[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MAXIMUM IMPACT: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU
OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND CHARTING THE
PATH FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
May 6, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-626 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Ranking Member
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARRK, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas TED LIEU K, California
YOUNG KIM, California SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, GREG STANTON, Arizona
American Samoa JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
KEITH SELF, Texas GEORGE LATIMER, New York
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
DARRELL ISSA, California Florida, Ranking Member
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee BRAD SHERMAN, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
RYAN ZINKE, Montana KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington GEORGE LATIMER, New York
Sarah Miller, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Sheila
Cherfilus-Mccormick............................................ 1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........ 2
WITNESSES
Statement of Hon. Nathan A. Sales, Former Coordinator For
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State..................... 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Statement of Dr. Daniel L. Byman, Director, Security Studies
Program, Georgetown University................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 46
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 47
Hearing Attendance............................................... 48
MAXIMUM IMPACT: ASSESSING THE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND
CHARTING THE PATH FORWARD
----------
Tuesday, May 6, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Lawler
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Lawler. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and North
Africa will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to explore the Bureau of
Counterterrorism's placement in the State Department, the role
and responsibilities of the Bureau's leadership, and the
execution of its programs.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member from Florida
Representative Cherfilus-McCormick for any statement that she
may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA
CHERFILUS-McCORMICK
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, for
convening this hearing on the State Department's
Counterterrorism Bureau. I welcome this timely conversation
with our two expert witnesses.
Thank you for coming in today. We look forward to hearing
your testimony.
As we sit here, terrorism and violent extremism remain a
growing threat that we must address with clear eyes and
effective policy.
According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, the number of
countries recording a terrorist attack increased from 55--58 to
66, reversing nearly a decade of improvement.
Today, 59 hostages remain captive in Gaza as a result of
Hamas' brutal terror attacks on Israel on October 7th,
including American Edan Alexander and the bodies of four other
Americans.
While Iranian proxies have been weakening and have been
weakened, and recent developments in Lebanon and Syria persist,
an opportunity for cautious optimism.
ISIS, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis remain an
active threat in the Middle East, have attacked the U.S. ships
and have even killed U.S. servicemen.
In Africa, the Sahel region including 10 countries--Burkina
Faso, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria,
Chad, and Mauritania--accounted for 19 of overall terror--of
all terrorist attacks worldwide, becoming the epicenter of
global terrorism.
These are just some of the threats that the CT Bureau has
been and must continue to address. I must also note that while
the CT Bureau is primarily focused on terrorism threats facing
the U.S. from abroad, we must remain vigilant to the ways
terrorism threatens us here at home.
In March, the Center of Strategic and International Studies
published its annual global terrorism threat assessment, which
Dr. Byman co-authored. I encourage my colleagues to read it
carefully.
The author notes that in contrast to the years following 9/
11, in 2025 the greatest terrorist threats facing the United
States is not foreign terrorist organizations but, rather,
domestic terrorism.
In 2025 the threat of terrorism is made worse--is made more
complex by terrorist organizations and groups using digital
assets, social media, and misinformation to strengthen their
operations across borders.
We also know that the threat of terrorism is exacerbated by
economic instability, political regression, famine, and climate
change. The African countries I mentioned earlier--Syria, Yemen
and potentially Haiti--have become ripe for recruitment if we
are not careful and vigilant.
But at the very moment we need our counterterrorism toolbox
full. This administration is hell bent on emptying it bit by
bit.
The arbitrary cuts to the Foreign Assistance Program and
the proposed 84 percent reduction in the State Department and
international assistant budget will leave us less prepared to
address the threats of this global terrorism.
I look forward to having a robust, expert-driven
conversation about how we can support the CT Bureau in the
important work.
I believe that if we ground our efforts in facts rather
than fantasies we can ensure the U.S. is best positioned to
address the multifaceted ways terrorism continues to threaten
American citizens, our allies, and the global stability.
I yield back.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER
Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member. I now
recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon, and thank you to our witnesses for being
here today.
From the Houthis in Yemen to al-Shabaab in the Sahel to
ISIS-K in Afghanistan, global terrorism remains a persistent
and evolving threat to the safety and security of Americans
both at home and abroad.
Terrorism not only endangers lives but also destabilizes
regions, disrupts global commerce, and undermines U.S.
interests around the world.
While countering violent extremism has long required a
comprehensive whole of government approach, the threat
landscape has evolved. Yet, our counterterrorism strategy has
not kept pace.
Therefore, today we gather to examine the specific and
critical role of the coordinator for counterterrorism and the
Bureau of Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State in
the modern threat landscape.
Established by Congress in 1998, the position of
coordinator for counterterrorism was created to serve as a
central note for U.S. diplomatic efforts to combat terrorism
abroad.
Now housed within the Bureau of Counterterrorism the
coordinator leads a team dedicated to advancing U.S.
counterterrorism policy and coordinating with partner nations
in the global fight against terrorism.
The Bureau's work is multifaceted and consequential, from
engaging diplomatically with foreign partners to designating
terrorist entities and implementing targeted assistance
programs.
The Bureau plays a vital role in our National Security
Strategy. The Bureau's mission also includes training foreign
law enforcement, border control, and judicial officials to
identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorist actors and networks.
These investments overseas deliver national security benefits
here at home.
However, to succeed in today's evolving threat environment
the Bureau must operate as an integrated and effective player
within the broader interagency framework. This requires close
coordination with key partners such as the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, and a wide range of
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
A clearly defined mission and delineated authorities are
essential to ensure the Bureau complements the work of its
interagency counterparts rather than duplicating efforts or
creating conflicts.
Effective coordination is especially vital when confronting
State sponsors of terrorism, chief among them Iran. In 2024
alone Iran exported an estimated 587 million barrels of oil,
marking a 10.75 percent increase from the previous year.
These revenues likely continue to bankroll terrorist
proxies including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. I am
particularly interested in how the Bureau engages
diplomatically and works across agencies to disrupt the
financial and trade networks that fuel Iran's global campaign
of terror.
This includes ensuring that our security assistance aligns
with counterterrorism priorities. The Bureau is uniquely
positioned to assess where partner nations fall short in
counterterrorism capabilities, but it is not always clear how
those assessments influence funding decisions.
As we have seen with countries like Morocco and Lebanon,
very different threat environments can result in nearly
identical foreign military financing levels. We should consider
whether the Bureau ought to have a more formalized role in
prioritizing security assistance when counterterrorism is the
primary objective.
At a time when adversaries like China and Russia are
actively seeking to undermine U.S. leadership on
counterterrorism it is more critical than ever for Congress to
evaluate and strengthen the authority, mission, and
effectiveness of the coordinator of counterterrorism.
Through the reauthorization process we will ensure that
every dollar spent and every diplomat deployed is singularly
focused on the safety and security of the American people.
Under the leadership of the Trump administration we now
have the opportunity to reevaluate and modernize our approach
to counterterrorism and chart a stronger, more strategic path
forward.
Our witnesses today bring a wealth of firsthand experience,
both from leading the Bureau of Counterterrorism and from
conducting extensive analysis of U.S. counterterrorism and
security policy.
