    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     A RETURN TO MAXIMUM PRESSURE: COMPREHEN-
                    SIVELY COUNTERING THE IRANIAN REGIME'S
                    MALIGN ACTIVITIES REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 April 1, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-10

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-454 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                        BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
    JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
    MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
    YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
        American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
    JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               GEORGE LATIMER, New York
    JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
    JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                  James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                     Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                                REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Chairman Brian Mast.........................     1
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........     2
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Gregory W. Meeks.............     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Statement of Norman T. Roule, Non-Resident Senior Advisor,
      Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, The Center
      For Strategic and International Studies........................     5
      Prepared Statement.............................................     8
    Statement of Claire Jungman, Chief of Staff, United Against
      Nuclear Iran...................................................    15
      Prepared Statement.............................................    17
    Statement of Dana Stroul, Director of Research and Shelly and
      Michael Kassen Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute For Near
      East Policy....................................................    29
      Prepared Statement.............................................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    76
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    78
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    79

     A RETURN TO MAXIMUM PRESSURE: COMPREHENSIVELY COUNTERING THE IRANIAN
             REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, April 1, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian
    Mastchairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Mast. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come
    to order.
        I ask everybody to rise and join me in reciting the Pledge
    of Allegiance.
        All. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States
    of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
    Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
    all.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRIAN MAST

        Chairman Mast. As we open this hearing to outline maximum
    pressure on Iran, I'm going to deliver just a short message
    before I pass this gavel off to Mr. Lawler, who will actually
    be chairing this hearing, as he has a keen interest in the
    issues, as all of us do, and a firm knowledge in everything
    that we are about to discuss. And because I stole this hearing
    from him--he was going to do it at the subcommittee level--I
    thought it would only be right that he chair this committee.
    So, he will be doing that.
        But the message that I wish to deliver is this, and it is
    simply to Ayatollah Khamenei, and I would deliver this to you:
    President Trump will work with you to peacefully end your
    nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program or President
    Trump will destroy your nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
    program. You get to choose the remedy, Ayatollah.
        I now pass the gavel to Mr. Lawler.
        Mr. Lawler. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The purpose of this hearing is to explore policy options to
    effectively curtail Iran's illicit revenue streams and address
    the nexus with Iran's malign activities, particularly relating
    to its sponsorship of terror proxies and the nuclear weapons
    program.
        I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER

        Mr. Lawler.Good afternoon.
        And again, thank you, Chairman Mast, for putting on this
    hearing, and to Ranking Member Meeks, for presiding today.
        I also want to thank our witnesses for their expertise and
    their attention to this pressing matter.
        When President Trump left office over 4 years ago, the
    Iranian regime and its terror proxies were on their heels. The
    Trump administration's maximum pressure policy had devastated
    Iran's economy and denied the regime access to critical
    resources.
        Diplomatically, Iran was cornered and isolated like never
    before. The Abraham Accords saw Israel normalize relations with
    three Arab nations. It was a direct blow to Iran's influence
    and put the Middle East on a path toward unity against Tehran's
    aggression.
        Militarily, the message was unmistakable: the United States
    would not flinch. The decisive strike that took out Soleimani,
    Iran's mastermind of its terror proxies, crushed Iran's
    confidence and deterred provocations.
        By 2021, the Middle East stood on the brink of a new era of
    peace and stability. Iran was contained, its proxies weakened,
    and the region almost freed from the looming threat of Iranian
    terror.
        Enter Joe Biden. President Biden desperately tried to
    revive a dead nuclear deal with Iran. Even as the regime
    continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of its
    non-proliferation-treaty-related obligations, the Biden
    administration pursued deals that would have provided the
    regime with sanctions relief, while also allowing it to
    continue to expand its enrichment capabilities, including with
    support from Russia.
        And when the Biden administration came up short on a
    nuclear deal, it pursued a misguided $6 billion giveaway to
    Iran. And less than 2 months later, Hamas, with support from
    Iran, launched the heinous October 7th terrorist attack on
    Israel.
        Under the last administration, we occasionally heard tough
    language, but that was rarely backed-up with concrete action.
    This lack of resolve emboldened Iran and its proxies, offering
    them a free hand to escalate attacks against the United States
    and its partners and allies--with few, if any, consequences.
        Under the Biden administration, Iran, China, and Russia
    joined forces to form an unholy alliance aimed at destabilizing
    the free world. Yet, even as Iranian missiles and drones were
    targeting Israel, fueling Putin's illegal war of aggression
    against Ukraine, and being used to threaten U.S. service
    members, the Biden administration did little to prevent the
    lapse of the U.N.'s missile embargo on Iran in October 2023. As
    a result, Iran now has a free hand to proliferate its missiles
    and long-range drones unchecked.
        Joe Biden's foreign policy decisions in the Middle East
    were ill-conceived, disorganized, and at times fatal, including
    for U.S. service members, as we tragically saw at Tower 22 in
    Jordan. And in the end, he left the world more volatile and
    less safe than he found it.
        It is clear that the Biden administration's blatant refusal
    to enforce sanctions against Iran contributed to instability
    across the region and the globe. Under his administration, we
    witnessed an unprecedented trade in illicit oil between Iran
    and China, opening a lifeline for the IRGC to fund its malign
    activities.
        It didn't work. Appeasing terrorists does not work. And
    that is why I'm pleased that President Trump has since put U.S.
    policy toward Iran back on track--restoring the much-needed and
    most effective maximum pressure campaign.
        Since taking office just over 2 months ago, the Trump
    administration has made great strides to implement an
    aggressive and comprehensive Iran policy that restores much-
    needed deterrence. This is a welcome change from the days of
    handwringing we saw under President Biden, whose policy toward
    Iran was all carrots and no sticks.
        The strategy now is to execute the maximum pressure
    campaign and deny the regime every ounce of grace given to them
    by the Biden administration. As part of this strategy, we must
    clamp down on the Iranian oil trade. Last year, Iran made over
    $50 billion from its illicit oil trade, much of which is
    controlled by its Revolutionary Guard Corps.
        As part of the maximum pressure, we must fully enforce
    existing sanctions to stop this illicit oil trade,
    specifically, cutting off Iran's oil trade with China, which
    accounts for, roughly, 90 percent of oil exports.
        We must also take all available steps to stop Iran from
    ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran is not an
    option, and the safety of the American people and everything we
    love is dependent on our success here. One way or another,
    Iran's nuclear ambitions are finished. And once Iran loses hope
    for nuclear capacity and we have decimated their bank accounts
    with the halt of the oil trade, they won't be able to fund
    terror proxies any longer.
        President Trump's support for Israel and the war against
    Iran-backed terror is absolute, and I hope to see other
    partners in the region step up their commitment to working with
    the United States and Israel to address this shared threat, to
    ensure Iran no longer threatens our security or that of the
    free world.
        As this hearing will demonstrate, there are a number of
    measures that can and should be taken, and I look forward to
    exploring that with our witnesses today and seeing the path
    forward.
        I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks for his opening
    remarks.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GREGORY MEEKS

        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Lawler, and I want to thank
    Chairman Mast for calling this timely hearing.
        Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us this
    afternoon.
        There is strong bipartisan understanding on this committee
    regarding the threat posed by the government of Iran, the
    world's foremost State sponsor of terrorism, and how it
    threatens the United States, Israel, the broader Middle East,
    and the entire globe.
        With our quality panel, I know we will leave this hearing
    better informed on various aspects of the Iranian threat--
    ranging from its illicit nuclear program to support of
    terrorist proxies.
        We are living in a dangerous time when it comes to Iran.
    Over the last year, we have seen Iranian proxies attempt to
    destroy Israel. Hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones
    launched by Iran threatened Israelis and Palestinians alike.
        The United States Armed Forces have been targeted in
    hundreds of Iranian-sponsored attacks. An Iranian proxy has
    crippled shipping through the Red Sea and directly targeted the
    U.S. Navy in international waters.
        Iranian drones are aiding Vladimir Putin in his illegal and
    brutal war on Ukraine, and China continues to purchase Iranian
    oil in the face of U.S. sanctions.
        We know, based upon public reports, though, that Iran is
    now closer than ever to having a nuclear weapons capability.
    Now, during the time of the JCPOA agreement, Iran was
    verifiably at least a year away from having enough highly
    enriched uranium for a single bomb. But, as a result of the
    Trump administration, because he was the President before
    Biden, as a result of him abandoning that agreement, Iran is
    now only days away from having enough highly enriched uranium
    for many bombs. By every measure, we are less safe today
    because we left the JCPOA than we were while we were in that
    agreement.
        We are now reading press reports that Prime Minister
    Netanyahu is planning a potential military strike on Iranian
    nuclear infrastructure as soon as this month. And reporting
    indicates that Mr. Netanyahu is aggressively lobbying President
    Trump to support such a strike.
        A military strike on Iran is no easy task, not a sure
    thing, and comes with significant risk of escalating into a
    destructive regional conflict. It is unlikely to deter Iran's
    nuclear weapons aspirations for a significant period of time
    and could have enormous impact on regional security, as well as
    the United States and global economies.
        You may have noticed that the U.S. economy is already
    facing troubling volatility, as a result of the President's
    reckless threats of tariffs. Rattling energy markets,
    disturbing trade routes, and unleashing additional regional
    instability is not something to be taken lightly.
        So, no military solution will permanently deny Iran the
    bomb, nor will it usher in a democratic Iranian government.
    That's pure fantasy.
        Like most observers of Iran, I'm acutely certain both the
    Iranian and American people would be better served by Iranian
    leadership who respect human rights at home and peace abroad. I
    hope we can protect foreign assistance efforts that support the
    Iranian people from further arbitrary cuts.
        We know Iranians do not broadly support their corrupt
    theocratic government that abuses women and minorities and
    wastes Iran's financial resources supporting terrorists that
    undermine their own security and bring no benefit to the
    Iranian people.
        Despite all these serious challenges, solutions are not
    impossible. I would always argue that diplomacy must always be
    kept on the table alongside credible threats. Diplomacy may not
    solve all of our challenge with Iran, but direct engagement
    with Iran has proven successful in lowering tensions and
    addressing the nuclear program--the main issue of concern.
        President Trump was right to send a letter to Iranian
    leaders opening the door to diplomatic engagement. We must
    encourage this effort and utilize all means of American power
    to address Iranian threats and to do so in lockstep with our
    allies. We should be involving our allies and bringing them in
    closer for this effort, not push them away.
        We have three excellent witnesses with us today to help
    think through the challenges before us. This is an excellent
    panel to assess the threats posed by Iran and help us formulate
    appropriate responses to keep the United States and our friends
    and allies safe.
        So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Members Meeks.
        Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record.
        [No statements have been submitted:]
        Mr. Lawler. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
    witnesses before us today on this important topic.
        Mr. Norman T. Roule, non-resident senior advisor, Warfare,
    Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, The Center for
    Strategic and International Studies.
        Ms. Claire Jungman, chief of staff, United Against Nuclear
    Iran.
        And Ms. Dana Stroul, director of research and Shelly and
    Michael Kassen Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near
    East Policy.
        This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
    before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us
    today.
        Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I
    will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes
    in order to allow more time for member questions.
        I now recognize Mr. Roule for his opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF NORMAN T. ROULE

        Mr. Roule. Chair Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear today. I will make brief comments, and
    with your concurrence, submit a statement for the record.
        For over two decades, Iran has used its nuclear program and
    regional militias as its primary tools of power projection.
    Tehran's role in the death of hundreds of Americans and tens of
    thousands of citizens in the Middle East is routinely
    acknowledged. Iran's missiles and drones kill Ukrainians and
    threaten global shipping in the Red Sea.
        But it has evaded meaningful consequences, in part, due to
    Western concerns that it would respond to significant
    retaliation by undertaking the final steps to acquire a nuclear
    weapon. These aggressive policies gradually have become
    entwined as Iran's malign sword and shield of its foreign
    policy. Recent seismic changes in the region give us an
    unprecedented opportunity to deal with these challenges.
        Despite the intelligence community's assessment that Iran
    is not undertaking nuclear weaponization, recent reports by the
    International Atomic Energy Agency are alarming. Tehran has
    built a nuclear program which has no justifiable civilian
    purpose. Iran now appears capable of producing its first
    quantity of 90 percent enriched uranium, sufficient for one
    nuclear weapon, in about a week. Tehran's current stockpile of
    60 percent enriched uranium is sufficient for about seven
    nuclear weapons. Assuming use of Iran's entire stock of
    enriched uranium and centrifuge capacity, some experts believe
    Iran could produce fissile material sufficient for
    approximately 10 nuclear weapons in a month. Let those numbers
    sink in.
        Tehran has also increased the number and sophistication of
    its centrifuge cascades, allowing for rapid weaponization when
    it so chooses. Iran routinely hampers IAEA efforts to verify
    its nuclear program, which, absence solid intelligence, reduces
    confidence in detecting any diversion of nuclear material or
    equipment to any possible covert weapons program.
        In short, Iran looks like a country building a nuclear
    weapons program, albeit one yet to make the final steps
    required, because it either fears discovery and the subsequent
    military consequences or believes its current approach offers
    diplomatic advantages beyond those found in possession of an
    actual nuclear weapon. Its long-range ballistic missile program
    appears to be following a similar path.
        Turning to Tehran's proxy network, Israeli and ongoing U.S.
    military actions have severely weakened its proxies in Lebanon,
    Gaza, Syria, and Yemen, but these groups survive along with its
    other partners in the region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard
    Corps Quds Force aims to revive these groups, including in the
    Red Sea region, where its strategy involves securing naval
    access via Sudan, where it likely hopes to establish weapons
    transshipment and militant training centers in East Africa to
    threaten the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and the Eastern
    Mediterranean.
        Iran's proxy operations remain vulnerable, however, to
    pressure on their logistics, finances, and personnel.
    Diplomatic and economic sanctions are important, although
    Europe's actions here have been insufficient. The United States
    needs to make it clear to Iran that, if the Quds Force operates
    as a terrorist organization, its personnel and logistics will
    be targeted accordingly, including by our military assets.
    Yemen presents an opportunity to demonstrate this decision.
        Tehran recognizes its unprecedented vulnerability to
    external military threats, particularly after Israel's October
    2024 strikes demonstrated the ineffectiveness of their air
    defenses. The Israeli strikes and Iran's failed counterattacks
    also show the potency of U.S. military technology and our
    regional partnerships.
        Domestically, Iran faces severe economic and political
    challenges which exceed its policy capabilities. Millions of
    Iranians have fallen into poverty in recent years. Inflation
    hovers at 35 percent. The return of the maximum pressure
    sanctions campaign has accelerated the collapse of Iran's
    currency against the dollar. The regime now appears to resemble
    the late Soviet Union, holding power through coercion and stale
    ideology.
        Between 2002 and 2003, and then, between 2013 and 2014,
    Iran navigated similar Western military threats, regional
    instability, and domestic discontent by blending belligerent
    rhetoric with lengthy diplomatic talks designed to soften
    sanctions. Tehran avoided actions which could have sparked a
    conventional war with the United States.
        This strategy led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of
    Action. This deal committed Tehran to potentially reversible
    nuclear concessions in exchange for long-term or permanent
    sanctions relief that it used to sustain the regime and
    resource its regional militias and missile program.
        We and our partners must use this period to foster debate
    among Iran's leadership that leads to the abandonment of
    regional adventurism and the pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
        Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your
    comments and questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Roule follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Roule.
        I now recognize Ms. Jungman for her opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF CLAIRE JUNGMAN

        Ms. Jungman. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today.
