[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROMOTING AND IMPROVING SAFETY AND
EFFICIENT PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
(119-8)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 25, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-155 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member
Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Arkansas, Vice Chairman District of Columbia
Daniel Webster, Florida Jerrold Nadler, New York
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Steve Cohen, Tennessee
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania John Garamendi, California
Brian Babin, Texas Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgia
David Rouzer, North Carolina Andre Carson, Indiana
Mike Bost, Illinois Dina Titus, Nevada
Doug LaMalfa, California Jared Huffman, California
Bruce Westerman, Arkansas Julia Brownley, California
Brian J. Mast, Florida Frederica S. Wilson, Florida
Pete Stauber, Minnesota Mark DeSaulnier, California
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Salud O. Carbajal, California
Dusty Johnson, South Dakota Greg Stanton, Arizona
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey Sharice Davids, Kansas
Troy E. Nehls, Texas Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois
Tracey Mann, Kansas Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Burgess Owens, Utah Seth Moulton, Massachusetts
Eric Burlison, Missouri Marilyn Strickland, Washington
Mike Collins, Georgia Patrick Ryan, New York
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Val T. Hoyle, Oregon
Kevin Kiley, California Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio,
Vince Fong, California Vice Ranking Member
Tony Wied, Wisconsin Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan
Tom Barrett, Michigan Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina
Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania
Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr., Robert Garcia, California
Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Jeff Hurd, Colorado Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan
Jefferson Shreve, Indiana Laura Friedman, California
Addison P. McDowell, North Carolina Laura Gillen, New York
David J. Taylor, Ohio Shomari Figures, Alabama
Brad Knott, North Carolina
Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
Northern Mariana Islands
Mike Kennedy, Utah
Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri
Vacancy
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
Dina Titus, Nevada, Ranking Member
David Rouzer, North Carolina Andre Carson, Indiana
Mike Bost, Illinois Seth Moulton, Massachusetts
Doug LaMalfa, California Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina
Bruce Westerman, Arkansas Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania,
Pete Stauber, Minnesota Vice Ranking Member
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Jerrold Nadler, New York
Dusty Johnson, South Dakota Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois
Troy E. Nehls, Texas Steve Cohen, Tennessee
Tracey Mann, Kansas Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgia
Burgess Owens, Utah Frederica S. Wilson, Florida
Eric Burlison, Missouri Patrick Ryan, New York
Vince Fong, California Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio
Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska Laura Friedman, California
Jefferson Shreve, Indiana Mark DeSaulnier, California
David J. Taylor, Ohio Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio)
Mike Kennedy, Utah
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials, opening statement..................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening statement.......... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
WITNESSES
Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid
Energy Pipeline Association, oral statement.................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Eric V. Taylor, P.E., Director, Engineering Services, BHE GT&S,
on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America,
oral statement................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Emanuel A. Paris IV, Vice President, Alex E. Paris Contracting
Co., Inc., on behalf of the Distribution Contractors
Association and the Pennsylvania Utility Contractors
Association, oral statement.................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, oral
statement...................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Daniel Webster:
Statement of Rob Benedict, Vice President, Petrochemicals and
Midstream, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers..... 61
Statement of the American Gas Association.................... 62
Letter of February 21, 2025, from Sarah K. Magruder Lyle,
President & Chief Executive Officer, Common Ground
Alliance, to Hon. Daniel Webster, Chairman, and Hon. Dina
Titus, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials......................... 64
Letter of March 6, 2025, from Hon. Chrissy Houlahan, a
Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, and Hon. Daniel Webster, Chairman, and Hon.
Dina Titus, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Dina Titus................................................ 67
APPENDIX
Question to Eric V. Taylor, P.E., Director, Engineering Services,
BHE GT&S, on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America, from Hon. Dina Titus............................... 69
Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust, from Hon. Dina Titus.................................... 70
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
February 21, 2025
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Promoting and Improving
Safety and Efficient Pipeline Infrastructure''
_______________________________________________________________________
I. PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
will meet on Tuesday, February 25, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. ET in
2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony
at a hearing entitled, ``Promoting and Improving Safety and
Efficient Pipeline Infrastructure.'' The United States
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is the Federal agency
responsible for regulating the safety of natural gas and
hazardous liquids pipelines. In 2023, the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure passed H.R. 6494, the
Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of
2023 (PIPES Act of 2023) that would reauthorize and make
improvements to PHMSA's pipeline safety programs and processes
to better ensure the safe transportation of natural gas and
hazardous liquid energy sources.\1\
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\1\ PIPES Act of 2023, H.R.6494, 118th Cong. (2024), [hereinafter
PIPES Act of 2023].
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This hearing will examine stakeholder perspectives on
legislation to improve natural gas and hazardous liquid
pipeline infrastructure safety. Members will receive testimony
from Andrew Black, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
Liquid Energy Pipeline Association; Eric V. Taylor, Director,
Engineering Services, Berkshire Hathaway Energy Eastern Gas
Transmission and Storage (BHE GT&S) on behalf of the Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America; Emanuel A. Paris IV, Vice
President of Alex E. Paris Contracting Co., Inc. on behalf of
the Distribution Contractors Association and the Pennsylvania
Utility Contractors Association; and Bill Caram, Executive
Director, Pipeline Safety Trust.
II. BACKGROUND
ABOUT PHMSA
PHMSA was created under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and
Special Programs Improvement Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-426) (2004
Act). Prior to the implementation of the 2004 Act, the DOT
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) managed the
DOT's pipeline and hazardous materials safety programs.\2\
PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the environment by
advancing the safe transportation of natural gas and hazardous
liquids through roughly 3.4 million miles of pipelines, which
account for the transportation of 65 percent of the energy
commodities consumed in the United States.\3\ The 2004 Act
established that PHMSA ``shall consider the assignment and
maintenance of safety as the highest priority . . . .'' \4\
PHMSA is also charged with the safe and secure movement of over
one million daily shipments of hazardous materials by all modes
of transportation.\5\
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\2\ Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423 [hereinafter the 2004
Act].
\3\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Program Budget and Grants Presentation
(Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.).
\4\ The 2004 Act, supra note 2.
\5\ See Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58,
135 Stat. 429, [hereinafter IIJA]; id.
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PHMSA sets Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline
safety functions, including developing, issuing, and enforcing
regulations for the safe transportation of natural gas
(including liquefied natural gas) and hazardous liquids by
pipeline through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).\6\ The
Agency's regulatory programs are focused on the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance or abandonment of
pipeline facilities, and in the construction, operation, and
maintenance of LNG facilities.\7\ PHMSA has safety jurisdiction
over transportation-related pipeline facilities; not drilling,
siting, or production facilities.\8\ Overall, OPS directly
employs 232 Federal inspector and enforcement staff, and
partners with 450 state inspectors.\9\
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\6\ PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/offices/office-pipeline-safety (last
updated Dec. 13, 2018).
\7\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Regulations, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/SafetyStandards.htm?nocache=8847.
\8\ See PHMSA, PHMSA Regulations, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations (last updated May 5, 2021); see also Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Natural Gas Pipelines, available at https://
www.ferc.gov/industries-data/natural-gas/overview/natural-gas-pipelines
(last updated Feb. 10, 2021); see also Library of Cong., Oil and Gas
Industry: A Research Guide, available at https://guides.loc.gov/oil-
and-gas-industry/laws/agencies.
\9\ PHMSA, Federal Effort, [hereinafter Federal Effort], available
at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
pipeline/effort-allocation/federal-
effort#: :text=OPS%27s%20216%20federal%20inspection
%20and,8%2C541%20hazardous%20liquid%20breakout%20tanks (last updated
Feb. 14, 2025).
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PIPELINE SAFETY FRAMEWORK
Safety regulations differ depending on the nature of the
pipeline and the commodity that is moving through it. PHMSA's
regulations govern pipelines and facilities that transport
natural gas separately from those that transport hazardous
liquids.\10\ Additionally, the pipelines and facilities used to
transport natural gas and hazardous liquids vary in operating
pressures, diameter size, intended purpose, and proximity to
populated areas.\11\ This infrastructure includes:
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\10\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 192, 195.
\11\ Id.
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LDistribution Pipelines: These pipelines transport
natural gas to commercial and residential end-users. Gas
distribution pipelines tend to be smaller in diameter and
operate at lower pressures.\12\ PHMSA estimates there are 2.35
million miles of gas distribution lines, many of which are
intrastate pipelines.\13\ There are no hazardous liquid
distribution pipelines.\14\
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\12\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Distribution Pipelines, available at
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
FSDistributionPipelines.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2018).
\13\ PHMSA, Annual Report Mileage for Gas Distribution Systems,
available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/
annual-report-mileage-gas-distribution-systems [hereinafter Annual
Mileage Report].
\14\ Gov't Accountability Off. (GAO), GAO-12-388, Pipeline Safety:
Collecting Data and Sharing Information on Federally Unregulated
Gathering Pipelines Could Help Enhance Safety, at 3, available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-388.pdf.
LTransmission Pipelines: These pipelines transport
energy products from treatment and processing facilities to
bulk customers, storage facilities, and local distribution
networks.\15\ The products transported can include natural gas
and hazardous liquids.\16\ PHMSA estimates there are 300,464
miles of interstate gas transmission lines.\17\
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\15\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
FSTransmissionPipelines.htm.
\16\ PHMSA, Pipeline Miles and Facilities 2010+, available at
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/
analytics/
saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_
portal%2FPublic%20Reports&Page=Infrastructure (last updated Jan. 28,
2022).
\17\ Annual Mileage Report, supra note 13.
LGathering Lines: These lines transport natural
gas from a production site to a central collection point. PHMSA
currently regulates 111,547 miles of gas gathering lines.\18\
Historically, gathering lines were built in lower populated
areas, had smaller diameters than transmission lines, and
operated at pressures and flow lower than transmission
lines.\19\ However, as new gas development occurs around the
country, producers are installing new gathering systems in
higher populated areas and building larger diameter and higher-
pressure gathering lines.\20\
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\18\ Id.
\19\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Gathering Pipelines, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/factsheets/fsgatheringpipelines.htm.
\20\ PHMSA, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Pipeline Safety: Safety
of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, PHMSA-2011-0023 (Apr. 8,
2016), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/05/
13/2016-11240/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-transmission-and-gathering-
pipelines.
LHazardous Liquid Pipelines: These pipelines
transport liquid petroleum and other types of liquid energy
products from sources of origin to refineries and chemical
plants, and in some cases to storage or distribution
facilities.\21\ According to PHMSA, hazardous liquids traverse
the United States through approximately 228,000 miles of
hazardous liquid pipelines.\22\ Hazardous liquids include crude
oil, refined petroleum products, and anhydrous ammonia.\23\
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\21\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and
Issues, available at https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
2015-PST-Briefing-Paper-03-HazLiquidBasics.pdf, (last updated Sept.
2015).
\22\ Annual Mileage Report, supra note 13.
\23\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 195.2. (noting PHMSA currently regulates
carbon dioxide in the supercritical state in 49 C.F.R. Sec. 195.
Carbon dioxide in this state is primarily used for enhanced oil
recovery).
LLiquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities: These
facilities are used for converting, transporting, or storing
LNG. Historically, PHMSA has regulated peak shaving facilities
and satellite facilities where LNG has been used to manage
capacity during times of peak demand. PHMSA also regulates
import and export terminals.\24\ To address growth in LNG
exports, the PIPES Act of 2016 and the PIPES Act of 2020
mandated that PHMSA update its safety regulations for LNG
facilities; however, rulemaking remains in its early
development phase.\25\
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\24\ See PHMSA, LNG Facility Siting, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-facility-siting.
\25\ PHMSA, PIPES ACT 2020 Web Chart, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2025-01/
January%202025%20PIPES%20Act%20Chart.pdf.
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PHMSA'S PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT
When violations of PHMSA's regulations occur, the Agency
has several enforcement mechanisms it can use. These include
the issuance of a warning letter, a notice of probable
violation, or a corrective action order.\26\ PHMSA may also
issue fines for non-compliance.\27\ In 2024, PHMSA initiated
197 cases and closed 187 enforcement cases.\28\
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\26\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 190.205.
\27\ See PHMSA, Civil Penalty Summary, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/pipeline/enforcement/civil-
penalty-summary.
\28\ PHMSA, Enforcement Activity, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data.
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STATES' PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT
PHMSA supports states' oversight work by authorizing states
to assume certain aspects of pipeline safety enforcement for
intrastate gas pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and
underground natural gas storage through certifications and
agreements with PHMSA under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 60105 and
60106(a). PHMSA also authorizes states with certifications to
participate in the oversight of interstate pipeline
transportation through agreements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.
60106(b). To conduct inspections and enforcement, each state
must annually certify its pipeline safety program by
demonstrating to the Secretary of Transportation that it: has
adopted, or is taking steps to adopt, the Federal standards; is
enforcing each standard through inspections; and is encouraging
and promoting the establishment of damage prevention
programs.\29\ States with certified pipeline safety programs
may impose additional standards for intrastate pipelines and
facilities so long as they are compatible with the minimum
Federal standards issued by PHMSA.\30\
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\29\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60105.
\30\ PHMSA, State Programs Overview, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/state-programs-overview.
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III. KEY PROVISIONS OF COMMITTEE'S PIPELINE SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION
FROM 118th CONGRESS: H.R. 6494, THE PIPES ACT OF 2023:
The current authorization for PHMSA pipeline safety
activities and programs expired on September 30, 2023, and has
been operating under continuing authorities. On December 16,
2023, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
favorably reported H.R. 6494, the PIPES Act of 2023 that passed
by voice vote.\31\ No further action was taken by the House
during the 118th Congress.
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\31\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 1.
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The bill would support the reliability and safety of
American energy infrastructure and PHMSA's pipeline safety
mission through rulemaking direction, studies, and programs
that increase pipeline safety, transparency, and stakeholder
engagement. These provisions will improve the performance and
safety record of the United States natural gas and hazardous
liquid pipeline network.
SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS AND SUPPORTING PHMSA'S MISSION
The PIPES Act of 2023 supports PHMSA's mission. Section 24
of the bill directs PHMSA to establish a voluntary information
sharing system (VIS) that encourages pipeline operators and
stakeholders to share pipeline safety data through a
confidential platform to be analyzed and reported, so that
pipeline safety lessons learned can be shared with
stakeholders.\32\
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\32\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 1, at Sec. 24.
