[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING THE SKIES:
ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED
DRONE ACTIVITY OVER U.S.
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-196 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia,
Mike Turner, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Michael Cloud, Texas Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Gary Palmer, Alabama Ro Khanna, California
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Pete Sessions, Texas Shontel Brown, Ohio
Andy Biggs, Arizona Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Robert Garcia, California
Pat Fallon, Texas Maxwell Frost, Florida
Byron Donalds, Florida Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Greg Casar, Texas
William Timmons, South Carolina Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Emily Randall, Washington
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Suhas Subramanyam, Virginia
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Yassamin Ansari, Arizona
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Wesley Bell, Missouri
Nick Langworthy, New York Lateefah Simon, California
Eric Burlison, Missouri Dave Min, California
Eli Crane, Arizona Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Brian Jack, Georgia Rashida Tlaib, Michigan
John McGuire, Virginia
Brandon Gill, Texas
------
Mark Marin, Staff Director
James Rust, Deputy Staff Director
Mitch Benzine, General Counsel
Kaity Wolfe, Deputy Director for Oversight
Grayson Westmoreland, Senior Professional Staff Member
Alex Phares, Professional Staff Member
Mallory Cogar, Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Jamie Smith, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
------
Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs
William Timmons, South Carolina, Chairman
Michael Turner, Ohio Suhas Subramanyam, Virginia
Michael Cloud, Texas Ranking Member
Andy Biggs, Arizona Stephen Lynch, Massachusetts
Byron Donalds, Florida Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Robert Garcia, California
Eli Crane, Arizona Greg Casar, Texas
John McGuire, Virginia Vacancy
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 29, 2025................................... 1
Witnesses
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Rear Admiral Paul Spedero, Jr., Vice Director for Operations, J3,
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
Oral Statement................................................... 5
Mr. M. Roosevelt Ditlevson, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD)
Oral Statement................................................... 6
Written opening statements and bios are available on the U.S.
House of Representatives Document Repository at:
docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
* Article, Markets and Markets, ``Autonomous Ascent, How AI is
Reshaping the Future of UAV Industry''; submitted by Rep.
Biggs.
* Article, The Wall Street Journal, ``Mystery Drones Swarmed a
U.S. Military Base for 17 Days''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Article, The Washington Times, ``What We Know About the
Langley Air Force Base Drone Incident''; submitted by Rep.
Biggs.
* Advisory,`` Application of Federal Laws to the Acquisition
and Use of Technology to Detect Mitigate UAS''; submitted by
Rep. McGuire.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
----------
* Questions for the Record: to Mr. Arel; submitted by Rep.
Timmons.
* Questions for the Record: to Rear Admiral Spedero; submitted
by Rep. Crane.
* Questions for the Record: to Rear Admiral Spedero; submitted
by Rep. McGuire.
These documents were submitted after the hearing, and may be
available upon request.
SECURING THE SKIES:
ADDRESSING UNAUTHORIZED
DRONE ACTIVITY OVER U.S.
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
----------
Tuesday, April 29, 2025
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m.,
Room HVC-210, U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. William
Timmons, [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Timmons, Cloud, Biggs, Luna,
McGuire, Subramanyam, and Lynch.
Mr. Timmons. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Military
and Foreign Affairs will come to order. I would like to welcome
everyone. Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at
any time. I recognize myself for the purpose of making an
opening statement.
Thank you for joining us today as we discuss one of the
most complex and serious threats to our national security, the
unauthorized use of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, over U.S.
military installations and sensitive sites. In recent years, we
have seen a surge in drone incursions over military
installations across the country.
In 2024, the Department of Defense stated that there are
more than one million drones registered in the United States
and estimated that there are more than 8,500 drones flown
legally across the country every day. I have even seen some of
these drone incursions firsthand during my time in the South
Carolina Air National Guard.
However, these incursions are not from hobbyists being
blown off course. The multitude of drones reported flying over
bases in the past several years revealed a coordinated effort
by our adversaries to collect valuable intelligence and
surveillance of some of our most sensitive military equipment.
These incursions often are designed to disrupt important
trainings and create chaos for a number of reasons. No. 1, base
commanders have inadequate or nonexistent monitoring
capabilities; two, a near total lack of counter-drone
capabilities; three, unclear standard operating procedures to
guide base commanders' responses and decisionmaking; and
finally, four, ambiguous legal authorities both on and off
base.
This threat is magnified by the complex regulatory and
prosecutorial framework that was patched together by the
previous Administration in what I would argue is a poor attempt
to address this issue. Right now, the Department of Defense,
Federal Aviation Administration, Intelligence Community,
Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security are
all involved in some aspects of the counter-UAS efforts. As a
result, there is no agency with primary authority on countering
drone incursions, leading to confusion and, more importantly,
gaps on how to identify and mitigate this threat.
This interagency failure was on full display last winter
when hundreds of drones were spotted in the skies above New
Jersey and other parts of the Northeast. After several
temporary flight restrictions and mass confusion among state,
local, and Federal partners, the Biden Administration provided
the public no answers to what was happening above them.
However, with only a few weeks of the current Administration
taking office, they revealed that the drones over New Jersey
were actually authorized by the FAA. This instance raises
multiple questions as to why the previous Administration left
the American people in the dark for over a month when they knew
the simple truth.
Another notable incident occurred at Langley Air Force Base
in December 2023. Over 17 days, unidentified drones repeatedly
breached our sensitive military airspace, one of America's
critical installations. The F-22 Raptor squadrons were moved to
alternate bases to lessen exposure, and discussions were
initiated on installing physical countermeasures.
These are not isolated incidents. In February, the
Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM testified to Congress that
there were over 350 detections of drones at 100 different
military installations last year alone. Additionally, since
2023, two Chinese nationals have been arrested for illegally
flying drones over military installations to conduct
surveillance. One of these individuals was caught attempting to
flee the U.S. and return to China with sensitive footage he had
recorded.
