[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BRIDGING THE GAP: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
March 5, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-3
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-235 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Ranking Member
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, GREG STANTON, Arizona
American Samoa JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr, New Jersey JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
KEITH SELF, Texas PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana GEORGE LATIMER, New York
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
KEITH SELF, Texas, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts,
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Ranking Member
MARK GREEN, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
YOUNG KIM, California JIM COSTA, California
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio GABE AMO, Rhode Island
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
C O N T E N T S
----------
REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Keith Self............ 1
Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member William Keating. 2
.................................................................
WITNESSES
Statement of Dr. Anna Borschevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior
Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.............. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Statement of Dr. Jonathan Schanzer, Executive Director,
Foundation for Defense of Democracies.......................... 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Statement of Dr. Celeste Wallander, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center
for New American Security...................................... 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 56
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 57
Hearing Attendance............................................... 58
BRIDGING THE GAP: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
----------
Wednesday, March 5, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Keith Self
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Self. The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the future trajectory
of Turkiye between the West and the East, as well as Turkiye's
relationship with the United States, Europe, neighboring
countries, and adversaries such as Russia.
I would like to start with a moment of silence for the
passing of Representative Sylvester Turner of Texas. Let's take
a moment of silence.
[Moment of silence.]
Mr. Self. Thank you. I would also like to welcome
Representatives Lawler, Cherfilus-McCormick, Zinke, Issa, and
Schneider who will be joining us today. They are all members of
the full committee, so there is no reason to vote them on. They
will be joining us.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN KEITH SELF
I welcome everyone to the first Europe Subcommittee
hearing. It is an honor to chair this subcommittee that deals
with a dynamic and potentially dangerous environment in a
crucial region for U.S. national interests. I look forward to
our work as a subcommittee.
Today our objective is to examine Turkiye's roles in NATO
and by necessity the Middle East, even though this is the
Europe Subcommittee. It will be necessary to look at Turkiye's
track record in NATO and the Middle East in order to gain
perspective on it's role going forward in both regions.
As a NATO member, historically Turkiye has operated as a
member of the NATO alliance often aligning it's foreign policy
interests with the goals of NATO, but in the last decade there
have been some actions that don't line up with the NATO goals.
Take for example the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the
barbaric October 7th attacks on Israel in 2023. While Turkiye
supports most of the agenda within the NATO alliance, it did
operate as a lone member, NATO lone member refusing to condemn
the actions of nefarious players in the Middle East. The world
is changing quickly, and Turkiye's geographic location places
it at the epicenter of the most tumultuous regions as conflicts
rage in Europe and the Middle East.
Turkiye has also assumed the position of power broker in
the vacuum created by Syria's regime change and is vexed by
it's unresolved issues with the Kurds going forward. The world,
particularly the United States, is watching closely as Turkiye
decides whether or not to ease tensions with the Kurds. America
has relied on the Kurds' partnership in the region, and
opposition to their success will be a major sticking point in
Turkiye's relationship with the United States.
Turkiye is also unique in that geographically it straddles
both Europe and Asia. It is a prominent member of the Minerals
Security Partnership and could be a strategic partner for the
West by operating as an alternative to Beijing. Recently
Turkiye laid claim to one of the largest rare earth element
reserves in the world with a 694 million ton rare earth
deposit.
Historically, Turkiye was the anchor for NATO's southeast
corner against the old Soviet Union, but over the past decade
Turkiye's commitment to anchoring that region has begun to
crack. They have the second largest military in NATO, only
behind the United States, which makes Turkiye a key asset to
the alliance, but it's geographic location also makes it
vulnerable to bad actors in the region.
I look forward to hearing testimony from our three experts
today as they share their views on Turkiye's role in both
Europe and the Middle East.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman
from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER WILLIAM KEATING
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your thoughts
at this time with the Turner family. I would like to thank you
and I would like to thank our witnesses here today.
For years Turkiye has been balancing its relationship with
Europe and the Middle East, most recently following Russia's
illegal invasion of Ukraine. Turkiye has been a vital--has been
vital in enabling the shipment of grain through the Black Sea
and standing up for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. These are principled stances, and Turkiye should be
applauded for those decisions.
Yet, significant challenges remain with Turkiye including
Turkish support for Hamas, a brutal terrorist organization
which conducted the heinous attack on October 7th. This support
must end.
At the same time Turkiye's acquisition of Russian S-400 air
defense systems as well as its delays in approving Finland and
Sweden for NATO membership certainly complicated our bilateral
relationship.
I also believe firmly that Turkiye must use its leverage
with Azerbaijan and push for durable long-term peace in the
Caucasus.
In our bilateral relationships with Turkiye we have a mixed
history, but when assessing the U.S.-Turkiye relationship, it
is important to acknowledge that it is a relationship. Both
sides must contribute and work for the benefit of our relations
and our safety worldwide. I can't sit here this morning and
ignore the deeply concerning events on the U.S. side of this
relationship which undermines our influence regionally, but
more importantly with our transatlantic and global allies.
Simply put, we must take a look in the mirror. In our own
relationship with Turkiye there are a variety of issues which
warrant this view and observation of U.S. policy.
First, on the important issue of NATO. Since 1949 NATO has
been the bedrock of the U.S.-Turkiye relationship. As I have
said, Turkiye's delay in admitting Finland and Sweden into NATO
following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine complicated this
relationship. Yet, I can't sit here without stating the
obvious. President Trump's go-it-alone strategy does not
further our relationship with NATO. It does not help us work on
important issues like counterterrorism in Turkiye. It does not
help pressure allies, many of whom have shed blood on our
behalf following 9/11, of our appreciation of our commitment to
NATO.
On the issue of Russia, I am deeply concerned with Turkish
involvement and unwillingness to cut trade with the Kremlin and
cease the export of important dual-use items to Russia which
Putin needs for his war effort. Yet, we must look in the
mirror. President Trump has sided with Russia. He has praised
Putin's authoritarian leadership style, and he has been
unwilling to call Putin the aggressor.
Importantly on Ukraine, Turkiye is a critical ally and has
helped facilitate the Black Sea Grain Initiative and enforce
the Montreux Convention in the Black Sea. Turkiye can and
should do even more, but so must the United States.
The Trump Administration has repeatedly shut the door on
Ukraine. Rather than bolster Ukraine with military support to
combat Russian aggression, this administration has frozen all
U.S. assistance to Ukraine, halted intelligence assistance in
Ukraine, and paused offensive cyber operations against Russia
here at home. Rather than make clear at the United Nations that
Russia is an aggressor State and that Vladimir Putin, a war
criminal, is to blame for this war, this administration sided
with Belarus and North Korea in opposition. Rather than work
with President Zelenskyy to secure a lasting secure peace
agreement, the President and Vice President berated him in the
Oval Office, echoing Putin's talking points and lecturing
Zelenskyy about democracy while the President and the Vice
President make a mockery of that with that performance here at
home.
At this time with so much on the line, we must speak up for
our values, for our allies in Ukraine, for the people in this
country, what they believe, that appeasing dictators and
attacking our allies who have died with so many Americans in
our history dating back to this great 80-year-plus period since
World War II. Doing that is simply wrong.
I will close with this. My uncle died on French soil during
World War II. As a Member of Congress I have had the
opportunity to meet with dozens of Gold Star families like my
own who suffered loss at the hands of enemies. Today I can't
help but think of the Ukrainian families, hundreds of thousands
of them, who are looking to the United States for partnership,
are instead receiving an empty hand, a closed fist, and
thankless public rebukes designed to the benefit of Vladimir
Putin.
While our President abandons Ukraine, many in Congress
won't, and I urge all of my colleagues to stay with Ukraine, to
stand up for what we all know is right, to stand up for
Ukraine. I look forward to our witnesses' testimony here today,
and I yield back.
Mr. Self. Thank you, ranking member.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. We have Dr. Anna
Borschevskaya, the Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow for the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. We have Dr. Jonathan
Schanzer, the Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense
of Democracies. And we have Hon. Celeste Wallander, Adjunct
Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security.
This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us
today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,
and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5
minutes in order to allow time for members' question.
I now recognize Dr. Borschevskaya for her opening
statement. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSCHEVSKAYA
Ms. Borschevskaya. Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating,
honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. With your permission I am submitting my written
testimony, and I would like to summarize it.
I would like to focus on three key issues. First, Turkiye
now has the potential to emerge as the primary naval power in
the Black Sea. Second, the Russia-Turkiye relationship is no
longer decisively tilted in Russia's favor, though Russia still
retains some advantages. Third, Turkiye has maintained a
pragmatic balancing act between Ukraine, Russia, and NATO after
Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
All of this, Mr. Chairman and honorable members, means that
the United States has an opportunity to use Turkiye's new
position to advance in the context of Russia's war on Ukraine,
especially as the U.S. shifts its strategic investments toward
the Indo-Pacific.