Their testimony will provide valuable insight into the
structural and operational challenges facing the Bureau and
will help identify the key reforms and authorities needed from
Congress to strengthen its effectiveness--moving forward.
With that, I want to again thank both of our witnesses for
their testimony.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic, Hon. Nathan A. Sales,
former coordinator for counterterrorism at the U.S. Department
of State, and Dr. Daniel L. Byman, director of the security
studies program at Georgetown University.
The committee recognizes the importance of the issues
before us and is grateful to have you both here to speak to us
today.
Your full statements will be made part of the record and I
will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes
in order to allow time for member questions.
I now recognize Ambassador Sales for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF NATHAN A. SALES
Mr. Sales. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick, and
members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here with
you today.
The gist of my testimony is fairly simple. Counterterrorism
still matters. It still matters even at a time when
Washington's primary focus is on adversary states like China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Today's threat landscape, as we have already heard, is as
complex and unpredictable as ever. After our withdrawal from
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is regrouping under the protection of its
longstanding Taliban patrons. It reportedly built nine new
camps in 2024 alone.
ISIS' local affiliate ISIS-K has shown it can strike far
beyond Afghanistan's borders.
Last March it killed more than 140 people in Moscow. Under
the Taliban's misrule, Afghanistan has once again become a safe
haven for terror. No fewer than 21 terrorist groups are active
on its soil.
In Syria, we have seen a steady rise in attacks by ISIS
remnants. Last year ISIS conducted about 700 attacks in the
country. That is an average of almost 60 per month, almost
triple the numbers from 2023.
West Africa is becoming the epicenter of global terrorism.
Last year the Sahel region accounted for 51 percent of global
terrorism-related deaths. Five of the 10 countries in the world
most affected by terrorism are in the Sahel.
The situation in Nigeria is particularly concerning with
extremist violence killing some 52,000 Christians since 2009.
So why does all this matter to the United States?
Well, first, we have a vital interest in preventing attacks
on Americans abroad and, ultimately, on our homeland. In
addition, terrorism can spark open warfare between states with
far reaching regional and even global consequences.
We saw this in the aftermath of the October 7th attack on
Israel by the Iranian regime's terror proxy Hamas.
Terrorism can unleash waves of migration that import
security risks and upend domestic politics as Europe has
learned in recent years. Hostile states like Russia know this
all too well and they weaponize migration to destabilize their
neighbors.
Finally, keeping terrorist threats at bay gives leaders the
space they need to address other geopolitical problems. A
catastrophic attack would leave policymakers with little
bandwidth for the urgent challenges posed by rival states,
which brings me to a key point.
CT isn't some kind of distraction from higher priorities in
an era of great power competition. It is a vital part of
American grand strategy.
CT cooperation can cement partnerships, aligning key states
with Washington, and detaching them from competitors. We are
the security partner of choice and we can offer capabilities
that our rivals can't match.
This is especially true in Africa where China and Russia
are both active. America and our African partners have the same
goal. We want front line states to be able to defend themselves
on their own and not be perpetually dependent on Washington.
Not so Communist China, whose debt trap diplomacy creates
vassals, and not so Russia, whose idea of security assistance
is to send in Wagner mercenaries to brutalize innocent
civilians.
Furthermore, counterterrorism tools can be used to respond
to state-backed proxy groups. Countries like Iran, North Korea,
and Russia are increasingly relying on such proxies to do their
dirty work--assassinations, attacks on civilian infrastructure,
even planting bombs on cargo planes.
Sanctions, prosecutions, and other CT tools can impose
meaningful costs on those responsible. They also negate the
plausible deniability that led hostile states to use proxies in
the first place.
Let me close with a few suggestions to make the State
Department's vital counterterrorism work more effective.
First, look at consolidating in the CT Bureau some of the
counterterrorism responsibilities that are still spread across
the State Department. There are some examples in my written
statement.
Second, streamline the process for reviewing foreign
terrorist organizations designations. Under current law CT
Bureau has to conduct a review every 5 years to determine
whether to keep a designated FTO on the list.
Those reviews are unnecessary as any group that renounces
terrorism can file a petition for delisting. Worse, the reviews
consume scarce resources that could be better spent imposing
new sanctions on new groups.
Third, change the CT coordinator's official title to
assistant secretary, the standard terminology used by most
other State Department bureaus.
And fourth and finally, preserve State's traditional role
as the central hub for the distribution of all foreign
assistance.
As the Nation's preeminent foreign policy agency, State is
normally in the best position to assess and ensure that
resources are aligned with mission.
Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for your time and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sales follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ambassador Sales.
I now recognize Dr. Byman for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN
Mr. Byman. Thank you.
Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick,
members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify.
I won't repeat what Ambassador Sales said about the
evolving nature of the terrorism threat and especially his
points on how it is incredibly consequential in Africa.
I would also add, however, that the white supremacist
threat has globalized and we are seeing interaction among white
supremacists around the world.
I would also note that China and particularly Russia are
engaged in gray zone competition that also involves activities
that we would consider support for terrorism such as
assassination and sabotage against civilian targets.
To meet this evolving threat, the Bureau of
Counterterrorism needs to remain an integral part of the
overall U.S. effort.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned whole of government effort and
I believe the Bureau should be at or near the center of that
effort.
It is an important coordinator in bilateral relations and
multilateral forums, but it also helps integrate U.S.
intelligence, the military, and other instruments of U.S.
national power.
Although most public attention on counterterrorism focuses
on military operations, the bulk of the effort on a day-to-day
basis against groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda is done by the
security services of U.S. allies and partners.
These must be constantly coordinated, directed, and
incentivized, and this task is accomplished in part through the
intelligence liaison but also in part through vigorous
diplomacy that the CT Bureau helps coordinate.
Integrating counterterrorism into overall diplomacy is
critical and it is especially important in regions like the
Middle East where at different times the United States has had
regional policies that have not integrated counterterrorism and
counterterrorism policies that haven't integrated regional
realities.
The State Department programs that support law enforcement,
border security, and other vital tasks are cost effective and
they improve the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners, and
in so doing make the United States and the American people more
secure.
They do so at a fraction of the cost of many--of military
action and this can save many American lives. In addition,
cutting these programs increases the terrorism risk to U.S.
allies and it also sends the wrong signal to them at a time of
competition, especially with China.
We need to ensure there remains a single, high-level entity
at the State Department for coordinating counterterrorism.
We also need to make sure that the power to designate
terrorist groups and State sponsors is used responsibly to
ensure the credibility of U.S. designations.
I have the honor of sitting next to Ambassador Sales. I
would like to commend him and the CT Bureau for the work they
did in the first Trump administration in designating the first
global white supremacist terrorist groups.
That sort of action demonstrates that the United States is
committed to fighting terrorism regardless of the political
ideology behind it.
We do not want these lists to simply be an accounting of
actors the United States does not like no matter how horrific
they are. The United States should be opposed to drug cartels,
to gangs, and other nefarious actors. It should take steps to
counter them.
