[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
=======================================================================
(119-13)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 25, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-422 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking
Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
District of Columbia Arkansas,
Jerrold Nadler, New York Vice Chairman
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Daniel Webster, Florida
John Garamendi, California Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaott Perry, Pennsylvania
Andre Carson, Indiana Brian Babin, Texas
Dina Titus, Nevada David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Greg Stanton, Arizona Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Burgess Owens, Utah
Patrick Ryan, New York Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon Mike Collins, Georgia
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio, Mike Ezell, Mississippi
Vice Ranking Member Kevin Kiley, California
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Vince Fong, California
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Tony Wied, Wisconsin
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Tom Barrett, Michigan
Robert Garcia, California Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska
Nellie Pou, New Jersey Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.,
Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan Pennsylvania
Laura Friedman, California Jeff Hurd, Colorado
Laura Gillen, New York Jefferson Shreve, Indiana
Shomari Figures, Alabama Addison P. McDowell, North
Carolina
David J. Taylor, Ohio
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
Northern Mariana Islands
Mike Kennedy, Utah
Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri
Vacancy
------ 7
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
Emergency Management
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania,
Chairman
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Ranking
Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Mike Ezell, Mississippi
District of Columbia Kevin Kiley, California
Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan Tom Barrett, Michigan
Shomari Figures, Alabama Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.,
John Garamendi, California Pennsylvania
Dina Titus, Nevada Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
Laura Friedman, California, Northern Mariana Islands
Vice Ranking Member Mike Kennedy, Utah
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri,
Vice Chairman
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management, opening statement.................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,
opening statement.............................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
WITNESSES
Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, oral statement............... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida Division of Emergency
Management, oral statement..................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania County, North
Carolina, oral statement....................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas, on behalf of
the National Association of Counties, oral statement........... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish,
Louisiana, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell......... 45
APPENDIX
Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon.
Kristen McDonald Rivet......................................... 65
March 21, 2025
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Reforming FEMA:
Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management''
_______________________________________________________________________
I. PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, March 25, 2025, at 10:00
a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive
testimony at a hearing entitled, ``Reforming FEMA: Bringing
Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' The
hearing will broadly examine the current state of emergency
management, including ways to reform the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and Federal disaster assistance. At
this hearing, Members will receive testimony from stakeholders
and experts in emergency management and disasters.
II. BACKGROUND
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR DISASTERS
FEMA is the Federal Government's lead agency for preparing
for, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from
disasters and emergencies related to all hazards--whether
natural or man-made.\1\ FEMA's primary authority in carrying
out these functions stems from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) (P.L. 100-
707, as amended).\2\ The Stafford Act authorizes three types of
declarations: (1) major disaster declarations; (2) emergency
declarations; and (3) fire management grant (FMAG)
declarations.\3\ The Stafford Act authorizes the President to
approve states' requests for a Federal disaster declaration
when ``the situation is of such severity and magnitude that
effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and
affected local governments.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dep't of Homeland Security, FEMA, (Feb. 3, 2023), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/employee-resources/federal-emergency-management-
agency-fema.
\2\ Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707.
\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
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PRESIDENTIALLY DECLARED MAJOR DISASTER
When state and local resources are overwhelmed and the
``disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective
response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the
affected local governments,'' \5\ the Governor of the affected
state may request the President declare a major disaster.\6\
FEMA's primary Stafford Act programs for disaster recovery in
the aftermath of a major disaster are in the Public Assistance
(PA) Program and the Individual Assistance (IA) Program.\7\
Following a major disaster declaration, FEMA also provides
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ FEMA, A Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process and Federal
Disaster Assistance 1, available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/rebuild/
recover/dec_proc.pdf.
\6\ Id.
\7\ Id.
\8\ Id.
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The PA Program, authorized primarily by Sections 403, 406,
and 428 of the Stafford Act, reimburses state, tribal, and
territorial governments, as well as certain private non-profits
for rebuilding damaged buildings and infrastructure.\9\ The
Federal cost-share for PA is 75 percent, but may be increased
by the President.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See FEMA, Assistance for Governments and Private Non-Profits
After a Disaster, (Feb. 23, 2023), available at https://www.fema.gov/
assistance/public.
\10\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IA Program is authorized primarily by Section 408 of
the Stafford Act. The IA program includes the Individuals and
Households Program (IHP), Mass Care and Emergency Assistance,
the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance, Disaster Legal Services, and Disaster
Case Management. IHP is the primary FEMA program used to assist
disaster survivors; it includes housing assistance and other
needs assistance. Housing assistance includes money for repair,
rental assistance, or ``direct assistance,'' such as the
provision of temporary housing.\11\ The current limits for IHP
assistance is $42,500 for housing assistance and $42,500 for
other needs assistance.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ FEMA, Individuals and Households Program, (Feb. 3, 2023),
available at https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/program.
\12\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5174.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes HMGP, which is
based on a percentage of PA funding, to provide grants to
state, tribal, and territorial governments for mitigation
projects that: (1) are cost effective and (2) reduce the risk
of future damage, hardship, and loss from natural hazards.\13\
The purpose of this grant program is to fund practical
mitigation measures that effectively reduce the risk of loss of
life and property from future disasters. State, tribal, and
territorial governments may use their HMGP funds to assist
families in reducing the risk to their homes from natural
disasters. The Federal cost share for HMGP is 75 percent and
the remaining 25 percent can come from a variety of sources
(i.e. a cash payment from the state or local government).\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (Dec. 27, 2022),
available at https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/hazard-mitigation.
\14\ Id.
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III. FEMA'S RESPONSE TO RECENT DISASTERS
HURRICANES HELENE AND MILTON
In 2024, FEMA provided assistance for 120 Presidentially
declared emergencies and major disasters including: five
hurricanes that made landfall, multiple unnamed severe storms,
wildfires, and an active tornado season that impacted many
states across the country.\15\ However, the most significant
disaster of 2024 was Hurricane Helene, which made landfall near
Perry, Florida on September 26, 2024, as a Category 4
hurricane.\16\ As Helene traveled across the Appalachian
Region, it resulted in catastrophic flooding, landslides, and
tornadoes. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina) received a major disaster
declaration associated with Helene.\17\ Alabama received an
emergency declaration.\18\ The destruction of Hurricane Helene
resulted in 219 storm-related deaths,\19\ including 106 in
North Carolina alone.\20\ That makes it the deadliest storm to
hit the mainland United States since Hurricane Katrina.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ FEMA, Declared Disasters, available at https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/declarations.
\16\ Kate Payne, Hurricane Helene Kills At Least 44 and Cuts A
Swath of Destruction Across the Southeast, AP News, (Sept. 27, 2024),
available at https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-helene-florida-
georgia-carolina-e5769b56dea81e40fae2161ad1b4e75d.
\17\ FEMA, Hurricane Helene, available at https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/current/hurricane-helene.
\18\ Id.
\19\ NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, U.S.
Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, available at https://
www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/events.
\20\ North Carolina Dep't of Health and Human Services, Hurricane
Helene Storm Related Fatalities, available at https://www.ncdhhs.gov/
assistance/hurricane-helene-recovery-resources/hurricane-helene-storm-
related-fatalities.
\21\ Ana Faguy & Brandon Drenon, Helene is Deadliest Mainland US
Hurricane Since Katrina, BBC, (Oct. 3, 2024), available at https://
www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1k70rnrp4xo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just two weeks later, Hurricane Milton formed in the Gulf
of Mexico and rapidly intensified to a Category 5
hurricane.\22\ By the time Milton made landfall near Siesta Key
on October 9, 2024, the storm had weakened to a Category 3
hurricane, but it brought a front of deadly tornadoes and storm
surges to Florida.\23\ This was the third hurricane in 13
months to impact Florida's Big Bend region.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Brad Brooks and Leonora LaPeter Anton, Hurricane Milton Leaves
At Least 10 Dead, Millions Without Power in Florida, Reuters, (Oct. 10,
2024), available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hurricane-milton-
weakens-it-marches-across-central-florida-homes-destroyed-2024-10-10/.
\23\ Id.
\24\ Chelsea Harvey, Third Hurricane in 13 Months Slams Florida's
Big Bend, E&E News by Politico, (Sept. 27, 2024), available at https://
www.eenews.net/articles/third-hurricane-in-13-months-slams-floridas-
big-bend/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to
Congress, FEMA has obligated $6.65 billion for Hurricane Helene
and $2.7 billion for Hurricane Milton.\25\ While 2020 holds the
all-time record for Presidentially declared emergencies and
major disasters due to declarations related to COVID-19, at
230, the size and severity of Stafford Act declarations in 2024
has drawn Congressional attention to FEMA's resource
constraints and response challenges.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ FEMA, February 2025 Disaster Relief Fund Report, (Feb. 12,
2025), available at https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_ocfo_feb-2025-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf [hereinafter
Disaster Relief Fund Report].
\26\ Adam B. Smith, 2023: A Historic Year of U.S. Billion-Dollar
Weather and Climate Disasters, NOAA, (Jan. 8, 2024), available at
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2023-historic-
year-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters; Letter from Sam
Graves, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure to Deanne
Criswell, Administrator, FEMA (Oct. 11, 2025) (on file with Comm.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOS ANGELES WILDFIRES
Starting on January 7, 2025, a series of 12 wildfires,
including the Palisades and Eaton fires, burned more than
40,000 acres across the greater Los Angeles area.\27\ The
wildfires burned for several weeks and were only 100 percent
contained on January 31, 2025.\28\ Twenty-nine people died as a
result of the wildfires, and more than 18,000 structures were
destroyed.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ CAL Fire, 2025 Incident Archive, available at https://
www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025.
\28\ Id.
\29\ Minyvonne Burke & Liz Kreutz, What We Know About the Victims
Killed in the California Wildfires, NBC News, (Feb. 12, 2025),
available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-wildfires-
what-we-know-victims-killed-rcna188240.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to
Congress, FEMA has obligated $1.27 billion for the Los Angeles
wildfires.\30\ The Los Angeles wildfires sparked a wider debate
about California's resource management, after reports began
circulating that water systems used to fight the Palisades and
Eaton fires could not maintain the continuous high water
pressures needed for fire hydrants at high elevations. In the
first days of the fires, firefighters were forced to overly
rely on water supplied by fire hydrants to suppress the
wildfires since hurricane force winds meant they could not use
planes and helicopters to drop water.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Disaster Relief Fund Report, supra note 25.
\31\ Karla Rendo, More Pacific Palisades Residents Join Lawsuit
Against LADWP, City Over Water Supply Failure, News4 Los Angeles, (Mar.
8, 2025), available at https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california-
wildfires/more-pacific-palisades-residents-join-lawsuit-against-ladwp-
city-over-water-supply-failure/3649420/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. HISTORICAL ISSUES AND REFORMS
FEMA was originally created by Executive Order to carry out
the President's authority in providing Federal disaster
assistance.\32\ FEMA was later merged into the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and its authorities dispersed
throughout the Department under the direction of the Secretary
of DHS.\33\ Following the poor response after Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, Congress enacted the Post Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006. PKEMRA re-established FEMA as a
distinct entity within DHS, designated the FEMA Administrator
as the President's advisor on Federal emergency management, and
authorized FEMA for the first time in statute.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Exec. Order No. 12127 (Apr. 1, 1979).
\33\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296.
\34\ Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
295.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since PKEMRA, Congress has enacted several other major
reforms to improve FEMA, including:
LIn 2013, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act (SRIA, P.L. 113-2) which included reforms to
speed up and streamline recovery efforts, reduce costs, and
improve the effectiveness of several disaster assistance
programs authorized by the Stafford Act, namely the PA Program,
the IA Program, and the HMGP.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2.
LIn 2018, Congress passed the Disaster Recovery
Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA) following Hurricanes Maria and Irma
which hit Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands.\36\
DRRA made additional reforms to speed up and improve disaster
response and recovery as well as established funding for FEMA's
pre-disaster mitigation program, currently called Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).\37\ In 2018,
Congress also enacted the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 that
included additional reforms intended to improve disaster
recovery, generally, as well as specifically in Puerto Rico and
the United States Virgin Islands.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254.
\37\ Id.
\38\ Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123.
In addition to these major reforms, the Committee has
moved, and Congress has enacted, targeted reforms intended to
improve FEMA assistance and coordination across the Federal
Government in responding to disasters. Despite these reforms,
issues remain. For example, there are currently over 1,000 open
major disaster, emergency, and fire management declarations
dating back to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.\39\ There are over
5,000 open projects from 2005 and 2017 (prior to Hurricanes
Maria and Irma).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ E-mail from FEMA Congressional Affairs to Elizabeth Granger,
Professional Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (Mar. 3,
2025, 4:48 PM EST) (on file with Comm.).
\40\ Id.
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V. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS
On January 24, 2025, President Trump announced, through
Executive Order, the creation of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency Review Council (Council).\41\ The stated
purpose of the Council is to, ``[evaluate] whether FEMA's
bureaucracy in disaster response ultimately harms the agency's
ability to successfully respond.'' \42\ The Executive Order
highlights the need for the Council to review FEMA in the wake
of recent disasters, like Hurricane Helene. The Executive Order
also points out that despite spending $30 billion in disaster
aid each of the past three years, FEMA has left many disaster
survivors without the resources they need.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Exec. Order No. 14180, (Jan. 24, 2025), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/council-to-assess-the-
federal-emergency-management-agency/.
\42\ Id.
\43\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Council will be co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of Defense, with any additional
members of the Council being appointed by the President. The
Council must hold its first public meeting before April 24,
2025, and will need to issue a report to the President 190 days
after that first meeting.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. CONCLUSION
Last year was a challenging year for disaster response and
recovery. Hurricanes Helene and Milton highlighted the need for
additional reforms to our Nation's current emergency management
system. The more recent California wildfires further charged
the debate about what role states should play in reducing their
own disaster risks. These disasters, along with President
Trump's Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council,
have begun a broader conversation about what the future of FEMA
should look like going forward. As this Subcommittee looks to
bring back common sense in emergency management, the following
witnesses will provide much-needed insights from a variety of
perspectives.
VII. WITNESSES
LMr. Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Team, United States Government Accountability Office
LMr. Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida
Division of Emergency Management
LMs. Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania
County, North Carolina
LAdrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County,
Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties
REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order.
The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be
authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The chairman also asks unanimous consent that Members not
on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee
at today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into
the record, please also email it to [email protected].
The Chair now recognizes himself for the purpose of an
opening statement for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC
BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Perry. I want to thank our witnesses for being here
today to discuss reforming FEMA and how we can bring common
sense back to Federal emergency management.
After witnessing the Federal Government's response to
Hurricane Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles
wildfires, I, like many Americans, was shocked by many of the
stories I heard coming from these communities. I know members
of this committee have proposed, and Congress has enacted,
reform after reform to make FEMA and the Federal emergency
management system work better. Despite these efforts, it seems
that nothing improves.
This is not meant to be a beatdown of FEMA, but we can't
just keep going the way we have been and expect different
outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth seems to have
only become more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when
disaster strikes.
Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for States and local
governments to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and
response, yet many of these programs move too slowly,
preventing timely and effective action when it is most direly
needed.
I mean, for 46 years, individual regions should have been
reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of
emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including
the cost and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.
What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is
demonstrative of that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support
the response and recovery in the mountains of North Carolina.
In California, we saw a lack of preparedness by State and local
officials--from a lack of water for firefighting to
disorganization on the ground, despite literally billions of
taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation,
preparedness, and firefighting.
On top of all that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA
disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina--which
is over 20 years ago--and well over 5,000 open projects. This
raises serious questions about the Federal Government being the
best institution to respond to localized disasters.
Federal disaster assistance was created to support State
and local governments when absolutely necessary, when the
resources required exceed the ability of local agencies to
respond. Unfortunately, the result has been to utilize FEMA as
the first responder to every disaster occurring throughout the
Nation.
This almost absolute reliance on the Federal Government is
dangerous and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first
responder in disasters. States and local governments are. They
know their communities best. They understand the risks, what
their communities need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to
respond quickly to emergencies.
It is critical, therefore, that State and local governments
make disaster preparedness a priority and that they budget for
it--let me say that again--and that they budget for it, have
the right people and training in place, and ensure that they
have the capacity and capability to respond.
The current system creates a perverse incentive for States.
States are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in
their own emergency response and preparedness plans because
they know they can rely on FEMA stepping in every time even if
it is inartful at best.
Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by
self-imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond
effectively when called upon or even close out projects going
back 20 years.
FEMA's ability to function effectively was further
undermined as the previous administration pushed its open
border, equity, and climate agenda onto the Agency, resulting
in disaster funding being diverted to ridiculous projects like
planting trees to address urban heat islands. It's no wonder
that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and issued
an Executive order on State and local preparedness.
I am hopeful that this hearing will provide valuable
insight, as T&I is the lead House committee on FEMA and Federal
emergency management, because meaningful reform is, obviously,
absolutely urgently needed.
With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on
these topics.
[Mr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss
reforming FEMA and how we can bring common sense back to federal
emergency management.
After witnessing the federal government's response to Hurricane
Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles wildfires, I, like most
Americans, was shocked by many of the stories I heard coming from these
communities. I know Members of this committee have proposed, and
Congress has enacted, reform after reform to make FEMA and the federal
emergency management system work better. Despite these efforts, it
seems that nothing has improved. This is not meant to be a beatdown of
FEMA, but we cannot just keep going the way we have been and expect
different outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth has only become
more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when disaster strikes.
Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for states and local governments
to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and response, yet many of these
programs move too slowly, preventing timely and effective action when
it is most direly needed. For 46 years, individual regions should have
been reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of
emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including the cost
and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.
What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is demonstrative of
that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support response and recovery in
the mountains of North Carolina. In California, we saw a lack of
preparedness by state and local officials--from a lack of water for
firefighting to disorganization on the ground, despite billions of
taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation, preparedness, and
firefighting.
On top of all of that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA
disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina, and well over
5,000 open projects. This raises serious questions about whether the
federal government is the best institution to respond to localized
disasters.
Federal disaster assistance was created to support state and local
governments when absolutely necessary--when the resources required
exceed the ability of local agencies to respond. Unfortunately, the
trend has been to utilize FEMA as the first responder to every disaster
occurring throughout the nation.
This increase in reliance on the federal government is dangerous
and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first responder in
disasters. States and local governments are. They know their
communities best--they understand the risks, what their communities
need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to quickly respond to
emergencies.
It is critical, therefore, that state and local governments make
disaster preparedness a priority--that they budget for it, have the
right people and training in place, and ensure that they have the
capability to respond.
The current system creates a perverse incentive for states. States
are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in their own
emergency response and preparedness plans because they have come to
rely on FEMA stepping in every time.
Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by self-
imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond effectively
when called upon or even close out projects going back 20 years.
FEMA's ability to function effectively was further undermined as
the previous administration pushed its open border, equity, and climate
agenda onto the agency, resulting in disaster funding being diverted to
projects like planting trees to address urban ``heat islands.'' It is
no wonder that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and
issued an executive order on state and local preparedness.
I am hopeful this hearing will provide valuable insight, as T&I is
the lead House Committee on FEMA and federal emergency management,
because meaningful reform is urgently needed.
Mr. Perry. And the Chair now recognizes the ranking member,
Representative Stanton, for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG STANTON OF ARIZONA, RANKING
MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS,
AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you all for attending this important hearing titled
``Reforming FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal
Emergency Management.''
I am the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I
take Federal disaster assistance delivery very seriously, and I
look forward to conducting oversight on FEMA's important work.
FEMA is where Americans look for help, critical help after
what is likely the worst day of their lives. So it is critical
that the Agency be postured to respond at all times. For most
of its life, FEMA has been an apolitical entity: red State or
blue State, it didn't matter. FEMA stayed focused on the
mission to help all Americans and kept out of the political
fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.
Following the recent catastrophic disasters in California
and South Carolina, President Trump has focused more on
spreading misinformation than helping Americans in need.
Specifically, after the tragic wildfires in Los Angeles, he
threatened to condition disaster relief on policy matters that
have nothing to do with emergency management. This is simply
wrong and shakes the trust that Americans have in their
Government to come to their aid after a catastrophe. That is
what FEMA is all about.
We should have a discussion about how to improve FEMA, but
as a baseline, we should acknowledge the need that we have in
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, specifically there to
help States and localities when an emergency goes beyond their
ability to immediately deal with it.
Yesterday, DHS Secretary Noem added to that uncertainty
facing disaster survivors when she said that we are, quote,
``we're going to eliminate FEMA,'' unquote, in a Presidential
Cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, quote,
``great job,'' unquote.
I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditioning aid
for emergency disaster assistance. Whether a State is red or
blue, they are American, and they are entitled to the support
of their fellow Americans on their worst day. So I condemn
calls to condition emergency disaster assistance in the
strongest possible terms and urge elected leaders to never make
such comments again.
Unfortunately, threats of conditioning lifesaving
assistance is not the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In
February, Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency
entered FEMA and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have
accessed secure Government systems that include disaster
survivors' personal information and slowed the delivery of FEMA
assistance.
I am deeply troubled to learn that all FEMA grants are now
subject to additional review to ensure that they are
complementary to President Trump's political agenda. And
Federal employees are living in fear that they will be fired if
they approve the wrong grant payment.
Federal employees should not be concerned about approving
grant disbursements approved by this body, Congress, in a
bipartisan way. In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse
payments that are mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I
will not stand by quietly if we see illegal action related to
the disbursement of FEMA grants. The Agency cannot violate the
Impoundment Control Act.
I am deeply concerned at the influence of DOGE at FEMA,
which contains no emergency management experts at DOGE, and
that they are going to steer the Agency in the direction of
another Katrina.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked
into the Department of Homeland Security without proper
consultation from professional emergency managers. FEMA was
weakened by being subsumed into DHS without proper consultation
with emergency management professionals. The result was
unnecessary catastrophic loss of life, the worst in modern
disaster history. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of
the past.
That said, reforming FEMA properly does not mean we should
avoid change altogether.
In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better. Last summer,
extreme heat caused temperatures in my district that were
nearly unlivable. We lost over 600 of our fellow citizens to
extreme heat and extreme heat islands.
We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for over a
month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed
during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The
heat in our State literally caused roads to crack, cars to
melt, and hundreds of lives lost.
However, FEMA was not to be found in Arizona because the
Agency has not yet adapted to emergency disasters like extreme
heat. Heat is a silent killer. It advances quietly and lingers.
The longer it lingers, the more devastating the impact.
So, we must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look
forward to working with the Agency to ensure that they have the
resources and authority they need to respond to disasters all
across the country.
So, I look forward to this important hearing, hearing from
my colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[Mr. Stanton's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
Thank you, all, for attending today's hearing entitled, ``Reforming
FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' As
the new Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, I take federal disaster
assistance delivery very seriously, and I look forward to conducting
oversight of FEMA's important work.
FEMA is where Americans look for help after what may have been the
worst day of their life. So it is critical that the Agency be postured
to respond at all times. For most of its life, FEMA has been an
apolitical entity--red state or blue state, it didn't matter. FEMA
stayed focused on the mission to help all Americans and kept out of the
political fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.
Following the catastrophic disasters in South Carolina and
California, President Trump has focused more on spreading
misinformation than helping Americans in need.
Specifically, after wildfires devastated Los Angeles, he threatened
to condition disaster relief on policy matters that have nothing to do
with emergency management. This is simply wrong and shakes the trust
that Americans have in their government to come to their aid after
catastrophe.
Yesterday, Secretary Noem added to the uncertainty facing disaster
survivors when she said that, ``we're going to eliminate FEMA'' in a
cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, ``great job.''
