole
scheme to fly illegal aliens into the interior of the United
States. These schemes were a clear abuse of power that left
American citizens, vulnerable communities exposed to criminals,
cartels, and potential terrorists. A notable component of this
parole scheme was Operation Allies Welcome, used to bring
Afghan nationals into the United States after President Biden's
disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
Multiple Inspector General reports found that DHS released
Afghan nationals into the United States without adequate
screening, without adequate vetting or monitoring, leaving our
country vulnerable to a national security risk from those that
were coming in.
In addition to the failure to protect America's borders,
the Biden-Harris administration favored the use of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's, FEMA's agency's resource to
support sanctuary cities and NGO's, nongovernmental
organizations, for sheltering and caring for illegal aliens,
monies that otherwise could be used elsewhere securing our
Southern Border.
FEMA's crisis of focus has been worsened by its fragmented
approach to disaster assistance, resulting in the Government
Accountability Office, GAO, adding Federal disaster delivery to
its 2025 high-risk list for waste, fraud, and abuse. I want to
reiterate that. It resulted in the GAO adding Federal disaster
delivery, FEMA's disaster aid to its 2025 high-risk list for
waste, fraud, and abuse, which we will talk more about.
Another DHS component that experienced a crisis of focus
under the Biden-Harris administration is the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA. In the 118th Congress,
this committee investigated and uncovered efforts by CISA to
pressure social media companies to remove posts by Americans
containing ``mis-, dis-, and malinformation'' related to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Republican lawmakers thankfully forced DHS to scuttle their
attempts to stand up to this Disinformation Governance Board,
as it's called, to further police the lawful speech of
Americans on-line.
CISA's focus on censorship instead of its statutory mission
to protect our critical infrastructure from cyber threats was
misguided at best, nefarious at worst. Either way, the
divergence from CISA's intended mission increased the risk to
our cybersecurity. Over the last several years, the Office of
Inspector General found severe cyber vulnerabilities in
Homeland Security's networks, including TSA, ICE, and CBP.
President Trump has now augmented our efforts to return
Americans to common sense on these policies. He's introduced
Executive Orders to secure our borders, uphold the rule of law,
defend against the waste of hard-earned taxpayer resources, and
create transparency through the Executive branch.
On his first day in office, President Trump stated he would
marshal all resources available to prevent unlawful entries
across the borders of the United States, to pursue criminal
charges against illegal alien criminals, and regain operational
control of the border from cartels and smugglers.
President Trump also organized the FEMA Review Council to
advise and report on potential reorganization of FEMA, leading
to potentially, as the President has discussed, more State
authority. Refocusing the Federal Government's disaster
response efforts on helping Americans, including by vesting
greater power in State governments to perform disaster
response, is long overdue.
Finally, we must recognize that the Executive branch has
acted swiftly in recent weeks to undo much of the Biden-Harris
administration's waste of taxpayer dollars. The Department of
Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has been instrumental in
exposing and suspending, even within Department of Homeland
Security, outlays on DEI programs, duplicative awards, and
services for illegal immigrants.
Today, we'll examine how under the Biden-Harris
administration DHS failed in its basic mission. We'll also
explore opportunities for greater efficiency and cost savings
in the Department of Homeland Security all across the Federal
Government.
I welcome our Members, appreciate the important work ahead
of us, and welcome our guests today. Thank you for joining us.
[The statement of Chairman Brecheen follows:]
Statement of Chairman Josh Brecheen
March 11, 2025
Good afternoon and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability's first hearing of the 119th
Congress titled, ``Eliminating Waste, Fraud, and Abuse at the
Department of Homeland Security: Addressing the Biden-Harris
Administration's Failures.''
I am honored to be Chairman of this subcommittee, and to be joined
by colleagues, distinguished guests, and experts. I also congratulate
Ranking Member Thanedar on his new role. There's a lot of work to be
done this Congress, and this subcommittee is excited to be at the
forefront of assisting in the reformation of the Department of Homeland
Security.
For too long, the Federal Government has spent money on programs,
contracts, and grants that do not promote the interests of the American
people. For 4 years under the Biden-Harris administration, I watched
taxpayer dollars entrusted with the Department of Homeland Security
become subject to waste, fraud, and abuse. There is no doubt that
inefficient and ineffective use of taxpayer resources undermine the
national interest.
Under Republican leadership in the last 2 years, this oversight
subcommittee pressed hard for transparency and offered the Biden-Harris
administration solutions that fell on deaf ears. The Government
Accountability Office and the Office of Inspector General also have
remaining open recommendations--recommendations that very well could
save taxpayer money and assist the Department in mission success.
For the last several years, non-profit organizations like the
Heritage Foundation, America First Legal, and the Council to Modernize
Governance--who will join us today on the second panel of witnesses--
have demanded transparency and accountability, but were consistently
stonewalled by the Government.
Today, we will examine some of the rampant waste, fraud, and abuse
at the Department of Homeland Security that occurred under the Biden-
Harris administration to evaluate solutions. We must tirelessly defend
against the waste of Americans' hard-earned resources entrusted to the
Government.
The failures of the Biden-Harris administration are staggering.
Because the previous administration refused to enforce immigration law,
America's sovereign borders have been in chaos.
From February 2021 to January 2025, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection encountered more than 11 million illegal aliens nationwide.
Most of those 11 million illegal aliens were released and provided
shelter, food, plane and bus tickets, cell phones, and cash by non-
governmental organizations--or NGO's--who received billions of taxpayer
dollars.
One Office of the Inspector General report found that DHS wasted at
least $17 million dollars paying 1 NGO for unused bedspace for illegal
aliens.
That's $17 million dollars that could have been spent on agent
salaries, better equipment for Federal law enforcement, or improved
training to help protect officers and keep communities safe.
In an attempt to shield the immigration crisis from the public, the
Biden-Harris administration created mass parole schemes to fly illegal
aliens to the interior of the United States.
These schemes were a clear abuse of power that left American
citizens and vulnerable communities exposed to criminals, cartels, and
potential terrorists.
A notable component of this parole scheme was Operation Allies
Welcome, used to bring Afghan nationals into the United States after
President Biden's disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
Multiple Inspector General reports found that DHS released Afghan
nationals into the United States without adequate screening, vetting,
or monitoring, leaving our country vulnerable to national security
risks.
In addition to their failure to protect America's borders, the
Biden-Harris administration favored the use of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's resources to support sanctuary cities and NGO's for
sheltering and caring for illegal aliens.
FEMA's crisis of focus has been worsened by its fragmented approach
to disaster assistance, resulting in the Government Accountability
Office, adding Federal disaster delivery to its 2025 high-risk list for
waste, fraud, and abuse.
Another DHS component that experienced a crisis of focus under the
Biden-Harris administration is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA).
In the 118th Congress, this committee investigated and uncovered
efforts by CISA to pressure social media companies to remove posts by
Americans containing,
``mis-, dis-, and malinformation''--related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Republican lawmakers, thankfully, forced DHS to scuttle their
attempts to stand up a ``Disinformation Governance Board'' to further
police the lawful speech of Americans on-line.
CISA's focus on censorship instead of its statutory mission to
protect American critical infrastructure from cyber threats, was
misguided at best, and nefarious at worst. Either way, the divergence
from CISA's intended mission increased the risks to our cyber security.
Over the last several years, the OIG found severe cyber vulnerabilities
in DHS networks, including at the TSA, ICE, and CBP.
President Trump has now augmented our efforts to return America to
common-sense policies.
He introduced Executive Orders to secure our borders, uphold the
rule of law, defend against the waste of hard-earned taxpayer
resources, and create transparency throughout the Executive branch.
On his first day in office, President Trump stated that he would
marshal all resources available to prevent unlawful entries across the
borders of the United States, to pursue criminal charges against
illegal alien criminals, and to regain operational control of the
border from cartels and smugglers.
President Trump also organized the FEMA Review Council to advise
and report on the potential reorganization of FEMA.
Refocusing the Federal Government's disaster response efforts on
helping Americans, including by vesting greater power in State
governments to perform disaster response, is long overdue.
Finally, I must recognize that the Executive branch has acted
swiftly in recent weeks to undo much of the Biden-Harris
administration's waste of taxpayer dollars.
The Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has been
instrumental in exposing and suspending DHS outlays on DEI programs,
duplicative awards, and services for illegal immigrants.
Today, we'll examine how under the Biden-Harris administration, DHS
failed in its basic mission. We'll also explore opportunities for
greater efficiency and cost savings in the Department of Homeland
Security and across the Federal Government.
I welcome our Members and appreciate the important work ahead of
us. I also welcome our guests today. Thank you all for joining us.
Mr. Brecheen. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Thanedar. Good afternoon. I want to, first of all,
congratulate Chairman Brecheen for his new role, and I'm
delighted to be on this committee and work with you throughout
the year in this Congress.
Also, welcome full committee Ranking Member Mr. Thompson to
our committee here.
Good afternoon to all.
Look, waste, fraud, and abuse are not new. That's why
Congress established legitimate entities decades ago to help
identify and root it out. Those experienced Government
watchdogs are now being viciously attacked by President Trump
and co-President Musk.
During his first week in office, Trump unlawfully fired 17
Inspectors General who defend against corruption and
mismanagement in Government. Trump falsely claimed it is a very
common thing to do, and pretended not to know the IGs he purged
despite appointing many of them himself.
Those IGs saved taxpayers $93 billion in fiscal year 2023
alone. Now, that is a $26 return on every dollar spent.
Such savings are not--are only possible when IGs are truly
independent from the administration they investigate. Such
independence is also crucial for the Office of Special Counsel,
which provides a safe place for Government employees to
disclose wrongdoing. So it was no surprise when Trump
unlawfully fired the head of OSC last month without cause.
Trump is purposefully gutting the watchdogs who can help
check Presidential power and replacing them with a dangerous
knock-off. Musk's so-called Department of Government
Efficiency, DOGE, has taken a chain saw to the Federal
Government, creating chaos and wreaking havoc.
DOGE has accessed highly-sensitive systems and information
in a manner that makes it easier for our adversaries China and
Russia to exploit. DOGE has purged the Government of dedicated
civil servants, including thousands of national security
employees who help collect intelligence and protect our country
from terrorist attacks. DOGE has canceled contracts without
regard to their purpose, including office leases, that enable
the Government Accounting Office, Congress' own watchdog, to
conduct reviews of national security programs.
Musk's DOGE is a national security nightmare that is
eroding the Federal Government's ability to function
effectively and efficiently, while the price of eggs skyrocket.
Let's not forget DOGE's disappearing receipts. Musk's
financial savings claims are riddled with math errors,
accidentally canceled contracts and contracts canceled by the
Biden administration.
If this administration was serious about finding waste,
fraud, and abuse, it would be supporting the legitimate
independent agencies that exist for that sole purpose. It's
time to end the failed DOGE experiment and restore power to the
entity Congress entrusted to root out waste, fraud, and abuse.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
March 11, 2025
Waste, fraud, and abuse are not new. That's why Congress
established legitimate entities decades ago to help identify and root
it out.
Those experienced Government watchdogs are now being viciously
attacked by President Trump and Co-President Musk. During his first
week in office, Trump unlawfully fired 17 inspectors general (IG) who
defend against corruption and mismanagement in Government. Trump
falsely claimed ``[i]t's a very common thing to do'' and pretended not
to know the IGs he purged despite appointing many of them.
Those IGs saved taxpayers $93 billion in fiscal year 2023 alone--a
$26 return on every dollar spent. Such savings are only possible when
IGs are truly independent from the administration they investigate.
Such independence is also crucial for the Office of Special Counsel
(OSC), which provides a safe place for Government employees to disclose
wrongdoing. So, it was no surprise when Trump unlawfully fired the head
of OSC last month without cause. Trump is purposefully gutting the
watchdogs who can help check Presidential power and replacing them with
a dangerous knock-off.
Musk's so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has
taken a chainsaw to the Federal Government, creating chaos and wreaking
havoc. DOGE has accessed highly sensitive systems and information in a
manner that makes it easier for our adversaries--China and Russia--to
exploit.
DOGE has purged the Government of dedicated civil servants,
including thousands of national security employees who help collect
intelligence and protect our country from terrorist attacks. DOGE has
canceled contracts without regard to their purpose, including office
leases that enable the Government Accountability Office, Congresses'
own watchdog, to conduct reviews of national security programs.
Musk's DOGE is a national security nightmare that is eroding the
Federal Government's ability to function effectively and efficiently
while the price of eggs skyrockets. Let's not forget DOGE's
disappearing receipts. Musk's financial savings claims are riddled with
math errors, ``accidentally canceled'' contracts, and contracts
canceled by the Biden administration.
If this administration was serious about fighting waste, fraud, and
abuse, it would be supporting the legitimate, independent agencies that
exist for that sole purpose. It's time to end the failed DOGE
experiment and restore power to the entities Congress entrusted to root
out waste, fraud, and abuse.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Representative Thanedar.
I now recognize the full committee Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Bennie Thompson, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my Republican colleagues are clearly obsessed
with President Biden. They investigated him last Congress and
turned up nothing. They tried to impeach him and turned up
nothing. Now that he's out of office, they just can't get him
out of their heads. Perhaps it's because the Musk-Trump co-
Presidency and DOGE are unpopular. Musk and DOGE are so
unpopular that my Republican colleagues are here today
pretending that Joe Biden is still President so that they can
have someone to beat up on for their failures.
But just in case my colleagues across the aisle don't get
it, let me make it clear to you. Republicans are in charge here
in the House. Republicans are in charge over in the Senate.
Republicans appointed Justices who control the Supreme Court.
Your ``Orange Jesus'' is in charge of the White House.
Republicans on this committee want to have a hearing to air
their grievances about the Biden-Harris administration, because
under the Trump-Musk administration, planes have been crashing
out of the sky, the price of eggs has skyrocketed, tens of
thousands of Americans have lost their jobs, and Russia and
China are celebrating.
If Republicans really want to combat waste, fraud, and
abuse, they should be laser-focused on overseeing Elon Musk's
Department of Government Efficiency, which is a cheap knockoff
of Congressionally-mandated watchdogs.
Elon Musk's DOGE not only is redundant but also is a direct
threat to the homeland's security. It must be stopped.
Because Elon Musk's DOGE illegally dismantled USAID, food
is rotting in the warehouses instead of feeding starving
children overseas. That is waste. It is also a national
security risk. Why? Because hungry nations won't go hungry for
long. Our global adversary, China, will be right there to feed
them, and China won't be there out of the goodness of their
heart.
Elon Musk laughed during a Cabinet meeting as he described
how DOGE accidentally cut Ebola funding, which is necessary to
prevent the ravaging disease from becoming a pandemic and
killing people here in the United States. Elon Musk froze
Homeland Security grants that Congress authorized to help
nonprofits prepare for a terrorist attack. Elon Musk's unvetted
DOGE delinquents have accessed sensitive Federal information
and fed sensitive data into unsecure artificial intelligence
software that China and Russia are sure to exploit.
Pursuant to a demand from President Trump, the CIA shared
the name of every single person hired at the intelligence
agency over the last 2 years. The message went through an
unsecured email address at OPM, the same agency that was
previously hacked by China. At the same time, the Trump-Musk
administration has fired thousands of Federal employees,
including veterans, people working in national security, and
hundreds of DHS employees.
Who does that benefit? It surely doesn't make the United
States safer.
Russian and Chinese spies are targeting recently-fired
Federal workers with security clearances, and I can guarantee
you that those foreign spies are targeting the young,
inexperienced DOGE employees who have unfettered access to the
Federal systems and classification information.
The Trump-Musk administration has created a national
security nightmare, and my Republican colleagues are
sleepwalking right into it. Make no mistake, Elon Musk's DOGE
is a home-grown threat, and it's time for the other side to
wake up.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 11, 2025
My Republican colleagues are clearly obsessed with President Biden.
They investigated him last Congress and turned up nothing. They tried
to impeach him and turned up nothing. And now that he is out of office,
they just can't get him out of their heads.
Perhaps it's because the Trump-Musk co-presidency and DOGE are
unpopular. Musk and DOGE are so unpopular that my Republican colleagues
are here today pretending that Joe Biden is still President so they
have someone to beat up on for their failures.
But just in case my colleagues across the aisle don't get it, let
me make it clear for you. Republicans are in charge here in the House.
Republicans are in charge over in the Senate. Republican-appointed
Justices control the Supreme Court. And your ``Orange Jesus'' is in the
White House.
Republicans on this committee want to have a hearing to air their
grievances about the Biden-Harris administration because under the
Trump-Musk administration, planes have been crashing out of the sky,
the price of eggs has skyrocketed, tens of thousands of Americans have
lost their jobs, and Russia and China are celebrating.
If Republicans really want to combat waste, fraud, and abuse, they
should be laser-focused on overseeing Elon Musk's Department of
Government Efficiency, which is a cheap knock-off of Congressionally-
mandated watchdogs. Elon Musk's DOGE not only is redundant but also is
a direct threat to homeland security. It must be stopped.
Because Elon Musk's DOGE illegally dismantled USAID, food is
rotting in warehouses instead of feeding starving children overseas.
That is waste. It also is a national security risk. Why? Because hungry
nations won't be hungry for long. Our global adversary, China, will be
right there to feed them, and China won't be there out of the goodness
of their hearts.
Elon Musk laughed during a Cabinet meeting as he described how DOGE
accidentally cut Ebola funding, which is necessary to prevent the
ravaging disease from becoming a pandemic and killing people here in
the United States. Elon Musk froze homeland security grants that
Congress authorized to help nonprofits prepare for a terrorist attack.
Elon Musk's unvetted DOGE delinquents have accessed sensitive Federal
information and fed sensitive data into unsecure artificial
intelligence software that China and Russia are sure to exploit.
Pursuant to a demand from President Trump, the CIA shared the names
of every single person hired at the intelligence agency over the past 2
years. The message went to an unsecured email address at OPM--the same
agency that was previously hacked by China.
At the same time, the Trump-Musk administration has fired thousands
of Federal employees--including veterans, people working in national
security, and hundreds of DHS employees. Who does that benefit? It
surely doesn't make the United States safer.
Russian and Chinese spies are targeting recently fired Federal
workers with security clearances. And I can guarantee you that those
foreign spies are targeting the young, inexperienced DOGE employees who
have unfettered access to Federal systems and Classified information.
The Trump-Musk administration has created a national security
nightmare, and my Republican colleagues are sleepwalking right into it.
Make no mistake, Elon Musk's DOGE is a home-grown threat, and it's time
for the other side to wake up!
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson.
Other Members of the committee are reminded opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are, as a committee, pleased to have a panel of
Government witnesses before us today on this important topic.
I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right
hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Brecheen. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered
in the affirmative.
Thank you, and please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Mr. Chris Currie is the director of the homeland security
and justice at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO.
Ms. Kristen Bernard is Department of Homeland Security's deputy
inspector for audits. Ms. Erika Lang is the Department of
Homeland Security's assistant inspector general for inspections
and evaluations.
Thank you all as witnesses for being here today.
I want to now recognize Mr. Chris Currie for 5 minutes for
his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECU-
RITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Currie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Thanedar, Ranking Member Thompson. It's an honor to be
here today to talk about GAO's work on the Department of
Homeland Security.
Since 2003 when DHS opened its doors, we've issued
thousands of reports and just as many recommendations to
improve the Department. There's been a lot of progress made
over that 20-some-odd years, but there's a huge number of
challenges that still remain. I can't cover them all in 5
minutes, but I just want to give you a snapshot of what I see
as the biggest priorities.
Right now, there's 459 open recommendations that we have to
the Department, but each year we send a letter to each Cabinet
Secretary outlining those that are the highest priority.
Last year, we sent a letter outlining 37 open
recommendations to the DHS Secretary, and these run across the
gamut of the mission of the Department. For example, we've
recommended they improve their IT procurement and acquisition
processes, better training and hiring for Secret Service
agents, simplifying disaster assistance, sharing cyber threat
information across the Department and across agencies, and
collecting better data on ICE detainees, just to give an
example of a few of them.
Each year, we also identify areas of duplication, overlap,
and fragmentation, and cost savings across the entire Federal
Government. DHS has been a major part of that too. Since we've
been doing that work, we've identified over $19 billion in
financial savings that the Department could save by making its
programs more efficient. Currently, there are many other areas,
over 30 of them, that have still not been fully addressed by
DHS.
Just to give a few examples of these, we have recommended
that better procuring and streamlining its IT systems could
save potentially hundreds of millions of dollars. Closing
unnecessary Coast Guard boat stations that overlap with one
another could save millions of dollars. DHS and the FBI could
work together to better streamline the sharing and collection
of terrorism information. Just to name a few.
I also want to discuss the DHS high-risk areas that are
currently on our list. Every 2 years with a new Congress, GAO
issues a high-risk report to Congress. There are currently over
30 issues across the Federal Government on there and many that
affect DHS, but the 2 I want to highlight are, No. 1, DHS
management at large. This has been on our high-risk list since
2003. It has been narrowed over the years as the Department has
worked to create itself into one functioning department, but we
still face a number of very difficult financial management and
IT security issues.
For example, every year DHS's independent auditor
identifies access controls and IT security problems with its
systems, which clearly, as one of the Nation's foremost
national security agencies, is a concern.
In financial management, DHS has a number of systems,
including FEMA and ICE, which manage most of the Department's
billions of dollars in resources, but some of these are over 25
years old. FEMA itself has 6 different procurement systems that
can't talk to one another. So there are still some legacy
challenges that have not been addressed in over 30 years since
FEMA was first created.
Last, and you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we just added a new
area to the high-risk list this year, strengthening the
delivery of Federal disaster assistance. There are over 30
different Federal agencies that are involved in disaster
assistance of some kind. Since 2015, we as a Federal Government
have spent close to half a trillion dollars on disaster
assistance. There are a number of ways this program and these
programs need to be streamlined. They are too complicated. We
hear over and over again from survivors and State and local
governments that they are too difficult, and oftentimes the
assistance they get does not meet the expectation of what they
think they're going to get.
Then last, you mentioned some of the issues about FEMA's
mission workload. FEMA is stretched too thin. They are managing
over 600 major disaster declarations, some going back 20 years.
They have too much of a workload and they can't keep up with
it. They have challenges retaining and hiring the right number
of workers with the right skills. As more and more is being
added to their workload, they just get further and further
behind.
This completes my prepared remarks, and I look forward to
the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Currie
Tuesday, March 11, 2025
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-25-108165, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has a pivotal role in securing the border, strengthening
cybersecurity, and preventing violent acts of domestic extremism, among
other roles. DHS has an annual discretionary budget of about $60
billion, plus additional funding for disaster assistance. Oversight
remains critically important to ensure effectiveness and efficiency.
GAO has designated 2 DHS areas to its High-Risk List: Improving the
Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance (2025) and Strengthening DHS IT
and Financial Management Functions (2003).
This statement discusses GAO's highest priority recommendations for
DHS and areas on GAO's High-Risk List, among other things.
This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 2024 to
February 2025. For this work, GAO analyzed DHS strategies and other
documents related to the Department's efforts to address its high-risk
areas and interviewed DHS officials, among other actions.
What GAO Recommends
As of March 2025, GAO has 459 recommendations to DHS that remain
open. These recommendations are designed to address the various
challenges discussed in this statement. DHS has taken steps to address
some of these recommendations. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's
efforts to determine if they fully address the challenges GAO has
identified.
department of homeland security.--key areas for dhs action and
congressional oversight
What GAO Found
GAO has issued numerous reports with thousands of recommendations
to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) over the Department's
history. DHS has yet to fully address many recommendations that would
help ensure effectiveness and efficiency, including dozens of the
highest-priority recommendations. For example, implementing GAO's
priority recommendations could help DHS address the increasing risk of
catastrophic cyber incidents for U.S. critical infrastructure, better
allocate billions of dollars used to procure goods and services, and
build effective policy to address violent extremism. DHS's continued
attention could lead to significant improvements in Government
operations.
In addition, GAO is tracking 2 DHS high-risk areas:
Improving the delivery of Federal disaster assistance.--
Natural disasters have become costlier and more frequent (see
figure). In the last 10 years, appropriations for disaster
assistance, including to DHS, totaled at least $448 billion,
plus an additional $110 billion in supplemental appropriations
so far in fiscal year 2025. Recent disasters such as Hurricanes
Helene and Milton and wildfires in California have demonstrated
the need for Government-wide action to deliver assistance
efficiently and effectively and reduce its fiscal exposure. In
particular, attention is needed to improve processes for
assisting survivors, invest in resilience, and strengthen the
disaster workforce and capacity.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Strengthening DHS IT and financial management functions.--
DHS manages an annual discretionary budget of about $60
billion, but it has faced difficulties with IT and financial
management. More work remains for DHS to (1) strengthen its
information security program, and (2) modernize its components'
financial management systems and business processes. These
security and modernization efforts are critical given the
significant amount of money DHS manages for disasters as well
as its sizable annual budget.
Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss key oversight
areas for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Over 20 years ago,
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks led to profound changes in
Government agendas, policies, and structures to confront homeland
security threats facing the Nation. Most notably, DHS began operations
in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks
from occurring in the United States, reducing the country's
vulnerability to terrorism, and responding to and minimizing the
damages from any attacks and natural disasters that may occur.
Given the constantly-evolving threat landscape, DHS's expansive
missions, and its annual discretionary budget of about $60 billion,
oversight remains critically important to ensure effectiveness and
efficiency. Over the Department's history, we have issued numerous
reports with thousands of recommendations to DHS. In addition to our
individual reports, we periodically highlight pressing issues through
our High-Risk List,\1\ duplication and cost savings series,\2\ and
priority recommendations letters.\3\
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\1\ At the beginning of each new Congress, we issue an update to
our High-Risk series, which identifies Government operations with
serious vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or
in need of transformation. See GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened
Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency
and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, DC: Feb. 25, 2025).
\2\ Each year, we report on Federal programs with fragmented,
overlapping, or duplicative goals or actions, and we have suggested
hundreds of ways to address those problems, reduce costs, or boost
revenue. See GAO, 2024 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to
Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions of
Dollars in Financial Benefits, GAO-24-106915 (Washington, DC: May 15,
2024). We plan to issue the next report in spring 2025.
\3\ Each year, we send letters to the heads of key departments and
agencies, urging them to focus on priority recommendations. We
highlight these recommendations because, upon implementation, they may
significantly improve Government operations, for example, by realizing
large dollar savings; eliminating mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or
making progress toward addressing a high-risk or duplication issue.
See, for example, GAO, Priority Open Recommendations: Department of
Homeland Security, GAO-24-107251 (Washington, DC: Aug. 19, 2024).
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DHS has challenges in several high-risk areas. In particular, in
our most recent High-Risk update in February 2025, we designated
Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance as a new high-
risk area. We added this area in recognition of the need for DHS to
deliver assistance as efficiently and effectively as possible, address
the fragmented Federal approach to disaster recovery, and to and reduce
fiscal exposures from the increased cost and frequency of disasters and
the fragmented Federal approach to disaster recovery. Additionally,
Strengthening DHS IT and Financial Management Functions is a long-
standing high-risk area with challenges that have persisted since the
beginnings of the Department in 2003.
Our recommendations to DHS can assist Congress in identifying key
areas for oversight that could result in significant improvements and
benefits. In particular, DHS has not yet fully addressed 36
recommendations that could better address fragmentation, duplication,
and overlap. Further, we have also made additional priority
recommendations that could significantly improve the efficiency of DHS
operations.
My statement today is based on our prior work identifying these key
areas for DHS oversight. For example, this statement includes
information on our priority recommendations to DHS; our fragmentation,
overlap, and duplication series; and our high-risk series, including
our most recent high-risk update in February 2025.
For this work, we analyzed DHS strategies and other documents
related to the Department's efforts to address its high-risk areas and
interviewed DHS officials, among other actions. In addition, to perform
our prior work, we reviewed and analyzed Federal law, agency guidance,
and other agency documentation. More detailed information on the scope
and methodology of our prior work can be found within each of the
issued reports cited throughout this statement.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with all sections of our Quality Assurance Framework that
are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and
perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to
meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work.
