    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

        REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY
                                   MANAGEMENT

    =======================================================================

                                    (119-13)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
        ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 25, 2025

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

              GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT

         Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
         transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                                 transportation

                            ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     60-422 PDF          WASHINGTON : 2025

                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

      Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
     Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking
                  Member
    Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
      District of Columbia               Arkansas,
    Jerrold Nadler, New York               Vice Chairman
    Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Daniel Webster, Florida
    John Garamendi, California           Thomas Massie, Kentucky
    Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaott Perry, Pennsylvania
    Andre Carson, Indiana                Brian Babin, Texas
    Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina
    Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois
    Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California
    Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
    Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida
    Salud O. Carbajal, California        Pete Stauber, Minnesota
    Greg Stanton, Arizona                Tim Burchett, Tennessee
    Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
    Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
    Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Troy E. Nehls, Texas
    Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Tracey Mann, Kansas
    Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah
    Patrick Ryan, New York               Eric Burlison, Missouri
    Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Mike Collins, Georgia
    Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio,           Mike Ezell, Mississippi
      Vice Ranking Member                Kevin Kiley, California
    Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Vince Fong, California
    Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Tony Wied, Wisconsin
    Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Tom Barrett, Michigan
    Robert Garcia, California            Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska
    Nellie Pou, New Jersey               Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.,
    Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan     Pennsylvania
    Laura Friedman, California           Jeff Hurd, Colorado
    Laura Gillen, New York               Jefferson Shreve, Indiana
    Shomari Figures, Alabama             Addison P. McDowell, North
                                         Carolina
                                         David J. Taylor, Ohio
                                         Brad Knott, North Carolina
                                         Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
                                           Northern Mariana Islands
                                         Mike Kennedy, Utah
                                         Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri
                                         Vacancy
                                    ------                                7

          Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
                              Emergency Management

        Scott Perry, Pennsylvania,
                 Chairman
      Greg Stanton, Arizona, Ranking
                  Member
    Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Mike Ezell, Mississippi
      District of Columbia               Kevin Kiley, California
    Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan     Tom Barrett, Michigan
    Shomari Figures, Alabama             Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.,
    John Garamendi, California           Pennsylvania
    Dina Titus, Nevada                   Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
    Laura Friedman, California,            Northern Mariana Islands
      Vice Ranking Member                Mike Kennedy, Utah
    Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri,
                                           Vice Chairman
                                         Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                     STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

    Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
      Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
      Management, opening statement..................................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
      Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,
      opening statement..............................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
      Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     8

                                   WITNESSES

    Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
      Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
    Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida Division of Emergency
      Management, oral statement.....................................    22
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
    Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania County, North
      Carolina, oral statement.......................................    27
        Prepared statement...........................................    30
    Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas, on behalf of
      the National Association of Counties, oral statement...........    36
        Prepared statement...........................................    38

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish,
      Louisiana, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell.........    45

                                    APPENDIX

    Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
      Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon.
      Kristen McDonald Rivet.........................................    65

                                 March 21, 2025

        SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

        TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development,
    Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
        FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
    Buildings, and Emergency Management
        RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Reforming FEMA:
    Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management''
    _______________________________________________________________________

                                   I. PURPOSE

        The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
    and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and
    Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, March 25, 2025, at 10:00
    a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive
    testimony at a hearing entitled, ``Reforming FEMA: Bringing
    Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' The
    hearing will broadly examine the current state of emergency
    management, including ways to reform the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) and Federal disaster assistance. At
    this hearing, Members will receive testimony from stakeholders
    and experts in emergency management and disasters.

                                 II. BACKGROUND

    FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR DISASTERS

        FEMA is the Federal Government's lead agency for preparing
    for, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from
    disasters and emergencies related to all hazards--whether
    natural or man-made.\1\ FEMA's primary authority in carrying
    out these functions stems from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
    Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) (P.L. 100-
    707, as amended).\2\ The Stafford Act authorizes three types of
    declarations: (1) major disaster declarations; (2) emergency
    declarations; and (3) fire management grant (FMAG)
    declarations.\3\ The Stafford Act authorizes the President to
    approve states' requests for a Federal disaster declaration
    when ``the situation is of such severity and magnitude that
    effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and
    affected local governments.'' \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Dep't of Homeland Security, FEMA, (Feb. 3, 2023), available at
    https://www.dhs.gov/employee-resources/federal-emergency-management-
    agency-fema.
        \2\ Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707.
        \3\ Id.
        \4\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PRESIDENTIALLY DECLARED MAJOR DISASTER

        When state and local resources are overwhelmed and the
    ``disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective
    response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the
    affected local governments,'' \5\ the Governor of the affected
    state may request the President declare a major disaster.\6\
    FEMA's primary Stafford Act programs for disaster recovery in
    the aftermath of a major disaster are in the Public Assistance
    (PA) Program and the Individual Assistance (IA) Program.\7\
    Following a major disaster declaration, FEMA also provides
    Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ FEMA, A Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process and Federal
    Disaster Assistance 1, available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/rebuild/
    recover/dec_proc.pdf.
        \6\ Id.
        \7\ Id.
        \8\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The PA Program, authorized primarily by Sections 403, 406,
    and 428 of the Stafford Act, reimburses state, tribal, and
    territorial governments, as well as certain private non-profits
    for rebuilding damaged buildings and infrastructure.\9\ The
    Federal cost-share for PA is 75 percent, but may be increased
    by the President.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ See FEMA, Assistance for Governments and Private Non-Profits
    After a Disaster, (Feb. 23, 2023), available at https://www.fema.gov/
    assistance/public.
        \10\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5172.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The IA Program is authorized primarily by Section 408 of
    the Stafford Act. The IA program includes the Individuals and
    Households Program (IHP), Mass Care and Emergency Assistance,
    the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program, Disaster
    Unemployment Assistance, Disaster Legal Services, and Disaster
    Case Management. IHP is the primary FEMA program used to assist
    disaster survivors; it includes housing assistance and other
    needs assistance. Housing assistance includes money for repair,
    rental assistance, or ``direct assistance,'' such as the
    provision of temporary housing.\11\ The current limits for IHP
    assistance is $42,500 for housing assistance and $42,500 for
    other needs assistance.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ FEMA, Individuals and Households Program, (Feb. 3, 2023),
    available at https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/program.
        \12\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5174.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes HMGP, which is
    based on a percentage of PA funding, to provide grants to
    state, tribal, and territorial governments for mitigation
    projects that: (1) are cost effective and (2) reduce the risk
    of future damage, hardship, and loss from natural hazards.\13\
    The purpose of this grant program is to fund practical
    mitigation measures that effectively reduce the risk of loss of
    life and property from future disasters. State, tribal, and
    territorial governments may use their HMGP funds to assist
    families in reducing the risk to their homes from natural
    disasters. The Federal cost share for HMGP is 75 percent and
    the remaining 25 percent can come from a variety of sources
    (i.e. a cash payment from the state or local government).\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (Dec. 27, 2022),
    available at https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/hazard-mitigation.
        \14\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    III. FEMA'S RESPONSE TO RECENT DISASTERS

    HURRICANES HELENE AND MILTON

        In 2024, FEMA provided assistance for 120 Presidentially
    declared emergencies and major disasters including: five
    hurricanes that made landfall, multiple unnamed severe storms,
    wildfires, and an active tornado season that impacted many
    states across the country.\15\ However, the most significant
    disaster of 2024 was Hurricane Helene, which made landfall near
    Perry, Florida on September 26, 2024, as a Category 4
    hurricane.\16\ As Helene traveled across the Appalachian
    Region, it resulted in catastrophic flooding, landslides, and
    tornadoes. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia,
    North Carolina, and South Carolina) received a major disaster
    declaration associated with Helene.\17\ Alabama received an
    emergency declaration.\18\ The destruction of Hurricane Helene
    resulted in 219 storm-related deaths,\19\ including 106 in
    North Carolina alone.\20\ That makes it the deadliest storm to
    hit the mainland United States since Hurricane Katrina.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ FEMA, Declared Disasters, available at https://www.fema.gov/
    disaster/declarations.
        \16\ Kate Payne, Hurricane Helene Kills At Least 44 and Cuts A
    Swath of Destruction Across the Southeast, AP News, (Sept. 27, 2024),
    available at https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-helene-florida-
    georgia-carolina-e5769b56dea81e40fae2161ad1b4e75d.
        \17\ FEMA, Hurricane Helene, available at https://www.fema.gov/
    disaster/current/hurricane-helene.
        \18\ Id.
        \19\ NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, U.S.
    Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, available at https://
    www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/events.
        \20\ North Carolina Dep't of Health and Human Services, Hurricane
    Helene Storm Related Fatalities, available at https://www.ncdhhs.gov/
    assistance/hurricane-helene-recovery-resources/hurricane-helene-storm-
    related-fatalities.
        \21\ Ana Faguy & Brandon Drenon, Helene is Deadliest Mainland US
    Hurricane Since Katrina, BBC, (Oct. 3, 2024), available at https://
    www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1k70rnrp4xo.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Just two weeks later, Hurricane Milton formed in the Gulf
    of Mexico and rapidly intensified to a Category 5
    hurricane.\22\ By the time Milton made landfall near Siesta Key
    on October 9, 2024, the storm had weakened to a Category 3
    hurricane, but it brought a front of deadly tornadoes and storm
    surges to Florida.\23\ This was the third hurricane in 13
    months to impact Florida's Big Bend region.\24\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ Brad Brooks and Leonora LaPeter Anton, Hurricane Milton Leaves
    At Least 10 Dead, Millions Without Power in Florida, Reuters, (Oct. 10,
    2024), available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hurricane-milton-
    weakens-it-marches-across-central-florida-homes-destroyed-2024-10-10/.
        \23\ Id.
        \24\ Chelsea Harvey, Third Hurricane in 13 Months Slams Florida's
    Big Bend, E&E News by Politico, (Sept. 27, 2024), available at https://
    www.eenews.net/articles/third-hurricane-in-13-months-slams-floridas-
    big-bend/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to
    Congress, FEMA has obligated $6.65 billion for Hurricane Helene
    and $2.7 billion for Hurricane Milton.\25\ While 2020 holds the
    all-time record for Presidentially declared emergencies and
    major disasters due to declarations related to COVID-19, at
    230, the size and severity of Stafford Act declarations in 2024
    has drawn Congressional attention to FEMA's resource
    constraints and response challenges.\26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ FEMA, February 2025 Disaster Relief Fund Report, (Feb. 12,
    2025), available at https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
    fema_ocfo_feb-2025-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf [hereinafter
    Disaster Relief Fund Report].
        \26\ Adam B. Smith, 2023: A Historic Year of U.S. Billion-Dollar
    Weather and Climate Disasters, NOAA, (Jan. 8, 2024), available at
    https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2023-historic-
    year-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters; Letter from Sam
    Graves, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure to Deanne
    Criswell, Administrator, FEMA (Oct. 11, 2025) (on file with Comm.).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    LOS ANGELES WILDFIRES

        Starting on January 7, 2025, a series of 12 wildfires,
    including the Palisades and Eaton fires, burned more than
    40,000 acres across the greater Los Angeles area.\27\ The
    wildfires burned for several weeks and were only 100 percent
    contained on January 31, 2025.\28\ Twenty-nine people died as a
    result of the wildfires, and more than 18,000 structures were
    destroyed.\29\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ CAL Fire, 2025 Incident Archive, available at https://
    www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025.
        \28\ Id.
        \29\ Minyvonne Burke & Liz Kreutz, What We Know About the Victims
    Killed in the California Wildfires, NBC News, (Feb. 12, 2025),
    available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-wildfires-
    what-we-know-victims-killed-rcna188240.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to
    Congress, FEMA has obligated $1.27 billion for the Los Angeles
    wildfires.\30\ The Los Angeles wildfires sparked a wider debate
    about California's resource management, after reports began
    circulating that water systems used to fight the Palisades and
    Eaton fires could not maintain the continuous high water
    pressures needed for fire hydrants at high elevations. In the
    first days of the fires, firefighters were forced to overly
    rely on water supplied by fire hydrants to suppress the
    wildfires since hurricane force winds meant they could not use
    planes and helicopters to drop water.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ Disaster Relief Fund Report, supra note 25.
        \31\ Karla Rendo, More Pacific Palisades Residents Join Lawsuit
    Against LADWP, City Over Water Supply Failure, News4 Los Angeles, (Mar.
    8, 2025), available at https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california-
    wildfires/more-pacific-palisades-residents-join-lawsuit-against-ladwp-
    city-over-water-supply-failure/3649420/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       IV. HISTORICAL ISSUES AND REFORMS

        FEMA was originally created by Executive Order to carry out
    the President's authority in providing Federal disaster
    assistance.\32\ FEMA was later merged into the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and its authorities dispersed
    throughout the Department under the direction of the Secretary
    of DHS.\33\ Following the poor response after Hurricane Katrina
    in 2005, Congress enacted the Post Katrina Emergency Management
    Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006. PKEMRA re-established FEMA as a
    distinct entity within DHS, designated the FEMA Administrator
    as the President's advisor on Federal emergency management, and
    authorized FEMA for the first time in statute.\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ Exec. Order No. 12127 (Apr. 1, 1979).
        \33\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296.
        \34\ Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
    295.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since PKEMRA, Congress has enacted several other major
    reforms to improve FEMA, including:

         LIn 2013, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery
    Improvement Act (SRIA, P.L. 113-2) which included reforms to
    speed up and streamline recovery efforts, reduce costs, and
    improve the effectiveness of several disaster assistance
    programs authorized by the Stafford Act, namely the PA Program,
    the IA Program, and the HMGP.\35\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2.

         LIn 2018, Congress passed the Disaster Recovery
    Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA) following Hurricanes Maria and Irma
    which hit Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands.\36\
    DRRA made additional reforms to speed up and improve disaster
    response and recovery as well as established funding for FEMA's
    pre-disaster mitigation program, currently called Building
    Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).\37\ In 2018,
    Congress also enacted the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 that
    included additional reforms intended to improve disaster
    recovery, generally, as well as specifically in Puerto Rico and
    the United States Virgin Islands.\38\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254.
        \37\ Id.
        \38\ Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123.

        In addition to these major reforms, the Committee has
    moved, and Congress has enacted, targeted reforms intended to
    improve FEMA assistance and coordination across the Federal
    Government in responding to disasters. Despite these reforms,
    issues remain. For example, there are currently over 1,000 open
    major disaster, emergency, and fire management declarations
    dating back to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.\39\ There are over
    5,000 open projects from 2005 and 2017 (prior to Hurricanes
    Maria and Irma).\40\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ E-mail from FEMA Congressional Affairs to Elizabeth Granger,
    Professional Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (Mar. 3,
    2025, 4:48 PM EST) (on file with Comm.).
        \40\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         V. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

        On January 24, 2025, President Trump announced, through
    Executive Order, the creation of the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency Review Council (Council).\41\ The stated
    purpose of the Council is to, ``[evaluate] whether FEMA's
    bureaucracy in disaster response ultimately harms the agency's
    ability to successfully respond.'' \42\ The Executive Order
    highlights the need for the Council to review FEMA in the wake
    of recent disasters, like Hurricane Helene. The Executive Order
    also points out that despite spending $30 billion in disaster
    aid each of the past three years, FEMA has left many disaster
    survivors without the resources they need.\43\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ Exec. Order No. 14180, (Jan. 24, 2025), available at https://
    www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/council-to-assess-the-
    federal-emergency-management-agency/.
        \42\ Id.
        \43\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Council will be co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland
    Security and the Secretary of Defense, with any additional
    members of the Council being appointed by the President. The
    Council must hold its first public meeting before April 24,
    2025, and will need to issue a report to the President 190 days
    after that first meeting.\44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \44\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 VI. CONCLUSION

        Last year was a challenging year for disaster response and
    recovery. Hurricanes Helene and Milton highlighted the need for
    additional reforms to our Nation's current emergency management
    system. The more recent California wildfires further charged
    the debate about what role states should play in reducing their
    own disaster risks. These disasters, along with President
    Trump's Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council,
    have begun a broader conversation about what the future of FEMA
    should look like going forward. As this Subcommittee looks to
    bring back common sense in emergency management, the following
    witnesses will provide much-needed insights from a variety of
    perspectives.

                                 VII. WITNESSES

         LMr. Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
    Justice Team, United States Government Accountability Office
         LMr. Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida
    Division of Emergency Management
         LMs. Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania
    County, North Carolina
         LAdrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County,
    Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties

        REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY
                                   MANAGEMENT

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
                   Buildings, and Emergency Management,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
    Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
    Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order.
        The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be
    authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's
    hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        The chairman also asks unanimous consent that Members not
    on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee
    at today's hearing and ask questions.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into
    the record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
        The Chair now recognizes himself for the purpose of an
    opening statement for 5 minutes.

        OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
        CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC
                  BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

        Mr. Perry. I want to thank our witnesses for being here
    today to discuss reforming FEMA and how we can bring common
    sense back to Federal emergency management.
        After witnessing the Federal Government's response to
    Hurricane Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles
    wildfires, I, like many Americans, was shocked by many of the
    stories I heard coming from these communities. I know members
    of this committee have proposed, and Congress has enacted,
    reform after reform to make FEMA and the Federal emergency
    management system work better. Despite these efforts, it seems
    that nothing improves.
        This is not meant to be a beatdown of FEMA, but we can't
    just keep going the way we have been and expect different
    outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth seems to have
    only become more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when
    disaster strikes.
        Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for States and local
    governments to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and
    response, yet many of these programs move too slowly,
    preventing timely and effective action when it is most direly
    needed.
        I mean, for 46 years, individual regions should have been
    reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of
    emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including
    the cost and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.
        What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is
    demonstrative of that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support
    the response and recovery in the mountains of North Carolina.
    In California, we saw a lack of preparedness by State and local
    officials--from a lack of water for firefighting to
    disorganization on the ground, despite literally billions of
    taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation,
    preparedness, and firefighting.
        On top of all that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA
    disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina--which
    is over 20 years ago--and well over 5,000 open projects. This
    raises serious questions about the Federal Government being the
    best institution to respond to localized disasters.
        Federal disaster assistance was created to support State
    and local governments when absolutely necessary, when the
    resources required exceed the ability of local agencies to
    respond. Unfortunately, the result has been to utilize FEMA as
    the first responder to every disaster occurring throughout the
    Nation.
        This almost absolute reliance on the Federal Government is
    dangerous and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first
    responder in disasters. States and local governments are. They
    know their communities best. They understand the risks, what
    their communities need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to
    respond quickly to emergencies.
        It is critical, therefore, that State and local governments
    make disaster preparedness a priority and that they budget for
    it--let me say that again--and that they budget for it, have
    the right people and training in place, and ensure that they
    have the capacity and capability to respond.
        The current system creates a perverse incentive for States.
    States are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in
    their own emergency response and preparedness plans because
    they know they can rely on FEMA stepping in every time even if
    it is inartful at best.
        Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by
    self-imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond
    effectively when called upon or even close out projects going
    back 20 years.
        FEMA's ability to function effectively was further
    undermined as the previous administration pushed its open
    border, equity, and climate agenda onto the Agency, resulting
    in disaster funding being diverted to ridiculous projects like
    planting trees to address urban heat islands. It's no wonder
    that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and issued
    an Executive order on State and local preparedness.
        I am hopeful that this hearing will provide valuable
    insight, as T&I is the lead House committee on FEMA and Federal
    emergency management, because meaningful reform is, obviously,
    absolutely urgently needed.
        With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on
    these topics.
        [Mr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress
     from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
        Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
        I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss
    reforming FEMA and how we can bring common sense back to federal
    emergency management.
        After witnessing the federal government's response to Hurricane
    Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles wildfires, I, like most
    Americans, was shocked by many of the stories I heard coming from these
    communities. I know Members of this committee have proposed, and
    Congress has enacted, reform after reform to make FEMA and the federal
    emergency management system work better. Despite these efforts, it
    seems that nothing has improved. This is not meant to be a beatdown of
    FEMA, but we cannot just keep going the way we have been and expect
    different outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth has only become
    more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when disaster strikes.
        Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for states and local governments
    to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and response, yet many of these
    programs move too slowly, preventing timely and effective action when
    it is most direly needed. For 46 years, individual regions should have
    been reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of
    emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including the cost
    and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.
        What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is demonstrative of
    that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support response and recovery in
    the mountains of North Carolina. In California, we saw a lack of
    preparedness by state and local officials--from a lack of water for
    firefighting to disorganization on the ground, despite billions of
    taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation, preparedness, and
    firefighting.
        On top of all of that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA
    disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina, and well over
    5,000 open projects. This raises serious questions about whether the
    federal government is the best institution to respond to localized
    disasters.
        Federal disaster assistance was created to support state and local
    governments when absolutely necessary--when the resources required
    exceed the ability of local agencies to respond. Unfortunately, the
    trend has been to utilize FEMA as the first responder to every disaster
    occurring throughout the nation.
        This increase in reliance on the federal government is dangerous
    and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first responder in
    disasters. States and local governments are. They know their
    communities best--they understand the risks, what their communities
    need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to quickly respond to
    emergencies.
        It is critical, therefore, that state and local governments make
    disaster preparedness a priority--that they budget for it, have the
    right people and training in place, and ensure that they have the
    capability to respond.
        The current system creates a perverse incentive for states. States
    are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in their own
    emergency response and preparedness plans because they have come to
    rely on FEMA stepping in every time.
        Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by self-
    imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond effectively
    when called upon or even close out projects going back 20 years.
        FEMA's ability to function effectively was further undermined as
    the previous administration pushed its open border, equity, and climate
    agenda onto the agency, resulting in disaster funding being diverted to
    projects like planting trees to address urban ``heat islands.'' It is
    no wonder that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and
    issued an executive order on state and local preparedness.
        I am hopeful this hearing will provide valuable insight, as T&I is
    the lead House Committee on FEMA and federal emergency management,
    because meaningful reform is urgently needed.

