    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     BRIDGING THE GAP: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST
                                   AND WEST

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                     OF THE

                             SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFAIRS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 March 5, 2025

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 119-3

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-235 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                        BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman

    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           BRAD SHERMAN, California
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
    MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
    YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
        American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois
    JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    THOMAS H. KEAN, Jr, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               GEORGE LATIMER, New York
    JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
    JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                  James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
                     Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                             SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

                          KEITH SELF, Texas, Chairman
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts,
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Ranking Member
    MARK GREEN, Tennessee                DINA TITUS, Nevada
    YOUNG KIM, California                JIM COSTA, California
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
                                         SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                                REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Keith Self............     1
    Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member William Keating.     2
    .................................................................

                                   WITNESSES

    Statement of Dr. Anna Borschevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior
      Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy..............     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     6
    Statement of Dr. Jonathan Schanzer, Executive Director,
      Foundation for Defense of Democracies..........................    11
      Prepared Statement.............................................    13
    Statement of Dr. Celeste Wallander, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center
      for New American Security......................................    24
      Prepared Statement.............................................    26

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    56
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    57
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    58

                 BRIDGING THE GAP: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

                                  ----------

                            Wednesday, March 5, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
                                 Subcommittee on Europe
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
    room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Keith Self
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Self. The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the future trajectory
    of Turkiye between the West and the East, as well as Turkiye's
    relationship with the United States, Europe, neighboring
    countries, and adversaries such as Russia.
        I would like to start with a moment of silence for the
    passing of Representative Sylvester Turner of Texas. Let's take
    a moment of silence.
        [Moment of silence.]
        Mr. Self. Thank you. I would also like to welcome
    Representatives Lawler, Cherfilus-McCormick, Zinke, Issa, and
    Schneider who will be joining us today. They are all members of
    the full committee, so there is no reason to vote them on. They
    will be joining us.
        I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN KEITH SELF

        I welcome everyone to the first Europe Subcommittee
    hearing. It is an honor to chair this subcommittee that deals
    with a dynamic and potentially dangerous environment in a
    crucial region for U.S. national interests. I look forward to
    our work as a subcommittee.
        Today our objective is to examine Turkiye's roles in NATO
    and by necessity the Middle East, even though this is the
    Europe Subcommittee. It will be necessary to look at Turkiye's
    track record in NATO and the Middle East in order to gain
    perspective on it's role going forward in both regions.
        As a NATO member, historically Turkiye has operated as a
    member of the NATO alliance often aligning it's foreign policy
    interests with the goals of NATO, but in the last decade there
    have been some actions that don't line up with the NATO goals.
        Take for example the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the
    barbaric October 7th attacks on Israel in 2023. While Turkiye
    supports most of the agenda within the NATO alliance, it did
    operate as a lone member, NATO lone member refusing to condemn
    the actions of nefarious players in the Middle East. The world
    is changing quickly, and Turkiye's geographic location places
    it at the epicenter of the most tumultuous regions as conflicts
    rage in Europe and the Middle East.
        Turkiye has also assumed the position of power broker in
    the vacuum created by Syria's regime change and is vexed by
    it's unresolved issues with the Kurds going forward. The world,
    particularly the United States, is watching closely as Turkiye
    decides whether or not to ease tensions with the Kurds. America
    has relied on the Kurds' partnership in the region, and
    opposition to their success will be a major sticking point in
    Turkiye's relationship with the United States.
        Turkiye is also unique in that geographically it straddles
    both Europe and Asia. It is a prominent member of the Minerals
    Security Partnership and could be a strategic partner for the
    West by operating as an alternative to Beijing. Recently
    Turkiye laid claim to one of the largest rare earth element
    reserves in the world with a 694 million ton rare earth
    deposit.
        Historically, Turkiye was the anchor for NATO's southeast
    corner against the old Soviet Union, but over the past decade
    Turkiye's commitment to anchoring that region has begun to
    crack. They have the second largest military in NATO, only
    behind the United States, which makes Turkiye a key asset to
    the alliance, but it's geographic location also makes it
    vulnerable to bad actors in the region.
        I look forward to hearing testimony from our three experts
    today as they share their views on Turkiye's role in both
    Europe and the Middle East.
        The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman
    from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement he may have.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER WILLIAM KEATING

        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your thoughts
    at this time with the Turner family. I would like to thank you
    and I would like to thank our witnesses here today.
        For years Turkiye has been balancing its relationship with
    Europe and the Middle East, most recently following Russia's
    illegal invasion of Ukraine. Turkiye has been a vital--has been
    vital in enabling the shipment of grain through the Black Sea
    and standing up for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
    integrity. These are principled stances, and Turkiye should be
    applauded for those decisions.
        Yet, significant challenges remain with Turkiye including
    Turkish support for Hamas, a brutal terrorist organization
    which conducted the heinous attack on October 7th. This support
    must end.
        At the same time Turkiye's acquisition of Russian S-400 air
    defense systems as well as its delays in approving Finland and
    Sweden for NATO membership certainly complicated our bilateral
    relationship.
        I also believe firmly that Turkiye must use its leverage
    with Azerbaijan and push for durable long-term peace in the
    Caucasus.
        In our bilateral relationships with Turkiye we have a mixed
    history, but when assessing the U.S.-Turkiye relationship, it
    is important to acknowledge that it is a relationship. Both
    sides must contribute and work for the benefit of our relations
    and our safety worldwide. I can't sit here this morning and
    ignore the deeply concerning events on the U.S. side of this
    relationship which undermines our influence regionally, but
    more importantly with our transatlantic and global allies.
    Simply put, we must take a look in the mirror. In our own
    relationship with Turkiye there are a variety of issues which
    warrant this view and observation of U.S. policy.
        First, on the important issue of NATO. Since 1949 NATO has
    been the bedrock of the U.S.-Turkiye relationship. As I have
    said, Turkiye's delay in admitting Finland and Sweden into NATO
    following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine complicated this
    relationship. Yet, I can't sit here without stating the
    obvious. President Trump's go-it-alone strategy does not
    further our relationship with NATO. It does not help us work on
    important issues like counterterrorism in Turkiye. It does not
    help pressure allies, many of whom have shed blood on our
    behalf following 9/11, of our appreciation of our commitment to
    NATO.
        On the issue of Russia, I am deeply concerned with Turkish
    involvement and unwillingness to cut trade with the Kremlin and
    cease the export of important dual-use items to Russia which
    Putin needs for his war effort. Yet, we must look in the
    mirror. President Trump has sided with Russia. He has praised
    Putin's authoritarian leadership style, and he has been
    unwilling to call Putin the aggressor.
        Importantly on Ukraine, Turkiye is a critical ally and has
    helped facilitate the Black Sea Grain Initiative and enforce
    the Montreux Convention in the Black Sea. Turkiye can and
    should do even more, but so must the United States.
        The Trump Administration has repeatedly shut the door on
    Ukraine. Rather than bolster Ukraine with military support to
    combat Russian aggression, this administration has frozen all
    U.S. assistance to Ukraine, halted intelligence assistance in
    Ukraine, and paused offensive cyber operations against Russia
    here at home. Rather than make clear at the United Nations that
    Russia is an aggressor State and that Vladimir Putin, a war
    criminal, is to blame for this war, this administration sided
    with Belarus and North Korea in opposition. Rather than work
    with President Zelenskyy to secure a lasting secure peace
    agreement, the President and Vice President berated him in the
    Oval Office, echoing Putin's talking points and lecturing
    Zelenskyy about democracy while the President and the Vice
    President make a mockery of that with that performance here at
    home.
        At this time with so much on the line, we must speak up for
    our values, for our allies in Ukraine, for the people in this
    country, what they believe, that appeasing dictators and
    attacking our allies who have died with so many Americans in
    our history dating back to this great 80-year-plus period since
    World War II. Doing that is simply wrong.
        I will close with this. My uncle died on French soil during
    World War II. As a Member of Congress I have had the
    opportunity to meet with dozens of Gold Star families like my
    own who suffered loss at the hands of enemies. Today I can't
    help but think of the Ukrainian families, hundreds of thousands
    of them, who are looking to the United States for partnership,
    are instead receiving an empty hand, a closed fist, and
    thankless public rebukes designed to the benefit of Vladimir
    Putin.
        While our President abandons Ukraine, many in Congress
    won't, and I urge all of my colleagues to stay with Ukraine, to
    stand up for what we all know is right, to stand up for
    Ukraine. I look forward to our witnesses' testimony here today,
    and I yield back.
        Mr. Self. Thank you, ranking member.
        Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record.
        We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
    before us today on this important topic. We have Dr. Anna
    Borschevskaya, the Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow for the
    Washington Institute for Near East Policy. We have Dr. Jonathan
    Schanzer, the Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense
    of Democracies. And we have Hon. Celeste Wallander, Adjunct
    Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security.
        This committee recognizes the importance of the issues
    before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us
    today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,
    and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5
    minutes in order to allow time for members' question.
        I now recognize Dr. Borschevskaya for her opening
    statement. Welcome.