        The topic of this hearing and disrupting Iran's malign
    behavior is a matter of urgent national security. At the heart
    of Iran's malign behavior is its oil sector. Despite U.S.
    sanctions, Iran continues to export over 1.5 million barrels of
    oil per day, earning tens of billions of dollars annually.
    These revenues are not just supporting Iran's economic; they
    are directly funding terrorism, nuclear escalation, and
    regional destabilization.
        That's because up to half of Iran's oil exports are now
    controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.
    This means that every barrel of Iranian oil sold on the black
    market strengthens the IRGC's hand, bankrolling groups like
    Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis--underwriting weapons
    development and fueling nuclear expansion.
        We have seen the consequences. Iran-backed militants have
    launched attacks across the region, emboldened by the financial
    cushion that oil exports have provided. New enforcement actions
    in late 2024, including designations on nearly 50 tankers and
    sanctions on Chinese refiners, have started to make an impact.
        Iran's oil exports have dipped and its access to hard
    currency is beginning to tighten. But this campaign must
    continue and expand. The goal should be to drive Iran's oil
    revenues as close to zero as possible, cutting off the
    financial oxygen that allows the regime to operate abroad and
    repress at home.
        Beyond oil, Iran is increasingly turning to other illicit
    revenue streams: crypto mining and laundering, shadow banking
    networks, dollar smuggling from Iraq, and barter trade with
    Russia and Syria. These activities are harder to track, but
    deeply dangerous.
        In total, we estimate Iran has generated over $100 billion
    in oil revenues since 2021 and additional billions through
    crypto and smuggling networks. These funds have empowered its
    proxies and enabled nuclear brinksmanship, but sanctions can
    still work. When properly enforced, they limit Iran's budget,
    disrupt its ability to pay militias, and increase the costs of
    escalation.
        To that end, I offer a few recommendations:
        First, continue aggressive enforcement against Iran's ghost
    fleet and shipping facilitators. Sanction every vessel,
    registry, insurer, captain, and port that helps move Iranian
    oil.
        Second, target foreign enablers, especially in China and
    Malaysia, who knowingly buy or store Iranian crude.
        Third, expand maritime interdictions and use AI tools to
    identify suspicious tanker behavior in real time. Each vessel
    seized directly cuts into Iran's revenue and deters further
    evasion.
        Fourth, establish a multilateral task force, modeled on the
    Russian sanctions coordination effort, to enable real-time
    intelligence-sharing on Iranian oil smuggling, front companies,
    and crypto laundering. Unified action will help close off
    evasion pathways faster and more effectively.
        Fifth, strengthen crypto enforcement by tracing wallets
    linked to Iran and sanctioning mining operations.
        And finally, Congress should ensure that secondary
    sanctions remain a powerful deterrent, holding accountable any
    foreign entity that transacts with the IRGC or its proxies.
        In closing, the United States must send a clear message:
    Iran cannot continue to fund terrorism, threaten its neighbors,
    and defy nuclear commitments without consequences. We must
    remain united, vigilant, and unyielding in our pursuit of
    financial pressure. Because cutting off the money is our best
    tool to constrain Iran's most dangerous activities.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jungman follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ms. Jungman.
        I now recognize Ms. Stroul for her opening statement.

                        STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL

        Ms. Stroul. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        Let me associate myself with Mr. Roule; the Iranian regime
    is on its back foot. The pillars of its security strategy--the
    nuclear weapons program, the network of terrorists and proxies,
    and the conventional missile and drone arsenal--are more
    vulnerable today than at any time in the history of the regime,
    making 2025 a decisive year.
        In the aftermath of Hamas' attack, Israel, with U.S.
    support, dismantled Iran's proxy network in Gaza, Lebanon, and
    elsewhere, disrupting the regime's ability to project power
    through asymmetric capabilities.
        In Syria, Tehran lost its regional strategic partner with
    the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, who permitted the use of Syrian
    territory for Iranian terror.
        From the validation of a U.S.-led regional air defense
    coalition in April of last year to Israel's defeat of a large-
    scale ballistic missile attack last October, we now know that
    Iran's complex conventional attacks and missile threats can be
    defeated. Israel's strikes inside Iran targeted key missile
    production facilities and degraded its strategic air defense
    systems.
        In addition, the regime is under economic and social
    pressure. The sanctions architecture from the 2019 maximum
    pressure campaign remains in place and has been strengthened.
        The window is open for the United States to work with its
    partners and advance opportunities in a region no longer held
    back by Iran's nefarious influence. To emphasize, this is a
    window of opportunity. How the United States proceeds in the
    coming months will determine whether a more stable and secure
    region emerges from the post-October 7th environment.
        In the coming months, the administration should test
    Tehran's willingness to reach a diplomatic agreement, while
    also preparing to set the nuclear weapons program back through
    military means. A good deal, as National Security Advisory
    Waltz emphasized, would be one that permanently blocks Iran
    from obtaining a nuclear weapon rather than just delaying its
    capability.
        Yet, the time window to test Iran's openness to negotiate
    is short, partly due to the looming October expiration of
    remaining U.N. Security Council restrictions and, also, because
    of Iran's current exposure to military strikes.
        Policymakers should assume that Russia and China will help
    Iran rebuild its military capacity and air defenses. Moscow and
    Beijing are already supporting Tehran diplomatically. So,
    Washington will need to prepare for a complex negotiation in
    which these powers do not contribute to a diplomatic process
    like they did as part of the P5+1.
        The following steps will strengthen the U.S. hand as it
    pursues a negotiated settlement:
        The administration can incentivize Iran to negotiate by
    articulating how sanctions relief would be structured if Iran
    dismantles its nuclear weapons program.
        The administration must keep its military options open by
    maintaining a robust U.S. military posture in the region;
    strengthening regional air and missile defense capabilities,
    and reinforcing America's commitment to deterring Iranian
    aggression against Israel and Arab allies.
        Congress can begin the process to conditionally authorize
    the use of military force against Iran's nuclear program if the
    regime proves unwilling to quickly take sufficient steps.
        Consultations with allies and partners, particularly in the
    Middle East and Europe, will ensure a unified approach to
    countering Iran, reinforce the legitimacy of any negotiated
    settlement, and maintain pressure on Tehran. This will be
    crucial to blunting spoiler policies from Russia and China.
        Engaging regional leaders is also essential for preventing
    Iran from reconstituting its threat network. Providing military
    assistance and intelligence-sharing to partners will enhance
    their ability to counter Iran.
        Restoring assistance to emerging leaders, while pressing
    for reforms, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, can further
    incentivize cooperation, ensuring they remain resilient against
    malign Iranian influence.
        In Yemen, the administration should ensure that its current
    air campaign exclusively targets military assets of the Houthis
    and mitigates civilian harm, while seeking ways to support the
    Yemeni people.
        Increasing maritime and overland interdiction efforts will
    prevent Iran from resupplying the Houthis.
        Additionally, working closely with the Saudis and Emirates
    on a political process aimed at ending Yemen's civil war will
    create a pathway for peace and stability.
        In conclusion, real opportunities exist to block Iran from
    pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and consolidate military
    gains against its destabilizing activities. To press the
    advantage, the United States must be prepared to bring more to
    the table.
        Military force and sanctions are critical elements of
    strategy, but insufficient on their own. The United States must
    lean into diplomacy as well, testing the possibility of a
    negotiated settlement, while supporting new leaders across the
    region that oppose Tehran's interest in rebuilding its axis of
    resistance.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
        I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
        Last year, two of my bills that became law targeted Iran's
    oil trade. The SHIP Act gave the President the authority to
    sanction foreign ports and refineries that processed illicit
    Iranian oil, and the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act allowed
    for sanctions against Chinese financial institutions that
    processed transactions involving Iranian oil.
        And I'm currently working on legislation that further
    expands sanctions authority, the Iran Enhanced Sanctions Act.
    Anyone or any entity that knowingly facilitates the Iranian oil
    trade will be found and cutoff until they are no longer doing
    so.
        Ms. Jungman, just over a week ago, the President sanctioned
    the Luqing Refinery in China under the SHIP Act authorities.
    Have we seen any impact since this recent designation, and do
    you believe this designation and the Trump administration's
    clear intent to enforce more of these types of sanctions may
    deter other refineries from continuing to accept Iranian oil?
        Ms. Jungman. Chairman Lawler, thank you for your question,
    and thank you for your work on the SHIP Act and associated
    acts.
        I do think that the first designations here on this
    refinery, it's still a little bit too soon to see an impact,
    given that it was only, you know, a week or so ago. But we need
    more of these. One refinery designated doesn't have a big
    impact. Iran is going to move its oil to be offloaded at
    another refinery. We need to continue the pressure. We need to
    continue the designations on the refineries and it shouldn't be
    piecemeal. It needs to all happen at once in order to really
    cut the lifeline.
        Mr. Lawler. Last week, reporting indicated that U.S. naval
    forces stopped a group of oil tankers in the Gulf. While
    originally thought to be Iraqi origin, they were found to be
    using forged Iraqi documents and the tankers were Iranian.
        This instance really raises the larger issue of this being
    a consistent problem in the Gulf. So, what do you believe we
    are doing now to stop vessels from obscuring their origin? And
    how our are allies and strategic partner countries like Iraq
    helping us? And what more can be done?
        Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately, I don't think our strategic
    partners are doing enough here. I think we need to have more
    diplomatic engagement with them and encourage them to try to
    stop these associated activities.
        We see Malaysia, Singapore, Iraq, Amman; these are all
    serving as hubs for Iran to blend its oil, rebrand its oil, and
    again, continue the lifeline of the oil to be exported. So, we
    need to continue pressure on them and encourage more diplomatic
    efforts from them.
        Mr. Lawler. Mr. Roule, you mentioned in your opening
    statement that it's important to demonstrate the credibility of
    a U.S. military offensive, should Iran undertake nuclear
    weaponization in the future. What alternatives to diplomacy
    would you recommend in attempting to constrain Iran's nuclear
    program? And what other factors need to be considered before
    any decision is made to pursue one of these.
        Mr. Roule. Diplomacy, of course, should remain our primary
    route, and the President has appropriately made this the
    forefront of his approach to the Iranians and engaged with our
    partners. The Iranians must understand, if they complete the
    final steps, that we will take that military final approach as
    well.
        There needs to be more action done to prevent Iran from
    acquiring the materiel they need to complete those last steps,
    and we need to make sure that our partners who are providing
    that equipment--the Chinese or the Europeans--shipping lines
    are punished severely, as they move that material.
        But in the end of the day, Iran has pretty much everything
    it needs to complete those last steps for its nuclear program.
    Unfortunately, the can has been kicked down the road for many
    years and we are at the end of the road. So, it's up to the
    Iranians to take those last steps, and they either come to a
    deal or they must face nuclear reaction--nuclear response,
    military response.
        Mr. Lawler. So, given that the can has been kicked down the
    road, what factors, in your estimation, need to be considered
    before any decision is made to pursue a non-diplomatic
    response?
        Mr. Roule. The location of the nuclear material. The IAEA
    has lost track of some aspects of Iran's program because Iran
    no longer provides full access to its production of centrifuge
    equipment.
        We need to make sure we understand exactly where all of
    Iran's sites are located, so that Iran simply doesn't reproduce
    its program in an alternative facility
        And in the end, even if there is a military strike, sir,
    we've got to make sure the Iranians understand our intent in
    the long term is to prevent reconstruction, or simply, we are
    going to be the process. So, it has got to be an international
    approach that says, with the United States and its partners, we
    are not going to tolerate Iran building a nuclear weapon.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
        I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
        Ms. Stroul, let me just go to you first. Thank you for your
    service to our country.
        And I said in my opening remarks that there's more to be
    done to try to bring Iran and the United States to the table to
    negotiate the core issues of concern here, which is Iran's
    nuclear program, because of that tough assignment.
        But I also believe that, you know, when I look at it thus
    far, Iran's response has been that they reject talks with the
    United States, but has left the door open to multilateral
    diplomacy. And what was important for me at the time of
    negotiating the JCPOA was that it was a multilateral agreement.
    There were things that were going on in negotiations that our
    allies wanted; that's how we got the agreement, because we
    figured it wouldn't be just us by ourselves. So, as Mr. Roule
    just said, getting them in, so that we could box Iran in,
    because it is not just the United States; it is the United
    States and our allies, which I think is important.
        And then, also, I think some credibility has been gone from
    the United States when we unilaterally pulled out and the other
    allies stayed in and wanted to work something together. So,
    there's a lack of trust that then develops, you know, in that
    regard on both sides.
        So, how do you think we could build some confidence with
    our adversary Iran, so that we could begin negotiations? And
    how do we bring back a diplomatic track with our allies, so
    that we are not by ourselves? I think Mr. Roule just talked
    about how significant and important that it is. How do you
    think that we can do that?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question.
        I couldn't agree with you more that we have seen in the
    past Iran has been willing to negotiate when it feels
    diplomatic isolation, coupled with economic pressure and the
    threat of military force.
        Right now, we have tremendous sanctions pressure, and I
    believe there is a credible threat of military force on the
    table. And there is a unilateral offer to negotiate from
    President Trump, but what is missing is this multilateral
    element.
        So, first of all, there is an eagerness in some of our
    previous partners from the P5+1, specifically, in Europe, to
    begin coordinating with Washington as soon as possible ahead of
    this deadline in October, later this year, when the remaining
    restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire. Our European
    allies--and they are still our allies--are very interested in
    negotiating, in aligning with us in order to have a unified
    front approaching Iran.
        Second, we have been using and relying on partners in the
    Middle East to pass messages to Iran and receive messages from
    Iran. I think that is very important, but our partners in the
    Middle East also need to have confidence that, if the Iranians
    lash out and threaten them or use military force against them,
    like we saw in the 2015 situation, that Washington is going to
    have their back and be willing to put security guarantees on
    the table and support their defense, just as the United States
    has done for Israel in supporting its defense.
        One is clarifying our commitment to our partners' defense.
    Two is making a meaningful and genuine effort to include them
    and consult with them on these talks. That will also strengthen
    any negotiation on the other side.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
        And this is to you again, Ms. Stroul and Mr. Roule.
    Hopefully, we will have time to get both of you.
        Could you maybe tell us about the challenges that it would
    be in setting back the Iranian nuclear program militarily?
    Would there be any challenges? Are there challenges there? Mr.
    Roule? Ms. Stroul?
        Ms. Stroul. I will try to do 20 seconds and hand it over to
    Mr. Roule.
        So, the greatest challenge is that you cannot bomb away
    knowledge. Iran has mastered the cycle of nuclear fuel
    enrichment. And we know, based on intelligence community
    reporting in an unclassified manner, that they are undertaking
    the activities to position themselves to go across the
    threshold and weaponize, should the Supreme Leader make the
    decision to do so. So, we are at a perilous moment.
        Their nuclear program is geographically diverse. Some of it
    is aboveground; some of it is buried deeply underground. This
    means it is not a one-night military campaign. We are talking
    about a serious campaign to set back a program in order to,
    then, buy time to negotiate or figure out what steps would
    happen on the other side of military action. It is a serious
    piece of business.
        Mr. Meeks. I think my time has expired.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.
        I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from South
    Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for being here today.
        What an important topic, as we face the threat from Iran.
    And to me, the regime in Tehran is very clear; they believe
    death to Israel; death to America. They believe that by
    developing a nuclear capability that would be existential to
    Israel, it would be existential to the United States,
    particularly, as they develop an ICBM capability, which could
    only have one purpose, and that is to deliver a nuclear attack
    on the American people.
