    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     STOPPING ILLEGAL ROBOCALLS AND ROBOTEXTS:
                      PROGRESS, CHALLENGES, AND NEXT STEPS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
                                    INVESTIGATIONS

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JUNE 4, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-22

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                       govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                            energycommerce.house.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-677 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                            BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
                                     Chairman
    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio                FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
    H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia           Ranking Member
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
    RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina       JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia    DORIS O. MATSUI, California
    GARY J. PALMER, Alabama              KATHY CASTOR, Florida
    NEAL P. DUNN, Florida                PAUL TONKO, New York
    DAN CRENSHAW, Texas                  YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
    JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania, Vice       RAUL RUIZ, California
        Chairman                         SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
    RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia               MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    RUSS FULCHER, Idaho                  NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
    AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas                DARREN SOTO, Florida
    DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee         KIM SCHRIER, Washington
    MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa       LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
    KAT CAMMACK, Florida                 LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
    JAY OBERNOLTE, California            ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York
    JOHN JAMES, Michigan                 JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
    CLIFF BENTZ, Oregon                  TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
    ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana                ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
    RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          KEVIN MULLIN, California
    LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               GREG LANDSMAN, Ohio
    NICHOLAS A. LANGWORTHY, New York     JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
    THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr., New Jersey
    MICHAEL A. RULLI, Ohio
    GABE EVANS, Colorado
    CRAIG A. GOLDMAN, Texas
    JULIE FEDORCHAK, North Dakota
                                     ------

                               Professional Staff

                         MEGAN JACKSON, Staff Director
                    SOPHIE KHANAHMADI, Deputy Staff Director
                   TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Minority Staff Director
                  Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                            GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
                                     Chairman
    TROY BALDERSON, Ohio, Vice Chairman  YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
    H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia           Ranking Member
    NEAL P. DUNN, Florida                DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
    DAN CRENSHAW, Texas                  PAUL TONKO, New York
    RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
    RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia               LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
    RUSS FULCHER, Idaho                  ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York
    MICHAEL A. RULLI, Ohio               KEVIN MULLIN, California
    BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky (ex          FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
        officio)                             officio)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Gary J. Palmer, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Alabama, opening statement..................................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     4
    Hon. Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New York, opening statement...........................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
    Hon. Brett Guthrie, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement....................    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    15
    Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................    18
        Prepared statement...........................................    20

                                   Witnesses

    Joshua M. Bercu, Executive Director, Industry Traceback Group,
      and Senior Vice President, USTelecom...........................    22
        Prepared statement...........................................    25
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   132
    Sarah Leggin, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA...........    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    35
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   134
    Stephen Waguespack, President, Institute for Legal Reform, and
      Special Counsel, U.S. Chamber of Commerce......................    47
        Prepared statement...........................................    49
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   137
    Ben Winters, Director of AI and Privacy, Consumer Federation of
      America........................................................    76
        Prepared statement...........................................    78

                               Submitted Material

    Inclusion of the following was approved by unanimous consent.
    List of documents submitted for the record.......................   130
    Letter of June 4, 2025, from Hon. Eric Sorensen, a Representative
      in Congress from the State of Illinois, to Mr. Palmer and Ms.
      Clarke.........................................................   131

      STOPPING ILLEGAL ROBOCALLS AND ROBOTEXTS: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES, AND
                                   NEXT STEPS

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
    room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary Palmer
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Palmer, Balderson,
    Griffith, Dunn, Crenshaw, Weber, Allen, Fulcher, Rulli, Guthrie
    (ex officio), Clarke (subcommittee ranking member), DeGette,
    Tonko, Trahan, Fletcher, Ocasio-Cortez, Mullin, and Pallone (ex
    officio).
        Also present: Representatives Joyce and Pfluger.
        Staff present: Ansley Boylan, Director of Operations;
    Jessica Donlon, General Counsel; Sydney Greene, Director of
    Finance and Logistics; Brittany Havens, Chief Counsel; Megan
    Jackson, Staff Director; Sophie Khanahmadi, Deputy Staff
    Director; Alex Khlopin, Clerk; John Lin, Senior Counsel; Sarah
    Meier, Counsel and Parliamentarian; Joel Miller, Chief Counsel;
    Chris Sarley, Member Services/Stakeholder Director; Joanne
    Thomas, Counsel; Matt VanHyfte, Communications Director; Aurora
    Ellis, Minority Law Clerk; Austin Flack, Minority Professional
    Staff Member; Waverly Gordon, Minority Deputy Staff Director
    and General Counsel; Tiffany Guarascio, Minority Staff
    Director; Will McAuliffe, Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and
    Investigations; Constance O'Connor, Minority Senior Counsel;
    Christina Parisi, Minority Professional Staff Member; Harry
    Samuels, Minority Counsel; and Caroline Wood, Minority Research
    Analyst.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARY J. PALMER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                   CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA

        Mr. Palmer. Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing
    entitled ``Stopping Illegal Robocalls and Robotexts: Progress,
    Challenges, and Next Steps.''
        All of us have personal experiences with unwanted robocalls
    and robotexts. Some are merely annoying, but others have
    devastating consequences. For example, in March, the FCC warned
    consumers about scam robocalls targeting older Americans, and
    the Department of Justice announced that it charged 25
    individuals for participating in the same scam that defrauded
    Americans out of more than $21 million in more than 40 States.
    The scammers made phone calls pretending to be an individual's
    grandchild who needed money for bail after being arrested, or
    pretended to be the grandchild's attorney and were told that
    they could not speak to anyone about the arrest. This is one of
    the many heartbreaking examples of scams perpetrated on
    Americans by illegal robocallers and bad actors.
        According to recent estimates, in April of 2025, nearly
    2,000 robocalls were placed to U.S. consumers every second.
    Spam and scam calls make consumers feel threatened, fearful,
    and distrustful of legitimate calls. As more and more Americans
    ignore calls from unknown numbers, they miss important calls.
    Moreover, fraud perpetrated against Americans by illegal
    robocalls costs an average of $25 billion annually, primarily
    affecting those who cannot afford such losses.
        We are also seeing a lot of unwanted and scam robotexts and
    AI-generated phone calls and text messages, including voice
    clones and deepfakes. According to the FCC, consumer complaints
    about unwanted text messages increased 500-fold between 2015
    and 2022. Americans are frustrated, and understandably so.
        In 2019, the bipartisan Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall
    Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence, or TRACED, Act was
    enacted to help reduce the flood of illegal robocalls. The
    TRACED Act allowed the FCC and law enforcement to impose
    stricter penalties for intentional violations of the Telephone
    Consumer Protection Act, or TCPA, improved adoption of
    technical solutions like STIR and SHAKEN call authentication
    framework, and established a Federal interagency working group
    to combat illegal robocalls. As a result, U.S.
    telecommunications carriers have made progress implementing
    STIR/SHAKEN into their networks.
        This framework authenticates that phone calls are coming
    from legitimate phone numbers, which helps reduce the number of
    spoofed and illegal robocalls. Generally, to operate within the
    U.S., voice service providers must now implement robocall
    mitigation programs and file these plans in their STIR/SHAKEN
    compliance certifications in the robocall mitigation database
    overseen by the FCC. Moreover, in July 2020, the FCC recognized
    the USTelecom Industry Traceback Group as the single registered
    consortium to conduct private led traceback efforts that
    identified the source of an illegal robocall. The FCC has also
    taken measures to address the growing burden of unwanted and
    scam robotexts and abused AI technologies.
        Specifically, in March 2023, the agency adopted regulations
    targeting scam robotexts. In addition, industry actors have
    partnered with Federal agencies to launch new programs such as
    robotext tracing. Lastly, in August, the FCC proposed rules to
    protect consumers from AI-generated robocalls and robotexts.
        These are steps in the right direction, and I applaud the
    coordination we have seen thus far. While the TCPA has provided
    many useful tools, the TCPA's private right of action has given
    rise to class-action lawsuits focused on minor infractions
    rather than the bad actors responsible for placing illegal
    robocalls, and it has not reduced the number of illegal
    robocalls or improved consumer protection.
        In addition, STIR/SHAKEN implementation among smaller
    carriers has been delayed, and bad actors have exploited these
    providers' reliance on legacy infrastructure. Moreover, a
    majority of illegal robocalls and robotexts originate overseas,
    making them hard to trace. Because these bad actors are outside
    the jurisdiction of U.S. law enforcement, they are challenging
    to combat.
        Finally, the FCC must grapple with emerging technologies
    and navigate the best way to create appropriate guard rails for
    these technologies, while simultaneously continuing to support
    innovation. We will always have robocalls and robotexts because
    not all of them are illegal. Many are used for legitimate
    purposes by U.S. businesses and public entities. But we must
    continue finding ways to combat the unwanted communications.
        I want to thank our panel of witnesses for joining us. I
    look forward to a robust discussion to understand the current
    landscape of illegal robocalls and robotexts plaguing U.S.
    consumers and businesses, so we can work together to identify
    and address remaining challenges.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. I now recognize the ranking member of the
    subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, for her opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. YVETTE D. CLARKE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

        Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our panel
    of witnesses for appearing before us today.
        Americans are tired of hundreds of unwanted calls and texts
    they receive every year from scammers attempting to steal their
    hard-earned money. In 2023, Americans lost over $25 billion to
    phone-based scams. These criminals target the vulnerable and
    kindhearted by pretending to be law enforcement, Medicare, or
    even relatives in order to scam them out of hard-earned money.
    Enough is enough.
        For years, there has been a bipartisan effort to address
    this issue. In 2019, Democrats and Republicans came together to
    pass the Pallone-Thune TRACED Act, giving the Federal
    Government greater enforcement ability and the authority to
    implement a call authentication framework and force phone
    carriers to improve the traceback of illegal calls.
        Under the Biden administration, the Federal Communications
    Commission created the Robocall Response Team that has assisted
    in cutting off providers who facilitate illegal robocalls. And
    last year, Ranking Member Pallone led a Democratic package to
    close the loophole scammers rely on to target Americans.
    Committee Democrats are now working on updates to strengthen
    that package.
        Unfortunately, the Trump administration and congressional
    Republicans are retreating from the fight against illegal
    robocalls and robotexts. Just last week, President Trump
    released his 2026 budget proposal, in which he recommends
    cutting $42 million and firing 83 people from the Federal Trade
    Commission. By the Trump administration's own definition, the
    mission of the FTC is to protect the public from unfair or
    deceptive business practices, including unlawful telemarketing
    and robocalls. How can we expect the Federal Government to do
    more to protect Americans when the Trump administration is
    firing the very people whose job it is to enforce the law?
        Right now, law enforcement in all 50 States and the
    District of Columbia are combating robocalls. A bipartisan
    group of 40 State attorney generals wrote to Congress to say
    that their State laws regulating artificial intelligence help
    prevent spam phone calls and texts. But just a few weeks ago,
    Republicans on this committee voted for a reconciliation
    package that includes a 10-year moratorium on enforcement of
    State and local AI laws that these State attorney generals are
    opposed to. This provision stops States in their tracks from
    doing important work when we have not yet provided a Federal
    solution.
        I think my Republican colleagues forget they are not the
    only elected officials in this country. State legislators and
    law enforcement work in tandem every day to stop these
    harassing robocalls and texts, and you should not stand in
    their way.
        Stopping robocalls and texts will require dedicated
    employees at every level of government. Congressional
    Republicans should not hamstring the efforts of State and local
    enforcement, and President Trump should not slash and burn the
    budgets and staff of Federal agencies, all of which are
    dedicated to serving the American people. We in Congress have a
    duty to our constituents. Committee Democrats are here to
    prioritize the will of the people who put us in these chairs,
    not prove our loyalty to Donald Trump.
        If my Republican colleagues honestly want to stop illegal
    robocalls and robotexts, let's work together to support the
    Federal employees and agencies that work, instead of tearing
    them down.
        Having said that, I thank you, and I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Clarke follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the
    full committee, Mr. Guthrie, for 5 minutes for an opening
    statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRETT GUTHRIE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
               CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Palmer, and I thank the
    Ranking Member Clarke. I thank you for holding this hearing. A
    lot of times, when we are back from our breaks away from home,
    people in DC ask us, ``What are you hearing back home?'' And I
    will tell you, I mean, of all the things going on in
    Washington, DC, one of the number-one things I hear is
    robocalls.
        And I was sitting with a good friend of mine who is a
    little older, and just chatting with him for about an hour
    during the break. And I bet his phone rang four or five times.
    And each one was a robocall. So this is important. It is
    important to the American people. And it is not just because of
    the annoyance, it is because of the people that get ripped off
    with these people. And there are over 52 billion robocalls, and
    that is 4 billion calls a month, an average of 13 calls per
    person.
        At the outset, I would like to state that many robocalls
    are both legal and necessary. Robocalls are used to convey
    public service announcements and emergency messages. They are
    used for announcing school closures and providing reminders of
    upcoming appointments and payments. These are the calls that we
    want.
        But a large number of robocalls are illegal and are used to
    defraud, harass, and deceive customers. We have all received
    calls where someone on the other end of the line pretends to be
    IRS or Treasury and attempts to offer student loans or debt
    relief and sell insurance, or claims to be a bank or a credit
    card company. According to one survey, American victims of
    fraud lost an average of $450 to phone scams that prey on trust
    and exploit vulnerabilities. This exploitation is despicable,
    and the impact on victims is tragic, and many have lost their
    entire life savings. And we know this must stop.
        And thankfully, in 2019, the committee passed the
    bipartisan bicameral legislation which President Trump signed
    into law, the Pallone-Thune TRACED Act, to combat the epidemic
    of illegal robocalls. And I was proud to vote for that. The
    TRACED Act is an important law that provides the FCC and its
    partners with greater enforcement authority to hold illegal
    robocallers and bad actors accountable.
        Since the enactment of the TRACED Act, the FCC has used
    this authority to issue additional rules as well as civil and
    criminal penalties under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
    As a result, we have seen a downward trend in the prevalence of
    illegal robocalls.
        In addition, the FCC continues to mandate the voice service
    providers implement STIR/SHAKEN, caller ID authentication
    technology, and provide robocall mitigation plans to the
    robocall mitigation database. Furthermore, in 2020, USTelecom's
    Industry Traceback Group, or ITG, was recognized as the single
    private consortium to trace back the origins of suspected
    illegal robocalls, helping us to stop these calls at their
    source. All together, we have seen some great work done by our
    Federal agencies and their industry partners.
        However, despite these strides forward, illegal and scam
    robocalls persist. We are even seeing a significant increase in
    unwanted scam and robotexts, which include messages alerting
    consumers to act on undeliverable packages and unpaid tolls, to
    name a few examples.
        Complicating these issues are new developments in
    artificial intelligence, including voice cloning and deepfake
    technologies to impersonate individuals and generate scam phone
    calls and texts. Just last month, the FBI issued a warning
    about a malicious messaging campaign targeting government
    officials and their acquaintances by sending AI-generated voice
    messages impersonating senior U.S. officials to gain access to
    their data.
        As challenges evolve, so too must solutions. The Committee
    on Energy and Commerce has been at the forefront of leading
    discussions, understanding challenges, and developing solutions
    to address issues with new technologies, and we will continue
    to do so throughout this Congress. Notwithstanding the complex
    landscape illegal scam robocalls and robotexts pose for
    customers, legitimate businesses, Federal agencies, and their
    partners, I am optimistic that Republicans and Democrats will
    continue to work together to develop commonsense, bipartisan
    solutions to protect the American people from these fraudsters.
        And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
    Thank you for taking your time to be here. And I look forward
    to your testimonies. And I will yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Guthrie follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. I thank the gentleman
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
    committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
                IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Combating the surge of unwanted robocalls and robotexts has
    been a priority of mine for years. And, as I appreciate
    Chairman Guthrie saying, in 2009, I led passage of the TRACED
    Act. And this law has helped protect Americans from predatory
    and annoying robocalls and gave Federal agencies better tools
    to fight back against fraudsters.
        Despite these steps, Americans are still continuously
    bombarded by unwanted calls and texts that are not only
    annoying but cause real harm through fraud and scams.
    Technological advancements have supercharged fraud and made it
    easier and less expensive for scammers to make massive numbers
    of robocalls, to spoof caller ID information in order to hide a
    caller's true identity. They also use artificial intelligence
    to trick consumers to thinking they are talking to a relative
    in financial trouble, or to a trusted business offering
    assistance.
        Now, Americans received over 52 billion robocalls in 2024,
    which is nearly 200 calls for every American adult. Scams
    targeting seniors are especially rampant and take many forms,
    including calls or texts claiming to be from grandchildren or
    law enforcement or Medicare, all aimed at bilking money from
    the senior citizen. And robotexts are increasingly problematic,
    using automated text messages that trick recipients into
    clicking damaging links, providing personal or financial
    information, or paying for fraudulent items or services.
        And Congress has to continue to update the authorities we
    have given both to the FTC and the Federal Communications
    Commission to crack down on robocalls. We must also consider
    legislation focused on robotexts and provide our consumer
    protection agencies with adequate funding and staffing to hold
    bad actors accountable.
        The TRACED Act gave the FCC increased authority to require
    carriers to implement a call authentication framework, and
    stepped up enforcement action against bad actors and directed
    carriers to develop better tools to protect their customers.
    But as technology evolves, fraudsters are finding new ways to
    scam Americans and abuse loopholes.
        So last Congress, I led a Democratic effort that would
    expand antirobocall protections and provide explicit
    protections against robotexts. And our bill also would have
    closed loopholes exploited by scammers, combated the use of AI
    for scams, and alleviated the robocall-blocking technology for
    consumers. My colleagues and I are working on updates to
    strengthen that package, and I am sure today's testimony will
    help inform our thinking on how to better protect consumers
    from unwanted robocalls and robotexts.
        Now, I am sure there is uniform agreement on this committee
    that it is important to put an end to harassing and illegal
    robocalls and robotexts. But I have to say that actions by the
    Trump administration do threaten our efforts to do just that.
    There is a regular effort to undermine--essentially what is
    happening is the Trump administration and, of course, the House
    Republicans, you know, are cutting funding and staff from the
    very entities that protect consumers. And, you know, this is
    all to give the big tax breaks to billionaires who do not need
    them.
        And the problem is that, while law enforcement and State
    governments have been active in combating robocalls and on
    working with industry to find technical solutions to address
    robocalls, last month the House Republicans supported the
    reconciliation bill that included a 10-year moratorium on State
    and local enforcement of their own AI laws.
        So if this Big Tech effort becomes law, it could stop State
    attempts to develop innovative solutions to prevent illegal
    robocalls and texts. And I think it compromises America's
    financial well-being and hamstrings States who are working to
    keep their citizens safe.
        Federal consumer protection agencies are vital components
    of this fight against the robocalls and robotexts. But since
    taking office, President Trump has attempted to remove Senate-
    confirmed FTC Commissioners, reduce FTC and FCC staff, and that
    cripples these two important agencies' efforts to protect
    consumers. And Democrats have advocated for stronger authority
    and resources for both the FTC and the FCC, and for sensible
    guardrails to ensure consumer safety is at the forefront of
    strong enforcement by Federal, State, and private partners. But
    House Republican budgets that have all these cuts, they are
    basically underresourcing these agencies and the staff that
    would actually use the tools we have given them to fight
    against robocalls.
        So, you know, I have to say, you know, obviously, this is
    not the way to protect consumers. And, you know, I always
    worry--and I am almost out of time, Mr. Chairman, but I just
    worry that, you know, whether it is the SUPPORT Act that is on
    the floor this week or it is your efforts to talk about the
    need to address robocalls and texts, if you do not have the
    resources, if you do not have the staff, and the money is cut
    for these agencies, then it is not going to be effective, no
    matter what we do as an authorizing committee. And I am going
    to continually point that out because I think it is important.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. I thank the gentleman.
        That concludes Member opening statements. The Chair would
    like to remind Members that, pursuant to the committee rules,
    all Members' written opening statements will be made part of
    the record.
        We want to thank our witnesses for being here today and
    taking time to testify before the subcommittee. You will have
    the opportunity to give an opening statement followed by a
    round of questions from the Members.
        Our witnesses today are Joshua Bercu, executive director
    for Industry Traceback Group and senior vice president of
    USTelecom; Ms. Sarah Leggin, vice president of regulatory
    affairs for CTIA; Mr. Stephen Waguespack, president of the
    Institute for Legal Reform and senior vice president of the
    U.S. Chamber Federation, State and local advocacy, at the U.S.
    Chamber of Commerce; and, finally, Mr. Ben Winters, director of
    AI and data privacy for the Consumer Federation of America.
        We appreciate you being here today, and I look forward to
    hearing from you.
        You are aware that the committee is holding an oversight
    hearing and, when doing so, has the practice of taking
    testimony under oath. Do any of you have any objection to
    testifying under oath?
        Seeing no objection, we will proceed.
        The Chair advises you that you are entitled to be advised
    by counsel pursuant to House rules. Do you desire to be advised
    by counsel during your testimony today?
        Seeing none, please rise and raise your right hand.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Palmer. Seeing the witnesses answered in the
    affirmative, you are now sworn in and under oath, subject to
    the penalties set forth in title 18, section 1001 of the United
    States Code.
        You may be seated.
        With that, we will now recognize Mr. Bercu for 5 minutes to
    give an opening statement.

      STATEMENTS OF JOSHUA M. BERCU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INDUSTRY
     TRACEBACK GROUP, AND SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, USTELECOM; SARAH
       LEGGIN, VICE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY AFFAIRS, CTIA; STEPHEN
      WAGUESPACK, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SPECIAL
    COUNSEL, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE; AND BEN WINTERS, DIRECTOR OF
             AI AND PRIVACY, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA

                      STATEMENT OF JOSHUA M. BERCU

        Mr. Bercu. Chairman Palmer and members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Congress's
    leadership in passing the TRACED Act and maintaining strong
    oversight remains critical to ensuring that industry and
    government act with urgency to address this top consumer
    concern. Your commitment remains vital to sustain the
    vigilance, innovation, and coordination needed in our continued
    and evolving fight against scam calls.
        I am Josh Bercu, executive director of the Industry
    Traceback Group, or ITG, which is the FCC-designated traceback
    consortium under the TRACED Act, and senior vice president at
    USTelecom.
        Let me start with the bottom line: The TRACED Act worked.
    When Congress passed the TRACED Act, robocall complaints were
    nearing a crisis point, doubling at the FTC from 1.7 million in
    2014 to nearly 4 million in 2019. Today, they are down more
    than 70 percent. FCC complaints are down 77 percent. That's
    real progress. It did not solve everything, but we now have
    tools and a mandate to fight back.
        Over the past 6 years, we have built a framework that makes
    it harder and riskier for bad actors and criminals to
    infiltrate our networks. But it is neither hard nor risky
    enough, and the threat is evolving. Fraud losses are rising,
    not because of mass robocalls but because of targeted, more
    sophisticated scams. We have gone from fishing with dynamite to
    precision strikes. And that demands a more agile defense.
        That is where traceback has come in. Since its inception,
    the ITG has conducted over 20,000 tracebacks. We help identify
    who's behind illegal calls, whether it is a robocall campaign,
    a spoof threat to a high school, or a scam impersonating a
    bank. Our work supports law enforcement and drives action.
        When a rural high school in West Virginia received a
    threatening call, we worked with providers to trace the call
    path within hours, helping police confirm the call was not
    actually made locally, and safely reunite families.
        The tools Congress empowered are as essential now as ever.
    Call blocking and labeling stops millions of illegal calls
    every day. Call authentication has made it far harder for bad
    actors to spoof numbers at scale. And pursuant to the TRACED
    Act, FCC rules now require all providers to know where their
    traffic comes from and take action when it is identified as
    unlawful, including through our tracebacks. The threat is
    evolving, so we need to keep evolving with the threat.
        The good news? We're not starting from scratch. Here are
    three things we think Congress can do to help:
        One, build a unified national scam strategy. We need a
    national strategy and a central Federal coordinator or task
    force to unify efforts, eliminate silos, and give industry a
    clear point of contact. That strategy should include
    international cooperation, including on traceback. We also need
    to treat call-based scams for what they are: crime. And it's
    crime that can only be fully stopped through cross-border
    criminal enforcement.
        Two, strengthen the tools that work. Let's reinforce the
    existing framework, extend the FCC's traceback designation
    cycle, and provide narrow immunity so we can plan, invest, and
    act decisively without being distracted or deterred by an
    annual administrative process or the risk of nuisance lawsuits.
    We've also worked on new tools to explore other aspects of
    unlawful calling campaigns and, with congressional backing,
    they could become permanent and powerful parts of the tool set.
        Three, unleash and promote cross-sector collaboration. Some
    of the most meaningful progress we've made has come from
    collaboration. We've launched a pilot with banks and carriers
    to trace spoofed numbers pretending to be the banks, a model of
    the cross-sector collaboration we need more of.
        But barriers can get in the way. Right now, providers may
    hesitate to share intelligence simply because rules and risks
    are not clear. A narrowly scoped safe harbor could change that,
    clarifying that sharing information to prevent fraud is not
    only allowed but encouraged. Blame will not stop fraud, but
    partnerships can. The TRACED Act was a turning point, but we
    need to keep adapting and fighting back.
        Thank you for your leadership. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bercu follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Leggin for 5
    minutes for your testimony.

                       STATEMENT OF SARAH LEGGIN

        Ms. Leggin. Chairmen Palmer and Guthrie, Ranking Members
    Clarke and Pallone, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf
    of CTIA and the wireless industry, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        CTIA commends the committee for its leadership in
    protecting Americans from the scourge of illegal and unwanted
    robocalls and robotexts. Consumers rely on wireless more than
    ever for voice calls and text messaging. As reported last year,
    Americans devoted nearly 2.4 trillion minutes to voice calls,
    and they exchanged more than 2.1 trillion text messages. And
    texts have a 98 percent open rate, evidencing just how much
    consumers open and read and trust their texts.
        Unfortunately, bad actors know how much consumers value and
    rely on wireless voice and text messages. As they have
    increased their deceptive efforts, we have increased our
    efforts and our success in combating them. So today, first, I
    want to talk about how we are working to stop robocalls, and
    then I will turn to the similar but different challenges we
    face when it comes to robotexts.
        First, on robocalls, we appreciate the committee's actions
    through the TRACED Act to provide the FCC with new tools to
    combat illegal robocalls. Under this framework, the wireless
    industry is helping lead the way in advancing consumers'
    control over the voice calls they receive. Although automated
    calls from your pharmacy, school, or charity can be helpful and
    enhance consumer welfare, too many of them are intrusive and a
    consumer pain point.
        In response, the wireless industry has built a range of
    defenses against illegal and unwanted robocalls. We spearheaded
    the development of STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework, led
    the way in implementing it, as the TRACED Act directed. In
    addition, wireless providers and their partners have launched a
    variety of powerful tools to regain consumer control over the
    calls they receive. These include know-your-customer practices,
    innovative call blocking, tracing back illegal robocalls to
    identify bad actors, and robust robocall mitigation programs.
        Wireless providers black label or identify over 45 billion
    scam calls every year while also working hard to make sure that
    legitimate calls are completed. Thanks to these efforts,
    robocall complaints reached a 6-year low last year. And we look
    forward to continuing progress there.
        Now, turning to text messaging. Wireless text messaging is
    one of the most popular and trusted forms of communication
    among American consumers today. The wireless industry and our
    partners in the messaging ecosystem work really hard to keep it
    that way. To do so, we use proactive, multilayered measures
    that include tools like up-front vetting and verification,
    sophisticated machine learning and AI for filtering and
    blocking, and consumer reporting, all balancing the need to
    protect consumers and ensure that legitimate texts go through.
        As just one metric, wireless providers blocked over 55
    billion texts last year while at the same time delivering
    trillions of legitimate texts. And we are always evolving our
    techniques to leverage the latest technology and meet new
    challenges. We complement these tools with best practices that
    offer industry-led guidance to honor consumer preferences
    focused on consent while supporting legitimate communications.
    The best practices are adopted throughout the messaging
    ecosystem and were recognized by a coalition of consumer
    advocate organizations as a critical element in protecting
    consumers and the messaging platform from bad actors.
        Notwithstanding all these efforts, bad actors continue to
    try to exploit consumers' trust by spamming and scamming them.
    So to better target those bad actors, CTIA launched the Secure
    Messaging Initiative, or the SMI, to convene the texting
    ecosystem to help identify scam activity and refer it to law
    enforcement for investigation. Through the SMI, we've already
    traced over 172,000 robotexts and made over a dozen referrals
    to our law enforcement partners at the FCC, FTC, DOJ, and 50-
    State attorney general enforcement task force. These focused on
    scams like student loans, government and bank impersonation,
    package delivery, and more. Collectively, these efforts are
    helping to stop scammers and maintain consumer trust in text
    messaging.
        Collaboration with our government partners is key to
    continued success, and we support the administration's efforts
    to protect consumers. Chairman Carr at the FCC has made
    cracking down on illegal robocalls a top priority, and we
    support this effort. And we acknowledge Ranking Member
    Pallone's Do Not Disturb Bill with the goal of combating
    consumer fraud.
        Finally, we encourage Congress to take steps to support
    action against the bad actors behind illegal robocalls and
    robotexts. Many agencies are working hard to fight consumer
    fraud but lack the personnel or resources to bring cases. To
    help out, Congress could have agencies report on their current
    consumer fraud resources and actions and leverage that
    information to prioritize support. With more resources at the
    Federal and State levels, Congress can help take bad actors off
    the field and stop illegal robocalls and robotexts at the
    source.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We look
    forward to working with you all to protect consumers from
    intrusive and illegal robocalls and robotexts.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Leggin follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Waguespack for 5
    minutes for your testimony.