But the terrorism designation is not useful, given that
doesn't fit what the terrorism designation was created for and
creates complications for U.S. businesses and U.S. charities.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Byman.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Ambassador Sales, in your experience does the current
placement of the Bureau of Counterterrorism within the State
Department allow it to fully leverage its authorities in
leading interagency CT strategy?
Mr. Sales. Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman.
As you will recall, during the Biden administration CT
Bureau was moved from J, the civil rights and human rights
family of bureaus, to P, political affairs, which is where the
regional bureaus are housed.
I think Secretary Rubio's proposal to shift CT Bureau to
the T family--that is to say, the security oriented bureaus--
makes a lot of sense.
CT has natural synergies with arms control, preventing
proliferation of weapons to terrorists in particular,
preventing the use of chemical weapons by terrorists in
particular.
So I think housing it in the T family would make a lot of
sense.
Mr. Lawler. So to that end, if you can elaborate more,
obviously, Secretary Rubio, as you point out, released this new
organizational chart, moving it from P branch to T. What is--
what do you really believe the benefits of that are in more
detail?
Mr. Sales. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, there is a couple
of benefits. One is it will enable better coordination across
the various State Department bureaus that are collectively
responsible for security.
The arms control team, the law enforcement team--that is to
say, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement,
and the CT team all work on the same set of issues, try to
solve the same sorts of problems. Having them housed under the
same umbrella I think makes it easier for them to coordinate
with each other.
Mr. Lawler. How do you believe that the Counterterrorism
Bureau helps facilitate coordination between the Bureau of
African Affairs, for instance, or the Bureau of Near East
Affairs?
Obviously, this committee being Middle East and North
Africa those two are relevant to the counterterrorism issues
that span both of those regions.
Mr. Sales. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the CT Bureau has a
really vital role to play there because it is laser focused on
the challenge posed by terrorist groups.
Regional bureaus--and this is the standard push and pull
dynamic no matter what the issue is in the State Department--
they tend to have a broader aperture for looking at problems in
a region, and no one problem is always going to command the
attention of the assistant secretary and the workforce in a
regional bureau.
So the interplay between a regional bureau like NEA, which
sees the big picture of what is American grand strategy in the
Middle East, and the CT Bureau, which can address specifically
the problems posed by ISIS or al-Qaeda or other threats is a
very important dynamic.
Mr. Lawler. Ambassador Sales, what role does the
Counterterrorism Bureau play in the policy development,
implementation, and coordination of sanctions targeting
terrorist organizations and their support networks?
Mr. Sales. I think it is one of the two most important
bodies in the Federal Government dealing with sanctions policy
and sanctions execution.
So the division of labor between the CT Bureau and the
Treasury Department, the other key player when it comes to
terrorism sanctions, is as follows.
CT Bureau has the authority to impose sanctions on those
who engage in terrorism--actual terrorist operatives, actual
terrorist organizations--whereas the Treasury Department has
the authority to impose sanctions on those that enable or
facilitate or raise money for terrorist organizations.
And so sometimes the line between those different
categories of behavior can be a bit blurry and that is why I
think it is very important for the CT Bureau to have a good
relationship with counterparts over at Treasury.
Mr. Lawler. The recent back and forth on the Houthi
designation as a terrorist group raises questions about how
consistent and effective our FTO designation process actually
is.
How does the Bureau evaluate the long term value of these
designations, especially when they get reversed from one
administration to the next?
Mr. Sales. Well, Mr. Chairman, during my time at State we
were responsible for putting the Houthis on the list and we did
it because that is what the evidence dictated.
This was an organization that was committing terrorist
attacks against energy infrastructure across the Middle East,
that had attacked, actually, the Aden Airport while the
government in exile of Yemen was arriving and managed to kill,
I believe, a number of U.N. humanitarian workers.
So we simply looked at the facts, and that is the way the
CT Bureau typically approaches FTO designations, in my
experience.
We have a legal standard, engage in terrorist activity. We
look at the evidentiary record that is compiled by open source
information as well as more exquisite forms of information, and
then it is ultimately up to the Secretary to make a call as to
whether the evidence meets the legal standard.
Mr. Lawler. So you support the redesignation of the Houthis
as a terrorist organization?
Mr. Sales. Absolutely. If they haven't earned it I am not
sure who has.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from California Mr. Sherman
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Yesterday was a big day at the State Department. It was
fork in the road day. I don't know how many State Department
people have taken the check and are leaving. We will find that
out soon.
Mr. Byman, we are here focused on the Bureau of
Counterterrorism. How much--if that Bureau is cut by 15 percent
does that endanger Americans?
Mr. Byman. The Bureau of Counterterrorism their work is
critical. It is truly life or death, and it keeps me safe. It
keeps my family safe. It keeps everyone here safe.
So I think the Bureau is already underfunded, is already
overstretched, and to cut it further means the programs will be
less effective. It means there will be less coordination and,
to me, that is very dangerous.
Mr. Sherman. And we will be more vulnerable to terrorism?
Mr. Byman. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. Got you.
The Popular Resistance Committees are the third largest
terrorist group based in Gaza. They have killed Americans. They
have engaged in a whole host of terrorism before October 7th
and were full participants on October 7th.
Mr. Sales, any reason we wouldn't designate the Popular--
well, my bill to designate them we shouldn't be doing this
here. The State Department should be doing it.
My bill to designate them passed this committee unanimously
but is there a reason why we haven't designated them? I realize
they are not as big as the other two but they are third on the
list.
Mr. Sales. Yes. Bronze medal is still on the trophy stand
so I think any group that is targeting people--targeting
innocent civilians, targeting Israeli soldiers--for deadly
violence that meets the standards should certainly be on the
State Department's radar screen.
Mr. Sherman. And I realize they were once affiliated with
Fatah and that is a less terrorist organization than other
Palestinian organizations, but they did kill three American
service guards back in 2003.
I want to focus a bit on crypto. There was a huge division
in this body many years ago about--some argued that our
economic--that our use of the dollar, our banking sanctions on
Iran, were so effective that we could have gotten a better
nuclear deal, and some thought that the sanctions using the
banking system were so effective that we did get a good deal.
But both sides who agreed--were violently opposed to each
other on the--whether the deal was good agreed why we were able
to get a deal.
Right now we have maybe 10,000 transactions a day in
crypto. We have got billions of dollars a day--transactions a
day--I am saying transactions, not dollars--in dollars.
So it is a lot easier to keep track of crypto unless it
becomes a currency and becomes something that--tens of millions
of transactions occur every day.
Crypto aspires to be a major currency. If oil transactions
could take place in crypto would that undermine our ability to
bring Iran to the table?
Mr. Sales. Congressman, if that is for me, I think the
concern you raised is something that policymakers should worry
about very much.
That said, I think there are still pressure points that can
be used to apply pressure to the Iranian regime to force them
to the table.
Insurance companies, for instance, are potential pressure
points. Shipping companies are potential pressure points and
various other economic players that are enablers of illicit
Iranian energy shipments.
Mr. Sherman. But other countries have insurance companies.