I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditions for emergency
disaster assistance. Whether a state votes red or blue; they are
American and are entitled to assistance. I condemn calls to condition
emergency disaster assistance in the strongest possible terms and urge
elected leaders to never make such comments again.
Unfortunately, threats to condition lifesaving assistance are not
the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In February, Billionaire
Musk's so-called ``Department of Government Efficiency'' entered FEMA
and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have accessed secure
government systems that include disaster survivors' personal
information and slowed the delivery of FEMA assistance.
I am deeply troubled to have learned that all FEMA grants are now
subject to an additional review to ensure they are complementary to
Trump's political agenda. And federal employees are living in fear that
they will be fired if they approve the wrong grant payment. Federal
employees should not be concerned about approving grant disbursements
approved by Congress!
In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse payments that are
mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I will not stand by quietly if
we see illegal action related to the disbursement of FEMA grants. The
Agency cannot violate the Impoundment Control Act.
I am deeply concerned that the influence of DOGE at FEMA, which
contains no emergency management experts, are going to steer the Agency
in the direction of another Katrina.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked into the
Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation from
professional emergency managers. FEMA was weakened by being subsumed
into the Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation
with emergency management professionals. The result was the most
catastrophic loss of life in modern disaster history. We cannot afford
to repeat the mistakes of the past.
That said, reforming FEMA thoughtfully does not mean we should
avoid change altogether. In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better.
Last summer, extreme heat caused temperatures in my district were
nearly unlivable. We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for
over a month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed
during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The heat in
our state literally caused roads to crack, cars to melt--and hundreds
of lives were lost.
However, FEMA was nowhere to be found because the Agency has not
yet adapted to emerging disasters like extreme heat. Heat is a silent
killer. It advances quietly and lingers. The longer it lingers; the
more devastating the impact.
We must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look forward to
working with the Agency to ensure they have the resources and authority
they need to respond to disasters all across the country--not just
hurricanes on the east coast.
That is why I am grateful that this Committee has invited a panel
of emergency management experts to testify here today about their
suggested reforms for emergency management. You are all the kind of
folks we should be consulting before making any change to FEMA
function. Thank you for taking the time to be here today, and I look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Representative Larsen, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, subcommittee Chair
Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Stanton, for convening
today's hearing.
Emergency management in the U.S. today stands at a
crossroads. As the Nation grapples with the devastation caused
by Hurricanes Helene and Milton, the wildfires in L.A., and
other disasters across the country, FEMA's role has come under
intense scrutiny.
The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane
Helene and the L.A. wildfires alone exceed $200 billion.
Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic
events will require robust congressional oversight,
supplemental funding, and Presidential leadership.
Instead of uniting the Nation, though, to rebuild what has
been lost, the administration has unfortunately exploited and
politicized these disasters. The President has spread
misinformation in the wake of these tragedies, threatened to
condition disaster aid, and doubled down on the suggestion to
eliminate FEMA altogether.
Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, quote, ``we're going
to eliminate FEMA,'' end quote, during a Cabinet meeting. No,
we are not.
These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the
women and men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives
to helping fellow Americans respond to and recover from
disasters.
FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during,
and after disasters.
States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity
to respond to a disaster. As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator
during President Trump's first term, aptly stated, ``Emergency
management is locally executed, State managed, and federally
supported.''
FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options
and resources are exhausted. Eliminating FEMA would not make
communities safer, would not reduce insurance premiums, would
not improve outcomes for disaster survivors. Instead, it would
shift the burden of disaster response and accountability from
the Federal Government to State and local governments.
The Democrats have long championed improvements to the
delivery of disaster assistance. It isn't new to us that FEMA
needs to be reformed. Last year, many bipartisan FEMA-related
bills were discussed in this committee, and we attempted to
pass them out of the House: Representative Titus' Disaster
Survivor Fairness Act to reform FEMA's Individual Assistance
Program; Representative Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement
Act to make FEMA's programs better equipped to address the
impacts of wildfires; and Representative Neguse's Disaster
Management Costs Modernization Act to build State and local
emergency management capacity.
Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA
reforms and getting reform right. However, it requires careful
consideration and input from emergency management
professionals.
For example, the President has suggested that disaster
assistance could be fixed by simply providing block grants for
recovery to impacted States. FEMA already offers a block grant
option through the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures
program authorized by section 428 of the Stafford Act. However,
States rarely use this authority due to the perceived risks
involved.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term
disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in
delivering outcomes and similarly has been the subject of
bipartisan scrutiny.
If you want these reforms to Federal emergency management
to succeed, the reforms must be informed by the challenges
faced by existing programs and built on recent progress.
For instance, in 2019, Congress authorized the creation of
a predisaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to
enhance community resilience against disasters while reducing
recovery costs for individuals, as well as State and local
governments as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act. And I
want to thank the Trump 1.0 administration for advocating for
this and for the President for signing that bill.
So, any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the
Agency's capability to support resilience projects and not
diminishing them.
So, I look forward to discussing possible solutions to
improve FEMA and outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel
of qualified experts that we have before us today.
I want to thank you all for being here, and I look forward
to your testimony.
I yield back.
[Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking
Member Stanton, for convening today's hearing.
Emergency management in the United States stands at a critical
crossroads.
As the nation grapples with the devastation caused by Hurricanes
Helene and Milton, the wildfires in Los Angeles and other disasters
across the country, FEMA's role has come under intense scrutiny.
The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane Helene and
the Los Angeles wildfires exceed $200 billion.
Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic events
will require robust congressional oversight, supplemental funding and
presidential leadership.
Instead of uniting the nation to rebuild what has been lost, the
Administration has unfortunately exploited and politicized these
disasters.
The President has spread misinformation in the wake of these
tragedies, threatened to condition disaster aid and doubled down on his
suggestion to eliminate FEMA altogether.
Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, ``we are going to eliminate
FEMA'' during a cabinet meeting. No, we are not.
These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the women and
men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives to helping their
fellow Americans respond to and recover from disasters.
FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during and after
disasters.
States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity to
respond to a disaster.
As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator during President Trump's first
term, aptly stated, ``Emergency management is locally executed, state-
managed and federally supported.''
FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options and
resources have been exhausted.
Eliminating FEMA would not make communities safer, would not reduce
insurance premiums, would not improve outcomes for disaster survivors.
Instead, it would shift the burden of disaster response and
accountability from the federal government to state and local
governments.
Democrats have long championed improvements to the delivery of
disaster assistance.
It isn't new to us that FEMA needs to be reformed.
Last year, among many FEMA-related bills, we attempted to pass:
Rep. Titus' Disaster Survivor Fairness Act to reform
FEMA's Individual Assistance Program;
Rep. Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement Act to make
FEMA's programs better equipped to address the impacts of wildfires;
and
Rep. Neguse's Disaster Management Costs Modernization Act
to build state and local emergency management capacity.
Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA reforms.
Getting reform right, however, requires careful consideration and input
from emergency management professionals.
For example, President Trump has suggested that disaster assistance
could be fixed by simply providing block grants for recovery to
impacted states.
FEMA already offers a block grant option through the Public
Assistance Alternative Procedures program authorized by Section 428 of
the Stafford Act.
However, states rarely use this authority due to the perceived
risks involved.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term
disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in
delivering outcomes and has similarly been the subject of bipartisan
scrutiny.
If we want reforms to federal emergency management to succeed, they
must be informed by the challenges faced by existing programs and built
upon recent progress.
For instance, in 2019 Congress authorized the creation of a pre-
disaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to enhance community
resilience against disasters while reducing recovery costs for
individuals as well as state and local governments.
This passed as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, and I want
to thank the Trump 1.0 Administration for advocating for this and for
the President signing that bill.
Any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the Agency's
capability to support resilience projects--not diminishing it.
I look forward to discussing possible solutions to improve FEMA and
outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel of qualified experts
before the Subcommittee today.
Thank you all for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
being here, especially the ones who have traveled a great
distance today.
Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain the
lighting system to our witnesses who may not have been here
recently or maybe ever. There are three lights in front of you.
Green means go, yellow means you are running out of time, and
red means to conclude your remarks.
The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses' full
statements be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses
have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to
them in writing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record
remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and
information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in
the record of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
As your written testimony has been made part of the record,
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5
minutes.
With that, Mr. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes for
your testimony, sir.
TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; KEVIN GUTHRIE,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT;
JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA COUNTY, NORTH
CAROLINA; AND ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY,
TEXAS, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Stanton, and other members of the subcommittee. It is an honor
to be here today to talk about GAO's work on FEMA.
I think the hearing and the discussions around reform are a
great opportunity to address many longstanding challenges that
we and many others have identified for years and years.
We have looked at Federal response and recoveries for
years, going from Guam to Puerto Rico and everywhere in
between. And what we have seen is an increasingly complicated,
fragmented, inflexible, and lengthy process that seems to get
harder and harder by the year.
FEMA and the rest of the Federal Government have spent over
$500 billion in the last 10 years on disaster aid. There are
currently over 30 Federal agencies that are involved in
disaster assistance, and many of these programs, which pay for
rebuilding the same types of infrastructure, have overlapping
or duplicative requirements.
Just as an example, the Department of Transportation, FEMA,
and HUD programs can all be used to build similar
infrastructure, but they may require completely different
paperwork, different environmental reviews, have different
rules, and, most difficultly, are on different timelines, which
makes it virtually impossible to synchronize those programs for
recovery.
This is a major reason why recovery takes up to 20 years,
as you said, Mr. Chairman. Two years ago, we actually issued a
report outlining the systemic problem and came up with a number
of options that Congress could take to reform the system. These
ranged from simple options to better streamlining current
programs, registration websites, things like that, all the way
to more significant changes like complete reorganizations and
overhauls of disaster agencies themselves.
On top of this, as you said, FEMA's workforce is
overwhelmed. There are over 600 major disasters and, as you
said, over 1,000 fire disasters, and all types of disasters
going back many, many years that require staffing to address
each one of those, and thousands of projects.
Last we looked at it, FEMA was 35 percent short of its
staffing needs based on the expectations on the Agency, and
there is now a never-ending disaster season.
The workforce structure was created at a time when large
disasters were very rare, and it needs to be reformed. And it
is not just about the numbers, but the whole structure needs to
be reformed to be more responsive.
Also, I want to talk about individual survivors. We have to
shift to programs that are not Government centric but are
survivor centric. And when I say that, I mean they have to be
geared towards helping a person get the assistance they need at
the worst time of their life.
A big problem at FEMA are antiquated technology and
financial management systems. These need to be fixed in order
for FEMA to be able to deliver the technology solutions that we
already have in the private sector to try to intake people and
get them the assistance they need.
The last thing I would like to talk about are just a few
cautions to consider for this committee as you look to reform
the system and for the administration. First is the National
Response Framework. I think we have to be really careful not to
break what is not broken. We have to not forget Hurricane
Katrina and what we fixed after that.
The National Response Framework provides steady funding and
coordination mechanisms that all levels of Government
understand at this point, and I think the structure works well.
We also have to remember the capacity differences across
the country. Some States and counties and cities have the
resources and the capacity to manage disasters. Many others we
see just don't, and that is not going to change any time soon.
These are always going to need State and Federal support to
provide the response that we need to help those citizens.
And then last, it is not just about FEMA. If we look to
reform FEMA but don't fix the whole disaster response and
recovery system, it is not going to fix the problem, and I
think that is very important to consider as we move forward.
So I look forward to your questions and the discussion.
[Mr. Currie's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Disaster Assistance: Improving the Federal Approach
Highlights
What GAO Found
There is a growing emphasis on how the federal government can
improve its approach to disaster recovery. In the last 10 years,
appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448 billion,
plus an additional $110 billion in supplemental appropriations so far
in fiscal year 2025. Recent disasters such as Hurricanes Helene and
Milton, the wildfires in California, and this month's destructive
tornadoes across the Midwest and South demonstrated the need for
government-wide action to deliver assistance efficiently and
effectively and reduce its fiscal exposure (see figures 1 and 4). Given
the rise in the number and cost of disasters and increasing challenges
related to the delivery of federal disaster assistance identified in
GAO's work, Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance was
added to GAO's High-Risk List in February 2025.
To improve the federal government's delivery of disaster
assistance, GAO has found that attention is needed to improve processes
for assisting survivors, reduce fragmentation across federal disaster
assistance programs, strengthen the disaster workforce and capacity,
and invest in resilience. For example, GAO has recommended that
Congress should consider establishing an independent commission to
recommend reforms to the federal approach to disaster recovery, which
is fragmented across more than 30 federal entities. GAO also reported
on various options for reforming the federal approach to disaster
recovery, such as better coordinating and consolidating programs across
agencies and simplifying processes for survivors, among other things.
Further, GAO recommended that the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) develop and implement a methodology that provides a more
comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction's ability to respond to a
disaster without federal assistance. Without an accurate assessment,
FEMA runs the risk of recommending to the President that federal
disaster assistance be awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it.
FEMA has taken past steps to do this but has not fully implemented this
recommendation. GAO also found that FEMA's workforce is overwhelmed by
the increasing number of disasters and other emergencies. Strengthening
the disaster workforce will be a critical part of better delivering the
assistance that communities and survivors need to recover.
Why GAO Did This Study
Natural disasters have become costlier and more frequent. In 2024,
there were 27 disasters with at least $1 billion in damages, compared
to 14 in 2018. Disasters in 2024 resulted in 568 deaths nationwide.
Further, federal disaster declarations and the expectation for
federal support have increased. In addition, federal support for
disaster recovery can last for years. For example, FEMA is managing
over 600 open major disaster declarations--some of which occurred
almost 20 years ago, according to the agency.
This statement discusses GAO's new disaster high-risk area, and
related work on reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to
disaster assistance, among other things.
This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 2020
through February 2025. For this work, GAO analyzed federal law and
documents related to disaster assistance and interviewed officials
across relevant federal, state and local agencies. GAO also conducted
site visits to recent disasters areas, among other actions.
What GAO Recommends
As of March 2025, GAO has approximately 60 open recommendations
related to disaster assistance. There are also four matters for
congressional consideration. These recommendations and matters are
designed to address the various challenges discussed in this statement.
Agencies have taken steps to address some of these recommendations. GAO
will continue to monitor agency efforts to determine if they fully
address the challenges GAO has identified.
__________
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our past work on the
federal approach to disaster recovery.
Hurricanes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and other natural
disasters affect hundreds of American communities each year. Due to the
rising number of natural disasters, there has been a growing emphasis
on how the federal government can improve its approach to disaster
recovery. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
calculated that, in 2018 the U.S. experienced 14 disasters that each
cost more than $1 billion in total economic damages. By 2024, the
number of disasters costing at least $1 billion almost doubled to
27.\1\ That same year, at least 568 people died, directly or
indirectly, as a result of those disasters. Recent disasters
demonstrate the need for the federal government to take action to
deliver assistance efficiently and effectively and reduce its fiscal
exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National
Centers for Environmental Information, ``U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather
and Climate Disasters'' (2025). These data are not direct costs to the
federal government and are produced using a detailed methodology
reflecting overall U.S. economic damages, including insured and
uninsured losses to residential, commercial, and government/municipal
buildings.
Hurricanes Helene and Milton occurred within 2 weeks of
one another in 2024 and affected some of the same areas in the
Southeast (see fig. 1). These two disasters resulted in over 200 deaths
and are expected to cost over $50 billion, according to the National
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
On January 8, 2025, the President approved a major
disaster declaration for historic wildfires in Los Angeles County,
California. The wildfires were unprecedented in their size, scope, and
the damage they caused. The Palisades and Eaton fires resulted in 29
deaths and the expected financial cost is still unknown as of March
2025.
In mid-March 2025, destructive tornadoes and severe
storms occurred across the Midwest and South over a three-day period.
The storms resulted in over 40 deaths, and the number of states that
will need federal assistance is still unclear as of March 2025.
Figure 1: Road Repair Following Hurricane Helene, North Carolina
My statement today is based on our most recent High-Risk update in
February 2025 as well as our prior work identifying key programmatic
challenges the federal government faces related to the delivery of
federal disaster assistance.\2\ This statement includes information on
our work related to 1) improving processes for assisting survivors, 2)
reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to disaster assistance,
3) strengthening Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) workforce
and capacity, and 4) investing in resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions
More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To conduct our prior work, we analyzed relevant statutes such as
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,\3\
regulations, agency guidance and interagency coordination documents,
such as the National Disaster Recovery Framework.\4\ We also
interviewed officials across relevant federal agencies and state and
local officials involved in disaster assistance, and conducted site
visits to communities impacted by recent disasters in California,
Florida, and North Carolina, among other actions. More detailed
information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found
within each of the issued reports cited throughout this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5121 et seq.
\4\ Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Recovery
Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with all sections of our Quality Assurance Framework that
are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and
perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to
meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work.
We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis
conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions
in this product.
Background
Disaster assistance includes providing support to communities and
survivors for response to, recovery from, and resilience to man-made
and natural disasters. For fiscal years 2015 through 2024,
appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448
billion.\5\ In total, FEMA approved over two million households for
federal disaster assistance in 2024.
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\5\ This total includes $312 billion in selected supplemental
appropriations to federal agencies for disaster assistance and
approximately $136 billion in annual appropriations to the Disaster
Relief Fund for fiscal years 2015 through 2024. It does not include
other annual appropriations to federal agencies for disaster
assistance. Of the supplemental appropriations, $97 billion was
included in supplemental appropriations acts that were enacted
primarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, in
December 2024, the Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2025, appropriated $110 billion in supplemental appropriations for
disaster assistance, not included in the $448 billion. Pub. L. No. 118-
158, div. B, 138 Stat. 1722 (2024).
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The Disaster Relief Fund, administered by FEMA, pays for several
key disaster response, recovery, and mitigation programs that assist
communities impacted by federally declared emergencies and major
disasters. Annual appropriations to this fund have varied but generally
increased from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure
2. Other federal agencies have specific authorities and resources
outside of the Disaster Relief Fund to support certain disaster
response and recovery efforts.
Figure 2: Disaster Relief Fund Appropriations in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023
Dollars, FY 2000 2024
Note: Fiscal year 2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of
sequestration. Supplemental data include contingent appropriations and
all appropriations under the heading of ``Disaster Relief'' or
``Disaster Relief Fund'' including the language ``for an additional
amount.'' Appropriations do not account for transfers or rescissions.
Deflator used was drawn from the FY2024 Budget of the United States
Government, ``Historical Tables: Table 1.3_Summary of Receipts,
Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current Dollars, Constant (FY
2012) Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940-2028.''
We have also previously reported that long-term recovery can be
challenging, and project costs can increase the longer a recovery
lasts.
For example, in February 2024, over 6 years after Hurricanes Irma
and Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico in 2017, we reported that FEMA
and Puerto Rico had taken actions, such as providing advance
disbursements of funds to grant recipients to help jump-start permanent
work construction to rebuild.\6\ However, grant subrecipients that
received awards from FEMA through an expedited process identified
increased project costs that pose risks to the completion of work. For
example, officials from Puerto Rico's Aqueduct and Sewer Authority said
that the costs for one water treatment plant project exceeded its
original estimate by 42 percent.
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\6\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery
Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
2024).
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Further, the number of federal disaster declarations and the
expectation for long-term federal support have increased. As shown in
figure 3, federal support for disaster recovery can last for years. For
example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major
disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in
various stages of response and recovery. For instance, as of February
2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects as part
of the Public Assistance program for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
2005.\7\
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\7\ FEMA's Public Assistance program provides assistance for debris
removal efforts; life-saving emergency protective measures; and the
repair or replacement of disaster-damaged publicly owned or certain
private non-profit facilities, roads and bridges, and electrical
utilities, among other activities.
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Figure 3: Time Frames and Activities in Disaster Preparedness,
Response, Recovery, and Resilience
The frequency and intensity of recent disasters have severely
strained FEMA, affecting its ability to deliver assistance as
effectively and efficiently as possible. We added Improving the
Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance to our High-Risk List in
February 2025, given the rise in the number and cost of disasters and
increasing programmatic challenges identified in our work.\8\
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\8\ At the beginning of each new Congress, we issue an update to
our High-Risk series, which identifies government operations with
serious vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or
in need of transformation. See GAO-25-107743.
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There are approximately 60 open recommendations related to this new
high-risk area, as of March 2025. In addition, there are four open
matters for congressional consideration to help address the nation's
delivery of disaster assistance, specifically related to fragmentation,
property acquisitions, and housing issues.\9\
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\9\ GAO-25-107743.
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Improving Processes for Assisting Survivors
Rural Assistance
Survivors face numerous challenges receiving needed aid, including
lengthy and complex application review processes. Federal agencies are
taking steps to help improve disaster assistance to survivors. For
example, in 2023, the Small Business Administration (SBA) implemented
the Disaster Assistance for Rural Communities Act to simplify the
process for a governor or tribal government chief executive to request
an agency disaster declaration in counties with rural communities that
have experienced significant damage.\10\
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\10\ Pub. L. No. 117-249, Sec. 2, 136 Stat. 2350 (2022) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(16)). See also at 13 C.F.R. Sec.
123.3(a)(6).
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We found in February 2024 that rural areas face unique challenges
in seeking SBA assistance following a disaster.\11\ For example, we
found that disaster survivors may not be aware of SBA's disaster loans.
We recommended that SBA should distinguish between rural and urban
communities in its outreach and marketing plan and incorporate actions
to mitigate the unique challenges rural communities face in accessing
its Disaster Loan Program. SBA agreed with our recommendation, and we
will continue to monitor its progress to address it.
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\11\ GAO, Small Business Administration: Targeted Outreach about
Disaster Assistance Could Benefit Rural Communities, GAO-24-106755
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2024).
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Block Grants
Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-
DR) funds provide significant, flexible federal recovery funding for
states and localities affected by disasters and generally support long-
term recovery. However, in December 2022, we reported that HUD does not
require CDBG-DR grantees to collect accurate data on critical
milestones.\12\
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\12\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Better Information is Needed on the
Progress of Block Grant Funds, GAO-23-105295 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
15, 2022).
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A HUD-funded 2019 study on the timeliness of CDBG-DR housing
activities found that all but one of the eight grantees in the study
faced challenges in developing a grant management system. HUD could
better ensure that its grantees identify problem milestones and address
delays in assisting survivors by requiring grantees to collect and
analyze timeliness data, as we recommended. As of February 2025, HUD
said it had explored options for requiring grantees to collect
milestone data and was evaluating how best to address this
recommendation to ensure the needs of disaster survivors are met in a
timely manner. We will continue to monitor its progress to address this
issue.
Flood Insurance
Federal law created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to
reduce the escalating costs of federal disaster assistance for flood
damage, while also keeping flood insurance affordable. The NFIP
transferred some of the financial burden of flood risk from property
owners to the federal government. In our 2025 High-Risk List we
reported that FEMA has developed a legislative proposal to improve the
program's solvency and address affordability, among other reforms.\13\
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\13\ See GAO-25-107743.
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However, Congress has yet to enact comprehensive reforms to NFIP
that would address the program's challenges. We have other ongoing work
about the state of the homeowner's insurance market, including concerns
about the availability and affordability of coverage, and the issue of
a lack of flood insurance coverage and what can be done to address it.
Reducing Fragmentation of the Federal Approach to Disaster Assistance
The federal approach to disaster recovery is fragmented across more
than 30 federal entities. These entities are involved with multiple
programs and authorities and have differing requirements and
timeframes. Moreover, data sharing across entities is limited. This
fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to
successfully navigate multiple federal programs.
