[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A RETURN TO MAXIMUM PRESSURE: COMPREHEN-
SIVELY COUNTERING THE IRANIAN REGIME'S
MALIGN ACTIVITIES REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
April 1, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-10
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-454 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Ranking Member
JOE WILSON,, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, GREG STANTON, Arizona
American Samoa JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
KEITH SELF, Texas PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana GEORGE LATIMER, New York
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Chairman Brian Mast......................... 1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........ 2
Opening Statement of Ranking Member Gregory W. Meeks............. 3
WITNESSES
Statement of Norman T. Roule, Non-Resident Senior Advisor,
Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, The Center
For Strategic and International Studies........................ 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Statement of Claire Jungman, Chief of Staff, United Against
Nuclear Iran................................................... 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Statement of Dana Stroul, Director of Research and Shelly and
Michael Kassen Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute For Near
East Policy.................................................... 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 76
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 78
Hearing Attendance............................................... 79
A RETURN TO MAXIMUM PRESSURE: COMPREHENSIVELY COUNTERING THE IRANIAN
REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES
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Tuesday, April 1, 2025
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian
Mastchairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Mast. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come
to order.
I ask everybody to rise and join me in reciting the Pledge
of Allegiance.
All. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States
of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
all.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRIAN MAST
Chairman Mast. As we open this hearing to outline maximum
pressure on Iran, I'm going to deliver just a short message
before I pass this gavel off to Mr. Lawler, who will actually
be chairing this hearing, as he has a keen interest in the
issues, as all of us do, and a firm knowledge in everything
that we are about to discuss. And because I stole this hearing
from him--he was going to do it at the subcommittee level--I
thought it would only be right that he chair this committee.
So, he will be doing that.
But the message that I wish to deliver is this, and it is
simply to Ayatollah Khamenei, and I would deliver this to you:
President Trump will work with you to peacefully end your
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program or President
Trump will destroy your nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
program. You get to choose the remedy, Ayatollah.
I now pass the gavel to Mr. Lawler.
Mr. Lawler. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The purpose of this hearing is to explore policy options to
effectively curtail Iran's illicit revenue streams and address
the nexus with Iran's malign activities, particularly relating
to its sponsorship of terror proxies and the nuclear weapons
program.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER
Mr. Lawler.Good afternoon.
And again, thank you, Chairman Mast, for putting on this
hearing, and to Ranking Member Meeks, for presiding today.
I also want to thank our witnesses for their expertise and
their attention to this pressing matter.
When President Trump left office over 4 years ago, the
Iranian regime and its terror proxies were on their heels. The
Trump administration's maximum pressure policy had devastated
Iran's economy and denied the regime access to critical
resources.
Diplomatically, Iran was cornered and isolated like never
before. The Abraham Accords saw Israel normalize relations with
three Arab nations. It was a direct blow to Iran's influence
and put the Middle East on a path toward unity against Tehran's
aggression.
Militarily, the message was unmistakable: the United States
would not flinch. The decisive strike that took out Soleimani,
Iran's mastermind of its terror proxies, crushed Iran's
confidence and deterred provocations.
By 2021, the Middle East stood on the brink of a new era of
peace and stability. Iran was contained, its proxies weakened,
and the region almost freed from the looming threat of Iranian
terror.
Enter Joe Biden. President Biden desperately tried to
revive a dead nuclear deal with Iran. Even as the regime
continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of its
non-proliferation-treaty-related obligations, the Biden
administration pursued deals that would have provided the
regime with sanctions relief, while also allowing it to
continue to expand its enrichment capabilities, including with
support from Russia.
And when the Biden administration came up short on a
nuclear deal, it pursued a misguided $6 billion giveaway to
Iran. And less than 2 months later, Hamas, with support from
Iran, launched the heinous October 7th terrorist attack on
Israel.
Under the last administration, we occasionally heard tough
language, but that was rarely backed-up with concrete action.
This lack of resolve emboldened Iran and its proxies, offering
them a free hand to escalate attacks against the United States
and its partners and allies--with few, if any, consequences.
Under the Biden administration, Iran, China, and Russia
joined forces to form an unholy alliance aimed at destabilizing
the free world. Yet, even as Iranian missiles and drones were
targeting Israel, fueling Putin's illegal war of aggression
against Ukraine, and being used to threaten U.S. service
members, the Biden administration did little to prevent the
lapse of the U.N.'s missile embargo on Iran in October 2023. As
a result, Iran now has a free hand to proliferate its missiles
and long-range drones unchecked.
Joe Biden's foreign policy decisions in the Middle East
were ill-conceived, disorganized, and at times fatal, including
for U.S. service members, as we tragically saw at Tower 22 in
Jordan. And in the end, he left the world more volatile and
less safe than he found it.
It is clear that the Biden administration's blatant refusal
to enforce sanctions against Iran contributed to instability
across the region and the globe. Under his administration, we
witnessed an unprecedented trade in illicit oil between Iran
and China, opening a lifeline for the IRGC to fund its malign
activities.
It didn't work. Appeasing terrorists does not work. And
that is why I'm pleased that President Trump has since put U.S.
policy toward Iran back on track--restoring the much-needed and
most effective maximum pressure campaign.
Since taking office just over 2 months ago, the Trump
administration has made great strides to implement an
aggressive and comprehensive Iran policy that restores much-
needed deterrence. This is a welcome change from the days of
handwringing we saw under President Biden, whose policy toward
Iran was all carrots and no sticks.
The strategy now is to execute the maximum pressure
campaign and deny the regime every ounce of grace given to them
by the Biden administration. As part of this strategy, we must
clamp down on the Iranian oil trade. Last year, Iran made over
$50 billion from its illicit oil trade, much of which is
controlled by its Revolutionary Guard Corps.
As part of the maximum pressure, we must fully enforce
existing sanctions to stop this illicit oil trade,
specifically, cutting off Iran's oil trade with China, which
accounts for, roughly, 90 percent of oil exports.
We must also take all available steps to stop Iran from
ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran is not an
option, and the safety of the American people and everything we
love is dependent on our success here. One way or another,
Iran's nuclear ambitions are finished. And once Iran loses hope
for nuclear capacity and we have decimated their bank accounts
with the halt of the oil trade, they won't be able to fund
terror proxies any longer.
President Trump's support for Israel and the war against
Iran-backed terror is absolute, and I hope to see other
partners in the region step up their commitment to working with
the United States and Israel to address this shared threat, to
ensure Iran no longer threatens our security or that of the
free world.
As this hearing will demonstrate, there are a number of
measures that can and should be taken, and I look forward to
exploring that with our witnesses today and seeing the path
forward.
I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks for his opening
remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GREGORY MEEKS
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Lawler, and I want to thank
Chairman Mast for calling this timely hearing.
Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us this
afternoon.
There is strong bipartisan understanding on this committee
regarding the threat posed by the government of Iran, the
world's foremost State sponsor of terrorism, and how it
threatens the United States, Israel, the broader Middle East,
and the entire globe.
With our quality panel, I know we will leave this hearing
better informed on various aspects of the Iranian threat--
ranging from its illicit nuclear program to support of
terrorist proxies.
We are living in a dangerous time when it comes to Iran.
Over the last year, we have seen Iranian proxies attempt to
destroy Israel. Hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones
launched by Iran threatened Israelis and Palestinians alike.
The United States Armed Forces have been targeted in
hundreds of Iranian-sponsored attacks. An Iranian proxy has
crippled shipping through the Red Sea and directly targeted the
U.S. Navy in international waters.
Iranian drones are aiding Vladimir Putin in his illegal and
brutal war on Ukraine, and China continues to purchase Iranian
oil in the face of U.S. sanctions.
We know, based upon public reports, though, that Iran is
now closer than ever to having a nuclear weapons capability.
Now, during the time of the JCPOA agreement, Iran was
verifiably at least a year away from having enough highly
enriched uranium for a single bomb. But, as a result of the
Trump administration, because he was the President before
Biden, as a result of him abandoning that agreement, Iran is
now only days away from having enough highly enriched uranium
for many bombs. By every measure, we are less safe today
because we left the JCPOA than we were while we were in that
agreement.
We are now reading press reports that Prime Minister
Netanyahu is planning a potential military strike on Iranian
nuclear infrastructure as soon as this month. And reporting
indicates that Mr. Netanyahu is aggressively lobbying President
Trump to support such a strike.
A military strike on Iran is no easy task, not a sure
thing, and comes with significant risk of escalating into a
destructive regional conflict. It is unlikely to deter Iran's
nuclear weapons aspirations for a significant period of time
and could have enormous impact on regional security, as well as
the United States and global economies.
You may have noticed that the U.S. economy is already
facing troubling volatility, as a result of the President's
reckless threats of tariffs. Rattling energy markets,
disturbing trade routes, and unleashing additional regional
instability is not something to be taken lightly.
So, no military solution will permanently deny Iran the
bomb, nor will it usher in a democratic Iranian government.
That's pure fantasy.
Like most observers of Iran, I'm acutely certain both the
Iranian and American people would be better served by Iranian
leadership who respect human rights at home and peace abroad. I
hope we can protect foreign assistance efforts that support the
Iranian people from further arbitrary cuts.
We know Iranians do not broadly support their corrupt
theocratic government that abuses women and minorities and
wastes Iran's financial resources supporting terrorists that
undermine their own security and bring no benefit to the
Iranian people.
Despite all these serious challenges, solutions are not
impossible. I would always argue that diplomacy must always be
kept on the table alongside credible threats. Diplomacy may not
solve all of our challenge with Iran, but direct engagement
with Iran has proven successful in lowering tensions and
addressing the nuclear program--the main issue of concern.
President Trump was right to send a letter to Iranian
leaders opening the door to diplomatic engagement. We must
encourage this effort and utilize all means of American power
to address Iranian threats and to do so in lockstep with our
allies. We should be involving our allies and bringing them in
closer for this effort, not push them away.
We have three excellent witnesses with us today to help
think through the challenges before us. This is an excellent
panel to assess the threats posed by Iran and help us formulate
appropriate responses to keep the United States and our friends
and allies safe.
So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Members Meeks.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[No statements have been submitted:]
Mr. Lawler. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this important topic.
Mr. Norman T. Roule, non-resident senior advisor, Warfare,
Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, The Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
Ms. Claire Jungman, chief of staff, United Against Nuclear
Iran.
And Ms. Dana Stroul, director of research and Shelly and
Michael Kassen Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy.
This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us
today.
Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I
will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes
in order to allow more time for member questions.
I now recognize Mr. Roule for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF NORMAN T. ROULE
Mr. Roule. Chair Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today. I will make brief comments, and
with your concurrence, submit a statement for the record.
For over two decades, Iran has used its nuclear program and
regional militias as its primary tools of power projection.
Tehran's role in the death of hundreds of Americans and tens of
thousands of citizens in the Middle East is routinely
acknowledged. Iran's missiles and drones kill Ukrainians and
threaten global shipping in the Red Sea.
But it has evaded meaningful consequences, in part, due to
Western concerns that it would respond to significant
retaliation by undertaking the final steps to acquire a nuclear
weapon. These aggressive policies gradually have become
entwined as Iran's malign sword and shield of its foreign
policy. Recent seismic changes in the region give us an
unprecedented opportunity to deal with these challenges.
Despite the intelligence community's assessment that Iran
is not undertaking nuclear weaponization, recent reports by the
International Atomic Energy Agency are alarming. Tehran has
built a nuclear program which has no justifiable civilian
purpose. Iran now appears capable of producing its first
quantity of 90 percent enriched uranium, sufficient for one
nuclear weapon, in about a week. Tehran's current stockpile of
60 percent enriched uranium is sufficient for about seven
nuclear weapons. Assuming use of Iran's entire stock of
enriched uranium and centrifuge capacity, some experts believe
Iran could produce fissile material sufficient for
approximately 10 nuclear weapons in a month. Let those numbers
sink in.
Tehran has also increased the number and sophistication of
its centrifuge cascades, allowing for rapid weaponization when
it so chooses. Iran routinely hampers IAEA efforts to verify
its nuclear program, which, absence solid intelligence, reduces
confidence in detecting any diversion of nuclear material or
equipment to any possible covert weapons program.
In short, Iran looks like a country building a nuclear
weapons program, albeit one yet to make the final steps
required, because it either fears discovery and the subsequent
military consequences or believes its current approach offers
diplomatic advantages beyond those found in possession of an
actual nuclear weapon. Its long-range ballistic missile program
appears to be following a similar path.
Turning to Tehran's proxy network, Israeli and ongoing U.S.
military actions have severely weakened its proxies in Lebanon,
Gaza, Syria, and Yemen, but these groups survive along with its
other partners in the region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps Quds Force aims to revive these groups, including in the
Red Sea region, where its strategy involves securing naval
access via Sudan, where it likely hopes to establish weapons
transshipment and militant training centers in East Africa to
threaten the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and the Eastern
Mediterranean.
Iran's proxy operations remain vulnerable, however, to
pressure on their logistics, finances, and personnel.
Diplomatic and economic sanctions are important, although
Europe's actions here have been insufficient. The United States
needs to make it clear to Iran that, if the Quds Force operates
as a terrorist organization, its personnel and logistics will
be targeted accordingly, including by our military assets.
Yemen presents an opportunity to demonstrate this decision.
Tehran recognizes its unprecedented vulnerability to
external military threats, particularly after Israel's October
2024 strikes demonstrated the ineffectiveness of their air
defenses. The Israeli strikes and Iran's failed counterattacks
also show the potency of U.S. military technology and our
regional partnerships.
Domestically, Iran faces severe economic and political
challenges which exceed its policy capabilities. Millions of
Iranians have fallen into poverty in recent years. Inflation
hovers at 35 percent. The return of the maximum pressure
sanctions campaign has accelerated the collapse of Iran's
currency against the dollar. The regime now appears to resemble
the late Soviet Union, holding power through coercion and stale
ideology.
Between 2002 and 2003, and then, between 2013 and 2014,
Iran navigated similar Western military threats, regional
instability, and domestic discontent by blending belligerent
rhetoric with lengthy diplomatic talks designed to soften
sanctions. Tehran avoided actions which could have sparked a
conventional war with the United States.
This strategy led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action. This deal committed Tehran to potentially reversible
nuclear concessions in exchange for long-term or permanent
sanctions relief that it used to sustain the regime and
resource its regional militias and missile program.
We and our partners must use this period to foster debate
among Iran's leadership that leads to the abandonment of
regional adventurism and the pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your
comments and questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roule follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Roule.
I now recognize Ms. Jungman for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CLAIRE JUNGMAN
Ms. Jungman. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.