        And so, over and over again, I'm so grateful to the
    leadership of Donald Trump to let the dictatorship in Tehran
    know that they should not develop a nuclear capability and
    nuclear bomb, and it should not be developed.
        And then, we need to get to, if we determine they are not,
    there must be actual verification, not some charade, of
    determining whether it has been stopped or not. And so, I have
    absolute faith.
        And I'm really grateful for Chairman Mast to bring up,
    indeed, that we need to do all we can to stop the financing of
    the dictatorship, with it being revealed that 90 percent of the
    oil and gas being sold goes to the Chinese Communist Party.
    Let's connect the dots, and then, we connect another dot.
        And I was very grateful for President Donald Trump over the
    weekend to identify the dots that are connected between War
    Criminal Putin and the sale of oil to maintain his dictatorship
    and the call for secondary sanctions. And these will be
    secondary sanctions that would be against allies of--not
    against, but working with allies of the United States, that
    they should be part of sanctions.
        So, over and over again, we are in a situation as we face
    the malign influence, the topic today, and we have a
    circumstance that is so clear to me, and that is that we are
    involved in a war we did not choose. And that is dictators with
    rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law.
        It began February 24, 2022, with the invasion of Ukraine.
    Then, October 7, 2023, the puppets of Iran, Hamas invading
    Israel. And then, over and over again, we just need to be
    working together.
        And with that in mind, I would like each of you--but, in
    particular, Mr. Roule--the issue of sanctions, what more
    sanctions can we have? And I want you to know that many of my
    colleagues here, that we have introduced a number of bills
    today, the Maximum Support Act, bipartisan, with Congressman
    Jimmy Panetta.
        We also have the Free Iraq from Iran Act--I had two of my
    sons serve in Iraq--to liberate Iraq. We didn't mean for it to
    be liberated, for Iran to come in with militias to control the
    country. And so, that needs to be achieved.
        And then, I'm really grateful that we have got legislation
    pending--and I need people really smart like Congressman
    Huizenga to be part of this--and that is to address the network
    of Hezbollah here in the Western Hemisphere working with drug
    cartels.
        With all of that, what can we do in terms of sanctions to
    help the people of Iran, not the dictatorship?
        Mr. Roule. Superb question, sir.
        Very quickly, any legislation should ensure that we loudly
    and clearly say that the Iranian people can obtain food and
    medicine from the United States and elsewhere. Because their
    own government's corruption and inefficiency prevents them from
    doing do, to include during COVID, where over a billion dollars
    of corruption cost them medicine that they so desperately
    needed.
        I would say that anything that could be done to deny the
    Quds Force resources, because that goes directly to terrorism,
    terrorism in the Homeland, and supporting proxies overseas who
    are attempting to kill Americans and individuals in the region,
    is important.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Jungman, indeed, the tanker tracking
    is so important, and we are talking about ghost ships of War
    Criminal Putin. We are talking about refineries of the Chinese
    Communist Party over and over again. So, how is this being
    processed?
        Again, President Trump has made every effort and been clear
    he is going to act.
        Ms. Jungman. Thank you for the question.
        I think it is important to remember that the revenue Iran
    accumulates from its oil sales is not revenue going back to the
    people of Iran. This revenue is going into the regime, into the
    regime's pockets.
        And I think it is also important to remember that the
    maritime industry is a large industry. There's a number of
    Western touchpoints that these vessels have that can be
    sanctioned or you can threaten sanctions on.
        For example, the classification societies. Essentially,
    every vessel needs to have a safety certification which is
    given from a classification society to ensure that it is safe
    to sail the seas. Without that classification certificate, a
    vessel cannot sail into a port. We have yet to see any
    sanctions on these classification societies. Flag registries as
    well and insurance companies.
        Mr. Wilson. And my time is up. I yield back.
        But tell you thank you for your insight.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from
    California, Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. What we learned early this century is that
    just an American leader pounding the table, as several did, and
    say, ``This country will not be allowed to have nuclear
    weapons'' is not exactly effective.
        That is why I was here, saw several Presidents make that
    declaration with regard to North Korea. And now, North Korea
    has scores of nuclear weapons.
        I'm going to ask our witnesses to give us an answer in
    writing about North Korea. Because 20 years ago North Korea
    provided not nuclear weapons to Syria, but the technology to
    build them. The reason for that is North Korea didn't have a
    surplus of nuclear weapons at the time, didn't want to give up
    their nuclear weapons, but they are happy to have Syria have
    nuclear weapons and to make some money off of it.
        So, I would like each of our witnesses, for the record, to
    detail ideas on what we do to prevent Iran from buying a
    nuclear weapon from North Korea, which today does not have a
    surplus of money and does have a surplus of nuclear weapons.
    And in particular, I would like you to address what steps we
    could take to force China to agree, at least privately, that no
    plane would be allowed to go directly from North Korea to Iran
    without stopping for inspection.
        I might add that I discussed this with President Obama in
    the Oval Office long ago and was unable to--and while he
    pointed out to me that we intercept certain ships leaving North
    Korea, he was unwilling to take action to prevent direct plane
    flights. At least he didn't think it was a good idea at the
    time.
        The MAHSA Act, named after Mahsa Amini who was brutally
    murdered by the Iranian regime, directed the administration to
    make targeted sanctions determinations on senior officials in
    the Iranian regime.
        Ms. Stroul, what can the administration do to better
    utilize those authorities and go after particular individuals
    responsible for human rights deprivations in Iran?
        Ms. Stroul. Well, thank you for that question, Congressman.
        The administration should certainly make use of the
    authorities granted to it by Congress in the MAHSA Act and
    continue to shine a light and impose----
        Mr. Sherman. Any particular individuals you would want to
    name today?
        Ms. Stroul. I don't have particular individuals.
        Mr. Sherman. Okay.
        Ms. Stroul. I don't know----
        Mr. Sherman. I add them for the record and I'll ask our
    witnesses to do that.
        [No statements have been submitted:]
        Mr. Sherman. But I will point out our witnesses have
    pointed out that you can't bomb knowledge away; that even an
    agreement with Iran is valid only so long as they adhere to it.
    Nothing will permanently prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran
    from having a nuclear weapon, except the permanent end to
    Islamic Republic of Iran and the creation of a truly democratic
    Iranian government.
        I am, therefore, shocked that the administration has cut,
    eliminated all the democracy and civil society programs in
    Iran, all of our support for grassroots political movements,
    all of our support for independent media.
        Now, I know that USAID spent a few tens of thousands of
    dollars doing stupid things that don't reflect American values,
    and certainly don't reflect our strategic needs.
        But we saw just yesterday the Chinese were rescuing people
    in Myanmar and we did not have the capacity to save a single
    life in Myanmar. We sent some people recently, long after, I
    think, all the survivors would have been deceased, to go scout
    out the situation. That's what happens when you lose USAID.
        Ms. Stroul, I would like you to focus just on the Trump
    years, 2017 to 2021. During that 4 years, did Iran increase its
    missile capacity? Yes or no?
        Ms. Stroul. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. During those 4 years, did Iran expand its
    stockpile of enriched uranium?
        Ms. Stroul. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. During those years, did Iran increase its
    capacity to refine uranium through banks of centrifuges?
        Ms. Stroul. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. So, well, I hope that Trump 2.0 works better.
        Ms. Jungman, you have brought the importance of
    cryptocurrency. I would point out that our sanctions that got
    us in 2015 were pretty much based on our power to control
    international currency, because it was all dollars.
        The crypto enthusiasts and the leaders in that industry
    have said they want to take that away from the United States
    because they think it is illegitimate for America to have that
    power. Do you think that we should give up the power that we
    get from having the dollar being the world's reserve currency?
        Ms. Jungman. No, I don't think we should give up that
    power, but I do think that there needs to be stronger
    regulations and monitoring of what's being done----
        Mr. Sherman. And my time is expired.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Sherman,
        I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me just ask two basic questions.
        You know, despite presenting itself as a U.S. partner,
    Azerbaijan under Aliyev--and I have met with him twice in Baku
    and raised human rights issues with him, and recently,
    obviously, he committed genocide against the people of Nagorno-
    Karabakh--he signed a cooperation agreement with both Iran and
    Russia, including a significant guest swap deal with Tehran.
    These actions, in my opinion, directly benefit the two regimes
    that the United States is actively working to counter. And I'm
    wondering what your thoughts might be on that.
        Second, if I could, Rob Malley, you know, we know that the
    Office of Inspector General--I have read the report. It was a
    good report about the fact that the State Department did not
    follow its own clearance guidelines. But the bigger issue is
    having someone who was seemingly very much in favor of Tehran's
    policy in such a strategic position as Special Envoy does raise
    the question what damage might have been done, has been done,
    and might even carry forward right into today, especially as to
    Tehran's perceptions of what we are all about.
        And do you think the FBI will ever get to the bottom of it?
    And if you could speak to that as well? But those two
    questions, if you could.
        Norman?
        Mr. Roule. In order to restrict Iran's access to funds and
    to apply the appropriate diplomatic and economic pressures, it
    is critical that Iran not have the capacity to undertake
    economic deals such as it conducted with Azerbaijan with
    anyone.
        As Ms. Stroul correctly stated, Iran is under the greatest
    pressure when it faces multilateral economic and diplomatic
    isolation, and that must be absolute. Whenever there are
    exceptions to that, Iran benefits and that weakens the pressure
    on Iran itself.
        Regarding Mr. Malley, it is out of my level of competence
    and I would defer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
    others.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Would any of you want to comment on either of
    those two issues?
        Ms. Stroul. I would simply note that, in the Biden
    administration, and again, in this administration, there is an
    aligned objective of pursuing negotiations first for a
    verifiable deal that blocks all Iran's pathways toward a
    nuclear weapon.
        And I think it underscores the importance of an independent
    and strong Inspector General in the State Department, as well
    as an FBI who is allowed to conduct credible and important
    investigations.
        Mr. Smith. Claire?
        Ms. Jungman. No.
        Mr. Smith. Do any of you have any sense as to when the FBI
    may reveal where it is in terms of this investigation? It seems
    like Malley just fell off the face of the earth. And to have
    someone of his Special Envoy in such a strategic position seems
    to me would undermine what this country was all about in our
    dealings with Iran. Would you agree with that at least?
        Nobody? Okay.
        I do hope that we will followup on the Azerbaijan
    connection. Again, I have met with a number of people who have
    political prisoners sitting in his horrible jails. He is so
    brazen that in the past he put a stringer who was an
    Azerbaijani woman into jail, gave her an over 7-year prison
    sentence, and she worked for Radio Free Europe.
        So, I actually convened a hearing and had the head of Radio
    Free Europe come and testify about how horrible it was. And
    what was her crime? She pointed out how corrupt Aliyev is.
        And now, we have a situation again where he is getting into
    deals with a country that needs hard currency extremely hard.
    We know that Xi Jinping and the Communist Party, they enable
    dictatorships and bad actors everywhere. But this man, who gets
    a free pass in this town--and that is Aliyev-needs to be called
    out.
        I thank you and yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
    Keating, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Stroul mentioned how important our allies are to us in
    this regard, even though we did move away from them and left
    many of them hanging from pulling out of the JCPOA. But I want
    to just comment on that.
        First, last year our allies did participate with an Iran
    proxy, the Houthis, in an attack with fighter jets, with ship-
    based cruise missiles, with targets like, you know, Houthi
    missile launchers, air defense systems, radar, weapons systems.
    We worked together. The UK participated in this. Canada
    participated in this. Australia and the Netherlands
    participated in this.
        Well, what has happened to our allies now with the Trump
    administration's latest actions and talks, deliberately
    irrigating--and this really takes a great deal of effort--our
    allies, Canada, wanting to make that the 51st State and
    bullying them with tariffs without negotiating the way you
    would with an ally.
        How does Canada respond? Well, Canada responded just last
    month with a $4.2 billion investment in cutting-edge radar with
    Australia, despite our geographic location in the Western
    Hemisphere--with Australia. And they are partaking with other
    European countries right now in alternative military buildup
    discrete from the United States, because of these actions.
        Denmark is part of NATO. And how are they reacting when
    they say they will take Greenland by force if necessary?
        Portugal, a NATO country, and other NATO countries, they
    are reconsidering buying F-35s because of their fear of the
    U.S. control over the parts and software. These are our allies.
    These are people that are instrumental to our success
    worldwide, but also in the Middle East.
        And let's talk about the leaked Signal chat that was there.
    Our Vice President saying, ``I just hate bailing out Europe
    again.''
        And what about our Secretary of Defense saying, ``I fully
    share your loathing of European freeloading.''? It is pathetic.
        And what about Stephen Miller in that chat? They had a lot
    to say and our allies were listening. He said, ``We will have
    to make it clear to Egypt and Europe what we expect in
    return.'' ``We also need to figure out how to enforce that
    requirement. If they don't remunerate, then what?'' ``If the
    U.S. successfully restores freedom of navigation at a great
    cost, there needs to be further economic gain extracted from
    them in return.'' That's the Signal chat. Those are the other
    actions, and I could go on.
        How can we really expect our allies to trust us on such an
    important issue as Iran and dealing with the malign influence
    throughout the Middle East if this is what they are getting in
    return? And we have already seen, as I have shown, some actions
    on their part where they are moving away from us because they
    can't trust us.
        Ms. Stroul, are we weaker without our allies side by side
    with us?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.
        Certainly, one of the core elements of American strength
    and its ability to accomplish its national security interests
    has been our unmatched network of allies and partners across
    multiple theaters. Any objective that we want to make the
    American people safer and our country safer is better done in
    coordination with allies and partners.
        Part of the reason we need to put in effort to align
    diplomatically, share burdens and resources upfront, is because
    there may be a time when we ask our allies and partners to do
    something that is not easy or is inconvenient.
        Mr. Keating. Like they did after 9/11 in joining with us--
    --
        Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, sir.
        Mr. Keating [continuing]. under Article 5.
        Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, sir.
        So, as we think through all of our different objectives in
    the Middle East, we have seen our European allies stand up, as
    well as our partners in the Middle East. The Air Defense
    Coalition last April was a good example. France's leadership in
    Lebanon is another example. The European coordination in Syria
    is another example. And absolutely, both the defensive presence
    in the Red Sea to defend against Houthi attacks and the
    offensive military strikes over the past year are great
    examples of our allies and partners putting skin in the game.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
        I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ladies and gentlemen, appreciate your time here today. We
    just get real about this conversation for once. Iran is a
    country that is run by a criminal terrorist regime. That is
    what Iran is. We are talking about having negotiations with
    them and so on and so forth. I guess we have got to.
        But North Korea is a criminal essentially terrorist regime
    when you look at what it does to its own citizens. It does it
    because it can't afford to export its terrorism. But Iran does.
    And has continued to do so. And even with the fact
    notwithstanding that 80 percent of Hezbollah's drones and
    missiles have been taken out, Assad's regime is gone, Tehran's
    missile factories have been devastated, the Houthis are finally
    under some real fire, Iran still exists. And we are talking
    like there is--well, let me ask you. You guys are the experts.
        Mr. Roule, is Iran going to give up its nuclear program?
    Have they ever shown any interest whatsoever? But before you
    answer that question, is there any question in anybody's mind
    on the panel that their nuclear program is specifically for
    weapons--it is a weapons program. It is not for power or any--
    or medical research. It is for aggressive military action. Is
    there any question about that? Is there any dissention from
    that?
        Mr. Roule. Frankly, sir, the question is the--I think the
    best way of putting it is Iran has a civilian nuclear program
    and has kept open the option for a military----
        Mr. Perry. Why do they need enrich so much for a civilian
    program?