                    STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSCHEVSKAYA

        Ms. Borschevskaya. Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating,
    honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    today. With your permission I am submitting my written
    testimony, and I would like to summarize it.
        I would like to focus on three key issues. First, Turkiye
    now has the potential to emerge as the primary naval power in
    the Black Sea. Second, the Russia-Turkiye relationship is no
    longer decisively tilted in Russia's favor, though Russia still
    retains some advantages. Third, Turkiye has maintained a
    pragmatic balancing act between Ukraine, Russia, and NATO after
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
        All of this, Mr. Chairman and honorable members, means that
    the United States has an opportunity to use Turkiye's new
    position to advance in the context of Russia's war on Ukraine,
    especially as the U.S. shifts its strategic investments toward
    the Indo-Pacific.
        So here is how we can dive into this opportunity to advance
    America's interests. Check Russia's ability to return to the
    Eastern Mediterranean. Russia will inevitably seek to return to
    the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a historic Russian aspiration.
    The U.S. should look for linkages between European and Middle
    East theaters.
        Turkiye has outmaneuvered Russia in Syria. The U.S. could
    see how it can work constructively with Turkiye to block
    Russia's influence there to ensure Russia does not regain
    influence.
        Take advantage of Turkiye's growing primacy in the Black
    Sea. Restoration of security in the Black Sea region is a goal
    Turkiye and the West share. Over the long term the U.S. should
    use the end of the war in Ukraine to limit Russia's presence,
    if not to expel Russia altogether from the Black Sea. It is in
    the U.S. interest to remove the threat of Russia from NATO's
    underbelly. In addition, neutralizing Russia in the Black Sea
    could also help blunt Russia's influence in the Levant.
        Support Turkiye's normalization with Armenia in a peace
    treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Ukraine is to achieve
    a lasting victory, the West will need to act outside Ukraine by
    putting Russia under pressure in other theaters and
    specifically by depriving it of resources and influence in
    those regions.
        The South Caucasus is one such region. It is a vital
    strategic link between Europe and the Middle East. Loss of
    influence in the South Caucasus will hurt Russia strategically
    because it will show Russia no longer has the same degree of
    control in its so-called near abroad. Promoting stability in
    this region is especially important now because Russia is
    gaining influence in Georgia.
        Work to reduce Turkiye's dependence on Russian gas.
    Approximately 15 percent of EU gas still comes from Russia, and
    the revenue Russia generates helps it to fund its war effort in
    Ukraine. TurkStream and the new Turkish Blend project create an
    opportunity for Moscow to hide the origin of its gas and exert
    influence across Europe. The U.S. could sanction companies
    involved in infrastructure of TurkStream and Turkish Blend. At
    the same time the U.S. could look for opportunities to work on
    alternative energy projects with Turkiye to further eliminate
    dependence on Russia.
        Take advantage of Turkiye's role as a mediator. Turkiye's
    mediation in the Black Sea grain deal was useful even if the
    deal ultimately collapsed. To the extent that it is
    advantageous to U.S. strategic interests, the U.S. should
    leverage Ankara's role as a mediator on the future.
        Mr. Chairman, honorable members, how the war in Ukraine
    ends will have far-reaching implications for American
    credibility, security, and economy. It will affect American
    allies and partners across the world. If Russia is victorious,
    if Russia succeeds, it may lead to a bigger confrontation
    between Russia and NATO, along with NATO partners. In this
    context the U.S. has an interest in focusing a constructive
    pragmatic relationship with Turkiye. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Borschevskaya follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Self. Thank you, Dr. Borschevskaya.
        I now recognize Dr. Schanzer for his opening statement.

                     STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER

        Mr. Schanzer. Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
    Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify.
        Turkiye has made headlines since the Bashar al-Assad regime
    in Syria collapsed late last year, and this is because Turkiye
    is the power broker behind the new government led by the al
    Qaeda affiliate known as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS.
    Turkiye's backing of al Qaeda in Syria is not new. Since the
    Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, Turkiye has supported several
    Jihadi groups fighting the Assad regime. However, Assad didn't
    fall for 14 years, and that explains how the Jihadi problem in
    Syria has grown worse.
        Ankara promotes HTS as a moderate entity. This is a farce.
    The violent history of HTS must not be ignored. The closest
    analog to this scenario, a designated terror group taking over
    an entire country, is the Taliban, and we know how that worked
    out for Afghanistan.
        Turkiye also supports Hezbollah. Last month Israeli Foreign
    Minister Gideon Sa'ar revealed that Turkiye is aiding Iran to
    smuggle funds to the Lebanese terror group. Last year the U.S.
    imposed sanctions on a network in Turkiye and Lebanon for
    funding the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah. Other Turkish-based
    entities have earned sanctions in recent years for similar
    reasons.
        Ankara is a leading patron of Hamas. For nearly two decades
    Turkiye has operated--openly backed, rather, the terror group,
    providing political cover and financial support. In 2011
    Palestinian sources allege that Erdogan earmarked $300 million
    to Hamas. After the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap that year,
    scores of Hamas prisoners were deported to Turkiye including
    Saleh al-Arouri, one of the group's most dangerous terrorist
    operatives. In 2014, Arouri ordered the killing of three teens
    in the West Bank sparking a major war with Hamas that year. The
    Erdogan government cheered Arouri when he claimed credit for
    that attack.
        After Hamas slaughtered 1,200 Israelis on October 7th,
    Erdogan doubled down on his Hamas support. He welcomed Hamas
    political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Istanbul. Just before he was
    killed by Israel in July 2024, the two discussed relocating
    Hamas's political headquarters from Qatar to Turkiye.
        To this day Turkiye is a hub for Hamas's global finances.
    Numerous U.S. sanctions designations underscore this trend.
    Trend GYO, a Turkish construction conglomerate, was designated
    by the U.S. in 2022 for generating revenue for Hamas. That
    company is still active today as are other firms that are
    funding Hamas in Turkiye.
        In December U.S. legislators received a classified briefing
    about Turkiye and Hamas. I hope that one theme emerged, namely
    that Erdogan has invested nearly 20 years legitimizing,
    funding, and empowering Hamas.
        So why does Erdogan support these terror groups? Because he
    aspires to regional, if not global domination, and he thinks
    that supporting these groups can help him. The collapse of the
    Assad regime and the rise of HTS was Erdogan's first major
    Middle East conquest, and he wants more.
        During the Arab Spring Turkiye backed Islamist factions
    vying for power as ossified Middle East regimes collapsed one
    after the next. Egyptian, Libyan, and other Islamist groups all
    looked to Ankara for political and financial support. Some
    still get Turkish backing hoping to replicate the success of
    HTS.
        Erdogan's Hamas rhetoric is a very clear attempt to
    position himself as a leader in the Muslim world. His failed
    call for an Islamic war against Israel led to nothing, but it
    was a clear attempt to rally the Muslim world around the
    Turkish flag.
        I am also concerned about Turkiye's Blue Homeland policy of
    aggression. Tensions are currently rising in the Eastern Med
    with Turkish vessels challenging Greek and Cypriot vessels,
    even in their own exclusive economic zones.
        The U.S. can no longer afford to ignore Turkish aggression.
    A policy shift is needed, and I offer these recommendations.
    The U.S. should maintain its modest military presence in Syria
    to counter Turkish aggression. The U.S. should block Turkish
    attempts to deploy military forces or contractors anywhere in
    the Middle East. The U.S. should expose and punish Ankara's
    policy of allowing Jihadi fighters and terror financiers to use
    Turkiye as a transit and logistics hub. The U.S. should
    preserve--rather should pressure Ankara to sever all ties with
    Hamas including shutting down its offices, extraditing known
    operatives, and revoking travel documents. Failure to do so
    should result in tough sanctions. The U.S. should closely
    monitor Turkish involvement in weapon smuggling with a focus on
    Syria's borders with Jordan and Lebanon. And finally, Congress
    should limit any major arms sale to Turkiye until it stops
    supporting terrorism and destabilizing NATO.
        I offer additional recommendations in my written testimony.
    I hope this subcommittee considers all of them. On behalf of
    FDD, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]
       [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Self. Thank you, Dr. Schanzer.
        I now recognize Dr. Wallander for her opening statement.

