    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        A DIRE CRISIS IN SUDAN: A GLOBAL CALL
                                   TO ACTION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                    OF THE

                             SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  May 22, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-20

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-183 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                        BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
    JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
    MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
    YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
        American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
    JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
    RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
    JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
    JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                  James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                     Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                             SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

                   CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SARA JACOBS, California, Ranking
     RONNY JACKSON, Texas                    Member
     BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
     AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,          Florida
        American Samoa                    JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
     JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
                                          JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland

                     Joe Foltz, Subcommittee Staff Director

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                                REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Christopher H. Smith..     1
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Sara Jacobs.....     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Statement of Ken Isaacs, Vice President, Programs & Government
      Relations, Samaritan's Purse...................................     6
      Prepared Statement.............................................    10
    Statement of Cameron Hudson, Senior Fellow, Africa Program,
      Center for Strategic and International Studies.................    15
      Prepared Statement.............................................    17
    Statement of Kholood Khair, Founder and Director, Confluence
      Advisory.......................................................    22
      Prepared Statement.............................................    25

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    54
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    56
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    57

                A DIRE CRISIS IN SUDAN: A GLOBAL CALL TO ACTION

                                  ----------

                             Thursday, May 22, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
                                 Subcommittee on Africa
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m., in
    room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Smith
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Smith. The Subcommittee on Africa will come to order.
    And the purpose of this hearing is to examine the ongoing
    conflict in Sudan, its devastating humanitarian consequences,
    including widespread displacement, violence, and external
    involvement, and to review the conflict's root causes,
    developments, and the responses from the United States and the
    international community.
        I do recognize myself at this point for an opening
    statement.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

        Over the decades, as especially our distinguished panel
    knows, the people of Sudan have been subjected to unbearable
    pain, suffering, and loss of life, even slavery. Since the
    1990's, I have been a vocal advocate for human rights,
    democracy, and stability in Sudan. Soon after Republicans took
    control of the House, I chaired a hearing in 1996 on slavery in
    Sudan and Mauritania.
        Today, there's a dire crisis again in Sudan, necessitating
    a global call to action. I went to Khartoum, for example, in
    August 2005 to meet with President Omar al-Bashir and other
    government officials, a number of people from the faith
    community, to press for an end to the genocide in Darfur. The
    meeting was necessarily contentious. Bashir denied any
    wrongdoing or complicity in the killings of Darfur genocide.
        In 2009, however, I point this out, Bashir was charged by
    the International Criminal Court with committing war crimes and
    crimes against humanity. And in 2010, he was the first person
    ever charged for the crime of genocide by the ICC.
        After meetings with Bashir and other government officials,
    I visited two refugee camps--many of you have done that, many
    of my colleagues have done that. Those two camps I went to in
    Darfur were Kalma camp and I stayed overnight at another called
    Mukjar in western Darfur. An experience that profoundly
    motivated me to do more to end the mass violence. When our
    helicopter landed at the remote Mukjar camp, thousands, and I
    mean thousand, a line was formed of these wonderful people:
    women and children dancing, clapping, singing beautiful African
    traditional songs. The people of Darfur have a remarkable
    generosity and spirit, and it was awe-inspiring.
        Just about everybody I spoke with, however, especially the
    women, told me personal stories of rape, senseless beatings,
    and massacres by the Janjaweed and Sudanese militias. I was
    deeply impressed with the dedication of the African Union
    peacekeepers operating under extremely difficult circumstances
    and urged international partners, including the United States,
    to better equip them. I was shocked to learn they were getting
    a little of a dollar a day. It was absurd.
        I went to Condoleezza Rice upon my return and said,
    ``Please, we've got to augment that. We've got to increase it.
    These soldiers are putting their lives on the line. They should
    not be so grossly underpaid and not getting the kind of things
    that they need in terms of munitions.''
        In November 2005, I chaired another hearing in a series on
    Sudan and was absolutely clear that the situation in Darfur was
    a genocide. At that time, over 400,000 killed and over a
    million displaced. We did stress, all of us, at that hearing
    the need for a comprehensive plan that could best contribute to
    peace and hold those who have murdered, raped, enslaved, and
    plagued the people of Sudan accountable.
        Meanwhile, Chairman Henry Hyde, Donald Payne, who was my
    ranking member from New Jersey, Frank Wolf, Tom Lantos, and a
    number of others, we pushed the Darfur Peace and Accountability
    Act that declared that the slaughter in Darfur was genocide,
    imposed sanctions on the malign actors, talked about helping
    the peacekeepers. And it was signed into law in October 2006.
    That law was built upon the Sudan Peace Act of 2001 and the
    Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004.
        I also, and I wasn't the only one, called on the Arab
    League to leverage its influence over the Sudanese government
    by encouraging the government to end its military offensive in
    Darfur and accept the United Nations peacekeeping which was
    there under the auspices of the AU. They didn't do it. It was
    like crickets. We got almost no response at all other than
    thank for raising it. So here we are again.
        In January 2017, again on this committee, I objected to the
    Obama administration's decision to ease sanctions on Sudan. I
    know it had to have been a tough call. We're always trying to
    look when the sanctions become counterproductive, so there was
    an argument to be made. But I thought it was the wrong one
    because Khartoum's government continued pervasive human rights
    violations. And we pointed out, at the time the violent
    government actions against the Sudanese citizens in Darfur,
    Nubia, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile, alongside the
    persecution of Christians nationwide.
        I was also disappointed in 2024 by the decision to allow
    Sudanese warlord Abdel Fattah al-Burhan into the country for a
    meeting with the U.N. Secretary-General. Burhan, as we all
    know, has massive amounts of blood on his hands and should
    never have been allowed into the U.S.
        Yet the Biden administration delayed and denied robust
    sanctions against both Burhan and Hemedti, delaying such
    actions until the administration's final hours. While we were
    glad when they did it, but we believe, I believe, and many of
    us believe it should've been done sooner. There will never be
    peace in Sudan until there's accountability for the atrocities
    committed by the twin butchers of Darfur.
        Over 18,000 civilian deaths have been committed since 2023,
    with estimates as high as 150,000, and more than 10 million
    people displaced. These are not just numerical estimates. But
    it's the evidence of an appalling range of harrowing human
    rights violations and international crimes. Each murder or
    displaced civilian is a person with dreams and hopes, family--a
    person whose life has been taken or irrevocably changed by
    these atrocities.
        Both the Sudanese Armed Forces, SAF, and the Rapid Support
    Forces, RSF, are guilty of arbitrary killings, detentions,
    abductions, rapes--including the rape of children--repression
    of fundamental human rights, illicit gold mining, and child
    solider recruitment.
        Illicit Sudanese gold, which the RSF struggles--smuggles, I
    should say, through the UAE is crucial to preventing the
    continued funding of Hemedti's atrocities and perpetuating this
    bloody conflict. The RSF's main international backer is widely
    reported to be the UAE, which has supplied weapons and
    financial support. Other external actors, such as Chad, have
    been accused credibly of enabling arms transfers and have been
    implicated in supporting the RSF.
        Domestically, the RSF has allied with some of non-RSF
    Janjaweed militias. It is clear that RSF is grappling with
    command and control, however, allowing its fighters to rape and
    to pillage, to target vulnerable women and children, and to
    attack civilian infrastructure. This is the opposite of capable
    government, and such behavior only confirms this to the
    Sudanese people.
        The SAF has received support from various domestic groups
    including the al-Bara Battalion--known as the Popular
    Resistance--which openly espouses a militant Islamist ideology,
    and former rebel groups including the Sudan Liberation Movement
    under Minni Minnawi and Mustafa Tambour. Externally, the SAF
    has received support from countries like Egypt, Iran, Qatar,
    and Turkey. Russia continues to pursue naval access to Port
    Sudan.
        I'd like to now welcome my distinguished colleague, Ms.
    Jacobs, for any opening comments that you have.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SARA JACOBS

        Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith, and thank you
    to all of our witnesses joining us today to testify and bring
    attention to the ongoing catastrophe in Sudan. Last month
    marked 2 years since the outbreak of war in Sudan. It is now
    the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Nearly 25 million
    people--half of Sudan's population--are facing acute hunger,
    and more than half a million people are facing famine. More
    than 13 million Sudanese have been displaced from the homes
    since the conflict began, including nearly four million people
    forced to flee across Sudan's borders as refugees. And I have
    seen the suffering firsthand when I traveled to Chad and met
    with Sudanese refugees last year.
        And let's be clear: this is a war of choice. The Rapid
    Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied
    militias have waged this war, committing war crimes and holding
    the Sudanese people captive for their own selfish interests.
    And their external backers, particularly the United Arab
    Emirates with their support to the RSF, in addition to Egypt,
    Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia, have turned this war
    into a regional proxy war by supporting and arming either side,
    risking further regional destabilization.
        But despite this, the Trump administration is nowhere to be
    found. In fact, the administration's actions have only worsened
    the suffering of the Sudanese people. The Trump
    administration's sham foreign assistance review was really just
    a pretext to end most foreign assistance--like food aid,
    disaster relief, global health programs, development and
    economic aid, and more. In Sudan, it's meant canceling millions
    of dollars in U.S.-funded life-saving aid. For instance, before
    it was illegally dismantled, USAID was supporting the heroic
    efforts of the Sudanese Emergency Response Rooms to open
    community kitchens and provide basic meals to Sudanese
    civilians throughout the country. Following the massive cuts to
    U.S. foreign assistance, which included USAID support to the
    ERRs, more than 80 percent of the roughly 1,500 community
    kitchens across Sudan have been forced to close their doors--
    cutting of vulnerable Sudanese civilians from life-saving food
    assistance.
        And the administration hasn't stopped there. Yesterday,
    they announced over $87 million worth of canceled humanitarian
    programs, including $30 million for emergency nutrition, water,
    and food aid in Darfur. The SAF and the RSF continue to commit
    atrocities against the Sudanese people, and the people of
    Darfur are facing a second genocide in 20 years at the hands of
    the RSF. Yet despite the clear need for the United States to
    play an active role in negotiations to end this brutal
    conflict, the Trump administration has failed to dedicate the
    resources necessary to do so.
        More than 4 months into President Trump's term, the
    administration has still failed to nominate an Assistant
    Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs at the State
    Department, an NSC Senior Director for Africa, or a Special
    Envoy for Sudan--a position that the administration is required
    to fill by law. And just yesterday, during Secretary Rubio's
    testimony, he actually refused to say the word genocide and
    reaffirm his previous statements that the RSF is in fact
    committing a genocide.
        These actions--or lack thereof--show that Sudan is just not
    a priority for the Trump administration. And while the
    administration ignores the conflict and its human consequences,
    it chooses instead to provide weapons to the UAE--a country
    that is arming the RSF, fueling the war, and facilitating a
    genocide in Darfur. There is widespread and credible reporting
    that the UAE continues to funnel arms to the RSF, even though
    the UAE continues to deny this publicly. But instead of
    pressuring the UAE to stop arming the RSF forces currently
    carrying out a genocide, the Trump administration has chosen to
    blow through a congressional hold by Ranking Member Meeks and
    proceed with arms sales worth more than $1 billion.
        Just as I did under the Biden administration, I believe
    that the United States needs to use its significant leverage
    with the UAE to pressure them to finally end their support to
    the RSF. That is why I, along with Ranking Member Meeks,
    introduced Joint Resolutions of Disapproval last week to block
    the administration's arms sales to the UAE. If the United
    States wanted to, we could take tangible actions and make
    sensible policy decisions that would help bring an end to the
    war in Sudan and a sustainable peace agreement that ends
    military rule, establish a civilian government, and provides a
    clear roadmap to democratic elections. Instead, this
    administration seems to be ignoring the problem and selling
    weapons that are fueling genocide, war crimes, crimes against
    humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
        The Sudanese people have suffered enough. It is time for
    the United States and the international community to step up
    and focus on bringing an end to this war so that the Sudanese
    people can finally rebuild their country. Thank you, Chairman
    Smith, and with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. We are very pleased to welcome a distinguished
    panel of experts to provide insights on the ongoing crisis in
    Sudan and its far reaching consequences before us today. We
    look forward to your recommendations in terms of policy. I do
    believe the Secretary of State said both before the Senate and
    before our Committee in answer to questions that he would
    welcome a special envoy.
        We have a sense of the Congress resolution because it is
    required by law to do just that. I know that special envoys and
    the key as you mentioned a moment ago, Ken Isaacs, he has to
    have--or she--direct access to the President. It has to be. It
    can't go through a bureaucracy and it ends up on somewhere over
    in Foggy Bottom.
        We got to have that kind of access. And I'll never forget
    how well a person like Senator Danforth did who had the
    gravitas and the ability to promote peace. Of course, peace
    remains elusive, but he did an amazing job, I thought at the
    time, and as did some of the others at this job.
        So I do think that's something that is evolving and will
    happen. It should've happened yesterday. But it will happen, I
    believe.
        So let me introduce first of all Ken Isaacs who's vice
    president of Programs and Government Relations at Samaritan's
    Purse. Mr. Isaacs brings over three decades of experience
    responding some of the world's worst and most urgent
    humanitarian crises from war zones to natural disasters. He's
    also former director of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster
    Assistance.
        So he knows how it works on the inside of our government,
    and I deeply appreciate that kind of expertise. He led relief
    efforts in response, for example, to the Indian Ocean tsunami,
    the Darfur crisis before. And I remember a whole group of us
    responded to the tsunami.
        If it wasn't for the work that was done by disaster relief,
    by our DART teams and everything else, so many more people
    who've died even though it was a quick--I mean, I never saw
    anything like it. And we had a bipartisan group who went to Sri
    Lanka and other places. So thank you for that leadership. It's
    extraordinary.
        We're going to hear from Cameron Hudson, Senior Fellow of
    the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies. Mr. Hudson has served at the highest
    levels of government, including as director for African affairs
    at the White House National Security Council and as Chief of
    Staff to multiple U.S. special envoys for Sudan. So what a
    perch you have in order to say what needs to be done. And thank
    you for that. He also led the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's
    Center for Prevention of Genocide.
        And then Ms. Kholood Khair, founder and director of
    Confluence Advisory. Ms. Khair is also the host and co-producer
    of Spotlight 249, Sudan's first English language political
    debate show created to engage a new generation in political
    discourse. I don't want to debate you, so thank you for being
    here.
        And please take as much time as you--there's no clock. We
    really need to hear what you've got to say. So I'd like to now
    recognize Mr. Isaacs.

                        STATEMENT OF KEN ISAACS

        Mr. Isaacs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
    Member Jacobs. This hearing has been long needed, and I'm
    grateful that even in spite of a late night that it was able to
    come together today. So I've been working in Sudan for 32
    years.
        I've had the privilege to know all of its leaders and seen
    the inner workings of much of as what has happened. When I look
    at Sudan today and I just want to ask the question, is Sudan in
    a crisis? Right now, it is near collapse on all levels:
    political, security, economic, social, humanitarian, health,
    food security, and infrastructure.
        This war has been going on since 2023, and it is
    essentially between two armed groups: the Sudan Armed Forces
    and a heavily armed militia group, the Rapid Support Forces,
    which it's worth noting were previously the Janjaweed in
    Darfur. And they were reformed under security reforms that in
    the Khartoum process I think in 2015 was when they really
    started upping their game. And that came with EU funding, and a
    lot of people don't dial into that.
        But nevertheless, it is an experiment that didn't work
    well. And today, they have come to the level where they have
    now challenged the Sudan Armed Forces. And there's a horrible
    civil war going on.
        The level of human suffering is horrible. Over 13 million
    people are displaced. Four million have fled to other nations.
    The death rate, as you said, is somewhere between 28 and
    150,000 people. I think those numbers are probably an
    understatement.
        Six hundred thirty-eight thousand are in Phase 5 IPC.
    Technically, they're in famine. And we proved that through a
    detailed statistical analysis which was submitted and reviewed
    by the Famine Review Committee. There's an additional 8.1
    million in Phase 4 food insecurity. That's near famine.
        It is has been--famine has been declared in both Darfur and
    South Kordofan states. And there's 17 additional locations at
    risk of falling into famine. And the total in all of that is
    24.6 million people are highly food insecure.
        I have seen the effects of famine on individuals,
    communities, and nations. And the one point that I would point
    out about Sudan, it is totally a manmade failure. It is a
    manmade famine.
        And last year what we started seeing in March--well,
    actually it was, yes, last year--hundreds of thousands of
    people were pouring into Kordofan State. And they were coming
    into a State that had a 41 percent decrease in crop production.
    But why were they coming there? They were coming there to get
    away from the fighting that was going on in the RSF attacked
    areas.
        I know this because we had staff there. We interviewed
    them. It was a very exhaustive process. It took about 4 months.
    And those people's lives were in immediate risk. I have some
    photographs here. I don't know if it's attached to the paper.
    But this is what the famine looks like. These are photographs
    that the staff at Samaritan's Purse took, and this is rampant.
    These are just two pages of photographs. I have hundreds of
    them.
        The Janjaweed was formed around the early 2000's by
    President Bashir as a way to control insurgency in Darfur. What
    they are known for is chaos, brutality, and savagery, killing.
    They're a very brutal force.
        And that DNA has been carried over to some extent in the
    Rapid Support Forces today. Their mandate has always remained
    the same, although their geographical assignments have been
    reassigned from time to time. The current civil war has seen
    the RSF position itself against this very State that created
    it.
        I would concur with you on the command and control of the
    RSF. I think that it is so shaky that even if they entered into
    a peace agreement, it's not likely that they can enforce it,
    even with the best intentions. And as you know, tribesmen have
    come all the way across the Sahel and joined the fighting.
        And I don't see any structure for pay other than whatever
    you can get is yours. So it's a very, very chaotic situation.
    What we have noticed also over the last 2 years is that when
    you look at maps of displaced people and refugees, they flow
    out of the RSF areas and they're going to SPLM north area and
    then they'll go into SAF areas when those areas are won back.
        In September of last year, I had an idea. We identified
    this one area in western Kordofan. It's in the written
    testimony. But the malnutrition rate in households was upwards
    of 50 percent.
        And kids were dying. People were dying. They were starving
    to death. We had people that had eaten grass to the point where
    the raw grass couldn't be digested and it had ripped through
    their organs and they were dying.
        We came up with the idea of air dropping food. And it was
    that desperate of a situation. I had the opportunity to meet
    with President Salva Kiir, and I asked him if he would talk to
    General Burhan and ask for permission. He did 2 days later.
    Burhan agreed, and that led to a protracted negotiation.
        It took us about three or 4 weeks. There were trips to Port
    Sudan, trips to Juba. In the end, we had a written agreement
    for 30 days to fly planes from Juba with food and air drop that
    food in what's called Julud and Kadugli.
        It was challenging, but the program went well. At the end
    of 30 days, the parties came together and we extended it 60
    more days. And in the end, we air dropped 2,502 tons of food.
        I will have to say that humanitarian access was fully given
    by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and by the
    Sudan Armed Forces. Everybody abided by the agreement. The
    reason that I'm making this point is that agreements can be
    made.
        They are open to humanitarian access and at the same time
    have legitimate security concerns. When I was in Port Sudan,
    the government of Sudan asked me if I would go look at El-
    Gadarif which is a city over in the eastern part of Sudan.
    Gadarif was an interesting situation in that the population is
    normally 1.5 million.
        Displaced people fleeing the RSF fighting had come into the
    area and the population was three million. The obstetric
    hospital was full. We were seeing three to five patients in a
    bed.
        So we set up an emergency field hospital there. This is
    Samaritan's Purse and it was done with private money, not with
    any government money. And we treated thousands of people, and
    we were delivering a lot of babies and most of them by
    caesarian section. I think we delivered about 506, and we had
    9,149 patients and 562 babies.
        That work went very well. And I will have to say that
    government of Sudan was very supportive. And it was difficult
    getting visas and travel permit. And we're landing in Addis and
    it's electronic.
        And a lot of the frustrations that they had honestly were
    limited bandwidth. And I didn't realize that until I drove
    through Port Sudan 1 day by the Office of Immigration. There
    were over 2,000 people, I estimate, crammed into a little
    parking lot waiting to get into the building. And I realized
    they have stepped away from whatever their administrative
    infrastructure was in Khartoum when they fled that city.
        So the security and the humanitarian situation in Sudan is
    truly a crisis. And yes, an enormous amount of humanitarian
    assistance is needed. But the key issue is we cannot dig
    ourselves out of this hole or change this situation with
    humanitarian assistance. The war must stop.
        And that's going to require persistent, intentional,
    political involvement. And that is really what's needed is to
    do that. You mentioned a special envoy. I second that notion
    and I think it needs to be an envoy that has direct access to
    the President of the United States to carry any gravitas.
        Why should America be involved in Sudan? An interesting
    question, right? What's our interest there. I think that if our
    foreign policy is built around governance of democracy, human
    rights, and humanitarian assistance, we have a weak foreign
    policy.
        We need to have foreign policy that's more forward looking.
    And it needs to be transactional to the extent that we have
    some business relations. We have other relations besides
    wagging our finger and telling people what to do.
        When I met with General Burhan, he was very clear. He was
    expressly clear. He wanted American businesses to come to
    Sudan. He wanted American businesses to help on the Red Sea. He
    wanted American businesses in his petroleum and his mineral
    extraction industries. And he didn't pull any bones about it.
    He just said it directly.
        When I look at the Red Sea and I think of real eState,
    location, location, location, the Red Sea is not so wide. On
    the other side are people that we're attacking right now,
    Houthis, because they're destabilized in that whole region. I
    think the argument could easily be made that anywhere on the
    Red Sea is of strategic value.
        The Russians are setting up some kind of military base. The
    Iranians have been there. This is north of Port Sudan. I don't
    know what those details are. But if the United States isn't
    involved, then it's a vacuum.
        I think that if we find a way to be involved and I think
    that we should find a way to be involved, I think it would be
    good. I have not seen sanctions work in North Korea, in Cuba,
    in Iran. They're just not working that good.
        And I think that we need to find a new way to bring peace
    to Sudan. And that is not going to happen if we don't have
    serious diplomatic intervention. That's the end of my words.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Isaacs follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Smith. Mr. Hudson.