        Mr. Perry. And the Chair now recognizes the ranking member,
    Representative Stanton, for 5 minutes for his opening
    statement.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG STANTON OF ARIZONA, RANKING
    MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS,
                        AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

        Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        Thank you all for attending this important hearing titled
    ``Reforming FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal
    Emergency Management.''
        I am the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I
    take Federal disaster assistance delivery very seriously, and I
    look forward to conducting oversight on FEMA's important work.
        FEMA is where Americans look for help, critical help after
    what is likely the worst day of their lives. So it is critical
    that the Agency be postured to respond at all times. For most
    of its life, FEMA has been an apolitical entity: red State or
    blue State, it didn't matter. FEMA stayed focused on the
    mission to help all Americans and kept out of the political
    fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.
        Following the recent catastrophic disasters in California
    and South Carolina, President Trump has focused more on
    spreading misinformation than helping Americans in need.
    Specifically, after the tragic wildfires in Los Angeles, he
    threatened to condition disaster relief on policy matters that
    have nothing to do with emergency management. This is simply
    wrong and shakes the trust that Americans have in their
    Government to come to their aid after a catastrophe. That is
    what FEMA is all about.
        We should have a discussion about how to improve FEMA, but
    as a baseline, we should acknowledge the need that we have in
    the Federal Emergency Management Agency, specifically there to
    help States and localities when an emergency goes beyond their
    ability to immediately deal with it.
        Yesterday, DHS Secretary Noem added to that uncertainty
    facing disaster survivors when she said that we are, quote,
    ``we're going to eliminate FEMA,'' unquote, in a Presidential
    Cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, quote,
    ``great job,'' unquote.
        I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditioning aid
    for emergency disaster assistance. Whether a State is red or
    blue, they are American, and they are entitled to the support
    of their fellow Americans on their worst day. So I condemn
    calls to condition emergency disaster assistance in the
    strongest possible terms and urge elected leaders to never make
    such comments again.
        Unfortunately, threats of conditioning lifesaving
    assistance is not the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In
    February, Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency
    entered FEMA and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have
    accessed secure Government systems that include disaster
    survivors' personal information and slowed the delivery of FEMA
    assistance.
        I am deeply troubled to learn that all FEMA grants are now
    subject to additional review to ensure that they are
    complementary to President Trump's political agenda. And
    Federal employees are living in fear that they will be fired if
    they approve the wrong grant payment.
        Federal employees should not be concerned about approving
    grant disbursements approved by this body, Congress, in a
    bipartisan way. In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse
    payments that are mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I
    will not stand by quietly if we see illegal action related to
    the disbursement of FEMA grants. The Agency cannot violate the
    Impoundment Control Act.
        I am deeply concerned at the influence of DOGE at FEMA,
    which contains no emergency management experts at DOGE, and
    that they are going to steer the Agency in the direction of
    another Katrina.
        Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked
    into the Department of Homeland Security without proper
    consultation from professional emergency managers. FEMA was
    weakened by being subsumed into DHS without proper consultation
    with emergency management professionals. The result was
    unnecessary catastrophic loss of life, the worst in modern
    disaster history. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of
    the past.
        That said, reforming FEMA properly does not mean we should
    avoid change altogether.
        In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better. Last summer,
    extreme heat caused temperatures in my district that were
    nearly unlivable. We lost over 600 of our fellow citizens to
    extreme heat and extreme heat islands.
        We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for over a
    month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed
    during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The
    heat in our State literally caused roads to crack, cars to
    melt, and hundreds of lives lost.
        However, FEMA was not to be found in Arizona because the
    Agency has not yet adapted to emergency disasters like extreme
    heat. Heat is a silent killer. It advances quietly and lingers.
    The longer it lingers, the more devastating the impact.
        So, we must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look
    forward to working with the Agency to ensure that they have the
    resources and authority they need to respond to disasters all
    across the country.
        So, I look forward to this important hearing, hearing from
    my colleagues.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        [Mr. Stanton's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress
    from the State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
            Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
        Thank you, all, for attending today's hearing entitled, ``Reforming
    FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' As
    the new Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, I take federal disaster
    assistance delivery very seriously, and I look forward to conducting
    oversight of FEMA's important work.
        FEMA is where Americans look for help after what may have been the
    worst day of their life. So it is critical that the Agency be postured
    to respond at all times. For most of its life, FEMA has been an
    apolitical entity--red state or blue state, it didn't matter. FEMA
    stayed focused on the mission to help all Americans and kept out of the
    political fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.
        Following the catastrophic disasters in South Carolina and
    California, President Trump has focused more on spreading
    misinformation than helping Americans in need.
        Specifically, after wildfires devastated Los Angeles, he threatened
    to condition disaster relief on policy matters that have nothing to do
    with emergency management. This is simply wrong and shakes the trust
    that Americans have in their government to come to their aid after
    catastrophe.
        Yesterday, Secretary Noem added to the uncertainty facing disaster
    survivors when she said that, ``we're going to eliminate FEMA'' in a
    cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, ``great job.''
        I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditions for emergency
    disaster assistance. Whether a state votes red or blue; they are
    American and are entitled to assistance. I condemn calls to condition
    emergency disaster assistance in the strongest possible terms and urge
    elected leaders to never make such comments again.
        Unfortunately, threats to condition lifesaving assistance are not
    the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In February, Billionaire
    Musk's so-called ``Department of Government Efficiency'' entered FEMA
    and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have accessed secure
    government systems that include disaster survivors' personal
    information and slowed the delivery of FEMA assistance.
        I am deeply troubled to have learned that all FEMA grants are now
    subject to an additional review to ensure they are complementary to
    Trump's political agenda. And federal employees are living in fear that
    they will be fired if they approve the wrong grant payment. Federal
    employees should not be concerned about approving grant disbursements
    approved by Congress!
        In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse payments that are
    mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I will not stand by quietly if
    we see illegal action related to the disbursement of FEMA grants. The
    Agency cannot violate the Impoundment Control Act.
        I am deeply concerned that the influence of DOGE at FEMA, which
    contains no emergency management experts, are going to steer the Agency
    in the direction of another Katrina.
        Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked into the
    Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation from
    professional emergency managers. FEMA was weakened by being subsumed
    into the Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation
    with emergency management professionals. The result was the most
    catastrophic loss of life in modern disaster history. We cannot afford
    to repeat the mistakes of the past.
        That said, reforming FEMA thoughtfully does not mean we should
    avoid change altogether. In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better.
        Last summer, extreme heat caused temperatures in my district were
    nearly unlivable. We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for
    over a month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed
    during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The heat in
    our state literally caused roads to crack, cars to melt--and hundreds
    of lives were lost.
        However, FEMA was nowhere to be found because the Agency has not
    yet adapted to emerging disasters like extreme heat. Heat is a silent
    killer. It advances quietly and lingers. The longer it lingers; the
    more devastating the impact.
        We must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look forward to
    working with the Agency to ensure they have the resources and authority
    they need to respond to disasters all across the country--not just
    hurricanes on the east coast.
        That is why I am grateful that this Committee has invited a panel
    of emergency management experts to testify here today about their
    suggested reforms for emergency management. You are all the kind of
    folks we should be consulting before making any change to FEMA
    function. Thank you for taking the time to be here today, and I look
    forward to hearing your testimony.

        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
    committee, Representative Larsen, for 5 minutes.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
         MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, subcommittee Chair
    Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Stanton, for convening
    today's hearing.
        Emergency management in the U.S. today stands at a
    crossroads. As the Nation grapples with the devastation caused
    by Hurricanes Helene and Milton, the wildfires in L.A., and
    other disasters across the country, FEMA's role has come under
    intense scrutiny.
        The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane
    Helene and the L.A. wildfires alone exceed $200 billion.
    Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic
    events will require robust congressional oversight,
    supplemental funding, and Presidential leadership.
        Instead of uniting the Nation, though, to rebuild what has
    been lost, the administration has unfortunately exploited and
    politicized these disasters. The President has spread
    misinformation in the wake of these tragedies, threatened to
    condition disaster aid, and doubled down on the suggestion to
    eliminate FEMA altogether.
        Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, quote, ``we're going
    to eliminate FEMA,'' end quote, during a Cabinet meeting. No,
    we are not.
        These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the
    women and men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives
    to helping fellow Americans respond to and recover from
    disasters.
        FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during,
    and after disasters.
        States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity
    to respond to a disaster. As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator
    during President Trump's first term, aptly stated, ``Emergency
    management is locally executed, State managed, and federally
    supported.''
        FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options
    and resources are exhausted. Eliminating FEMA would not make
    communities safer, would not reduce insurance premiums, would
    not improve outcomes for disaster survivors. Instead, it would
    shift the burden of disaster response and accountability from
    the Federal Government to State and local governments.
        The Democrats have long championed improvements to the
    delivery of disaster assistance. It isn't new to us that FEMA
    needs to be reformed. Last year, many bipartisan FEMA-related
    bills were discussed in this committee, and we attempted to
    pass them out of the House: Representative Titus' Disaster
    Survivor Fairness Act to reform FEMA's Individual Assistance
    Program; Representative Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement
    Act to make FEMA's programs better equipped to address the
    impacts of wildfires; and Representative Neguse's Disaster
    Management Costs Modernization Act to build State and local
    emergency management capacity.
        Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA
    reforms and getting reform right. However, it requires careful
    consideration and input from emergency management
    professionals.
        For example, the President has suggested that disaster
    assistance could be fixed by simply providing block grants for
    recovery to impacted States. FEMA already offers a block grant
    option through the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures
    program authorized by section 428 of the Stafford Act. However,
    States rarely use this authority due to the perceived risks
    involved.
        The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term
    disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in
    delivering outcomes and similarly has been the subject of
    bipartisan scrutiny.
        If you want these reforms to Federal emergency management
    to succeed, the reforms must be informed by the challenges
    faced by existing programs and built on recent progress.
        For instance, in 2019, Congress authorized the creation of
    a predisaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to
    enhance community resilience against disasters while reducing
    recovery costs for individuals, as well as State and local
    governments as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act. And I
    want to thank the Trump 1.0 administration for advocating for
    this and for the President for signing that bill.
        So, any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the
    Agency's capability to support resilience projects and not
    diminishing them.
        So, I look forward to discussing possible solutions to
    improve FEMA and outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel
    of qualified experts that we have before us today.
        I want to thank you all for being here, and I look forward
    to your testimony.
        I yield back.
        [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on
                       Transportation and Infrastructure
        Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking
    Member Stanton, for convening today's hearing.
        Emergency management in the United States stands at a critical
    crossroads.
        As the nation grapples with the devastation caused by Hurricanes
    Helene and Milton, the wildfires in Los Angeles and other disasters
    across the country, FEMA's role has come under intense scrutiny.
        The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane Helene and
    the Los Angeles wildfires exceed $200 billion.
        Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic events
    will require robust congressional oversight, supplemental funding and
    presidential leadership.
        Instead of uniting the nation to rebuild what has been lost, the
    Administration has unfortunately exploited and politicized these
    disasters.
        The President has spread misinformation in the wake of these
    tragedies, threatened to condition disaster aid and doubled down on his
    suggestion to eliminate FEMA altogether.
        Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, ``we are going to eliminate
    FEMA'' during a cabinet meeting. No, we are not.
        These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the women and
    men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives to helping their
    fellow Americans respond to and recover from disasters.
        FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during and after
    disasters.
        States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity to
    respond to a disaster.
        As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator during President Trump's first
    term, aptly stated, ``Emergency management is locally executed, state-
    managed and federally supported.''
        FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options and
    resources have been exhausted.
        Eliminating FEMA would not make communities safer, would not reduce
    insurance premiums, would not improve outcomes for disaster survivors.
        Instead, it would shift the burden of disaster response and
    accountability from the federal government to state and local
    governments.
        Democrats have long championed improvements to the delivery of
    disaster assistance.
        It isn't new to us that FEMA needs to be reformed.
        Last year, among many FEMA-related bills, we attempted to pass:
          Rep. Titus' Disaster Survivor Fairness Act to reform
    FEMA's Individual Assistance Program;
          Rep. Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement Act to make
    FEMA's programs better equipped to address the impacts of wildfires;
    and
          Rep. Neguse's Disaster Management Costs Modernization Act
    to build state and local emergency management capacity.

        Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA reforms.
    Getting reform right, however, requires careful consideration and input
    from emergency management professionals.
        For example, President Trump has suggested that disaster assistance
    could be fixed by simply providing block grants for recovery to
    impacted states.
        FEMA already offers a block grant option through the Public
    Assistance Alternative Procedures program authorized by Section 428 of
    the Stafford Act.
        However, states rarely use this authority due to the perceived
    risks involved.
        The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term
    disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in
    delivering outcomes and has similarly been the subject of bipartisan
    scrutiny.
        If we want reforms to federal emergency management to succeed, they
    must be informed by the challenges faced by existing programs and built
    upon recent progress.
        For instance, in 2019 Congress authorized the creation of a pre-
    disaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to enhance community
    resilience against disasters while reducing recovery costs for
    individuals as well as state and local governments.
        This passed as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, and I want
    to thank the Trump 1.0 Administration for advocating for this and for
    the President signing that bill.
        Any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the Agency's
    capability to support resilience projects--not diminishing it.
        I look forward to discussing possible solutions to improve FEMA and
    outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel of qualified experts
    before the Subcommittee today.
        Thank you all for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.

        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
    being here, especially the ones who have traveled a great
    distance today.
        Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain the
    lighting system to our witnesses who may not have been here
    recently or maybe ever. There are three lights in front of you.
    Green means go, yellow means you are running out of time, and
    red means to conclude your remarks.
        The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses' full
    statements be included in the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of
    today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses
    have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to
    them in writing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record
    remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and
    information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in
    the record of today's hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        As your written testimony has been made part of the record,
    the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5
    minutes.
        With that, Mr. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes for
    your testimony, sir.

      TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
    JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; KEVIN GUTHRIE,
     EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT;
      JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA COUNTY, NORTH
       CAROLINA; AND ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY,
        TEXAS, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

      TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
             JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Currie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
    Stanton, and other members of the subcommittee. It is an honor
    to be here today to talk about GAO's work on FEMA.
        I think the hearing and the discussions around reform are a
    great opportunity to address many longstanding challenges that
    we and many others have identified for years and years.
        We have looked at Federal response and recoveries for
    years, going from Guam to Puerto Rico and everywhere in
    between. And what we have seen is an increasingly complicated,
    fragmented, inflexible, and lengthy process that seems to get
    harder and harder by the year.
        FEMA and the rest of the Federal Government have spent over
    $500 billion in the last 10 years on disaster aid. There are
    currently over 30 Federal agencies that are involved in
    disaster assistance, and many of these programs, which pay for
    rebuilding the same types of infrastructure, have overlapping
    or duplicative requirements.
        Just as an example, the Department of Transportation, FEMA,
    and HUD programs can all be used to build similar
    infrastructure, but they may require completely different
    paperwork, different environmental reviews, have different
    rules, and, most difficultly, are on different timelines, which
    makes it virtually impossible to synchronize those programs for
    recovery.
        This is a major reason why recovery takes up to 20 years,
    as you said, Mr. Chairman. Two years ago, we actually issued a
    report outlining the systemic problem and came up with a number
    of options that Congress could take to reform the system. These
    ranged from simple options to better streamlining current
    programs, registration websites, things like that, all the way
    to more significant changes like complete reorganizations and
    overhauls of disaster agencies themselves.
        On top of this, as you said, FEMA's workforce is
    overwhelmed. There are over 600 major disasters and, as you
    said, over 1,000 fire disasters, and all types of disasters
    going back many, many years that require staffing to address
    each one of those, and thousands of projects.
        Last we looked at it, FEMA was 35 percent short of its
    staffing needs based on the expectations on the Agency, and
    there is now a never-ending disaster season.
        The workforce structure was created at a time when large
    disasters were very rare, and it needs to be reformed. And it
    is not just about the numbers, but the whole structure needs to
    be reformed to be more responsive.
        Also, I want to talk about individual survivors. We have to
    shift to programs that are not Government centric but are
    survivor centric. And when I say that, I mean they have to be
    geared towards helping a person get the assistance they need at
    the worst time of their life.
        A big problem at FEMA are antiquated technology and
    financial management systems. These need to be fixed in order
    for FEMA to be able to deliver the technology solutions that we
    already have in the private sector to try to intake people and
    get them the assistance they need.
        The last thing I would like to talk about are just a few
    cautions to consider for this committee as you look to reform
    the system and for the administration. First is the National
    Response Framework. I think we have to be really careful not to
    break what is not broken. We have to not forget Hurricane
    Katrina and what we fixed after that.
        The National Response Framework provides steady funding and
    coordination mechanisms that all levels of Government
    understand at this point, and I think the structure works well.
        We also have to remember the capacity differences across
    the country. Some States and counties and cities have the
    resources and the capacity to manage disasters. Many others we
    see just don't, and that is not going to change any time soon.
    These are always going to need State and Federal support to
    provide the response that we need to help those citizens.
        And then last, it is not just about FEMA. If we look to
    reform FEMA but don't fix the whole disaster response and
    recovery system, it is not going to fix the problem, and I
    think that is very important to consider as we move forward.
        So I look forward to your questions and the discussion.
        [Mr. Currie's prepared statement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
                 Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
              Disaster Assistance: Improving the Federal Approach
                                   Highlights
    What GAO Found
        There is a growing emphasis on how the federal government can
    improve its approach to disaster recovery. In the last 10 years,
    appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448 billion,
    plus an additional $110 billion in supplemental appropriations so far
    in fiscal year 2025. Recent disasters such as Hurricanes Helene and
    Milton, the wildfires in California, and this month's destructive
    tornadoes across the Midwest and South demonstrated the need for
    government-wide action to deliver assistance efficiently and
    effectively and reduce its fiscal exposure (see figures 1 and 4). Given
    the rise in the number and cost of disasters and increasing challenges
    related to the delivery of federal disaster assistance identified in
    GAO's work, Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance was
    added to GAO's High-Risk List in February 2025.
        To improve the federal government's delivery of disaster
    assistance, GAO has found that attention is needed to improve processes
    for assisting survivors, reduce fragmentation across federal disaster
    assistance programs, strengthen the disaster workforce and capacity,
    and invest in resilience. For example, GAO has recommended that
    Congress should consider establishing an independent commission to
    recommend reforms to the federal approach to disaster recovery, which
    is fragmented across more than 30 federal entities. GAO also reported
    on various options for reforming the federal approach to disaster
    recovery, such as better coordinating and consolidating programs across
    agencies and simplifying processes for survivors, among other things.
        Further, GAO recommended that the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA) develop and implement a methodology that provides a more
    comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction's ability to respond to a
    disaster without federal assistance. Without an accurate assessment,
    FEMA runs the risk of recommending to the President that federal
    disaster assistance be awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it.
    FEMA has taken past steps to do this but has not fully implemented this
    recommendation. GAO also found that FEMA's workforce is overwhelmed by
    the increasing number of disasters and other emergencies. Strengthening
    the disaster workforce will be a critical part of better delivering the
    assistance that communities and survivors need to recover.
    Why GAO Did This Study
        Natural disasters have become costlier and more frequent. In 2024,
    there were 27 disasters with at least $1 billion in damages, compared
    to 14 in 2018. Disasters in 2024 resulted in 568 deaths nationwide.
        Further, federal disaster declarations and the expectation for
    federal support have increased. In addition, federal support for
    disaster recovery can last for years. For example, FEMA is managing
    over 600 open major disaster declarations--some of which occurred
    almost 20 years ago, according to the agency.
        This statement discusses GAO's new disaster high-risk area, and
    related work on reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to
    disaster assistance, among other things.
        This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 2020
    through February 2025. For this work, GAO analyzed federal law and
    documents related to disaster assistance and interviewed officials
    across relevant federal, state and local agencies. GAO also conducted
    site visits to recent disasters areas, among other actions.
    What GAO Recommends
        As of March 2025, GAO has approximately 60 open recommendations
    related to disaster assistance. There are also four matters for
    congressional consideration. These recommendations and matters are
    designed to address the various challenges discussed in this statement.
    Agencies have taken steps to address some of these recommendations. GAO
    will continue to monitor agency efforts to determine if they fully
    address the challenges GAO has identified.
                                   __________
        Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the
    Subcommittee:
        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our past work on the
    federal approach to disaster recovery.
        Hurricanes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and other natural
    disasters affect hundreds of American communities each year. Due to the
    rising number of natural disasters, there has been a growing emphasis
    on how the federal government can improve its approach to disaster
    recovery. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    calculated that, in 2018 the U.S. experienced 14 disasters that each
    cost more than $1 billion in total economic damages. By 2024, the
    number of disasters costing at least $1 billion almost doubled to
    27.\1\ That same year, at least 568 people died, directly or
    indirectly, as a result of those disasters. Recent disasters
    demonstrate the need for the federal government to take action to
    deliver assistance efficiently and effectively and reduce its fiscal
    exposure.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National
    Centers for Environmental Information, ``U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather
    and Climate Disasters'' (2025). These data are not direct costs to the
    federal government and are produced using a detailed methodology
    reflecting overall U.S. economic damages, including insured and
    uninsured losses to residential, commercial, and government/municipal
    buildings.

          Hurricanes Helene and Milton occurred within 2 weeks of
    one another in 2024 and affected some of the same areas in the
    Southeast (see fig. 1). These two disasters resulted in over 200 deaths
    and are expected to cost over $50 billion, according to the National
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

          On January 8, 2025, the President approved a major
    disaster declaration for historic wildfires in Los Angeles County,
    California. The wildfires were unprecedented in their size, scope, and
    the damage they caused. The Palisades and Eaton fires resulted in 29
    deaths and the expected financial cost is still unknown as of March
    2025.

          In mid-March 2025, destructive tornadoes and severe
    storms occurred across the Midwest and South over a three-day period.
    The storms resulted in over 40 deaths, and the number of states that
    will need federal assistance is still unclear as of March 2025.

        Figure 1: Road Repair Following Hurricane Helene, North Carolina

        My statement today is based on our most recent High-Risk update in
    February 2025 as well as our prior work identifying key programmatic
    challenges the federal government faces related to the delivery of
    federal disaster assistance.\2\ This statement includes information on
    our work related to 1) improving processes for assisting survivors, 2)
    reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to disaster assistance,
    3) strengthening Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) workforce
    and capacity, and 4) investing in resilience.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions
    More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To conduct our prior work, we analyzed relevant statutes such as
    the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,\3\
    regulations, agency guidance and interagency coordination documents,
    such as the National Disaster Recovery Framework.\4\ We also
    interviewed officials across relevant federal agencies and state and
    local officials involved in disaster assistance, and conducted site
    visits to communities impacted by recent disasters in California,
    Florida, and North Carolina, among other actions. More detailed
    information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found
    within each of the issued reports cited throughout this statement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5121 et seq.
        \4\ Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Recovery
    Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with all sections of our Quality Assurance Framework that
    are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and
    perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to
    meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work.
    We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis
    conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions
    in this product.
                                   Background
        Disaster assistance includes providing support to communities and
    survivors for response to, recovery from, and resilience to man-made
    and natural disasters. For fiscal years 2015 through 2024,
    appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448
    billion.\5\ In total, FEMA approved over two million households for
    federal disaster assistance in 2024.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ This total includes $312 billion in selected supplemental
    appropriations to federal agencies for disaster assistance and
    approximately $136 billion in annual appropriations to the Disaster
    Relief Fund for fiscal years 2015 through 2024. It does not include
    other annual appropriations to federal agencies for disaster
    assistance. Of the supplemental appropriations, $97 billion was
    included in supplemental appropriations acts that were enacted
    primarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, in
    December 2024, the Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act,
    2025, appropriated $110 billion in supplemental appropriations for
    disaster assistance, not included in the $448 billion. Pub. L. No. 118-
    158, div. B, 138 Stat. 1722 (2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Disaster Relief Fund, administered by FEMA, pays for several
    key disaster response, recovery, and mitigation programs that assist
    communities impacted by federally declared emergencies and major
    disasters. Annual appropriations to this fund have varied but generally
    increased from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure
    2. Other federal agencies have specific authorities and resources
    outside of the Disaster Relief Fund to support certain disaster
    response and recovery efforts.

    Figure 2: Disaster Relief Fund Appropriations in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023
                             Dollars, FY 2000	2024

          Note: Fiscal year 2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of
    sequestration. Supplemental data include contingent appropriations and
        all appropriations under the heading of ``Disaster Relief'' or
      ``Disaster Relief Fund'' including the language ``for an additional
     amount.'' Appropriations do not account for transfers or rescissions.
      Deflator used was drawn from the FY2024 Budget of the United States
        Government, ``Historical Tables: Table 1.3_Summary of Receipts,
    Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current Dollars, Constant (FY
             2012) Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940-2028.''

        We have also previously reported that long-term recovery can be
    challenging, and project costs can increase the longer a recovery
    lasts.
        For example, in February 2024, over 6 years after Hurricanes Irma
    and Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico in 2017, we reported that FEMA
    and Puerto Rico had taken actions, such as providing advance
    disbursements of funds to grant recipients to help jump-start permanent
    work construction to rebuild.\6\ However, grant subrecipients that
    received awards from FEMA through an expedited process identified
    increased project costs that pose risks to the completion of work. For
    example, officials from Puerto Rico's Aqueduct and Sewer Authority said
    that the costs for one water treatment plant project exceeded its
    original estimate by 42 percent.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery
    Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
    2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, the number of federal disaster declarations and the
    expectation for long-term federal support have increased. As shown in
    figure 3, federal support for disaster recovery can last for years. For
    example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major
    disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in
    various stages of response and recovery. For instance, as of February
    2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects as part
    of the Public Assistance program for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
    2005.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ FEMA's Public Assistance program provides assistance for debris
    removal efforts; life-saving emergency protective measures; and the
    repair or replacement of disaster-damaged publicly owned or certain
    private non-profit facilities, roads and bridges, and electrical
    utilities, among other activities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Figure 3: Time Frames and Activities in Disaster Preparedness,
                       Response, Recovery, and Resilience

        The frequency and intensity of recent disasters have severely
    strained FEMA, affecting its ability to deliver assistance as
    effectively and efficiently as possible. We added Improving the
    Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance to our High-Risk List in
    February 2025, given the rise in the number and cost of disasters and
    increasing programmatic challenges identified in our work.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ At the beginning of each new Congress, we issue an update to
    our High-Risk series, which identifies government operations with
    serious vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or
    in need of transformation. See GAO-25-107743.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There are approximately 60 open recommendations related to this new
    high-risk area, as of March 2025. In addition, there are four open
    matters for congressional consideration to help address the nation's
    delivery of disaster assistance, specifically related to fragmentation,
    property acquisitions, and housing issues.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ GAO-25-107743.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Improving Processes for Assisting Survivors
    Rural Assistance
        Survivors face numerous challenges receiving needed aid, including
    lengthy and complex application review processes. Federal agencies are
    taking steps to help improve disaster assistance to survivors. For
    example, in 2023, the Small Business Administration (SBA) implemented
    the Disaster Assistance for Rural Communities Act to simplify the
    process for a governor or tribal government chief executive to request
    an agency disaster declaration in counties with rural communities that
    have experienced significant damage.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Pub. L. No. 117-249, Sec.  2, 136 Stat. 2350 (2022) (codified
    at 15 U.S.C. Sec.  636(b)(16)). See also at 13 C.F.R. Sec.
    123.3(a)(6).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We found in February 2024 that rural areas face unique challenges
    in seeking SBA assistance following a disaster.\11\ For example, we
    found that disaster survivors may not be aware of SBA's disaster loans.
    We recommended that SBA should distinguish between rural and urban
    communities in its outreach and marketing plan and incorporate actions
    to mitigate the unique challenges rural communities face in accessing
    its Disaster Loan Program. SBA agreed with our recommendation, and we
    will continue to monitor its progress to address it.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ GAO, Small Business Administration: Targeted Outreach about
    Disaster Assistance Could Benefit Rural Communities, GAO-24-106755
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Block Grants
        Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
    (HUD), the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-
    DR) funds provide significant, flexible federal recovery funding for
    states and localities affected by disasters and generally support long-
    term recovery. However, in December 2022, we reported that HUD does not
    require CDBG-DR grantees to collect accurate data on critical
    milestones.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Better Information is Needed on the
    Progress of Block Grant Funds, GAO-23-105295 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
    15, 2022).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A HUD-funded 2019 study on the timeliness of CDBG-DR housing
    activities found that all but one of the eight grantees in the study
    faced challenges in developing a grant management system. HUD could
    better ensure that its grantees identify problem milestones and address
    delays in assisting survivors by requiring grantees to collect and
    analyze timeliness data, as we recommended. As of February 2025, HUD
    said it had explored options for requiring grantees to collect
    milestone data and was evaluating how best to address this
    recommendation to ensure the needs of disaster survivors are met in a
    timely manner. We will continue to monitor its progress to address this
    issue.
    Flood Insurance
        Federal law created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to
    reduce the escalating costs of federal disaster assistance for flood
    damage, while also keeping flood insurance affordable. The NFIP
    transferred some of the financial burden of flood risk from property
    owners to the federal government. In our 2025 High-Risk List we
    reported that FEMA has developed a legislative proposal to improve the
    program's solvency and address affordability, among other reforms.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ See GAO-25-107743.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, Congress has yet to enact comprehensive reforms to NFIP
    that would address the program's challenges. We have other ongoing work
    about the state of the homeowner's insurance market, including concerns
    about the availability and affordability of coverage, and the issue of
    a lack of flood insurance coverage and what can be done to address it.
     Reducing Fragmentation of the Federal Approach to Disaster Assistance
        The federal approach to disaster recovery is fragmented across more
    than 30 federal entities. These entities are involved with multiple
    programs and authorities and have differing requirements and
    timeframes. Moreover, data sharing across entities is limited. This
    fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to
    successfully navigate multiple federal programs.
        Congress and federal agencies have taken steps to better manage
    fragmentation, such as through interagency agreements and reducing
    program complexity, but challenges remain. In our November 2022 report,
    we identified 11 options to improve the federal government's approach
    to disaster recovery based on our review of relevant literature,
    interviews with federal, state, and local officials; and a panel of
    experts.\14\ See table 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related
    to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option
    and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to
    improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. We
    attribute statements from experts collected as part of the panel
    discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes
    statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery:
    Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-104956
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).