So here is how we can dive into this opportunity to advance
America's interests. Check Russia's ability to return to the
Eastern Mediterranean. Russia will inevitably seek to return to
the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a historic Russian aspiration.
The U.S. should look for linkages between European and Middle
East theaters.
Turkiye has outmaneuvered Russia in Syria. The U.S. could
see how it can work constructively with Turkiye to block
Russia's influence there to ensure Russia does not regain
influence.
Take advantage of Turkiye's growing primacy in the Black
Sea. Restoration of security in the Black Sea region is a goal
Turkiye and the West share. Over the long term the U.S. should
use the end of the war in Ukraine to limit Russia's presence,
if not to expel Russia altogether from the Black Sea. It is in
the U.S. interest to remove the threat of Russia from NATO's
underbelly. In addition, neutralizing Russia in the Black Sea
could also help blunt Russia's influence in the Levant.
Support Turkiye's normalization with Armenia in a peace
treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Ukraine is to achieve
a lasting victory, the West will need to act outside Ukraine by
putting Russia under pressure in other theaters and
specifically by depriving it of resources and influence in
those regions.
The South Caucasus is one such region. It is a vital
strategic link between Europe and the Middle East. Loss of
influence in the South Caucasus will hurt Russia strategically
because it will show Russia no longer has the same degree of
control in its so-called near abroad. Promoting stability in
this region is especially important now because Russia is
gaining influence in Georgia.
Work to reduce Turkiye's dependence on Russian gas.
Approximately 15 percent of EU gas still comes from Russia, and
the revenue Russia generates helps it to fund its war effort in
Ukraine. TurkStream and the new Turkish Blend project create an
opportunity for Moscow to hide the origin of its gas and exert
influence across Europe. The U.S. could sanction companies
involved in infrastructure of TurkStream and Turkish Blend. At
the same time the U.S. could look for opportunities to work on
alternative energy projects with Turkiye to further eliminate
dependence on Russia.
Take advantage of Turkiye's role as a mediator. Turkiye's
mediation in the Black Sea grain deal was useful even if the
deal ultimately collapsed. To the extent that it is
advantageous to U.S. strategic interests, the U.S. should
leverage Ankara's role as a mediator on the future.
Mr. Chairman, honorable members, how the war in Ukraine
ends will have far-reaching implications for American
credibility, security, and economy. It will affect American
allies and partners across the world. If Russia is victorious,
if Russia succeeds, it may lead to a bigger confrontation
between Russia and NATO, along with NATO partners. In this
context the U.S. has an interest in focusing a constructive
pragmatic relationship with Turkiye. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Borschevskaya follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Self. Thank you, Dr. Borschevskaya.
I now recognize Dr. Schanzer for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER
Mr. Schanzer. Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
Turkiye has made headlines since the Bashar al-Assad regime
in Syria collapsed late last year, and this is because Turkiye
is the power broker behind the new government led by the al
Qaeda affiliate known as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS.
Turkiye's backing of al Qaeda in Syria is not new. Since the
Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, Turkiye has supported several
Jihadi groups fighting the Assad regime. However, Assad didn't
fall for 14 years, and that explains how the Jihadi problem in
Syria has grown worse.
Ankara promotes HTS as a moderate entity. This is a farce.
The violent history of HTS must not be ignored. The closest
analog to this scenario, a designated terror group taking over
an entire country, is the Taliban, and we know how that worked
out for Afghanistan.
Turkiye also supports Hezbollah. Last month Israeli Foreign
Minister Gideon Sa'ar revealed that Turkiye is aiding Iran to
smuggle funds to the Lebanese terror group. Last year the U.S.
imposed sanctions on a network in Turkiye and Lebanon for
funding the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah. Other Turkish-based
entities have earned sanctions in recent years for similar
reasons.
Ankara is a leading patron of Hamas. For nearly two decades
Turkiye has operated--openly backed, rather, the terror group,
providing political cover and financial support. In 2011
Palestinian sources allege that Erdogan earmarked $300 million
to Hamas. After the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap that year,
scores of Hamas prisoners were deported to Turkiye including
Saleh al-Arouri, one of the group's most dangerous terrorist
operatives. In 2014, Arouri ordered the killing of three teens
in the West Bank sparking a major war with Hamas that year. The
Erdogan government cheered Arouri when he claimed credit for
that attack.
After Hamas slaughtered 1,200 Israelis on October 7th,
Erdogan doubled down on his Hamas support. He welcomed Hamas
political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Istanbul. Just before he was
killed by Israel in July 2024, the two discussed relocating
Hamas's political headquarters from Qatar to Turkiye.
To this day Turkiye is a hub for Hamas's global finances.
Numerous U.S. sanctions designations underscore this trend.
Trend GYO, a Turkish construction conglomerate, was designated
by the U.S. in 2022 for generating revenue for Hamas. That
company is still active today as are other firms that are
funding Hamas in Turkiye.
In December U.S. legislators received a classified briefing
about Turkiye and Hamas. I hope that one theme emerged, namely
that Erdogan has invested nearly 20 years legitimizing,
funding, and empowering Hamas.
So why does Erdogan support these terror groups? Because he
aspires to regional, if not global domination, and he thinks
that supporting these groups can help him. The collapse of the
Assad regime and the rise of HTS was Erdogan's first major
Middle East conquest, and he wants more.
During the Arab Spring Turkiye backed Islamist factions
vying for power as ossified Middle East regimes collapsed one
after the next. Egyptian, Libyan, and other Islamist groups all
looked to Ankara for political and financial support. Some
still get Turkish backing hoping to replicate the success of
HTS.
Erdogan's Hamas rhetoric is a very clear attempt to
position himself as a leader in the Muslim world. His failed
call for an Islamic war against Israel led to nothing, but it
was a clear attempt to rally the Muslim world around the
Turkish flag.
I am also concerned about Turkiye's Blue Homeland policy of
aggression. Tensions are currently rising in the Eastern Med
with Turkish vessels challenging Greek and Cypriot vessels,
even in their own exclusive economic zones.
The U.S. can no longer afford to ignore Turkish aggression.
A policy shift is needed, and I offer these recommendations.
The U.S. should maintain its modest military presence in Syria
to counter Turkish aggression. The U.S. should block Turkish
attempts to deploy military forces or contractors anywhere in
the Middle East. The U.S. should expose and punish Ankara's
policy of allowing Jihadi fighters and terror financiers to use
Turkiye as a transit and logistics hub. The U.S. should
preserve--rather should pressure Ankara to sever all ties with
Hamas including shutting down its offices, extraditing known
operatives, and revoking travel documents. Failure to do so
should result in tough sanctions. The U.S. should closely
monitor Turkish involvement in weapon smuggling with a focus on
Syria's borders with Jordan and Lebanon. And finally, Congress
should limit any major arms sale to Turkiye until it stops
supporting terrorism and destabilizing NATO.
I offer additional recommendations in my written testimony.
I hope this subcommittee considers all of them. On behalf of
FDD, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Self. Thank you, Dr. Schanzer.
I now recognize Dr. Wallander for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF CELESTE WALLANDER
Ms. Wallander. Thank you. Chairman Self, Ranking Member
Keating, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for
this opportunity to speak with you today on one of the most
consequential bilateral geopolitical relationships that the
United States enjoys with a key ally, the Republic of Turkiye.
Turkiye is a strong ally across key global security priorities
of the United States, however too often Turkiye is also at odds
with U.S. policies and priorities. And at other times the U.S.
and Turkiye share strong common interests, but have differing
approaches to resolving problems that threaten American
interests.
I lay this out as the good, the bad, and the complicated.
The good. For over 70 years Turkiye has been a strong front-
line member of the NATO alliance. Spanning the Bosphorus and
holding one-third of the Black Sea coast, Turkiye has been key
to credible defense and deterrence against Soviet and now
Russian threat in Europe. Turkiye's location affords NATO
allies key overflight access for defense and surveillance
operations across Southeast Europe. During the cold war Turkiye
played this vital alliance role along with Greece, the two
forward locations for NATO in Southeast Europe.
Today they are joined by Bulgaria, Romania, and the Western
Balkan allies to enable NATO air, sea, and ground defenses that
force Russian military planners to contemplate defense from the
Arctic to the Caucasus. With Turkiye as a NATO ally, the
Kremlin cannot afford to focus on attack on simply ground
forces on one axis in Central Europe.
The U.S. military is better able to fulfill its missions
for European and global security because of our alliance with
Turkiye. The U.S. operates military bases in Incirlik and Izmir
along with other NATO allies. These bases support air, ground,
and sea components of allied forces and support a network of
censors that provide warning and surveillance capacity to the
alliance, deep in Europe's eastern areas. Hosting U.S. military
forces at these bases has meant that Turkiye has enabled and
supported U.S. operations and NATO deterrence for decades.