        Mr. Roule. Not only do they not need to enrich--it is a
    great question--they are now focusing the enrichment aspect of
    their entire nuclear program on non-civilian enrichment. So
    they need to enrich between----
        Mr. Perry. Yes.
        Mr. Roule [continuing]. 3 and 5 percent in----
        Mr. Perry. It is a weapons program.
        Mr. Roule [continuing]. civilian. They are enriching at 60
    percent, which is only military grade. In essence, they are
    shaping their entire civilian nuclear program to make it look
    as if they are aiming for a military program. It has no
    civilian use. It is architecture they are creating. That
    doesn't mean they have decided to make a bomb. And we have
    heard the DNI Gabbard say they are not doing this, but facts
    are facts in that regard.
        Mr. Perry. Maybe I should have added they are a lying
    criminal terrorist regime, right? They lie about things. They
    use diplomacy to their advantage because the rest of the--to
    the point of the JCPOA, the rest of the world are our allies,
    followed President Obama who didn't want to see a nuclear Iran
    during his term, but didn't mind seeing one 15 years later when
    he was no longer the President. It didn't stop their nuclear
    production, their military nuclear capability. It just delayed
    it. That is all it did. Nobody here wants to acknowledge it.
        But to my other point, have they ever shown any interest
    whatsoever in getting rid of this nuclear program for whatever
    way you want to describe it?
        Mr. Roule. No, and in fact it is----
        Mr. Perry. No.
        Mr. Roule [continuing]. extremely--their red lines have
    been not giving up industrial enrichment, not closing any
    facilities, and not giving up R&D. And it is very unlikely they
    will give up any of those red lines without significant
    pressure and the threat of military action, unfortunately.
        Mr. Perry. Ms. Jungman, you disagree with that?
        Ms. Jungman. I do not disagree. Completely agree.
        Mr. Perry. Ms. Stroul?
        Ms. Stroul. I do not disagree.
        Mr. Perry. Okay. So what are we talking about here? We are
    talking about--like we can have some conversation that is going
    to get them to give it up even while we all know in the room
    they ain't giving it up, right?
        Ms. Jungman, they got what, 300 ghost ships running around
    selling their oil which is sanctioned, but they sell it to the
    Chinese and whoever they want. And where does that--does that
    money go to the people of Iran? Look, there are probably
    wonderful--I am sure there are wonderful people in Iran that
    don't want to live under this yoke of terrorism. But the money
    is not going to them, is it? It is going to who?
        Ms. Jungman. No, the money from Iran's oil goes right back
    to its terrorist proxies.
        Mr. Perry. Yes, it is terrorist proxies, the Quds Force,
    probably to their nuclear weapons program.
        Ladies and gentlemen, all we are doing is delaying the
    inevitable, right? We are acting like we can talk our way out
    of having this cancer get worse by just having the cancer kind
    of settle down for a little bit. There is a cancer in the
    Middle East. There is a cancer on the globe. The name in this
    case is Iran and the leadership in Iran. That is the cancer.
        We better get real about what we are talking about because
    they are not going to give it up willingly no matter what the
    negotiation is. And I just wish that we would quit fooling
    around and acting like the IAEA is going to tell us something.
    I mean, they wouldn't even allow an America inspector on the
    team. They wouldn't allow inspectors to visit military sites.
    Who are we kidding here?
        I am sorry I didn't have any questions. I yield.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
        I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
    Castro.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
        Thank you all for your testimony today.
        Ms. Stroul, in your testimony you recommended that
    Congress, quote, ``strengthen the administration's hand by
    beginning the process to conditionally authorize the use of
    military force against Iran's nuclear program if the regime
    proves unwilling to take sufficient steps to ensure that it
    will not acquire nuclear weapons.'' And I guess that
    recommendation gives me some concern based on history.
        This was the same argument made to justify voting for the
    Iraq War in 2002. In debates in the Congress they argued that a
    show of resolve by Congress by preemptively authorizing the use
    of military force against Iraq would strengthen the Bush
    administration's hand in negotiations and force Saddam Hussein
    to come to the table. What ensued with the Iraq War was one of
    the biggest mistakes that our country has made in decades, and
    I don't think any of us, or most of us at least, want to repeat
    that same mistake. And I am concerned with everything going on
    now that we could with Iran.
        The American people are not looking to get into another
    protracted war in the Middle East. I think most folks would
    agree with that. I am also skeptical that the votes--or that
    the votes are there for such a war, skeptical that the votes
    are there. In February 2020 bipartisan majorities in the House
    and Senate voted to end hostilities with Iran after the strike
    on Soleimani.
        During the congressional debates on the repeal of the 2002
    Iraq AUMF, some Republicans attempted to ensure that the law
    could still be used to strike Iranian-backed proxies. In
    response, a bipartisan majority in the Senate, including with
    the crucial support of now Vice President J.D. Vance, voted 60
    to 36 to stop those efforts.
        And so my question is would you say that we should
    strengthen the administration's negotiating hand by
    preemptively authorizing the use of military force against
    Iran? Do you trust Donald Trump and his administration with
    that responsibility at this time?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question, and I
    think it is a very important point. So the words I chose were
    ``begin the process to conditionally authorize,'' and I think
    those two clauses are important in the point I am making.
        One is begin the process. That is because I don't think
    that this decision should be left in the hands of any President
    without advice and consent and consultation with Congress. And
    conditionally because I am not recommending preemptive
    authorization. I am recommending that by Members of Congress
    having debate about the conditions and circumstances under
    which it would approve use of military force it will send a
    signal of bipartisan consensus and commitment that that
    credible military option remains on the table should
    negotiations fail.
        I want to be very clear that my recommendation associated
    with Mr. Roule is that we should pursue negotiations first
    because no military action will eliminate the knowledge and the
    entire program overnight.
        Mr. Castro. I guess what would the--per your recommendation
    what would that trigger be? When do you start down that road?
        Ms. Stroul. First I think the intelligence community should
    be providing regular updates to Members of Congress in a closed
    and classified atmosphere on exactly what the steps are that
    the intelligence community understands Iran to be taking. And
    second, I think there should be consultations about exactly
    what is being contemplated when we talk about military strikes
    on Iran.
        Mr. Castro. Would you require that we go through a JCPOA-
    type negotiation before going down that road?
        Ms. Stroul. I think that testing the diplomatic waters with
    the regime either in a multilateral context in indirect
    negotiations that appear to be contemplated at this moment.
    Either way, a negotiated settlement is by far more--easier to
    verify in implementation and blocking Iran's pathways to a
    nuclear weapon than military force, which on the other side we
    don't know what regime decisionmaking would be. We don't know
    what Iranian decisionmaking would be. And we don't know what
    the war looks like on the other side of that. And this is why I
    think there is such serious issues that merit congressional
    input.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you. And also for the other witnesses,
    just for the record as we are having this discussion, do you
    believe that we should to a preemptive AUMF?
        Mr. Roule. I associate myself with Ms. Stroul's comments.
    We should have a thoughtful process in which Congress plays its
    rightful role as an institution. But the Iranians must
    understand that endless negotiations aren't the only strategy
    of the United States.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you.
        Let me check in with you.
        Ms. Jungman. Yes, and I agree with Ms. Stroul and Mr. Roule
    in their comments.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Castro.
        I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Michigan,
    Mr. Huizenga.
        Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And during the last Congress I actually led a letter with
    several of my colleagues on this committee underscoring the
    urgency of suspending the activity of the Iranian ghost armada.
    And, Ms. Jungman, you were--have been a part of a couple of
    those conversations, I think.
        Dispatched from Iran, these vehicles ferry illicit oil and
    petroleum products to bolster the human rights abuses and
    terrorist acts perpetrated by the Iranian regime. It is their
    funding source. These foreign-owned and flagged ships operate
    undetected within the ghost armada and violate maritime law by
    obfuscating their positioning, thus circumventing U.S., and
    frankly world enforcement.
        At the time of my letter in 2023 the armada was made up of
    364 vessels with 47 percent of them being flagged by the Panama
    Maritime Authority. That is 171 vessels approximately. As the
    vessel has now grown, I would argue thanks to a lack of action
    in the last administration about enforcement, it is--sanctions
    are only as strong as the enforcement that you are willing to
    put behind it.
        And by the way, I serve on the Financial Services
    Committee. I am the vice chair of that committee. I have been
    working on this. That is, the origin of many of those sanctions
    is that committee.
        The latest report indicates it has now grown to 521 vessels
    with 17 percent of those flagged by Panama, which is about 88.
    So it has been cut in half on Panama.
        I am kind of curious. I will start with you, Ms. Jungman.
    You have worked on this issue by closely tracking these vessels
    engaging in the transportation of illicit Iranian oil. How
    should the United States deal with countries that continue to
    flag vessels that are listed on the Department of Treasury's
    Specially Designated National and Blocked Person, or SDN list?
    And where have those other vessels been flagged?
        Ms. Jungman. Thank you for your question and thank you for
    your work on this topic. It is a matter of great importance
    given that the revenue Iran accumulates from these oil sales is
    going back to its nuclear program and terrorist activities.
        If we look to a year ago, like you said, Panama was
    flagging a significant amount of the ghost fleet. And that
    number has dropped drastically, which is showing that
    diplomatic efforts and negotiations with----
        Mr. Huizenga. Are you exposure?
        Ms. Jungman. Exposure, yes.
        Mr. Huizenga. Sunlight discussion like this?
        Ms. Jungman. Essentially naming and shaming, calling them
    out for enabling this activity has an impact. And so I think
    Panama has taken a significant step, but we would of course
    like to see that 17 percent down to 0 percent.
        Mr. Huizenga. Where are they getting flagged?
        Ms. Jungman. So that is a new problem that has come up.
    Unfortunately, as a result of Panama de-flagging these vessels
    we are seeing Iran set up these false registries in Guyana,
    Comoros, Eswantini even and----
        Mr. Huizenga. Shall we say maybe less well-known maritime
    powers?
        Ms. Jungman. Sure. Yes. But----
        Mr. Huizenga. Because they don't have that kind of--
    typically that kind of flagging capability or that kind of
    fleet coming out there.
        Ms. Jungman. Well, and I think it is important to note that
    they are not necessarily legitimate flag registries under these
    countries.
        Mr. Huizenga. Yes.
        Ms. Jungman. They are companies set up in--most likely in
    Dubai or in India that are really run by Iran and providing
    these registrations to these vessels.
        Mr. Huizenga. We are going fast on time, but this is
    important stuff. I need to jump to Arsenio Dominguez from the
    Republic of Panama. He was elected, has the 4-year term as
    Secretary General of the International Maritime organization,
    IMO. They are the U.N. agency tasked with establishing, quote,
    ``the authority for the safety, security, environmental
    performance of international shipping.'' How can he possibly
    effectively lead the IMO while representing a nation that
    knowingly green lights this kind of transportation of Iranian
    oil against international sanctions?
        Mr. Jungman. That is a great question and I think the IMO
    has done little to nothing on this topic and there should be
    and could be a lot more from them.
        Mr. Huizenga. Okay. I have got a lot that I am going to
    have to followup with in some written questions as well, but
    let's touch on the teapot refineries and deterring those and
    their willingness to accept Iranian oil. Has there been an
    impact since President Trump designated one of those teapot
    refineries last week?
        Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately it is still too soon to see an
    impact from that and designating one refinery has little to no
    impact as Iran will just move its oil to other refineries.
        Mr. Huizenga. Okay.
        Ms. Jungman. So there needs to be a more comprehensive
    approach on targeting and sanctioning them.
        Mr. Huizenga. All right. And as I have said, sanctions are
    only as good as the weakest link in the sanctions chain. And
    that has been a huge problem. We need robust multinational buy-
    in from allies and partners, including Europe. I recently had a
    conversation with the Ambassador from the EU who happens to be
    Lithuanian. She understands this ghost fleet also with Russia
    and what has been happening there.
        Do you sense that there is any appetite, any of you, in
    Europe to push back on Iran's illicit trade with China, whether
    it be illicit oil or not?
        Ms. Jungman. I don't think I can speak for the Europeans,
    but I think that we are finally starting to wake up to see that
    China is the only one benefiting here. China is getting the
    cheap oil while everybody else is paying real prices and----
        Mr. Huizenga. Because they sell it at a discount. With
    that, I know I am over time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it and
    I will be writing some questions as well with everybody. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Huizenga.
        I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman and ranking
    member of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms.
    Cherfilus-McCormick, of Florida.
        Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        As we have heard today the United States combined with our
    partners and allies in the region must take all necessary
    measures to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to
    halt the support for terrorism. One of the main tools to help
    Iran's development of nuclear weapons and its continued funding
    of its terrorist proxies is sanctions. That is why I was proud
    to introduce bipartisan legislation with Congressman Lawler,
    who is the chairman for the Middle East, to strengthen
    sanctions on foreign entities enabling Iran's illicit oil
    trade.
        Over the past few years we have witnessed growing alignment
    between Iran, Russia, and China, presenting a significant
    challenge to United States' national security and global
    stability.
        Ms. Stroul, what steps did the Biden Administration take to
    combat these alliances?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question. A variety of
    different elements. The first is to lean into strengthening our
    unmatched network of allies and partners in order to increase
    Russia's isolation in the European theater, China's isolation
    in the Indo-Pacific theater, and Iranian isolation in the
    Middle East. We work with all of our long-time allies and
    partners across those different theaters.
        No. 2 was to highlight and expose the ways in which this
    axis of upheaval is supporting itself counter to the interests
    of our allies and partners. Iranian drones killing Ukrainians
    via Russia, Iranian support to Russian defense industry,
    Russia's provision of more sophisticated defense technology to
    China, Chinese purchase of Iranian oil at a discount. I could
    go on and on with these examples.
        We should also talk about North Korean foot soldiers
    fighting on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. All of this suggests
    an emerging axis that is working to challenge the current
    international global order that benefits and keeps Americans
    safe.
        There was also successive rounds of sanctions to break and
    diminish the different ways in which they are strengthening.
    And again, provision of security support, assistance, military
    aid, and intelligence to our allies and partners so that they
    understand exactly what the negative strategic impact is of
    this emerging axis to their and our security.
        Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. What additional measures can you--
    would you recommend be implemented to prevent Russia and China
    from aiding Iran in evading sanctions?
        Ms. Stroul. Well first of all, we need to continue to
    sanction those activities. And the sanctioning not only cuts
    off and dis-incentivizes it from a financial perspective, but
    it also shines a light on and exposes that nefarious activity.
        Clearly though I would say that it seems the Chinese
    government doesn't really care if it gets exposed and neither
    does President Putin of Russia. So we are going to have to find
    more ways to dis-incentivize this behavior. And a lot of that
    is making sure that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran feel the
    consequences of this cooperation not just from Washington, but
    from European capitals and Middle East capitals. Red carpets
    should not be rolled out for the leaders of these countries.
    Sanctions loopholes and certain economic environments should
    not be allowed for these illicit networks, and more has to be
    done to impose consequences and costs.
        Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, I want to turn our attention
    for a moment to Syria. We know that the fall of the Assad
    regime was a major blow to Iran's influence in Syria, however
    what America does next is critical to the future of the
    country. Ms. Stroul, do you believe America's current policy in
    Syria is positioned well to further undermine Iran?
        Ms. Stroul. Right now we have a transitional government in
    Damascus under the leadership of Interim President Ahmed al-
    Sharaa and he is saying that he is committed to fighting Isis
    in Syria and has told Iran that they will not be allowed to use
    Syrian territory the way they did under Bashar al-Assad. And he
    is also looking to impose consequences on Russia and deny it
    use of that naval base that is on the Mediterranean.