Other countries have fleets of ships--in fact, far more than we
do.
Only one country controls the currency that is accepted for
international petroleum transactions. I would ask to put in the
record this article ``FBI busts $1.5 million Hamas crypto
currency ring'' into the record.
Mr. Lawler. Without objection.
[The information referred to was not provided]
Mr. Sherman. And I will ask our other witness whether if
crypto became a true rival to the dollar, millions of
transactions a day, accepted for international petroleum
transactions would that undermine our sanctions.
Mr. Byman. Crypto right now encompasses a large number of
very legitimate business entities and a wild range of
alternatives, and to the extent that different crypto
currencies want to become legitimate and want to enjoy the
rights and benefits and transactions they need to also accept
the rules and that includes preventing their use by terrorist
entities.
And whether that is Iran, whether that is different
terrorist groups they need to be cooperating with Treasury.
They need to be cooperating with investigators, and if that is
not done then----
Mr. Sherman. If you spend any time listening to the
advocates of crypto you know that is exactly what they are not
going to do.
And I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. The gentleman's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, the
chairman emeritus of the Middle East and North Africa
Subcommittee Joe Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman. I am very happy
to be emeriti. This is good, as we speak Latin here.
But aside from that, I want to thank both of you for being
here today and thank you for your service to the American
people and, indeed, Dr. Byman, I appreciate you were talking
about the enemies of freedom are working together, and somehow
there just needs to be an understanding that we are in a
conflict we didn't choose.
And these are dictators who rule by gun invading
democracies who rule by law, and it really started February 24,
2023, when war criminal Putin invaded Ukraine.
Then on October 7, 2024, you had Iran, through its puppets,
invade Israel. The aggression has continued and that--and you
have the aggression of war criminal Putin. You have the regime
in Tehran and then you have the Chinese Communist Party.
And so thank you for referencing that indeed, we have got
enemies that are working together, and people of good faith and
persons who truly want to promote freedom and democracy need to
be working together in every way.
And for both of you, in recent years we have seen
disturbing levels of a subversion of the government of Iraq by
Iran-backed terrorists, organizations, and militias. They wield
substantial influence over all branches of government and
overtly support Iran-friendly policy.
Additionally, I am particularly concerned because two of my
sons have served in Iraq with the intent of promoting freedom
for the people of Iraq, and so to see the Iranian influence, to
me, is just inconceivable of what is going on.
And with that, for each of you what is the level of the
Iranian strategy of taking over Iraq through its military
puppets and how is the Bureau adjusting its counterterrorism
approach to deal with the growing activity of Iranian puppets
as Iran continues to develop a nuclear capability?
Mr. Sales. Well, thank you, Congressman, for that question.
I think you are exactly right. Iraq really is at a
crossroads. It has to choose whether it wants to be a vassal
State to its neighbor or whether it wants to be a free and
prosperous democracy engaged in trade and commerce with the
United States and our allies.
I think Iran has tools that the United States doesn't have
for influence in Iran. It can threaten----in Iraq, I should
say.--It can threaten to kill Iraqi parliamentarians. It can
threaten to kill their families. It can offer bribes.
The United States doesn't play that game. We are not going
to stop playing the game the way we play it so what we need to
do is make sure that we are applying pressure to Iran's tools
of influence in Iraq.
That includes sanctioning the terrorist groups, the
militias that use force domestically against protesters, that
use force against American soldiers and diplomats.
It means limiting----using the power of the dollar to limit
Iran's influence over the Iraqi economy, in particular the
continued need for Iraq to purchase energy from its neighbor,
giving waivers to Iraq, which has been done for many years.
To allow those transactions to continue is a gift to the
mullahs. It gives them more leverage over a very fragile Iraqi
government and economy. It needs to stop.
Mr. Byman. Thank you, sir, for that question.
There is a decline in U.S. influence in Iraq that has been
steady now in multiple administrations for some time, and
despite the sacrifices of American soldiers, despite the
service of your sons, the United States has, largely, walked
away from Iraq and this has occurred even as Iran's position
there has been weakened by Israeli military action.
And we have seen emboldened Iraqi civil society actors more
willing to push back against Iran even though they face, as the
Ambassador pointed out, a true threat to their very lives.
Part of the role of the State Department should be
encouraging greater U.S. effort in Iraq, should be increasing
the number of people we have on the ground there, should be
ensuring that the United States has a robust military presence
in the region, and also playing a critical role in coordinating
U.S. allies--Saudi Arabia, Israel, others--with a strong
interest there.
Unfortunately, I think we are going in the wrong direction
on Iraq, and I hope that this committee can push it in the
proper direction.
Mr. Wilson. Well, your influence will be very helpful and,
indeed, we know that oil has been transferred from Iran to Iraq
under the understanding it is from Iraq.
No, it is not. It is from Iran. And then incredibly tragic
is with the dictatorship in Damascus, Assad fleeing to Moscow,
appropriately, in fact, in Iraq today the Iranian training of
forces to try to overthrow the new government that we have such
high hopes will be successful for the people of Syria.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts Mr.
Keating for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Byman, in particular, you know, if we are looking at
the important issues of reorganization, to try and be more
efficient and more effective, certainly that is the course we
should all embark on here.
But, you know, without dealing with the root causes and
having a policy that focuses on the root causes without dealing
with partnerships, because this is a global threat, it won't
mean anything.
It would be reorganization. It would be akin to moving
around the deck chairs on the Titanic. It won't accomplish
anything. So getting into the root causes there is real
problems that I see now in partnerships.
Dr. Byman, can you briefly talk about the value and the
necessity of global partners?
Mr. Byman. Thank you for the question, Mr. Keating.
The day to day of counterterrorism is, largely, done
through U.S. allies and partners. They have the forces on the
ground, whether that is law enforcement or intelligence or
military.
They also often have capabilities because they are dealing
with domestic problems that have ramifications for the United
States.
At the same time, there are zones of chaos. There are angry
populations, and U.S. programs to counter extremism are
designed to help manage or at least reduce some of the
problems.
Mr. Keating. So you are concerned, sir, about some of the
cuts that have occurred to our allied nations and the cuts that
are there through USAID and other sources that really are
necessary to help buildup our effectiveness in
counterterrorism?
Mr. Byman. These programs are necessary for our allies to
be strong including on counterterrorism and cutting them is a
setback for the United States.
Mr. Keating. Those partnership capabilities do they include
intelligence sharing?
Mr. Byman. They do.
Mr. Keating. Isn't it concerning--it is to me--that with
Signalgate and everything you see going on with the scandal
there that the U.S. has really called into question its ability
to manage its own intelligence and to keep these kind of
discussions private?
I look at the--thwarted, caught in Vienna. If it wasn't for
global partners here and information that could be shared and
trusted it wouldn't have been thwarted.
So isn't that--isn't it integral to our ability to deal
with partners that they trust that the intel they share stays
there and is not something that can be so easily breached as
was with the Signal messaging that occurred with Secretary
Hegseth?
Mr. Byman. Admiral McRaven, the former head of Special
Operations Command, used to talk about you can't surge trust
and that trust is something that you could spend years working
on and then it could break in a day.