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While serious pipeline incidents have declined by 34
percent over the previous 20 years, there remain a number of
preventable incidents the bill seeks to address.\33\ According
to PHMSA data, excavation damage in the past 20 years accounted
for over 1,300 incidents, 60 fatalities, and $659.8 million in
property damage to pipelines, representing 11 percent of all
pipeline incidents.\34\ Section 18 of the PIPES Act of 2023
updates the assessment criteria for State Damage Prevention
programs and requires adoption of leading practices for state
one-call programs, including requiring states to limit
exemptions to one-call program participation and increasing the
use of commercially-available technology to locate underground
facilities.\35\ Also, according to PHMSA data, pipeline
material, weld, or equipment failures in the past 20 years
accounted for 5,184 incidents, 32 fatalities, and $3.8 billion
in property damage, representing 41 percent of all pipeline
incidents.\36\ The bill ensures PHMSA and state pipeline safety
programs have necessary resources to conduct pipeline safety
oversight, including $56 million over four years for increases
to state pipeline safety program budgets and calls for hiring
up to 30 additional employees with advanced engineering,
scientific, or other technical expertise at PHMSA.\37\
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\33\ Federal Effort, supra note 9.
\34\ PHMSA, Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends, (last updated Dec.
11, 2023), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/
pipeline/pipeline-incident-20-year-trends [hereinafter Pipeline
Incident].
\35\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 1, at Sec. 18.
\36\ Pipeline Incident, supra note 34.
\37\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 1, at Sec. 2.
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INCREASED TRANSPARENCY
The PIPES Act of 2023 requires PHMSA to review industry
safety standards every four years and incorporate into existing
regulations as needed, and improves public access to such
standards.\38\ Section 7 of the bill directs PHMSA to report on
its inspection and enforcement priorities, as well as report on
the number of inspections completed and violations found.\39\
Section 8 of the bill requires PHMSA to provide notification to
Congress when it does not follow the recommendations of the
external technical safety standards advisory committees.\40\
Section 10 creates an Office of Public Engagement and assigns
specific duties to engage with the public, government
officials, public safety organizations, and pipeline operators,
and assist with inquiries regarding pipeline safety best
practices and regulations. Further, Section 29 directs PHMSA to
assess how pipeline operators engage and share information with
the public and state or local emergency response organizations,
and issue updated guidance if necessary.\41\
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\38\ Id. at Sec. 6.
\39\ Id. at Sec. 7.
\40\ Id. at Sec. 8.
\41\ Id. at Sec. 29.
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EMERGING FUELS AND TECHNOLOGIES
Section 20 of the Pipes Act of 2023 requires the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to study existing natural gas
pipeline systems that blend hydrogen at a volume greater than
five percent. The report may inform future rulemaking if
necessary.\42\ Additionally, Section 14 of the bill requires
PHMSA to study the potential and existing use of pipelines
constructed with composite materials to transport hydrogen and
hydrogen blended with natural gas, and issue a rulemaking
allowing for the use of such materials following the completion
of the study.\43\ Lastly, the bill directs PHSMA to update its
regulations that govern the transportation of gaseous carbon
dioxide, including the requirement that operators utilize
dispersion modeling in high consequence areas.\44\
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\42\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 1, at Sec. 20.
\43\ Id. at Sec. 14.
\44\ Id. at Sec. 25.
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IV. WITNESSES
LAndrew Black, President and CEO, Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association
LEric V. Taylor, P.E., Director, Engineering
Services, BHE GT&S, on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America
LEmanuel A. Paris IV, Vice President, Alex E.
Paris Contracting Co., Inc., on behalf of the Distribution
Contractors Association and the Pennsylvania Utility
Contractors Association
LBill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust
PROMOTING AND IMPROVING SAFETY AND
EFFICIENT PIPELINE INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m. in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during the subcommittee's hearing.
Without objection, show that adopted.
I also ask unanimous consent that the Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit on the subcommittee on today's
hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, show that ordered.
As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into
the record, please email those documents to
[email protected].
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLOR-
IDA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPE-
LINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Mr. Webster of Florida. When it comes to energy resources,
the United States has been twice blessed. First, we have been
blessed with a natural endowment of natural resources of
various types and compositions. Second, we have been blessed
with the ingenuity and entrepreneurship and that spirit that
goes with that to develop technologies and capabilities to
safely and effectively access, develop, and transport these
previously unavailable resources to markets and consumers.
The economic and security benefits of this bounty have been
substantial. Overall, the domestic oil and gas sector supports
more than 10 million jobs and generates nearly $1.8 trillion in
economic activity. The average industry wage is 65 percent
greater than the United States average wage in other employment
sectors. These jobs are spread across multiple industries,
including manufacturing, construction, transportation, and
warehousing.
Our committee has an interest in ensuring this energy
bounty is safely transported across the energy supply chain.
Today's hearing will examine the need to reauthorize the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or
PHMSA, including providing it with new direction and authority
over emerging energy resources.
Last Congress, the committee passed H.R. 6494, the
Promising Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of
2023, or PIPES. It was reported out of the committee on a
bipartisan basis. In drafting this bill, the committee
solicited input from a wide range of parties and received 90
priorities from Members and over 100 requests from pipeline
safety stakeholders.
In our country, roughly 3.3 million miles of onshore
pipelines safely and efficiently carry natural gas, crude,
hydrogen, hazardous liquids, and other energy sources vital to
our Nation's energy independence. It is of the utmost
importance for Congress to ensure that PHMSA is focused on its
core mission of advancing the safe transportation of these
resources.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today: Mr. Andrew
Black, president and CEO of the Liquid Energy Pipeline
Association; Eric Taylor, director of engineering services, BHE
GT&S; Emanuel Paris, vice president of Alex E. Paris
Contracting Company; and Mr. Bill Caram, executive director of
the Pipeline Safety Trust.
I look forward to hearing your testimony.
[Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
When it comes to energy resources, the United States has been twice
blessed. First, we are blessed with a natural endowment of mineral
resources of various types and composition. Second, we are blessed with
the ingenuity and entrepreneurial spirit of American business that
developed the technology and capabilities to safely and efficiently
access, develop, and transport these previously unavailable resources
to markets and consumers.
The economic and security benefits of this bounty have been
substantial. Overall, the domestic oil and gas sector supports more
than 10 million jobs and generates nearly $1.8 trillion in economic
activity. The average industry wage is 65 percent greater than the
United States average wage in other employment sectors. These jobs are
spread across multiple industries including manufacturing,
construction, transportation, and warehousing.
Our committee has an interest in ensuring this energy bounty is
safely transported across the energy supply chain. Today's hearing will
examine the need to reauthorize the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), including providing it with new
direction and authority over emerging energy sources.
Last Congress, the Committee passed H.R. 6494, the Promoting
Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023. It
was reported out of Committee on a bipartisan basis. In drafting this
bill, the Committee solicited input from a wide range of parties and
received about 90 priorities from Members and over 100 requests from
pipeline safety stakeholders.
In our country, roughly 3.3 million miles of onshore pipelines
safely and efficiently carry natural gas, crude, hydrogen, hazardous
liquids, and other energy sources vital for our nation's energy
independence. It is of the utmost importance for Congress to ensure
PHMSA is focused on its core mission of advancing the safe
transportation of these resources.
Mr. Webster of Florida. I will yield back now and recognize
Ranking Member Titus for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DINA TITUS OF NEVADA,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPE-
LINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for being here today.
As you all know, there are 3.4 million miles of hazardous
liquid and gas pipelines in the United States that help deliver
energy to all communities in all our districts. Over 11,000 of
those are in Nevada, so ensuring the safety of these pipelines
is a matter I take very seriously.
In 2004, just to do a little history, Congress enacted
legislation to create the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, or PHMSA. PHMSA's dedicated staff in the
Office of Pipeline Safety ensures that the United States
pipeline transportation network operates safely, reliably, and
in an environmentally sound manner.
States have also taken steps to improve pipeline safety. In
2021, Nevada became the first State to require annual leak
surveys of all intrastate natural gas pipelines. This was
annual instead of every 5 years, I think it was. By identifying
leaks early on, the regulations are helping prevent explosions
at businesses and in residential areas all across Nevada. Late
last year also, you saw regulators in Colorado finalize rules
requiring operators of natural gas pipelines to disclose more
data on leaks.
Data from PHMSA shows that serious pipeline incidents have
really improved. They have decreased by 34 percent over the
last 20 years, and that's great. But despite this progress,
there is still work to be done.
In January of last year, 2024, two houses, for example,
less than a mile apart in Jackson, Mississippi, exploded just 3
days from each other because of Atmos Energy pipeline leaks.
The first home explosion resulted in one fatality and one
injury. The resulting fire from the second explosion spread to
a neighboring home. These incidents happened after Atmos had
identified leaks in their pipelines in the area, but had failed
to correct and repair them.
Then, in December of last year, a natural gas explosion in
Avondale, Louisiana, killed one person and injured five. And
again, this pipe was operated by Atmos Energy.
Congress has repeatedly made it clear that pipeline safety
is a bipartisan issue, and I appreciate that, and that's why I
am concerned with President Trump's efforts to slash the
Federal workforce that will ensure this safety.
Last Congress, as the chairman said, this committee
approved a bipartisan pipeline safety bill that would authorize
PHMSA to hire 30 additional staff members to implement pipeline
safety policies and fulfill Congress' mandates. This was
supported by Democrats and Republicans, as well as industry and
safety advocates, because we all know that increased capacity
will make pipelines safer for operators, for communities near
pipelines, and for our environment in general. This
legislation, however, never did receive a vote on the House
floor.
The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2023 also included critical
provisions to address PHMSA's safety workforce shortages,
improve PHMSA's public outreach and engagement efforts, and
strengthen penalties for pipeline damage and disruption. The
bill also had provisions to help PHMSA prepare to regulate the
next generation of pipelines in keeping up with technology.
Congress invested in pipeline projects to transport gaseous
carbon dioxide and hydrogen through the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act. I want to
be sure that the Federal safety regulators have the tools they
need to mitigate the new risks that are associated with these
projects.
In closing, I look forward to working with the chairman and
other members of this committee to build on the bipartisan work
on pipeline safety that started long ago and intensified last
session so that we can get legislation across the finish line
during this Congress.
So, thank you all for being here today, and I look forward
to hearing your perspectives.
I yield back.
[Ms. Titus' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Thank you, Chairman Webster, for holding this hearing today.
There are 3.4 million miles of hazardous liquid and gas pipelines
in the United States that help deliver energy to our communities, and
over 11,000 of those are in Nevada. Ensuring the safe operations of
these pipelines is a matter I take very seriously.
In 2004, Congress enacted legislation to create the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. PHMSA's dedicated staff in
the Office of Pipeline Safety ensure that the United States' pipeline
transportation network operates safely, reliably and in an
environmentally sound manner.
States have also taken steps to improve pipeline safety. In 2021,
Nevada became the first state to require annual leak surveys of all
intrastate natural gas pipelines. By identifying leaks early on, these
regulations are helping prevent explosions at businesses and in
residential areas across Nevada. Late last year, regulators in Colorado
also finalized rules requiring operators of natural gas pipelines to
disclose more data on leaks.
Data from PHMSA shows that serious pipeline incidents have
decreased by 34 percent over the last twenty years. Despite this
progress, our work is far from over.
In January 2024, two homes less than a mile from each other in
Jackson, Mississippi, exploded three days apart from Atmos Energy
pipeline leaks. The first home explosion resulted in one fatality and
one injury. The resulting fire from the second explosion spread to a
neighboring home. These incidents happened after Atmos had identified
leaks in their pipelines in the area but failed to repair them.
In December of last year, a natural gas explosion in Avondale,
Louisiana, killed one person and injured five. This pipe was also
operated by Atmos Energy.
Congress has repeatedly made clear that pipeline safety is a
bipartisan issue. This is why I am so concerned about President Trump's
efforts to slash the federal workforce.
Last Congress, this Committee approved a bipartisan pipeline safety
bill that would authorize PHSMA to hire 30 additional staff to
implement pipeline safety policies and fulfill congressional mandates.
This was supported by Democrats and Republicans, as well as industry
and safety advocates, because increased capacity will make pipelines
safer for operators, communities near pipelines, and our environment.
This legislation, however, did not receive a vote on the House floor.
The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2023 also included critical provisions
to address PHMSA's safety workforce shortages, improve PHMSA's public
outreach and engagement efforts, and strengthen penalties for pipeline
damage or disruption. The bill also had provisions to help PHMSA
prepare to regulate the next generation of pipelines.
Congress invested in pipeline projects to transport gaseous carbon
dioxide and hydrogen through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the
Inflation Reduction Act. I want to be sure that federal safety
regulators have the tools they need to mitigate new risks associated
with these projects.
In closing, I look forward to working with Chairman Webster and the
other members of this Committee to build upon the bipartisan work on
pipeline safety to get legislation across the finish line this
Congress.
Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today. I look forward
to hearing each of your perspectives on this critical issue.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. I now
recognize the ranking member of the full committee.
Mr. Larsen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASH-
INGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPOR-
TATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Chair Webster and
Ranking Member Titus, for holding this hearing.
The recent rise in pipeline incidents and deaths should be
a warning call to this committee. Now, last year in the
Northwest, we marked the 25th anniversary of the Olympic
pipeline explosion in Bellingham, Washington, an explosion that
claimed the lives of two 10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old
young man. The explosion released 237,000 gallons of gasoline
into Whatcom Creek that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in
Bellingham.
And so since then, for my entire tenure in Congress, I have
fought to reduce the risk of pipeline incidents, promote
transparency of pipeline safety information for local
communities, and increase accountability for pipeline
operators. And progress has been made, but certainly more needs
to be done through legislation and rulemaking.
PHMSA advanced two important rulemakings in December of
last year, one on methane leak detection and the other on
gaseous carbon dioxide pipeline requirements. The leak
detection rule helps reduce pollution by limiting unintentional
methane leaks and intentional venting. I want to be clear that
President Trump signed this requirement into law in his first
term.
As well, the 2011 Pipeline Safety Act, passed 13 years ago,
first required a carbon dioxide rulemaking. This requirement
was made more urgent after a carbon dioxide pipeline ruptured
in Mississippi in 2020. These rulemakings will increase safety,
they are required by law, and the new administration should now
quickly advance them after pulling them back.They can do work
already without us having to do more work.
But now I want to turn to deadly accidents. According to
PHMSA, in the past 5 years, there have been 3,070 pipeline
incidents, killing 58 people, injuring 167 more people, and
causing more than $2.3 billion in property damage. The primary
reason these incidents occurred was due to material, weld, or
equipment failures: all factors primarily within the control of
pipeline operators.
The NTSB, in addition to doing its great work investigating
aviation accidents that we have seen over the last 34, 35 days,
has nine open pipeline safety investigations, including one
that launched this past weekend after a Kansas Gas pipeline
leak and explosion in Hutchinson, Kansas.
More people are dying, as well: 2024 and 2023 saw the
deadliest pipeline incidents in more than a decade. In March of
2023, a UGI pipeline explosion at a chocolate factory in West
Reading, Pennsylvania, killed 7 people, injured 11 people,
displaced 3 families from a neighboring apartment building, and
forced many more people from the area to evacuate. The
chocolate factory was not rebuilt, and production has shifted
to other facilities, leaving the town of West Reading,
population 4,530, without a significant employer that had been
in the community for 65 years.