                     STATEMENT OF CELESTE WALLANDER

        Ms. Wallander. Thank you. Chairman Self, Ranking Member
    Keating, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for
    this opportunity to speak with you today on one of the most
    consequential bilateral geopolitical relationships that the
    United States enjoys with a key ally, the Republic of Turkiye.
    Turkiye is a strong ally across key global security priorities
    of the United States, however too often Turkiye is also at odds
    with U.S. policies and priorities. And at other times the U.S.
    and Turkiye share strong common interests, but have differing
    approaches to resolving problems that threaten American
    interests.
        I lay this out as the good, the bad, and the complicated.
    The good. For over 70 years Turkiye has been a strong front-
    line member of the NATO alliance. Spanning the Bosphorus and
    holding one-third of the Black Sea coast, Turkiye has been key
    to credible defense and deterrence against Soviet and now
    Russian threat in Europe. Turkiye's location affords NATO
    allies key overflight access for defense and surveillance
    operations across Southeast Europe. During the cold war Turkiye
    played this vital alliance role along with Greece, the two
    forward locations for NATO in Southeast Europe.
        Today they are joined by Bulgaria, Romania, and the Western
    Balkan allies to enable NATO air, sea, and ground defenses that
    force Russian military planners to contemplate defense from the
    Arctic to the Caucasus. With Turkiye as a NATO ally, the
    Kremlin cannot afford to focus on attack on simply ground
    forces on one axis in Central Europe.
        The U.S. military is better able to fulfill its missions
    for European and global security because of our alliance with
    Turkiye. The U.S. operates military bases in Incirlik and Izmir
    along with other NATO allies. These bases support air, ground,
    and sea components of allied forces and support a network of
    censors that provide warning and surveillance capacity to the
    alliance, deep in Europe's eastern areas. Hosting U.S. military
    forces at these bases has meant that Turkiye has enabled and
    supported U.S. operations and NATO deterrence for decades.
        Turkiye has a strong industrial base including production
    of some of the most advanced and innovative capabilities
    crucial to modern warfare, notably unmanned aerial vehicles,
    UAVs, military ships, and electronic warfare systems. Turkiye
    has also invested in American-built advanced weapons that
    advance NATO's strength and interoperability, notably its fleet
    of F-16 fighters.
        This advanced capability is one of the forgotten stories in
    Ukraine's surprise success in the early months of Russia's
    invasion in 2022. One of the signature headline capabilities
    the Ukrainians used for surveillance and attack that caught the
    Russian army by surprise was Turkish Aerospace Industries
    produced Bayraktar UAVs. In a war that changed our
    understanding of how conventional conflict can and must be
    fought, that has--and that has led to the massive growth in
    production of UAVs for military use, the leading example was
    Turkiye's use and development of UAVs.
        In other places globally Turkiye has contributed where
    American partners are supported by U.S. military forces,
    however there is no question that at times Turkiye has also
    taken actions that are contrary to American national security
    interests. We have already heard mention of Turkiye's arming of
    Azerbaijan that led the President Aliyev to believe that he
    could achieve his objectives against Armenia and take territory
    in a way that led to the displacement and refugee status of
    tens of thousands of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.
        Turkiye has also acted against U.S. interests in NATO,
    notably with delaying Finland and Sweden's memberships and
    therefore sending a message to Putin of disunity within NATO.
    And Turkiye did acquire the S-400 Russian system putting at
    risk the entire European NATO F-35 program by operating and
    deploying that system.
        The complicated issue I want to highlight is Turkiye's
    concerns and track record of striking at PKK-affiliated groups
    in Northern Syria and in Iraq. For years Turkiye did this
    without coordination with the United States and often put at
    risk U.S. military forces exercising the counter-ISIS missions
    that the U.S. Government has designated. With the change in
    Syrian leadership and the evolution of the government of
    Turkiye's relationship with the leadership of the PKK within
    Turkiye, there is an opportunity to buildupon better
    communication, alignment in counterterrorism operations, namely
    counter-ISIS operations in Syria and Iraq, and perhaps begin to
    untangle this unfortunate period in U.S.-Turkiye relations.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Wallander follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Self. Thank you.
        I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Dr.
    Schanzer, I will start with you. Turkiye has the second largest
    military in NATO after the United States. And we are hearing,
    and I am hearing from individual delegations that Europe is
    starting to expand their defense capabilities. As they expand
    their capabilities, what does that mean for Turkiye and their
    participation in NATO? And specifically I would like to ask you
    to address Greece and the S-400.
        Mr. Schanzer. Sure. Chairman Self, thank you for the
    question. First, I think there does need to be an assessment. I
    think it could be an interesting report, perhaps produced by
    the congressional Research Service or some other.
        But to question this assertion that Turkiye's army is
    invaluable to NATO, its size does not mean that it is
    effective, or that it is updated, or that its army is capable
    of tangling with Russia, or any other country for that matter.
    So I do think an assessment could be necessary.
        I think there is a question though among the European
    powers right now about Turkiye's role within NATO and within
    Europe. Specifically I think when we look at the number of
    clashes that have--or near clashes that have taken place in the
    Eastern Med, I am concerned. Turkiye has been very aggressive
    of late in challenging the Greeks and the Cypriots in their own
    exclusive economic zones. They have been engaged in illegal
    drilling, but they have also tried to assert, I mentioned in my
    spoken remarks, this Blue Homeland policy of denying countries
    in the region to be able to go into international waters.
        This cannot continue if the goal is to preserve even a
    modicum of stability within NATO, and I think it is crucial
    that we address this now. I would say that having the U.S.
    patrol with Greece may be actually useful. Having the Israelis
    patrol with Greece in the Eastern Med may be useful. But
    Turkiye needs to understand that it needs to share these
    waterways. This is going to be crucial moving forward.
        Mr. Self. Thank you. Either of our other witnesses?
        Ms. Wallander. I would highlight the value of Turkish armed
    forces in the area of special operations forces. Turkiye has
    contributed to, for example, the training of Somali special
    operations forces alongside American trained and equipped
    Somali, the Danab Brigade, which is aimed at preventing the
    success of al-Shabaab in Somalia and holding it at bay. Al-
    Shabaab has identified by American intelligence as the only
    terrorist organization in Africa with the capability and the
    intent to strike through global operations, including against
    the U.S. homeland.
        So there are areas of strength that we have worked, the
    United States has worked in cooperation with the Turkish armed
    forces. I would highlight that on in particular.
        Ms. Borschevskaya. I agree with my colleagues and want to
    add only one brief comment. Turkiye's support for Ukraine,
    Turkiye's military support for Ukraine, as, Mr. Chairman, you
    have highlighted in your remarks, has been useful. And in that
    regard I--well, I agree with everything my colleagues said, but
    there has to be more of a nuanced approach to Turkiye's--to our
    understanding of Turkish military.
        Mr. Self. Thank you for that. I want to ask about this rare
    earth element find. Can any of the three of you comment on
    that? Because one of the critical areas that we need to divorce
    ourselves from China is rare earths, critical minerals, because
    they are mined lots of places, but China controls 92 percent of
    the processed critical minerals.
        Ms. Wallander. I mean, it is certainly an opportunity to
    partner with Turkiye in that commercial endeavor. The Trump
    Administration has made clear that it is seeking those kinds of
    partnerships. And I would simply observe, watching Chinese
    operations throughout Africa and the Middle East. If the United
    States is not active and offering a value proposition to
    countries, Chinese ability to move in with what look like very
    lucrative commercial opportunities usually create facts on the
    ground that are difficult to walk back.
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, I would agree. The fact of the
    matter is we are focused on great power competition as a
    trajectory of our foreign policy. And as such, a focus on
    minerals is a part of this debate.
        Therefore, if we don't have a seat at the table, somebody
    else will fill in that space. It is better that we find a way
    to do it rather than our adversaries.
        Mr. Self. Thank you very much.
        I now recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        [Audio malfunction.] Keep going with this, but see if it
    resets my time, if I could, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        There are many here in Congress that don't think Ukraine is
    important to us back here at home, that what happens over there
    is their business and we should worry about our own priorities
    here.
        I am looking at, as we discuss Turkiye, I mentioned before
    their involvement in keeping navigation and the Black Sea free.
    I sponsored the Black Sea Security Act, which was incorporated
    in the NDAA last year, to underscore this importance.
        Now can you tell us how important, Dr. Wallander, it is to
    have the access through Odessa and through Ukraine and make
    sure that doesn't fall in the hands of Russia and what that
    would mean for the--our security and what would it mean for
    economic impact worldwide and at home if that should fall to
    Russia?
        Ms. Wallander. Thank you, sir. There is a lot of focus the
    last 3 years on security assistance and how vital the ability
    for Ukraine to fight on the battlefield was to its survival,
    but its military success is both not enough, but also not
    possible without the Ukrainian economy. And Turkiye's decision
    to invoke the Montreux Convention in--the 1936 Montreux
    Convention shut off the Russian navy from being able to
    reinforce the Black Sea fleet.
        As Ukrainians were skilled in using various coastal defense
    capabilities and unmanned surface vehicles and sinking Russian
    ships, Russia was not able to repair or resupply the Russian
    Black Sea fleet to the point where the Russia Black Sea fleet
    had to retreat from Sevastopol in Crimea to Novorossiysk and it
    is stuck back in the Eastern Black Sea.
        This has affected Russia's ability to launch attacks in the
    Odessa area. It has not eliminated, but it constrained Russia's
    ability to use surface ships to attack Ukrainian cities, and it
    is something that Russia has persistently throughout the
    conflict pressed Turkiye to change to allow Russian warships to
    enter the Black Sea, and Turkiye has prevented that.
        Ukraine's ability to send grain, to send manufactured goods