Turkiye has a strong industrial base including production
of some of the most advanced and innovative capabilities
crucial to modern warfare, notably unmanned aerial vehicles,
UAVs, military ships, and electronic warfare systems. Turkiye
has also invested in American-built advanced weapons that
advance NATO's strength and interoperability, notably its fleet
of F-16 fighters.
This advanced capability is one of the forgotten stories in
Ukraine's surprise success in the early months of Russia's
invasion in 2022. One of the signature headline capabilities
the Ukrainians used for surveillance and attack that caught the
Russian army by surprise was Turkish Aerospace Industries
produced Bayraktar UAVs. In a war that changed our
understanding of how conventional conflict can and must be
fought, that has--and that has led to the massive growth in
production of UAVs for military use, the leading example was
Turkiye's use and development of UAVs.
In other places globally Turkiye has contributed where
American partners are supported by U.S. military forces,
however there is no question that at times Turkiye has also
taken actions that are contrary to American national security
interests. We have already heard mention of Turkiye's arming of
Azerbaijan that led the President Aliyev to believe that he
could achieve his objectives against Armenia and take territory
in a way that led to the displacement and refugee status of
tens of thousands of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.
Turkiye has also acted against U.S. interests in NATO,
notably with delaying Finland and Sweden's memberships and
therefore sending a message to Putin of disunity within NATO.
And Turkiye did acquire the S-400 Russian system putting at
risk the entire European NATO F-35 program by operating and
deploying that system.
The complicated issue I want to highlight is Turkiye's
concerns and track record of striking at PKK-affiliated groups
in Northern Syria and in Iraq. For years Turkiye did this
without coordination with the United States and often put at
risk U.S. military forces exercising the counter-ISIS missions
that the U.S. Government has designated. With the change in
Syrian leadership and the evolution of the government of
Turkiye's relationship with the leadership of the PKK within
Turkiye, there is an opportunity to buildupon better
communication, alignment in counterterrorism operations, namely
counter-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq, and perhaps begin to
untangle this unfortunate period in U.S.-Turkiye relations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wallander follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Self. Thank you.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Dr.
Schanzer, I will start with you. Turkiye has the second largest
military in NATO after the United States. And we are hearing,
and I am hearing from individual delegations that Europe is
starting to expand their defense capabilities. As they expand
their capabilities, what does that mean for Turkiye and their
participation in NATO? And specifically I would like to ask you
to address Greece and the S-400.
Mr. Schanzer. Sure. Chairman Self, thank you for the
question. First, I think there does need to be an assessment. I
think it could be an interesting report, perhaps produced by
the congressional Research Service or some other.
But to question this assertion that Turkiye's army is
invaluable to NATO, its size does not mean that it is
effective, or that it is updated, or that its army is capable
of tangling with Russia, or any other country for that matter.
So I do think an assessment could be necessary.
I think there is a question though among the European
powers right now about Turkiye's role within NATO and within
Europe. Specifically I think when we look at the number of
clashes that have--or near clashes that have taken place in the
Eastern Med, I am concerned. Turkiye has been very aggressive
of late in challenging the Greeks and the Cypriots in their own
exclusive economic zones. They have been engaged in illegal
drilling, but they have also tried to assert, I mentioned in my
spoken remarks, this Blue Homeland policy of denying countries
in the region to be able to go into international waters.
This cannot continue if the goal is to preserve even a
modicum of stability within NATO, and I think it is crucial
that we address this now. I would say that having the U.S.
patrol with Greece may be actually useful. Having the Israelis
patrol with Greece in the Eastern Med may be useful. But
Turkiye needs to understand that it needs to share these
waterways. This is going to be crucial moving forward.
Mr. Self. Thank you. Either of our other witnesses?
Ms. Wallander. I would highlight the value of Turkish armed
forces in the area of special operations forces. Turkiye has
contributed to, for example, the training of Somali special
operations forces alongside American trained and equipped
Somali, the Danab Brigade, which is aimed at preventing the
success of al-Shabaab in Somalia and holding it at bay. Al-
Shabaab has identified by American intelligence as the only
terrorist organization in Africa with the capability and the
intent to strike through global operations, including against
the U.S. homeland.
So there are areas of strength that we have worked, the
United States has worked in cooperation with the Turkish armed
forces. I would highlight that on in particular.
Ms. Borschevskaya. I agree with my colleagues and want to
add only one brief comment. Turkiye's support for Ukraine,
Turkiye's military support for Ukraine, as, Mr. Chairman, you
have highlighted in your remarks, has been useful. And in that
regard I--well, I agree with everything my colleagues said, but
there has to be more of a nuanced approach to Turkiye's--to our
understanding of Turkish military.
Mr. Self. Thank you for that. I want to ask about this rare
earth element find. Can any of the three of you comment on
that? Because one of the critical areas that we need to divorce
ourselves from China is rare earths, critical minerals, because
they are mined lots of places, but China controls 92 percent of
the processed critical minerals.
Ms. Wallander. I mean, it is certainly an opportunity to
partner with Turkiye in that commercial endeavor. The Trump
Administration has made clear that it is seeking those kinds of
partnerships. And I would simply observe, watching Chinese
operations throughout Africa and the Middle East. If the United
States is not active and offering a value proposition to
countries, Chinese ability to move in with what look like very
lucrative commercial opportunities usually create facts on the
ground that are difficult to walk back.
Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, I would agree. The fact of the
matter is we are focused on great power competition as a
trajectory of our foreign policy. And as such, a focus on
minerals is a part of this debate.
Therefore, if we don't have a seat at the table, somebody
else will fill in that space. It is better that we find a way
to do it rather than our adversaries.
Mr. Self. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
[Audio malfunction.] Keep going with this, but see if it
resets my time, if I could, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
There are many here in Congress that don't think Ukraine is
important to us back here at home, that what happens over there
is their business and we should worry about our own priorities
here.
I am looking at, as we discuss Turkiye, I mentioned before
their involvement in keeping navigation and the Black Sea free.
I sponsored the Black Sea Security Act, which was incorporated
in the NDAA last year, to underscore this importance.
Now can you tell us how important, Dr. Wallander, it is to
have the access through Odessa and through Ukraine and make
sure that doesn't fall in the hands of Russia and what that
would mean for the--our security and what would it mean for
economic impact worldwide and at home if that should fall to
Russia?
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, sir. There is a lot of focus the
last 3 years on security assistance and how vital the ability
for Ukraine to fight on the battlefield was to its survival,
but its military success is both not enough, but also not
possible without the Ukrainian economy. And Turkiye's decision
to invoke the Montreux Convention in--the 1936 Montreux
Convention shut off the Russian navy from being able to
reinforce the Black Sea fleet.
As Ukrainians were skilled in using various coastal defense
capabilities and unmanned surface vehicles and sinking Russian
ships, Russia was not able to repair or resupply the Russian
Black Sea fleet to the point where the Russia Black Sea fleet
had to retreat from Sevastopol in Crimea to Novorossiysk and it
is stuck back in the Eastern Black Sea.
This has affected Russia's ability to launch attacks in the
Odessa area. It has not eliminated, but it constrained Russia's
ability to use surface ships to attack Ukrainian cities, and it
is something that Russia has persistently throughout the
conflict pressed Turkiye to change to allow Russian warships to
enter the Black Sea, and Turkiye has prevented that.
Ukraine's ability to send grain, to send manufactured goods
out, to import the components for its own defense industry has
vitally depended on the openness, the commercial openness of
the Western Black Sea. And that will be a major element of any
cease-fire or peace negotiation going forward as well.
Mr. Keating. What would be your concerns if that fell into
Russia's hands? And how would China view that change?
Ms. Wallander. Control of the Black Sea would give Russia
control of Eastern Europe. It would give control of not just
the sea, but air flight, overflight permissions that the United
States uses, for example, to access the Middle East. It would
give Russia the ability to continue its stranglehold on
Georgia, to influence Azerbaijan and support Azerbaijan in
negotiations for a peace settlement in Armenia.
I mean, the Black Sea as a Russian lake would be a
significant strike against European security and American
global access, working with our NATO partners and allies in the
region.
Mr. Keating. Yes, and following that along and the
importance of that, in the aftermath of what happened last week
in the Oval Office, disrupting our Transatlantic alliances,
there was a meeting of European leaders. The core of that, I
thought, was to have a peace agreement that made sure there was
a security component to that. We can't trust Putin's word, and
there has to be a backstop to make sure that that's enforced.
Can you tell us the importance of any agreement having that
security agreement that, if Putin does what he always does,
lies and goes back on his word, that there would be some kind
of security built into any agreement, so that he couldn't
advance himself with another aggressive attack, illegal,
immoral attack on Ukraine?