And more problems are occurring. There were more incidents
in 2024 than there were in 2023, including one in my district
in late December of 2023. The now BP-owned Olympic pipeline saw
another gas spill in my district. This time more than 20,000
gallons of diesel spilled near an elementary school in Conway,
Washington. Emergency response took more than a year, and it
still hasn't been completely cleaned up.
But more can be done, and we should work quickly to pass a
pipeline safety bill similar to the one we passed last
Congress. This committee unanimously approved a bipartisan
pipeline safety bill that improved transparency by creating an
Office of Public Engagement, an idea championed by
Representative Strickland. This legislation also required PHMSA
to review operator emergency response plans.
And more funding will help. PHMSA and State pipeline safety
programs need resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct
investigations when incidents occur, and take appropriate
enforcement actions so bad actors are held accountable. Our
bill increased the authorizations for both PHMSA and State
pipeline safety authorities. We also included $56 million for
State pipeline safety programs over 4 years.
But I am troubled by the President's recent efforts to
remove people from the jobs that play a critical role to hold
pipeline operators accountable for their actions that might
harm people. Just as an example, PHMSA assessed a $2 million
civil penalty on Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines and its
contractor, Republic Testing Laboratories, for obstructing
PHMSA safety inspectors from observing pipeline repairs and
verbally and physically assaulting PHMSA safety inspectors.
Employees of these two companies physically prevented a PHMSA
safety inspector from questioning a welder, held up a screen to
prevent a PHMSA safety inspector from observing a weld, and
prevented a PHMSA safety inspector from photographing test
equipment. These repairs were being conducted to replace the
carbon dioxide pipeline that ruptured in Satartia, Mississippi,
that sent 45 people to the hospital in 2020.
Danbury's behavior towards PHMSA's safety inspectors, the
administration's efforts to cut staff from the Office of
Pipeline Safety and to cut funding for grants that Congress
itself--we all--mandated, including PHMSA's technical
assistance grants, put communities at risk nationwide. Let's
put safety in America first.
Now, Congress has recognized that improving safety requires
strong regulation and funding support. The BIL created the
first-ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and
Modernization grant program, and last May, PHMSA announced $196
million for 60 publicly owned utilities to repair or replace
natural gas pipelines. This investment will reduce incidents
and improve safety. We should keep it going.
Pipelines play a critical role in the daily lives of
Americans. We are here today to make sure the national pipeline
network safely delivers energy across the country.
I look forward to today's discussion and thank each of the
witnesses today for your testimony.
I yield.
[Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chairman Webster and Ranking Member Titus, for holding
this hearing.
The recent rise in pipeline incidents and deaths should be a
warning call to this Committee.
Last year, in the Northwest, we marked the 25th anniversary of the
Olympic pipeline explosion in Bellingham, WA that claimed the lives of
two 10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old young man.
The explosion released 237,000 gallons of gasoline into a creek
that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham.
For my entire tenure in Congress, I have fought to reduce the risk
of pipeline incidents, promote transparency of pipeline safety
information for local communities and increase accountability for
pipeline operators.
Progress has been made, but more needs to be done through
legislation and rulemaking.
PHMSA advanced two important rulemakings in December 2024: one on
methane leak detection and the other on gaseous carbon dioxide pipeline
requirements.
The leak detection rule helps reduce pollution by limiting
unintentional methane leaks and intentional venting. I want to be clear
that President Trump signed this requirement into law in his first
term.
A carbon dioxide rulemaking was first required in the 2011 Pipeline
Safety Act--13 years ago. This requirement was made more urgent after a
carbon dioxide pipeline ruptured in Mississippi in 2020.
These rulemakings will increase safety, are required by law and the
new Administration should quickly advance them after pulling them back.
They can do work already without us having to do more work.
But now I want to turn to deadly accidents.
According to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), in the past 5 years there have been 3,070
pipeline incidents claiming 58 lives, injuring 167 more and causing
more than $2.3 billion in property damage.
The primary reason these incidents occurred was due to material,
weld or equipment failures--all factors primarily within the control of
pipeline operators.
The National Transportation Safety Board, in addition to doing this
great work investigating the aviation accidents we've seen over the
last 35 days, has nine open pipeline safety investigations, including
one it launched this past weekend after a Kansas Gas pipeline leak and
explosion in Hutchinson, Kansas.
More people are dying, as well. 2024 and 2023 saw the deadliest
pipeline incidents in more than a decade.
In March 2023, a UGI pipeline explosion at a chocolate factory in
West Reading, PA killed seven people, injured 11 people, displaced 3
families from a neighboring apartment building and forced many more
from the area to evacuate.
The chocolate factory was not rebuilt, and production has shifted
to other facilities--leaving the town of West Reading, population
4,530, without a significant employer that had been in the community
for 65 years.
More problems are occurring--there were more pipeline incidents in
2024 than in 2023, including one in my district.
In December 2023, the now BP-owned Olympic pipeline saw another gas
spill in my district, this time more than 20,000 gallons of diesel
spilled near an elementary school in Conway, Washington. Emergency
response took more than a year, and it still hasn't been completely
cleaned up.
More can be done; we should work quickly to pass a pipeline safety
bill similar to the one we passed last Congress.
This Committee unanimously approved a bipartisan pipeline safety
bill that improved transparency by creating an Office of Public
Engagement--an idea championed by Representative Strickland.
The legislation also required PHMSA to review operator emergency
response plans.
More funding will help: PHMSA and the state pipeline safety
programs need resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct
investigations when incidents occur and take appropriate enforcement
actions so bad actors are held accountable.
Our bill increased the authorizations for both PHMSA and state
pipeline safety authorities. We also included $56 million for state
pipeline safety programs over four years.
But I am troubled by the President's recent efforts to remove
people from jobs that play a critical role to hold pipeline operators
accountable for their actions that might harm people.
As an example, PHMSA assessed a $2 million civil penalty on Denbury
Gulf Coast Pipelines and its contractor, Republic Testing Laboratories,
for obstructing PHMSA safety inspectors from observing pipeline repairs
and verbally and physically assaulting PHMSA safety inspectors.
Employees of these two companies physically prevented a PHMSA
safety inspector from questioning a welder, held up a screen to prevent
a PHMSA safety inspector from observing a weld, and prevented PHMSA
staff from photographing test equipment.
These repairs were being conducted to replace the carbon dioxide
pipeline that ruptured in Satartia, Mississippi that sent 45 people to
the hospital in 2020.
Denbury's behavior towards PHMSA safety inspectors, the Trump
Administration's efforts to cut staff from the Office of Pipeline
Safety, and cut funding for grants Congress mandated, including PHMSA's
technical assistance grants, put communities at risk nationwide.
Congress recognized that improving safety requires strong
regulation and funding support. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
created the first ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety
and Modernization grant program.
Last May, PHMSA announced $196 million for 60 publicly-owned
utilities to repair or replace natural gas pipelines. This investment
will reduce incidents and improve safety. We should keep it going.
Pipelines play a critical role in the daily lives of Americans.
We are here today to make sure the national pipeline network safely
delivers energy across the country.
I look forward to today's discussion and thank each of the
witnesses for your testimony.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. Again, I would
like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for being here
today.
Briefly, I would like to explain our lighting system. Green
means go, yellow means you are getting ready to stop, and red
means stop. Pretty simple.
The witnesses' full statements will be included in the
record.
Without objection, show that ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that might be submitted in writing.
Without objection, show that ordered.
I ask for unanimous consent that the record remain open for
15 days for additional comments and information submitted by
Members or witnesses to be included in today's hearing.
Without objection, show that ordered.
As your written testimony will be made part of the record,
we ask you to limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
Mr. Black, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EX-
ECUTIVE OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIA-
TION; ERIC V. TAYLOR, P.E., DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING SERV-
ICES, BHE GT&S, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL
GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; EMANUEL A. PARIS IV, VICE
PRESIDENT, ALEX E. PARIS CONTRACTING CO., INC., ON BE-
HALF OF THE DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION
AND THE PENNSYLVANIA UTILITY CONTRACTORS ASSOCIA-
TION; AND BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE
SAFETY TRUST
TESTIMONY OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EX-
ECUTIVE OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIATION
Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members. I am
Andy Black, president and CEO of the Liquid Energy Pipeline
Association.
LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators transporting
transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet;
transportation feedstocks like crude oil; home heating fuels
like propane and heating oil; industrial feedstocks like ethane
and butane; and low-carbon solutions like liquid petroleum gas,
renewable diesel, and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member
companies delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across
the nearly 230,000-mile network of pipelines.
Thank you for holding this hearing today and highlighting
the vital role this committee has promoting the infrastructure
that leads to American prosperity. This committee has an
important role in ensuring our pipeline network is safe through
pipeline safety reauthorization, allowing us to confidently
expand our pipeline infrastructure.
As the committee considers the role of pipeline
infrastructure and what changes to make to Federal pipeline
safety laws, it is important to remember that pipelines are the
safest way to deliver energy. More than 99.999 percent of crude
oil and petroleum products delivered by pipeline reaches its
destination safely. A report prepared by PHMSA for Congress
analyzing 10 years of incident data found pipelines were 13
times safer than both trains and trucks, with pipelines
experiencing only 1 incident for every 720 million gallons
delivered. An Obama administration analysis found rejecting a
major pipeline and shipping the same crude oil by rail would
increase the risk of oil release by over 800 times and of
barrels released by 2.6 times.
Current PHMSA pipeline incident statistics also show
pipeline safety is improving. According to publicly available
PHMSA data, total liquid pipeline incidents are down 12 percent
over the last 5 years. Liquid pipelines incidents impacting
people or the environment are also down 12 percent over the
last 5 years. Declining pipeline incidents over the last 5
years supports the committee's measured approach to
reauthorizing pipeline safety laws, without major changes or
new mandates.
LEPA does believe Congress can do more to help modernize
pipeline safety programs because key parts of PHMSA safety
regulations are over 20 years old and do not reflect the latest
advances in safety technology or know-how.
LEPA recognizes that America is blessed with an abundance
of energy. Pipelines are the vital link from where that energy
is produced to where it is refined into usable products and on
to consumers and businesses in their home regions. Smart
pipeline policies will promote the pipeline infrastructure
needed to deliver American energy dominance.
Lastly, LEPA believes Congress can help PHMSA increase the
effectiveness and transparency of its pipeline safety programs
and requirements. LEPA welcomed and supported the pipeline
safety reauthorization bill this committee approved in December
of 2023.
My written testimony details the many provisions LEPA
supported, including these six: number one, reforming PHMSA's
special permit program; number two, strengthening penalties for
pipeline safety violations that impair operations of facilities
or damage construction sites; number three, requiring PHMSA
issue an already congressionally mandated rulemaking on idled
pipelines; number four, authorizing a voluntary information-
sharing to convene stakeholders to collaborate on safety
initiatives; number five, requiring risk-based inspections of
in-service breakout tanks to reduce unnecessary greenhouse gas
and air pollutant emissions, reduce worker safety threats, and
reduce hazardous waste when shown to achieve an equivalent
level of safety; and number six, improving pipeline expertise
of PHMSA personnel with hiring authority for engineering,
scientific, or other technical expertise.
One final note on leveraging new technologies. In the 2020
PIPES Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety could benefit
from harnessing the latest high-tech inspection technologies
and analytics. However, PHMSA bureaucratic redtape in the last
administration effectively strangled this program before it
could ever start. An opportunity now exists, and LEPA supports
restoring the will of Congress and reauthorizing this program
without additional bureaucratic redtape or conditions.
Thank you again for the committee's support of pipeline
energy infrastructure and the opportunity to testify before you
today on the benefits of pipelines, including their safety.
Thank you.
[Mr. Black's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association
Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee.
My name is Andy Black and I am President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators
delivering transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel,
transportation feedstocks like crude oil, home heating fuels like
propane and home heating oil, industrial feedstocks like ethane and
butane, and low carbon solutions like renewable diesel, liquified
petroleum gas and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member companies
delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across a nearly a 230,000-
mile network of pipelines.
Thank you for holding this hearing today and highlighting the vital
role this Committee has promoting the infrastructure that leads to
American prosperity. In recent years, American families and workers
have suffered from higher prices on everything from food to housing to
energy. America is blessed with abundant energy supplies. Expanding
American energy production will send new supply to market and pressure
prices downward. Building energy infrastructure like pipelines will
help us deliver more energy to the American people. The Transportation
& Infrastructure Committee has an important role ensuring our pipeline
network is safe, such as through pipeline safety reauthorization,
allowing us confidently to expand our energy infrastructure.
Pipelines deliver the energy products American families use every
day. Liquid energy pipelines deliver transportation fuels like
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel that families, commuters, businesses and
travelers use to drive and fly where they need to go. Pipelines deliver
transportation fuel feedstocks like crude oil and industrial feedstocks
like ethane, propane and butane to make everything from plastics to
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, paints and fabrics. Rural home heating and
agricultural fuels like propane delivered regionally by pipeline before
traveling locally by truck heat rural homes and farms, dry crops after
harvest, and keep livestock barns warm throughout the winter.
When thinking about energy, the American people tell us what they
care most about is safety, followed by affordability and reliability.
Each year, LEPA commissions a nationwide poll of public sentiment on
energy and pipelines. The American public's preference for safe energy
supports this Committee's work to reauthorize federal pipeline safety
law.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As the Committee considers the role of pipeline infrastructure and
what changes to make to federal pipeline safety laws, it is important
to remember pipelines are the safest way to deliver energy. More than
99.999% of crude oil and petroleum products delivered by pipeline
reaches its destination safely.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A 2018 report prepared for Congress by PHMSA analyzing 10 years of
incident data found pipelines were 13 times safer than both trains and
trucks with pipelines experiencing 1 incident for every 720 million
gallons delivered and rail incidents occurring every 50 million gallons
delivered. An Obama administration analysis found rejecting a major
pipeline and shipping the same crude oil by rail would increase the
risk of oil release by over 800 times and barrels released by 2.6
times.
Current PHMSA pipeline incident statistics also show pipeline
safety is improving. Federal law and regulations require operators to
report pipeline incident data to PHMSA. Full year data for 2024 is now
available, which allows us to examine current trends in pipeline
safety.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
According to publicly available PHMSA data, total liquids pipeline
incidents are down 12% over the last 5 years. Liquids pipeline
incidents Impacting People or the Environment (IPE) are also down 12%
over the last 5 years. This last metric, incidents Impacting People or
the Environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline Safety
Trust and industry under the recommendation of the National
Transportation Safety Board. NTSB asked the pipeline community to
identify the most meaningful metric for measuring pipeline safety.
PHMSA certainly tracks many metrics but we agree that Incidents
Impacting People or the Environment are the most meaningful and are
gratified they are down 12% over the last 5 years.