Congress and federal agencies have taken steps to better manage
fragmentation, such as through interagency agreements and reducing
program complexity, but challenges remain. In our November 2022 report,
we identified 11 options to improve the federal government's approach
to disaster recovery based on our review of relevant literature,
interviews with federal, state, and local officials; and a panel of
experts.\14\ See table 1.
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\14\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related
to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option
and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to
improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. We
attribute statements from experts collected as part of the panel
discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes
statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery:
Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-104956
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
Table 1: Options To Improve the Federal Government's Approach to
Disaster Recovery
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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1. Develop new coordinated efforts to clearly and consistently
communicate about recovery programs.
2. Provide coordinated technical assistance throughout disaster
recovery.
3. Develop models to more effectively coordinate across disaster
recovery programs.
4. Develop a single, online application portal for disaster recovery
that feeds into one repository.
5. Standardize requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.
6. Simplify requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.
7. Further incentivize investments in disaster resilience as part of
federally-funded recovery programs.
8. Identify desired recovery outcomes and develop a mechanism to track
these across programs.
9. Prioritize disaster recovery funding for vulnerable communities
across all federal programs.
10. Consolidate federal disaster recovery programs.
11. Adjust the role of the federal government in disaster recovery.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of relevant literature; interviews with federal,
state, and local officials; and a panel of experts. GAO-25-108216
Certain options identified could be acted on within one or more
agencies' existing authorities, while others may require congressional
action to implement.\15\ In our report, we detailed the key strengths
and limitations that the panel of experts identified about each of
these options. For example, one option is to develop a single
application for disaster recovery assistance that feeds into one
repository. This portal could help applicants, including state and
local governments and individual disaster survivors, identify which
federal programs fit their specific recovery needs based on their
eligibility.
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\15\ Other than where we have made prior recommendations related to
certain options, we do not endorse any particular option. Rather, our
November 2022 report identifies possible implementation methods and the
strengths and limitations of each option. Experts who participated in
our panel agreed that the federal government's approach to disaster
recovery needs to be improved. They discussed ways to make it operate
more efficiently and effectively and to better incorporate incentives
for improving disaster resilience and address equity concerns. See GAO-
23-104956.
For strengths, experts said implementing this option
could improve the applicant experience by streamlining the application
process for disaster survivors and state and local applicants. This
option could also help address state and local government capacity
limitations by reducing the amount of work needed to complete multiple
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applications for different disaster recovery programs.
In terms of limitations, experts discussed the costs
associated with the development and management of the system, cross-
agency privacy and data sharing concerns, and the fact that this option
would not necessarily reduce the complexity of the federal disaster
recovery programs.
Another identified option is to consolidate disaster recovery
programs across federal agencies. This option could be implemented by,
for example, providing a single federal disaster recovery block grant
that identifies funding options by sector. It could also be implemented
by reorganizing existing federal disaster recovery programs into a
single agency focused on disaster resilience and recovery efforts.
For strengths, experts said that consolidating federal
disaster recovery programs could reduce the administrative burden on
disaster survivors and state and local governments. They also said that
implementing this option could reduce the number of federal funding
streams for disaster recovery, which could reduce the complexity of
carrying out disaster recovery projects.
In terms of limitations, experts said that implementing
this option by reorganizing government agencies would be difficult and
may create additional risks. Specifically, experts noted that
consolidating programs or creating a new agency would not necessarily
reduce the complexity of implementing programs.
In our November 2022 report, we recommended that Congress should
consider establishing an independent commission to recommend reforms to
the federal approach to disaster recovery.\16\ Such a commission should
follow our leading practices for interagency collaboration.\17\ In
January 2025, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate that would
establish a Commission on Federal Natural Disaster Resilience and
Recovery to examine and recommend reforms to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the federal government's approach to natural disaster
resilience and recovery, and for other purposes.\18\ We will continue
to monitor the progress of this bill.
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\16\ GAO-23-104956.
\17\ GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to
Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Address Crosscutting Challenges,
GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023).
\18\ S. 270, 119th Cong. (2025).
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In addition, on January 24, 2025, the President established the
Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council (FEMA Review
Council).\19\ According to DHS, the goal of the FEMA Review Council is
to advise the President on the existing ability of FEMA to capably and
impartially address disasters occurring within the United States. The
council shall also advise the President on all recommended changes
related to FEMA to best serve the national interest.
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\19\ 90 Fed. 10,082 (Feb. 21, 2025).
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As administrator of several disaster recovery programs, FEMA should
also take steps to better manage fragmentation across its own programs,
as we recommended in 2022. Such actions could make the programs
simpler, more accessible and user-friendly, and improve the
effectiveness of federal disaster recovery efforts.
Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster recovery
and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to disaster
survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of recovery
efforts. In response to our November 2022 recommendations, as of
February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to streamline the applications for
two of its recovery programs. However, FEMA will need to demonstrate
that it has thoroughly considered available options to (1) better
manage fragmentation across its own programs, (2) identify which
changes FEMA intends to implement to its recovery programs, and (3)
take any necessary steps to fully implement the recommendation to
better manage fragmentation across disaster recovery programs.\20\
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\20\ GAO-23-104956.
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Further, we have found that communities continue to face challenges
obtaining support to address wildfires. FEMA and multiple other federal
entities have responsibilities for federal wildfire mitigation,
response, and recovery efforts, to include the award and management of
contracts awarded before and during wildfire seasons. Additionally,
state, local, and tribal governments can enter into mutual aid
agreements with federal agencies to enable coordinated wildfire
responses.
In response to the challenges that wildfires pose for the nation,
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act required the establishment
of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission in 2021.\21\
In September 2023, the commission issued a set of policy priorities and
recommendations calling for greater coordination, interoperability,
collaboration, and simplification within the wildfire system. In
addition, we have found that as the incidence and severity of massive
wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find additional
opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\22\ For example,
we recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to provide
immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a process
to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from Fire
Management Assistance Grants recipients.\23\ Taking these steps would
help foster more resilient communities and reduce the future demand on
federal resources. We are monitoring efforts to address this
recommendation. See figure 4 for example of wildfire damage.
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\21\ Pub. L. No. 117-58, Sec. Sec. 70201-07, 135 Stat. 429, 1250-
58 (2021).
\22\ See GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA
Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2025)
and GAO, Disaster Contracting: Action Needed to Improve Agencies' Use
of Contracts for Wildfire Response and Recovery, GAO-23-105292
(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2023).
\23\ GAO-25-106862.
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Figure 4: Fire Damage Following the Palisades Fire Los Angeles,
California
Strengthening FEMA's Disaster Workforce and Capacity
FEMA has long-standing workforce management issues that make
supporting response and recovery efforts difficult. In recent years,
the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic,
and other responsibilities have placed additional pressures on FEMA.
FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and staffing levels has
limited its capacity to provide effective disaster assistance.
In May 2020, we reported that FEMA has faced challenges with
deploying staff with the right qualifications and skills to meet
disaster needs.\24\ We recommended that FEMA develop a plan to address
challenges in providing quality information to field leaders about
staff qualifications. In June 2022, FEMA provided a plan that included
both completed and ongoing actions to address our recommendation. FEMA
officials told us that the actions in the plan enhance reliability of
FEMA workforce qualifications and increases field leadership
accessibility of workforce information. Such actions should better
enable the agency to use its disaster workforce flexibility as
effectively as possible to meet mission needs in the field.
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\24\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address
Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360 (Washington,
D.C.: May 4, 2020).
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In May 2023, we reported that FEMA uses different processes under
various statutory authorities to hire full-time employees and temporary
reservists.\25\ We found that FEMA had an overall staffing gap of
approximately 35 percent across different positions at the beginning of
fiscal year 2022. While the gaps varied across different positions,
Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower
percentages of staffing targets met--between 44 and 60 percent at the
beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important
functions, including administering assistance to state and local
governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction
activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and
movement during a disaster.
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\25\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring
Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
2023).
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In October 2024, FEMA had only 9 percent of its disaster-response
workforce available for Hurricane Milton response as staff were
deployed to other disasters such as Hurricane Helene in the southeast
and flooding in Vermont.\26\ In addition, FEMA had only 20 percent of
its disaster-response workforce available for Los Angeles fire response
in January 2025.\27\ We have made numerous recommendations to help FEMA
better manage catastrophic or concurrent disasters.
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\26\ FEMA National Watch Center, National Situation Report (Oct. 8,
2024).
\27\ FEMA, National Watch Center, Daily Operations Briefing (Jan.
8, 2025).
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For example, we recommended that FEMA should develop and implement
a methodology that provides a more comprehensive assessment of a
jurisdiction's response and recovery capabilities including its fiscal
capacity.\28\ Without an accurate assessment, FEMA runs the risk of
recommending to the President that federal disaster assistance be
awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it. FEMA has taken steps to
update the factors considered when evaluating a request for a major
disaster declaration for Public Assistance, specifically the estimated
cost of assistance, through the federal rulemaking process three
times--in 2016, 2017, and 2020. However, as of January 2025, the agency
has not issued a final rule updating the estimated cost of assistance.
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\28\ GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to
Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own,
GAO-12-838 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).
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The COVID-19 pandemic marked the first time the Disaster Relief
Fund has been used to respond to a nationwide public health emergency.
FEMA used its typical process to estimate its obligations for COVID-19.
However, in July 2024 we reported that FEMA did not meet its accuracy
goal for actual obligations for COVID-19 in any fiscal year from 2021
through 2023.\29\ By identifying and documenting lessons learned for
estimating obligations based on its experience with COVID-19, as we
recommended, FEMA can better position itself to adapt to similar
estimation challenges in the future. FEMA did not concur with our
recommendation; however, we maintain that it is warranted. In January
2025, FEMA told us it believes the analyses it has already conducted,
including an analysis of COVID-19 expenditure drawdowns, are sufficient
to meet the intent of the recommendation. We have requested
documentation of this analysis and of any associated lessons learned
related to cost estimation. We will continue to monitor FEMA's efforts
and provide further information when we confirm any actions taken to
address the recommendation.
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\29\ FEMA has a goal for its actual obligations to fall within 10
percent of the baseline estimate by the end of the fiscal year. This is
for individual disasters and for the Disaster Relief Fund overall. See,
GAO, Disaster Relief Fund: Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Could Improve
FEMA's Estimates, GAO-24-106676 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2024).
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Investing in Resilience
Disaster resilience can reduce the need for more costly future
recovery assistance. In our Disaster Resilience Framework, we reported
that the reactive and fragmented federal approach to disaster risk
reduction limits the federal government's ability to facilitate
significant reduction in the nation's overall disaster risk.\30\
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\30\ GAO, Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles for Analyzing
Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to Natural
Disasters, GAO-20-100SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2019).
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FEMA's hazard mitigation assistance programs provide assistance for
eligible long-term solutions that reduce the impact of future
disasters, thereby increasing disaster resilience. However, we have
reported that FEMA can improve its hazard mitigation assistance grant
programs.
For example, the Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk
Mitigation Act of 2021 authorized FEMA to award capitalization grants--
seed funding--to help eligible states, territories, Tribes, and the
District of Columbia establish revolving loan funds for mitigation
assistance.\31\ In response, FEMA established the Safeguarding Tomorrow
Revolving Loan Fund grant program in 2022. In February 2025, we found
that while FEMA has identified some tools to collect information on the
Revolving Loan Fund program, FEMA does not have a process for
systematically collecting and evaluating the information to assess
program effectiveness across all phases of the program.\32\ We
recommended that FEMA document and implement a process to regularly
assess program effectiveness using evidence-based decision-making
practices to help instill confidence in program participants and better
ensure the long-term sustainability and success of the program. FEMA
concurred with our recommendation.
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\31\ Pub. L. No. 116-284, 134 Stat. 4869 (2021) (codified at 42
U.S.C. Sec. 5135).
\32\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Improve Guidance and
Assessment of Its Revolving Loan Fund Program, GAO-25-107331
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2025).
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FEMA's Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program
provides pre-disaster mitigation grants to help eligible state,
territorial, federally recognized tribal and local governments invest
in a variety of natural hazard mitigation activities. These activities
focus on infrastructure projects and building capability and capacity
among local communities. During the 5-year period from fiscal years
2020 through 2024, FEMA made about $5.5 billion available for these
grants. As of January 2025, FEMA had announced awards of about $1
billion.\33\ We are currently reviewing this program.
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\33\ FEMA, The Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of January
31, 2025. (Washington D.C. Feb. 12, 2025) For example, of the $500
million made available in fiscal year 2020, FEMA had announced awards
for $252 million, as of January 2025.
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In addition, individuals who lack sufficient insurance coverage
often face greater challenges in recovery. If disaster survivors are
uninsured or underinsured, they may have to rely more on federal
disaster assistance. Until recent regulatory changes, FEMA did not
award any housing assistance to individuals who received at least the
maximum FEMA award for housing repairs from their insurance company,
even if there was a gap between their insurance coverage and their
losses. For disasters with Individual Assistance declared on or after
March 22, 2024, FEMA will now award housing assistance to those who
receive insurance payouts that exceed the FEMA maximum award for their
losses, up to the statutory maximums, if they have eligible unmet needs
or uncovered losses.\34\ FEMA officials said they expect the amounts of
Individual Assistance awards to increase due to this change.
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\34\ FEMA's Individual Assistance program provides financial
assistance and direct services to eligible individuals and households
who have uninsured or underinsured necessary expenses and serious needs
as a result of a disaster. FEMA has also made other regulatory changes
to the Individual Assistance program intended to improve access to
assistance for survivors. 89 Fed. Reg. 3990 (Jan. 22, 2024). See also
FEMA, Biden-Harris Administration Reforms Disaster Assistance Program
to Help Survivors Recover Faster, (Washington, D.C.: 2024) for more
information.
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In conclusion, by identifying and taking steps to better manage
disaster assistance and the negative effects of the fragmented approach
to disaster assistance, federal agencies could improve service delivery
to disaster survivors and communities, improve the effectiveness of
disaster recovery, and potentially reduce the federal government's
fiscal exposure. Our recommendations to the various agencies involved
in disaster assistance can help Congress identify key areas to address
the nation's delivery of disaster assistance and reduce the
government's fiscal exposure. We will continue to monitor agency
progress and congressional actions.
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his
testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Guthrie for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF KEVIN GUTHRIE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA
DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
Stanton, also Ranking Member Larsen, and other distinguished
members of the committee for the invitation to testify today.
I am Kevin Guthrie. I am the executive director of the
Florida Division of Emergency Management. Throughout my tenure,
I have led the division through numerous major events,
including hurricanes such as Ian, Michael, Dorian, Isaias; as
well as wildfires, floods, tornadoes, and the Surfside building
collapse.
I have also assisted in national immigration efforts, like
Operation Vigilant Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in
Texas. In my 30-plus years of experience at the local and State
level, I have responded to over 50 major incidents.
Under Governor Ron DeSantis' leadership, FDEM has become a
model for the future of emergency management. This is due to
our professionals' dedication and the lessons learned from our
experience in a disaster-prone State.
Florida looks forward to working with you and President
Trump's administration to improve the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. We have learned the importance of effective
coordination across all levels of Government.
FDEM allows the philosophy that emergencies are federally
supported, State managed, and locally executed. We emphasize
collaboration with local governments supporting the response
efforts instead of dictating them. This approach has allowed us
to build on local best practices and continuously improve
Florida's emergency management capabilities. This collaborative
model is enhanced by the critical support that the Federal
Government provides.
FDEM operates year round, requiring funding even for
nondisaster periods. While Federal grants help maintain our
capabilities, we need to focus Federal support on expanding
State and local capacities.
States must have flexibility to build their systems without
relying on Federal funding during a noncrisis period. One way
to solidify this approach is through Federal block grants for
emergency management. Block grants will allow States to quickly
allocate funding for response and recovery operations, reducing
bureaucratic delays and staffing needs at the Federal level.
As we look to future improvements, one key area, as
mentioned, is the integration of modern technology into our
response systems. Florida has led the way and has modernized
emergency management by digitizing workflows and improving data
input processes. This has improved our efficiency, reduced
delays, and expedited payment processing, cutting the time it
takes to process invoices from 61 days during Hurricane Ian to
just 16 days in recent hurricane season.
Our use of technology has also reduced administrative costs
and helped streamline disaster response. Data sharing among
Federal, State, and local agencies is essential to improving
response times. Leveraging advanced analytics machine learning
has empowered decisionmakers in Florida to act faster and be
more accurate than ever before.
Another critical component of Florida's success has been
our ability to collaborate with our other States through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, known as EMAC. EMAC,
which is financially supported by the Federal Government, has
been essential in States receiving aid that they need when they
lack the necessary resources to respond and recover
independently.
Since 2022, Florida has leveraged EMAC in 6 major disasters
receiving crucial support from 39 States. While collaboration
has been effective, there are still areas where Federal
processes could be streamlined to enhance disaster response.
There are several ways the Federal Government can improve
disaster response, such as creating a combined Federal disaster
declaration process. This would eliminate delays caused by
separate declarations for separate agencies. Additionally,
streamlining disaster case management. And last, grant closeout
procedures would accelerate recovery efforts and reduce
displacement for survivors.
All three of these have impacted me directly during my
tenure with the State of Florida.
As we continue to enhance our capabilities, Florida also
emphasizes the importance of operational readiness. FDEM
maintains a network of strategically located warehouses for
rapid resource deployment and implements emergency standby
contracts to ensure fast access to critical resources.
Routine communication with State, local, and Federal
partners through the State Emergency Response Team in Florida
keeps Florida prepared for disaster.
Sir, in conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude
for the opportunity to testify before you today. Emergency
management is a public safety entity that is essential for
protecting lives and property. By improving Federal support, we
can strengthen our Nation's disaster response capabilities and
ensure faster recovery for all Americans.
I look forward to continued collaboration with you, the
committee, and the administration to improve these systems.
Thank you.
[Mr. Guthrie's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida
Division of Emergency Management
Introduction
Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and other
distinguished members of the Committee for the invitation to testify
here today.
I am Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director of the Florida Division of
Emergency Management (FDEM). Today I want to share with you what I know
about Emergency Management. Due to the leadership of Governor Ron
DeSantis, the State of Florida and FDEM are proud to have become a
model for the future of emergency management. Florida's success is also
directly tied to the dedication of our emergency management
professionals and experience that comes with being in a disaster-prone
state.
Leading the profession in prepared and resilient communities, staff
members provide technical assistance to local governments as they
prepare emergency plans and procedures, as well as conduct emergency
operations training for state and local governmental agencies with the
mission of coordinating, collaborating and communicating with all
community stakeholders for a more resilient Florida. As Executive
Director and on behalf of my colleagues in State and Local emergency
management, we thank you for this opportunity to provide a state
perspective on the future of Federal Emergency Management. We are
excited to work with you and President Trump's Administration to
empower states in their emergency management efforts.
Disaster History
Regarding disasters, as Executive Director, I have led the agency
through numerous significant events, including Hurricanes Debby,
Helene, Milton, Idalia, Ian, Nicole, Michael, Dorian, Isaias, Sally,
and Eta, as well as Tropical Storms Elsa and Fred. Besides tropical
systems, I have provided support to Floridians through a variety of
events, including the tragic Surfside Building Collapse, wildfires,
tornadoes, floods and more. We have also assisted efforts in the
nation's fight against illegal immigration through Operation Vigilant
Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in Texas. Additionally, in my
broader 30 plus years of experience, I have responded to, assisted in
leading, or led the operations of over 50 additional incidents or
events in Florida or across the nation.
State Management
We maintain our emergency management approach with conservative
principles, emphasizing that emergencies should be federally supported,
state-managed, and locally executed. Where possible, we utilize the
federal government to bolster, rather than obstruct, state and local
disaster response efforts. Local response efforts are amplified and
supported by the State rather than dictated. Where additional support
is needed, the Florida Division of Emergency Management does not
hesitate to fill the need but does not take control or micromanage a
response. We do not dictate what a local response looks like. Our
willingness to support locals in their varied response efforts allows
us to identify the best practices which are then shared and improved
disaster after disaster. Again, we lead the industry in the field, but
we are not perfect and believe in constant improvement at all ends of
the emergency management system.
Regarding federal support, the potential implementation of block
grants for emergency management is an exciting development. With a
block grant, an allocation of funding is provided to meet a given
purpose such as response or recovery operations. If it is properly and
consistently utilized within the criteria determined by the federal
government, bureaucratic delays at the federal level are removed and
states can push out the funding more quickly and effectively. Block
grants may also allow for large-scale decreases in the administrative
functions at the federal level.
Amplification of Efforts Through Partnerships
FDEM is made up of 225 full-time employees and approximately 170
temporary employees. During a disaster, we activate our State Emergency
Response Team (SERT) to maximize our capabilities. The SERT consists of
our federal partners, State agencies, local emergency management, and
private sector industries such as power, water, lodging, grocery,
equipment, and materials. Additionally, Florida's First Lady, Casey
DeSantis, has activated charitable foundations, volunteer
organizations, and the faith community as part of our State Emergency
Response Team (SERT). These entities provide tremendous assistance to
disaster survivors without cost to the State. This assistance includes
disaster cleanup, reconstruction, housing assistance, meal service,
transportation, and more.
We are not afraid of leaning on and empowering the private sector
to improve our response and recovery efforts. In many facets of
emergency management, the State and local governments rely on the
private sector to do the essentials, whether that be restoring power,
removing debris, or getting businesses operational as quickly as
possible to create the necessary environment for a speedy recovery. We
are not afraid of the private sector and do not care about logos or
patches during a disaster. We care only about getting the job done.
State and Local Emergency Management Enhanced by Federal Support
FDEM operates 24/7, 365 days a year regardless of activation level
or disaster status. Our staff must maintain operations continually to
be ready to respond to natural and man-made disasters. In the event of
a weather event, we usually have notice and ability to make final
preparations prior to the disaster. In other cases, no-notice disasters
specifically, our team activates to full capacity and may activate the
entire SERT. To satisfy continual operations for the State and local
emergency management agencies, funding is necessary on a non-disaster
cycle. Base FEMA grants currently fund much of these continual
operations. Any change or end to these base grants would necessitate an
alternative funding source either through the State or local
governments. In the same way that a government continually funds its
Law Enforcement and Fire Departments, State and local governments must
find a way to establish emergency management functions without Federal
financial support for blue sky periods. This will look different state-
by-state and government-by-government. For more populous states, a
stand-alone State-funded emergency management agency is certainly
possible. In less populous states, incorporating the functions of an
emergency management agency into existing capabilities such as the
National Guard could be an option. Locally, in rural areas,
incorporating the emergency management functions into the Sheriffs'
offices or fire departments is expected. In metropolitan areas, the
emergency management functions could be stand-alone due to the larger
tax base.
When public safety, health, and critical infrastructure agencies
need help they call on Emergency Management. Therefore, Emergency
Management is a public safety agency and it is incumbent upon each
government to treat it as such. This means providing funding and
resources within existing resources and capabilities. Regardless of how
each state or local government would establish emergency management
functions without federal financial assistance, it is critical that all
federal support be focused on expanding capability rather than
maintaining capability. Federal grants should not support long-term
staffing at the State or local level.
With this new paradigm in place, federal support can be targeted
specifically for disaster events as the needs arise, and without a
large bureaucracy in place at the federal level.
Embracing Standardization of Data and Improved Technology
FDEM has embraced modern technology to improve how data is used for
operations. The first step in embracing technology is to streamline
business operations and gain efficiencies to digitize current document
workflows. The second step is to focus on the inputs of good,
structured, digital information into the system(s) at the lowest
possible level eliminating the need for bureaucratic reviews and
approvals. In Florida, this has accelerated disaster response efforts,
improved efficiency, reduced bureaucratic delays, and expedited payment
processing after disasters. Efforts have not only helped the State work
faster during an emergency but also ensure taxpayer money is managed
responsibly. Embracing technology and activating data assets directly
impacts our ability to ensure residents can recover and the economy can
get back up and running faster than ever before.