We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis
conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions
in this product.
priority recommendations to dhs
As of March 2025, there are 459 open GAO recommendations across
DHS's mission set that have not yet been fully addressed.\4\ Fully
implementing these open recommendations could significantly improve DHS
operations. In addition, each year, GAO sends a letter to all Federal
agencies identifying those recommendations that we deem as highest
priority. In our 2024 DHS priority recommendations letter, we
highlighted 37 priority recommendations.\5\ DHS has since implemented 5
of these recommendations.
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\4\ In November 2024, we reported that, on a Government-wide basis,
70 percent of our recommendations made 4 years ago were implemented.
See GAO, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2024, GAO-
25-900570 (Washington, DC: Nov. 15, 2024). DHS's recommendation
implementation rate was 84 percent.
\5\ GAO-24-107251. We plan to issue our next priority
recommendations update in spring 2025.
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In general, our priority recommendations to DHS relate to emergency
preparedness and response; border security and immigration; countering
violent extremism and domestic terrorism; domestic intelligence and
information sharing; information technology and cybersecurity; and
infrastructure, acquisition, and management. DHS's continued attention
to these issues could lead to significant improvements in Government
operations. For example:
Cybersecurity.--In June 2022, we recommended that the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency work with the
Federal Insurance Office to produce a joint assessment for
Congress on the extent to which the risks to the Nation's
critical infrastructure from catastrophic cyber attacks--and
the potential financial exposures resulting from these risks--
warrant a Federal insurance response.\6\ As of March 2024, DHS
had collaborated with the Department of the Treasury on
identifying data needs for the agencies' joint assessment of
the need for a Federal insurance response to address
catastrophic cyber attacks and plans to continue collaborating
on a joint cyber insurance assessment. We will continue to
monitor DHS's progress. An assessment with DHS's analysis of
the cyber risks facing critical infrastructure could inform
Congress in its deliberations related to addressing the
increasing risk of catastrophic cyber incidents for U.S.
critical infrastructure.
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\6\ GAO, Cyber Insurance: Action Needed to Assess Potential Federal
Response to Catastrophic Attacks, GAO-22-104256 (Washington, DC: June
21, 2022).
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Procurement management.--In July 2021, we recommended that
DHS ensure its chief procurement officer uses a balanced set of
performance metrics to manage the Department's 10 procurement
organizations, including outcome-oriented metrics to measure
(a) cost savings/avoidance, (b) timeliness of deliveries, (c)
quality of deliverables, and (d) end-user satisfaction.\7\ In
February 2024, DHS showed that in fiscal year 2023, the
Department used category management activities for about 80
percent of its common goods and services expenditures ($18
billion of $22.5 billion) and had tracked savings of $502
million.\8\ We will continue to monitor DHS's progress. Using a
balanced set of performance metrics would help DHS better
identify improvement opportunities, set priorities, and
allocate resources.
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\7\ GAO, Federal Contracting: Senior Leaders Should Use Leading
Companies' Key Practices to Improve Performance, GAO-21-491
(Washington, DC: July 27, 2021).
\8\ Category management is an acquisition approach intended to help
the Federal Government better manage categories of spending for
commonly-purchased products and services.
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Targeted violence.--In July 2021, we recommended that DHS,
in consultation with affected offices and components, establish
common terminology for targeted violence.\9\ As of February
2025, DHS officials stated that the draft terminology was still
under review and anticipated that the definition would be
finalized and published by September 2025. Without a common
definition for targeted violence, it will be difficult for DHS
to assess threats, track trends, and build effective policy
within DHS and the stakeholder community. We will continue to
monitor DHS's progress.
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\9\ According to DHS's Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism
and Targeted Violence and implementation plans, DHS generally uses the
term targeted violence to refer to any incident of violence that
implicates homeland security and/or DHS activities in which a known or
knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to the violent
attack. However, the strategy states that this use of the term is
unduly broad, and it indicates that it does not help the agency or
stakeholders have a common understanding of the threat posed by
targeted violence. This contributed to our recommendation for
establishing common terminology. See GAO, Countering Violent Extremism:
DHS Can Further Enhance Its Strategic Planning and Data Governance
Efforts, GAO-21-507 (Washington, DC: July 20, 2021).
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Southwest Border security.--In February 2020, we recommended
that DHS, together with the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), collaborate to address information-sharing gaps
to ensure that HHS's Office of Refugee Resettlement receives
information needed to make decisions for unaccompanied alien
children, including those apprehended with an adult.\10\ In
fall 2023, DHS and HHS reported that they were working on a new
interagency agreement to govern information sharing. As of
February 2025, DHS and HHS have not finalized the new
agreement, but DHS officials stated they expect to finalize it
in spring 2025. We will continue to monitor DHS's progress.
Finalizing an information-sharing agreement that addresses
information-sharing gaps we identified would enable HHS to make
more informed and timely decisions for unaccompanied children.
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\10\ GAO, Southwest Border: Actions Needed to Improve DHS
Processing of Families and Coordination between DHS and HHS, GAO-20-245
(Washington, DC: Feb. 19, 2020).
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Secret Service training.--In May 2019, we recommended that
the U.S. Secret Service develop and implement a plan to ensure
that special agents assigned to Presidential Protective
Division and Vice Presidential Protective Division reach annual
training targets given current and planned staffing levels.\11\
In February 2025, Secret Service officials told us--due to
events involving the Secret Service during the 2024
Presidential Campaign and recently enacted legislation--they
are revising training targets and staffing levels. We will
continue to monitor the Secret Service's progress. Developing
and implementing a plan for meeting protection-related training
targets would better prepare special agents to effectively
respond to the security threats faced by the President and
other protectees.
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\11\ GAO, U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully
Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations, GAO-19-415
(Washington, DC: May 22, 2019).
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opportunities to address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and
achieve financial benefits
Since 2011, we have made dozens of recommendations to DHS that
address duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, which could save
taxpayers millions of dollars.\12\ DHS has implemented some of these
recommendations and has realized significant benefits. As of July 2024,
we had identified 83 instances of financial benefits totaling $19.5
billion as a result of implementing our recommendations where DHS was a
contributing agency.\13\ For example, in response to our 2017
recommendations that the Coast Guard address 18 unnecessarily
duplicative boat stations, which, if permanently closed, would reduce
costs by $290 million over 20 years. DHS has directed the consolidation
of 5 stations and saved about $10 million as of February 2025.\14\
Additional boat stations may be considered for closure in the future,
which could result in additional cost savings.
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\12\ GAO-24-106915.
\13\ This financial benefit amount reflects benefits from all
contributing agencies to these accomplishments, and therefore exceeds
benefits attributable to actions by DHS. See GAO, Open GAO
Recommendations: Financial Benefits Could Be Between $106 Billion and
$208 Billion, GAO-24-107146 (Washington, DC: July 11, 2024).
\14\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Close Stations Identified
as Overlapping and Unnecessarily Duplicative, GAO-18-9 (Washington, DC:
Oct. 26, 2017).
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As of May 2024, DHS had not yet fully implemented 36 of our
recommendations aimed at addressing fragmentation, overlap, and
duplication or achieving financial benefits.\15\ For example:
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\15\ GAO-24-106915.
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Critical infrastructure protection.--In March 2024, we
recommended that DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency implement guidance to better manage
fragmentation and improve its interagency collaboration efforts
aimed at addressing risks to operational technology used in
operating critical infrastructure, such as oil and gas
distribution.\16\ DHS concurred with this recommendation. DHS
has taken some steps to address this recommendation but has not
completed its efforts to determine how its products and
services are performing to make improvements to such products
and services.
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\16\ GAO, Cybersecurity: Improvements Needed in Addressing Risks to
Operational Technology, GAO-24-106576 (Washington, DC: Mar. 7, 2024).
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Coast Guard housing.--In February 2024, we recommended that
the Coast Guard assess the potential benefits of certain
housing authorities and develop a legislative proposal, if
appropriate, to better manage its housing program costs.\17\ As
of fiscal year 2023, for example, the Coast Guard was managing
about $4.6 billion in Government-owned housing and 37 percent
of these assets were beyond their service life. DHS concurred
with this recommendation. The Coast Guard has taken some
actions to address this recommendation and anticipates
completing its assessment in June 2025.
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\17\ GAO, Coast Guard: Better Feedback Collection and Information
Could Enhance Housing Program, GAO-24-106388 (Washington, DC: Feb. 5,
2024).
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Countering domestic terrorism.--In February 2023, we
recommended that the DHS under secretary for intelligence and
analysis, in collaboration with the director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, assess existing formal agreements to
determine if they fully articulate a joint process for working
together to counter domestic terrorism threats and sharing
relevant domestic terrorism-related information and update and
revise accordingly.\18\ DHS concurred with this recommendation.
As of February 2025, DHS has taken some steps to implement this
recommendation by reviewing its formal agreements with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and reaching one new agreement
to assign a Federal Bureau of Investigation staff member to a
DHS counterterrorism office to better facilitate information
sharing.
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\18\ GAO, Domestic Terrorism: Further Actions Needed to Strengthen
FBI and DHS Collaboration to Counter Threats, GAO-23-104720
(Washington, DC: Feb. 22, 2023).
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In addition to recommendations to DHS, we have also identified
matters for Congressional consideration that could help address
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication or realize financial
benefits.\19\ For example:
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\19\ GAO-24-106915.
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Disaster recovery.--Congress should consider establishing an
independent commission to recommend reforms to the Federal
Government's approach to disaster recovery.\20\ In January
2025, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate that would
establish a Commission on Federal Natural Disaster Resilience
and Recovery to examine and recommend reforms to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal Government's
approach to natural disaster resilience and recovery, and for
other purposes. We will continue to monitor the progress of
this bill.
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\20\ GAO-23-104956.
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Interagency communication.--Congress may wish to consider
requiring the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and
Treasury to collaborate on the development and implementation
of a joint radio communications solution.\21\ As of February 3,
2025, there has been no legislative action taken that would
require these departments to (1) collaborate on the development
and implementation of an interoperable radio communications
solution or (2) commit to using the nationwide public safety
broadband network to fully support their mission-critical voice
operations.
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\21\ Specifically, Congress may wish to consider requiring the
departments to (1) establish an effective governance structure that
includes a formal process for making decisions and resolving disputes,
(2) define and articulate a common outcome for this joint effort, and
(3) develop a joint strategy for improving radio communications. See
GAO, Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure
Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution, GAO-09-133
(Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 2008). Legislation has been enacted to
provide funding for, among other things, the development of a
nationwide, interoperable broadband network that is aimed at improving
interoperable radio communications among public safety officials.
However, the use of the broadband network by public safety users is
voluntary. In addition, as of January 2025, officials from the
Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury stated that
they currently do not expect to use the nationwide public safety
broadband network to fully support their mission-critical voice
operations. As a result, this legislation will not remedy these
agencies' fragmented approaches to improving interoperable radio
communications.
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We continue to monitor DHS and Congressional actions and will
provide updated information in our annual report in spring 2025.\22\
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\22\ In between annual updates, GAO's Duplication and Cost Savings
website is a publicly accessible resource that allows Congress,
agencies, and the public to track the Federal Government's progress in
addressing the issues we have identified.
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high-risk area: improving the delivery of federal disaster assistance
In February 2025, we added Improving the Delivery of Federal
Disaster Assistance to our High-Risk List. Given the rise in the number
and cost of disasters and increasing programmatic challenges related to
the delivery of Federal disaster assistance identified in our work,
disaster assistance merited a high-risk designation.\23\ In 2018, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration calculated that the
United States experienced 14 disasters that each cost more than $1
billion in total economic damages. By 2024, the number of disasters
costing at least $1 billion almost doubled to 27. That same year at
least 568 people died, directly or indirectly, as a result of those
disasters. In addition to natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic--
which was a Federally-declared disaster--tested Federal agencies'
capacity to mount an effective and equitable nationwide response.
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\23\ GAO-25-107743.
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Recent disasters demonstrate the need for the Federal Government to
take Government-wide action to deliver assistance efficiently and
effectively and reduce its fiscal exposure.
Hurricanes Helene and Milton occurred within 2 weeks of one
another in 2024 and affected some of the same areas in the
Southeast (see fig. 1). These two disasters resulted in over
200 deaths and are expected to cost over $50 billion, according
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
On January 8, 2025, the President approved a major disaster
declaration for historic wildfires in Los Angeles County,
California. The wildfires were unprecedented in their size,
scope, and the damage they caused. The Palisades and Eaton
fires resulted in 29 deaths and the expected financial cost is
still unknown as of March 2025.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Disaster assistance includes providing support to communities and
survivors for response to, recovery from, and resilience to man-made
and natural disasters. For fiscal years 2015 through 2024,
appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448
billion.\24\ In total, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
provided assistance to over 2 million households for Federal disaster
assistance in 2024.
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\24\ This total includes $312 billion in selected supplemental
appropriations to Federal agencies for disaster assistance and
approximately $136 billion in annual appropriations to the Disaster
Relief Fund for fiscal years 2015 through 2024. It does not include
other annual appropriations to Federal agencies for disaster
assistance. Of the supplemental appropriations, $97 billion was
included in supplemental appropriations acts that were enacted
primarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, in
December 2024, the Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2025, appropriated $110 billion in supplemental appropriations for
disaster assistance. Pub. L. No. 118-158, div. B, 138 Stat. 1722
(2024).
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The Disaster Relief Fund, administered by FEMA, pays for several
key disaster response, recovery, and mitigation programs that assist
communities impacted by Federally-declared emergencies and major
disasters.\25\ Annual appropriations to this fund have varied but
generally increased from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2024, as shown
in figure 2.
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\25\ Other Federal agencies have specific authorities and resources
outside of the Disaster Relief Fund to support certain disaster
response and recovery efforts.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
There are about 60 open recommendations related to this new high-
risk area, as of March 2025. In addition, there are 4 matters for
Congressional consideration to help address the Nation's delivery of
disaster assistance.
FEMA and other Federal entities--including Congress--need to
address the Nation's fragmented Federal approach to disaster recovery.
Attention is also needed to strengthen FEMA's disaster workforce and
capacity and invest in resilience.
Reducing Fragmentation of the Federal Approach to Disaster
Assistance.--The Federal approach to disaster recovery is
fragmented across more than 30 Federal entities, making it
harder for survivors and communities to successfully navigate
the disaster assistance process. The Federal entities involved
have multiple programs and authorities that have differing
requirements and time frames. Moreover, data sharing across
entities is limited.
As administrator of several disaster recovery programs, FEMA should
also take steps to better manage fragmentation across its own
programs, as we recommended.\26\ Such actions could make the
programs simpler, more accessible and user-friendly, and
improve the effectiveness of Federal disaster recovery efforts.
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\26\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal
Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, DC: Nov. 15, 2022).
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Reforming the Federal Government's approach to disaster recovery
and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to
disaster survivors and communities and improve the
effectiveness of recovery efforts. In response to our
recommendations, as of February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to
streamline the applications for 2 of its recovery programs.\27\
However, FEMA will need to demonstrate that it has thoroughly
considered available options to (1) better manage fragmentation
across its own programs, (2) identify which changes FEMA
intends to implement to its recovery programs, and (3) take
steps to fully implement this recommendation.
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\27\ GAO-23-104956.
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Strengthening FEMA's Disaster Workforce.--FEMA's staffing
levels and workforce challenges have limited its capacity to
provide effective disaster assistance. In recent years, the
increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the COVID-19
pandemic, and other responsibilities have placed additional
pressures on FEMA.
In January 2022, we reported that FEMA has faced challenges with
deploying staff with the right qualifications and skills to
meet disaster needs.\28\ We recommended that FEMA develop a
plan to address challenges in providing quality information to
field leaders about staff qualifications. FEMA officials told
us that the actions in the plan enhance reliability of FEMA
workforce qualifications and increases field leadership
accessibility of workforce information. Such actions could
better enable the agency to use its disaster workforce
flexibility as effectively as possible to meet mission needs in
the field.
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\28\ GAO, FEMA Workforce: Long-Standing and New Challenges Could
Affect Mission Success, GAO-22-105631 (Washington, DC: Jan. 20, 2022).
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In May 2023, we reported that FEMA uses different processes under
various statutory authorities to hire full-time employees and
temporary reservists.\29\ We found that FEMA had an overall
staffing gap of approximately 35 percent across different
positions at the beginning of fiscal year 2022. While the gaps
varied across different positions, Public Assistance, Hazard
Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower percentages of
staffing targets filled--between 44 and 60 percent at the
beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important
functions, including administering assistance to State and
local governments, creating safer communities by managing risk
reduction activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource
planning and movement during a disaster.
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\29\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring
Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, DC: May 2,
2023).
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FEMA only had 9 percent of its disaster-response workforce
available for Hurricane Milton response as staff were deployed
to other disasters such as Hurricane Helene in the southeast
and flooding in Vermont.\30\ In addition, FEMA only had 20
percent of its disaster-response workforce available for Los
Angeles fire response.\31\ We have made numerous
recommendations to help FEMA better manage catastrophic or
concurrent disasters.
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\30\ FEMA, National Watch Center, National Situation Report (Oct.
8, 2024).
\31\ FEMA, National Watch Center, Daily Operations Briefing (Jan.
8, 2025).
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Investing in Resilience.--Disaster resilience can reduce the
need for more costly future recovery assistance. In our
Disaster Resilience Framework, we reported that the reactive
and fragmented Federal approach to disaster risk reduction
limits the Federal Government's ability to facilitate
significant reduction in the Nation's overall disaster
risk.\32\
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\32\ GAO, Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles for Analyzing
Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to Natural
Disasters, GAO-20-100SP (Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 2019).
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FEMA's hazard mitigation assistance programs provide assistance for
eligible long-term solutions that reduce the impact of future
disasters, thereby increasing disaster resilience. However, we
have reported that there are areas in which FEMA can improve
its hazard mitigation assistance grant programs.
For example, the Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk
Mitigation Act of 2021 authorized FEMA to award capitalization
grants--seed funding--to help eligible States, territories,
Tribes, and the District of Columbia establish revolving loan
funds for mitigation assistance.\33\ In response, FEMA
established the Safeguarding Tomorrow Revolving Loan Fund grant
program in 2022. In February 2025, we found that while FEMA has
identified some tools to collect information on the Revolving
Loan Fund program, FEMA does not have a process for
systematically collecting and evaluating the information to
assess program effectiveness across all phases of the
program.\34\ We recommended that FEMA document and implement a
process to regularly assess program effectiveness using
evidence-based decision-making practices to help instill
confidence in program participants and better ensure the long-
term sustainability and success of the program.
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\33\ Pub. L. No. 116-284, 134 Stat. 4869 (2021) (codified at 42
U.S.C. 5135).
\34\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Improve Guidance and
Assessment of Its Revolving Loan Fund Program, GAO-25-107331
(Washington, DC: Feb. 24, 2025).
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high-risk area: strengthening dhs it and financial management functions
Shortly after DHS was formed, we designated Implementing and
Transforming DHS as a high-risk area in January 2003 because it had to
transform 22 agencies--several with major management challenges--into
one department.\35\ This high-risk area has evolved over time to
reflect DHS's progress and now focuses on Strengthening DHS IT and
Financial Management Functions.
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\35\ GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, DC: January 2003).
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As we reported in our latest high-risk update, DHS has faced
difficulties securing Federal IT systems and information and continues
to face significant challenges with its financial management systems,
processes, controls, and reporting.\36\ Among other things, DHS's
progress depends on addressing challenges identified by DHS's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) and its financial statement auditor.
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\36\ GAO-25-107743.
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IT Management.--DHS has made progress implementing
recommendations from DHS's OIG related to IT security
weaknesses. However, more work remains for DHS to strengthen
its information security program.
In fiscal year 2023, the DHS OIG reported 6 deficiencies in the
information security program. For example, the OIG reported
that not all vulnerabilities were promptly mitigated, nor did
DHS create the plans of action and milestones for all
information security weaknesses. These actions include
enforcing requirements for components to obtain authority to
operate, resolving critical and high-risk vulnerabilities, and
applying sufficient resources to mitigate security weaknesses.
Further, in 2024, DHS's financial statement auditor continued to
designate deficiencies in IT controls and information systems
as a material weakness for financial reporting purposes. These
deficiencies included ineffective design and implementation of
controls to address areas such as system changes and access
controls at several DHS components. DHS has identified planned
steps and projects to achieve an opinion on internal controls
over financial reporting for 2 consecutive years with no
material control weaknesses by November 2029.
Until DHS addresses these deficiencies, the data and systems will
continue to remain at risk of disruption. Ineffective security
controls to protect these systems and data could significantly
affect a broad array of agency operations and assets.
Financial Management.--DHS has received an unmodified
(clean) audit opinion on its consolidated financial statements
for 12 consecutive years, from fiscal years 2013 through 2024.
However, during those same 12 years, DHS did not receive a
clean opinion on its internal controls over financial reporting
because it did not design and fully implement control
activities to provide reasonable assurance that its systems
will reliably report financial information.
First, the financial statement auditor found that DHS did not
design, implement, or effectively operate information technology
general controls to help prevent unauthorized access to programs and
data; document, authorize, or monitor system changes; and control
access to systems that were commensurate with job responsibilities.
Second, DHS did not effectively design, implement, or operate controls
over the financial reporting process in the following areas:
appropriate level of supervisory review of journal entries and
preparation of disclosures; monitoring of automated and manual control
environments, including service providers; and establishing an
organizational structure and internal communication to plan and execute
controls at the Coast Guard.
Much work also remains to modernize DHS components' financial
management systems and business processes. For example, FEMA
currently uses 6 segregated systems for financial management
and procurement. FEMA plans to include the functionality of
these systems under one financial system modernization effort.
This modernization effort is critical given the significant
amount of money FEMA manages for disasters.
DHS's financial statement auditor also continued to report that
agency financial management systems did not comply with
requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement
Act of 1996.\37\ Specifically, DHS does not comply with
applicable Federal accounting standards in certain instances,
Federal financial management system requirements, and the U.S.
Standard General Ledger at the transaction level.\38\ Without
implementing modernized systems with fully effective controls
that comply substantially with these requirements, DHS is at an
increased risk of errors and inconsistent or incomplete
financial information.
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\37\ Pub. L. No. 104-208, tit, VII, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-389
(1996).
\38\ DHS Office of Inspector General, Independent Auditors' Report
on the Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Years 2024 and 2023
Consolidated Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial
Reporting, OIG-25-05 (Washington, DC: Nov. 15, 2024).
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In conclusion, given the constantly-evolving threat landscape,
DHS's expansive missions, and its annual discretionary budget of about
$60 billion, oversight remains critically important to ensure
effectiveness and efficiency. Our recommendations to DHS can assist
Congress in identifying key areas for oversight that could result in
significant improvements and benefits. We continue to monitor DHS and
Congressional actions.
Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Currie.
I now recognize Ms. Kristen Bernard for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF KRISTEN D. BERNARD, DEPUTY INSPECTOR
GENERAL, OFFICE OF AUDITS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Bernard. Thank you so much, Chairman Brecheen, Ranking
Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting me here today to discuss our oversight work that
improves DHS's execution of its mission operations, while
preventing fraud and abuse in its programs. My testimony today
will highlight long-standing and systemic weaknesses that
pertain to border security and immigration enforcement,
cybersecurity, and emergency management.
First, DHS faces challenges executing its day-to-day border
security and immigration operations. We've issued numerous
reports highlighting recurring problems in tracking and
accounting for migrants entering and being released into the
country.
For example, we recently reported ICE was unable to monitor
the location and status of all unaccompanied children once
released or transferred from DHS custody. We also reported DHS
could not locate migrants once released due to missing or
invalid addresses, as well as the reliance on manual ad hoc
methods for border apprehension and detention processing.
Each of these deficiencies point to the absence of
fundamental practices necessary for maintaining operational
control of the border.
The root cause of these issues stem from DHS's lack of
strategic focus for cross-component collaboration. Automation
and consistency would better enable CBP and ICE to keep pace
with the fluctuating volume of migrants apprehended. Until
these issues are addressed, DHS will be unable to maintain
awareness of all migrants' locations once released from DHS
custody, which may hinder immigration enforcement operations.
Second, DHS's inability to consistently secure systems,
networks, and data across its 22 components may weaken its
overall defense against potential cyber attacks.
Our recent audits of access controls, which is an essential
cybersecurity practice, revealed hundreds of personnel who had
either left DHS or transferred to a new position, but they
continued to have access. We also identified hundreds of users
with elevated privileges and access. Similarly, our audits of
mobile devices identified thousands of prohibited and high-risk
applications and thousands of devices that were not adequately
secured.
Last, our recurring testing of critical systems across DHS
has revealed hundreds of workstations that were not receiving
security patches or operating with the right settings.
Collectively, our oversight has identified more than 4,000
security vulnerabilities over the past 3 years.
But I will note our recommendations have prompted swift
action by DHS in the area of their cybersecurity posture.
They've made continuous improvements and quickly remediated
vulnerabilities. I credit this to our in-house automated
testing capabilities and methodologies that enable us to
provide results before the audit concludes, as well as to our
strong partnership with DHS officials who are responsible for
implementing and overseeing cybersecurity practices.
Third and finally, I will highlight our continued work to
help improve FEMA's administration of disaster programs. While
FEMA has certainly faced an unprecedented number of natural
disasters and a global pandemic, it continues to operate in a
manner that is not conducive to the scale or complexity of its
current environment.
We continue to identify astronomical amounts of questioned
costs totaling $12 billion in the last 3 years. Earlier this
year, in fact, we notified FEMA and Congress of our findings
totaling $7 billion in funds that could have been put to better
use due to the delays in closing out disaster programs.
The results of our work demonstrate our dedication to
promoting the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS
programs and operations. But we do remain concerned that until
the Department fully addresses recommendations for improvement,
its components may be hindered to achieve these essential
mission functions that our national security and prosperity
rely upon.
DHS OIG remains committed to working with this subcommittee
and DHS leadership and other stakeholders to promote
transparency, efficiency, and accountability.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our critical work.
Thank you for Congress' support in enhancing our ability to
promote accountability and deter fraud against DHS programs and
operations.
This concludes my testimony. I'm happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Bernard and Ms. Lang
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Kristen D. Bernard and Erika Lang
March 11, 2025
Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General's (OIG) efforts
to combat fraud, waste, and abuse in the Department of Homeland
Security.
DHS is tasked with safeguarding our Nation from diverse and
evolving threats; it operates with over 260,000 personnel and annual
total budget authority of over $100 billion. OIG's mission is to
promote excellence, integrity, efficiency, and accountability across
the vast DHS enterprise. OIG does this by conducting independent
oversight through audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations
that identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in
DHS's programs and operations.
In fiscal year 2024, DHS OIG identified over $7 billion in funds
put to better use, over $19 million in funds recovered or deobligated
through audit work, and over $53 million in recoveries, fines,
restitution, and asset forfeiture from OIG investigations. We issued
nearly 200 recommendations to DHS, evaluated nearly 25,000 hotline
complaints, made 110 arrests, and referred over 200 cases for criminal
prosecution. OIG provides a remarkable return on investment for the
American taxpayer. For every taxpayer dollar invested in DHS OIG, our
work returns $18.63 \1\ in questioned costs, funds put to better use,
funds recovered or deobligated, fines, and restitutions.
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\1\ Five-year average return on investment for fiscal year 2020-24.
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As the main oversight agency for DHS, OIG has identified systemic
weaknesses in border security and immigration enforcement,
cybersecurity, and emergency management. Our recent audits,
inspections, and investigations have exposed inadequate internal
controls, insufficient program management, and inefficient resource
allocation that resulted in operational vulnerabilities and financial
losses.
In this testimony, OIG highlights key findings from recent reports
on border security operations, cybersecurity protections, and emergency
management programs that reveal significant challenges and
opportunities to improve the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness
of DHS programs.
dhs border security and immigration challenges
OIG has allocated significant resources to border security and
immigration oversight. In fiscal years 2022-24, OIG issued 86 reports
about DHS's border security challenges, including 297 recommendations
to improve the ability of DHS operational components' to secure the
Nation's borders and enforce immigration laws. As of today, 222
recommendations (nearly 75 percent) are closed and 75 remain open.