        Table 1: Options To Improve the Federal Government's Approach to
                                Disaster Recovery
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. Develop new coordinated efforts to clearly and consistently
     communicate about recovery programs.
    2. Provide coordinated technical assistance throughout disaster
     recovery.
    3. Develop models to more effectively coordinate across disaster
     recovery programs.
    4. Develop a single, online application portal for disaster recovery
     that feeds into one repository.
    5. Standardize requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.
    6. Simplify requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.
    7. Further incentivize investments in disaster resilience as part of
     federally-funded recovery programs.
    8. Identify desired recovery outcomes and develop a mechanism to track
     these across programs.
    9. Prioritize disaster recovery funding for vulnerable communities
     across all federal programs.
    10. Consolidate federal disaster recovery programs.
    11. Adjust the role of the federal government in disaster recovery.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: GAO analysis of relevant literature; interviews with federal,
      state, and local officials; and a panel of experts. GAO-25-108216

        Certain options identified could be acted on within one or more
    agencies' existing authorities, while others may require congressional
    action to implement.\15\ In our report, we detailed the key strengths
    and limitations that the panel of experts identified about each of
    these options. For example, one option is to develop a single
    application for disaster recovery assistance that feeds into one
    repository. This portal could help applicants, including state and
    local governments and individual disaster survivors, identify which
    federal programs fit their specific recovery needs based on their
    eligibility.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Other than where we have made prior recommendations related to
    certain options, we do not endorse any particular option. Rather, our
    November 2022 report identifies possible implementation methods and the
    strengths and limitations of each option. Experts who participated in
    our panel agreed that the federal government's approach to disaster
    recovery needs to be improved. They discussed ways to make it operate
    more efficiently and effectively and to better incorporate incentives
    for improving disaster resilience and address equity concerns. See GAO-
    23-104956.

          For strengths, experts said implementing this option
    could improve the applicant experience by streamlining the application
    process for disaster survivors and state and local applicants. This
    option could also help address state and local government capacity
    limitations by reducing the amount of work needed to complete multiple
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    applications for different disaster recovery programs.

          In terms of limitations, experts discussed the costs
    associated with the development and management of the system, cross-
    agency privacy and data sharing concerns, and the fact that this option
    would not necessarily reduce the complexity of the federal disaster
    recovery programs.

        Another identified option is to consolidate disaster recovery
    programs across federal agencies. This option could be implemented by,
    for example, providing a single federal disaster recovery block grant
    that identifies funding options by sector. It could also be implemented
    by reorganizing existing federal disaster recovery programs into a
    single agency focused on disaster resilience and recovery efforts.

          For strengths, experts said that consolidating federal
    disaster recovery programs could reduce the administrative burden on
    disaster survivors and state and local governments. They also said that
    implementing this option could reduce the number of federal funding
    streams for disaster recovery, which could reduce the complexity of
    carrying out disaster recovery projects.

          In terms of limitations, experts said that implementing
    this option by reorganizing government agencies would be difficult and
    may create additional risks. Specifically, experts noted that
    consolidating programs or creating a new agency would not necessarily
    reduce the complexity of implementing programs.

        In our November 2022 report, we recommended that Congress should
    consider establishing an independent commission to recommend reforms to
    the federal approach to disaster recovery.\16\ Such a commission should
    follow our leading practices for interagency collaboration.\17\ In
    January 2025, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate that would
    establish a Commission on Federal Natural Disaster Resilience and
    Recovery to examine and recommend reforms to improve the efficiency and
    effectiveness of the federal government's approach to natural disaster
    resilience and recovery, and for other purposes.\18\ We will continue
    to monitor the progress of this bill.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ GAO-23-104956.
        \17\ GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to
    Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Address Crosscutting Challenges,
    GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023).
        \18\ S. 270, 119th Cong. (2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, on January 24, 2025, the President established the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council (FEMA Review
    Council).\19\ According to DHS, the goal of the FEMA Review Council is
    to advise the President on the existing ability of FEMA to capably and
    impartially address disasters occurring within the United States. The
    council shall also advise the President on all recommended changes
    related to FEMA to best serve the national interest.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ 90 Fed. 10,082 (Feb. 21, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As administrator of several disaster recovery programs, FEMA should
    also take steps to better manage fragmentation across its own programs,
    as we recommended in 2022. Such actions could make the programs
    simpler, more accessible and user-friendly, and improve the
    effectiveness of federal disaster recovery efforts.
        Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster recovery
    and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to disaster
    survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of recovery
    efforts. In response to our November 2022 recommendations, as of
    February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to streamline the applications for
    two of its recovery programs. However, FEMA will need to demonstrate
    that it has thoroughly considered available options to (1) better
    manage fragmentation across its own programs, (2) identify which
    changes FEMA intends to implement to its recovery programs, and (3)
    take any necessary steps to fully implement the recommendation to
    better manage fragmentation across disaster recovery programs.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ GAO-23-104956.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, we have found that communities continue to face challenges
    obtaining support to address wildfires. FEMA and multiple other federal
    entities have responsibilities for federal wildfire mitigation,
    response, and recovery efforts, to include the award and management of
    contracts awarded before and during wildfire seasons. Additionally,
    state, local, and tribal governments can enter into mutual aid
    agreements with federal agencies to enable coordinated wildfire
    responses.
        In response to the challenges that wildfires pose for the nation,
    the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act required the establishment
    of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission in 2021.\21\
    In September 2023, the commission issued a set of policy priorities and
    recommendations calling for greater coordination, interoperability,
    collaboration, and simplification within the wildfire system. In
    addition, we have found that as the incidence and severity of massive
    wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find additional
    opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\22\ For example,
    we recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to provide
    immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a process
    to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from Fire
    Management Assistance Grants recipients.\23\ Taking these steps would
    help foster more resilient communities and reduce the future demand on
    federal resources. We are monitoring efforts to address this
    recommendation. See figure 4 for example of wildfire damage.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Pub. L. No. 117-58, Sec. Sec.  70201-07, 135 Stat. 429, 1250-
    58 (2021).
        \22\ See GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA
    Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2025)
    and GAO, Disaster Contracting: Action Needed to Improve Agencies' Use
    of Contracts for Wildfire Response and Recovery, GAO-23-105292
    (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2023).
        \23\ GAO-25-106862.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Figure 4: Fire Damage Following the Palisades Fire Los Angeles,
                                   California

              Strengthening FEMA's Disaster Workforce and Capacity
        FEMA has long-standing workforce management issues that make
    supporting response and recovery efforts difficult. In recent years,
    the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic,
    and other responsibilities have placed additional pressures on FEMA.
    FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and staffing levels has
    limited its capacity to provide effective disaster assistance.
        In May 2020, we reported that FEMA has faced challenges with
    deploying staff with the right qualifications and skills to meet
    disaster needs.\24\ We recommended that FEMA develop a plan to address
    challenges in providing quality information to field leaders about
    staff qualifications. In June 2022, FEMA provided a plan that included
    both completed and ongoing actions to address our recommendation. FEMA
    officials told us that the actions in the plan enhance reliability of
    FEMA workforce qualifications and increases field leadership
    accessibility of workforce information. Such actions should better
    enable the agency to use its disaster workforce flexibility as
    effectively as possible to meet mission needs in the field.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address
    Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360 (Washington,
    D.C.: May 4, 2020).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In May 2023, we reported that FEMA uses different processes under
    various statutory authorities to hire full-time employees and temporary
    reservists.\25\ We found that FEMA had an overall staffing gap of
    approximately 35 percent across different positions at the beginning of
    fiscal year 2022. While the gaps varied across different positions,
    Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower
    percentages of staffing targets met--between 44 and 60 percent at the
    beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important
    functions, including administering assistance to state and local
    governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction
    activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and
    movement during a disaster.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring
    Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
    2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In October 2024, FEMA had only 9 percent of its disaster-response
    workforce available for Hurricane Milton response as staff were
    deployed to other disasters such as Hurricane Helene in the southeast
    and flooding in Vermont.\26\ In addition, FEMA had only 20 percent of
    its disaster-response workforce available for Los Angeles fire response
    in January 2025.\27\ We have made numerous recommendations to help FEMA
    better manage catastrophic or concurrent disasters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ FEMA National Watch Center, National Situation Report (Oct. 8,
    2024).
        \27\ FEMA, National Watch Center, Daily Operations Briefing (Jan.
    8, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For example, we recommended that FEMA should develop and implement
    a methodology that provides a more comprehensive assessment of a
    jurisdiction's response and recovery capabilities including its fiscal
    capacity.\28\ Without an accurate assessment, FEMA runs the risk of
    recommending to the President that federal disaster assistance be
    awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it. FEMA has taken steps to
    update the factors considered when evaluating a request for a major
    disaster declaration for Public Assistance, specifically the estimated
    cost of assistance, through the federal rulemaking process three
    times--in 2016, 2017, and 2020. However, as of January 2025, the agency
    has not issued a final rule updating the estimated cost of assistance.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to
    Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own,
    GAO-12-838 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The COVID-19 pandemic marked the first time the Disaster Relief
    Fund has been used to respond to a nationwide public health emergency.
    FEMA used its typical process to estimate its obligations for COVID-19.
    However, in July 2024 we reported that FEMA did not meet its accuracy
    goal for actual obligations for COVID-19 in any fiscal year from 2021
    through 2023.\29\ By identifying and documenting lessons learned for
    estimating obligations based on its experience with COVID-19, as we
    recommended, FEMA can better position itself to adapt to similar
    estimation challenges in the future. FEMA did not concur with our
    recommendation; however, we maintain that it is warranted. In January
    2025, FEMA told us it believes the analyses it has already conducted,
    including an analysis of COVID-19 expenditure drawdowns, are sufficient
    to meet the intent of the recommendation. We have requested
    documentation of this analysis and of any associated lessons learned
    related to cost estimation. We will continue to monitor FEMA's efforts
    and provide further information when we confirm any actions taken to
    address the recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ FEMA has a goal for its actual obligations to fall within 10
    percent of the baseline estimate by the end of the fiscal year. This is
    for individual disasters and for the Disaster Relief Fund overall. See,
    GAO, Disaster Relief Fund: Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Could Improve
    FEMA's Estimates, GAO-24-106676 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Investing in Resilience
        Disaster resilience can reduce the need for more costly future
    recovery assistance. In our Disaster Resilience Framework, we reported
    that the reactive and fragmented federal approach to disaster risk
    reduction limits the federal government's ability to facilitate
    significant reduction in the nation's overall disaster risk.\30\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ GAO, Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles for Analyzing
    Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to Natural
    Disasters, GAO-20-100SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FEMA's hazard mitigation assistance programs provide assistance for
    eligible long-term solutions that reduce the impact of future
    disasters, thereby increasing disaster resilience. However, we have
    reported that FEMA can improve its hazard mitigation assistance grant
    programs.
        For example, the Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk
    Mitigation Act of 2021 authorized FEMA to award capitalization grants--
    seed funding--to help eligible states, territories, Tribes, and the
    District of Columbia establish revolving loan funds for mitigation
    assistance.\31\ In response, FEMA established the Safeguarding Tomorrow
    Revolving Loan Fund grant program in 2022. In February 2025, we found
    that while FEMA has identified some tools to collect information on the
    Revolving Loan Fund program, FEMA does not have a process for
    systematically collecting and evaluating the information to assess
    program effectiveness across all phases of the program.\32\ We
    recommended that FEMA document and implement a process to regularly
    assess program effectiveness using evidence-based decision-making
    practices to help instill confidence in program participants and better
    ensure the long-term sustainability and success of the program. FEMA
    concurred with our recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ Pub. L. No. 116-284, 134 Stat. 4869 (2021) (codified at 42
    U.S.C. Sec.  5135).
        \32\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Improve Guidance and
    Assessment of Its Revolving Loan Fund Program, GAO-25-107331
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FEMA's Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program
    provides pre-disaster mitigation grants to help eligible state,
    territorial, federally recognized tribal and local governments invest
    in a variety of natural hazard mitigation activities. These activities
    focus on infrastructure projects and building capability and capacity
    among local communities. During the 5-year period from fiscal years
    2020 through 2024, FEMA made about $5.5 billion available for these
    grants. As of January 2025, FEMA had announced awards of about $1
    billion.\33\ We are currently reviewing this program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ FEMA, The Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of January
    31, 2025. (Washington D.C. Feb. 12, 2025) For example, of the $500
    million made available in fiscal year 2020, FEMA had announced awards
    for $252 million, as of January 2025.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, individuals who lack sufficient insurance coverage
    often face greater challenges in recovery. If disaster survivors are
    uninsured or underinsured, they may have to rely more on federal
    disaster assistance. Until recent regulatory changes, FEMA did not
    award any housing assistance to individuals who received at least the
    maximum FEMA award for housing repairs from their insurance company,
    even if there was a gap between their insurance coverage and their
    losses. For disasters with Individual Assistance declared on or after
    March 22, 2024, FEMA will now award housing assistance to those who
    receive insurance payouts that exceed the FEMA maximum award for their
    losses, up to the statutory maximums, if they have eligible unmet needs
    or uncovered losses.\34\ FEMA officials said they expect the amounts of
    Individual Assistance awards to increase due to this change.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ FEMA's Individual Assistance program provides financial
    assistance and direct services to eligible individuals and households
    who have uninsured or underinsured necessary expenses and serious needs
    as a result of a disaster. FEMA has also made other regulatory changes
    to the Individual Assistance program intended to improve access to
    assistance for survivors. 89 Fed. Reg. 3990 (Jan. 22, 2024). See also
    FEMA, Biden-Harris Administration Reforms Disaster Assistance Program
    to Help Survivors Recover Faster, (Washington, D.C.: 2024) for more
    information.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In conclusion, by identifying and taking steps to better manage
    disaster assistance and the negative effects of the fragmented approach
    to disaster assistance, federal agencies could improve service delivery
    to disaster survivors and communities, improve the effectiveness of
    disaster recovery, and potentially reduce the federal government's
    fiscal exposure. Our recommendations to the various agencies involved
    in disaster assistance can help Congress identify key areas to address
    the nation's delivery of disaster assistance and reduce the
    government's fiscal exposure. We will continue to monitor agency
    progress and congressional actions.
        Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
    to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his
    testimony.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Guthrie for 5 minutes.

        TESTIMONY OF KEVIN GUTHRIE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA
                    DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member
    Stanton, also Ranking Member Larsen, and other distinguished
    members of the committee for the invitation to testify today.
        I am Kevin Guthrie. I am the executive director of the
    Florida Division of Emergency Management. Throughout my tenure,
    I have led the division through numerous major events,
    including hurricanes such as Ian, Michael, Dorian, Isaias; as
    well as wildfires, floods, tornadoes, and the Surfside building
    collapse.
        I have also assisted in national immigration efforts, like
    Operation Vigilant Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in
    Texas. In my 30-plus years of experience at the local and State
    level, I have responded to over 50 major incidents.
        Under Governor Ron DeSantis' leadership, FDEM has become a
    model for the future of emergency management. This is due to
    our professionals' dedication and the lessons learned from our
    experience in a disaster-prone State.
        Florida looks forward to working with you and President
    Trump's administration to improve the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency. We have learned the importance of effective
    coordination across all levels of Government.
        FDEM allows the philosophy that emergencies are federally
    supported, State managed, and locally executed. We emphasize
    collaboration with local governments supporting the response
    efforts instead of dictating them. This approach has allowed us
    to build on local best practices and continuously improve
    Florida's emergency management capabilities. This collaborative
    model is enhanced by the critical support that the Federal
    Government provides.
        FDEM operates year round, requiring funding even for
    nondisaster periods. While Federal grants help maintain our
    capabilities, we need to focus Federal support on expanding
    State and local capacities.
        States must have flexibility to build their systems without
    relying on Federal funding during a noncrisis period. One way
    to solidify this approach is through Federal block grants for
    emergency management. Block grants will allow States to quickly
    allocate funding for response and recovery operations, reducing
    bureaucratic delays and staffing needs at the Federal level.
        As we look to future improvements, one key area, as
    mentioned, is the integration of modern technology into our
    response systems. Florida has led the way and has modernized
    emergency management by digitizing workflows and improving data
    input processes. This has improved our efficiency, reduced
    delays, and expedited payment processing, cutting the time it
    takes to process invoices from 61 days during Hurricane Ian to
    just 16 days in recent hurricane season.
        Our use of technology has also reduced administrative costs
    and helped streamline disaster response. Data sharing among
    Federal, State, and local agencies is essential to improving
    response times. Leveraging advanced analytics machine learning
    has empowered decisionmakers in Florida to act faster and be
    more accurate than ever before.
        Another critical component of Florida's success has been
    our ability to collaborate with our other States through the
    Emergency Management Assistance Compact, known as EMAC. EMAC,
    which is financially supported by the Federal Government, has
    been essential in States receiving aid that they need when they
    lack the necessary resources to respond and recover
    independently.
        Since 2022, Florida has leveraged EMAC in 6 major disasters
    receiving crucial support from 39 States. While collaboration
    has been effective, there are still areas where Federal
    processes could be streamlined to enhance disaster response.
        There are several ways the Federal Government can improve
    disaster response, such as creating a combined Federal disaster
    declaration process. This would eliminate delays caused by
    separate declarations for separate agencies. Additionally,
    streamlining disaster case management. And last, grant closeout
    procedures would accelerate recovery efforts and reduce
    displacement for survivors.
        All three of these have impacted me directly during my
    tenure with the State of Florida.
        As we continue to enhance our capabilities, Florida also
    emphasizes the importance of operational readiness. FDEM
    maintains a network of strategically located warehouses for
    rapid resource deployment and implements emergency standby
    contracts to ensure fast access to critical resources.
        Routine communication with State, local, and Federal
    partners through the State Emergency Response Team in Florida
    keeps Florida prepared for disaster.
        Sir, in conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude
    for the opportunity to testify before you today. Emergency
    management is a public safety entity that is essential for
    protecting lives and property. By improving Federal support, we
    can strengthen our Nation's disaster response capabilities and
    ensure faster recovery for all Americans.
        I look forward to continued collaboration with you, the
    committee, and the administration to improve these systems.
        Thank you.
        [Mr. Guthrie's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida
                        Division of Emergency Management
                                  Introduction
        Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and other
    distinguished members of the Committee for the invitation to testify
    here today.
        I am Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director of the Florida Division of
    Emergency Management (FDEM). Today I want to share with you what I know
    about Emergency Management. Due to the leadership of Governor Ron
    DeSantis, the State of Florida and FDEM are proud to have become a
    model for the future of emergency management. Florida's success is also
    directly tied to the dedication of our emergency management
    professionals and experience that comes with being in a disaster-prone
    state.
        Leading the profession in prepared and resilient communities, staff
    members provide technical assistance to local governments as they
    prepare emergency plans and procedures, as well as conduct emergency
    operations training for state and local governmental agencies with the
    mission of coordinating, collaborating and communicating with all
    community stakeholders for a more resilient Florida. As Executive
    Director and on behalf of my colleagues in State and Local emergency
    management, we thank you for this opportunity to provide a state
    perspective on the future of Federal Emergency Management. We are
    excited to work with you and President Trump's Administration to
    empower states in their emergency management efforts.
                                Disaster History
        Regarding disasters, as Executive Director, I have led the agency
    through numerous significant events, including Hurricanes Debby,
    Helene, Milton, Idalia, Ian, Nicole, Michael, Dorian, Isaias, Sally,
    and Eta, as well as Tropical Storms Elsa and Fred. Besides tropical
    systems, I have provided support to Floridians through a variety of
    events, including the tragic Surfside Building Collapse, wildfires,
    tornadoes, floods and more. We have also assisted efforts in the
    nation's fight against illegal immigration through Operation Vigilant
    Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in Texas. Additionally, in my
    broader 30 plus years of experience, I have responded to, assisted in
    leading, or led the operations of over 50 additional incidents or
    events in Florida or across the nation.
                                State Management
        We maintain our emergency management approach with conservative
    principles, emphasizing that emergencies should be federally supported,
    state-managed, and locally executed. Where possible, we utilize the
    federal government to bolster, rather than obstruct, state and local
    disaster response efforts. Local response efforts are amplified and
    supported by the State rather than dictated. Where additional support
    is needed, the Florida Division of Emergency Management does not
    hesitate to fill the need but does not take control or micromanage a
    response. We do not dictate what a local response looks like. Our
    willingness to support locals in their varied response efforts allows
    us to identify the best practices which are then shared and improved
    disaster after disaster. Again, we lead the industry in the field, but
    we are not perfect and believe in constant improvement at all ends of
    the emergency management system.
        Regarding federal support, the potential implementation of block
    grants for emergency management is an exciting development. With a
    block grant, an allocation of funding is provided to meet a given
    purpose such as response or recovery operations. If it is properly and
    consistently utilized within the criteria determined by the federal
    government, bureaucratic delays at the federal level are removed and
    states can push out the funding more quickly and effectively. Block
    grants may also allow for large-scale decreases in the administrative
    functions at the federal level.
                 Amplification of Efforts Through Partnerships
        FDEM is made up of 225 full-time employees and approximately 170
    temporary employees. During a disaster, we activate our State Emergency
    Response Team (SERT) to maximize our capabilities. The SERT consists of
    our federal partners, State agencies, local emergency management, and
    private sector industries such as power, water, lodging, grocery,
    equipment, and materials. Additionally, Florida's First Lady, Casey
    DeSantis, has activated charitable foundations, volunteer
    organizations, and the faith community as part of our State Emergency
    Response Team (SERT). These entities provide tremendous assistance to
    disaster survivors without cost to the State. This assistance includes
    disaster cleanup, reconstruction, housing assistance, meal service,
    transportation, and more.
        We are not afraid of leaning on and empowering the private sector
    to improve our response and recovery efforts. In many facets of
    emergency management, the State and local governments rely on the
    private sector to do the essentials, whether that be restoring power,
    removing debris, or getting businesses operational as quickly as
    possible to create the necessary environment for a speedy recovery. We
    are not afraid of the private sector and do not care about logos or
    patches during a disaster. We care only about getting the job done.
        State and Local Emergency Management Enhanced by Federal Support
        FDEM operates 24/7, 365 days a year regardless of activation level
    or disaster status. Our staff must maintain operations continually to
    be ready to respond to natural and man-made disasters. In the event of
    a weather event, we usually have notice and ability to make final
    preparations prior to the disaster. In other cases, no-notice disasters
    specifically, our team activates to full capacity and may activate the
    entire SERT. To satisfy continual operations for the State and local
    emergency management agencies, funding is necessary on a non-disaster
    cycle. Base FEMA grants currently fund much of these continual
    operations. Any change or end to these base grants would necessitate an
    alternative funding source either through the State or local
    governments. In the same way that a government continually funds its
    Law Enforcement and Fire Departments, State and local governments must
    find a way to establish emergency management functions without Federal
    financial support for blue sky periods. This will look different state-
    by-state and government-by-government. For more populous states, a
    stand-alone State-funded emergency management agency is certainly
    possible. In less populous states, incorporating the functions of an
    emergency management agency into existing capabilities such as the
    National Guard could be an option. Locally, in rural areas,
    incorporating the emergency management functions into the Sheriffs'
    offices or fire departments is expected. In metropolitan areas, the
    emergency management functions could be stand-alone due to the larger
    tax base.
        When public safety, health, and critical infrastructure agencies
    need help they call on Emergency Management. Therefore, Emergency
    Management is a public safety agency and it is incumbent upon each
    government to treat it as such. This means providing funding and
    resources within existing resources and capabilities. Regardless of how
    each state or local government would establish emergency management
    functions without federal financial assistance, it is critical that all
    federal support be focused on expanding capability rather than
    maintaining capability. Federal grants should not support long-term
    staffing at the State or local level.
        With this new paradigm in place, federal support can be targeted
    specifically for disaster events as the needs arise, and without a
    large bureaucracy in place at the federal level.
           Embracing Standardization of Data and Improved Technology
        FDEM has embraced modern technology to improve how data is used for
    operations. The first step in embracing technology is to streamline
    business operations and gain efficiencies to digitize current document
    workflows. The second step is to focus on the inputs of good,
    structured, digital information into the system(s) at the lowest
    possible level eliminating the need for bureaucratic reviews and
    approvals. In Florida, this has accelerated disaster response efforts,
    improved efficiency, reduced bureaucratic delays, and expedited payment
    processing after disasters. Efforts have not only helped the State work
    faster during an emergency but also ensure taxpayer money is managed
    responsibly. Embracing technology and activating data assets directly
    impacts our ability to ensure residents can recover and the economy can
    get back up and running faster than ever before.
        We have seen tremendous returns on investment in technology. For
    every dollar targeted at technology modernization, we have an estimated
    $530 in business efficiency. Additionally, the time it takes to process
    thousands of invoices following a disaster has decreased by 73%. During
    Hurricane Ian, FDEM averaged 61 days to process invoices. For
    Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton, this improved to just 16 days.
        The inability of data to flow from local to state to federal
    government through efficient use of technology is responsible for the
    delays and years long frustrations experienced in emergency management.
    We have proven that these delays can be reduced by up to 90% in some
    cases, all while decreasing long-term and temporary staffing needs.
        Collecting, analyzing, and governing relevant data is integral for
    providing reliable, actionable information for emergency operation
    decision-makers before, during, and after an emergency. We deployed an
    anomaly detector to identify and mitigate financial risks, including
    potential fraud, waste, and abuse, by detecting abnormalities when
    processing invoices for payment. With 99% accuracy, the anomaly
    detector identified three major invoice irregularities in the first 30
    days.
        Data is essential for Federal, State, and local officials as well
    as emergency management leaders charged with protecting and serving
    residents. By leveraging advanced analytics and machine learning, FDEM
    has empowered its leaders to transition from manual information
    collection and research into a modern, data-drive approach.
                 Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
        In the event of large disasters, the Federal government has
    supported Florida financially and operationally. Additionally, states
    across our nation have lent support to Florida when we have needed it
    most.
        Since 2022, Florida has leveraged the Emergency Management
    Assistance Compact (EMAC) to request aid during six (6) disaster
    events. Over these incidents, 39 states across the nation stepped up to
    assist Florida by providing crucial assistance and bolstering Florida's
    response efforts. Through EMAC, Florida has received essential assets
    such as Swiftwater and Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) teams, fire
    response units, Incident Management Teams (IMTs), Emergency Operations
    Center (EOC) support, voluntary liaisons, and National Guard
    assistance. These resources play a critical role in ensuring an
    effective disaster response.
        Throughout the six (6) disasters since 2022, including Operation
    Vigilant Sentry (OVS) and five (5) hurricanes--Ian, Idalia, Debby,
    Helene, and Milton, Florida has received a total of 7,444 personnel and
    associated equipment with total costs amounting to $74,731,312.50.
    These coordinated efforts have been instrumental in helping the state
    navigate disaster impacts over the past several years.
        The successful coordination of the EMAC, financially supported by
    the federal government, has been essential in ensuring states receive
    the aid they need when they lack the necessary resources to respond and
    recover independently. We want the federal government to continue
    administering and supporting EMAC to facilitate efficient and effective
    disaster response across the country.
        While many states, including Florida, have received significant
    financial support from American taxpayers during disasters, few states
    could fully fund disaster response and recovery without federal
    assistance. Thanks to responsible fiscal stewardship and a positive
    economic climate, Florida remains resilient--but ongoing federal
    support remains critical in times of crisis.
                        Additional Federal Efficiencies
        Combined Federal Disaster Declaration: When a disaster occurs, the
    federal government often claims to bring all forces to bear in
    response. Unfortunately, this is not always the case due to separate
    disaster declaration processes for different federal agencies. While a
    declaration by the President may be declared quickly for FEMA, other
    agencies such as the US Department of Agriculture or the US Department
    of Commerce (Fisheries and Aquaculture) require a separate lengthy
    process for disaster declaration. This separate process leads to
    significant delays in response to the agriculture and aquaculture
    industries. A combined declaration for all federal agencies would end
    these delays.
        Data Sharing: During response and recovery, the State and Federal
    agencies are often duplicating data gathering efforts as there is no
    ``one-stop-shop'' for services. Disaster survivors are constantly
    filling out federal and state forms, applications, portals, and more.
    While there are challenges associated with data sharing, it is
    absolutely crippling for federal agencies to be prohibited from data
    sharing agreements with the State and locals. Remedying data sharing
    issues, as part of an annual ``blue sky'' process, will ensure a
    coordinated and less burdensome delivery of services to survivors,
    rather than duplicative and siloed data collection efforts and
    programs.
        Disaster Case Management: For disaster survivors, case management
    is a lengthy process, severely limiting available services and
    resources to survivors until months after the event occurred. By the
    time resources become available, many survivors have moved away or
    missed crucial deadlines in applications for assistance. The recovery
    of a community is stifled when its population moves away. Ensuring
    rapid deployment of disaster case management and funding can get
    survivors back on their feet more quickly will reduce the long-term
    costs of extended displacement.
        Disaster Grant Closeout Procedures: Current policy implies that all
    work must be completed on a public assistance project prior to
    application for reimbursement. This requirement causes excessive delay
    and long-term extension of disaster closeout and creates significant
    vulnerability to de-obligation. Allowing grants to cover partial work
    will facilitate quicker project accomplishment while getting funding to
    those communities that struggle to facilitate project completion due to
    limited revenues and cash flow.
                                 Best Practices
        Warehousing & Deployable Resources: The Florida Division of
    Emergency Management (FDEM) maintains a network of strategically
    located warehouses, each designed to fulfill critical functions in
    statewide emergency response and disaster preparedness. These
    facilities serve as primary distribution hubs for essential resources,
    ensuring that life-sustaining supplies such as food, water, and
    emergency equipment are readily available for rapid deployment when
    disasters strike. In routine operations and smaller-scale emergencies,
    we are responsible for maintaining operational readiness, overseeing
    inventory management, and coordinating response efforts. However, in
    the event of a large-scale activation, additional surge personnel,
    including contractors, National Guardsmen, and State Guardsmen--are
    mobilized to expedite the efficient deployment of critical commodities.
    Beyond basic supplies, FDEM's warehouses are equipped with a wide range
    of specialized assets designed to support complex emergency operations.
    These include power generation equipment, high-capacity water pumps,
    personal protective equipment (PPE), flood prevention systems, mobile
    command vehicles (MCVs), heavy machinery, and sleeper trailers to
    accommodate on-site response teams. By maintaining these resources, we
    bolster the state's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to
    emergencies, mitigate disaster impacts, and safeguard lives and
    property.
        Emergency Standby Contracts: FDEM has implemented Emergency Standby
    Contracts as a proactive disaster management strategy, recognized as a
    national best practice. These pre-established agreements allow vendors
    to stage and procure critical resources in advance, ensuring faster,
    more efficient response efforts. This approach streamlines logistics,
    reduces delays, and helps protect lives and property by securing
    essential personnel, equipment, and supplies ahead of time. The
    contracts cover vital resources such as disaster support personnel,
    incident management teams, shelter staffing, medical personnel, care
    sites, transportation services, equipment, and emergency fuels.
    Contracts for emergency supplies and services--mirror best practices
    found in our state-level logistics operations (e.g., resource bundling,
    turn-key solutions, multiple vendors, allow for state/local level piggy
    backing, etc.). This cuts red tape during procurement, accelerates
    resource deployment, and leverages economies of scale.
        Routine Cycle of Preparedness: Throughout the year, the Florida
    State Emergency Resource Team (SERT) focuses on routine communication
    with our local, state, and contracted partners. Florida's emergency
    management framework is robust. The SERT is one of the most experienced
    in the Nation and is well-suited to address a wide range of complex
    incidents and events. For most natural and man-made emergencies, our
    state-level capacity, including rapid incident monitoring, logistical
    support, and specialized technical expertise (e.g., nuclear and
    radiological preparedness), ensures we can respond effectively. To
    better respond to these disasters, the SERT has digitized many of our
    mutual aid processes to include the FEMA reimbursement document. These
    efforts have allowed for quicker response and reimbursement for our
    first responders. Florida is the centralized emergency management
    coordination hub for disasters. To continue to excel in this, the SERT
    coordinates meetings with city, county, and tribal partners to forecast
    potential challenges and develop plans to address concerns. Quarterly,
    the SERT meets with command staff to strategize and discuss how to
    better respond to natural and man-made disasters. It is through these
    partnerships and routine communications that Florida leads the nation
    in mutual aid support provided across the country and our response
    times during a disaster.
                                   Conclusion
        To conclude, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. Emergency Management is critical, and the time is now to
    implement improvements that will change the way we do business and
    ultimately better serve the citizens of the United States.