        All of these are interests that align with U.S. security
    objectives as well as having a secure unified Syria under the
    control of one government, but right now U.S. policy is not
    geared toward seizing these opportunities. We need to find ways
    to support the Syrian people through some measured sanctions
    relief benchmarked against performance of the Sharaa
    government.
        Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. And before I run out of time I
    just wanted to ask you this last question. Do you believe that
    dismantling the USAID in Syria is helpful or harmful to U.S.
    interests in Syria?
        Ms. Stroul. I believe that it is harmful. I think what
    Syrian people will remember is an American flag or the USAID
    stamp on emergency food assistance, stabilization assistance,
    clean water, baby formula, and the U.S. actually putting skin
    in the game to demonstrate that we care about the lives and the
    livelihoods of Syrian people. And by taking this precious
    element of American power off the table we undermine our own
    ability to achieve our interests in Syria.
        Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Kim. [Presiding.] Thank you. I now recognize myself for
    5 minutes.
        Ms. Jungman, you talk about the sophisticated and deceptive
    techniques that the Iranian regime is utilizing to evade oil
    sanctions including through foreign front companies. Iran also
    remains heavily dependent on China to sustain its illicit oil
    trade which is like 90 percent of Iran's oil exports go to
    China, primarily independent teapot refineries. So you note
    that Chinese purchase of Iranian oil increased by over 20
    percent last year despite the U.S. sanctions.
        So in your perspective how successful has the U.S. been in
    identifying these teapot refineries and front companies?
        Ms. Jungman. Thank you for your question. I think it is
    important to remember that until end of 2024 we saw an
    administration that was essentially giving lax sanctions
    enforcement. As a result of that, Iran was able to buildup its
    revenues and in turn is--despite these sanctions is easily able
    to replace the vessels that are designated. And until there is
    a comprehensive designation across the entire ghost fleet these
    vessels will continue to export Iranian oil to China.
        When looking at the refineries themselves I think that it
    was a great first step from this administration to designate
    the refineries we saw sanctioned I guess 2 weeks ago, but
    unfortunately designation on one refinery has little to no
    impact. There has to be a comprehensive holistic approach on
    all of the refineries that are taking on Iranian oil.
        Ms. Kim. You talk about the realistic short-term action
    that the U.S. can take to close that loophole. What about the
    long-term actions, short-term and long-term actions that we can
    take to close that loophole?
        Ms. Jungman. Sure. I think that there needs to be--in
    addition with sanctions there has to be negotiation or a
    diplomatic approach. And I think if there is any President that
    will be able to figure out what to hold over China's head, it
    will be this President.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. Mr. Roule, one of the recommendations
    you provide in your testimony to counter the Iranian regime's
    malign activities is to continue investing in the regional
    military, economic, and commercial partnerships, because in
    your testimony, in quote, ``regional economic and social
    success is as essential to our security interests as their
    military strength,'' end quote.
        So what role do joint security exercises or intelligence
    sharing activities with our allies play in disrupting the
    Iran's illicit activities?
        Mr. Roule. Thank you, Congresswoman. the relationships we
    have with our Gulf partners and other regional partners played
    a profound role in the defense of Israel during Iran's
    ballistic missile attack on Israel. We saw years of CENTCOM's
    investment in those relationships come to fruition in the
    smooth air defense of the entire region. And thousands of
    lives, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives were saved as a
    result of that.
        But this is a broader target set because the Iranians are
    moving, as I say, in the Red Sea Basin. They are moving in the
    Persian Gulf area. They are moving in--throughout the Arabian
    Peninsula. And these relationships require a tremendous
    investment by the CENTCOM team as well as our Department of
    Defense as a whole.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. Ms. Jungman, let me come back to you.
    You talk about the IRGC's efforts to diversify its revenue
    streams including through cryptocurrency and how it offers Iran
    a way to bypass financial oversight and quietly move funds
    across the borders. So in your perspective how extensively is
    the IRGC using cryptocurrency to evade sanctions?
        Ms. Jungman. We saw around I think it was $8 billion of
    transactions from Iran using cryptocurrency. And I think that
    this is an area they are obviously tapping into as sanctions
    are coming out. So they are moving their money there because it
    is harder to track. And I think that it is an area that
    sanctions could be enforced stronger.
        Ms. Kim. So could you talk about some of the policy changes
    that you think is necessary to improve that effectiveness of
    sanctions? And also, what risks do Iran's cryptocurrency and
    front company activities pose to global financial integrity?
        Ms. Jungman. This is not my area of expertise, but I am
    happy to followup with a written response there.
        Ms. Kim. All right. Well, thank you so much. I ask that
    because I want to see if these tactics could set a precedent
    for other rogue actors or states. And I think we have been
    pretty clear on the reason why we need a digital assets
    framework to coordinate with our allies to address those crypto
    crime. So thank you so much for your testimony and I yield
    back.
        Let's see, who is next? Representative Stanton, I recognize
    you for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        Iran has built a network of proxies across the Middle East
    sowing chaos and instability in the region for decades. It has
    funded, trained, and armed Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis,
    and various militia groups to target Israel and other regional
    rivals, all while keeping Tehran out of the direct conflict.
        The human cost to Iran's offensive is undeniable. On
    October 7, 2023, 1,300 Israelis were murdered by Hamas
    terrorists and attacks by these proxy militia have injured or
    killed American troops. Over the last 18 months Iran has
    continued to support its proxies as they send ballistic
    missiles and drones at Israeli targets and at American Service
    members. But Iran's axis of resistance is waning. Right now we
    are at a critical and fragile moment for the region. Iranian
    proxies are weakened and new leadership in Lebanon and Syria
    are refusing to bow to Tehran's influence.
        The U.S., acting in partnership with our allies, has an
    opportunity to end Iran's malign influence and to protect our
    ally Israel and expand the Abraham Accords and change the
    trajectory of the region for decades to come. But we can only
    take advantage of this moment if we maintain a focus on
    democracy building, work with and support our allies in the
    region, and fully enforce the U.S. sanctions regime.
        In a completely self-defeating move the Trump
    Administration has eliminated impactful programs that support
    the rule of law, protect human rights, and counter
    misinformation. Limiting U.S. foreign aid and programs is a
    gift to our adversaries--Iran, but also to China and Russia.
    International investments are an essential instrument of U.S.
    foreign policy and U.S. national security policy, and has been
    for decades under Republican and Democratic administrations.
        Now, there are still some active aid programs in the region
    and we need to make sure those resources get delivered
    efficiently to the people that need it.
        Mr. Roule, what can the U.S. do to support foreign aid
    delivery while also preventing Iranian malign activity?
        Mr. Roule. The best expertise on foreign aid delivery in
    the region are regional partners themselves. They know the
    neighborhood; they know the players; they know where corruption
    exists; they know the needs of their people. And building
    relationships with these actors themselves will allow us to
    know how best to deliver and where are--the impact can be the
    greatest.
        This goes to the previous question by one of your
    colleagues. Do we have relationships with our reliable partners
    in the region? And we extract utility from that in many
    different areas to include foreign aid. We can build soft-power
    impact as well as our military impact.
        Mr. Stanton. To successfully deter Iran and our global
    adversaries we should be leveraging our allies and our
    partners. President Trump's go-it-alone foreign policy strategy
    is short-sighted and self-defeating. He started trade wars with
    our neighbors and angering our friends, even causing South
    Korea and Japan to restart trade discussions with China for the
    first time in 5 years. And Vice President J.D. Vance in public
    speeches, and embarrassingly in leaked Signal chats, has spit
    in the eye of our European allies.
        Europe is the second largest arms supplier to Israel. The
    U.K. critically stepped in to shoot down missiles fired at
    Iran--by Iran, excuse me, at Israel in last October's
    escalation. And France helped broker the critical Lebanon-
    Israel cease-fire. They are vital to achieving Middle Eastern
    peace and supporting democratic goals in the region. In
    addition to those values Europe's presence and our presence in
    the Middle East contribute to stronger global trade and
    business, another vital component of keeping stability.
        For Ms. Stroul, how has Europe worked to secure the Red Sea
    global shipping lanes and how should we work with them to
    better stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question. The Europeans have
    both participated in a U.S.-led defensive coalition called
    Prosperity Guardian which has kept the critical choke points in
    the southern Red Sea open. Some European partners as well as
    others in other theaters also participated with us in
    multilateral offensive strikes last year to take Houthi
    capabilities off the table in Yemen. And the Europeans maintain
    their own separate defensive coalition as well in the Red Sea.
        Mr. Stanton. Thank you.
        The final question is for Ms. Jungman about China, and they
    are unfortunately working with Iran. What is China's role in
    helping Iran avoid oil sanctions?
        Ms. Jungman. China plays a large role in enabling Iran to
    accumulate this revenue. They purchased 90--90 percent of
    Iranian oil is going to China. It serves as the lifeline for
    Iran's revenue and extremist activity.
        Mr. Stanton. All right. Thank you very much for those
    answers and I will yield back the rest of my----
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. I recognize Representative Davidson of
    Ohio for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Davidson. Thank you, chairwoman.
        Thanks to our colleagues for hosting this hearing. Thanks
    to our witnesses. Appreciate your testimony today.
        First, Iran and their despotic regime have just horrible
    human rights abuses. They have been a force really for terror
    and instability in the Middle East for a long time. the 10/7
    attacks by Hamas were a profoundly evil act by a network of
    terror groups all linked to Iran. Maximum pressure against
    these groups and their Iranian sponsors is more than warranted
    and I applaud the Trump Administration for doing just that.
        The second truth about the situation that we are in is that
    a full-blown ground war in Iran is simply not in America--it is
    not our war to fight. As we turn toward strategic competition
    with China we cannot afford to continue to be bogged down in
    the Middle East. For the United States an economy of force
    strategy in the Middle East makes sense so that we can address
    American interests while minimizing the American investment
    there. This allows us to focus on other strategic threats and
    more immediate security risks to our own country.
        As our committee's State Department authorization process
    move forward I look forward to engaging on pressing issues for
    the Arms Export Control Act and AUMF reforms so that Congress
    is active in confronting the rapidly evolving security
    environment in the world.
        Mr. Roule, thank you for your testimony today. And I
    personally worry about an overly broad reading of the 2001 AUMF
    providing a blank check for virtually any war in the Middle
    East without Congress really having sometimes even knowledge,
    but certainly input in it. Failure to update the 2001 AUMF
    represents an abdication of congressional war powers.
        So as we confront really needed security challenges with
    Houthi proxies, for example, who are disrupting sea traffic and
    posing a threat not just in the oceans to our navy and others,
    what is the actual underlying authorization today?
        Mr. Roule. Congressman, it is a complicated question. And I
    am going to evade some of that because I am not an expert, but
    I will say this: Congress needs to start now, as Ms. Stroul
    stated, with a process to understand what role should be played
    to develop specific authorities. Because the Quds Force needs
    to be taken apart in the region because a nuclear deal that
    simply provides funding for the Quds Force to reestablish its
    proxy network to the region just repeats this entire system of
    violence. And we will face the same situation over and over
    again.
        So we really do need to understand the prospect of military
    actions against Iran and its personnel and its architecture at
    present. And Congress needs to play its role in that.
        Mr. Davidson. Yes, thank you for that. That is exactly what
    I have tried to do for a long time. Since I have been here,
    really since the summer of 2016, updating the 2001 AUMF has
    been darn near impossible, frankly. For people like me that
    wanted to do it, we were blocked from even being on this
    committee, blocked from--anybody that really wanted reform
    couldn't get on the Committee of Jurisdiction. And then when
    you try to do it through appropriations, oh, you know, you are
    supposed to do it through the Committee of Jurisdiction. And
    now, even after the Afghan War has wound down, long after we
    have formally left Iraq, we still keep the 2001 AUMF.
        Does anyone believe that the Houthis or Hamas--let's just
    say Hamas--are they affiliates of Al Qaeda? I mean, that is the
    underlying situation. They are terrorists in that sense, but
    they are not coordinating--they share some similar enemies, but
    they are not really covered by the 2001 AUMF. So I think it is
    urgent that we update them. And I definitely appreciate you
    all's effort to call that out.
        But, Ms. Jungman, in your testimony you bemoaned the
    existence of cryptocurrency to some extent saying that the
    pseudonym-ist nature of block chain transactions makes
    enforcement challenging. However, you admit that it only makes
    up about $8 billion in transaction.
        I am the chairman of National Security and Illicit Finance.
    We just had a hearing earlier today where people trying to
    trace the money actually like cryptocurrency because it is on a
    public block chain. So it is easier to follow the money. It
    still presents challenges for on and off ramps, but when it is
    on a block chain, it is easier to detect.
        So what proportion of Iran's illicit finance is really
    crypto versus conventional finance?
        Ms. Jungman. In the grand scheme the 8 billion is not that
    significant when you look at 50 billion that was made in oil
    revenues last year or 135 billion in oil revenue that was made
    between 2021 and 2024. So I think that there needs to be
    stricter enforcement and oversight on the block chain and the
    crypto transactions, but it doesn't necessarily need to be----
        Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. My time is expired and I
    yield.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative
    Moskowitz from Florida for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        I want to thank Chairman Lawler and Chairman Mast for
    bringing this hearing. I have supported for months now giving
    the Iranians a period of time to end their nuclear program
    peacefully or that the United States should end it for them. I
    have worked with Chairman Lawler on that in the last Congress
    dealing with Iranian oil. And in this Congress Senator Lindsey
    Graham and I filed a resolution to get a sense of Congress on
    just that issue.
        Iran is weaker now than they have been in a very long time,
    weaker in the region because of Israel's efforts against Hamas
    and Hezbollah, this administration's intervention on the
    Houthis. Now is the time. There is no question now is the time
    to try to bring this to a peaceful solution, right? And that is
    really up to the Iranians to choose what path they want to go.
        But I also have to recognize that we are in the third month
    of the administration. And for 3 months now the administration
    has treated Canada and Greenland and Europe and Ukraine and PBS
    and NPR and the Associated Press worse than they have talked
    and treated Iran. I mean, 3 months in they have just noticed
    all of a sudden that perhaps we should turn our attention to
    Iran instead of these distractions of, oh, we are going to get
    Gaza, or Canada is going to be the 51st State, or oh,
    Greenland.
        I mean, this is the opportunity. And it is an opportunity,
    quite frankly, for the administration that has been very
    partisan over the last 3 months to do something on a bipartisan
    basis.
        But I am also deeply worried about the Vice President. If
    we look at the text messages on Signal for Signalgate, the Vice
    President seems to be against striking the Houthis. Well, if he
    is against striking the Houthis, then I mean where is he going
    to be on striking Iran if they don't choose a peaceful
    solution? Obviously he is the Vice President. The President
    makes the final decision, but if you look at that conversation,
    a deputy chief of staff had to weigh in from the White House
    putting the Vice President in his place saying the President
    was clear on his direction.
        So let me ask a question. Based on what you have seen, we
    have all seen publicly in that Signal chat, this isolationist
    trend that is going on in some circles of the Republican
    Party--Ms. Jungman, are you concerned that we may miss an
    opportunity to really curtail Iran's nuclear program? Because
    again, if you look at what the Vice President was saying with
    the Houthis, right, he clearly did not want to do the strike
    that the President had ordered.
        Ms. Jungman. Thank you for that question. I think it is
    important to look at the efforts that the administration has
    done over the last 3 months which includes designations on
    Iran, its ghost fleet, and a refinery in China.
        Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, but those are meaningless. The Biden
    Administration--I was critical of the Biden Administration of
    these designations and non-enforcement of certain things. I
    mean, I was very critical when the Biden Administration did not
    enforce the bill that Mike Lawler and I passed dealing with
    Iranian oil.