                    STATEMENT OF STEPHEN WAGUESPACK

        Mr. Waguespack. Thank you, Chairman Palmer, Ranking Member
    Clarke, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Stephen
    Waguespack, and I serve as president of the U.S. Chamber of
    Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform, more commonly known as
    ILR. The ILR is a division of the Chamber whose mission is to
    champion a fair legal system that promotes economic growth and
    opportunity. We believe that an effective legal system is
    critical to helping both customers and business owners. Thank
    you for the opportunity to testify today about the robocalling
    landscape and how American businesses are protecting consumers.
        There are four main points I would like to cover in today's
    hearing.
        Number one, legitimate businesses support and are helping
    to lead efforts to crack down on illegal and abusive robocalls
    and robotexts. Businesses have every incentive to ensure that
    consumers continue to trust these communications. The illegal
    calls and texts that seek to defraud U.S. consumers begin with
    bad actors exploiting the reputation and good will of trusted
    American brands.
        For example, one in three businesses report being
    impersonated by scammers, with 13 percent reporting a switch in
    brands due to this deception. According to 2024 data from Hiya,
    45 percent of consumers have received a call from someone
    impersonating a legitimate business, and 70 percent of
    businesses report getting a similar attack. Beyond reputational
    damage, fraudulent calling and texting schemes also degrade
    consumers' trust in these types of communications, making it
    difficult for businesses to engage with their customers. That's
    why many companies are proactively helping regulators trace
    these bad actors and going on the offensive by fighting back
    directly against them.
        For example, Marriott International brought its own
    trademark lawsuit against malicious robocallers and scored
    significant legal victories over both foreign and U.S.-based
    defendants, while DirecTV also secured a total of $8 million in
    judgments and broad, permanent injunctions. The private sector
    is also devising innovative technologies, such as analytics-
    powered software, while partnering with the government through
    programs like the Industry Traceback Group and Secure Messaging
    Initiative in tackling illegal and abusive robocalls.
        Number two, more legislation will not solve the problem.
    Fraudulent and abusive robocalls and robotexts are already
    illegal. Congress must ensure that its already substantial
    efforts to curb these activities bear fruit by encouraging
    Federal agencies to make illegal robocalls and robotexts an
    enforcement priority. As the Chamber has previously urged,
    lawmakers should push DOJ to prioritize enforcement against
    these bad actors and report annually to Congress on their
    efforts.
        There is optimism that focus on this topic could be
    welcomed by the DOJ, as we have seen the FCC and FTC utilizing
    tools like the traceback program to increase the focus on bad
    actors.
        Number three and most critically, the TCPA's private rights
    of action provisions continue to fuel abusive litigation
    against American businesses. This difficult operating
    environment hurts both businesses and consumers and is
    undermining the proactive efforts by this Congress to address
    the very real problem of scammers. The private right of action
    provisions in the TCPA make it more challenging for legitimate
    businesses and organizations to send and for consumers to
    receive good calls and texts, such as appointment reminders,
    notifications about school closures, and other communications
    that consumers want. At the same time, it does not deter bad
    calls and texts, such as fraudulent and harassing
    communications that originate from bad actors.
        It is critical that Congress distinguish between these two
    types of calls and limit the ability of a handful of aggressive
    plaintiff firms to dominate the market for these suits.
    Congress should also encourage the FCC to simplify TCPA
    regulations to boost compliance, ensure certainty for
    legitimate businesses, and focus on addressing bad actors.
        Fourth and finally, Congress could utilize the precedents
    set in other Federal and State statutes to limit the abuse of
    private rights of action found within TCPA by implementing,
    one, reasonable damage caps; two, clear safe harbor provisions;
    three, limits on unreasonable attorney fees; and, four,
    mandatory disclosure of any usage of third-party litigation
    financing, known as TPLF, in these TCPA cases to ensure
    consumer rights are protected. The business community wants to
    end illegal robocalls and robotexts to foster a safe and
    trustworthy communications ecosystem for businesses and their
    consumers.
        As Congress considers paths forward, the enforcement should
    be a top priority of all Federal agencies, and Congress should
    consider reforms to prevent legitimate businesses from being
    ensnared in abusive TCPA litigation.
        Thank you for your work to date on this topic, and to the
    subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss these important
    issues. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Waguespack follows:]
      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Winters for 5
    minutes for your testimony.