Declining pipeline incidents over the last 5 years supports the
Committee's measured approach to reauthorizing pipeline safety laws
without major changes or new mandates. LEPA does believe Congress can
do more to help modernize pipeline safety programs. Hi-tech inspection
and analytical tools, like an MRI or ultrasound in the doctor's office,
are available for pipeline safety. However, key parts of PHMSA safety
regulations are over 20 years old and do not reflect the latest
advances in safety technology or know-how.
LEPA also recognizes that America is blessed with an abundance of
energy. Pipelines are the vital link from where that energy is
produced, to where it is refined into usable products, and on to
consumers and businesses in their home regions. Smart pipeline policies
will promote the pipeline energy infrastructure needed to deliver
American energy dominance. Lastly, LEPA believes Congress can help
PHMSA increase the effectiveness and transparency of its pipeline
safety programs and requirements.
LEPA welcomed and supported the pipeline safety reauthorization
bill the Committee approved in December 2023. Provisions LEPA supported
included:
Reforming PHMSA Special Permit program to impose permit
review shot clock and limit unrelated permit requirements (Sec. 17)
Strengthening penalties for pipeline safety violations
that impair operation of facilities or damage construction sites (Sec.
21)
Requiring PHMSA issue Congressionally mandated rulemaking
on idled pipelines (Sec. 12)
Providing defendants the opportunity for a formal PHMSA
hearing, and protect security or commercially sensitive information
presented as evidence in PHMSA hearings open to the public (Sec. 26)
Authorizing a Voluntary Information Sharing program to
convene stakeholders to collaborate on safety initiatives (Sec. 24)
Requiring risk-based inspections of in-service breakout
tanks to reduce unnecessary greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions,
worker safety threats, and hazardous waste when shown to achieve an
equivalent level of safety (Sec. 28)
Improving pipeline expertise of PHMSA personnel with
hiring authority for engineering, scientific or other technical
expertise (Sec. 4)
Increasing transparency of PHMSA inspection program with
reporting on inspection priorities, dates and locations (Sec. 7)
Require PHMSA review of consensus safety improvement
standards (Sec. 6)
Targeted update of federal CO2 pipeline requirements to
extend regulatory coverage to gaseous CO2, require CO2-specific
incident dispersion modeling (topography, weather, operating
conditions, trace compounds), require PHMSA complete rulemaking within
1 yr. (Sec. 25)
One final note on leveraging new technologies. In the 2020 PIPES
Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety could benefit from harnessing
the latest hi-tech inspection technologies and analytics. Congress
authorized PHMSA to conduct a pipeline safety technology demonstration
pilot program under certain conditions.
However, in implementing the technology demonstration program,
PHMSA under the previous administration added a host of additional
administrative, regulatory and legal conditions to the program beyond
what Congress itself mandated. As a result, PHMSA received no
applications to conduct technology pilots and the program sunsetted.
Pipeline operators cited the additional conditions PHMSA imposed in its
implementation guidance as making the program infeasible. PHMSA
bureaucratic red tape effectively strangled this program in its crib.
An opportunity now exists and LEPA supports restoring the will of
Congress and reauthorizing this program without additional bureaucratic
red tape or conditions.
Thank you again for the Committee's support of pipeline energy
infrastructure and the opportunity to testify before you today on the
benefits of pipelines, including their safety.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF ERIC V. TAYLOR, P.E., DIRECTOR, ENGINEER-
ING SERVICES, BHE GT&S, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Taylor. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Titus, and
members of the subcommittee, good morning. My name is Eric
Taylor, and I serve as the director of engineering services for
BHE GT&S. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of
the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, otherwise
known as INGAA, on promoting and improving safety and pipeline
infrastructure. We appreciate the subcommittee's leadership and
ongoing efforts to develop a measure that would reauthorize the
Office of Pipeline Safety within PHMSA.
INGAA is a trade association specifically representing the
interstate natural gas pipeline and storage industry. INGAA's
member companies transport most of the natural gas consumed in
the United States through a network of approximately 200,000
miles of interstate transmission pipelines and are primarily
focused on serving customers like local distribution companies,
electricity generators, industrial manufacturers, and LNG
export facilities.
I focused the last 10 years of my career on pipeline
safety, and most recently have been engaged in the last 2 major
PHMSA rulemakings: the Leak Detection and Repair, LDAR, and
Class Location proposed rules. I was very involved in the Gas
Pipeline Advisory Committee, GPAC, meetings in November 2023
and March 2024.
We applaud the committee for employing a bipartisan
strategy in the 118th Congress to reauthorize PHMSA pipeline
safety programs for 4 years. As you begin your deliberations to
draft and ideally enact a pipeline safety reauthorization
measure, there are several points I would like to make on
behalf of the natural gas transmission pipeline industry.
First, the United States Department of Transportation,
PHMSA, other regulators, and industry experts have for decades
agreed that pipelines are the safest mode of natural gas
transportation. INGAA supports having a strong safety regulator
and the robust, durable, and consistent regulations led by
PHMSA to ensure accountability of operators. We take our
commitment to safety seriously, and appreciate PHMSA's role in
ensuring the industry maintains its safety focus, and the
public is confident in the safety and reliability of natural
gas pipelines.
Second, INGAA's top regulatory priority with PHMSA is
completion of the Class Location Rule, which presents
opportunities to improve safety, protect the environment, and
possibly increase capacity of existing pipelines that have had
their capacity reduced due to a downrate from a class location
change. Class location change regulations have not been
substantially updated in more than 50 years. Revising them has
been an INGAA goal for more than two decades. More details were
provided in my written testimony, but INGAA strongly supports
the committee's prior mandate for PHMSA to complete this
rulemaking within 90 days after the enactment date.
Third, in the 2011 reauthorization, Congress required PHMSA
to issue regulations for conducting tests to confirm the
material strength of previously untested natural gas
transmission pipelines. PHMSA completed this congressional
mandate in the fall of 2019. And while INGAA supported PHMSA
promulgating this regulation, the agency made admitted drafting
errors. Unless rectified, INGAA members may be forced to retest
previously tested pipelines with no added safety benefit,
causing disruption to communities, unnecessarily venting gas,
and costing operators billions of dollars. INGAA commends this
committee for addressing this issue in the PIPES Act of 2023.
Fourth, the GPAC is an advisory committee to the
Department, and plays an important role to enhance gas pipeline
safety regulations. Historically, GPAC met regularly to
consider important rules and discuss important safety
advancements, but since January 2021, has only convened three
times, despite its charter stating GPAC meet approximately four
times per year. Further, there are times where PHMSA has
disagreed with the unanimous GPAC decisions to final rules
without providing a technical basis for why. While INGAA does
not challenge PHMSA's independence to render decisions, we
believe Congress can strengthen transparency by receiving PHMSA
reports on rationale and conclusions when issuing final rules.
INGAA appreciates the committee previously addressing both
issues.
Lastly, our industry recognizes the importance of data-
sharing and proactively attempts to participate in industry
organizations to share lessons learned. INGAA supports the
bipartisan inclusion of language in your bill last Congress for
voluntary information-sharing.
In conclusion, your efforts are vital to ensure PHMSA has
the resources and direction to continually improve safety for
our industry. I truly appreciate the opportunity to testify in
front of the subcommittee today, and I look forward to your
questions.
[Mr. Taylor's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eric V. Taylor, P.E., Director, Engineering Services,
BHE GT&S, on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Good morning. My name is Eric Taylor, and I serve as the Director
of Engineering Services for BHE GT&S.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) on promoting and
improving safety and pipeline infrastructure. We appreciate the
Subcommittee's leadership and ongoing efforts to develop a measure that
would reauthorize the Office of Pipeline Safety within the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).
Background
BHE GT&S is an interstate natural gas transmission and storage
company headquartered in Glen Allen, Virginia, with operations in 10
states between New York and Florida. BHE GT&S is an indirect wholly
owned subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. BHE GT&S operates 5,400
miles of natural gas transmission pipelines with more than 985,000
horsepower, 100 miles of natural gas liquids pipelines, and 756 billion
cubic feet (Bcf) of total natural gas storage--with 420 Bcf of working
gas capacity--along with a gathering and processing company. We also
provide liquified natural gas (LNG) for U.S. customers through Pivotal
LNG and operate Cove Point, LNG--an import, export and liquefaction
facility in Lusby, Maryland. In 2024, BHE GT&S delivered over 2.2
trillion cubic feet of natural gas to its customers.
BHE GT&S provides service to many large customers such as major
utilities, power plants and industrial manufacturers, through numerous
links to major pipelines. BHE GT&S is committed to providing customers
with innovative and sustainable solutions that help its customers
transport natural gas safely, reliably and efficiently in their
markets.
BHE GT&S is a member of INGAA, the Southern Gas Association (SGA),
and the Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI). As a member of
these organizations, BHE GT&S shares and learns from some of the
brightest and most innovative minds within our industry. PRCI, for
example, provides an excellent opportunity to collectively fund
research to improve the understanding of failure mechanisms and
identify methods to more accurately characterize and address pipeline
safety. PRCI also provides research to meet the needs of future fuels
to support operators' efforts to safely transport those fuels and
associated products.
INGAA is a trade association specifically representing the
interstate natural gas pipeline and storage industry. INGAA's member
companies transport most of the natural gas consumed in the United
States through a network of approximately 200,000 miles of interstate
transmission pipelines. These large capacity, critical infrastructure
systems are analogous to the Interstate Highway System and span
multiple states and regions. INGAA members are primarily focused on
serving customers like local distribution companies, electricity
generators, industrial manufacturers and LNG export facilities.
I work out of the BHE GT&S Bridgeport, West Virginia office. I
began my career as an engineer in the gas control group and conducted
system modeling to evaluate the most efficient methods to transport
natural gas through our pipeline system. This modeling ultimately
reduced fuel consumption and related emissions. I gained a great
understanding of how our pipeline system operates throughout the year,
how we rely on our storage capabilities to meet peak demand, and how
critical our pipeline system is to ensure consistent deliverability of
electricity near our pipeline system as electric generation facilities
consume large quantities of gas to balance the grid during the hottest
days.
I have focused the last 10 years of my career on pipeline safety,
which includes ensuring BHE GT&S meets PHMSA compliance. Throughout my
career, I have helped improve pipeline safety by studying the root
causes of failures and near miss incidents, by implementing lessons
learned from those incidents to help reduce the likelihood of a similar
event, and by evaluating new technologies to support the reduction of
methane emissions. BHE GT&S supports and participates in various
industry groups to better understand and mitigate threats to our
natural gas and liquid pipeline systems and LNG facilities. I am
currently an executive board member of PRCI and will present at
multiple SGA events this year. Previously, I chaired the INGAA pipeline
safety committee in 2023 and 2024.
I have been engaged in the last two major PHMSA rule makings--the
Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) and the Class Location proposed rules.
I assisted in the development of INGAA and joint trade comments on
PHMSA's LDAR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). And I was very
involved in the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meetings in
November 2023 and March 2024, where I helped educate industry GPAC
members on proposed regulations and made multiple public comments on
the LDAR and Class Location proposed rules. After the GPAC meetings, I
worked with joint industry groups to formulate comments on both
proposed rules.
For more than a decade, the shale revolution has gifted our country
with abundant natural gas supplies, which has elevated the need for
additional infrastructure to transport natural gas across the country.
Pipelines reliably deliver North America's abundant natural gas
reserves to fuel our homes and businesses and are the safest mode of
natural gas transportation. The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation indicated in its recent summer assessment that ``natural
gas supply and infrastructure is vitally important to electric grid
reliability, particularly as variable energy resources satisfy more of
our energy needs.''
The INGAA membership is committed to transporting natural gas in a
safe, reliable and environmentally responsible manner. Our industry has
a long history of supporting Congress' enactment of bipartisan pipeline
safety reauthorization measures, which help advance the safe operation
and maintenance of critical energy infrastructure.
We applaud the Committee for employing such a strategy in the 118th
Congress when it approved via voice vote H.R. 6494, the Pipeline
Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023, which would have
reauthorized for four years the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration's (PHMSA) pipeline safety programs. Additionally, H.R.
6494, which contained the priorities of the interstate natural gas
pipeline sector, would have provided an efficient and effective
framework to advance the safety of energy infrastructure across the
United States. As you begin your deliberations to draft, and ideally,
enact a pipeline safety reauthorization measure, there are several
points I would like to make on behalf of the natural gas transmission
pipeline industry.
1. INGAA supports having a strong safety regulator
The U.S. Department of Transportation, PHMSA, other regulators and
industry experts have for decades agreed that pipelines are the safest
mode of natural gas transportation. According to PHMSA, these linear
infrastructure networks transport large quantities of natural gas and
petroleum products, with over 99.999% of all pipeline deliveries being
made safely each year. Accidents are rare, and INGAA's members are
committed to ca goal of zero pipeline incidents.
INGAA supports having a strong safety regulator and the robust,
durable and consistent regulations led by PHMSA to ensure
accountability of operators. We take our commitment to safety seriously
and appreciate PHMSA's role in ensuring that the industry maintains its
safety focus and that the public is confident in the safety and
reliability of natural gas pipelines.
INGAA's members purchase top-quality materials, address potential
safety or security issues during the pipeline planning and siting
processes, and conduct consistent quality and safety checks throughout
the construction process. Pipeline companies strive for zero accidents
and incidents by evaluating, inspecting and maintaining pipelines. Our
members evaluate and learn from information and data shared at joint
industry meetings and as part of PHMSA and NTSB investigations to
prevent similar events from occurring on individual systems.
As part of ongoing safety programs, pipeline companies conduct
integrity management and continuous improvement programs in the areas
of evaluation, inspection and maintenance. A critical component of
integrity management programs is the use of inline inspection tools,
which are often referred to as smart pigs. Operators run these tools to
detect potentially harmful defects in pipelines. Over the last 30
years, modern methods of pipe inspection have improved greatly and
become more effective, efficient and environmentally sound compared to
other assessment methods, with the added benefit of nominally
interrupting pipeline operations.
For example, BHE GT&S was an early user of inline inspection tools
to identify anomalies. We recognize this is the most efficient and
accurate method to identify, evaluate and track possible system
anomalies and collaborate with service providers to expand the use of
inline inspection technology on our pipelines that are more difficult
to assess. BHE GT&S also was an early user of inline inspection
technologies and processes for storage wells to help ensure storage
integrity. BHE GT&S reviews in detail near misses, accidents and
incidents to identify causal factors, learn from them and implement
measures to prevent reoccurrence. BHE GT&S uses information and data
shared at joint industry meetings and as part of PHMSA and NTSB
investigations to evaluate our pipeline system, procedures, training
and design and implement improvements to prevent a similar event from
occurring on our system. We also work with external agencies to conduct
emergency simulations to evaluate how we can work together to minimize
any potential impact to the public.