Today, this Committee will hear from officials from the
Department of Defense on what the Trump Administration is doing
to help combat this issue and bring an end to these illegal
drone incursions. We must demand full accountability, expedited
technological upgrades, and enhanced oversight to safeguard our
sovereignty and ensure that our military remains unexposed to
foreign surveillance and potential threats. I am hopeful that
our witnesses here today have suggestions on how Congress can
help empower the right Federal agencies to combat this problem
and secure the skies above our military bases.
I now recognize Ranking Member Subramanyam for the purpose
of making an opening statement.
Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses
for being here today and for your service to our country and to
making our airspace safe.
It is clear that UAS is an issue right now. It is the
future of warfare from the war in Ukraine to our own military
bases in the continental United States. We are seeing real time
that UAS are redefining how battles are fought and how
intelligence is gathered. I believe it has been 350 drones that
have been reported in the last year, over 100 different
military installations. That is 350 different potential
national security breaches that we know of. These include
highly sensitive sites such as nuclear facilities and major
military bases, and that is a huge threat to our national
security and the lives of our service members. And
unfortunately, you know, our lack of coordinated effective
response needs to be addressed immediately. And I know everyone
here today wants to work on it and is planning on working on
it.
And so, we are familiar with this issue in my home state,
in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In December 2023, service
members at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia saw drones
hovering over their airspace for 17 days. And Langley, for
those who do not know, is home to key national security assets
like the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, and it plays an important
role in keeping us safe here in our Nation's capital. And so,
we also have some important naval assets in that area too.
And, you know, these drones demonstrated complicated aerial
maneuvers and did not just broadcast on known frequencies,
suggesting that they were not just a local hobbyist making an
innocent mistake. As far as we can tell in Congress, there was
and still is not a cohesive or coordinated plan for how we are
going to deal with this, but maybe we can learn more today
about what is happening now and what we can do moving forward.
You know, our job on this Committee is to find answers to
questions, and I have a lot. You know, who was piloting these
drones, for instance? Were these criminal actors? Are these
foreign adversaries? Are they simply local hobbyists with
advanced capabilities? I am not sure about that, but maybe that
is the case. And what are they doing? Are they gathering
intelligence? Are they probing for weaknesses? Are they
planning an attack? And finally, what is our plan for dealing
with them safely and effectively because these UAS are a clear
and present danger to our national security, and we need to
have a plan to counter them.
There are several areas I would like to focus on today. The
first is counter-drone authorities. Right now, the U.S. law
allows the Department of Energy, Justice, Defense, and Homeland
Security to detect and respond to drone activities in certain
situations such as nuclear facilities, for instance, missile
defense assets, or other covered facilities, but only around
half of all military installations actually fall under this
definition of covered facility, which is why I think this may
be something we should look at for change.
The second is counter-drone technologies. You know, it is
not just as simple as shooting them down, as we know. You know,
there are homes and businesses and parks near bases like
Langley, and people live there. Children play there. Shooting
down drones could endanger people in these communities,
especially if we do not know what payloads the drones may
carry. And a missed shot could also pose a threat to commercial
air traffic as well. And so, you know, we need to find a way to
safely counter some of these incursions.
And we have other technologies at our disposal like jamming
and disrupting and even taking over unknown or hostile drones,
but there is a lot of work to do to develop these capabilities.
And some of that work actually takes place in my district in
northern Virginia.
And, you know, with that said, I do not know of a silver
bullet, and so it is going to take a coordinated effort, I
think, at the state, local, and Federal level, and so we are
all going to have to work together because everyone has got
different jurisdictions. And I would like to, on that front,
see if we can work together and maybe have some sort of task
force in place so that information is easily gathered and where
everyone is up to date on the latest technology, as well as the
best practices.
And so, this is a very timely hearing on an important
issue, and I want to work with my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to come up with a plan to protect our military bases
and protect the American people, so I yield back.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that.
I am pleased to welcome an expert panel of witnesses for
today's discussion. I would first like to welcome Rear Admiral
Paul Spedero, the Vice Director for Operations, or J3, for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I would also like to welcome Mr. Mark Ditlevson, who is the
current Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Hemispheric Affairs.
Due to unforeseen circumstances, the FAA is no longer
testifying at today's hearing, but they have committed to
answering in writing any questions that our Members have. If
any Member has questions they would like to submit to the FAA
following this hearing, please get them to staff for the FAA to
answer.
Now, we are going to administer the oath to the witnesses.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses will please
stand and raise their right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
[Chorus of ayes.]
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. Please take your seat. Let the
record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your
testimony. Let me remind the witnesses that we will have read
your written statement, and it will appear in full in the
hearing record. Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes.
As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in
front of you so that it is on and the Members can hear you.
When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn
green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the
red light comes on, your 5 minutes have expired, and we would
ask that you please wrap up.
I now recognize Rear Admiral Spedero for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL SPEDERO JR.
VICE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J3
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)
Admiral Spedero. Good afternoon, Chairman Timmons, Ranking
Member Subramanyam, Committee Members, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and thank you
for your support and your oversight. Admittedly, several of my
opening comments will echo those of the Chairman and the
Ranking Member.
The rapid emergence, proliferation, and employment of
unmanned systems has fundamentally changed the way that both
professional militaries, as well as terrorist organizations,
conduct warfare. Over the last few years, we have seen the
employment of unmanned systems, in particular unmanned aerial
systems, in every major conflict, from the Russia-Ukraine war
to Iran's attacks on Israel and attacks against U.S. bases and
ships across the Middle East. And most tragically, an Iranian-
supported militant group successfully employed a one-way attack
drone on Tower 22 in Jordan, killing three U.S. service
members, and wounding 40, on January 27, 2024.
Here in the homeland, as Assistant Secretary Ditlevson will
note in his opening remarks, the mass drone incursions over
Joint Base Langley-Eustis in December 2023 reminded us that the
homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And should our adversary
choose to employ drones for surveillance or even attack, we
would not be prepared to adequately defend our homeland and
only marginally capable to defend our military installations.
The incursions over Joint Base Langley-Eustis were not the
first, they have not been the last, but they were the longest
and the largest series of incursions that we have seen to date.
In the comprehensive review of that event, as well as in
the actions we took in follow-on incursions like those that
occurred over Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, and over
Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle in New
Jersey, have resulted in improvements. But more action is
needed, and the Joint Force has made counter-UAS our priority
line of effort.