                        STATEMENT OF BEN WINTERS

        Mr. Winters. Chair Guthrie, Ranking Member Pallone, Chair
    Palmer, Ranking Member Clarke, and members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for inviting me to testify before you on this
    important issue.
        I am Ben Winters. I am the director of AI and privacy at
    the Consumer Federation of America, or CFA. CFA is an
    association of nonprofit consumer organizations established in
    1968 to advance the consumer interest through research,
    advocacy, and education.
        There is a staggering amount of monetary and emotional harm
    caused by scams perpetrated through robocalls and robotexts.
    Consumers lost over $12.5 billion to scams last year, which was
    a 20 percent increase from 2023. Even when no money is lost,
    there is a constant sense of annoyance and need for vigilance.
    Americans received an estimated 19.2 billion robotexts and 5
    billion robocalls last month alone. And just this morning, the
    Washington Post featured the fact that there is a five times
    jump in scam losses from schemes that started in texts since
    2020.
        In this testimony, I will be highlighting how
    underregulated technologies like AI are making these problems
    worse, how Federal consumer protection agencies can be doing
    more, and how Congress can act to protect consumers from this
    annoying and dangerous problem.
        Generative AI reduces the time and effort criminals have to
    expend in order to deceive their targets. Products like ChatGPT
    can create quick and unique human-sounding scripts that can be
    sent in text or read by humans or AI-generated voices, and it's
    easy to make variations that make them difficult to spot.
        In CFA's recent ``Scamplified'' report, we illustrate how
    easy it is to use ChatGPT to generate text with an urgent ask
    to add $50 worth of bitcoin to a wallet. It spat out 30, 50,
    100 texts with common women's names and real hospitals in
    common U.S. cities to create urgency. It even continued to spit
    out texts when we asked it to target it to someone that might
    have dementia.
        And it is not just text generators. Voice-cloning tools can
    now replicate anyone's speech using just a few seconds from a
    phone call or a podcast interview. Scammers have exploited this
    to impersonate loved ones, such as in grandparent scams you
    have already heard about today.
        Consumer Reports' investigation showed popular voice-
    cloning platforms do not require the user to verify their
    identity or gain consent before creating these voice clonings.
        Beyond AI, there is a host of companies in what we call the
    scam stack, all of which are fueling an increase in scams.
    These include data brokers that sell data en masse based on
    people's behavior, purchases, relationships, location, and
    more, automated content delivery, things like we're talking
    about today, and methods of reporting which can be improved to
    bridge the gap between a victim and the authorities that could
    help.
        Federal consumer protection agencies tasked with stopping
    scam robotexts and robocalls like the FCC and FTC are being
    stripped down and distracted. The consequence is stark. In
    April, the Department of Justice eliminated their consumer
    protection branch entirely. This is the branch that brought a
    landmark criminal case against a data broker that sold over 30
    million records of elderly Americans that was then used to
    perpetrate a scam. This type of enforcement of upstream actors
    is exactly what we need to see, and it is troubling to see that
    agency get axed.
        Americans deserve an FCC that is focused on the complicated
    robocall ecosystem, and they have done a lot to try to address
    it. But the agency leadership right now seems focused on
    controlling the speech and hiring practices of entertainment
    companies that are perceived to be the enemies of the President
    instead of ramping up rulemaking and enforcement as an
    independent agency.
        Chairman Carr's Delete, Delete, Delete Initiative, in which
    he is asking the American public what regulations the FCC
    should delete because they stand in the way of expansion and
    technological innovation, is illustrative of this disastrous
    deregulatory approach that does not even mention consumer
    protection.
        At the FTC, the firing of key staff and, critically, two of
    the five Commissioners have left the agency ill equipped to
    protect American consumers. The agency must finalize the
    individual impersonation rule so they can deter and enforce
    violations of widespread things like voice cloning, like they
    have started to do with government and business impersonation,
    which they finalized last year.
        Both agencies must prioritize enforcement against upstream
    actors, such as voice service providers and AI developers who
    knowingly facilitate these harmful practices. These
    intermediaries are critical to how illegal calls and texts
    scale and are essential to meaningful accountability.
        Congress has to hold upstream actors accountable, just like
    I talked about, strengthen enforcement tools beyond just what's
    in the TRACED Act, increase transparency, and mandate
    consequences for known bad actors throughout the call path. We
    also urge Congress to increase funding for State enforcement,
    pass privacy laws restricting data brokers, and require
    responsible AI moderation and transparency.
        One thing Congress absolutely should not do right now is
    pass a moratorium on regulating AI at the State level. The
    scale of these problems is one of many reasons it's not the
    time to do this. And if States can create transparency or
    establish appropriate liability, we should welcome it,
    embracing the critical roles of States not only to protect
    consumers but be the laboratory of democracy.
        Right now, the FTC, FCC, and CFPB risk being cops off of
    their beat. And Congress must empower them, resource them, and
    restore them in order to aggressively protect consumers. The
    American people deserve nothing less.
        Thanks again for the opportunity to testify, and I am happy
    to answer any questions you might have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Winters follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Palmer. I thank you all for your testimony. We will now
    move on to questioning. I will begin and recognize myself for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Bercu, the Broadband Association's Industry Traceback
    Group conducted more than 3,600 tracebacks of suspected
    unlawful robocalls in 2024. Generally speaking, what percentage
    of unlawful robocalls are foreign originated?
        Mr. Bercu. Thank you for the question. So I do not have an
    exact number on how many came from foreign countries or foreign
    entities. But we do know that a lot of the fraud comes from
    abroad. Illegal telemarketing, we see that sometimes originate
    at home, sometimes abroad. But a lot of the fraud does
    originate overseas.
        And one of the things we have been seeing a lot lately is--
    because so much of enforcement and regulation was focused on
    who brought the illegal call into the country, what we're now
    seeing is some of the bad actors spinning out U.S.-based LLCs
    so that we are tracing it to a U.S. entity that probably has no
    people in the United States at all.
        Mr. Palmer. Dealing with the foreign actors, though,
    creates some tremendous challenges because we cannot charge
    them with a crime right now, unless they are operating in
    country. Is there any recourse through civil action? I mean,
    what recourse do you have to deal with foreign actors? And be
    as brief as you can.
        Mr. Bercu. Yes, I think we can do criminal action, and I
    think that needs to be a priority. The same people attacking us
    here are attacking other countries as well. I think there's a
    lot of opportunities for collaboration. And just to give you
    one anecdote, when the FBI did work several years ago with the
    Central Bureau of Intelligence in India to raid some of the
    call centers there, we saw IRS robocalls drop 80 percent
    overnight.
        Mr. Palmer. Ms. Leggin, can you tell us how CTIA's Secure
    Messaging Initiative works to trace back robotexts? And how
    effective has this been to stop illegal and unwanted robotexts?
        Ms. Leggin. Thank you for the question. CTIA's Secure
    Messaging Initiative was launched to convene the messaging
    ecosystem and the various players that have a role there in
    protecting consumers so that we can facilitate information
    sharing among the industry stakeholders to complement their
    existing industry tools to better fight the bad actors, and
    then to share that information with law enforcement partners at
    the FCC, FTC, DOJ, and the 50-State attorney general
    enforcement task force. To date, we have done over 172,000
    robotexts as part of those information packages that we share
    with law enforcement. And we've done over a dozen of those
    packages that focus on scams that you all have seen, including
    government or bank impersonation, package delivery, and AI-
    enhanced scams as well.
        We continue to focus on the areas where we're hearing that
    scams are happening for consumers so that we give that
    information to law enforcement so they can prioritize their
    efforts to go after the bad actors and stop the traffic at the
    source.
        Mr. Palmer. Mr. Bercu, I want to go back to you. How widely
    has the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework been
    implemented? And what percentage of the providers still need to
    implement the framework?
        Mr. Bercu. So under FCC rules, it is implemented on the IP
    portions of providers' networks. And we have seen a shift in
    practice because of it, especially the high-volume illegal
    telemarketers. One of the things, I think, because of STIR/
    SHAKEN, they've moved away from spoofing to actually getting
    real numbers, which STIR/SHAKEN does not directly address.
        Mr. Palmer. Mr. Waguespack, in your testimony you were
    talking about how the private right of action has been abused.
    Instead of protecting people who have been harmed by scam
    robocalls, it has led to basically a cottage industry that is
    attacking legitimate companies. Can you talk a little bit about
    that?
        Mr. Waguespack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, in the
    statements from--the opening statements from the panel and
    obviously from the witnesses here, there seems to be a unified
    focus that these bad actors a lot of times which are very hard
    to find which are located overseas, those are the true ones
    driving a lot of this issue. The private right of action
    provisions within TCPA are not utilized to go after those bad
    actors. Instead, a cottage industry has developed to go after
    simply where there are opportunities to make money.
        And also the provisions of the PRA within TCPA are
    extremely broad compared to other Federal statutes. There's no
    caps on recovery, as you see in HIPAA, no safe harbor provision
    you see in COPPA, no cap on attorney fees that you see in other
    statutes. And so it has created a class action factory that is
    being exploited by just a handful of firms--
        Mr. Palmer. So it has become a predatory use of the private
    right of action. I saw where one of the judgments was for $260-
    something million. So how do we respond to that?
        Mr. Waguespack. I think we borrow from other statutes
    already in place at the Federal level. You look to HIPAA to put
    a cap on the total recovery. They set that at 25,000. There is
    no cap here. It is up to 15,000 per occurrence under this
    statute, which absolutely drives those numbers up.
        And most of these suits, they are not trying to win in
    court, they are just trying to drive discovery to make it very
    expensive and drive settlement. And you are seeing it play out
    time and time again. In fact, there is one law firm that has
    done over 155 cases over a 3-year period on this front. They
    have developed a niche market. There is even one plaintiff who
    has done almost 125 himself on this issue.
        So you have a handful of folks exploiting this system. That
    is not helping the consumers that desperately need some of the
    help from these scam robocalls.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
    subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes for her questions.
        Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Unwanted calls continue to be the top consumer complaint
    received by the FCC, the Federal Communications Commission. In
    2024, Americans received over 52 billion robocalls, and 49
    percent of those robocalls were scams or from telemarketers.
        Mr. Bercu, how has the robocall and robotext threat
    landscape changed since the implementation of the TRACED Act
    and STIR and SHAKEN?
        Mr. Bercu. So I think we have made a lot of progress. But
    as you are recognizing, there is work left to do. We have seen
    complaints. They are still too high, but they have dropped
    pretty dramatically from the highs from several years ago.
        We have seen some of the bad actors, instead of--for scam
    robocalls, they are about 50 percent of what they once were for
    scam robocalls. But we have seen the scammers move from mass
    robocalls to more targeted, more sophisticated attacks where
    they know exactly who they are calling. So that is a little bit
    of how this has changed over time.
        Ms. Clarke. Thank you. So we still have more to do.
        With the work left undone in the fight against phone scams,
    it baffles me that the Trump administration is undermining the
    government institutions that combat them. In March, President
    Trump attempted to illegally removed Senate-confirmed
    Commissioners from the Federal Trade Commission, an independent
    agency with the explicit mission to protect the public from
    unfair and deceptive business practices like unlawful
    telemarketing and robocalls. And in April, in accordance with a
    Trump administration instruction, the Department of Justice
    announced plans to dissolve its consumer protection branch,
    which tries cases targeting large-scale scams against seniors,
    AI, and cybercrimes against consumers, and illegal
    telemarketing. This just makes no sense.
        The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, FCC, FTC, and the
    Department of Justice have all been hit by early retirements,
    terminations, and deferred resignations. And they are all
    agencies that combat the robocall problem we are gathered to
    discuss today.
        Mr. Winters, how does an unstable and depleted FCC and FTC
    workforce impact the role both agencies play in addressing the
    robocall scams?
        Mr. Winters. Thanks for the question. I mean, these
    underresourced consumer protection agencies is just a big win
    for scammers, right? Less cops on the beat mean less
    consequences, and they can sort of act with impunity. And so
    what we need to be doing--and I think was reflected in all of
    our testimony today, is that we need more enforcement, more
    resources, and more proactive behavior. And everything from
    firing Commissioners to budget cuts goes exactly against that.
        Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Last week, President Trump released
    a detailed Fiscal Year 2026 funding proposal. If enacted, this
    proposal would make permanent and add to the number of fired
    Federal employees, including 74 at the FCC, 83 at the FTC, and
    32 of which are identified as consumer protection roles. The
    proposal also cuts 42 million from the FTC and more than 18
    million of which would go directly toward protecting consumers.
        Mr. Winters, what would happen to the robocall-fighting
    infrastructure if the Federal Government pulled back from its
    role, whether it be from a lack of manpower, funds, or general
    disinterest in holding scammers accountable?
        Mr. Winters. In the interest of time, I'll be simple, in
    that it will get worse.
        Ms. Clarke. And what do the government actions we have
    discussed today tell the scammers and fraudsters who conduct
    robocalls and texts about the priorities of the U.S.
    Government? Do you think actions like these make robocalls more
    likely to occur in the future?
        Mr. Winters. Yes. I mean, I think it incentivizes bad
    behavior. It makes people feel like we are absolutely not going
    to be able to--we're not going to get enforcement action
    against us, it is going to be hard to track. It is hard to
    track when you have a full-court press against it, and we have
    seen that for years. But if we are pulling back, then that is
    even, you know, an unimaginable harm for American consumers.
        Ms. Clarke. Very well. Well, Mr. Chairman, in their written
    testimony, several of today's witnesses said Congress must
    increase support for and prioritize enforcement actions if we
    truly want to stop bad actors. The experts are calling for more
    funding and enforcement, not less. And I ask my colleagues
    across the aisle to listen to them.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Clarke.
        Next is the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Guthrie.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. I thank all the witnesses for being
    here. I appreciate you all being here this morning.
        So, Mr. Bercu, in July of 2020 the FCC first selected
    USTelecom, the Broadband Association's Industry Traceback
    Group, as the single registered consortium to conduct private-
    led traceback efforts, and has redesigned USTelecom's ITG each
    year since.
        So could you kind of explain--I know I am going between two
    hearings, so if you are repetitive, it helps me to repeat
    anyway, so how does traceback work and how has the USTelecom
    ITG helped the FCC with its efforts to fight illegal robocalls?
        Mr. Bercu. Yes, absolutely. So traceback helps solve for
    one of the problems, which was when a call is spoofed and we do
    not know where it is coming from, the carrier does not know
    exactly where it came from--STIR/SHAKEN helps with that, but
    traceback goes even farther. And we go hop by hop in a
    semiautomated system through a portal, and we find out exactly
    where it is coming from. And in fact, in our tracebacks we have
    identified over 2,000 providers from 75 different countries. So
    we will trace it all over the world until we can find out who
    is making the calls and actually disrupt it there.
        Our data has been used for virtually every robocall
    enforcement by the FCC, by the FTC, by the State AGs, so it has
    been a very successful partnership with the industry and
    government.
        Mr. Guthrie. Well, should the technology not be in place to
    say if I am sitting in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and a phone
    call is coming in from Nigeria that is not in my data in my
    cell phone or anything like that, should that be--there is
    technology that can block that from coming. I mean, you have to
    sign up for it, I gather, but there is technology that keeps
    that from coming to your phone, does it not?
        Mr. Bercu. So the challenge is that there is not perfect
    information at the carrier side about where that call is coming
    from. STIR/SHAKEN helps with that. I am optimistic that a
    recent rule clarification the FCC did last year, that will
    continue to advance STIR/SHAKEN and the impact there. But that
    is the challenge. And so there's definitely tools to achieve
    that, but the carriers do not have perfect information to know
    that call is coming from Nigeria.
        Mr. Guthrie. My understanding is that when a lot of these
    robocalls happen, they are not like I am calling Neal Dunn in
    Florida and faking him out on something, like I am a criminal
    in Bowling Green calling Neal Dunn in Florida. It is usually,
    spam is just thousands of calls instantaneously going out. Can
    carriers not determine that and block those calls?
        Mr. Bercu. So that type, it still happens, but that is at a
    fraction of what it once was, thanks to enforcement, thanks to
    the TRACED Act, thanks to STIR/SHAKEN. Those types of calls are
    down, depending on the data you look, about 50 percent.
        Where we see fraud calls, a lot of the robocalls that
    people still hate, a lot of those are illegal telemarketing.
    That is the majority of the robocalls people get, where it is