The topic of this hearing and disrupting Iran's malign
behavior is a matter of urgent national security. At the heart
of Iran's malign behavior is its oil sector. Despite U.S.
sanctions, Iran continues to export over 1.5 million barrels of
oil per day, earning tens of billions of dollars annually.
These revenues are not just supporting Iran's economic; they
are directly funding terrorism, nuclear escalation, and
regional destabilization.
That's because up to half of Iran's oil exports are now
controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.
This means that every barrel of Iranian oil sold on the black
market strengthens the IRGC's hand, bankrolling groups like
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis--underwriting weapons
development and fueling nuclear expansion.
We have seen the consequences. Iran-backed militants have
launched attacks across the region, emboldened by the financial
cushion that oil exports have provided. New enforcement actions
in late 2024, including designations on nearly 50 tankers and
sanctions on Chinese refiners, have started to make an impact.
Iran's oil exports have dipped and its access to hard
currency is beginning to tighten. But this campaign must
continue and expand. The goal should be to drive Iran's oil
revenues as close to zero as possible, cutting off the
financial oxygen that allows the regime to operate abroad and
repress at home.
Beyond oil, Iran is increasingly turning to other illicit
revenue streams: crypto mining and laundering, shadow banking
networks, dollar smuggling from Iraq, and barter trade with
Russia and Syria. These activities are harder to track, but
deeply dangerous.
In total, we estimate Iran has generated over $100 billion
in oil revenues since 2021 and additional billions through
crypto and smuggling networks. These funds have empowered its
proxies and enabled nuclear brinksmanship, but sanctions can
still work. When properly enforced, they limit Iran's budget,
disrupt its ability to pay militias, and increase the costs of
escalation.
To that end, I offer a few recommendations:
First, continue aggressive enforcement against Iran's ghost
fleet and shipping facilitators. Sanction every vessel,
registry, insurer, captain, and port that helps move Iranian
oil.
Second, target foreign enablers, especially in China and
Malaysia, who knowingly buy or store Iranian crude.
Third, expand maritime interdictions and use AI tools to
identify suspicious tanker behavior in real time. Each vessel
seized directly cuts into Iran's revenue and deters further
evasion.
Fourth, establish a multilateral task force, modeled on the
Russian sanctions coordination effort, to enable real-time
intelligence-sharing on Iranian oil smuggling, front companies,
and crypto laundering. Unified action will help close off
evasion pathways faster and more effectively.
Fifth, strengthen crypto enforcement by tracing wallets
linked to Iran and sanctioning mining operations.
And finally, Congress should ensure that secondary
sanctions remain a powerful deterrent, holding accountable any
foreign entity that transacts with the IRGC or its proxies.
In closing, the United States must send a clear message:
Iran cannot continue to fund terrorism, threaten its neighbors,
and defy nuclear commitments without consequences. We must
remain united, vigilant, and unyielding in our pursuit of
financial pressure. Because cutting off the money is our best
tool to constrain Iran's most dangerous activities.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jungman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ms. Jungman.
I now recognize Ms. Stroul for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL
Ms. Stroul. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
Let me associate myself with Mr. Roule; the Iranian regime
is on its back foot. The pillars of its security strategy--the
nuclear weapons program, the network of terrorists and proxies,
and the conventional missile and drone arsenal--are more
vulnerable today than at any time in the history of the regime,
making 2025 a decisive year.
In the aftermath of Hamas' attack, Israel, with U.S.
support, dismantled Iran's proxy network in Gaza, Lebanon, and
elsewhere, disrupting the regime's ability to project power
through asymmetric capabilities.
In Syria, Tehran lost its regional strategic partner with
the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, who permitted the use of Syrian
territory for Iranian terror.
From the validation of a U.S.-led regional air defense
coalition in April of last year to Israel's defeat of a large-
scale ballistic missile attack last October, we now know that
Iran's complex conventional attacks and missile threats can be
defeated. Israel's strikes inside Iran targeted key missile
production facilities and degraded its strategic air defense
systems.
In addition, the regime is under economic and social
pressure. The sanctions architecture from the 2019 maximum
pressure campaign remains in place and has been strengthened.
The window is open for the United States to work with its
partners and advance opportunities in a region no longer held
back by Iran's nefarious influence. To emphasize, this is a
window of opportunity. How the United States proceeds in the
coming months will determine whether a more stable and secure
region emerges from the post-October 7th environment.
In the coming months, the administration should test
Tehran's willingness to reach a diplomatic agreement, while
also preparing to set the nuclear weapons program back through
military means. A good deal, as National Security Advisory
Waltz emphasized, would be one that permanently blocks Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon rather than just delaying its
capability.
Yet, the time window to test Iran's openness to negotiate
is short, partly due to the looming October expiration of
remaining U.N. Security Council restrictions and, also, because
of Iran's current exposure to military strikes.
Policymakers should assume that Russia and China will help
Iran rebuild its military capacity and air defenses. Moscow and
Beijing are already supporting Tehran diplomatically. So,
Washington will need to prepare for a complex negotiation in
which these powers do not contribute to a diplomatic process
like they did as part of the P5+1.
The following steps will strengthen the U.S. hand as it
pursues a negotiated settlement:
The administration can incentivize Iran to negotiate by
articulating how sanctions relief would be structured if Iran
dismantles its nuclear weapons program.
The administration must keep its military options open by
maintaining a robust U.S. military posture in the region;
strengthening regional air and missile defense capabilities,
and reinforcing America's commitment to deterring Iranian
aggression against Israel and Arab allies.
Congress can begin the process to conditionally authorize
the use of military force against Iran's nuclear program if the
regime proves unwilling to quickly take sufficient steps.
Consultations with allies and partners, particularly in the
Middle East and Europe, will ensure a unified approach to
countering Iran, reinforce the legitimacy of any negotiated
settlement, and maintain pressure on Tehran. This will be
crucial to blunting spoiler policies from Russia and China.
Engaging regional leaders is also essential for preventing
Iran from reconstituting its threat network. Providing military
assistance and intelligence-sharing to partners will enhance
their ability to counter Iran.
Restoring assistance to emerging leaders, while pressing
for reforms, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, can further
incentivize cooperation, ensuring they remain resilient against
malign Iranian influence.
In Yemen, the administration should ensure that its current
air campaign exclusively targets military assets of the Houthis
and mitigates civilian harm, while seeking ways to support the
Yemeni people.
Increasing maritime and overland interdiction efforts will
prevent Iran from resupplying the Houthis.
Additionally, working closely with the Saudis and Emirates
on a political process aimed at ending Yemen's civil war will
create a pathway for peace and stability.
In conclusion, real opportunities exist to block Iran from
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and consolidate military
gains against its destabilizing activities. To press the
advantage, the United States must be prepared to bring more to
the table.
Military force and sanctions are critical elements of
strategy, but insufficient on their own. The United States must
lean into diplomacy as well, testing the possibility of a
negotiated settlement, while supporting new leaders across the
region that oppose Tehran's interest in rebuilding its axis of
resistance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Last year, two of my bills that became law targeted Iran's
oil trade. The SHIP Act gave the President the authority to
sanction foreign ports and refineries that processed illicit
Iranian oil, and the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act allowed
for sanctions against Chinese financial institutions that
processed transactions involving Iranian oil.
And I'm currently working on legislation that further
expands sanctions authority, the Iran Enhanced Sanctions Act.
Anyone or any entity that knowingly facilitates the Iranian oil
trade will be found and cutoff until they are no longer doing
so.
Ms. Jungman, just over a week ago, the President sanctioned
the Luqing Refinery in China under the SHIP Act authorities.
Have we seen any impact since this recent designation, and do
you believe this designation and the Trump administration's
clear intent to enforce more of these types of sanctions may
deter other refineries from continuing to accept Iranian oil?
Ms. Jungman. Chairman Lawler, thank you for your question,
and thank you for your work on the SHIP Act and associated
acts.
I do think that the first designations here on this
refinery, it's still a little bit too soon to see an impact,
given that it was only, you know, a week or so ago. But we need
more of these. One refinery designated doesn't have a big
impact. Iran is going to move its oil to be offloaded at
another refinery. We need to continue the pressure. We need to
continue the designations on the refineries and it shouldn't be
piecemeal. It needs to all happen at once in order to really
cut the lifeline.
Mr. Lawler. Last week, reporting indicated that U.S. naval
forces stopped a group of oil tankers in the Gulf. While
originally thought to be Iraqi origin, they were found to be
using forged Iraqi documents and the tankers were Iranian.
This instance really raises the larger issue of this being
a consistent problem in the Gulf. So, what do you believe we
are doing now to stop vessels from obscuring their origin? And
how our are allies and strategic partner countries like Iraq
helping us? And what more can be done?
Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately, I don't think our strategic
partners are doing enough here. I think we need to have more
diplomatic engagement with them and encourage them to try to
stop these associated activities.
We see Malaysia, Singapore, Iraq, Amman; these are all
serving as hubs for Iran to blend its oil, rebrand its oil, and
again, continue the lifeline of the oil to be exported. So, we
need to continue pressure on them and encourage more diplomatic
efforts from them.
Mr. Lawler. Mr. Roule, you mentioned in your opening
statement that it's important to demonstrate the credibility of
a U.S. military offensive, should Iran undertake nuclear
weaponization in the future. What alternatives to diplomacy
would you recommend in attempting to constrain Iran's nuclear
program? And what other factors need to be considered before
any decision is made to pursue one of these.
Mr. Roule. Diplomacy, of course, should remain our primary
route, and the President has appropriately made this the
forefront of his approach to the Iranians and engaged with our
partners. The Iranians must understand, if they complete the
final steps, that we will take that military final approach as
well.
There needs to be more action done to prevent Iran from
acquiring the materiel they need to complete those last steps,
and we need to make sure that our partners who are providing
that equipment--the Chinese or the Europeans--shipping lines
are punished severely, as they move that material.
But in the end of the day, Iran has pretty much everything
it needs to complete those last steps for its nuclear program.
Unfortunately, the can has been kicked down the road for many
years and we are at the end of the road. So, it's up to the
Iranians to take those last steps, and they either come to a
deal or they must face nuclear reaction--nuclear response,
military response.
Mr. Lawler. So, given that the can has been kicked down the
road, what factors, in your estimation, need to be considered
before any decision is made to pursue a non-diplomatic
response?
Mr. Roule. The location of the nuclear material. The IAEA
has lost track of some aspects of Iran's program because Iran
no longer provides full access to its production of centrifuge
equipment.
We need to make sure we understand exactly where all of
Iran's sites are located, so that Iran simply doesn't reproduce
its program in an alternative facility
And in the end, even if there is a military strike, sir,
we've got to make sure the Iranians understand our intent in
the long term is to prevent reconstruction, or simply, we are
going to be the process. So, it has got to be an international
approach that says, with the United States and its partners, we
are not going to tolerate Iran building a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
Ms. Stroul, let me just go to you first. Thank you for your
service to our country.
And I said in my opening remarks that there's more to be
done to try to bring Iran and the United States to the table to
negotiate the core issues of concern here, which is Iran's
nuclear program, because of that tough assignment.
But I also believe that, you know, when I look at it thus
far, Iran's response has been that they reject talks with the
United States, but has left the door open to multilateral
diplomacy. And what was important for me at the time of
negotiating the JCPOA was that it was a multilateral agreement.
There were things that were going on in negotiations that our
allies wanted; that's how we got the agreement, because we
figured it wouldn't be just us by ourselves. So, as Mr. Roule
just said, getting them in, so that we could box Iran in,
because it is not just the United States; it is the United
States and our allies, which I think is important.
And then, also, I think some credibility has been gone from
the United States when we unilaterally pulled out and the other
allies stayed in and wanted to work something together. So,
there's a lack of trust that then develops, you know, in that
regard on both sides.
So, how do you think we could build some confidence with
our adversary Iran, so that we could begin negotiations? And
how do we bring back a diplomatic track with our allies, so
that we are not by ourselves? I think Mr. Roule just talked
about how significant and important that it is. How do you
think that we can do that?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question.
I couldn't agree with you more that we have seen in the
past Iran has been willing to negotiate when it feels
diplomatic isolation, coupled with economic pressure and the
threat of military force.
Right now, we have tremendous sanctions pressure, and I
believe there is a credible threat of military force on the
table. And there is a unilateral offer to negotiate from
President Trump, but what is missing is this multilateral
element.
So, first of all, there is an eagerness in some of our
previous partners from the P5+1, specifically, in Europe, to
begin coordinating with Washington as soon as possible ahead of
this deadline in October, later this year, when the remaining
restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire. Our European
allies--and they are still our allies--are very interested in
negotiating, in aligning with us in order to have a unified
front approaching Iran.
Second, we have been using and relying on partners in the
Middle East to pass messages to Iran and receive messages from
Iran. I think that is very important, but our partners in the
Middle East also need to have confidence that, if the Iranians
lash out and threaten them or use military force against them,
like we saw in the 2015 situation, that Washington is going to
have their back and be willing to put security guarantees on
the table and support their defense, just as the United States
has done for Israel in supporting its defense.
One is clarifying our commitment to our partners' defense.
Two is making a meaningful and genuine effort to include them
and consult with them on these talks. That will also strengthen
any negotiation on the other side.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
And this is to you again, Ms. Stroul and Mr. Roule.
Hopefully, we will have time to get both of you.
Could you maybe tell us about the challenges that it would
be in setting back the Iranian nuclear program militarily?
Would there be any challenges? Are there challenges there? Mr.
Roule? Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. I will try to do 20 seconds and hand it over to
Mr. Roule.
So, the greatest challenge is that you cannot bomb away
knowledge. Iran has mastered the cycle of nuclear fuel
enrichment. And we know, based on intelligence community
reporting in an unclassified manner, that they are undertaking
the activities to position themselves to go across the
threshold and weaponize, should the Supreme Leader make the
decision to do so. So, we are at a perilous moment.
Their nuclear program is geographically diverse. Some of it
is aboveground; some of it is buried deeply underground. This
means it is not a one-night military campaign. We are talking
about a serious campaign to set back a program in order to,
then, buy time to negotiate or figure out what steps would
happen on the other side of military action. It is a serious
piece of business.
Mr. Meeks. I think my time has expired.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here today.
What an important topic, as we face the threat from Iran.
And to me, the regime in Tehran is very clear; they believe
death to Israel; death to America. They believe that by
developing a nuclear capability that would be existential to
Israel, it would be existential to the United States,
particularly, as they develop an ICBM capability, which could
only have one purpose, and that is to deliver a nuclear attack
on the American people.
And so, over and over again, I'm so grateful to the
leadership of Donald Trump to let the dictatorship in Tehran
know that they should not develop a nuclear capability and
nuclear bomb, and it should not be developed.
And then, we need to get to, if we determine they are not,
there must be actual verification, not some charade, of
determining whether it has been stopped or not. And so, I have
absolute faith.