We have seen tremendous returns on investment in technology. For
every dollar targeted at technology modernization, we have an estimated
$530 in business efficiency. Additionally, the time it takes to process
thousands of invoices following a disaster has decreased by 73%. During
Hurricane Ian, FDEM averaged 61 days to process invoices. For
Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton, this improved to just 16 days.
The inability of data to flow from local to state to federal
government through efficient use of technology is responsible for the
delays and years long frustrations experienced in emergency management.
We have proven that these delays can be reduced by up to 90% in some
cases, all while decreasing long-term and temporary staffing needs.
Collecting, analyzing, and governing relevant data is integral for
providing reliable, actionable information for emergency operation
decision-makers before, during, and after an emergency. We deployed an
anomaly detector to identify and mitigate financial risks, including
potential fraud, waste, and abuse, by detecting abnormalities when
processing invoices for payment. With 99% accuracy, the anomaly
detector identified three major invoice irregularities in the first 30
days.
Data is essential for Federal, State, and local officials as well
as emergency management leaders charged with protecting and serving
residents. By leveraging advanced analytics and machine learning, FDEM
has empowered its leaders to transition from manual information
collection and research into a modern, data-drive approach.
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
In the event of large disasters, the Federal government has
supported Florida financially and operationally. Additionally, states
across our nation have lent support to Florida when we have needed it
most.
Since 2022, Florida has leveraged the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) to request aid during six (6) disaster
events. Over these incidents, 39 states across the nation stepped up to
assist Florida by providing crucial assistance and bolstering Florida's
response efforts. Through EMAC, Florida has received essential assets
such as Swiftwater and Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) teams, fire
response units, Incident Management Teams (IMTs), Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) support, voluntary liaisons, and National Guard
assistance. These resources play a critical role in ensuring an
effective disaster response.
Throughout the six (6) disasters since 2022, including Operation
Vigilant Sentry (OVS) and five (5) hurricanes--Ian, Idalia, Debby,
Helene, and Milton, Florida has received a total of 7,444 personnel and
associated equipment with total costs amounting to $74,731,312.50.
These coordinated efforts have been instrumental in helping the state
navigate disaster impacts over the past several years.
The successful coordination of the EMAC, financially supported by
the federal government, has been essential in ensuring states receive
the aid they need when they lack the necessary resources to respond and
recover independently. We want the federal government to continue
administering and supporting EMAC to facilitate efficient and effective
disaster response across the country.
While many states, including Florida, have received significant
financial support from American taxpayers during disasters, few states
could fully fund disaster response and recovery without federal
assistance. Thanks to responsible fiscal stewardship and a positive
economic climate, Florida remains resilient--but ongoing federal
support remains critical in times of crisis.
Additional Federal Efficiencies
Combined Federal Disaster Declaration: When a disaster occurs, the
federal government often claims to bring all forces to bear in
response. Unfortunately, this is not always the case due to separate
disaster declaration processes for different federal agencies. While a
declaration by the President may be declared quickly for FEMA, other
agencies such as the US Department of Agriculture or the US Department
of Commerce (Fisheries and Aquaculture) require a separate lengthy
process for disaster declaration. This separate process leads to
significant delays in response to the agriculture and aquaculture
industries. A combined declaration for all federal agencies would end
these delays.
Data Sharing: During response and recovery, the State and Federal
agencies are often duplicating data gathering efforts as there is no
``one-stop-shop'' for services. Disaster survivors are constantly
filling out federal and state forms, applications, portals, and more.
While there are challenges associated with data sharing, it is
absolutely crippling for federal agencies to be prohibited from data
sharing agreements with the State and locals. Remedying data sharing
issues, as part of an annual ``blue sky'' process, will ensure a
coordinated and less burdensome delivery of services to survivors,
rather than duplicative and siloed data collection efforts and
programs.
Disaster Case Management: For disaster survivors, case management
is a lengthy process, severely limiting available services and
resources to survivors until months after the event occurred. By the
time resources become available, many survivors have moved away or
missed crucial deadlines in applications for assistance. The recovery
of a community is stifled when its population moves away. Ensuring
rapid deployment of disaster case management and funding can get
survivors back on their feet more quickly will reduce the long-term
costs of extended displacement.
Disaster Grant Closeout Procedures: Current policy implies that all
work must be completed on a public assistance project prior to
application for reimbursement. This requirement causes excessive delay
and long-term extension of disaster closeout and creates significant
vulnerability to de-obligation. Allowing grants to cover partial work
will facilitate quicker project accomplishment while getting funding to
those communities that struggle to facilitate project completion due to
limited revenues and cash flow.
Best Practices
Warehousing & Deployable Resources: The Florida Division of
Emergency Management (FDEM) maintains a network of strategically
located warehouses, each designed to fulfill critical functions in
statewide emergency response and disaster preparedness. These
facilities serve as primary distribution hubs for essential resources,
ensuring that life-sustaining supplies such as food, water, and
emergency equipment are readily available for rapid deployment when
disasters strike. In routine operations and smaller-scale emergencies,
we are responsible for maintaining operational readiness, overseeing
inventory management, and coordinating response efforts. However, in
the event of a large-scale activation, additional surge personnel,
including contractors, National Guardsmen, and State Guardsmen--are
mobilized to expedite the efficient deployment of critical commodities.
Beyond basic supplies, FDEM's warehouses are equipped with a wide range
of specialized assets designed to support complex emergency operations.
These include power generation equipment, high-capacity water pumps,
personal protective equipment (PPE), flood prevention systems, mobile
command vehicles (MCVs), heavy machinery, and sleeper trailers to
accommodate on-site response teams. By maintaining these resources, we
bolster the state's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to
emergencies, mitigate disaster impacts, and safeguard lives and
property.
Emergency Standby Contracts: FDEM has implemented Emergency Standby
Contracts as a proactive disaster management strategy, recognized as a
national best practice. These pre-established agreements allow vendors
to stage and procure critical resources in advance, ensuring faster,
more efficient response efforts. This approach streamlines logistics,
reduces delays, and helps protect lives and property by securing
essential personnel, equipment, and supplies ahead of time. The
contracts cover vital resources such as disaster support personnel,
incident management teams, shelter staffing, medical personnel, care
sites, transportation services, equipment, and emergency fuels.
Contracts for emergency supplies and services--mirror best practices
found in our state-level logistics operations (e.g., resource bundling,
turn-key solutions, multiple vendors, allow for state/local level piggy
backing, etc.). This cuts red tape during procurement, accelerates
resource deployment, and leverages economies of scale.
Routine Cycle of Preparedness: Throughout the year, the Florida
State Emergency Resource Team (SERT) focuses on routine communication
with our local, state, and contracted partners. Florida's emergency
management framework is robust. The SERT is one of the most experienced
in the Nation and is well-suited to address a wide range of complex
incidents and events. For most natural and man-made emergencies, our
state-level capacity, including rapid incident monitoring, logistical
support, and specialized technical expertise (e.g., nuclear and
radiological preparedness), ensures we can respond effectively. To
better respond to these disasters, the SERT has digitized many of our
mutual aid processes to include the FEMA reimbursement document. These
efforts have allowed for quicker response and reimbursement for our
first responders. Florida is the centralized emergency management
coordination hub for disasters. To continue to excel in this, the SERT
coordinates meetings with city, county, and tribal partners to forecast
potential challenges and develop plans to address concerns. Quarterly,
the SERT meets with command staff to strategize and discuss how to
better respond to natural and man-made disasters. It is through these
partnerships and routine communications that Florida leads the nation
in mutual aid support provided across the country and our response
times during a disaster.
Conclusion
To conclude, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. Emergency Management is critical, and the time is now to
implement improvements that will change the way we do business and
ultimately better serve the citizens of the United States.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his
testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Laughter. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA
COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA
Ms. Laughter. Thank you, Chairman and members of the
committee.
Nine days. For 9 days, my county's emergency responders and
I bore witness to the aftermath of the most devastating natural
disaster to hit our community in over 100 years.
We witnessed a family's terror when their little boy was
injured in a landslide, taking their home off its foundation.
We witnessed a very pregnant mother desperately trying to dry
out her empty trailer with dehumidifiers so that she would have
somewhere to bring her baby home to--all of her possessions in
a dumpster nearby.
We witnessed the elderly man in his home too overwhelmed to
start the process, with mold creeping up the walls around him
within days of the flood.
For those 9 long days, our community was trying to grapple
with the destruction of Helene, trying to chart a path forward,
searching for answers to questions, and without the key partner
who was supposed to be at our aid, without FEMA. And it would
be 2 weeks after the storm before more than a single worker
arrived, despite repeated pleas for help.
Locally, we knew housing was going to be one of the
greatest challenges. Immediate needs post-storm are the basic
necessities we all understand: Clean water, food, and shelter.
FEMA's temporary shelter assistance is ill-fitted to meet
the needs of rural America. Our citizens who qualified for TSA
found hotel choices to be in Greenville, South Carolina, or
Charlotte, North Carolina, both 2 hours outside of our county,
leaving untenable options to stay in damaged homes, bunk with
family and friends, or leave their job, school, and community
behind for an unknown time.
Appalachians don't leave our home, our land, or the fabric
of our community. So the TSA vouchers may as well have been
Monopoly money.
Even after FEMA's arrival, the negative impact of delay in
FEMA response was compounded by ongoing communication
challenges, changing FEMA staff assignments, and contradicting
information and directions that stalled progress for my
community.
In the written testimony, you will even see where our
sheriff and I were repeatedly given opposite updates on door-
to-door response by FEMA representatives that could have
resulted in conflicting public messages, except for the fact
that in my community, the sheriff and I work side by side in
emergency response, communicating regularly.
At 21 days and with tireless advocacy, we were granted a
meeting with FEMA housing mission leaders. We received an
overview of the housing options coming, along with identifying
some obstacles that we would face.
For instance, we were able to explain the inadequacy of
HUD's fair market rent methodology in our rural community and
how that would hamstring any possibility of rentals being an
option if the FMR was used to establish allowable rents.
We were heard and a request was elevated immediately to
approve an increase in the allowable FEMA rate. Even with the
increase, rental assistance could not meet the needs of those
whose homes were destroyed, and more options would be needed.
Ultimately, we found that housing process requirements
under FEMA are too rigid to apply effectively in our
mountainous community. For those who could leverage that
assistance option, progress was only made after establishing
weekly FEMA and State EM calls with us locally to cut through
miscommunication and establish accountable discussions.
At times, our county would face contradictions from
different FEMA siloes, as you will also find documented in the
written testimony. While putting our county resources to task
trying to support the FEMA mission, we would also feel the
sting of the deep conflict and contradiction of FEMA being both
disaster response and regulator of local flood plain management
programs.
Threats of losing NFIP status and future disaster funding
in our community made it harder to assist families in repairing
their homes, meet immediate human needs post-disaster, while at
the same time, other FEMA workers were working with us to
support housing among limited solutions.
Contradicting guidance and unclear processes were also
frustrating to vulnerable survivors, and lack of answers led to
deteriorating public trust and faith in FEMA, but not because
the people deployed were not genuine and service-oriented
people. It was because the workers themselves were stuck in a
system designed to prioritize process and policy over common
sense and responsiveness.
We saw these workers hamstrung to help us with a lack of
training across functions and a system difficult to navigate
even for them. While there were genuine attempts to be
responsive to the local needs, like approving private roads and
bridges for assistance in western North Carolina, the decisions
on requirements attached were made in bubbles far away from our
community that did not engage local leadership, meaning that
guidance is still fraught with concerns about the ability to
meet the requirements that will be imposed.
Transylvania County lost homes, infrastructure, and
possessions, but somehow we did not lose lives [inaudible].
What I can't imagine is how our sister counties who lost whole
towns are navigating these processes when the recovery is far
more complex and the sting of loss so much deeper.
Communities facing recovery need assistance with our
counties representing the frontline response and need realistic
solutions and meaningful engagement before a disaster.
The stated mission of a responsive FEMA can be achieved,
but only when the local voice is not just heard, but is also
involved in solution building so that practical boots-on-the-
ground insight can be engaged upfront. Only then can we
effectively and efficiently support our survivors.
My community, all of our communities, our people across the
country, and the FEMA workers themselves deserve better.
Together we must do better.
Thank you for the opportunity to share about my community's
experience.
[Ms. Laughter's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania
County, North Carolina
County Post-Hurricane Helene Response and Recovery Experience and
Feedback
This document is intended to provide constructive feedback with our
conclusive statements in bold and explanation of the elements of the
response and recovery experience in Transylvania County post Hurricane
Helene that led us to those conclusions. We have included suggestions
for improvements from our perspective. The appendices included provide
backup documentation to this document but are not the full scope of
documented and undocumented communication that has occurred between
Transylvania County and FEMA.
Statement 1: When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a
system in place to support response and recovery because local
governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to handle
a response at that scale during non-response times. Overall, FEMA staff
our county engaged with seemed genuine in their desire to help, but
faced some of the same frustrations with communication, procedures,
processes, and difficulty navigating the system as we did. Any redesign
of a system to deliver that support needs to prioritize the local
government voice, be adaptable to different conditions and ensure
responsiveness to local needs during and after disaster.
This document expresses the experience and frustrations that we
faced with FEMA because that is the jurisdiction of the hearing, but we
recognize that in some situations there seemed to be blame to be shared
for difficulties between both state and federal agencies, but our main
concern is that the system work at the point of delivery locally and we
do not have a clear perspective on how the interface between state and
federal helped or hindered the response. County government is the
closest governance to our citizens and the very people who form local
government live disasters alongside the community while also
responding. There must be response infrastructure to support those
efforts from other levels of government.
Statement 2: Transylvania County was left to manage emergency
response without FEMA in early days and did not get FEMA support until
numerous and repeated phone calls and emails were made to appeal for
assistance. Even our federal legislators were puzzled by the delay in
FEMA arriving or responding. No official reason has ever been offered,
but this delayed citizens' being able to start the application process,
left local resources strained without information and lowered
confidence in the FEMA response from the beginning with our leaders and
our community.
No FEMA representatives were present in Transylvania County until 9
days after Hurricane Helene created the worst disaster to hit our area
in over 100 years. Flooding, landslides, and wind/tree damage left our
county looking and feeling like a war zone with the vast majority
without power, without communication and with devastating damage. Our
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) received one phone call on day 6 from
a FEMA representative stating they would be on site the following day
without any arrival or additional call. Receiving any level of service
took constant advocacy meaning some of our local resources were spent
trying to get FEMA to engage instead of accomplishing other response
activities. Status of damage incurred, and needs were communicated for
days without response.
When I discussed the delay with one FEMA worker, they suggested the
lack of assistance uptake from our county, such as those utilizing
Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA), made it appear as if there
was less need in our community because of low reported utilization of
TSA. This seems like it could be a factor, and the data does reflect a
lower measure of initial assistance uptake; however, data reports did
not accurately convey the reasons people were not accepting assistance.
Data points from these reports may still be limited in understanding
the full impact of Helene in our county. Even damage assessment figures
were slow to reflect total impact because flooding could be easily
identified by inspecting floodplain areas, but our county suffered
landslide and tree damage to homes that were spread out across the
county and took longer to inventory.
I recently spoke with a county manager on the other side of the
disaster in North Carolina that indicated they were not even sure why
they were in the disaster declaration because they saw very little
impact from the storm, but that FEMA representatives arrived promptly
and unannounced right after the storm. The only other plausible reason
for the delay we have been able to identify is that the main operation
was put in Hickory, NC and our county was one of the furthest away from
that base; but plenty of FEMA staff were in neighboring Buncombe and
Henderson counties well before arriving here and even present in some
counties during the storm. The FEMA shelter set up immediately at the
NC Agriculture Center is less than 15 minutes from our county line.
Statement 3: Both short- and long-term housing response processes
instilled in FEMA are not suited to be effective in rural America or in
environments like the mountains. This created a disconnect in the
practical connection of those who needed help and the options available
to them with specific issues around what those options meant for their
families. A lesson learned in our experience is that the FEMA data
around assistance uptake in long term housing does not adequately
reflect degree of need in a community and that options that allow
people to stay on their own property would have been more supportive
and utilized. Policy makers should consider how protocols apply in
different settings with the ability to be responsive to communities,
instead of a one-size-fits-all approach.
Once life safety is secured in an emergency, our priorities pivot
to the basic immediate human needs of clean water, food, and shelter.
The Temporary Shelter Assistance (TSA) program, FEMA's first line of
assistance to those displaced from their homes, is not set up to
provide immediate assistance in rural areas because the availability of
major hotel chains, capacity and established contracts are inconsistent
or unavailable completely. Our citizens who applied for assistance and
were approved for TSA in the initial weeks following the disaster found
that the closest availability for hotels accepting the TSA program were
in Charlotte, NC, or Greenville, SC, requiring anywhere between a 1-
and 3-hour drive away from their homes, jobs, and schools. The TSA
numbers for our county do not reflect the ultimate need for housing
after the storm because many were not willing to uproot their lives and
either stayed with friends and family or in their damaged homes. We saw
the most success for immediate housing needs with North Carolina
Emergency Management and nonprofits that were able to secure RV units
for households that could be placed at damaged home sites quickly and
that did not require meeting floodplain elevation standards and other
more stringent restrictions since they are mobile units. Unfortunately,
those resources were not robust enough to assist to the full extent
needed; however, similar resources could be an improved option in rural
emergency response both for immediate needs and for the longer term
while households navigate the lengthy process of determining whether to
tear down, rebuild, relocate, etc.
FEMA housing leadership met with us to explain the options coming
for our residents and explained that long-term housing implementation
would take time. The long-term housing program has requirements that
take a significant amount of time to deploy, with some of those found
to be unrealistic for our community; so, there was no interim support
unless citizens wanted to leave the area to use TSA. Rental assistance
is one of the easier options, but there was an existing lack of rentals
before the storm in our county. FEMA housing leadership explained that
HUD's fair market rents are used to determine rental assistance limits
early in our conversations. We provided a history of advocacy and data
that shows that the methodology to estimate rural community fair market
rent levels is not an accurate depiction of our county. FEMA
representatives heard us on this issue and raised the request to
increase the amount allowed. Even with an approval of doubling the fair
market rent allowance, our county only saw 10 units immediately
available under those limits. Households that pursued rental assistance
and FEMA workers had challenges finding units within the limits.
Addressing FMR helped the housing mission because it was responsive to
the local characteristics of the community.
For long-term housing, FEMA units could not be placed in the
floodplain, but the homeowners who needed a unit to allow them to
repair or to have time to go through hazard mitigation/buy out
processes to determine their best options are in the floodplain and
could not use the FEMA units unless they could find property outside of
the floodplain for placement. Most of the commercial mobile home parks
are in or near the floodplain because in the mountains, floodplains
provide flat land that can be developed and used for those purposes.
Additionally, the mobile home parks had limited availability due to the
pre-existing short housing supply. Our county even pulled tax record
data to provide all commercial mobile home park sites in the county to
FEMA personnel to facilitate locating sites, and few were identified as
possibilities for either available space or for being in the
floodplain.
People in our rural community did not want to leave their homes;
around half those qualifying for long-term housing chose to stay in
their damaged dwellings, as reflected in FEMA data, often because the
options offered were not realistic. Even the federally owned campground
in Pisgah National Forest was eventually excluded as a mass housing
site because it is in a floodplain, despite it being a federally owned
site and easily accessible in our county. Additionally, the logistics
baked into the long-term housing unit placement--such as required
inspections to meet standardized requirements--are lengthy processes
even under ideal circumstances. The first FEMA unit placed in our
county saw an over two-week delay because the fire suppression unit was
not working, leading to attempted repairs and eventual replacement.
Typical mobile home placements under building code do not even have
similar fire suppression units.
Communication was a challenge in housing planning and response as
detailed in another section, but systemic issues of policy, procedure
and protocol were apparent once communication improved, and the
requirements were understood locally. Weekly calls--which we
established with NCEM and FEMA in December after repeated communication
frustrations expressed by the county manager--were instrumental in
getting consistent information on housing, understanding of the rules
(such as learning that sites in the floodplain would be rejected) and
having clear status updates on those being approved for housing and the
process being followed. While it is our perspective that the process
needs to be made more responsive and efficient with fewer obstacles,
understanding the rules made the participation of local officials more
effective and the communication with the public clearer.
Statement 4: Some processes were overly complicated, costing time
and diverting resources from areas that would have addressed more
immediate needs in the local community. This also created barriers to
providing efficient and effective service, in addition to eroding trust
in FEMA as a response partner.
An example of these overly complex processes occurred when we
offered a conference room to house a Disaster Resource Center (DRC) to
get one operational in our county. The site visit required review of
the conference room to see if it could be used for a DRC involving at
least 7 FEMA representatives on the site visit and, while here, a call
had to be made to see if a handicapped bathroom stall in our public
county government building being an inch too short could be approved in
order for the DRC to locate. After over a week post-inspection and
multiple follow-ups from our staff, we were finally cleared to get a
DRC. We were then told on a Tuesday that the DRC would soft open on a
Thursday, with staff and resources arriving on Thursday morning, and
then officially open on Friday. We scheduled our county operations and
IT staff to be available to assist for Thursday. Wednesday morning, we
were contacted by our staff in that building that FEMA representatives
were there to set up the DRC. We diverted our operations and IT staff
immediately to assist, only to find that the people to staff the DRC
had been sent to our location, but that the equipment necessary to
operate had been sent to another county so setup could not occur that
day. Later that day, a higher-level FEMA official assigned fault to the
county for the failure to open on time, even though the issue was
caused by FEMA staff and required equipment being sent to two different
places.
When teams arrived to go door to door in impacted neighborhoods, we
assigned a county staff person to accompany them for the two days we
were told they would be going door to door. (Note: A third day they
scheduled without informing county staff resulted in an incident
referenced elsewhere in this report.) Including a county staff member
on the visits was to help assure our citizens that these were not scams
and to facilitate getting assistance to more of our households. While
in one neighborhood, a homeowner came up to the team and said he knew
an elderly man in one of the houses needed help with the application.
He offered to go let the man know the team was coming and then came
back to let them know he spoke to the man, who was ready and waiting to
receive help. When the team got to the driveway, one of the FEMA
workers stated they could not go to the door because there was a no
solicitation sign and started to move on to the next house. While it is
understandable to avoid issues with no trespass or no solicitation
signs, there must be some flexibility when it is clear that help is
welcomed, like in this situation.
Statement 5: Siloed internal FEMA communications and no clear
communication protocols, along with inconsistent communication to the
County Level Emergency Operations Center, created barriers and
frustration. Communication challenges seemed to frustrate FEMA staff
themselves when they worked with us to find answers to questions or
connect to resources. Prior communication directly with counties before
an event occurs and not just coordination through state without
engagement of local government would improve this by establishing
relationships in advance. This could be even more effective by having
non-emergency regular opportunities for training and relationship
building.
Communication between federal, state, and local governments and
communication within FEMA posed challenges. Multiple examples
throughout the response showcase those challenges; a few include:
After receiving a phone call from FEMA to our EOC that
someone would be coming the next day and then seeing two days pass with
no arrivals, the county manager reached out to Congressman Edward's
office to ask who we could contact at FEMA because we were still
without support. A name and number were provided, and the county
manager called that number. She was then handed off because the
``internal affairs person'' for our county had changed multiple times
in the same day. Transylvania County staff communicated via phone and
email with the internal affairs liaison assigned to the county once
that person was finally identified. When the local government liaison
arrived in person, it was a different person than anyone who had been
identified days before, with no communication with us at the local
level that a change had occurred. We also found none of the information
we had shared prior had been passed to the new person. Details can be
found in the timeline attached.