    telemarketing that no one consented to and they are violating
    the TCPA.
        But what we are seeing with the scams are the scams are
    getting more sophisticated, more targeted, where they are
    targeting individuals.
        Mr. Guthrie. OK, so Ms. Leggin, could you talk about how
    the CTA is trying to help fight these spam calls and robocalls?
        Ms. Leggin. Sure thing. Thank you for the question.
        As Josh said, the----
        Mr. Guthrie. I think you probably need your mic. There you
    go.
        Ms. Leggin. Try that again?
        Mr. Guthrie. Perfect. It was on?
        Ms. Leggin. Is it on now?
        Mr. Guthrie. Maybe just closer to it. Yes, closer to it.
        Ms. Leggin. Sorry. Cannot see if it is on or not.
        Thank you for the question.
        Like Josh's members, the wireless industry are dedicated to
    protecting consumers from illegal and unwanted robocalls. We
    helped lead the way in developing the STIR/SHAKEN framework,
    and we supported this committee's efforts through the TRACED
    Act to promote the deployment of that. And it is now working
    well as a call authentication tool to help protect consumers
    from spoofed calls. It is just one tool in the toolbox, though,
    so especially over the last few years we have been developing
    lots of different call blocking, labeling, filtering tools to
    complement STIR/SHAKEN as part of a multipronged approach to
    protect consumers from robocalls.
        At CTIA, we are developing the next generation of call
    authentication, which is branded calling or RCTA's BCID, or
    branded calling ID, which gives consumers even more information
    about who is calling and why, to help empower consumers about
    whether to answer the phone again, as well as protecting them
    by providing consumer resources to educate them about which
    calls to ignore, so that we are kind of coming at it from all
    fronts.
        Mr. Guthrie. I assume that could be a competitive thing
    between providers to say, ``Hey, if you use our service, we can
    help you block your robocalls.'' I assume that would be.
        So Mr. Waguespack, how about increasing fines for illegal
    robocalls? What would that--would such a change affect
    legitimate businesses? And how could we improve collection of
    existing fines or overall enforcement?
        Mr. Waguespack. You know, obviously, FCC and FTC, I think,
    have done a really great job working with industry partners to
    develop through traceback and other initiatives to identify
    those, so we definitely encourage strong enforcement. And add
    that DOJ should also go after these bad actors any way we can.
    We think going through those channels as compared to unleashing
    a small niche cadre of plaintiff firms to go after quite
    frankly credible businesses just because they cannot find the
    bad actors has been the wrong minor approach within TCPA.
        So it is that private right of action that truly we think
    is a disincentive to businesses to reach out to develop those
    partnerships with their consumers that, quite frankly, most of
    their consumers want.
        Mr. Guthrie. OK, thank you. Well, my time has expired, and
    I yield back. Appreciate you all being here. Thanks.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Next up is the ranking member of the full committee, Mr.
    Pallone.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you so much. And, look, I think we all
    know we have to do more to stop these dangerous and unwanted
    calls and texts that continue to bombard Americans. I mean, I
    get so many myself every day. And they are not just harassment,
    they are causing real harm. The phone scams alone defrauded
    Americans of $25 billion in 2023.
        Now, the TRACED Act, which I authored in 2019, required the
    implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN call authentication
    technology to help verify the legitimacy of calls. So I wanted
    to ask Mr. Bercu, you run the Industry Traceback Group, which
    traces calls to their origin as required by the TRACED Act on
    behalf of the communications industry. In your testimony, you
    discuss how industry is utilizing this framework to fight the
    problem of robocalls and to protect consumers from scam
    artists.
        What more can industry do to protect consumers from
    unwanted and dangerous robocalls and robotexts? I am going to
    ask you a question and then Mr. Winters, so a couple minutes.
        Mr. Bercu. Sure. So thank you for the question, Ranking
    Member Pallone.
        I think the industry, we do have blocking and labeling
    deployed. We do--STIR/SHAKEN is deployed. I think there is a
    lot at work there. But I think what our experience shows is
    that when we are dealing with whether it is the illegal
    telemarketers, whether it is the criminal fraudsters abroad,
    they do not stop because it gets a little bit harder. This is
    their business, so they keep trying to find new paths.
        So I think what we see with Traceback, we are tracing them
    back, we have adapted to tracing back the targeted scam calls,
    working closely with the financial sector, other sectors as
    well. And I think that is more of the work to be done,
    complemented by very aggressive enforcement against the actual
    bad actors.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you. So in March, President Trump
    illegally, in my opinion, fired the two Democratic FTC
    Commissioners, meaning that their crucial voices are missing
    from any discussion at FTC of how to better protect consumers
    from robocalls and robotexts. And they have my full support in
    their ongoing lawsuit to be rightfully restored at the FTC, and
    I think that is the very first step that needs to be taken.
        But just last year, I introduced, and I mentioned also, the
    Do Not Disturb Act, a comprehensive piece of legislation that
    aims to build on the success of the TRACED Act. And it would
    ensure that scam artists using illegal robocalls or robotexts
    cannot exploit new loopholes as new technology makes it even
    easier for fraudsters to steal from Americans.
        So, Mr. Winters, I have 2 questions. You have 2 minutes.
        Do you agree there is a need for legislation to provide
    updates to current laws like last year's Do Not Disturb Act,
    and do the FTC and FCC need more authority from Congress to
    fight text message scams? Is it just money and enforcement, or
    do they actually need more authority, if you will?
        Mr. Winters. Thank you. Yes, so on that first question, I
    think there is a lot more that Congress can do, and there is
    more that they need to do. And so whether that is some of the
    provisions in the Do Not Disturb Act, like codifying the rule
    about AI disclosures and increasing penalties for AI-generated
    scam calls, there is a lot more that can be done by Congress,
    including giving more resources to not just FCC but to State
    attorneys general, who are leading the forefront of a lot of
    this work, and increasing collaboration.
        Mr. Pallone. But do they need more authority, though?
        Mr. Winters. They do need more authority. One thing in
    particular is that they are not able to directly collect fines.
    They have to refer fine collection to the Department of
    Justice. And so they have to rely on another overworked agency
    to collect fines. And we see a lot of times, although there are
    big headlines and numbers of fines, the FCC might not actually
    be able to resolve and get a lot of that money back. So that is
    one thing that needs to be done in terms of authority.
        And they also need the authority to put more automatic
    suspension and provisions in the robocall mitigation database,
    so that when there are repeat bad actors, they are
    automatically taken out. They cannot just stay in the robocall
    mitigation database. There is not enough sort of continued
    standards and continued enforcement using that.
        Mr. Pallone. Well, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, as you can
    see, I think there is no question more authority is needed for
    the agencies. But I will repeat what I said earlier, which is
    they also need more resources and staff, and cutting back on
    staff and firing, you know, some of the Commissioners is
    certainly not the way to go if you really want to try to
    improve the situation with robocalls. And so I would not only
    ask that we try to move toward more authority to fight these
    scams, but also provide the resources, not cut the resources,
    not cut the staff.
        And with that, I will yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Pallone.
        I am up next. So welcome everybody. I am glad you are able
    to join us.
        Ms. Leggin, I will direct my questions to you this morning.
        According to the FCC, text message scams have increased
    500-fold in recent years. How have scams become more
    sophisticated over the years?
        Ms. Leggin. Thanks for the question. CTIA and our members
    are dedicated to protecting consumers from scam and spam text
    messages while also making sure that legitimate ones go
    through, because we know that consumers open and read and trust
    their text messages as one of the most preferred platforms for
    communications today.
        Over the years, we have seen bad actors increasingly target
    text messaging because they know that consumers open and read
    those texts. So as bad actors have evolved and enhanced their
    tactics, we've evolved and enhanced our defenses as well. So
    over the years, we've enhanced our blocking/filtering tools by
    enhancing them with machine learning and AI. We have launched
    the Secure Messaging Initiative, which is our work to partner
    with law enforcement to give them actionable information about
    bad actors so that they can go and take traffic off at the
    source, and those are working to help the FCC, the FTC, DOJ,
    and the attorney general enforcement task force in giving them
    information they can go after bad actors with.
        Mr. Balderson. OK, thank you very much. You also answered
    my follow up.
        Are mobile carriers and other industry players doing enough
    to address the growth in scam and illegal robotexts?
        Ms. Leggin. Our industry is really dedicated to this issue.
    As just one metric, we blocked over 55 billion texts last year
    while also making sure that the legitimate ones go through and
    supporting over 2 trillion legitimate texts. So it really is
    always a balance. But we've dedicated a lot of different
    resources to enhancing our protections against bad actors.
        In terms of more things we can do, again, we can welcome
    help from Congress in prioritizing resources towards
    enforcement so that the agencies we work with can take on more
    of those cases, do more investigations, and go after the bad
    actors to stop that traffic at the source.
        Mr. Balderson. All right, thank you.
        How well are mobile carriers engaging with States and other
    entities for information sharing and enforcement? For example,
    with the scam toll text, did mobile carriers pause delivery and
    contact State toll authorities to verify the legitimacy of the
    numbers?
        Ms. Leggin. Our members were focused on the toll road scams
    as well as the other versions of that as part of our work to
    protect consumers from all those types of scams that
    impersonate legitimate businesses.
        The wireless carriers as well as other partners in the
    messaging ecosystem, including providers of other types of
    messaging apps that were targeted by that type of scam,
    including over-the-top online-based and at-base messaging, all
    were working together to share information with law enforcement
    to help them find the bad actors responsible and take them off
    the field.
        Mr. Balderson. OK, thank you. How can we get mobile
    carriers to better engage and pull their weight to stop the
    flood of robotexts at the same level as robocalls? At the same
    level they did for robocalls, I'm sorry.
        Ms. Leggin. The wireless industry and our messaging
    ecosystem partners are really focused on this issue. For years,
    we have been seeing bad actors really target the voice network
    because there were not blocking and other protections in place
    until the last few years.
        In text messaging, we have actually had the ability to
    block and to filter and to employ up-front vetting and
    verification for decades. And so for a long time the messaging
    platform was really protected from bad actors. Of course, bad
    actors are getting more sophisticated and over the last few
    years targeting text messaging more. But this has been an area
    of focus and a priority for our members for years. And we
    continue to dedicate significant resources toward protecting
    consumers while maintaining trust in text messaging.
        Mr. Balderson. OK, thank you very much. I yield back my
    remaining time.
        Next up is the gentlelady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much.
        So I just got back along with many of our colleagues on
    this committee from a conference on artificial intelligence.
    And so I would like to talk with you about that today, because
    I think it is really being implemented in a disturbing way by
    scammers to find new ways to deal with Americans. A lot of us
    have been hearing these chilling stories about how somebody
    gets called by somebody who they think is their child or their
    parent and asked for money, and the voice sounds eerily like
    their loved one.
        So, Mr. Winters, I want to ask you, how has AI technology
    been used to create more sophisticated robocall and robotext
    scams that target consumers?
        Mr. Winters. Thanks for the question. It has been in a lot
    of different ways, and so I will categorize the two different
    types of AI systems in it. So one in text generation services,
    like sort of as I mentioned in my opening statement, whether it
    is something like ChatGPT or cloud that you might have played
    around with, or one of the ones that even has less moderation,
    you can create a bunch of texts really quickly that have good
    grammar and, you know, seems like--you do not have the bells
    going off in your head from them. So you can do that.
        You can have a list of people's names, target-based off
    their location, other information you have, have it connect to
    a link of, you know, a wallet or a Zelle or something like
    that. So it is just a sort of scale and accuracy and
    plausibility thing.
        The other big category is the sort of impersonation of
    people, whether that be through voice or video. And that is
    where you see the really harrowing stories of sort of like
    real-time fraud and deepfake stuff that, you know, have not
    only caused a lot of emotional harm but have sort of ruined
    people's lives. Yes.
        Ms. DeGette. So this kind of goes without saying, but
    because of this degree of sophistication, even when you have an
    educated consumer, it becomes much more difficult to identify
    these scams?
        Mr. Winters. Absolutely. I mean, I think that one thing is
    it is really difficult and kind of an impossible proposition to
    have all American people be able to spot when something is AI
    in the moment and then not respond to the emotional sort of
    ``I'm your son and I'm in jail'' thing, even if you are able to
    flag that. And then not all AI-generated anything will be a
    scam or a fraud, so it is complicated there. Because you do not
    necessarily want to teach that, or it will just get people
    paranoid. So it is really--it should be on the companies and on
    the enforcement----
        Ms. DeGette. Right, so if we are not going to rely on the
    consumers by education, Ms. Leggin, what more can industry do
    to filter these messages and prevent them from ever getting to
    the victims?
        Ms. Leggin. So as Mr. Winters said, it is a balanced
    approach to make sure that we are blocking the messages that we
    do not want consumers to receive and they do not want to
    receive, while also making sure that legitimate ones go
    through.
        Ms. DeGette. That is right.
        Ms. Leggin. So with AI-enhanced scams, for example, there
    are aspects of that that we can also detect using AI by
    analyzing vaster quantities of data, by enhancing our existing
    tools and algorithms and frameworks, and then by complementing
    those with large fraud teams to help protect consumers from
    scams.
        Ms. DeGette. And do you think that the Federal agencies
    have the necessary authorities to fight against these scams? Or
    can companies do it themselves? Do they have the authority to
    do it?
        Ms. Leggin. We value our partnerships with all the law
    enforcement entities, including the FCC, FTC----
        Ms. DeGette. Right. Do you think they have enough authority
    to do it?
        Ms. Leggin. We think----
        Ms. DeGette. Yes or no will work.
        Ms. Leggin. We think that the best authority, the best way
    for them to continue to help us, is by prioritizing resources
    towards enforcement.
        Ms. DeGette. Resources. So that means Congress and the
    administration have to adequately fund them, right?
        Ms. Leggin. We continue to work----
        Ms. DeGette. No, a yes or no will work.
        Ms. Leggin. Yes.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. Mr. Winters, do you think they have enough
    authorities?
        Mr. Winters. No.
        Ms. DeGette. And why is that?
        Mr. Winters. I mean, if they did and they had the resources
    as well, I think we probably would not be here today. You know,
    they need an ability to, as I mentioned, follow up on the fines
    that they levy and actually collect those. They need sort of
    required transparency and basic moderation obligations for AI
    companies. There are lots of things that just using something
    like unfair deceptive practices authority are--
        Ms. DeGette. OK, thanks. We look forward to working with
    you to see what new authorities we want.
        Mr. Winters. Definitely.
        Ms. DeGette. I just have a little time left, so I want to
    ask you one more question. In the bill, the great big bill, a
    couple weeks ago that we are now learning all of the things
    that were included, one of the things that was included in the
    reconciliation package was a 10-year moratorium on State and
    local enforcement of their own AI bills.
        Does a 10-year moratorium on State AI bills prevent States
    from using evolving technologies to help fight this program?
    And do you think that's something Congress should look at, Mr.
    Winters?
        Mr. Winters. So we vehemently oppose the moratorium
    provision. I do not think the moratorium as written would stop
    State agencies from using AI, but it would harm consumers
    without a doubt.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is my good friend Mr. Griffith from Virginia.
        Mr. Griffith. Let me start in a little bit different
    direction than I planned on going, Ms. Leggin. You were asked
    about adequate funding a minute ago, and I got the sense that
    while you were told to give a yes or no answer, you wanted to
    see the Federal Trade Commission and others to receive adequate
    funding. But it seemed to me that you were not trying to get
    into the debate as to what the definition of adequate funding
    is. Am I correct that I read your body language correctly? That
    you did not want to get into that debate, but you do want them
    to be adequately funded?
        Ms. Leggin. That is right. It is up to each agency to
    allocate resources to their enforcement teams. But what we have
    said and what we are seeing with our work with our enforcement
    partners, is that sometimes the consumer fraud protection folks
    lack the personnel or resources they need to go after cases. So
    we welcome, you know, information collection or just a way to
    try to allocate the existing resources----
        Mr. Griffith. But it is also true that AI may make this
    much more efficient, and so we are looking forward to that too.
    Is that not correct?
        Ms. Leggin. That is right, AI----
        Mr. Griffith. I have to move on to what I was really going
    to go after. But for you and Mr. Bercu, the good news is that
    the fraud, while terrible, is on the downward slope. And I hear
    from my constituents all the time about receiving robocalls.
    And a couple of years ago, it was all about the fraudulent
    stuff, and they were concerned about that. But I will tell you,
    in the last year, particularly in the last few months, the real