                      STATEMENT OF CAMERON HUDSON

        Mr. Hudson. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member
    Jacobs, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on
    Africa, thank you for having me participate in today's hearing.
    It's an honor to be here, and I commend the subcommittee for
    focusing on this urgent and evolving challenge. And in
    particular, I want to thank both the chairman and the ranking
    member for you long history on this issue and for doing what
    you have done in recent months to shine a light on the drivers
    of this conflict.
        The views I express today are my own and should not be
    attributed to the Center for Strategic and International
    Studies, my employer. And I would like to request that the full
    text of my testimony be submitted for the record.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Hudson. Thank you. As the title of today's hearing lays
    bare the ongoing crisis in Sudan is indeed dire and is
    worsening by the day. Now into its third year, we see in full
    relief the consequences of a distracted, disjointed, and anemic
    international response.
        We are faced with a conflict in which no corner of the
    country is safe for civilians where battle lines now shift by
    the hour, where every single neighboring country is playing a
    role by both bearing the costs and reaping the rewards from
    this conflict, where civilians are sacrificial pawns in a game
    between generals and ambitious regional states, and where
    horrific humanitarian conditions now threaten the lives of more
    people that the fighting itself.
        Two months ago, Sudan's army retook the Presidential palace
    in central Khartoum, signaling what many of us hoped would be a
    turning point in this war by retaking control of the capital.
    But in a war marked by momentum shifts, these army gains gave
    been no sooner eroded and the very nature of this conflict
    transformed by the introduction of more advanced weaponry.
    Sudan is today an international arms bazaar, and the war itself
    has fully transformed into a battle for influence among a host
    of local and regional actors who seek economic, geopolitical,
    and strategic gain in the context of this war.
        This fight is existential for both sides, and we are seeing
    that both sides are prepared to do whatever it takes, ally
    themselves with whomever it takes, and purchase weapons from
    wherever they must in order to emerge victorious. To illustrate
    this point, in a matter of days this month, Sudan army drones
    purchased from Turkey bombed an RSF air base in Nyala, the
    capital of South Darfur State, reportedly killing as many as
    eight Emirati military officers along with mercenaries, local
    press reports, from Colombia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan.
    This is in addition to mercenaries that have been documented as
    fighting on the side of the RSF from Chad, Libya, Niger,
    Burkina Faso, and Mali.
        The following day, the RSF countered this attack 1,200
    kilometers--or sorry, miles away in Port Sudan using their own
    long distance and kamikaze drones, drones from China
    transferred via the UAE through a field hospital covering as a
    military base in eastern Chad. This was a sophisticated aerial
    operation requiring planning, coordination, and targeting
    between forces based hundreds of miles apart on specific
    targets inside a crowded city. These are skills that we know
    the RSF does not alone possess and demonstrates that this war
    is no longer a conventional ground campaign with predictable
    battle lines.
        As troubling as the conflict and its humanitarian
    consequences are inside the country, its suspension and
    ultimate resolution are unlikely to come from the belligerents
    themselves. The parties remain unwilling to engage each other
    directly. And for a host of reasons, there is currently no
    civilian leaders that have emerged with sufficient influence to
    govern a new transition.
        Instead, we must directly engage the regional parties who
    are supporting the two sides to advance their own political,
    economic, and strategic ambitions. There is no single country
    better placed to do this than the United States. And it isn't
    too late to add Sudan to our agenda.
        However, rather than appointing a Sudan envoy whose efforts
    are focused inside the country as some have suggested, we
    should also acknowledge where the power to end the fighting
    lies and realize that the Trump administration has already a
    fully staffed Middle East envoy team in place that is well
    positioned to take on this issue. As a first priority, the
    Trump administration must engage its allies in the United Arab
    Emirates about de-escalating and suspending their support to
    the RSF. It strains credulity for the UAE to continue to deny
    any role in this conflict.
        But make no mistake. The UAE are not alone in fueling this
    fight. And while suspending their support is necessary, it is
    not a sufficient condition for ending the war. That's why the
    Trump team should initiate an honest conversation among all of
    our allies across the region about the risks and rewards they
    face in Sudan.
        Such a discussion would reveal that the United States, the
    UAE, and other regional actors active in Sudan like Egypt,
    Saudi Arabia, and Turkey harbor many of the same concerns and
    share similar interests in Sudan. Avoiding the country becoming
    a failed State, preventing Sudan from once again becoming a
    nexus for international terrorism, arresting a further
    degradation of Red Sea security, and avoiding a return of
    Islamist leaders to a position of authority in the country. I
    believe these are all shared concerned among regional allies.
        The people of Sudan deserve to see their democratic
    aspirations supported and the promise of their popular
    revolution fulfilled. But that conversation is unlikely to
    succeed until the guns go silent and those fueling this war are
    made to understand that an absolute military victory is simply
    not possible. If Washington does not use its influence that it
    has and initiate a de-escalatory dialog with the region
    quickly, we will be left with little choice but to begin
    preparing a containment strategy for the forces that will
    surely lead to the breakup of Africa's third largest country.
    Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hudson follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much. Without objection, your
    full statement as you asked, and same with Mr. Isaacs and Ms.
    Khair.
        The floor is yours.