And I'm really grateful for Chairman Mast to bring up,
indeed, that we need to do all we can to stop the financing of
the dictatorship, with it being revealed that 90 percent of the
oil and gas being sold goes to the Chinese Communist Party.
Let's connect the dots, and then, we connect another dot.
And I was very grateful for President Donald Trump over the
weekend to identify the dots that are connected between War
Criminal Putin and the sale of oil to maintain his dictatorship
and the call for secondary sanctions. And these will be
secondary sanctions that would be against allies of--not
against, but working with allies of the United States, that
they should be part of sanctions.
So, over and over again, we are in a situation as we face
the malign influence, the topic today, and we have a
circumstance that is so clear to me, and that is that we are
involved in a war we did not choose. And that is dictators with
rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law.
It began February 24, 2022, with the invasion of Ukraine.
Then, October 7, 2023, the puppets of Iran, Hamas invading
Israel. And then, over and over again, we just need to be
working together.
And with that in mind, I would like each of you--but, in
particular, Mr. Roule--the issue of sanctions, what more
sanctions can we have? And I want you to know that many of my
colleagues here, that we have introduced a number of bills
today, the Maximum Support Act, bipartisan, with Congressman
Jimmy Panetta.
We also have the Free Iraq from Iran Act--I had two of my
sons serve in Iraq--to liberate Iraq. We didn't mean for it to
be liberated, for Iran to come in with militias to control the
country. And so, that needs to be achieved.
And then, I'm really grateful that we have got legislation
pending--and I need people really smart like Congressman
Huizenga to be part of this--and that is to address the network
of Hezbollah here in the Western Hemisphere working with drug
cartels.
With all of that, what can we do in terms of sanctions to
help the people of Iran, not the dictatorship?
Mr. Roule. Superb question, sir.
Very quickly, any legislation should ensure that we loudly
and clearly say that the Iranian people can obtain food and
medicine from the United States and elsewhere. Because their
own government's corruption and inefficiency prevents them from
doing do, to include during COVID, where over a billion dollars
of corruption cost them medicine that they so desperately
needed.
I would say that anything that could be done to deny the
Quds Force resources, because that goes directly to terrorism,
terrorism in the Homeland, and supporting proxies overseas who
are attempting to kill Americans and individuals in the region,
is important.
Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Jungman, indeed, the tanker tracking
is so important, and we are talking about ghost ships of War
Criminal Putin. We are talking about refineries of the Chinese
Communist Party over and over again. So, how is this being
processed?
Again, President Trump has made every effort and been clear
he is going to act.
Ms. Jungman. Thank you for the question.
I think it is important to remember that the revenue Iran
accumulates from its oil sales is not revenue going back to the
people of Iran. This revenue is going into the regime, into the
regime's pockets.
And I think it is also important to remember that the
maritime industry is a large industry. There's a number of
Western touchpoints that these vessels have that can be
sanctioned or you can threaten sanctions on.
For example, the classification societies. Essentially,
every vessel needs to have a safety certification which is
given from a classification society to ensure that it is safe
to sail the seas. Without that classification certificate, a
vessel cannot sail into a port. We have yet to see any
sanctions on these classification societies. Flag registries as
well and insurance companies.
Mr. Wilson. And my time is up. I yield back.
But tell you thank you for your insight.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. What we learned early this century is that
just an American leader pounding the table, as several did, and
say, ``This country will not be allowed to have nuclear
weapons'' is not exactly effective.
That is why I was here, saw several Presidents make that
declaration with regard to North Korea. And now, North Korea
has scores of nuclear weapons.
I'm going to ask our witnesses to give us an answer in
writing about North Korea. Because 20 years ago North Korea
provided not nuclear weapons to Syria, but the technology to
build them. The reason for that is North Korea didn't have a
surplus of nuclear weapons at the time, didn't want to give up
their nuclear weapons, but they are happy to have Syria have
nuclear weapons and to make some money off of it.
So, I would like each of our witnesses, for the record, to
detail ideas on what we do to prevent Iran from buying a
nuclear weapon from North Korea, which today does not have a
surplus of money and does have a surplus of nuclear weapons.
And in particular, I would like you to address what steps we
could take to force China to agree, at least privately, that no
plane would be allowed to go directly from North Korea to Iran
without stopping for inspection.
I might add that I discussed this with President Obama in
the Oval Office long ago and was unable to--and while he
pointed out to me that we intercept certain ships leaving North
Korea, he was unwilling to take action to prevent direct plane
flights. At least he didn't think it was a good idea at the
time.
The MAHSA Act, named after Mahsa Amini who was brutally
murdered by the Iranian regime, directed the administration to
make targeted sanctions determinations on senior officials in
the Iranian regime.
Ms. Stroul, what can the administration do to better
utilize those authorities and go after particular individuals
responsible for human rights deprivations in Iran?
Ms. Stroul. Well, thank you for that question, Congressman.
The administration should certainly make use of the
authorities granted to it by Congress in the MAHSA Act and
continue to shine a light and impose----
Mr. Sherman. Any particular individuals you would want to
name today?
Ms. Stroul. I don't have particular individuals.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Ms. Stroul. I don't know----
Mr. Sherman. I add them for the record and I'll ask our
witnesses to do that.
[No statements have been submitted:]
Mr. Sherman. But I will point out our witnesses have
pointed out that you can't bomb knowledge away; that even an
agreement with Iran is valid only so long as they adhere to it.
Nothing will permanently prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran
from having a nuclear weapon, except the permanent end to
Islamic Republic of Iran and the creation of a truly democratic
Iranian government.
I am, therefore, shocked that the administration has cut,
eliminated all the democracy and civil society programs in
Iran, all of our support for grassroots political movements,
all of our support for independent media.
Now, I know that USAID spent a few tens of thousands of
dollars doing stupid things that don't reflect American values,
and certainly don't reflect our strategic needs.
But we saw just yesterday the Chinese were rescuing people
in Myanmar and we did not have the capacity to save a single
life in Myanmar. We sent some people recently, long after, I
think, all the survivors would have been deceased, to go scout
out the situation. That's what happens when you lose USAID.
Ms. Stroul, I would like you to focus just on the Trump
years, 2017 to 2021. During that 4 years, did Iran increase its
missile capacity? Yes or no?
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. During those 4 years, did Iran expand its
stockpile of enriched uranium?
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. During those years, did Iran increase its
capacity to refine uranium through banks of centrifuges?
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. So, well, I hope that Trump 2.0 works better.
Ms. Jungman, you have brought the importance of
cryptocurrency. I would point out that our sanctions that got
us in 2015 were pretty much based on our power to control
international currency, because it was all dollars.
The crypto enthusiasts and the leaders in that industry
have said they want to take that away from the United States
because they think it is illegitimate for America to have that
power. Do you think that we should give up the power that we
get from having the dollar being the world's reserve currency?
Ms. Jungman. No, I don't think we should give up that
power, but I do think that there needs to be stronger
regulations and monitoring of what's being done----
Mr. Sherman. And my time is expired.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Sherman,
I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just ask two basic questions.
You know, despite presenting itself as a U.S. partner,
Azerbaijan under Aliyev--and I have met with him twice in Baku
and raised human rights issues with him, and recently,
obviously, he committed genocide against the people of Nagorno-
Karabakh--he signed a cooperation agreement with both Iran and
Russia, including a significant guest swap deal with Tehran.
These actions, in my opinion, directly benefit the two regimes
that the United States is actively working to counter. And I'm
wondering what your thoughts might be on that.
Second, if I could, Rob Malley, you know, we know that the
Office of Inspector General--I have read the report. It was a
good report about the fact that the State Department did not
follow its own clearance guidelines. But the bigger issue is
having someone who was seemingly very much in favor of Tehran's
policy in such a strategic position as Special Envoy does raise
the question what damage might have been done, has been done,
and might even carry forward right into today, especially as to
Tehran's perceptions of what we are all about.
And do you think the FBI will ever get to the bottom of it?
And if you could speak to that as well? But those two
questions, if you could.
Norman?
Mr. Roule. In order to restrict Iran's access to funds and
to apply the appropriate diplomatic and economic pressures, it
is critical that Iran not have the capacity to undertake
economic deals such as it conducted with Azerbaijan with
anyone.
As Ms. Stroul correctly stated, Iran is under the greatest
pressure when it faces multilateral economic and diplomatic
isolation, and that must be absolute. Whenever there are
exceptions to that, Iran benefits and that weakens the pressure
on Iran itself.
Regarding Mr. Malley, it is out of my level of competence
and I would defer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
others.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Would any of you want to comment on either of
those two issues?
Ms. Stroul. I would simply note that, in the Biden
administration, and again, in this administration, there is an
aligned objective of pursuing negotiations first for a
verifiable deal that blocks all Iran's pathways toward a
nuclear weapon.
And I think it underscores the importance of an independent
and strong Inspector General in the State Department, as well
as an FBI who is allowed to conduct credible and important
investigations.
Mr. Smith. Claire?
Ms. Jungman. No.
Mr. Smith. Do any of you have any sense as to when the FBI
may reveal where it is in terms of this investigation? It seems
like Malley just fell off the face of the earth. And to have
someone of his Special Envoy in such a strategic position seems
to me would undermine what this country was all about in our
dealings with Iran. Would you agree with that at least?
Nobody? Okay.
I do hope that we will followup on the Azerbaijan
connection. Again, I have met with a number of people who have
political prisoners sitting in his horrible jails. He is so
brazen that in the past he put a stringer who was an
Azerbaijani woman into jail, gave her an over 7-year prison
sentence, and she worked for Radio Free Europe.
So, I actually convened a hearing and had the head of Radio
Free Europe come and testify about how horrible it was. And
what was her crime? She pointed out how corrupt Aliyev is.
And now, we have a situation again where he is getting into
deals with a country that needs hard currency extremely hard.
We know that Xi Jinping and the Communist Party, they enable
dictatorships and bad actors everywhere. But this man, who gets
a free pass in this town--and that is Aliyev-needs to be called
out.
I thank you and yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Stroul mentioned how important our allies are to us in
this regard, even though we did move away from them and left
many of them hanging from pulling out of the JCPOA. But I want
to just comment on that.
First, last year our allies did participate with an Iran
proxy, the Houthis, in an attack with fighter jets, with ship-
based cruise missiles, with targets like, you know, Houthi
missile launchers, air defense systems, radar, weapons systems.
We worked together. The UK participated in this. Canada
participated in this. Australia and the Netherlands
participated in this.
Well, what has happened to our allies now with the Trump
administration's latest actions and talks, deliberately
irrigating--and this really takes a great deal of effort--our
allies, Canada, wanting to make that the 51st State and
bullying them with tariffs without negotiating the way you
would with an ally.
How does Canada respond? Well, Canada responded just last
month with a $4.2 billion investment in cutting-edge radar with
Australia, despite our geographic location in the Western
Hemisphere--with Australia. And they are partaking with other
European countries right now in alternative military buildup
discrete from the United States, because of these actions.
Denmark is part of NATO. And how are they reacting when
they say they will take Greenland by force if necessary?
Portugal, a NATO country, and other NATO countries, they
are reconsidering buying F-35s because of their fear of the
U.S. control over the parts and software. These are our allies.
These are people that are instrumental to our success
worldwide, but also in the Middle East.
And let's talk about the leaked Signal chat that was there.
Our Vice President saying, ``I just hate bailing out Europe
again.''
And what about our Secretary of Defense saying, ``I fully
share your loathing of European freeloading.''? It is pathetic.
And what about Stephen Miller in that chat? They had a lot
to say and our allies were listening. He said, ``We will have
to make it clear to Egypt and Europe what we expect in
return.'' ``We also need to figure out how to enforce that
requirement. If they don't remunerate, then what?'' ``If the
U.S. successfully restores freedom of navigation at a great
cost, there needs to be further economic gain extracted from
them in return.'' That's the Signal chat. Those are the other
actions, and I could go on.
How can we really expect our allies to trust us on such an
important issue as Iran and dealing with the malign influence
throughout the Middle East if this is what they are getting in
return? And we have already seen, as I have shown, some actions
on their part where they are moving away from us because they
can't trust us.
Ms. Stroul, are we weaker without our allies side by side
with us?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.
Certainly, one of the core elements of American strength
and its ability to accomplish its national security interests
has been our unmatched network of allies and partners across
multiple theaters. Any objective that we want to make the
American people safer and our country safer is better done in
coordination with allies and partners.
Part of the reason we need to put in effort to align
diplomatically, share burdens and resources upfront, is because
there may be a time when we ask our allies and partners to do
something that is not easy or is inconvenient.
Mr. Keating. Like they did after 9/11 in joining with us--
--
Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. under Article 5.
Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, sir.
So, as we think through all of our different objectives in
the Middle East, we have seen our European allies stand up, as
well as our partners in the Middle East. The Air Defense
Coalition last April was a good example. France's leadership in
Lebanon is another example. The European coordination in Syria
is another example. And absolutely, both the defensive presence
in the Red Sea to defend against Houthi attacks and the
offensive military strikes over the past year are great
examples of our allies and partners putting skin in the game.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen, appreciate your time here today. We
just get real about this conversation for once. Iran is a
country that is run by a criminal terrorist regime. That is
what Iran is. We are talking about having negotiations with
them and so on and so forth. I guess we have got to.
But North Korea is a criminal essentially terrorist regime
when you look at what it does to its own citizens. It does it
because it can't afford to export its terrorism. But Iran does.
And has continued to do so. And even with the fact
notwithstanding that 80 percent of Hezbollah's drones and
missiles have been taken out, Assad's regime is gone, Tehran's
missile factories have been devastated, the Houthis are finally
under some real fire, Iran still exists. And we are talking
like there is--well, let me ask you. You guys are the experts.
Mr. Roule, is Iran going to give up its nuclear program?
Have they ever shown any interest whatsoever? But before you
answer that question, is there any question in anybody's mind
on the panel that their nuclear program is specifically for
weapons--it is a weapons program. It is not for power or any--
or medical research. It is for aggressive military action. Is
there any question about that? Is there any dissention from
that?
Mr. Roule. Frankly, sir, the question is the--I think the
best way of putting it is Iran has a civilian nuclear program
and has kept open the option for a military----
Mr. Perry. Why do they need enrich so much for a civilian
program?
Mr. Roule. Not only do they not need to enrich--it is a
great question--they are now focusing the enrichment aspect of
their entire nuclear program on non-civilian enrichment. So
they need to enrich between----
Mr. Perry. Yes.
Mr. Roule [continuing]. 3 and 5 percent in----
Mr. Perry. It is a weapons program.