We are now better prepared to respond to incursions with
the designation of Commander of U.S. Northern Command and
Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command as the operational
synchronizers in their respective areas of responsibility. Last
year and within weeks of being assigned this role, General
Guillot, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, released a
comprehensive commander's assessment that has served as a
roadmap to building the necessary command and control and
standard operating procedures to address the drone threat.
Over the last year, we have also invested in education and
training against this threat. NORTHCOM has been a central
driving force for the work being done by several organizations
in partnership with industry to deliver the domain awareness
and counter-UAS systems that we require. And last, we are
progressing well in our completion of the counter-UAS tasks
assigned to us in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA.
We appreciate your continued support and your oversight.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I will now
pass to Secretary Ditlevson.
STATEMENT OF MARK ROOSEVELT DITLEVSON
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)
Mr. Ditlevson. Chairman Timmons, Ranking Member
Subramanyam, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to speak here today. The events of
December 2023 at Joint Base Langley-Eustis served to focus and
energize DoD's counter-small UAS efforts in the homeland.
During the event, DoD struggled to address the incursions in a
timely and effective fashion, owing at least in part to
challenges within the DoD and our ability to implement a
relatively untested interagency coordination process. To some
extent, those challenges from JBLE still exist. However, we
have worked since then to improve and refine our processes and
coordination efforts, and we have seen improvements in
subsequent responses.
I can assure the Committee that the Department is as
frustrated by these events as you are. However, we cannot
simply focus on looking back and waste precious resources. As a
department, we act, we review that action, we adjust, and we
move out. Today, I am here to tell you that we are continuing
to move out. I am confident that we are in a stronger position
to defend DoD installations today than we were in December
2023.
We are fighting this threat on three fronts, internal
process reviews, generating better domain awareness, and
clarifying commanders' authority in legislation. Internally, we
must focus on the ability to provide response at the speed of
relevance. The designation of USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM late
last year as the counter-UAS operational synchronizers in their
respective areas of the homeland was an essential step. We have
developed more streamlined interagency coordination consistent
with section 130i.
We are also conducting a comprehensive review, as requested
in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA section 925 and, where necessary,
consolidating and updating DoD policy. This is an effort long
overdue, and it provides us with direction and momentum.
Last, working with our interagency partners, like our
colleagues from the FAA, we have enabled DoD to sponsor
facilities which provide a critical mission to DoD but are not
directly DoD facilities or assets.
Second, generating better domain awareness is essential to
developing an understanding of what is flying in our airspace
and how to separate the negligent from the nefarious. This is
the fundamental issue we saw at Langley in New Jersey. DoD is
working through venues like the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,
the JRAC, to rapidly acquire the right equipment and to give
commanders better tools to understand the operating environment
and the ability to effectively conduct non-kinetic and kinetic
mitigations. The Commander of USNORTHCOM phrased it this way in
his posture hearing in February: ``You cannot defeat what you
cannot see.''
On the legislative front, we continue to engage with
Members of Congress to seek modest but important refinements to
DoD's counter-UAS authorities under section 130i. Our
legislative proposal is intended to allow the Department to
protect additional locations and missions, add greater
stability for long-term planning and resource allocation within
the Department, and facilitate improved understanding and
cooperation among the U.S. interagency and local partners.
Ultimately, I believe we need to address all these issues
with end users in mind, our installation commanders and the
security personnel charged with the duties to protect our
installations, our operations, and ultimately our personnel.
Last, the President of the United States has issued several
executive orders directing the Department of Defense to take
all appropriate and lawful measures to ensure the complete
operational control of the border. The Department, in turn, is
responding by preparing the path for employment of counter-sUAS
activities along the border, both in support of DoD interests
and in support of DHS as the lead Federal agency. As the
operational environment, legislation, and threats evolve,
policy must adapt to ensure DoD's ability to continue to
advance our national defense objectives remains.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Subramanyam, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, in conclusion, the homeland continues
to face increased and evolving threats from UAS. To address
these challenges requires a whole-of-government approach and a
unified effort. We must modernize the ability to assess the
threat, determine its weaknesses, and acquire and deploy
countermeasures. Thank you for the support of Congress and for
your continued commitment in support of the Department of
Defense. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Rear Admiral Spedero, how many drone incursions have taken
place over U.S. military installations over the past 2 years?
We got the number last time we had a briefing of 350, but have
they grown? Or what is the current data you are willing to
share?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, so the exact number I would be happy
to share in a classified setting, but I can tell you that it
has grown.
Mr. Timmons. I am actually curious. Why did we get the 350
number in an unclassified setting? That was one of the
questions I had.
Admiral Spedero. It is a great question, sir.
Mr. Timmons. OK.
Admiral Spedero. Yes.
Mr. Timmons. Fair enough. All right. Well, let us do this.
Can you discuss procedures that DoD has in place for a base
commander when the base commander gets reports of an
unauthorized drone incursion?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, so currently, there is a standard
operating procedure that has been published by the Commander of
U.S. Northern Command. So, each base has been provided that
standard operating procedure. The expectation is they will
respond in accordance with that.
Mr. Timmons. When was that created?
Admiral Spedero. It was just published here recently,
within the last month.
Mr. Timmons. OK.
Admiral Spedero. It was finalized and published.
Mr. Timmons. So, what percent of base commanders have any
technology to actually track drones as opposed to just, ooh, I
saw a drone, and then you report it?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, so the capabilities at each base is
varied. Again, the specifics for the individual locations would
be better in a classified setting, but it is not comprehensive,
I can tell you that. It is not sufficient and, again, varies
from base to base, from very little to somewhat more
comprehensive.
Mr. Timmons. Is that something that Congress can help with
authorizations and appropriations to get additional resources?