                       STATEMENT OF KHOLOOD KHAIR

        Ms. Khair. Thank you very much. Chairman Smith, Ranking
    Member Jacobs, honorable members of the African Subcommittee,
    good morning. I know you've all had a very long time, and your
    presence here this morning is a testament to your commitment to
    Sudan. And for that especially I thank you. I also like to
    thank your staff for their efforts in keeping Sudan on this
    committee's agenda.
        Congress has been a vital champion for the people of Sudan.
    Throughout decades of Islamist rule under dictator Omar al
    Bashir through the revolution and the transitional period and
    was quick to condemn the 2001 coup that derailed the path to
    democracy and put Sudan on a trajectory toward this devastating
    war. In the interest of time, I'll be summarizing the points in
    my statement already submitted to the committee and will focus
    on humanitarian situation and atrocities.
        This hearing comes at a crucial time. I think we all
    recognize that. Sudan is now the world's largest humanitarian,
    hunger, displacement, and protection crisis all at once.
        This apocalyptic situation is caused by the counter
    revolutionary war led by factions of Bashir's security regime,
    now at war with each other. As the heirs of Bashir, the
    Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces are using
    every tool in the Bashir playbook, including ethnic
    mobilization, genocide, the use of chemical weapons, and the
    policy of starvation as a weapon of war to capture the leaders
    of Bashir's lucrative security State and position themselves to
    decide the political and economic future of Sudan. They're
    currently incentivized by their ambitions, their foreign
    backers, and the domestic political constituencies, in
    particular, the broad church of Sudan's Islamists to keep the
    war going for as long as possible in the hopes of eroding the
    calls for democracy, accountability, and civilian rule.
        All the while, humanitarian needs continue to mount, and
    Sudan is potentially facing another failed agricultural season.
    Famine, announced months ago, has not had the required
    international or national response. This is in great part
    because the Sudanese Armed Forces denies there even is a famine
    and the Rapid Support Forces has systematically destroyed hard-
    won harvests and looted food stocks.
        International community response has been criminally woeful
    with the UN's humanitarian response only 13 percent funded, 1-
    3. To make matters worse, the UN's inexplicable decision to
    treat the Sudanese Armed Forces as a de facto authority has
    made the entire international humanitarian system complicit in
    the starvation campaign that the SAF continues to wage. The
    deference has not paid off.
        Access blocks, movement restraints, holding up of permits,
    all hallmarks of the Bashir playbook are all being used to
    devastating effect during this war with only few exceptions.
    The only bright spot has been the volunteered humanitarian
    response rooms--emergency response rooms, excuse me, and other
    mutual aid groups who are not only providing the lion's share
    of the humanitarian response in terms of providing food,
    medicine, safe spaces, and evacuations. But they're doing so
    with far fewer resources and under immense repression from both
    warring parties.
        The U.S. has been the largest humanitarian donor in Sudan,
    and the generosity of the American people has quite literally
    kept people and hope alive. With little clarity around what
    U.S. foreign assistance will look like after September in
    particular with the shuttering of USAID, there will be greater
    crisis and potential cliff edge in terms of funding. The
    lifesaving work of these responders could see clinics and
    community kitchens, a lifeline for so many, close if no new or
    alternative funding is secured.
        This war has also seen many atrocities committed by both
    sides characterize much of the violence that we're seeing. The
    RSF, an entity created by Bashir's regime to violently clear
    people of land and to commit genocide has been doing exactly
    that. In West Darfur alone, the RSF have committed acts of
    genocide not once but twice against the Masalit ethnic group.
        The RSF have also run campaigns of terror, rape, sexual
    slavery in Central Sudan. And recent testimony from the ground
    points to the systematic targeting of men and boys based on
    ethnic identity. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces has been
    enacting systematic campaigns of indiscriminate bombings, often
    targeting civilians with reports the use barrel bombs of
    summary executions. And the U.S. Government has concluded the
    use of chemical weapons.
        Neither party has ever faced justice for doing all of this
    before and that decades long impunity continues to directly
    drive atrocities today. All of this has been facilitated by the
    steady gold for weapons pipeline that has gone into hyper drive
    since April 2023 with ever more sophisticated weapons appearing
    in Sudan. Ground reporting from Darfur, especially Nyala,
    capital of South Darfur, points to flights likely delivering
    material to the RSF often going through Uganda, Kenya, and
    Chad.
        Recent research and flight tracker information shows that
    northern Somalia and Somaliland have also become transit
    points. All flights appear to come from the United Arab
    Emirates. Both frequency and volume of these has increased.
        The UAE's patronage of the RSF has drawn in Turkey, Qatar,
    Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in support of the SAF with deepening
    rifts between these middle powers manifesting in their support
    to conflict parties in the greater Horn of Africa with huge
    destabilizing potential. As Cameron mentioned, recently we saw
    an escalation in the drone attacks on both Nyala and Port
    Sudan. For me, the most important part of this is that we have
    seen foreign actors directly fire upon each other with Turkish
    Bayraktar drone operators firing on Nyala and the UAE firing
    directly back on these Turkish Bayraktar drone operators and
    injuring some of them.
        This shows a severe and very marked escalation in Sudan
    following from last year's escalation between reportedly
    Egyptian military actors and the UAE as well. So we're seeing
    an escalation here with no signs of abating. Middle powers, in
    particular the UAE, need to be pressured to do business
    differently in Sudan as well as the border region.
        Ending this war requires political agreements in place
    across all three levels of conflict: the local, the national,
    and the regional and international. This must take place within
    a framework that guides Sudan toward civilian governance, a
    system that could finally discourage competition for power
    through the gun. It is clear that this war represents something
    of an end of an arch of history.
        Bashir's regime is consuming itself while trying to survive
    this war of succession. In the meantime, many more RSFs are
    being created. What comes next depends entirely on how this war
    is resolved with a view toward justice, reform, and civilian
    rule or more impunity and power sharing.
        What Sudan's history shows that there is no military
    victory likely, and that given the right conditions, all wars,
    even ones on this scale, end in a political agreement. So what
    can be done? I'd like to highlight two recommendations.
        The first is for Congress to continue to put pressure on
    the UAE as it continues to supply weapons to the RSF using
    their genocidal campaigns. Other U.S. allies in the region such
    as Turkey and Egypt are responsible for weapon sales to the
    Sudanese Armed Forces should also be pressured to stop flooding
    Sudan with weapons that are used in targeting civilians and
    that myriad militias can use to wage their violent campaigns.
    The U.S. must show diplomatic leadership instead of ceding
    ground to its predatory allies in the Gulf.
        This will require, amongst other things, a high level White
    House envoy to take the lead on Sudan to speak directly on
    behalf of the President with Gulf leaders. That's the only kind
    of level of envoy that they will respect, deconflicting their
    interest and working with others to institute a holistic and
    inclusive political process that can pave the way for viable
    cease-fire talks.
        Second and especially in light of the humanitarian and
    protection issues we've been discussing today, predictable and
    sustained funding for lifesaving work to mutual aid groups is
    imperative. Programming for youth groups in Sudan's war
    affected regions is also key, lest the war be the only
    industry. Supporting nonpartisan media is also critical,
    particularly in efforts to counter hate speech.
        And finally, I'd like to ask this council to continue
    championing the wishes of the civilians in Sudan who wish to
    see a Sudan free from the scourge of war and with a political
    system that stops the continuous destructive cycle of war,
    death, disease, and conquest. Thank you for the opportunity to
    brief you today. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Khair follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony and for
    your leadership. I have a few questions, I'll yield to my
    colleague, then might have some additional questions as well.
        Mr. Cameron--Hudson I should say, Cameron Hudson--your
    point that we're now into the third year and we see the full
    relief consequences of a distracted, disjointed, and anemic
    international response. We're faced with a conflict where no
    corner of the country is safe for civilians, where battle lines
    now shift by the hour, where every single neighboring country
    is playing a role. What can be done to put a tourniquet on?
        I mean, it's been 3 years. I mean, my distinguished
    colleague, John James, who was our chairman of the committee in
    the last Congress got a very important resolution passed, H.
    Res. 1328. It was totally bipartisan.
        It condemned the RSF and SAF atrocities, called for an end
    to the war which is obvious. It urged the U.S. to take
    immediate steps at the U.N. Security Council to document the
    atrocities, support community-based organizations, and support
    tribunals to hold the RSF accountable. I'm not sure how much of
    that was done by this Biden--or now Trump is there. But he's
    only been there a few short months.
        We're hoping this hearing and the fact that our Secretary
    of State who is tasked with so many jobs and is building out
    his own bureaucracy as we meet here. He has a lot of people he
    needs to get in place. But time is of the essence.
        So it's been 3 years since you pointed out where maybe more
    could've been done. So I like when you said we need--there's a
    desperate need of reinvigoration of a policy. And I think this
    is the perfect time for all of us to do that.
        I know that when the Secretary of State testified before
    the Senate and before the house, he was very clear that they
    are talking to UAE. As a matter of fact, my senator, Senior
    Senator from New Jersey, Senator Booker pointed out that UAE is
    a vital ally to the U.S. And then he asked questions about what
    we're doing.
        And Senator Rubio said, we have expressed to UAE and other
    countries that they are turning it, Sudan, into a proxy war and
    destabilizing the region that threatens to spill over and make
    it worse. We obviously have to do more. And your very specific
    recommendations on what more we need to be doing will be very
    helpful.
        I think you've done some of it, maybe a lot of it in your
    testimoneys which we'll study very carefully, all of us. But I
    think this has to be the pivot point. If not, as you pointed
    out, by the hour more people will die. More people will be
    maimed and abused.
        And at some point, it becomes even harder to put it all
    back together again because of the trauma and the PTSD and all
    the rest that follows such atrocities. So Mr. Hudson, if you
    want to start, and then I'll go to our two distinguished
    colleagues.
        Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's obviously a tall
    order what more can be done. I think where I have focused my
    attention right now is as this war has evolved over the course
    of 3 years and as I reflect back on some of the initiatives of
    the Biden administration, right, I think we had a very
    traditional approach with respect to a special envoy for Sudan
    under the Biden administration.
        We've had over a dozen special envoys in the past 25 years
    for Sudan. So this is not a new exercise for the United States.
    But I think we have to think differently about how we approach
    this diplomatically at this stage of the war.
        We saw a special envoy last year, last summer, initiate
    what looked like a kind of traditional peace process or the
    beginnings of a peace process, trying to bring the parties
    around the table, trying to support civilian voices in the
    diaspora as an alternative to military rule. And I think that's
    a formula that we have used before in Sudan. But I don't think
    that this conflict is right now ripe for that kind of
    traditional resolution.
        I think we have to focus on the drivers of this conflict
    outside of the country. There are a host of problems and a host
    of drivers inside the country that go back decades. They go
    back generations that need to be resolved around the role of
    the State, governance, ethnicity, militarism, corruption, you
    name it, right? And Kholood talked a little bit about that this
    is the last gasp of the Bashir regime that are playing out in
    this country right now.
        But I think we have to focus at least from a U.S.
    perspective because we're talking to the U.S. Congress and
    we're talking about recommendations to the U.S. Government. I
    think the U.S. Government has a unique position to influence
    the regional actors in a way that no one else does right now,
    right? And I think that focusing on all of the states in the
    region that are playing a role, they are benefiting from this.
        It is also costing them because when you look at the
    refugee situation in places like Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan,
    it is a burden--Chad, it is a burden on those countries. But
    elites in those countries are also benefiting from smuggling
    from this war. And so I think we can use our influence to focus