    concern has become Medicare and particularly Medicare Advantage
    solicitors calling up the folks in my district. And I have an
    older population, generally speaking, than most districts. And
    they are just driving them crazy with all these calls.
        And a 2023 survey estimated that 30 percent of Medicare
    Advantage-eligible beneficiaries received seven or more calls a
    week.
        I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman and witnesses, I have had
    constituents who have told me if they only got seven a day,
    they would be thrilled. That would be a down number.
        So what can we do? Because this is a huge issue in my
    district. What can we do to make that situation better?
        Mr. Bercu. Yes, I think that those calls, if they are
    robocalls, if they are telemarketing calls, they may be in
    violation of the TCPA, they may be in violation of the
    telemarketing sales rules.
        Mr. Griffith. So how do we get them to use--because I have
    asked. I have said to folks as I have been talking with them,
    ``Have you put yourself on the Do Not Call list?'' And they
    said, ``Yes, but it does not seem to change anything.'' So how
    do we make that better?
        Mr. Bercu. I mean, so one of the things is--and we would be
    happy to work with you--we have got to trace back those calls.
    We have to see who is ignoring the law, get that information,
    get that to the right enforcement authorities to go after them.
    And we have seen success with that. Like, the auto warranty
    campaign was the same. We worked very closely with the States
    and the FCC, and that went from the most prolific robocall
    campaign in America to basically zero right now. So that is the
    answer there.
        Mr. Griffith. All right, well, I will be glad to work with
    you in any way, because when I start going to events and I
    start hearing this at, you know, at a majority of the events I
    go to, whether it be a street festival or a meeting of folks,
    that tells me we have a problem.
        Ms. Leggin, I got the toll texts. Of course, I called my
    staff assistant and said, ``How come you have not kept my
    account up to date?''
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Griffith. Not realizing--I was on the road. And she
    said, ``It is a scam, do not worry about it.''
        But I have gotten a number of those things since then and
    some others, and apparently somebody out there thinks I need a
    new job. And I click delete. I report as junk and delete. Does
    that do any good?
        Ms. Leggin. It certainly does. That is one of the key tools
    that the wireless industry and our partners on the device side
    have made available for consumers, to delete, report junk. You
    can also forward your scam texts to 7726, which spells ``spam''
    and both of those are key inputs for wireless providers and our
    messaging partners in making our algorithms and filtering and
    blocking more sophisticated and responsive to what we are
    hearing from consumers out there, like you and others in this
    room that have gotten those types of texts.
        In addition, we look at those types of scams and we develop
    evidence on them and refer them to our law enforcement partners
    through our Secure Messaging Initiative as well, so that we are
    working to target the bad actors responsible.
        Mr. Griffith. All right, I appreciate that.
        Mr. Waguespack--and I hope I get your name right.
        Mr. Waguespack. That is pretty good.
        Mr. Griffith. All right, not too bad.
        I do not know that I really have a question for you, but I
    will just make a comment. As a recovering attorney, I hate the
    whole strike suit industry where they get an itch and they just
    go after things. I want people to be able to sue when they are
    legitimately harmed. And I just make the offer that if I can
    work with you in any way to try to make the law so that it lets
    the legitimate complaint go forward but stops the strike suits
    where they are just trying to make it expensive and get a
    settlement--you talked about that earlier--just let me know
    what I can do to be of assistance. I will try.
        Mr. Waguespack. I appreciate that. That is the balance we
    are looking for, and the balance is found in other Federal
    statutes all across the Code.
        Mr. Griffith. All right, I appreciate it, and yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Griffith.
        Next up is Mrs. Trahan.
        Mrs. Trahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Well, I am glad to know that the frustration of unwanted
    robocalls is as universal in Congress as it is with our
    constituents. According to one estimate, Massachusetts
    residents received over 43 million robocalls in the month of
    May alone. Each of these unwanted calls wastes the precious
    time of the people we represent, and there are real risks that
    the caller on the other end is a scammer looking to swindle
    them out of hundreds or even thousands of dollars.
        The scourge of robocalls and robotexts must end. And yet
    the Trump administration does seem determined to cut
    enforcement agencies like the FCC and the FTC who fight for
    Americans every single day.
        Mr. Winters, can you just explain in brief the role that
    the FCC plays in combating robocalls and texts and how this
    agency works with private-sector partners to do that?
        Mr. Winters. Sure, thanks for the question.
        The FCC has a lot of responsibility and a big thing, you
    know, to cover. But one of the things they do is maintain and
    establish the robocall mitigation database. They have
    enforcement and investigation teams for, you know, reading
    consumer complaints, taking them in, analyzing it, and trying
    to do enforcement when possible. And I think they also, you
    know, work with industry colleagues--and maybe I will speak
    more to that--to try to ensure that they are doing as much as
    they can.
        But I think already, even when there were no cuts to
    staffing, it is really hard for them to actually make
    meaningful consequences for the repeat bad actors, whether it
    is certain ability to get the fines themselves, or the fact
    that there is a relatively low standard for the robocall
    mitigation database. There are all sorts of reasons why, even
    if fully staffed, they do not have quite the right authorities
    or the right approach. And so, you know, to cut their staffing
    would make it even harder.
        Mrs. Trahan. Thank you. In February, President Trump signed
    the Executive Order 14215, incorrectly named Ensuring
    Accountability for All Agencies. This EO strips the
    independence from many of our regulatory agencies, including
    the FCC. And the FCC is essential in the fight against illegal
    robocalls, making the actions of the Trump administration all
    the more concerning.
        Mr. Winters again, what effects will there be in the fight
    against illegal robocalls and texts if the Trump administration
    undermines the independence of Federal agencies like the FCC?
        Mr. Winters. Thanks. Yes, the independent nature of the FCC
    and the FTC both is essential for them to be able to focus on
    consumer protection and not go down political pursuits. I
    highlighted a little bit in my oral and wrote more about it in
    my written testimony. But particularly at the FCC, this
    relationship with the White House has taken priority and makes
    it so Chairman Carr is most of the time talking about DEI
    hiring practices at companies and threatening to pull licenses
    for airing interviews with Democratic candidates, for example,
    as well as, you know, just focusing on, you know, providing
    contracts for people like Elon Musk in getting Spectrum lines.
        All of that focus is not on consumer protection, right? And
    one of the reasons why is because of that lack of independence
    where they cannot focus on that because they are sort of, you
    know, focusing on the priorities of the President.
        Mrs. Trahan. Thank you. The FCC's budget justification
    lists cracking down on illegal robocalls as a performance
    indicator for the agency, which is a necessary priority.
    Unfortunately, the Trump administration has doubled down on its
    mission to hamstring the Federal Government's ability to hold
    robocall scammers accountable by proposing to eliminate 74
    positions at the FCC in the Fiscal Year 2026 budget.
        The FCC, however, is not alone in fighting robocalls.
    Industry has, in many instances, implemented solutions and
    voluntarily adopted best practices. Yes, they can always do
    more. But as lawmakers, we should look to build upon their good
    work while identifying gaps where the Federal Government can
    add value.
        Ms. Leggin, can you discuss the importance of public-
    private partnerships in combating robocalls and robotexts and
    suggest specific ways in which Congress can accelerate the
    efforts that industry has already taken?
        Ms. Leggin. Thank you. Public-private partnerships are a
    key tool in helping us go after bad actors so that we are
    stopping robocalls and robotexts at the source. CTIA's members
    participate in the USTelecom Industry Traceback Group to help
    identify the bad actors behind illegal robocalls, and our
    members on the wireless side, and then also throughout the
    messaging ecosystem, participate in CTIA's Secure Messaging
    Initiative, which convenes the messaging ecosystem to share
    information among each other and with our law enforcement
    partners across the Federal agencies and with the State
    attorney general enforcement task force so that they can take
    that information and go after the bad actors as well.
        Mrs. Trahan. Thank you. Thank you to all the witnesses. I
    appreciate it.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Dr. Joyce.
        Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member, for
    holding today's hearing. And thank you for all of the witnesses
    who have agreed to testify today.
        When I return to my district, Pennsylvania's 13th
    Congressional District, I hear about the pervasive and
    unrelenting illegal robocalls and texts that my constituents
    are faced with, often on a daily basis. So many of my
    constituents are senior citizens. I sat down and did a senior
    citizen seminar twice in the district in the last month, and
    you hear recurrent themes. You hear the ``Grandma, grandma,
    it's Mike, I'm in Mexico and I'm in jail. I need your help. I
    need it.'' It sounded just like Mike. I hear that repeatedly
    when I have these roundtable discussions with seniors.
        And it seems like the scammers are getting creative and
    finding actually new ways to trick us with incredible-looking
    text messages and very convincing grandma and grandpa calls.
    Scammers have even learned how to incorporate AI into
    intimidating loved ones to convince them to turn over personal
    information. Credit card numbers, bank numbers. Too many of my
    constituents are risking their retirement savings, and
    subsequently they lose faith in the system that we have set in
    place to protect them.
        We need to do better. We need to both educate consumers and
    anticipate the next angle of attack that these scammers will
    take, particularly with the assistance of our partners in law
    enforcement and the DOJ.
        Mr. Bercu, your testimony mentioned a project piloted by
    the Industry Traceback Group, ITG, in partnership with banks
    and carriers aimed at tackling fraud and consumer financial
    losses. Can you elaborate on the pilot goals and successes thus
    far, and is there collaboration with law enforcement?
        Mr. Bercu. Yes, absolutely. I think some of the most
    promising work our industry is doing is partnering across
    sectors, because the fraudsters are hurting our collective
    customers, whether that is banks or the carriers and your
    constituents.
        So what we have been doing is working with banks to help
    them identify where their number has been spoofed, and a few
    carriers. So working with the carriers, getting examples of
    calls that the carriers see from the bank's number, getting
    that back to the bank, and the bank can tell us, ``Oh, those
    were not us.''
        And what we are doing with that is two things. We are able
    to trace that back, find out who made the calls, find out who
    was spoofing the number, get that information in the hands of
    law enforcement to take action with it, but also help the bank
    identify and look at those customers and say, ``Oh, did any of
    these customers that got the fake call pretending to be us have
    a suspicious transaction?'' and helping to find that. And I
    think criminal enforcement has to be key here, because that--we
    know the scammers will use any tool available to them, and they
    will not stop just because it gets a little harder. They keep
    evolving. And so the key is going after them, and we stand
    ready to continue to support that.
        Mr. Joyce. And I agree, the scammers certainly have the
    ability to be incredibly crafty, devious, and downright evil in
    this regard.
        Talk to me about how you interface with financial
    institutions to make them aware of these situations.
        Mr. Bercu. So I think that is actually one of the promising
    things going on across the industry, is that we work directly
    with a lot of the financial institutions, we work with tech
    companies, others. Marriott was mentioned before. We worked
    very closely with Marriott to trace the calls pretending to be
    Marriott. So that is what we are doing. But there are broader
    conversations now about how the industries can even keep
    growing and continue to integrate.
        In my opening testimony, one thing I mentioned that I think
    Congress can do to help here is a safe harbor for that fraud
    information sharing, because I think there are questions about
    rules and risks when you do share information. So I think that
    is one way we can continue to lock those good partnerships.
        Mr. Joyce. And thank you. Thank you for being proactive in
    this.
        Mr. Waguespack, many of my constituents are in rural
    central Pennsylvania, where internet connectivity is difficult
    and educational digital resources on illegal robocalls are
    inaccessible. How can Federal agencies and industry partner,
    coordinate efforts to better educate consumers specifically in
    rural areas with limited internet access in those digital
    resources?
        Mr. Waguespack. Well, I think on leaning into what has been
    done since TCPA was first initiated, where you have private-
    sector solutions going in and working with--we have talked a
    lot about FCC and FTC, but also the local law enforcement and
    local financial institutions on the ground there, putting that
    initiative out there.
        Mr. Bercu talked about some of the information sharing that
    is done with the banks to prevent the fraud. There is also a
    second level down that is a good example of the education
    program. Through the bankers association, they have armed about
    2,000 banks out there to talk to their consumers, ``Here is a
    hit list of the things we will never ask you for, so if you get
    an email that has this, this, this, or this, ignore it, it is
    spam, here is how you call us back.'' And so we can use the
    private sector, I think, to develop some of that messaging and
    make sure consumers can be informed with the decisions they
    need to be able to fight back on their own.
        Mr. Joyce. I thank all of the witnesses for presenting here
    today. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is the gentlelady from Texas, Mrs. Fletcher.
        Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you. And thanks to our Chairman Palmer
    and Ranking Member Clarke for convening this hearing today.
    Thank you to our witnesses for all of your testimony. I think
    it has been really helpful for all of us. And as we have heard
    throughout the morning, abusive robocalls and robotexts are not
    just nuisance, right? They are a danger. And we need to do
    something about that.
        I appreciate the work that you are doing, and also the
    issues that you have brought to our attention this morning and
    the conversation around what we can do about it.
        You know, I am concerned, as several of my colleagues have
    mentioned, that we are hearing consistently from you we need
    more enforcement, we need more coordination, we need adequate
    resourcing, and we need adequate staffing to be able to do some
    of the things we are doing in a complex and challenging
    environment where the technology is moving faster than
    Congress, faster than our agencies. And what we are seeing at
    the same time is that those resources both in terms of money
    and staff are being cut from the administration. As we speak,
    they are asking Congress to rescind additional funding. They
    are stopping funding.
        And so, you know, as several of my colleagues have noted,
    agencies like the FCC, the FTC, and the DOJ have actually
    utilized the law that we passed together, the work that we have
    done collaboratively, to und the problems and really conduct
    meaningful enforcement that has stopped scammers. And now, it
    seems like the administration is taking the cops off the beat
    in this area and in many others.
        Mr. Winters, you noted in your testimony and you mentioned
    just earlier this morning that the Trump administration has
    taken steps to dissolve the DOJ's consumer protection bureau.
    And I believe you just said the Consumer Protection Branch of
    the DOJ, you just told us this morning that they had
    successfully prosecuted a case and stopped scammers who had--I
    guess it was against the data brokers who had sold the data of
    30 million Americans. And that data winds up in the hands of
    criminals who use it in these scams and others. So I think it's
    really important that we understand that these agencies need to
    be fully funded and that shuttering something like the DOJ's
    Consumer Protection Branch, this expert-led enforcement agency,
    really puts our communities at more risk. It is not something
    we should be doing.
        You also mentioned in your testimony that the CFPB, the
    Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the work that it has
    done in this area, and the administration is also shuttering or
    attempting to shutter that agency that Congress created and
    that has been really critical to protecting consumers. And
    that's what we're talking about in this hearing: protecting
    consumers, protecting American citizens from these scams.
        I think that what we are hearing this morning also calls on
    all of us on this committee to redouble our efforts to do our
    work around creating comprehensive privacy laws that protect
    American consumers. Because what I am hearing from you and what
    we are seeing is that our data is being stolen, is being sold,
    is being used. And it is being used by these scammers.
        So can you take, with the time that we have, just can you
    talk a little bit more about cutting the DOJ's Consumer
    Protection Branch as well as the CFPB, and what that would
    mean, Mr. Winters, in terms of protecting American consumers?
    In this larger context, if you want to talk too about the
    effort to take away the staff and the funding for these
    agencies that are protecting consumers from robocalls and
    robotexts that we are all clearly worried about and clearly
    concerned. We want to address how is this going to help or hurt
    us in that effort.
        Mr. Winters. Yes, absolutely, and thank you for the
    question. I mean, very simply, taking resources away from these
    agencies, and in the case of the CFPB and this part of the DOJ,
    completely trying to stop all of their work is absolutely not
    going to help in the fight against these harms.
        On the DOJ consumer protection case that I mentioned, yes,
    that is a data broker that sold a list of over 30 million
    elderly Americans directly to a scammer. It is not just that it
    ended up in the scammer's hands. Data brokers will sell to
    anyone at any time. And so what Congress needs to do for both
    scam reasons and lots of other reasons is pass comprehensive
    data privacy law with data minimization and a private right of
    action and a few other key things. Or at least, if you want to
    be more focused, it should be focused on restricting the sale
    of consumer data.
        CFPB specifically, shuttering that really cuts off a
    central resource for people that are victims of scams,
    especially. They have had, you know, counselors, people that