And it is vital that we preserve that, especially for
intelligence sharing.
Mr. Keating. And the other, getting to the root abilities
we have together, it is so important that the U.S. show that
they have the strongest adherence to rule of law. Isn't that
the case?
Mr. Byman. Yes.
Mr. Keating. Wouldn't you think that having the President
of the United States, who was just asked in the last week
whether or not he would, you know, defend our Constitution here
in our own country and his reply saying, ``Well, I don't
know,'' isn't that something that generally would be unnerving
to allies and partners at that level, to say we wouldn't adhere
to our own rule of law?
Mr. Byman. One thing we see throughout the world is that
successful counterterrorism depends on a fundamental commitment
to the rule of law, that when we move away from it we may have
momentary successes but over time it corrupts the governments
and corrupts our partnerships.
So it is--rule of law is vital, sir.
Mr. Keating. Yes. In your opening remarks and statements
you were dealing with issues and the concerns with white
supremacist groups, and I also have that concern.
I was dealing with making sure with appropriations that we
fully fund the racially and ethnically motivated violent
extremism causes we have.
Can you really deal--if you are really putting a hierarchy
on the threats we have how high is that threat?
Mr. Byman. It is an extremely highest threat, sir. If you
look back at violence in the United States just in terms of
death toll in recent years white supremacists have been at the
very top of that list and I think everyone agrees that is a
threat that needs to be covered.
Mr. Keating. Great. Well, thank you very much. I yield
back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I now recognize the gentleman from California Mr. Issa for
5 minutes.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Ambassador, you know, we have an expression that we use so
often here, that partisanship ends at the water's edge.
Unfortunately, we are nowhere close to the water's edge, I
guess, in today's hearings to a certain extent.
Back to the question of the moving of the counterterrorism,
you, obviously, have an expertise about the ability to keep
secrets, the working with partners, all of that, correct?
Mr. Sales. I would like to think so, Congressman.
Mr. Issa. Well, you had the job and you did a good job. So
given that and given the broad historic area that the under
secretary for political affairs has versus the new position, in
a sense, aren't we moving it to the--the Secretary is moving it
to a more secure use to working with things that you keep close
to the vest you negotiate in order to get the end results you
want, usually without disclosure?
Mr. Sales. I think that is right, Congressman. I think
moving the CT Bureau into the T family where all of the other
security-related bureaus are located makes a lot of sense,
including for the reason you have just identified.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So we will just leave it as moving it to
the right place for the right reason could, in fact, be a good
decision from a U.S. senator, now Secretary, who has looked at
this on a national security basis for his decade of service
here.
But one other question that this begs, too, isn't this one
of the most important positions, going forward, as we look at
global issues, trade issues, cybersecurity, all kinds? We have
got all kinds of issues that are global.
But this issue to a great extent is the issue that bit us
in the back end on 9/11. This is the issue that, for example,
has led to attacks around the world to our allies.
So isn't this one of those issues where you have to give it
to somebody who isn't looking at the broad policy of the day
and all the things that are in vogue but in fact diligently
working on something that could happen anywhere at any time, if
you take your view away from that specific issue?
Mr. Sales. I think absolutely.
Counterterrorism is a no-fail mission. If a diplomat
offends an assistant minister someplace then you have to send a
note of apology. If counterterrorism safeguards fail Americans
die.
So it is absolutely critical that this issue remain a
priority across the government, and as I said in my opening
statement, that doesn't mean that this is a distraction from
America's broader strategic objectives.
Counterterrorism tools and counterterrorism partnerships
are precisely one way that we can advance our strategic
objectives against our rival states that are increasingly
acting together and with terrorist organizations.
Look no further than the Iranian regime sending drones to
Putin to be used in strikes against Ukrainian civilians in
Kyiv. I mean, that is up----that is what we are up against here
and CT can be part of solving that problem.
Mr. Issa. Well, and continuing along that theme, the
gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. Keating seemed to imply in his
questions that if we just did more to end poverty and
misunderstandings and, you know, I don't know, the myriad of
issues--the do-good issues, if you will--not saying they are
not important but that somehow that would be as effective as
actually fighting counterterrorism.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Sales. Congressman, in my experience the most effective
counterterrorism programs are the nuts and bolts--training
prosecutors, training judges--to handle terrorism cases,
assisting foreign ministries of finance to help track the money
and impose sanctions on terrorist groups.
Things that matter on the front lines of terrorism, in my
experience, have been the most effective way to keep Americans
safe.
Mr. Issa. And, perhaps, just to put a bow on this, was
Osama bin Laden somehow poor, disadvantaged, or in some other
way brought to terrorism because of things that foreign aid
would help with?
Mr. Sales. I think his family's extreme wealth would have
made him ineligible for a USAID grant.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So, again, I will put a second bow on this
just to be sure, and, Doctor, I will give you the last of--the
last answer for a moment.
Aren't there distinct differences between how we fight
terrorism where we see it and how we fight poverty and other
things, which may allow people to be induced to join terrorists
but per se doesn't create the terrorist regimes?
Mr. Byman. I think there is a definite distinction, sir,
between the programs. My caveat is in some places, though,
there is overlap and especially some of the places that the
Ambassador mentioned in Africa where government is weak.
Building government, making it stronger, helps us fight
terrorism and some of the AID programs play that role.
Mr. Issa. I certainly agree. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Issa.
I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois Mr. Schneider
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for joining us.
The State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism plays a
critical role in safeguarding our national security. I think we
all agree how important it is to make sure we keep Americans
and American interests safe around the world and here at home.
We have to promote global stability and protect the lives
of American citizens or else we aren't doing our job. For
decades the Bureau of Counterterrorism, commonly known as CT,
has served as the strategic hub for international efforts to
combat terrorism.
The CT Bureau cultivates partnerships with foreign
governments, coordinates with multilateral organizations
focused on peace building, and bolsters the capacity of nations
to detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats before they
reach our shores.
We all agree we must continue to invest in this critical
body and the counterterrorism workforce. The CT Bureau's
efforts are not abstract diplomacy.
The eight programs and forums within the Bureau save lives
each and every day through initiatives like the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance--ATA--program.
CT Bureau has helped train more than 150,000 law
enforcement security officials in more than 100 countries.
These partnerships have directly prevented violent attacks,
disrupted terrorist networks, and captured dangerous extremists
intent on inciting civil unrest.
Ambassador Sales, in your opening remarks you said CT still
matters, and you went on to list in countries around the globe
where those threats are not just still existent but, indeed,
growing.
I want to be clear. Diminishing the Bureau of
Counterterrorism I believe would be a profound mistake.
Terrorism is evolving.
Today's terrorist organizations are more diffuse, more
digitally connected, more skilled in exploiting fragile
regimes, as you talked about in Africa.
And so in your testimony, Ambassador, you had a couple of
recommendations. The first is to consolidate programs not
currently in the CT Bureau but within Department of State under
the CT Bureau, making it more powerful, more influential--more
effective, not less.