Ms. Wallander. Well, if you look at the track record of
Russian failure to implement peace agreements, cease-fire
agreements in Georgia, Russia has never lived up to the
commitments that were made in 2008. Russia has never lived up
to the commitments that it made to withdraw forces from
Transnistria in Moldova, and Russia never implemented the
successive Minsk agreements in 2014 and 2015. The first step in
those agreements was a cease-fire. Russia never implemented it,
and the international community only put in a lightly armed
monitoring mission.
So, based on the track record, you would need a strong
agreement. You would need a strong, armed presence, not merely
a peacekeeping presence, but a peace enforcement presence. And
that would mean a substantial ground force with substantial air
support as well.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I think that is one of the most
important things coming out of any agreement.
I yield back.
Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
Green.
Mr. Green. Chairman Self and Ranking Member Keating, thank
you for convening this hearing on the critical role Turkiye
plays in geopolitics today, Turkiye's strategic location and
strong military give it the unique ability to put NATO's
security mandate into action. Yet, I do have some concerns
about Turkiye's willingness to do so.
As a flight surgeon during the War on Terror, I served on
the frontlines, balancing dual roles as a soldier and a healer.
I treated U.S. NATO soldiers' combat wounds in the middle of
firefights--learning firsthand that strength against our
enemies and building trust with our allies are inseparable
duties.
Today, we are here to discuss both standing strong and
building bridges. From the war in Gaza to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine, Turkiye plays an integral role in the current
geopolitical landscape, but these actions of late are, as I
have said, very concerning.
From seeking membership with BRICS countries who clearly
have taken a position to destabilize the United States dollar
to attempting to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, I
do see some red flags. This explicit flirtation with U.S.
adversaries undermines NATO's cohesion.
The purchase of the Russian S-400 missile systems, dragging
its feet on Sweden's and Finland's admission to NATO, and
continuing to fund terror groups just doesn't go with what the
goals--doesn't align with the goals of the United States or
NATO.
Turkiye's conflicting loyalties are exemplified by the role
it played in Russia's war on Ukraine. Turkiye closed the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Russia and supplied drones to
Kiev, but it also helped Russia evade sanctions.
In Syria, Turkiye's antagonism against our allied Kurdish-
led Syrian Democratic Forces jeopardizes the mission to defeat
ISIS. This could lead to an ISIS resurgence. We all know what
that would be.
My hope for Turkiye is that it will give up its support for
Hamas, renew strong economic relationships with Israel, and
together, that these two countries can revitalize the Middle
East. But this isn't going to happen if Turkiye chooses to
support terrorist proxies.
Now, I will say that Turkiye has a unique position in the
world--its history with Russia, its Ottoman heritage, and its
relationship with the West. It is sort of like threading a
needle, if you will.
There seems to be in foreign policy, or at least my study
of it in foreign affairs and history, the approach, I like to
call it the ``put a foot in each bucket'' approach or ``a foot
in every bucket'' approach.
I get, for example, a nation like India that desires to be
a third or fourth pole in the multipolar system of the world
might do things that are both pro-American and aligned with
Russia or China at various points in time. I get that. However,
we don't have a treaty like NATO with India.
That leaves us to ask hard questions. And I think, you
know, in being as fair as I possibly can, with that unique
history, that geopolitical position or that location, the
geographic location of the country and the challenges around
it, I just want to ask, first, Dr. Schanzer, what external
pressure would the United States need to put on Turkiye for it
to properly distance itself from Hamas?
Mr. Schanzer. Congressman Green, thank you for the
question.
I don't know what the exact answer is, but I do know that
Turkiye does respond to sanctions pressure. We saw this during
the first Trump administration. Pastor Brunson had been taken
hostage by the Turkish government. The Trump administration put
significant sanctions on Erdogan's inner circle, really began
to target his closest allies in government, and the threats
began to ratchet up, and then, he released Pastor Brunson.
I believe that the threat of sanctions on Turkiye, economic
pressure as a place to start, but I think we need to consider
other ways that we can put pressure on them as well--political,
diplomatic. But giving them the leverage that they have right
now in NATO doesn't help, and, of course, there is no mechanism
for releasing them from NATO.
Mr. Green. Right. Let me ask one other quick question
because I'm about to run out of time. And you guys can respond
in writing.
Can Erdogan run for reelection? Is he going to run for
reelection, if he can? And if he doesn't run for reelection, is
it the Istanbul mayor? I mean, who is the heir apparent in
Turkiye?
I would love to get that in writing because I am now out of
time. Thank you.
Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs.
Cherfilus-McCormick.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman and Ranking Member.
Although Turkiye and Israel restored full diplomatic ties
in 2022, relations have dramatically worsened since Hamas'
October 7th attack and Israel's military operation in Gaza.
Erdogan has taken a very harsh stance against Israel, and in
May 2024, Turkiye stopped all trade with Israel until a
permanent cease-fire is achieved in Gaza and humanitarian aid
is allowed without interruption. Under Erdogan, Turkiye has
provided consistent political support to Hamas and has
periodically hosted Hamas' political officials.
What is the nature of Turkiye's relationship with Hamas and
how is it likely to affect Turkiye's ability to: one, improve
its relationship with Israel; two, play a role in mediating the
Israel-Palestine conflict, and three, assist with post-conflict
recovery and reconstruction in Gaza?
Mr. Schanzer. I will take it that's for me. Thank you for
the question.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Yes.
Mr. Schanzer. Look, the relationship between Turkiye and
Hamas goes back to at least 2006. That was the first time we
saw a major delegation hosted by Erdogan. We saw Erdogan get
into an open fight with Shimon Peres, then President of Israel,
Nobel Prize Laureate, accusing him, essentially, of war crimes.
Then, we began to see the money flowing from Turkiye. We
began to see more operatives finding a home in Turkiye,
businesses created in Turkiye, operatives planning and
executing attacks out of Turkiye.
Let me just put it this way: Turkiye is to the letter of
the law a State sponsor of terrorism as it relates to Hamas.
They are unquestionably the largest jurisdiction right now for
Hamas operatives and for Hamas finance in the world. That is,
obviously, deeply troubling when we think about the fact that
this is a NATO ally and a country that we rely on for a modicum
of stability in the Middle East.
So, as of right now, especially after October 7th, I see no
way forward between Turkiye and Israel if Turkiye's policies
continue along these lines. They have not stood down. They have
not dialed back on their Hamas support of anything. Erdogan
appears to be more committed to this terror group right now,
and I think this is why this hearing, in particular, strikes me
as so crucial at this moment.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. What steps do you think the
United States should take to addressing the risk of Turkiye's
continued support to Hamas?
Mr. Schanzer. Oh, I think we need to make very clear
demands right now on Hamas. I mean, No. 1, I think we should be
sanctioning Turkiye for any evidence we have. We know there are
a number of companies right now that are throwing off cash for
Hamas and sending it to the Gaza Strip. There are charities
that are doing the same. I think they need to be designated by
the Treasury Department. We need to be demanding the
extradition of Hamas operatives that are based in Turkiye. We
should be asking the Turks to revoke travel documents that have
been issued formerly by the Turkish government to Hamas
operatives.
There are many steps that we can take that we have yet to
take. I cannot tell you exactly why we haven't taken them. And
I would actually argue that it is a bipartisan problem. Both
Democrats and Republicans have failed to address this, I think
maybe for fear of upsetting the alliance that we have with the
Turks, knowing that they are NATO allies and that they have
vital roles to play in other areas. But I think they have
fallen down on the job as American allies if they are so openly
and willingly supporting a violent group like Hamas.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. As the Syrian people emerge from
decades under Assad's brutal dictatorship, I'm concerned about
Turkiye's actions against Syria's Kurds community and support
of fully inclusive Syria, representative of all its people.
I'm also equally concerned about the potential rise of ISIS
in Syria and the dangerous consequences of freezing foreign aid
to that region. This is not just a matter of foreign policy.
This is a national security issue and the consequences will be
felt right here at home. This evil terrorist group committed
heinous terrorist attacks, including the Pulse Nightclub
shooting in Orlando that killed 49 people.
Let me be clear. Foreign aid is not a handout. It is an
investment in our national security. That aid helped prevent
ISIS from regaining strength and keeps local forces trained and
equipped and stabilizes communities, so terrorism does not take
root again.
But by cutting it off, we are giving ISIS exactly what it
wants--a power vacuum, a weakened opposition, and a chance to
rebuild. And who will pay for this mistake? It will be the
American people, unfortunately.
Humanitarian needs in Syria are at an all-time high. In
2024, 16.7 million people were estimated to require assistance,
the largest number since the beginning of the civil war in
2011. We are either going to feed them now or we are going to
end up fighting them later.
Ms. Wallander, do Turkish officials seek to weaken U.S.-
backed Kurdish forces, such as the SDF, which are a strong
counterterrorist partner to the United States and its European
allies?