    out, to import the components for its own defense industry has
    vitally depended on the openness, the commercial openness of
    the Western Black Sea. And that will be a major element of any
    cease-fire or peace negotiation going forward as well.
        Mr. Keating. What would be your concerns if that fell into
    Russia's hands? And how would China view that change?
        Ms. Wallander. Control of the Black Sea would give Russia
    control of Eastern Europe. It would give control of not just
    the sea, but air flight, overflight permissions that the United
    States uses, for example, to access the Middle East. It would
    give Russia the ability to continue its stranglehold on
    Georgia, to influence Azerbaijan and support Azerbaijan in
    negotiations for a peace settlement in Armenia.
        I mean, the Black Sea as a Russian lake would be a
    significant strike against European security and American
    global access, working with our NATO partners and allies in the
    region.
        Mr. Keating. Yes, and following that along and the
    importance of that, in the aftermath of what happened last week
    in the Oval Office, disrupting our Transatlantic alliances,
    there was a meeting of European leaders. The core of that, I
    thought, was to have a peace agreement that made sure there was
    a security component to that. We can't trust Putin's word, and
    there has to be a backstop to make sure that that's enforced.
        Can you tell us the importance of any agreement having that
    security agreement that, if Putin does what he always does,
    lies and goes back on his word, that there would be some kind
    of security built into any agreement, so that he couldn't
    advance himself with another aggressive attack, illegal,
    immoral attack on Ukraine?
        Ms. Wallander. Well, if you look at the track record of
    Russian failure to implement peace agreements, cease-fire
    agreements in Georgia, Russia has never lived up to the
    commitments that were made in 2008. Russia has never lived up
    to the commitments that it made to withdraw forces from
    Transnistria in Moldova, and Russia never implemented the
    successive Minsk agreements in 2014 and 2015. The first step in
    those agreements was a cease-fire. Russia never implemented it,
    and the international community only put in a lightly armed
    monitoring mission.
        So, based on the track record, you would need a strong
    agreement. You would need a strong, armed presence, not merely
    a peacekeeping presence, but a peace enforcement presence. And
    that would mean a substantial ground force with substantial air
    support as well.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you. I think that is one of the most
    important things coming out of any agreement.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
    Green.
        Mr. Green. Chairman Self and Ranking Member Keating, thank
    you for convening this hearing on the critical role Turkiye
    plays in geopolitics today, Turkiye's strategic location and
    strong military give it the unique ability to put NATO's
    security mandate into action. Yet, I do have some concerns
    about Turkiye's willingness to do so.
        As a flight surgeon during the War on Terror, I served on
    the frontlines, balancing dual roles as a soldier and a healer.
    I treated U.S. NATO soldiers' combat wounds in the middle of
    firefights--learning firsthand that strength against our
    enemies and building trust with our allies are inseparable
    duties.
        Today, we are here to discuss both standing strong and
    building bridges. From the war in Gaza to Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine, Turkiye plays an integral role in the current
    geopolitical landscape, but these actions of late are, as I
    have said, very concerning.
        From seeking membership with BRICS countries who clearly
    have taken a position to destabilize the United States dollar
    to attempting to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, I
    do see some red flags. This explicit flirtation with U.S.
    adversaries undermines NATO's cohesion.
        The purchase of the Russian S-400 missile systems, dragging
    its feet on Sweden's and Finland's admission to NATO, and
    continuing to fund terror groups just doesn't go with what the
    goals--doesn't align with the goals of the United States or
    NATO.
        Turkiye's conflicting loyalties are exemplified by the role
    it played in Russia's war on Ukraine. Turkiye closed the
    Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Russia and supplied drones to
    Kiev, but it also helped Russia evade sanctions.
        In Syria, Turkiye's antagonism against our allied Kurdish-
    led Syrian Democratic Forces jeopardizes the mission to defeat
    ISIS. This could lead to an ISIS resurgence. We all know what
    that would be.
        My hope for Turkiye is that it will give up its support for
    Hamas, renew strong economic relationships with Israel, and
    together, that these two countries can revitalize the Middle
    East. But this isn't going to happen if Turkiye chooses to
    support terrorist proxies.
        Now, I will say that Turkiye has a unique position in the
    world--its history with Russia, its Ottoman heritage, and its
    relationship with the West. It is sort of like threading a
    needle, if you will.
        There seems to be in foreign policy, or at least my study
    of it in foreign affairs and history, the approach, I like to
    call it the ``put a foot in each bucket'' approach or ``a foot
    in every bucket'' approach.
        I get, for example, a nation like India that desires to be
    a third or fourth pole in the multipolar system of the world
    might do things that are both pro-American and aligned with
    Russia or China at various points in time. I get that. However,
    we don't have a treaty like NATO with India.
        That leaves us to ask hard questions. And I think, you
    know, in being as fair as I possibly can, with that unique
    history, that geopolitical position or that location, the
    geographic location of the country and the challenges around
    it, I just want to ask, first, Dr. Schanzer, what external
    pressure would the United States need to put on Turkiye for it
    to properly distance itself from Hamas?
        Mr. Schanzer. Congressman Green, thank you for the
    question.
        I don't know what the exact answer is, but I do know that
    Turkiye does respond to sanctions pressure. We saw this during
    the first Trump administration. Pastor Brunson had been taken
    hostage by the Turkish government. The Trump administration put
    significant sanctions on Erdogan's inner circle, really began
    to target his closest allies in government, and the threats
    began to ratchet up, and then, he released Pastor Brunson.
        I believe that the threat of sanctions on Turkiye, economic
    pressure as a place to start, but I think we need to consider
    other ways that we can put pressure on them as well--political,
    diplomatic. But giving them the leverage that they have right
    now in NATO doesn't help, and, of course, there is no mechanism
    for releasing them from NATO.
        Mr. Green. Right. Let me ask one other quick question
    because I'm about to run out of time. And you guys can respond
    in writing.
        Can Erdogan run for reelection? Is he going to run for
    reelection, if he can? And if he doesn't run for reelection, is
    it the Istanbul mayor? I mean, who is the heir apparent in
    Turkiye?
        I would love to get that in writing because I am now out of
    time. Thank you.
        Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs.
    Cherfilus-McCormick.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr.
    Chairman and Ranking Member.
        Although Turkiye and Israel restored full diplomatic ties
    in 2022, relations have dramatically worsened since Hamas'
    October 7th attack and Israel's military operation in Gaza.
    Erdogan has taken a very harsh stance against Israel, and in
    May 2024, Turkiye stopped all trade with Israel until a
    permanent cease-fire is achieved in Gaza and humanitarian aid
    is allowed without interruption. Under Erdogan, Turkiye has
    provided consistent political support to Hamas and has
    periodically hosted Hamas' political officials.
        What is the nature of Turkiye's relationship with Hamas and
    how is it likely to affect Turkiye's ability to: one, improve
    its relationship with Israel; two, play a role in mediating the
    Israel-Palestine conflict, and three, assist with post-conflict
    recovery and reconstruction in Gaza?
        Mr. Schanzer. I will take it that's for me. Thank you for
    the question.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Yes.
        Mr. Schanzer. Look, the relationship between Turkiye and
    Hamas goes back to at least 2006. That was the first time we
    saw a major delegation hosted by Erdogan. We saw Erdogan get
    into an open fight with Shimon Peres, then President of Israel,
    Nobel Prize Laureate, accusing him, essentially, of war crimes.
        Then, we began to see the money flowing from Turkiye. We
    began to see more operatives finding a home in Turkiye,
    businesses created in Turkiye, operatives planning and
    executing attacks out of Turkiye.
        Let me just put it this way: Turkiye is to the letter of
    the law a State sponsor of terrorism as it relates to Hamas.
    They are unquestionably the largest jurisdiction right now for
    Hamas operatives and for Hamas finance in the world. That is,
    obviously, deeply troubling when we think about the fact that
    this is a NATO ally and a country that we rely on for a modicum
    of stability in the Middle East.
        So, as of right now, especially after October 7th, I see no
    way forward between Turkiye and Israel if Turkiye's policies
    continue along these lines. They have not stood down. They have
    not dialed back on their Hamas support of anything. Erdogan
    appears to be more committed to this terror group right now,
    and I think this is why this hearing, in particular, strikes me
    as so crucial at this moment.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. What steps do you think the
    United States should take to addressing the risk of Turkiye's
    continued support to Hamas?
        Mr. Schanzer. Oh, I think we need to make very clear
    demands right now on Hamas. I mean, No. 1, I think we should be
    sanctioning Turkiye for any evidence we have. We know there are
    a number of companies right now that are throwing off cash for
    Hamas and sending it to the Gaza Strip. There are charities
    that are doing the same. I think they need to be designated by
    the Treasury Department. We need to be demanding the
    extradition of Hamas operatives that are based in Turkiye. We
    should be asking the Turks to revoke travel documents that have
    been issued formerly by the Turkish government to Hamas
    operatives.
        There are many steps that we can take that we have yet to
    take. I cannot tell you exactly why we haven't taken them. And
    I would actually argue that it is a bipartisan problem. Both
    Democrats and Republicans have failed to address this, I think
    maybe for fear of upsetting the alliance that we have with the
    Turks, knowing that they are NATO allies and that they have
    vital roles to play in other areas. But I think they have
    fallen down on the job as American allies if they are so openly
    and willingly supporting a violent group like Hamas.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. As the Syrian people emerge from
    decades under Assad's brutal dictatorship, I'm concerned about
    Turkiye's actions against Syria's Kurds community and support
    of fully inclusive Syria, representative of all its people.
        I'm also equally concerned about the potential rise of ISIS
    in Syria and the dangerous consequences of freezing foreign aid
    to that region. This is not just a matter of foreign policy.