    answer the phone and take complaints and try to get things
    resolved for you. There are a bunch of great stories of people
    that literally had their scams resolved. You know, they got
    money back from their bank with the help of CFPB professionals.
    So they can do things on enforcement and work with financial
    actors where people are losing their money. But they also are
    just critical support. And they provide also tracking of those
    complaints and, you know, gets it to State AGs and those who
    can help.
        Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you, Mr. Winters. I have gone over my
    time. I do have more questions for the panel, so I will submit
    them for the record, and I will yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is Mr. Tonko.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Americans received over 52 billion robocalls in 2024, which
    is nearly 200 calls for every American adult. Americans also
    have lost 25 billion annually to scams that begin as spam
    calls. Unfortunately, we know the scammers often target older
    Americans who are especially vulnerable victims to these scams.
    Older adults in particular lost 4.9 billion through all types
    of fraud last year alone.
        I know I listened to the exchange that you had with my
    colleague, Representative DeGette. But I want to delve into
    this with the senior perspective.
        Certain scams put even the most technically savvy at risk,
    scams that in some cases mimic law enforcement, hospitals, or
    Medicare, or the voices of family members seeming to be in
    danger or in need of money.
        So, Mr. Winters, what specific tactics do scammers use to
    target seniors and other vulnerable groups?
        Mr. Winters. Yes, I mean--and thank you for the question--
    scammers in general capitalize on uncertainty and fear. And
    especially for seniors, especially those who are on a fixed
    income, all sorts of concerns about an unpaid bill, a toll
    account that you do not quite have set up yet, Medicare, you
    know, potential fraud and targeting, like, they are going to be
    thinking that the senior citizens are good targets for it. This
    is exactly why we had the case where a data broker bought a
    large list of senior citizens and targeted them with scams. And
    that is, you know, a terrible thing.
        And so, again, yes, they try to capitalize on uncertainty
    and fear. And that is why you see lost bills, job
    opportunities, especially in this current climate where a lot
    of people are getting fired and the economic uncertainty is
    everywhere, the job opportunity scams are going to be--more
    people are going to fall for them because, you know, you want a
    job, you need a job, you need to pay your bills.
        So, you know, I think that those are some of the ways in
    which they are targeting everyone but, you know, are hitting
    seniors most.
        Mr. Tonko. And what prevention strategies have been the
    most successful in that fight against illegal robocalls and
    texts?
        Mr. Winters. Yes, so, you know, there have been really
    strong enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commission of
    voice-over-internet providers. So, you know, I think the most
    appropriate and effective enforcement is going sort of
    upstream, especially when you are trying to get accountability
    for some of the actors that are providing the content or the
    delivery or the targets of some of these scams.
        One other really good case was the Rytr case by the FTC
    last year, where they targeted using the means and
    instrumentalities concept. In this case, it was a tool that
    generated lots of fake reviews, and the FTC was cracking down
    on fake reviews. But you can use that same tool to generate
    sort of an endless list of scam texts. And that sort of, you
    know, is a force multiplier for scammers.
        And again, you know, the use of these AI tools makes it
    harder because, you know, there are no typos, it comes in, you
    know, perfect English, and there's no, you know, these weird
    links that we have all sort of become accustomed to, so that
    makes it even tougher.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And, Ms. Leggin, how is the wireless
    industry working to protect that older community and otherwise
    more vulnerable customers?
        Ms. Leggin. That is a priority for the wireless industry.
    And to do that, we work with AARP and we support their National
    Elder Fraud Coordination Center, which works to take reports of
    victim losses in and then bring cases against bad actors.
        We also were happy to participate in the FTC's Stop Senior
    Scams Working Group, and we led the working group focused on
    text messaging issues, which was a cross-sector effort to
    explore ways that we could do more to protect older Americans
    from scams.
        We also participate in other working groups with consumers
    directly to try to push out our educational materials so that
    they know which text not to click on, which calls not to
    answer. And we have those resources on our website and our
    members' websites as well.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And the AARP that you mentioned has
    said that, and I quote, ``The alarmingly high levels of fraud
    against older adults underscores that stronger protections are
    urgently needed.''
        So as technology evolves, so must our ability to combat
    these illegal and harmful calls and texts. Mr. Bercu, what
    additional tools does the Industry Traceback Group need to
    protect Americans from fraudulent calls or fraudulent texts?
        Mr. Bercu. Thank you for the question. So I mentioned in my
    opening testimony I think there are ways to build on what is
    working and reinvest in our work. We are always adapting to the
    threat. A few years ago, we were only really tracing illegal
    robocalls. Now we are tracing threatening calls, we are tracing
    targeted scams. And I think that doubled last year, how many we
    traced. So we are always adapting and I think Congress's
    support through targeted immunity, through extending the cycle,
    will allow us to continue to invest and to innovate.
        Mr. Tonko. Well, I thank you very much.
        And with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is the gentlelady from New York, Ocasio-Cortez,
    please.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Winters, I want folks back home to kind of understand
    why this problem is happening. You know, the average American
    receives about 15 robocalls each month, but obviously,
    depending on who you are, you could be experiencing that in a
    day. And we know that it was not always like this. So I want
    folks to understand what the root of this problem is, so that
    they also understand what some of our solutions can be.
        Is it fair to say that essentially back in the day, calls
    used to be routed through phone wires, through your telecom
    company, and so your telecom provider, whether it was Verizon
    or AT&T or T-Mobile, they were responsible for routing the
    calls and therefore they were kind of able to trace who was
    making them, is that right?
        Mr. Winters. Yes.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. And then, as internet applications
    started to grow, then voice service providers and calls over
    digital services started to really expand in their
    infrastructure. And so it was not just your cell phone provider
    or even your landline provider that was in charge of your phone
    calls, it then became kind of these other kind of internet
    companies, right?
        Mr. Winters. Yes, there are a lot of intermediary service
    providers. Sometimes a call will go through like eight or 10 of
    them before reaching you through AT&T or whatever.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Yes, so it was really in that switch
    from call and telecom providers to the expanding growth of
    internet providers that really kind of allowed the volume of
    these calls to blossom, because we were not just talking about
    telecom regulation but internet regulation, right?
        Mr. Winters. I think that's definitely a lot of the reason
    to blame for those additional intermediary providers that are
    harder to track through.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. And so it is no longer about who your
    personal provider is. As you said, you could have eight, you
    could have 10 of these companies routing this call. So you have
    the person who wants to make this robocall, and then it just
    leapfrogs between all these intermediary companies.
        Mr. Winters, how many of these intermediary companies
    currently exist? And does the Government have any way to keep
    track of who these actors are?
        Mr. Winters. Thanks for the question. Yes. It is kind of an
    unanswerable question. I think since we have been there, there
    are probably additional companies that have popped up and
    registered on the robocall mitigation database. I think last
    time I checked a few days ago, it was over 9,500 of these
    intermediary service providers. And so, you know, there is a
    list online. It is not a high barrier to entry. You have to,
    you know, register that you are a company, you have to put a
    robocall mitigation plan in the form. But there is not a lot of
    vetting there, right?
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. And if these kind of abusive companies--
    sure, they have to register. But if we find that they are not
    complying, the consequence just seems to be that they get
    delisted from the database, correct?
        Mr. Winters. Only sometimes. Not even that sometimes.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. OK. But without any additional
    penalties, is there anything to stop these companies from just
    immediately getting relisted?
        Mr. Winters. No. You can, you know, if you are delisted,
    you can get another corporation and set it up and sign up
    again.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. So if you are a bad actor in this space,
    someone that is, you know, really perpetuating spam calls, in
    some cases fraudulent calls, you can be found to be breaking
    these rules, you can get delisted from the FCC, and then you
    can just turn around and it is, what a hundred bucks to----
        Mr. Winters. I think that is not even necessarily in force
    yet, but yes, it will be a hundred bucks.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Yes, it's a hundred bucks, and maybe you
    will have to pay it, maybe not.
        Mr. Winters. Mm-hmm.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. So clearly, there is an enforcement
    problem here in keeping these bad actors out of the space.
        In your opinion as a consumer protection advocate, how can
    we as Congress work to strengthen some of these protections?
    And what do you think some of the best solutions here are?
        Mr. Winters. Yes, I think particularly to the lack of
    accountability in the robocall mitigation database, you know,
    there are a few really easy things that either the FCC can do
    or Congress can instruct the FCC to do to speed that up, I
    guess. There is a really low barrier. Right now, you have to
    have reasonable precautions of taking--you know, to mitigate
    robocalls. And that standard should be increased to effective,
    actual implementation. There should be requirements for the
    downstream providers, the bigger companies, to have
    responsibility for the calls that they are taking in from those
    eight to 10, whatever, plus intermediary service providers.
    And, you know, there is just insufficient tracking,
    insufficient consequences for repeat offenders, even--even
    under the company they are doing.
        And one thing we advocate for to try to increase that
    accountability, because it is genuinely a difficult problem to
    try to track all these service providers, even if there is a
    full-court press. But one proposal we have put out there is to
    implement bonding for robocall mitigation database members, so
    that a third party is incentivized to make sure that they are
    actually doing what they say they are going to do and help
    protect consumers. So very happy to work with your office to
    try to make that happen. Thanks.
        Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is Mr. Mullin for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being
    here today.
        Americans lose billions of dollars every year to phone-
    based scams. We must crack down on illegal robocalls and
    robotexts.
        With the recent enactment of laws that further empower
    enforcement agencies, there has been progress toward protecting
    people from these predatory practices, but not enough.
        I want to recognize former Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, who
    represents a district neighboring mine. She has represented
    that for over 30 years before her recent retirement. I want to
    thank her for her leadership on this issue.
        She introduced key legislation like the Hangup Act and the
    Robocalls and Texts Act, and I am proud to help uplift some of
    that work that she led on in this committee and hopefully carry
    it forward in the future.
        As we have heard today, more must be done to keep up with
    the rapidly advancing technology and the increasingly
    sophisticated tactics that scammers are using. Enforcement
    agencies need the tools and resources to stay ahead. The more
    sophisticated the methods, the more likely people fall victim
    to them. As more companies integrate AI into their products, it
    is becoming even harder for consumers to distinguish legitimate
    communication from fraud.
        Mr. Bercu, you mentioned AI-generated messages are harder
    to detect and can present challenges for enforcement. How can
    the Government and industry better coordinate to establish
    safeguards to limit harm to people from illegal calls using AI?
        Mr. Bercu. Thank you for the question. I think it--the fact
    that the criminal actors behind these calls use AI just
    underscores they will use every tool, every channel available
    to them to defraud Americans. And I think that is one of the
    challenges we have, is they are not going--they are already
    violating the law with impunity. They are committing fraud,
    that is violation of the criminal code. So that is one of the
    things I think we think, is we do need a national strategy. We
    do need to prioritize criminal enforcement, because they are
    going to continue to use the tools.
        And from the carrier perspective, there is not going to be
    a good way to know which tools they are using because, as Mr.
    Winters pointed out, they are so far upstream from where our
    members sit.
        Mr. Mullin. Thank you for that. We know that certain people
    in our communities are particularly vulnerable, like seniors
    and individuals with limited English proficiency. Mr. Winters,
    what can the FTC in coordination with other agencies do to be
    proactive in protecting vulnerable populations from these kinds
    of scams?
        Mr. Winters. Thank you for the question. You know, I think
    it is a lot of the same, of working to cut off the problem at
    the source, right? So whether we are talking about an AI tool
    that makes it super easy to generate a million texts that
    threaten to be immigration enforcement or something, for
    example. The enforcement action should target those developers
    that are putting those products out there.
        Same thing goes for, you know, putting liability and
    responsibility for people throughout the call stream, to make
    sure that the calls they are taking content from are, you know,
    actually doing what they're saying they're going to do. But I
    think that the FTC and all these, you know, State attorneys
    general as well can be doing more to do better investigation of
    the members of the robocall mitigation database, making sure
    that the STIR/SHAKEN protocols are implemented, you know,
    thoroughly and it actually does what it is supposed to do. I
    think a lot of times, we see scam calls that have the high
    level of attestation, despite that being the whole point. So I
    think that there is just a lot more that they can do together.
        Mr. Mullin. And you also strongly assert, Mr. Winters, in
    your testimony that the FTC's overall enforcement capacity has
    been diminished by the recent unlawful firings of two
    Democratic Commissioners and deep staff and budget cuts at the
    agency. So how are those agency cuts going to hinder FTC's
    ability to advance its efforts to combat illegal robocalls and
    robotexts?
        Mr. Winters. It will hurt their ability to do so. As we
    have talked about, it is already a really difficult issue, even
    if you are trying your best and have all the resources you can.
    If you are taking people away, especially at an agency like the
    FTC that has a really broad jurisdiction, of course you are
    going to have less resources, less creative cases, just
    because, you know, more things are being put on less people,
    and the priorities are not there either. And so especially
    without the Commissioners, two of the five Commissioners, you
    do not get dissent, you don't get the conversations that might
    generate more creative ideas or different ideas. And so between
    that and the staffing, it will just make it a lot harder.
        Mr. Mullin. Thank you for that. I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you. Next up is the gentleman from
    Texas, Mr. Pfluger.
        Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
    witnesses being here.
        I want to take a little bit different approach on this and
    just talk about a little bit of the impact that I am not sure
    has been fully discussed today, and that is to physicians. And
    in the process of getting screenshots of the physicians in my
    district, and one in particular who is showing me kind of the
    impact of about 20 a day that they are getting, that is really
    preventing--these calls, these robocalls are preventing that
    physician from being able to take calls from the ER or from
    labor and delivery. And it is pretty concerning.
        So apparently, the apps that they are using to either
    diagnose or have conversations with their patients--the Abridge
    app is one of them, and then there is another app, and I am not
    familiar with these, so I am not the expert on this--but you
    cannot use those apps when calls are coming in.
        And so I just wrote down from the screenshot the calls that
    recently came in. This was from last week on Friday: 2:31,
    2:53, 2:57, 3:48, 3:53, 3:58, 3:59, 4:38, and 4:48. And in that
    period of time, starting at 2:30, ending at almost 5:00 p.m.,
    you know, there were a number of patients that were disrupted.
        So I know we are beating a dead horse with just how painful
    these things are. But that actually is pretty serious, you
    know, when they cannot take a call from the labor and delivery
    section saying, ``Hey, we have an incident here that you need
    to get up pretty quick and, you know, deliver.''
        So I will start with Ms. Leggin. And, by the way, thank you
    all. I know we are all working together to try to solve these.
    But, you know, to what extent do you see TCPA and TRACED being
    effective? And then I will go a step further. I mean, we have
    had these discussions already in this hearing but, you know,
    the sense of urgency and what else needs to be done to prevent
    that physician and all the other physicians from having to deal
    with that in the middle of what could be an emergency situatio.
        Ms. Leggin. Thank you for the question. And that seems like
    a serious issue.
        TRACED and the TCPA are great tools that are helpful and
    helping bring enforcement actions against bad actors under the
    TCPA if you are violating those consent, autodialer,
    prerecorded voice provisions. But unfortunately, bad actors do
    not care about the TCPA or other laws, so they are going to
    spam you no matter what. And that is where our work with law
    enforcement partnerships on the calling side through the ITG or
    on the texting side through the Secure Messaging Initiative--to
    bring investigations against those bad actors so that we are
    stopping those at the source are really helpful.
        Mr. Pfluger. Yes, go ahead.
        Ms. Leggin. And I was just going to say you have heard me
    say throughout this hearing, we would welcome help from
    Congress in prioritizing resources towards enforcement to bring