Below, we highlight information from 7 key reports issued during
this period that specifically assessed U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) ability to prevent noncitizens from entering the
United States, as well as Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE)
capacity to safely detain, transport, and track migrants. Based on the
volume of migrants that entered the United States, our oversight work
in this area focused primarily on DHS's ability to screen, manage, and
track all noncitizens crossing the border at and between ports of
entry. OIG's work revealed two major areas of weakness:
DHS Screening and Holding Noncitizens Entering the Country Through
Ports of Entry
OIG examined whether DHS had the ability to effectively
screen and vet persons seeking admission through ports of
entry. Although OIG found that DHS has technology to screen
travelers at airports, DHS faced operational challenges in
executing day-to-day screening operations. For example, in 2024
OIG reported \2\ CBP could not biometrically confirm the
identity of all persons seeking entry in vehicles at land ports
of entry, nor did CBP maintain consistency in operational
procedures to screen all vehicle passengers. We found multiple
instances where CBP did not query all individuals at land ports
of entry for derogatory information prior to allowing these
non-U.S. citizens into the country.
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\2\ (OIG-24-27), DHS Needs to Improve Its Screening and Vetting of
Asylum Seekers and Noncitizens Applying for Admission into the United
States (REDACTED), June 7, 2024.
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OIG also assessed DHS's actions \3\ related to the screening
process of a suspected terrorist, and the timing of an arrest
after the suspected terrorist's release into the United States.
In 2022, CBP missed multiple opportunities to verify that an
apprehended migrant was a positive match for the terrorist
watch list before releasing the migrant into the community.
This included not providing information requested by the FBI's
Terrorist Screening Center, which would have confirmed the
positive match. This occurred because of CBP's ineffective
practices and processes for resolving inconclusive matches with
the watch list. Days later when the migrant boarded a domestic
U.S. flight, the Transportation Security Administration's
normal screening resulted in an alert to the Terrorist
Screening Center, leading to ICE being notified to effectuate
the migrant's arrest. However, ICE faced multiple challenges
planning and conducting the migrant's arrest, including delays
in transferring documentation and difficulties obtaining GPS
data while conducting the arrest. We issued 3 recommendations,
which are now all closed.
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\3\ (OIG-23-31), CBP Released a Migrant on a Terrorist Watchlist,
and ICE Faced Information Sharing Challenges Planning and Conducting
the Arrest (REDACTED), June 28, 2023.
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While examining DHS's ability \4\ to assess risks associated
with releasing noncitizens without identification into the
country and allowing them to travel on domestic flights, OIG
determined that CBP and ICE accepted noncitizens' self-reported
biographical information in the absence of acceptable forms of
identification. CBP and ICE could not provide data about how
many noncitizens without identification were released into the
country. We issued 3 recommendations--including for CBP and ICE
to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the risks associated
with releasing noncitizens into the country without proper
identification and take steps to mitigate those risks--with
which the Department concurred; the recommendations remain
resolved and open.
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\4\ (OIG-24-65), CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks
Associated with Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into the
United States and Allowing Them to Travel on Domestic Flights
(REDACTED), September 30, 2024.
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DHS Could Not Track All Migrants Released into the Country
Between fiscal years 2022-24, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)
apprehended more than 5.7 million migrants who illegally
entered the United States.\5\ Given this volume, OIG sought to
determine whether DHS had sufficient capabilities to account
for all migrants once apprehended. Over a series of 4 reports,
OIG found that DHS did not have the systems or infrastructure
to process the influx of migrants who illegally crossed the
border between ports of entry. For example, in 2022 we
identified \6\ shortcomings with technology systems that
resulted in manual methods to transfer and track migrants,
which prevented DHS from having digital access to records from
the point of apprehension to release or transfer. Given that
thousands of migrants are transferred daily, this gap in
functionality adversely affects DHS's ability to manage the
high volume of apprehensions and timely transfer individuals
from USBP custody. OIG also determined DHS shared information
manually with the Department of Justice because systems lacked
integration, and DHS personnel faced challenges from
inconsistent or missing data in DHS's systems of record.
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\5\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-
encounters, filtered for fiscal year 2022, 2023, 2024 and U.S. Border
Patrol.
\6\ (OIG-22-66), DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support
Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border, September 9, 2022.
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Similarly, in 2023, we reported \7\ DHS had limited ability
to track migrants' post-release addresses, as more than 177,000
illegal migrant records were either missing, invalid for
delivery, or not legitimate residential locations. In 2024, we
reported \8\ ICE was unable to locate more than 32,000
unaccompanied migrant children (UCs) who did not appear as
scheduled for immigration court proceedings, nor did ICE always
inform the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services' Office
of Refugee Resettlement when UCs failed to appear in court. OIG
found that ICE did not serve a Notice to Appear on more than
291,000 UCs.
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\7\ (OIG-23-47), DHS Does Not Have Assurance That All Migrants Can
be Located Once Released into the United States (REDACTED), September
6, 2023.
\8\ (OIG-24-46), Management Alert--ICE Cannot Monitor All
Unaccompanied Migrant Children Released from DHS and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services' Custody, August 19, 2024.
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Finally, OIG assessed \9\ CBP and ICE processes for
detaining and removing inadmissible travelers arriving at a
particular international airport. Between fiscal years 2021-23,
CBP released at least 383 inadmissible travelers from custody
at the international airport because it could not transfer them
to ICE, detain them at the airport, or fly them to another
airport. CBP also did not have an effective process to
determine which inadmissible travelers failed to return for
their removal flights--a population that constituted 44 percent
(168) of inadmissible travelers--and thus did not consistently
transfer their cases to ICE for removal proceedings. We made 3
recommendations, which are all now closed.
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\9\ (OIG-24-30), CBP and ICE Did Not Have an Effective Process for
Detaining and Removing Inadmissible Travelers at an International
Airport (REDACTED), June 12, 2024.
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DHS Border Security Operations During Operation Allies Welcome
The scope of our border security audit and inspection work has
expanded in recent years to include potential vulnerabilities due to
exigent circumstances. For example, OIG published 6 reports related to
the resettlement of individuals evacuated from Afghanistan as part of
Operation Allies Welcome (OAW); this involved the resettlement of
approximately 97,000 evacuees in American communities beginning in
September 2021.
OIG assessed \10\ the extent to which DHS screened, vetted,
and inspected evacuees arriving as part of OAW and determined
CBP did not always have critical data to properly vet Afghan
evacuees. Information used to vet evacuees in Government
databases was sometimes inaccurate, incomplete, or missing. In
addition, CBP permitted 35 Afghan evacuees to board a flight
without being cleared to travel and did not collect biometrics
from 1,299 evacuees prior to their travel to the United States.
As a result, DHS paroled at least 2 evacuees into the United
States who posed a risk to national security and the safety of
local communities and may have admitted or paroled more
individuals of concern.
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\10\ (OIG-22-64), DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and
Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (REDACTED),
September 6, 2022.
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OIG reviewed \11\ DHS's efforts to track evacuees who
independently departed U.S. military bases and how these
``independent departures'' affected immigration status.
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\11\ (OIG-22-79), The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track
Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases, September
29, 2022.
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Approximately 11,700 Afghan evacuees departed U.S. military
bases, or safe havens, without assistance from resettlement
agencies. OIG's review found the Unified Coordination Group
(UCG)--the entity tasked with coordinating resettlement
efforts--struggled to track OAW independent departures evacuees
and had difficulties documenting when independent departures
occurred. Finally, the UCG did not attempt to locate all
evacuees who independently departed safe havens to verify their
compliance with parole conditions.
In assessing \12\ DHS's identification and resolution of
potentially derogatory records for OAW parolees, OIG found that
CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and
ICE's interconnected processes for identifying and resolving
derogatory information for OAW parolees was fragmented. OIG
identified USCIS enforcement action gaps for parolees who were
denied immigration benefits; specifically, USCIS would not
initiate removal proceedings against an OAW parolee or
terminate parole when it denied a benefit application due to
derogatory information. OIG also determined that no one in DHS
had responsibility for monitoring parole expiration for OAW
parolees or taking any related action, such as initiating
removal proceedings, when derogatory information about a
parolee was discovered.
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\12\ (OIG-24-24), DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and
Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees,
May 6, 2024.
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OIG also reviewed DHS's overall management of OAW to
determine if there were any deficiencies or best practices. We
found that DHS met processing time lines \13\ for the limited
number of asylum applicants from the OAW population. However,
DHS did not have a structure to support its own volunteers for
unfunded operations such as OAW,\14\ and the lack of direct
funding and absence of clear authority for UCG leadership
affected the UCG's coordination of the OAW resettlement
process.\15\ In total, DHS OIG made 14 recommendations related
to OAW. Currently, 5 recommendations are closed, 8
recommendations are resolved and open, and one recommendation,
with which the Department did not concur, remains unresolved
and open.
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\13\ (OIG-23-40), USCIS Has Generally Met Statutory Requirements to
Adjudicate Asylum Applications from Paroled Afghan Evacuees, August 18,
2023.
\14\ (OIG-22-54), DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its
Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies
Welcome, July 27, 2022.
\15\ (OIG-22-78), The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation
Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in
Funding And Authority, September 29, 2022.
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Unannounced Inspections of CBP and ICE Facilities
OIG continues to conduct unannounced inspections of both CBP short-
term holding facilities and ICE detention facilities, as mandated by
Congress in 2019. CBP is responsible for apprehending migrants and
detaining them for a short period, typically not to exceed 72 hours,
while ICE is responsible for long-term detention. OIG's inspections of
CBP and ICE facilities evaluate the Department's compliance with
applicable detention standards to ensure they meet Federal requirements
regarding the safety, well-being, and care of detainees in custody. We
use a risk-based, data-driven methodology to determine which facilities
to inspect, based on prior inspections, location, size, facility type,
DHS OIG Hotline complaints, and historical and current apprehension
numbers. Our inspections help ensure facilities comply with standards;
improve the efficiency of detention operations; and mitigate risks to
the health, welfare, and safety of detainees and DHS personnel.
OIG issued 16 reports regarding CBP short-term holding
facilities from fiscal years 2022-24, covering 93 USBP and
Office of Field Operations facilities. Within those 16 reports,
OIG made 39 recommendations to improve the conditions of
detainees in detention. Some of OIG's most significant
recommendations have addressed meeting standards for time in
custody, overcrowding, managing detainees with contagious
diseases, and handling detainee property. DHS has taken
corrective action to close 36 of the 39 recommendations.
In the same period, OIG issued 13 reports and one management
alert related to 13 ICE detention facilities. Within those 14
reports, we made 111 recommendations to improve the conditions
of detainees in detention. Generally, areas of non-compliance
included environmental health and safety, the use of special
management units, staff-detainee communication, dental and
chronic care, medical staffing shortages, and grievance
systems. We also found that ICE paid approximately $86 million
for unused bedspace under contracts in which ICE guarantees
minimum payments to detention facility contractors or State and
local governments, paying for bed space regardless of use. ICE
has taken corrective action to close 106 of the 111
recommendations.
cybersecurity oversight
Cyber space has become the most active threat domain in the world
and a dynamic threat to U.S. security. In 2023, Federal agencies
reported nearly a 10 percent increase of cybersecurity incidents with
over 32,000 total incidents Federal Government-wide.\16\ DHS's vast and
complex information technology (IT) environment includes more than 800
unique IT systems that process and maintain critical and sensitive
mission-related data pertaining to counterterrorism, border security,
law enforcement, and critical infrastructure, among other areas. This
scale and level of potential exposure requires continuous monitoring
and action to ensure cybersecurity threats are identified and
remediated timely. Such protections are vital to secure the
Departments' systems and information from domestic and foreign
adversaries who may wish to exploit vulnerabilities to gain access.
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\16\ (FY23-FISMA-Report), Office of Management and Budget, Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 Annual Report Fiscal
Year 2023.
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OIG's role is to ensure DHS cyber defenses are adequate to
identify, prevent, and mitigate threats. OIG uses a multidisciplinary
IT oversight approach with IT auditors leading assessments of
management controls, cybersecurity experts providing targeted technical
expertise, and technical testing tools to perform real-time assessments
of system controls to detect weaknesses. OIG's technical testing tools
include vulnerability and configuration scans of component
workstations, servers, domain controllers, databases, and applications
to identify system vulnerabilities and verify settings are correctly
implemented.
OIG collaborates closely with DHS officials to maintain awareness
of key cybersecurity challenges and priorities, which informs our risk-
based approach for selecting the audits to address the Department's
most pressing cybersecurity risks and challenges. DHS OIG adds value to
the Department by sharing the results of its technical testing to
uncover IT security vulnerabilities in real time. Over the past 3
years, OIG has identified more than 4,000 security vulnerabilities,
allowing DHS to quickly address vulnerabilities and weaknesses that
could potentially be exploited by adversaries.
Since fiscal year 2021, OIG has issued 16 reports containing a
total of 99 recommendations aimed at bolstering the Department's
cybersecurity protections for systems, networks, and mobile device
security.
System and Mobile Device Security Oversight Work
We conducted technical assessments \17\ to test security controls
of several mission-critical systems across CBP, ICE, FEMA, and TSA,
finding that additional steps are needed to ensure these sensitive
systems are adequately secured. For example, we identified hundreds of
workstations that were not receiving security patches to address
critical and high vulnerabilities for more than 6 months and those that
were missing the DHS required settings needed to ensure effective
system security.
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\17\ (OIG-23-43), CBP Implemented Effective Technical Controls to
Secure a Selected Tier 1 High Value Asset, August 23, 2023; (OIG-23-
44), Cybersecurity System Review of the Transportation Security
Administration's Selected High Value Asset, August 28, 2023; (OIG-24-
53), ICE Did Not Fully Implement Effective Security Controls on
Selected High Value Asset Systems, September 17, 2024; (OIG-25-08),
Cybersecurity System Review of a Selected High Value Asset at CISA,
January 15, 2025.
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We found significant shortcomings at each of the 3 DHS components--
USCIS, FEMA, and ICE--we assessed for proper controls \18\ to prevent
unauthorized access to data and systems. Based on our test samples
across these audits, on average 64 percent of the personnel who had
either left DHS or transferred to a new position continued to have
access to Department systems and information beyond their last day. We
also identified hundreds of users who held inappropriate access to
privileged accounts--such as administrators with broad and/or special
access to system data--with no mission need for their level of access.
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\18\ (OIG-22-65), USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict
Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information, September 7, 2022;
(OIG-23-16), FEMA Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized
Access to Its Systems and Information, February 15, 2023; (OIG-23-33),
ICE Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its
Systems and Information, July 19, 2023.
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OIG completed assessments of mobile device security practices at
ICE and FEMA,\19\ in which we found weak security practices such as
employees installing high-risk applications from companies banned by
the Government and mobile devices that were not wiped even though they
were lost, stolen, or taken abroad without appropriate permission. As a
result, mobile devices and the sensitive information they contain may
be at a higher risk of unauthorized access and more susceptible to
cyber attacks.
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\19\ (OIG-24-61), ICE Did Not Always Manage and Secure Mobile
Devices to Prevent Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Information,
September 26, 2024; (OIG-23-32), FEMA Did Not Always Secure Information
Stored on Mobile Devices to Prevent Unauthorized Access, July 7, 2023.
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As we plan our work for fiscal year 2026 and beyond, DHS OIG will
utilize red team and penetration testing--methods in which OIG conducts
a simulated and nondestructive cyber attack--to further enhance our
oversight work. We will also employ penetration testing attack methods
such as phishing exercises, password cracking, theft of credentials,
attempted unauthorized logins, unauthorized input attacks from external
sources, malicious payload deployment, identity spoofing to gain
trusted access to networks and devices, and unauthorized privilege
escalation to continue to ensure DHS has the necessary cybersecurity
posture to prevent threats.
federal emergency and disaster management
The past several years has been marked by record-breaking
catastrophic disasters for management by FEMA, including unprecedented
natural disasters and a global pandemic. FEMA has declared 238 major
disaster declarations from fiscal year 2022 through the present, such
as hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and wildfires. OIG conducted nearly
40 audits on FEMA, identifying overpayments, ineligible payments, and
unsupported payments totaling approximately $12 billion. We have also
identified inadequate oversight leading to $9 billion in funds put to
better use. Collectively, OIG found that FEMA continues to face
significant challenges in 3 key areas: COVID-19 pandemic response,
natural disaster response, and management of other grants.
FEMA COVID-19 Pandemic Response
Given the unprecedented level of funding provided to FEMA for
America's COVID-19 response, most of OIG's FEMA audit work over the
past years has related to the pandemic. As of September 2021, FEMA had
received nearly $100 billion to assist the Nation in addressing the
challenges of the pandemic. The size of these appropriations, coupled
with the need to quickly distribute funds, signal an environment ripe
for fraud.
OIG has taken a technology-enabled joint audit and investigative
approach to overseeing FEMA's COVID funds and programs. OIG auditors
were able to quickly identify areas of fraud, waste, and abuse for
several specific programs. OIG criminal investigators led the charge
against fraud by sharing information on known fraud schemes for similar
programs, such as COVID-19 unemployment insurance fraud. OIG's data
scientists obtained data sets from partner agencies to conduct in-depth
computer matching efforts to support audits.
OIG conducted robust oversight on FEMA's management of COVID-19
assistance programs across 14 audit reports over the past 3 years. We
highlight reports below to illustrate some of the weaknesses in FEMA's
management of COVID-19 funding which led to $12 billion in questioned
costs and $1.5 billion in funds put to better use.
In 2022, OIG found that FEMA's Lost Wage Assistance (LWA)
program \20\ launched the program for State workforce agencies
to provide unemployment insurance without first setting clear
guidance or controls to mitigate the risk of improper payments.
Instead, FEMA relied on State insurance programs to determine
eligibility and distribute the funding, resulting in more than
$3.7 billion in improper payments. We issued a management alert
and 2 audit reports on this subject containing a total of 15
recommendations to improve FEMA's management of its Federal
assistance programs and to recover improper payments; 5
recommendations remain open and unresolved.
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\20\ (OIG-22-28), Management Alert--Reporting Suspected Fraud of
Lost Wages Assistance, February 28, 2022; (OIG-22-69), FEMA Did Not
Implement Controls to Prevent More than $3.7 Billion in Improper
Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program, September 16, 2022;
(OIG-22-73), More than $2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA
Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees' Identities, September 27, 2022.
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OIG in 2022 also found \21\ that FEMA did not have effective
controls over the Funeral Assistance Program, resulting in over
$26 million in ineligible or unallowable funeral expenses. We
issued an alert to recommend FEMA immediately establish
guardrails for reimbursement expenses and cost exceptions and
later issued a final report including 6 recommendations to
improve FEMA's oversight of the funeral assistance program. Two
recommendations are open; 1 is unresolved.
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\21\ (OIG-22-36), Management Alert--FEMA's COVID-19 Funeral
Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent with Previous
Interpretation of Long-Standing Regulations for Eligible Funeral
Expenses, April 13, 2022; (OIG-23-42), Ineffective Controls Over COVID-
19 Funeral Assistance Leave the Program Susceptible to Waste and Abuse,
August 22, 2023.
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In 2023, OIG assessed FEMA's oversight of the distribution
of COVID-19 medical supplies and equipment. We found \22\ that
FEMA did not effectively manage the distribution process, nor
did it provide sufficient oversight of Project Airbridge, a
COVID-19 initiative to reduce shipping times. As a result, FEMA
did not have full visibility into the resources shipped and
received, hindering its ability to make informed decisions.
FEMA may have also paid unnecessary transportation costs and
the projects $238 million may have been better spent on COVID-
19 initiative. We issued 5 recommendations to improve FEMA's
oversight of future public/private partnerships, all are open
and resolved.
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\22\ (OIG-23-14), FEMA Did Not Provide Sufficient Oversight of
Project Airbridge, February 7, 2023; (OIG 23-34), FEMA Did Not
Effectively Manage the Distribution of COVID-19 Medical Supplies and
Equipment, July 19, 2023.
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In January 2025, we reported \23\ FEMA did not have
sufficient oversight over COVID-19 emergency protective
measures public assistance funding. FEMA over-obligated at
least $1.5 billion in funds for 1 State's medical staffing
grant and did not determine the cost allowability of the $8.1
billion in funds drawn down by the State. Additionally, we
reviewed a sample of 20 other grants and identified
approximately $32.8 million in improper payments. We issued 7
recommendations for FEMA to improve oversight, 4 remain open
and resolved.
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\23\ (OIG-25-13), FEMA's Insufficient Oversight of COVID-19
Emergency Protective Measures Grants Led to Over $8.1 Billion in
Questioned Costs and $1.5 Billion in Over-obligated Funds, January 30,
2025.
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COVID-19 Fraud Investigations
In 2021, OIG established a dedicated COVID-19 Fraud Unit (CFU) to
focus solely on identifying and investigating fraud related to COVID-
19. Due to the large scope of the potential fraud, OIG utilized data
analytics to identify large, organized fraud schemes--some of which
resulted in millions of dollars being distributed to fraudsters. Our
investigations have identified instances in which recipients, through
fraud, received payments that they were not eligible for under the
Disaster Relief Fund.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, OIG has received over 8,800
complaints and opened over 600 investigations into COVID-19 fraud. To
date, our investigations have resulted in more than 200 indictments, 50
criminal Bills of Information, 162 convictions, and nearly $49 million
in recoveries. A sample of OIG significant cases in this area include:
A New Jersey man was sentenced to 6 years and 9 months in
prison and was ordered to pay $4.2 million in restitution for 2
related COVID-19 fraud cases; one case alleged wire fraud and
aggravated identity theft in California and the other case
alleged wire fraud in New Jersey. The perpetrator executed a
scheme to defraud the California Employment Development
Department (EDD) by filing at least 78 fraudulent unemployment
insurance claims with EDD, seeking Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance and other benefits under the CARES Act. The scheme
sought over $2.5 million in unemployment insurance benefits and
caused EDD and the United States to incur actual losses
exceeding $900,000. The perpetrator also executed a scheme to
defraud the Small Business Administration by fraudulently
receiving $1.28 million in Economic Injury Disaster Loans funds
and withdrawing over $777,000.
A Georgia woman was sentenced to 12 years in prison for her
role in a scheme to defraud the Georgia Department of Labor
(GaDOL) out of tens of millions of dollars in benefits meant to
assist unemployed individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
scammer and her co-conspirators caused more than 5,000
fraudulent unemployment insurance claims to be filed with
GaDOL, resulting in at least $30 million in stolen benefits.
DHS OIG and FBI Phoenix's Violent Street Gang Task Force
investigated the Arizona Mexican Mafia (AMM) for COVID pandemic
unemployment assistance (PUA) fraud after developing
information that AMM prison inmates were engaged in PUA fraud
along with other criminal activities, e.g., illegal drugs and
stolen property. The AMM is one of the most violent street
gangs in Arizona; it exerts significant influence over most
Arizona Department of Corrections prison yards. The estimated
fraud loss included over $1 million in unemployment benefit
payments and nearly $2 million in money-laundering activities.
Thirty members and/or associates of the gang were indicted on
multiple felony charges including fraudulent schemes,
conspiracy, money laundering, and participating in a criminal
syndicate.
FEMA Management of Disaster Response Programs
DHS OIG will continue robust oversight of FEMA's management of
disaster response programs, including the individual assistance
program, disaster closeout process, and Puerto Rico's recovery to
Hurricane Maria. Over the past 3 years, 10 audits resulted in nearly
$500,000 in questioned costs and over $7 billion in funds put to better
use.
OIG reported in 2022 \24\ that FEMA did not effectively
manage the Individual Assistance Disaster Case Management
Program following Hurricane Maria. FEMA did not properly
monitor cooperative agreements to ensure non-profit
organization were using accounting methods in accordance with
Federal requirements. FEMA made advance payments totaling $6.4
million to 6 nonprofit organizations based on estimates,
without reconciling the payments with actual costs.
Additionally, FEMA lacked supporting documentation for 8
nonprofit organizations totaling $10.7 million. These reports
contained 3 recommendations to improve the programs and
management of funds; 1 is open and resolved and 2 are closed.
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\24\ (OIG-22-77), FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage Disaster Case
Management Program Funds in Support of Hurricane Maria Recovery
Services, September 29, 2022.
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We recently reported \25\ on FEMA's efficiency in closing
out disaster declarations for grant programs awarded in 2012 or
earlier. We identified 26 programs that remained open beyond
their period of performance, totaling nearly $9.4 million in
unliquidated funds. FEMA also extended 41 program periods of
performance or closeout liquidation periods without detailed
and documented justification, delaying project closures by up
to 16 years. The 41 programs represent more than $7 billion in
unliquidated funds that could potentially be returned to the
Disaster Relief Fund. The report contained 2 recommendations to
improve FEMA's closeout of declared disasters, both remain open
with 1 resolved and the other unresolved.
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\25\ (OIG-24-45), FEMA's Inadequate Oversight Led to Delays in
Closing Out Declared Disasters, August 14, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA Grants Management
OIG continues to oversee FEMA's management of its grants and
programs. We issued 10 audit reports on these topics, including a
review of Humanitarian Relief Funds, the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program, and information technology. Our work assessing FEMA's grants
management led to $26 million in questioned costs and $180 million in
funds put to better use.
In 2022 we looked at FEMA's oversight of its Hazard
Mitigation Grant program (HMGP) property acquisitions and
reported \26\ FEMA did not provide assurance that projects were
awarded equitably. Grant program officials regularly granted
States more funds than needed to complete projects, did not
always deobligate unused funds promptly, and did not use
Strategic Funds Management, an incremental funding process, as
required. We estimate that FEMA could put about $135 million to
better use if it strengthens its HMGP project management. We
made 4 recommendations to strengthen FEMA's property
acquisition activities, and all recommendations are open and
resolved.
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\26\ (OIG-22-46), FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions, June 22, 2022.
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Also in 2022, we reported \27\ on improvements FEMA could
implement to better manage the Emergency Food and Shelter
Program to ensure individuals receive aid in a timely manner
and that program funding is used in accordance with Federal
requirements. From fiscal years 2017-2020, the Board did not
spend about $58 million of the $560 million (10.4 percent) in
appropriated grant funds. We made 10 recommendations to improve
oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, FEMA
nonconcurred with 3 recommendations. Of those recommendations,
5 are closed and 5 are open and resolved.
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\27\ (OIG-22-56), FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the
Emergency Food and Shelter Program, August 10, 2022.
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Finally, in 2023 we reported \28\ that FEMA should increase
oversight to prevent misuse of humanitarian relief funds. We
reviewed $12.9 million from 18 local recipient organizations
and determined FEMA did not support the $7.4 million in funding
provided to them. Additionally, FEMA was unable to provide
documentation for families and individuals to whom they
provided services. We made 2 recommendations to improve
oversight and enforcement for similar future appropriations.
One recommendation is closed, and 1 is open but resolved.
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\28\ (OIG-23-20), FEMA Should Increase Oversight to Prevent Misuse
of Humanitarian Relief Funds, March 28, 2023.
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OIG continues to monitor FEMA's disaster response operations and
has on-going audit work to evaluate FEMA's management of claims for the
Hermit's Peak/Calf Canyon fires, and adherence to applicable policies
when determining community trends that impact disaster survivor
assistance for Hurricanes Irene and Milton. We also have work planned
to assess FEMA's response to the 2023 wildfire in Lahaina, Hawaii, and
recent wildfires in Southern California.
access to information
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, established Offices
of Inspector General as ``independent and objective'' units in
departments and large agencies. The Inspector General Empowerment Act
of 2016 further protected Inspectors General by confirming that all IGs
are entitled to ``full and prompt access to agency records'' to ensure
IGs can conduct their reviews in an efficient manner. This law also
allowed IGs to match data across agencies to help uncover wasteful
spending and enhance the public's access to information about
misconduct among senior Government employees.
Beginning with OIG's Semi-Annual Report to Congress (SAR) for the
period ending September 30, 2021, and continuing with every subsequent
SAR, OIG has documented DHS delays or denials in providing requested
information in accordance with the law. These delays and denials have
adversely impacted our ability to provide Congress and the public
objective and timely oversight of the Department's operations and
programs.
Since 2021, OIG has reported 33 delays and 35 denials of access to
information by the Department. Examples include:
CBP on 3 occasions denied OIG access to BorderStat, citing
concerns that the OIG would have access to data outside the
scope of the announced audit. BorderStat contains data from
multiple data sources, such as anti-terrorism matches, cargo
processing rates, and passenger processing rates. Most
recently, CBP denied our request despite being unable to
provide the OIG with a complete set of data to support an on-
going audit.