    This is a national security issue and the consequences will be
    felt right here at home. This evil terrorist group committed
    heinous terrorist attacks, including the Pulse Nightclub
    shooting in Orlando that killed 49 people.
        Let me be clear. Foreign aid is not a handout. It is an
    investment in our national security. That aid helped prevent
    ISIS from regaining strength and keeps local forces trained and
    equipped and stabilizes communities, so terrorism does not take
    root again.
        But by cutting it off, we are giving ISIS exactly what it
    wants--a power vacuum, a weakened opposition, and a chance to
    rebuild. And who will pay for this mistake? It will be the
    American people, unfortunately.
        Humanitarian needs in Syria are at an all-time high. In
    2024, 16.7 million people were estimated to require assistance,
    the largest number since the beginning of the civil war in
    2011. We are either going to feed them now or we are going to
    end up fighting them later.
        Ms. Wallander, do Turkish officials seek to weaken U.S.-
    backed Kurdish forces, such as the SDF, which are a strong
    counterterrorist partner to the United States and its European
    allies?
        Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        The Turkish government has stated, or when I served in
    government until January stated, that it sees an opportunity to
    now distinguish PKK-affiliated groups in northern Syria and in
    northern Iraq, expect them to be disarmed and to cease their
    operations, but not to act against Syrian Kurdish groups that
    are not affiliated with PKK. Now is the time to test that
    commitment and see whether they can live up to it. Because it
    would be significant progress, but their actions need to meet
    their words.
        Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.
        Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentlelady from California,
    Mrs. Kim.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Chairman Self and Ranking Member
    Keating, for holding today's hearing.
        I want to thank you all for joining us today.
        Turkiye has expressed its desire to have close relations
    with both the West and the East, and it is the first NATO
    member that has openly asked to join BRICS, which is led by our
    adversaries Russia and China.
        So, I want to ask you, what are the--I mean, I'm going to
    direct this question to any one of you--what are the top
    drivers for Turkiye's pursuit of BRICS membership or partner
    country status?
        Ms. Wallander. Briefly, thank you, Congresswoman.
        So, I think that what Turkiye often points to--I'm not
    advocating this--is the limitations of their integration in the
    European Union and the economic opportunities there. I don't
    necessarily think that that is a good argument for, as you
    point out, seeking deeper economic relations with America's two
    top strategic competitors, Russia and China, because the
    relationships of economic trade with Europe don't bring with
    them dependence and influence in a way that trade investment
    and economic entanglement with China and Russia do.
        The United States should be very clear with Turkiye that
    our own economic relationships, our own integration in
    different industries would be limited----
        Mrs. Kim. But do you think Turkiye's membership in BRICS
    or, like, Shanghai Cooperation Organization is likely?
        Ms. Wallander. I don't know that--I think that Russia, in
    particular, would see that as a prize because of the influence.
    I think that it would extend China's influence in the European
    terrain, given that Europe itself is now quite resistant to
    Chinese influence in the economic sphere. So, I do think it is
    a risk and I think you put your finger on something important.
        Mrs. Kim. I think you wanted to add to that?
        Mr. Schanzer. Yes, I would love to add this: that I believe
    that Turkiye's dalliance in both sides of this equation
    reflects President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's deep discomfort with
    American values, with Western values. I don't think that he
    feels like he belongs there.
        This is a man who identifies very openly as an Islamist.
    This is a man who does not put a lot of faith in democracy. And
    you can see he's already testing the limits of the democracy in
    Turkiye. He is putting strain on the judiciary, putting strain
    on the media. I would actually argue that he has been
    eviscerating Turkiye's democracy. It wasn't exactly strong to
    begin with, but it continues to weaken.
        This is driving Turkiye into the hands of some of these
    other organizations populated by less liberal countries. You
    can see the alliances or the semi-alliances that Turkiye has
    maintained with the likes of Iran over the years or engaging in
    illicit financial activity with the Russians. This is a man who
    does not see himself squarely fitting within NATO, and that is
    why we are watching him stray into these other organizations.
        Mrs. Kim. Well, let me address this. I saw the Pew Research
    Center polling from 2024 where it says fewer than 20 percent of
    Turks have a favorable view of the United States, while their
    favorable rating of China is 30 percent and their rating for
    Russia is 26 percent.
        Why do you think this is the case? And how can the U.S.
    gain greater favorability among the Turks?
        Mr. Schanzer. Look, a lot of what we see right now is
    actually the result of the manipulation of the Turkish media,
    which is fully controlled or almost fully controlled by Recep
    Tayyip Erdogan. If you want to see some of the public sentiment
    begin to shift, maybe allow for more liberal media. Once upon a
    time, there was a lot more of it. Now there is not. I would say
    that is a major point of concern, but as for exactly why Turks
    feel the way they do, I think you would have to ask the Turks.
        Mrs. Kim. And then, more than 40 percent of Turks, they
    have a favorable view of NATO and the European Union. Why is
    that? Why do you think that is the case?
        Ms. Wallander. I wish it were higher. I think the favorable
    view is that ``in between.'' Turks see themselves also as
    European and see the NATO alliance as contributing to Turkish
    security, although they have concerns about terrorism, but,
    also, the aspiration to play a role as a leading European
    country. So, I think that that is rooted in the country, but it
    is also balanced--I agree with Jonathan--by the views of having
    larger global aspirations as well.
        Mrs. Kim. Got it.
        I wish I can engage more with you, but my time is up. So, I
    will yield back.
        Mr. Self. Thank you.
        I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
        Ms. Johnson. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and
    Ranking Member. It is an honor to be on this subcommittee.
        I have been listening to your testimony with great
    interest. It has been fascinating to me.
        The U.S.-Turkiye relationship is complex and sometimes
    challenging, as you have well-educated us here today. Turkiye
    has continued to engage with Hamas, which has fueled
    heartbreaking conflict in the Middle East that many of my
    constituents keenly feel.
        But even Turkiye consistently rejects Russia's claim over
    Ukraine and joined the free world in voting for the United
    Nations Resolution in opposite of the U.S. vote, where we,
    unfortunately and tragically, cast our vote to align with
    Russia and North Korea, two dictatorships that represent the
    opposite of our values, in voting against our allies and voting
    against peace in the region.
        So, my question is, does this sort of give permission, this
    signal by the United States to align with Russia and China and
    North Korea, does that give permission for Turkiye to do the
    same?
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, I think you are making a very
    important, a very important point here and I think it points to
    the larger geostrategic dilemmas that we are facing as part of
    this discussion. Because, as we have all discussed here today,
    Turkiye is a very problematic ally. And yet, on the one hand,
    it supports Hamas. Its actions oftentimes go against our
    values.
        Yet, when we think about the bigger geopolitical picture,
    as you brought up Ukraine right now, we have to think about,
    how do we navigate; what is the way forward? How do we go
    forward from here?
        Well, first, if I may go back to the earlier part of our
    discussion with Turkiye, Representative Kim's comment, the
    problem is Turkiye's actions do not--Turkiye does not align
    with our values. And so, when we think about the way forward in
    our relationship with Turkiye, it is looking toward interests
    rather than values. And that is a very different way of looking
    at this issue, because we tend to, when we think about the NATO
    alliance, we certainly think of a values-based alliance.
        Ms. Johnson. You know, many of you all testified that--
    well, I loved your analysis, sort of the good, the bad, and the
    complicated.
        On the one hand, we really much need Turkiye. We need their
    policing-(we need the openness that that provides to the
    region. We need so much from them. But they are acting very
    bad, you know, like a very bad child.
        If you had to say, which interest is more important to the
    United States, if you have to pick a policy path? Is it more
    important to rein in their bad behavior or is it more important
    to keep them wanting to be on our side?
        Ms. Wallander. So, a global superpower, the United States,
    the most powerful country in the world, doesn't have to choose.
    We have influence. We can work with not just Turkiye, but other
    countries with whom we can solve problems and advance American
    interests, but we can also hold them to account.
        For example, I fully support and believe it was a
    constructive move for Congress to include Turkiye under the
    CAATSA sanctions, precisely because, by buying the S-400
    system, Turkiye was putting U.S. pilots and NATO pilots at
    risk.
        Ms. Johnson. Right. So, we need to step up our game, I
    think. It seems like the diplomacy in this country needs to be
    elevated to a high level to make sure that we rein in their bad
    behavior, is what it is really sounding like. Their interaction
    with Hamas, their interactions with terrorist groups, their
    support--their running to Russia and China are all such things
    that should be very, very concerning to the United States and
    it needs to be a top focus of our interactions with them. Is
    that fair.
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Well, I think that's fair and I would
    add to that, Turkiye is certainly not choosing. Turkiye is
    making it very clear in its behavior that they don't want to
    choose. All of its actions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine
    show that they, on the one hand, were certainly supportive of
    Ukrainian territorial integrity, but they also continue to do
    business with Russia. As we discussed, Turkiye is talking about
    joining the BRICS.
        So, if Turkiye is not willing to choose, we, as a
    superpower, certainly don't have to choose and we can balance--
    and, in fact, it is a prerogative of a superpower to be able to
    focus on more than one priority at a time.
        Mr. Schanzer. I will only add one thing here. We are
    entering into an era of great power competition. We hear this
    all the time. We are going to have to deal with China. We are
    going to have to deal with Russia. We have got great challenges
    on the horizon.
        We need reliable allies, period. We need to make demands of
    our allies. And by the way, Turkiye is not alone; you have got
    countries like Qatar that are supporting Hamas. You have got