    more cases against those bad actors.
        Mr. Pfluger. What do you think we can do--and anybody is
    open to answer this. What do you think we can do for hospitals
    in general? You know, for those that are providing emergency
    services. Because nobody is using a pager anymore. It is all
    cell phone. Maybe they need to go back to that.
        But what can we do to think creatively to really stop that
    for those--I mean, every constituent of mine wants it stopped.
    But are there specific ideas?
        Ms. Leggin. That is a good question. You know, it is a
    really challenging issue, especially when we want to make sure
    that critical public safety, public health services need to get
    their calls through. You know, the same tools that we apply to
    protect consumers can protect, you know, the personal lines of
    physicians and other things. Call blocking, call labeling, call
    filtering services, and then combining that with enforcement so
    that we are stopping those at the source.
        Mr. Pfluger. This particular physician goes through,
    deletes and, you know, reports junk and does--reports it and
    does all that. So it sounds like it has been a continued issue.
        I will go to Mr. Bercu. When we look at the gaps, and just
    kind of building on this same theme, you know, are there
    specific things that you would have us do to address those gaps
    and, if so, maybe describe how they affect, let's just go with
    the physician sector, healthcare.
        Mr. Bercu. Yes, absolutely. And I think, by the way, I
    think we have the right framework. Mr. Winters was talking
    about the robocall mitigation database, and I could not agree
    more, we need to find ways to quickly find the bad actors in
    that database, get them out. The FCC does require that
    providers have to do due diligence about who they take traffic
    from. So we are developing the data to see who keeps taking
    traffic from these shell companies. So I am optimistic we will
    continue to make progress.
        There are--as Ms. Leggin mentioned, there are blocking,
    labeling, and specific-use cases. I know we work sometimes with
    some companies that sit on the inbound call side for a
    hospital. And we have had successful--and they have really
    sophisticated tools to see which is the consumer and which is
    not. So those are some of the things I would recommend that the
    doctor looks into.
        Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Next up is Mr. Allen for 5 minutes, please.
        Mr. Allen. I want to thank Chairman Palmer for convening
    this hearing. And you probably heard this today from every
    district in the country, but my constituents frequently express
    their frustration with the persistent barrage of illegal
    robocalls, robotexts. They are a nuisance, and they are a
    significant distress, anxiety, particularly for our elderly
    population, because some of these folks are up to no good and
    are taking advantage of our constituents.
        These communications often exploit our most vulnerable
    individuals. And it is really eroding our trust in the
    telecommunications systems. I look forward to receiving updates
    on the progress made under existing laws and exploring
    actionable next steps to protect consumers and strengthen
    enforcement. And I want to thank our witnesses for being here
    with us.
        Mr. Bercu and Ms. Leggin, there has been a lot of public
    and private action in the fight against illegal robocalls, both
    under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and under the
    TRACED Act. Generally, robocall numbers have been on a downward
    trend over the years.
        If illegal robocalls trends have dropped, why am I still
    getting so many complaints from my constituents?
        Mr. Bercu. Yes, I think some of the members sort of
    expressed that. There are really positive numbers, the 50
    percent reduction in scam robocalls. But not everyone is having
    the same experience. Some people do get more than others. So
    that is an ongoing challenge.
        But there again, I think we have the right framework. We
    are tracing back those illegal calls. Some of those are illegal
    telemarketing. We are tracing them back. That information is
    making its way to enforcement.
        And in terms of the scam calls in particular, we know that
    they are going to keep going. Just because it gets a little
    harder does not mean they say, ``OK, we are going to go do
    another line of business.'' They are just going to keep coming
    through a new channel, through a new method, through a new
    shell company. And so that is really where we think the answer
    has to be actually going after them with criminal enforcement.
    And we think that should be a priority.
        Mr. Allen. Ms. Leggin, would you care to add to that?
        Ms. Leggin. I agree with what Mr. Bercu said. You know, the
    framework that we have in place continues to show progress, and
    we continue to build upon that with new tools and enhance those
    tools with machine learning and AI and the latest technologies
    to make them even better. And I agree that more focus on
    enforcement by taking those bad actors off the field is where
    we need help.
        We saw a group of State attorneys general, for example,
    recently get a judgment against prolific robocaller Jonathan
    Spiller, so that that prevents him from starting new businesses
    or otherwise kind of popping up again after getting an
    enforcement action against him.
        So things like that will continue to help make a big
    difference and continue to drive those robocall numbers down.
        Mr. Allen. So we are identifying these bad actors. It is
    just a matter of prosecuting them?
        Mr. Bercu. In many cases we are, where we are getting good
    data that can further the investigation. It is one of the
    reasons that I am actually optimistic about continuing to work
    across sectors, because we can now combine some of our data
    with some data that the banks can get that through, as Ms.
    Leggin mentioned, the AARP's National Elder Coordination
    Council. Really aggregate data. Because that is one of the
    challenges. If it is one scam, it is hard to get a prosecutor
    involved. But if you can show it is a multimillion-dollar scam,
    you can. So that is still where some of the work needs to go.
        Mr. Allen. Well, thank you.
        Mr. Waguespack, in April 2025, FCC issued a notice of
    proposed rulemaking. They proposed a 2-year time line for
    providers to maintain non-IP infrastructure to either complete
    their IP transitions or fully implement one or more of the
    available non-IP caller ID authentication frameworks in their
    non-IP network.
        In your opinion, is the FCC's 2-year time line reasonable?
        Mr. Waguespack. I would yield to my colleagues to the right
    on more of the technical time line there, because they are the
    ones that are going to be implementing some of that.
        I would say from our perspective, if I could just--since I
    have the mic for a second--bring in another universe of
    recipient of a lot of these robocalls that we have not really
    addressed yet, is what lies in between business and consumers a
    lot of times is small business. Because a lot of those
    recipients, they are kind of part consumer, part business
    owner. Their cell phone becomes their business phone and their
    residential phone, et cetera. They cannot qualify for Do Not
    Call if it is considered business or not.
        That is a vulnerability that we hear a lot from our members
    on small business. And it is also a vulnerability that is being
    exploited from some of these predatory lawsuits I mentioned
    earlier in my opening statement.
        Mr. Allen. All right, you have answered my second question
    there about the impact, particularly in rural areas, and other
    non-IP networks.
        Ms. Leggin, in your testimony you discuss how CTIA and its
    wireless partners embark on the next generation of call
    identification solutions, namely branded calling. What is
    branded calling, and how will it help reduce scams and scam
    calls?
        Ms. Leggin. Thank you for the question. CTIA is building
    the next generation of branded calling by bring together the
    wireless ecosystem players to give the consumer more
    information about who is calling and why. And branded calling,
    as the name suggests, means that the logo of the caller comes
    through.
        This framework provides verified identity of the caller and
    builds upon the STIR/SHAKEN framework to make that information
    that comes through to the caller even clearer and better. So by
    doing so, we help empower the consumer to make better choices
    about do you want to answer the call or not. And we think that
    will be a really helpful tool in continuing to protect
    consumers from scam calls.
        Mr. Allen. Good. I thank all of you. And, Mr. Chairman, I
    yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking
    Member Clarke.
        Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a
    request for unanimous consent. Representative Sorensen sent a
    letter to the chair and myself about the importance of taking
    action and his bipartisan QUIET Act, which addresses some of
    the issues raised here today.
        I ask for unanimous consent for his letter to be entered
    into the record.
        Mr. Balderson. We received the letter. And seeing no
    objection, accept it.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you.
        Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
        Mr. Balderson. Next up, the gentleman from the great State
    of Ohio, Mr. Rulli, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Rulli. Thank you, Chairman.
        The question will be directed at Ms. Leggin. This is a
    bipartisan issue and I think the most engaging, sensitive
    constituency that we have, I would say, over 60. When I was
    young, I used to listen to a lot of talk radio in the 1980s and
    the 1990s. And it was a subject then and it is just a subject
    as much right now today. They want to enjoy their peace and
    their tranquility. And these robocalls just keep ruining it.
        So what percentage of illegal robocalls and spam text
    messages originate abroad? And where do they primarily
    originate from? What part of the world?
        Ms. Leggin. Thank you for the question. It is a mix of
    robocalls and robotexts that come from both the U.S.----
        Mr. Balderson. Ms. Leggin, your mic, please. Sorry.
        Ms. Leggin. Sorry. Microphone.
        It is a mix. It comes from bad actors that are both located
    in the U.S. and outside the U.S. And we take seriously our work
    to protect consumers from illegal robocalls and robotexts that
    originate abroad. It continues to evolve. But southeast Asia is
    one area, including India, and the call centers there that Mr.
    Bercu mentioned earlier continues to be a source of illegal and
    unwanted robocalls and robotexts.
        So we support efforts like those at the FCC, where they
    have memorandums of understanding with international partners,
    with States to collaborate on enforcement against the bad
    actors located outside of the U.S.
        Mr. Rulli. Out of curiosity, do you think that America has
    migrated into an evolution where we have gotten better than we
    have in the early 1990s? Or not really?
        Ms. Leggin. We have definitely gotten a lot better than the
    early 1990s. And especially over the last 10 years on the
    robocall front, we have had a lot of attention to this issue
    from this committee, through the TRACED Act, from the FCC and
    other agencies giving us more tools, more authority to go after
    bad actors in this space. And there has been a lot of
    innovation in the texting space as well over the years to make
    our onboarding, our filtering, our blocking and consumer
    reporting tools even better. And we continue to enhance those
    very day.
        Mr. Rulli. Thank you so much. And then I have a question
    for Mr. Bercu. To fight against robocalls and spam texts, the
    FCC has formed international alliances and partnerships with
    countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, Romania,
    Singapore, just to name a few. How should we move forward with
    helping the FCC handle enforcement with countries that are bad
    players, like in Laos and in Cambodia, who seem not wanting to
    get involved in the Government? How can we get more involved
    with these countries that are allowing these illegal procedures
    to happen?
        Mr. Bercu. That is a great question.
        Mr. Balderson. Is your mic on?
        Mr. Bercu. Sorry. That's a great question.
        So I think one of the things we would love to see is that
    is why we do need a national strategy, because the same people
    attacking us here are also attacking consumers in Canada and
    the U.K. and Thailand.
        I think as we go around the world, there is more of a
    coalition of the willing to go after the criminal actors here.
    And so, you know, the FCC has those MOUs with other countries.
    But we also need it coming from the criminal law enforcement
    authorities at that level, and working together to take down
    some of these entities. And organized crime, really, is what we
    are going after with those.
        Mr. Rulli. Do you think it is obtainable?
        Mr. Bercu. I think it is obtainable. I think we have seen
    some other countries take very aggressive actions. For example,
    Myanmar is now building out their reporting about these fraud
    centers in Myanmar. The Thai Government shut off the power, so
    they are going to generators. But I think there is room to
    continue to build on those and build those collaborations.
    Because again, those same entities are attacking us all over
    the world.
        Mr. Rulli. Outstanding. Thank you so much.
        And with that, I yield my time back to the chair.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you. Next up is the gentleman from
    Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. Weber.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Leggin, I am coming to you. I had to be at another
    hearing for a long time. I apologize if this is redundant.
        In many cases, robocalls are so believable that millions of
    Americans fall prey to the various scams every year. However,
    the recent rise in robotexts, as we call them, adds a new layer
    of complexity. What makes combating spam and scam texts--why is
    that more difficult than robocalls?
        Ms. Leggin. Thank you for the question. CTIA and our
    members throughout the messaging ecosystem take seriously our
    goal to protect consumers from illegal and unwanted robotexts.
    Voice and text are different technologies, and they present
    different ways that bad actors target consumers. So we've got
    different problems with different solutions.
        So it is just a different ecosystem where we still bring
    blocking tools to bear in the texting space. For example, we
    blocked over 55 billion scam texts just last year. But that is
    just one piece of the----
        Mr. Weber. Can I give you my cell phone and have you block
    some more?
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Leggin. Happy to help, yes.
        We continue to up those efforts and bring new tools to
    bear.
        In messaging, we've got tools throughout the message flow,
    including up-front vetting and verification services that help
    identify whether legitimate businesses are who they say they
    are. And it helps deter bad actors from getting on the platform
    in the first place. We've got sophisticated algorithms, machine
    learning, AI, and fraud teams that look at ways to protect
    consumers from unwanted and illegal text messages in the
    middle, and then we've got consumer reporting on the back end
    so that you can delete and report junk, or you can forward your
    spam text to 7726. And the wireless industry takes those in to
    use to enhance our protection tools so that we are taking in
    that consumer feedback to make those tools even stronger.
        Mr. Weber. Do you know, this question may be a little bit
    to the left, do you know or are you all able to determine how
    many texts a company sends out at any given time? They send out
    a million, 10 million? Can you identify that, know that?
        Ms. Leggin. So companies use a variety of different
    platforms to send out their communications. So to us, that is
    not something that we look at. What we look at is trying to
    make sure that we are looking for suspicious patterns,
    indicators of spam or other illegal things to target those, to
    protect consumers from those. Otherwise, it's really a balance
    to protect consumers while also making sure that legitimate
    business communications go through.
        So like I said, we blocked 55 billion last year. But we
    also let--you know, supported 2 trillion texts to go through.
    So it is always a balance.
        Mr. Weber. Well, I think a trillion of those came to my
    cell phone.
        Mr. Bercu, I am going to come to you. As you are probably
    aware, there are varying levels of jurisdiction and oversight
    when dealing with either foreign or domestic entities.
        Now, I missed the first half of his question. So if this is
    redundant--did he ask you about this?
        Mr. Bercu. He may have but I am happy to----
        Mr. Weber. Well, what are some of the unique challenges
    regulators and law enforcement face when dealing with foreign-
    originating robocalls? Is that what you all just went through?
        Mr. Bercu. We went through an aspect of that. But I am
    happy to talk about it. We have traced--in our tracebacks, we
    have traced calls----
        Mr. Weber. And how do they vary from domestic ones?
        Mr. Bercu. Yes. So I think in our experience, both on what
    we have seen through our tracebacks but also some public
    reporting, I think what we see is that illegal telemarketing,
    often that is homegrown and there are entities--John Spiller,
    Ms. Leggin mentioned earlier--that might be more local. But we
    do see a lot of the fraud comes from abroad, especially the
    scaled fraud.
        So in terms of other countries, I think those same actors
    are attacking everyone around the world. I think there is a lot
    of work to be done collaboratively with other countries. We
    have traced those, we do trace those, we find those entities.
    We sometimes see entities log into our portal saying they are a
    U.S. company but log in from abroad. So I think we are building
    that dataset and it can arm criminal law enforcement to go
    after it.
        Mr. Weber. OK, very quickly. Our first responders, medical
    professionals, and others often deal with individuals who are
    at their most vulnerable, making them a prime target for
    potential scams and attacks. So the question is going to be--
    but I have one to ask real quick--how do we address spoofing
    related to hospitals, police, government agencies, and other
    public service entities? And I want to hone in on this as a
    question for the two of you all. And we will go back to you,
    Ms. Leggin. How about have you all ever encountered what is
    known as swatting?
        Ms. Leggin. Yes.
        Mr. Weber. And how often? Or would you put a percentage on
    that? And what do you do about it?
        Ms. Leggin. So we take swatting very seriously. You know,
    that is where someone calls in a fake emergency and has, you
    know, a police team go to your house. That is something where
    we are not really seeing that as much on wireless 911 calls as
    much as it is on other networks. But regardless, the same tools
    that protect consumers from illegal and unwanted robocalls--
    like call authentication, like STIR/SHAKEN, call filtering,
    call blocking, and then tracing back calls after they have gone
    through to find the bad actor responsible--are all things that
    we encourage to address swatting, as well as partnerships with
    law enforcement to go after that criminal activity as well.
        Mr. Weber. OK. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Balderson. Thank you. Seeing no other Members here
    wishing to ask questions, I would like to thank our witnesses
    again for being here today. Without objection, that will be the
    order.
        Pursuant to committee rules, I remind Members that they
    have 10 business days to submit additional questions for the
    record. And I ask that the witnesses submit their response
    within 10 business days upon receipt of the questions.
        Without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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