        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his
    testimony.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Laughter. You are recognized
    for 5 minutes.

       TESTIMONY OF JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA
                         COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA

        Ms. Laughter. Thank you, Chairman and members of the
    committee.
        Nine days. For 9 days, my county's emergency responders and
    I bore witness to the aftermath of the most devastating natural
    disaster to hit our community in over 100 years.
        We witnessed a family's terror when their little boy was
    injured in a landslide, taking their home off its foundation.
    We witnessed a very pregnant mother desperately trying to dry
    out her empty trailer with dehumidifiers so that she would have
    somewhere to bring her baby home to--all of her possessions in
    a dumpster nearby.
        We witnessed the elderly man in his home too overwhelmed to
    start the process, with mold creeping up the walls around him
    within days of the flood.
        For those 9 long days, our community was trying to grapple
    with the destruction of Helene, trying to chart a path forward,
    searching for answers to questions, and without the key partner
    who was supposed to be at our aid, without FEMA. And it would
    be 2 weeks after the storm before more than a single worker
    arrived, despite repeated pleas for help.
        Locally, we knew housing was going to be one of the
    greatest challenges. Immediate needs post-storm are the basic
    necessities we all understand: Clean water, food, and shelter.
        FEMA's temporary shelter assistance is ill-fitted to meet
    the needs of rural America. Our citizens who qualified for TSA
    found hotel choices to be in Greenville, South Carolina, or
    Charlotte, North Carolina, both 2 hours outside of our county,
    leaving untenable options to stay in damaged homes, bunk with
    family and friends, or leave their job, school, and community
    behind for an unknown time.
        Appalachians don't leave our home, our land, or the fabric
    of our community. So the TSA vouchers may as well have been
    Monopoly money.
        Even after FEMA's arrival, the negative impact of delay in
    FEMA response was compounded by ongoing communication
    challenges, changing FEMA staff assignments, and contradicting
    information and directions that stalled progress for my
    community.
        In the written testimony, you will even see where our
    sheriff and I were repeatedly given opposite updates on door-
    to-door response by FEMA representatives that could have
    resulted in conflicting public messages, except for the fact
    that in my community, the sheriff and I work side by side in
    emergency response, communicating regularly.
        At 21 days and with tireless advocacy, we were granted a
    meeting with FEMA housing mission leaders. We received an
    overview of the housing options coming, along with identifying
    some obstacles that we would face.
        For instance, we were able to explain the inadequacy of
    HUD's fair market rent methodology in our rural community and
    how that would hamstring any possibility of rentals being an
    option if the FMR was used to establish allowable rents.
        We were heard and a request was elevated immediately to
    approve an increase in the allowable FEMA rate. Even with the
    increase, rental assistance could not meet the needs of those
    whose homes were destroyed, and more options would be needed.
        Ultimately, we found that housing process requirements
    under FEMA are too rigid to apply effectively in our
    mountainous community. For those who could leverage that
    assistance option, progress was only made after establishing
    weekly FEMA and State EM calls with us locally to cut through
    miscommunication and establish accountable discussions.
        At times, our county would face contradictions from
    different FEMA siloes, as you will also find documented in the
    written testimony. While putting our county resources to task
    trying to support the FEMA mission, we would also feel the
    sting of the deep conflict and contradiction of FEMA being both
    disaster response and regulator of local flood plain management
    programs.
        Threats of losing NFIP status and future disaster funding
    in our community made it harder to assist families in repairing
    their homes, meet immediate human needs post-disaster, while at
    the same time, other FEMA workers were working with us to
    support housing among limited solutions.
        Contradicting guidance and unclear processes were also
    frustrating to vulnerable survivors, and lack of answers led to
    deteriorating public trust and faith in FEMA, but not because
    the people deployed were not genuine and service-oriented
    people. It was because the workers themselves were stuck in a
    system designed to prioritize process and policy over common
    sense and responsiveness.
        We saw these workers hamstrung to help us with a lack of
    training across functions and a system difficult to navigate
    even for them. While there were genuine attempts to be
    responsive to the local needs, like approving private roads and
    bridges for assistance in western North Carolina, the decisions
    on requirements attached were made in bubbles far away from our
    community that did not engage local leadership, meaning that
    guidance is still fraught with concerns about the ability to
    meet the requirements that will be imposed.
        Transylvania County lost homes, infrastructure, and
    possessions, but somehow we did not lose lives [inaudible].
    What I can't imagine is how our sister counties who lost whole
    towns are navigating these processes when the recovery is far
    more complex and the sting of loss so much deeper.
        Communities facing recovery need assistance with our
    counties representing the frontline response and need realistic
    solutions and meaningful engagement before a disaster.
        The stated mission of a responsive FEMA can be achieved,
    but only when the local voice is not just heard, but is also
    involved in solution building so that practical boots-on-the-
    ground insight can be engaged upfront. Only then can we
    effectively and efficiently support our survivors.
        My community, all of our communities, our people across the
    country, and the FEMA workers themselves deserve better.
    Together we must do better.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share about my community's
    experience.
        [Ms. Laughter's prepared statement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania
                             County, North Carolina
       County Post-Hurricane Helene Response and Recovery Experience and
                                    Feedback
        This document is intended to provide constructive feedback with our
    conclusive statements in bold and explanation of the elements of the
    response and recovery experience in Transylvania County post Hurricane
    Helene that led us to those conclusions. We have included suggestions
    for improvements from our perspective. The appendices included provide
    backup documentation to this document but are not the full scope of
    documented and undocumented communication that has occurred between
    Transylvania County and FEMA.

        Statement 1: When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a
    system in place to support response and recovery because local
    governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to handle
    a response at that scale during non-response times. Overall, FEMA staff
    our county engaged with seemed genuine in their desire to help, but
    faced some of the same frustrations with communication, procedures,
    processes, and difficulty navigating the system as we did. Any redesign
    of a system to deliver that support needs to prioritize the local
    government voice, be adaptable to different conditions and ensure
    responsiveness to local needs during and after disaster.
        This document expresses the experience and frustrations that we
    faced with FEMA because that is the jurisdiction of the hearing, but we
    recognize that in some situations there seemed to be blame to be shared
    for difficulties between both state and federal agencies, but our main
    concern is that the system work at the point of delivery locally and we
    do not have a clear perspective on how the interface between state and
    federal helped or hindered the response. County government is the
    closest governance to our citizens and the very people who form local
    government live disasters alongside the community while also
    responding. There must be response infrastructure to support those
    efforts from other levels of government.

        Statement 2: Transylvania County was left to manage emergency
    response without FEMA in early days and did not get FEMA support until
    numerous and repeated phone calls and emails were made to appeal for
    assistance. Even our federal legislators were puzzled by the delay in
    FEMA arriving or responding. No official reason has ever been offered,
    but this delayed citizens' being able to start the application process,
    left local resources strained without information and lowered
    confidence in the FEMA response from the beginning with our leaders and
    our community.
        No FEMA representatives were present in Transylvania County until 9
    days after Hurricane Helene created the worst disaster to hit our area
    in over 100 years. Flooding, landslides, and wind/tree damage left our
    county looking and feeling like a war zone with the vast majority
    without power, without communication and with devastating damage. Our
    Emergency Operations Center (EOC) received one phone call on day 6 from
    a FEMA representative stating they would be on site the following day
    without any arrival or additional call. Receiving any level of service
    took constant advocacy meaning some of our local resources were spent
    trying to get FEMA to engage instead of accomplishing other response
    activities. Status of damage incurred, and needs were communicated for
    days without response.
        When I discussed the delay with one FEMA worker, they suggested the
    lack of assistance uptake from our county, such as those utilizing
    Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA), made it appear as if there
    was less need in our community because of low reported utilization of
    TSA. This seems like it could be a factor, and the data does reflect a
    lower measure of initial assistance uptake; however, data reports did
    not accurately convey the reasons people were not accepting assistance.
    Data points from these reports may still be limited in understanding
    the full impact of Helene in our county. Even damage assessment figures
    were slow to reflect total impact because flooding could be easily
    identified by inspecting floodplain areas, but our county suffered
    landslide and tree damage to homes that were spread out across the
    county and took longer to inventory.
        I recently spoke with a county manager on the other side of the
    disaster in North Carolina that indicated they were not even sure why
    they were in the disaster declaration because they saw very little
    impact from the storm, but that FEMA representatives arrived promptly
    and unannounced right after the storm. The only other plausible reason
    for the delay we have been able to identify is that the main operation
    was put in Hickory, NC and our county was one of the furthest away from
    that base; but plenty of FEMA staff were in neighboring Buncombe and
    Henderson counties well before arriving here and even present in some
    counties during the storm. The FEMA shelter set up immediately at the
    NC Agriculture Center is less than 15 minutes from our county line.

        Statement 3: Both short- and long-term housing response processes
    instilled in FEMA are not suited to be effective in rural America or in
    environments like the mountains. This created a disconnect in the
    practical connection of those who needed help and the options available
    to them with specific issues around what those options meant for their
    families. A lesson learned in our experience is that the FEMA data
    around assistance uptake in long term housing does not adequately
    reflect degree of need in a community and that options that allow
    people to stay on their own property would have been more supportive
    and utilized. Policy makers should consider how protocols apply in
    different settings with the ability to be responsive to communities,
    instead of a one-size-fits-all approach.
        Once life safety is secured in an emergency, our priorities pivot
    to the basic immediate human needs of clean water, food, and shelter.
    The Temporary Shelter Assistance (TSA) program, FEMA's first line of
    assistance to those displaced from their homes, is not set up to
    provide immediate assistance in rural areas because the availability of
    major hotel chains, capacity and established contracts are inconsistent
    or unavailable completely. Our citizens who applied for assistance and
    were approved for TSA in the initial weeks following the disaster found
    that the closest availability for hotels accepting the TSA program were
    in Charlotte, NC, or Greenville, SC, requiring anywhere between a 1-
    and 3-hour drive away from their homes, jobs, and schools. The TSA
    numbers for our county do not reflect the ultimate need for housing
    after the storm because many were not willing to uproot their lives and
    either stayed with friends and family or in their damaged homes. We saw
    the most success for immediate housing needs with North Carolina
    Emergency Management and nonprofits that were able to secure RV units
    for households that could be placed at damaged home sites quickly and
    that did not require meeting floodplain elevation standards and other
    more stringent restrictions since they are mobile units. Unfortunately,
    those resources were not robust enough to assist to the full extent
    needed; however, similar resources could be an improved option in rural
    emergency response both for immediate needs and for the longer term
    while households navigate the lengthy process of determining whether to
    tear down, rebuild, relocate, etc.
        FEMA housing leadership met with us to explain the options coming
    for our residents and explained that long-term housing implementation
    would take time. The long-term housing program has requirements that
    take a significant amount of time to deploy, with some of those found
    to be unrealistic for our community; so, there was no interim support
    unless citizens wanted to leave the area to use TSA. Rental assistance
    is one of the easier options, but there was an existing lack of rentals
    before the storm in our county. FEMA housing leadership explained that
    HUD's fair market rents are used to determine rental assistance limits
    early in our conversations. We provided a history of advocacy and data
    that shows that the methodology to estimate rural community fair market
    rent levels is not an accurate depiction of our county. FEMA
    representatives heard us on this issue and raised the request to
    increase the amount allowed. Even with an approval of doubling the fair
    market rent allowance, our county only saw 10 units immediately
    available under those limits. Households that pursued rental assistance
    and FEMA workers had challenges finding units within the limits.
    Addressing FMR helped the housing mission because it was responsive to
    the local characteristics of the community.
        For long-term housing, FEMA units could not be placed in the
    floodplain, but the homeowners who needed a unit to allow them to
    repair or to have time to go through hazard mitigation/buy out
    processes to determine their best options are in the floodplain and
    could not use the FEMA units unless they could find property outside of
    the floodplain for placement. Most of the commercial mobile home parks
    are in or near the floodplain because in the mountains, floodplains
    provide flat land that can be developed and used for those purposes.
    Additionally, the mobile home parks had limited availability due to the
    pre-existing short housing supply. Our county even pulled tax record
    data to provide all commercial mobile home park sites in the county to
    FEMA personnel to facilitate locating sites, and few were identified as
    possibilities for either available space or for being in the
    floodplain.
        People in our rural community did not want to leave their homes;
    around half those qualifying for long-term housing chose to stay in
    their damaged dwellings, as reflected in FEMA data, often because the
    options offered were not realistic. Even the federally owned campground
    in Pisgah National Forest was eventually excluded as a mass housing
    site because it is in a floodplain, despite it being a federally owned
    site and easily accessible in our county. Additionally, the logistics
    baked into the long-term housing unit placement--such as required
    inspections to meet standardized requirements--are lengthy processes
    even under ideal circumstances. The first FEMA unit placed in our
    county saw an over two-week delay because the fire suppression unit was
    not working, leading to attempted repairs and eventual replacement.
    Typical mobile home placements under building code do not even have
    similar fire suppression units.
        Communication was a challenge in housing planning and response as
    detailed in another section, but systemic issues of policy, procedure
    and protocol were apparent once communication improved, and the
    requirements were understood locally. Weekly calls--which we
    established with NCEM and FEMA in December after repeated communication
    frustrations expressed by the county manager--were instrumental in
    getting consistent information on housing, understanding of the rules
    (such as learning that sites in the floodplain would be rejected) and
    having clear status updates on those being approved for housing and the
    process being followed. While it is our perspective that the process
    needs to be made more responsive and efficient with fewer obstacles,
    understanding the rules made the participation of local officials more
    effective and the communication with the public clearer.

        Statement 4: Some processes were overly complicated, costing time
    and diverting resources from areas that would have addressed more
    immediate needs in the local community. This also created barriers to
    providing efficient and effective service, in addition to eroding trust
    in FEMA as a response partner.
        An example of these overly complex processes occurred when we
    offered a conference room to house a Disaster Resource Center (DRC) to
    get one operational in our county. The site visit required review of
    the conference room to see if it could be used for a DRC involving at
    least 7 FEMA representatives on the site visit and, while here, a call
    had to be made to see if a handicapped bathroom stall in our public
    county government building being an inch too short could be approved in
    order for the DRC to locate. After over a week post-inspection and
    multiple follow-ups from our staff, we were finally cleared to get a
    DRC. We were then told on a Tuesday that the DRC would soft open on a
    Thursday, with staff and resources arriving on Thursday morning, and
    then officially open on Friday. We scheduled our county operations and
    IT staff to be available to assist for Thursday. Wednesday morning, we
    were contacted by our staff in that building that FEMA representatives
    were there to set up the DRC. We diverted our operations and IT staff
    immediately to assist, only to find that the people to staff the DRC
    had been sent to our location, but that the equipment necessary to
    operate had been sent to another county so setup could not occur that
    day. Later that day, a higher-level FEMA official assigned fault to the
    county for the failure to open on time, even though the issue was
    caused by FEMA staff and required equipment being sent to two different
    places.
        When teams arrived to go door to door in impacted neighborhoods, we
    assigned a county staff person to accompany them for the two days we
    were told they would be going door to door. (Note: A third day they
    scheduled without informing county staff resulted in an incident
    referenced elsewhere in this report.) Including a county staff member
    on the visits was to help assure our citizens that these were not scams
    and to facilitate getting assistance to more of our households. While
    in one neighborhood, a homeowner came up to the team and said he knew
    an elderly man in one of the houses needed help with the application.
    He offered to go let the man know the team was coming and then came
    back to let them know he spoke to the man, who was ready and waiting to
    receive help. When the team got to the driveway, one of the FEMA
    workers stated they could not go to the door because there was a no
    solicitation sign and started to move on to the next house. While it is
    understandable to avoid issues with no trespass or no solicitation
    signs, there must be some flexibility when it is clear that help is
    welcomed, like in this situation.