I would feel that most bases should have, at the very least,
the ability to track. Whether they have countermeasures is a
different thing. But is that something that you all need? You
need additional money?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, sir, absolutely. I think the
development fielding the acquisition distribution of domain
awareness sensors is the critical first step. It is not the
only thing. Obviously, we need a method to exert command and
control so that we can build a common operating picture because
it will take layers of different sensors because one sensor may
be better against certain UAVs and certain flight profiles, and
you may have to rely on different sensors to round out the
picture. So, being able to fuse all that together to get the
complete picture will be necessary. And then, as you mentioned,
getting to a point where we can actually respond, that is an
entirely next investment that needs to be made.
So, yes, we do need more sensors. We are addressing the
shortfall right now with the fielding of flyaway kits. So,
these will be kits that will be available for bases that have
very limited capability to detect on their own and build domain
awareness. And should they have an incursion that they are
unable to resolve, they would solicit the help from Commander
of the U.S. Northern Command, and this flyaway kit, as well as
expertise and additional resources that would be required would
be immediately deployed to that location.
Mr. Timmons. So, I guess, resources are probably fairly
easy, and you all are going to work on telling us what you
actually need from a technology perspective, but the other side
is the authority. So, I mean, does a base commander have clear
authorities, what they can and cannot do relative to whether
the drone is in their airspace or just outside the airspace?
And is that as big or bigger of a problem?
Admiral Spedero. So, all of our installations have the
authority that is afforded them under the standing rules of
engagement and the standing rules for the use of force. You
know, in those rules, if they are--can establish that there is
hostile intent or hostile act--then they not only have the
authority, but they have the absolute right and responsibility
to respond appropriately to protect themselves, forces, as well
as DoD property. So, those are standing rules that they have.
Now, being able to discern hostile intent and hostile act,
as referred to in the opening comments, may be very
challenging. Is this negligent activity being conducted by
someone just flying a drone irresponsibly, whether that is a
recreational enthusiast or it is someone that is using a drone
for commercial aspects? So, it can be a challenge here in the
homeland to determine that.
Mr. Timmons. So, a base commander has the authority to, for
example, arrest a Chinese national that is a quarter mile off
base?
Admiral Spedero. He does not have the authority to detain
someone that is off base. He would have to coordinate with
local law enforcement to apprehend someone that is operating a
drone outside of the base. Now, I know Secretary Ditlevson will
talk about 130i authorities, which is something that we really
do want to talk about today because I think it is important.
But under 130i authorities, there is some additional room to
respond. For a covered facility, merely the presence of that
drone conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected of
conducting unauthorized surveillance or interfering with
operations, as you referred to in your opening statement, about
the interference with F-22 operations, that would meet the
standard for a response rather than having to determine hostile
intent or hostile act.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. My time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Subramanyam, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to go back to something I mentioned a couple of
times, which is what is a covered facility and a not covered
facility? And Rear Admiral Spedero, if you are not a covered
facility, what does that mean? Does that impair your ability to
respond? And what do covered facilities have that noncovered
ones do not?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, so if you are not covered, you can
request to be covered, but you would have to meet the criteria
to become a covered facility, and that is one of the problems
with the 130i authorization is meeting the criteria for
covered. An example of this would be Luke Air Force Base where
F-35 training takes place for roughly three-quarters of those
that fly F-35s, and it is not a covered facility because
training facilities are not covered. So, it would be
problematic to actually get approval for Luke Air Force Base to
be a 130i.
Now, as I mentioned earlier, under 130i, if a drone is
conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected even of
conducting authorized surveillance, then the base commander
would be able to respond to that. Unauthorized surveillance may
or may not meet the criteria of hostile intent, which would
give you the authority to respond under the standing rules of
engagement and the standing rules for the use of force. So, it
relieves some of the burden on that base commander to determine
that there is an imminent threat. If this is interfering with
our operations, if this is giving the potential adversary a
look at our base and our sensitive activities, then we have the
authority to respond.
Mr. Subramanyam. And you mentioned before having to reach
out to local jurisdictions if someone is operating UAS outside
of a base. And what kind of coordination is currently being
done with state and local jurisdictions? Is it sort of ad hoc,
or is there like a process in place right now? And does Federal
law limit the extent of engagement with state and local? And
how can we make that better?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, thank you for that question. So, each
base commander, one of his imperatives is to build
relationships with the local community. That would include law
enforcement agencies. It is covered extensively in all of the
base commander courses. So, their part of their training and
their education program, before they assume command, is
building, is how to build those relationships, the importance,
what the limitations of those are. So, each individual base
commander is responsible.
There are additional lessons learned and protocols and best
practices about how to engage law enforcement on this
particular threat, but those occur at our bases and did occur
at Joint Base Langley-Eustis. They had a very, very tight
relationship with local law enforcement, with sheriffs, police
departments, as well as other Federal agencies, law enforcement
agencies that have capability in that area. And they did
respond in concert together to try to apprehend individuals
that were responsible for that drone activity over the base.
So, that--it does occur, and it is very important.
Mr. Subramanyam. And as far as technology and mitigation,
what--and I do not know if maybe this is the right forum for
this, but broadly, do you think there is technology gaps
currently? And do you think that there is progress being made
toward kind of filling those gaps? And what can we do, both in
Congress, as well as the private industry, to help kind of fill
the gaps when it comes to technology if we are trying to
address both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, in general, the technology to field
systems has far outpaced the technology to defeat those
systems. It is a much wider, broader, deeper market for drone
application for commercial and recreational purposes, so hence,
that technology has evolved very quickly from radio-controlled
drones to now fully autonomous drones that may or may not even
rely on reception of a GPS signal, which would make it very
challenging to intercept. So, on the counter-drone activity,
you know, you have to come back to agencies that would be
interested in that like Department of Defense, Department of
Homeland Security, FBI, you know, law enforcement agencies. So,
we have to partner and we have to create that demand within
industry to get technology back on pace to counter this ever-
increasing emergence of drone technology.
Mr. Subramanyam. Do you feel like we have the personnel
right now and the expertise in the country to be able to do
this?
Admiral Spedero. I think we have seen a good response. I
will defer to Secretary Ditlevson. He can talk about DIU and
other organizations that have really made a solid partnership
with industry to advance this technology.