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman.
The Turkish government has stated, or when I served in
government until January stated, that it sees an opportunity to
now distinguish PKK-affiliated groups in northern Syria and in
northern Iraq, expect them to be disarmed and to cease their
operations, but not to act against Syrian Kurdish groups that
are not affiliated with PKK. Now is the time to test that
commitment and see whether they can live up to it. Because it
would be significant progress, but their actions need to meet
their words.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.
Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentlelady from California,
Mrs. Kim.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Chairman Self and Ranking Member
Keating, for holding today's hearing.
I want to thank you all for joining us today.
Turkiye has expressed its desire to have close relations
with both the West and the East, and it is the first NATO
member that has openly asked to join BRICS, which is led by our
adversaries Russia and China.
So, I want to ask you, what are the--I mean, I'm going to
direct this question to any one of you--what are the top
drivers for Turkiye's pursuit of BRICS membership or partner
country status?
Ms. Wallander. Briefly, thank you, Congresswoman.
So, I think that what Turkiye often points to--I'm not
advocating this--is the limitations of their integration in the
European Union and the economic opportunities there. I don't
necessarily think that that is a good argument for, as you
point out, seeking deeper economic relations with America's two
top strategic competitors, Russia and China, because the
relationships of economic trade with Europe don't bring with
them dependence and influence in a way that trade investment
and economic entanglement with China and Russia do.
The United States should be very clear with Turkiye that
our own economic relationships, our own integration in
different industries would be limited----
Mrs. Kim. But do you think Turkiye's membership in BRICS
or, like, Shanghai Cooperation Organization is likely?
Ms. Wallander. I don't know that--I think that Russia, in
particular, would see that as a prize because of the influence.
I think that it would extend China's influence in the European
terrain, given that Europe itself is now quite resistant to
Chinese influence in the economic sphere. So, I do think it is
a risk and I think you put your finger on something important.
Mrs. Kim. I think you wanted to add to that?
Mr. Schanzer. Yes, I would love to add this: that I believe
that Turkiye's dalliance in both sides of this equation
reflects President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's deep discomfort with
American values, with Western values. I don't think that he
feels like he belongs there.
This is a man who identifies very openly as an Islamist.
This is a man who does not put a lot of faith in democracy. And
you can see he's already testing the limits of the democracy in
Turkiye. He is putting strain on the judiciary, putting strain
on the media. I would actually argue that he has been
eviscerating Turkiye's democracy. It wasn't exactly strong to
begin with, but it continues to weaken.
This is driving Turkiye into the hands of some of these
other organizations populated by less liberal countries. You
can see the alliances or the semi-alliances that Turkiye has
maintained with the likes of Iran over the years or engaging in
illicit financial activity with the Russians. This is a man who
does not see himself squarely fitting within NATO, and that is
why we are watching him stray into these other organizations.
Mrs. Kim. Well, let me address this. I saw the Pew Research
Center polling from 2024 where it says fewer than 20 percent of
Turks have a favorable view of the United States, while their
favorable rating of China is 30 percent and their rating for
Russia is 26 percent.
Why do you think this is the case? And how can the U.S.
gain greater favorability among the Turks?
Mr. Schanzer. Look, a lot of what we see right now is
actually the result of the manipulation of the Turkish media,
which is fully controlled or almost fully controlled by Recep
Tayyip Erdogan. If you want to see some of the public sentiment
begin to shift, maybe allow for more liberal media. Once upon a
time, there was a lot more of it. Now there is not. I would say
that is a major point of concern, but as for exactly why Turks
feel the way they do, I think you would have to ask the Turks.
Mrs. Kim. And then, more than 40 percent of Turks, they
have a favorable view of NATO and the European Union. Why is
that? Why do you think that is the case?
Ms. Wallander. I wish it were higher. I think the favorable
view is that ``in between.'' Turks see themselves also as
European and see the NATO alliance as contributing to Turkish
security, although they have concerns about terrorism, but,
also, the aspiration to play a role as a leading European
country. So, I think that that is rooted in the country, but it
is also balanced--I agree with Jonathan--by the views of having
larger global aspirations as well.
Mrs. Kim. Got it.
I wish I can engage more with you, but my time is up. So, I
will yield back.
Mr. Self. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member. It is an honor to be on this subcommittee.
I have been listening to your testimony with great
interest. It has been fascinating to me.
The U.S.-Turkiye relationship is complex and sometimes
challenging, as you have well-educated us here today. Turkiye
has continued to engage with Hamas, which has fueled
heartbreaking conflict in the Middle East that many of my
constituents keenly feel.
But even Turkiye consistently rejects Russia's claim over
Ukraine and joined the free world in voting for the United
Nations Resolution in opposite of the U.S. vote, where we,
unfortunately and tragically, cast our vote to align with
Russia and North Korea, two dictatorships that represent the
opposite of our values, in voting against our allies and voting
against peace in the region.
So, my question is, does this sort of give permission, this
signal by the United States to align with Russia and China and
North Korea, does that give permission for Turkiye to do the
same?
Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, I think you are making a very
important, a very important point here and I think it points to
the larger geostrategic dilemmas that we are facing as part of
this discussion. Because, as we have all discussed here today,
Turkiye is a very problematic ally. And yet, on the one hand,
it supports Hamas. Its actions oftentimes go against our
values.
Yet, when we think about the bigger geopolitical picture,
as you brought up Ukraine right now, we have to think about,
how do we navigate; what is the way forward? How do we go
forward from here?
Well, first, if I may go back to the earlier part of our
discussion with Turkiye, Representative Kim's comment, the
problem is Turkiye's actions do not--Turkiye does not align
with our values. And so, when we think about the way forward in
our relationship with Turkiye, it is looking toward interests
rather than values. And that is a very different way of looking
at this issue, because we tend to, when we think about the NATO
alliance, we certainly think of a values-based alliance.
Ms. Johnson. You know, many of you all testified that--
well, I loved your analysis, sort of the good, the bad, and the
complicated.
On the one hand, we really much need Turkiye. We need their
policing-(we need the openness that that provides to the
region. We need so much from them. But they are acting very
bad, you know, like a very bad child.
If you had to say, which interest is more important to the
United States, if you have to pick a policy path? Is it more
important to rein in their bad behavior or is it more important
to keep them wanting to be on our side?
Ms. Wallander. So, a global superpower, the United States,
the most powerful country in the world, doesn't have to choose.
We have influence. We can work with not just Turkiye, but other
countries with whom we can solve problems and advance American
interests, but we can also hold them to account.
For example, I fully support and believe it was a
constructive move for Congress to include Turkiye under the
CAATSA sanctions, precisely because, by buying the S-400
system, Turkiye was putting U.S. pilots and NATO pilots at
risk.
Ms. Johnson. Right. So, we need to step up our game, I
think. It seems like the diplomacy in this country needs to be
elevated to a high level to make sure that we rein in their bad
behavior, is what it is really sounding like. Their interaction
with Hamas, their interactions with terrorist groups, their
support--their running to Russia and China are all such things
that should be very, very concerning to the United States and
it needs to be a top focus of our interactions with them. Is
that fair.
Ms. Borschevskaya. Well, I think that's fair and I would
add to that, Turkiye is certainly not choosing. Turkiye is
making it very clear in its behavior that they don't want to
choose. All of its actions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine
show that they, on the one hand, were certainly supportive of
Ukrainian territorial integrity, but they also continue to do
business with Russia. As we discussed, Turkiye is talking about
joining the BRICS.
So, if Turkiye is not willing to choose, we, as a
superpower, certainly don't have to choose and we can balance--
and, in fact, it is a prerogative of a superpower to be able to
focus on more than one priority at a time.
Mr. Schanzer. I will only add one thing here. We are
entering into an era of great power competition. We hear this
all the time. We are going to have to deal with China. We are
going to have to deal with Russia. We have got great challenges
on the horizon.
We need reliable allies, period. We need to make demands of
our allies. And by the way, Turkiye is not alone; you have got
countries like Qatar that are supporting Hamas. You have got
countries like Oman that are supporting the Houthis.
None of this should be allowed to continue under an
alliance structure that demands discipline. That is what I
think we need to start to see out of our diplomats, out of our
State Department, out of our White House. I think this has gone
on for too long.
Mr. Self. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you all so very much.
Mr. Self. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed, Secretary Wallander, I want to thank you for your
analysis about the Black Sea, how important it is. And I'm
really grateful for Ranking Member Keating raising that issue
up.
Because we have already seen the efforts by the
collaboration between War Criminal Putin and the Chinese
Communist Party and the regime in Tehran. And it was October
26th that the War Criminal Putin rigged the Presidential
elections in the Republic of Georgia, and the consequence of
that is that now there's an effort by the Chinese Communist
Party to scheme and build a port on the Black Sea.