    countries like Oman that are supporting the Houthis.
        None of this should be allowed to continue under an
    alliance structure that demands discipline. That is what I
    think we need to start to see out of our diplomats, out of our
    State Department, out of our White House. I think this has gone
    on for too long.
        Mr. Self. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Ms. Johnson. Thank you all so very much.
        Mr. Self. Thank you.
        I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
    Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Indeed, Secretary Wallander, I want to thank you for your
    analysis about the Black Sea, how important it is. And I'm
    really grateful for Ranking Member Keating raising that issue
    up.
        Because we have already seen the efforts by the
    collaboration between War Criminal Putin and the Chinese
    Communist Party and the regime in Tehran. And it was October
    26th that the War Criminal Putin rigged the Presidential
    elections in the Republic of Georgia, and the consequence of
    that is that now there's an effort by the Chinese Communist
    Party to scheme and build a port on the Black Sea.
        The collaboration between the axis of evil is clearer every
    day and we should be supporting, indeed, as Europe is, the
    legitimate President Salome Zourabichvili of the Republic of
    Georgia and call for new and fair and free elections.
        With that in mind, America and Turkiye have been NATO
    allies beginning even in 1952 with Turkish soldiers fighting
    alongside Americans in the Korean War and in every conflict
    since, including I have had my son serve with Turkish troops in
    Iraq and Afghanistan.
        There's always been ups and downs in our relationship, but
    I believe that, ultimately, what we have as mutual benefits
    should be a basis of our partnership for ultimate good results
    for both of our countries and for freedom and democracy.
        Additionally, Turkiye has been crucial for the victory in
    the cold war, defeating communism, liberating countries of
    Central and Eastern Europe, of Central Asia, of the Caucasus.
    We have worked together and we need to focus on that. And,
    indeed, we have been partners in the Global War on Terrorism.
        The Turkish American community, for over 130 years, has
    been very assimilated into American society as business leaders
    and so appreciated.
        I was grateful to actually host the Turkish Ambassador
    Sedat Onal to the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee.
    And I was grateful that he was there with Senator Scott of my
    State, Tim Scott, and Senator Lindsey Graham, and Governor
    Henry McMaster. Everybody welcomed the Ambassador.
        It was just so positive that, actually, the Ambassador came
    to Columbia, South Carolina, after the election, and I was
    grateful to have him welcomed by Mayor Dan Rickenmann; by Carl
    Blackstone, Chamber of Commerce President; the Secretary of
    Commerce; Republican and Democrat legislators.
        So, every effort I think should be made to reinforce the
    relationship that has been so beneficial.
        I'm also grateful that President Donald Trump, as we saw
    last night, believes in a pragmatic foreign policy and reducing
    the burdens on America. I really appreciate that President
    Donald Trump has praised Turkiye and Saudi Arabia for working
    with the new government in Syria.
        Additionally, Qatar, too, has been helpful with the new
    government in Syria.
        What we need to do is to seek to end the conflicts and the
    self-declared enemies of America in the Middle East and North
    Africa who create the migration crisis to Europe. We should be,
    I believe, working with Turkiye for stabilization in the area.
        Indeed, I'm really grateful that Turkiye has played a
    positive role supporting assistance to Ukraine from the
    beginning and, also, agreeing to possibly send peacekeepers to
    Ukraine.
        Then, it is also that Turkiye was so critical in the fall
    of the narco-trafficking Assad Syrian regime. And with that in
    mind, we should be working, and we can already see that the
    foreign minister of the regime in Tehran condemned Turkiye
    yesterday, calling their actions for a free Syria as
    unconstructive, when, in fact, Turkiye has been working to
    publicly calling for the rights of women and Christians.
        With all of this in mind, Dr. Borschevskaya, what is the
    best way for the United States to encourage positive progress,
    working with the country of Turkiye?
        Ms. Borschevskaya. So, thank you. Thank you for the
    question.
        I think the best way to encourage positive progress is to
    be very pragmatic and practical and compartmentalized, our
    relationship. Again, Turkiye is a problematic ally on many
    fronts, but we also need it and it is part of NATO.
        Specifically, in Syria, we have an incredible opportunity.
    With Assad in power, Syria had no chance and the rest of the
    Middle East would continue to be unstable. In other words,
    Syria sat at the center of terrorism, of narco trafficking, of
    enormous instability that harmed our direct national security
    interests and the interests of our allies.
        Now, we are in an era of uncertainty. We have a lot of
    questions about where Syria goes. But at least Syria has a
    modicum of a chance. And the best way we can ensure that is to
    be present, to have a seat at the table, to attempt to shape
    the outcome. That is what we need to do.
        Here, we can look for ways on how Turkiye can be helpful,
    along with keeping our own presence in Syria, keeping our
    troops in Syria. So again, compartmentalize the relationship;
    be pragmatic.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Mr. Self. I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Costa.
        Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
    the ranking member, for this hearing. It is important.
        I want to kind of go beyond bridging the gap between East
    and West. Turkiye has been a challenge, and you talked about
    the good, the bad, and the complicated, I think, the previous
    witness.
        I apologize if I'm asking questions that have already been
    asked and please let me know.
        But I am very perplexed and troubled by Turkiye's influence
    and its unwillingness to understand the importance of its
    agreements with Armenia and its engagement with Azerbaijan that
    I think really threatened Armenia's ability to continue to
    focus toward the Western interests.
        Would you care to comment?
        Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. I very much
    appreciate your question.
        Turkiye has an opportunity to help resolve a tragic,
    longstanding dispute, but instead----
        Mr. Costa. They do.
        Ms. Wallander. And instead----
        Mr. Costa. But they have not been helpful. Their history
    has not been there.
        Ms. Wallander. Exactly. Instead, Turkiye helped to arm
    Azerbaijan to the point where President Aliyev believed and had
    a military advantage. And rather than continuing to work with
    the international community, Turkiye included for a peaceful
    resolution of the unresolved dispute, tipped the balance----
        Mr. Costa. Well, and it is not clear to----
        Ms. Wallander [continuing]. to allow that.
        Mr. Costa [continuing]. what role this administration is
    going to play in supporting Armenia's efforts there. Nagorno-
    Karabakh, which you both referenced, it was outrageous what
    they did there--120,000 refugees that are now in Armenia, and
    not recognizing that historic Artsakh, as the Armenians like to
    refer to it as.
        I want to switch to about Ukraine here. You know, some of
    my colleagues here on the other side talk about that we should
    leave the war in Ukraine to the President. I don't subscribe to
    that. I don't think they do so when Joe Biden was President. I
    think Congress must assert its role during the oversight
    responsibility on behalf of the American people.
        Russia was the aggressor that invaded Ukraine. Putin is the
    dictator. Russia is a syndicate masquerading as a country with
    a mob boss called Putin. And I think if you look at it through
    those lenses, that prism, you understand the dynamics that we
    are dealing with here in trying to reach a peace.
        Do you believe, either of you, that this President is
    giving up our leverage in negotiations, while kneecapping
    Ukraine's military capabilities on the battlefield, most
    recently today or yesterday, that we are not going to share the
    ability for them to target key targets?
        Ms. Wallander. Congressman, President Putin believes he is
    winning. He believes his economy can continue to produce
    weapons that are being used to attack Ukraine. For 3 years, we
    have disabused him of that notion. And to get leverage to get
    President Putin to the table for a peace agreement, which I
    believe a just peace agreement would be in Ukraine's interest
    because it allows Ukraine to return on its path of Euro-
    Atlantic integration, you need to impose costs on President
    Putin--economic and military costs.
        Mr. Costa. So, when you hear the Vice President's comments
    at the Munich Summit Security Council; when you hear the vote
    on the U.N. last Monday, siding with autocrats and
    dictatorships against our democratic allies; when you see the
    debacle on Friday, would you say this is either gross
    incompetence or malign intent, or neither, in terms of what we
    need to be doing to reach a cease-fire; ultimately, to get a
    peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia?
        Ms. Wallander. I, along probably with Anna, have closely
    watched what is said in Moscow. And to all of those instances,
    you know----
        Mr. Costa. I think they are popping champagne in the
    Kremlin right now.
        Ms. Wallander [continuing]. they have explicitly said that
    all of those developments are in Russia's interests and are
    going to support Russian success----
        Mr. Costa. So, tell me, why is the success of Ukraine
    beneficial to our national security, and why should Americans
    care about what Ukraine's fate is?
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Thank you. Can you hear me?
        Mr. Costa. Yes, please. I'm running out of time.
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Success of Ukraine is vital to our
    national security interests because, if Russia is not stopped
    in Ukraine, NATO and Europe at large will most likely have to
    face a bigger war in Europe.
        Mr. Costa. Georgia and Moldova and possibly the Baltic
    states. They have already undermined the Romanian Presidential
    election. We know what Putin's intentions are. He has made it
    clear. He wants to recreate the old Soviet Union. He thinks he
    is a reincarnation of Peter the Great. That is the bottom line
    and that is what we should understand when we are dealing with
    Russia.
        Ms. Borschevskaya. I absolutely agree with you.
        Mr. Costa. Thank you.
        Mr. Self. I recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr.
    Zinke.
        Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, I have a lot of experience with Turkiye military
    and I do recognize the contributions to the Korean War. I
    fought in Kosovo with Turkish troops, both armor and infantry,
    and have a great deal of joint operations experience with their
    special forces. And I respect their military, and their
    military is actually key to NATO.
        But I have concerns about PKK/YPG. You talk about a thorn
    in the side between the two countries. We have a thorn in the
    side called ISIS and Al Qaeda. Turkiye has also a thorn in the
    side called PKK and YPG.
        A friend of our enemies is not necessarily a friend of
    ours. And I do think or recognize that the United States made a