        Statement 5: Siloed internal FEMA communications and no clear
    communication protocols, along with inconsistent communication to the
    County Level Emergency Operations Center, created barriers and
    frustration. Communication challenges seemed to frustrate FEMA staff
    themselves when they worked with us to find answers to questions or
    connect to resources. Prior communication directly with counties before
    an event occurs and not just coordination through state without
    engagement of local government would improve this by establishing
    relationships in advance. This could be even more effective by having
    non-emergency regular opportunities for training and relationship
    building.
        Communication between federal, state, and local governments and
    communication within FEMA posed challenges. Multiple examples
    throughout the response showcase those challenges; a few include:
          After receiving a phone call from FEMA to our EOC that
    someone would be coming the next day and then seeing two days pass with
    no arrivals, the county manager reached out to Congressman Edward's
    office to ask who we could contact at FEMA because we were still
    without support. A name and number were provided, and the county
    manager called that number. She was then handed off because the
    ``internal affairs person'' for our county had changed multiple times
    in the same day. Transylvania County staff communicated via phone and
    email with the internal affairs liaison assigned to the county once
    that person was finally identified. When the local government liaison
    arrived in person, it was a different person than anyone who had been
    identified days before, with no communication with us at the local
    level that a change had occurred. We also found none of the information
    we had shared prior had been passed to the new person. Details can be
    found in the timeline attached.

          The FEMA coordinator for our county arrived at our EOC on
    day 9, but with no communication to indicate he was coming that day. He
    began engaging with county staff to understand needs and submitting
    reports into some system, but did not seem to be getting any answers or
    information back. On day 13, the internal affairs liaison arrived with
    no prior communication to the FEMA coordinator already there; because
    the coordinator was unaware anyone else was coming, he could not
    coordinate the meeting who had no prior knowledge of the arrival. This
    prevented him from coordinating with our leadership.

          The Sheriff for our county is part of county government
    with the county manager, and his office is in the same building as the
    EOC. On numerous occasions, the county manager was told that FEMA teams
    were not going door to door, while Sheriff Chuck Owenby was receiving
    phone calls from a FEMA representative in Washington, DC, telling him
    teams were going door to door. This resulted in contradictory messages
    being pushed out to county residents. Both leaders shared with FEMA
    representatives that this was unacceptable, but the issue occurred and
    even damaging to have mixed messages, but it occurred at least two more
    times, and further confusion was only averted because the manager and
    Sheriff were coordinating locally with each other to prevent the
    contradictions from confusing the public. A FEMA representative from DC
    also called Transylvania County dispatch asking racially inappropriate
    questions referencing a racially charged incident has allegedly
    occurred four days prior that was never reported or documented with
    Transylvania County. See timeline and CAD report included in
    attachment.

          Transylvania County staff was given four different
    instructions for how to submit possible housing sites and followed all
    of them in the first six weeks after the storm. The concern over
    housing challenges in the community was communicated in writing prior
    to any FEMA staff arriving, because county staff were well aware of the
    lack of rentals and the challenges with available housing prior to the
    storm. County staff continued to raise the question about sites,
    including an easily accessible campground in the federally owned Pisgah
    National Forest and two private sites owners had offered for
    consideration.

           When county staff inquired about the status of the consideration
    of these sites for housing, FEMA staff would provide a new, different
    method to submit the sites for review, and there appeared to be no
    continuity of information shared among FEMA staff. After the manager
    requested weekly calls on housing with FEMA and NCEM representatives in
    December, the first meeting began with a discussion of the status of
    those sites being considered. The FEMA representative on the call
    pulled up a database which did not have any of the sites submitted by
    the county in it, meaning none of the site submittal pathways given
    previously had worked. The lack of clear pathways and having to re-
    explain community conditions around housing meant time and effort from
    our team that could have been spent addressing other recovery issues.

        Statement 6: Changing contacts and inconsistent handoff of
    information established shaky infrastructure that impacted
    communication, trust in partnership and efficiency. We had to re-
    explain our local needs, challenges, culture and practical information
    over and over again without getting answers to questions or progress on
    addressing issues. A solid human resource infrastructure is necessary
    to make collaboration effective.
        The timeline included in this report reflects examples of FEMA
    contacts being changed, often with no notice to the county EOC staff
    that a change was being made. Additionally, staff handoff of
    information was inconsistent, ranging from no transfer of information
    at all to a written handoff report and coordinated meetings. When an
    effective handoff occurred, it relieved local staff from the resource
    drain of having to keep re-orienting new FEMA representatives. An
    example of a handoff being well done in the timeline was Heather Long,
    who organized a handoff meeting and prepared a status report to review
    with the incoming replacement, as well as scheduling a meeting with
    county staff to introduce the incoming replacement and ensure
    information on challenges, current issues and needs was addressed in
    the meeting. The re-orientation required by local staff when those
    handoffs were not well facilitated was frustrating, time consuming and
    demoralizing to county staff, in addition to stalling progress of the
    response.

        Statement 7: Conflicting guidance for public assistance process and
    items eligible for reimbursement created confusion and frustration. It
    also led to decisions being made on faulty information to spend local
    funds or make decisions on resource usage based on erroneous
    information that may create additional financial impact to the county
    budget already impacted by the impacts of the disaster.
        The impact of contradicting and changing guidance on the county has
    been challenging and creates financial risk for the county. Guidance
    about reimbursable expenses created additional resource devotion to
    tracking expenses that would later be said could not be reimbursed.
    Early direction included that the local volunteer fire departments had
    to file their own public assistance only to find later that they could
    have fallen under the county's effort, meaning they had to figure out
    how to navigate that process or chose not to seek reimbursement due to
    the amount of resources it would take to pursue it.
        Some of the contradictions and financial impact to the county were
    county resources used by FEMA and the Red Cross in the response. We did
    not charge FEMA or Red Cross rent on any of our properties used for
    shelters or DRC locations because staff recalled being told during a
    meeting the County would be able to claim dates of use and be
    reimbursed per square foot for the space used. This would offset
    utilities and programs that had to be cancelled from those locations so
    that those functions could occupy the space in response and recovery.
    After the DRC closed and all shelters closed, we added this information
    to our Cat B expenses and were then told this was not reimbursable
    despite the earlier guidance. We were told by PDMG we should have
    created a rental agreement with FEMA and Red Cross before they moved
    into those spaces to recoup the cost of our operations. There is no
    reimbursable claim for our facilities being inaccessible to regular
    entities renting space or programs that had to be cancelled. We had
    similar conflicting guidance on covering fees on behalf of survivors
    for debris disposal, permit fees for repair and other expenses that
    have a direct impact on county resources and budget.

        Statement 8: The Just in Time training approach in the field was
    frustrating because there was not anyone available with broader
    knowledge and training, which impacted trust with county citizens. To
    be effective, this training method requires a readily accessible lead
    with a broader knowledge of disaster management.
        An example of just-in-time training having an ineffective result
    occurred with the FEMA teams sent to go door to door for applications.
    County management was initially told the teams would be able to assist
    people who had applied and either did not know the status of their
    application or had been rejected and needed help. Instead, the teams
    told residents they would have to call the FEMA 1-800 number for any
    questions. Residents were not able to get through on the hotline and
    reported waiting hours, only to get disconnected (possibly because
    communications across the county were running on temporary cell
    infrastructure due to the storm damage). In speaking with those on the
    FEMA teams, we learned they had received ``just in time training'' and
    were only trained to help fill out applications. They could not assist
    beyond the form or even refer for assistance beyond the 1-800 number.
    While just in time training can be an efficient tool for deployment of
    resources, teams are ineffective if there is not someone deployed
    alongside that has broader information and context to support the
    services being delivered. The inability to assist beyond filling in
    information on tablets and referring to the hotline frustrated citizens
    and made them lose confidence in the FEMA support they were seeing.

        Statement 9: Flexibility is required to meet unique needs in
    different disasters. Our county's recovery depends on the ability to
    address private roads and bridges, but decisions are made only to have
    FEMA's guidance shift (i.e. recent letter on requirements). It is
    unclear how the funding for this will be managed and what requirements
    would be imposed on local government in the process.
        Western North Carolina has many bridges and roads privately owned
    and maintained. Initially private roads/bridges were not going to be
    eligible for any FEMA assistance except through individual assistance
    means. After consideration of the need in our area, FEMA changed course
    and announced that funds could be used for repair of damaged private
    roads and bridges, but processes and requirements are not yet clear. A
    recent FEMA memo indicates these bridges and roads will be required to
    have an engineer's certification stating the bridge/road was built to
    the same or greater level than prior to the storm. No reliable records
    exist on many of these bridges and roads, however, meaning it is
    unreasonable to expect an engineer to be able to provide this
    certification universally. Lack of clarity about how funds will be
    administered, who will be responsible for holding bonds, guarantees or
    where liabilities will fall mean that repairs are being delayed
    further.

        Statement 10: FEMA as floodplain protection ordinance enforcer and
    FEMA as disaster response created conflicting purposes that were
    logistical challenges to the county being effective at meeting the more
    immediate needs in the community. Disaster funding assistance should
    not be tied to having floodplain control ordinances and programs in
    place as it has historically. The incentive for having floodplain
    management programs should solely be eligibility for subsidized flood
    insurance through NFIP in those communities. Early in the response,
    staff for the Flood Management and Insurance section put pressure on
    the county floodplain administrator to increase requirements on flood
    victims and institute unrealistic requirements for repair permits to be
    issued. Later in March, representatives from FEMA came to audit sample
    assessments conducted by the county floodplain administrator
    determining Substantial Damage or Non-Substantial Damage. Yet FEMA has
    still not resolved all housing placements for those who qualify for
    long term housing assistance from the disaster. The focus on compliance
    and the threat of loss of NFIP status, without consideration of
    immediate human needs, created contradictory priorities and additional
    pressure on the county.
        Transylvania County administers a floodplain protection ordinance
    as required for the county to be eligible to receive funding and
    support from FEMA in a disaster. After the storm occurred, many of our
    residents were committed to staying at their property instead of using
    TSA that would take them out of the area. To restore their damaged
    homes to a livable condition, they were eager to make repairs.
    Initially, our building inspections department that administers the
    floodplain ordinance and our city planning department who also
    administers a floodplain ordinance were told by FEMA staff that they
    needed to require non-conforming structures to come into compliance
    before permitting any repairs. The steps to raise a home or flooded
    trailer include having a surveyor shoot base floor elevations and an
    engineer design the measures to safely raise the structure. There were
    no surveyors and engineers in the area available to even provide this
    kind of service, and the process would require time that the pending
    cold weather would not allow these families. Our staff witnessed
    families throwing away all their possessions and desperately trying to
    use dehumidifiers to make a safe place for their family to stay. I
    toured a flooded mobile home with a woman who was 9 months pregnant.
    Their outlets had been inundated, and there were volunteers eager to
    assist in repair; but our staff was told we might endanger our NFIP
    status if we did not require the floodplain compliance before issuing
    permits to make those repairs. Another elderly man was still living in
    his home even though mold had reached a foot high in the home, posing a
    health hazard to him while awaiting repairs.
        Our staff found a document issued by FEMA indicating we had
    flexibility in the administration of repair permits and timeline of
    compliance with floodplain ordinances. We decided to use temporary
    occupancy permits to address the immediate need for healthy and safe
    shelter over forcing immediate floodplain compliance. FEMA staff from
    the floodplain administration side of the agency also put pressure on
    our building department to propose an increase in base floor elevation
    requirements in the ordinance, while the same department was in the
    middle of trying to address immediate assessment and building
    inspections needed to make homes livable for these families. The
    proposed FEMA changes would have increased the standard those impacted
    would have had to meet in the middle of the recovery.
        An email included in this packet shows where a FEMA representative
    advised the city staff that the county was trying to skirt the
    ordinance because a county structure was being listed by the city as
    having flooded to 50% damage. This occurred despite both photographic
    evidence to the contrary and a sworn building inspector and a
    contractor providing written letters that the building did not have
    water above the basement of the structure. The push by these FEMA
    representatives on floodplain ordinance issues--and even implied
    threats of noncompliance and resulting ineligibility for future
    disaster funding--worked directly against the most urgent mission to
    restore safe shelter to affected families with winter weather pending.
    NFIP eligibility should be enough incentive for local governments to
    have floodplain administration ordinances, and assistance in a disaster
    should not be held hostage over floodplain compliance. Forcing
    compliance should never take precedence over meeting immediate needs in
    a disaster. (Additional documentation attached in appendix.)

        Conclusion: FEMA workers generally want to support communities in
    disasters and are genuine in their desire to help, as evidenced by
    their willingness to leave their own communities to come serve. Our
    experience has been that the issues in process, protocol,
    organizational structure, and ill-designed communication make those
    employees' efforts less effective and efficient in meeting the local
    community's needs. Improvements to the system and well thought out
    methods of creating flexibility to meet the unique needs of an impacted
    community will better serve those impacted in a disaster, as well as
    those who work within the FEMA system. Our county is thankful for the
    progress that has been made in response and recovery, but at the same
    time we recognize that more positive impact could be achieved in a more
    responsive and organized system. We appreciate the opportunity to share
    our experience and feedback.
                                  Appendices:
    Appendix A: Timeline of FEMA communication through 11-2-24 and sample
    communication challenges

    Appendix B: Sample Documentation of Flood Management and Insurance
    Challenges

    Appendix C: Sample Documentation Challenges Specific to Housing

    Appendix D: Sample Documentation of Conflicting Public Assistance Rules
    from FEMA

    Appendix E: Documented Example of Effective Handoff between FEMA
    Liaisons by Heather Long

        [Editor's note: The appendices, totaling 174 pages, are retained in
    committee files and available online at: https://docs.house.gov/
    meetings/PW/PW13/20250325/117940/HHRG-119-PW13-Wstate-LaughterJ-
    20250325.pdf]

        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady for her
    testimony.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garcia for 5 minutes.

    TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS,
           ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

        Mr. Garcia. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for having
    me today.
        My name is Adrian Garcia, and I am a county commissioner in
    Harris County, Texas, and I am here on behalf of the National
    Association of Counties where I serve as the cochair of the
    Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force.
        Among the many responsibilities entrusted to counties, we
    are on the frontlines of disaster mitigation response and
    recovery. Nearly 900 counties each year receive at least 1
    disaster, Presidential disaster declaration. This results in
    major economic losses, serious effects on communities, and
    immense pressures on local resources.
        Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency
    managers are the first on the scene and play a key role in
    recovery and rebuilding efforts so our residents can return to
    their lives as quickly as possible.
        As major owners and operators of public infrastructure,
    counties are uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts of
    disasters. America's 3,069 counties, parishes, and boroughs own
    44 percent of public roads, 38 percent of the national bridge
    inventory, over 900 hospitals, and directly support one-third
    of the Nation's airports.
        I am here today to underscore the county role in
    strengthening our Nation against disasters and to discuss how
    we can best work together to meet the challenges of today and
    the demands of the future.
        First, FEMA is crucial for communities before, during, and
    after disasters. That said, inefficiencies in the Agency do
    demand urgent reform. Disaster response, recovery, and
    mitigation starts local and absolutely ends local. However,
    these efforts would not be possible without the support from
    critical Federal programs. One such program that counties rely
    on is FEMA's Public Assistance Program.
        PA is crucial for helping communities rebuild after
    disasters, but the lengthy process to receive reimbursement can
    delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to restore
    critical services post-disaster.
        Last year, NACo conducted a survey of its members that
    concluded that one in five counties' longest open PA claim had
    been in processing between 4 and 6 years. Counties urge
    Congress to take decisive action to expedite funding from this
    PA Program, ensuring communities receive the critical resources
    we need for timely disaster recovery and rebuilding.
        Second, removing barriers to funding and resources for
    underserved and disadvantaged communities is absolutely
    critical. Requiring the completion of complex and burdensome
    paperwork by communities who are unfamiliar with the process
    during the most stressful times of their lives can
    significantly impede progress when it is most needed.
        Populations that feel the biggest impact are often our
    underserved and disadvantaged communities who lack the
    resources and capacity to complete applications and meet
    critical deadlines. Implementing plain language into
    applications, reducing bureaucratic redtape, and identifying
    resources available to assist applicants is paramount to
    improving the overall resilience of our Nation.
        Counties are supportive of bipartisan legislation like the
    Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance
    Simplification Act, which would streamline the application
    process and reduce redundant paperwork.
        Finally, counties understand that improving our Nation's
    disaster system relies on a strong Federal, State, local
    partnership. Counties are not merely stakeholders in this
    conversation. Rather, we are a part of the Federal, State, and
    local partnership of Government that together can work together
    to share the responsibility of protecting our Nation and its
    residents from disasters.
        While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our
    State and Federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools
    like funding, human capital, and technical assistance.
    Rebuilding our communities and making them more resilient is
    only possible with the support of our Federal and State
    partners.
        Counties stand ready to work side by side with you to
    improve our Nation's disaster response, recovery, and
    mitigation capabilities to ensure the health, well-being, and
    safety of our Nation and our residents.
        Chairman Perry and Ranking Member Stanton, thank you again
    for the invitation to discuss this critical issue on behalf of
    America's counties.
        This concludes my testimony, and I am happy to take any
    questions. Thank you.
        [Mr. Garcia's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County,
            Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties
                                  Introduction
        Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Association of Counties
    (NACo), thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important
    role counties play in disaster response, recovery and mitigation.
        My name is Adrian Garcia, and I serve as a Commissioner in Harris
    County, Texas. I also serve as the Chair of the Justice and Public
    Safety Policy Steering Committee and Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental
    Disaster Reform Task Force at NACo.
        NACo is the only national organization that represents county
    governments in the United States, including Alaska's boroughs and
    Louisiana's parishes. Founded in 1935, NACo assists America's 3,069
    counties in pursuing excellence in public service to produce healthy,
    vibrant, safe and resilient communities. NACo works to strengthen
    county resiliency by advocating for federal policies and programs that
    help county leaders identify and manage risk and allow counties to
    become more flexible and responsive to disasters. Through sustainable
    practices and infrastructure, counties become better prepared to
    address these issues in a manner that can minimize the impact on our
    residents and businesses.
        Harris County is home to over 4.8 million residents to whom we
    provide critical services, including public safety and emergency
    services, public housing, health and human services, transportation and
    more. We predominantly rely on local property taxes to ensure our many
    responsibilities are met; however, due to constraints on local revenues
    that are enforced at the state level, a strong intergovernmental
    partnership is critical as we work to meet the challenges of today and
    plan for the future.
        For example, in 2017 Harris County was struck by Hurricane Harvey.
    This catastrophic event resulted in widespread flooding, affecting
    approximately 300,000 structures and displacing thousands of residents.
    The storm resulted in at least 89 fatalities in Harris County, with
    many occurring outside designated flood zones, underscoring the
    unpredictable nature of such disasters. The storm's unprecedented
    rainfall overwhelmed our infrastructure, leading to significant
    economic and social repercussions
        More recently, Hurricane Beryl made landfall in July 2024, causing
    extensive power outages that affected over 2.7 million households and
    businesses. The prolonged loss of electricity, combined with extreme
    heat, led to at least six heat-related fatalities in Harris County.
        Paramount among other critical county responsibilities is the role
    of counties in community preparedness. Counties are on the front lines
    of defense before, during and after disasters strike. While state
    statutes and organizational structures vary, local emergency management
    responsibilities are most commonly vested in county governments.
    Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency managers
    are often the first on the scene and play a key role in the
    coordination of local emergency management efforts. Other key county
    staff involved in pre- and post-disaster efforts include local police,
    sheriffs, firefighters, 911 call center staff, public health officials
    and public records and code inspectors. In the aftermath of disasters,
    we coordinate clean-up, recovery and rebuilding efforts so our
    residents can return to their lives as quickly as possible.
        Furthermore, because counties are major owners of public
    infrastructure, we are also uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts
    of disasters before they occur. Collectively, we own 44 percent of
    public road miles, 38 percent of the National Bridge Inventory, 960
    hospitals, more than 2,500 jails, over 650 nursing homes and directly
    support a third of the nation's airports and public transit systems. We
    also own and maintain a wide variety of public safety infrastructure,
    including roadside ditches, flood control channels, stormwater culverts
    and pipes and other infrastructure used to funnel water away from low-
    lying roads, properties and businesses. Counties provide extensive
    outreach and education to residents on water quality and stormwater
    impacts prior to and following disasters, and we work to reduce water
    pollution, adopt setbacks for land use plans and are responsible for
    water recharge areas, green infrastructure and water conservation
    programs.
        Over the past 20 years, natural and man-made disasters have
    increased in frequency, severity and cost. On average, 25 percent of
    counties have experienced at least one disaster in each of the last
    three years. In 2023, 849 counties experienced at least one federally
    declared major disaster, 720 counties had at least one disaster
    declaration and 312 counties had at least one emergency declaration
    and. That same year, the nation experienced 28 separate billion-dollar
    disasters, which totaled approximately $93 billion in damages.
        As a result of this uptick in frequency and cost, NACo has launched
    the Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force to strengthen our
    nation's disaster mitigation, response and recovery capabilities. The
    Task Force brings together county officials from across the country to
    advocate for practical, common-sense reforms that improve disaster
    response, recovery and mitigation. Given that counties are on the
    frontlines of disaster management, our direct involvement in federal
    policy reforms is essential to ensure that policies are practical,
    effective, and address the unique challenges faced by local
    communities. By having a seat at the table, counties can advocate for
    streamlined processes and resources tailored to their specific needs,
    leading to more resilient and prepared communities nationwide.
        Counties are not merely stakeholders in this conversation. Rather,
    we are a part of the federal-state-local partnership of governments
    that together share the responsibility of protecting our nation and its
    residents from both natural and man-made disasters. Like the federal
    government, counties are entrusted by taxpayers to provide a variety of
    important services to our residents, and we stand ready to work with
    our intergovernmental counterparts to improve community resiliency and
    mitigate the impacts of future disasters. To this end, counties offer
    the following considerations:

        1.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for
    disaster response and recovery, but operational challenges and
    bureaucratic inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more
    effective and equitable program delivery.

        2.  Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and
    resources, particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities,
    by providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.

        3.  County officials are effective stewards of federal investments,
    and a strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the
    entirety of our public sector responsibilities.

    The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for disaster
    response and recovery, but operational challenges and bureaucratic
    inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more effective and
    equitable program delivery.

        Disaster response, recovery and mitigation starts local and ends
    local. Counties across the country are currently managing large scale
    recovery efforts, while simultaneously continuing to meet our daily
    responsibilities around ensuring our communities remain safe and
    resilient to the next disaster. While we are doing our part at the
    local level, effective response and recovery efforts would not be
    possible without the continued support from agencies like FEMA, who
    administer programs that provide vital resources before, during and
    after disasters. Without FEMA, state and local governments would face
    significant challenges in recovering from disaster due to limited
    resources and coordination capabilities.
        However, FEMA's effectiveness is often hindered by inflexible
    decision-making processes and excessive bureaucratic red tape,
    highlighting the need for reform. The agency's layered approval
    procedures and complex administrative requirements can delay the
    delivery of critical resources to communities in need. We have heard
    countless examples from counties about the challenges of navigating
    FEMA's stringent application processes and slow response times.
    Streamlining decision-making, increasing transparency, and reducing
    unnecessary administrative barriers would allow FEMA to respond more
    swiftly and effectively, ensuring communities receive timely support in
    the aftermath of a disaster.
        One such program that is in desperate need of reform is FEMA's
    Public Assistance (PA) Program. PA is crucial for helping communities
    rebuild after disasters, but the lengthy process to receive
    reimbursement can delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to
    restore critical services post disaster. Last year, NACo conducted a
    survey of members that concluded that one in five counties (20 percent)
    longest open PA claim had been in processing between four and six
    years; almost a third of respondents (28 percent) reported processing
    times exceeding six years. For counties with all outstanding claims
    paid, the majority (71 percent) report typical turnaround times between
    one and three years. Because PA operates as a reimbursement, the cost
    of response efforts is paid upfront using county funds placing
    significant financial strain on counties, who are often forced to take
    out large loans to cover upfront disaster costs.
        NACo has strongly supported the FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief
    Act--passed by this committee in the 118th Congress--and a proposal
    from the FEMA National Advisory Council to treat the first few months
    of PA as a grant versus a reimbursement, which would dramatically
    improve disaster recovery for localities. By offering immediate relief
    through grants for the initial months, communities would have access to
    essential funds more quickly, allowing them to respond to urgent
    recovery needs without the burden of upfront costs. Additionally, the
    FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief Act would reduce the financial
    pressure on communities, allowing for any interest incurred on disaster
    loans to be reimbursed by PA. These measures would help ensure that
    recovery efforts are not delayed due to bureaucratic hurdles or
    financial barriers, ultimately allowing communities to rebuild faster
    and more effectively.

    Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and resources,
    particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities, by
    providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.

        Unfortunately, bureaucratic red tape follows a disaster. For
    example, requiring the completion of complex and overly burdensome
    paperwork by communities who may be entirely unfamiliar with system
    protocols and who are attempting to undertake these processes during
    the most stressful times of their lives can significantly impede
    progress when it is needed most. Populations that feel the biggest
    impact are often our underserved and disadvantaged communities where
    resources and capacity to complete applications and meet critical
    deadlines can be severely exacerbated.
        Ensuring no communities are left behind requires reexamining
    current procedures when applying for federal funding. Implementing
    plain language into applications, providing clear timelines and
    identifying resources available to assist applicants during the process
    are paramount to improving the resiliency of our communities. Excessive
    paperwork and lack of clarity can be particularly difficult for
    jurisdictions who may be under resourced or dealing with co-occurring
    disasters, as we saw with many parts of the country throughout the last
    few years.
        Counties have long supported legislation like the Disaster
    Survivors Fairness Act (H.R.1245)--approved by this committee in the
    118th Congress--and the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act (S.861).
    These critical pieces of legislation would streamline the application
    process for federal aid, reducing redundant paperwork and making it
    easier for survivors to access the support they need. By improving
    coordination between agencies and simplifying eligibility requirements,
    these reforms would alleviate the administrative burden on those
    recovering from disasters.