    on these regional actors in ways that we haven't done before.
    And I think that having worked on Sudan since the days of John
    Danforth and all the way through more recent envoys.
        I can say that 10 years ago, 20 years ago, we would not
    have been discussing the role of Egypt, of Saudi Arabia, of
    UAE. They were not a part of the conversation a decade ago,
    right? A decade ago, I traveled with President Bush to New
    York.
        He convened an international summit around the CPA and
    about the secession of South Sudan. He convened an
    international summit as did President Obama about the genocide
    in Darfur. There was a moment when the United States used its
    position on the world stage to convene the international
    community around the challenges that the world faced in Sudan.
        I think there is the opportunity for that kind of
    leadership from the United States. I don't know that it needs
    to be at the United Nations. I think that it could be within a
    group of Arab states and regional states within Africa and the
    Arab world that convene around this conversation.
        And as I said in my testimony, I think we have to
    acknowledge that all of these countries actually have
    legitimate concerns with the outcome of this war in Sudan. This
    is their region. This is their backyard.
        I think that they are, in many ways, undertaking the wrong
    set of policies to ensure that their interests are met. But I
    think that rather than, as Ken said, scolding countries for
    having these interests, I think we have to acknowledge that
    they do have these interests and acknowledge that we actually
    have shared interests in avoiding a worst case scenario in
    Sudan. Yes, there will be things about the future governance of
    the country that we don't agree on.
        But I don't think that we can allow that to presuppose how
    we end this war, right? And I think we have to think about
    ending this war in stages. And I think we can all agree that we
    want a civilian democratic government to emerge from the ashes
    of this conflict. But until we can get to the ashes of this
    conflict, until we can end the fighting and silence the guns, I
    think it is premature to put out a resolution for some kind of
    civilian governance that is, I think, at least in the medium
    term, if not in the short term.
        Mr. Smith. Ken.
        Mr. Isaacs. I agree with Cameron. I think that you're
    looking at a society that has been ruled by militants. It's
    rule by militants right now. And anybody that comes to power is
    not going to have success if they don't have the respect and
    the ability to contain the military to some extent. So what
    this may mean is that there will have to be a transition from
    the type of governance that it has now to the type of
    governance that can be seen in the future. But the No. 1 thing
    I believe everyone should keep their eye on, end the war, find
    a way to stop the war.
        I think bringing a regional confluence of people together
    to share their views, see what their interests are, and use our
    political clout, this is one of the things that I think is
    actually good about the development portfolio of USAID being
    moved into the State Department. These kind of things are
    uniquely political. And the State Department is going to be
    better prepared to handle those than outside negotiators. So
    end the war. End the war.
        Mr. Smith. Ms. Khair, before you go to that, if you could
    also speak to you obviously pointed out, as did our other
    witnesses, this is the world's worst humanitarian crisis,
    world's worst hunger crisis. And you did point out and testify
    that the suffering is not incidental and that the starvation is
    being used as a weapon of war. And this isn't the first time.
        Mengistu used it in Ethiopia with unbelievably telling
    effect. Even Aliyev with Nagorno-Karabakh used it in his
    genocide against the Armenians just recently. I convened a
    hearing right in this room where we had a prosecutor from the
    ICC say this is genocide.
        They're using food as a weapon and wiping these people off
    the map either by moving out of Nagorno-Karabakh or killing
    them. And then now we're seeing it happen again, so your
    thoughts. And again, when Mr. Isaacs, you point out that there
    are 24.6 million people that are food insecure, 8.1 million in
    IPC Phase 5, technically famine, and 638,000, they went to 5,
    8.1 million in Phase 4.
        I mean, these numbers are just atrocious, and it didn't
    happen overnight. It's been growing over the last 3 years or
    maybe longer, but at least 3 years. But if you could speak to
    food as a weapon.
        Ms. Khair. Yes, I'm happy to do that. I think one thing to
    note is that it's not the first time this has happened in Sudan
    either. Both Cameron and Mr. Isaacs will remember that this
    happened--the Sudanese Armed Forces and the government in
    Khartoum uses it very effectively in what is now South Sudan,
    in Darfur, and Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains and other parts of
    Kordofan.
        So this is a very tried and tested policy by the
    authorities in Sudan to effectively kill as many people for as
    little amount of money as possible. But it's cost money.
    Starvation does not.
        There's another part of this which is the Sudanese Armed
    Forces in particular with their authorities in Port Sudan are
    using the limiting of aid as a way to assert a level of
    sovereignty, as a way to assert a level sort of governmentality
    in the eyes of the international community. It is by limiting
    access to different parts of the country. It is by limiting
    aid. It is by limiting visas. It is by limiting permission.
        They're able to assert the sovereignty. They're not able to
    share the sovereignty in any other way, certainly not in terms
    of responsibility. The RSF, of course, have been doing what
    they've always done which is rape, pillage, and steal.
        And so we have here in Sudan currently no entity that is
    actually wanting to keep people alive. Unfortunately, other
    than the groups I mentioned earlier, mutual aid groups and
    emergency response rooms. Now I think what is clear is that
    within the U.S. Government, actually, USAID understood this
    very well.
        USAID has had decades of engagement in Sudan where it has
    come to the position where it's able to identify who the main
    actors are, particularly in terms of not just aid provision but
    also democratic transformation and other key areas that we're
    speaking of today. My fear is that with USAID being shuttered
    that knowledge throughout the decades will be lost. And any new
    team particularly in the State Department may not have that
    level of knowledge that is frankly needed to be able to read
    the scene properly.
        I want to very quickly comment on what you said about the
    UAE and also a comment to what Cameron said. The idea that
    civilian rule is central to resolving the manifold issues in
    Sudan is not blue sky thinking. This is not about a kumbaya
    moment where we instill a civilian government for the sake of
    civilian government.
        Having a civilian government in Sudan is the most practical
    way of changing the structure of the government such that it is
    not through the gun that you compete for power but maybe
    through the ballot box. It is not by picking up guns that you
    get invited to the mediation table but by having a political
    agenda. Unless that formula is shifted very sharply, we're
    going to continue to see the proliferation of armed groups.
        Twenty, thirty years ago, Mr. Isaacs in particular will
    remember, there was only rebel movement in Sudan. But because
    of the way the peacemaking has been done, effectively rewarding
    those with the guns by asking them to come to the mediation
    table at the exclusion of civilian groups, it has created a
    negative incentive structure that allows only for the people to
    really be represented through carrying a gun and through having
    an armed movement rather than a civilian agenda. So I think we
    need to flip this on its head.
        And actually, now that this war has taken so much scope
    because it has reached every part of the country, this is the
    time to try to right that formula when it comes to--and correct
    that formula when it comes to how peacemaking is done in Sudan.
    So sequencing is going to be very important. I don't believe
    we're going to get a cease-fire that lasts in any way unless we
    figure out what the political issues are going to be, unless we
    get a political solution.
        And when it comes to the UAE but also Turkey, Saudi, Qatar,
    the UAE, these are all U.S. allies in the region. The U.S. is,
    as Cameron said earlier, uniquely positioned to engage. And I
    think unless that engagement happens, we're not going to get
    very far.
        They do agree on many things. Unfortunately, one of the
    many things they agree on is they don't want to see civilian
    government in Sudan. But I agree with Cameron. They're going
    about this the wrong way. The civilian is the sine qua non of
    peace in Sudan. Without civilian rule, you're not going to get
    any kind of lasting peace in Sudan.
        Mr. Smith. Just for the record, was the Biden
    administration as engaged in this as it should've been?
        Ms. Khair. I think the short answer is no. But at least
    what we did see was some level of engagement on the subject.
    Unfortunately, we haven't seen that under this administration.
    But I am confident that we will be able to see at least some
    movement, and this hearing is a really good indication of that.
        Mr. Smith. That's why we're having it. Thank you so very
    much. Ms. Jacobs.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you all so much. First of all, many of
    you know we had a very late night or early morning or whatever
    you want to call it of voting here in the House. And a couple
    of my colleagues were unable to make it here but wanted to make
    sure their statements and questions were entered in the record.
    So Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the
    record the statements of Representative Jayapal and
    Representative Olszewski.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. So thank you all for testifying on
    this incredibly important topic. And I commend the chairman for
    shining a light on the horrific war in Sudan that is not
    getting enough attention.
        I want to first turn to the dire humanitarian situation and
    highlight the heroic work Sudanese civilians have been doing in
    the absence of a functional government. Ms. Khair, you
    highlighted in your testimony the important work of the
    emergency response rooms. You just talked a little bit about
    them now along with other mutual aid groups who have been
    providing emergency assistance and other essential services at
    a fraction of the cost of international NGO's.
        Following Trump's draconian cuts to our foreign assistance,
    80 percent of the 1,460 emergency food kitchens have been
    forced to close. Ms. Khair, can you please explain to the
    committee why these kitchens were forced to close and the
    practical impacts of these closures?
        Ms. Khair. Thank you very much for the question. I think
    it's difficult to overState just how devastating the cuts were
    to these kitchens. And in part, it's because there hasn't been,
    unfortunately, enough of a shift internationally to
    understanding the value of these mutual aid groups.
        They're still very much sort of orthodoxy when it comes to
    delivering humanitarian aid through large INGO's or the United
    Nations, which for reasons I mentioned earlier particularly
    when they chose to make or chose to consider one of the main
    belligerent group, the de facto authorities, they are
    effectively self-limiting and unable to deliver in the ways
    that they are. The emergency response rooms and other groups
    that arose out of the pro-democracy movement are uniquely
    places because they are in communities to make these
    deliveries. But they have for three things.
        They've asked for recognition as humanitarian actors.
    They've asked for protection because they are being targeted by
    both warring parties. And they've asked for partnership when it
    comes to delivering aid.
        Now under the previous administration, there was a
    recognition of the unique role that they played. And there was
    a lot of engagement with trying to make sure that they're
    funded. But since the aid have come in sort of since February,
    we have seen an immediate closure of many kitchens in Khartoum,
    particular in other parties of the country.
        Because the way that these groups work is that they need
    little and often rather than huge sums of money as, for
    example, the U.N. might. And so when that sort of train of
    funding stops, of course it has an immediate effect. The
    difficulty now is though some of that has been switched back on
    and we have seen some aid be able to be delivered through these
    kitchens, the issue now is what happens after September.
        The issue now is when it comes to these supply lines that
    are very urgently needed, especially in relation to healthcare
    and medicine, how do you maintain that when you don't know
    what's going to happen in the next few months. We're also
    seeing the supporting structure around these emergency response
    rooms, particularly in the INGO world and the U.N. also being
    impacted. Effectively, it's an industry-wide sort of sea change
    that is happening.
        And that ecosystem is going to be massively impacted. And
    it is people on the ground who are going to feel that first and
    foremost. I'd also like to make very briefly another comment
    which is that a lot of young people in Sudan, young people make
    up the majority of Sudan.
        So a lot of the majority of Sudan are invested in these
    groups, in these structures, as a way to basically sew back the
    fabric of this war. The social fabric of this war is being
    ripped apart by this war. If you take away that work, if you
    take away these structures, not only are you going to be
    impacting the ability for people to stay alive, but these
    groups, these young people may also find alternative ways to
    engage in this war.
        And those may be, in fact, quite severe. They might be
    quite violent. They may be drawn toward other ways in which to
    engage in this war. So I think it's really imperative that