Mr. Roule [continuing]. civilian. They are enriching at 60
percent, which is only military grade. In essence, they are
shaping their entire civilian nuclear program to make it look
as if they are aiming for a military program. It has no
civilian use. It is architecture they are creating. That
doesn't mean they have decided to make a bomb. And we have
heard the DNI Gabbard say they are not doing this, but facts
are facts in that regard.
Mr. Perry. Maybe I should have added they are a lying
criminal terrorist regime, right? They lie about things. They
use diplomacy to their advantage because the rest of the--to
the point of the JCPOA, the rest of the world are our allies,
followed President Obama who didn't want to see a nuclear Iran
during his term, but didn't mind seeing one 15 years later when
he was no longer the President. It didn't stop their nuclear
production, their military nuclear capability. It just delayed
it. That is all it did. Nobody here wants to acknowledge it.
But to my other point, have they ever shown any interest
whatsoever in getting rid of this nuclear program for whatever
way you want to describe it?
Mr. Roule. No, and in fact it is----
Mr. Perry. No.
Mr. Roule [continuing]. extremely--their red lines have
been not giving up industrial enrichment, not closing any
facilities, and not giving up R&D. And it is very unlikely they
will give up any of those red lines without significant
pressure and the threat of military action, unfortunately.
Mr. Perry. Ms. Jungman, you disagree with that?
Ms. Jungman. I do not disagree. Completely agree.
Mr. Perry. Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. I do not disagree.
Mr. Perry. Okay. So what are we talking about here? We are
talking about--like we can have some conversation that is going
to get them to give it up even while we all know in the room
they ain't giving it up, right?
Ms. Jungman, they got what, 300 ghost ships running around
selling their oil which is sanctioned, but they sell it to the
Chinese and whoever they want. And where does that--does that
money go to the people of Iran? Look, there are probably
wonderful--I am sure there are wonderful people in Iran that
don't want to live under this yoke of terrorism. But the money
is not going to them, is it? It is going to who?
Ms. Jungman. No, the money from Iran's oil goes right back
to its terrorist proxies.
Mr. Perry. Yes, it is terrorist proxies, the Quds Force,
probably to their nuclear weapons program.
Ladies and gentlemen, all we are doing is delaying the
inevitable, right? We are acting like we can talk our way out
of having this cancer get worse by just having the cancer kind
of settle down for a little bit. There is a cancer in the
Middle East. There is a cancer on the globe. The name in this
case is Iran and the leadership in Iran. That is the cancer.
We better get real about what we are talking about because
they are not going to give it up willingly no matter what the
negotiation is. And I just wish that we would quit fooling
around and acting like the IAEA is going to tell us something.
I mean, they wouldn't even allow an America inspector on the
team. They wouldn't allow inspectors to visit military sites.
Who are we kidding here?
I am sorry I didn't have any questions. I yield.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Castro.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony today.
Ms. Stroul, in your testimony you recommended that
Congress, quote, ``strengthen the administration's hand by
beginning the process to conditionally authorize the use of
military force against Iran's nuclear program if the regime
proves unwilling to take sufficient steps to ensure that it
will not acquire nuclear weapons.'' And I guess that
recommendation gives me some concern based on history.
This was the same argument made to justify voting for the
Iraq War in 2002. In debates in the Congress they argued that a
show of resolve by Congress by preemptively authorizing the use
of military force against Iraq would strengthen the Bush
administration's hand in negotiations and force Saddam Hussein
to come to the table. What ensued with the Iraq War was one of
the biggest mistakes that our country has made in decades, and
I don't think any of us, or most of us at least, want to repeat
that same mistake. And I am concerned with everything going on
now that we could with Iran.
The American people are not looking to get into another
protracted war in the Middle East. I think most folks would
agree with that. I am also skeptical that the votes--or that
the votes are there for such a war, skeptical that the votes
are there. In February 2020 bipartisan majorities in the House
and Senate voted to end hostilities with Iran after the strike
on Soleimani.
During the congressional debates on the repeal of the 2002
Iraq AUMF, some Republicans attempted to ensure that the law
could still be used to strike Iranian-backed proxies. In
response, a bipartisan majority in the Senate, including with
the crucial support of now Vice President J.D. Vance, voted 60
to 36 to stop those efforts.
And so my question is would you say that we should
strengthen the administration's negotiating hand by
preemptively authorizing the use of military force against
Iran? Do you trust Donald Trump and his administration with
that responsibility at this time?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question, and I
think it is a very important point. So the words I chose were
``begin the process to conditionally authorize,'' and I think
those two clauses are important in the point I am making.
One is begin the process. That is because I don't think
that this decision should be left in the hands of any President
without advice and consent and consultation with Congress. And
conditionally because I am not recommending preemptive
authorization. I am recommending that by Members of Congress
having debate about the conditions and circumstances under
which it would approve use of military force it will send a
signal of bipartisan consensus and commitment that that
credible military option remains on the table should
negotiations fail.
I want to be very clear that my recommendation associated
with Mr. Roule is that we should pursue negotiations first
because no military action will eliminate the knowledge and the
entire program overnight.
Mr. Castro. I guess what would the--per your recommendation
what would that trigger be? When do you start down that road?
Ms. Stroul. First I think the intelligence community should
be providing regular updates to Members of Congress in a closed
and classified atmosphere on exactly what the steps are that
the intelligence community understands Iran to be taking. And
second, I think there should be consultations about exactly
what is being contemplated when we talk about military strikes
on Iran.
Mr. Castro. Would you require that we go through a JCPOA-
type negotiation before going down that road?
Ms. Stroul. I think that testing the diplomatic waters with
the regime either in a multilateral context in indirect
negotiations that appear to be contemplated at this moment.
Either way, a negotiated settlement is by far more--easier to
verify in implementation and blocking Iran's pathways to a
nuclear weapon than military force, which on the other side we
don't know what regime decisionmaking would be. We don't know
what Iranian decisionmaking would be. And we don't know what
the war looks like on the other side of that. And this is why I
think there is such serious issues that merit congressional
input.
Mr. Castro. Thank you. And also for the other witnesses,
just for the record as we are having this discussion, do you
believe that we should to a preemptive AUMF?
Mr. Roule. I associate myself with Ms. Stroul's comments.
We should have a thoughtful process in which Congress plays its
rightful role as an institution. But the Iranians must
understand that endless negotiations aren't the only strategy
of the United States.
Mr. Castro. Thank you.
Let me check in with you.
Ms. Jungman. Yes, and I agree with Ms. Stroul and Mr. Roule
in their comments.
Mr. Castro. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Castro.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Huizenga.
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And during the last Congress I actually led a letter with
several of my colleagues on this committee underscoring the
urgency of suspending the activity of the Iranian ghost armada.
And, Ms. Jungman, you were--have been a part of a couple of
those conversations, I think.
Dispatched from Iran, these vehicles ferry illicit oil and
petroleum products to bolster the human rights abuses and
terrorist acts perpetrated by the Iranian regime. It is their
funding source. These foreign-owned and flagged ships operate
undetected within the ghost armada and violate maritime law by
obfuscating their positioning, thus circumventing U.S., and
frankly world enforcement.
At the time of my letter in 2023 the armada was made up of
364 vessels with 47 percent of them being flagged by the Panama
Maritime Authority. That is 171 vessels approximately. As the
vessel has now grown, I would argue thanks to a lack of action
in the last administration about enforcement, it is--sanctions
are only as strong as the enforcement that you are willing to
put behind it.
And by the way, I serve on the Financial Services
Committee. I am the vice chair of that committee. I have been
working on this. That is, the origin of many of those sanctions
is that committee.
The latest report indicates it has now grown to 521 vessels
with 17 percent of those flagged by Panama, which is about 88.
So it has been cut in half on Panama.
I am kind of curious. I will start with you, Ms. Jungman.
You have worked on this issue by closely tracking these vessels
engaging in the transportation of illicit Iranian oil. How
should the United States deal with countries that continue to
flag vessels that are listed on the Department of Treasury's
Specially Designated National and Blocked Person, or SDN list?
And where have those other vessels been flagged?
Ms. Jungman. Thank you for your question and thank you for
your work on this topic. It is a matter of great importance
given that the revenue Iran accumulates from these oil sales is
going back to its nuclear program and terrorist activities.
If we look to a year ago, like you said, Panama was
flagging a significant amount of the ghost fleet. And that
number has dropped drastically, which is showing that
diplomatic efforts and negotiations with----
Mr. Huizenga. Are you exposure?
Ms. Jungman. Exposure, yes.
Mr. Huizenga. Sunlight discussion like this?
Ms. Jungman. Essentially naming and shaming, calling them
out for enabling this activity has an impact. And so I think
Panama has taken a significant step, but we would of course
like to see that 17 percent down to 0 percent.
Mr. Huizenga. Where are they getting flagged?
Ms. Jungman. So that is a new problem that has come up.
Unfortunately, as a result of Panama de-flagging these vessels
we are seeing Iran set up these false registries in Guyana,
Comoros, Eswantini even and----
Mr. Huizenga. Shall we say maybe less well-known maritime
powers?
Ms. Jungman. Sure. Yes. But----
Mr. Huizenga. Because they don't have that kind of--
typically that kind of flagging capability or that kind of
fleet coming out there.
Ms. Jungman. Well, and I think it is important to note that
they are not necessarily legitimate flag registries under these
countries.
Mr. Huizenga. Yes.
Ms. Jungman. They are companies set up in--most likely in
Dubai or in India that are really run by Iran and providing
these registrations to these vessels.
Mr. Huizenga. We are going fast on time, but this is
important stuff. I need to jump to Arsenio Dominguez from the
Republic of Panama. He was elected, has the 4-year term as
Secretary General of the International Maritime organization,
IMO. They are the U.N. agency tasked with establishing, quote,
``the authority for the safety, security, environmental
performance of international shipping.'' How can he possibly
effectively lead the IMO while representing a nation that
knowingly green lights this kind of transportation of Iranian
oil against international sanctions?
Mr. Jungman. That is a great question and I think the IMO
has done little to nothing on this topic and there should be
and could be a lot more from them.
Mr. Huizenga. Okay. I have got a lot that I am going to
have to followup with in some written questions as well, but
let's touch on the teapot refineries and deterring those and
their willingness to accept Iranian oil. Has there been an
impact since President Trump designated one of those teapot
refineries last week?
Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately it is still too soon to see an
impact from that and designating one refinery has little to no
impact as Iran will just move its oil to other refineries.
Mr. Huizenga. Okay.
Ms. Jungman. So there needs to be a more comprehensive
approach on targeting and sanctioning them.
Mr. Huizenga. All right. And as I have said, sanctions are
only as good as the weakest link in the sanctions chain. And
that has been a huge problem. We need robust multinational buy-
in from allies and partners, including Europe. I recently had a
conversation with the Ambassador from the EU who happens to be
Lithuanian. She understands this ghost fleet also with Russia
and what has been happening there.
Do you sense that there is any appetite, any of you, in
Europe to push back on Iran's illicit trade with China, whether
it be illicit oil or not?
Ms. Jungman. I don't think I can speak for the Europeans,
but I think that we are finally starting to wake up to see that
China is the only one benefiting here. China is getting the
cheap oil while everybody else is paying real prices and----
Mr. Huizenga. Because they sell it at a discount. With
that, I know I am over time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it and
I will be writing some questions as well with everybody. Thank
you.
Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Huizenga.
I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman and ranking
member of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms.
Cherfilus-McCormick, of Florida.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
As we have heard today the United States combined with our
partners and allies in the region must take all necessary
measures to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to
halt the support for terrorism. One of the main tools to help
Iran's development of nuclear weapons and its continued funding
of its terrorist proxies is sanctions. That is why I was proud
to introduce bipartisan legislation with Congressman Lawler,
who is the chairman for the Middle East, to strengthen
sanctions on foreign entities enabling Iran's illicit oil
trade.
Over the past few years we have witnessed growing alignment
between Iran, Russia, and China, presenting a significant
challenge to United States' national security and global
stability.
Ms. Stroul, what steps did the Biden Administration take to
combat these alliances?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question. A variety of
different elements. The first is to lean into strengthening our
unmatched network of allies and partners in order to increase
Russia's isolation in the European theater, China's isolation
in the Indo-Pacific theater, and Iranian isolation in the
Middle East. We work with all of our long-time allies and
partners across those different theaters.
No. 2 was to highlight and expose the ways in which this
axis of upheaval is supporting itself counter to the interests
of our allies and partners. Iranian drones killing Ukrainians
via Russia, Iranian support to Russian defense industry,
Russia's provision of more sophisticated defense technology to
China, Chinese purchase of Iranian oil at a discount. I could
go on and on with these examples.
We should also talk about North Korean foot soldiers
fighting on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. All of this suggests
an emerging axis that is working to challenge the current
international global order that benefits and keeps Americans
safe.
There was also successive rounds of sanctions to break and
diminish the different ways in which they are strengthening.
And again, provision of security support, assistance, military
aid, and intelligence to our allies and partners so that they
understand exactly what the negative strategic impact is of
this emerging axis to their and our security.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. What additional measures can you--
would you recommend be implemented to prevent Russia and China
from aiding Iran in evading sanctions?
Ms. Stroul. Well first of all, we need to continue to
sanction those activities. And the sanctioning not only cuts
off and dis-incentivizes it from a financial perspective, but
it also shines a light on and exposes that nefarious activity.
Clearly though I would say that it seems the Chinese
government doesn't really care if it gets exposed and neither
does President Putin of Russia. So we are going to have to find
more ways to dis-incentivize this behavior. And a lot of that
is making sure that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran feel the
consequences of this cooperation not just from Washington, but
from European capitals and Middle East capitals. Red carpets
should not be rolled out for the leaders of these countries.
Sanctions loopholes and certain economic environments should
not be allowed for these illicit networks, and more has to be
done to impose consequences and costs.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, I want to turn our attention
for a moment to Syria. We know that the fall of the Assad
regime was a major blow to Iran's influence in Syria, however
what America does next is critical to the future of the
country. Ms. Stroul, do you believe America's current policy in
Syria is positioned well to further undermine Iran?
Ms. Stroul. Right now we have a transitional government in
Damascus under the leadership of Interim President Ahmed al-
Sharaa and he is saying that he is committed to fighting Isis
in Syria and has told Iran that they will not be allowed to use
Syrian territory the way they did under Bashar al-Assad. And he
is also looking to impose consequences on Russia and deny it
use of that naval base that is on the Mediterranean.
All of these are interests that align with U.S. security
objectives as well as having a secure unified Syria under the
control of one government, but right now U.S. policy is not
geared toward seizing these opportunities. We need to find ways
to support the Syrian people through some measured sanctions
relief benchmarked against performance of the Sharaa
government.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. And before I run out of time I
just wanted to ask you this last question. Do you believe that
dismantling the USAID in Syria is helpful or harmful to U.S.
interests in Syria?