FEMA routinely denies OIG requests for access to certain
databases citing similar concerns regarding scope. In a recent
audit, the FEMA data analytics team was unable to provide the
OIG with complete datasets due to the complexity of the FEMA GO
database, forcing the OIG to make multiple requests for data
extracts. This resulted in a 114-calendar day delay before the
OIG received complete data.
For over 3 years OIG has been denied access to the DHS
Integrated Security Management System (ISMS), run by the Office
of the Chief Security Officer, which houses key information on
DHS personnel (contractors and staff) related to security
processing, such as background and clearance information.
Because this is a system of record for key data elements that
do not exist elsewhere in DHS, its data is critical for several
on-going OIG reviews. Additionally, access to ISMS is necessary
for OIG to perform adequate oversight of DHS's security
clearance and adjudication processes, which are integral to the
safe, effective functioning of the Department.
conclusion
Eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse is not just about recovering
lost funds; it is about ensuring that taxpayer dollars are used
effectively in the first place. As evidenced through the robust
portfolio of reports and investigations highlighted in this testimony,
OIG has worked diligently to improve efficiency and effectiveness of
the Department of Homeland Security.
OIG can perform this important work due to its independent posture;
we conduct objective, non-partisan, and credible oversight, that has
identified critical vulnerabilities within the Department, resulted in
the recovery of millions of taxpayer dollars, and yielded actionable
recommendations to strengthen accountability and efficiency in DHS
programs and operations.
We appreciate your support and remain committed to working with
Congress, this subcommittee, DHS leadership, and other stakeholders to
promote transparency, efficiency, and accountability throughout the
Department.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Ms. Bernard.
I now recognize Ms. Erika Lang for her 5 minutes of opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ERIKA LANG, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GEN-
ERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF THE IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL
Ms. Lang. Good afternoon, Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member
Thanedar, and esteemed Members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the Office of Inspector
General's independent oversight of Homeland Security programs
and operations. As you've heard from my colleague, our vital
work ensures DHS is effective and efficient, while safeguarding
American security and taxpayer dollars. My testimony today will
focus on my office's oversight of DHS's efforts regarding
border security and immigration enforcement.
First, I want to highlight OIG's body of work related to
the resettlement of approximately 97,000 Afghan evacuees into
American communities in 2021. We determined that approximately
11,700 Afghan evacuees independently departed U.S. military
bases without assistance from resettlement agencies.
Our review found DHS struggled to track who independently
departed and when these independent departures occurred. DHS
also did not attempt to locate all evacuees who independently
departed the bases to verify their compliance with parole
conditions.
We also examined DHS's processes for identifying and
resolving potentially derogatory records of Afghan parolees and
found this process was fragmented. Ultimately, the Department
did not have a process for monitoring parole expiration for
individual Afghan parolees and had not designated a single
component to monitor this parole expiration.
Finally, we reviewed DHS's overall management of the
evacuation efforts. We found the Department met processing time
lines for the limited number of asylum applicants from the
Afghan population. However, it did not have a structure to
support DHS volunteers for the effort, and the lack of direct
funding and absence of clear authority affected the
coordination of the resettlement process.
I also want to discuss 2 key reports that point to specific
weaknesses in the Department's ability to maintain effective
border security.
First, in 2022, CBP apprehended and released an alien
without providing information requested by the FBI's Terrorist
Screening Center that would have confirmed the individual was a
positive match for the terrorist watch list. This occurred
because of CBP's ineffective processes for resolving
inconclusive matches with the watch list. We determined that
ICE also faced multiple challenges planning and conducting the
alien's arrest.
Second, we examined CBP's and ICE's processes for detaining
and removing inadmissible travelers from a particular
international airport. Between fiscal years 2021 and 2023, CBP
released at least 383 inadmissible travelers from custody at
that airport. Forty-four percent of them did not return for
their removal flight. We found CBP did not have an effective
process to track who failed to return for their flights and did
not consistently transfer their cases to ICE for removal
proceedings.
Our findings that I've just shared point to weaknesses in
processes, information sharing, resources, and technologies
that affect the Department's ability to effectively secure its
borders and enforce immigration laws.
Last, we continue to conduct Congressionally-mandated
unannounced inspections of both CBP holding facilities and ICE
detention facilities to ensure the facilities comply with
Federal detention standards. We have issued 16 reports
regarding CBP's short-term holding facilities from fiscal year
2022 through 2024. Our most significant recommendations address
meeting national standards for time in custody as well as
overcrowding.
During the same time, we issued 14 reports related to ICE
detention facilities and made multiple recommendations to
improve the conditions of those in detention.
These unannounced inspections help ensure the Department
complies with applicable detention standards to maintain the
required conditions of detainees in custody and mitigates risks
to the health and safety of DHS personnel.
As my colleague and I have described, DHS OIG's
comprehensive body of work demonstrates our commitment to
improving the Department's effectiveness in its many mission
areas.
The independence of Inspectors General ensures necessary
oversight, accountability, and transparency in the Federal
Government. It allows us to make objective, actionable
recommendations. We appreciate Congress' on-going support of
our independent oversight.
This concludes my testimony, and I'm happy to answer any
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Ms. Lang.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning our witnesses, and additional rounds
of questioning may be called after all Members have been
recognized.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Currie, starting in 2011, GAO made 83 recommendations--
you pointed this out in your opening statement--implicating $19
billion in savings. So from 2011 to date, recommendations from
your organization proved $19 billion in savings for the
taxpayer.
In March 2025, there remains 459 open recommendations that
the GAO has made specific, and you mentioned 37 of those are
high-priority recommendations, with only 5 of those
recommendations for efficiency being implemented. You mentioned
the 2 high-priority areas, one of which included FEMA, which
our President has been talking about, we have Members of
Congress talking about.
To what extent does the high number of recommendations from
GAO relative to the Department of Homeland Security, 37, 2 of
them specifically that remain unaddressed, implicate major
duplications, cost-saving potential?
Mr. Currie. Well, definitely all of them relate to
streamlining or improving the efficiency, if not directly
finding overlapping programs. So, certainly, you can translate
those recommendations that, if implemented, you would save
millions if not billions of dollars.
Mr. Brecheen. So I want you to, again, please highlight the
2 areas specific to this high-risk category, Federal
Government-wide, correct? The 2 areas specific to this
committee's jurisdiction, what are those 2 areas again, just
for simplicity?
Mr. Currie. Sure. One is DHS IT security and financial
management, also improving the delivery of Federal disaster
assistance. Actually, there's one more I didn't mention today,
which is the cybersecurity of the Nation is a high-risk area as
well in DHS.
Mr. Brecheen. Which OIG has also indicated.
So one area that showcases the significant growth, waste,
as you just said, is the FEMA's disaster recovery efforts. It
is more than justified what our President has been discussing
when he's talking about what we can do to change the status
quo.
So I've asked staff to provide this chart. Visuals are
always good. I don't know--we may have to raise that up. Can
you all see the red lines from your seated position, the red
lines at the bottom? Are you able to see that?
That's the rate of inflation. That is the rate of
inflation. Starting in 2000, at the side bar here, far left,
the dark blue at the bottom is the base for disaster recovery.
Then the light blue is the supplementals that Congress comes in
and brings about.
So the bottom red line represents just the base growth
every year appropriated by Congress. The upper red line
represents what would be if we had grown at the rate of
inflation supplementals added.
So go back to 2000. At the rate of inflation, what we will
see is base disaster aid annually appropriated. If it had just
grown at the rate of inflation, it would be almost 2 times
greater. Bottom left number, $2.5 billion, today at the rate of
inflation that base number would be $4.2 billion. That's the
bottom red line. You can see very slow growth.
The upper red line, again, indicative of the supplementals.
If we go back, middle number on the left side, $4.2 billion in
2000 was the total, adding in the supplemental cost. If you
rise at the rate of inflation, that would put us at $8.2
billion.
But you notice where those red lines track on the right
side of this graph, way short of where we actually are. You
have to--instead of a multiplier of 200, you have to put a
multiplier of 800 percent. That is the rate of growth, whether
it's the base 800 percent growth relative what would be the
rate of inflation or supplemental 800 percent growth. Then you
see a few years before.
I want to dismantle quickly. I don't have the time to go
through the stats. I've done this in committee before. Anyone
who says this is climate-related, more climate, you've got a
United Nations Climate Panel, the United Nations, not known to
be right of center, saying that there is no correlation between
frequency of hurricanes and drought and wildfires relative to
climate change. So that argument, even the United Nations
dispels. We've got a waste problem. We've got an inefficiency
problem.
All right. GAO added improving FEMA's disaster recovery
assistance to its high-risk. Annual appropriations to that fund
have greatly outpaced inflation, as I just showed.
Mr. Currie, what does it mean to be on the high-risk list
and how that--given the increased appropriations the DRF has
continued to receive, what should policy makers be concerned
about when it comes to them remaining on that list, especially
given these numbers?
Mr. Currie. To be on the high-risk list means that the
program is vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse, and
mismanagement or inefficiency. One of the main reasons we added
this to our list this year is--actually, your chart shows FEMA
dollars. If you were to add the rest of the Federal Government,
it would go through the ceiling pretty much.
So what's happened over time is that this process and this
assistance has just gotten too fragmented and too large, and
it's just not well-coordinated. We hear this over and over
again when we go around the country and talk to survivors and
State and local governments.
So I think there's just a tremendous amount of efficiency
that can be gained by better streamlining these programs.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you.
I want to now, for his 5 minutes of questioning, recognize
Mr. Thanedar. You are recognized.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chair. Thank you to our guests
here.
The Inspector Generals play a crucial role in combating
waste, fraud, and abuse, and promoting efficiency and
effectiveness in Government programs and operations. However,
they must adhere to integrity, objectivity, and independent
standards.
Previously, GAO found that a lack of transparency in DHS
OIG's selection of work topics called into question the
independence of the organization.
What changes--this is a question for Ms. Bernard and Ms.
Lang. What changes has the OIG made to ensure transparency when
selecting work proposals, and how does the agency ensure it is
targeting the highest-risk areas at DHS?
Ms. Bernard. Thank you so much for the question, and thank
you for recognizing the importance of inspectors general.
At DHS OIG, that is very important for us. We always want
to make sure we're allocating our resources very wisely,
especially recognizing we are overseeing a department with 22
components, over 260,000 employees worldwide. It's very
important that we allocate our resources to address the highest
risk.
So I am really proud of our risk-based approach to make
sure we are helping DHS accomplish its most critical mission
areas and its most critical challenges. So we do have a
recurring and repeatable framework for that. It encourages
staff to consider project ideas from multiple sources
internally and externally.
Mr. Thanedar. My question here, of course, is really coming
to comment that the OIG's audits, evaluations, and
investigations of the Trump administration will meet integrity,
objectivity, and independent standards and help ensure DHS
operates within the law.
Ms. Bernard. Yes, I can assure you we will continue
conducting our oversight work in accordance with our statutory
authority. We will remain independent and objective and will
continue to follow our auditing standards. Our work continues
unabated as we currently are still working under our inspector
general, Dr. Cuffari.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
My question to Mr. Currie is, for over 100 years GAO has
played a crucial role in enhancing the effectiveness of
Government programs and ensuring taxpayer money is well spent.
Over the past 20 years, GAO's work has resulted in about $1.45
trillion in financial benefits and over 30,000 programs and
operational benefits.
Through its high-risk list, GAO focused attention on the
most significant challenges facing the Government. One such
challenge is human capital, including skill shortage, a
challenge DOGE does not seem to appreciate as it purges civil
servants.
What are the consequences of reducing the Federal work
force using a sledgehammer rather than a scalpel?
Mr. Currie. Well, you're correct. Many of the high-risk
areas--and there's over 30 of them across all of the Federal
Government that we've identified--are on the list because of
some sort of staffing or capacity challenge. That means that
either they don't have the right number of people to perform
the mission or they don't have the right skills.
So, typically, what you do is you figure out what you want
the Government or the agencies to do and how you want them to
do it, then you figure out what sort of staff you need to do
it. So, obviously, it's going to have some implications but,
you know, we don't know yet what exactly those will be.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
Ms. Lang, I didn't give you any time to respond, so if you
want to take 30 seconds, if you like.
Ms. Lang. No, thank you. I think my colleague covered
everything. Thank you.
Mr. Thanedar. All right.
Thank you, Chair, and I yield back.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentleman yields back.
I now would like to recognize the gentleman from Tennessee
for his 5 minutes of questioning, Mr. Ogles.
Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Lang, after the Biden administration's disastrous
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Biden offered tens of thousands of
Afghans passage into the United States. We all understand the
desire to get known trusted partners to the United States,
perhaps, safely after withdrawal. But there are also many
hostile, violent people in Afghanistan.
Did the Biden administration adequately vet Afghans before
granting them parole? Ms. Lang.
Ms. Lang. Thank you for that question. The screening and
vetting of Afghan evacuees at the time was a subject of one of
our reports. Kristen--I would like to--it was part of my
colleague----
Mr. Ogles. Ms. Bernard? Fine.
Ms. Bernard. Sure, yes, I can take that. We did do an audit
in 2022 to look at the screening and vetting of the Afghan
withdrawals. We did--in our population, we did find that I
believe it was 35 who were allowed to board a flight that
hadn't been fully screened.
Generally, we found that CBP did not always have accurate
and complete data for conducting the screening of those
evacuees. In some cases, they were just missing their
identification. So, you know, we didn't even have biographic
information to screen.
Since that time, the Department has provided documentation
that all of the evacuees have been screened, and that's
something that we're still looking at now to validate.
Mr. Ogles. So, to be clear, at the time that they were
granted parole, we did not have the entire picture of who these
individuals were. In some cases, we did not have their
identifications.
I think it's safe to say that some of the very people that
have torn that country apart, some of the very folks from
Afghanistan that we might otherwise allow to be here, they
allowed the folks they're running from to come with them.
This is a disaster. This is a recipe for disaster. Also
keep in mind that little event called 9/11 was planned in
Afghanistan. So we have folks in this country, that country,
that don't like the United States of America. We've seen it on
full display for decades now. The botched withdrawal, the
failed policies of the Biden administration, and allowing folks
from a hostile nation to come here unvetted makes America less
safe.
To be clear, we know that we've let individuals on the
terror watch list into this Nation, some through the parole
program, some have walked through our Southern Border. This is
a failure of the Biden administration. Enough is enough.
So as you see President Trump going through the process of
closing the border, as you see the mechanism where we're
deporting individuals, this is our country. These are our
borders. If you're not from here, you are a guest. We can get
to decide who comes in and who has to leave.
The way forward as we face the barreling debt this country
has in our future is we get to decide. The average immigrant
family that comes here illegally will cost the American
taxpayer a million dollars. A million dollars. Where's that
money coming from? It's coming from you. It's coming from me.
It's coming from hardworking Americans.
It's time that we do the hard thing, that we admit that the
Biden administration or, for that matter, any administration
who allowed folks to be here that shouldn't be here, that we
send them home, that we give them the opportunity to go back
home.
Look, I don't blame anyone for wanting to come here. I have
3 children. My wife and I, we have 3 children. You walk through
fire and over glass to give them a better life. But if you want
to come to this country, our country, you can do it the right
way. You're going to follow our rules and our laws. If you
don't like it, you can leave.
I'm not going to be apologetic for a President or for
myself or for my colleagues who understand and respect the rule
of law and expect everyone--citizen, noncitizen, guest,
illegal--are going to follow our laws. If you're here
illegally, you need to get out.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize Ranking Member Thompson for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Currie, how long have you been with the GAO?
Mr. Currie. Be 23 years in June.
Mr. Thompson. I compliment you on that.
How long have you been looking at DHS and its programs?
Mr. Currie. About 22 of those years.
Mr. Thompson. OK. Thank you.
So if you looked at DHS at this point and there had to be a
reduction in force, what would you expect, how would that
process play out?
Mr. Currie. Well, it's a challenge because there's not a
mission in DHS that's not critical, which is very unique. I
think it would be hard to balance between is cybersecurity more
important than disaster assistance, and it's not. Each of their
missions is critical.
So I think that what you'd have to look at is, what are the
agencies expected to do and what are they expected to deliver?
So, for example, with FEMA, 100 or more disasters a year, 600
total disasters they're managing. What do our communities and
our survivors expect from them, and then what sort of numbers
of people do we need to deliver that assistance. Right now, for
example, with FEMA, they can't keep their head above water with
delivering what we expect them to deliver.
Mr. Thompson. Well, thank you.
You mentioned FEMA, and what's the other agency? You
mentioned 2.
Mr. Currie. Oh, I think cybersecurity, CISA.
Mr. Thompson. OK. So if I told you that there have been
hundreds of FEMA employees and CISA employees summarily told to
leave, without evaluation, without a plan or anything of that
nature, have you seen that?
Mr. Currie. Well, we know that there have been dismissals
of employees, yes.
Mr. Thompson. So are you aware of any kind of a reduction
in force plan or dismissal plan for the employees that are
currently being discharged at FEMA or CISA?
Mr. Currie. I haven't seen any plan like that. I do know
that some of these reductions have been based on for new or
probationary employees. That's about the extent of the grouping
that I am aware of.
Mr. Thompson. Well, when you say probationary employees,
define that for the committee.
Mr. Currie. Well, that could be--that could be people that
are new to FEMA or it could be people that are new to their
particular position.
Mr. Thompson. If I told you that there were employees
who've been with the agency for 10 years, got promoted to
another position, and all of a sudden they are considered
probationary, is that consistent with normal personnel policies
and procedures?
Mr. Currie. Not normally. I'd want to know, you know, where
they work and what their--what their actual performance was.
That's an important part, their performance every year. Then
also, what specific area they work in to know whether that is
something that would have an impact on the mission or not.
Mr. Thompson. So if I told you there are hundreds of
employees at FEMA and CISA who have been discharged whose
evaluations say they've been excellent employees.
Mr. Currie. Yes. I mean, I would have concerns over that.
Not just from the immediate mission but, you know, hiring new
employees as well, because, you know, whatever reductions are
made, there is going to have to be some people, Federal
employees that deliver the services.
So I'm concerned that--I'm concerned mostly with FEMA being
able to deliver the mission that we expect it to deliver.
Mr. Thompson. Yes. If I told you that CISA employees have a
critical mission. They have to maintain, basically, our cyber
hygiene for Government and that we have people who are being
discharged, and now those--that agency is losing its capacity
to do what its mission calls for, that that creates a
vulnerability by letting those people go. I mean----
Mr. Currie. Yes. In the area of cybersecurity, particularly
in CISA, you know, we've spent the last 10 years trying to get
DHS the authorities it needs to bring on board people with
those skill sets, because they don't always want to work for
Government. They can make a lot more money outside.
So with regard to cybersecurity specialists, yes, I'm
concerned about losing that talent and then being able to
recruit the talent we need to address the threat we face.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the Representative from Georgia, Ms.
Greene.
Ms. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I can assure everyone the threat we face is millions of
people that came into our country under the Biden
administration and full Democrat control under the past 4
years.
In Joe Biden's first few days and months as President, in
full Democrat control of this country, the Biden administration
stopped construction of the border wall, unlawfully granted
mass parole--that means he let thousands and thousands of
people in this country every single day--expanded the grounds
for claiming asylum to pretty much anybody and everyone,
implemented catch-and-release.
Oh, if they caught them, they just release them in with
here's some paperwork. Here's a free flight. Here's a bus
ticket. If you make it to New York City, taxpayers in New York
and other sanctuary cities will pay for you to stay.
He terminated cooperative agreements and took just about
every action possible to facilitate the largest invasion of our
country and create the highest national security threat in our
homeland that our country has ever faced.
Ask any angel parent how they feel today about Federal
workers losing their jobs. You know what they're going to say?
They're going to say the U.S. Government failed our family
because our child or family member were murdered by an illegal
alien that shouldn't have been in this country. Ask Laken
Riley's mother how she feels about that.
Ms. Bernard and Ms. Lang, in your testimony, you stated
that in a 2024 OIG report, CBP could not biometrically confirm
the identity of all persons seeking entry in vehicles, at land
ports of entry, nor did CBP maintain consistency in operational
procedures to screen all vehicle passengers prior to allowing
these noncitizens into the country.
We knew that CBP wasn't verifying the identities of people
crossing the border in between ports of entry, but they weren't
even able to fully identify people at ports of entry in cars.
That would be like us opening up our doors to our house,
opening up our windows, and not checking to see who's coming in
with our children in our house.
You also testified that OIG assessed DHS's actions related
to the screening process of suspected terrorists, and in 2022,
CBP missed multiple opportunities to verify that an apprehended
alien was a positive match for the terrorist watch list before
releasing the migrants into the community. Terrorist watch
list, ladies and gentlemen. This included not providing
information requested by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center,
which would have confirmed a positive match.
Ms. Bernard and Ms. Lang, why did these failures occur
under the Biden administration? Ms. Bernard.
Ms. Bernard. Thank you. This is a critical area for us.
We've done a lot of work to look at border security. In that
particular project that you mentioned, we were looking
specifically at how CBP was conducting screening and vetting at
ports of entry.
Our focus was on the technological capabilities, resources,
and processes that they were using. Yes, we did find challenges
in biometric screening capabilities. One was that biometric
capabilities are not available at all land border crossing
lanes. The second was that, on occasion, they would forego
screening passengers. So if there was a backlog of a high
volume of travelers coming across the port of entry, they may
waive the screening of the passenger and only do the driver.
Ms. Greene. So to increase people coming in, let's move the
traffic along. Yes, that's a complete failure.
Ms. Lang, can you explain?
Ms. Lang. I can speak to the release of the individual who
was a match for the watch list. We found that that happened
because of weaknesses that we see across DHS, which is
ineffective practices, poor information sharing within CBP
itself, staffing constraints on the part of CBP. Really, it was
paper processes, relying on paper files, moving them across the
country.
So if these vulnerabilities can be addressed. We did make
one recommendation to the Department about this particular
case, but the recommendation can be used more broadly across
their processes.
Ms. Greene. Right. So these were the policies of the Biden
administration, just to be clear. The Democrats had full
control, and they allowed millions of people in the country.
Mr. Chairman, President Trump and his administration is
doing a great job. Tom Homan is leading as border czar and has
reduced the crossings from thousands every single day to less
than 300.
This isn't about resources. This isn't about how many
Federal employees we have. This is a difference in an election,
and this is what the American people voted for, border security
and the promises that President Trump made.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentlelady yields.
The Chair now recognizes the Representative from Illinois,
Mrs. Ramirez, for her 5 minutes.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member.
You know, it's our first Oversight Subcommittee hearing
this Congress, very first one, and I find it really ironic that
we're discussing waste, fraud, and abuse when you have a
unelected civilian like Musk, and Trump, who are getting--who
are actually gutting every single tool that DHS has to actually
address waste, fraud, and abuse.
I mean, just think about it. One of the very first actions
from this administration--this administration that the
gentlelady from Georgia loves to brag about--was to fire 17
inspector generals. Since many of my colleagues seem to be
confused about the role of an inspector general, well, let me
go ahead and remind them. Their mission is to provide objective
oversight to promote the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness, and integrity of our agencies.
Since those firings, the administration has been on a
rampage of terminations and fork-in-the-road emails to gut the
Federal work force. Their objective, let me be clear, replace
impartial independent Federal employees with Musk---it has to
be Musk-first--Trump loyalists.
On top of all that, Trump puts a billionaire, who, by the
way, gets $8 million a day in Government contracts--significant
conflict of interest, I'd say--and numerous complaints and open
investigations, in charge of waste, fraud, and abuse. Come on,
you all. It's the fox guarding the henhouse.
Then you add illegal impoundment, funding freezes, extreme
budget cuts, and you have a recipe for more abuse. Trump's
billionaire friends getting contracts and payouts on the back
of working families and veterans that we all represent.
So you see how it's hard for me to reconcile that the chaos
of illegal firings, the irresponsible handling of conflict, the
defunding of Congressionally-authorized services is a credible
way to approach handling waste, fraud, and abuse. You see, I
too want to see an end to the misuse of funding and abuse of
our agencies, especially within Homeland under this Secretary.
But from where I'm sitting, the biggest culprits of waste,
fraud, and abuse are sitting at DOGE and in the White House.
So, Ms. Bernard and Ms. Lang, do you believe that the
Office of Inspector General plays a critical role in
safeguarding the agency from waste, from fraud and abuse, yes
or no? Ms. Bernard.
Ms. Bernard. Yes.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you.
Ms. Lang.
Ms. Lang. Yes. Thank you.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you.
My follow-up question. Ms. Bernard and Ms. Lang, I want to
ask you, in your opinion, is maintaining a sufficient Federal
work force imperative to the success of the agency, yes or no?
Ms. Lang.
Ms. Lang. Yes.
Mrs. Ramirez. Ms. Bernard.
Ms. Bernard. Yes.
Mrs. Ramirez. Ms. Bernard and Ms. Lang, I have another
question. Is there a replacement for the Office of Inspector
General or an office or department that can do the same work,
yes or no?
Ms. Lang. No.
Mrs. Ramirez. Ms. Bernard.
Ms. Bernard. Not that I'm aware of that has the same
statutory function, no.
Mrs. Ramirez. Yes. I figured you'd say that.
The reality is that we need our inspector generals, but
this administration overnight sends them an email at 7 p.m. and
tells them you are fired. Thank you for your service. This is
the same administration that wants to talk about
accountability.
So I want to pivot quickly to the importance of maintaining
a sufficient Federal work force.
Mr. Currie, the GAO's testimony states that you found that
FEMA had an overall staffing gap of about 35 percent across
different positions at the fiscal year of 2022. What are the
possible consequences if DHS does not properly staff up
instances like disaster recovery and resilience?
Mr. Currie. Well, quite simply, if the workload remains the
same, which I think it will, or increase moving forward,
they're not going have enough people to do the job that they're
asked to do right now, unless they are, you know--their mission
or their authorities are reduced in some way.
Mrs. Ramirez. So, Mr. Currie, we here say that we care
deeply about the American people, our constituents. I have
colleagues up here that do everything they can to go after
immigrants. But the reality is that this administration here is
talking about cuts when we know that we need these funds for
disaster recovery and resilience, and not having the work force
actually makes it impossible for us to be able to deliver those
services.
Let me close by saying this. As a Member of this committee,
especially this subcommittee, my responsibility is to ensure
that we are, in fact, conducting oversight, and the reality
that--is that Trump is the President right now, that the
Republicans have the House and the Senate, and so, therefore,
we're going to have to do some internal assessment of how you
are functioning, and especially today given the unethical and
illegal actions coming from billionaire bosses. Because I'm
clear that maintaining independent oversight and accountability
tools are critical for the health and success of our agencies
and for the American people. I want that to be on the record.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Brecheen. The Representative yields.
I would now like to recognize for 5 minutes of questioning
the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott.
Mr. Knott. Thank you, Chairman.
Witnesses, thank you all for being here.
Rather than take up most the time with speaking, I would
love to go in and ask some questions about the previous 4 years
and the border disaster that I saw first-hand.
I want to start with Ms. Lang. One of the OIG reports under
the Biden administration described the screening and the
vetting implementation as soiled.
Are you familiar with that report or the vetting procedures
that seem to have been, I would say, deficient during the
previous administration?
Ms. Lang. I'm going to defer to my colleague, Ms. Bernard,
for screening and vetting.
Mr. Knott. Ms. Bernard.
Ms. Bernard. If that is referring to our 2023 report, and
I'm guessing that it is, on port of entry screening and
vetting, yes.
Mr. Knott. Are you familiar--why--what led to that
conclusion?
Ms. Bernard. So, you know, in that particular report, like
I said a moment ago, we were looking at the technology and the
processes that CBP and ICE are using at ports of entry. You
know, one common theme that we see in that report and time and
time again is just the lack of situational awareness. There's a
lot of--as Ms. Lang pointed to earlier, there's a lot of manual
procedures, data inaccuracies, and other lags in getting
information from partners that can just reduce situational
awareness. Every land port of entry is different, has different
technological capabilities and infrastructure, so our----
Mr. Knott. Is there a system--is there a system that could
have facilitated appropriate screening of 11 million encounters
at the border?