    these structures are maintained.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I agree with you, and we'll keep
    fighting to get that funding. Mr. Hudson, as you laid out in
    your testimony, there's overwhelming evidence that the UAE is
    supplying the RSF with weapons that they are using to carry
    genocide in the Darfur region. Would you agree that there is
    evidence to suggest the UAE has provided weapons to the RSF
    without the consent of the original supplier?
        Mr. Hudson. I can't comment on the relationship that the
    UAE has China or what the end user agreement is. What I can say
    is that there is a U.N. arms embargo that exists that is nearly
    20 years old on weapons transfers into Darfur. And I think it's
    safe to say that the UAE is in violation of that U.N. arms
    embargo.
        The only other country whose weapons have reportedly been
    found in the possession of the RSF are weapons from the United
    States. These are reports from the ground. They have not been
    verified because we don't have access to those weapons.
        But there are local reports and anecdotal reports of U.S.
    weapons having been found. I would encourage this Congress to
    do what it can to investigate the provenance of those weapons,
    to work with Sudanese authorities or other authorities on the
    ground to get the serial numbers so that we can trace how those
    weapons came to be in Darfur and in the possession of the RSF.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Very concerning that there might be
    U.S. weapons involved in this. Given the role that the UAE is
    actively playing in supplying weapons to an armed group
    carrying out a genocide in violation of a U.N. arms embargo on
    Darfur with the potential that U.S. weapons are themselves
    implicated, do you think it is appropriate for the U.S. to be
    selling weapons to the UAE while they continue to support the
    RSF?
        Mr. Hudson. Again, I don't--I can't speak to our overall
    policy toward the UAE. What I would say is I'd frankly
    acknowledge what Secretary Rubio said yesterday and the day
    before which is we have a very full and complicated
    relationship with the UAE. We have a very full agenda with the
    UAE.
        And I think we have seen from the Biden administration over
    the past few years a rather pugnacious approach to the UAE. It
    did not move the needle with the UAE. I don't know a
    threatening approach to the UAE frankly is even reasonable from
    this administration.
        I think Secretary Rubio made it very clear. And we saw from
    the President's trip to the UAE just 10 days ago that there is
    a robust bilateral agenda. Will this administration decide to
    hold that bilateral agenda hostage to the UAE's support to
    Sudan or to the RSF? I doubt it.
        And so that's why in my testimony I suggest, I think, a
    more realist approach. It might not be the preferred approach
    or the more optimistic approach. But it is, I think, a realist
    approach to acknowledge that all of these countries in the
    region, whatever role they are playing, they have an interest
    in what happens in Sudan.
        They have an interest in the outcome. And to lay bare the
    facts of that and to not pretend that these countries are not
    playing a role and to not pretend that their interests in Sudan
    matter less than our interests. I think we need to acknowledge
    very openly and freely what these interests are and look for a
    way forward that is not necessarily punitive, that is not
    necessarily congratulatory, but that is honest and realistic.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And I think you're being a little
    diplomatic about the robust bilateral relationship when I think
    it's clear what President Trump is worried about is the 2
    billion dollar Emirati investment in his crypto company and the
    Trump Tower that will be built in Dubai. But Ms. Khair, same
    question to you. Do you think it's appropriate for the U.S. to
    be selling weapons to the UAE while they continue to support
    the RSF?
        Ms. Khair. I think Sudanese people should not be held
    hostage to any U.S. allies in the region, and that includes the
    United Arab Emirates. I think Cameron is right. I think that we
    are very aware. We have been very aware under the Biden
    administration but certainly now that this is bigger than
    Sudan.
        For the United States, it is about Israel. It's about the
    Red Sea. It is about other corridors. And Sudan in many ways is
    a very small part of that calculation. What I would urge is
    that the United States as a government system, including
    Congress but also the administration, really look at the price
    of its current engagement with its allies in the region.
        This is not just the United Arab Emirates, although that is
    the most acute case. But it's also the case with Egypt and
    Turkey as a NATO ally who are invested in this war. War is big
    business.
        Egypt is making a lot of money from Sudan, both through the
    gold and through the gum arabic that is smuggled there. The
    United Arab Emirates, of course, is making a lot of money from
    the gold but also keeping options around Red Sea influence
    open. There are a lot of countries involved in Sudan.
        I think of it much more as a globalized war rather than a
    civil war. And unless the United States as the key ally to all
    of these countries really sort of grapples with--and I agree
    with Cameron, honestly has an honest conversation with these
    countries about what their interests are, not just in Sudan.
    But we're seeing this play out in Somalia, in South Sudan, in
    Ethiopia. Unless there's an honest conversation about what this
    looks like, I don't think we're going to get very far in terms
    of actually making life easier and better for people in Sudan
    and elsewhere.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I think one of the important first
    steps is for the U.S. to actually use the leverage that we
    have. And as the biggest weapons seller to the UAE, I think
    that is very considerable leverage.
        And so Chairman Smith and any of my colleagues who are
    watching, I'd encourage you all to join my bill, the Stand Up
    for Sudan Act. That would block arms to UAE until they stop
    arming RSF as well as the joint resolutions of disapproval that
    Ranking Member Meeks and I just introduced that would block
    over a billion dollars in arm sales to the UAE. And I have them
    here, Chairman Smith, if you'd like to take a look. Thank you,
    I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. And Mr. Isaacs, you spoke
    about the emergency field hospital that at the request of the
    Sudan Ministry of Health you set up for 87 days, staffed by 93
    people, over 9,000 patients, delivered 562 babies. And you
    pointed out that's a neglected and vulnerable demographic,
    pregnant women and newborn children.
        Have there been other requests made? I mean, I think that's
    amazing that they would--not surprising, though, because they
    know that you go in--Samaritan's Purse goes in and just gets
    the job done and helps people who are most at risk, sick,
    disabled. Or in this case, the obstetric hospital you said had
    three to five women in each bed. I mean, that is overcrowding
    on--like, few of us can imagine. Yes, go ahead.
        Mr. Isaacs. So that particular hospital, the community
    population returned to normal as people started returning to
    safe areas. But I was with the president of our organization,
    Franklin Graham. We met with General Burhan.
        It was very interesting. General Burhan asked us, would we
    go to Khartoum and build a hospital? He's talking about a brick
    and mortar real hospital. And Franklin said, we would if you'd
    let it be a Christian hospital. And Burhan said, yes, that
    would be fine.
        And so internally, that is something that we're planning on
    doing. We're waiting for the security circumstance to allow it.
    But they have indicated to us that they will give us
    humanitarian access, where we need to go, where we want to go.
    And we look forward to doing more in the Sudan area.
        Mr. Smith. Let me ask you. You said in March, you met
    personally with the delegation in Sudan hosted by General
    Burhan. He made it expressly clear that he desired American
    involvement in his country.
        And I'm wondering for American business, diplomats, it's
    one thing. They eat, sleep, and breathe conflict and trying to
    mitigate conflict and problems. But businesses want to go in
    and sell the product or whatever. Was he talking about those
    kinds of opportunities too and others not realize that so long
    as there's this terrible conflict, it's almost impossible to
    have any kind of foreign investment?
        Mr. Isaacs. My perception and interpretation of what he was
    saying at that time was expressing a deeply rooted desire to
    see the American country get involved in his country, whether
    that involved business, whether that involved politics, whether
    that involved military, not from the perspective of fighting
    but military from the perspective of utilizing the port up
    north. But my sense was that he sees great advantage in
    American involvement. And he would like to see that kind of
    influence.
        In fact, we talked about when Chevron Oil left the country.
    I think it was probably around 1994, 1992. And there was some
    reflection on what would Sudan have been like today had that
    not happen.
        So I think he's very open. And specifically he said I don't
    want to buy things from the Russians and I don't want to buy
    things from Iran. I'd like to do business with America, but
    America won't do business with me.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. How would you assess that as an
    opportunity?
        Mr. Isaacs. Say it again.
        Mr. Smith. That is an opportunity.
        Mr. Isaacs. Oh, I think it's a clear opportunity. And I
    have to tell you having worked in Sudan for so long, I entered
    in South Sudan. Many times, I have been in caves, under rocks,
    and running from bombs coming from Sudan Armed Forces.
        I told General Burhan this. I have not been a fan of Sudan
    Armed Forces. I have been a responder to the carnage that has
    come about as an act of the war. When I look at the situation
    today and what's going on, I think the country needs stability.
    It needs security.
        And I only see one entity there right now until there's a
    transitionary period where there can be a civilian led
    government. And that's what I would ultimately advocate for.
    And I just don't see the command and control in the RSF for
    that to happen. I see the command and control for SAF to
    happen.
        And another interesting point that I will share with you is
    that the animosity coming from individual Sudanese citizens
    toward the RSF is enormous. The people that have been killed,
    the way that they were killed, the things that were stolen, the
    damage that has been done, I've never quite seen that kind of
    hardness of heart. And I just find it very hard to imagine the
    RSF would be able to add a lot of value at this point after
    what's happened.
        Mr. Smith. Let me ask you how would you assess the World
    Food Programs and other U.N. major organizations on the ground
    in Sudan today?
        Mr. Isaacs. Well, that's an interesting subject. I think
    all of the humanitarian actors on the ground could do more.
    There could be improvements in anybody's organizational
    structure.
        What I do know is that when we had the situation in
    Kordofan State in South Kordofan and West Kordofan, we engaged
    directly with the parties, negotiated the air bridge. And then
    we had other agencies coming to us saying, how did you get that
    air bridge? Can we use your air bridge? How did you do that?
        And we kept it as a muffled--we didn't talk about it
    publicly. But it was highly successful. So I think in the
    future when I need access into an area, I'll probably attempt
    to negotiate it on my own.
        Mr. Smith. Did any of you assess the risks that the
    humanitarian aid workers take by operating in theater? I
    remember a couple visits with Salva Kiir in Juba when his own
    forces made life miserable for humanitarian aid workers. Not
    only did some of his private military go--and these are the
    people that guard him--go and raid humanitarian stockpiles. But
    they also put people at grave risk. How big of a problem is
    that right now, especially with all the bloodletting that is
    going on?
        Mr. Isaacs. I would say, everybody will have their
    opinions. But I would say generally speaking errant and
    unacceptable behavior frequently happens in war zones. That's
    just part of the deal.
        You hope that doesn't happen. But the days of you have a
    white flag and you're protected because you're a humanitarian
    group, those days are gone. And I think practical down to earth
    negotiations with armed actors is required to gain access.
        And then you have to have trust in there. And that trust, I
    can tell you in Sudanese society, comes from building
    relationships. So you would think as a Christian you're not
    going to make any progress in Sudan, it's the Islamic Republic
    of Sudan.
        But that's not at all what I have found. What I have found
    is that by demonstrating integrity, doing what I say I'll do,
    not surprising them, having private conversations behind doors,
    and speaking your mind has built trust. And we enjoy good
    relationships there today with people on all sides of the
    conflict.
        Mr. Smith. Any of you want to respond to this? And the
    Sudanese authorities, why haven't they handed Bashir and other
    former officials wanted by the ICC over to the court? And we
    all recall that even when Bashir was planning on going to
    Turkey, Erdogan made it very clear that he would not honor the
    request which the EU was saying get him to the Hague for
    prosecution and then he didn't go.
        China does the exact same thing in terms of inability to in
    any way enforce the indictment by bringing him to the Hague.
    But why has no one else? I mean, why? Do we know?
        Mr. Hudson. I asked this very question of General Burhan in
    December. And I can tell you what he told me which was--I
    didn't accept the answer. But his response was that they wanted
    to try General Bashir in Sudan, that they wanted local justice.
        I made the point to him, and this was in the context of a
    conversation about the return of Islamist in the country, his
    reliance to some degree on Islamist militias to aid the SAF