    County officials are effective stewards of federal investments, and a
    strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the entirety of
    our public sector responsibilities.

        Counties across the country are working daily to address the needs
    of our residents and make decisions that drive the success of our
    jurisdictions. While we are doing our part at the local level, 45
    states limit the ability of counties to raise revenue in various ways,
    making the intergovernmental partnership vital to meeting our public
    sector responsibilities. Only 29 states authorize counties to collect
    sales taxes, but almost always under various restrictions. 26 states
    impose a sales tax limit and 19 require voter approval. For western
    counties, who are at great risk of flooding and wildfires, state
    restrictions on local revenues can be even more impactful, as much of
    the land within western county boundaries is considered federal land,
    thus removing the ability of a county to levy property taxes.
        While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our state
    and federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools, like funding
    assistance, human capital and technical assistance. Without proper
    federal and state support, county recovery and mitigation efforts may
    lack the full capabilities necessary to rebuild our communities and
    make them more resilient against future disasters. In an environment
    where counties have limited financial flexibility, a strong
    intergovernmental partnership is crucial to community recovery and key
    to the success of future mitigation efforts.
        With that in mind, Congress should prioritize legislation that
    seeks to strengthen intergovernmental partnerships in disaster recovery
    by enhancing coordination, streamlining communication and supporting
    resource-sharing between all levels of government. By promoting pre-
    disaster planning, simplifying aid processes and supporting local
    recovery efforts, lawmakers can ensure a more effective and coordinated
    response to disasters.
                                   Conclusion
        Counties are on the front lines of the pre- and post-disaster
    efforts, and without proper federal assistance, recovery and mitigation
    efforts may lack the full support necessary to rebuild our communities
    and return the lives of our residents to normal.
        Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you again for inviting me to testify here
    today.
        Counties stand ready to work side-by-side with our federal and
    state partners to make our communities more resilient and ensure the
    health, well-being and safety of our citizens.

        Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman, as well as
    thanking all the witnesses for their testimony.
        We will now turn to questions for the panel, and the Chair
    recognizes himself for the first round of questions.
        I am going to start with you, Ms. Laughter. I read through
    a bunch of what you submitted. I will admit I didn't read
    through every single bit of it. It is voluminous: emails and
    correspondence. And as the county manager, I am not sure--maybe
    you never thought about the mission of FEMA, but it is to
    coordinate between the Federal agencies and, of course, State
    and local agencies. But it was never designed to be the command
    and control and do all the work, right. But that is kind of
    what is expected of it now.
        And it seems to me, as the person that is trying to figure
    that out in the aftermath of this devastating disaster, like,
    you don't have time to figure it out. You are just trying to
    deliver, right.
        I remember the two times we were flooded out of our home.
    One time we stayed in the fire hall before we moved to a
    neighbor's house that wasn't affected, somebody we didn't even
    know just offered to come take us in. And then the other time
    was at the township building.
        And I am thinking about it, but it seems to me, as I read
    through your correspondence here, much of your county didn't
    even exist, right. There wasn't any--there might not have been
    a township building, a fire hall, or a neighbor's house to go
    to.
        And so I am just wondering, from your experience, I mean,
    you couldn't get answers even about a federally owned property
    for which to place temporary housing on. You couldn't get any
    answers on that, let alone the housing.
        If you were going to give everybody here, which I think are
    very interested in trying to figure out how to make this work,
    what would be the one message--as a person who has lived
    through it and experienced it and have been frustrated by it
    and seen people like you described, living in trailers filled
    with mold and having no prospect whatsoever of anything
    changing any time soon, what would be the one message regarding
    what FEMA--how it would be different in your eyes if it were
    going to work?
        Ms. Laughter. At local government, we were looking for
    resources. We needed assistance, and what we could not find
    were how to leverage those resources. The resources that we
    were offered, like TSA, were very clearly not suited for my
    community. And so I think the message that I would have is
    that, number one, communication.
        If there are resources being offered, we need to understand
    what those terms are upfront so we can even evaluate whether or
    not they are going to be effective in the community.
        The second is, there has to be some responsiveness.
    Wherever we identified issues, whenever we identified resources
    like the Federal property, we had to follow up on that
    ourselves.
        We were living a disaster in our own lives. We were living
    a disaster with our community, and yet we were having to follow
    up repeatedly in order to try to get any progress or any
    answers or even find out if our requests were being heard
    anywhere.
        I submitted that property no less than four times in four
    different ways and still when I got on a call in November to
    ask about housing, they pulled up a database, and none of those
    requests managed to get into the database.
        So I think the two messages are that the communication
    structures have to be robust. They need to happen before the
    disaster so that we know who even to call. And we also need to
    know upfront how to use these resources or make those resources
    more flexible so that whenever we identify what the needs are
    and how that is going to play out in our community, we can use
    them.
        Mr. Perry. Do you have any indication at this point why it
    took so long for FEMA to even show up? Like, right after this
    happened, obviously everybody knows what has happened, but it
    took days and days. And I think, it is my understanding, when
    they finally did show up, they were headquartered like 90 miles
    away, which is a fair drive, right, especially in bad
    conditions.
        Do you have any indication now what took them so long?
        Ms. Laughter. I have never been given a reason. I can
    hypothesize. I think the fact that we are on the edge of the
    disaster was part of it. It is hard to get through the
    mountains. You don't get places very easily.
        The only other thing I can imagine is that our numbers,
    like, for TSA did not look like they were high, which could
    indicate on a data front point that we didn't need help, but
    they weren't high because it wasn't an applicable solution for
    Transylvania County.
        Mr. Perry. Okay.
        I have got a lot of questions and a little bit of time here
    for each one of you.
        Mr. Guthrie, you perfected I think or at least honed a
    fraud prevention program in your State. Can you briefly outline
    how that might be applicable to FEMA, because there is a huge
    amount of fraud in the FEMA dollars that are spent, and we
    would, obviously, like that not to be the case.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, for that question.
        In Florida, we knew that there was the propensity to have
    fraud, waste, and abuse, and what we did, starting about 2
    years ago, we built a program that we want to get good,
    structured data into our system that helps us get good,
    structured data and it allows us to utilize large language
    modeling machine learning and, to a certain point, some
    generative AI to predict when we may have a duplicate payment
    or the payment doesn't actually check the box for the contract.
    In other words, a vendor has charged us more than they should
    have.
        So, again, it focuses from a standpoint of getting the
    good, structured data into the system, and then we use machine
    learning on the backside to do that. And we are detecting, just
    in the recent months, we had three situations for about
    $600,000 that we flagged for potential fraud, waste, or abuse.
    And then we put eyes on that to then investigate it and correct
    the anomalies that were in the invoices, and it was just that.
    It was an anomaly in the invoices where we were charged a
    different rate when we should have been charged a lower rate.
        But it did end up saving taxpayer dollars just in the last
    3 months, $600,000.
        Mr. Perry. I appreciate the response.
        I am way over my time. So I yield and recognize the
    gentleman from Arizona, Ranking Member Stanton.
        Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        My first question is for Mr. Guthrie, Florida's executive
    director for emergency management.
        Florida is arguably one of the States most capable of
    responding to disasters on its own, but you do rely on Federal
    assistance from FEMA and the Emergency Management Assistance
    Compact, EMAC system, when responding to catastrophic events.
        At yesterday's Cabinet hearing, Secretary Noem did indicate
    her desire to eliminate FEMA. The President indicated support
    for that plan to eliminate FEMA.
        From your perspective, how would post-disaster outcomes for
    Floridians be impacted if FEMA were eliminated?
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question.
        At the end of the day, we need Federal support. I go back
    to what you mentioned in your opening statement, sir. Federal
    support, State managed, locally executed. We need to focus on
    the State-managed part. That has been a part of that phrase
    since Brock Long was the FEMA Administrator.
        But we haven't focused on the State-managed piece. We keep
    going back to the Federal Government. We need to focus more on
    that State-managed piece and actually make sure we are managing
    disasters at the State level we are allowing local levels to
    execute in a commonsense approach while we need Federal
    support.
        Now, if that looks like a FEMA of the future, which I think
    all emergency managers nationwide would agree, FEMA needs to be
    reformed. That is a task that takes, obviously, Presidential
    and congressional action to eliminate FEMA.
        So we want to work with the Federal Government. We want to
    work with the President. We want to work with the legislature
    on what that looks like in the future.
        But to the point, we do need Federal support. Florida can
    probably handle 95 to 97 percent of what we do on a day-to-day
    basis, but, for example, in Hurricane Helene and Milton, we
    needed 1 million gallons of fuel. We went to FEMA. We went to
    the Department of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency to
    meet that need.
        So, again, even a highly capable capacity State like
    Florida from time to time needs Federal support.
        Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.
        Mr. Currie, the Federal law is very clear about the
    qualification requirements for the FEMA Administrator. The
    President has named Cameron Hamilton the senior official
    performing the duties of Administrator.
        In your opinion, does he possess the qualifications that
    are legally required to run the Agency?
        Mr. Currie. Well, we have actually been asked to look at
    this and the legality of him serving in that role under the
    Federal Vacancies Reform Act, which GAO has a role in that. And
    so we will do that and have that result pretty quickly.
        But I will say that the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
    Reform Act is pretty clear about the requirements for FEMA
    Administrator. It requires two things. One is the person have
    significant emergency management experience, and the other
    thing is at least 5 years of executive experience. So that is
    what the law says.
        But I want to be very clear that the ideal state is have a
    Senate-confirmed Administrator. The Senate confirmation process
    is the process for vetting a candidate's experience and their
    ability to do that job effectively.
        Mr. Stanton. We saw in Katrina just how horrifically wrong
    it can go if you have someone who is the head of FEMA who
    doesn't have experience in emergency management. It is
    critical. So we want to get that done as soon as possible.
        Mr. Currie, in your role at the GAO, you understand the
    risk of overhauling Federal programs without proper
    consideration. FEMA underwent significant reorganization
    without proper input from emergency managers before Hurricane
    Katrina, and that did contribute to those tragic outcomes.
        What should this administration and this Congress consider
    to ensure that we don't cripple FEMA's lifesaving
    responsibilities when attempting to reform this critical
    agency?
        Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir.
        Like I said in my opening statement, we can't break what is
    not broken, and the only people that can tell you that are our
    first line emergency managers and responders.
        There are things that work well in the current system. The
    problem is, you don't hear good news often. There are things
    that work. We want to keep those. We want to fix the things
    that don't work.
        The other thing I will say is we have to fix the root
    causes. If we just move agencies, rename agencies, rename
    programs, but don't fix the root causes, none of this is going
    to change.
        Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.
        I want to go next to our local elected official, Mr.
    Garcia. Can you also explain how disaster response in your
    county would be impacted without access to Federal resources or
    support after a disaster?
        Mr. Garcia. Ranking Member, without access to Federal
    resources or funding, our county's disaster response would
    absolutely be severely compromised. Local governments simply
    don't have the financial capacity or staffing to manage large-
    scale recovery efforts, meaning vital services like debris
    removal, infrastructure repairs, emergency sheltering would be
    delayed or inaccessible.
        Federal support is essential for ensuring a coordinated and
    effective response, allowing us to restore public safety, and
    meet the needs of our residents as quickly as possible.
        Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields
    back, and I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
    Ezell, for 5 minutes of questions.
        Mr. Ezell. That is Ezell, and I appreciate that.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you all for being here today.
        Mississippi is no stranger to storms. Most notably, as we
    have talked about, Katrina, where we lost the lives of over
    1,300 people and $125 billion in damages.
        In 2005, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency
    Management Reform Act, which reestablished FEMA as a distinct
    entity within DHS.
        As we approach the 20-year anniversary of Hurricane
    Katrina, I am still waiting for FEMA to respond to claims in my
    district associated with this devastating storm. It is
    unacceptable and a perfect example of how the Federal
    Government has let our people down.
        I am proud to have led, co-led, and passed several bills
    that seek to improve FEMA. Bills like H.R. 2254, the Don't
    Penalize Victims Act; H.R. 152, the Federal Disaster Assistance
    Coordination Act; and H.R. 153, the Post-Disaster Assistance
    Online Accountability Act.
        I was thrilled when President Trump recently announced the
    creation of the FEMA Review Council to evaluate FEMA
    bureaucracy and disaster response. FEMA has spent $30 billion
    in disaster aid each of the past 3 years, yet many disaster
    survivors and taxpayers still lack the resources they need.
        I have been working closely with FEMA to address
    outstanding issues in my district, and I look forward to seeing
    how we can improve the process for future disasters because we
    know they are going to happen.
        Before I get too far, I want to enter a document from St.
    Charles Parish, Louisiana, reflecting some of the reforms we
    have discussed for the Agency.
        I want to ask Mr. Currie----
        Mr. Bresnahan [interrupting]. Without objection, so
    ordered.
        [The information follows:]

    Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana,
                  Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell
        Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the
    Subcommittee: Louisiana is no stranger to disaster. It has certainly
    shaped who we are as people, strengthening our resolve and reminding us
    to take care of our neighbors. As President of St. Charles Parish in
    Southeast Louisiana, I appreciate the opportunity to share some of the
    many challenges I've experienced firsthand with the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) before, during, and after disasters. Thank you
    for allowing me to share the experiences of Southeast Louisiana as you
    consider critical reforms to this agency.
        In recent years, St. Charles Parish and the State of Louisiana have
    faced significant challenges due to natural disasters coupled with
    skyrocketing insurance costs. Since 2020, five major storms hit the
    State of Louisiana--Hurricanes Laura, Delta, Zeta, Ida, and Francine.
    While we are unfortunately all too familiar with real-time emergency
    management and disaster recovery, I believe this experience makes our
    state a strong voice for the nation in shaping what federal emergency
    management should look like moving forward and ensuring FEMA returns to
    its core mission of helping people when disaster strikes.
        One of President Trump's initial actions upon taking office this
    year was to sign an executive order establishing the FEMA Review
    Council. I applaud President Trump for taking bold actions early in his
    administration to underscore the importance of restructuring this
    agency. Just about anyone who has encountered FEMA knows all too well
    there is plenty of room for improvement. I welcome the opportunity to
    assist Congress in enacting real reforms to improve the federal
    government's ability to better deliver assistance to those in need.
        One program in particular is in dire need of attention and has
    already negatively impacted tens of thousands of Americans, many of
    whom live in Southeast Louisiana. The National Flood Insurance Program
    (NFIP) has been essential in safeguarding American property owners
    against the financial devastation of floods. However, time and time
    again, we have been forced to fight with FEMA over the gross lack of
    transparency in the NFIP, particularly with the disastrous Biden-Harris
    enacted Risk Rating 2.0 system.
        In 2023, I led a lawsuit on behalf of St. Charles Parish after we
    were denied public records requests demanding the calculations behind
    the Risk Rating 2.0 rate-setting system. Policyholders in my state have
    seen their premiums skyrocket, with some expected to increase from $500
    to over $5,000. It is outrageous that FEMA simply will not justify the
    math that led to these premium hikes, even when subject to
    Congressional inquiries. As FEMA itself expected, this policy has
    forced hundreds of thousands to drop their coverage altogether, leaving
    an alarming number of uninsured property owners in Louisiana and across
    the nation and jeopardizing the financial stability of the entire NFIP.
        This has led to deep mistrust of FEMA because the agency has
    refused to say how local and state mitigation initiatives affect their
    methodology. St. Charles Parish has invested millions of local taxpayer
    dollars to construct new levees and pumps. Yet, we still have residents
    priced out of their homes. Property owners implementing protective
    measures often see little to no reduction in their premiums. This
    oversight discourages proactive risk reduction and fails to reward
    efforts that decrease overall flood risk. Instead, FEMA should work
    with state and local governments to ensure their Risk Rating 2.0 model
    accurately reflects our communities' real risk so we can direct
    resources to mitigate, protect, and achieve affordable flood insurance
    rates. As a public entity, FEMA must reveal the calculations that have
    driven up prices and work with local leaders to implement a policy that
    maintains affordability--a goal it has significantly strayed from under
    the Biden-Harris administration.
        Another problem that deserves the focus of the FEMA Review Council
    is how to improve the federal government's ability to better deliver
    assistance to those in need. The council should solicit input to
    implement reforms that ensure the swift and efficient deployment of
    FEMA aid to state and local governments, as well as to individuals and
    businesses in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. I believe states
    are better equipped to deliver disaster assistance. Currently, state
    agencies are responsible for administering FEMA regulations. We need to
    explore policy solutions that allow states to deliver aid efficiently
    without the cumbersome bureaucratic processes and environmental reviews
    that drastically slow recovery efforts when people are most in need. To
    that point, St. Charles Parish is still waiting for millions of dollars
    from Hurricane Ida in 2021. I firmly believe streamlining processes,
    cutting red tape, and empowering state and local governments to act
    quickly will accelerate recovery efforts, minimize economic losses and
    alleviate the suffering of impacted communities.
        As President of St. Charles Parish, I urge the Subcommittee to
    consider the perspectives and recommendations of the local and state
    leaders who have responded to and managed the recovery efforts in the
    wake of natural disasters. By addressing the shortcomings of the NFIP
    and enhancing the efficiency of FEMA's assistance programs, we can
    better serve our communities in their darkest moments, ultimately
    saving lives and livelihoods.
    References:
          E&E News. ``Hundreds of Thousands Drop Flood Insurance as
    Rates Rise.'' 2024. https://www.eenews.net/articles/hundreds-of-
    thousands-drop-flood-insurance-as-rates-rise/
          WDSU. ``Louisiana Parish Leads Lawsuit Against FEMA Over
    Flood Insurance Hikes.'' 2023. https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-
    fema-flood-lawsuit/43700966
          NOLA.com. ``How Much Will Your Flood Insurance Rise?
    Check This Map.'' 2023. https://www.nola.com/news/environment/how-much-
    will-your-flood-insurance-rise-check-this-map/article_acc5a67e-e458-
    11ed-9482-438f8ebca9f2.html

        Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
        Mr. Currie, the GAO has done a great job, has done great
    reports, on the problems with Risk Rating 2.0. Each community
    across the Nation has invested many resources to manage its
    membership in the NFIP.
        The primary issue with the Risk Rating 2.0 is a lack of
    transparency regarding the algorithm. This results in
    communities being unable to make decisions to target resiliency
    projects, plan future growth, formulate effective policies, or
    simply ensure that they are not wasting resources.
        Its impact today is felt more than ever. With the rising
    cost of housing, this policy hides the actual cost of home
    ownership.
        Mr. Currie, could you reflect on the damage and concerns
    attached to the lack of transparency of Risk Rating 2.0?
        Mr. Currie. Thank you.
        FEMA has a huge challenge with the National Flood Insurance
    Program. The idea behind Risk Rating 2.0 is the right one,
    which is you want to assess each house's individual risk to a
    disaster and not just assume that everybody in an area has the
    same exact risk.
        The challenge is that if your house is at higher rise, your
    premiums are going to be higher. So they are trying to get the
    program to the point of solvency or close to solvency because
    it has never been solvent. It is $20 billion in debt.
        And honestly, sir, it is up to the Congress now to decide
    what they want this program to be. Do they want it to be an
    insurance program, or do they want it to be a Federal disaster
    assistance program?
        As long as premiums do not cover the cost of the program, a
    large portion of the flood insurance program is a disaster aid
    program.
        Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
        What reforms could resolve the possible damage that Risk
    Rating 2.0 can have on families and communities, in general?
        Mr. Currie. Well, there are a number of different options
    that have been put out there, for example, State or Federal
    programs to help supplement homeowners of a certain income
    level or a certain income threshold, just like we do with other
    programs who are basically going to be priced out of a certain
    market because they can't afford the flood--well, they barely
    afford the mortgage and then barely afford the flood insurance
    on top of that.
        So there are a number of options like that, but,
    unfortunately, there are no easy options that will drive down
    the cost. It is going to be very expensive, and somebody has to
    pay for the cost, either the taxpayer, the State, or the
    Federal Government.
        Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
        Should some of the procedures within NFIP be standardized
    and transparent to ensure that communities can effectively use
    the resources?
        Mr. Currie. Absolutely. I mean, that's key. And FEMA,
    through its flood mapping project, should be very transparent
    about the risk of each individual property. And so, I mean,
    they have a long way to go in implementing this program and
    making sure there is transparency.
        Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
        If I may have just another 30 seconds?
        Mr. Bresnahan. No objection.
        Mr. Ezell. In my home State of Mississippi and also along
    the gulf coast, after the hurricane, FEMA just came in there
    and blanketed just about the whole area that was flooded and
    just moved all the flood maps.
        Since then and since I have been in Congress, I have worked
    tirelessly trying to get some sort of order back in place so
    that we could--this is a once-in-a-lifetime storm, and it has
    not happened again. And I've just got to say that it has been
    very frustrating. They have the flood maps, but they don't know
    how to implement them, and we are waiting for those things to
    get implemented. And that is very frustrating to people who are
    trying to buy, build, or have a life, a future on the
    Mississippi Gulf Coast.
        So with that, if you have any way that you can tell them to
    hurry up and get those things adopted, we sure would appreciate
    it.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
    recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. McDonald Rivet, for
    5 minutes of questions.
        Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you very much.
        I want to start just by thanking Chairman Perry and Ranking
    Member Stanton for holding this hearing on what seems to be a
    bipartisan level of frustration.
        I represent a community in Michigan, Midland, Michigan,
    that 5 years ago saw multiple dams fail after heavy rainfall.
    In fact, I personally ran one of the evacuation centers. It
    caused massive flooding and water levels reaching as high as 35
    feet above normal levels.
        Thankfully, no one died in that, which I actually just
    think is a miracle. But it resulted in over $200 million in
    damages, and not only did it decimate our infrastructure like
    our roads and bridges, it destroyed homes that families have
    lived in for generations and small businesses that families had
    dedicated their entire lives to.
        So here we sit 5 years later. Ms. Laughter, I hear your
    story, and it just resonated so deeply with me. It is a
    continuous struggle, a continuing struggling in order to
    resolve the pieces that FEMA came in to help.
        But what we see over and over again, like multiple Federal
    programs, is that the intent of FEMA and the amazing people who
    work there is dying under a cumbersome bureaucracy that is so
    frustrating, particularly for local people who don't have the
    experience of dealing with big Federal bureaucracies and are
    just at the point of giving up.
        Our local communities are owed hundreds of thousands of
    dollars, which is nothing in a Federal budget but everything in
    a local budget.
        So I do want to just say that I understand the frustration,
    but what I am not understanding is the suggested remedy, which
    is a suggested elimination of FEMA and also the suggestion that
    this actually can be solved at a local level if States and
    locals would just budget more appropriately, which having been
    a State senator on the Appropriations Committee, I can tell you
    States cannot handle this just by budgeting, handling this on
    their own and, in particular, when we are simultaneously
    considering extensive cuts, including $880 billion from our
    Medicare program. I mean, it just defies common sense.
        But I do think we have to do something because we can't
    tolerate this. And my local community still sits there and
    waits, and I hope it doesn't take 5 years for you.
        But I hear you, Mr. Currie, when you were talking about,
    okay, what can we do. We know that block granting is also a
    very difficult solution because most Federal block grants,
    again, as a State appropriator, come with burdens, like
    incredibly complex and burdensome regulations.
        But you said, let's address the root causes. Everything
    isn't broken. But I didn't hear you say what those root causes
    are, and I would love to hear them.
        Mr. Currie. Sure.
        Let me take the grant issue. And so a lot has been talked
    about recently about switching FEMA to a block grant. I am not
    so much as concerned with the name of the grant. A block grant
    just means, theoretically, that you provide all the funding
    upfront, and the State manages it instead of the Federal
    Government holding the money and doling it out slowly, which is
    what the FEMA process is.
        The root cause is that the process is too complicated, and
    there are too many rules and overlapping requirements and
    inconsistency for the years that go on with recovery.
        Turnover in staffing plays into this, too, and different
    cultural changes at FEMA. So the problem is that you have an
    infrastructure project that could take 10 to 15 years to
    rebuild, and all throughout there are cost changes, and you
    have to go back and forth to the Federal Government. It is
    very, very confusing.
        I think what we are trying to do is we want to come up with
    something where the Federal Government still provides the
    support that the States will never be able to come up with,
    like you said, but it does so in a way that they provide it to
    the States where there is flexibility, but there is still the
    appropriate oversight and control. And that is the balance you
    are trying to strike.
        With block granting, you give up some of the control at the
    Federal level and the oversight, but you give the States more
    flexibility. But you don't design the block----
        Ms. McDonald Rivet [interrupting]. I am sorry to interrupt
    you, but I am aware of my time. I just want to say, in your
    experience, and I know this is a bit of an unfair question, but
    have you ever seen a Federal-to-State block grant that did not
    come with its own set of rules and overlapping requirements?
        Mr. Currie. It does. But we have to build it better in this
    case. So, for example, with the Community Development Block
    Grant, disaster recovery, one of the challenges with that is,
    is that you try to build the whole program upfront and then
    turn it over to the States, and that takes too long.
        So the money doesn't get there quick enough. We have to
    build this system and the rules and requirements upfront, get
    the States up to speed on it, get everyone familiar with the
    process, build their system, so they can manage this amount of
    money so it can be turned over much quicker. And that is very
    possible to do.
        Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I
    recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Kennedy, for 5 minutes
    for questions.
        Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
    Member Stanton. And today's hearing is more than just about
    FEMA reform. It is about shifting the center of gravity away
    from bloated Federal bureaucracy and toward capable States that
    are closest to the people that they serve.
        In Utah, we know how to do more with less. We invest wisely
    and build strong partnerships between the State and local
    governments. That same principle--clear, locally led
    coordination between State and local governments--should guide
    how we approach emergency management across the country.
    Whether it is wildfires in California, hurricanes in the
    Southeast or earthquakes and flooding risks in Utah, we must
    ensure the Federal Government is a reliable partner, not a
    bureaucratic bottleneck. FEMA should be empowering States and
    counties, not burying them under redtape.
        When agencies grow too large and too distant from the
    people they serve, they lose the ability to act with urgency,
    efficiency, or local understanding. Emergency management is
    just one example, but it is a critical one.
        I support President Trump's Executive order establishing
    the FEMA Review Council. We need that top-to-bottom review, and
    I look forward to working with the committee to play a leading
    role in it.
        I had a few questions for--we will start with Mr. Currie
    and Mr. Guthrie. We have talked about block grants and both of
    you have mentioned that in your testimonies.
        Can you give me some more specifics about if we were to do
    something like that, how would you do that without fraud,
    waste, and abuse, but also cut the redtape and allow that money
    to be used immediately? And start with you, Mr. Currie.
        Mr. Currie. Yes. Sure. Well, I think there is a
    misconception that with a block grant that there is no
    oversight; that Congress appropriates the money, and they write
    a check to the State, and it's done. That is not how it works.
        Most block grants, the State and the Federal Government
    work together to develop very specific rules and requirements
    and controls and audit processes. It's just more of the money
    is delivered upfront. So it is going to take some time, if you
    develop this into a block grant, to train and build the States'
    capacities. Some States, like Florida, probably is going to be
    very quick; other States it is not, other communities it is
    not.
        And so it is possible to do this. But I also think this
    needs to be very different than other block grants that we have
    created before.
        Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question. And it somewhat
    goes to the previous Congresswoman's question as well.
        I will give you two examples of where we can really speed
    this up. Number one, environmental historical preservation. In
    the emergency management community--I have several State
    directors sitting behind me--that is where projects go to die.
    It could take 4 to 6 years to get that done.
        Every State has an environmental and historical
    preservation officer. Why are we duplicating effort on that?
    Let the State do their job, let us document the file and put
    that as a part of the file. We can speed that process up by at
    least 90 percent savings and time.
        I will give you another example. The Consolidated Resource
    Center. I would move to abolish the Consolidated Resource
    Center. Again, that is where people send us RFIs, numerous
    RFIs, hundreds of RFIs, requests for information. Again, the
    State is responsible for managing its grant. Whether it is a
    block grant or if it is a traditional grant, we do that.
        But the number of RFIs that come out--and one of our
    individuals from Alabama talked about he literally had to give
    some type of minute piece of information in a debris removal
    claim. That's insane.
        So those are two examples of where that is already
    happening at the State level. To document those State actions,
    it should be a part of the file, and we move on.
        Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you for those suggestions.
        And, Mr. Garcia, if I could ask you a question about the
    counties. And I agree with the potency of counties, and I think
    that was a big part of your statement.
        The question that I had is, is the hierarchy that you would
    consider associated with counties? Because the Governor is
    generally in charge of the State.
        The idea of the Federal Government, for example, giving
    grants to a county directly and subverting the role of the
    Governor, I am curious how you would--if you were to see
    Federal funds flowing, would you have those funds go directly
    to counties, or would you have them go to the Governor and
    subsequently to the counties? What is your thought about that?
        Mr. Garcia. Well, some counties have capacity like Harris
    County. We are very fortunate in that regard. But not everybody
    does. And so we absolutely need to find ways to work with both
    entities where you work through the States in some regards.
        But, for example, in places like Oregon, Oregon is a State
    that has experienced some delays in reimbursements for the
    recovery process, but places like Hamilton County has had to
    suspend current bids because they are just struggling with some
    of that process. But I think you find ways to work both with
    the counties and the States who have capacity and some who
    struggle with it.
        Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you very much for that answer.
        Mr. Chair, I am committed to helping bring common sense and
    efficiency to this program. It is an essential program, but I
    think there are better ways that we can do that. And thank you
    to the witnesses for their willingness to come and educate us
    about this.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
    recognize the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes
    for questions.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you very much. Earlier, the ranking member
    of the full committee mentioned--and I appreciated it--the
    Disaster Survivors Fairness Act that I have introduced with my
    colleague from North Carolina, Representative Edwards,
    Republican.
        This would streamline Federal assistance for disaster
    victims and expand FEMA's authority to help make homes more
    resilient for future disasters. I am pleased that NACo endorsed
    this legislation. It was a pleasure speaking to you,
    Commissioner Garcia, and other members of NACo about this topic
    earlier.
        In your testimony, you urge Federal policymakers to remove
    barriers to funding and resources for underserved and
    disadvantaged communities. How would creating a universal
    application for individual disaster assistance help in that
    effort that you mentioned?
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you for the question. The reality is that
    making sure that the barriers were removed, as I mentioned in
    my testimony, is very, very important. It is critical that we
    make it plain language, as suggested in the two pieces of
    legislation that I have mentioned, the survivors and
    simplification acts. Those speak to the challenges that many of
    our underserved and disadvantaged communities struggle with.
        Ms. Titus. Okay. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate the
    support. I was looking for a little more detail on how it will
    be helpful, but that is good enough.
        I represent Las Vegas, and we don't have a lot of
    hurricanes in Las Vegas except we could probably make one if we
    decided that would be a tourist attraction. But anyway, one of
    the weather hazards that we do have is extreme heat. And this
    past year, we had the hottest day ever in Las Vegas, 120
    degrees.
        And statistics from the National Weather Service show that
    heat kills more people than hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes
    combined in any given year. There were over 520 heat-related
    fatalities in Clark County last year alone. So I have an
    Extreme Weather and Heat Response Modernization Act so FEMA can
    more aggressively include extreme temperatures, especially
    heat, in its disaster planning and have the resources to deal
    with it.
        I wonder if all four of you would take a minute just to
    talk about how extreme heat is impacting the communities you
    serve and how this would be helpful. Maybe we start with Mr.
    Currie.
        Mr. Currie. Sure. I am familiar with the statistic you
    mentioned, too, that heat kills more people than all the other
    disasters combined.
        The challenge right now for FEMA is the whole system relies
    on quantifying damage to figure out if they provide help. And
    heat is a very difficult thing to quantify in their current
    system.
        I agree with you that there is no better thing to quantify
    in terms of an impact and loss of life. But right now, their
    declaration process relies on damage to infrastructure, and it
    is very hard to show acute damage to infrastructure from heat.
        And so that is one of the reasons that you don't see more
    disaster declarations. So I think we are going to have to look
    at that if we are going to change it.
        Ms. Titus. Kind of hard to say when it starts and when it
    stops, like a storm or something.
        Mr. Currie. Yes. And it does damage infrastructure.
        Ms. Titus. Yes.
        Mr. Currie. I mean, it damages roads, bridges. I mean, it
    is just harder to quantify it acutely because it happens, like
    you said, over a long period of time.
        Ms. Titus. Railroads. Anybody else?
        Mr. Guthrie. We do have extreme heat situations inside of
    southeast Florida, specifically Miami. But this is a great
    example of the federally supported, State managed, locally
    executed.
        In southeast Florida, they plan for that as a part of their
    hazards that they respond to on a local level, and they do that
    on a day-to-day basis when we have those issues. If they need
    assistance from the State, they ask for assistance from the
    State. So the system does work in Florida.
        Ms. Titus. With cooling stations and things like that?
        Mr. Guthrie. Yes.
        Ms. Titus. I think the chairman mentioned it wasn't a good
    idea to plant trees to offset heat islands. I couldn't disagree
    more with that. But anyway--so locally you are doing some
    things?
        Mr. Guthrie. Locally. Southeast Florida, southwest Florida,
    those counties approach it differently. But they are locally
    executing on that situation.
        Ms. Titus. Anybody else real quick?
        Mr. Garcia. I do want to offer that in my precinct, just as
    an example, I have a public works department. We absolutely and
    my staff told me that the heat damage can be identified in
    various pieces of infrastructure. But as it was stated, it is
    very difficult to quantify.
        But we do know that extreme heat is an issue for many of
    our NACo members, and we do have data that we can pass along to
    you to help craft some thoughts around that issue.
        Ms. Titus. That would be great. I know our ranking member
    represents the Phoenix area, and we share some of these common
    problems. So that would be very helpful.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I
    recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, for 5
    minutes for questions.
        Mr. Kiley of California. Good morning. Mr. Guthrie, I
    commend the work you have done in Florida to strengthen your
    State's capacity to respond to disasters quickly and
    effectively and to thereby mitigate and minimize the threat to
    life and property.
        Unfortunately, my own State of California has not been
    quite so forward-looking in terms of its disaster response
    capabilities, and this was put on shocking display for the
    whole world with the recent tragic catastrophic fires in Los
    Angeles, as we bore witness to an empty reservoir, to fire
    hydrants that wouldn't release water, and other basic failures
    of preparedness for which the residents of Los Angeles are now
    paying such a high price.
        So do you have, number one, some best practices that you
    might share with our State for how it can do better in the
    future, and, number two, thoughts on how the ongoing effort to
    reform FEMA might actually itself help to spread those sort of
    practices?
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
    First and foremost, in Florida, we do not respond based on
    whether or not we are going to get federally reimbursed. The
    Governor of the State of Florida, the legislature, support
    emergency management holistically, and they expect us to
    respond not worrying about if we are going to get reimbursed or
    not.
        Unfortunately, not every State, every city or county has
    that option. They have to wait to respond to see if they are
    going to meet a threshold or so on to seek FEMA reimbursement.
        I think another thing that was very, very obvious to me in
    that particular disaster is you had the local officials, such
    as a fire chief, sheriff, and things of that nature, but
    nowhere on that dais or that podium did you see the emergency
    manager. They were treating it as--in my opinion, sir, they
    were treating it as still a fire. They were treating it still
    as a traffic issue.
        They had a much more complex issue, and I know that Nancy,
    the California State director, was involved. But, again,
    emergency management was not there on the day. The Los Angeles
    County Emergency Management director was buried in the back. I
    never saw the city of Los Angeles Emergency Management
    director.
        And this is more of a systemic problem across the country,
    in that, what is emergency management? That is something our
    own national emergency manager's association is grappling with,
    and we are going to try to help define for Congress and others
    in the future is, what is emergency management. We could all
    agree that this is what emergency management does.
        I think those are some of the issues. As far as FEMA goes,
    I know that Regional Administrator Bob Fenton was there, and he
    was heavily involved during that timeframe in the Hurst fire
    that you speak of. FEMA was present.
        However, again, State managed, getting it to the point
    where you can get that State involvement very early on, working
    with your local emergency managers to push funding down, start
    doing the things--for example, in the Hurst fire, the attorneys
    paralyzed that response worried about the environmental hazard
    that was going on to clean up the debris. We deal with that
    every single day across this country. We know what to do. Let
    us separate it, let us put it in the appropriate landfill--tier
    1, 2, or 3--based on the hazardous material, and let us move
    forward.
        Do not stop the operation because there is hazardous
    material. We deal with that every single day.
        Mr. Kiley of California. Thank you. That is a great
    insight. And I should mention, the individuals you mentioned,
    Mr. Fenton, Ms. Ward, work well with my office. It is clearly a
    systemic issue here that we need to reform.
        Mr. Currie, a question I had for you is that some of the
    grants that FEMA makes available for sort of predisaster
    efforts--like the BRIC grants, the PDM grants--they don't allow
    for predisaster water infrastructure for fire suppression to be
    an eligible use; so, fire hydrants, upgrading lines, tanks that
    would actually sort of be critical in some cases for immediate
    response.
        And this is important for several communities I represent
    that are high fire risk, such as the Tahoe Basin. And, in fact,
    the Caldor fire, which is 2021, one of the factors that was
    cited for why it didn't ultimately engulf communities in South
    Tahoe was the availability of water infrastructure for fire
    suppression.
        So why is it that that is not an eligible use, and is that
    something you think we ought to change?
        Mr. Currie. Yes. What I found over the years is that a lot
    of times when people say it is not eligible under FEMA, it is
    just because it was not approved. There is not a law or a
    requirement that says they can't do it. All these mitigation
    programs rely on the State or the local government to provide a
    justification or a benefit-cost analysis to FEMA, and then FEMA
    decides based on all the other project requests it is getting,
    if it meets their threshold. And then in that case, they
    didn't.
        It's not that it's not allowed. It's just that--and this is
    a very common problem with these mitigation issues. These are
    very complicated projects, and FEMA oftentimes--the paperwork
    required to get the approvals is just extremely difficult.
        And if you are a large county or a large State with the
    capacity to do that, then you might have the resources to put
    that together. If you are a smaller county or a Tribe or
    something like that, you don't have the resources to put a good
    justification together, so you don't get the funding.
        Mr. Kiley of California. I know we are a little over time
    here. But just to clarify, are you saying that for PDM and BRIC
    grants, that is an eligible use; it is just a matter of where
    the threshold is set, or is there a needed----
        Mr. Currie [interrupting]. I will go back and check on the
    requirement. I am just saying that what I found is a lot of
    times when it is deemed ineligible or it is not approved, it is
    because FEMA--it doesn't meet some sort of cost-benefit
    threshold as opposed to that specific kind of project not being
    able to be approved. It is just they haven't demonstrated that
    the benefits are going to exceed the cost.
        Mr. Kiley of California. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
    recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Friedman, for 5
    minutes for questions.
        Ms. Friedman. Thank you very much. And I want to thank the
    witnesses for their testimony, being here.
        I have to say that it is hard as a Los Angeles Congress
    Member sometimes to hear Los Angeles, at the time when it is
    reeling from disasters and when victims are still living in
    hotels, somehow seeming to be blamed for their own disaster.
        I really appreciate Mr. Guthrie's response to Mr. Kiley's
    question about what California could do better, because it is
    important that we do evaluate our response to disaster, do
    audits to make sure that we improve. And so your very good
    suggestions about disaster management are something that I am
    very interested in, and I appreciate your saying them.
        I do feel that I have to respond a bit about the idea that
    somehow these fires were caused because of not having pressure
    in hydrants or reservoirs being empty. Yes, a reservoir was
    down for repair, and we should always look at what our
    timetables are, and fire hydrants were not designed to put out
    a thousand fires in a residential neighborhood simultaneously.
    There is not a fire system in this country that would be able
    to function adequately under those kinds of conditions.
        But due to what's happening with climate change and
    changing conditions, we are going to have to look at our
    infrastructure and make investments to counter conditions that
    this country has never seen.
        I grew up in Florida. And my entire childhood, I believe
    there were two hurricanes, my whole childhood. And now we see
    multiple hurricanes every single year.
        So we have extreme weather events happening around this
    country, and we have got to make investments in our
    infrastructure and our emergency response to counter that. And
    we can't pretend that it is not because of climate change as
    well. And so efforts that we can make in this body to slow that
    change down are also going to help save lives.
        So, I have been working on fire issues for many, many years
    in the California Legislature. California has invested hundreds
    of millions of dollars over the past several years, year after
    year, to beef up our response to, add more resources for
    fighting fires, for fire resiliency, and we saw those resources
    deployed in these fires with hundreds and hundreds of
    firefighters on the line, more air response than we have ever
    seen in this Nation's history; where really hurricane winds
    driving embers in a time of year that normally is wet, and with
    record dryness instead.
        And we are going to, unfortunately, have to keep putting
    those resources on the ground. Now, I have introduced my first
    two bills around supporting wildfire victims with the Don't
    Penalize Victims Act, which would ensure that charitable
    donations are not used to unfairly penalize victims of natural
    disasters. I appreciate the members of this committee to making
    that a bipartisan bill.
        We also have introduced a Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act
    to stop price gouging around this country after natural
    disasters.
        I also believe in holding FEMA accountable. We have had a
    lot of concerns in Los Angeles around air quality, soil, and
    water pollution because of these disasters, and I would love to
    see FEMA doing more monitoring on a regular basis so that the
    people in Los Angeles know whether or not they need to take
    precautions if they send their kids to school in Pasadena or if
    their water has been contaminated or whether or not they can
    plant things in their garden if they are worried that their
    soil has become contaminated. We haven't seen FEMA take that
    seriously, and I would like to see that happen.
        I do have a quick question about disaster aid, and we have
    heard a little talk about that. But, unfortunately, this
    administration has said that they want to hold Californians
    accountable, and that they, I think, want to punish the people
    of California, not for anything about their response, but just
    because this administration doesn't like their policies around
    things like voting rights or around our commitment to
    diversity.
        So I have a simple yes-or-no question. For Ms. Laughter,
    when Hurricane Helene hit North Carolina last year, did
    President Biden condition disaster aid against major policy
    changes in that State? It was a yes-or-no question.
        Ms. Laughter. No.
        Ms. Friedman. Thank you.
        Mr. Guthrie, when Hurricane Milton hit Florida last year,
    did President Biden condition disaster aid on the people of
    Florida?
        Mr. Guthrie. No.
        Ms. Friedman. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I would
    hope that this administration does not play games with people's
    lives.
        Lastly, I want to ask about staffing. FEMA has been on the
    ground in Los Angeles helping people, and they are very
    grateful that there are FEMA officials there. I am very worried
    about the mass layoffs that we are seeing to public employees,
    and I have had people in Los Angeles say, when I show up to
    that office, are there going to be enough people there to help
    me?
        I want to know whether you think workplace cuts are going
    to make it easier or harder for people after a disaster to get
    a live person on the phone or someone to sit in front of them
    and help them out with whatever issue they have. I will start
    with Mr. Garcia, I think.
        Mr. Garcia. Absolutely, workforce depletions do bring
    challenges. Local communities and NACo county members need in
    many regards that human capital that brings that technical
    assistance that helps to get the funding necessary to help
    those communities recover and rebuild.
        So we do need the people behind all the other Federal
    guidelines and framework.
        Ms. Friedman. Thank you. Mr. Currie, would you like to
    respond?
        Mr. Currie. It is not going to help. That is my easy
    answer.
        FEMA will always marshal the resources towards response and
    the disasters that have just happened. What the cuts do is it
    affects the disasters that happened 6 months ago, 1 year ago, 6
    years ago. So it is a cumulative effect because of how many
    disasters they are dealing with.
        Ms. Friedman. Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I
    recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
        Some of my professional background lends a voice to this
    topic. In my previous life, I worked in the heavy highway
    construction, and my family company partnered with States and
    local communities on all efforts, like rebuilding Interstate I-
    95 after the tragic collapse. We also worked in Fort Myers
    after Hurricane Ian, rebuilding power distribution systems
    where I saw firsthand the devastation and how locally executed,
    State-managed, and federally supported programs could be
    exceptionally beneficial. I have also seen how bureaucratic
    redtape can impede relief.
        During COVID, FEMA offered grants to hospitals to address
    challenges, like finding adequate PPE and medical supplies, as
    well as address workforce shortages. Even though the public
    health emergency ended nearly 2 years ago, Pennsylvania
    hospitals are still waiting on $690 million in grant
    applications.
        In September of 2023, Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties in my
    district experienced historic flooding. Our State emergency
    agency estimated the damage to be $25 million, including the
    loss of lives. In April of 2024, FEMA denied the State's
    request for major disaster declaration.
        As GAO points out, there are more than 30 Federal entities
    involved in disaster recovery. This was a clear sign to
    Pennsylvania that we can't always count on the support of FEMA
    for disaster relief, which brings me to my questions on how
    States can best prepare for and deliver relief before, during,
    and after disasters.
        So my first question for Mr. Guthrie, in your written
    testimony, you discuss Florida's Division of Emergency
    Management implementing emergency standby contracts as part of
    your proactive management strategy.
        How can States replicate this practice to have dedicated
    vendors on standby ready to deploy for various types of natural
    disasters that States can experience?
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question, sir. It is very
    easy to do.
        These are zero-dollar contingency contracts put in place
    where we already know who the bidders are. One of the issues
    with FEMA is, when you need a--for instance, a direct housing
    program, they have to then go to contracting right then and
    there. We know we are going to need direct housing all over
    this country. We should have that already done so that that
    speeds that process up by months.
        We have done that in Florida. I will make it available--as
    I have already told my partners from other States, I will make
    all of our contracts available as a starting point to take the
    scope of work, copy and paste it, put it into their terms and
    conditions and fast forward that methodology for any State, any
    city, or any county that wants to do that, sir.
        Mr. Bresnahan. So not all disasters can be predicted. What
    are some best practices Florida uses to have flexibility with
    these contracts to ensure adequate response from vendors while
    protecting taxpayer money?
        Mr. Guthrie. So I have some of the best attorneys in the
    world. They always get to a yes. And what they allow us to do
    is they advise me of risk where we may be getting outside the
    four corners of a document, or they will get me to a yes where
    I can stay within the four corners of the document so that I
    don't have to do another emergency procurement to get into the
    four corners of the document.
        And those that are attorneys understand what I am saying
    there. That is one way; having a good attorney that knows their
    job, which is to advise the principle on risk versus reward.
    Sometimes we have to take the risk. And knowing the
    consequences of that ahead of time, it is always good to have a
    good attorney for that.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Mr. Guthrie, Ms. Laughter, and Mr. Garcia,
    when communities suffer from disasters, it can also be an
    opportunity to build back stronger, more resilient
    infrastructure. But oftentimes, we see 21st-century communities
    being rebuilt with 20th-century infrastructure.
        How have your respective States and counties engaged in
    long-term planning to ensure rebuilt infrastructure is more
    resilient, more secure, and incorporates the latest in digital
    technologies and digital infrastructure? Mr. Garcia, Honorable
    Garcia.
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you. In Harris County, we are absolutely
    putting the Federal resources that we have been fortunate to
    receive into resilient initiatives. For example, in Harris
    County, we received $51 million to help with the buyout program
    to take people out of flood-prone areas. And we are doing a
    whole lot more to make sure that resilience is at the top of
    our work process.
        Ms. Laughter. We are interested in any way that we can
    improve for the future. I think one of the things that has to
    be taken into account, though, is that whenever we receive
    grants or we receive support from Federal or State agencies, if
    there are restrictions around that that make it harder for us
    to make decisions and make those investments, then it becomes
    counterproductive.
        Mr. Guthrie. So we have done a comprehensive reform on
    this. We have come out with Florida legislation that preempts
    cities and counties from doing bureaucratic things when it
    comes to permitting. That is one thing that we have done.
        We have worked with the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes and
    the national BuildStrong Coalition for ensuring we have good
    building codes. We have the best building code in the United
    States, and strong building codes do work. You can see that all
    up and down our coastline.
        Those are just a couple of examples that we have done where
    we have been able to do this much faster.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you for the testimony and your time,
    and I yield back.
        I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi,
    for 5 minutes for questions.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    for the issues that you are raising. I would like to just pick
    up on what Ms. Friedman was referring to earlier and make sure
    that we fully understand where we are with requirements in
    order to receive FEMA assistance.
        Mr. Currie, is there any example in the past where a FEMA
    assistance program, disaster assistance, was conditioned on in
    any number, in any way? Are you familiar with any of that?
        Mr. Currie. I am not familiar. The only thing I would be
    familiar with is if it is conditioned on using that for
    resilience purposes, for building back better than it was
    before.
        Mr. Garamendi. I do want to come to that.
        Mr. Guthrie, you answered no to the question that Ms.
    Friedman raised about conditions. Is it your view that there
    should be conditions for the emergency assistance being
    available to a disaster area? Should there be preconditions?
        Mr. Guthrie. There should not be preconditions. However,
    again, to the mitigation piece, benefit-cost analysis, should
    we be applying a BCA to a situation where we want a house out
    of the flood plain, we want to build a house stronger; just
    because we meet a number, does that make sense? I don't think
    so.
        So I think there should be some preconditions to some
    programs that say we should waive this or we should make this
    stronger.
        Mr. Garamendi. Fair enough. And I would appreciate your
    coming back with the specifics that you are referring to.
    Certainly, flood, we have been in and out of that for the 15
    years I have been here; and, yes, we are making some progress.
        The other area that I want to go to deals with the GAO
    report. You had 60 recommendations in the GAO report. It would
    seem to me that this committee would be--its time would be very
    usefully spent going through those.
        Mr. Currie, in your testimony, you highlighted, I think,
    four specific areas. I would like you to revisit those in the
    next minute or so, the four priorities that are on your mind
    for the legislative policy changes that this committee should
    spend time on--that you believe we should spend time on.
        Mr. Currie. Yes. Those 60 recommendations cut across four
    areas, as you said. First is streamlining the Federal disaster
    recovery process because it is fragmented.
        Mr. Garamendi. Fragmented among multiple agencies.
        Mr. Currie. Exactly; 30 agencies, to be sure.
        Better delivering disaster aid to survivors, making that
    easier for individual survivors.
        Reforming the FEMA workforce is number three.
        And then number four is using our resilience dollars and
    making resilience programs easier to navigate for State and
    local governments.
        Mr. Garamendi. All right. And in each of those areas you
    had specific ways in which the improvements could be
    accomplished, that is, legislative.
        Mr. Currie. Yes, absolutely. Well, actually, 2 years ago,
    before the reform discussions even started, we recommended that
    Congress set up its own commission to look at disaster
    recovery, because we were so frustrated that the agencies for
    years, we were making recommendations, they weren't
    implementing them. And also, this issue cuts across so many
    committees of jurisdiction. So it is rare that we recommend
    something like that, but we thought the problem was large
    enough that it was warranted.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, you have given me direction on how I
    should spend my time, and hopefully the committee would
    similarly spend time on the details of each of these,
    streamlining multiple Federal agencies, maybe eliminate or at
    least change the way in which they, presumably, should work
    together.
        Individual Assistance Programs, could you be a little more
    specific about that?
        Mr. Currie. Well, changing our aid programs to the
    individual survivor from being Government centric to customer
    centric. And what I mean by that is, right now, the survivor
    has to extract the money out of the Federal Government through
    a lengthy, frustrating process. And because of that, they don't
    get everything they could possibly get.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie, you are nodding your
    head, and the rest of you would think this is something we
    ought to deal with?
        Mr. Guthrie. Yes, sir. I mean, the mere fact that a
    homeowner may have to wait 4, 5, or 6 years to get back to
    where they need to be. What we want, all of us want, is that
    homeowner back on their property in their home.
        Mr. Garamendi. I am almost out of time. For the four of
    you, if you could present to the committee, and certainly to me
    and my colleagues, the specific kinds of reform that you think
    are most necessary on the Individual Assistance.
        On the workforce, we have already talked about the current
    reductions in workforce, and there has been a discussion on
    that.
        With regard to resiliency, FEMA does have a bit of a
    problem in that build back better is not in their lexicon, at
    least in the regulations that they administer. So we need to be
    aware that we need to change and encourage FEMA to look to
    resiliency that is really do build back better, more details.
        I am out of time. Thank you very much, gentlemen and lady.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
    recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Onder, for 5 minutes
    for questions.
        Dr. Onder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
    witnesses for being here today.
        Mr. Currie, the GAO has conducted numerous audits of FEMA's
    disaster relief spending. Has your office identified instances
    where FEMA funds have been used to provide aid to illegal
    immigrants, whether it be housing assistance or otherwise, and
    could you provide examples?
        Mr. Currie. Yes. We did a report a year or two ago--I will
    have to get back to you on the specifics--on the Emergency Food
    and Shelter Program, which, as you know, Congress authorized
    that program for FEMA to provide assistance to cities to help
    support the influx of migrants.
        Dr. Onder. Okay. Do you recall when Congress authorized
    that program?
        Mr. Currie. It was in the last Congress, but I have to get
    back to you on the details.
        Dr. Onder. It was 118. Okay. Okay. Given FEMA's mission to
    assist American citizens and legal residents, are there
    oversight mechanisms currently in place to ensure that funds
    are used appropriately for disaster recovery as opposed to
    being diverted to other uses?
        Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. The Disaster Relief Fund is closely
    monitored, and there are many controls over the payments that
    come out of that and go to the States. And it is not just at
    the Federal level. FEMA has its own controls, but then it goes
    to the States.
        Like Mr. Guthrie's State, they have their own controls
    before it goes down to the local level, too. So it is a very
    highly overseen pot of money.
        Dr. Onder. Thank you.
        And, Ms. Laughter, as a county official, have you
    encountered concerns about FEMA's aid distribution being
    inconsistent, influenced by nondisaster factors, perhaps
    political factors?
        Ms. Laughter. We have not seen that. We have seen
    frustration from our survivors of being able to access the
    funds that they should be able to access and difficulty in
    getting any answers.
        The 800 number that a lot of our survivors were referred to
    for a long time could not be connected. So they really
    expressed a lot of the frustration around those components.
        Dr. Onder. Got it. So in your testimony, you also stated
    that, ``When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a
    system in place to support response and recovery because local
    governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to
    handle a response at that scale during nonresponse times.''
        Based on your experience with Hurricane Helene, what role
    do you think the Federal Government should play versus the
    State governments and perhaps the local governments?
        Ms. Laughter. I think they both need to play a role. And at
    the end of the day, at the local government level, we just need
    a system that works.
        Dr. Onder. What do you think can be done to improve
    communication between FEMA employees and the State and local
    officials involved in disaster recovery?
        Ms. Laughter. What we experienced was a lot of siloes where
    we could ask a single question to one worker, they did not even
    know themselves how to get an answer to a question that was
    outside of their training or outside of their silo. So
    communication is a huge component in training.
        Dr. Onder. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I
    recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Figures, for 5
    minutes for questions.
        Mr. Figures. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Mr. Ranking Member,
    for hosting this hearing and for all of the witnesses being
    here.
        I want to start by recognizing Alabama's Director of
    Emergency Management, Jeff Smitherman, who is in the audience
    with us and also thank you for your near 30 years of service to
    this Nation's military. So thank you and thank you for being
    here, and thank you for what you do in the State.
        Our State was just hit by a round of thunderstorms, and
    your office kept us abreast of what was going on and kept us
    well-prepared. Fortunately--well, I guess both fortunately and
    unfortunately, the damage did not rise to a level of a
    Federal--or at least that is my understanding as of this
    morning, that it will not likely rise to the level of a Federal
    emergency, but yet some rural areas did take hits and there
    were some lives lost in that storm.
        Ms. Laughter, I want to do something that I don't think you
    have probably gotten in this process. And that is, I believe it
    was Maya Angelou who once said that people don't remember
    everything about you, but they will certainly remember how you
    made them feel. Sounds like FEMA didn't make you and your
    community feel very good.
        And so on behalf of all of us--I was not in Congress at the
    time--but on behalf of everybody on this committee and
    everybody that serves in Federal Government, I want to say that
    I am sorry, because our Government should be there for our
    people, and I know you guys experienced that in Florida as
    well. So I want to apologize on behalf of all of us and commit
    to doing better and using my position here to make sure that we
    are not making other communities feel the way that you felt.
    And I mean that.
        As a kid that was born in hurricane alley, where names like
    Erin and Opal and Danny and Georges and Katrina and Ivan, they
    mean a little bit something different to me. Hell, I was
    literally born during a hurricane in September 1985, Hurricane
    Elena.
        So I know a little bit about FEMA, I know a little bit
    about communities that need their recovery, need their help.
    But we need it to be efficient, and we need it to be quick, and
    we need it to be effective.
        And so, I want to start--at least my first question is, it
    seems that this problem is bigger than just FEMA. You have
    mentioned 30 agencies being involved in this process. So how by
    fixing FEMA are we resolving the entire problem, or is there a
    broader scope of inquiry that we need to be addressing these
    efforts on?
        We can just go down the row. Mr. Currie.
        Mr. Currie. Yes. Unfortunately, FEMA is the face of
    response and recovery for the Federal Government. But when you
    look at the funding, it is spread all over the Federal
    Government. And each of those agencies has their own rules,
    programs, requirements, and timeframes.
        And so when those all come together, it creates a very
    confusing system and process if you are a State or local
    emergency manager.
        Mr. Figures. Mr. Guthrie.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman. I would say yes, we
    need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and
    structure of FEMA, but I would even say take that to the back
    row. We need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and
    structure of every agency that is a part of the Federal family
    that responds to disasters.
        Because, again, FEMA is a coordinating element. They are
    not the command and control element. They are the coordinating
    element. But when you have--if you are a fishery or
    aquaculture, you have to go through, I believe it is the
    Department of Commerce; if you are in agriculture, you go
    through the U.S. Department of Agriculture; if you have
    something that is on an FHWA roadway, you are going through
    DOT. That is at the public level.
        Imagine if you were an individual that is dependent on
    section 8 housing, you are going through HUD, if you are with
    DCF, you are going through maybe another HHS agency. We have
    got to figure out, again, comprehensive review of the scope,
    mission, and structure of the Federal family to streamline that
    into one single application, whether it is for public sector or
    Individual Assistance sector, we've got----
        Mr. Figures [interrupting]. I don't want to cut you off. I
    want to get Ms. Laughter because I want to get one more
    question in for Mr. Garcia.
        Ms. Laughter. I agree. I think it is more complicated than
    just FEMA. We have an example right now of private property
    debris removal. We have a farmer that has 300 bales of spoiled
    hay from a flood, and he cannot access the private property
    debris removal because he falls under USDA.
        And he also cannot get direction from the same agency of
    how to access USDA in order to get relief. He just needs help.
        Mr. Figures. Mr. Garcia.
        Mr. Garcia. With so many agencies involved, it does cause
    confusion--or would cause confusion--at all levels for the
    local community, as well as the residents at heart. So
    comprehensive review absolutely is necessary.
        Mr. Figures. All right. Now, Mr. Garcia, just for you. You
    mentioned in your opening testimony, you mentioned about
    underserved and disadvantaged communities. And that
    particularly resonates with me. I am in a very poor district.
    For the most part, individual median income is just around
    $30,000. So these are people that can't afford to rebuild on
    their own.
        So my question for you is, in those communities that have
    been hit by storms, particularly hurricanes, tornadoes where we
    see those blue tarps go on those roofs, we go back too often,
    and those blue tarps are still there years later; in fact,
    sometimes decades later. How can we better streamline resources
    to getting to those communities?
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you. And I will tell you that
    streamlining the process is absolutely critical. As I
    mentioned, both the legislation that is being proposed, the
    Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance
    Simplification Act, all those things are going to help us
    remove the barriers that the communities could face. And so we
    need the support by FEMA. So staff shortages at FEMA do not
    help us move forward. All of this is important for us to
    address.
        So simplification, plain language, universal portals, those
    things are absolutely helpful to get the resources where they
    are needed.
        Mr. Figures. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you for the overage.
        Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
        Are there further questions from any members of the
    subcommittee who have not been recognized?
        Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.
        I would like to thank each of the witnesses for your
    testimony. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                    Appendix