        We can sign executive orders for maximum pressure, but
    really--this President is not shy. I mean, he is not shy. He
    tells us how he feels at all times. OK. And so just last week
    all of a sudden we turned our attention to Iran, which I am
    happy about. Better late than never.
        But there is something going on in this administration that
    should all wake up to, that there is a wing led by the Vice
    President that didn't want to strike the Houthis and probably
    doesn't want to curtail Iran's nuclear program. How are you
    going to deal with that?
        Ms. Jungman. I don't see that from Treasury right now. I do
    think that there are efforts being made and I think looking at
    the questions we have received there is an--there is bipartisan
    consensus to go after Iran. And the Vice President alone----
        Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, and look, we have to be clear, right?
    Because Democrats have made this mistake. When you draw a red
    line and then you don't do it, we see problems. That is what
    happened in Syria under the Obama administration. So President
    Trump has drawn a red line. He has said either we are going to
    end it peacefully, which I hope we do--we want--we all want
    that--or the United States is going to end it. That has been
    said now. And that is what we have to hold the President to. I
    yield back.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Issa of
    California for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you. I am going to pick up where my
    colleague just left off. Better late than never? Has it been 75
    days or is it 72? I wouldn't call this late, with all due
    respect. But let's contrast it with the previous 4 years.
        What was the economic position of Iran on the day that
    President Trump left office?
        Ms. Jungman. They were a lot weaker than they are today.
        Mr. Issa. Were they shipping a couple hundred thousand
    barrels a day, not a million-and-a-half barrels a day?
        Ms. Jungman. That is correct.
        Mr. Issa. So during the 4-years of the Biden Administration
    perhaps in plain sight while other things were being discussed:
    JCPOA, Iran's nuclear and so on, they went up by more than a
    million barrels a day times $75, right?
        Ms. Jungman.
        [Nonverbal response.]
        Mr. Issa. Most of it was sold to China, correct?
        Ms. Jungman.
        [Nonverbal response.]
        Mr. Issa. So the last administration allowed China to
    enrich Iran. During those 4 years is it accurate to say that
    that money, a great deal of it ended up in the hands of Hamas,
    the Houthis, and Hezbollah?
        Ms. Jungman. That is correct.
        Mr. Issa. OK. So I want to go to the go forward. And I know
    my colleague has left, but 72 days is the beginning of an
    administration. Over the next 3 years if maximum pressure
    includes taking ghost ships off the high seas, do you believe
    it is possible to reverse that 1 million or a 1.2 million of
    additional oil and bring Iran economically back to where they
    were 4 years ago?
        Ms. Jungman. I do, but I don't think taking the ghost fleet
    off alone will do that.
        Mr. Issa. I am including that because most of that million
    barrels plus is shipped through ghost ships, correct?
        Ms. Jungman. Correct. Yes.
        Mr. Issa. Okay. So as part of a maximum effort, recognizing
    that Israel may strike in its own best interest between now and
    the end of October when nuclear legitimacy, according to the
    last administration goes forward--as part of a package economic
    sanctions as we know are not working because people are
    cheating on them. The No. 1 cheater is China. As the President
    uses his pressure with China and tariffs should he include
    reducing the purchases of clandestine oil from China and Russia
    as part of a deal with China? Would that be helpful?
    Additionally, the same thing goes for our European allies who
    either directly or indirectly buy that sanctioned oil.
        Ms. Jungman. Absolutely. I think that is a great place to
    start and hopefully would have an impact.
        Mr. Issa. Now just before I spoke we heard about the so-
    called reluctance of the Vice President to strike the Houthis.
    In fact, isn't that one of more major proactive strikes that
    has occurred in the last several years?
        Ms. Jungman. Correct.
        Mr. Issa. That particular strike as I understand it was an
    offensive strike to take out capability, not simply a
    retaliatory for a place from which they were fired?
        Ms. Jungman. I am going to defer to Mr. Roule on that, but
    he has got more expertise in that area.
        Mr. Roule. They are the most significant strikes we have
    conducted against the Houthis. They are not only taking out--
    degrading the Houthi weapons capability, but taking out Houthi
    leadership and they are starting to impact on the Houthi
    leadership decisionmaking structure itself.
        Mr. Issa. So Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, the three
    most powerful arms of the--of Iran, in addition to the oil that
    gives them money--if those activities continue at the pace they
    have been going over the last--some of it more than 75 days
    because of Israel's efforts with Hamas and Hezbollah. But if
    those three tentacles of Iran are taken out over the next 3
    years, if the clandestine oil is reduced to let's just say
    the--about where it was 4 years earlier, do you believe we can
    avoid all-out war with Iran, but bring Iran back to a situation
    in which they must deal or be unable to function because of
    economic disaster?
        Mr. Roule. If we could also ensure that the Quds Force does
    not have a logistics line into the region, we could avoid a war
    based on activities such as Hamas and Houthi actions----
        Mr. Issa. Right.
        Mr. Roule [continuing]. in the Red Sea. There will be some
    who will say that Iran could be encouraged to build a nuclear
    weapon if it thinks it can get away with it and we won't
    attack. So the President would also have to say if we see you
    building a nuclear weapon, we are going to have to use another
    direction.
        Mr. Issa. And I will just close with one statement: Many
    people have talked about the nuclear capability, but is it fair
    to say that the ability to build a nuke only allows you to blow
    yourself up if you don't have the ability to launch it? And
    isn't that part of the administration's responsibility, along
    with allies--is to make sure that they do not have the ability
    to launch a nuclear weapon?
        Ms. Kim. The gentleman's time is up. And the witnesses may
    respond in writing if you would choose to do so. Is that Okay?
        Mr. Issa. Thank you.
        Ms. Kim. Yes. Let me now recognize Mr. Olzewski of Maryland
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Olzewski. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        And thank you to our witnesses for your time and your
    testimony today. I will just open by saying how much I firmly
    believe with a lot of what was said and how important it is for
    the U.S. to use all of the tools at our disposal to dismantle
    Iran's support for regional terrorism and its nuclear ambition.
    So thank you for your comments on that.
        We know that a strong Iranian sanctions regime, which I
    support and this administration has imposed, is critical to
    limit the revenue that Iran uses to fund its military and
    terror proxies in the region.
        However, we cannot forget about the other national security
    tools at our disposal including both diplomacy and development
    and that the U.S. has to comprehensively counter the regime's
    malign activities and hold them accountable for human rights
    violations. The use of force should be an option, but it should
    also be our last resort option. Again, we need a comprehensive
    tool box to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-equipped and to
    address the root causes of these abuses.
        I support a zero tolerance approach for attacks by Iran's
    proxies on the United States and our interests, but again I
    also believe that any U.S. action must also be taken in
    accordance with the law and in ways that protects classified
    information and civilians overseas.
        It is also worth noting and reiterating that this
    administration's gutting of foreign assistance programs will
    only weaken that response. There was a program implemented by a
    non-profit back in my home State of Maryland that supported
    religious and minorities in Northern Iraq in part not to join
    Iran-backed militias. This project supported thousands of young
    Yazidis and Christians in a youth employment project to provide
    financial incentives not to join these armed groups. In its
    absence we risk migration and radicalization including to these
    Iran-backed proxy groups.
        We know this program unfortunately is not a one-off.
    Programs to strengthen local capacity and support ethnic and
    religious minorities in Yemen, Gaza, and Lebanon where Iran-
    backed militias continue to hold military and political
    influence were cut. Iranian media even praised the pause
    because it would halt U.S. support for pro-democracy activists
    in the country. Other media compared it to a cold shower for
    the regime's opponents and joked that the U.S. was ``abandoning
    its allies like disposable tissues,'' quote, unquote.
        Ms. Stroul, can you talk about how these soft-power
    programs like those administered by USAID and the State
    Department play an important role in America's response to
    Iran's activities around the world? How will Iran and their
    proxies be emboldened by these cuts?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question. When we
    think about all of the different areas where Iran's threat
    network has been degraded: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, to some extent
    Iraq, right now Yemen, what we need to think about is the other
    side of combat operations.
        And that is not just humanitarian aid. It is stabilization,
    reconstruction. Societies and communities need to have
    something on the other side in order to buildup their
    resilience to resist what the Iranians are going to do, which
    is try to rebuild their illicit networks for arming, funding,
    training both fighters--and then weapon shipments, drug
    shipments, et cetera. So we have to give those communities
    resources to buildup their resilience and we have to give the
    emerging leaders of these nascent governments the opportunity
    to deliver for their people. And there I am specifically
    talking about Lebanon and Syria.
        So the pause and dismantling of USAID is not just about the
    humanitarian aid being taken off the table. It is the non-
    humanitarian aid, the stabilization assistance. And then it is
    the decades of U.S. investment in developing our technical
    expertise, our national security practitioners, our development
    and technical assistance providers who understand that
    reconstruction and stabilization on the other side of conflict
    is inherently a political task, not a military task.
        Mr. Olzewski. Thank you so much for that response. And I
    will just close without an additional question recognizing that
    my time is winding down, but just reiterate what my colleague
    Representative Keating honed in earlier and just advancing my
    concern, Madam Chair, about the reckless use of platforms that
    are not secure and in the sharing of very sensitive data. It is
    not a way to conduct military operations, nor diplomatic
    operations, nor to impose sanctions. And so I am deeply
    concerned about the actions of some of our most highest ranking
    officials and the fact that there has been no accountability.
    And with that, I will yield back. Thank you.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Mr. Baird from
    Indiana for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Baird. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank our witnesses for being here today. The expertise
    you share with us is very beneficial and very helpful. But I am
    going to touch on a couple or three other areas that are of
    interest to me, the first one being what role do you think that
    the Western technology is playing in sustaining Iran, and by
    extension Russia's ability to produce lethal weapons like the
    Shahad 136 drone?
        Mr. Roule. We have seen Iran use dual-use technology that
    is obtained from Europe, even the United States, through
    sanctions-busting architecture to import this within in its
    drone system and to--well, even use this within drones that it
    has sent to Russia for use against Ukraine. This is something
    that the U.S. law enforcement has worked against successfully
    in some cases for years. Iran has a robust sanctions-busting
    program in this regard and Iran will continue to use this
    system to acquire technology that it can't produce at home.
        Mr. Baird. Ms. Jungman?
        Ms. Jungman. I am going to tackle this from a little bit of
    a different angle, and I think it is an area that hasn't had a
    lot of attention. But we have talked a lot today about the dark
    fleet and the ghost fleet. There is Western technology that is
    used on these vessels. Every ship essentially has some Western
    component on it. That is an area that could be looked at
    closer.
        Mr. Baird. Ms. Stroul?
        Ms. Stroul. I would associate myself specifically with Mr.
    Roule. The threat is the dual-use technology. So part of this
    is about sanctions and shining a light and exposure. It is also
    about education initiatives with the commercial sector so they
    understand the risk of both the legitimate uses of some of this
    technology and then the illegitimate and illicit ways in which
    a regime like Iran might use it.
        Mr. Baird. The next part of that is what steps can be taken
    to prevent Iran from procuring that critical technology?
        And, Ms. Jungman, you kind of started on that conversation,
    so please State.
        Ms. Jungman. Sure. I think as I have previously mentioned,
    there are still a number of Western entities that are involved
    in the maritime industry and these vessels such as the
    classification societies, the flag states, and the insurance
    companies. It is not enough to just designate the vessels
    themselves. The vessel will move to a new owner, a new company
    and so on. So there needs to be a more comprehensive approach
    to targeting these vessels and their associated networks.
        Mr. Baird. Mr. Roule?
        Mr. Roule. We need to ensure that law enforcement partners
    in Europe and Asia working closely with the United States and
    our Gulf partners to identify import actors in Iran who are
    attempting to bring in dual-use technology for Iran's military
    and security services.
        Mr. Baird. Thank you. Ms. Stroul?
        Ms. Stroul. I have nothing to add. I think my colleagues
    did a great job answering the question.
        Mr. Baird. That is a good answer.
        One other area: Do you believe that the United States and
    its allies are focused enough on preventing the rebuilding of
    the Iranian proxy groups, and what more could we do if that is
    true? Mr. Roule?
        Mr. Roule. If there is a nuclear deal that provides Iran
    with sanctions relief that allows the Quds Force to rebuild
    Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis over time, we recreate the
    very world we have worked so hard to dismantle today. It is
    critical that any new nuclear deal simply does not allow the
    Quds Force to do this. And this therefore becomes a problem.
        Do we come up with an approach? Does the international
    community compel Iran to in essence change the nature of the
    Quds Force, to turn it into a counterterrorism element, which
    is something every country should have, and not an element that
    has the job of creating militias and terrorists. Until Iran
    does this it is a terrorist nation.
        Mr. Baird. Thank you. And I see I only got 26 seconds left,
    and so I am sorry to the other two, but I yield back.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize Representative Schneider of Illinois
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Again I want to the witnesses for joining us here.
        So I keep this next to my desk. It is the JCPOA from 10
    years ago. It is tabbed and marked and highlighted. Ten years
    ago I studied it closely because so much was at stake. Iran was
    on the precipice of a nuclear weapon and the world came
    together. And at that time, as we all recall, it was the E3+3,
    it was the P5+1, whatever you called it. But it United States,
    our European allies, U.K., France and Germany, and China and
    Russia.
        As you discussed earlier, what was available to us then is
    not available to us now. And I had issues with the JCPOA a
    decade ago because while it may have temporary-temporarily
    blocked Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon, it didn't
    permanently close them. It left it to where we are today.
        And we meet today. I really believe there is a crossroad,
    as you have touched on. Over the past year we have seen Iran's
    strategic position almost turn 180 degrees. Its proxies are
    diminished. Its air defenses are weakened. At the same time,
    again as was mentioned, Iran's breakout time is almost to the
    goal line. It is measured in weeks, maybe even days.
        We all know a nuclear-armed Iran would transform the
    strategic map of the Middle East once again. It would not only
    endanger our allies including Israel; it would trigger in all
    likelihood a regional arms race. It would embolden the
    terrorist proxies and it would undercut the global
    nonproliferation regime.
        Now we know this moment didn't come out of nowhere. Iran
    has been working on a nuclear weapon for more than a
    generation. We can talk about the decision to invade Iraq and
    then empower Iran. We can talk about the JCPOA, which was a
    problem. I think at the end of the day the decision to pull out
    of the JCPOA without a strategy of how to move forward and make
    sure that Iran couldn't get closer to a weapon left us at the
    point we are in today: Iran literally at the goal line. And
    that is the challenge we have.
        Now, part of the problem I think in pulling out of the
    JCPOA was there wasn't a plan, that it was more about the
    headlines than about making actual progress. It was not very
    serious. And this has been a challenge that I have seen with
    the administration, first term of the Trump Administration, and
    today with the return of the administration perhaps even
    greater.
        The dismantling of USAID, the freezing of aid to camps like
    Al-Hol where Isis remnants remain active, the whiplash of
    threats followed by back-channel talks with Hamas, all of it
    suggests a governing style that is far more impulsive,
    theatrical, and dangerously un-tethered from strategy. I wish
    we could trust that this renewed maximum pressure approach
    being discussed was grounded in facts, deliberation, and
    interagency coordination. I wish I believed that President
    Trump had read the briefings, sought our dissenting views, or
    agonized over the details of a strike plan, but I don't have
    that confidence and I am very concerned about where we are
    right now.
        Serious policy means aligning sanctions, intelligence, and
    diplomacy. It means working with allies to close loopholes, not
    just naming problems, but resourcing, developing solutions. It
    means being honest about what air strikes can and cannot
    accomplish and about what it takes to truly dismantle Iran's
    nuclear weapons program.