Mr. Ditlevson. Thank you, Admiral. Yes, there are several
different organizations within the DoD that are looking at this
issue and moving out rapidly to acquire new capabilities such
as the JRAC, the Joint Counter-UAS Office, and DIU. All of
those, this is a focus area and one of their primary lines of
effort.
Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. McGuire, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses.
Admiral, thanks for your service.
I want a yes or no from both of you. Are you aware of the
August 2020 advisory? It is an advisory on the application of
Federal laws to the application and use of technologies to
detect and mitigate unmanned aircraft systems. Are you two
aware of that?
Admiral Spedero. No, sir, I am not specifically aware of
that.
Mr. Ditlevson. No, sir.
Mr. McGuire. If and when appropriate, I have a copy, and I
would like to admit that into the record.
Mr. Timmons. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. McGuire. So, I believe that is the source of a lot of
the problems that we have. In the military, we have something
called paralysis by analysis. Obviously, the commanders at
Langley and other bases have seen drones, and they fail to act
because--and I believe the source of those problems is this
August 2020 advisory.
And I think I have a solution for it. I was recently at the
southern border where I met with Tom Homan. I met with border
control, ICE agents, mayors, sheriffs, business owners, 10th
Mountain Division folks that are protecting our border from San
Diego all the way to Texas, and I asked them, are you seeing
drones come across the southern border and surveying our
troops? And the answer was yes. And I said, is 130i working for
you right now? And I know what they said, but Admiral, what do
you think? Is 130i right now working for us?
Admiral Spedero. So, they do not have 130i. That is the
first piece.
Mr. McGuire. OK. That----
Admiral Spedero. And we are working to resolve that. So,
for instance, in the national defense areas that have just been
established as an annex, does not have 130i. Now----
Mr. McGuire. I get it. I just am going to get to a point.
Admiral Spedero. Yes.
Mr. McGuire. And how about do you have an opinion on 130i
right now as of today?
Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman. If we can get 130i
implemented in these areas where a joint task force southwest
border is operating, it should enable the commanders on the
ground to have those expanded authorities that allow them to
interdict and mitigate these UAS threats.
Mr. McGuire. And I know you said you are working with
Congress on legislation, so I would like to talk to you about
an idea on a piece of legislation. It may be something that
involves Judiciary and FAA, but let me run this across you.
So, we currently have troops on the border facing the
cartels and our critical infrastructure. Now, of course, we
have got Langley Air Force Base and other critical
infrastructure as well, and, of course, we have got bad actors
that have bought land next to our military bases, and they are
surveilling us on a daily basis. And it is only a matter of
time until we have our next 9/11 terrorist attack. The problem
is bureaucracy prevents action, but this time we know about it
and we can fix it. And right now, with 130i, the way it is
proposed, you have to be observed or attacked and then ask for
permission, and that takes delays.
I have got an idea that might speed that up. Eighteen U.S.
Code 32 is treating remote-control airplanes, which I call a
drone--so 18 U.S.C. 32 is treating remote-control airplanes or
drones as if they are passenger airplanes, and they are not.
Basically, the problem is the government has created complex
statutes to let a few bad actors possibly take action if you
jump through a thousand hoops, 130i. This is not good enough.
We owe it to our military and our citizens to fix this. The
United States provides better protection from UAS to Saudi
Arabia than we do to our own citizens.
And so, my idea for a bill is you change the word from
aircraft to manned aircraft because I think every commander is
afraid that if I shoot down a remote-control airplane or a
drone, no one is going to back me up. I think I remember
hearing the Langley commander say, are you guys going to back
me up? Are you guys going to back me up? And no one answered.
That may not be 100 percent true, but Admiral, do you have any
comments on that idea?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, this is the burden of command. And
you need to understand that if there is something that is
assessed as a threat to your forces or your installation, then,
again, you not only have the authority but the responsibility
to act.
I would counter that they have authority right now on the
southwest border to engage UAS. We have in the last few days
alone reaffirmed that under the standing rules of engagement
and the standing rules of use of force, when you take in the
totality of the facts and the circumstances at the time, you
have the authority.
We know that cartels have used UAS for unauthorized
surveillance to assess our troop size, our movements, to
solicit and enable attacks from other vectors. We know that
they have used drones and kinetic attacks against Mexican----
Mr. McGuire. Well, Admiral, with all due respect----
Admiral Spedero [continuing]. Military authorities.
Mr. McGuire [continuing]. I just returned from the southern
border, and I asked the commander from Texas to San Diego if he
has authority to shoot down drones that he is looking at that
is looking at his troops, and he still is not sure. I just left
the southern border, and I think it goes back to that advisory.
That advisory has created a stigma, and I think that we can
mitigate or overcome that if we just change the word from
aircraft to manned aircraft, and then they will not have such a
huge penalty if they shoot down a drone. And certainly, if
someone wants to prosecute somebody for shooting down private
property, there are plenty of laws on the books for that.
But with that, I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank the witnesses for helping the Committee with its work.
I do have to say that I would prefer that we were reviewing
the facts of the signal chats that were conducted by Secretary
Hegseth and the Trump leadership team in order to get to the
bottom of that. However, I will, at a later date in full
Committee, enter a resolution of inquiry to ask the
administration to provide information to this Committee, to the
Oversight Committee, regarding how that happened.
It was bad enough that the last time we were here, we just
knew that the initial signal chat had happened and that
inadvertently they had included the editor of The Atlantic, who
was not approved for clearance, and that the chat included
specific information about those attacks against Yemen, which
could have put our sons and daughters in uniform at grave risk.
Now, that was then. Now we know that this chat also went to
Secretary Hegseth's brother, his sister. I do not think his mom
was in on it. She is about the only one in the family who was
not in on it. And then the family attorney was in on it as
well. So, that is a whole set of people who were not authorized
to be on that chat, again, that disclosed, you know, classified
information and actionable intelligence about an impending U.S.
attack in Yemen.
And then beyond that, now we find out that Secretary
Hegseth is using his Gmail account and using a phone that was
listed on his sports betting app and available to the public.
So, this just keeps getting worse.