The collaboration between the axis of evil is clearer every
day and we should be supporting, indeed, as Europe is, the
legitimate President Salome Zourabichvili of the Republic of
Georgia and call for new and fair and free elections.
With that in mind, America and Turkiye have been NATO
allies beginning even in 1952 with Turkish soldiers fighting
alongside Americans in the Korean War and in every conflict
since, including I have had my son serve with Turkish troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
There's always been ups and downs in our relationship, but
I believe that, ultimately, what we have as mutual benefits
should be a basis of our partnership for ultimate good results
for both of our countries and for freedom and democracy.
Additionally, Turkiye has been crucial for the victory in
the cold war, defeating communism, liberating countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, of Central Asia, of the Caucasus.
We have worked together and we need to focus on that. And,
indeed, we have been partners in the Global War on Terrorism.
The Turkish American community, for over 130 years, has
been very assimilated into American society as business leaders
and so appreciated.
I was grateful to actually host the Turkish Ambassador
Sedat Onal to the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee.
And I was grateful that he was there with Senator Scott of my
State, Tim Scott, and Senator Lindsey Graham, and Governor
Henry McMaster. Everybody welcomed the Ambassador.
It was just so positive that, actually, the Ambassador came
to Columbia, South Carolina, after the election, and I was
grateful to have him welcomed by Mayor Dan Rickenmann; by Carl
Blackstone, Chamber of Commerce President; the Secretary of
Commerce; Republican and Democrat legislators.
So, every effort I think should be made to reinforce the
relationship that has been so beneficial.
I'm also grateful that President Donald Trump, as we saw
last night, believes in a pragmatic foreign policy and reducing
the burdens on America. I really appreciate that President
Donald Trump has praised Turkiye and Saudi Arabia for working
with the new government in Syria.
Additionally, Qatar, too, has been helpful with the new
government in Syria.
What we need to do is to seek to end the conflicts and the
self-declared enemies of America in the Middle East and North
Africa who create the migration crisis to Europe. We should be,
I believe, working with Turkiye for stabilization in the area.
Indeed, I'm really grateful that Turkiye has played a
positive role supporting assistance to Ukraine from the
beginning and, also, agreeing to possibly send peacekeepers to
Ukraine.
Then, it is also that Turkiye was so critical in the fall
of the narco-trafficking Assad Syrian regime. And with that in
mind, we should be working, and we can already see that the
foreign minister of the regime in Tehran condemned Turkiye
yesterday, calling their actions for a free Syria as
unconstructive, when, in fact, Turkiye has been working to
publicly calling for the rights of women and Christians.
With all of this in mind, Dr. Borschevskaya, what is the
best way for the United States to encourage positive progress,
working with the country of Turkiye?
Ms. Borschevskaya. So, thank you. Thank you for the
question.
I think the best way to encourage positive progress is to
be very pragmatic and practical and compartmentalized, our
relationship. Again, Turkiye is a problematic ally on many
fronts, but we also need it and it is part of NATO.
Specifically, in Syria, we have an incredible opportunity.
With Assad in power, Syria had no chance and the rest of the
Middle East would continue to be unstable. In other words,
Syria sat at the center of terrorism, of narco trafficking, of
enormous instability that harmed our direct national security
interests and the interests of our allies.
Now, we are in an era of uncertainty. We have a lot of
questions about where Syria goes. But at least Syria has a
modicum of a chance. And the best way we can ensure that is to
be present, to have a seat at the table, to attempt to shape
the outcome. That is what we need to do.
Here, we can look for ways on how Turkiye can be helpful,
along with keeping our own presence in Syria, keeping our
troops in Syria. So again, compartmentalize the relationship;
be pragmatic.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Self. I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
the ranking member, for this hearing. It is important.
I want to kind of go beyond bridging the gap between East
and West. Turkiye has been a challenge, and you talked about
the good, the bad, and the complicated, I think, the previous
witness.
I apologize if I'm asking questions that have already been
asked and please let me know.
But I am very perplexed and troubled by Turkiye's influence
and its unwillingness to understand the importance of its
agreements with Armenia and its engagement with Azerbaijan that
I think really threatened Armenia's ability to continue to
focus toward the Western interests.
Would you care to comment?
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. I very much
appreciate your question.
Turkiye has an opportunity to help resolve a tragic,
longstanding dispute, but instead----
Mr. Costa. They do.
Ms. Wallander. And instead----
Mr. Costa. But they have not been helpful. Their history
has not been there.
Ms. Wallander. Exactly. Instead, Turkiye helped to arm
Azerbaijan to the point where President Aliyev believed and had
a military advantage. And rather than continuing to work with
the international community, Turkiye included for a peaceful
resolution of the unresolved dispute, tipped the balance----
Mr. Costa. Well, and it is not clear to----
Ms. Wallander [continuing]. to allow that.
Mr. Costa [continuing]. what role this administration is
going to play in supporting Armenia's efforts there. Nagorno-
Karabakh, which you both referenced, it was outrageous what
they did there--120,000 refugees that are now in Armenia, and
not recognizing that historic Artsakh, as the Armenians like to
refer to it as.
I want to switch to about Ukraine here. You know, some of
my colleagues here on the other side talk about that we should
leave the war in Ukraine to the President. I don't subscribe to
that. I don't think they do so when Joe Biden was President. I
think Congress must assert its role during the oversight
responsibility on behalf of the American people.
Russia was the aggressor that invaded Ukraine. Putin is the
dictator. Russia is a syndicate masquerading as a country with
a mob boss called Putin. And I think if you look at it through
those lenses, that prism, you understand the dynamics that we
are dealing with here in trying to reach a peace.
Do you believe, either of you, that this President is
giving up our leverage in negotiations, while kneecapping
Ukraine's military capabilities on the battlefield, most
recently today or yesterday, that we are not going to share the
ability for them to target key targets?
Ms. Wallander. Congressman, President Putin believes he is
winning. He believes his economy can continue to produce
weapons that are being used to attack Ukraine. For 3 years, we
have disabused him of that notion. And to get leverage to get
President Putin to the table for a peace agreement, which I
believe a just peace agreement would be in Ukraine's interest
because it allows Ukraine to return on its path of Euro-
Atlantic integration, you need to impose costs on President
Putin--economic and military costs.
Mr. Costa. So, when you hear the Vice President's comments
at the Munich Summit Security Council; when you hear the vote
on the U.N. last Monday, siding with autocrats and
dictatorships against our democratic allies; when you see the
debacle on Friday, would you say this is either gross
incompetence or malign intent, or neither, in terms of what we
need to be doing to reach a cease-fire; ultimately, to get a
peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia?
Ms. Wallander. I, along probably with Anna, have closely
watched what is said in Moscow. And to all of those instances,
you know----
Mr. Costa. I think they are popping champagne in the
Kremlin right now.
Ms. Wallander [continuing]. they have explicitly said that
all of those developments are in Russia's interests and are
going to support Russian success----
Mr. Costa. So, tell me, why is the success of Ukraine
beneficial to our national security, and why should Americans
care about what Ukraine's fate is?
Ms. Borschevskaya. Thank you. Can you hear me?
Mr. Costa. Yes, please. I'm running out of time.
Ms. Borschevskaya. Success of Ukraine is vital to our
national security interests because, if Russia is not stopped
in Ukraine, NATO and Europe at large will most likely have to
face a bigger war in Europe.
Mr. Costa. Georgia and Moldova and possibly the Baltic
states. They have already undermined the Romanian Presidential
election. We know what Putin's intentions are. He has made it
clear. He wants to recreate the old Soviet Union. He thinks he
is a reincarnation of Peter the Great. That is the bottom line
and that is what we should understand when we are dealing with
Russia.
Ms. Borschevskaya. I absolutely agree with you.
Mr. Costa. Thank you.
Mr. Self. I recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr.
Zinke.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I have a lot of experience with Turkiye military
and I do recognize the contributions to the Korean War. I
fought in Kosovo with Turkish troops, both armor and infantry,
and have a great deal of joint operations experience with their
special forces. And I respect their military, and their
military is actually key to NATO.
But I have concerns about PKK/YPG. You talk about a thorn
in the side between the two countries. We have a thorn in the
side called ISIS and Al Qaeda. Turkiye has also a thorn in the
side called PKK and YPG.
A friend of our enemies is not necessarily a friend of
ours. And I do think or recognize that the United States made a
mistake diplomatically of not separating PKK/YPG from Kurds.
I have a lot of experience with the Peshmerga. And I give
the analogy of the Irish. Not all Irish are IRA and not all
Kurds are PKK or YPG.
But, you know, I think there is a recognition that PKK and
YPG are responsible for at least 30,000 deaths of Turkish,
which is 10 times what happened in 9/11.