Ms. Bernard. I think there's a lot of nuances to that
question, but it all goes back to volume, right, and DHS has
certainly struggled to keep pace with the volume.
Mr. Knott. Do you know where the decisions were made to
allow or to facilitate the number of illegal immigrants at the
border, to admit them? Was that in the White House? Was it the
DHS boss? Who made those decisions?
Ms. Bernard. I think that would be a combination of DHS
guidance and Federal regulations at the time.
Mr. Knott. OK. Was there ever any discussion about limiting
the number of inflow so that we could vet them more thoroughly?
Ms. Bernard. We wouldn't get involved in those policy
decisions at the inspector general's office. That would be for
DHS.
Mr. Knott. OK. Ms. Lang, were you familiar with any
discussions that went on about limiting the number of people
who were coming into the country?
Ms. Lang. No, I'm not familiar with that. Thank you.
Mr. Knott. OK. Mr. Currie, in regards to your role in
identifying how the Department functions most, I would say with
the highest level of functionality, were you aware of any
discussions with leadership, the White House under the Biden
administration, about limiting the number of illegal immigrants
who were coming into the country?
Mr. Currie. No, sir.
Mr. Knott. OK. Were there any concerns that were relayed to
the administration about, you know, we have terrorists coming
in, we have drug dealers coming in, we have human traffickers
coming in, there are people that want to harm this country
coming in, because of the sheer volume we'd miss some of them?
Were those concerns relayed to your superiors and to the folks
in the White House?
Mr. Currie. Well, in our work, I mean, we've certainly done
a lot of work over the last 4 to 5 years on CBP's role at the
border and the processing. Certainly, the influx has had an
impact on CBP's mission and the number--for example, the number
of staff they need to process all those people. So from that
standpoint, we've assessed those aspects of it.
Mr. Knott. Can CBP process 11 million people, known
encounters? I mean, I submit there's more than 11 million
people that crossed over, but is that a feasible ask to say,
CBP, we--you need to process 11 million people in 4 years?
Mr. Currie. Well, traditionally, they've been very short-
staffed, and they've struggled with hiring, for example. It's
been a big problem to meet the numbers they need in general, so
it's been a huge challenge.
Mr. Knott. So is the agency able to facilitate 11 million
people coming into the country? Can you facilitate vetting? Can
you know with confidence these people are not a threat to the
country?
Mr. Currie. Well, I'm not--honestly, I'm not sure about the
exact number of 11 million and what they could do. I can just
tell you that, based on our work, that we know that they've--
they--they've struggled to meet their mission for a long time
and hire the number of people they need in regular times, let
alone when there's a surge.
Mr. Knott. In regards to the number of employees that you
think CBP needs to secure the border and to effectively protect
the homeland, how many more people do you think you need?
Mr. Currie. I don't have the exact hiring targets at the
tip of my tongue right now. They actually--CBP does set a
target of what they need, and I know that they've had
challenges meeting that and hiring enough agents. We've done a
lot of work on that. Part of the problem is--is the process.
Mr. Knott. Yep.
Mr. Currie. It's like a multi-year process, 2 to 3----
Mr. Knott. To hire somebody?
Mr. Currie. Yes, at CBP, it's particularly challenging, and
that's been something DHS has been trying to address for quite
some time.
Mr. Knott. OK. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentleman--if it's OK with the committee,
can he ask a follow-up?
Mr. Thanedar. Yes.
Mr. Knott. A few extra questions?
Mr. Brecheen. Yes.
Mr. Knott. In regards to the--going to the portion of
disaster relief to the States. Mr. Currie, is there anything
that GAO can do to assist the President's counsel in terms of
research on returning power to the States in disaster recovery?
He's mentioned block grants. He's mentioned giving money more
efficiently to the States. Is that something that you would
have interest in doing, and, if so, what kind of
recommendations would you give us to assist in that regard?
Mr. Currie. Yes, we haven't been contacted by the counsel
yet, but we've been reporting on this for a number of years. We
did a report a couple years ago. We had 10 major options for
reforming this system, which, by the way, has been a problem
for many years.
Mr. Knott. When you say this system, what----
Mr. Currie. The disaster recovery system. I call it ``the
system'' because it's 30 Federal agencies, including FEMA. It's
this big, large bureaucratic sort-of soup of agencies that all
provide assistance. What we've found over the years is that
it's just--it's too complicated is the bottom line.
Mr. Knott. Yes.
Mr. Currie. So for--yes, we have a number of options we've
laid out. For example, one is Federal Government providing less
assistance and getting involved in--maybe not getting involved
in the medium and smaller disasters and letting the States
manage those.
Another is changing the grant structure. Right now, we
have--FEMA's grants are some of the most complicated in all of
Government. You know, like I said, some of these disasters of
20 years--Hurricane Katrina is still an open disaster. FEMA is
still writing checks and obligating funds for Hurricane
Katrina. So getting out of the business of that so they can
focus on response near-term is another option, so--but there's
many other options too.
Mr. Knott. Is one of the perverse incentives of FEMA and
your department is, I would think is, it disincentivizes States
and local governments from having their own types of creativity
or outlets in terms of dealing with disasters? Is that fair?
Mr. Currie. Absolutely. I mean, they know they can rely on
the Federal Government. For example, a few years ago, we looked
at the States--how many States have a rainy day fund for
disasters, and very few do, because they base--they told us
outright that if something is a bad--it's bad, then they'll
just--they'll have the Federal Government pay for it. So----
Mr. Knott. Right.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. For sure.
Mr. Knott. I would just go down the list. If you all have
any suggestions about how to more efficiently and effectively
respond, I'd love to hear it from you, Ms. Bernard or Ms. Lang.
Ms. Bernard. Yes. I would just add to what Mr. Currie said.
There is a lot of bureaucracy in FEMA, and something that we've
seen over, not just the last 4 years but certainly in the 20
years I've been here, is FEMA really struggles with operational
efficiency. There are a lot of partners involved. They also
struggle with just making sure that they're collecting
sufficient documentation. It's a heroic effort to review just
the sheer volume of transactions that they're dealing with. So
they have a lot of different options for reviewing payments as
they go along or reviewing a sample of payments, and that's
just something we see time and again. It's--the more
transactions they're dealing with, the more opportunities there
are for potential fraud or just misspent funds.
Mr. Knott. What's the source of the inefficiency? Is it the
workload? Is it the work force? Is it the process?
Ms. Bernard. I think it's definitely all 3. Yes, all 3.
Mr. Knott. Mr. Chairman, I think my time's up. I yield
back.
Mr. Brecheen. I thank the----
Mr. Thanedar. Mr. Chair.
Mr. Brecheen. I thank the gentleman.
Go ahead.
Mr. Thanedar. I'd like to ask for unanimous consent to
enter a statement for the record from the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency that speaks to the value of
the IG community.
Mr. Brecheen. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Tammy L. Hull, Acting Chairperson, Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency, and Inspector General, U.S. Postal
Service
March 11, 2025
The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE) appreciates the opportunity to provide a statement to the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight
Investigations, and Accountability.
Federal Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) have promoted economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in Government operations and helped
detect and deter fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement since the
Inspector General Act (IG Act) was passed on a bipartisan basis in
1978. IGs have a nearly 50-year history of working in a nonpartisan way
with Members of Congress and administrations of both parties, on behalf
of all Americans.
More specifically, the objective and independent work performed by
the IG community touches every aspect of American society:
We promote trust in our Government leaders by holding them
accountable.
We protect taxpayer dollars by making sure they are given to
the intended recipients and used for the intended purposes.
We protect health and welfare of Americans in so many ways--
We help ensure that:
public transportation and infrastructure are safe,
veterans and the elderly have the medical care they need
and deserve, and
even astronauts in outer space are protected by orbital
debris.
And, when we see problems, we identify them so that the
agencies we oversee can take corrective action.
We help protect whistleblowers who are just trying to do the
right thing.
We help protect against threats to the Government--from
hackers to terrorists--by identifying weaknesses and
vulnerabilities and offering solutions.
The IG community's effectiveness is reflected in its results. In
fiscal year 2024, the work of skilled and dedicated employees across 73
OIGs resulted in potential savings totaling $71.1 billion:
$52.7 billion from audit recommendations, and
$18.4 billion from investigative receivables and recoveries.
With the IG community's aggregate fiscal year 2024 budget of
approximately $3.9 billion,\1\ these potential savings represent an
approximate return of $18 for every dollar invested in OIGs through
their appropriations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This total does not include amounts associated with the
intelligence community OIGs due to the Classified nature of their
budgets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fiscal year 2024, OIGs also helped to strengthen programs across
the Federal Government through:
2,042 audit, inspection, and evaluation reports issued;
20,968 investigations closed;
3,917 indictments and criminal informations;
3,675 successful prosecutions;
1,015 successful civil actions;
4,127 suspensions or debarments; and
3,037 personnel actions in response to OIG findings.
Core to the IGs' ability to effectively conduct this critical
oversight is that IGs operate in a strictly non-partisan manner. IGs
are appointed, by law, without regard to their political affiliation
and, during their tenures, they perform necessary oversight without
regard to political party.
Further, over the years, Congress has strengthened IGs' ability to
conduct effective oversight through bipartisan legislation.
Specifically, with the passage of the Inspector General Reform Act of
2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-409), the Inspector General Empowerment Act of
2016 (Pub. L. No. 114-317) and the fiscal year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act (Title LII of Pub. L. No. 117-263), Congress enacted
provisions to safeguard the independence of IGs, including requirements
for the removal of IGs and the filling of vacancies. Since January 24,
2025, however, more than half of the Presidentially-appointed, Senate-
confirmed IGs--who led some of the largest and most critical OIGs in
Government oversight--have received termination notices, without the
required notice and reasons for termination that Congress put in place
in 2022.
It is critical that the independent nature of IGs' work, which is
necessary to preserving the value of this nearly 50-year investment in
the integrity of our Government, continues. It is equally important
that the individuals who are temporarily acting in these IG positions
remain nonpolitical, and that the administration nominate, and the
Senate confirm, individuals who are similarly committed to leading
objective oversight and carrying out their OIG's statutory mission.
The value of the IG community is as critical as it has ever been.
We appreciate Congress's unwavering support for the nonpartisan work of
our offices, and we are committed to meeting our shared goal of
addressing integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues across
Government agencies. Our longstanding partnership ultimately benefits
the American public by promoting responsive, accountable, and
transparent Government programs and operations.
In addition to this statement, CIGIE is providing to the
subcommittee 3 fact sheets that highlight IG-community efforts to
improve Government efficiency, identify challenges with information
technology modernization, and fight fraud.
______
Inspectors General Identify Technology Modernization Challenges
Information Technology (IT) modernization has the potential to
enable seamless communication and collaboration between agencies,
foster innovation, empower data-driven decision making through advanced
analytics, provide taxpayers improved return on investment, improve
national security, and create user-friendly digital platforms to
enhance citizen services.
Still, IGs have found IT modernization as a key area of concern
facing multiple Federal agencies. and have identified an array of
challenges agencies face in realizing this potential, such as:
Failure to Keep Pace.--Cloud computing policies and
guidelines established by the Department of State were outdated
and obsolete and had not kept pace with the quickly evolving
cloud computing landscape.
Lack of Strategy.--The Social Security Administration did
not have an approved strategy or guidance for defining and
implementing plans to modernize, replace, or retire its legacy
IT systems.
Increased Costs.--The IRS did not have an enterprise-wide
program to identify, prioritize, and execute the updating,
replacing, or retiring of legacy IT systems. Until most of
these systems are decommissioned, costs to maintain them will
likely continue to increase.
Poor Project Management.--VA needs to improve its oversight
of its initial claims automation project, which focused on
automating hypertension claims, to ensure accurate and
consistent decisions for veterans while improving claims
processing timeliness and minimizing manual processes. Failure
to do so may result in veterans not receiving benefits to which
they are entitled to and VA investing in a process and
technology that does not deliver the intended outcomes.
Lack of Governance.--The Small Business Administration faced
challenges in establishing an effective IT investment
governance framework, despite 6 years of Inspector General
findings on significant IT investment internal control issues.
Ineffective Planning.--The Railroad Retirement Board could
not provide detailed project plans to expend approximately
$26.5 million in IT modernization funding and spent $6.6
million in obligated funds on non-IT modernization projects.
Most OIG reports/activities referenced are from fiscal year 2024.
______
Inspectors General Focus on Government Efficiency
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Most OIG reports/activities referenced are from FY 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
$693 billion in potential savings
Over the course of the last decade, IGs have had a cumulative
impact on the United States Government of identifying $693 billion in
potential savings. However, over 13,000 recommendations made by IGs
have yet to be implemented--many of which could result in substantial
savings to taxpayers. To highlight these potential savings, the
following 7 IG reports included recommendations that could result in
approximately $62 billion in funds being used more efficiently,
including:
$45.6 billion in potentially fraudulent pandemic
unemployment insurance (UI) payments
$7.2 billion in Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
overpayment errors
$4.9 billion in unused funding available for reimbursement
of regular UI benefits, held in States' Federal Unemployment
Accounts
$1.8 billion in potentially erroneous Employee Retention
Credit claims paid by the IRS
$1.2 billion in SSI payments made to someone other than the
documented representative payees
Over $727 million over 4 years, if the DoD addressed the
recommendations and expedited the retirement of 24 outdated DoD
financial management systems
$694 million in Medicare costs over 3 years by expanding the
hospital transfer policy for discharges to post-acute care
______
Inspectors General Fight Fraud
IGs play a significant role in detecting and deterring fraud,
waste, and abuse. In fiscal year 2024 alone, IG investigative work
resulted in approximately:
3,675 successful criminal prosecutions,
1,015 successful civil actions, and
$18.4 billion in recoveries.
The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) and
its data analytics center identified $5.4 billion in
potentially fraudulent pandemic loans obtained using over
69,000 questionable Social Security Numbers.
The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
identified a fraud scheme and alerted the Internal Revenue
Service to prevent $3.5 billion of potentially improper
Employee Retention Credits and Sick and Family Leave Credits.
A joint criminal investigation involving 5 IGs (HHS OIG, VA
OIG, OPM OIG, DoD OIG, and Amtrak OIG) and their law
enforcement partners (FDA OCI, FBI, DEA, and DOJ) resulted in
an opioid manufacturer being ordered to pay more than $1.5
billion in criminal fines and forfeiture for distributing
misbranded opioid medication.
The Department of State OIG found that a business owner
fraudulently induced U.S. Government agencies to pay his
company more than $125 million and paid bribes to a Government
insider.
A Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation OIG evaluation, in a
partnership with the PRAC and its data analytics center,
identified Special Financial Assistance Program approved and
paid applications included erroneous calculations due to the
inclusion of deceased participant data. Based on this
evaluation, PBGC has adjusted its approval process for
applications which will result in an estimated $125 million of
taxpayer dollars being put to better use. Additionally, the
PBGC is performing retrospective audits of all previously-paid
plans, resulting in the return of approximately $164 million to
the U.S. Treasury since December 2024.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG and the
PRAC partnered to build an inventory of potential fraud schemes
in HUD programs that were previously unknown to the agency.
Some of those schemes were found in an investigation by HUD OIG
and partners (DOI, HSI, DOJ, and DOL OIG) into New York City
Housing Authority that resulted in the largest single-day total
of bribery charges in the Department of Justice's history.
Mr. Brecheen. I thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony; Members, for your questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We ask the witnesses to respond in
writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will
be open for 10 days.
The witnesses are dismissed, and the committee will be in
recess for 5 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Brecheen. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight Investigations and Accountability,
will come to order.
I'm pleased to have our second panel of distinguished
witnesses before us today to speak on this important topic.
I ask the witnesses please rise and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Brecheen. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered
in the affirmative. Thank you.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Mr. Curtis Schube is the executive director of the Council
to Modernize Governance.
Mr. Schube, I am so glad, that's like my last name. Someone
helped me pronounce that in my notes. You and I share a
commonality there, right? Tough last names.
Mr. Mike Howell is the executive director of the Oversight
Project, The Heritage Foundation. Mr. John Roth is a former
inspector general for the Department of Homeland Security. Mr.
Andrew Block is a senior counsel at the America First Legal
Foundation.
I thank all of you as witnesses for being here today, and I
value your time.
I now recognize Mr. Curtis Schube for 5 minutes for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CURTIS M. SCHUBE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COUNCIL TO MODERNIZE GOVERNANCE
Mr. Schube. Chairman, Ranking Member, and to the Members of
this committee, thank you for having me here today. My name is
Curtis Schube. I am the executive director of Council to
Modernize Governance. We're a nonprofit, and our overall
mission is to reduce the power of the administrative state and
ultimately return that power back to both the Congress and the
people.
I'm here today to talk about internet censorship and
Homeland Security's involvement in it. Now, the overarching
principle that I'd like this committee to keep in mind today as
I speak is this: The answer to wrong speech is more speech, not
less. Giving Government the power to determine what is true and
what is not and the power to determine what narratives can be
spoken and what cannot and giving the power to silence the
dissenting voice is opening the door to tyranny.
Now, I submitted some written testimony for this committee.
I'd like to just give some of the highlights.
We all remember back in 2020, election and COVID-related
content was routinely marked as misinformation or
malinformation or disinformation on social media. Sometimes it
was given that little moniker saying that this is
disinformation, sometimes it was deleted, and sometimes the
person who spoke even was removed from social media.
Now, in a time when 54 percent of Americans say at least
sometimes they get their news from social media, this is a very
significant development. It means that some messages are able
to get to a significant portion of the American populous and
some messages are not.
Now, we've come to find out that there were specific NGO's
who were driving this effort. They had determined what messages
were constituted MDM--misinformation, disinformation, or
malinformation--and they would funnel that off into social
media companies who would in turn delete that content. We've
also come to find out that some Government employees were
involved in that during 2020, but as far as we can tell,
leadership was not, until President Biden took over.
So I want to talk about CISA, which we think was one of the
more abusive subagencies within this effort. So what CISA did--
it was created in 2018. It was created to oversee American
infrastructure with regard to cybersecurity. But it took the
term that was given in the statutory mandate, quote, ``critical
infrastructure,'' and took that to mean cognitive
infrastructure. So something that was meant for us, the U.S.
Government, to oversee the tangible elements of our
cybersecurity, they took that to mean it can censor American
thought.
Now, if CISA had begun to itself routinely identify content
and report it itself, American--the American public would've
had an outcry, because we intuitively know that that would
violate the First Amendment. What it did instead is it begun to
fund these NGO's that had been driving this effort in the form
of grants. The plan was to have the NGO's do the dirty work.
The NGO would be the one to identify the content. The NGO would
be the one to contact social media, and the Government would
have less of a hand in it.
CISA spent a lot of money in this endeavor. The Center for
Internet Security, for example, received $107 million in DHS
grants in the last 3 years. Other parts of the Department of
Homeland Security, like FEMA, were also involved in these type
of efforts.
This is all by design. Again, the Government knows that
social media has protections under section 230 and other legal
precedents, so the Government can claim, hey, we didn't remove
any of this content, you know, Facebook did it. Then Facebook
in turn can say, well, we had protections under section 230 and
other versions of the law, and then there's no legal recourse
for the censored party there either.
This is exactly what happened last year in Murthy v.
Missouri, when the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of
censored Americans' lawsuits because they supposedly did not
have standing.
So, Members, misinterpreting statutes and finding legal
loopholes to avoid the protections given to all Americans under
the First Amendment is abuse. Funding that effort is waste. The
Government knows that it should not and cannot censor the
speech of American citizens, so under President Biden's
leadership, it found that loophole and this must be fixed.
Fortunately, there are some opportunities for Congress to
fix this. It could pass laws that better define what the term
``critical infrastructure'' is to keep CISA under control. It
can also pass laws that would prevent any funding of--excuse
me, any Government funding of an NGO over the other private
party who was involved in censorship efforts. Third, it can
pass a law that would give citizens standing to have legal
recourse when the types of activities described herein today
were to occur.
Thank you for having me today, and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schube follows:]
Prepared Statement of Curtis M. Schube
Tuesday, March 11, 2025
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify.
i. introduction
``Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government: When
this support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is
dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins.''--Benjamin Franklin,
U.S. Founding Father.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jared Sparks, The Works of Benjamin Franklin, (Boston:
Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1840), available at https://
books.google.com/books?id=qXQUJhWz2rQC&pg=PA285&-
lpg=PA285&dq=%E2%80%9CFreedom+of+speech+is+a+principal+pillar+of+a+free+
government-
:+When+this+support+is+taken+away,+the+constitution+of+a+free+society+is
+dissolved,%E2%-
80%9D&source=bl&ots=JTqQGNvLis&sig=Q3og_EfuwQ0lrjvF4dt0NGMlbE&hl=en&sa=X
- &ved=0ahUKEwi98PHJ6s_NAhXlbZoKHSDbDd04ChDoAQgbMAA#v=onepage&q=%E2%80-
%9CFreedom%20of%20'speech%20is%20a%20principal%20pillar%20of%20a%20free%
20-
government%3A%20When%20this%20'support%20is%20taken%20away%2C%20the%20-
constitution%20of%20a%20free%20'society%20is%20dissolved%2C%E2%80%9D&f=f
alse.
The answer to so-called ``wrong'' speech is more speech. The moment
that speech is limited, so too is freedom. To give Government, or any
specific party, the power to determine what is true, and what is not,
is to give extraordinary power to that party. It is a slippery slope.
This is where tyranny begins.
Free speech has been under assault in recent years. Social media
companies like Facebook and the formerly named Twitter have worked with
Government, or non-profits funded by Government, to identify speech
that they disagree with and not only remove the content, but also
sometimes remove the speaker communicating this content altogether.
Unfortunately, the views censored consistently leaned one way.
Social media is the new vehicle for news. Fifty-four percent of
adults say that they at least sometimes get their news from social
media.\2\ Understandably, if certain viewpoints are prohibited from
having access to a source that such a significant portion of people use
to access information, the ability to arrive at the truth is severely
suppressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Social Media and News Fact Sheet,'' Pew Research Center,
September 17, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/
social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now imagine that social media and the Government become
ideologically aligned. If Government and social media coordinate, or if
Government coerces social media, Government becomes infinitely more
powerful.
Unfortunately, this is not imaginary, but in fact it is exactly
where we found ourselves for the last 4 years. In the run-up to the
2020 election, efforts to label, discredit, and ban so-called ``dis-,
mis-, and mal-information'' effectively became official policy at many
social media companies and supported by NGO's. But with the Biden
administration, the Government's involvement was formalized. The
administration gave grants to outside organizations to censor speech--
something the First Amendment prohibited the administration from
directly doing itself.
This should be alarming for all Americans. Anyone should be able to
understand that Government should never be involved in moderating
content of Americans. That violates the very principle that the First
Amendment rests upon. By combining forces with platforms in order to
moderate content is simply the Government doing indirectly what the
Constitution prohibits it from doing directly.
ii. biden's administration's abuses, including his department of
homeland security
Before detailing the efforts made during the Biden years, it is
important to first lay the groundwork for how internet censorship has
been conducted. Censors use 3 different categories of speech violations
when reviewing social media: dis-,
mis-, and mal-information.\3\ Disinformation is deliberately false
speech created to mislead, harm, or manipulate. Misinformation is
factually false, but not created or shared with the intent to harm.
Malinformation is defined as factually correct speech that has been
taken out of or presented without context.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Curtis M. Schube and Gary Lawkowski, ``Restoring Online Free
Speech and Shutting Down the Censorship Industrial Complex,'' December
2023, 3, https://modernizegovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/
Censorship.pdf.
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, there may be bad actors who want to intentionally spread
false information for various nefarious reasons. But the problem with
regulating categories of speech is this: who decides? Regulation of
speech first requires someone to determine what is true, and what is
not. And, as seen by our weekly news cycle for years now, the
perception of what is true and what is not frequently differs, and may
evolve over time as the amount and quality of information improves.
Even those who live in the same communities may perceive truth
differently.
Giving the power to define and fix what is ``true'' to the
Government, social media, or anyone else, is dangerous. With regard to
Government, it inverts the balance of power that the framers of our
Constitution intended: that the Government serves the people.
Government is not meant to pick sides. It is not meant to punish those
who disagree simply for disagreeing.
Second, Government is ultimately a human institution. It is
susceptible to human sins that come with power. And, even if
righteously motivated, those humans can make mistakes and be wrong.
It is for these reasons that the overarching premise of this
testimony is this: the antidote to mis-, dis-, and mal-information is
more speech, not less. Government should provide facts, data, and
information to the public in support of policy decisions. But
Government should never silence, punish, or vilify those who disagree
with those decisions. Nor should it provide resources to those who do.
A. DHS Censorship Efforts
The Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
housed within the DHS, has been actively involved in censorship. The
agency, created in 2018, has a mission of ``lead[ing] cybersecurity and
critical infrastructure security programs, operations, and associated
policy.''\5\ ``Critical infrastructure,'' as defined in 2003 by
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--7, meant ``information
technology; telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems,
including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail
and pipeline systems; emergency services; and postal and shipping.''\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 6 U.S.C. 652.
\6\ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The
Weaponization of CISA: How a ``Cybersecurity'' Agency Colluded with Big
Tech and ``Disinformation'' Partners to Censor Americans, June 26,
2023, 5, https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-
judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/cisa-staff-report6-26-
23.pdf, (``House Judiciary Report'') citing Homeland Sec. Presidential
Directive 7, 2. Pub. Papers 1739 (Dec. 17, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These items intuitively align with ``infrastructure.'' The
dictionary definition means ``the resources (such as personnel,
buildings, or equipment) required for an activity.''\7\ The word itself
denotes tangible structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``Infrastructure,'' Merriam-Webster, accessed March 5, 2025,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, beginning in 2021, under the direction of Jen Easterly, the
Biden-era CISA interpreted critical infrastructure to include thought.
She remarked that ``The most critical infrastructure is our cognitive
infrastructure, so building that resilience to misinformation and
disinformation, I think is incredibly important.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Maggie Miller, ``Cyber Agency Beefing Up Disinformation,
Misinformation Team,'' The Hill, Nov. 10, 2021, https://thehill.com/
policy/cybersecurity/580990-cyber-agency-beefing-up-
disinformationmisinformation-team/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA also actively employed people with social media ties to help
it in its efforts. One example is Vijaya Gadde, who joined an advisory
committee with CISA from Twitter \9\ for, among other things, to
``combat[] misinformation and disinformation impacting the security of
critical infrastructure.''\10\ In June 2021, she then, along with her
committee, drafted an ``information ecosystem'' report, which called
for censoring not only citizens, but the press too, through the
monitoring of ``social media platforms of all sizes, mainstream media,
cable news, hyper partisan media, talk radio and other on-line
resources.''\11\ The resource she promoted \12\ using is the Global
Disinformation Index (GDI), an NGO dedicated to ``identifying
disinformation'' with a focus on ``at-risk groups'' that include
``immigrants, to protected classes like women, persecuted minorities,
people of colour [sic], the LGBTQ+ community, children, etc.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Twitter was already known to actively censor for content-based
messaging. See, for example, O'Handley v. Padilla, 579 F. Supp. 1163
(N.D. Cal. 2022).
\10\ Department of Homeland Security-Cybersecurity & Infrastructure
Security Agency, CISA Names 23 Members to New Cybersecurity Advisory
Committee, December 1, 2021, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/
cisa-names-23-members-new-cybersecurity-advisory-committee.
\11\ Jon Levine, ``House Republicans Promise to Investigate Exec
Vijaya Gadde's role in Twitter Censorship,'' New York Post, December 3,
2022, https://nypost.com/2022/12/03/house-republicans-to-investigate-
vijaya-gadde-role-in-twitter-censorship/.
\12\ Charlie McCarthy, ``Ex-Twitter Exec Promoted to GDI to DHS
Subcommittee,'' Newsmax, July 12,2023, https://www.newsmax.com/
newsfront/twitter-exec-gadde/2023/07/12/id/1126847/.