I know that is not the fault of these witnesses, and they
probably cannot illuminate the circumstances, but I will be
filing that resolution of inquiry asking for the White House to
provide that information because that is important. It is not
partisan politics. It is just what the Oversight Committee
should be doing to keep our military personnel safe, like what
we are doing here. We are having a hearing on drones, you know,
being flown in the area of, you know, U.S. bases, and that
presents a danger to our sons and daughters. Well, so does, you
know, using a non-secure platform to discuss actionable
intelligence against our enemy who has anti-aircraft and anti-
naval vessel capability. That is really important, too, and
that presents a clear and present danger.
I know that there were reports in the press that the White
House said that was childish, that was childish that Secretary
Hegseth did that. I agree with that assessment. I think it was
totally immature, and it demonstrates an unfitness and a lack
of seriousness about protecting our sons and daughters in
uniform.
You know, we all nominate young men and women from our
district to the Military Academy at West Point and to the Naval
Academy, and dear God, you cannot, you know, put a family in
that position, put one of our best and brightest in that
position, and then leak information to our enemies while they
are going into battle.
OK. So, this Committee, myself included, investigated an
attack, a 2020 attack by al-Shabaab at Manda Bay in Kenya. That
was a drone attack. Several recent base attacks overseas, in
fact, have involved the use of drones. So, Admiral, how has our
profile, you know, countermeasures against drones, how has that
changed since those initial attacks back in 2020 that resulted
in U.S. casualties?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, so since that time, we have fielded a
number of new systems across a variety of the spectrum,
electromagnetic as well as electro-optical and infrared sensors
to build our domain awareness. We have also fielded a number of
kinetic systems that shoot interceptors or use some sort of
munition, and they are deployed at our most vulnerable and most
likely to be attacked facilities overseas. That is where the
bulk of our counter-UAS capability is actually located is
overseas, and hence, the problem here on the homeland is we
have very limited and sparse and distributed capability across,
you know, the multitude of installations we have.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Biggs, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to briefly comment about the previous
questioner, once again, going with the woke media story and not
bothering to mention the success of the strikes which restored
freedom of navigation, protected shipping lanes, and kept
Americans safe, nor did he bother to mention that the encrypted
service that was being used was one recommended by the previous
Administration, by DHS guidance.
But my questions with regard to this topic is for both of
you, and this is the context. So, do we have the technology to
discover that there is UAVs in the neighborhood of our bases?
Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman, we do.
Mr. Biggs. OK. If a UAV is there, can we track it? Do we
have the technology to track it?
Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Biggs. OK. And then you could interdict it if you chose
to at every base?
Mr. Ditlevson. We have different options for interdiction,
Congressman, across a spectrum----
Mr. Biggs. Right.
Mr. Ditlevson [continuing]. For the commander to use their
best judgment.
Mr. Biggs. But you could interdict if you chose, if you so
chose. And you have authorities under 130i, perhaps, depending
on the commanding chain there, right? I mean, you could make
that point, right?
Mr. Ditlevson. Depending upon the installation, whether it
is a covered installation, Congressman, you would have the 130i
additional authorities. But, as the Admiral has said, there is
always the ability to respond if there is hostile intent for
that base commander.
Mr. Biggs. But you have to determine hostile intent, and
that is the problem, right?
Admiral Spedero, could you explain how unauthorized drone
activity, even when it is caused by recreational or commercial
users, diverts critical security resources away from responding
to legitimate national security threats, please?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, Congressman, thank you for your
question. If we go back to New Jersey and, you know, that
activity, once the FAA put the temporary flight restrictions in
place and there was, you know, very broad and comprehensive
coverage of that by the media, many of you spoke about it, many
of the Members of Congress talked about the anxiety that was
building in the community due to the high level of sightings.
Once that word got out, that public messaging about responsible
drone use, once the word got out about the flight restrictions,
we saw a rapid decline in the number of sightings. The drone
activity essentially went away. And we do not want to get to
the point where we have to do that every time.
If we can message to the public that responsible commercial
and recreational application of your drone is an imperative to
prevent diverting our attention and our resources both from
investment, training, and response, we are going to be better
at defending the homeland. But if we have to continually be
aware of negligent drones flying into our base, it is going to
divert attention.
That is not to say that we do not need to address this
threat because, as was brought up by this Committee and we
agree with, our adversary has demonstrated that they will use
this type of activity for unauthorized surveillance, for
espionage.
Mr. Biggs. Yes, and let us add to that for a second, and
that is the coupling of AI, which is moving rapidly forward and
providing autonomous navigation, obstacle avoidance, deep
learning, computer vision, easier to become weaponized, real-
time image recognition, target identification. So, I would
like, briefly, if you could, either one of you want to talk
about the threat of AI, coupled with drone technology, to
become actually an exponentially increased threat to our
national security.
Mr. Ditlevson. Congressman, it is a great question. Thank
you for that. On the policy side, we need to make sure that our
regulations internally at the DoD are streamlined to the extent
that we stay at pace with the threat that we face outside the
fence line of our installations. We need to make sure that we
are giving the commanders on the ground clarity on what they
have for authority and providing them the capabilities to
counter those threats.
Now, I think the Admiral can speak better as far as what is
actually being developed at this time and how far ahead we are
in counter-UAS technologies, but as far as the policy purview
is concerned, I know from the Secretary of Defense front office
down, we need to give the warfighter every capability they need
to keep our service members safe.
Mr. Biggs. I know that I am not going to have time to hear
your answer, Admiral, sorry, but with regard to the policy, I
would ask that you work with the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on policies that need to be rewritten, perhaps through
legislation, that we can do to facilitate defending against
this combination of AI and drone technology, which is advancing
very rapidly.
Mr. Chairman, to that extent, I have some unanimous consent
requests, if possible.
Mr. Timmons. Yes.
Mr. Biggs. Yes, the first one is ``Autonomous Ascent: How
AI is Reshaping the Future of the UAV Industry.'' Another
piece, ``Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17
days.'' The next one, ``What We Know About the Langley Air
Force Base Drone Incident.''
Mr. Timmons. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Cloud, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for bringing up
this very important topic that is very timely. And thank you,
Admiral, especially for your service and those in uniform
behind you for what you do to protect and serve our country.