How do we separate in Syria the Kurds that are Marxists-
Leninists, terrorist organizations, from Kurds that support
democracy that may not be our type of democracy, but certainly
aren't terrorist organizations?
Ms. Wallander, I would love to hear a comment from you.
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
I would give an example. And you, yourself, pointed to it.
Which is Turkiye's relationship with the Kurdistan Regional
Government in Iraq and with the Peshmerga is quite positive.
They have worked constructively with those entities and with
the government of Iraq, the Federal Government of Iraq in
Baghdad on counterterrorism operations at times.
At times, there's been frictions because they have
unilaterally struck at PKK elements in northern Iraq, but the
fundamental reality is that it is possible--and we should hold
Turkiye to it--to be able to distinguish between the terrorist
organizations and units, such as PKK, and not, as you point
out, incorrectly with a broad brush characterize all Kurds with
that same category. And they have done it in Iraq, and we
should hold them to that now with the opportunity in Syria.
Mr. Zinke. I have an equal concern about Turkiye's support
of Hamas, because they have. They offer harbor. They offer
financial assistance at times, although not as much as Iran.
So, Doctor, how can we--I mean, is it possibly also, if we
have a deal where we don't support the YPG/PKK, do you think it
is possible for Turkiye to stop their support of Hamas, which
is an irritant to us?
Mr. Schanzer. I think it is wishful thinking,
unfortunately, Mr. Congressman. I would say that, right now,
Turkiye has pushed all of its chips into the middle of the
table as it relates to Hamas. I would also argue for Al Qaeda,
for that matter, for HTS in Syria. I don't think there is any
walking back from that.
This is an ideological commitment that this government has
made to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, and even some
worse movements. I think a reckoning is needed here. I don't
think a deal is what is needed to get them to stop the support.
At this point, I am convinced, after watching this play out
since 2006, I believe that significant American pressure is
what is needed in order to force a divorce between Hamas and
Turkiye.
Mr. Zinke. Dr. Anna, do you also share the same opinion?
Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, I share that opinion. I think
pressure is needed. I also think, again, when we think about
our bigger geostrategic interests in Syria, our presence, our
presence in this region is what is going to create that
pressure, but also our engagement and our willingness to show
that we are not leaving this region, that we are willing--that
we are committed to our interests, and we are not fair weather
friends.
Mr. Zinke. Doctor, you can comment on that if you would
like.
Ms. Wallander. Yes, the job is not done in Syria. ISIS
remains a threat. The detention facilities, if not monitored
and kept secure, would be a huge setback in American and global
security. And so, the job is not done.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Self. I recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Amo.
Mr. Amo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Look, while I appreciate the focus on Turkiye, I think the
Subcommittee on Europe should be discussing the most dire
threat to European security. That is Russia's unlawful invasion
of Ukraine. That's right, Russia.
And again, so we align on some facts, it was Russia that
invaded Ukraine and launched an unprovoked war. It is an
aggressive Russia that poses one of the greatest threats to
Europe's freedoms, stability, and democratic values. It is
Russia who now believes the visions--believe that--the visions
of our two nations are aligned.
So, instead of having a hearing to address the threat posed
by Vladimir Putin, this committee is looking the other way,
literally. No one should choose to sit back and let President
Trump parrot Kremlin propaganda and blow up our European
relationships.
Make no mistake, the scene caused by the President and Vice
President at the White House last Friday was unnerving. It was,
in my opinion, disgraceful. Ukrainians are dying every day to
defend democracy. Yet, our colleagues were more concerned about
President Zelenskyy and the flattering that he should have done
of President Trump, and his wardrobe, than the existential war
that he is fighting.
So, unlike my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I
cannot stay silent while our President sides with a dictator
over our allies. Abandoning our allies, refusing to send them
aid, belittling leaders in public does not make the United
States stronger. It makes us weaker. It is clear that America
First is rapidly turning into Putin first and America alone.
Instead of leading by example, our President is siding with
North Korea and Iran at the United Nations, voting to protect
Russia. This is not the company we want to keep.
Now, I recognize that Turkiye is the subject of today's
hearing, a NATO member that has offered to host peace talks
between Ukraine and Russia. Turkiye has also pushed back
against false Russian claims to Ukrainian land. But while
Turkiye supports sovereign territory in Ukraine, they fail to
support it in their own backyard, in countries like Armenia.
In 2023, Turkiye provided material support for Azerbaijan's
brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
ancestral home of the Armenian people. The United States
supports Armenia. We provided over $57 million in foreign
assistance to Armenia last year, including humanitarian
assistance for refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh. But this
assistance was halted by President Trump's illegal foreign aid
freeze. It is yet another example of Trump abandoning an ally--
all while Turkiye has reportedly discussed establishing a
corridor to connect with Azerbaijan across Armenia's sovereign
territory.
So, I know that Mr. Costa touched on this a bit, but I want
to go a little bit deeper. Ms. Wallander, what steps can the
United States take to push back on Turkiye's support of
Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia, and how can the United
States dissuade Turkiye and Azerbaijan from encroaching on
Armenia's sovereignty with a ground transport corridor?
Ms. Wallander. Thank you so much, Congressman.
I agree with you that Turkiye has played a negative role in
the last couple of years on this conflict. And it is difficult
to imagine that Azerbaijan would come to the table with a
reasonable and equitable and just resolution without Turkiye's
positive influence.
The specifics could be to look at specific arms transfers
that contributed to the loss of life and the expulsion of those
tens of thousands of Armenians from that region. It also could
look at possible sanctions on Turkish relations with Russia in
the technology sphere that fuels some of those defense
industrial productions. I do think targeted sanctions, if they
were used for leverage to push toward diplomacy, could help
Turkiye to play a constructive role in influencing, in
particular, Azerbaijan.
Mr. Amo. And could you speak a little bit to the ground
transport corridor specifically?
Ms. Wallander. I don't have any secret ideas or public
ideas of how to succeed in pressing that ground transit
corridor. I would appeal to Turkiye's principled support in
support of the U.N. and international law for Ukraine and ask
them to consider no less in recognizing the international
community's obligation for Armenia to be able to have control
of its own territory, to negotiate an acceptable solution to
the issues of transport with Azerbaijan, and offer the kind of
positive influence and example that the Turkish leadership so
often seeks.
Mr. Amo. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
Titus.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Sorry to
walk right in here. Well, thank you.
As you all have been hearing and talking about the numerous
challenges throughout the region, preserving peace in the
Middle East is vital. Now, as a reliable and stable security
partner in the region, Greece best represents U.S. interests
there. Allowing Greece to maintain the qualitative and
strategic advantage over Turkiye is crucial in this respect. It
provides a deterrent to Turkiye's historic aggression toward
Greece, which shouldn't be upset, and this balance would be
upended if Turkiye were to acquire F-35s.
Despite the recent easing of tensions between Greece and
Turkiye, Erdogan's fundamental positions and claims, in
violation of Greek and Cypriot sovereignty, remain unchanged.
This year saw a sudden uptick in Turkiye's violations of
Greece's airspace, while the violations of its territorial
waters continued throughout the last year. Meanwhile, Erdogan
is cozying up to Hamas and threatening to invade Israel.
Yet, Greece continues to play a constructive role in the
region by promoting energy security through the three-plus-one
Great Sea Interconnector; providing crucial assistance for
Ukraine, as Russia continues its war of aggression, and serving
as a responsible NATO member by working with the U.S. to
coordinate mutual security goals. Greece's responsible ally
ship promotes U.S. interests in the region, while Turkiye seems
only interested in promoting Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions.
I would ask--Dr. Schanzer, is it?----
Mr. Schanzer. Yes.
Ms. Titus [continuing]. if the United States has imposed
CAATSA sanctions on any other NATO ally besides Turkiye.
Mr. Schanzer. No, it has not.
Ms. Titus. Yes.
Mr. Schanzer. No other ally has acquired the Russian S-400
system. No other ally has put our technology and our allies at
risk the way the Turks have. And I'm actually shocked that this
crisis continues so many years after it began. It is actually
inconceivable to me that we have not forced this crisis to a
suitable conclusion. I understand that Turkiye put itself in a
pickle, but that is not our problem any longer. We need that S-
400 out of Turkiye.
But I would also just like to say, the way that you have
just characterized what is happening in the Eastern Med is
exactly as I understand it. I think Greece has done more than
its fair share to shoulder its load, and it continues to come
under attack, under threat, from Turkiye.
The question is, at some point, what does the United States
do to help support our allies in Greece? I do think that
there's an opportunity to perhaps forge some kind of mechanism
that would enable the United States, Israel, and Greece to work
together for the betterment of security in the East Med. I
sincerely hope we see that materialize in the months or years
to come.
Ms. Titus. I do, too. I think Greece is strategically
located geopolitically to play a leadership role in that area.