                                  ----------

      Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
    U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Kristen McDonald Rivet

        Question 1. My office received outreach from a number of
    constituents still affected by the historic 2020 Midland floods. The
    following questions are asked on behalf of members of my community.
    Thank you for your review and prompt response.
        Question 1.a. Is there a process for FEMA to annually review
    Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation
    programs, by interviewing people who are impacted by the process to see
    what is working and what isn't?
        Answer:
    Individual Assistance
           In 2020, GAO found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) conducted three different telephone surveys to assess disaster
    survivors' experiences with its Individuals and Households Program and
    used these results to assess program performance.\1\ However, GAO found
    that the methodology FEMA used did not fully align with federal
    standards for statistical surveys, limiting FEMA's ability to use the
    results to determine how well their efforts are working. As a result,
    GAO recommended that FEMA correct and refine the methodology used to
    survey survivors. In December 2022, FEMA took steps to correct and
    refine its methodology used to survey survivors.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ These surveys are (1) an initial survey to measure the quality
    of disaster assistance information and services received by survivors
    during the initial application process; (2) a contact survey to measure
    the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by
    survivors while they checked the status of their case online or during
    interactions with FEMA staff; and (3) an assessment survey to measure
    the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by
    survivors after FEMA determines their eligibility for Individuals and
    Households Program assistance. GAO, Disaster Assistance: Additional
    Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program,
    GAO-20-503 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2020).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Public Assistance
           GAO is not aware of an annual review of the Public Assistance
    program or interviews with applicants for the purposes of identifying
    what is working well and what is not. However, in 2021, FEMA did
    conduct customer satisfaction surveys of Public Assistance applicants
    and grantees with the goal of program improvement. According to FEMA,
    the information collected from customers and stakeholders will help
    ensure that users have an effective, efficient, and satisfying
    experience with the Agency's programs. This feedback will provide
    insights into customer or stakeholder perceptions, experiences and
    expectations, provide an early warning of issues with service, or focus
    attention on areas where communication, training or changes in
    operations might improve delivery of products or service.

           Additionally, in 2023, FEMA issued a report that included
    stakeholder feedback from Public Assistance applicants. The survey
    results were used to further program improvement and develop
    recommendations to FEMA management on streamlining the program.
    Hazard Mitigation
           In March 2020, FEMA issued a Summary of Stakeholder Feedback
    report summarizing stakeholder feedback on its hazard mitigation grant
    programs.\2\ According to the report, FEMA solicited input from
    stakeholders as part of its effort to develop the BRIC program and
    reported that stakeholders were overwhelmingly dissatisfied with
    benefit-cost analysis requirements and said that they were a barrier to
    completing grant applications. FEMA received over 5,000 comments and 75
    letters and summarized the contents of these in the Summary of
    Stakeholder Feedback report.
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        \2\ See, FEMA, Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building Resilient
    Infrastructure and Communities, (Washington D.C.: March 2020). See,
    GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
    Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
    140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).

           In February 2021, GAO reported on challenges state and local
    officials faced when applying for FEMA hazard mitigation grants. GAO
    found that FEMA had developed resources to help hazard mitigation
    applicants--guidance, Fact Sheets, project examples, studies, and
    technical publications.\3\ However, the resources could be difficult to
    locate on FEMA's website and there was no centralized inventory of
    resources to help applicants locate the information. As a result, GAO
    recommended that FEMA create a centralized inventory of hazard
    mitigation resources on its website. FEMA concurred and has since taken
    steps to do so. In June 2022, FEMA finished re-designing portions of
    their website to centralize guidance and other resources on their
    hazard mitigation programs. The reorganization makes these resources
    easier to find and better positions FEMA to help state and local
    applicants successfully apply for grants for mitigation projects that
    enhance disaster resilience. As a result, this recommendation is closed
    as implemented.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
    Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
    140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).

        In February 2025, GAO added Improving the Delivery of Federal
    Disaster Assistance to its High-Risk List.\4\ In the new segment GAO
    emphasized the need for FEMA to take steps to better manage
    fragmentation across its own programs, as GAO has recommended. Such
    actions could make the programs simpler, more accessible and user-
    friendly, and improve the effectiveness of federal disaster recovery
    efforts. Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster
    recovery and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to
    disaster survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of
    recovery efforts.\5\ As of February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to
    streamline the applications for two of its recovery programs. However,
    FEMA will need to demonstrate that it has thoroughly considered
    available options to reduce fragmentation across its own programs,
    identified those FEMA intends to implement, and then taken steps to
    fully implement this recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions
    More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
        \5\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal
    Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, GAO has found that as the incidence and severity of
    massive wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find
    additional opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\6\ For
    example, GAO recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to
    provide immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a
    process to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from
    state, local, and tribal Fire Management Assistance Grants recipients.
    Taking these steps would help foster more resilient communities and
    reduce the future demand on federal resources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA
    Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2024).

        Question 1.b. Has FEMA measured the number of disconnects between
    the initial approved project amount and the actual costs at closeout of
    said projects?
        Answer. GAO has not assessed whether FEMA has systematically
    measured the initial costs of Public Assistance projects against their
    actual costs at closeout. However, it is common that initial project
    costs would increase as the project is completed and eventually closed
    out. For example, GAO reported in 2024 that in Puerto Rico, Public
    Assistance awardees have faced challenges related to disaster recovery
    projects due to the increased costs.\7\ For example, GAO reported that
    subrecipients that have received Public Assistance awards under the
    Accelerated Award Strategy identified increased project costs that pose
    challenges to the full recovery of their facilities. According to
    officials from the four Accelerated Award Strategy subrecipient
    entities, inflation and labor shortages have increased the costs of
    projects beyond their anticipated estimated costs.
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        \7\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery
    Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
    2024).

        Question 1.c. Has FEMA considered having a FEMA employee who walks
    through the whole recovery journey with the municipality rebuilding?
    What resources would be necessary?
        Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee
    to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However, GAO
    has found that FEMA staffing turnover throughout the lifecycle of
    public assistance projects is a long-standing challenge cited by state
    and local officials. For example, in March 2019 GAO reported that FEMA
    and Puerto Rico municipality officials cited concerns about FEMA staff
    turnover and lack of knowledge about how the Public Assistance
    alternative procedures are to be applied.\8\ FEMA officials
    acknowledged that more personnel with expertise in the alternative
    procedures process were needed to administer Public Assistance and
    assist subrecipients.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight,
    and Recovery Challenges, GAO-19-256 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FEMA officials stated that they faced additional responsibilities
    due to COVID-19, while also managing the traditional seasonal peaks of
    disaster activity during the year, which created burnout for many
    employees and increased employee attrition.\9\ Such attrition and an
    increasing workload make it difficult for FEMA to provide individual
    technical support to all grantees as needed. FEMA's workforce
    challenges are a key area identified in GAO's recent high-risk report.
    In recent years, the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the
    COVID-19 pandemic, and other responsibilities have placed additional
    pressures on FEMA. FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and
    staffing levels has limited its capacity to provide effective disaster
    assistance.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring
    Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,
    2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For example, GAO found in May 2023 that FEMA had an overall
    staffing gap of approximately 35 percent across different positions at
    the beginning of fiscal year 2022. The gaps varied, but Public
    Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower
    percentages of staffing targets filled--between 44 and 60 percent at
    the beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important
    functions, including administering assistance to state and local
    governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction
    activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and
    movement during a disaster.
        GAO also found that FEMA has fallen short of its yearly staffing
    target between 2019 and 2022, and that gap continues to grow. For
    example, FEMA only had nine percent of its disaster-response workforce
    available for Hurricane Milton response, according to its daily
    operations brief. Many responders have declined deployments in recent
    disasters because of burnout or severe conditions in the field. GAO has
    made numerous recommendations to help FEMA better manage catastrophic
    or concurrent disasters.

        Question 1.d. Instead of each municipality learning to navigate the
    FEMA assistance process independently, has FEMA considered assigning a
    staffer to that municipality as their recovery expert?
        Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee
    to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However,
    FEMA does have methods for coordinating with municipalities following a
    disaster. Two of these methods include FEMA's Integration Teams and
    FEMA's Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers:
        FEMA Integration Teams. Officials in all 10 FEMA regions that GAO
    interviewed in 2024 stated that they provide resources and support to
    states through FEMA Integration Teams, which are FEMA staff embedded
    within state emergency management offices.\10\ Officials from six FEMA
    regions said that Integration Team members serve as liaisons between
    FEMA and the states in various aspects of responding to disasters. For
    example, officials from these six FEMA regions said that Integration
    Team members provide situational awareness during a disaster response.
    Officials in one region said they have an Integration Team member who
    serves as an Individual Assistance subject matter expert during
    Preliminary Damage Assessments. GAO has not comprehensively assessed
    this program to further determine how these teams may assist
    municipalities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ The FEMA Integration Teams were established in July 2017 with
    the goal of embedding FEMA staff with state and territorial partners,
    and to work alongside tribal partners. FEMA Integration Teams provide
    technical assistance and coordination to state, tribal, and territorial
    emergency management agencies in areas such as planning, logistics,
    recovery, and grants management.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers. In addition, FEMA
    provides Program Delivery Managers following a disaster declaration. In
    2017, GAO reported that FEMA redesigned the delivery of the Public
    Assistance program to address past workforce management challenges,
    such as shortages in experienced and trained Public Assistance staff
    and high turnover among these staff.\11\ As part of the redesigned
    program, FEMA created, among other things, Program Delivery Managers to
    ensure more consistent guidance to Public Assistance applicants.
    However, in February 2025, GAO reported that FEMA continues to have
    long-standing workforce management issues that makes supporting
    response and recovery efforts difficult.\12\ GAO has started work
    examining FEMA's staffing gaps.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Enhance
    Implementation of the Redesigned Public Assistance Program Grant
    Program, GAO-18-30 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2017).
        \12\ GAO-25-107743

        Question 1.e. How does FEMA measure if the disaster assistance
    process is working? Does FEMA measure the amount of time from the time
    of the incident to full recovery?
        Answer. FEMA tracks the amount of time from the initial disaster to
    full recovery but does not set any targets or metrics for how long this
    process should take. Disaster recovery can take years to complete
    depending on the severity of the disasters and many other factors, such
    as state and local resources and capacity to manage the recovery. For
    example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major
    disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in
    various stages of response and recovery.\13\ For instance, as of
    February 2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects
    as part of Public Assistance for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ GAO-25-107743
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GAO previously recommended in February 2021, that FEMA use data on
    the timeliness and performance of the Public Assistance application
    process.\14\ GAO made this recommendation to help identify
    inefficiencies and root causes of delays in the Public Assistance
    process and provide FEMA and its local partners with the information
    needed to address them. To address this recommendation, in March 2021,
    FEMA's Recovery Analytics and Public Assistance Divisions published a
    live dashboard tool with timeliness metrics on FEMA's internet,
    accessible to FEMA staff, that captures metrics at the FEMA and
    applicant level and provides data under five performance goals. As a
    result, this recommendation was closed as implemented.
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        \14\ GAO, 2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal Actions Helped
    Facilitate the Response, but FEMA Needs to Address Long-Term Recovery
    Challenges, GAO-21-91 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2021).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        FEMA also has a performance measure on timeliness of
    assistance.\15\ Specifically, FEMA measures the average timeliness of
    Individuals and Households Program awards in days. This measure
    assesses how quickly the program provides the first financial
    assistance received by qualified individuals and households through the
    Individuals and Households Program. By evaluating how quickly disaster
    survivors receive financial assistance, the program can assess the
    effectiveness of a critical, customer-facing element of the agency's
    mission.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report
    Fiscal Year 2024.

        Question 1.f. Does FEMA measure and/or track the amount of time it
    takes the municipality to receive its money at the time of closeout?
        Answer. As noted above, FEMA does track the amount of time from the
    initial disaster to full recovery but does not set any targets or
    metrics for how long this process should take. Project closeout is
    dependent on a on a number of factors including the severity and
    complexity of the disaster and amount of time it takes for the state or
    municipality to provide all necessary projects documentation and
    justifications.
        According to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide,
    project closeout requires timely and complete project-level information
    from the Recipient as work is completed.\16\ To initiate project-level
    closeout, the Subrecipient must inform the Recipient that its project
    is complete and the date the work was completed. To ensure a timely
    closeout process, the Subrecipient should notify the Recipient
    immediate as it completes each Large Project and when its completed its
    last Small Project.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, Version 4 FP
    104-009-2 (June 1, 2020).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide states that
    they have a process for obligating Public Assistance funding based on
    the Applicant's schedule to execute the work. If a project is greater
    than one million and the applicant does not need funds for more than
    180 days from the time the Project is ready for obligation, FEMA
    obligates funds based on the project completion schedule. In addition,
    according to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, FEMA
    only provides Public Assistance funding for work completed and costs
    incurred within regulatory guidelines.

        Question 1.g. Does FEMA measure the number of issues suffered by
    the municipality during the process, such as finding that key items
    were left off the disaster-recovery punch list and the assistance ($)
    estimated vs. the result of the bids?
        Answer. FEMA has a performance measure that assesses the percent of
    applicants satisfied with the Public Assistance process and customer
    service. According to FEMA documentation, FEMA conducts a Public
    Assistance Assessment survey that collects satisfaction information
    from applicants after they received an award.
        In addition, in May 2021, GAO reported on Puerto Rico's disaster
    recovery efforts, including its use of Public Assistance awards and
    difficulties it has faced implementing recovery projects.\17\ For
    example, GAO reported that FEMA made progress in approving Public
    Assistance projects, but that FEMA had not comprehensively identified
    or assessed the risk that could affect the success of the remainder of
    Puerto Rico's recovery, such as Puerto Rico's ability to start
    construction on recovery projects. GAO recommended that FEMA, in
    coordination with Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies, identify
    and assess the risks to Puerto Rico's recovery, including Puerto Rico's
    capacity to carry out projects, and identify potential actions to
    manage the risks. In 2024, FEMA finalized a risk management plan that
    documented its framework to manage and monitor risks to the remainder
    of Puerto Rico's recovery. Further, FEMA provided a memorandum
    documenting the FEMA executive leadership's approval to implement this
    plan. FEMA also provided additional documentation on its efforts to
    engage and coordinate with the Government of Puerto Rico on efforts to
    continuously manage and monitor risks to the recovery. As a result,
    these recommendations were closed as implemented.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ GAO, Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Approving
    Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery, GAO-21-
    264 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2021).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Additionally, GAO has reported that the federal approach to
    disaster recovery is fragmented across more than 30 federal
    entities.\18\ These entities are involved with multiple programs and
    authorities and have differing requirements and timeframes. This
    fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to
    successfully navigate multiple federal programs. Congress and federal
    agencies have taken steps to better manage fragmentation, such as
    through interagency agreements and reducing program complexity, but
    challenges remain. In November 2022, GAO identified 11 options to
    improve the federal government's approach to disaster recovery based on
    our review of relevant literature, interviews with federal, state, and
    local officials; and a panel of experts.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal
    Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
        \19\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related
    to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option
    and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to
    improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. GAO
    attributed statements from experts collected as part of the panel
    discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes
    statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery:
    Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-104956
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).
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