The FEMA coordinator for our county arrived at our EOC on
day 9, but with no communication to indicate he was coming that day. He
began engaging with county staff to understand needs and submitting
reports into some system, but did not seem to be getting any answers or
information back. On day 13, the internal affairs liaison arrived with
no prior communication to the FEMA coordinator already there; because
the coordinator was unaware anyone else was coming, he could not
coordinate the meeting who had no prior knowledge of the arrival. This
prevented him from coordinating with our leadership.
The Sheriff for our county is part of county government
with the county manager, and his office is in the same building as the
EOC. On numerous occasions, the county manager was told that FEMA teams
were not going door to door, while Sheriff Chuck Owenby was receiving
phone calls from a FEMA representative in Washington, DC, telling him
teams were going door to door. This resulted in contradictory messages
being pushed out to county residents. Both leaders shared with FEMA
representatives that this was unacceptable, but the issue occurred and
even damaging to have mixed messages, but it occurred at least two more
times, and further confusion was only averted because the manager and
Sheriff were coordinating locally with each other to prevent the
contradictions from confusing the public. A FEMA representative from DC
also called Transylvania County dispatch asking racially inappropriate
questions referencing a racially charged incident has allegedly
occurred four days prior that was never reported or documented with
Transylvania County. See timeline and CAD report included in
attachment.
Transylvania County staff was given four different
instructions for how to submit possible housing sites and followed all
of them in the first six weeks after the storm. The concern over
housing challenges in the community was communicated in writing prior
to any FEMA staff arriving, because county staff were well aware of the
lack of rentals and the challenges with available housing prior to the
storm. County staff continued to raise the question about sites,
including an easily accessible campground in the federally owned Pisgah
National Forest and two private sites owners had offered for
consideration.
When county staff inquired about the status of the consideration
of these sites for housing, FEMA staff would provide a new, different
method to submit the sites for review, and there appeared to be no
continuity of information shared among FEMA staff. After the manager
requested weekly calls on housing with FEMA and NCEM representatives in
December, the first meeting began with a discussion of the status of
those sites being considered. The FEMA representative on the call
pulled up a database which did not have any of the sites submitted by
the county in it, meaning none of the site submittal pathways given
previously had worked. The lack of clear pathways and having to re-
explain community conditions around housing meant time and effort from
our team that could have been spent addressing other recovery issues.
Statement 6: Changing contacts and inconsistent handoff of
information established shaky infrastructure that impacted
communication, trust in partnership and efficiency. We had to re-
explain our local needs, challenges, culture and practical information
over and over again without getting answers to questions or progress on
addressing issues. A solid human resource infrastructure is necessary
to make collaboration effective.
The timeline included in this report reflects examples of FEMA
contacts being changed, often with no notice to the county EOC staff
that a change was being made. Additionally, staff handoff of
information was inconsistent, ranging from no transfer of information
at all to a written handoff report and coordinated meetings. When an
effective handoff occurred, it relieved local staff from the resource
drain of having to keep re-orienting new FEMA representatives. An
example of a handoff being well done in the timeline was Heather Long,
who organized a handoff meeting and prepared a status report to review
with the incoming replacement, as well as scheduling a meeting with
county staff to introduce the incoming replacement and ensure
information on challenges, current issues and needs was addressed in
the meeting. The re-orientation required by local staff when those
handoffs were not well facilitated was frustrating, time consuming and
demoralizing to county staff, in addition to stalling progress of the
response.
Statement 7: Conflicting guidance for public assistance process and
items eligible for reimbursement created confusion and frustration. It
also led to decisions being made on faulty information to spend local
funds or make decisions on resource usage based on erroneous
information that may create additional financial impact to the county
budget already impacted by the impacts of the disaster.
The impact of contradicting and changing guidance on the county has
been challenging and creates financial risk for the county. Guidance
about reimbursable expenses created additional resource devotion to
tracking expenses that would later be said could not be reimbursed.
Early direction included that the local volunteer fire departments had
to file their own public assistance only to find later that they could
have fallen under the county's effort, meaning they had to figure out
how to navigate that process or chose not to seek reimbursement due to
the amount of resources it would take to pursue it.
Some of the contradictions and financial impact to the county were
county resources used by FEMA and the Red Cross in the response. We did
not charge FEMA or Red Cross rent on any of our properties used for
shelters or DRC locations because staff recalled being told during a
meeting the County would be able to claim dates of use and be
reimbursed per square foot for the space used. This would offset
utilities and programs that had to be cancelled from those locations so
that those functions could occupy the space in response and recovery.
After the DRC closed and all shelters closed, we added this information
to our Cat B expenses and were then told this was not reimbursable
despite the earlier guidance. We were told by PDMG we should have
created a rental agreement with FEMA and Red Cross before they moved
into those spaces to recoup the cost of our operations. There is no
reimbursable claim for our facilities being inaccessible to regular
entities renting space or programs that had to be cancelled. We had
similar conflicting guidance on covering fees on behalf of survivors
for debris disposal, permit fees for repair and other expenses that
have a direct impact on county resources and budget.
Statement 8: The Just in Time training approach in the field was
frustrating because there was not anyone available with broader
knowledge and training, which impacted trust with county citizens. To
be effective, this training method requires a readily accessible lead
with a broader knowledge of disaster management.
An example of just-in-time training having an ineffective result
occurred with the FEMA teams sent to go door to door for applications.
County management was initially told the teams would be able to assist
people who had applied and either did not know the status of their
application or had been rejected and needed help. Instead, the teams
told residents they would have to call the FEMA 1-800 number for any
questions. Residents were not able to get through on the hotline and
reported waiting hours, only to get disconnected (possibly because
communications across the county were running on temporary cell
infrastructure due to the storm damage). In speaking with those on the
FEMA teams, we learned they had received ``just in time training'' and
were only trained to help fill out applications. They could not assist
beyond the form or even refer for assistance beyond the 1-800 number.
While just in time training can be an efficient tool for deployment of
resources, teams are ineffective if there is not someone deployed
alongside that has broader information and context to support the
services being delivered. The inability to assist beyond filling in
information on tablets and referring to the hotline frustrated citizens
and made them lose confidence in the FEMA support they were seeing.
Statement 9: Flexibility is required to meet unique needs in
different disasters. Our county's recovery depends on the ability to
address private roads and bridges, but decisions are made only to have
FEMA's guidance shift (i.e. recent letter on requirements). It is
unclear how the funding for this will be managed and what requirements
would be imposed on local government in the process.
Western North Carolina has many bridges and roads privately owned
and maintained. Initially private roads/bridges were not going to be
eligible for any FEMA assistance except through individual assistance
means. After consideration of the need in our area, FEMA changed course
and announced that funds could be used for repair of damaged private
roads and bridges, but processes and requirements are not yet clear. A
recent FEMA memo indicates these bridges and roads will be required to
have an engineer's certification stating the bridge/road was built to
the same or greater level than prior to the storm. No reliable records
exist on many of these bridges and roads, however, meaning it is
unreasonable to expect an engineer to be able to provide this
certification universally. Lack of clarity about how funds will be
administered, who will be responsible for holding bonds, guarantees or
where liabilities will fall mean that repairs are being delayed
further.
Statement 10: FEMA as floodplain protection ordinance enforcer and
FEMA as disaster response created conflicting purposes that were
logistical challenges to the county being effective at meeting the more
immediate needs in the community. Disaster funding assistance should
not be tied to having floodplain control ordinances and programs in
place as it has historically. The incentive for having floodplain
management programs should solely be eligibility for subsidized flood
insurance through NFIP in those communities. Early in the response,
staff for the Flood Management and Insurance section put pressure on
the county floodplain administrator to increase requirements on flood
victims and institute unrealistic requirements for repair permits to be
issued. Later in March, representatives from FEMA came to audit sample
assessments conducted by the county floodplain administrator
determining Substantial Damage or Non-Substantial Damage. Yet FEMA has
still not resolved all housing placements for those who qualify for
long term housing assistance from the disaster. The focus on compliance
and the threat of loss of NFIP status, without consideration of
immediate human needs, created contradictory priorities and additional
pressure on the county.
Transylvania County administers a floodplain protection ordinance
as required for the county to be eligible to receive funding and
support from FEMA in a disaster. After the storm occurred, many of our
residents were committed to staying at their property instead of using
TSA that would take them out of the area. To restore their damaged
homes to a livable condition, they were eager to make repairs.
Initially, our building inspections department that administers the
floodplain ordinance and our city planning department who also
administers a floodplain ordinance were told by FEMA staff that they
needed to require non-conforming structures to come into compliance
before permitting any repairs. The steps to raise a home or flooded
trailer include having a surveyor shoot base floor elevations and an
engineer design the measures to safely raise the structure. There were
no surveyors and engineers in the area available to even provide this
kind of service, and the process would require time that the pending
cold weather would not allow these families. Our staff witnessed
families throwing away all their possessions and desperately trying to
use dehumidifiers to make a safe place for their family to stay. I
toured a flooded mobile home with a woman who was 9 months pregnant.
Their outlets had been inundated, and there were volunteers eager to
assist in repair; but our staff was told we might endanger our NFIP
status if we did not require the floodplain compliance before issuing
permits to make those repairs. Another elderly man was still living in
his home even though mold had reached a foot high in the home, posing a
health hazard to him while awaiting repairs.
Our staff found a document issued by FEMA indicating we had
flexibility in the administration of repair permits and timeline of
compliance with floodplain ordinances. We decided to use temporary
occupancy permits to address the immediate need for healthy and safe
shelter over forcing immediate floodplain compliance. FEMA staff from
the floodplain administration side of the agency also put pressure on
our building department to propose an increase in base floor elevation
requirements in the ordinance, while the same department was in the
middle of trying to address immediate assessment and building
inspections needed to make homes livable for these families. The
proposed FEMA changes would have increased the standard those impacted
would have had to meet in the middle of the recovery.
An email included in this packet shows where a FEMA representative
advised the city staff that the county was trying to skirt the
ordinance because a county structure was being listed by the city as
having flooded to 50% damage. This occurred despite both photographic
evidence to the contrary and a sworn building inspector and a
contractor providing written letters that the building did not have
water above the basement of the structure. The push by these FEMA
representatives on floodplain ordinance issues--and even implied
threats of noncompliance and resulting ineligibility for future
disaster funding--worked directly against the most urgent mission to
restore safe shelter to affected families with winter weather pending.
NFIP eligibility should be enough incentive for local governments to
have floodplain administration ordinances, and assistance in a disaster
should not be held hostage over floodplain compliance. Forcing
compliance should never take precedence over meeting immediate needs in
a disaster. (Additional documentation attached in appendix.)
Conclusion: FEMA workers generally want to support communities in
disasters and are genuine in their desire to help, as evidenced by
their willingness to leave their own communities to come serve. Our
experience has been that the issues in process, protocol,
organizational structure, and ill-designed communication make those
employees' efforts less effective and efficient in meeting the local
community's needs. Improvements to the system and well thought out
methods of creating flexibility to meet the unique needs of an impacted
community will better serve those impacted in a disaster, as well as
those who work within the FEMA system. Our county is thankful for the
progress that has been made in response and recovery, but at the same
time we recognize that more positive impact could be achieved in a more
responsive and organized system. We appreciate the opportunity to share
our experience and feedback.
Appendices:
Appendix A: Timeline of FEMA communication through 11-2-24 and sample
communication challenges
Appendix B: Sample Documentation of Flood Management and Insurance
Challenges
Appendix C: Sample Documentation Challenges Specific to Housing
Appendix D: Sample Documentation of Conflicting Public Assistance Rules
from FEMA
Appendix E: Documented Example of Effective Handoff between FEMA
Liaisons by Heather Long
[Editor's note: The appendices, totaling 174 pages, are retained in
committee files and available online at: https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/PW/PW13/20250325/117940/HHRG-119-PW13-Wstate-LaughterJ-
20250325.pdf]
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady for her
testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garcia for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS,
ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
Mr. Garcia. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for having
me today.
My name is Adrian Garcia, and I am a county commissioner in
Harris County, Texas, and I am here on behalf of the National
Association of Counties where I serve as the cochair of the
Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force.
Among the many responsibilities entrusted to counties, we
are on the frontlines of disaster mitigation response and
recovery. Nearly 900 counties each year receive at least 1
disaster, Presidential disaster declaration. This results in
major economic losses, serious effects on communities, and
immense pressures on local resources.
Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency
managers are the first on the scene and play a key role in
recovery and rebuilding efforts so our residents can return to
their lives as quickly as possible.
As major owners and operators of public infrastructure,
counties are uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts of
disasters. America's 3,069 counties, parishes, and boroughs own
44 percent of public roads, 38 percent of the national bridge
inventory, over 900 hospitals, and directly support one-third
of the Nation's airports.
I am here today to underscore the county role in
strengthening our Nation against disasters and to discuss how
we can best work together to meet the challenges of today and
the demands of the future.
First, FEMA is crucial for communities before, during, and
after disasters. That said, inefficiencies in the Agency do
demand urgent reform. Disaster response, recovery, and
mitigation starts local and absolutely ends local. However,
these efforts would not be possible without the support from
critical Federal programs. One such program that counties rely
on is FEMA's Public Assistance Program.
PA is crucial for helping communities rebuild after
disasters, but the lengthy process to receive reimbursement can
delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to restore
critical services post-disaster.
Last year, NACo conducted a survey of its members that
concluded that one in five counties' longest open PA claim had
been in processing between 4 and 6 years. Counties urge
Congress to take decisive action to expedite funding from this
PA Program, ensuring communities receive the critical resources
we need for timely disaster recovery and rebuilding.
Second, removing barriers to funding and resources for
underserved and disadvantaged communities is absolutely
critical. Requiring the completion of complex and burdensome
paperwork by communities who are unfamiliar with the process
during the most stressful times of their lives can
significantly impede progress when it is most needed.
Populations that feel the biggest impact are often our
underserved and disadvantaged communities who lack the
resources and capacity to complete applications and meet
critical deadlines. Implementing plain language into
applications, reducing bureaucratic redtape, and identifying
resources available to assist applicants is paramount to
improving the overall resilience of our Nation.
Counties are supportive of bipartisan legislation like the
Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance
Simplification Act, which would streamline the application
process and reduce redundant paperwork.
Finally, counties understand that improving our Nation's
disaster system relies on a strong Federal, State, local
partnership. Counties are not merely stakeholders in this
conversation. Rather, we are a part of the Federal, State, and
local partnership of Government that together can work together
to share the responsibility of protecting our Nation and its
residents from disasters.
While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our
State and Federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools
like funding, human capital, and technical assistance.
Rebuilding our communities and making them more resilient is
only possible with the support of our Federal and State
partners.
Counties stand ready to work side by side with you to
improve our Nation's disaster response, recovery, and
mitigation capabilities to ensure the health, well-being, and
safety of our Nation and our residents.
Chairman Perry and Ranking Member Stanton, thank you again
for the invitation to discuss this critical issue on behalf of
America's counties.
This concludes my testimony, and I am happy to take any
questions. Thank you.
[Mr. Garcia's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County,
Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties
Introduction
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Association of Counties
(NACo), thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important
role counties play in disaster response, recovery and mitigation.
My name is Adrian Garcia, and I serve as a Commissioner in Harris
County, Texas. I also serve as the Chair of the Justice and Public
Safety Policy Steering Committee and Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental
Disaster Reform Task Force at NACo.
NACo is the only national organization that represents county
governments in the United States, including Alaska's boroughs and
Louisiana's parishes. Founded in 1935, NACo assists America's 3,069
counties in pursuing excellence in public service to produce healthy,
vibrant, safe and resilient communities. NACo works to strengthen
county resiliency by advocating for federal policies and programs that
help county leaders identify and manage risk and allow counties to
become more flexible and responsive to disasters. Through sustainable
practices and infrastructure, counties become better prepared to
address these issues in a manner that can minimize the impact on our
residents and businesses.
Harris County is home to over 4.8 million residents to whom we
provide critical services, including public safety and emergency
services, public housing, health and human services, transportation and
more. We predominantly rely on local property taxes to ensure our many
responsibilities are met; however, due to constraints on local revenues
that are enforced at the state level, a strong intergovernmental
partnership is critical as we work to meet the challenges of today and
plan for the future.
For example, in 2017 Harris County was struck by Hurricane Harvey.
This catastrophic event resulted in widespread flooding, affecting
approximately 300,000 structures and displacing thousands of residents.
The storm resulted in at least 89 fatalities in Harris County, with
many occurring outside designated flood zones, underscoring the
unpredictable nature of such disasters. The storm's unprecedented
rainfall overwhelmed our infrastructure, leading to significant
economic and social repercussions
More recently, Hurricane Beryl made landfall in July 2024, causing
extensive power outages that affected over 2.7 million households and
businesses. The prolonged loss of electricity, combined with extreme
heat, led to at least six heat-related fatalities in Harris County.
Paramount among other critical county responsibilities is the role
of counties in community preparedness. Counties are on the front lines
of defense before, during and after disasters strike. While state
statutes and organizational structures vary, local emergency management
responsibilities are most commonly vested in county governments.
Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency managers
are often the first on the scene and play a key role in the
coordination of local emergency management efforts. Other key county
staff involved in pre- and post-disaster efforts include local police,
sheriffs, firefighters, 911 call center staff, public health officials
and public records and code inspectors. In the aftermath of disasters,
we coordinate clean-up, recovery and rebuilding efforts so our
residents can return to their lives as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, because counties are major owners of public
infrastructure, we are also uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts
of disasters before they occur. Collectively, we own 44 percent of
public road miles, 38 percent of the National Bridge Inventory, 960
hospitals, more than 2,500 jails, over 650 nursing homes and directly
support a third of the nation's airports and public transit systems. We
also own and maintain a wide variety of public safety infrastructure,
including roadside ditches, flood control channels, stormwater culverts
and pipes and other infrastructure used to funnel water away from low-
lying roads, properties and businesses. Counties provide extensive
outreach and education to residents on water quality and stormwater
impacts prior to and following disasters, and we work to reduce water
pollution, adopt setbacks for land use plans and are responsible for
water recharge areas, green infrastructure and water conservation
programs.
Over the past 20 years, natural and man-made disasters have
increased in frequency, severity and cost. On average, 25 percent of
counties have experienced at least one disaster in each of the last
three years. In 2023, 849 counties experienced at least one federally
declared major disaster, 720 counties had at least one disaster
declaration and 312 counties had at least one emergency declaration
and. That same year, the nation experienced 28 separate billion-dollar
disasters, which totaled approximately $93 billion in damages.
As a result of this uptick in frequency and cost, NACo has launched
the Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force to strengthen our
nation's disaster mitigation, response and recovery capabilities. The
Task Force brings together county officials from across the country to
advocate for practical, common-sense reforms that improve disaster
response, recovery and mitigation. Given that counties are on the
frontlines of disaster management, our direct involvement in federal
policy reforms is essential to ensure that policies are practical,
effective, and address the unique challenges faced by local
communities. By having a seat at the table, counties can advocate for
streamlined processes and resources tailored to their specific needs,
leading to more resilient and prepared communities nationwide.
Counties are not merely stakeholders in this conversation. Rather,
we are a part of the federal-state-local partnership of governments
that together share the responsibility of protecting our nation and its
residents from both natural and man-made disasters. Like the federal
government, counties are entrusted by taxpayers to provide a variety of
important services to our residents, and we stand ready to work with
our intergovernmental counterparts to improve community resiliency and
mitigate the impacts of future disasters. To this end, counties offer
the following considerations:
1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for
disaster response and recovery, but operational challenges and
bureaucratic inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more
effective and equitable program delivery.
2. Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and
resources, particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities,
by providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.
3. County officials are effective stewards of federal investments,
and a strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the
entirety of our public sector responsibilities.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for disaster
response and recovery, but operational challenges and bureaucratic
inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more effective and
equitable program delivery.
Disaster response, recovery and mitigation starts local and ends
local. Counties across the country are currently managing large scale
recovery efforts, while simultaneously continuing to meet our daily
responsibilities around ensuring our communities remain safe and
resilient to the next disaster. While we are doing our part at the
local level, effective response and recovery efforts would not be
possible without the continued support from agencies like FEMA, who
administer programs that provide vital resources before, during and
after disasters. Without FEMA, state and local governments would face
significant challenges in recovering from disaster due to limited
resources and coordination capabilities.
However, FEMA's effectiveness is often hindered by inflexible
decision-making processes and excessive bureaucratic red tape,
highlighting the need for reform. The agency's layered approval
procedures and complex administrative requirements can delay the
delivery of critical resources to communities in need. We have heard
countless examples from counties about the challenges of navigating
FEMA's stringent application processes and slow response times.
Streamlining decision-making, increasing transparency, and reducing
unnecessary administrative barriers would allow FEMA to respond more
swiftly and effectively, ensuring communities receive timely support in
the aftermath of a disaster.
One such program that is in desperate need of reform is FEMA's
Public Assistance (PA) Program. PA is crucial for helping communities
rebuild after disasters, but the lengthy process to receive
reimbursement can delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to
restore critical services post disaster. Last year, NACo conducted a
survey of members that concluded that one in five counties (20 percent)
longest open PA claim had been in processing between four and six
years; almost a third of respondents (28 percent) reported processing
times exceeding six years. For counties with all outstanding claims
paid, the majority (71 percent) report typical turnaround times between
one and three years. Because PA operates as a reimbursement, the cost
of response efforts is paid upfront using county funds placing
significant financial strain on counties, who are often forced to take
out large loans to cover upfront disaster costs.
NACo has strongly supported the FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief
Act--passed by this committee in the 118th Congress--and a proposal
from the FEMA National Advisory Council to treat the first few months
of PA as a grant versus a reimbursement, which would dramatically
improve disaster recovery for localities. By offering immediate relief
through grants for the initial months, communities would have access to
essential funds more quickly, allowing them to respond to urgent
recovery needs without the burden of upfront costs. Additionally, the
FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief Act would reduce the financial
pressure on communities, allowing for any interest incurred on disaster
loans to be reimbursed by PA. These measures would help ensure that
recovery efforts are not delayed due to bureaucratic hurdles or
financial barriers, ultimately allowing communities to rebuild faster
and more effectively.
Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and resources,
particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities, by
providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.
Unfortunately, bureaucratic red tape follows a disaster. For
example, requiring the completion of complex and overly burdensome
paperwork by communities who may be entirely unfamiliar with system
protocols and who are attempting to undertake these processes during
the most stressful times of their lives can significantly impede
progress when it is needed most. Populations that feel the biggest
impact are often our underserved and disadvantaged communities where
resources and capacity to complete applications and meet critical
deadlines can be severely exacerbated.
Ensuring no communities are left behind requires reexamining
current procedures when applying for federal funding. Implementing
plain language into applications, providing clear timelines and
identifying resources available to assist applicants during the process
are paramount to improving the resiliency of our communities. Excessive
paperwork and lack of clarity can be particularly difficult for
jurisdictions who may be under resourced or dealing with co-occurring
disasters, as we saw with many parts of the country throughout the last
few years.
Counties have long supported legislation like the Disaster
Survivors Fairness Act (H.R.1245)--approved by this committee in the
118th Congress--and the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act (S.861).
These critical pieces of legislation would streamline the application
process for federal aid, reducing redundant paperwork and making it
easier for survivors to access the support they need. By improving
coordination between agencies and simplifying eligibility requirements,
these reforms would alleviate the administrative burden on those
recovering from disasters.