It occurs to me that we are discussing this issue, but it
seems to me like it is as much a system of some of the bigger
issues we have seen at the Pentagon regarding our stance just
on the world stage in the sense that, you know, I wish we were
talking today about how advanced we are and how forward-
thinking we have thought about this and that we have invested
in these new technologies and that we are leading the world in
it when we look at drones and drone incursions. But yet, for
me, you know, I have considered that funding our defense is our
No. 1 constitutional duty in Congress.
My biggest concerns have been that sometimes we are funding
legacy systems that are outdated as opposed to investing into
where the puck is going, so to speak. And while the funding for
this is in lots of different buckets, my analysis, looking
through a bunch of this, it seems like we are spending about
$22 billion-ish in the last budget on fighter jets and maybe $1
billion on drone and counter-drone technology together. That
may be off a bit because, again, it is in a lot of different
pockets.
But it is that that concerns me in the sense of, you know,
we are talking about military incursions over our base. We are
talking about one drone coming and what we can or cannot do
about it. I think from the American taxpayer who is sitting at
home going, we are spending $800 billion roughly on defense,
and we cannot shoot a drone down, it is just a frustrating
experience because we want to think that we can do that.
So, as has been mentioned, us needing to do our job to make
sure that you have the capabilities to do it, but I would also
wonder how much of this is a little bit of a reactive stance in
command being more concerned about CYA, so to speak, as opposed
to protecting the assets and the intelligence and the
information that is available on that base.
You mentioned that you recently developed the SOP, I guess,
about a month ago. That was news to me. Could we get a copy of
that sent to this Committee?
Admiral Spedero. Yes, sir. I do not see a problem with
that. I will coordinate with the Commander, U.S. Northern
Command.
Mr. Cloud. OK. That would be much appreciated.
And, you know, we all remember, what I would call, Biden's
balloon blunder where we had this balloon come across. We sat
here and watched it for days. I went to a meteorologist at one
of the local news stations, and he was tracking it and
predicting where it was going to go, and yet we were watching
it go over bases and not doing anything about it. How much of
this is just not the will to act versus legitimately you being
prohibited legally from doing things? There is a difference
between not having a clear authority and being prohibited from
doing something, I guess is what I am trying to draw on.
Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congressman. That is a great question.
For us on the policy side, we seek to clarify the authorities
for base commanders so that they understand exactly what they
are able to do. And, as you pointed out, sometimes there may be
a little bit of confusion because of how the language is given
out or guidance is pushed down to the lower levels.
During our review of counter-UAS policies, as prescribed in
section 925 of the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, we have gone back and
we have reviewed all of our counter-UAS documentation. For
example, section 130i, it was at about 130 pages. We have cut
that down to 20 pages now. So, we are looking to streamline our
processes as much----
Mr. Cloud. Yes.
Mr. Ditlevson [continuing]. As possible so commanders
understand what they have for authorities.
Mr. Cloud. That is certainly very helpful. I guess, you
know, if I could convey kind of the angst of the American
people, you know, we are looking at this and thinking, OK,
there is drone incursion into the United States. You know,
there are bad actors within our borders now who have the
ability to even attack infrastructure. And we are talking
military bases, but it could be electric powerlines, it could
be pipelines, it could be anything at this point, and we seem
very--like we are approaching this from a very bureaucratic
standpoint as opposed to something that literally could be a
problem next week. And I am wondering what we can do, and what
we can help you do, in the sense of the sense of urgency that
could be needed.
Again, we have bad actors even at the state level within
our borders because, you know, we had open borders for the last
4 years, so the terrorist activity that is now in our country
and bad actors from other states that do not have the best
interest of our country in mind are here with this kind of
capability. And what can we do to speed up this process so that
it is handled with the urgency as opposed to kind of, like,
this curious bureaucratic question that needs to be resolved?
That is a question. What can we do to speed it up both from
DoD and from Congress' standpoint to support what you need?
Mr. Ditlevson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. We
have a legislative proposal working through the Pentagon right
now focused on three areas where we could improve section 130i.
In the Department's opinion, we do not want this provision to
sunset. We want to make sure that the authorities continue
forward. There is an expiration date on 130i authorities next
year.
We also want to expand the locations and missions covered
under 130i. As we have discussed today, the bases are not all
covered. Not all installations qualify as one of the nine
mission areas under 130i, so we would like to expand that to
cover all installations.
And then we would also like to facilitate data sharing
because, right now, data sharing from the DoD side is limited
only in the pursuit of a legal case against a particular
individual or group. We are not able to share data with our
interagency partners to improve our tactics, techniques, or
procedures. And to your point, Congressman, earlier about
driving cost efficiencies, being able to share data to produce
better technology would help us be more efficient with taxpayer
money.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. The gentleman's time has
expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
Luna, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Luna. Thank you, Chairman.
Here is what every American needs to know that is watching
this currently. In 2024 alone, 350 drones were detected flying
over our military installations, over 100 to be exact, and that
came straight out of the mouth of General Gregory Guillot,
Commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. These were not
just toys. These were intelligence-gathering, signal-jamming,
and potentially weaponized drones. These incursions happened
while the Biden Administration sat on their hands allowing
bureaucracy and interagency dysfunction to run the show. I see
a lot of military here right now. You guys all know that
bureaucracy, many times, can be our worst enemy.
Now that President Trump is back in office, thank God, we
finally have strong leadership again, but cleaning up Biden's
national security blunder is no small task. Our military
installations are still extremely vulnerable. As hearing just
sitting here from some of my colleagues, we have the CCP,
Iranian proxies, Mexican cartels, they all know this.
We are here today to fix that. And let me be crystal clear.
As I am sure many of you would agree, if you are flying
unauthorized drones over military installations, you should
expect it to be shot down. Do not expect Uncle Sam to pay for
it either. My opinion is play stupid games, win stupid prizes.
Now, Admiral Spedero, I have heard directly from General
Guillot, in February, 350 drone incursions over 100 military
installations in 1 year. I know that this is not your fault
directly, but this is a massive security gap and utter failure.