Your second recommendation, I believe, is to elevate the
director--the head of the CT Bureau--to an assistant secretary
status. Is that correct?
Mr. Sales. Yes. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Schneider. But in the new State Department org chart it
shows it being moved from the P family to the T family. This
committee has yet to be briefed on the reasoning for that
decision.
You note CT work is essential and I would argue, as you
said, I agree it should be elevated, not diminished.
With the proposed cuts to funding this administration's
attack on our allies through tariffs, et cetera, I worry the
Bureau's importance will be diminished and its coordination
work and effectiveness also diminish.
What is the consequence of transferring it to the T family,
of lowering its priority or its profile, whether it is in
Africa or the Middle East? Is this the right approach, do you
think, dealing with the Bureau?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I share very much your
concern that CT as an issue and CT Bureau as an organization
not be diminished in any way. I don't think, with respect, that
moving it from one silo in the State Department to another silo
in the State Department would have that effect.
When CT was originally created back in 1972 it was part of
the office of the Secretary, then it moved to the so-called J
family.
When I was acting under secretary CT was part of my
portfolio. In the Biden administration it moved to the P
family. So it has had a number of organizational homes.
Mr. Schneider. I understand that. But do you believe that
the way the administration, the way the Secretary of State, is
talking about the CT Bureau, the moves they are making, is that
elevating the profile or diminishing the profile of the Bureau?
Mr. Sales. Well, I think moving it to the T family makes a
lot of sense and I think it elevates it in so far as it creates
synergies between CT Bureau, the arms control people, the law
enforcement people, other bureaucrats, other units that are
responsible for the security issues. I think that elevates the
importance of----
Mr. Schneider. But you are saying it should be elevated,
not diminished?
Mr. Sales. I agree with that, Congressman.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Byman, do you view the reorganization
plan as a shift in priorities or do you see it the way the
Ambassador does?
Mr. Byman. So my honest answer, sir, is I don't know. We
haven't received clear reasoning on the logic of the move and I
am a little disappointed to learn that the subcommittee has not
received that either.
In general, the regional bureaus have been bureaucratically
stronger than the functional bureaus and so moving it out of P
does have potential consequences.
But as the Ambassador knows so well, much depends on the
head of the CT Bureau's relationship with the Secretary and
that is going to vary by how much attention Secretary Rubio
gives CT. But the discussion of significant budget cuts doesn't
bode well for the elevation of CT concerns.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I am out of time. But I do
appreciate the comments and I hope we do maintain the high
profile of counterterrorism. It keeps our Nation secure and our
people safe.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
I would just note for the record the Secretary's staff and
the State Department staff have come and met with the staff of
the full committee, both the majority and the minority.
The ranking member's staff was part of the briefing with
respect to the reorganization of the chart so they do have
information and I would certainly encourage my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle to reach out to the ranking
member's office for more information.
Mr. Schneider. In fairness, they did not talk about the CT
Bureau.
Mr. Lawler. They talked about the reorganization chart.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Texas Mr.
Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing today. Thank you to our
witnesses for your testimony today.
The world has increasingly become a more dangerous place
due to the Biden administration's failed leadership, leaving
our enemies more empowered and America and our allies more
vulnerable than ever.
While the previous administration was hyper focused on
advancing radical DEI initiatives, we must re-prioritize the
safety and security of the American people above all else and
that begins with reexamining the structure of the Department of
State.
This committee is holding hearings that will optimize the
agency to better serve and protect our national security while
efficiently using taxpayer dollars.
Historically, our national defense and security has spanned
multiple agencies with different specialties and different
approaches.
However, inefficient intelligence sharing and coordination
has plagued federal government, leading to duplicative entities
and significant intelligence gaps, not to mention wasted
dollars.
Ambassador Sales, from your experience what were the
biggest barriers to coordination between the Counterterrorism
Bureau and other key interagency actors such as the National
Security Council, the Department of Defense, the CIA, and
others in the intelligence community?
What authorities or reporting lines could be reformed to
reduce duplication and improve outcomes?
Mr. Sales. It is a great question, Congressman, and we
could probably have an entire hearing just on that.
In my experience the challenges of coordination derive from
different mission sets. The State Department mission is
different from the intelligence community's mission is
different from the Defense Department's mission, and when you
sit around the table at a policy coordinating committee or at a
principals committee you are going to see differences of
opinion stemming from those sort of bureaucratic and turf
priorities.
But also I think the way to solve those is clear lines of
communication between the CT coordinator and the Secretary of
State.
If the Secretary cares about your issue, if the Secretary
is prepared to expend capital to move the ball forward on your
issue, you can sort of steamroll a lot of that opposition that
might come up during the interagency process.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, and I agree. You know, we want to
decrease wasted time, money, and duplicate efforts. We want to
get rid of all of that stuff.
But are there actually times where these different
authorities actually work to our benefit in countering violent
extremist organizations and other types of terrorism?
Mr. Sales. I think so, and I don't mean to shortchange the
good that can come from robust interagency conversation. If one
agency wants to impose sanctions on a group that would
complicate, for example, the ability of the Defense Department
to maintain force protection.
That is something that needs to come out, right? That is
something that the interagency needs to take very seriously.
If, on the other hand, the imposition of sanctions on a
politician is going to cause problems for diplomats who want to
engage with that politician, that is also something that needs
to come out in the interagency discussion.
Now, that is not to say that you should or shouldn't do
something, only that these sorts of issues need to be aired in
a transparent way among cabinet principals who trust each
other.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, that is--the deconflicting is absolutely,
you know, key and I think that is kind of what you are
describing here--deconflicting, some of that stuff.
It has been my experience also being on the Intelligence
Committee that not only the deconfliction but sometimes there
are actual authorities that one entity will have that the other
entity doesn't and they can work with each other to accomplish
more, in the end.
So I just wanted to point that out as well. I thank you
both for your time today, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Jackson.
I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee Mr. Burchett
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity.
I am going to change courses here with you all. Are any of
you all aware that the Biden State Department sent billions of
taxpayer dollars to the Taliban and did the CT Bureau oppose
this decision?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I can't speak to the CT
Bureau's reaction. I was a private citizen at the time watching
from the sidelines.
It is my understanding that the CT Bureau--sorry, that the
Defense Department, unfortunately, during the botched
withdrawal did leave behind a substantial amount of military
hardware in the hands of our enemies.
Mr. Burchett. Right. It was currently money that is being
sent in the form of aid we found that $40 million a week is
going to the Taliban and I have been trying for about a year to
stop that, and it seems now this the State Department is
looking into it.
Does the CT Bureau believe there is any ideological
differences between the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qaeda and, if so,
what are those differences?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, just speaking for myself,
these terrorist groups that you mentioned have certain things
in common and certain things that differ from each other.
One thing that they all share is the desire to kill as many
Americans as possible, ideally here in the homeland, but if
that isn't possible then to do it abroad, and meanwhile to do
the same thing to Jews and to citizens of other allied states.
There are theological and ideological differences between
them. Al-Qaeda is patient in trying to establish a caliphate.
ISIS wants it now.