    against the RSF and the concerning trend that I saw at the time
    and continue to see today that Islamists associated with the
    former regime would like to see their own return to power
    eventually and see it as a way back to power, kind of
    piggybacking on the army and becoming a useful instrument of
    the army. And so my demonstration--my request to him was to
    say, if you truly want to distance yourself from the former
    regime, if you truly want to demonstrate to the international
    community as you have said privately and publicly that you
    don't want to see the former regime return to power and that
    you want to put distance between the Army and those elements
    that the best way to do that to demonstrate to the world would
    be to turn President Bashir over to the ICC.
        And that would send a very clear signal. And his response
    was, well, we would prefer to try him at home. And I think
    reading between the lines, my interpretation of that was that
    General Burhan is in a very, very difficult position trying to
    consolidate his own power in the country, the power of the army
    in the country.
        And to a degree, he is responsive to and in need of support
    from those former regime elements. They are a distinct group,
    minority group but a distinct and powerful group in the
    country. And if he alienates them right now, then he risks
    seeing the fracturing of his own army. And so he is in a very
    difficult position, I think, with respect to Islamists. And
    that's why he has chosen not to kind of poke the bear and turn
    President Bashir over to the ICC.
        Mr. Smith. Yes, please. Of course.
        Ms. Khair. Thank you. I think the obvious answer is
    precedent. Burhan does not want to set a precedent as a head of
    State which is he says that's what he is, would be sent to the
    ICC less that same thing happen to him in due course.
        The other thing is that there was an opportunity for Burhan
    under the transitional period of 2019 to 2021 to try President
    Bashir. There was a sort of kangaroo court. I think they sort
    of had him indicted on financial charges rather than genocide
    and all the other serious charges which is basically the same
    as getting Al Capone on tax evasion.
        And what we're seeing here is there's no serious commitment
    to justice and accountability in Sudan in all levels, including
    from Burhan. The reliance on jihad groups, the reliance on the
    Islamist groups means that the decisions are not always resting
    solely with Burhan. And so I would push back a bit against what
    Mr. Isaacs is saying which is that Burhan will tell any
    interlocutor he faces what they want to hear to a great deal of
    extent.
        It's good to see that he's giving access to Samaritan's
    Purse. It's good to see that he's making these rhetorical
    commitments to supporting the work of Samaritan's Purse. And he
    says that he wants to get American businesses into the country,
    et cetera.
        I am sure that he's probably saying the same thing to the
    Russians. I am sure he's probably saying the same thing to the
    Iranians. This is how he keeps himself alive.
        President Bashir at the time did exactly the same thing.
    This is the same playbook playing out. I wouldn't put that much
    stock in it. But also the binary is not helpful, this binary
    between SAF and the RSF.
        We have to remember where these came from, Burhan and
    Hemeti. Twenty years ago, we're fighting hand in fisted glove
    against the people of Darfur. They were committing genocide
    together.
        This is not a case of two entirely distinct groups. There
    is a difference here without much distinction. And I think it
    would be very remiss of us not to bear that in mind. The RSF is
    today's enemy for the Sudanese Armed Forces.
        In the meantime, they are creating many RSFs through, for
    example, the Al-Bara' ibn Malik Brigade, the Jihadist Brigade,
    through, for example, the Sudan Shield group which is becoming
    stronger. They recently announced that they've grown in number.
    They have access to sophisticated weaponry.
        We're seeing the same thing that happened with the RSF play
    out there, in essence an ethnic militia as well. So there is an
    incentive here for Sudan Armed Forces to keep this playbook
    going because it allows them to justify military rule which is
    in the end their main objective. They want to stay in power.
        If there is peace in Sudan, why would you need a military
    government. So of course, you keep a war going. You couldn't
    justify your presence in government. WFP very quickly because I
    do want to make sure I speak about this.
        WFP has been very slow to evolve to the conditions on the
    ground. I'm very glad that Samaritan's Purse has been able to
    negotiate this access. I would love to see that sort of
    engagement being made available to other international actors.
        It would be great to see Samaritan's Purse, for example,
    work with WFP which is one of the few organizations despite
    their many failures to be able to buildup the scale that is
    required to respond to the humanitarian situation. So I think
    here we need to see less competition between different
    humanitarian deliverers and actually a lot more cooperation.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Throw out a few other questions and
    then any other questions that Ms. Jacobs might have. When you
    talk, Mr. Hudson, about the issue of doing a local court, ICC
    does not have a stellar track record of getting its man, even
    thought Bashir was in the crosshairs and probably will never go
    to the Hague.
        But we know from hybrid court in Rwanda, especially the
    court for Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia, Charles Taylor never
    thought that he's get 50 years for--and we've had David Crane
    testify several times and Alan White as well who are so
    instrumental in that and for others who committed these
    horrific crimes. Is that something that we should be talking
    about, a tribunal for--I mean, if you leave it to the local,
    just let their own justice system handle it. Good luck with
    that.
        I wouldn't want to be a juror on that frankly because it
    would be very dangerous to your health. So that's one question.
    Then if any of you would like to speak as to the relationship
    to Iran and China. What is China doing?
        Russia probably is more preoccupied with Ukraine sadly. But
    Russia, I'm sure, does have some interest, like, getting access
    to the port more. But China we know is ubiquitous in the
    exploitation throughout Africa.
        They're everywhere, and they're exploiting Africa
    everywhere. So how are they moving in on this? And finally, on
    gold, we had a hearing. And as a matter of fact, a former
    staffer for our subcommittee, I hired him, Thierry Dongala, has
    done amazing work on proving the relationship and fighting
    against the precious metal of gold and how it funds the
    procurement of weapons and all the other things that kill
    people.
        And so it's an area where we need to step up. We also
    focused on at that hearing how all of the--frankly, all of
    the--what do you call it--cobalt for EVs is coming out of the
    DR Congo through child labor and slave labor, 200,000 adults,
    upwards of 40,000, some say 25 to 40,000 children, all goes to
    Xinjiang in China. Then it ends up into EVs.
        And 25 percent of all the vehicles in the EU now that are
    EVs are coming from China on the backs of these little
    children. So I mean, it's so lucrative for China to be here.
    But when you throw in the gold part, maybe you can speak to
    that.
        And I do have one other one, and that's on the refuge
    flows. Chad has nearly a million refugees. I mean, it's a
    refugee--it's just horrible what has happened. There's so many
    people are either IDPs or refugees.
        And that does not help the countries that are trying to
    help these people. It has an negative impact there. If you want
    to just speak to--I mean, all the more reasons why there needs
    to be an absolute concerted effort, as you said, Mr. Isaacs,
    end this war, end the war, but also step up the humanitarian
    side of it as well.
        Mr. Isaacs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I'll come back to
    what I said. The war needs to be ended. War--excuse me. The
    gold mining is very lucrative. And I think the RSF after they
    were sort of officially enshrined, they had a gold mine.
        They sold it to the government. I believe that they got
    that back. But the smuggling of gold that is going out of the
    country I believe is enormous. I think that the Russians are
    deeply involved in it.
        I think that the RSF is deeply involved in it. And I
    understand that's the basis of the business empire that Hemeti
    has built is really around the gold. And my contacts tell me
    that gold is going through Dubai.
        The issue of China and what they're exploiting, they're
    very ubiquitous everywhere. And I had the opportunity in 2006
    to go to Shanghai and Beijing with CSIS for a 2-week--and we
    just wanted to know what is China's African development policy.
    What we found is they don't have one.
        What they have are Chinese national interest. But there was
    one comment that was made at the last day in Shanghai by a very
    senior diplomat. He said, we have 800 million people with your
    equivalent of a high school education and they make less than
    one dollar a day. We're going to send them out all over the
    world.
        So when you go into a place, it doesn't matter where you go
    in China. You go up to Port Sudan--or not China but anywhere.
    There's Chinese people doing trade on the sidewalk. There's
    Chinese people going into the petroleum offices.
        So China has a way to assert soft power through
    transactional processes that gives them enormous diplomatic
    influence. And I don't think that the U.S. has a way--that's
    not a level playing field for us. We can't do that for whatever
    reasons.
        And I think that that needs to be explored. I'm not a
    proponent for exploitative transactional diplomacy. But
    transactions and diplomacies I think have to go hand in hand
    with us. And I think that we would be better positioned to
    effect change and bring the war about to an end. And so that's
    probably enough that I'll say about that right now.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Hudson or Ms. Khair.
        Mr. Hudson. So there are a lot of questions there. So let
    me just sort of hopscotch over a few of them. With respect to
    courts, I mean, I think we're in the situation we are in Sudan
    right now to some degree because justice has never been
    delivered for any of the crimes that have been visited upon the
    people of Sudan.
        We've been talking about justice in Sudan for decades. I
    fear that the air that you refer back to of international
    tribunals to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars in
    U.S. and U.N. assessed dues, I fear that day is behind us in
    the United States. I fear it also because we have lost our
    Office of Global Criminal Justice at the State Department that
    was spearheading these kinds of initiatives and shining a light
    on these kinds of institutions.
        And I think that the State institutions of Sudan have
    broken down. There are no courts in Sudan right now. So it's
    not realistic to think that anytime some there will be any kind
    of justice delivered either internationally or locally.
        With respect to Iran, I want to underscore we don't, I
    think, understand the full extent of the relationship with Iran
    and Sudan right now. And I think that both the army and the
    Iranians take advantage of this idea that--or seek advantage
    from this idea that neither of them are isolated
    diplomatically. So there is value in having that relationship
    just to say that we have this relationship.
        The Iranians take value in having a relationship in the Red
    Sea and the potential on the horizon for potentially having a
    base there. I've heard in candid moments from senior leadership
    in Sudan that they don't get anything for free from the
    Iranians. And they don't get a friends and family discount on
    weapons from the Iranians, that the Iranians play up their role
    in Sudan to be greater than it is for their own domestic
    political purposes and international geostrategic interests.
        So I think to some degree both sides are overstating the
    degree that Iran is a factor. I'm not saying it is not a
    factor. But I don't know that it is playing a determinative
    role in this conflict.
        It's certainly a factor. I think China we have seen much
    more of a factor in terms of the weapons that are being used on
    both sides of the conflict are largely Chinese weapons. The
    Chinese have a diplomatic presence in Port Sudan.
        There are only a handful of countries that have a permanent
    diplomatic presence in Port Sudan. China is one. So they have
    been able to play a diplomatic role. They have protected
    Sudanese interests at the United Nations. And they are
    benefiting--they're profiting from the arm sales that they have
    engaged in.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Hudson, do you know what kinds of weapons,
    AK-47s?
        Mr. Hudson. There have been a whole host of light arms,
    more heavy material, and now more recently Chinese drones that
    have been active in the conflict primarily on the side of the
    RSF, the Chinese drones. With respect to the gold trade, I
    think there's been a lot of reporting on this, public reporting
    on the extent of the gold trade. I think the only fact that I
    think is needed is to say that Sudan produced more gold last
    year in 2024 than it did before the war started, right?
        So we have seen almost a doubling of Sudan's official gold
    exports since the war began, right? This is what is being
    reported officially, right? Those numbers are in the range of 3
    billion dollars a year.
        We know that the RSF controls its own gold mines in South
    Darfur, in North Darfur. We know that in the eastern part of
    the country, the army is controlling gold mines there. They are
    doing business in those gold mines with Russia and with the
    UAE.
        The UAE is profiting on both sides of this conflict because
    all gold in the country is funneling, as Ken said, back to
    Dubai which is, again, I think, why I'm also skeptical of
    simply turning off the spigot from the UAE. The RSF is gaining
    and earning enough money that if it did not have privileged