\13\ Global Disinformation Index, ``How We Define Disinformation,''
accessed March 6, 2025, https://www.disinformationindex.org/mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2021, soon after President Biden took office, CISA
changed its focus. Even one if its task forces, named ``Countering
Foreign Influence Task Force,'' was renamed the ``Mis-, Dis- and
Malinformation'' (MDM) task force.\14\ CISA acknowledged that its focus
was no longer exclusively on ``countering foreign influence,'' but also
MDM from domestic sources.\15\ The topics were to include ``the origins
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, racial
justice, U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the nature of the U.S.
support to Ukraine.''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ CSC White Paper #6: Countering Disinformation in the United
States at 14, U.S. Cybersecurity Solarium Commission (Dec. 2021),
https://www.hsdl.org/c/view?docid=863779 (``The Countering Foreign
Influence Task Force, established in 2018 within CISA's predecessor
agency, became in 2021 the Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation (MDM) team,
which `work[s] in close coordination with interagency and private-
sector partners, social media companies, academia, and international
partners on a variety of projects to build resilience against malicious
information activities.' '').
\15\ House Judiciary Report 10.
\16\ Aaron Kleigman, ``DHS Agency Appears to be `Burying' Evidence
of Involvement with `Domestic Censorship Activities': Expert,'' March
7, 2023, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/dhs-agency-appears-burying-
evidence-involvement-domestic-censorship-activities-expert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This same ``MDM''\17\ committee also included a member from
University of Washington's Center for an Informed Public, Kate
Starbird, another organization devoted to on-line censorship.\18\ It is
dedicated to ``translate research about misinformation and
disinformation into policy.''\19\ Alongside Gadde and Starbird were
Government representatives from CISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Standing for Mis-, Dis-, and Mal-Information.
\18\ House Judiciary Report 6.
\19\ University of Washington-Center for an Informed Public, About,
accessed March 6, 2025, https://www.cip.uw.edu/about/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps scarier, CISA's own definition of monitored activity
included ``malinformation,'' which as noted above is ``based on fact,
but used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.''\20\ Now,
even true information, merely interpreted to the Government's
disliking, was objectionable. CISA employed 15 people to dedicate
themselves to this effort.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ House Judiciary Report 10, citing CYBERSECURITY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, MIS-, DIS-, AND MALINFORMATION PLANNING AND
INCIDENT RESPONSE GUIDE FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS, at 1 (2022), https://
www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/mdm-incident-response-
guide_508.pdf.
\21\ Ibid. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA was actively involved in flagging content at the beginning. It
flagged election-related content as far back as 2018.\22\ However, once
domestic speech was the focus, CISA had other organizations perform its
bidding. Starbird emailed the subcommittee the recommendation that
``CISA should also engage in content- and narrative-specific mitigation
efforts . . . CISA should support these efforts . . . through funding
outside organizations to assist this work.''\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid 12.
\23\ Ibid 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Federal Grants that Sponsored Censorship
The Center for Internet Security (CIS), a nonprofit, was found to
have served as a conduit for election officials to report alleged false
or misleading content about the 2020 election.\24\ CIS's Elections
Infrastructure Sharing and Analysis Center (``EI-ISAC'') was a
``collaborative partnership between CIS, CISA, and the Election
Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council.'' It was CIS
that would send the reports to social media platforms.\25\ So while
technically CISA did not report the content, it was in collaboration
with those who did. While CISA proudly boasted that it did not engage
in switchboarding for the 2022 election cycle, it actually had only
transferred the ``switchboard function'' to EI-ISAC.\26\ They have
received $107.9 million in DHS grants, which were paid out from 2022-
2024.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Ibid. 7.
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ House Judiciary Report 22.
\27\ Center for Internet Security, Inc., USASpending.gov, accessed
March 6, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/recipient/3fe5cc66-9042-
5e94-dd7b-53e58329f4bf-R/latest. While some of this grant was for 2019,
the payments began in 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This was not the only non-profit/NGO benefiting financially from
DHS for carrying out censorship activities at the behest of the
Government. GDI, the British-based non-profit discussed previously, for
example, received $960,000 for its efforts.\28\ In 2022, $7 million
went to a DHS media literacy campaign, which was to focus on
``misinformation and disinformation.''\29\ These funds went to what
appear to be partisan NGO's, such as The Carter Center, funded by
President Jimmy Carter, who received $99,372 in 2022. The University of
Rhode Island received $701,612 to combat disinformation, conspiracy
theories, and propaganda. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars received $750,000 to create a game to help students identify
disinformation. The Urban Rural Action received $769,190.\30\ The DHS
grant document provided that ``Disinformation, conspiracy theories, and
propaganda have become large-scale social problems, shaping the way
citizens view facts, define truth, and make decisions.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ McCarthy.
\29\ Corruption Chronicles, ``Millions in DHS Terrorism Prevention
Grants go to Promote Media Literacy, Combat Disinformation,'' Judicial
Watch, October 3, 2022, https://www.judicialwatch.org/millions-in-dhs-
prevention-grants/.
\30\ Ibid.
\31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA also used grant money to combat alleged disinformation. Under
its grants' descriptions on FEMA's website, under the category of
``Domestic Violent Extremism,'' it lists grants for ``open-source
analysis of misinformation campaigns . . . and online/social media-
based threats.'' It also provides grants for ``training and awareness
programs . . . to educate the public on misinformation and
disinformation campaigns . . . ''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fiscal Year 2024 Homeland
Security Grant Program Frequently Asked Questions, April 16, 2024,
https://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/homeland-security/fy-24-faqs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Blocking Legal Redress for Censorship--Hiding Behind Standing
Doctrine
Why would CISA, and other subagencies, send money to outside
organizations to monitor on-line content and report it, rather than do
that itself? The answer is because this would blatantly violate the
First Amendment. ``Content-based laws--those that target speech based
on its communicative content--are presumptively unconstitutional . . .
''.\33\ It is content-based speech if the speech is regulated ``because
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.''\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
\34\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government, therefore, cannot regulate, and suppress, based
upon content. But the Government knows that, as the law is applied now,
private parties can suppress speech. In a case out of California that
had very similar facts, where the State of California coordinated with
an NGO, who then reported content to social media, the court found that
there was no standing because ``there is no allegation that the State
had any contact with Twitter . . . nor is there any allegation that the
State was involved in any of Twitter's content moderation
decisions.''\35\ ``Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives
of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State
responsible for those initiatives.''\36\ That case was dismissed as to
Twitter too, likening their rights to a newspaper, giving it a ``First
Amendment right to moderate content disseminated on their
platforms.''\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ O'Handley, 579 F.Supp. 3d at 1189.
\36\ Ibid. 1181, quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05
(1982).
\37\ Ibid. 1187, quoting Netchoice v. Paxton, 573 F.Supp.3d 1092,
1106 (W.D. Tex. 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, a censored party is in a catch-22. If they seek recourse
against the Government, the Government simply points its finger at the
social media company. The social media company simply says that it is
protected by the ability to moderate content on its private social
media business. There is no recourse.
This is exactly what the Department of Justice argued in Murthy v.
Missouri. In Murthy, it was alleged that various agencies, including
CISA, ``coerced'' or ``significantly encouraged'' social media
platforms to moderate content.\38\ In the Government's brief, which
cited O'Handley numerous times, it argued that the censored parties
lacked standing ``because they have not shown any cognizable injuries
that are fairly traceable to the Government,'' noting that the content
moderation was performed by private parties.\39\ The Supreme Court
agreed, noting that ``platforms had independent incentives to moderate
content and often exercised their own judgment.''\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ 144 S.Ct. at 1984.
\39\ Brief For the Petitioners, 13, Murthy v. Missouri, No. 23-411,
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-411/293780/
20231219192259919_23-411ts%20- Murthy.pdf.
\40\ Murthy, 144 S.Ct. at 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, without some action by Congress changing this paradigm,
agencies can creatively avoid consequences for their censorship
efforts.
iii. solutions
Congress could reduce a lot of these problems with some very
simple, and common-sense solutions. First, Congress should prohibit any
agency from funding non-governmental organizations whose purpose is to
suppress political speech, dissent, or narratives that do not align
with the Government's chosen message.\41\ No Government money should
ever be used to suppress speech, regardless of whether the actor is
Governmental or private.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Of course, exceptions should be made for legitimate law
enforcement purposes. For example, if criminal activity is coordinated
over social media platforms, Government should be permitted to identify
and have removed that content. The same goes for other criminal
content, such as child pornography.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, specific to the term ``critical infrastructure,'' Congress
should define the term to prevent there from being any question that
the term does not mean ``cognitive.'' Congress should also order
agencies to review their policies to determine whether other statutory
interpretations have led to the moderation of content on-line.
Third, Congress should explicitly grant standing to those who are
targeted for internet censorship. As stated previously, the Government
has hidden behind standing to get away with censorship and the Supreme
Court has enabled that to continue. But if Congress were to explicitly
create a cause of action for situations where Government coordinates
with big tech, then citizens would have recourse. Creating personal
liability and employment discipline would also deter Government
employees from acting independent of agency policy.
iv. conclusion
The efforts of CISA, FEMA, and DHS as a whole, to participate in
censorship activity by way of funding the censors is disturbing. It
runs contrary to the spirit of the First Amendment, at the very least.
But Congress has the power to prevent this behavior in the future. The
simple solutions suggested within would disrupt this practice. Congress
should do so.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Schube.
I now recognize Mr. Mike Howell for 5 minutes for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MIKE HOWELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
OVERSIGHT PROJECT, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Howell. Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify about the role of NGO's, or
nongovernmental organizations, in facilitating mass illegal
immigration. I currently serve as the executive director of the
Oversight Project, and previously was at DHS and on Capitol
Hill conducting oversight of immigration matters.
The United States of America is still reeling from the
worst border invasion in its history. This was an invasion that
was planned, promoted, encouraged, funded, and sustained by
radical elements of the previous administration. But this
invasion could not have been accomplished without a colossal
partnership with the NGO community. Simply put, the Government
just did not have the capacity to get these--this many people
in and around the country without the support of the
nonprofits.
To that end, they gave them almost $6 billion to a
conglomerate of U.N. agencies and over 200 NGO's to do just
that, according to statistics from the Center for Immigration
Studies. The result was that Border Patrol became a daycare. It
became Uber drivers just to shuttle illegals to the nonprofits
to get them around the country.
Now, the Oversight Project has led the way in exposing what
I call this border industrial complex. In December 2022, we did
the first-of-its-kind study where we tracked illegal aliens by
their cell phones as they went through these nonprofits at the
border. In just a 1-month period in tracking 30,000 devices, so
a very small subset of the 10 million that Biden had cross the
border, we found out that the illegals went to nearly every
single Congressional district in the United States. We proved
that every town was indeed a border town.
That work informed the House of Representatives to pass
H.R. 2, which notably contained a provision defunding the
entirety of these NGO's.
Now, this is a landmark event. It was controversial even
amongst politicians here in the District of Columbia, because
the dirty secret is a lot of politicians have a very cozy
relationship with these organizations. In fact, one Member went
as far to say that that provision in H.R. 2 was un-Christian.
Well, that's now common-sense principle for immigration policy
today that we do not fund our own invasion. To that end, DHS
pausing all money to these organizations is simply common-
sense.
Now, really quickly on H.R. 2, because there's been a lot
of confusion on this point, some of your colleagues last
Congress over in the Senate introduced a bill to undercut H.R.
2 that would've mandated a new normal of illegal border
crossings at over 5,000 a day. Now, I'm going to quote
President Trump here from his State of the Union last week.
People kept saying we needed new legislation to secure the
border, ``but it turned out all we needed is a new President.''
He was right. He is right.
In addition, the Oversight Project continues to lead the
way in uncovering seedy behavior after behavior at NGO's. In
New York, we found illegal aliens getting tax--or false
residency documents. In Mexico, we found fliers at an illegal
alien station camp encouraging illegals to vote for Biden. In
Arizona, we found a former Mexican consulate official at the
Southside Worker Center in Tucson advising illegals how to lie
to law enforcement and evade ICE. That's against the law.
Additionally, we produced documentary evidence of noncitizens
admitting on camera to being registered to vote in Georgia,
North Carolina, Minnesota, Arizona.
So where are all the Government investigations? I am
begging for someone to please join us. What about the DHS OIG?
I see investigation after investigation into the conditions at
ICE facilities. Where are the investigations of these
nonprofits and the $6 billion that flowed through them? It's
time that we start treating the Biden border crisis like the
crime scene that it is.
Now, this body funded it. I know a lot of Members here want
nothing to do with it, but the money came from Congress to fund
the Biden border invasion. So this body retains a
responsibility and luckily the authority to figure out exactly
how that money was spent and where these illegals ended up, and
what NGO's, like the ones that helped facilitate the travel of
Jose Ibarra, who ended up killing Laken Riley, what taxpayer
dollars were involved in that.
One thing I want to leave you with, perhaps most
importantly, is the left designed a sophisticated
infrastructure to get this many people in the country. You all
can do the same thing to get them out. I'm encouraging you to
look at all available funding streams to help work with people
outside the Government to educate illegals on how to leave, to
help arrange or even pay for their travel home. I call this
whole concept homeward bound. People need to go home.
It's time for a modernization of the immigration
enforcement system writ large. This means we don't need to
secure the border for just 2025 but forever, a renaissance in
applying technology scientific advancements. The stovepipe
system of various Federal agencies holding this data needs to
be fixed. This is what border czar Tom Homan called for just a
few weeks ago. Generally, we should give Tom Homan exactly what
he needs to get this job done.
Finally, we've got to prepare for the cartels to fight
back. These people made a lot of money and gained a lot of
power during the Biden administration, and they're not going to
take this lying down. We need to get ready for when they start
launching drones, kinetic attacks, other asymmetrical warfare.
They are not going to go quietly in the night.
With that, I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
testify, and I look forward to answering all your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Howell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Howell
March 11, 2025
Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the role
non-governmental organizations (``NGO's'') play in facilitating mass
illegal immigration. I currently serve as the executive director of the
Oversight Project and have previously served at the Department of
Homeland Security and on Capitol Hill conducting oversight of
immigration matters. I appear today in my personal capacity.
The United States of America is still reeling from the consequences
of the worst border invasion in its history. This was an invasion that
was planned, promoted, encouraged, funded, and sustained by radical
elements of the previous administration. This invasion could not have
been accomplished without a colossal ``partnership'' between the
Government and NGO's. The Federal Government provided billions of
dollars to NGO's to do the dirty work the Federal Government could not.
Simply put, under the Biden administration's open border policies,
the Government could only do so much to facilitate mass illegal
migration, welcome the illegal aliens to the United States, and move
them around the country. It needed help and NGO's jumped at the
opportunity to fill the void. The Biden administration repaid them by
driving an estimated $6 billion to a conglomerate of 15 U.N. agencies
and 230 NGO's, as recently calculated by the Center for Immigration
Studies, to do this work for them.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://nypost.com/2025/02/01/opinion/how-us-taxpayers-funded-
the-largest-illegal-migration-in-history/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In doing so, the Biden administration turned the Border Patrol into
nothing more than a welcome center, a day care, and glorified Uber
drivers that ferried illegal aliens to NGO's. In turn, the NGO's
facilitated mass migration of illegal aliens throughout the interior of
the United States.
The Oversight Project has led the way on exposing what I call the
border industrial complex. In December 2022, we published a first-of-
its-kind study tracking the movement of illegal aliens by their cell
phones through NGO's at the border.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.heritage.org/the-oversight-project/securing-
americas-borders/tracking-movement-illegal-aliens-ngos-the-us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our investigation was simple.
We purchased the ad tech cell phone data of approximately 30,000
devices found at border NGO facilities and tracked the movement of
those devices throughout the United States during the month of January
2022. The results were staggering. We found that these devices traveled
to 431 different Congressional districts in the United States. Our
research proved that indeed ``every town is a border town.''
Our work informed the House of Representatives' passage of H.R. 2
(118th Cong.), which notably contained a provision prohibiting DHS from
providing funds to NGO's that facilitate or encourage illegal
immigration or provide certain services such as lodging or legal
services.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This was a landmark shift for politicians in Washington, DC, with
the dirty little secret being that many had a cozy relationship with
these organizations and one even went as far as calling the bill ``un-
Christian'' in order to advocate on NGO's' behalf. Moving forward,
prohibiting the funding of the invasion itself through NGO's should be
a common-sense staple. To that end, DHS's freezing of such money only
makes sense.
I pause for a moment to discuss the entire point of H.R. 2, which
was to close the loopholes that the Biden administration weaponized to
open the border and to prevent future administrations adverse to border
security from doing the same. There has been much misinformation on
this very point, with some of your colleagues in the Senate and the
previous administration who united around a policy to maintain record
numbers of illegal border crossings as a new normal. As President Trump
said in his State of the Union last week, those people ``kept saying we
needed new legislation to secure the border--but it turned out that all
we really needed was a new President.'' How right he is.
In addition, the Oversight Project has uncovered instance after
instance of seedy behaviors at NGO's promoting illegal immigration. In
New York, we discovered a taxpayer-funded shelter providing false
residency documents to illegals. In Mexico, we discovered flyers at an
illegal alien staging camp encouraging illegals to remember to vote for
Biden when they got to the United States. In Arizona, we found a former
Mexican consulate official at an Southside Worker Center in Tucson
advising illegals to lie to law enforcement to evade ICE--a probable
violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324. Additionally, we have produced
documentary evidence of noncitizens admitting, on camera, to being
registered to vote in Georgia, North Carolina, Illinois, and New
York.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://x.com/OversightPR/status/1836145827091210719.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is remarkable to me that law enforcement and policy makers
haven't focused on similar investigations. Save for Attorney General
Greg Abbott in Texas, there has not been much action. In the 117th
Congress, when Democrats had complete control of Congress and the
border crisis was spiraling out of control, a Senate subcommittee
devoted a year-and-a-half investigating an ICE detention facility where
there were allegations of a doctor performing forced hysterectomies on
illegals. This was obviously false, and I said so at the time. The
Senate subcommittee also found the allegations were false. Just
recently, NBC Universal had to settle a defamation suit against the
doctor at the center of these allegations for pushing this fake news on
MSNBC in segments with Rachel Maddow, Chris Hayes, and Nicole Wallace.
So in effect, your Senate colleagues spent time investigating a fake
``uterus collector'' story during a very real border crisis.
In turn, the DHS Office of Inspector General releases report after
report on the conditions in ICE facilities which are required to meet
stringent standards of care for those who invade our country. In stark
contrast, the non-governmental organizations shuttling illegals in and
around the country are not required to meet such standards and have not
been a sustained focus for the DHS OIG.
Where are the deep dives and accounting audits into the over $6
billion spent by our Government to promote a border crisis? How is this
not an epic scandal? To me, this represents a flagrant Constitutional
abuse, perhaps the greatest in American history for its scale and just
complete contradiction of the very duties of our own Government to
secure our own borders and protect Americans. This body funded the NGO
facilitation of Jose Ibarra's illegal entry into this country and
multiple trips to New York and Georgia, where he killed Laken Riley.
They are the poster children for this fiscal negligence I encourage
all of you on the subcommittee to commit to a deep dive investigation
into the actions of these NGO's over the last few years, not to mention
the troubling continuing trend of NGO's working against the national
interest to assist illegals in evading ICE. This body funded them, and
in doing so retains responsibility to the taxpayer to figure out who
spent that money, how, and what information they retain about the
illegals they moved and where.
But the one thing I want to leave you with, perhaps most
importantly, is that it took immense organizational sophistication by
Open Borders advocates to design a system where they could
significantly augment the ability of the Government to get illegal
aliens into the country. You can now do the same to get them out.
Now is the time to look at all available streams of funding to
drive capacity toward those outside the Federal Government who can help
get this done. Whether it is educating illegal that their free ride is
over and deportation is in the offing, or helping arrange them travel
home.
It is a time for a complete modernization of the immigration
enforcement system and border security. We do not need to secure our
country for just 2025, but for the future. This means a renaissance in
applying technological and scientific advancements. Currently, the
stove-piped systems of various Federal agencies holding different sets
of critical information for enforcement are outdated. Don't take my
word for it. Border Czar Tom Homan recently called for a new
immigration enforcement life-cycle system. As a general matter, we
should be giving Tom Homan what he wants. It is he who has the
Herculean task and is in the arena.
We should also be preparing for the cartels to fight back. These
transnational criminals made a lot of money in cooperation with the
Biden administration. They aren't just going to give up territory and
profit modes of human and drug trafficking. I encourage you all to
think deeply about not just investing in traditional modes of border
security and personnel, but about what it means to secure the border
against drones, kinetic attacks, and evolving means of asymmetrical
warfare. The events of October 7 in Israel should be instructive in
this regard.
I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify and I am
happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Howell.
I now recognize Mr. John Roth for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FORMER IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECU-
RITY
Mr. Roth. Thank you for the opportunity to testify here
today. My testimony is going to focus on the crucial role of
the inspector generals they play in fighting waste, fraud, and
abuse, and the need for a sustained and thoughtful effort to
identify and root out waste, and the false economy of large-
scale, indiscriminate personnel reductions.
Since their creation, IGs have played a vital role in
improving Government operations, saving the taxpayers billions
of dollars, and ensuring that agencies operate within the law.
IG offices actually save more money than they spend. For
example, in 2023 alone, IG offices identified over $93 billion
in potential savings. These savings represent a 26-to-1 return
on investments for IGs.
This is possible because IGs and their staff have the
training and experience in audits, inspections, and
investigations, are bound by their professional standards to be
independent of the programs and operations they review, to make
conclusions and recommendations only when well-founded and
supported by the evidence, and to approach their job with the
professional skepticism inherent in an auditor. They ask the
difficult questions, they challenge their organizations to be
better, to be more efficient, to ensure rigor in Government
operations and look to eliminate waste, but they are often the
bearers of bad news.
Recent events have called into question the independence of
these IGs. The unprecedented removal of multiple IGs has sent a
chilling message to the oversight community: Produce findings
that are uncomfortable or politically sensitive and you risk
losing your job. This undermines the entire system of
Government accountability. These actions create an implicit
pressure to avoid the kinds of work necessary for effective
Government and can lead to self-censorship. Even worse, it
destroys the public and Congressional confidence in the
integrity, the accuracy, and the independence of findings that
the IG does make.
I applaud the administration's interest in combating waste,
fraud, and abuse in Government. My career was dedicated to
exactly that proposition. But I believe that the administration
has missed the mark in relying on the Department of Government
Efficiency to identify and root out waste rather than the
mechanism that already exists: the inspector general community.
IG offices are well-positioned to understand the specific
operational challenges and risks within their agency. If the
intent is to cut with a scalpel rather than a hatchet, the deep
knowledge of the institution involved is necessary.
Moreover, IGs are accountable both to Congress, this body,
as well as the general public. IGs are required to submit
written reports to Congress detailing their findings and
recommendations, which are published, ensuring transparency and
accountability.
IG staff meets with Congressional staff to discuss reports
and recommendations. They also review--initiate reviews based
on recommendations from this committee and other committees of
Government operations. IGs testify before Congress, as we saw
today, to explain their findings and answer Congress'
questions. Congressional appropriators routinely cite IG
reports in their own reports directing agencies to fix problems
that the IGs have uncovered.
Because an IG's findings and recommendations are credible
specifically because they are the result of a rigorous,
professional, and transparent process, no ad hoc process, no
matter how well intentioned, will garner the same level of
credibility and trust.
With regard to the reductions in Federal work force that's
currently going on, intuitively it makes sense that reducing
the Federal work force may save money, but in reality, I think
the actions will be unlikely to do so. Any reductions in force
should be part of a well-thought-out management plan that
aligns agency resources and priorities and mission requirements
with the work force necessary to carry them out. To do so
otherwise will drain the agency of specific skills necessary to
ensure that the agency performs its mission.
Moreover, creating a climate of fear and uncertainty in
Government work force simply drives out high-quality employees,
those with the necessary skills and the record performance, out
of the Federal Government.
Finally, any reduction in force must comply with the laws
that Congress has enacted and be decided by those without
conflict of interest and avoid prohibited personnel practices.
Failure to do so results in wasteful and time-consuming
litigation, allegations of improper motive, and loss of agency
focus in dealing with the fallout from such actions.
This concludes my testimony. I'm happy to answer any
questions the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Roth
March 11, 2025
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the issue of preventing
waste, fraud, and abuse at the Department of Homeland Security. As
background, I was the inspector general for Homeland Security from 2013
to 2017. Before that, I was a Federal prosecutor for over 25 years in
the Department of Justice in a variety of leadership and policy-making
roles in both Republican and Democratic administrations. After retiring
from Government service, I worked in the financial services industry,
leading the compliance and ethics functions for a high-tech startup as
well as a Fortune 200 public company. As such, I have first-hand
experience in conducting oversight in both the public and private
sectors.
My testimony today will focus on the crucial role that independent
Inspectors General play in fighting waste, fraud, and abuse, the
necessity for a sustained and thoughtful effort to identify and root
out waste, and the false economy in large-scale, indiscriminate
personnel reductions.
the role of inspectors general
Inspectors general were created to provide independent oversight of
Federal agencies. Since the passage of the Inspector General Act of
1978, IGs have played a vital role in improving Government operations,
saving taxpayers billions of dollars, and ensuring that agencies
operate within the law.
IGs conduct audits, investigations, and evaluations that identify
inefficiencies, mismanagement, and corruption. For example, during my
tenure at the Department of Homeland Security, my office issued
numerous reports that identified critical weaknesses in border
security, transportation security, cybersecurity, and disaster response
efforts. These reports provided Congress and the public with objective
assessments and actionable recommendations to improve Government
performance. I know from personal experience that the entire IG
community is committed to these goals.
IG offices are unique in that they save more than they spend, and
by a large margin. According to reports from the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), IG offices
collectively identify tens of billions of dollars in savings each
year--many times their own operating costs. For example, in the 2023
fiscal year, IGs across the Federal Government identified over $93
billion in potential savings. These potential savings represent an
approximate $26 return on every dollar invested in the OIGs. These
savings come from identifying improper payments, uncovering procurement
fraud, preventing unnecessary expenditures, and improving program
efficiency.
This is possible only because IGs and their staffs have training
and experience in audits, inspections, and investigations, and are
bound by their professional standards: to be independent of the
programs and operations they review, to make conclusions and
recommendations only when well-founded and supported by the evidence,
and to approach their job with professional skepticism inherent in a
professional auditor.
The role is best described in the Comptroller General's Government
Auditing Standards--otherwise known as ``the Yellow Book''--which are
the rules for Government auditing organizations published by the
Government Accountability Office. The description of the independence
necessary for an auditor hits the nail on the head ``Independence of
mind [is the] state of mind that permits the conduct of an engagement
without being affected by influences that compromise professional
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and
exercise objectivity and professional skepticism.''\1\ As head of the
organization, an IG must be able to ``conduct engagements and report
findings, opinions, and conclusions objectively and without fear of
reprisal.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO-24-106786, Government Auditing Standards, section 3.21.
\2\ Section 3.56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a nutshell, that is an IG's job: a professional skeptic. They
act as agents of positive change within their Departments they serve by
having the freedom to be independent and objective and to speak truth
to power. They ask the difficult questions, challenge their
organizations to be better, to be more efficient, to ensure rigor in
Departmental operations, and to look for and eliminate waste.
IGs have traditionally been appointed based on merit, rather than
political affiliation, and are expected to conduct their duties with
impartiality. Additionally, IGs do not have operational roles within
the agencies they oversee. This distinction is critical because it
means IGs are not evaluating their own policies or decisions--which
could otherwise create a conflict of interest. Instead, they serve as
independent auditors and investigators, assessing agency performance
from an objective standpoint.\3\ Every large public company has an
internal audit function. Those auditors are protected from undue
influence by reporting directly to the board of directors rather than
management. Hiring, firing, and compensation are handled by by the
board. This insulates the auditors from undue influence and gives their
board and the investing public confidence that the audits are carried
out in an objective manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Similar principles govern the private sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, IGs are bound by strict professional and ethical
standards. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) sets guidelines to ensure that IGs operate with
integrity and impartiality. If an IG were to act in a biased or
conflicted manner, or produce reports unsupported by the facts, there
are mechanisms in place--including oversight by Congress and CIGIE's
Integrity Committee--to investigate and address such behavior.