Ms. Stroul. I believe that it is harmful. I think what
Syrian people will remember is an American flag or the USAID
stamp on emergency food assistance, stabilization assistance,
clean water, baby formula, and the U.S. actually putting skin
in the game to demonstrate that we care about the lives and the
livelihoods of Syrian people. And by taking this precious
element of American power off the table we undermine our own
ability to achieve our interests in Syria.
Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Kim. [Presiding.] Thank you. I now recognize myself for
5 minutes.
Ms. Jungman, you talk about the sophisticated and deceptive
techniques that the Iranian regime is utilizing to evade oil
sanctions including through foreign front companies. Iran also
remains heavily dependent on China to sustain its illicit oil
trade which is like 90 percent of Iran's oil exports go to
China, primarily independent teapot refineries. So you note
that Chinese purchase of Iranian oil increased by over 20
percent last year despite the U.S. sanctions.
So in your perspective how successful has the U.S. been in
identifying these teapot refineries and front companies?
Ms. Jungman. Thank you for your question. I think it is
important to remember that until end of 2024 we saw an
administration that was essentially giving lax sanctions
enforcement. As a result of that, Iran was able to buildup its
revenues and in turn is--despite these sanctions is easily able
to replace the vessels that are designated. And until there is
a comprehensive designation across the entire ghost fleet these
vessels will continue to export Iranian oil to China.
When looking at the refineries themselves I think that it
was a great first step from this administration to designate
the refineries we saw sanctioned I guess 2 weeks ago, but
unfortunately designation on one refinery has little to no
impact. There has to be a comprehensive holistic approach on
all of the refineries that are taking on Iranian oil.
Ms. Kim. You talk about the realistic short-term action
that the U.S. can take to close that loophole. What about the
long-term actions, short-term and long-term actions that we can
take to close that loophole?
Ms. Jungman. Sure. I think that there needs to be--in
addition with sanctions there has to be negotiation or a
diplomatic approach. And I think if there is any President that
will be able to figure out what to hold over China's head, it
will be this President.
Ms. Kim. Thank you. Mr. Roule, one of the recommendations
you provide in your testimony to counter the Iranian regime's
malign activities is to continue investing in the regional
military, economic, and commercial partnerships, because in
your testimony, in quote, ``regional economic and social
success is as essential to our security interests as their
military strength,'' end quote.
So what role do joint security exercises or intelligence
sharing activities with our allies play in disrupting the
Iran's illicit activities?
Mr. Roule. Thank you, Congresswoman. the relationships we
have with our Gulf partners and other regional partners played
a profound role in the defense of Israel during Iran's
ballistic missile attack on Israel. We saw years of CENTCOM's
investment in those relationships come to fruition in the
smooth air defense of the entire region. And thousands of
lives, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives were saved as a
result of that.
But this is a broader target set because the Iranians are
moving, as I say, in the Red Sea Basin. They are moving in the
Persian Gulf area. They are moving in--throughout the Arabian
Peninsula. And these relationships require a tremendous
investment by the CENTCOM team as well as our Department of
Defense as a whole.
Ms. Kim. Thank you. Ms. Jungman, let me come back to you.
You talk about the IRGC's efforts to diversify its revenue
streams including through cryptocurrency and how it offers Iran
a way to bypass financial oversight and quietly move funds
across the borders. So in your perspective how extensively is
the IRGC using cryptocurrency to evade sanctions?
Ms. Jungman. We saw around I think it was $8 billion of
transactions from Iran using cryptocurrency. And I think that
this is an area they are obviously tapping into as sanctions
are coming out. So they are moving their money there because it
is harder to track. And I think that it is an area that
sanctions could be enforced stronger.
Ms. Kim. So could you talk about some of the policy changes
that you think is necessary to improve that effectiveness of
sanctions? And also, what risks do Iran's cryptocurrency and
front company activities pose to global financial integrity?
Ms. Jungman. This is not my area of expertise, but I am
happy to followup with a written response there.
Ms. Kim. All right. Well, thank you so much. I ask that
because I want to see if these tactics could set a precedent
for other rogue actors or states. And I think we have been
pretty clear on the reason why we need a digital assets
framework to coordinate with our allies to address those crypto
crime. So thank you so much for your testimony and I yield
back.
Let's see, who is next? Representative Stanton, I recognize
you for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Iran has built a network of proxies across the Middle East
sowing chaos and instability in the region for decades. It has
funded, trained, and armed Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis,
and various militia groups to target Israel and other regional
rivals, all while keeping Tehran out of the direct conflict.
The human cost to Iran's offensive is undeniable. On
October 7, 2023, 1,300 Israelis were murdered by Hamas
terrorists and attacks by these proxy militia have injured or
killed American troops. Over the last 18 months Iran has
continued to support its proxies as they send ballistic
missiles and drones at Israeli targets and at American Service
members. But Iran's axis of resistance is waning. Right now we
are at a critical and fragile moment for the region. Iranian
proxies are weakened and new leadership in Lebanon and Syria
are refusing to bow to Tehran's influence.
The U.S., acting in partnership with our allies, has an
opportunity to end Iran's malign influence and to protect our
ally Israel and expand the Abraham Accords and change the
trajectory of the region for decades to come. But we can only
take advantage of this moment if we maintain a focus on
democracy building, work with and support our allies in the
region, and fully enforce the U.S. sanctions regime.
In a completely self-defeating move the Trump
Administration has eliminated impactful programs that support
the rule of law, protect human rights, and counter
misinformation. Limiting U.S. foreign aid and programs is a
gift to our adversaries--Iran, but also to China and Russia.
International investments are an essential instrument of U.S.
foreign policy and U.S. national security policy, and has been
for decades under Republican and Democratic administrations.
Now, there are still some active aid programs in the region
and we need to make sure those resources get delivered
efficiently to the people that need it.
Mr. Roule, what can the U.S. do to support foreign aid
delivery while also preventing Iranian malign activity?
Mr. Roule. The best expertise on foreign aid delivery in
the region are regional partners themselves. They know the
neighborhood; they know the players; they know where corruption
exists; they know the needs of their people. And building
relationships with these actors themselves will allow us to
know how best to deliver and where are--the impact can be the
greatest.
This goes to the previous question by one of your
colleagues. Do we have relationships with our reliable partners
in the region? And we extract utility from that in many
different areas to include foreign aid. We can build soft-power
impact as well as our military impact.
Mr. Stanton. To successfully deter Iran and our global
adversaries we should be leveraging our allies and our
partners. President Trump's go-it-alone foreign policy strategy
is short-sighted and self-defeating. He started trade wars with
our neighbors and angering our friends, even causing South
Korea and Japan to restart trade discussions with China for the
first time in 5 years. And Vice President J.D. Vance in public
speeches, and embarrassingly in leaked Signal chats, has spit
in the eye of our European allies.
Europe is the second largest arms supplier to Israel. The
U.K. critically stepped in to shoot down missiles fired at
Iran--by Iran, excuse me, at Israel in last October's
escalation. And France helped broker the critical Lebanon-
Israel cease-fire. They are vital to achieving Middle Eastern
peace and supporting democratic goals in the region. In
addition to those values Europe's presence and our presence in
the Middle East contribute to stronger global trade and
business, another vital component of keeping stability.
For Ms. Stroul, how has Europe worked to secure the Red Sea
global shipping lanes and how should we work with them to
better stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question. The Europeans have
both participated in a U.S.-led defensive coalition called
Prosperity Guardian which has kept the critical choke points in
the southern Red Sea open. Some European partners as well as
others in other theaters also participated with us in
multilateral offensive strikes last year to take Houthi
capabilities off the table in Yemen. And the Europeans maintain
their own separate defensive coalition as well in the Red Sea.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you.
The final question is for Ms. Jungman about China, and they
are unfortunately working with Iran. What is China's role in
helping Iran avoid oil sanctions?
Ms. Jungman. China plays a large role in enabling Iran to
accumulate this revenue. They purchased 90--90 percent of
Iranian oil is going to China. It serves as the lifeline for
Iran's revenue and extremist activity.
Mr. Stanton. All right. Thank you very much for those
answers and I will yield back the rest of my----
Ms. Kim. Thank you. I recognize Representative Davidson of
Ohio for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davidson. Thank you, chairwoman.
Thanks to our colleagues for hosting this hearing. Thanks
to our witnesses. Appreciate your testimony today.
First, Iran and their despotic regime have just horrible
human rights abuses. They have been a force really for terror
and instability in the Middle East for a long time. the 10/7
attacks by Hamas were a profoundly evil act by a network of
terror groups all linked to Iran. Maximum pressure against
these groups and their Iranian sponsors is more than warranted
and I applaud the Trump Administration for doing just that.
The second truth about the situation that we are in is that
a full-blown ground war in Iran is simply not in America--it is
not our war to fight. As we turn toward strategic competition
with China we cannot afford to continue to be bogged down in
the Middle East. For the United States an economy of force
strategy in the Middle East makes sense so that we can address
American interests while minimizing the American investment
there. This allows us to focus on other strategic threats and
more immediate security risks to our own country.
As our committee's State Department authorization process
move forward I look forward to engaging on pressing issues for
the Arms Export Control Act and AUMF reforms so that Congress
is active in confronting the rapidly evolving security
environment in the world.
Mr. Roule, thank you for your testimony today. And I
personally worry about an overly broad reading of the 2001 AUMF
providing a blank check for virtually any war in the Middle
East without Congress really having sometimes even knowledge,
but certainly input in it. Failure to update the 2001 AUMF
represents an abdication of congressional war powers.
So as we confront really needed security challenges with
Houthi proxies, for example, who are disrupting sea traffic and
posing a threat not just in the oceans to our navy and others,
what is the actual underlying authorization today?
Mr. Roule. Congressman, it is a complicated question. And I
am going to evade some of that because I am not an expert, but
I will say this: Congress needs to start now, as Ms. Stroul
stated, with a process to understand what role should be played
to develop specific authorities. Because the Quds Force needs
to be taken apart in the region because a nuclear deal that
simply provides funding for the Quds Force to reestablish its
proxy network to the region just repeats this entire system of
violence. And we will face the same situation over and over
again.
So we really do need to understand the prospect of military
actions against Iran and its personnel and its architecture at
present. And Congress needs to play its role in that.
Mr. Davidson. Yes, thank you for that. That is exactly what
I have tried to do for a long time. Since I have been here,
really since the summer of 2016, updating the 2001 AUMF has
been darn near impossible, frankly. For people like me that
wanted to do it, we were blocked from even being on this
committee, blocked from--anybody that really wanted reform
couldn't get on the Committee of Jurisdiction. And then when
you try to do it through appropriations, oh, you know, you are
supposed to do it through the Committee of Jurisdiction. And
now, even after the Afghan War has wound down, long after we
have formally left Iraq, we still keep the 2001 AUMF.
Does anyone believe that the Houthis or Hamas--let's just
say Hamas--are they affiliates of Al Qaeda? I mean, that is the
underlying situation. They are terrorists in that sense, but
they are not coordinating--they share some similar enemies, but
they are not really covered by the 2001 AUMF. So I think it is
urgent that we update them. And I definitely appreciate you
all's effort to call that out.
But, Ms. Jungman, in your testimony you bemoaned the
existence of cryptocurrency to some extent saying that the
pseudonym-ist nature of block chain transactions makes
enforcement challenging. However, you admit that it only makes
up about $8 billion in transaction.
I am the chairman of National Security and Illicit Finance.
We just had a hearing earlier today where people trying to
trace the money actually like cryptocurrency because it is on a
public block chain. So it is easier to follow the money. It
still presents challenges for on and off ramps, but when it is
on a block chain, it is easier to detect.
So what proportion of Iran's illicit finance is really
crypto versus conventional finance?
Ms. Jungman. In the grand scheme the 8 billion is not that
significant when you look at 50 billion that was made in oil
revenues last year or 135 billion in oil revenue that was made
between 2021 and 2024. So I think that there needs to be
stricter enforcement and oversight on the block chain and the
crypto transactions, but it doesn't necessarily need to be----
Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. My time is expired and I
yield.
Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative
Moskowitz from Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to thank Chairman Lawler and Chairman Mast for
bringing this hearing. I have supported for months now giving
the Iranians a period of time to end their nuclear program
peacefully or that the United States should end it for them. I
have worked with Chairman Lawler on that in the last Congress
dealing with Iranian oil. And in this Congress Senator Lindsey
Graham and I filed a resolution to get a sense of Congress on
just that issue.
Iran is weaker now than they have been in a very long time,
weaker in the region because of Israel's efforts against Hamas
and Hezbollah, this administration's intervention on the
Houthis. Now is the time. There is no question now is the time
to try to bring this to a peaceful solution, right? And that is
really up to the Iranians to choose what path they want to go.
But I also have to recognize that we are in the third month
of the administration. And for 3 months now the administration
has treated Canada and Greenland and Europe and Ukraine and PBS
and NPR and the Associated Press worse than they have talked
and treated Iran. I mean, 3 months in they have just noticed
all of a sudden that perhaps we should turn our attention to
Iran instead of these distractions of, oh, we are going to get
Gaza, or Canada is going to be the 51st State, or oh,
Greenland.
I mean, this is the opportunity. And it is an opportunity,
quite frankly, for the administration that has been very
partisan over the last 3 months to do something on a bipartisan
basis.
But I am also deeply worried about the Vice President. If
we look at the text messages on Signal for Signalgate, the Vice
President seems to be against striking the Houthis. Well, if he
is against striking the Houthis, then I mean where is he going
to be on striking Iran if they don't choose a peaceful
solution? Obviously he is the Vice President. The President
makes the final decision, but if you look at that conversation,
a deputy chief of staff had to weigh in from the White House
putting the Vice President in his place saying the President
was clear on his direction.
So let me ask a question. Based on what you have seen, we
have all seen publicly in that Signal chat, this isolationist
trend that is going on in some circles of the Republican
Party--Ms. Jungman, are you concerned that we may miss an
opportunity to really curtail Iran's nuclear program? Because
again, if you look at what the Vice President was saying with
the Houthis, right, he clearly did not want to do the strike
that the President had ordered.
Ms. Jungman. Thank you for that question. I think it is
important to look at the efforts that the administration has
done over the last 3 months which includes designations on
Iran, its ghost fleet, and a refinery in China.
Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, but those are meaningless. The Biden
Administration--I was critical of the Biden Administration of
these designations and non-enforcement of certain things. I
mean, I was very critical when the Biden Administration did not
enforce the bill that Mike Lawler and I passed dealing with
Iranian oil.