But in terms of tactics and in terms of objectives with
respect to the United States, they are unremittingly hostile
and that is something they share in common.
Mr. Burchett. I guess you all view the Taliban as a
terrorist organization, though, correct?
Mr. Sales. Well, they certainly walk like it and talk like
it.
Mr. Burchett. I know that some people consider them a
counterterrorism ally against ISIS, kind of enemy of my enemy
is my friend kind of situation. I wonder what you all think.
Mr. Sales. I think some people do share that view. I am not
one of them. It is the case that the Taliban and ISIS are
enemies. They see each other as adversaries. They both seek
control of Afghanistan.
But just because ISIS is a designated terrorist group
doesn't mean that we should blind ourselves to the very real
reality of atrocities committed by the Taliban.
The Taliban works hand in glove with the Haqqani Network
which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, which is a U.S. designated
terrorist organization. Haqqani figures are senior members of
the Taliban government, using that term advisedly. Taliban
regime is probably a better term.
So nobody should expect that the Taliban's interest in
degrading ISIS are similar in any way to the interests of the
United States in eliminating terrorist threats in Afghanistan
as such.
Mr. Burchett. How does the State Department coordinate
counterterror financing actions with the government as a whole?
Mr. Sales. Well, State works very closely with policymakers
at Treasury and also OFAC, which is part of Treasury and which
has----I would characterize it as more of a ministerial type
role, administrative type role in administering sanctions.
The State Department sanctions related to terrorism
typically get imposed on individuals and organizations that are
actively engaged in terrorism such as al-Qaeda. Whereas
Treasury, which has its own sanctions authorities for
terrorism, will typically focus on financiers or enablers,
money launderers, and those who are otherwise providing support
to terrorism.
Mr. Burchett. I am always aware of and cautious of folks
that are our friends until they are not our friends, and it
generally turns out bad. If you want to jump in on any of this
or you jump in as well.
Are there efforts by the State Department--any efforts they
can make to streamline counter terror efforts within the
Federal Government?
Mr. Byman. Sir, there is a lot that can be done to
streamline different aspects of the Federal Government. It is
always difficult with huge organizations to have that
coordination, and sometimes you have the military going in one
direction and the White House going in another and that has
been common in multiple organizations.
So you need a strong coordinator, sir. You need someone who
is empowered who is close to a secretary and thus people will
listen to you and that enables more streamlining.
Mr. Burchett. It always bothers me as well, it seems when
history plays out that we are on both sides of a lot of these
conflicts and it--again, the only people that it pays out for
is Wall Street.
What international partners can we rely on to assist with
some of these counterterror financing efforts? And I am out of
time, so give me a name.
Mr. Sales. The U.K. has been an enormously powerful force
enabler. When you lock a terrorist group out of the U.S.
financial system and the British financial system you put some
real hurt on their ability to raise and move money.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Kean,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
As we evaluate the State Department's counterterrorism
programs we must ensure that tools such as sanctions,
diplomacy, and foreign assistance are being used strategically
and effectively.
Terrorist groups have adapted and authoritarian adversaries
like Iran, Russia, and China are using influence and
instability to undermine U.S. efforts abroad.
Ambassador Sales, as Congress considers its authorization
of the State Department and Counterterrorism Bureau how can we
ensure that its mandate and resources are better aligned with
the threats facing Israel, our closest ally in the Middle East,
from Iranian-backed terrorist groups like Hamas or Hezbollah?
Mr. Sales. Well, I think that is a really important
question. It is always an important question. It has become an
even more important question in the aftermath of the October 7
atrocities perpetrated by Hamas which, of course, is a key
terror proxy of the Iranian regime.
I think you have to address the head of the octopus, not
just the tentacles. Iran has built--or had built before Israel
successfully degraded it--a network of terrorist organizations
that encircle the Jewish State, from Hezbollah in the north to
Hamas in the south to Palestinian Islamic Jihad to others, the
Houthis getting involved in the game as well.
All of----that entire network runs through Tehran. That
entire network runs through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. In order to degrade it----there is kinetic ways to do
that but there are financial ways to do it as well.
You have to cutoff the flow of money to that far flung
network of terrorist organizations. That includes restoring
maximum pressure on Iranian energy exports.
It means sanctioning the groups themselves, going after
their own finances. I think the President was very clear just
yesterday talking about the Iranian nuclear program----no
program at all.
In order to get there----and I think he is 100 percent
right----we should not settle for a JCPOA 2.0. In order to get
the Iranians to budge we are going to have to reimpose maximum
pressure and squeeze their economy. That is going to result in
a better nuclear deal.
But to your question, Congressman, that is also going to
result in a defanged terrorist network that could hurt Israel
and that could hurt us.
Mr. Kean. Thank you. Dr. Byman, how can the reauthorization
process be used to reinforce the Bureau's use of sanctions,
designations, and foreign assistance tools, deny space,
funding, and legitimacy to Iran's terror proxy network
operating near or against Israeli territory?
Mr. Byman. So, sir, I think part of it is hearings like
this that call attention to Iran's support for terrorism around
the world.
I think much of it, though, is making sure that programs
that are designed to counter Iranian influence are well-funded
and well-staffed, and that includes programs in different parts
of the Middle East.
It includes programs around the world that are going after
the financing of terrorism and having a very robust
counterterrorism program is vital, and one of the members
before mentioned how in 9/11 we were caught by surprise.
And looking back, one of the problems was so many U.S.
bureaucracies were not focused on terrorism, and making sure
that all the different parts of the U.S. Government maintain
this focus is vital.
Mr. Kean. Thank you.
Ambassador Sales, what specific tools has the
Counterterrorism Bureau deployed or could be using more
effectively to disrupt the Iranian proxy networks threatening
Israel specifically against designated terrorist organizations
like Hezbollah and Hamas?
Mr. Sales. Well, I think one of the most important steps
that the CT Bureau took was to designate Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization.
That was done in 2019 and it was groundbreaking in the
sense that it was the first time the U.S. Government had ever
imposed terrorism sanctions of this sort on a State entity.
So I think pressing other countries to follow America's
lead and impose similar sanctions under their authorities on
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a key piece.
Another key thing, I think, is internationalizing the
American approach to sanctions on Hezbollah. A lot of countries
like to say, well, there is the military wing and we will
sanction them but there is the humanitarian wing of Hezbollah
and we don't want to interfere with that.
They are a political party in Lebanon with important
constituencies so we will artificially cordon off this other
element and leave it untouched.
That approach doesn't work. Hezbollah does not see itself
as split into a civilian side and a military side. It is one
organization. It is a terrorist organization.
I would like to see the State Department continue to press
partner governments----allied governments around the world
follow our lead in sanctioning Hezbollah in its entirety.
Mr. Kean. Thank you both for your testimony. I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Kean.
I now recognize myself for a second round of questions for
5 minutes.
Ambassador Sales, both China and Russia are now vying with
the U.S. for influence abroad, especially in regions like
Africa and South and Central Asia.
How does CT Bureau navigate the waters of ensuring the U.S.
maintains its key partners in the fight against terrorism when
resources are finite and increasingly being directed toward
great power competition?