    mistake diplomatically of not separating PKK/YPG from Kurds.
        I have a lot of experience with the Peshmerga. And I give
    the analogy of the Irish. Not all Irish are IRA and not all
    Kurds are PKK or YPG.
        But, you know, I think there is a recognition that PKK and
    YPG are responsible for at least 30,000 deaths of Turkish,
    which is 10 times what happened in 9/11.
        How do we separate in Syria the Kurds that are Marxists-
    Leninists, terrorist organizations, from Kurds that support
    democracy that may not be our type of democracy, but certainly
    aren't terrorist organizations?
        Ms. Wallander, I would love to hear a comment from you.
        Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
        I would give an example. And you, yourself, pointed to it.
    Which is Turkiye's relationship with the Kurdistan Regional
    Government in Iraq and with the Peshmerga is quite positive.
    They have worked constructively with those entities and with
    the government of Iraq, the Federal Government of Iraq in
    Baghdad on counterterrorism operations at times.
        At times, there's been frictions because they have
    unilaterally struck at PKK elements in northern Iraq, but the
    fundamental reality is that it is possible--and we should hold
    Turkiye to it--to be able to distinguish between the terrorist
    organizations and units, such as PKK, and not, as you point
    out, incorrectly with a broad brush characterize all Kurds with
    that same category. And they have done it in Iraq, and we
    should hold them to that now with the opportunity in Syria.
        Mr. Zinke. I have an equal concern about Turkiye's support
    of Hamas, because they have. They offer harbor. They offer
    financial assistance at times, although not as much as Iran.
        So, Doctor, how can we--I mean, is it possibly also, if we
    have a deal where we don't support the YPG/PKK, do you think it
    is possible for Turkiye to stop their support of Hamas, which
    is an irritant to us?
        Mr. Schanzer. I think it is wishful thinking,
    unfortunately, Mr. Congressman. I would say that, right now,
    Turkiye has pushed all of its chips into the middle of the
    table as it relates to Hamas. I would also argue for Al Qaeda,
    for that matter, for HTS in Syria. I don't think there is any
    walking back from that.
        This is an ideological commitment that this government has
    made to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, and even some
    worse movements. I think a reckoning is needed here. I don't
    think a deal is what is needed to get them to stop the support.
    At this point, I am convinced, after watching this play out
    since 2006, I believe that significant American pressure is
    what is needed in order to force a divorce between Hamas and
    Turkiye.
        Mr. Zinke. Dr. Anna, do you also share the same opinion?
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, I share that opinion. I think
    pressure is needed. I also think, again, when we think about
    our bigger geostrategic interests in Syria, our presence, our
    presence in this region is what is going to create that
    pressure, but also our engagement and our willingness to show
    that we are not leaving this region, that we are willing--that
    we are committed to our interests, and we are not fair weather
    friends.
        Mr. Zinke. Doctor, you can comment on that if you would
    like.
        Ms. Wallander. Yes, the job is not done in Syria. ISIS
    remains a threat. The detention facilities, if not monitored
    and kept secure, would be a huge setback in American and global
    security. And so, the job is not done.
        Mr. Zinke. Thank you.
        I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Self. I recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
    Amo.
        Mr. Amo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Look, while I appreciate the focus on Turkiye, I think the
    Subcommittee on Europe should be discussing the most dire
    threat to European security. That is Russia's unlawful invasion
    of Ukraine. That's right, Russia.
        And again, so we align on some facts, it was Russia that
    invaded Ukraine and launched an unprovoked war. It is an
    aggressive Russia that poses one of the greatest threats to
    Europe's freedoms, stability, and democratic values. It is
    Russia who now believes the visions--believe that--the visions
    of our two nations are aligned.
        So, instead of having a hearing to address the threat posed
    by Vladimir Putin, this committee is looking the other way,
    literally. No one should choose to sit back and let President
    Trump parrot Kremlin propaganda and blow up our European
    relationships.
        Make no mistake, the scene caused by the President and Vice
    President at the White House last Friday was unnerving. It was,
    in my opinion, disgraceful. Ukrainians are dying every day to
    defend democracy. Yet, our colleagues were more concerned about
    President Zelenskyy and the flattering that he should have done
    of President Trump, and his wardrobe, than the existential war
    that he is fighting.
        So, unlike my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I
    cannot stay silent while our President sides with a dictator
    over our allies. Abandoning our allies, refusing to send them
    aid, belittling leaders in public does not make the United
    States stronger. It makes us weaker. It is clear that America
    First is rapidly turning into Putin first and America alone.
        Instead of leading by example, our President is siding with
    North Korea and Iran at the United Nations, voting to protect
    Russia. This is not the company we want to keep.
        Now, I recognize that Turkiye is the subject of today's
    hearing, a NATO member that has offered to host peace talks
    between Ukraine and Russia. Turkiye has also pushed back
    against false Russian claims to Ukrainian land. But while
    Turkiye supports sovereign territory in Ukraine, they fail to
    support it in their own backyard, in countries like Armenia.
        In 2023, Turkiye provided material support for Azerbaijan's
    brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
    ancestral home of the Armenian people. The United States
    supports Armenia. We provided over $57 million in foreign
    assistance to Armenia last year, including humanitarian
    assistance for refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh. But this
    assistance was halted by President Trump's illegal foreign aid
    freeze. It is yet another example of Trump abandoning an ally--
    all while Turkiye has reportedly discussed establishing a
    corridor to connect with Azerbaijan across Armenia's sovereign
    territory.
        So, I know that Mr. Costa touched on this a bit, but I want
    to go a little bit deeper. Ms. Wallander, what steps can the
    United States take to push back on Turkiye's support of
    Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia, and how can the United
    States dissuade Turkiye and Azerbaijan from encroaching on
    Armenia's sovereignty with a ground transport corridor?
        Ms. Wallander. Thank you so much, Congressman.
        I agree with you that Turkiye has played a negative role in
    the last couple of years on this conflict. And it is difficult
    to imagine that Azerbaijan would come to the table with a
    reasonable and equitable and just resolution without Turkiye's
    positive influence.
        The specifics could be to look at specific arms transfers
    that contributed to the loss of life and the expulsion of those
    tens of thousands of Armenians from that region. It also could
    look at possible sanctions on Turkish relations with Russia in
    the technology sphere that fuels some of those defense
    industrial productions. I do think targeted sanctions, if they
    were used for leverage to push toward diplomacy, could help
    Turkiye to play a constructive role in influencing, in
    particular, Azerbaijan.
        Mr. Amo. And could you speak a little bit to the ground
    transport corridor specifically?
        Ms. Wallander. I don't have any secret ideas or public
    ideas of how to succeed in pressing that ground transit
    corridor. I would appeal to Turkiye's principled support in
    support of the U.N. and international law for Ukraine and ask
    them to consider no less in recognizing the international
    community's obligation for Armenia to be able to have control
    of its own territory, to negotiate an acceptable solution to
    the issues of transport with Azerbaijan, and offer the kind of
    positive influence and example that the Turkish leadership so
    often seeks.
        Mr. Amo. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Self. I now recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
    Titus.
        Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Sorry to
    walk right in here. Well, thank you.
        As you all have been hearing and talking about the numerous
    challenges throughout the region, preserving peace in the
    Middle East is vital. Now, as a reliable and stable security
    partner in the region, Greece best represents U.S. interests
    there. Allowing Greece to maintain the qualitative and
    strategic advantage over Turkiye is crucial in this respect. It
    provides a deterrent to Turkiye's historic aggression toward
    Greece, which shouldn't be upset, and this balance would be
    upended if Turkiye were to acquire F-35s.
        Despite the recent easing of tensions between Greece and
    Turkiye, Erdogan's fundamental positions and claims, in
    violation of Greek and Cypriot sovereignty, remain unchanged.
    This year saw a sudden uptick in Turkiye's violations of
    Greece's airspace, while the violations of its territorial
    waters continued throughout the last year. Meanwhile, Erdogan
    is cozying up to Hamas and threatening to invade Israel.
        Yet, Greece continues to play a constructive role in the
    region by promoting energy security through the three-plus-one
    Great Sea Interconnector; providing crucial assistance for
    Ukraine, as Russia continues its war of aggression, and serving
    as a responsible NATO member by working with the U.S. to
    coordinate mutual security goals. Greece's responsible ally
    ship promotes U.S. interests in the region, while Turkiye seems
    only interested in promoting Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions.
        I would ask--Dr. Schanzer, is it?----
        Mr. Schanzer. Yes.
        Ms. Titus [continuing]. if the United States has imposed
    CAATSA sanctions on any other NATO ally besides Turkiye.
        Mr. Schanzer. No, it has not.
        Ms. Titus. Yes.
        Mr. Schanzer. No other ally has acquired the Russian S-400
    system. No other ally has put our technology and our allies at
    risk the way the Turks have. And I'm actually shocked that this
    crisis continues so many years after it began. It is actually
    inconceivable to me that we have not forced this crisis to a
    suitable conclusion. I understand that Turkiye put itself in a
    pickle, but that is not our problem any longer. We need that S-
    400 out of Turkiye.
        But I would also just like to say, the way that you have
    just characterized what is happening in the Eastern Med is
    exactly as I understand it. I think Greece has done more than
    its fair share to shoulder its load, and it continues to come
    under attack, under threat, from Turkiye.
        The question is, at some point, what does the United States
    do to help support our allies in Greece? I do think that
    there's an opportunity to perhaps forge some kind of mechanism
    that would enable the United States, Israel, and Greece to work
    together for the betterment of security in the East Med. I
    sincerely hope we see that materialize in the months or years
    to come.
        Ms. Titus. I do, too. I think Greece is strategically
    located geopolitically to play a leadership role in that area.