We can sign executive orders for maximum pressure, but
really--this President is not shy. I mean, he is not shy. He
tells us how he feels at all times. OK. And so just last week
all of a sudden we turned our attention to Iran, which I am
happy about. Better late than never.
But there is something going on in this administration that
should all wake up to, that there is a wing led by the Vice
President that didn't want to strike the Houthis and probably
doesn't want to curtail Iran's nuclear program. How are you
going to deal with that?
Ms. Jungman. I don't see that from Treasury right now. I do
think that there are efforts being made and I think looking at
the questions we have received there is an--there is bipartisan
consensus to go after Iran. And the Vice President alone----
Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, and look, we have to be clear, right?
Because Democrats have made this mistake. When you draw a red
line and then you don't do it, we see problems. That is what
happened in Syria under the Obama administration. So President
Trump has drawn a red line. He has said either we are going to
end it peacefully, which I hope we do--we want--we all want
that--or the United States is going to end it. That has been
said now. And that is what we have to hold the President to. I
yield back.
Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Issa of
California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Issa. Thank you. I am going to pick up where my
colleague just left off. Better late than never? Has it been 75
days or is it 72? I wouldn't call this late, with all due
respect. But let's contrast it with the previous 4 years.
What was the economic position of Iran on the day that
President Trump left office?
Ms. Jungman. They were a lot weaker than they are today.
Mr. Issa. Were they shipping a couple hundred thousand
barrels a day, not a million-and-a-half barrels a day?
Ms. Jungman. That is correct.
Mr. Issa. So during the 4-years of the Biden Administration
perhaps in plain sight while other things were being discussed:
JCPOA, Iran's nuclear and so on, they went up by more than a
million barrels a day times $75, right?
Ms. Jungman.
[Nonverbal response.]
Mr. Issa. Most of it was sold to China, correct?
Ms. Jungman.
[Nonverbal response.]
Mr. Issa. So the last administration allowed China to
enrich Iran. During those 4 years is it accurate to say that
that money, a great deal of it ended up in the hands of Hamas,
the Houthis, and Hezbollah?
Ms. Jungman. That is correct.
Mr. Issa. OK. So I want to go to the go forward. And I know
my colleague has left, but 72 days is the beginning of an
administration. Over the next 3 years if maximum pressure
includes taking ghost ships off the high seas, do you believe
it is possible to reverse that 1 million or a 1.2 million of
additional oil and bring Iran economically back to where they
were 4 years ago?
Ms. Jungman. I do, but I don't think taking the ghost fleet
off alone will do that.
Mr. Issa. I am including that because most of that million
barrels plus is shipped through ghost ships, correct?
Ms. Jungman. Correct. Yes.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So as part of a maximum effort, recognizing
that Israel may strike in its own best interest between now and
the end of October when nuclear legitimacy, according to the
last administration goes forward--as part of a package economic
sanctions as we know are not working because people are
cheating on them. The No. 1 cheater is China. As the President
uses his pressure with China and tariffs should he include
reducing the purchases of clandestine oil from China and Russia
as part of a deal with China? Would that be helpful?
Additionally, the same thing goes for our European allies who
either directly or indirectly buy that sanctioned oil.
Ms. Jungman. Absolutely. I think that is a great place to
start and hopefully would have an impact.
Mr. Issa. Now just before I spoke we heard about the so-
called reluctance of the Vice President to strike the Houthis.
In fact, isn't that one of more major proactive strikes that
has occurred in the last several years?
Ms. Jungman. Correct.
Mr. Issa. That particular strike as I understand it was an
offensive strike to take out capability, not simply a
retaliatory for a place from which they were fired?
Ms. Jungman. I am going to defer to Mr. Roule on that, but
he has got more expertise in that area.
Mr. Roule. They are the most significant strikes we have
conducted against the Houthis. They are not only taking out--
degrading the Houthi weapons capability, but taking out Houthi
leadership and they are starting to impact on the Houthi
leadership decisionmaking structure itself.
Mr. Issa. So Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, the three
most powerful arms of the--of Iran, in addition to the oil that
gives them money--if those activities continue at the pace they
have been going over the last--some of it more than 75 days
because of Israel's efforts with Hamas and Hezbollah. But if
those three tentacles of Iran are taken out over the next 3
years, if the clandestine oil is reduced to let's just say
the--about where it was 4 years earlier, do you believe we can
avoid all-out war with Iran, but bring Iran back to a situation
in which they must deal or be unable to function because of
economic disaster?
Mr. Roule. If we could also ensure that the Quds Force does
not have a logistics line into the region, we could avoid a war
based on activities such as Hamas and Houthi actions----
Mr. Issa. Right.
Mr. Roule [continuing]. in the Red Sea. There will be some
who will say that Iran could be encouraged to build a nuclear
weapon if it thinks it can get away with it and we won't
attack. So the President would also have to say if we see you
building a nuclear weapon, we are going to have to use another
direction.
Mr. Issa. And I will just close with one statement: Many
people have talked about the nuclear capability, but is it fair
to say that the ability to build a nuke only allows you to blow
yourself up if you don't have the ability to launch it? And
isn't that part of the administration's responsibility, along
with allies--is to make sure that they do not have the ability
to launch a nuclear weapon?
Ms. Kim. The gentleman's time is up. And the witnesses may
respond in writing if you would choose to do so. Is that Okay?
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Ms. Kim. Yes. Let me now recognize Mr. Olzewski of Maryland
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Olzewski. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And thank you to our witnesses for your time and your
testimony today. I will just open by saying how much I firmly
believe with a lot of what was said and how important it is for
the U.S. to use all of the tools at our disposal to dismantle
Iran's support for regional terrorism and its nuclear ambition.
So thank you for your comments on that.
We know that a strong Iranian sanctions regime, which I
support and this administration has imposed, is critical to
limit the revenue that Iran uses to fund its military and
terror proxies in the region.
However, we cannot forget about the other national security
tools at our disposal including both diplomacy and development
and that the U.S. has to comprehensively counter the regime's
malign activities and hold them accountable for human rights
violations. The use of force should be an option, but it should
also be our last resort option. Again, we need a comprehensive
tool box to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-equipped and to
address the root causes of these abuses.
I support a zero tolerance approach for attacks by Iran's
proxies on the United States and our interests, but again I
also believe that any U.S. action must also be taken in
accordance with the law and in ways that protects classified
information and civilians overseas.
It is also worth noting and reiterating that this
administration's gutting of foreign assistance programs will
only weaken that response. There was a program implemented by a
non-profit back in my home State of Maryland that supported
religious and minorities in Northern Iraq in part not to join
Iran-backed militias. This project supported thousands of young
Yazidis and Christians in a youth employment project to provide
financial incentives not to join these armed groups. In its
absence we risk migration and radicalization including to these
Iran-backed proxy groups.
We know this program unfortunately is not a one-off.
Programs to strengthen local capacity and support ethnic and
religious minorities in Yemen, Gaza, and Lebanon where Iran-
backed militias continue to hold military and political
influence were cut. Iranian media even praised the pause
because it would halt U.S. support for pro-democracy activists
in the country. Other media compared it to a cold shower for
the regime's opponents and joked that the U.S. was ``abandoning
its allies like disposable tissues,'' quote, unquote.
Ms. Stroul, can you talk about how these soft-power
programs like those administered by USAID and the State
Department play an important role in America's response to
Iran's activities around the world? How will Iran and their
proxies be emboldened by these cuts?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question. When we
think about all of the different areas where Iran's threat
network has been degraded: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, to some extent
Iraq, right now Yemen, what we need to think about is the other
side of combat operations.
And that is not just humanitarian aid. It is stabilization,
reconstruction. Societies and communities need to have
something on the other side in order to buildup their
resilience to resist what the Iranians are going to do, which
is try to rebuild their illicit networks for arming, funding,
training both fighters--and then weapon shipments, drug
shipments, et cetera. So we have to give those communities
resources to buildup their resilience and we have to give the
emerging leaders of these nascent governments the opportunity
to deliver for their people. And there I am specifically
talking about Lebanon and Syria.
So the pause and dismantling of USAID is not just about the
humanitarian aid being taken off the table. It is the non-
humanitarian aid, the stabilization assistance. And then it is
the decades of U.S. investment in developing our technical
expertise, our national security practitioners, our development
and technical assistance providers who understand that
reconstruction and stabilization on the other side of conflict
is inherently a political task, not a military task.
Mr. Olzewski. Thank you so much for that response. And I
will just close without an additional question recognizing that
my time is winding down, but just reiterate what my colleague
Representative Keating honed in earlier and just advancing my
concern, Madam Chair, about the reckless use of platforms that
are not secure and in the sharing of very sensitive data. It is
not a way to conduct military operations, nor diplomatic
operations, nor to impose sanctions. And so I am deeply
concerned about the actions of some of our most highest ranking
officials and the fact that there has been no accountability.
And with that, I will yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Mr. Baird from
Indiana for 5 minutes.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank our witnesses for being here today. The expertise
you share with us is very beneficial and very helpful. But I am
going to touch on a couple or three other areas that are of
interest to me, the first one being what role do you think that
the Western technology is playing in sustaining Iran, and by
extension Russia's ability to produce lethal weapons like the
Shahad 136 drone?
Mr. Roule. We have seen Iran use dual-use technology that
is obtained from Europe, even the United States, through
sanctions-busting architecture to import this within in its
drone system and to--well, even use this within drones that it
has sent to Russia for use against Ukraine. This is something
that the U.S. law enforcement has worked against successfully
in some cases for years. Iran has a robust sanctions-busting
program in this regard and Iran will continue to use this
system to acquire technology that it can't produce at home.
Mr. Baird. Ms. Jungman?
Ms. Jungman. I am going to tackle this from a little bit of
a different angle, and I think it is an area that hasn't had a
lot of attention. But we have talked a lot today about the dark
fleet and the ghost fleet. There is Western technology that is
used on these vessels. Every ship essentially has some Western
component on it. That is an area that could be looked at
closer.
Mr. Baird. Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. I would associate myself specifically with Mr.
Roule. The threat is the dual-use technology. So part of this
is about sanctions and shining a light and exposure. It is also
about education initiatives with the commercial sector so they
understand the risk of both the legitimate uses of some of this
technology and then the illegitimate and illicit ways in which
a regime like Iran might use it.
Mr. Baird. The next part of that is what steps can be taken
to prevent Iran from procuring that critical technology?
And, Ms. Jungman, you kind of started on that conversation,
so please State.
Ms. Jungman. Sure. I think as I have previously mentioned,
there are still a number of Western entities that are involved
in the maritime industry and these vessels such as the
classification societies, the flag states, and the insurance
companies. It is not enough to just designate the vessels
themselves. The vessel will move to a new owner, a new company
and so on. So there needs to be a more comprehensive approach
to targeting these vessels and their associated networks.
Mr. Baird. Mr. Roule?
Mr. Roule. We need to ensure that law enforcement partners
in Europe and Asia working closely with the United States and
our Gulf partners to identify import actors in Iran who are
attempting to bring in dual-use technology for Iran's military
and security services.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. Ms. Stroul?
Ms. Stroul. I have nothing to add. I think my colleagues
did a great job answering the question.
Mr. Baird. That is a good answer.
One other area: Do you believe that the United States and
its allies are focused enough on preventing the rebuilding of
the Iranian proxy groups, and what more could we do if that is
true? Mr. Roule?
Mr. Roule. If there is a nuclear deal that provides Iran
with sanctions relief that allows the Quds Force to rebuild
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis over time, we recreate the
very world we have worked so hard to dismantle today. It is
critical that any new nuclear deal simply does not allow the
Quds Force to do this. And this therefore becomes a problem.
Do we come up with an approach? Does the international
community compel Iran to in essence change the nature of the
Quds Force, to turn it into a counterterrorism element, which
is something every country should have, and not an element that
has the job of creating militias and terrorists. Until Iran
does this it is a terrorist nation.
Mr. Baird. Thank you. And I see I only got 26 seconds left,
and so I am sorry to the other two, but I yield back.
Ms. Kim. Thank you.
Let me now recognize Representative Schneider of Illinois
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again I want to the witnesses for joining us here.
So I keep this next to my desk. It is the JCPOA from 10
years ago. It is tabbed and marked and highlighted. Ten years
ago I studied it closely because so much was at stake. Iran was
on the precipice of a nuclear weapon and the world came
together. And at that time, as we all recall, it was the E3+3,
it was the P5+1, whatever you called it. But it United States,
our European allies, U.K., France and Germany, and China and
Russia.
As you discussed earlier, what was available to us then is
not available to us now. And I had issues with the JCPOA a
decade ago because while it may have temporary-temporarily
blocked Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon, it didn't
permanently close them. It left it to where we are today.
And we meet today. I really believe there is a crossroad,
as you have touched on. Over the past year we have seen Iran's
strategic position almost turn 180 degrees. Its proxies are
diminished. Its air defenses are weakened. At the same time,
again as was mentioned, Iran's breakout time is almost to the
goal line. It is measured in weeks, maybe even days.
We all know a nuclear-armed Iran would transform the
strategic map of the Middle East once again. It would not only
endanger our allies including Israel; it would trigger in all
likelihood a regional arms race. It would embolden the
terrorist proxies and it would undercut the global
nonproliferation regime.
Now we know this moment didn't come out of nowhere. Iran
has been working on a nuclear weapon for more than a
generation. We can talk about the decision to invade Iraq and
then empower Iran. We can talk about the JCPOA, which was a
problem. I think at the end of the day the decision to pull out
of the JCPOA without a strategy of how to move forward and make
sure that Iran couldn't get closer to a weapon left us at the
point we are in today: Iran literally at the goal line. And
that is the challenge we have.
Now, part of the problem I think in pulling out of the
JCPOA was there wasn't a plan, that it was more about the
headlines than about making actual progress. It was not very
serious. And this has been a challenge that I have seen with
the administration, first term of the Trump Administration, and
today with the return of the administration perhaps even
greater.
The dismantling of USAID, the freezing of aid to camps like
Al-Hol where Isis remnants remain active, the whiplash of
threats followed by back-channel talks with Hamas, all of it
suggests a governing style that is far more impulsive,
theatrical, and dangerously un-tethered from strategy. I wish
we could trust that this renewed maximum pressure approach
being discussed was grounded in facts, deliberation, and
interagency coordination. I wish I believed that President
Trump had read the briefings, sought our dissenting views, or
agonized over the details of a strike plan, but I don't have
that confidence and I am very concerned about where we are
right now.
Serious policy means aligning sanctions, intelligence, and
diplomacy. It means working with allies to close loopholes, not
just naming problems, but resourcing, developing solutions. It
means being honest about what air strikes can and cannot
accomplish and about what it takes to truly dismantle Iran's
nuclear weapons program.