However, for IGs to be effective, they must operate without fear of
retaliation or political pressure. Independence is not just an abstract
principle--it is the foundation of their ability to conduct meaningful
and credible investigations and audits. If agency leaders or political
appointees can interfere with IG investigations or retaliate against
IGs for unfavorable findings, then oversight is compromised. Moreover,
not only must IGs be independent in fact, but they must also be
perceived of as such. Congress and the American public must
fundamentally trust that Government employees and programs will be
reviewed and held accountable by an independent fact finder.
The independence of IGs is only as strong as the willingness of the
Executive branch and Congress to uphold it. Recent events have called
this independence into question. The removal of multiple IGs has sent a
chilling message to the oversight community: produce findings that are
uncomfortable or politically inconvenient, and you risk losing your
job. This undermines not only the individual IGs but the entire system
of Government accountability. Any power to remove IGs must be exercised
responsibly and judiciously. Government auditing standards specifically
recognize that replacing an auditor because of a disagreement with the
contents of a report or the auditors conclusions constitutes a threat
to the independence of the organization.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Government Auditing Standards, Section 3.42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current wholesale removals of IGs is unprecedented. IGs
typically serve across multiple administrations regardless of political
affiliation, reflecting their nonpartisan role. When IGs are dismissed
without a clear and legitimate rationale, it damages public trust and
weakens the oversight process.
First, such removals discourage IGs from conducting thorough and
independent investigations. IGs are in the bad news business, and
delivering bad news can ruffle political feathers. If an IG knows that
uncovering waste, fraud, and abuse could cost them their job, there is
an implicit pressure to avoid the kinds of audits, inspections, and
investigations necessary for effective Government. This can lead to
self-censorship and a failure to hold Government agencies accountable.
Even worse, it destroys public and Congressional confidence in the
integrity, accuracy, and independence of any findings an IG does make.
New appointees for these positions, regardless of their qualifications
or background, will be under a cloud of suspicion as to their
independence.
Second, these removals can disrupt on-going investigations. Many IG
offices work on long-term audits and investigations that require
continuity. The IG firings have resulted in the community losing a
cadre of experienced, qualified, and independent professional
leadership that will be difficult to replace. These sudden firings can
stall or even terminate critical oversight work, allowing waste, fraud,
and abuse to go unchecked. Thanks to legislation enacted in 2022, the
seconds-in-command now lead the affected offices. This legislation was
put in place specifically to protect IGs from opportunistic
replacement. However, there is no substitute for permanent, accountable
leadership.
Third, politically-motivated removals make it more difficult to
attract qualified candidates to IG positions. Talented professionals
will be reluctant to accept a role that is subject to political whims,
and one in which their professionalism is under a cloud. Over time,
this weakens the overall effectiveness of the IG community and
diminishes the quality of oversight in Federal agencies.
Of course, there can be instances where the President can and
should remove an inspector general. An IG could be affected by a
conflict of interest, or fail to ensure sufficient independence, or
could conduct themselves unprofessionally or in violation of law or
regulation. However, as the law provides, they should be removed only
after the President supplies a substantive rationale, including
detailed and case-specific reasons. And it should never be as a result
of a mere disagreement with a IG report or recommendation.
Congress has previously protected the inspector general community
from undue political influence. For example, in January 2017,
transition officials in the incoming Trump administration told the
incumbent inspectors general, including me, that they would be replaced
as a matter of course. The Trump administration ultimately reversed
course after a demonstration of strong support of the IGs by Congress,
including particularly from the Republican Members of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Empowering the Inspectors General, Hearing before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Serial 115-11, February
1, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspectors general are a cornerstone of Government transparency and
accountability. Their work helps to see to it that agencies operate
efficiently, ethically, and in the best interests of the American
people. However, without independence, IGs cannot fulfill their
mission. The recent firings of IGs set a dangerous precedent that, if
left unchecked, will erode public trust and weaken Government
oversight.
DHS as an organization has struggled with performance since its
inception. When I arrived I found significant shortfalls across all
areas of DHS operations. The shortfalls were long-standing and
systemic, and were the result of a lack of management fundamentals such
as data collection, cost analysis, and performance measurement.\6\ As
it relates to the Southwest Border, DHS acquisition management failures
stretch back to the 2006 ``SBI Net'' project, a project to secure the
Southwest Border with a combination of technology, infrastructure, and
personnel, which was ultimately canceled in 2011 after costing the
taxpayers nearly $1 billion for only 53 miles of coverage. Multiple
reports from the IG found that DHS did not follow acquisition best
practices, including developing operational requirements and ensuring
an experienced and trained acquisition workforce.\7\ During my tenure,
our office found waste in a number of programs, including programs
involving the acquisition of helicopters, unmanned drones, IT and
accounting systems, workforce housing, hiring, and contract
management.\8\
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\6\ OIG-17-08, Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing
the Department of Homeland Security, November 7, 2016.
\7\ OIG-17-70-SR, Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior
Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border,
June 12, 2017.
\8\ See, e.g., OIG-13-89, DHS' H-60 Helicopter Programs, May 23,
2013; OIG-15-17, US CBP Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does not
Achieve Intended Results of Recognize All Costs of Operations, December
24, 2014; OIG-14-131, CBP Did Not Effectively Plan and Manage Employee
Housing in Ajo, Arizona, September 3, 2014; OIG-14-47, US CBP Advanced
Training Center Acquisition, February 28, 2014; OIG-15-53, CBP's
Oversight of its Non-intrusive Inspection Equipment Maintenance
Contracts Need Improvement, March 25, 2015; OIG-16-34, CBP's Special
Operations Group Program Cost and Effectiveness are Unknown, January
29, 2016; OIG-17-114, CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully
Support Border Security Operations, September 28, 2017; OIG-17-99-MA,
CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable
Applicants, August 4, 2017.
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This appears to remain true today. The current Office of Inspector
General reports reflect that the major management and performance
challenges cut across multiple DHS missions areas, affecting the
Department's ability to conduct its mission.\9\ The GAO placed DHS on
their high-risk list shortly after the Department was created, and
since then, DHS has struggled to make progress. Recently, however, GAO
has cited ``substantial progress'' in areas of concern, and noted that
the improvements implemented by the Department accrued a $2 billion
financial benefit.\10\ The progress that has been made was possible
only through consistent, sustained effort over a course of years.
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\9\ See, e.g., OIG-23-05, Major Management and Performance
Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, November 3,
2023; OIG-25-04, Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security, November 8, 2024.
\10\ GAO-23-106203, High-Risk Series, April 2023, page 158.
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eliminating government waste is a long-term effort requiring knowledge,
expertise, and accountability
I applaud the administration's interest in combatting waste, fraud,
and abuse in Government; as my testimony makes evident, my career, like
those of many of my fellow IGs, was dedicated to that proposition. But
I believe that the administration has missed the mark in relying on the
Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to identify and root out
waste rather than the mechanism that already exists--the inspector
general community.
First, DOGE is a centralized entity with little background in the
agencies that they review. Inspector general offices, in contrast, are
decentralized and embedded within their respective agencies. This
structural difference means that IGs are better positioned to
understand the specific operational challenges and risks within their
agencies. Their proximity and background allows them to identify
inefficiencies at a granular level and recommend targeted improvements.
In contrast, DOGE's broad, Government-wide mandate results in more
generalized assessments that may fail to understand the context of
specific activities.
Second, DOGE does not have the same accountability to Congress and
the public. IGs are required to submit written reports to Congress
detailing their findings and recommendations, which are then published,
ensuring transparency and accountability. IG staff regularly meets with
Congressional staff to discuss reports and recommendations. IGs
regularly initiate reviews based on recommendations from their
committees of jurisdiction. IGs regularly testify before Congress to
explain their findings and answer questions. Congressional
appropriators routinely cite IG work product in their Committee
Reports, directing agencies to fix the problems that the IGs have
found. DOGE does not operate under the same statutory reporting
requirements, meaning there is less Congressional and public oversight
of its effectiveness and the accuracy of its actions. Without this
level of transparency, there is little assurance that DOGE is truly
identifying and addressing waste as effectively as the IGs.
Third, and most importantly, DOGE is not governed by the same
professional standards as IGs. They have both an oversight and
operational role, are not required to comply with the quality standards
for accuracy and objectivity that govern IG reports, and they may lack
the necessary expertise and training to identify fraud. Moreover, IG
staff is conscious of best practices in conducting reviews, such as
securely handling information, protecting sensitive personal
information, protecting attorney-client and other privileges, and
following appropriate data security requirements.
An inspector general's findings and recommendations are credible
specifically because they are the result of a rigorous, professional,
and transparent process. No ad hoc process, no matter how well-
intentioned, will garner the same level of credibility and trust.
the false economy of mass firings of federal employees
Intuitively, it makes sense that reducing the Federal workforce
through mass firings would lower costs. In reality, such actions will
be unlikely to do so. Indiscriminate personnel cuts often lead to
reduced efficiency, increased reliance on contractors, loss of
institutional knowledge, and the potential for expensive rehiring
efforts later.\11\ Any reductions in force should be part of a well-
thought-out management plan that aligns agency priorities and mission
requirements with the workforce needed to carry them out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ That contractors can cost the taxpayers more than Federal
employees in many circumstances has been well-documented. See, e.g.,
Government Executive, Civilians are Cheaper than Contractors for Most
Defense Jobs, Internal Report Finds, December 18, 2018 (reporting on
internal DOD Study); Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the
Government?, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs, March 29, 2012; Project on Government
Oversight, Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring
Contractors, September 13, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than resorting to indiscriminate mass firings, workforce
reductions should be approached strategically. Agencies should conduct
documented assessments to determine their mission requirements and
match the current workforce against those requirements. Cuts should be
made only after a full understanding of the agency and its function, an
inventory of the current skills present and missing, an assessment of
what functions can be eliminated and which roles are essential, and how
workforce adjustments align with long-term goals. A well-planned
approach--based on data-driven decision making--ensures that cost
savings are realized without jeopardizing agency performance or
incurring unforeseen expenses. It also avoids what we have recently
seen, where employees are dismissed but then brought back after
realizing that they provide a necessary, often life-or-death,
Government mission.
Abrupt reductions in workforce can create critical gaps in
expertise and institutional knowledge. Many Federal agencies rely on
employees with specialized skills and knowledge that take years to
develop. Significantly, the Government Accountability Office recently
noted that Federal agencies currently suffer from a ``skills gap'' that
poses a high risk to the Government. These current gaps are broad and
affect a variety of functions, including science, technology,
engineering, mathematics, cybersecurity, and acquisitions.\12\ When
these employees are suddenly removed, agencies are left struggling to
fulfill their missions, leading to delays in essential services,
compliance failures, and operational inefficiencies. Moreover, creating
a climate of fear and uncertainty in the Government workforce simply
drives high-quality employees--the ones with the necessary skills and
record of performance--out of Government service. In many cases,
reductions in employee headcount will reduce the necessary controls
guarding against fraud, waste, and abuse in the administration of
grants or public benefits, or collection of revenue, thereby increasing
waste, fraud, and abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO-23-106203, GAO High-Risk Series, April 20, 2023, page 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, any reduction in force must comply with the laws that
Congress has enacted, be decided and executed by those without
conflicts of interest, and avoid prohibited personnel practices.
Failure to do so results in wasteful and time-consuming litigation,
allegations of improper motive, and loss of agency focus in dealing
with the fallout from such actions.
This concludes my testimony. I am happy to answer any questions the
committee may have.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Roth.
Mr. Block, you are now recognized for--to make your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW BLOCK, SENIOR COUNSEL, AMERICA
FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION
Mr. Block. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on
the Biden administration's waste, fraud, and abuse at the
Department of Homeland Security. We at America First Legal have
spent the last 4 years educating the American public on this
topic, and I am honored to share some of our findings and
results with you.
The Biden administration's cavalier attitude toward the law
was on full display in the way that it approached immigration
policy, where, at the direction of President Biden and
Secretary Mayorkas, DHS failed to faithfully execute the laws
and even actively created barriers to law enforcement.
Among the administration's many abuses, none is worse, in
my view, than its abuse of the parole authority. Congress
empowered the Executive branch to use its discretion on a case-
by-case basis in compelling, exigent circumstances to
temporarily admit otherwise inadmissible aliens when doing so
is necessary for an urgent humanitarian reason or a significant
public benefit. Yet from this limited, qualified, and
individualized authority of last resort, the Biden
administration created whole programs completely disregarding
all of the constraints imposed by Congress and using it as a
primary authority to indiscriminately admit millions of people.
One of these programs is the CBP One app. Now, when you or
I arrive at a border or a port of entry, we have to show our
documents, whether it's a passport, a driver's license, a visa,
or some other document showing that we are entitled to enter
the country. But with the CBP One app, the last administration
said, forget all of that, and illegal aliens, lacking any basis
or authority under the law to enter the country, were allowed
to make an appointment, show up at a port of entry, and walk in
the front door. It wasn't even catch-and-release, as Ms. Taylor
Greene said. It was literally show up and walk in.
According to Secretary Noem, more than 1 million people
entered the country this way. AFL applauds DHS's announcement
yesterday that, going forward, they're going to repurpose this
app for the removal efforts.
Other parole programs which I touch on in my--more detail
in my written testimony are the CHNV, a program so rife with
fraud that the administration actually paused it of its own
volition for nearly a month, and the Parole in Place. Now,
Parole in Place was particularly egregious, and AFL took the
administration to court and won, stopping this program in its
tracks.
Through these 3 parole programs, the last administration
attempted to bestow legal status on 2.6 million illegal aliens.
For context, that is more than the population of 15 U.S. States
and the equivalent of the population of the United States'
third largest city of Chicago.
Where the Biden administration cannot make an argument
under existing law, it simply endeavored to rewrite the law.
One such example is the 2022 asylum officer rule, which gave
USCIS asylum officers the duties of immigration judges, leading
to AFL founder and president Stephen Miller at the time calling
it the most extreme immigration regulation ever proposed.
Last is the issue of interior enforcement. While removals
were statistically nonexistent during the Biden administration,
its attitude toward ICE is even more pernicious than that.
Under the Biden administration, DHS implemented policies that
proactively made it harder for ICE agents to take the routine
enforcement actions against the worst of the worst.
Under the ironically-named priorities memo, for example,
DHS required ICE agents to seek preapproval from Washington, DC
headquarters for every proposed enforcement action, every
proposed enforcement action for almost all of 2020, 2021--I'm
sorry, all of 2021.
Records obtained by AFL show how ridiculous this policy
was, resulting in nearly 60,000 requests by field agents to do
their job. This is 60,000 enforcement actions against gang
members, cartel members, murderers, arsonists, traffickers,
rapists, and violent individuals that were slowed down or
delayed because trained ICE enforcement officers had to go to a
desk, write out a justification, and get preapproval from the
District of Columbia to do their job.
The story of the Biden administration's DHS cannot be told
without emphasizing just how wasteful and abusive its policies
were of taxpayer resources. From willfully ignoring the law to
attempting to rewrite it, to actively erecting roadblocks to
block law enforcement, every Biden-era DHS immigration policy
can be categorized as waste, fraud, or abuse.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Block follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew Block
March 11, 2025
Dear Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the invitation to testify today on the
topic of the Biden administration's Waste, Fraud, and Abuse at the
Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''). We at America First Legal
Foundation (``AFL'') have spent the last 4 years fighting the Biden
administration in court and educating the American public on this very
topic, so I am honored to share some of our work and findings.
While AFL has exposed Biden-era waste, fraud, and abuse in many
areas, including NGO's,\1\ Censorship,\2\ and Weaponization,\3\ other
witnesses will focus on those topics and so I will focus my remarks
specifically on waste, fraud, and abuse in the immigration context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For example, after hiring Andrew Lorenzen-Strait (an Obama
admin alum and part of the Biden transition team), Family Endeavors
almost immediately received 2 single-source, no-bid Federal contracts
in the amount of $530 million from HHS and $87 million from ICE. AFL
subsequently exposed how the original $530 million contract cost has
quadrupled, surpassing $2 billion in obligated Federal funds, $1.3
billion of which has been sent to Endeavors as of today. America First
Legal Uncovers New Documents Revealing How the Biden Admin Used $2
Billion in Taxpayer-Funded Contracts to House Illegal Aliens and Enrich
Former Biden Admin Staffers, AM. FIRST LEGAL (Sept. 28, 2023), https://
perma.cc/BJ3Z-ES6X. This inflated cost is in addition to the $17
million in waste identified by the DHS Inspector General from Family
Endeavors' $87 million contract with ICE, which AFL found provided
illegal aliens with taxpayer-funded luxury services. The Biden
Administration Reveals That It Provides Concierge Services to Illegal
Aliens, Covers Up the Cost Paid by American Taxpayers, AM. FIRST LEGAL
(Nov. 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/PGQ8-5DEG.
\2\ EXCLUSIVE--Brennan-Clapper Group Pushed DHS to Adopt Covert
Influence Campaigns to Crush Political Opposition, AM. FIRST LEGAL
(July 9, 2024), https://perma.cc/8H5A-FQNP.
\3\ See EXCLUSIVE--Brennan-Clapper Intel Group was Part of a Whole-
of-Government Approach to Silence Political Dissent in the United
States, AM. FIRST LEGAL (July 11, 2024), https://perma.cc/U4KU-HN8R
(AFL litigation revealed how DHS attended NSC interagency meetings on
how to censor speech, including working with the UK Government to
accomplish that policy); EXCLUSIVE--America First Legal Obtains New
Internal CDC Documents Revealing Foreign Collusion in Biden-Harris
Government Censorship Regime, AM. FIRST LEGAL (Sept. 13, 2024), https:/
/perma.cc/VXU4-7BTW.
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background
The Biden administration took a cavalier approach to the law in
everything it did. This was evident, for example, in its actions with
respect to student loan forgiveness,\4\ the COVID-era eviction
moratorium,\5\ mask mandates,\6\ and vaccine mandates,\7\ all of which
were obviously illegal from the outset but nevertheless implemented
because of an ``act now and maybe get rejected later'' approach. This
attitude was on display in full force with the administration's
approach to immigration enforcement where, at President Biden and
Secretary Mayorkas' direction, DHS failed to faithfully execute the
laws, actively created barriers to law enforcement, ignored clear and
longstanding interpretations of laws, and even attempted to rewrite
Congressionally-enacted laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 447 (2023).
\5\ Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 594
U.S. 758 (2021).
\6\ Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc v. Biden, 599 F. Supp. 3d 1144
(M.D. Fla. 2022), vacated as moot sub nom. Health Freedom Def. Fund v.
President of the United States, 71 F.4th 888 (11th Cir. 2023).
\7\ Louisiana ex rel Landry v. Biden, 64 F.4th 674 (5th Cir. 2023);
Payne v. Biden, 62 F.4th 598 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 144 S.Ct. 480 (2023).
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I. Abuse of ``Parole'' Authority
Among the Biden administration's many abuses of authority none, in
my view, is worse than the abuse of what is commonly referred to as
Parole Authority.
Congress has created a clear and comprehensive immigration system.
But of course, for any rule, there are exceptions. One issue that has
been at the center of the give and take between the Legislative and
Executive branches for decades is the question of how to deal with
exigent circumstances.
Congress's solution, so far, has been to give the Attorney General,
and now the Secretary of Homeland Security, ``Parole Authority.''\8\
Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5), Congress empowered the Executive branch to
use its discretion, in compelling exigent circumstances, to permit an
otherwise inadmissible alien temporarily to enter the United States
when doing so is necessary for ``urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,'' and no other provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (``INA'') addressed the situation. But the
Executive branch has all-too-often abused parole to address its own
disagreement with other provisions of the INA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 4 (2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress has already modified Section 1182 once to curtail
Executive branch abuses.\9\ Unfortunately, the Executive branch
continued to abuse the parole power, although never as egregiously as
during the Biden administration.\10\ Unfortunately, the Biden
administration's abuses put to Congress a difficult policy question of
whether to further curtail the availability of parole--which is
intended to be a necessary ``break glass in case of emergency''
provision in immigration law; or remove the authority altogether. What
is clear is that future Executives cannot be allowed to abuse the
provision to indiscriminately admit 11 million people from around the
world--who would not otherwise have a basis to enter the country--
because the Biden administration has given a future lawless Executive
the road map.
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\9\ Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
\10\ George Fishman, A Pernicious Perversion of Parole, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD. (Feb. 16, 2022), https://perma.cc/8Y6P-LKPM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It did so with 3 programs: the CBP One app, Process for Cubans,
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (``CHNV''), and Parole in Place
(``PIP''). AFL challenged these in court, defeating the PIP initiative
at trial. Such ``programs'' undermine the laws enacted by Congress, are
incredibly wasteful, and are a large part of why more than 11 million
people entered the country illegally since 2021. My testimony will
explain how the Biden administration hid most of these entries under a
veneer of legitimacy by unlawfully abusing the parole power on an
unprecedented industrial scale.
A. CBP One App
During the Vice-Presidential debate, now Vice President J.D. Vance
artfully explained, ``There's an application called the CBP One app
where you can go on as an illegal migrant, apply for asylum or apply
for parole and be granted legal status at the wave of a Kamala Harris
open border wand.'' That is precisely how this ``program'' worked.
Through the CBP One app, the Biden administration created, by executive
fiat, what amounts to a parallel system for visa-free immigration to
the United States for people who would otherwise have no basis to enter
the United States of America.
Specifically, the app allowed aliens to apply for Advanced Travel
Authorization (``ATA''), which allowed them to travel to a U.S. Port of
Entry without a visa and request parole to enter the United States.
Whereas you or I need a passport, visa, or license to enter the
country, the Biden administration waived all that for illegals and
simply let them in the front door. CBP statistics show that more than
852,000 appointments were made using the CBP One app.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ CBP Releases September 2024 Monthly Update: CBP One App, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Oct. 22, 2024), https://perma.cc/C2CC-YNAS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If that were not bad enough, this new system lacked the protections
that Congress carefully constructed. For example, aliens applying for
an immigrant visa must appear in person for a visa interview with a
Department of State consular officer at the embassy or consulate.\12\
Those interviews are conducted by a consular officer who speaks that
alien's native language and is familiar with the local culture. The
officer can make an informed, in-person evaluation of the alien's
truthfulness and qualifications under the law to enter the United
States. The Biden administration discarded the interview requirement to
receive an ATA.
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\12\ 8 U.S.C. 1202(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But it gets worse. Congress has established numerical limitations
and quotas for various visa classifications that the CBP One app
ignored.\13\ Aliens could apply for ATA for free, whereas each alien
applying for an immigrant visa pays a substantial fee of between $205
and $345.\14\ Aliens applying for immigrant visas must also meet
several other requirements, such as comprehensive medical exams, strict
vaccination requirements, and conclusive proof that they have the
financial means to support themselves.\15\ ATAs did not require any of
these safeguards. Worst of all, the lack of any in-person interview
made it impossible for any kind of reasonable security vetting of these
aliens before entering the United States. Yet the Biden administration
rubber-stamped ATA applications, approving them at rates of up to 97.5
percent.\16\
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\13\ E.g., 8 U.S.C. 1151 (imposing annual numerical caps for
various immigrant visa classifications); id. 1184(e) (imposing ``annual
numerical limit'' on certain nonimmigrant professionals); id. 1184(g)
(imposing ``limitation on numbers'' of [t]emporary workers and
trainees''); id. 1184(p) (imposing ``numerical limitations'' on annual
number of recipients of visa for certain victims of crimes).
\14\ Dep't of State, Fees for Visa Services, (accessed Sep. 25,
2023) https://perma.cc/T976-BZPW.
\15\ 42 C.F.R. 34.1 et seq.; 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(1)(ii); 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(4) and 1183a.
\16\ Texas v. DHS, 722 F. Supp. 3d 688, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2024).
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This committee has reported that more than 95 percent of these
applications receive court dates in the United States and temporary
status until then.\17\ It is estimated that just through the CBP One
app, more than 800,000 aliens--more than the population of 4 States and
Washington, DC--entered the United States in under 2 years from this
one abuse of the parole authority.
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\17\ News, New Documents Obtained by Homeland Majority Detail
Shocking Abuse of CBP One App, HOMELAND SEC. COMM. REPUBLICANS (Oct.
23, 2023), https://perma.cc/Y5JT-62F5.
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Unsurprisingly, the CBP One App was rife with fraud. Cartels
exploited it, using VPN technology to work around its required geofence
so aliens from anywhere in the world could use it.\18\ With the
cartels' help, anyone could make a CBP One app appointment and
``lawfully'' enter the United States. The Biden administration did not
adjudicate these parole decisions on a case-by-case basis, as required
by law. Instead, it opened our doors and allowed anyone to enter. The
result is the worst-case scenario as illegal aliens who have entered
the United States through the CBP One App have reportedly gone on to
murder American citizens.\19\
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\18\ Anna Giaritelli, Mexican cartels exploit US government's CBP
One app, WASH. EXAM'R (Aug. 4, 2023), https://perma.cc/6KPJ-UDE4.
\19\ America First Legal (@America1stLegal), X (Sept. 15, 2024,
10:26AM), https://perma.cc/YXT6-UFZ5.
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B. Process for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans
Under the guise of preventing illegal aliens from crossing the
southern land border, the Biden administration took the unbelievable
step of ``creating'' a new ``program'' that permitted up to 360,000
aliens from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, or Venezuela to be ``paroled'' into
the United States every year--despite no authorization from Congress to
do so. Worse yet, the CHNV program allowed aliens in their home
countries to obtain the benefit of using the CBP One app to secure ATA
to enter the United States--despite no other basis in law for them
doing so.
This committee has reported that by September 2024, more than
531,000 aliens had entered the United States through the CHNV
program.\20\ Half a million people got to cut the line and be flown to
their destination of choice in the United States. Similar to aliens
from other countries using the CBP One App, the Biden administration
purported to give these CHNV aliens ``lawful status'' in the United
States without any statutory authority.\21\
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\20\ News, Startling Stats Factsheet: Fiscal Year 2024 Ends with
Nearly 3 Million Inadmissible Encounters, 10.8 Million Total Encounters
Since Fiscal Year 2021, HOMELAND SEC. COMM. REPUBLICANS (Oct. 24,
2024), https://perma.cc/CR6C-HYJH.
\21\ ``DHS cannot use that power to parole aliens en masse; that
was the whole point of the `case-by-case' requirement that Congress
added in IIRIRA.'' Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 997 (5th Cir. 2021)
rev'd and remanded, 597 U.S. 785 (2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And, as it turns out, the CHNV program was also rife with fraud.
Aliens who entered the U.S. submitted fraudulent documents, had
criminal records, and did not always come from 1 of the 4 CHNV
countries.\22\ Additionally, the same 3,000 sponsors sponsored more
than 100,000 applicants, with 24 of the most used social security
numbers belonging to dead people.\23\ At a rate of 33 aliens per serial
sponsor (many tied to an address of a commercial warehouse),\24\ there
is no credible argument that CHNV admissions were evaluated on a case-
by-case basis.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Press Release, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY & SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGR.
INTEGRITY, SECURITY, AND ENF'T, New Report: Two Years of the Biden-
Harris Administration's Fraud-Ridden Parole Program (Nov. 20, 2024),
https://perma.cc/7R9F-J3Q3.
\23\ Julia Ansley & Laura Strickler, Biden Administration May Soon
Restart Immigration Program That Was Paused Was for Possible Fraud
(Aug. 28, 2024), NBC NEWS, https://perma.cc/VWT2-ZQT4.
\24\ Id.
\25\ See Texas v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 6:23-cv-007
ECF. No. 1, (S.D. Tex. Jan 24, 2023), available at https://perma.cc/
24FD-RKVJ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fraud was actually so bad that the Biden administration paused
their own program--for 27 days--before ultimately resuming it.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Jason Hopkins, Biden Admin Pauses Migrant Flight Program Amid
Reports of Massive Fraud, DAILEY CALLER (Aug. 2, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFL knew that this program was a gross exploitation of parole
authority and sued the Biden administration in 2023 on behalf of Texas
and 20 other States.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ America First Legal, Texas, and a Coalition of 20 State
Attorneys General Take Urgent New Legal Action to Stop President Biden
from Flying Hundreds of Thousands of Illegal Aliens Into the United
States, AM. FIRST LEGAL (Apr. 4, 2024), https://perma.cc/T9V6-HT8B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Parole in Place
In yet another abuse of authority--dubbed Parole in Place--the
Biden administration attempted to give legal ``parole'' status to
aliens who have been unlawfully present in the United States for over a
decade.