County officials are effective stewards of federal investments, and a
strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the entirety of
our public sector responsibilities.
Counties across the country are working daily to address the needs
of our residents and make decisions that drive the success of our
jurisdictions. While we are doing our part at the local level, 45
states limit the ability of counties to raise revenue in various ways,
making the intergovernmental partnership vital to meeting our public
sector responsibilities. Only 29 states authorize counties to collect
sales taxes, but almost always under various restrictions. 26 states
impose a sales tax limit and 19 require voter approval. For western
counties, who are at great risk of flooding and wildfires, state
restrictions on local revenues can be even more impactful, as much of
the land within western county boundaries is considered federal land,
thus removing the ability of a county to levy property taxes.
While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our state
and federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools, like funding
assistance, human capital and technical assistance. Without proper
federal and state support, county recovery and mitigation efforts may
lack the full capabilities necessary to rebuild our communities and
make them more resilient against future disasters. In an environment
where counties have limited financial flexibility, a strong
intergovernmental partnership is crucial to community recovery and key
to the success of future mitigation efforts.
With that in mind, Congress should prioritize legislation that
seeks to strengthen intergovernmental partnerships in disaster recovery
by enhancing coordination, streamlining communication and supporting
resource-sharing between all levels of government. By promoting pre-
disaster planning, simplifying aid processes and supporting local
recovery efforts, lawmakers can ensure a more effective and coordinated
response to disasters.
Conclusion
Counties are on the front lines of the pre- and post-disaster
efforts, and without proper federal assistance, recovery and mitigation
efforts may lack the full support necessary to rebuild our communities
and return the lives of our residents to normal.
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you again for inviting me to testify here
today.
Counties stand ready to work side-by-side with our federal and
state partners to make our communities more resilient and ensure the
health, well-being and safety of our citizens.
Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman, as well as
thanking all the witnesses for their testimony.
We will now turn to questions for the panel, and the Chair
recognizes himself for the first round of questions.
I am going to start with you, Ms. Laughter. I read through
a bunch of what you submitted. I will admit I didn't read
through every single bit of it. It is voluminous: emails and
correspondence. And as the county manager, I am not sure--maybe
you never thought about the mission of FEMA, but it is to
coordinate between the Federal agencies and, of course, State
and local agencies. But it was never designed to be the command
and control and do all the work, right. But that is kind of
what is expected of it now.
And it seems to me, as the person that is trying to figure
that out in the aftermath of this devastating disaster, like,
you don't have time to figure it out. You are just trying to
deliver, right.
I remember the two times we were flooded out of our home.
One time we stayed in the fire hall before we moved to a
neighbor's house that wasn't affected, somebody we didn't even
know just offered to come take us in. And then the other time
was at the township building.
And I am thinking about it, but it seems to me, as I read
through your correspondence here, much of your county didn't
even exist, right. There wasn't any--there might not have been
a township building, a fire hall, or a neighbor's house to go
to.
And so I am just wondering, from your experience, I mean,
you couldn't get answers even about a federally owned property
for which to place temporary housing on. You couldn't get any
answers on that, let alone the housing.
If you were going to give everybody here, which I think are
very interested in trying to figure out how to make this work,
what would be the one message--as a person who has lived
through it and experienced it and have been frustrated by it
and seen people like you described, living in trailers filled
with mold and having no prospect whatsoever of anything
changing any time soon, what would be the one message regarding
what FEMA--how it would be different in your eyes if it were
going to work?
Ms. Laughter. At local government, we were looking for
resources. We needed assistance, and what we could not find
were how to leverage those resources. The resources that we
were offered, like TSA, were very clearly not suited for my
community. And so I think the message that I would have is
that, number one, communication.
If there are resources being offered, we need to understand
what those terms are upfront so we can even evaluate whether or
not they are going to be effective in the community.
The second is, there has to be some responsiveness.
Wherever we identified issues, whenever we identified resources
like the Federal property, we had to follow up on that
ourselves.
We were living a disaster in our own lives. We were living
a disaster with our community, and yet we were having to follow
up repeatedly in order to try to get any progress or any
answers or even find out if our requests were being heard
anywhere.
I submitted that property no less than four times in four
different ways and still when I got on a call in November to
ask about housing, they pulled up a database, and none of those
requests managed to get into the database.
So I think the two messages are that the communication
structures have to be robust. They need to happen before the
disaster so that we know who even to call. And we also need to
know upfront how to use these resources or make those resources
more flexible so that whenever we identify what the needs are
and how that is going to play out in our community, we can use
them.
Mr. Perry. Do you have any indication at this point why it
took so long for FEMA to even show up? Like, right after this
happened, obviously everybody knows what has happened, but it
took days and days. And I think, it is my understanding, when
they finally did show up, they were headquartered like 90 miles
away, which is a fair drive, right, especially in bad
conditions.
Do you have any indication now what took them so long?
Ms. Laughter. I have never been given a reason. I can
hypothesize. I think the fact that we are on the edge of the
disaster was part of it. It is hard to get through the
mountains. You don't get places very easily.
The only other thing I can imagine is that our numbers,
like, for TSA did not look like they were high, which could
indicate on a data front point that we didn't need help, but
they weren't high because it wasn't an applicable solution for
Transylvania County.
Mr. Perry. Okay.
I have got a lot of questions and a little bit of time here
for each one of you.
Mr. Guthrie, you perfected I think or at least honed a
fraud prevention program in your State. Can you briefly outline
how that might be applicable to FEMA, because there is a huge
amount of fraud in the FEMA dollars that are spent, and we
would, obviously, like that not to be the case.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, for that question.
In Florida, we knew that there was the propensity to have
fraud, waste, and abuse, and what we did, starting about 2
years ago, we built a program that we want to get good,
structured data into our system that helps us get good,
structured data and it allows us to utilize large language
modeling machine learning and, to a certain point, some
generative AI to predict when we may have a duplicate payment
or the payment doesn't actually check the box for the contract.
In other words, a vendor has charged us more than they should
have.
So, again, it focuses from a standpoint of getting the
good, structured data into the system, and then we use machine
learning on the backside to do that. And we are detecting, just
in the recent months, we had three situations for about
$600,000 that we flagged for potential fraud, waste, or abuse.
And then we put eyes on that to then investigate it and correct
the anomalies that were in the invoices, and it was just that.
It was an anomaly in the invoices where we were charged a
different rate when we should have been charged a lower rate.
But it did end up saving taxpayer dollars just in the last
3 months, $600,000.
Mr. Perry. I appreciate the response.
I am way over my time. So I yield and recognize the
gentleman from Arizona, Ranking Member Stanton.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My first question is for Mr. Guthrie, Florida's executive
director for emergency management.
Florida is arguably one of the States most capable of
responding to disasters on its own, but you do rely on Federal
assistance from FEMA and the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, EMAC system, when responding to catastrophic events.
At yesterday's Cabinet hearing, Secretary Noem did indicate
her desire to eliminate FEMA. The President indicated support
for that plan to eliminate FEMA.
From your perspective, how would post-disaster outcomes for
Floridians be impacted if FEMA were eliminated?
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question.
At the end of the day, we need Federal support. I go back
to what you mentioned in your opening statement, sir. Federal
support, State managed, locally executed. We need to focus on
the State-managed part. That has been a part of that phrase
since Brock Long was the FEMA Administrator.
But we haven't focused on the State-managed piece. We keep
going back to the Federal Government. We need to focus more on
that State-managed piece and actually make sure we are managing
disasters at the State level we are allowing local levels to
execute in a commonsense approach while we need Federal
support.
Now, if that looks like a FEMA of the future, which I think
all emergency managers nationwide would agree, FEMA needs to be
reformed. That is a task that takes, obviously, Presidential
and congressional action to eliminate FEMA.
So we want to work with the Federal Government. We want to
work with the President. We want to work with the legislature
on what that looks like in the future.
But to the point, we do need Federal support. Florida can
probably handle 95 to 97 percent of what we do on a day-to-day
basis, but, for example, in Hurricane Helene and Milton, we
needed 1 million gallons of fuel. We went to FEMA. We went to
the Department of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency to
meet that need.
So, again, even a highly capable capacity State like
Florida from time to time needs Federal support.
Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.
Mr. Currie, the Federal law is very clear about the
qualification requirements for the FEMA Administrator. The
President has named Cameron Hamilton the senior official
performing the duties of Administrator.
In your opinion, does he possess the qualifications that
are legally required to run the Agency?
Mr. Currie. Well, we have actually been asked to look at
this and the legality of him serving in that role under the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act, which GAO has a role in that. And
so we will do that and have that result pretty quickly.
But I will say that the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act is pretty clear about the requirements for FEMA
Administrator. It requires two things. One is the person have
significant emergency management experience, and the other
thing is at least 5 years of executive experience. So that is
what the law says.
But I want to be very clear that the ideal state is have a
Senate-confirmed Administrator. The Senate confirmation process
is the process for vetting a candidate's experience and their
ability to do that job effectively.
Mr. Stanton. We saw in Katrina just how horrifically wrong
it can go if you have someone who is the head of FEMA who
doesn't have experience in emergency management. It is
critical. So we want to get that done as soon as possible.
Mr. Currie, in your role at the GAO, you understand the
risk of overhauling Federal programs without proper
consideration. FEMA underwent significant reorganization
without proper input from emergency managers before Hurricane
Katrina, and that did contribute to those tragic outcomes.
What should this administration and this Congress consider
to ensure that we don't cripple FEMA's lifesaving
responsibilities when attempting to reform this critical
agency?
Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir.
Like I said in my opening statement, we can't break what is
not broken, and the only people that can tell you that are our
first line emergency managers and responders.
There are things that work well in the current system. The
problem is, you don't hear good news often. There are things
that work. We want to keep those. We want to fix the things
that don't work.
The other thing I will say is we have to fix the root
causes. If we just move agencies, rename agencies, rename
programs, but don't fix the root causes, none of this is going
to change.
Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.
I want to go next to our local elected official, Mr.
Garcia. Can you also explain how disaster response in your
county would be impacted without access to Federal resources or
support after a disaster?
Mr. Garcia. Ranking Member, without access to Federal
resources or funding, our county's disaster response would
absolutely be severely compromised. Local governments simply
don't have the financial capacity or staffing to manage large-
scale recovery efforts, meaning vital services like debris
removal, infrastructure repairs, emergency sheltering would be
delayed or inaccessible.
Federal support is essential for ensuring a coordinated and
effective response, allowing us to restore public safety, and
meet the needs of our residents as quickly as possible.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields
back, and I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Ezell, for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Ezell. That is Ezell, and I appreciate that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here today.
Mississippi is no stranger to storms. Most notably, as we
have talked about, Katrina, where we lost the lives of over
1,300 people and $125 billion in damages.
In 2005, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act, which reestablished FEMA as a distinct
entity within DHS.
As we approach the 20-year anniversary of Hurricane
Katrina, I am still waiting for FEMA to respond to claims in my
district associated with this devastating storm. It is
unacceptable and a perfect example of how the Federal
Government has let our people down.
I am proud to have led, co-led, and passed several bills
that seek to improve FEMA. Bills like H.R. 2254, the Don't
Penalize Victims Act; H.R. 152, the Federal Disaster Assistance
Coordination Act; and H.R. 153, the Post-Disaster Assistance
Online Accountability Act.
I was thrilled when President Trump recently announced the
creation of the FEMA Review Council to evaluate FEMA
bureaucracy and disaster response. FEMA has spent $30 billion
in disaster aid each of the past 3 years, yet many disaster
survivors and taxpayers still lack the resources they need.
I have been working closely with FEMA to address
outstanding issues in my district, and I look forward to seeing
how we can improve the process for future disasters because we
know they are going to happen.
Before I get too far, I want to enter a document from St.
Charles Parish, Louisiana, reflecting some of the reforms we
have discussed for the Agency.
I want to ask Mr. Currie----
Mr. Bresnahan [interrupting]. Without objection, so
ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell
Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the
Subcommittee: Louisiana is no stranger to disaster. It has certainly
shaped who we are as people, strengthening our resolve and reminding us
to take care of our neighbors. As President of St. Charles Parish in
Southeast Louisiana, I appreciate the opportunity to share some of the
many challenges I've experienced firsthand with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) before, during, and after disasters. Thank you
for allowing me to share the experiences of Southeast Louisiana as you
consider critical reforms to this agency.
In recent years, St. Charles Parish and the State of Louisiana have
faced significant challenges due to natural disasters coupled with
skyrocketing insurance costs. Since 2020, five major storms hit the
State of Louisiana--Hurricanes Laura, Delta, Zeta, Ida, and Francine.
While we are unfortunately all too familiar with real-time emergency
management and disaster recovery, I believe this experience makes our
state a strong voice for the nation in shaping what federal emergency
management should look like moving forward and ensuring FEMA returns to
its core mission of helping people when disaster strikes.
One of President Trump's initial actions upon taking office this
year was to sign an executive order establishing the FEMA Review
Council. I applaud President Trump for taking bold actions early in his
administration to underscore the importance of restructuring this
agency. Just about anyone who has encountered FEMA knows all too well
there is plenty of room for improvement. I welcome the opportunity to
assist Congress in enacting real reforms to improve the federal
government's ability to better deliver assistance to those in need.
One program in particular is in dire need of attention and has
already negatively impacted tens of thousands of Americans, many of
whom live in Southeast Louisiana. The National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) has been essential in safeguarding American property owners
against the financial devastation of floods. However, time and time
again, we have been forced to fight with FEMA over the gross lack of
transparency in the NFIP, particularly with the disastrous Biden-Harris
enacted Risk Rating 2.0 system.
In 2023, I led a lawsuit on behalf of St. Charles Parish after we
were denied public records requests demanding the calculations behind
the Risk Rating 2.0 rate-setting system. Policyholders in my state have
seen their premiums skyrocket, with some expected to increase from $500
to over $5,000. It is outrageous that FEMA simply will not justify the
math that led to these premium hikes, even when subject to
Congressional inquiries. As FEMA itself expected, this policy has
forced hundreds of thousands to drop their coverage altogether, leaving
an alarming number of uninsured property owners in Louisiana and across
the nation and jeopardizing the financial stability of the entire NFIP.
This has led to deep mistrust of FEMA because the agency has
refused to say how local and state mitigation initiatives affect their
methodology. St. Charles Parish has invested millions of local taxpayer
dollars to construct new levees and pumps. Yet, we still have residents
priced out of their homes. Property owners implementing protective
measures often see little to no reduction in their premiums. This
oversight discourages proactive risk reduction and fails to reward
efforts that decrease overall flood risk. Instead, FEMA should work
with state and local governments to ensure their Risk Rating 2.0 model
accurately reflects our communities' real risk so we can direct
resources to mitigate, protect, and achieve affordable flood insurance
rates. As a public entity, FEMA must reveal the calculations that have
driven up prices and work with local leaders to implement a policy that
maintains affordability--a goal it has significantly strayed from under
the Biden-Harris administration.
Another problem that deserves the focus of the FEMA Review Council
is how to improve the federal government's ability to better deliver
assistance to those in need. The council should solicit input to
implement reforms that ensure the swift and efficient deployment of
FEMA aid to state and local governments, as well as to individuals and
businesses in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. I believe states
are better equipped to deliver disaster assistance. Currently, state
agencies are responsible for administering FEMA regulations. We need to
explore policy solutions that allow states to deliver aid efficiently
without the cumbersome bureaucratic processes and environmental reviews
that drastically slow recovery efforts when people are most in need. To
that point, St. Charles Parish is still waiting for millions of dollars
from Hurricane Ida in 2021. I firmly believe streamlining processes,
cutting red tape, and empowering state and local governments to act
quickly will accelerate recovery efforts, minimize economic losses and
alleviate the suffering of impacted communities.
As President of St. Charles Parish, I urge the Subcommittee to
consider the perspectives and recommendations of the local and state
leaders who have responded to and managed the recovery efforts in the
wake of natural disasters. By addressing the shortcomings of the NFIP
and enhancing the efficiency of FEMA's assistance programs, we can
better serve our communities in their darkest moments, ultimately
saving lives and livelihoods.
References:
E&E News. ``Hundreds of Thousands Drop Flood Insurance as
Rates Rise.'' 2024. https://www.eenews.net/articles/hundreds-of-
thousands-drop-flood-insurance-as-rates-rise/
WDSU. ``Louisiana Parish Leads Lawsuit Against FEMA Over
Flood Insurance Hikes.'' 2023. https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-
fema-flood-lawsuit/43700966
NOLA.com. ``How Much Will Your Flood Insurance Rise?
Check This Map.'' 2023. https://www.nola.com/news/environment/how-much-
will-your-flood-insurance-rise-check-this-map/article_acc5a67e-e458-
11ed-9482-438f8ebca9f2.html
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
Mr. Currie, the GAO has done a great job, has done great
reports, on the problems with Risk Rating 2.0. Each community
across the Nation has invested many resources to manage its
membership in the NFIP.
The primary issue with the Risk Rating 2.0 is a lack of
transparency regarding the algorithm. This results in
communities being unable to make decisions to target resiliency
projects, plan future growth, formulate effective policies, or
simply ensure that they are not wasting resources.
Its impact today is felt more than ever. With the rising
cost of housing, this policy hides the actual cost of home
ownership.
Mr. Currie, could you reflect on the damage and concerns
attached to the lack of transparency of Risk Rating 2.0?
Mr. Currie. Thank you.
FEMA has a huge challenge with the National Flood Insurance
Program. The idea behind Risk Rating 2.0 is the right one,
which is you want to assess each house's individual risk to a
disaster and not just assume that everybody in an area has the
same exact risk.
The challenge is that if your house is at higher rise, your
premiums are going to be higher. So they are trying to get the
program to the point of solvency or close to solvency because
it has never been solvent. It is $20 billion in debt.
And honestly, sir, it is up to the Congress now to decide
what they want this program to be. Do they want it to be an
insurance program, or do they want it to be a Federal disaster
assistance program?
As long as premiums do not cover the cost of the program, a
large portion of the flood insurance program is a disaster aid
program.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
What reforms could resolve the possible damage that Risk
Rating 2.0 can have on families and communities, in general?
Mr. Currie. Well, there are a number of different options
that have been put out there, for example, State or Federal
programs to help supplement homeowners of a certain income
level or a certain income threshold, just like we do with other
programs who are basically going to be priced out of a certain
market because they can't afford the flood--well, they barely
afford the mortgage and then barely afford the flood insurance
on top of that.
So there are a number of options like that, but,
unfortunately, there are no easy options that will drive down
the cost. It is going to be very expensive, and somebody has to
pay for the cost, either the taxpayer, the State, or the
Federal Government.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
Should some of the procedures within NFIP be standardized
and transparent to ensure that communities can effectively use
the resources?
Mr. Currie. Absolutely. I mean, that's key. And FEMA,
through its flood mapping project, should be very transparent
about the risk of each individual property. And so, I mean,
they have a long way to go in implementing this program and
making sure there is transparency.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
If I may have just another 30 seconds?
Mr. Bresnahan. No objection.
Mr. Ezell. In my home State of Mississippi and also along
the gulf coast, after the hurricane, FEMA just came in there
and blanketed just about the whole area that was flooded and
just moved all the flood maps.
Since then and since I have been in Congress, I have worked
tirelessly trying to get some sort of order back in place so
that we could--this is a once-in-a-lifetime storm, and it has
not happened again. And I've just got to say that it has been
very frustrating. They have the flood maps, but they don't know
how to implement them, and we are waiting for those things to
get implemented. And that is very frustrating to people who are
trying to buy, build, or have a life, a future on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast.
So with that, if you have any way that you can tell them to
hurry up and get those things adopted, we sure would appreciate
it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. McDonald Rivet, for
5 minutes of questions.
Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you very much.
I want to start just by thanking Chairman Perry and Ranking
Member Stanton for holding this hearing on what seems to be a
bipartisan level of frustration.
I represent a community in Michigan, Midland, Michigan,
that 5 years ago saw multiple dams fail after heavy rainfall.
In fact, I personally ran one of the evacuation centers. It
caused massive flooding and water levels reaching as high as 35
feet above normal levels.
Thankfully, no one died in that, which I actually just
think is a miracle. But it resulted in over $200 million in
damages, and not only did it decimate our infrastructure like
our roads and bridges, it destroyed homes that families have
lived in for generations and small businesses that families had
dedicated their entire lives to.
So here we sit 5 years later. Ms. Laughter, I hear your
story, and it just resonated so deeply with me. It is a
continuous struggle, a continuing struggling in order to
resolve the pieces that FEMA came in to help.
But what we see over and over again, like multiple Federal
programs, is that the intent of FEMA and the amazing people who
work there is dying under a cumbersome bureaucracy that is so
frustrating, particularly for local people who don't have the
experience of dealing with big Federal bureaucracies and are
just at the point of giving up.
Our local communities are owed hundreds of thousands of
dollars, which is nothing in a Federal budget but everything in
a local budget.
So I do want to just say that I understand the frustration,
but what I am not understanding is the suggested remedy, which
is a suggested elimination of FEMA and also the suggestion that
this actually can be solved at a local level if States and
locals would just budget more appropriately, which having been
a State senator on the Appropriations Committee, I can tell you
States cannot handle this just by budgeting, handling this on
their own and, in particular, when we are simultaneously
considering extensive cuts, including $880 billion from our
Medicare program. I mean, it just defies common sense.
But I do think we have to do something because we can't
tolerate this. And my local community still sits there and
waits, and I hope it doesn't take 5 years for you.
But I hear you, Mr. Currie, when you were talking about,
okay, what can we do. We know that block granting is also a
very difficult solution because most Federal block grants,
again, as a State appropriator, come with burdens, like
incredibly complex and burdensome regulations.
But you said, let's address the root causes. Everything
isn't broken. But I didn't hear you say what those root causes
are, and I would love to hear them.
Mr. Currie. Sure.
Let me take the grant issue. And so a lot has been talked
about recently about switching FEMA to a block grant. I am not
so much as concerned with the name of the grant. A block grant
just means, theoretically, that you provide all the funding
upfront, and the State manages it instead of the Federal
Government holding the money and doling it out slowly, which is
what the FEMA process is.
The root cause is that the process is too complicated, and
there are too many rules and overlapping requirements and
inconsistency for the years that go on with recovery.
Turnover in staffing plays into this, too, and different
cultural changes at FEMA. So the problem is that you have an
infrastructure project that could take 10 to 15 years to
rebuild, and all throughout there are cost changes, and you
have to go back and forth to the Federal Government. It is
very, very confusing.
I think what we are trying to do is we want to come up with
something where the Federal Government still provides the
support that the States will never be able to come up with,
like you said, but it does so in a way that they provide it to
the States where there is flexibility, but there is still the
appropriate oversight and control. And that is the balance you
are trying to strike.
With block granting, you give up some of the control at the
Federal level and the oversight, but you give the States more
flexibility. But you don't design the block----
Ms. McDonald Rivet [interrupting]. I am sorry to interrupt
you, but I am aware of my time. I just want to say, in your
experience, and I know this is a bit of an unfair question, but
have you ever seen a Federal-to-State block grant that did not
come with its own set of rules and overlapping requirements?
Mr. Currie. It does. But we have to build it better in this
case. So, for example, with the Community Development Block
Grant, disaster recovery, one of the challenges with that is,
is that you try to build the whole program upfront and then
turn it over to the States, and that takes too long.
So the money doesn't get there quick enough. We have to
build this system and the rules and requirements upfront, get
the States up to speed on it, get everyone familiar with the
process, build their system, so they can manage this amount of
money so it can be turned over much quicker. And that is very
possible to do.
Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I
recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Kennedy, for 5 minutes
for questions.
Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Stanton. And today's hearing is more than just about
FEMA reform. It is about shifting the center of gravity away
from bloated Federal bureaucracy and toward capable States that
are closest to the people that they serve.
In Utah, we know how to do more with less. We invest wisely
and build strong partnerships between the State and local
governments. That same principle--clear, locally led
coordination between State and local governments--should guide
how we approach emergency management across the country.
Whether it is wildfires in California, hurricanes in the
Southeast or earthquakes and flooding risks in Utah, we must
ensure the Federal Government is a reliable partner, not a
bureaucratic bottleneck. FEMA should be empowering States and
counties, not burying them under redtape.
When agencies grow too large and too distant from the
people they serve, they lose the ability to act with urgency,
efficiency, or local understanding. Emergency management is
just one example, but it is a critical one.
I support President Trump's Executive order establishing
the FEMA Review Council. We need that top-to-bottom review, and
I look forward to working with the committee to play a leading
role in it.
I had a few questions for--we will start with Mr. Currie
and Mr. Guthrie. We have talked about block grants and both of
you have mentioned that in your testimonies.
Can you give me some more specifics about if we were to do
something like that, how would you do that without fraud,
waste, and abuse, but also cut the redtape and allow that money
to be used immediately? And start with you, Mr. Currie.
Mr. Currie. Yes. Sure. Well, I think there is a
misconception that with a block grant that there is no
oversight; that Congress appropriates the money, and they write
a check to the State, and it's done. That is not how it works.
Most block grants, the State and the Federal Government
work together to develop very specific rules and requirements
and controls and audit processes. It's just more of the money
is delivered upfront. So it is going to take some time, if you
develop this into a block grant, to train and build the States'
capacities. Some States, like Florida, probably is going to be
very quick; other States it is not, other communities it is
not.
And so it is possible to do this. But I also think this
needs to be very different than other block grants that we have
created before.
Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question. And it somewhat
goes to the previous Congresswoman's question as well.
I will give you two examples of where we can really speed
this up. Number one, environmental historical preservation. In
the emergency management community--I have several State
directors sitting behind me--that is where projects go to die.
It could take 4 to 6 years to get that done.
Every State has an environmental and historical
preservation officer. Why are we duplicating effort on that?
Let the State do their job, let us document the file and put
that as a part of the file. We can speed that process up by at
least 90 percent savings and time.
I will give you another example. The Consolidated Resource
Center. I would move to abolish the Consolidated Resource
Center. Again, that is where people send us RFIs, numerous
RFIs, hundreds of RFIs, requests for information. Again, the
State is responsible for managing its grant. Whether it is a
block grant or if it is a traditional grant, we do that.
But the number of RFIs that come out--and one of our
individuals from Alabama talked about he literally had to give
some type of minute piece of information in a debris removal
claim. That's insane.
So those are two examples of where that is already
happening at the State level. To document those State actions,
it should be a part of the file, and we move on.
Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you for those suggestions.
And, Mr. Garcia, if I could ask you a question about the
counties. And I agree with the potency of counties, and I think
that was a big part of your statement.
The question that I had is, is the hierarchy that you would
consider associated with counties? Because the Governor is
generally in charge of the State.
The idea of the Federal Government, for example, giving
grants to a county directly and subverting the role of the
Governor, I am curious how you would--if you were to see
Federal funds flowing, would you have those funds go directly
to counties, or would you have them go to the Governor and
subsequently to the counties? What is your thought about that?
Mr. Garcia. Well, some counties have capacity like Harris
County. We are very fortunate in that regard. But not everybody
does. And so we absolutely need to find ways to work with both
entities where you work through the States in some regards.
But, for example, in places like Oregon, Oregon is a State
that has experienced some delays in reimbursements for the
recovery process, but places like Hamilton County has had to
suspend current bids because they are just struggling with some
of that process. But I think you find ways to work both with
the counties and the States who have capacity and some who
struggle with it.
Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you very much for that answer.
Mr. Chair, I am committed to helping bring common sense and
efficiency to this program. It is an essential program, but I
think there are better ways that we can do that. And thank you
to the witnesses for their willingness to come and educate us
about this.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
recognize the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes
for questions.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much. Earlier, the ranking member
of the full committee mentioned--and I appreciated it--the
Disaster Survivors Fairness Act that I have introduced with my
colleague from North Carolina, Representative Edwards,
Republican.
This would streamline Federal assistance for disaster
victims and expand FEMA's authority to help make homes more
resilient for future disasters. I am pleased that NACo endorsed
this legislation. It was a pleasure speaking to you,
Commissioner Garcia, and other members of NACo about this topic
earlier.
In your testimony, you urge Federal policymakers to remove
barriers to funding and resources for underserved and
disadvantaged communities. How would creating a universal
application for individual disaster assistance help in that
effort that you mentioned?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you for the question. The reality is that
making sure that the barriers were removed, as I mentioned in
my testimony, is very, very important. It is critical that we
make it plain language, as suggested in the two pieces of
legislation that I have mentioned, the survivors and
simplification acts. Those speak to the challenges that many of
our underserved and disadvantaged communities struggle with.
Ms. Titus. Okay. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate the
support. I was looking for a little more detail on how it will
be helpful, but that is good enough.
I represent Las Vegas, and we don't have a lot of
hurricanes in Las Vegas except we could probably make one if we
decided that would be a tourist attraction. But anyway, one of
the weather hazards that we do have is extreme heat. And this
past year, we had the hottest day ever in Las Vegas, 120
degrees.
And statistics from the National Weather Service show that
heat kills more people than hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes
combined in any given year. There were over 520 heat-related
fatalities in Clark County last year alone. So I have an
Extreme Weather and Heat Response Modernization Act so FEMA can
more aggressively include extreme temperatures, especially
heat, in its disaster planning and have the resources to deal
with it.
I wonder if all four of you would take a minute just to
talk about how extreme heat is impacting the communities you
serve and how this would be helpful. Maybe we start with Mr.
Currie.
Mr. Currie. Sure. I am familiar with the statistic you
mentioned, too, that heat kills more people than all the other
disasters combined.
The challenge right now for FEMA is the whole system relies
on quantifying damage to figure out if they provide help. And
heat is a very difficult thing to quantify in their current
system.
I agree with you that there is no better thing to quantify
in terms of an impact and loss of life. But right now, their
declaration process relies on damage to infrastructure, and it
is very hard to show acute damage to infrastructure from heat.
And so that is one of the reasons that you don't see more
disaster declarations. So I think we are going to have to look
at that if we are going to change it.
Ms. Titus. Kind of hard to say when it starts and when it
stops, like a storm or something.
Mr. Currie. Yes. And it does damage infrastructure.
Ms. Titus. Yes.
Mr. Currie. I mean, it damages roads, bridges. I mean, it
is just harder to quantify it acutely because it happens, like
you said, over a long period of time.
Ms. Titus. Railroads. Anybody else?
Mr. Guthrie. We do have extreme heat situations inside of
southeast Florida, specifically Miami. But this is a great
example of the federally supported, State managed, locally
executed.
In southeast Florida, they plan for that as a part of their
hazards that they respond to on a local level, and they do that
on a day-to-day basis when we have those issues. If they need
assistance from the State, they ask for assistance from the
State. So the system does work in Florida.
Ms. Titus. With cooling stations and things like that?
Mr. Guthrie. Yes.
Ms. Titus. I think the chairman mentioned it wasn't a good
idea to plant trees to offset heat islands. I couldn't disagree
more with that. But anyway--so locally you are doing some
things?
Mr. Guthrie. Locally. Southeast Florida, southwest Florida,
those counties approach it differently. But they are locally
executing on that situation.
Ms. Titus. Anybody else real quick?
Mr. Garcia. I do want to offer that in my precinct, just as
an example, I have a public works department. We absolutely and
my staff told me that the heat damage can be identified in
various pieces of infrastructure. But as it was stated, it is
very difficult to quantify.
But we do know that extreme heat is an issue for many of
our NACo members, and we do have data that we can pass along to
you to help craft some thoughts around that issue.
Ms. Titus. That would be great. I know our ranking member
represents the Phoenix area, and we share some of these common
problems. So that would be very helpful.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, for 5
minutes for questions.
Mr. Kiley of California. Good morning. Mr. Guthrie, I
commend the work you have done in Florida to strengthen your
State's capacity to respond to disasters quickly and
effectively and to thereby mitigate and minimize the threat to
life and property.
Unfortunately, my own State of California has not been
quite so forward-looking in terms of its disaster response
capabilities, and this was put on shocking display for the
whole world with the recent tragic catastrophic fires in Los
Angeles, as we bore witness to an empty reservoir, to fire
hydrants that wouldn't release water, and other basic failures
of preparedness for which the residents of Los Angeles are now
paying such a high price.
So do you have, number one, some best practices that you
might share with our State for how it can do better in the
future, and, number two, thoughts on how the ongoing effort to
reform FEMA might actually itself help to spread those sort of
practices?
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
First and foremost, in Florida, we do not respond based on
whether or not we are going to get federally reimbursed. The
Governor of the State of Florida, the legislature, support
emergency management holistically, and they expect us to
respond not worrying about if we are going to get reimbursed or
not.
Unfortunately, not every State, every city or county has
that option. They have to wait to respond to see if they are
going to meet a threshold or so on to seek FEMA reimbursement.
I think another thing that was very, very obvious to me in
that particular disaster is you had the local officials, such
as a fire chief, sheriff, and things of that nature, but
nowhere on that dais or that podium did you see the emergency
manager. They were treating it as--in my opinion, sir, they
were treating it as still a fire. They were treating it still
as a traffic issue.
They had a much more complex issue, and I know that Nancy,
the California State director, was involved. But, again,
emergency management was not there on the day. The Los Angeles
County Emergency Management director was buried in the back. I
never saw the city of Los Angeles Emergency Management
director.
And this is more of a systemic problem across the country,
in that, what is emergency management? That is something our
own national emergency manager's association is grappling with,
and we are going to try to help define for Congress and others
in the future is, what is emergency management. We could all
agree that this is what emergency management does.
I think those are some of the issues. As far as FEMA goes,
I know that Regional Administrator Bob Fenton was there, and he
was heavily involved during that timeframe in the Hurst fire
that you speak of. FEMA was present.
However, again, State managed, getting it to the point
where you can get that State involvement very early on, working
with your local emergency managers to push funding down, start
doing the things--for example, in the Hurst fire, the attorneys
paralyzed that response worried about the environmental hazard
that was going on to clean up the debris. We deal with that
every single day across this country. We know what to do. Let
us separate it, let us put it in the appropriate landfill--tier
1, 2, or 3--based on the hazardous material, and let us move
forward.
Do not stop the operation because there is hazardous
material. We deal with that every single day.
Mr. Kiley of California. Thank you. That is a great
insight. And I should mention, the individuals you mentioned,
Mr. Fenton, Ms. Ward, work well with my office. It is clearly a
systemic issue here that we need to reform.
Mr. Currie, a question I had for you is that some of the
grants that FEMA makes available for sort of predisaster
efforts--like the BRIC grants, the PDM grants--they don't allow
for predisaster water infrastructure for fire suppression to be
an eligible use; so, fire hydrants, upgrading lines, tanks that
would actually sort of be critical in some cases for immediate
response.
And this is important for several communities I represent
that are high fire risk, such as the Tahoe Basin. And, in fact,
the Caldor fire, which is 2021, one of the factors that was
cited for why it didn't ultimately engulf communities in South
Tahoe was the availability of water infrastructure for fire
suppression.
So why is it that that is not an eligible use, and is that
something you think we ought to change?
Mr. Currie. Yes. What I found over the years is that a lot
of times when people say it is not eligible under FEMA, it is
just because it was not approved. There is not a law or a
requirement that says they can't do it. All these mitigation
programs rely on the State or the local government to provide a
justification or a benefit-cost analysis to FEMA, and then FEMA
decides based on all the other project requests it is getting,
if it meets their threshold. And then in that case, they
didn't.
It's not that it's not allowed. It's just that--and this is
a very common problem with these mitigation issues. These are
very complicated projects, and FEMA oftentimes--the paperwork
required to get the approvals is just extremely difficult.
And if you are a large county or a large State with the
capacity to do that, then you might have the resources to put
that together. If you are a smaller county or a Tribe or
something like that, you don't have the resources to put a good
justification together, so you don't get the funding.
Mr. Kiley of California. I know we are a little over time
here. But just to clarify, are you saying that for PDM and BRIC
grants, that is an eligible use; it is just a matter of where
the threshold is set, or is there a needed----
Mr. Currie [interrupting]. I will go back and check on the
requirement. I am just saying that what I found is a lot of
times when it is deemed ineligible or it is not approved, it is
because FEMA--it doesn't meet some sort of cost-benefit
threshold as opposed to that specific kind of project not being
able to be approved. It is just they haven't demonstrated that
the benefits are going to exceed the cost.
Mr. Kiley of California. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Friedman, for 5
minutes for questions.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you very much. And I want to thank the
witnesses for their testimony, being here.
I have to say that it is hard as a Los Angeles Congress
Member sometimes to hear Los Angeles, at the time when it is
reeling from disasters and when victims are still living in
hotels, somehow seeming to be blamed for their own disaster.
I really appreciate Mr. Guthrie's response to Mr. Kiley's
question about what California could do better, because it is
important that we do evaluate our response to disaster, do
audits to make sure that we improve. And so your very good
suggestions about disaster management are something that I am
very interested in, and I appreciate your saying them.
I do feel that I have to respond a bit about the idea that
somehow these fires were caused because of not having pressure
in hydrants or reservoirs being empty. Yes, a reservoir was
down for repair, and we should always look at what our
timetables are, and fire hydrants were not designed to put out
a thousand fires in a residential neighborhood simultaneously.
There is not a fire system in this country that would be able
to function adequately under those kinds of conditions.
But due to what's happening with climate change and
changing conditions, we are going to have to look at our
infrastructure and make investments to counter conditions that
this country has never seen.
I grew up in Florida. And my entire childhood, I believe
there were two hurricanes, my whole childhood. And now we see
multiple hurricanes every single year.
So we have extreme weather events happening around this
country, and we have got to make investments in our
infrastructure and our emergency response to counter that. And
we can't pretend that it is not because of climate change as
well. And so efforts that we can make in this body to slow that
change down are also going to help save lives.
So, I have been working on fire issues for many, many years
in the California Legislature. California has invested hundreds
of millions of dollars over the past several years, year after
year, to beef up our response to, add more resources for
fighting fires, for fire resiliency, and we saw those resources
deployed in these fires with hundreds and hundreds of
firefighters on the line, more air response than we have ever
seen in this Nation's history; where really hurricane winds
driving embers in a time of year that normally is wet, and with
record dryness instead.
And we are going to, unfortunately, have to keep putting
those resources on the ground. Now, I have introduced my first
two bills around supporting wildfire victims with the Don't
Penalize Victims Act, which would ensure that charitable
donations are not used to unfairly penalize victims of natural
disasters. I appreciate the members of this committee to making
that a bipartisan bill.
We also have introduced a Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act
to stop price gouging around this country after natural
disasters.
I also believe in holding FEMA accountable. We have had a
lot of concerns in Los Angeles around air quality, soil, and
water pollution because of these disasters, and I would love to
see FEMA doing more monitoring on a regular basis so that the
people in Los Angeles know whether or not they need to take
precautions if they send their kids to school in Pasadena or if
their water has been contaminated or whether or not they can
plant things in their garden if they are worried that their
soil has become contaminated. We haven't seen FEMA take that
seriously, and I would like to see that happen.
I do have a quick question about disaster aid, and we have
heard a little talk about that. But, unfortunately, this
administration has said that they want to hold Californians
accountable, and that they, I think, want to punish the people
of California, not for anything about their response, but just
because this administration doesn't like their policies around
things like voting rights or around our commitment to
diversity.
So I have a simple yes-or-no question. For Ms. Laughter,
when Hurricane Helene hit North Carolina last year, did
President Biden condition disaster aid against major policy
changes in that State? It was a yes-or-no question.
Ms. Laughter. No.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you.
Mr. Guthrie, when Hurricane Milton hit Florida last year,
did President Biden condition disaster aid on the people of
Florida?
Mr. Guthrie. No.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I would
hope that this administration does not play games with people's
lives.
Lastly, I want to ask about staffing. FEMA has been on the
ground in Los Angeles helping people, and they are very
grateful that there are FEMA officials there. I am very worried
about the mass layoffs that we are seeing to public employees,
and I have had people in Los Angeles say, when I show up to
that office, are there going to be enough people there to help
me?
I want to know whether you think workplace cuts are going
to make it easier or harder for people after a disaster to get
a live person on the phone or someone to sit in front of them
and help them out with whatever issue they have. I will start
with Mr. Garcia, I think.
Mr. Garcia. Absolutely, workforce depletions do bring
challenges. Local communities and NACo county members need in
many regards that human capital that brings that technical
assistance that helps to get the funding necessary to help
those communities recover and rebuild.
So we do need the people behind all the other Federal
guidelines and framework.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you. Mr. Currie, would you like to
respond?
Mr. Currie. It is not going to help. That is my easy
answer.
FEMA will always marshal the resources towards response and
the disasters that have just happened. What the cuts do is it
affects the disasters that happened 6 months ago, 1 year ago, 6
years ago. So it is a cumulative effect because of how many
disasters they are dealing with.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
Some of my professional background lends a voice to this
topic. In my previous life, I worked in the heavy highway
construction, and my family company partnered with States and
local communities on all efforts, like rebuilding Interstate I-
95 after the tragic collapse. We also worked in Fort Myers
after Hurricane Ian, rebuilding power distribution systems
where I saw firsthand the devastation and how locally executed,
State-managed, and federally supported programs could be
exceptionally beneficial. I have also seen how bureaucratic
redtape can impede relief.
During COVID, FEMA offered grants to hospitals to address
challenges, like finding adequate PPE and medical supplies, as
well as address workforce shortages. Even though the public
health emergency ended nearly 2 years ago, Pennsylvania
hospitals are still waiting on $690 million in grant
applications.
In September of 2023, Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties in my
district experienced historic flooding. Our State emergency
agency estimated the damage to be $25 million, including the
loss of lives. In April of 2024, FEMA denied the State's
request for major disaster declaration.
As GAO points out, there are more than 30 Federal entities
involved in disaster recovery. This was a clear sign to
Pennsylvania that we can't always count on the support of FEMA
for disaster relief, which brings me to my questions on how
States can best prepare for and deliver relief before, during,
and after disasters.
So my first question for Mr. Guthrie, in your written
testimony, you discuss Florida's Division of Emergency
Management implementing emergency standby contracts as part of
your proactive management strategy.
How can States replicate this practice to have dedicated
vendors on standby ready to deploy for various types of natural
disasters that States can experience?
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question, sir. It is very
easy to do.
These are zero-dollar contingency contracts put in place
where we already know who the bidders are. One of the issues
with FEMA is, when you need a--for instance, a direct housing
program, they have to then go to contracting right then and
there. We know we are going to need direct housing all over
this country. We should have that already done so that that
speeds that process up by months.
We have done that in Florida. I will make it available--as
I have already told my partners from other States, I will make
all of our contracts available as a starting point to take the
scope of work, copy and paste it, put it into their terms and
conditions and fast forward that methodology for any State, any
city, or any county that wants to do that, sir.
Mr. Bresnahan. So not all disasters can be predicted. What
are some best practices Florida uses to have flexibility with
these contracts to ensure adequate response from vendors while
protecting taxpayer money?
Mr. Guthrie. So I have some of the best attorneys in the
world. They always get to a yes. And what they allow us to do
is they advise me of risk where we may be getting outside the
four corners of a document, or they will get me to a yes where
I can stay within the four corners of the document so that I
don't have to do another emergency procurement to get into the
four corners of the document.
And those that are attorneys understand what I am saying
there. That is one way; having a good attorney that knows their
job, which is to advise the principle on risk versus reward.
Sometimes we have to take the risk. And knowing the
consequences of that ahead of time, it is always good to have a
good attorney for that.
Mr. Bresnahan. Mr. Guthrie, Ms. Laughter, and Mr. Garcia,
when communities suffer from disasters, it can also be an
opportunity to build back stronger, more resilient
infrastructure. But oftentimes, we see 21st-century communities
being rebuilt with 20th-century infrastructure.
How have your respective States and counties engaged in
long-term planning to ensure rebuilt infrastructure is more
resilient, more secure, and incorporates the latest in digital
technologies and digital infrastructure? Mr. Garcia, Honorable
Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. In Harris County, we are absolutely
putting the Federal resources that we have been fortunate to
receive into resilient initiatives. For example, in Harris
County, we received $51 million to help with the buyout program
to take people out of flood-prone areas. And we are doing a
whole lot more to make sure that resilience is at the top of
our work process.
Ms. Laughter. We are interested in any way that we can
improve for the future. I think one of the things that has to
be taken into account, though, is that whenever we receive
grants or we receive support from Federal or State agencies, if
there are restrictions around that that make it harder for us
to make decisions and make those investments, then it becomes
counterproductive.
Mr. Guthrie. So we have done a comprehensive reform on
this. We have come out with Florida legislation that preempts
cities and counties from doing bureaucratic things when it
comes to permitting. That is one thing that we have done.
We have worked with the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes and
the national BuildStrong Coalition for ensuring we have good
building codes. We have the best building code in the United
States, and strong building codes do work. You can see that all
up and down our coastline.
Those are just a couple of examples that we have done where
we have been able to do this much faster.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you for the testimony and your time,
and I yield back.
I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi,
for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for the issues that you are raising. I would like to just pick
up on what Ms. Friedman was referring to earlier and make sure
that we fully understand where we are with requirements in
order to receive FEMA assistance.
Mr. Currie, is there any example in the past where a FEMA
assistance program, disaster assistance, was conditioned on in
any number, in any way? Are you familiar with any of that?
Mr. Currie. I am not familiar. The only thing I would be
familiar with is if it is conditioned on using that for
resilience purposes, for building back better than it was
before.
Mr. Garamendi. I do want to come to that.
Mr. Guthrie, you answered no to the question that Ms.
Friedman raised about conditions. Is it your view that there
should be conditions for the emergency assistance being
available to a disaster area? Should there be preconditions?
Mr. Guthrie. There should not be preconditions. However,
again, to the mitigation piece, benefit-cost analysis, should
we be applying a BCA to a situation where we want a house out
of the flood plain, we want to build a house stronger; just
because we meet a number, does that make sense? I don't think
so.
So I think there should be some preconditions to some
programs that say we should waive this or we should make this
stronger.
Mr. Garamendi. Fair enough. And I would appreciate your
coming back with the specifics that you are referring to.
Certainly, flood, we have been in and out of that for the 15
years I have been here; and, yes, we are making some progress.
The other area that I want to go to deals with the GAO
report. You had 60 recommendations in the GAO report. It would
seem to me that this committee would be--its time would be very
usefully spent going through those.
Mr. Currie, in your testimony, you highlighted, I think,
four specific areas. I would like you to revisit those in the
next minute or so, the four priorities that are on your mind
for the legislative policy changes that this committee should
spend time on--that you believe we should spend time on.
Mr. Currie. Yes. Those 60 recommendations cut across four
areas, as you said. First is streamlining the Federal disaster
recovery process because it is fragmented.
Mr. Garamendi. Fragmented among multiple agencies.
Mr. Currie. Exactly; 30 agencies, to be sure.
Better delivering disaster aid to survivors, making that
easier for individual survivors.
Reforming the FEMA workforce is number three.
And then number four is using our resilience dollars and
making resilience programs easier to navigate for State and
local governments.