We know this challenge won't get easier with time, as has
been discussed earlier. Iran's nuclear program isn't just a
bargaining chip; it is a shield from behind which Tehran wages
war through proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
And that is why I was proud last Congress to join with then
Chairman McCaul to introduce H. Res. 559 declaring it the
policy of the United States that a nuclear Islamic Republic of
Iran is not acceptable under any circumstances.
So with that, let me turn to you, Ms. Stroul. You have
spoken previously about the need for regional architecture. Can
you speak our seriously you think our Gulf partners view the
risk of a nuclear Iran and whether they believe the U.S. is
still--or U.S. does have at all a coherent plan to stop it?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question,
Congressman. Many of our Gulf partners are hedging because they
are uncertain as to what U.S. commitments are and whether or
not U.S. commitments to the region and to their defense will be
enduring. So almost every U.S. partner in the Gulf has pursued
their own rapprochement with the Iranian regime, exchanging
Ambassadors, maintaining economic relations, as well as very
consistent diplomatic engagement back and forth.
We are using some of these channels for the passing of
messages, but the bottom line is if there is going to be
military strikes used against Iran, we are going to need the
support of our partnership the Gulf, we are going to need
flexibility with the bases we have where U.S. forces are
present, and we are--and if we are going to achieve a
negotiated settlement, Iran is going to need to hear from our
partners in the Middle East that they are as serious about
getting to a negotiated settlement that blocks all Iranian
pathways to a nuclear weapon as Washington is. And those are
some of the I think security commitments both to their self-
defense and to our long-term commitment in developing this
regional architecture that could benefit from clarification at
this moment in time.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I have gone over time.
Ms. Kim. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
Mr. Schneider. I appreciate the extension. I yield back.
Ms. Kim. Of course. I know recognize Mr. Kean,
Representative Kean from New Jersey for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you to our
witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Roule, what type of support is Russia providing Iran's
nuclear program and what role is Russian State owned energy
giant Rosatom playing and supporting Iran's nuclear ambitions?
Mr. Roule. Russia's role in the joint comprehensive plan of
action was limited to support for the Bushehr civilian nuclear
power plant on Iran's southwest coast. The development of that
plant, there were discussions on the--perhaps building of other
nuclear power plants in country and part of the deal under
JCPOA was that, in essence, Iran would send spent nuclear fuel
in Russia in exchange for fresh nuclear fuel. Now that, of
course, stopped when Iran ceased to do this.
I think the most important question is whether Russia is
providing Iran with capabilities to allow it to move closer to
a nuclear weapon? Now there is no public information of which I
am aware that that is occurring. And it is also a fact,
however, that Russia does have a presence in country through
Bushehr and that were we to have a multi-lateral negotiation
with Iran on its nuclear program, Russia would be a prominent
part because of that element. China, as well, because of
China's role with the Iraq power plant, its former plutonium
plant which is due to come online in 2026.
Mr. Kean. And what types of support is Russia currently
providing Iran's proxies? And what does Russia hope to gain
from its outreach to the Houthis and what might trigger the
Kremlin to step this support up or decrease it?
Mr. Roule. There have been reports that Russia has
attempted to provide weapons to the Houthis and that diplomatic
pressure from regional actors have prevented this and Russia
may have told these actors that the purpose of this support was
to complicate the lives of western powers who were supporting
Ukraine. There has also been some reporting of Russian weaponry
that has found its way to Hezbollah, although the evidence of
Russia's direct engagement with Hezbollah is more tenuous and
Russia has, of course, provided intelligence engagements with
its counterparts in Iran on how to defeat western intelligence.
Mr. Kean. So in your view what, therefore, does the Iranian
regime hope to gain from its increasingly cozy relationship
with the Kremlin and what threats does that pose to U.S.
national security priorities?
Mr. Roule. Although Russia is a sometimes competitor with
Iran, it is a malign actor. It has blocked all pressure on Iran
at the United Nations. So for example, regarding Yemen, Russia
has made sure that there has been no significant investigation
of Iran's support for the Houthis at the United Nations for
many years. So Russia's support for Iran is significant. It is
malign. It is pervasive. And it impacts global economy.
Mr. Kean. Are there points of friction within that
bilateral relationship that the U.S. could effectively exploit?
Mr. Roule. I am not aware of any, but Dana, do you have
anything you would like to add on that?
Ms. Stroul. I think the bottom line here is that Russia and
Iran share the objective of challenging the United States, our
influence, and our investment in the current global and
international order. And that strategic convergence is stronger
than any wedge we might want to draw between the two.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, all, for your testimony here today and
I yield back.
Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Amo from
Rhode Island for 5 minutes.
Mr. Amo. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses for being here. I know it has been a little while
that you have been sitting there.
Ms. Stroul, good to see you again. The last time we were
here was last April and I discussed with you the growing
cooperation between Ayatollah Khomeini and Vladimir Putin. And
back then, we saw Iran transfer drones to Russia. The same
Iranian drones which were turned on Israel were used by Putin
to attack Ukraine. One year later, Putin's drones are still
taking the lives of innocent civilians and the ties between
Russia and Iran have grown stronger.
Earlier this year, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year
strategic partnership treaty with a military cooperation
agreement. And the duo has expanded to include a third, Xi
Jinping's China. In March, warships from all three countries
conducted joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman, the
strategic corridor for more than one quarter of the world's
seaborne oil. That same week, China hosted Russia and Iranian
diplomats to discuss Iran's nuclear program.
So in the aftermath of Trump 1.0 and the withdrawal of
commitments to contain Iran by leaving the JCPOA, Iran has
continued in its acceleration of its development of its nuclear
program. Now as we are in Trump 2.0, as President Trump
continues our surrender on the global stage, as we have seen in
the last 70 plus days, China is racing to fill that vacuum. Xi
is strengthening Iran's hands, thanks to Trump's retreat.
The annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence
community released last month found that China, Russia, and
Iran were three of the largest foreign threats to the United
States.
Ms. Stroul, what actions should President Trump continue
from the Biden administration to deter this growing alliance
and ensure that Russia and China do not continue to help Iran
evade sanctions?
Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question,
Congressman. Good to see you as well.
What we have seen since last year is continued coordination
and strategic convergence across Russia, Iran, China, and
sometimes North Korea. So it is diplomatic protection of Iran
at the U.N. Security Council and across many international
institutions. It is not just exchanging lessons learned on how
to evade sanctions. It is also deeper economic cooperation,
working on how to de-dollarize their economies, how to increase
banking transactions between these different capitals to make
themselves less exposed to U.S. sanctions. It is increasing
exchanges in sophisticated defense technology. It is the
military exercises, as you note, and then it is even trading
and exchanging lessons learned on how to exert domestic control
inside their countries, to suppress human rights and popular
protests, not to mention nuclear cooperation.
So all of this requires a whole of government approach from
the administration. It is investing in our unmatched network of
allies and partners in order to counter this access. It is
restoring the elements of U.S. soft power, USAID investing in
our diplomats in order to counter the diplomatic actions of
these different malign actors. It is strengthening our foreign
military sales processes, our own military exercises, our own
defense and security cooperation in order to counter that, and
also making sure that we continue to have the most professional
U.S. military in the world because partners and allies should
want to do military exercises with us, not with Russia or
China.
Mr. Kean. And Ms. Stroul, with my remaining time, what can
we do or what changes can we make to disrupt the growing ties
between a lot of those points that you just referenced on how
we engage with our partners and our allies, but what can we do
to disrupt the close ties between Iran, Russia, and China as
this connection grows even stronger in their opposition to us?
Ms. Stroul. We are going to have to disincentivize the
interests of those leaders and in those capitals to deepen
their coordination with each other, to make it less attractive
to do that and for them to perceive that the consequences of
that deeper coordination that run counter to U.S. interests
will be more painful than pursuing this course. And again, it
means demonstrated resolve to maintain U.S. military
partnerships, to invest and provide security assurances, and
support for the defense of our allies and partners so that they
are working with us and not hedging toward this other access
and it is fielding a strong diplomatic corps and a strong
network of development professionals.
Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Mills. [Presiding.] Thank you. At this time, I
recognize I recognize myself. I am unfortunate that my
colleague left with his JCPOA binder as that would have been
very helpful. We have got a small chair in the back that is a
little bit wobbly and that is about the only thing you could
have put under it to actually stabilize it, since there is
nothing to stabilize Iran.
Ms. Stroul, you really love the quick fire, rapid fire
stuff when it came to the Biden administration. I kind of want
to follow suit here, if you will, and I want to make this
quick. Did oil exportation increase under the Biden
administration?
Ms. Stroul. Sanctions enforcement is an area that could
have been improved.
Mr. Mills. Did it increase under the Biden administration?
Yes or no?
Ms. Stroul. Chinese purchase of discounted Iranian oil
increased under the previous administration.
Mr. Mills. Okay, did Biden delist the Houthi rebels?
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Mills. Did that disrupt 12 percent of global trade
through the Red Sea?
Ms. Stroul. The delisting itself was not the cause of the
disruption of the global trade.
Mr. Mills. Did the increase in actual tax as a result of
delisting the Houthis increase the amount of disruption of
global trade through the Red Sea resulting in 12 percent of
global trade being disrupted?
Ms. Stroul. Iranian provision of support to the Houthis is
part of the----
Mr. Mills. Did the unfreezing of assets and the increase of
oil trade give more money to Iran to be able to fund proxy
militias?
Ms. Stroul. I can't speak to the exact fungibility of the--
--
Mr. Mills. I actually thought that was your job. Did the
currency of the Iran--the rial go up in value versus the dollar
during the time the Biden administration was in place?
Ms. Stroul. My colleague would be better positioned on
that.
Mr. Mills. I will allow you to answer.
Ms. Stroul. Yes.
Mr. Mills. Yes, it did because under max pressure it is at
about a million rials to the dollar, something we haven't seen
in a long time.
So I noticed that you had a lot of really quick, rapid
fired things in the previous administration, but not a whole
lot when it came to the increase in maximum pressure that
actually resulted in the Iranian regime reducing the amount of
attacks that it has right now.
Wasn't it the Biden administration that actually requested
the IDF and Israel to launch themselves into a cease-fire for
negotiations?
Ms. Stroul. I can't speak to the specifics of that. What I
know----
Mr. Mills. Well, the answer is yes. And had they done that,
we wouldn't have eliminated Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah. We
would not have eliminated Sinwar. We would not have eliminated
many of the actual terrorist organization leads that has
basically been put in place and enforced to grow stronger as a
result of the weakness that the administration have shown.
Look at what we have today. We talk all the time about how
Russia, we are so weak on Russia, but was it not the Trump
administration actually removed us from the failed INF treaty,
something that no other administration was willing to do
before? Was it not the JCPOA that both General Secretary Ban
Ki-moon and Guterres said had been violated when Iran was still
shipping mid-range ballistic missiles to the Houthis when they
were launching against Saudi Aramco?
This is preposterous to even assume that the Biden
administration had done anything to prevent the enrichment of
nuclear that the JCPOA or Jake Sullivan or any of the others
had done anything that would weakened the regime.
I want to be very clear. There is a difference and I think
it is important to always point out the differentiation of
this. There is a difference in the regime and the Iranian
people. The Iranian people want a free Iran. I can tell you
that those who are bravely protesting in the streets, those who
are continuing to try and risk their lives every single day
like Mahsa Amini did to say enough is enough shouldn't be
lumped in so when our colleagues very recklessly just says
Iran, I think that that is a very big misnomenclature and I
want to correct that for the record.
I want to go into sanction enforcements. Do you feel, Ms.
Jungman, that sanctions were enforced under the Biden
administration?
Ms. Jungman. Not until late 2024.
Mr. Mills. And do you feel that Iran is at a stronger or
weaker position right now than they were previously?
Ms. Jungman. As a result of the sanctions that have been
rolled out over the last few months and at the end of 2024,
they are weaker, but not as weak as they could have been if
sanctions were fully enforced under the Biden administration.
Mr. Mills. I completely agree. And what I notice from Iran
is that not only are they concerned about this administration
more so than the last, they have actually moved and relocated
their surface-to-air missiles around Qom, around Natanz, around
Isfahan because they know that unlike the Obama-Biden drawn red
line that this administration has actually proven to take real
enforcement.
Do you think, Mr. Norman, that if we actually--not actually
hurting or impacting or having a lot of collateral damage as
you would if you hit cities like Tehran or others, but went
after the nuclear facilities, that would send a direct message
to the regime that we will not continue to play weak with them?
Mr. Roule. It certainly would send a powerful message to
the regime that we would not play weak with them, sir.
Mr. Mills. And I think that that is really what this
administration has proven, both in the first administration and
now is that we are not going to continue to play weak with our
adversaries. The China, Russia, Iran, North Korea geopolitical
alignment has grown stronger in the previous regime and as
President Trump and this administration is continuing to try
and make the necessary steps to enforce sanctions to guarantee
that we re-list the Houthis, to stop the sea of navigation from
being disrupted and to actually for once and for all actually
see that the Iranian people have support from the United
States, overthrow a regime that has been a dictatorship,
tyrannical, and continue to do but only build and embolden
themselves under the Biden administration.
With that, I will now recognize if it pops up here and I am
not sure they are updating it. There we go, we will recognize
the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Dean.
Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bear with me, and let's
restart the clock, please.
Mr. Mills. Restarted the clock.
Ms. Dean. Thank you very much. I thank Chairman Mast and
Ranking Member Meeks for holding this hearing and I thank all
of you, your expertise, your passion, and your intellect around
these issues. It is very valuable to us in these incredibly
challenging times.
Going back to the JCPOA, in 2015, the P5+1, the EU, and
Iran agreed to the JCPOA choosing diplomacy over aggression to
ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be peaceful,
constrained. The JCPOA was an historic deal in ensuring
verification and compliance and the IAEA had previously warned
that its failure would be a loss for nuclear verification and
multi-lateralism. Unfortunately, in 2018, even though the IAEA
verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related
commitments, President Trump, in my mind, recklessly withdrew
the United States from the JCPOA and without a plan as my
colleagues, Mr. Schneider, spoke about.
Mr. Roule, I would like to go back to the very beginning of
your testimony. It is stunning testimony that I think bears
repeating. You said in page 1 and page 2 first the IAEA notes
that Iran continues to expand its production of 60 percent
enriched uranium. Is that correct?
Mr. Roule. That is correct, ma'am.
Ms. Dean. You say Iran appears capable of producing its
first quantity of 90 percent enriched uranium. Can you speak to
that? What leads us to know that?
Mr. Roule. That is based on International Atomic Energy
Agency's access to Iran's nuclear program at present which is
limited, but it still takes place.
Ms. Dean. And when you use the expression, as experts do,
they would have the possibility of 90 percent enriched uranium
sufficient for one nuclear weapon in about a week, what does
about a week mean to a layman like me?