INGAA's commitment to safety has been an essential priority for
years. After the unfortunate and tragic incident in San Bruno,
California, in 2010, INGAA's member companies have proactively worked
to improve the industry's safety performance. This effort resulted in
the formation of the Integrity Management, Continuous Improvement, or
IMCI, program. The program is anchored by a goal of zero pipeline
incidents, and since its inception, the pipeline industry has made
rapid advances in safety technology and practices in pursuit of
achieving this goal. The program was recently updated to include input
from PHMSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National
Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives, and the Pipeline Safety
Trust. The program follows five guiding principles:
1. Our goal is zero incidents;
2. We are committed to a strong safety culture;
3. We will be relentless in our pursuit of improving by learning;
4. We are committed to implementing and continuously improving
pipeline safety management systems; and
5. We will regularly engage our stakeholders.
INGAA's work on the updated IMCI program--IMCI 2.0--and the related
results were shared with key stakeholders.
2. PHMSA should promulgate the Class Location Rule
INGAA's top regulatory priority with PHMSA is completion of the
Class Location rule, which presents opportunities to improve safety,
protect the environment, and possibly increase capacity of existing
infrastructure that has been downrated due to a class change. Class
location change regulations have not been substantially updated in more
than 50 years. Revising them has been an INGAA goal for more than two
decades. We were pleased when PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) on the Class Location Rule in October 2020. Operators
appreciated that Congress included a provision in the enacted 2020
Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES)
Act requiring the agency to convene a meeting of the Gas Pipeline
Advisory Committee (GPAC) comprised of industry, government and public
stakeholders to provide policy recommendations and review the NPRM by
the end of 2021.
This proposed rulemaking would address scenarios where population
changes around pipelines necessitate changes to existing pipeline
infrastructure. When a class location change occurs, current
regulations may require operators to replace existing pipe. This can be
required even when an engineering assessment using modern inspection
tools ensures the pipeline segment can continue to safely operate at
the same historical maximum allowable operating pressure. Advancements
in inline inspection tools and other safety technologies help enhance
company decisions to make repairs and, in most cases, eliminate the
need for disruptive pipe replacements.
Existing regulations require unnecessary pipe replacements due to
class changes. When PHMSA requires operators to replace pipes,
operators must ensure gas is absent from the pipeline segments to be
replaced, which results in service disruptions and released emissions.
When operators are forced to replace pipe that can continue to operate
safely at its historical maximum allowable operation pressure, the
public and landowners also are affected because of the excavation and
land impact associated with replacing pipe. INGAA estimates that
existing requirements to unnecessarily replace perfectly safe pipe cost
its members $200-$300 million per year. These funds could be better
allocated to address other aspects of our safety systems.
INGAA also estimates that class change pipe replacements under the
current regulations result in up to 800 million standard cubic feet of
natural gas blowdowns to the atmosphere annually which equals the
amount of gas that could meet the needs of more than 10,000 homes. The
optimal way for the pipeline industry to reduce methane emissions is to
decrease the number of blowdowns or voluntary gas releases. Finalizing
the rulemaking would lower methane emissions by eliminating preventable
releases.
In place of a class location pipeline replacement change, INGAA
members have submitted special permit applications to demonstrate their
pipelines can continue to operate safely at their same historical
maximum allowable operating pressures. However, these applications take
a long time to approve, are inconsistent in their requirements, and are
burdensome to the pipeline sector and PHMSA. Problems include the
regularity of the changing process and the fact that it can take up to
three years to approve a single permit. Finalizing the class location
rule can improve safety by requiring the appropriate assessments for a
miles long pipeline segment, from launcher to receiver, as opposed to
the replacement of a small section of pipe that could range 100 to 1000
feet, meeting current class location replacement requirements to
maintain the existing maximum allowable operating pressure. It can also
provide regulatory certainty and consistency for industry stakeholders
and the regulator because it would allow modern technological tools to
inspect pipeline infrastructure in lieu of outdated methods.
PHMSA held a class location GPAC meeting last March. At the GPAC
meeting, interstate natural gas pipeline industry members recommended
an improved method of using a risk-based application to determine
class. This new method expanded the scope of the final rule beyond that
of the proposed rule to address broader class location concerns and
ensure risk is properly identified on pipeline systems. As a result of
this proposal, the Committee overwhelmingly voted to hold a second
advisory committee meeting in March 2025.
INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will publish a final rule before year-
end 2026 to improve safety and meet the collective goal of the industry
and the public to lower GHG emissions. INGAA strongly supports the
Committee's mandate for PHMSA to complete this rulemaking within 90
days after the enactment date of H.R. 6494.
3. Gas Transmission Rule Part 1 (RIN 1) record keeping issue
In Section 23 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job
Creation Act of 2011, Congress required PHMSA to `` . . . issue
regulations for conducting tests to confirm the material strength of
previously untested natural gas transmission pipelines . . . '' PHMSA
completed this congressional mandate October 1, 2019, issuing the gas
transmission rule part 1 (RIN 1). This rule governs testing and record
keeping requirements for the maximum allowable operating pressure
(MAOP), which determines the amount of natural gas that can move safely
through a pipeline. Since the 1950s and even earlier before testing and
record keeping requirements were required by federal code in 1970,
operators have regularly conducted these tests to ensure a pipeline is
safe prior to entering service.
While INGAA supported PHMSA promulgating its RIN 1 regulation, the
agency made drafting errors related to the MAOP record keeping
requirements that would result in the natural gas pipeline transmission
industry needlessly retesting about 50,000 miles of previously pre-1970
tested pipelines if modern-day record keeping standards are not met.
Changes to the regulation to state that only previously untested
pipelines are required to be tested are critical. In 2022, PHMSA
published a regulatory interpretation letter on this subject,
illustrating the problematic regulatory text and could be enforced by
state regulators. In response, PHMSA created a formal working group and
met several times in 2024 with INGAA and the Pipeline Safety Trust, a
public safety stakeholder, to craft a regulatory solution.
Without a durable regulatory fix, INGAA members would be forced to
retest previously tested pipelines with no added safety benefit and
causing disruptions to communities and unnecessarily venting of gas.
This would cost operators billions of dollars which could be better
deployed advancing actual safety measures. The interstate gas pipeline
sector continues to advocate for this regulation to be clarified and
resolved through legally durable regulatory changes in 2025 to provide
pipeline operators certainty on required pipeline work to satisfy the
July 2028 regulatory requirement.
INGAA commends the Committee statutorily address this issue by
including a provision in the PIPES Act of 2023 to temporarily prohibit
PHMSA from requiring operators to retest previously tested pipelines
with documented records showing a sufficient minimum pressure until a
working group report and rulemaking proceeding is completed.
4. Enforcement reform
PHMSA has five regional offices where its inspectors audit pipeline
operators and issue enforcement actions based on their findings. In
recent years, PHMSA has promulgated several significant rules affecting
the gas transmission sector and resulting in substantial changes to the
code. During the prior administration, PHMSA began inspecting and
enforcing these new regulations. Under existing PHMSA enforcement
processes, each regional office acts mostly autonomously with little
oversight from the agency headquarters. This process produces multiple
problematic enforcement cases that have substantial impacts. A single
improperly written enforcement action has the potential to compel
operators to make costly changes completely outside of the rulemaking
process. An incorrect interpretation of the code requirement can be
referenced in subsequent enforcement cases as justification for the
enforcement case to proceed, and an operator could be incorrectly
identified as being out of compliance with the regulation.
The agency's inspectors are uninvolved in the rulemaking process
and often are unaware of the background to understand regulatory
intent. Inspections that are typically scheduled to last a week or two
regularly drag out for months. Furthermore, many inspectors employ
creative interpretations of regulations to penalize operators when the
action identified has no measurable safety impact. Several pipeline
operators have challenged these enforcement actions via litigation,
which is costly and time consuming for both the industry and PHMSA.
INGAA requests PHMSA reform its enforcement processes.
Specifically, interstate operators continue to advocate for requiring
the agency's senior career leadership in the offices of field
operations and policy and programs to review all draft enforcement
actions to ensure consistent application and interpretation of the
regulation, the application of the regulation meets the original intent
of the regulation, set time limited audits, and mandate that all
enforcement actions be directly tied to risk-based safety threats.
5. Improve PHMSA application approval process
PHMSA is required to review applications from pipeline operators in
several key areas. These requests stem from aspects of federal
regulations where the code allows operators to utilize different
methodology than what is prescribed, broader notification requirements
and allowing exceptions to the code in certain circumstances.
For all these different scenarios, PHMSA has increasingly delayed
responses, periodically disregarded statutory deadlines to provide
adequate responses or modified requirements for similar activities over
the years. In some instances, applications can take years for PHMSA to
respond. Pipeline operators file these requests typically due to major
reliability, financial or safety implications, and often conduct
engineering-critical assessments to calculate the remaining strength of
a pipeline based on known inputs such as threats, loadings, operational
circumstances, mechanical and fracture material properties, and
degradation processes, giving operators the information needed to
understand the health of their assets. Delayed responses to these
applications can have substantial impacts on pipeline operators.
INGAA encourages PHMSA to create uniform processes for all
applications with quicker approval times by year-end 2025.
6. Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) reform
GPAC is an advisory committee to the Department of Transportation
and PHMSA on matters of natural gas pipeline safety and regulatory
oversight. GPAC is comprised of 15 members, with equal representation
from the natural gas industry, federal and state agencies, and the
public (such as safety advocates and emergency managers). GPAC's stated
role is to review PHMSA's proposed regulatory initiatives to ensure the
technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness and
practicability of each proposal. PHMSA is not bound by GPAC
recommendations but must include rationale related to disagreements
with GPAC's recommendations in the preamble text of final rules. These
processes are required by statute.
GPAC plays an important role in completing INGAA's objective to
enhance gas pipeline safety regulations. The time needed to complete a
rulemaking is partially affected by the quantity and quality of
dialogue with impacted stakeholders, which is especially important when
rulemakings are complex and technical, including initiatives relating
to pipeline safety regulation. New rules should leverage stakeholder
knowledge and expertise to facilitate the deployment of new
technologies and practices that are more effective and efficient and
less disruptive than legacy methods that may be reflected in existing
regulations.
Historically, GPAC met regularly to consider important rules and
discuss important safety advancements. Since January 2021, GPAC has
only convened three times. The 2022-2024 GPAC Charter states that GPAC
meets approximately 4 times each year. It also states that GPAC members
are to be appointed based on their experience in the safety regulation
of the transportation of gas and pipeline facilities or must be
technically qualified to evaluate gas pipeline safety standards or
risk-management principles by their training, experience or knowledge
in one or more fields of engineering that are applicable to the
transportation of gas or operation of a gas pipeline facility. With the
known benefits of GPAC, INGAA believes that Congress should consider
requiring PHMSA to hold at least two GPAC meetings annually and ensure
GPAC members are experienced in safety regulations of gas pipelines and
pipeline facilities or be technically qualified, meeting the 2022-2024
charter requirement.
PHMSA has disagreed with unanimous GPAC recommendations to several
important final rules without providing a technical basis on why it
disagreed with the recommendations. While INGAA does not challenge
PHMSA's independence to render decisions, we believe Congress can
strengthen transparency by receiving reports from PHMSA on their
rationale and conclusions when issuing final rules. INGAA appreciated
this Committee's inclusion of a provision accomplishing this goal in
H.R. 6494.
7. Voluntary information sharing system
Industry recognizes the importance of data sharing and proactively
attempts to participate in industry organizations to share lessons
learned; however, there are many roadblocks to effectively sharing
lessons learned across the broader industry. INGAA supports the
bipartisan bill passed by this Committee in the 118th Congress for the
voluntary information sharing system. Industry requires the proper
protections to share a detailed analyses of the cause or causes of a
pipeline failure, abnormal operating conditions or near miss incident
that could then be understood by other operators to effectively develop
a remedial action plan to address causal factors.
Conclusion
To fulfill America's energy, economic, security and environmental
goals and continue to improve pipeline safety, INGAA stands ready to
work in a bipartisan manner. We are prepared to enact durable pipeline
safety reforms that enable safe operations of our infrastructure to
maintain the reliable delivery of natural gas.
In conclusion, your efforts are vital to ensure PHMSA has the
resources and direction to continually improve safety in our industry.
I truly appreciate the opportunity to testify in front of the
Subcommittee today and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
Mr. Paris, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF EMANUEL A. PARIS IV, VICE PRESIDENT, ALEX
E. PARIS CONTRACTING CO., INC., ON BEHALF OF THE DIS-
TRIBUTION CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION AND THE PENN-
SYLVANIA UTILITY CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Paris. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Titus, Ranking
Member Larsen, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss
effective ways to improve pipeline safety and efficient
pipeline infrastructure.
I am Emanuel Paris, vice president of Alex E. Paris
Contracting Company. We are located out of Atlasburg,
Pennsylvania, and our company was established in 1928. We
perform a variety of construction services, including
installation of large and small diameter piping, cross-country
pipeline, utility construction, and a variety of civil and
commercial projects. I am here today representing the
Distribution Contractors Association and the Pennsylvania
Utility Contractors Association.
DCA is a national association representing the entities who
provide construction services needed for installation,
replacement, and rehabilitation of natural gas distribution
systems as well as transmission pipelines and communities
across our country. PUCA is one of the largest statewide
utility construction associations in the country, serving
excavation contractors in multiple underground facility
markets. Because the vast majority of pipeline construction is
contracted out to members of our industry, we appreciate this
opportunity.
While there are many facets to pipeline safety, our
industry remains especially concerned with the enduring problem
of damage to underground facilities during excavation. For the
most part, contractors, operators, and leaders in damage
prevention like the Common Ground Alliance have long supported
the concept of sharing responsibility and damage prevention.
Ensuring for accurate and timely locating and marking of
underground facilities is fundamental to this process, and they
are gaining attention.
According to the Common Ground Alliance's 2023 Damage
Information Reporting Tool, excavators face about 50/50 odds of
being able to legally start work on time due to utilities not
providing timely locates. This obviously undermines the 811
process. According to CGA, failure to locate underground
facilities accurately and on time was the root cause of 34
percent of facility damages in 2023. Records of underground
utilities can be outdated, inaccurate, or incomplete, and are
sometimes unavailable to damage prevention stakeholders like
designers, locators, and excavators such as ourselves.
This committee's pipeline safety reauthorization bill
considered in the last Congress addressed these challenges by
proposing improvements to State damage prevention programs.
Specifically, we believe State pipeline safety authorities
should support and encourage adoption of leading practices to
improve their programs. We believe State damage prevention
authorities should be setting policies to reduce exemptions in
the damage prevention process; require marking of all
underground lines and laterals, including sewer lines and
laterals; encourage robust training for locate professionals;
and to promote and encourage the use of state-of-the-art
technologies to locate underground facilities.