This PIP program's criteria was as arbitrary as it was capricious.
Making new immigration policy out of thin air, the administration
purported to grant ``legal status'' to those who were: (1) a spouse of
a U.S. citizen here unlawfully for 10 years; or (2) were a stepchild of
a U.S. citizen who had unlawfully entered the United States before June
17, 2024 (just 1 month before PIP was announced). The PIP program, if
successful, would have granted legal status to up to 1.3 million
illegal aliens, despite a statutory requirement that such aliens leave
the country and obtain a visa to lawfully return.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See 8 U.S.C. 1255.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But AFL, representing a coalition of 15 States, took the Biden
administration to court and won stopping this program and removing a
significant pull factor to show that aliens cannot enter the country
illegally, get amnesty, and be placed on a fast-track to
citizenship.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ See Texas v. Dep't of Homeland Security, No. 6:24-cv-00306,
2024 WL 4711951 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Through these 3 ``programs'' alone, the Biden administration
attempted to bestow legal status on 2.6 million illegal aliens. That is
more than the population of 15 U.S. States and the equivalent of the
population of the United States' third-largest city of Chicago.
II. Re-Writing of Immigration Law Though the Asylum Officer Rule
Where the Biden administration could not bend existing law beyond
all recognition to meet its will, it simply endeavored to re-write it.
On March 29, 2022, the Biden administration published an Interim
Final Rule (``IFR'') that would completely restructure the asylum
process for the United States, commonly referred to as the ``Asylum
Officer Rule.''\30\ Under the guise of ``efficiency'' and ``process,''
the rule would transfer many of the duties of immigration judges to
asylum officers--a change that would only result in the approval of
countless meritless asylum claims from aliens who unlawfully entered
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of
Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum
Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18078 (Mar. 29, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rule also attempted to codify a further abuse of the parole
power by establishing a presumption that parole should be presumed to
serve a ``significant public benefit.'' This is a complete inversion of
the statutory law enacted by this body which, as explained, is a power
of last resort given to the Secretary of Homeland Security to use ``on
a case-by-case basis'' to address exigent circumstances. Thus, at the
time, America First Legal's founder and president Stephen Miller called
the rule ``the most extreme immigration regulation ever proposed.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ America First Legal and Texas File Urgent Lawsuit to Block
Extreme Biden Regulation Awarding Green Cards to Newly Arriving Illegal
Aliens, AM. FIRST LEGAL (Apr. 28, 2022), https://perma.cc/3XXK-RS5T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is why AFL, partnering with the State of Texas, filed a
lawsuit to prevent the rule from taking effect. The lawsuit argues that
the rule was not only a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
and the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also a violation of the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution as the Biden administration
attempted to give to asylum officers the duties Congress delegated to
immigration judges.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See Texas v. Mayorkas, 2:22-cv-094, 2024 WL 455337 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 6, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFL and the State of Texas defeated the Biden administration's
motion to dismiss. And although the case was fully briefed at the
summary judgment stage, it is currently stayed as the Government works
out how recent Executive Orders might impact the issues presented in
this litigation.
This is yet another example of how the Biden administration poured
countless hours and resources into a project--from drafting the rule to
processing and addressing over 5,000 comments to defending it in
court--despite a clear lack of authority and particularly potent
Constitutional issues.
III. Lack of Interior Enforcement
Finally, while the Biden administration was importing en masse
aliens from around the world, removal of illegal aliens from the United
States was virtually non-existent.\33\ One of the biggest scandals,
that went largely unreported, from the last 4 years was the utter lack
of interior enforcement by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(``ICE''). During his entire term of office, President Biden only
removed fewer than 600,000 aliens.\34\ For context, President Obama
removed 1.15 million in his first 3 years,\35\ and removed over 432,000
aliens in 2013 alone.\36\ Similarly, President Trump removed 1.19
million illegal aliens during his first term.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See Presidential Power to Secure the Border: Hearing before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. On Immigr. Integrity, Sec., &
Enf't, 118th Cong. (2024) (Statement of Gene P. Hamilton, Executive
Director, America First Legal Foundation).
\34\ In fiscal year 2021, ICE removed 59,011 aliens. U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENF'T, ICE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2021 (Mar. 11, 2022),
https://perma.cc/UYG5-XW8M. In fiscal year 2022 it removed 72,177. U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, ICE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2022 (Dec. 30,
2022), https://perma.cc/7X8F-X49Z. In fiscal year 2023 it removed
142,580. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, ICE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2023 (Dec. 29, 2023), https://perma.cc/3R6V-YETL. And in fiscal year
2024 it removed 271,484. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, ICE ANNUAL
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2024 (Dec. 19, 2024), https://perma.cc/D8E9-WRBY.
\35\ U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFF. OF HOMELAND SEC. STATS., 2022
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 104, https://perma.cc/4XBY-C44Y.
\36\ Id.
\37\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But not only did the Biden administration fail to remove illegal
aliens from the United States, it proactively made it harder for ICE
agents to even take routine enforcement actions against the worst of
the worst. For instance, one Biden administration policy, ironically
called a ``priorities memo,''\38\ required ICE agents to seek pre-
approval from Washington, DC headquarters for every proposed
enforcement action (arrest or removal of an illegal alien) for a nearly
10-month period.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Memorandum from Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf't to all ICE Employees (Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/
R6Z9-JCB6.
\39\ Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2, Am. First Legal Found. v.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 21-cv-2168. (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2023), ECF
No. 28-1, https://perma.cc/EQA4-NX5M (Explaining: ``Political
leadership[ICE] issued an Interim Guidance memorandum setting forth new
requirements for ICE agents. This memorandum was in effect until
November 29, 2021, when it was superseded by a September 30, 2021,
memorandum issued by [ ] Secretary Mayorkas. While in effect, the
Interim Guidance implemented new bureaucratic requirements before ICE
officers could take enforcement action against non-citizens illegally
in the United States. Specifically, before arresting or removing an
alien, ICE officers were required to pause and seek approval from
Washington, DC headquarters. Considering the serious public health and
safety risks posed by many such individuals, this added delay left
convicted violent criminals and other dangerous aliens in communities
longer than they otherwise would have been and made an already complex
job for ICE officers even more challenging.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But ICE, under the Biden administration, did not identify
``priorities'' in the way Tom Homan does today. What the policy really
did was slow down legitimate law enforcement efforts and create more
bureaucracy to protect criminal illegal aliens.
Records obtained by AFL show how ridiculous the policy was. Instead
of allowing the trained and professional law enforcement officers at
ICE to go out and do their job, the Biden administration made them come
in to a desk, write up a justification, and wait for approval. And this
applied to everyone. AFL sued ICE to obtain these written
justifications, and the results will astound you.
AFL's investigation showed that the priorities memo resulted in
nearly 60,000 requests by ICE field agents to Washington D.C.
headquarters simply to do their job.\40\ This included pre-approval
requests to arrest or deport known cartel and gang members, people
convicted of crimes including: crimes against children, homicide,
fraud, weapons and narcotics trafficking, arson, drug dealing, drunk
driving, domestic violence, and virtually every other crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ IMMIGRATIONS DOCS: AFL Releases Disturbing Data on Illegal
Aliens Under Biden Administration Policies; ICE Agents Had to Seek
Permission to Arrest or Deport Thousands of Felons Convicted of
Virtually Every Crime, AM. FIRST LEGAL (May 10, 2023), https://
perma.cc/8DKF-CYST.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
The story of the Biden administration's Department of Homeland
Security cannot be told without emphasizing just how wasteful and
abusive their policies were of taxpayer resources. From willfully
ignoring the law to attempting to rewrite it to actively erecting
roadblocks to law enforcement, virtually every Biden-era DHS initiative
can be categorized as waste, fraud, or abuse. Thank you, and I look
forward to answering the committee's questions.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Block.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. Additional rounds of questioning may
be called for. All Members have been recognized.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Howell, you encouraged Congress just a minute ago
relative to the NGO's, nongovernmental organizations, and what
we could do in particular to having the Office of Inspector
Generals look into the NGO's. I really am intrigued by that,
because I think it's something that committees are going to be
lacking on if we don't do that. I think it's a great idea.
So I'm going to take your idea. I'm going to pivot to a
former lead official within the Office of Inspector General,
Mr. Roth. How would Congress be able to approach the Office of
Inspector Generals to be able to do the granular element of
trying to find how the NGO's--we know we have an issue of
financial management, which it came up minimal in the previous
panel, where under Homeland Security financial management of
controls, of tracking monies, what did you see, what can we do,
in your estimation, quickly, to be able to accomplish this goal
for accountability with these NGO's?
Mr. Roth. Well, in my experience, IG's offices are
extraordinarily sensitive to requests from their committees of
jurisdiction. So the fact that you are the Chair of the
Subcommittee of Homeland Security means that, typically, or at
least in my experience when I was IG, we would take that very,
very seriously. So my advice, for what it's worth, is that I
would have your staff call their staff, engage in some
discussions, and then perhaps follow up with a formal
recommendation as to--or formal request as to the sort-of scope
of the work.
Mr. Brecheen. In terms of NGO's and their ability to--given
the financial management element, we know that there's--we're
under high risk under Homeland Security right now. Were you
able to find things within NGO funding after it had been let to
the NGO's that were on your radar screen when you were part of
the Inspector General's Office?
Mr. Roth. Not in the immigration context, we weren't.
Mr. Brecheen. OK.
Mr. Roth. I am unfamiliar with the source of this funding
to the NGO's, whether it was like a Department of Homeland
Security grant or some other Federal agency. Obviously, we'd
only have jurisdiction over--that is, my old office----
Mr. Brecheen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. Would only have jurisdiction over
sort-of a Homeland Security grant.
Mr. Brecheen. So I want to pivot back to you, Mr. Howell,
because you talked--I mean, you're adding these NGO's into what
you call the border industrial complex. You mentioned $6
billion were spent under the Biden administration that was
specific to the NGO's. Did I understand you correctly on that?
Mr. Howell. Yes.
Mr. Brecheen. That there are 230 different NGO's involved.
Can you name 5--you don't have to do 5, OK, but a number of
NGO's just right off-hand that you feel like were the most
egregious offenders?
Mr. Howell. Right. So at DHS there used to be a board that
kind-of oversaw the distribution of the funding, and on that
board sat some of, we'll call them the name-brand national
charities, and those would include people like, you know,
Catholic Relief Services or Catholic Charities, USCCB, one
variation of that, Lutheran Relief Services, Hebrew Immigrant
Aid Society, all these kind-of mega organizations that play in
the disaster space sat on that board that distributed the money
through a web of nonprofits.
So I'm sure the number far exceeds 230, but there's a
reason why the left did it this way. It's so that you couldn't
get who actually ended up with the money and how they spent it.
It is doing the Government's work outside of Government to
evade this type of oversight. So I'd encourage you guys not to
rely on the IG community who has not shown an interest at all
in this $6 billion, who sat by and watched the worst border
crisis in history happen in front of them, but to go get the
information yourself, which is your Constitutional duty with
your subpoena power, to these nonprofits, make them turn over
financial documents, records of illegals, have them answer
questions and so forth.
Mr. Brecheen. So you mentioned, though, engaging the
inspectors general in this process. So in addition to what you
just laid out, how would you see engaging the IG's office in
this effort?
Mr. Howell. Frankly, I don't think they're going to be that
willing of a partner, because they haven't shown an interest in
the border crisis over the last 4 years. I think it's certainly
worthwhile to ask, but I don't think Congress should absolve
themself of the Constitutional responsibility by a request to
the IG. I'd even be looking at law enforcement. A lot of this
activity borders on criminal.
Mr. Brecheen. That's good.
It came up, Mr. Schube, a minute ago--you've got 30 seconds
between you and I--about NGO's, nongovernmental organizations,
and how they were the ones that--under the ability of what was
supposed to be a network of information protection, stop our
electric grid from being taken down, they were farming out
internet policing to these NGO's. You've got 15 seconds. What
would you want to say in terms of what we can do to get to the
bottom of that in the process?
Mr. Schube. You know, I didn't mention this in my remarks,
but I think the same suggestion. I think the IG community or
DOGE could look into which NGO's were benefiting from this
financially and what they were doing with that money.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you all very much.
With that, I will open it up to Mr. Thanedar for his 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to all of our
witnesses here for your testimony.
Mr. Roth, I thank you for your service. Earlier today, we
heard from the GAO and their DHS Office of IG about their work
rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse. These offices were created
by Congress and have legal authority to audit the Federal
Government, as you know. The term Musk administration and House
Republicans claim they want to eliminate waste, fraud, and
abuse.
So does it make sense to you, Mr. Roth, that one of the
first things the new administration did was fire almost every
inspector general?
Mr. Roth. Firing the inspector generals is a disempowering
act. It sent the very clear message that if you have a
politically sensitive audit or investigation or review, bad
news is not welcome in this administration. What it has done is
sent a chilling effect throughout the oversight community, and
that's including the inspector general's office, but also the
Office of Special Counsel, Office of Government Ethics, that
they are unwelcome and that oversight is not apparently
welcome.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
Mr. Roth, how does Elon Musk's DOGE differ from the
statutory watchdogs Congress created, who have a long history
of rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse?
Mr. Roth. So one of the primary ways that it's different is
the decentralized nature of the OIGs, so each OIG is harbored
within a specific department. So, for example, for me it was
the Department of Homeland Security; someone else it would be
NASA. What that gives you is the opportunity to get deep
knowledge as to the functions and missions of each agency,
sort-of the pluses and the minuses, so that you can then go and
direct audits, investigations, inspections.
The other thing that the IG's Office brings that DOGE can't
bring is the kind of rigor that professional auditing does. You
saw a demonstration of that today in the first panel with the
IG's Office, who is very well-informed, had written reports
that were vetted and according to accounting and auditing
standards. You don't have any of that with an ad hoc group that
isn't bound by the same kind of professional auditing
standards.
Mr. Thanedar. Mr. Roth, you were the inspector general for
DHS for a number of years, and you worked closely with other
statutory watchdogs created by Congress to protect the American
taxpayer, offices like GAO and the Offices of Special Counsel.
Based on your experience, why is independence such a critical
feature for the Office of Inspector General, and how does that
differ from the people at DOGE?
Mr. Roth. So there's 2 answers to that question. One is
sort-of the ability to gain information from the agency in
which you are sort-of doing oversight on. So if you were
perceived of as independent and neutral, you're more willing to
get whistleblowers to come in and talk about--and this is
really the lifeblood of any oversight is to be able to get
people to trust you and talk about sort-of what it is that they
see.
During my tenure at DHS, we had a number of whistleblowers
in different places, because I was perceived as being on
nobody's side. I wasn't part of the administration. I wasn't
part of the non-administration.
Likewise, the Office of Special Counsel has special
programs in place to protect whistleblowers. So that's one
aspect of it is that people trust you and they'll come to you
so you can root out problems.
Second aspect, of course, is just credibility. So when the
IG or the Office of Special Counsel writes a report, the fact
that they don't have a dog in this fight, the fact that they
aren't part of the management, that they're not encumbered by
any financial conflicts of interest or other kind of political
conflicts of interest, makes those reports more credible than
otherwise would be.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Thank you for that.
It is, you know, disturbing because we don't see the same
level of competence. Again, do you see the same level of
competence or the independence in the 19-year-olds and the 20-
year-olds that are hired? Or if you look at their social media
profile, you see all kinds of racism and other horrible
background. Are these people qualified----
Mr. Roth. Right.
Mr. Thanedar [continuing]. To do the job that they've been
assigned to?
Mr. Roth. Again, the process that the Inspector General's
offices have is that you have to have professional auditors who
are trained and skilled in the kinds of things that auditors
do. They are reviewed, they are supervised. Any report goes
through vetting, et cetera.
Mr. Thanedar. My time is up, so I yield back, Chair.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the Representative from Illinois, Mrs.
Ramirez, for her 5 minutes.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman. I'm really grateful for
the opportunity to also stay for the second panel.
At our first Homeland Security full committee hearing a
couple of weeks ago, I brought this graphic with me. As you
read here, Elon Musk, Elon Musk, Elon Musk. That is what I
believe to my core is the biggest threat to our national
security.
This is the Committee on Homeland. Since then, I've asked
the Members of this committee, who is supposed to do everything
in their power to protect the homeland, to really take
seriously the threat that Trump, Musk, and his army of
unaccountable tech bros represent every day.
So you can imagine my disappointment--not really--to see
that, instead, the Republicans on the subcommittee have decided
to throw their Lord and Savior a parade in the form of a
hearing. While their Lord and Savior changes from time to
time--yesterday it was Donald Trump, today it's Musk, tomorrow
might be the next billionaire, although this guy is about to
become a trillionaire off the backs of working people--
something that's very clear for me is that Republicans have
willingly given away their power to conduct oversight over our
agencies and the dangers that these unelected billionaires have
on our security.
So, you see, my Republican colleagues and their
hyperpartisan witnesses sitting here today have completely
ignored that the waste in our agencies is the millions of
dollars spent on the DOGE army of unqualified workers stealing
our data and firing dedicated, qualified public servants.
The fraud in our Government is Elon Musk, whose greatest
achievement on efficiency is a social media platform that
crashed multiple times yesterday. The abuse is our Nation--in
our Nation is the power grab with which Donald Trump imposes
his authoritarian agenda. They don't have any legal authority
to take sledgehammers to the services and programs that working
people depend on and, by the way, Congress authorized--we
authorized--but Republicans have allowed it to happen anyway.
So, Mr. Roth, I want to ask you the questions today. As
DHS's former inspector general, could you share with us what
are the potential threats posed by an unvetted DOGE employee
with little to no Government experience plugging into DHS's
information systems and databases?
Mr. Block. So I can't talk about the specifics of exactly
what DOGE is doing because, obviously, I'm not involved any
longer in the Government. But I will tell you that the IT
systems within DHS and really across the Government, according
to the DHS's reviews of those, are extraordinarily sensitive,
are being targeted by foreign adversaries in a way that is not
represented in private networks, for example.
You heard the testimony of the GAO witness on the first
panel talking about the vulnerabilities that exist--the
documented vulnerabilities that exist in access controls. So
having an unknown person or an unvetted person have access in
ways that you don't have a full understanding of is
extraordinarily dangerous and represents a significant
vulnerability to IT systems.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Mr. Roth. I think in part, you
know, when you said you're not quite sure what their authority
or what they're doing is, I think it's actually the concern
that a number of us have here.
I've said this in Veteran Affairs Committee and I'm going
to say it here. I want to know what does DOGE have access to,
who authorized it, who are they talking to, what data do they
have, how is it that they can have sensitive data to our
national security and that it go completely unchecked. This
committee, this subcommittee specifically, is responsible for
oversight, accountability, and investigation.
We've already seen the effects of having unqualified people
accessing our data and making decisions in our agency, because,
look, the day after the DOGE's website was launched, it
suffered a security breach, putting our sensitive data in the
hands of anyone with a computer and access to the internet.
How can we forget when DOGE fired more than 300 staffers
from the National Nuclear Security Administration? Yes, that's
the agency that's tasked with managing the national--Nation's
nuclear stockpile. Or the several employees who were working on
the Federal Government's response to H5N1 avian flu outbreak.
DOGE doesn't have a great track record, and whether it's
due to stupidity or hatred, at this point, a better name for
DOGE would be the Department of Obstruction and Gross Errors.
I really hope that this committee takes the threat of DOGE
and Elon Musk seriously, and I intend to work with all of my
colleagues to do that.
With that, Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Brecheen. The lady yields.
I now would like to recognize for his 5 minutes of
questioning the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Howell, your organization published findings from your
analysis of cell phone data revealing potential illicit
activities by NGO's, such as providing false residency
documents or advising illegal immigrants to lie to law
enforcement to evade ICE. After the release of your findings,
did the Biden administration take any steps to address these
concerns? How did they respond to your research and your
implications?
Mr. Howell. So the Biden administration through the Biden
campaign called me and my organization some variant of
disinformation, of course, and then otherwise relied on their
legacy media outlets to try to come after us and discredit us,
which they ultimately failed and actually ended up supporting
our findings.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. How do you think the
administration's failure to act on this issue might've
emboldened other NGO's or other groups engaged in questionable
practices?
Mr. Howell. Well, they turned on the fire hydrant of
billions of dollars of funding. They built an entire
sophisticated apparatus and infrastructure. A lot of people
gained a lot of power, influence, and money throughout this,
and it resulted in the biggest invasion of the United States,
the biggest mass movement of human beings I can think of in an
organized fashion throughout our country and to everyone here's
community with drugs, crime, violence, all coming with it.
Mr. Strong. Mr. Howell, in your testimony, you alluded to
examples of NGO's misusing taxpayer-funded grants or resources
to facilitate fraudulent activities. Can you elaborate on how
these funds were directly misused and what measures can be
implemented to trace and prevent further misuse of public
funds?
Mr. Howell. Right. So the behavior we see at the NGO's
ranges across the gamut of questionable and even illegal
activity, including advising illegal aliens on how to evade
ICE. I believe it construes kind-of harboring illegal aliens
too. It potentially implicates the trafficking of them as well.
There's all amounts of kind of criminal negligence I think we
can find at these nonprofits.
In addition, in New York, we found them giving false
residency documents to illegal aliens. Who knows the impact
that has in our voting systems.
Mr. Strong. Did you know of any NGO's that were helping
people try to register to vote?
Mr. Howell. Yes, absolutely. By giving them false residency
documents, with residency being one component of voting, that
is a factor there. Also, south of the border in Mexico, we
discovered fliers encouraging illegals to vote for Biden when
they entered the country.
Separate, the White House themselves, when they tried the
Federal takeover of elections via Executive Order 14019, they
invited a lot of these nonprofits and their partner
organizations to basically advise we don't need to do anything
to warn illegals not to vote whatsoever.
They kept the system wide open because they were relying on
those very votes. That's why they opened the border in the
first place. They can't win with only American votes. They
needed to import a new population dependent on Government to
fundamentally change the United States. That's what this is all
about.
Mr. Strong. You're spot on.
Switching gears. America First Legal has been dedicated to
ensuring transparency and holding the Government accountable.
However, these efforts have faced significant obstacles,
particularly from actions within the Biden administration aimed
at hindering oversight work.
Mr. Block, can you share some examples of how individuals
within the Biden administration have attempted to obstruct
America First Legal efforts to hold the Government accountable
and promote transparency?
Mr. Block. Yes. So a couple that come to mind. I mean, from
Day 1, the Department of Justice moved to disqualify one of our
cofounders and general counsel, Gene Hamilton, from cases that
he was qualified to work on and had every right to be on.
From--and that was Day 1 all the way up through to just
before the election, NARA was supposed to produce documents
depicting Hunter Biden and Joe Biden meeting President Xi.
Those were ultimately produced after the election. There were
other productions that we were supposed to get before the
election that came after the election as well. So, I mean, just
from Day 1 through the current day.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Block.
Mr. Chairman, I'd be remiss if I didn't mention, I walked
in and I heard the word ``hyperpartisan.'' I'm telling you
right now I hate that I was committed to something else and I
couldn't be here longer.
I want to defend these folks. Two of the 3 Republican folks
that are testifying today have served with distinguished
records for years for DHS, and they've been called
hyperpartisan.
What this committee wants is the facts. We want to know
what worked. We want to know what didn't work.
I thank you for your service, and I hope that that
hyperpartisan statement doesn't affect anything you do in your
future. Thank you for your service to our country.
Mr. Brecheen. The gentleman yields.
I thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We ask the witnesses to respond to
these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will
be open for 10 days.
I do want to just make a general statement. Relative to the
actions of the administration, whether it was the Digital
Services, renamed DOGE, what we know is Article II of the
Constitution does provide and vest all Executive authority onto
the President, and the authority of the President, duly
elected, to be able to execute on the day-to-day operations is
his prerogative.
Additionally, I want to move to enter this letter from the
vice president of the Associated Builders and Contractors, a
national construction industry trade association representing
more than 23,000 members, requesting Members of the committee
reduce wasteful spending in infrastructure contracting by
removing the Biden-Harris administration's project labor
agreement that discouraged fair contract completion.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Associated Builders and Contractors
March 11, 2025.
The Honorable Josh Brecheen,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Accountability, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Shri Thanedar,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Accountability, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Brecheen, Ranking Member Thanedar and Members of the
U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Accountability: On behalf of Associated Builders
and Contractors, a national construction industry trade association
with 67 chapters representing more than 23,000 members, I write today
to thank you for holding the hearing, ``Eliminating Waste, Fraud, and
Abuse at the Department of Homeland Security: Addressing the Biden-
Harris Administration's Failures.'' This hearing is essential to
ensuring that U.S. Department of Homeland Security prioritizes
efficiency, quality, and maximizing the value of taxpayer investments.
abc members advance u.s. department of homeland security infrastructure
ABC and its members play a significant role in improving America's
infrastructure, including that procured by the DHS. Between fiscal
years 2009-2023, ABC members won 54 percent of Federal contracts worth
$35 million or more. Specific to homeland security, ABC members have
competed on and won infrastructure projects of all sizes, including
those in excess of $100 million. These projects include the
construction, renovation, and repair of border walls, ports of entry,
waterfront structures, barracks, and utility infrastructure and were
completed free from project labor agreement mandates and
encouragements.
While ABC members have traditionally played a critical role
building homeland security projects, the Biden administration sought to
discourage them from competing for Federal construction contracts
through its Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction
Projects final rule. Effective Jan. 20, 2024, the rule requires PLAs on
Federal construction projects of $35 million or more and discourages
competition from quality nonunion contractors and their employees, who
comprise a record-high 89.7 percent of the private U.S. construction
industry workforce. This policy effectively tells ABC member
contractors and subcontractors they are not welcome to compete to win
taxpayer-funded infrastructure projects unless they sign a jobsite-
specific collective bargaining agreement with unions. It also inflates
Federal construction projects costs by 12 percent to 20 percent,
needlessly wasting billions of taxpayer dollars annually.
pla legal developments since the start of the trump administration
On Jan. 21, 2025, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor
of ABC and Associated General Contractors Federal contractor members
that filed bid protests against PLAs mandated on 12 project
solicitations procured by DOD agencies as a result of the Biden
administration's pro-PLA FAR Council rule. The judge's ruling, limited
to the dozen projects in question to date, found that PLA mandates
violate Federal competitive bidding laws and evidence presented to the
court illustrated their anti-competitive and inflationary effect. The
court heard evidence that Federal agencies conducted market research
and hired consultants who recommended against mandating PLAs because of
their anti-competitive and inflationary outcomes. However, the Biden
rule forced DOD procurement experts to ignore these findings and
indiscriminately require PLAs on contracts in markets where PLAs were
harmful to the DOD's mission and objectives.
Despite legal wins and welcome policy reversals by the DOD and U.S.
General Services Administration to remove PLA requirements on certain
projects, the Biden administration's illegal PLA rule continues to
cause confusion, delays, and reduced competition for construction
contracts procured by other Federal agencies, such as the DHS, months
into the Trump administration. For this reason, ABC encourages the
Trump administration to permanently rescind the Biden administration's
PLA mandate rule on direct Federal contracts and eliminate other pro-
PLA schemes on Federally-assisted infrastructure, clean energy, and
manufacturing projects via Federal tax incentives, loans, and grant
programs.
conclusion
ABC encourages Members of the Homeland Security Committee to ensure
the Federal Government benefits from robust merit-based competition by
eliminating Government-mandated PLAs and PLA preferences pushed by
inflationary Biden administration policies. By cosponsoring the Fair
and Open Competition Act, Members of Congress can prohibit Biden's
failed PLA policies from undermining infrastructure investments,
reducing competition, and preventing taxpayers from getting the best
value on Federal construction projects. If passed, FOCA would save
taxpayers at least $10 billion annually and ensure all Americans,
regardless of labor affiliation, have the opportunity to participate on
Federal construction projects.
ABC appreciates the opportunity to comment on today's hearing and
looks forward to working with the committee during the 119th Congress.
Sincerely,
Kristen Swearingen,
Vice President, Legislative & Political Affairs.
Mr. Brecheen. With that, thank you to the witnesses for
your testimony, to the Members for your time. Now this
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]