Under current authorities, what is preventing base commanders
from neutralizing these immediately, in my opinion, going out
there with a shotgun and shooting these things down?
Admiral Spedero. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. I wish
it were as simple as shooting it with a shotgun, but it is not.
Ms. Luna. Depending on elevation. But what is stopping it?
Is it still the bureaucratic red tape and sign-offs? Because in
my opinion, if you are flying something like this that can jam
communications, maybe carry explosives, collect surveillance on
classified systems, I do not think that you should have to be
required to make a phone call. I think that if you see it, you
should shoot it down.
Admiral Spedero. Yes, under 130i, unauthorized surveillance
would meet the standard for engagement. If it were interfering
with your operations, it would meet the standard for
engagement. If you are not at 130i, then again, back to the
rules of engagement and establishing hostile intent or hostile
act. But you may get there, so just the presence of that drone
over your base may meet hostile intent or hostile act. There is
not a set of circumstances I can tell you in every case and go
down a checklist, OK, you have met it, go ahead and shoot.
Ms. Luna. Sir, I mean, I think you might agree. If you are
flying a drone in any capacity, I do not care if it is civilian
or not, over a military installation, I do not even think you
should have to go to a checklist. I think that it should
automatically be taken down.
Admiral Spedero. Yes, and that is the preference to invoke
130i is to relieve that burden because we do agree that
unauthorized access to our bases poses a threat. Even if there
are not sensitive activities, it does provide surveillance of
our force posture, our weak points, our vulnerabilities, you
know, descriptions, geographic details of the base.
Ms. Luna. All of the information, right?
Admiral Spedero. They can gather intelligence piece by
piece by any means necessary, so we do want 130i protection
because we would like to relieve that burden. Now, engagement
still needs to meet the standard, the responsible standard, and
you have to do a collateral damage assessment before you can
engage anywhere.
Ms. Luna. Well, I have a feeling with this Administration
and the Members on this panel, I think that you will probably
get there. So, help is on the way in that regard.
Mr. Ditlevson--hopefully, I said that OK--do you believe
that foreign adversaries like China and Iran exploit the
jurisdictional chaos under the previous Administration to
increase their drone activity over U.S. territories?
Mr. Ditlevson. Yes, Congresswoman. I think our adversaries
take advantage of every weakness that we have in our system,
and they are constantly probing, trying to find an entry point.
Ms. Luna. OK. Well, let me just be crystal clear for the
record. If you fly a drone over an American military base, it
should be blown out of the sky. I do not think that this is a
controversial perspective to have. No phone calls, no
paperwork, no permission slips. But under the Biden message, I
think it was more or less the message of fly wherever you want,
we will kind of deal with it later. But be crystal clear, under
this Administration, the message is FAFO. For decorum's sake,
we will not interpret that, but just mess around, find out. You
guys all know what that means.
We have the technology, we have the capability, but what we
have lacked up until now is the courage to act without apology.
This is not about drones. It is about deterrence. It is about
restoring the kind of unapologetic strength that keeps our
enemies at bay and our warfighters safe.
I yield my time. Thank you guys so much for being here
today. You guys look great in uniform, and you do too, ladies.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. In closing, I want to thank our
witnesses once again for their testimony today.
I now yield to Ranking Member Subramanyam for closing
remarks.
Mr. Subramanyam. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think I will keep
it brief.
I think we have some good ideas that we can maybe turn into
legislation, and we can hopefully make sure that we empower
bases to both have the right technologies to address this, as
well as to make sure more military installations are covered
under statute potentially, make sure there is better
coordination with state, local, and Federal, and make sure that
overall we have a workforce and the capacity to be able to
address these challenges. So, I am glad we are all on the same
page on that front, and I look forward to working on this
together.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I now recognize myself for closing
remarks.
It seems that we are a bit paralyzed here in Congress to
deal with emerging technology. I have been working on
cybersecurity legislation for the last six-plus years, and the
bill that we need, a comprehensive bill would have to go
through at least ten, maybe more, committees of jurisdiction to
get it right in the House and probably another five-plus in the
Senate. And we are just unable to do what we need to do to
address real national security issues in the realm of
cybersecurity. And I fear that it is going to take some tragedy
to cause us to act in that capacity on cybersecurity.
I do not think drones are much different both because of
the complexity, the challenges that we face from a legislative
perspective, whether it is authorizing and appropriating the
money to purchase the necessary technology to monitor, to then
engage with and disarm drones that are posing a threat, or
whether it is the authority side to address the legal concerns
that are very real. And it is probably not going to get done in
one bill. It is going to probably be a number of bills, and,
you know, there is going to be a lot of interest surrounding
how we do it.
You know, as I think about this issue, the Chinese New Year
drone was one of the most amazing things I have ever seen, and
it also was very troubling. That display of--I mean, I guess it
was an AI-enabled drone swarm that was basically providing
entertainment. But while it was very entertaining, it is also
terrifying. And I think that the capabilities of our
adversaries and seeing how war has evolved in Ukraine and how
the Russians and the Ukraine military are largely relying on
drones, I mean, a huge portion of that conflict is being used
as technology as opposed to traditional warfare.
So, we have got to get moving on this. We have to enhance
our capacity. Congress has to act, but a lot of this is the
private sector getting up to speed. A lot of this is our
Defense Department telling us exactly what they need. And we do
not have time to waste. We have spent enormous amounts of
resources to make sure that we have a 24/7, 365 air alert
mission for fighter jets to be deployed. And I am not sure how
good that capacity is right now, considering that a couple
dozen drones could severely impede our ability to get jets off
the ground. So, I mean, this is a huge, huge challenge, and we
need to act before it is too late.
I appreciate you all taking the time to come here today. It
seems that we are moving in the right direction, and I
appreciate your work to help get us where we need to be. And I
look forward to working with my friend, the Ranking Member, to
craft some legislation.
And with that, I will yield back. Thank you again for being
here today.
Without objection, all Members have five legislative days
within which to submit materials and additional written
questions for the witnesses, which will be forwarded to the
witnesses. If there is no further business, without objection,
the Subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]