Exemptions to the One Call or 811 process have been a thorn
in the side of damage prevention since One Call laws were
established. Exemptions for specific stakeholders or certain
types of infrastructure do nothing but compromise the damage
prevention process. While it was generally agreed to that
exemptions to One Call participation are bad for damage
prevention, it is important to clarify that participation means
that all excavators notify their 811 center prior to
excavation, and that all underground facility owners belong to
their respective 811 center and respond to locate requests.
I want to move to the need for improved mapping of
underground facilities, and specifically the need to move
toward geographic information systems, or GIS mapping. GIS can
create, analyze, and map different layers of data by creating
maps and scenes related to underground facilities, and allows
for layering of data tied to geographic points, rather than
restricting the user to limited features on a static map. The
goal of moving toward superior GIS mapping is shared by
industries outside of the excavation construction industry.
Support of these damage prevention provisions, especially
related to GIS mapping, was shared by other national
associations and organizations representing all of us.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 provided
an unprecedented $550 billion in new investments in American
infrastructure, and a significant portion of those dollars will
go toward improvements to underground systems. That means that
there will be an unprecedented amount of underground utility
work coming forward.
Our members also support provisions that would hold those
who physically attack pipeline infrastructure more accountable.
While most agree on the right to peaceful activism, including
peaceful protests to pipeline construction projects, stiffer
penalties are needed to hold those who engage in criminal
activities during protests more accountable. It is important to
include pipeline facilities under construction within the scope
of this provision, and the excavation community would argue
that while interfering or tampering with the operation of
pipeline would clearly compromise pipeline safety, vandalism
and destruction of nearby equipment used to build a pipeline
can be just as dangerous.
The excavation construction industry looks forward to
working with all of you on advancing pipeline safety
reauthorization legislation to include language to improve
State pipeline safety programs through promotion of several
leading practices. I would like to thank you again for the
opportunity to speak with you today, and I look forward to
answering any questions that you have.
[Mr. Paris' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Emanuel A. Paris IV, Vice President, Alex E. Paris
Contracting Co., Inc., on behalf of the Distribution Contractors Associa-
tion and the Pennsylvania Utility Contractors Association
Introduction
Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Titus, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and
testify this morning. I am Emanuel Paris, vice president of Alex E.
Paris Contracting Company, located in Atlasburg, Pennsylvania. Our
company was established in 1928, performing a variety of construction
projects including both large and small diameter pipeline installation,
cross country pipeline, utility line construction and a variety of
civil and commercial projects.
I'm here today representing the Distribution Contractors
Association (DCA) and the Pennsylvania Utility Contractors Association
(PUCA). DCA is a national association representing contractors,
suppliers and manufacturers who provide distribution construction
services including installation, replacement and rehabilitation of
natural gas distribution systems as well as gas transmission pipelines
in communities across the country. PUCA is one of the largest state-
wide utility construction associations in the country, serving
excavation contractors in a range of underground facility markets.
The excavation construction industry has a vested interest in
legislation that would reauthorize the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the nation's pipeline safety program.
In the 118th Congress, two bills were introduced and passed through
their respective committees in the House, but failed to advance to a
floor vote in the House. Our hope is to help advance a new pipeline
safety bill in the 119th Congress that includes bipartisan language
intended to improve state pipeline safety programs and ensure the
safety of both pipeline operators and contractors when protesting
activities are conducted near pipeline infrastructure and related
equipment located on pipeline projects.
Avoiding Pipeline Damage During Excavation
While there are many facets to pipeline safety, our industry is
especially concerned with the enduring problem of damage to underground
facilities during excavation activity. Organizations like ours and
leading damage prevention organizations like the Common Ground Alliance
(CGA) have long supported the concept of sharing responsibility in
damage prevention. A fundamental responsibility included in this
process is ensuring for accurate and timely locating and marking of
subsurface facilities prior to excavation. We believe the next pipeline
safety reauthorization bill should include language that would take
steps toward improved pipeline mapping, underground facility locating,
and ensuring all relevant stakeholders are required to participate in
the 811 process and meet their respective responsibilities.
Problems associated with unmarked or mismarked facilities, or
facilities not marked on time in accordance with state law, are gaining
attention. According to the Common Ground Alliance's 2023 Damage
Information Reporting Tool (DIRT) Report, excavators face essentially
50-50 odds of being able to legally start work on time due to utilities
not providing timely locates--undermining confidence in the 811 system.
Moreover, according to CGA, failure to locate underground
facilities accurately and on time was the root cause attributed to 34%
of damages to underground utilities in 2023. Records of underground
utilities are often inaccurate or incomplete and are largely
unavailable to damage prevention stakeholders like designers, locators,
and excavators. Improving damage prevention mapping technology and
accessibility to damage prevention stakeholders has strong potential to
reduce damages and increase the efficiency of the excavation process.
Excavation contractors put safety first, and preventing damages to
underground facilities during excavation activity is fundamental in
their work. To that end, we support policy that reflects shared
responsibility among all stakeholders and promotes four principal
``pillars'' of the damage prevention process:
1) full participation in the 811 process, including membership of
all owners/operators of underground facilities to the state 811 center;
2) accurate and timely locating of underground facilities;
3) visually identifying (``potholing'') of underground facilities;
and
4) full and balanced enforcement of state damage prevention law.
While these fundamental responsibilities in damage prevention are
evident, strong enforcement must be administered in a balanced and
equitable manner. Locating and accurate marking responsibilities
subject to facility operators should be held in the same regard as one-
call notification and safe digging practices subject to excavators.
This committee's pipeline safety reauthorization bill considered in
the last congress addressed challenges to the damage prevention process
by proposing improvements to state damage prevention programs.
Specifically, we believe state pipeline safety authorities should
support and encourage adoption of leading practices to improve their
damage prevention programs. These leading practices include:
Examining and limiting exemptions to the damage
prevention process, including municipal exemptions;
Requiring a ``positive response'' from the facility owner
prior to excavation to ensure that underground facilities are marked,
or that the excavation area is clear of any underground facilities;
Requiring marking of all lines and laterals, including
sewer lines and laterals;
Encouraging training for locate professionals; and
Encouraging the use of state-of-the-art technologies to
locate underground facilities, especially geographic information
systems (GIS), which offer the most detailed and prolific pipeline
mapping available.
For the most part, stakeholders involved the excavation industry
agree that these leading practices will undoubtably improve the damage
prevention process in many states across the nation.
While ensuring for safe excavation is paramount, breakdowns in the
damage prevention process also result in significant financial loss.
According to a 2021 study sponsored by the Infrastructure Protection
Coalition (IPC) entitled ``811 Emergency,'' failures in the 811 system
are costing $61 billion a year in waste and excess costs and creating
unnecessary hazards for public safety, particularly in states where the
implementation and accountability are most lax.
The IPC report includes an in-depth examination of its operations
in every state, and shows that these costs and the increased risk to
public safety could be substantially reduced if states adopted more
effective practices and procedures already in use in other parts of the
country. The provisions described above are consistent with the
findings of the IPC report.
GIS Mapping
Optimal damage prevention begins early in the planning and design
stages of a pipeline project. Understanding the risk and developing
designs that mitigate risk is best achieved using industry-driven
standards and utility engineering best practices. Providing excavators
with well-contrived designs that avoid or mitigate utility conflicts
along with standardized digital data on utility infrastructure enables
better construction planning and execution by leveraging virtual design
and construction technologies that eliminate potential for damages.
Moreover, these methods expedite construction, providing tremendous
cost savings on projects. A fundamental need is to electronically
document utilities properly and in a standardized fashion at the time
of installation.
The last pipeline safety reauthorization bill enacted into law,
commonly referred to as the ``PIPES Act of 2020,'' included language
that would require operators of gas distribution pipelines to identify
and manage traceable, reliable, and complete records, including maps
and other drawings. Accurate mapping of underground utility
infrastructure facilitates locating, and use of geographic information
systems (GIS) is the most effective way to identify and document a wide
range of data about the underground infrastructure in a given area.
GIS can create, manage, visualize, analyze, and map different
layers of data by creating maps and scenes related to underground
facilities. GIS connects data to a map, integrating location data with
a range of limiting information regarding the subsurface facilities in
that area, and it allows for layering of data tied to geographic
points. Rather than restricting the user to limited features on a
static map, GIS mapping allows for viewing customizable combinations of
data layers in a single dynamic tool.
Ensuring the use of readily available GIS mapping technologies
would be the most efficient way to identify and document the exact
location of underground pipelines (as well as other subsurface
infrastructure). This precise mapping system is an increasingly
utilized to ensure for the accurate locating and marking of underground
facilities.
The goal of moving toward superior GIS mapping of underground
facilities is shared by industries outside of excavation construction
industry. Several letters in support of GIS mapping put together by DCA
and PUCA in the last congress were signed on and supported by other
national associations and organizations representing engineers,
equipment manufacturers and distributors, technology experts and labor
unions. Providing incentives for state pipeline safety programs to
encourage and even require use of GIS mapping is clearly supported by a
growing number of stakeholders.
Attached for your consideration is an overview of the state of
damage prevention and initiatives to improve underground facility
mapping, including expanding access to GIS mapping technologies.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 provided an
unprecedented $550 billion in new investments in American
infrastructure, and a significant portion of those dollars will go
toward improvements to underground systems. This means an unprecedented
amount of excavation activity coming our way. The provisions described
above would take needed steps to encourage states to reduce exemptions
to the 811 process, require locating employ state-of-the-art
technologies, such as GIS mapping along with published standards for
documenting utility infrastructure, which will only improve the damage
prevention process.
Increased Penalties for Physical Attacks on Pipeline Infrastructure
Our members also support language that would hold those who engage
in physical attacks on pipeline infrastructure accountable.
Specifically, the House bills considered in the last congress would
have established a criminal penalty of up to 10 years in prison for
those who cause a defect to or disruption of a pipeline system.
Importantly, the provision would include pipeline facilities under
construction.
While most agree on the right to peaceful activism, including
peaceful protests to existing and pending pipeline construction
projects, we strongly support legislative language that would hold
those who engage in criminal activities during protests more
accountable.
Past proposals related to this problem would have revised existing
criminal penalties for damaging or destroying a pipeline facility by
specifying that vandalism, tampering or disrupting the operation of a
pipeline facility would be punishable by criminal fines and
imprisonment. Importantly, leading proposals included pipeline
facilities under construction within their scope. While interfering or
tampering with the operation of a pipeline would clearly compromise
pipeline safety, vandalism and destruction of nearby equipment used to
build a pipeline can be just as dangerous.
Several states have enacted laws intended to deter pipeline
vandalism. Tampering with or vandalizing this critical infrastructure
or nearby equipment used to build it can create serious safety risks to
the public, pipeline employees and even the perpetrators. Additionally,
acts of vandalism could result in devastating environmental impacts.
Therefore, we encourage the committee to adopt language that would
enact criminal penalties for criminal protesting activities, and these
penalties would be subject to vandalism and destruction of both
pipeline infrastructure as well as the equipment and materials needed
to build it.
The excavation construction industry looks forward to working with
all you on advancing pipeline safety reauthorization legislation to
includes language to improve state pipeline safety programs through
promotion of several leading practices to help avoid damages to
underground facilities during excavation activities.
I'd like to again thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
speak with you today, and I look forward to answering any questions you
have on these important issues.
__________
Attachment
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
OVERVIEW: The State of Damage Prevention
Background: The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is dedicated to
preventing damage to underground utility infrastructure and protecting
those who live and work near these important assets through the shared
responsibility of our stakeholders. CGA is a member-driven association
of nearly 4,000 damage prevention professionals committed to saving
lives and preventing damage to North American underground
infrastructure by promoting effective damage prevention practices of
today and tomorrow. CGA is the preeminent source of damage prevention
data and information to reduce damages to underground facilities in
North America through shared responsibility among all stakeholders.
According to CGA's Damage Information Reporting Tool (DIRT) Report,
the annual rate of damages to buried infrastructure in the U.S. has
remained stagnant for most of the last decade and costs the U.S. a
staggering $30 billion every year. Each of the hundreds of thousands of
dig-ins to underground utilities that occur annually has the potential
to cripple communities and businesses by cutting them off from critical
services, causing injury or even loss of life.
Looking Ahead: The damage prevention industry is facing
increasingly complex challenges, and we must encourage innovation and
incentivize the development of damage prevention solutions for the
future. To do this, CGA has elevated the work of its traditional
programs (Best Practices, DIRT and 811 awareness and use) and launched
three new efforts to expedite the industries' achievement of the next
significant reduction in damages:
The Next Practices Initiative--Launched in 2020, the Next
Practices Initiative's goal is to encourage innovation and new
practices to address the most critical challenges facing the damage
prevention industry. The Next Practices Advisory Committee uses
industry data, quantitative surveys, and stakeholder input to clearly
identify and focus the industry on the advancement of the most
effective solutions to address critical damage prevention challenges.
The Damage Prevention Institute (DPI)--Launched in
January 2023, the DPI mission builds on the industry-leading insights
of CGA's Next Practices Initiative by utilizing a stakeholder-centered
approach to develop performance metrics that reflect a commitment to
Best Practices and dedication to improving the reliability of the U.S.
damage prevention system for everyone involved.
The 50 in 5 Industry Challenge--Announced in 2023, this
effort challenges stakeholders to reduce damages to critical
underground utilities by 50% in five years by bringing damage
prevention advocates together around a targeted set of strategic, data-
driven priorities. This call to action encourages the damage prevention
industry to concentrate on three focus areas that prioritize critical
issues identified by CGA's Next Practices Initiative and the top damage
root causes that contribute to more than 76% of damages to buried
infrastructure (according to CGA's most recent DIRT Report):
Effective and Consistent Use of 811
Key Excavator Practices (potholing, maintaining
clearance, etc.)
Accurate, Timely Utility Locating
CGA recently introduced the CGA Index, a metric for evaluating
year-over-year damage trends, to measure industry progress in reducing
damage. The status of the CGA Index will be updated annually in
conjunction with the release of the DIRT report.
CHALLENGE: The Mapping Gap
In 2023, failure to locate accurately and on time was the root
cause attributed to 34% of damages to underground utilities. CGA's
Locator White Paper and the work of the Next Practices Initiative
reveal that improving the accuracy of facility maps and implementing
electronic white-lining would help locators complete their work more
quickly and accurately.
Records of underground utilities are often inaccurate or incomplete
and are largely unavailable to damage prevention stakeholders like
designers, locators, and excavators. Bringing damage prevention mapping
technology and accessibility to damage prevention stakeholders has the
potential to reduce damages and increase the efficiency of the safe
excavation process.
Additionally, excavators continue to emphasize the importance of
greater access to mapping records. The results of a 2024 national
survey of excavators conducted by CGA revealed that 89% of professional
excavators believe that having access to utility maps would reduce
excavation damage.
OPPORTUNITY: Improved Facility Mapping Records
Although there is still a gap in mapping record accuracy and
availability, many stakeholders are implementing programs and
initiatives to improve mapping records. Featured in CGA's Leadership in
Mapping video series, Jerry Schmitz, VP of Safety & Online Quality for
Southwest Gas, describes his company's commitment to using maps as the
foundation for its asset management and damage prevention efforts.