        We know this challenge won't get easier with time, as has
    been discussed earlier. Iran's nuclear program isn't just a
    bargaining chip; it is a shield from behind which Tehran wages
    war through proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
    And that is why I was proud last Congress to join with then
    Chairman McCaul to introduce H. Res. 559 declaring it the
    policy of the United States that a nuclear Islamic Republic of
    Iran is not acceptable under any circumstances.
        So with that, let me turn to you, Ms. Stroul. You have
    spoken previously about the need for regional architecture. Can
    you speak our seriously you think our Gulf partners view the
    risk of a nuclear Iran and whether they believe the U.S. is
    still--or U.S. does have at all a coherent plan to stop it?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question,
    Congressman. Many of our Gulf partners are hedging because they
    are uncertain as to what U.S. commitments are and whether or
    not U.S. commitments to the region and to their defense will be
    enduring. So almost every U.S. partner in the Gulf has pursued
    their own rapprochement with the Iranian regime, exchanging
    Ambassadors, maintaining economic relations, as well as very
    consistent diplomatic engagement back and forth.
        We are using some of these channels for the passing of
    messages, but the bottom line is if there is going to be
    military strikes used against Iran, we are going to need the
    support of our partnership the Gulf, we are going to need
    flexibility with the bases we have where U.S. forces are
    present, and we are--and if we are going to achieve a
    negotiated settlement, Iran is going to need to hear from our
    partners in the Middle East that they are as serious about
    getting to a negotiated settlement that blocks all Iranian
    pathways to a nuclear weapon as Washington is. And those are
    some of the I think security commitments both to their self-
    defense and to our long-term commitment in developing this
    regional architecture that could benefit from clarification at
    this moment in time.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I have gone over time.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.
        Mr. Schneider. I appreciate the extension. I yield back.
        Ms. Kim. Of course. I know recognize Mr. Kean,
    Representative Kean from New Jersey for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Kean. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you to our
    witnesses for being here today.
        Mr. Roule, what type of support is Russia providing Iran's
    nuclear program and what role is Russian State owned energy
    giant Rosatom playing and supporting Iran's nuclear ambitions?
        Mr. Roule. Russia's role in the joint comprehensive plan of
    action was limited to support for the Bushehr civilian nuclear
    power plant on Iran's southwest coast. The development of that
    plant, there were discussions on the--perhaps building of other
    nuclear power plants in country and part of the deal under
    JCPOA was that, in essence, Iran would send spent nuclear fuel
    in Russia in exchange for fresh nuclear fuel. Now that, of
    course, stopped when Iran ceased to do this.
        I think the most important question is whether Russia is
    providing Iran with capabilities to allow it to move closer to
    a nuclear weapon? Now there is no public information of which I
    am aware that that is occurring. And it is also a fact,
    however, that Russia does have a presence in country through
    Bushehr and that were we to have a multi-lateral negotiation
    with Iran on its nuclear program, Russia would be a prominent
    part because of that element. China, as well, because of
    China's role with the Iraq power plant, its former plutonium
    plant which is due to come online in 2026.
        Mr. Kean. And what types of support is Russia currently
    providing Iran's proxies? And what does Russia hope to gain
    from its outreach to the Houthis and what might trigger the
    Kremlin to step this support up or decrease it?
        Mr. Roule. There have been reports that Russia has
    attempted to provide weapons to the Houthis and that diplomatic
    pressure from regional actors have prevented this and Russia
    may have told these actors that the purpose of this support was
    to complicate the lives of western powers who were supporting
    Ukraine. There has also been some reporting of Russian weaponry
    that has found its way to Hezbollah, although the evidence of
    Russia's direct engagement with Hezbollah is more tenuous and
    Russia has, of course, provided intelligence engagements with
    its counterparts in Iran on how to defeat western intelligence.
        Mr. Kean. So in your view what, therefore, does the Iranian
    regime hope to gain from its increasingly cozy relationship
    with the Kremlin and what threats does that pose to U.S.
    national security priorities?
        Mr. Roule. Although Russia is a sometimes competitor with
    Iran, it is a malign actor. It has blocked all pressure on Iran
    at the United Nations. So for example, regarding Yemen, Russia
    has made sure that there has been no significant investigation
    of Iran's support for the Houthis at the United Nations for
    many years. So Russia's support for Iran is significant. It is
    malign. It is pervasive. And it impacts global economy.
        Mr. Kean. Are there points of friction within that
    bilateral relationship that the U.S. could effectively exploit?
        Mr. Roule. I am not aware of any, but Dana, do you have
    anything you would like to add on that?
        Ms. Stroul. I think the bottom line here is that Russia and
    Iran share the objective of challenging the United States, our
    influence, and our investment in the current global and
    international order. And that strategic convergence is stronger
    than any wedge we might want to draw between the two.
        Mr. Kean. Thank you, all, for your testimony here today and
    I yield back.
        Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Amo from
    Rhode Island for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Amo. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our
    witnesses for being here. I know it has been a little while
    that you have been sitting there.
        Ms. Stroul, good to see you again. The last time we were
    here was last April and I discussed with you the growing
    cooperation between Ayatollah Khomeini and Vladimir Putin. And
    back then, we saw Iran transfer drones to Russia. The same
    Iranian drones which were turned on Israel were used by Putin
    to attack Ukraine. One year later, Putin's drones are still
    taking the lives of innocent civilians and the ties between
    Russia and Iran have grown stronger.
        Earlier this year, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year
    strategic partnership treaty with a military cooperation
    agreement. And the duo has expanded to include a third, Xi
    Jinping's China. In March, warships from all three countries
    conducted joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman, the
    strategic corridor for more than one quarter of the world's
    seaborne oil. That same week, China hosted Russia and Iranian
    diplomats to discuss Iran's nuclear program.
        So in the aftermath of Trump 1.0 and the withdrawal of
    commitments to contain Iran by leaving the JCPOA, Iran has
    continued in its acceleration of its development of its nuclear
    program. Now as we are in Trump 2.0, as President Trump
    continues our surrender on the global stage, as we have seen in
    the last 70 plus days, China is racing to fill that vacuum. Xi
    is strengthening Iran's hands, thanks to Trump's retreat.
        The annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence
    community released last month found that China, Russia, and
    Iran were three of the largest foreign threats to the United
    States.
        Ms. Stroul, what actions should President Trump continue
    from the Biden administration to deter this growing alliance
    and ensure that Russia and China do not continue to help Iran
    evade sanctions?
        Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question,
    Congressman. Good to see you as well.
        What we have seen since last year is continued coordination
    and strategic convergence across Russia, Iran, China, and
    sometimes North Korea. So it is diplomatic protection of Iran
    at the U.N. Security Council and across many international
    institutions. It is not just exchanging lessons learned on how
    to evade sanctions. It is also deeper economic cooperation,
    working on how to de-dollarize their economies, how to increase
    banking transactions between these different capitals to make
    themselves less exposed to U.S. sanctions. It is increasing
    exchanges in sophisticated defense technology. It is the
    military exercises, as you note, and then it is even trading
    and exchanging lessons learned on how to exert domestic control
    inside their countries, to suppress human rights and popular
    protests, not to mention nuclear cooperation.
        So all of this requires a whole of government approach from
    the administration. It is investing in our unmatched network of
    allies and partners in order to counter this access. It is
    restoring the elements of U.S. soft power, USAID investing in
    our diplomats in order to counter the diplomatic actions of
    these different malign actors. It is strengthening our foreign
    military sales processes, our own military exercises, our own
    defense and security cooperation in order to counter that, and
    also making sure that we continue to have the most professional
    U.S. military in the world because partners and allies should
    want to do military exercises with us, not with Russia or
    China.
        Mr. Kean. And Ms. Stroul, with my remaining time, what can
    we do or what changes can we make to disrupt the growing ties
    between a lot of those points that you just referenced on how
    we engage with our partners and our allies, but what can we do
    to disrupt the close ties between Iran, Russia, and China as
    this connection grows even stronger in their opposition to us?
        Ms. Stroul. We are going to have to disincentivize the
    interests of those leaders and in those capitals to deepen
    their coordination with each other, to make it less attractive
    to do that and for them to perceive that the consequences of
    that deeper coordination that run counter to U.S. interests
    will be more painful than pursuing this course. And again, it
    means demonstrated resolve to maintain U.S. military
    partnerships, to invest and provide security assurances, and
    support for the defense of our allies and partners so that they
    are working with us and not hedging toward this other access
    and it is fielding a strong diplomatic corps and a strong
    network of development professionals.
        Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Mills. [Presiding.] Thank you. At this time, I
    recognize I recognize myself. I am unfortunate that my
    colleague left with his JCPOA binder as that would have been
    very helpful. We have got a small chair in the back that is a
    little bit wobbly and that is about the only thing you could
    have put under it to actually stabilize it, since there is
    nothing to stabilize Iran.
        Ms. Stroul, you really love the quick fire, rapid fire
    stuff when it came to the Biden administration. I kind of want
    to follow suit here, if you will, and I want to make this
    quick. Did oil exportation increase under the Biden
    administration?
        Ms. Stroul. Sanctions enforcement is an area that could
    have been improved.
        Mr. Mills. Did it increase under the Biden administration?
    Yes or no?
        Ms. Stroul. Chinese purchase of discounted Iranian oil
    increased under the previous administration.
        Mr. Mills. Okay, did Biden delist the Houthi rebels?
        Ms. Stroul. Yes.
        Mr. Mills. Did that disrupt 12 percent of global trade
    through the Red Sea?
        Ms. Stroul. The delisting itself was not the cause of the
    disruption of the global trade.
        Mr. Mills. Did the increase in actual tax as a result of
    delisting the Houthis increase the amount of disruption of
    global trade through the Red Sea resulting in 12 percent of
    global trade being disrupted?
        Ms. Stroul. Iranian provision of support to the Houthis is
    part of the----
        Mr. Mills. Did the unfreezing of assets and the increase of
    oil trade give more money to Iran to be able to fund proxy
    militias?
        Ms. Stroul. I can't speak to the exact fungibility of the--
    --
        Mr. Mills. I actually thought that was your job. Did the
    currency of the Iran--the rial go up in value versus the dollar
    during the time the Biden administration was in place?
        Ms. Stroul. My colleague would be better positioned on
    that.
        Mr. Mills. I will allow you to answer.
        Ms. Stroul. Yes.
        Mr. Mills. Yes, it did because under max pressure it is at
    about a million rials to the dollar, something we haven't seen
    in a long time.
        So I noticed that you had a lot of really quick, rapid
    fired things in the previous administration, but not a whole
    lot when it came to the increase in maximum pressure that
    actually resulted in the Iranian regime reducing the amount of
    attacks that it has right now.
        Wasn't it the Biden administration that actually requested
    the IDF and Israel to launch themselves into a cease-fire for
    negotiations?
        Ms. Stroul. I can't speak to the specifics of that. What I
    know----
        Mr. Mills. Well, the answer is yes. And had they done that,
    we wouldn't have eliminated Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah. We
    would not have eliminated Sinwar. We would not have eliminated
    many of the actual terrorist organization leads that has
    basically been put in place and enforced to grow stronger as a
    result of the weakness that the administration have shown.
        Look at what we have today. We talk all the time about how
    Russia, we are so weak on Russia, but was it not the Trump
    administration actually removed us from the failed INF treaty,
    something that no other administration was willing to do
    before? Was it not the JCPOA that both General Secretary Ban
    Ki-moon and Guterres said had been violated when Iran was still
    shipping mid-range ballistic missiles to the Houthis when they
    were launching against Saudi Aramco?
        This is preposterous to even assume that the Biden
    administration had done anything to prevent the enrichment of
    nuclear that the JCPOA or Jake Sullivan or any of the others
    had done anything that would weakened the regime.
        I want to be very clear. There is a difference and I think
    it is important to always point out the differentiation of
    this. There is a difference in the regime and the Iranian
    people. The Iranian people want a free Iran. I can tell you
    that those who are bravely protesting in the streets, those who
    are continuing to try and risk their lives every single day
    like Mahsa Amini did to say enough is enough shouldn't be
    lumped in so when our colleagues very recklessly just says
    Iran, I think that that is a very big misnomenclature and I
    want to correct that for the record.
        I want to go into sanction enforcements. Do you feel, Ms.
    Jungman, that sanctions were enforced under the Biden
    administration?
        Ms. Jungman. Not until late 2024.
        Mr. Mills. And do you feel that Iran is at a stronger or
    weaker position right now than they were previously?
        Ms. Jungman. As a result of the sanctions that have been
    rolled out over the last few months and at the end of 2024,
    they are weaker, but not as weak as they could have been if
    sanctions were fully enforced under the Biden administration.
        Mr. Mills. I completely agree. And what I notice from Iran
    is that not only are they concerned about this administration
    more so than the last, they have actually moved and relocated
    their surface-to-air missiles around Qom, around Natanz, around
    Isfahan because they know that unlike the Obama-Biden drawn red
    line that this administration has actually proven to take real
    enforcement.
        Do you think, Mr. Norman, that if we actually--not actually
    hurting or impacting or having a lot of collateral damage as
    you would if you hit cities like Tehran or others, but went
    after the nuclear facilities, that would send a direct message
    to the regime that we will not continue to play weak with them?
        Mr. Roule. It certainly would send a powerful message to
    the regime that we would not play weak with them, sir.
        Mr. Mills. And I think that that is really what this
    administration has proven, both in the first administration and
    now is that we are not going to continue to play weak with our
    adversaries. The China, Russia, Iran, North Korea geopolitical
    alignment has grown stronger in the previous regime and as
    President Trump and this administration is continuing to try
    and make the necessary steps to enforce sanctions to guarantee
    that we re-list the Houthis, to stop the sea of navigation from
    being disrupted and to actually for once and for all actually
    see that the Iranian people have support from the United
    States, overthrow a regime that has been a dictatorship,
    tyrannical, and continue to do but only build and embolden
    themselves under the Biden administration.
        With that, I will now recognize if it pops up here and I am
    not sure they are updating it. There we go, we will recognize
    the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Dean.
        Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bear with me, and let's
    restart the clock, please.
        Mr. Mills. Restarted the clock.
        Ms. Dean. Thank you very much. I thank Chairman Mast and
    Ranking Member Meeks for holding this hearing and I thank all
    of you, your expertise, your passion, and your intellect around
    these issues. It is very valuable to us in these incredibly
    challenging times.
        Going back to the JCPOA, in 2015, the P5+1, the EU, and
    Iran agreed to the JCPOA choosing diplomacy over aggression to
    ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be peaceful,
    constrained. The JCPOA was an historic deal in ensuring
    verification and compliance and the IAEA had previously warned
    that its failure would be a loss for nuclear verification and
    multi-lateralism. Unfortunately, in 2018, even though the IAEA
    verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related
    commitments, President Trump, in my mind, recklessly withdrew
    the United States from the JCPOA and without a plan as my
    colleagues, Mr. Schneider, spoke about.
        Mr. Roule, I would like to go back to the very beginning of
    your testimony. It is stunning testimony that I think bears
    repeating. You said in page 1 and page 2 first the IAEA notes
    that Iran continues to expand its production of 60 percent
    enriched uranium. Is that correct?
        Mr. Roule. That is correct, ma'am.
        Ms. Dean. You say Iran appears capable of producing its
    first quantity of 90 percent enriched uranium. Can you speak to
    that? What leads us to know that?
        Mr. Roule. That is based on International Atomic Energy
    Agency's access to Iran's nuclear program at present which is
    limited, but it still takes place.