Mr. Garamendi. All right. And in each of those areas you
had specific ways in which the improvements could be
accomplished, that is, legislative.
Mr. Currie. Yes, absolutely. Well, actually, 2 years ago,
before the reform discussions even started, we recommended that
Congress set up its own commission to look at disaster
recovery, because we were so frustrated that the agencies for
years, we were making recommendations, they weren't
implementing them. And also, this issue cuts across so many
committees of jurisdiction. So it is rare that we recommend
something like that, but we thought the problem was large
enough that it was warranted.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, you have given me direction on how I
should spend my time, and hopefully the committee would
similarly spend time on the details of each of these,
streamlining multiple Federal agencies, maybe eliminate or at
least change the way in which they, presumably, should work
together.
Individual Assistance Programs, could you be a little more
specific about that?
Mr. Currie. Well, changing our aid programs to the
individual survivor from being Government centric to customer
centric. And what I mean by that is, right now, the survivor
has to extract the money out of the Federal Government through
a lengthy, frustrating process. And because of that, they don't
get everything they could possibly get.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie, you are nodding your
head, and the rest of you would think this is something we
ought to deal with?
Mr. Guthrie. Yes, sir. I mean, the mere fact that a
homeowner may have to wait 4, 5, or 6 years to get back to
where they need to be. What we want, all of us want, is that
homeowner back on their property in their home.
Mr. Garamendi. I am almost out of time. For the four of
you, if you could present to the committee, and certainly to me
and my colleagues, the specific kinds of reform that you think
are most necessary on the Individual Assistance.
On the workforce, we have already talked about the current
reductions in workforce, and there has been a discussion on
that.
With regard to resiliency, FEMA does have a bit of a
problem in that build back better is not in their lexicon, at
least in the regulations that they administer. So we need to be
aware that we need to change and encourage FEMA to look to
resiliency that is really do build back better, more details.
I am out of time. Thank you very much, gentlemen and lady.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Onder, for 5 minutes
for questions.
Dr. Onder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Currie, the GAO has conducted numerous audits of FEMA's
disaster relief spending. Has your office identified instances
where FEMA funds have been used to provide aid to illegal
immigrants, whether it be housing assistance or otherwise, and
could you provide examples?
Mr. Currie. Yes. We did a report a year or two ago--I will
have to get back to you on the specifics--on the Emergency Food
and Shelter Program, which, as you know, Congress authorized
that program for FEMA to provide assistance to cities to help
support the influx of migrants.
Dr. Onder. Okay. Do you recall when Congress authorized
that program?
Mr. Currie. It was in the last Congress, but I have to get
back to you on the details.
Dr. Onder. It was 118. Okay. Okay. Given FEMA's mission to
assist American citizens and legal residents, are there
oversight mechanisms currently in place to ensure that funds
are used appropriately for disaster recovery as opposed to
being diverted to other uses?
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. The Disaster Relief Fund is closely
monitored, and there are many controls over the payments that
come out of that and go to the States. And it is not just at
the Federal level. FEMA has its own controls, but then it goes
to the States.
Like Mr. Guthrie's State, they have their own controls
before it goes down to the local level, too. So it is a very
highly overseen pot of money.
Dr. Onder. Thank you.
And, Ms. Laughter, as a county official, have you
encountered concerns about FEMA's aid distribution being
inconsistent, influenced by nondisaster factors, perhaps
political factors?
Ms. Laughter. We have not seen that. We have seen
frustration from our survivors of being able to access the
funds that they should be able to access and difficulty in
getting any answers.
The 800 number that a lot of our survivors were referred to
for a long time could not be connected. So they really
expressed a lot of the frustration around those components.
Dr. Onder. Got it. So in your testimony, you also stated
that, ``When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a
system in place to support response and recovery because local
governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to
handle a response at that scale during nonresponse times.''
Based on your experience with Hurricane Helene, what role
do you think the Federal Government should play versus the
State governments and perhaps the local governments?
Ms. Laughter. I think they both need to play a role. And at
the end of the day, at the local government level, we just need
a system that works.
Dr. Onder. What do you think can be done to improve
communication between FEMA employees and the State and local
officials involved in disaster recovery?
Ms. Laughter. What we experienced was a lot of siloes where
we could ask a single question to one worker, they did not even
know themselves how to get an answer to a question that was
outside of their training or outside of their silo. So
communication is a huge component in training.
Dr. Onder. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Figures, for 5
minutes for questions.
Mr. Figures. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Mr. Ranking Member,
for hosting this hearing and for all of the witnesses being
here.
I want to start by recognizing Alabama's Director of
Emergency Management, Jeff Smitherman, who is in the audience
with us and also thank you for your near 30 years of service to
this Nation's military. So thank you and thank you for being
here, and thank you for what you do in the State.
Our State was just hit by a round of thunderstorms, and
your office kept us abreast of what was going on and kept us
well-prepared. Fortunately--well, I guess both fortunately and
unfortunately, the damage did not rise to a level of a
Federal--or at least that is my understanding as of this
morning, that it will not likely rise to the level of a Federal
emergency, but yet some rural areas did take hits and there
were some lives lost in that storm.
Ms. Laughter, I want to do something that I don't think you
have probably gotten in this process. And that is, I believe it
was Maya Angelou who once said that people don't remember
everything about you, but they will certainly remember how you
made them feel. Sounds like FEMA didn't make you and your
community feel very good.
And so on behalf of all of us--I was not in Congress at the
time--but on behalf of everybody on this committee and
everybody that serves in Federal Government, I want to say that
I am sorry, because our Government should be there for our
people, and I know you guys experienced that in Florida as
well. So I want to apologize on behalf of all of us and commit
to doing better and using my position here to make sure that we
are not making other communities feel the way that you felt.
And I mean that.
As a kid that was born in hurricane alley, where names like
Erin and Opal and Danny and Georges and Katrina and Ivan, they
mean a little bit something different to me. Hell, I was
literally born during a hurricane in September 1985, Hurricane
Elena.
So I know a little bit about FEMA, I know a little bit
about communities that need their recovery, need their help.
But we need it to be efficient, and we need it to be quick, and
we need it to be effective.
And so, I want to start--at least my first question is, it
seems that this problem is bigger than just FEMA. You have
mentioned 30 agencies being involved in this process. So how by
fixing FEMA are we resolving the entire problem, or is there a
broader scope of inquiry that we need to be addressing these
efforts on?
We can just go down the row. Mr. Currie.
Mr. Currie. Yes. Unfortunately, FEMA is the face of
response and recovery for the Federal Government. But when you
look at the funding, it is spread all over the Federal
Government. And each of those agencies has their own rules,
programs, requirements, and timeframes.
And so when those all come together, it creates a very
confusing system and process if you are a State or local
emergency manager.
Mr. Figures. Mr. Guthrie.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman. I would say yes, we
need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and
structure of FEMA, but I would even say take that to the back
row. We need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and
structure of every agency that is a part of the Federal family
that responds to disasters.
Because, again, FEMA is a coordinating element. They are
not the command and control element. They are the coordinating
element. But when you have--if you are a fishery or
aquaculture, you have to go through, I believe it is the
Department of Commerce; if you are in agriculture, you go
through the U.S. Department of Agriculture; if you have
something that is on an FHWA roadway, you are going through
DOT. That is at the public level.
Imagine if you were an individual that is dependent on
section 8 housing, you are going through HUD, if you are with
DCF, you are going through maybe another HHS agency. We have
got to figure out, again, comprehensive review of the scope,
mission, and structure of the Federal family to streamline that
into one single application, whether it is for public sector or
Individual Assistance sector, we've got----
Mr. Figures [interrupting]. I don't want to cut you off. I
want to get Ms. Laughter because I want to get one more
question in for Mr. Garcia.
Ms. Laughter. I agree. I think it is more complicated than
just FEMA. We have an example right now of private property
debris removal. We have a farmer that has 300 bales of spoiled
hay from a flood, and he cannot access the private property
debris removal because he falls under USDA.
And he also cannot get direction from the same agency of
how to access USDA in order to get relief. He just needs help.
Mr. Figures. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. With so many agencies involved, it does cause
confusion--or would cause confusion--at all levels for the
local community, as well as the residents at heart. So
comprehensive review absolutely is necessary.
Mr. Figures. All right. Now, Mr. Garcia, just for you. You
mentioned in your opening testimony, you mentioned about
underserved and disadvantaged communities. And that
particularly resonates with me. I am in a very poor district.
For the most part, individual median income is just around
$30,000. So these are people that can't afford to rebuild on
their own.
So my question for you is, in those communities that have
been hit by storms, particularly hurricanes, tornadoes where we
see those blue tarps go on those roofs, we go back too often,
and those blue tarps are still there years later; in fact,
sometimes decades later. How can we better streamline resources
to getting to those communities?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. And I will tell you that
streamlining the process is absolutely critical. As I
mentioned, both the legislation that is being proposed, the
Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance
Simplification Act, all those things are going to help us
remove the barriers that the communities could face. And so we
need the support by FEMA. So staff shortages at FEMA do not
help us move forward. All of this is important for us to
address.
So simplification, plain language, universal portals, those
things are absolutely helpful to get the resources where they
are needed.
Mr. Figures. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for the overage.
Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
Are there further questions from any members of the
subcommittee who have not been recognized?
Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.
I would like to thank each of the witnesses for your
testimony. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix
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Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Kristen McDonald Rivet
Question 1. My office received outreach from a number of
constituents still affected by the historic 2020 Midland floods. The
following questions are asked on behalf of members of my community.
Thank you for your review and prompt response.
Question 1.a. Is there a process for FEMA to annually review
Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation
programs, by interviewing people who are impacted by the process to see
what is working and what isn't?
Answer:
Individual Assistance
In 2020, GAO found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) conducted three different telephone surveys to assess disaster
survivors' experiences with its Individuals and Households Program and
used these results to assess program performance.\1\ However, GAO found
that the methodology FEMA used did not fully align with federal
standards for statistical surveys, limiting FEMA's ability to use the
results to determine how well their efforts are working. As a result,
GAO recommended that FEMA correct and refine the methodology used to
survey survivors. In December 2022, FEMA took steps to correct and
refine its methodology used to survey survivors.
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\1\ These surveys are (1) an initial survey to measure the quality
of disaster assistance information and services received by survivors
during the initial application process; (2) a contact survey to measure
the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by
survivors while they checked the status of their case online or during
interactions with FEMA staff; and (3) an assessment survey to measure
the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by
survivors after FEMA determines their eligibility for Individuals and
Households Program assistance. GAO, Disaster Assistance: Additional
Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program,
GAO-20-503 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2020).
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Public Assistance
GAO is not aware of an annual review of the Public Assistance
program or interviews with applicants for the purposes of identifying
what is working well and what is not. However, in 2021, FEMA did
conduct customer satisfaction surveys of Public Assistance applicants
and grantees with the goal of program improvement. According to FEMA,
the information collected from customers and stakeholders will help
ensure that users have an effective, efficient, and satisfying
experience with the Agency's programs. This feedback will provide
insights into customer or stakeholder perceptions, experiences and
expectations, provide an early warning of issues with service, or focus
attention on areas where communication, training or changes in
operations might improve delivery of products or service.
Additionally, in 2023, FEMA issued a report that included
stakeholder feedback from Public Assistance applicants. The survey
results were used to further program improvement and develop
recommendations to FEMA management on streamlining the program.
Hazard Mitigation
In March 2020, FEMA issued a Summary of Stakeholder Feedback
report summarizing stakeholder feedback on its hazard mitigation grant
programs.\2\ According to the report, FEMA solicited input from
stakeholders as part of its effort to develop the BRIC program and
reported that stakeholders were overwhelmingly dissatisfied with
benefit-cost analysis requirements and said that they were a barrier to
completing grant applications. FEMA received over 5,000 comments and 75
letters and summarized the contents of these in the Summary of
Stakeholder Feedback report.
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\2\ See, FEMA, Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building Resilient
Infrastructure and Communities, (Washington D.C.: March 2020). See,
GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).
In February 2021, GAO reported on challenges state and local
officials faced when applying for FEMA hazard mitigation grants. GAO
found that FEMA had developed resources to help hazard mitigation
applicants--guidance, Fact Sheets, project examples, studies, and
technical publications.\3\ However, the resources could be difficult to
locate on FEMA's website and there was no centralized inventory of
resources to help applicants locate the information. As a result, GAO
recommended that FEMA create a centralized inventory of hazard
mitigation resources on its website. FEMA concurred and has since taken
steps to do so. In June 2022, FEMA finished re-designing portions of
their website to centralize guidance and other resources on their
hazard mitigation programs. The reorganization makes these resources
easier to find and better positions FEMA to help state and local
applicants successfully apply for grants for mitigation projects that
enhance disaster resilience. As a result, this recommendation is closed
as implemented.
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\3\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).
In February 2025, GAO added Improving the Delivery of Federal
Disaster Assistance to its High-Risk List.\4\ In the new segment GAO
emphasized the need for FEMA to take steps to better manage
fragmentation across its own programs, as GAO has recommended. Such
actions could make the programs simpler, more accessible and user-
friendly, and improve the effectiveness of federal disaster recovery
efforts. Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster
recovery and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to
disaster survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of
recovery efforts.\5\ As of February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to
streamline the applications for two of its recovery programs. However,
FEMA will need to demonstrate that it has thoroughly considered
available options to reduce fragmentation across its own programs,
identified those FEMA intends to implement, and then taken steps to
fully implement this recommendation.
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\4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions
More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
\5\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal
Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
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In addition, GAO has found that as the incidence and severity of
massive wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find
additional opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\6\ For
example, GAO recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to
provide immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a
process to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from
state, local, and tribal Fire Management Assistance Grants recipients.
Taking these steps would help foster more resilient communities and
reduce the future demand on federal resources.
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\6\ GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA
Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2024).
Question 1.b. Has FEMA measured the number of disconnects between
the initial approved project amount and the actual costs at closeout of
said projects?
Answer. GAO has not assessed whether FEMA has systematically
measured the initial costs of Public Assistance projects against their
actual costs at closeout. However, it is common that initial project
costs would increase as the project is completed and eventually closed
out. For example, GAO reported in 2024 that in Puerto Rico, Public
Assistance awardees have faced challenges related to disaster recovery
projects due to the increased costs.\7\ For example, GAO reported that
subrecipients that have received Public Assistance awards under the
Accelerated Award Strategy identified increased project costs that pose
challenges to the full recovery of their facilities. According to
officials from the four Accelerated Award Strategy subrecipient
entities, inflation and labor shortages have increased the costs of
projects beyond their anticipated estimated costs.
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\7\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery
Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
2024).
Question 1.c. Has FEMA considered having a FEMA employee who walks
through the whole recovery journey with the municipality rebuilding?
What resources would be necessary?
Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee
to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However, GAO
has found that FEMA staffing turnover throughout the lifecycle of
public assistance projects is a long-standing challenge cited by state
and local officials. For example, in March 2019 GAO reported that FEMA
and Puerto Rico municipality officials cited concerns about FEMA staff
turnover and lack of knowledge about how the Public Assistance
alternative procedures are to be applied.\8\ FEMA officials
acknowledged that more personnel with expertise in the alternative
procedures process were needed to administer Public Assistance and
assist subrecipients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight,
and Recovery Challenges, GAO-19-256 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA officials stated that they faced additional responsibilities
due to COVID-19, while also managing the traditional seasonal peaks of
disaster activity during the year, which created burnout for many
employees and increased employee attrition.\9\ Such attrition and an
increasing workload make it difficult for FEMA to provide individual
technical support to all grantees as needed. FEMA's workforce
challenges are a key area identified in GAO's recent high-risk report.
In recent years, the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the
COVID-19 pandemic, and other responsibilities have placed additional
pressures on FEMA. FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and
staffing levels has limited its capacity to provide effective disaster
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring
Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, GAO found in May 2023 that FEMA had an overall
staffing gap of approximately 35 percent across different positions at
the beginning of fiscal year 2022. The gaps varied, but Public
Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower
percentages of staffing targets filled--between 44 and 60 percent at
the beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important
functions, including administering assistance to state and local
governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction
activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and
movement during a disaster.
GAO also found that FEMA has fallen short of its yearly staffing
target between 2019 and 2022, and that gap continues to grow. For
example, FEMA only had nine percent of its disaster-response workforce
available for Hurricane Milton response, according to its daily
operations brief. Many responders have declined deployments in recent
disasters because of burnout or severe conditions in the field. GAO has
made numerous recommendations to help FEMA better manage catastrophic
or concurrent disasters.
Question 1.d. Instead of each municipality learning to navigate the
FEMA assistance process independently, has FEMA considered assigning a
staffer to that municipality as their recovery expert?
Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee
to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However,
FEMA does have methods for coordinating with municipalities following a
disaster. Two of these methods include FEMA's Integration Teams and
FEMA's Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers:
FEMA Integration Teams. Officials in all 10 FEMA regions that GAO
interviewed in 2024 stated that they provide resources and support to
states through FEMA Integration Teams, which are FEMA staff embedded
within state emergency management offices.\10\ Officials from six FEMA
regions said that Integration Team members serve as liaisons between
FEMA and the states in various aspects of responding to disasters. For
example, officials from these six FEMA regions said that Integration
Team members provide situational awareness during a disaster response.
Officials in one region said they have an Integration Team member who
serves as an Individual Assistance subject matter expert during
Preliminary Damage Assessments. GAO has not comprehensively assessed
this program to further determine how these teams may assist
municipalities.
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\10\ The FEMA Integration Teams were established in July 2017 with
the goal of embedding FEMA staff with state and territorial partners,
and to work alongside tribal partners. FEMA Integration Teams provide
technical assistance and coordination to state, tribal, and territorial
emergency management agencies in areas such as planning, logistics,
recovery, and grants management.
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Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers. In addition, FEMA
provides Program Delivery Managers following a disaster declaration. In
2017, GAO reported that FEMA redesigned the delivery of the Public
Assistance program to address past workforce management challenges,
such as shortages in experienced and trained Public Assistance staff
and high turnover among these staff.\11\ As part of the redesigned
program, FEMA created, among other things, Program Delivery Managers to
ensure more consistent guidance to Public Assistance applicants.
However, in February 2025, GAO reported that FEMA continues to have
long-standing workforce management issues that makes supporting
response and recovery efforts difficult.\12\ GAO has started work
examining FEMA's staffing gaps.
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\11\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Enhance
Implementation of the Redesigned Public Assistance Program Grant
Program, GAO-18-30 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2017).
\12\ GAO-25-107743
Question 1.e. How does FEMA measure if the disaster assistance
process is working? Does FEMA measure the amount of time from the time
of the incident to full recovery?
Answer. FEMA tracks the amount of time from the initial disaster to
full recovery but does not set any targets or metrics for how long this
process should take. Disaster recovery can take years to complete
depending on the severity of the disasters and many other factors, such
as state and local resources and capacity to manage the recovery. For
example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major
disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in
various stages of response and recovery.\13\ For instance, as of
February 2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects
as part of Public Assistance for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
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\13\ GAO-25-107743
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GAO previously recommended in February 2021, that FEMA use data on
the timeliness and performance of the Public Assistance application
process.\14\ GAO made this recommendation to help identify
inefficiencies and root causes of delays in the Public Assistance
process and provide FEMA and its local partners with the information
needed to address them. To address this recommendation, in March 2021,
FEMA's Recovery Analytics and Public Assistance Divisions published a
live dashboard tool with timeliness metrics on FEMA's internet,
accessible to FEMA staff, that captures metrics at the FEMA and
applicant level and provides data under five performance goals. As a
result, this recommendation was closed as implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ GAO, 2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal Actions Helped
Facilitate the Response, but FEMA Needs to Address Long-Term Recovery
Challenges, GAO-21-91 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2021).
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FEMA also has a performance measure on timeliness of
assistance.\15\ Specifically, FEMA measures the average timeliness of
Individuals and Households Program awards in days. This measure
assesses how quickly the program provides the first financial
assistance received by qualified individuals and households through the
Individuals and Households Program. By evaluating how quickly disaster
survivors receive financial assistance, the program can assess the
effectiveness of a critical, customer-facing element of the agency's
mission.
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\15\ Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report
Fiscal Year 2024.
Question 1.f. Does FEMA measure and/or track the amount of time it
takes the municipality to receive its money at the time of closeout?
Answer. As noted above, FEMA does track the amount of time from the
initial disaster to full recovery but does not set any targets or
metrics for how long this process should take. Project closeout is
dependent on a on a number of factors including the severity and
complexity of the disaster and amount of time it takes for the state or
municipality to provide all necessary projects documentation and
justifications.
According to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide,
project closeout requires timely and complete project-level information
from the Recipient as work is completed.\16\ To initiate project-level
closeout, the Subrecipient must inform the Recipient that its project
is complete and the date the work was completed. To ensure a timely
closeout process, the Subrecipient should notify the Recipient
immediate as it completes each Large Project and when its completed its
last Small Project.
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\16\ FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, Version 4 FP
104-009-2 (June 1, 2020).
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Further, the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide states that
they have a process for obligating Public Assistance funding based on
the Applicant's schedule to execute the work. If a project is greater
than one million and the applicant does not need funds for more than
180 days from the time the Project is ready for obligation, FEMA
obligates funds based on the project completion schedule. In addition,
according to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, FEMA
only provides Public Assistance funding for work completed and costs
incurred within regulatory guidelines.
Question 1.g. Does FEMA measure the number of issues suffered by
the municipality during the process, such as finding that key items
were left off the disaster-recovery punch list and the assistance ($)
estimated vs. the result of the bids?
Answer. FEMA has a performance measure that assesses the percent of
applicants satisfied with the Public Assistance process and customer
service. According to FEMA documentation, FEMA conducts a Public
Assistance Assessment survey that collects satisfaction information
from applicants after they received an award.
In addition, in May 2021, GAO reported on Puerto Rico's disaster
recovery efforts, including its use of Public Assistance awards and
difficulties it has faced implementing recovery projects.\17\ For
example, GAO reported that FEMA made progress in approving Public
Assistance projects, but that FEMA had not comprehensively identified
or assessed the risk that could affect the success of the remainder of
Puerto Rico's recovery, such as Puerto Rico's ability to start
construction on recovery projects. GAO recommended that FEMA, in
coordination with Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies, identify
and assess the risks to Puerto Rico's recovery, including Puerto Rico's
capacity to carry out projects, and identify potential actions to
manage the risks. In 2024, FEMA finalized a risk management plan that
documented its framework to manage and monitor risks to the remainder
of Puerto Rico's recovery. Further, FEMA provided a memorandum
documenting the FEMA executive leadership's approval to implement this
plan. FEMA also provided additional documentation on its efforts to
engage and coordinate with the Government of Puerto Rico on efforts to
continuously manage and monitor risks to the recovery. As a result,
these recommendations were closed as implemented.
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\17\ GAO, Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Approving
Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery, GAO-21-
264 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2021).
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Additionally, GAO has reported that the federal approach to
disaster recovery is fragmented across more than 30 federal
entities.\18\ These entities are involved with multiple programs and
authorities and have differing requirements and timeframes. This
fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to
successfully navigate multiple federal programs. Congress and federal
agencies have taken steps to better manage fragmentation, such as
through interagency agreements and reducing program complexity, but
challenges remain. In November 2022, GAO identified 11 options to
improve the federal government's approach to disaster recovery based on
our review of relevant literature, interviews with federal, state, and
local officials; and a panel of experts.\19\
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\18\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal
Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
\19\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related
to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option
and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to
improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. GAO
attributed statements from experts collected as part of the panel
discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes
statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery:
Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-104956
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
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