Consumer's Energy has recently implemented a program to map its own
natural gas distribution pipelines in addition to sewer facilities in
close proximity to those assets.
In California, Senate Bill 865 (SB 865), introduced and passed in
2020, takes the improvement of mapping records further by requiring
that new installations be mapped using GIS. The legislation aims to
enhance safe excavation practices in the state by requiring all new
subsurface installations to be mapped using a GIS starting from January
1, 2023, except for specific oil and gas flowlines within oil fields.
Increased availability and accessibility of GPS-enabled locating
devices is also providing the industry with greater opportunities to
effectively map facilities. UtiliSource, a Missouri-based utility
design, engineering and project management company, rolled out a
program to record the location of all third-party locates throughout a
fiber installation project. They will then be able to utilize this
mapping record as they continue to do work in the same area improving
future project efficiency.
Gopher State One Call's GPS-enabled locator program in Minnesota
partners with locating technology providers to equip damage prevention
stakeholders across the state with utility line locators integrated
with RTK GNSS accuracy and GPS collection capabilities. This program
has been particularly beneficial to small municipalities, for whom
updating legacy paper maps can be prohibitively time-consuming and
expensive.
OPPORTUNITY: Expanding Access to Utility Mapping Information
Important Concepts and Terminology
It is not necessary to consolidate utility mapping data in a single
location to enable visualization of mapping data to support damage
prevention processes.
The term ``distributed GIS'' refers to geographic information
systems that do not have all of the system components in the same
physical location. In the context of this document, ``distributed GIS''
refers specifically to the rendering (or display) of geospatial data
for an end user without that user having access to the underlying data.
Current GIS technology allows geospatial data owners to publish
their data through a ``Web Mapping Service'', or ``WMS''. Publishing a
WMS is a means of displaying view-only map data over the internet.
Publishing a WMS empowers a data owner to completely control their own
data, including where the data is stored, how the data is rendered/
displayed for end users, and who may view the data. A WMS can be
configured to prohibit copying or downloading GIS data underlying an
internet-based map.
Creating GIS Mashups
In a distributed GIS, the term ``mashup'' refers to a web-based
mapping application that combines mapping content from disparate
sources (such as web mapping services). Mashups separate the underlying
geospatial data from the presentation of the data.
GIS mashups that incorporate mapping content from multiple
utilities--who maintain full control over their own data--present many
opportunities to support the damage prevention process. For example, an
811 center could create a mashup of member utility data. The 811 center
could then provide a display of the mapping data for dig tickets. The
display would be limited to the extent of the excavation area and would
only be available for the life of the ticket. An example of a mashup
created by an 811 center is presented in CGA's Next Practices Case
Study--Minnesota Utilities Mapping Project. The case study clearly
demonstrates the concepts described in this document. Additionally,
Texas 811 has created a mashup to provide map renderings of select
facility participants' abandoned lines. CGA is following several
mapping pilot projects and industry efforts to document practical
options, effective protocols, and successful practices.
Efforts such as these have the potential to increase locating
efficiency, decrease over-notification practices utilized by both
contractors and facility owner/operators, and help decrease overall 811
request volume so locators' workloads are more manageable.
Additionally, increasing access to facility map information during the
planning and design phase of large projects will improve overall
project and process efficiency.
Documenting Industry Best Practices for Distributed GIS for Damage
Prevention
Effectively using distributed GIS for damage prevention will
require identifying Best Practices to address issues that arise with
increased sharing of mapping records such as the following:
Geospatial data accuracy
Map feature attribute data
Geospatial data projections and coordinate systems
Adoption of protocols for publishing web mapping services
to support damage prevention processes while also protecting data
owners' information security
As the only trade association that brings together stakeholders
from all facets of the damage prevention industry, CGA is uniquely
situated to facilitate an industry-wide dialogue to identify and
document Best Practices that are creating an environment in which
distributed GIS can serve the damage prevention process. This includes
consideration of the items outlined above, which would provide the
guardrails needed to provide greater access to facility mapping
information prior to and during excavation projects.
Taking Demonstration to Deployment
An effective option to provide greater access to facility map
visualization for planned excavation would require selecting a finite
area where map information would be provided to end users. Currently,
the most widely adopted process for providing facility location
information is when excavators make a locate request through the 811
process--this occurs over 41 million times per year. Through this
process, 811 centers use facility owner/operator map information to
identify utilities that may be affected during an excavation project.
Those utilities are then notified to locate and mark their facilities
during a specified period of time prior to the excavation project. This
well-understood process can be applied more broadly to provide affected
stakeholders with facility visualization prior to and during an
excavation project. This would not replace locating and marking but
would greatly enhance the entire 811 damage prevention process.
This document is not intended to outline all of the issues that
must be addressed, but to serve as a starting point to establish a
process that has the potential to significantly enhance the current 811
process and focus the industry on taking damage prevention to the next
level in order to keep our communities safe and connected to the
utilities we depend on every day.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
Mr. Caram, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST
Mr. Caram. Thank you. Good morning, Chair Webster, Ranking
Member Titus, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today on the
vital subject of pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I
am the executive director of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
The Pipeline Safety Trust was founded after the 1999
Olympic pipeline tragedy in Bellingham, Washington, an entirely
preventable failure, spilled gasoline into a beautiful salmon
stream in the heart of our community which ignited and killed
three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so appalled at the
operations of the pipeline company and the lax oversight from
the Federal Government that they asked the courts to set aside
money from the settlement to create the Pipeline Safety Trust
as a national watchdog on the pipeline industry and its
regulators.
I look forward to the day when I can tell you that there
have been no fatalities since the last time I testified, but
today is not that day. The last 2 years have been the deadliest
2-year period for pipelines in nearly 15 years, since the 2-
year period that included the devastating PG&E pipeline
explosion in San Bruno, California, widely considered a low
point for pipeline safety. I warn you that my message is
largely the same as my previous opportunities to testify before
this subcommittee, and that is because the state of pipeline
safety is largely the same. We continue to languish with
consistent poor performance, with a significant incident almost
every day, and 30 people killed over the last 2 years.
In December, the NTSB held a board meeting to discuss the
2023 UGI Utilities pipeline failure in West Reading,
Pennsylvania, that killed 7 people and injured 11. The failed
piece of pipeline infrastructure was made from Aldyl A plastic.
PHMSA has known these Aldyl A components are prone to failure
for decades.
The NTSB is also investigating an Enbridge pipeline failure
that occurred in November in South Jordan, Utah, that killed a
15-year-old child. The preliminary report finds that the failed
pipeline was also Aldyl A.
Atmos Energy, a large gas distribution pipeline operator in
the Southeast, has had a string of deadly failures with
troublingly common patterns. An NTSB investigation of a 2018
home explosion that took the life of a 12-year-old girl while
she practiced her cheerleading routine, found that the failed
pipeline was part of an undermaintained system full of leaks
that had led to fires in neighboring homes in the preceding
days. Neighbors had complained repeatedly about the smell of
gas. Atmos didn't find any leaks they deemed to be hazardous
before the home exploded.
Then, just last year in Jackson, Mississippi, a pipeline-
fueled home explosion killed the 82-year-old wife of a
community pastor. An NTSB preliminary report found that the
failed pipeline was part of an undermaintained system full of
leaks that led to another home explosion in the following days.
Neighbors had complained repeatedly about the smell of gas.
Atmos didn't find any leaks they deemed to be hazardous before
the home exploded.
Again, if I am repeating myself, it is because operators
are repeating their mistakes that kill people.
While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero
incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. I commend
this subcommittee for working together on pipeline safety
legislation over the last 2 years, and the bill this
subcommittee passed has some good provisions. Increasing civil
penalties is a step in the right direction. When we try to
chart penalties levied on operators against their quarterly
earnings, we often can't even visualize the penalty at such a
tiny percentage of earnings. So giving PHMSA more enforcement
authority, albeit small in this case, is moving in the right
direction.
Additionally, increasing authorized resources to PHMSA and
State programs is another move in the right direction. Not only
has the agency been chronically underfunded, but the additional
miles of jurisdictional pipe and the potential build-out of
carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines demand an increase in
resources from Congress. Thank you for answering that call.
However, given the continued lack of progress on pipeline
safety, we need more. There are many provisions in this bill
that won't contribute to safety progress. Additionally, there
are commonsense, practical safety initiatives that would make a
real impact on safety, such as fire shutoff valves. These
devices can mitigate the damage caused by a house fire that
could be made worse by the presence of gas service. The valve
automatically closes when exposed to heat, preventing natural
gas from adding literal fuel to the fire. These devices are
inexpensive, require no ongoing maintenance, and can be easily
installed on service lines.
As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's
pipeline safety program and make improvements to the law, I
implore you to think of the empty seats at dinner tables across
the country because of pipeline failures. I have been with
families who have lost loved ones recently. I have been with
families who lost loved ones over 25 years ago. And I can tell
you, the pain never goes away. Please give PHMSA the authority
and the resources it needs to meet its responsibility to the
American people. Thank you.
[Mr. Caram's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust
Good morning, Committee Chair Graves, Subcommittee Chair Webster,
Committee Ranking Member Larsen, Subcommittee Ranking Member Titus, and
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today
on the vital subject of pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I
am the Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line
tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable
failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a
beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually
ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so
appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled
at the lax oversight from the federal government, that they asked the
federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the
Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization
over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
We work to ensure that no other community will endure the senseless
grief that Bellingham experienced from a pipeline tragedy. Sadly, there
have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters since
Bellingham. Sadly, there have been many since the last hearing before
this subcommittee just nine months ago. I am here today, hoping that we
can continue to work together to move towards our shared goal of zero
incidents.
Recent Pipeline Failures
I look forward to the day when I can speak before you to let you
know that there were no fatalities since the last time I testified, but
today is not that day. The last two years have been the deadliest two-
year period for pipelines in nearly 15 years, since the two-year period
that included the devastating PG&E pipeline explosion in San Bruno, CA
that killed eight people and destroyed an entire neighborhood--a time
that I think all on this panel would agree was a low point for pipeline
safety. I warn you in advance that my message is largely the same as my
previous opportunities to testify before this subcommittee. That's
because the state of pipeline safety is largely the same. We continue
to languish with consistent poor performance, with a significant
incident almost every day and 30 people killed over the last two years.
In December, the NTSB held a Board meeting to discuss the 2023 UGI
Utilities pipeline failure in West Reading, PA that resulted in an
explosion that killed seven people and injured 11 \1\. Family members
of some of the victims attended the meeting where the NTSB discussed
the failed piece of pipeline infrastructure made from Aldyl A plastic.
PHMSA has known these Aldyl A components are prone to failure for
decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD23LR002.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB is also investigating an Enbridge pipeline failure that
occurred in November 2024 in South Jordan, UT that killed a 15-year-old
child. The preliminary report finds that the failed pipeline was also
Aldyl A \2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD25FR001.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atmos Energy, a large gas distribution pipeline operator in the
Southeast has had a string of deadly failures with troublingly common
patterns. In 2018, a deadly home explosion in Dallas, TX took the life
of a 12-year-old child while she practiced her cheerleading routine. An
NTSB investigation found that the failed pipeline was part of an under-
maintained system full of leaks that had led to other fires in
neighboring homes in the preceding days. Neighbors had complained
repeatedly about the smell of gas. Atmos didn't find any leaks they
deemed to be hazardous before the home exploded \3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD18FR002.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then, just last year, in Jackson, MS, a pipeline fueled home
explosion killed the 81-year-old wife of a community pastor. An NTSB
preliminary report found that the failed pipeline was part of an under-
maintained system full of leaks that led to another home explosion in
the following days. Neighbors had complained repeatedly about the smell
of gas. Atmos didn't find any leaks they deemed to be hazardous before
the home exploded \4\. Again, if I'm repeating myself, it's because
operators are repeating their mistakes that kill people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD24FR003.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the hazardous liquids side, we've seen two recent failures that
have contaminated drinking water wells. An Energy Transfer pipeline in
Pennsylvania was discovered to have been leaking jet fuel for at least
16 months, according to PHMSA, after many complaints about the taste
and smell of residents' water. And In December, an Enterprise Products
pipeline spilled 23,000 gallons of gasoline, contaminating nine
drinking wells.
These are just several of the 534 significant pipeline incidents
that have happened in the last two years.
5 Year Anniversary of the Denbury Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Failure in
Satartia, MS
I want to take a moment to acknowledge the five-year anniversary of
the harrowing carbon dioxide pipeline failure in Satartia, MS. As of
this past Saturday, five years have passed since nearly 50 people went
to the hospital experiencing seizures, loss of consciousness, foaming
at the mouth, and many other terrifying effects of carbon dioxide
exposure \5\. Denbury's failure in Satartia laid bare many glaring
regulatory shortfalls that have been clearly identified, but five years
later we haven't modernized the regulations. It took over 12 years for
PHMSA to modernize regulations with lessons learned from PG&E's
devastation in San Bruno. I hope it doesn't take nearly as long for
PHMSA to modernize carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations with
lessons learned from Denbury's disaster in Satartia.
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\5\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/
Failure%20Investigation
%20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf
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PIPES Act of 2023
While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero
incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. I commend this
subcommittee for working on pipeline safety legislation over the last
two years. The bill this subcommittee passed has some good provisions.
Increasing civil penalties is a step in the right direction. With
few exceptions, civil penalties are not financially meaningful to
operators. When we try to chart penalties levied on operators because
of fatal pipeline failures against their quarterly earnings, we often
can't even visualize the penalty, it's such a tiny percentage of
earnings. Giving PHMSA more enforcement authority, albeit small in this
case, is moving in the right direction.
The Voluntary Information Sharing system, authorized by the PIPES
Act of 2023 has the potential to make a difference on pipeline safety.
Especially if coupled with widespread adoption of Pipeline Safety
Management Systems.
Additionally, increasing authorized resources to PHMSA is another
move in the right direction. Not only has the agency been chronically
underfunded, but the additional miles of jurisdictional pipe such as
gas gathering pipelines and the Congressionally incentivized potential
buildout of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines demand an increase in
resources from Congress. Thank you for answering that call.
However, given the continued lack of progress on pipeline safety,
we need more. There are many provisions in this bill that won't
contribute to safety progress. Allowing for reduced storage tank
inspection, for example, will help operators save money, but will not
promote safety. Mitigating pipeline failures due to geohazards would be
better served by mandating a rulemaking than a study. We have industry
guidance and several studies that should be more than enough to inform
a PHMSA rulemaking effort to close this gaping regulatory gap.
Pipeline Safety Management Systems have been developed over the
last ten years. Lessons have been incorporated and updated. When
implemented properly it leads to better safety outcomes. However
widespread adoption still eludes the pipeline industry. Congress could
make a meaningful difference in pipeline safety by directing PHMSA to
take steps towards widespread industry adoption.