Mr. Roule. Well, it means they have centrifuges which spin
gas and basically produce highly enriched uranium that would
then have to be converted into material for a warhead that
could then be used as a weapon. This is the first stage of that
process so this is before the warhead construction starts. So
they don't have a weapon. They just have the material that
would begin the process toward the weapon. So they don't have a
bomb, but they have the fissile material that would then begin
the process for a weapon.
Ms. Dean. What stages were they at prior to President Trump
removing the United States from JCPOA? What were the numbers
then?
Mr. Roule. They had a very, very tiny amount of enriched
uranium at a level that was much, much reduced to this--it was
below 5 percent. They had a very small number of centrifuges.
But I should also say, ma'am, that when President Trump left
JCPOA, they did not significantly increase their centrifuge
production until, frankly, diplomatic talks began under the
Biden administration. It wasn't because of the Biden
administration itself. It was just because the Iranians just
decided to expand their program even when diplomacy was
offered.
Ms. Dean. And then you said, let me see here, second, you
said Iran continues to increase the number and sophistication
of its centrifuge cascade. Can you speak to that a little bit?
Mr. Roule. Yes. In essence, the centrifuges have--the more
advanced the centrifuge is, the greater efficiency, the faster
it can produce highly enriched uranium and what that means is
the faster it can produce the fissile material for a weapon.
And the faster it can produce something means the fewer number
of centrifuges which means the footprint is smaller, it means
the smaller the installations can be and easier you could hide
it.
So in essence, Iran's nuclear architecture right now
appears to be designed to produce the highest enriched uranium
in the fastest way possible and not the lowest enriched uranium
in just an average speed possible. So it is not producing
enriched uranium in a way that you would expect for a civilian
nuclear program. It is also producing this enriched uranium in
centrifuge cascades, in facilities that are deeply buried that
look as if they are designed to survive a military attack. That
is all very suspicious.
Ms. Dean. Very suspicious. I see my time is up. Where does
this leave our partners, our former partners in the JCPOA, if
you could answer that?
Mr. Roule. Well, Europeans have been attempting to revive
negotiations for some time without success, in part because the
Iranians themselves refuse to cooperate in negotiations as they
refused to cooperate under the Biden administration, which is
why then the Secretary of State in the Biden administration
called the negotiations to an end.
Ms. Dean. I thank you very much all of you. I am sorry I
wasn't able to get to everybody. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Mills. Thank you. At this time, we recognize our good
friend from Texas, Mr. Self, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2015, President Obama
flew a plane with $400 million in cash to the Ayatollah and
released billions more. In 2021, President Biden rescinded
President Trump's maximum pressure campaign, as we have heard.
They went from like $4 billion, I think in reserves, to
somewhere around $100 billion today, perhaps more.
We have suffered through multiple inept leadership in terms
of Iran and now we have a strong commander in chief who sees
maximum pressure working. However, as an Article 1 branch of
government, Congress must have jurisdiction over sanctions.
Some say so over the sanctions for Iran and for any future
administration. That is why I have reintroduced the Iran
Sanctions Relief Review Act which passed the House last
session, but my bill will give us a seat at the table and the
American people a voice and view. We must strengthen Congress'
hand to produce future generations from emergency existential
threats to our Nation's survival and the Iranian nuclear weapon
might do that. We have a duty to do that.
So I want to start with you, Mr. Roule. What is the center
of gravity of the Iranian nuclear program? Is it the warhead?
Is it the guidance system? Is it the missile itself? Is it the
facilities? Is it the potential for software from your years in
the CIA? What is the center of gravity?
Mr. Roule. It is a broad, federated program that exists in
many locations across a broad geography. For many years, the
center would have been the development of fissile material, but
as we just discussed, that is produced at a number of locations
at a very advanced rate at present, so understanding their
number of centrifuges, their production rate of highly enriched
uranium is the most important aspect of the program at present.
Mr. Self. So you think they can quickly link the material
with a guidance system with a missile because they never tested
this, did they?
Mr. Roule. No, sir. I didn't say that.
Mr. Self. Okay.
Mr. Roule. But it is unlikely they would be able to do
quickly or efficiently in my view. They have not done that and
in the time it would take for them to do that, it depends upon
the amount of testing, how quickly and securely they would wish
to do that. And the metallurgy to shape a warhead, and by the
way, that is also saying they decide they wouldn't put it into
a gravity bomb into an airplane or some other system to deliver
it.
Mr. Self. Or sneak it into a port somewhere.
Mr. Roule. Or sneak it into a port, sir. But at this point,
it is the creation of fissile material in the enrichment
program.
Mr. Self. Interesting. I would have said it would have been
the building of an actual warhead on a missile.
But anyway, Ms. Jungman, we know that the Ayatollah stopped
the program, supposedly in early 2000. He is now, what 86, 87
years old. Do you think that they may be doing something behind
his back, seeing that his days are numbered? What are the
chances that is happening that somebody surreptitiously is
moving the nuclear program forward?
Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately, that is not my area of
expertise. I am going to defer to my colleagues.
Mr. Self. Okay. Mr. Roule, I think you have been nominated.
Mr. Roule. Minimal.
Mr. Self. Minimal.
Mr. Roule. Minimal. It is not how the country works. It is
a very small circle of people and it is extremely unlikely
something like that would happen without his knowledge.
Mr. Self. Okay, very good. So regime change. I have heard
that discussed here. I think that is a horrible concept because
we haven't defeated a nation for decades now, but we do know
that there have been several uprisings in Iran and they are put
down brutally. So how in the world do we encourage the people
of Iran to actually go through the pain to change the regime?
Is that possible? Because we are assuming some external force,
U.S. or somebody else, will have to make this happen because if
we do have a successor to the Ayatollah standing in the wings,
how do we encourage them to do this themselves?
Mr. Roule. The people of Iran need to know that America
stands with them, but we need to be very careful and cautious
as to how we do this because people are risking their lives.
They will pay a terrific price in the prisons of Iran, the
hands of Iran's extraordinarily cruel security forces when they
are punished. And we need to be very careful that we don't--we
aren't too cavalier about how this is handled. It is up to the
people of Iran to determine their future and as they do take
steps to change that future, they need to know that we will
support them and perhaps even provide safe haven if they need
security if it is in such a situation. But we just need to be
careful on how we move forward because if there is a situation
where they are caught in the hands of Iran's security, they
will be handled very roughly.
Mr. Self. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Mills. Thank you. At this time, we recognize the
Representative of Delaware, Rep. McBride.
Ms. McBride. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. Thank you very
much to our witnesses for your perseverance with us today.
Around the world, we are watching a clash unfold between
democratic values and authoritarian oppression, from Europe to
the Middle East, to this very continent. This is the story of
our moment, democracy versus authoritarianism. Iran sits at the
center of a growing alliance of authoritarianism, an access
that includes not only hostile nation states like Russia and
China, but also a network of terrorist organizations and armed
militias across the Middle East. Iran props up groups like
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, using them as tools to
destabilize democracies and challenge U.S. interests. This is a
part of Iran's global strategy to withstand authoritarian
influence and erode the norms of international law and human
rights. And while we sit here warning of Iranian malign
activities, President Trump's national security team has been
carelessly handling classified and mission-sensitive
information about the Houthis in open.
The problem isn't just that they mistakenly added a
reported to a text chain. The bigger problem is that these
officials, some of the most surveilled people on the planet,
were communicating in a way that allowed that mistake to even
happen. How many Signal chats contained sensitive or classified
material right now? How many have occurred over the last
several months? Reporters may have not been able to see them,
but Iran, Russia, and China very easily could.
It is entirely possible that Iran or one of its partners
was following along on the Signal chat that we know about and
because of that, it is a miracle, it is a miracle that we are
not mourning dead American troops right now. Had there been
retaliation waiting in response because of that breach, that
could have handed the Houthis and Iran a major victory. That is
not just embarrassing, it was dangerous.
As Hamas is weakened and Iran looks to recalibrate its
strategy, we must ensure that Iran does not have additional
proxies to fall back on. I am proud to co-lead the bipartisan,
Bicameral Accountability For Terrorist Perpetrators of October
7th Act introduced by my colleagues, Representatives Sherman
and Lawler which would finally sanction the Popular Resistance
Committees, a brutal terrorist organization in Gaza and an
active participant in the horrific attacks in Israel on October
7th. These terrorists have carried out attacks against
Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians for decades and their
deep ties to Hamas make them a credible candidate for Iran if
they are looking to increase support for other proxies in the
region.
So Mr. Roule, my question for you is despite having been
responsible for American civilians being murdered since 2003,
the Popular Resistance Committees has never been sanctioned. As
Iran's adjusted strategy in response to the weakening of its
primary proxies, how should the U.S. Government and our allies
monitor and preempt the rise of new or lesser known Iranian-
backed groups that could fill the vacuum?
Mr. Roule. Superb question. I go back to a previous
statement. As long as the Quds Force exists as an organization
created to sponsor militias and terrorists, we will see more
and more of this. There are Quds Force training camps in Iran
designed to train multi-national terrorists to, in essence, go
out and become train the trainer individuals. Some of the best
training Iran provides to the Houthis, to Hezbollah and others
is provided within Iran itself. Until Iran is compelled to
change the Quds Force itself, we are fated to deal with this
issue.
So I would encourage legislation that insists that our
partners in Europe and the region can do what they can to
constrain Iran's--from the Quds Force's activity. Until this
happens, we are fated to watch this movie play again and again.
Ms. McBride. Thank you. And quickly, Ms. Stroul, given
Iran's strategy of using proxies, destabilized fragile
democracies, and suppressed civil society from Lebanon to Iraq,
how can the U.S. more effectively support democratic
institutions and counteract the malign influence of these
authoritarian-backed actors?
Ms. Stroul. The ability of societies and communities to be
resilient in the face of what the Iranians will try to do which
is reconstitute their threat network is to empower our
diplomats and our development assistance professionals. So that
would particularly be the U.S. Agency for International
Development and to allow our diplomats to do what they do best
which is political and diplomatic engagement.
Ms. McBride. Thank you, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, I would remind, just for
clarification, Rep. McBride, that those sitting in the chair
are chairman or chairwoman, there is no acting and so I would
assume we know the difference between real and acting. And at
this time, I will recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
Shreve.
Mr. Shreve. Thank you, Mr.--gentleman in the chair. I
appreciate the testimony from the witnesses. I know we have
spent a long afternoon and I appreciate that.
Ms. Jungman, nearly 3 hours ago, as we opened up, you
discussed the establishment of a global maritime no dock list
as a means of curtailing this shadow fleet. What might the U.S.
do to encourage other countries to uphold this no dock list at
their ports?
Ms. Jungman. Thank you for bringing that up and thank you
for the question. I think it is important to recognize again
that there are western entities touching the vessels involved
in this activity, whether that is the Classification Society,
the flag State. The Classification Society, for example, have
offices here in the U.S. or the flag states provide the flags
to these vessels, we can essentially say none of their vessels
would be able to sail to the U.S. For example, if that is
Panama or Comoros or Cook Islands, if we said if you are going
to flag these vessels, your vessels will not be able to come to
the U.S. So I think there is a number of different ways that we
can encourage them, but essentially the thought behind the no
sail list or kind of monitored off a no-fly list is that the
enforcement of sanctions can take time and having this list of
vessels that are involved in this type of activity would send a
warning and hopefully deter them from off-loading their oil at
different areas.
Mr. Shreve. So that deterrence would be second hand. They
can't prescribe those vessels on the no dock list directly at
foreign ports, but we could get to the bad actor states by
prohibiting their docking into our ports? Is that a fair
characterization?
Ms. Jungman. Yes.
Mr. Shreve. All right, well, thank you. Thank you, sir, I
yield back.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. At this time, we recognize
the gentlelady from South Carolina, Rep. Biggs.
Ms. Biggs. Thank you, sir, and thank you to our witnesses
for being here today.
So the denuclearization of Iran remains a cornerstone of
U.S. policy and it is critical to ensuring regional stability
and global security given Iran's history of pursuing nuclear
capabilities that threaten its neighbors and international
communities. The Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal, the
JCPOA, notably failed to achieve this goal as it allowed Iran
to retain significant nuclear infrastructure and did not
mandate the verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons
program. Moreover, the Obama administration sought to obligate
the United States to remove key sanctions on Iran, notably
those with Section 1245 of Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, which
enforced significant financial and oil restrictions. The Obama
administration's agreement boiled down to a trade which simply
stated temporary nuclear restriction in exchange for permanent
sanctions relief.
Yet, these efforts fell well short of the denuclearization
standard mandated by the CIFADA, a bill signed into law by
President Obama, which explicitly requires Iran to cease the
pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear weapons and to
dismantle its nuclear program as one of a number of conditions
terminating significant U.S. sanctions. The law's mandate is
clear and indisputable and Obama administration's agreement
failed significantly short raising serious concerns about its
effectiveness and security implications for the United States
and for our allies.
Only strict adherence to the law will ensure the permanent
removal of nuclear threat from Iran.
So my question is simple. To each of our witnesses, I just
want to know does anyone disagree with this fundamental
principle?
And I will start with Mr. Roule.
Mr. Roule. Sorry, ma'am, could you give it a question,
please?
Ms. Biggs. I just want to know if you disagree or agree
with this fundamental principle.
Mr. Roule. Of?
Ms. Biggs. What I just stated about what the Obama--how we
fell short and how it affects us now.
Mr. Roule. You are correct, ma'am. The JCPOA provided a
permanent sanctions relief and permanent relief of a number of
restrictions in return for, in many cases, a temporary or
finite restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and with a
government of malign individuals who sponsored proxies, did a
number of oppressive activities against their own people, and
led us to the current State where we are today.
And if I can just go a little farther, in essence, the
problem with JCPOA is it has become an issue about us and when
it should be an issue about Iran. OK? This was Iran's chance to
turn a new chapter of history and it didn't. And it is Iran's
fault, OK? And that is the issue here. So yes, ma'am.
Ms. Biggs. Thank you.
Ms. Jungman. I would agree with the comments made by Mr.
Roule.
Ms. Stroul. I would also agree and I think it is even more
important that whatever deal is contemplated and negotiated,
this has to be much stronger than the JCPOA, particularly
because of the perilous advances in Iran's nuclear program
today.
Ms. Biggs. Absolutely. I believe that is why our past is so
important to pay attention to as we move forward. And thank you
to our witnesses. And I yield back my time.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. I want to thank our witnesses
for their valuable testimony and the members for their
questions. Members of the committees may have some additional
questions for the witnesses and we may ask you to respond to
these in writing.
Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
record, subject to the length limitations.
Without objection the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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