Just to add to that, are there any other NATO allies who
occupy a country the way that Turkiye occupies Cyprus? And are
there any other NATO allies that are actively seeking BRICS
membership or status with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization? I think I know the answer. No?
Mr. Schanzer. You're correct.
Ms. Titus. OK. Thank you.
One other question. In your written testimony, you mention
Turkiye's ``Blue Homeland'' policy of dominating the Eastern
Mediterranean. Could you elaborate on this for a little bit and
tell us how it threatens Greece and Cypriot sovereignty in the
region?
Mr. Schanzer. Oh, absolutely. What Turkiye has done is it
has extended the way it views its own territorial waters to
cover, effectively, almost all of the Eastern Med. It is almost
as if Cyprus doesn't exist. It is as if Greece doesn't exist.
They have got a relationship, an agreement with Libya that,
basically, wipes Cyprus off the map. Right?
And all the while, we see illegal drilling, Turkiye
drilling in the territorial waters off of Cyprus and near
Greece. When you see Greek and Cypriot vessels coming out of
their Exclusive Economic Zones into international waters, they
are challenged by Turkish vessels. This is extremely aggressive
and it is articulated in this ``Blue Homeland'' policy that
this is the design of Turkiye. It is to dominate the Eastern
Med.
I would argue that conquest of Syria by Hay'at Tahrir al-
Sham, the Al Qaeda group, has now made Greece, Israel, and
Cyprus, and other countries in the region very alarmed. They
see now a surge in power on the part of the Turkish regime, and
I get the sense right now that they are looking to work
together to begin to counter it.
Ms. Titus. It doesn't sound like Turkiye is a very reliable
ally to me.
Mr. Schanzer. No.
Ms. Titus. Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Schanzer. No, ma'am.
Mr. Self. Thank you.
We are going to recognize the ranking member and the chair
for a second round of questioning, and I will go ahead and let
the ranking member begin.
Thank you.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to use the second round to go back at
statements made by our witnesses, and there are two that I
would like to emphasize.
No. 1, Dr. Schanzer said, ``We need reliable allies.'' I
couldn't agree more. But, honestly, right now, the U.S., on the
part of our closest allies, our Transatlantic allies, that
reliability is openly being questioned--just recent comments by
French officials, German officials, our Scandinavian allies. It
is clear. I don't have to go--they are public record.
But I can see their point after looking at the United
States taking an ally like Ukraine and cutting off its
intelligence capabilities that were so integral to success
here; cutting off weapons funding, important for just their
survival as a country. The actions where we have distanced
ourselves from our allies at the U.N. and the comments in the
aftermath of the Oval Office incident of last week, which
prompted an emergency meeting of our European allies in Great
Britain. These all make us less reliable.
So, I would like to ask, question one, how important is
this reliability? And since I believe it is unmistakable--these
are the words of our allies themselves, essentially, saying we
are not reliable--how important that is that America First
can't be America alone?
Now, the second point that was brought up--I'm not sure
which witness brought it--but it was on, you know, how come
Turkiye has a view of the United States of only 20 percent
favorable? And the comments of our witnesses were, well,
Erdogan's repression of journalists and a free press really
resulted in the people of Turkiye not getting a full message,
and not a clear message and a very skewed message.
So, the second question I have is, the importance of
funding and making sure we are positioning our Radio Free
Europe and our Radio Liberty capabilities, making sure that
those things are able and present to break through that very
problem that our witnesses raised themselves.
I question that, given funding threats in the past. I
question it, frankly, by the advancing of Kari Lake, a seven-
time election denier, to lead that entity. So, I'm concerned.
I'm concerned on the reliability and I'm concerned on our
ability to get democratic messages through Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty.
I will start with Dr. Wallander.
Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
So, Russia will be able to rebuild its military and adjust
its military and be poised to be able to threaten not just
Ukraine, but NATO, assessments are, in about 5 years.
European countries, as of last year, 23 were meeting at
least the 2 percent of GDP spending on defense, and many more
are moving toward that. And what we have heard in the last
couple of months is a determination to spend even more and
invest in defense industrial base.
The United States is on the cusp of achieving something
that American leaders have demanded of Europe for 75 years of
NATO, which is that European countries really invest in their
defense and really take the lead in defending their country
with the United States as an ally. But it is going to take them
some time.
At this point, being that reliable ally, giving Europe the
opportunity to take that leadership role, to free up the United
States for our important global challenges, especially
strategic competition and the pacing challenge of China, it is
within our grasp and we have that opportunity to have that
success that Presidents across both Republican and Democratic
leaderships have sought for decades.
Mr. Keating. The importance of global media?
Ms. Wallander. The importance of?
Mr. Keating. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?
Ms. Wallander. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are
respected as credible and important sources of alternative
information across the globe, I mean as resources, but
especially given the cold war history. Even in countries that
have free media, it is an alternative source of information. It
is a source about America. But it has to be credible. It has to
be about free media, and it is a huge asset in making the
American case and building that trust that enables us to have
access in Europe. That is so important for our global security.
Mr. Keating. I yield back.
Mr. Self. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I want to take 4 minutes on this next question. We have
danced around S-400's and F-35s.
So, starting with you, Dr. Schanzer, Greece, Israel,
Turkiye seem to me to be the players in this, as well as NATO
as a whole, of course. Would you just outline the issue for us?
Because this is a major issue for NATO in my mind.
Mr. Schanzer. It is, and I thank you for raising it,
Chairman Self.
We spoke about this before the hearing. There are, of
course, different variants of the F-35, and I think Israel
would have a superior one to whatever Turkiye might acquire and
I'm sure it is superior to whatever Greece has.
I am concerned, however, about giving this platform in any
form to this government in Turkiye. I think that it will be
used to further Turkiye's aggressive posture in the region. I
would fear clashes between Greece and Turkiye and would not
want to put both Greek and Turkish F-35s in the sky, as they
battle over Alexandroupolis or other key areas, as tensions
rise in the Eastern Med.
I know the Israelis are steadfastly opposed right now to
this government, the government of Turkiye, which has called
for a Pan-Islamic war against Israel, giving them, rewarding
them with the F-35. Now, they were removed from this program
because of their acquisition of the Russian S-400 system. We
should not put them back on.
I would argue that, even if they relinquish the S-400,
there should be a cooling-off period, probably several years,
before we begin to consider furnishing them with an F-35
because there needs to be a price to pay when our allies
disobey clear directives, as we gave the Turks. We said, ``Do
not buy that S-400.'' They did so anyway. They should pay a
steep price. They should be made an example of, I think, right
now for all of our other allies to see.
Mr. Self. Either of the other two doctors?
Ms. Wallander. I will speak to this.
Mr. Self. Dr. Wallander?
Ms. Wallander. I have a somewhat different view. I believe
that Turkiye should--I believe the right decision was made to
remove Turkiye from the F-35 program, to not deliver the
aircraft that it has already paid for because of its
acquisition of the S-400 system, and to impose sanctions as a
consequence of that choice.
I, however, believe that, because the United States is a
member of NATO, and because the American people are only as
secure as the alliance is strong, it is in our interest for
NATO allies to have advanced military capabilities. And NATO is
moving toward the F-35 as a core capability, and
interoperability across the alliance is extremely important.
If Turkiye were to undo that mistake in a verifiable,
irreversible way, to move forward, to move Turkiye, under the
right circumstances with the right provisions and security for
that decision, is something that would be in the American
national interest and is something that should be advanced with
all due caution, with a period of time to ensure that it is in
American interests going forward.
Mr. Self. Dr. Borschevskaya?
Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, and I would add to that, when we
sanctioned Turkiye for the purchase of the S-400, and when we
removed Turkiye as a co-producer of the F-35, we did say that,
if Turkiye were to relinquish the S-400, Turkiye would be
brought back into this program. And I agree with Celeste's
comments to that end. Not only is this issue important because
of NATO cohesion, because Turkiye is a NATO ally, but the
question is, what leverage do we have with Turkiye to
relinquish the S-400, if not bring it back into the program,
again, with an appropriate cooling-off period?
Mr. Self. Thank you.
Well, this is a complex topic, and I think we all recognize
that Turkiye has one foot in Europe and one foot in the Middle
East and they try to focus on both, and I don't think they can.
So, for the purview, for the portfolio of this committee, I
think the NATO military alliance is all important as we address
Turkiye. And I think that Turkiye needs to return to its
traditional, historic role as anchoring that southeast corner
of the NATO treaty alliance. Because this is a treaty. It is a
treaty that carries dramatic consequences if Article 5 is
invoked.
So, this is an extremely important topic to me, as
chairman, and I know to this committee, because I have heard
all of these comments. And I appreciate it.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions.
The members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing.
Mr. Self. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have
5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous
materials for the record, subject to the length limitations.
Mr. Self. Without objection, the committee stands
adjourned. Thank you so much.
[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]