        Ms. Dean. And when you use the expression, as experts do,
    they would have the possibility of 90 percent enriched uranium
    sufficient for one nuclear weapon in about a week, what does
    about a week mean to a layman like me?
        Mr. Roule. Well, it means they have centrifuges which spin
    gas and basically produce highly enriched uranium that would
    then have to be converted into material for a warhead that
    could then be used as a weapon. This is the first stage of that
    process so this is before the warhead construction starts. So
    they don't have a weapon. They just have the material that
    would begin the process toward the weapon. So they don't have a
    bomb, but they have the fissile material that would then begin
    the process for a weapon.
        Ms. Dean. What stages were they at prior to President Trump
    removing the United States from JCPOA? What were the numbers
    then?
        Mr. Roule. They had a very, very tiny amount of enriched
    uranium at a level that was much, much reduced to this--it was
    below 5 percent. They had a very small number of centrifuges.
    But I should also say, ma'am, that when President Trump left
    JCPOA, they did not significantly increase their centrifuge
    production until, frankly, diplomatic talks began under the
    Biden administration. It wasn't because of the Biden
    administration itself. It was just because the Iranians just
    decided to expand their program even when diplomacy was
    offered.
        Ms. Dean. And then you said, let me see here, second, you
    said Iran continues to increase the number and sophistication
    of its centrifuge cascade. Can you speak to that a little bit?
        Mr. Roule. Yes. In essence, the centrifuges have--the more
    advanced the centrifuge is, the greater efficiency, the faster
    it can produce highly enriched uranium and what that means is
    the faster it can produce the fissile material for a weapon.
    And the faster it can produce something means the fewer number
    of centrifuges which means the footprint is smaller, it means
    the smaller the installations can be and easier you could hide
    it.
        So in essence, Iran's nuclear architecture right now
    appears to be designed to produce the highest enriched uranium
    in the fastest way possible and not the lowest enriched uranium
    in just an average speed possible. So it is not producing
    enriched uranium in a way that you would expect for a civilian
    nuclear program. It is also producing this enriched uranium in
    centrifuge cascades, in facilities that are deeply buried that
    look as if they are designed to survive a military attack. That
    is all very suspicious.
        Ms. Dean. Very suspicious. I see my time is up. Where does
    this leave our partners, our former partners in the JCPOA, if
    you could answer that?
        Mr. Roule. Well, Europeans have been attempting to revive
    negotiations for some time without success, in part because the
    Iranians themselves refuse to cooperate in negotiations as they
    refused to cooperate under the Biden administration, which is
    why then the Secretary of State in the Biden administration
    called the negotiations to an end.
        Ms. Dean. I thank you very much all of you. I am sorry I
    wasn't able to get to everybody. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you. At this time, we recognize our good
    friend from Texas, Mr. Self, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2015, President Obama
    flew a plane with $400 million in cash to the Ayatollah and
    released billions more. In 2021, President Biden rescinded
    President Trump's maximum pressure campaign, as we have heard.
    They went from like $4 billion, I think in reserves, to
    somewhere around $100 billion today, perhaps more.
        We have suffered through multiple inept leadership in terms
    of Iran and now we have a strong commander in chief who sees
    maximum pressure working. However, as an Article 1 branch of
    government, Congress must have jurisdiction over sanctions.
    Some say so over the sanctions for Iran and for any future
    administration. That is why I have reintroduced the Iran
    Sanctions Relief Review Act which passed the House last
    session, but my bill will give us a seat at the table and the
    American people a voice and view. We must strengthen Congress'
    hand to produce future generations from emergency existential
    threats to our Nation's survival and the Iranian nuclear weapon
    might do that. We have a duty to do that.
        So I want to start with you, Mr. Roule. What is the center
    of gravity of the Iranian nuclear program? Is it the warhead?
    Is it the guidance system? Is it the missile itself? Is it the
    facilities? Is it the potential for software from your years in
    the CIA? What is the center of gravity?
        Mr. Roule. It is a broad, federated program that exists in
    many locations across a broad geography. For many years, the
    center would have been the development of fissile material, but
    as we just discussed, that is produced at a number of locations
    at a very advanced rate at present, so understanding their
    number of centrifuges, their production rate of highly enriched
    uranium is the most important aspect of the program at present.
        Mr. Self. So you think they can quickly link the material
    with a guidance system with a missile because they never tested
    this, did they?
        Mr. Roule. No, sir. I didn't say that.
        Mr. Self. Okay.
        Mr. Roule. But it is unlikely they would be able to do
    quickly or efficiently in my view. They have not done that and
    in the time it would take for them to do that, it depends upon
    the amount of testing, how quickly and securely they would wish
    to do that. And the metallurgy to shape a warhead, and by the
    way, that is also saying they decide they wouldn't put it into
    a gravity bomb into an airplane or some other system to deliver
    it.
        Mr. Self. Or sneak it into a port somewhere.
        Mr. Roule. Or sneak it into a port, sir. But at this point,
    it is the creation of fissile material in the enrichment
    program.
        Mr. Self. Interesting. I would have said it would have been
    the building of an actual warhead on a missile.
        But anyway, Ms. Jungman, we know that the Ayatollah stopped
    the program, supposedly in early 2000. He is now, what 86, 87
    years old. Do you think that they may be doing something behind
    his back, seeing that his days are numbered? What are the
    chances that is happening that somebody surreptitiously is
    moving the nuclear program forward?
        Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately, that is not my area of
    expertise. I am going to defer to my colleagues.
        Mr. Self. Okay. Mr. Roule, I think you have been nominated.
        Mr. Roule. Minimal.
        Mr. Self. Minimal.
        Mr. Roule. Minimal. It is not how the country works. It is
    a very small circle of people and it is extremely unlikely
    something like that would happen without his knowledge.
        Mr. Self. Okay, very good. So regime change. I have heard
    that discussed here. I think that is a horrible concept because
    we haven't defeated a nation for decades now, but we do know
    that there have been several uprisings in Iran and they are put
    down brutally. So how in the world do we encourage the people
    of Iran to actually go through the pain to change the regime?
    Is that possible? Because we are assuming some external force,
    U.S. or somebody else, will have to make this happen because if
    we do have a successor to the Ayatollah standing in the wings,
    how do we encourage them to do this themselves?
        Mr. Roule. The people of Iran need to know that America
    stands with them, but we need to be very careful and cautious
    as to how we do this because people are risking their lives.
    They will pay a terrific price in the prisons of Iran, the
    hands of Iran's extraordinarily cruel security forces when they
    are punished. And we need to be very careful that we don't--we
    aren't too cavalier about how this is handled. It is up to the
    people of Iran to determine their future and as they do take
    steps to change that future, they need to know that we will
    support them and perhaps even provide safe haven if they need
    security if it is in such a situation. But we just need to be
    careful on how we move forward because if there is a situation
    where they are caught in the hands of Iran's security, they
    will be handled very roughly.
        Mr. Self. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you. At this time, we recognize the
    Representative of Delaware, Rep. McBride.
        Ms. McBride. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. Thank you very
    much to our witnesses for your perseverance with us today.
        Around the world, we are watching a clash unfold between
    democratic values and authoritarian oppression, from Europe to
    the Middle East, to this very continent. This is the story of
    our moment, democracy versus authoritarianism. Iran sits at the
    center of a growing alliance of authoritarianism, an access
    that includes not only hostile nation states like Russia and
    China, but also a network of terrorist organizations and armed
    militias across the Middle East. Iran props up groups like
    Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, using them as tools to
    destabilize democracies and challenge U.S. interests. This is a
    part of Iran's global strategy to withstand authoritarian
    influence and erode the norms of international law and human
    rights. And while we sit here warning of Iranian malign
    activities, President Trump's national security team has been
    carelessly handling classified and mission-sensitive
    information about the Houthis in open.
        The problem isn't just that they mistakenly added a
    reported to a text chain. The bigger problem is that these
    officials, some of the most surveilled people on the planet,
    were communicating in a way that allowed that mistake to even
    happen. How many Signal chats contained sensitive or classified
    material right now? How many have occurred over the last
    several months? Reporters may have not been able to see them,
    but Iran, Russia, and China very easily could.
        It is entirely possible that Iran or one of its partners
    was following along on the Signal chat that we know about and
    because of that, it is a miracle, it is a miracle that we are
    not mourning dead American troops right now. Had there been
    retaliation waiting in response because of that breach, that
    could have handed the Houthis and Iran a major victory. That is
    not just embarrassing, it was dangerous.
        As Hamas is weakened and Iran looks to recalibrate its
    strategy, we must ensure that Iran does not have additional
    proxies to fall back on. I am proud to co-lead the bipartisan,
    Bicameral Accountability For Terrorist Perpetrators of October
    7th Act introduced by my colleagues, Representatives Sherman
    and Lawler which would finally sanction the Popular Resistance
    Committees, a brutal terrorist organization in Gaza and an
    active participant in the horrific attacks in Israel on October
    7th. These terrorists have carried out attacks against
    Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians for decades and their
    deep ties to Hamas make them a credible candidate for Iran if
    they are looking to increase support for other proxies in the
    region.
        So Mr. Roule, my question for you is despite having been
    responsible for American civilians being murdered since 2003,
    the Popular Resistance Committees has never been sanctioned. As
    Iran's adjusted strategy in response to the weakening of its
    primary proxies, how should the U.S. Government and our allies
    monitor and preempt the rise of new or lesser known Iranian-
    backed groups that could fill the vacuum?
        Mr. Roule. Superb question. I go back to a previous
    statement. As long as the Quds Force exists as an organization
    created to sponsor militias and terrorists, we will see more
    and more of this. There are Quds Force training camps in Iran
    designed to train multi-national terrorists to, in essence, go
    out and become train the trainer individuals. Some of the best
    training Iran provides to the Houthis, to Hezbollah and others
    is provided within Iran itself. Until Iran is compelled to
    change the Quds Force itself, we are fated to deal with this
    issue.
        So I would encourage legislation that insists that our
    partners in Europe and the region can do what they can to
    constrain Iran's--from the Quds Force's activity. Until this
    happens, we are fated to watch this movie play again and again.
        Ms. McBride. Thank you. And quickly, Ms. Stroul, given
    Iran's strategy of using proxies, destabilized fragile
    democracies, and suppressed civil society from Lebanon to Iraq,
    how can the U.S. more effectively support democratic
    institutions and counteract the malign influence of these
    authoritarian-backed actors?
        Ms. Stroul. The ability of societies and communities to be
    resilient in the face of what the Iranians will try to do which
    is reconstitute their threat network is to empower our
    diplomats and our development assistance professionals. So that
    would particularly be the U.S. Agency for International
    Development and to allow our diplomats to do what they do best
    which is political and diplomatic engagement.
        Ms. McBride. Thank you, I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you, I would remind, just for
    clarification, Rep. McBride, that those sitting in the chair
    are chairman or chairwoman, there is no acting and so I would
    assume we know the difference between real and acting. And at
    this time, I will recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.
    Shreve.
        Mr. Shreve. Thank you, Mr.--gentleman in the chair. I
    appreciate the testimony from the witnesses. I know we have
    spent a long afternoon and I appreciate that.
        Ms. Jungman, nearly 3 hours ago, as we opened up, you
    discussed the establishment of a global maritime no dock list
    as a means of curtailing this shadow fleet. What might the U.S.
    do to encourage other countries to uphold this no dock list at
    their ports?
        Ms. Jungman. Thank you for bringing that up and thank you
    for the question. I think it is important to recognize again
    that there are western entities touching the vessels involved
    in this activity, whether that is the Classification Society,
    the flag State. The Classification Society, for example, have
    offices here in the U.S. or the flag states provide the flags
    to these vessels, we can essentially say none of their vessels
    would be able to sail to the U.S. For example, if that is
    Panama or Comoros or Cook Islands, if we said if you are going
    to flag these vessels, your vessels will not be able to come to
    the U.S. So I think there is a number of different ways that we
    can encourage them, but essentially the thought behind the no
    sail list or kind of monitored off a no-fly list is that the
    enforcement of sanctions can take time and having this list of
    vessels that are involved in this type of activity would send a
    warning and hopefully deter them from off-loading their oil at
    different areas.
        Mr. Shreve. So that deterrence would be second hand. They
    can't prescribe those vessels on the no dock list directly at
    foreign ports, but we could get to the bad actor states by
    prohibiting their docking into our ports? Is that a fair
    characterization?
        Ms. Jungman. Yes.
        Mr. Shreve. All right, well, thank you. Thank you, sir, I
    yield back.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. At this time, we recognize
    the gentlelady from South Carolina, Rep. Biggs.
        Ms. Biggs. Thank you, sir, and thank you to our witnesses
    for being here today.
        So the denuclearization of Iran remains a cornerstone of
    U.S. policy and it is critical to ensuring regional stability
    and global security given Iran's history of pursuing nuclear
    capabilities that threaten its neighbors and international
    communities. The Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal, the
    JCPOA, notably failed to achieve this goal as it allowed Iran
    to retain significant nuclear infrastructure and did not
    mandate the verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons
    program. Moreover, the Obama administration sought to obligate
    the United States to remove key sanctions on Iran, notably
    those with Section 1245 of Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, which
    enforced significant financial and oil restrictions. The Obama
    administration's agreement boiled down to a trade which simply
    stated temporary nuclear restriction in exchange for permanent
    sanctions relief.
        Yet, these efforts fell well short of the denuclearization
    standard mandated by the CIFADA, a bill signed into law by
    President Obama, which explicitly requires Iran to cease the
    pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear weapons and to
    dismantle its nuclear program as one of a number of conditions
    terminating significant U.S. sanctions. The law's mandate is
    clear and indisputable and Obama administration's agreement
    failed significantly short raising serious concerns about its
    effectiveness and security implications for the United States
    and for our allies.
        Only strict adherence to the law will ensure the permanent
    removal of nuclear threat from Iran.
        So my question is simple. To each of our witnesses, I just
    want to know does anyone disagree with this fundamental
    principle?
        And I will start with Mr. Roule.
        Mr. Roule. Sorry, ma'am, could you give it a question,
    please?
        Ms. Biggs. I just want to know if you disagree or agree
    with this fundamental principle.
        Mr. Roule. Of?
        Ms. Biggs. What I just stated about what the Obama--how we
    fell short and how it affects us now.
        Mr. Roule. You are correct, ma'am. The JCPOA provided a
    permanent sanctions relief and permanent relief of a number of
    restrictions in return for, in many cases, a temporary or
    finite restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and with a
    government of malign individuals who sponsored proxies, did a
    number of oppressive activities against their own people, and
    led us to the current State where we are today.
        And if I can just go a little farther, in essence, the
    problem with JCPOA is it has become an issue about us and when
    it should be an issue about Iran. OK? This was Iran's chance to
    turn a new chapter of history and it didn't. And it is Iran's
    fault, OK? And that is the issue here. So yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Biggs. Thank you.
        Ms. Jungman. I would agree with the comments made by Mr.
    Roule.
        Ms. Stroul. I would also agree and I think it is even more
    important that whatever deal is contemplated and negotiated,
    this has to be much stronger than the JCPOA, particularly
    because of the perilous advances in Iran's nuclear program
    today.
        Ms. Biggs. Absolutely. I believe that is why our past is so
    important to pay attention to as we move forward. And thank you
    to our witnesses. And I yield back my time.
        Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. I want to thank our witnesses
    for their valuable testimony and the members for their
    questions. Members of the committees may have some additional
    questions for the witnesses and we may ask you to respond to
    these in writing.
        Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to
    submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the
    record, subject to the length limitations.
        Without objection the committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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