Mr. Sales. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a great
question, and I think one of the ways I would answer it is to
say that providing counterterrorism assistance in Africa in
particular and in South Asia in particular is a way of
advancing our grand strategy.
It is a way of advancing our interests with respect to
nation State rivals like China and Russia. Africa is on the
front lines of the fight against terrorism. They face a
dizzying array of terrorist groups, from al-Qaeda affiliates to
ISIS affiliates to Boko Haram to others.
We can help them in ways that no other country can. China
is not in a position to provide counterterrorism assistance.
Russia will make a big show of it by sending Wagner mercenaries
in.
But as more than one head of State said to me while in
government, we tried it the Russian way. It didn't work. We
want to work with America.
So I think maintaining America's engagement, providing nuts
and bolts counterterrorism assistance, rapid response teams
that can put down assaults in real time, training police,
training prosecutors, training judges----that kind of
assistance helps defeat terrorist threats that threaten us but
also helps lay down a marker that America is here to help you
and brings those front line states into our camp and detaches
them from our enemies.
Mr. Lawler. So continuing down that path, can you use an
example from the current threat landscape to illustrate the
role of the CT Bureau and U.S. counterterrorism efforts
contrasted with Russian and Chinese influence?
Mr. Sales. Absolutely. Unfortunately, the example I am
about to share is one in the opposite direction.
The United States until fairly recently had a robust
counterterrorism partnership with Niger. In recent years,
recent months, we have seen Niger pivot away from the United
States toward Russia.
And so where the United States previously was able to
operate a significant drone base in Agadez from which we
collected intelligence information about local terrorist
threats and applied pressure to those local terrorist threats,
we have now seen that base close down, the American presence
diminish to nothing, and Wagner mercenaries come in.
That is bad for us from a global power competition
standpoint. Russia's rise is our decline in that country. But
it also means that that country is not going to be in a
position to seriously degrade the terrorist threats that it
faces because the Wagner approach--steal natural resources,
inflict harm on civilian populations--is not a sustainable way.
It is not an effective way to fight terrorism.
So if I may offer a word of advice to my friends in the new
administration and friends in Congress, getting back into West
Africa has to be an urgent priority for the new administration.
Mr. Lawler. I appreciate that. On a separate note, how can
the Bureau further utilize its convening power and platforms
like the counter transnational terrorism forum established to
increase awareness and understanding of Iranian-sponsored and
directed terrorist activity to continue to allow the United
States to play a lead role in international coordination on CT?
Mr. Sales. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think other countries will
participate in these fora to the extent they think it matters
to the United States and when I was the CT coordinator I could
tell my counterparts, I could tell assistant secretaries from
foreign governments, we need you to be there to talk about the
Iranian threat.
And as a courtesy they would come. But if you really want
to move foreign governments it needs to be a priority at the
level of the secretary.
It needs to be a priority at the level of the President,
and it was during the first Trump administration. I have every
reason to believe that it will be during this administration as
well.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois Mr. Schneider
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
chance for a second question.
Dr. Byman, I will start with you, and specifically as it
relates to dealing with the Houthis or any other group, does
the President require a FTO--a foreign terrorist organization--
or a SDGT designation to take additional diplomatic or kinetic
action against a terrorist group or individuals suspected of
terrorism?
Or does--and does that FTO designation permit the United
States to engage in military operations, say, against cartels
in Mexico that otherwise could not without an FTO designation?
Mr. Byman. The designations are not tied to authorizations
for the use of military force, and that is a different set of
authorities. The designations involve a set of legal penalties,
financial penalties, and other restrictions but not linked to
the U.S. military.
Mr. Schneider. Let me expand on that, and this is specific
to the CT Bureau.
Can you elaborate a little more on the role the bureau
plays in countering illicit finance? My colleague Mr. Sherman
talked about Hamas using crypto currency to finance some of its
operations. Similar groups, Hezbollah, I know did the same.
And how can Congress work to strengthen our efforts to
basically interdict the efforts of these groups to finance
their operations?
Mr. Byman. So a lot of the lead is done by the Department
of Treasury and also at different times the Department of
Justice, especially through the FBI.
Much of the Department of State's role is a coordination
role and especially dealing with American allies and partners
around the world, and one problem the United States is having
is it is simply outnumbered on the ground around the world.
We have seen a diminishment of the U.S. presence and the
ability to coordinate, not just in national capitals but at a
more local level, has been greatly diminished.
And so ensuring that there is robust funding, that the
programs are broad and have authority to reach around different
key countries, is going to be vital and I urge the subcommittee
to focus on that.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Let me expand on that a little bit because--and,
Ambassador, you talked about this as well--one of our greatest
strengths in the United States, greatest strengths in leading
on a global stage, has been the ability to convene, to pull
people together, whether it is at the secretary level or even
in lower ranks to be having those conversations.
As this administration is beating up on allies, on
threatening with tariffs, taking actions that zig one way today
and zag another way tomorrow or even the same afternoon, is
that affecting our ability to convene, to have credibility with
our allies?
Because, as you said, Dr. Byman, we aren't in every place.
We can't do it alone. We need the help of our allies.
Mr. Byman. What has been frustrating for me is that our
criticism has at times involved very close allies and partners
that have been with us in every war, for example, such as
Australia, and there are many countries we rely on heavily for
counterterrorism and for other foreign policy needs.
And to me, undercutting them, criticizing them about their
domestic politics, makes them more hostile to the United
States, less willing to work with us and more likely to look
for alternatives.
So I worry that our rhetoric and, at times, our foreign
policy actions are driving key allies and partners away.
Mr. Schneider. Ambassador Sales, how important is it for us
to have that credibility for you and the work you were doing in
the Bureau to be able to speak one to one with your
counterparts in other countries and our allies, and have them
know that, A, you have the authority to speak, that you have
credibility when you speak, and that the priorities that we
focus on today are going to be consistent across time?
Mr. Sales. I think it is very important and, you know,
Congressman, the premise of your question is exactly right.
Allies matter.
We need allies as force multipliers, whether we are
fighting terrorists or whether we are trying to prevent a
Russian invasion of NATO territory in Europe.
Alliances matter, and America builds alliances in ways that
our rivals can't. Nobody wants to be China's ally. China
doesn't want peers. It wants vassals. It wants satrapies.
So the American approach is very different and it is very
effective. But for alliances to be effective we need our allies
to carry their share of the burden.
And so I think when you hear NATO Secretaries General
thanking President Trump for encouraging----encouraging is a
diplomatic word----encouraging their NATO allies to do more to
meet our collective self-defense obligations and suggesting
that wouldn't have happened had it not been for a sometimes
sharp-elbowed diplomatic approach, I think that also enters
into the analysis, too.
Mr. Schneider. I think, certainly, friends can be firm. We
need to be with our allies shoulder to shoulder. It is not one
in front, one in back, but that shoulder to shoulder
relationship requires, I believe, a mutual respect and a vision
of a common interest in the world.
I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. The gentleman's time has expired.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee
may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we
will ask you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
record, subject to the length limitations.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]