    access to Emirati largesse, it could go onto the black market.
    With 2 billion dollars, it can go and buy any weapons that it
    needs to sustain this war.
        So we have to think, I think, really holistically about not
    just the kind of the drivers and the political support that the
    RSF is getting from outside. But we also have to think about
    turning off the funding that is coming from not just gold but
    from gum arabic, from smuggling, from all of the rest, all in
    there.
        Ms. Khair. Thank you. I think a lot has been covered. So
    let me briefly just underscore a few points. In terms of local
    costs, there's currently not sort of government functionality
    at any level in Sudan. That's become very clear.
        And so expecting there to be any kind of fully fledged
    justice mechanism, especially because that's always been
    deferred, particularly at a moment like this without
    infrastructure as I think it's impossible really. It's not just
    Bashir. There are other ICC indictees like Ahamd Harun who has
    recently been made the head of one faction of Bashir's former
    party, the National Congress Party.
        So these characters are very much alive. They're very much
    engaged in the politics in Sudan. They're being protected by
    the Sudanese Armed Forces. And wherever they are in the
    country, we hear reports of them being moved around, et cetera.
        But there is no desire. There's no sort of will here, I
    think, on the Sudanese Armed Forces to see any of these
    characters face justice. They are too valuable currently for
    them in terms of, one, the constituency with the Islamists, and
    two, the connections that some of them have, two international
    actors, for example, the Iranians and Chinese and Malaysians
    and Turks and others.
        Just very briefly on the gold. A lot of the gold, it's
    exactly as you describe, Chairman Smith, what is happening in
    DRC. Most of the gold in Sudan is mined artisanally. That is on
    the ground mostly by very vulnerable people.
        It is mined and then taken to the United Arab Emirates,
    chiefly where the world's gold markets are and sold for large
    amounts of money. And so there are sort of many injustices that
    are happening here, not just because this gold is used then to
    buy weapons, to bomb these very people, these very vulnerable
    people that are mining it in the first place because the
    working conditions for these people are horrendous. And the
    fact that the gold has gone up only indicates that the working
    conditions have become worse for these people.
        And longer the war continues, the more the economy will be
    entrenched and the more the conditions for these people will
    become more desperate. So absolutely something that requires
    attention. There have been calls, for example, to set up sort
    of a fund very much like what the Europeans have Ukraine where
    a lot of the money that is being made out of gold enters into a
    trust fund that is then used to potentially rehabilitate and
    reconstruct Sudan later on.
        A lot more thinking needs to be done about how to do that.
    If some of these flows of money can be arrested and put into
    this fund for later use, that would be very, very useful. In
    terms of the refugee flows, I want to make sure we discuss
    this.
        The displacement has been--the world's largest displacement
    crisis is in Sudan, not just internally where there are 11
    million internally displaced but also, of course, externally in
    Egypt, in Chad, in South Sudan. Effectively, countries around
    Sudan that are themselves quite vulnerable and facing a lot of
    economic shocks. We're not seeing any kind of sort of
    humanitarian support to these groups that is very sufficient.
        So for example, in Ethiopia, we're not seeing UNHCR, the
    UN's humanitarian--sorry, refugee organization really respond
    to the refugees there. We're not seeing the same by UNHCR in
    Egypt. And the reason for that is the governments of Ethiopia
    and Egypt.
        They're not granting the United Nations and UNHCR the
    ability to adequately respond to the refugee crisis. Egypt is
    making a lot of money from Sudanese people who re in Egypt,
    spending, of course, a lot of money on rent, on food, et
    cetera. And you've seen Egypt sort of send them back to Sudan
    particularly as Sudanese armed forces has been making gains
    very much against international recognized refugee norms of
    non-reform.
        So we need to see a lot more protections for refugees in
    the region. In Chad in particular, we're seeing that the U.N.
    has not been able to fully support people there. And those
    people in particular are fleeing genocide. They're not just
    fleeing the war as people in other countries are. So I think an
    extra focus on this from the United States is absolutely
    required. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And I actually want to build on the
    line of questioning Chairman Smith was asking. I am very
    focused on the UAE's role here because I think that it is
    large.
        But of course, the UAE is not the only outside actor that
    is supporting belligerence in this conflict in order to advance
    their own objectives. You all have talked about some already,
    right? We've got Chad serving as a staging area for weapons and
    shipments from the UAE.
        We've got Kenya hosting meetings of RSF leaders during
    which they've declared the establishment of a parallel
    government in Sudan. Obviously, we have Russia siding with SAF.
    We've got Egypt continuing to provide military assistance to
    SAF.
        Reports suggest that RSF smuggles gold from Darfur through
    South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya to help finance its operations.
    We've talked about the role of Iran, the role of China, just a
    small sample. Ms. Khair, can you describe how the influence of
    outside actors has prolonged the conflict in Sudan and
    exacerbated its consequences for the Sudanese people?
        Ms. Khair. Thank you for the question. I think it's
    impossible to believe that this war would've gotten to the
    State that it has, the level of destruction and devastation, if
    not for the role of outside actors. Sudan has been extremely
    vulnerable to the predations of not just its neighbors but also
    Gulf countries because it has never been able to set up a
    political system internally that is able to protect Sudan
    against this vulnerability.
        And so we're going to see unfortunately these countries
    pick at the carcass that is Sudan at the moment. And even as
    things get worse, they're not motivated by the humanitarian
    situation. They're not motivated by the risks of atrocities,
    genocide, et cetera.
        And so there's actually no sort of potential end. There's
    no turning point potentially at which these countries pull back
    from the support that they're giving. And they're giving very
    high tech weapons, what started off as very sort of reasonably
    low tech war has suddenly become with the use of drone warfare
    from many of these countries, Turkey, China, Iran, and of
    course the transit countries that facilitate this.
        This is becoming very quickly a very technologically
    advanced war which means that we're going to see sort of the
    impact on civilians go through the roof. For example,
    previously a lot of civilians were fleeing war at the front
    lines of the battlefield. Today, RSF drones hitting key
    infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, for example, water
    stations, power plants, ports, et cetera, means that actually
    just any sort of normalcy and sort of human normalcy and normal
    life that is able to exist is going to be impacted which means,
    A, no place is geographically safe, and B, that actually it's
    going to be very difficult to eke out any kind of normalcy, any
    kind of normal existence for a lot of people.
        So the scale of this war would not be what it was or what
    it is without, I think, the engagement of these countries. But
    what we have to understand is that war is--we all know this
    very well. War is big business. And so all of these countries
    that you have mentioned are very much economically invested in
    this war. And so unless the formula has changed, unless this
    war becomes actually more of a liability than it is a source of
    revenue, we're not, I think, going to see any of these
    countries, as I say, motivated by the humanitarian situations
    enough to pull back.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Thank you all again for testifying
    and for everything you're doing for the people of Sudan. Mr.
    Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Jacobs. We're just
    about finished, but I do want thank you so very much for your
    just expert testimony. It gives us all the guidance on both
    sides of the aisle as to what we need to be doing.
        We want to play a role, hopefully a very constructive one.
    So thank you. I can't thank you enough. Just let me ask you if
    I could, Ms. Khair, is Ethiopia penalizing Sudanese refugees
    because of the territorial dispute over Al-Fashaga?
        Ms. Khair. So I think it is broader than that. The
    Ethiopian authorities or the Ethiopian government has been, as
    you say, in dispute over the Al-Fashaga territory. This has
    been going on for decades.
        There was something of a gentleman's agreement between
    Meles Zenawi and Omar al-Bashir in the past that meant that Al-
    Fashaga was sort of left unaddressed for the most part. That
    came to a head when there were changes in government in both
    Sudan and Ethiopia. Those tensions seem to have eased somewhat.
        But I think the issue is still on the table. But Sudan
    doesn't have these territorial disputes just with Ethiopia. It
    has them with South Sudan and the Abyei region. It has them, of
    course, with Egypt as well and Halayeb-Shalateen.
        There needs to be a formula for how to address these
    issues, particularly for countries around Sudan who get
    militarily involved in Sudan's conflict, including, of course,
    South Sudan to a great degree and also Egypt. So we need to--
    the resolution to Sudan's war is not just going to be about
    engaging internal actors but also Sudan's neighbors. I think
    fortunately we have seen a de-escalation in tensions between
    particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces and the government in
    Ethiopia.
        But depending on how things go between Ethiopia and Eritrea
    and tensions there and the likelihood as we're seeing of a
    ratcheting up of tensions in potentially armed conflict,
    Ethiopia and Eritrea may be the first countries to be sort of
    pulled into the war in Sudan and vice versa, that Sudanese
    communities, particularly those on the border regions, will be
    pulled into the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In fact,
    we're already seeing this during the Tigray conflict. We
    already saw lots of assistance, shall we say, from the Sudanese
    authorities in that war.
        Likewise, we're seeing a lot of Eritrean and Ethiopian
    engagement in the war in Sudan currently, particularly by the
    Eritreans. Recently, we saw their trained navy dock in Port
    Sudan. So what we're seeing here is the overspill that many of
    us, including Cameron and I, have been warning about since the
    beginning of the war is already happening. It's already
    unfolding. And unless these issues around contested territory
    but also regional interest of neighboring countries are dealt
    with, I don't think we're going to be able to sort of have a
    comprehensive resolution to this war.
        Mr. Smith. Just a little bit of understanding about why the
    refugees in Egypt, why Egypt would not want the UNHCR. Is it
    because they're welcoming them? I mean, Karen Bass who used to
    be my ranking member, when she chair, I was her ranking member,
    we made a trip and we met with President Museveni.
        And we went to a refugee camp that it was extraordinary how
    the local Ugandan people were welcoming the South Sudanese
    people with such concern and love. And he had it too. It was
    just amazing.
        And both of us were like our eyes were wide open about this
    is a good neighborly policy. Is that what Egypt is doing? Or is
    it something else?
        Ms. Khair. That's not my understanding, no. Egypt and Sudan
    have a very contentious relationship, mostly because Egypt sees
    Sudan----
        Mr. Smith. The people too? I mean, not just----
        Ms. Khair. Yes, so Egypt sees Sudan as an extension of its
    southern border, believes that it should be very much involved
    in deciding what the government in Sudan looks like. This is
    why they continue to support the Sudanese Armed Forces. They
    have done, let's say, for almost 70 years.
        There are issues with racism. The Sudanese people, a face
    in Egypt particularly previously that the South Sudanese when
    they were Cairo, particularly in large numbers during the
    north-south conflict 20 years ago. Darfur is as well who have
    been displaced to Egypt have faced severe racism, but so have
    Sudanese of all types.
        There's also rhetoric within Egypt similar to what we saw
    with the Syrians that the economic issues that Egypt is facing
    is in large part due to the hosting of refugee communities,
    including the Sudanese communities. That said, a lot of
    Sudanese people, particularly from the center and north of the
    country, have a lot of familial ties with Egypt. There's, of
    course, a shared language and in many ways a shared history and
    culture that has meant a lot of people who believe that Egypt
    is still the place to go without the kind of refugee
    protections that you saw firsthand in Uganda which I think are
    sort of an aberration.
        They're an exception. Without those protections, people in
    Sudan--Sudanese people in Egypt will be very vulnerable.
    Recently, the Egyptians came up with some legislation that has
    made it actually more difficult for people in Sudan to be able
    to register with UNHCR and therefore get the requisite support
    there.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much. Anything else? Deeply
    appreciate it. And we will followup.
        Ms. Khair. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. And if we have some additional questions, we
    will get them to you, particularly for some of the members who
    are not here but wanted to be. And without any further ado, the
    hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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