        Just to add to that, are there any other NATO allies who
    occupy a country the way that Turkiye occupies Cyprus? And are
    there any other NATO allies that are actively seeking BRICS
    membership or status with the Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization? I think I know the answer. No?
        Mr. Schanzer. You're correct.
        Ms. Titus. OK. Thank you.
        One other question. In your written testimony, you mention
    Turkiye's ``Blue Homeland'' policy of dominating the Eastern
    Mediterranean. Could you elaborate on this for a little bit and
    tell us how it threatens Greece and Cypriot sovereignty in the
    region?
        Mr. Schanzer. Oh, absolutely. What Turkiye has done is it
    has extended the way it views its own territorial waters to
    cover, effectively, almost all of the Eastern Med. It is almost
    as if Cyprus doesn't exist. It is as if Greece doesn't exist.
    They have got a relationship, an agreement with Libya that,
    basically, wipes Cyprus off the map. Right?
        And all the while, we see illegal drilling, Turkiye
    drilling in the territorial waters off of Cyprus and near
    Greece. When you see Greek and Cypriot vessels coming out of
    their Exclusive Economic Zones into international waters, they
    are challenged by Turkish vessels. This is extremely aggressive
    and it is articulated in this ``Blue Homeland'' policy that
    this is the design of Turkiye. It is to dominate the Eastern
    Med.
        I would argue that conquest of Syria by Hay'at Tahrir al-
    Sham, the Al Qaeda group, has now made Greece, Israel, and
    Cyprus, and other countries in the region very alarmed. They
    see now a surge in power on the part of the Turkish regime, and
    I get the sense right now that they are looking to work
    together to begin to counter it.
        Ms. Titus. It doesn't sound like Turkiye is a very reliable
    ally to me.
        Mr. Schanzer. No.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you and I yield back.
        Mr. Schanzer. No, ma'am.
        Mr. Self. Thank you.
        We are going to recognize the ranking member and the chair
    for a second round of questioning, and I will go ahead and let
    the ranking member begin.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to use the second round to go back at
    statements made by our witnesses, and there are two that I
    would like to emphasize.
        No. 1, Dr. Schanzer said, ``We need reliable allies.'' I
    couldn't agree more. But, honestly, right now, the U.S., on the
    part of our closest allies, our Transatlantic allies, that
    reliability is openly being questioned--just recent comments by
    French officials, German officials, our Scandinavian allies. It
    is clear. I don't have to go--they are public record.
        But I can see their point after looking at the United
    States taking an ally like Ukraine and cutting off its
    intelligence capabilities that were so integral to success
    here; cutting off weapons funding, important for just their
    survival as a country. The actions where we have distanced
    ourselves from our allies at the U.N. and the comments in the
    aftermath of the Oval Office incident of last week, which
    prompted an emergency meeting of our European allies in Great
    Britain. These all make us less reliable.
        So, I would like to ask, question one, how important is
    this reliability? And since I believe it is unmistakable--these
    are the words of our allies themselves, essentially, saying we
    are not reliable--how important that is that America First
    can't be America alone?
        Now, the second point that was brought up--I'm not sure
    which witness brought it--but it was on, you know, how come
    Turkiye has a view of the United States of only 20 percent
    favorable? And the comments of our witnesses were, well,
    Erdogan's repression of journalists and a free press really
    resulted in the people of Turkiye not getting a full message,
    and not a clear message and a very skewed message.
        So, the second question I have is, the importance of
    funding and making sure we are positioning our Radio Free
    Europe and our Radio Liberty capabilities, making sure that
    those things are able and present to break through that very
    problem that our witnesses raised themselves.
        I question that, given funding threats in the past. I
    question it, frankly, by the advancing of Kari Lake, a seven-
    time election denier, to lead that entity. So, I'm concerned.
    I'm concerned on the reliability and I'm concerned on our
    ability to get democratic messages through Radio Free Europe
    and Radio Liberty.
        I will start with Dr. Wallander.
        Ms. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
        So, Russia will be able to rebuild its military and adjust
    its military and be poised to be able to threaten not just
    Ukraine, but NATO, assessments are, in about 5 years.
        European countries, as of last year, 23 were meeting at
    least the 2 percent of GDP spending on defense, and many more
    are moving toward that. And what we have heard in the last
    couple of months is a determination to spend even more and
    invest in defense industrial base.
        The United States is on the cusp of achieving something
    that American leaders have demanded of Europe for 75 years of
    NATO, which is that European countries really invest in their
    defense and really take the lead in defending their country
    with the United States as an ally. But it is going to take them
    some time.
        At this point, being that reliable ally, giving Europe the
    opportunity to take that leadership role, to free up the United
    States for our important global challenges, especially
    strategic competition and the pacing challenge of China, it is
    within our grasp and we have that opportunity to have that
    success that Presidents across both Republican and Democratic
    leaderships have sought for decades.
        Mr. Keating. The importance of global media?
        Ms. Wallander. The importance of?
        Mr. Keating. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?
        Ms. Wallander. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are
    respected as credible and important sources of alternative
    information across the globe, I mean as resources, but
    especially given the cold war history. Even in countries that
    have free media, it is an alternative source of information. It
    is a source about America. But it has to be credible. It has to
    be about free media, and it is a huge asset in making the
    American case and building that trust that enables us to have
    access in Europe. That is so important for our global security.
        Mr. Keating. I yield back.
        Mr. Self. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        I want to take 4 minutes on this next question. We have
    danced around S-400's and F-35s.
        So, starting with you, Dr. Schanzer, Greece, Israel,
    Turkiye seem to me to be the players in this, as well as NATO
    as a whole, of course. Would you just outline the issue for us?
    Because this is a major issue for NATO in my mind.
        Mr. Schanzer. It is, and I thank you for raising it,
    Chairman Self.
        We spoke about this before the hearing. There are, of
    course, different variants of the F-35, and I think Israel
    would have a superior one to whatever Turkiye might acquire and
    I'm sure it is superior to whatever Greece has.
        I am concerned, however, about giving this platform in any
    form to this government in Turkiye. I think that it will be
    used to further Turkiye's aggressive posture in the region. I
    would fear clashes between Greece and Turkiye and would not
    want to put both Greek and Turkish F-35s in the sky, as they
    battle over Alexandroupolis or other key areas, as tensions
    rise in the Eastern Med.
        I know the Israelis are steadfastly opposed right now to
    this government, the government of Turkiye, which has called
    for a Pan-Islamic war against Israel, giving them, rewarding
    them with the F-35. Now, they were removed from this program
    because of their acquisition of the Russian S-400 system. We
    should not put them back on.
        I would argue that, even if they relinquish the S-400,
    there should be a cooling-off period, probably several years,
    before we begin to consider furnishing them with an F-35
    because there needs to be a price to pay when our allies
    disobey clear directives, as we gave the Turks. We said, ``Do
    not buy that S-400.'' They did so anyway. They should pay a
    steep price. They should be made an example of, I think, right
    now for all of our other allies to see.
        Mr. Self. Either of the other two doctors?
        Ms. Wallander. I will speak to this.
        Mr. Self. Dr. Wallander?
        Ms. Wallander. I have a somewhat different view. I believe
    that Turkiye should--I believe the right decision was made to
    remove Turkiye from the F-35 program, to not deliver the
    aircraft that it has already paid for because of its
    acquisition of the S-400 system, and to impose sanctions as a
    consequence of that choice.
        I, however, believe that, because the United States is a
    member of NATO, and because the American people are only as
    secure as the alliance is strong, it is in our interest for
    NATO allies to have advanced military capabilities. And NATO is
    moving toward the F-35 as a core capability, and
    interoperability across the alliance is extremely important.
        If Turkiye were to undo that mistake in a verifiable,
    irreversible way, to move forward, to move Turkiye, under the
    right circumstances with the right provisions and security for
    that decision, is something that would be in the American
    national interest and is something that should be advanced with
    all due caution, with a period of time to ensure that it is in
    American interests going forward.
        Mr. Self. Dr. Borschevskaya?
        Ms. Borschevskaya. Yes, and I would add to that, when we
    sanctioned Turkiye for the purchase of the S-400, and when we
    removed Turkiye as a co-producer of the F-35, we did say that,
    if Turkiye were to relinquish the S-400, Turkiye would be
    brought back into this program. And I agree with Celeste's
    comments to that end. Not only is this issue important because
    of NATO cohesion, because Turkiye is a NATO ally, but the
    question is, what leverage do we have with Turkiye to
    relinquish the S-400, if not bring it back into the program,
    again, with an appropriate cooling-off period?
        Mr. Self. Thank you.
        Well, this is a complex topic, and I think we all recognize
    that Turkiye has one foot in Europe and one foot in the Middle
    East and they try to focus on both, and I don't think they can.
        So, for the purview, for the portfolio of this committee, I
    think the NATO military alliance is all important as we address
    Turkiye. And I think that Turkiye needs to return to its
    traditional, historic role as anchoring that southeast corner
    of the NATO treaty alliance. Because this is a treaty. It is a
    treaty that carries dramatic consequences if Article 5 is
    invoked.
        So, this is an extremely important topic to me, as
    chairman, and I know to this committee, because I have heard
    all of these comments. And I appreciate it.
        I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
    members for their questions.
        The members of the subcommittee may have some additional
    questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
    those in writing.
        Mr. Self. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have
    5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous
    materials for the record, subject to the length limitations.
        Mr. Self. Without objection, the committee stands
    adjourned. Thank you so much.
        [Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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