There are other commonsense, practical safety initiatives that
could be incorporated that will make a real impact on safety. One such
example is fire shutoff valves. These devices can mitigate the damage
caused by a house fire that could be made worse by the presence of gas
service. A valve is held open by a polymer with a low melting point,
and when exposed to heat, the polymer melts and the valve automatically
closes, preventing natural gas from adding literal fuel to the fire.
These devices are inexpensive and can be easily installed on service
lines.
Conclusion
As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's pipeline
safety program and make improvements to the law, I implore you to think
of the empty seats at dinner tables across the country because of
pipeline failures. I've been with families who have lost their loved
ones recently and some who lost their loved ones 25 years ago. I can
tell you; the pain never goes away. Please give PHMSA the authority and
the resources it needs to meet its responsibility to the American
people.
Thank you.
__________
Appendix
Fact Sheet: Requiring the Installation of Fire Shutoff Valves in Gas
Distribution Pipelines
The Problem: In the event of a fire in a structure that has natural
gas service, gas distribution piping is often compromised and serves as
fuel. This adds literal fuel to the fire and puts occupants and first
responders at increased risk of injury and death. According to PHMSA,
for this reason, it is necessary to quickly shut off the flow of gas to
the structure.
Background: It may take considerable time to complete the shutoff
of gas, including notification of first responders and the gas company,
arrival of first responders and gas company at the scene, determining
the appropriate method to shut off the gas, executing shut off, and
release of the gas in the pipe between the shutoff location and the
structure. Reviews of accident reports have shown that it is not
unusual for this to take hours, prolonging the emergency. Use of
automated shutoff valves can significantly reduce the time to shut off
gas to the structure. One such device is a fire shutoff valve (FSV),
also known as a thermal shutoff valve.
A typical FSV uses a spring-loaded plug held in place by a fusible
link made of a low melting point alloy. When the fire shutoff valve is
exposed to fire, the link melts and the spring closes the valve,
shutting off the gas. FSVs are typically installed in the service line
either before the regulator, before the meter, or after the meter.
FSVs are commercially available and have been used in gas service
lines before the gas meter and in gas supplies to appliances.
Currently, there are no federal regulations requiring their use in
natural gas distribution systems. They are required in Massachusetts
\6\ and have been used in Germany since the 1990s. The Pipeline Safety
Trust supports the widespread use of these safety devices and advocates
for federal regulations that would make their use mandatory.
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\6\ General Laws of Massachusetts Part 1, Title XXII, Chapter 164,
Section 75 A
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Recommendation: Congress should require PHMSA to amend 49 CFR Part
192(H) to require operators to install fire shutoff valves on all gas
distribution service lines.
Suggested Statutory Language
Sec. __, Requiring Fire Shutoff Valves for Gas Distribution Service
Lines.--
(a) In general--Section 60110 of title 49, United States Code, is
amended by inserting at the end:
1. Definitions. As used in this section:
Fire shut off valves are spring-loaded plugs held in place
by a fusible link made of a low melting point alloy and
attached to a gas source. When the fire shutoff valve is
exposed to fire, the link melts and the spring closes the
valve, shutting off the gas.
2. Not later than ___, the Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe standards on the circumstances under which an
operator of a natural gas distribution system must install fire
shutoff valves in the system.
3. If the Secretary decides, under subsection (2) of this
section that there are circumstances under which an operator
will not be required to install a fire shutoff valve on a
service line in a natural gas distribution system, the
Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the reasons for
the decision not later than 30 days after the decision is made.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. Okay, so now
it is time for us to ask questions. If you are ready, we are
ready.
I guess my first question is, basically, Mr. Caram and
others mentioned the fact that things just didn't get done. I
am wondering, the last 4 years has had no Administrator, nobody
in charge. How does that affect the overall enforcement, no
matter what kind of law we passed? Anybody want to tackle that?
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. LEPA applauds President
Trump for nominating a PHMSA Administrator for Senate
confirmation. It is important to have an Administrator to drive
change within PHMSA, and PHMSA needs that change to improve the
use of new technologies.
An Administrator can also help reassure the American public
that comprehensive regulations govern pipeline safety, that
PHMSA is on the case, and, like the modes of other
transportation networks, can reassure the American public that
this transportation system is safe.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Anyone else?
Mr. Paris.
Mr. Paris. So I think not having a confirmed Administrator
shows that there are some--it gives an uncertain regulatory
environment. And if there is a confirmed Administrator, it
shows that the Government is serious about tackling these
issues. So I think it is very important that we do so.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, we would also
support having that individual confirmed, but we also can
support and make sure that we work with the current PHMSA
administration and make sure that we continue to improve on
safety, and we have been able to do so through the last
administration.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Caram.
Mr. Caram. Yes, my hope and expectation is that pipeline
safety is a bipartisan issue that rises above politics. And I
think we have seen that through all recent administrations,
including the last Trump administration under Skip Elliott's
leadership. And seeing two members of that team returning, and
Paul Roberti and Ben Kochman, leads me to hope and expect that
safety-forward leadership will continue.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Pipelines are the safest mode of
transportation by far. We understand that. But are the safety
rules, regulations, laws, and other things enough? Maybe just
undirected by a--not having a leader? Or is there something
else we should be doing? Anybody want to tackle that one?
Mr. Black. It's great that pipeline incidents are declining
12 percent overall and 12 percent on incidents impacting the
pipeline environment, but our goal is zero incidents. Congress
has a role in that through pipeline safety reauthorization. So
does PHMSA. Technology is improving. Engineering analytics are
improving. The way to improve pipeline safety further is to
update PHMSA regulations to use this new technology and know-
how through pipeline safety demonstration pilot programs and
then updating of PHMSA's regulations.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Anyone else?
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I will build off
of what Mr. Black just said.
We also agree with continuing to leverage new technologies.
We are part of several different associations, organizations,
one of them being Pipeline Research Council International,
where funds are collected and developed to improve technology
and figure out ways to leverage that new technology and
incorporate it.
So sometimes PHMSA is not as quick to adopt those new
technologies, and so we would be looking for PHMSA to find
avenues to be able to do that if it is recommended practices,
if it is new technologies, but trying to leverage those as
quickly as we can just to improve pipeline safety.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Paris.
Mr. Paris. I think first, a consideration is, what we are
doing here today is getting all the stakeholders involved and
talking about these things. I mean, it is important that we all
understand. I don't understand what my colleagues here do every
day, and I don't expect them to know what I do every day. So it
is important for us to have these discussions.
Another point that they had made is this evolving
technology. And for us, as excavators, the GIS mapping is what
stands out to us the most. The technology is readily available,
and we really feel that it would help our industry.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Yes. Well, there is--I know there
have been advancements just in the last 10 years as far as what
is underneath the earth. And it is a beautiful thing that can
be done, beautiful technology. It works. Is that lacking?
Mr. Paris. In our industry we don't see it, yes. I mean, we
are basically given a static, black-and-white map or a drawing
that shows where utilities are, and half the time, they are not
correct. So we don't see the GIS mapping involved in our
industry yet.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Caram.
Mr. Caram. Yes, I would just like to say that the goal is
not to be the safest form of transportation of hazardous
materials. The goal is zero incidents. And one way to make some
meaningful movement towards that is the widespread adoption of
safety management systems.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
Okay, Ms. Titus, you are recognized for questions.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Webster.
As I said, Nevada was the first State to have annual
inspections and surveys of all the natural gas pipelines.
Rather than every 5 years, we do it annually. It is a triple
win. We find leaks earlier, which improves safety; we reduce
greenhouse gases; and we create jobs. More people are surveying
for these lines.
Mr. Caram, if we had a national standard, would you expect
to see similar results in other States, and we could have these
three goals accomplished nationwide?
Mr. Caram. Yes, absolutely. I agree, a good leak detection
and repair program with good standards on leak detection
technology has multiple benefits, many of which you listed.
Primarily, for us, the biggest benefit is better safety
outcomes. We continue to have too many home explosions and too
many people dying from these leaks on pipelines. And leak
detection standards and strong repair criteria will make a
difference on that, and so we are strong supporters of it.
Many States--or some States have adopted those, like
Nevada, and that is wonderful to see. Some operators do go
above and beyond and have those strict standards for
themselves. But what we really need is what Congress asked
PHMSA to do in 2020, and that is set a national standard, where
we know that all operators are held to this standard of finding
leaks on a regular basis and repairing those leaks promptly.
Ms. Titus. As I mentioned in my remarks earlier, there was
knowledge of leaks in some of these accidents, but they just
weren't fixed. How about the sanctions on companies that don't
fix the leaks, even if they know about them? Would those be
adequate in the last legislation that came out of this
committee, or should we look at that?
Mr. Caram. I am sorry, could you repeat the question one
more time?
Ms. Titus. Well, if you discover a leak but you don't fix
it and it results in an accident, what are the consequences?
Mr. Caram. Sure. Yes, we have seen the consequences over
and over, unfortunately, of home explosions and fatalities. Of
course, not every leak----
Ms. Titus [interrupting]. I don't mean: What are the bad
consequences for the environment? I mean: What are the
consequences for the company that found the leak and didn't fix
it?
Mr. Caram. Well, that is left up to the enforcement, to the
investigation, whether it is an NTSB investigation and they
find the root cause analysis, or if it is PHMSA or the State
program that investigates. If the regulator finds that they
were out of compliance and that they should have determined
that it was a hazardous leak that they didn't repair, they
could be held liable with enforcement.
But the regulations are not written very specifically as to
how they should appropriately grade a leak and what they
determine to be hazardous. And I think----
Ms. Titus [interrupting]. So it is not a----
Mr. Caram [continuing]. The draft PHMSA rule----
Ms. Titus [interrupting]. It is not a scale of fines, or
penalties, or anything like that? It is just kind of ad hoc?
Mr. Caram. Yes, there is a standard as to fines that are
charged when an operator is found out of compliance. It is just
sometimes it is difficult to find an operator out of compliance
when the regulations are not written very prescriptively as to
how they should handle leaks.
Ms. Titus. And do you think the legislation that came out
of this committee last time deals with that sufficiently?
Mr. Caram. Well, the PIPES Act of 2020 directed PHMSA to
write rules on finding leaks and repairing any leak that could
be deemed hazardous. And so we would expect PHMSA to interpret
that rule to do exactly what we are talking about, be
prescriptive about how to grade leaks and how to ensure that
they are repaired promptly.
Ms. Titus. Well, without this standard in place, since the
legislation didn't pass--you mentioned some companies do it
themselves. I mean, they are good companies, they want to be
safe themselves. Could you all address what does a company do?
Does it take it on itself to have these annual leak
inspections, that sort of thing? Brag about yourselves, and
tell us what you are doing, even without this standard in
place.
Mr. Black or Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Black. Pipeline operators regulated by PHMSA have
requirements for fixed intervals for inspecting their pipes
through smart pigs that collect--that travel through the pipe,
and they develop a risk-based schedule. If there are features
that need to be researched more frequently through more smart
pigs, they will.
We are using advanced analytics right now with better
predictive models to understand, if we find a sign of corrosion
or cracking or something, when is the best time to--when do you
need to go out there and address that before--and what are the
true threats? Certainly believe about the importance of doing
smart pigs through pipelines and assessing features on the
schedule that they need to be before an issue can become a
problem.
Ms. Titus. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Yes. For the natural gas industry and for the
transmission side, we actually do more frequent patrols than
what you are describing. So for Class 1 and 2 you will do once
per year. But then in Class 3 and 4, our higher populated
areas, it is more frequent than that. High-consequence areas
you also have quarterly patrols. So you are again looking for
those leaks that could be detrimental, could be hazardous, and
making sure that you respond appropriately to address those.
So from a transmission side, we are out there more
frequently than what you are describing.
Ms. Titus. Okay. Mr. Caram.
Mr. Caram. And I will just say that patrols are not the
same as surveys and are not always done with leak detection
technology. Many operators, of course, do, but they are not
required in the regulations.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Webster.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Larsen, do you have questions?
Mr. Larsen of Washington. I do.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Some say yes, some say no.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. [Inaudible.]
Mr. Webster of Florida. Sure, go ahead.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Kind of going out of turn, and I
appreciate that. For a variety of reasons, a lot going on
today. But my first question is for Mr. Caram.
In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress created a grant that the
Pipeline Safety Trust receives to provide technical assistance
to communities and individuals in support of pipeline safety.
What does your organization do with those dollars?
Mr. Caram. Yes, this has been really critical funding for
our organization, and we are grateful to Congress for
authorizing it and to PHMSA for awarding it. We have spent the
money on a number of ways to improve--to offer technical
assistance to communities, and we really see that as a way to
improve public engagement among the public, the pipeline
industry, and the regulators.
One of the ways to improve public engagement and to offer
technical assistance is to educate the public. So we have used
grant money on a number of things, including a primer on
pipelines that we call The Briefing Papers. It is a 15-page
document that--or 15-part document, it is much longer than 15
pages--that includes information such as the basics of how
pipelines work, how they are regulated, how to find information
about pipelines through the National Pipeline Mapping System
and the PHMSA database, and a lot of information about
emergency response and spill response planning.
We have also produced guides that are stakeholder-specific,
like a landowners guide to pipelines and local government guide
to pipelines.
We also use the grant money for some of our staff time. We
get a lot of calls from members of the public, a lot of them
that live along rights-of-way that find us online. And they are
often angry, frustrated, haven't gotten a lot of answers from
anyone. And we maintain a good working relationship with PHMSA,
with a lot of the State regulators, with the pipeline trade
associations, and with a lot of individual operators, so we are
often able to talk to these folks, find out why they are so
frustrated, and connect them with the right people.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. How many staff do you have?
Mr. Caram. We have about 10 staff.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Total? Yes.
Mr. Caram. Yes, and----
Mr. Larsen of Washington [interrupting]. All in Bellingham?
Mr. Caram. No, about half are in Bellingham and half are
spread out. COVID showed us that we are able to work remotely.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. So it has been over 20 years
since much of the pipeline industry began implementing
integrity management. Has integrity management improved
pipeline safety compared to a more prescriptive regulatory
approach in the view of PST?
Mr. Caram. Integrity management is a bit of a mixed bag.
There are some areas you can look to that we have seen some
improvement. I think the Distribution Integrity Management
Program, also known as DIMP, while there is still lots of room
for improvement, we can see some real progress there since DIMP
has been implemented. Parts of transmission integrity
management have proven to be effective. Using inline inspection
tools to find corrosion has been successful.
But I will say the idea of integrity management puts the
onus on the operator to identify all of the potential threats
on their pipeline within these high-consequence areas and
create a plan to mitigate against those threats and implement
that plan. So we would expect that when we look at the
significant incidents within those areas where they are
required to have integrity management, that we would have lower
rates of significant failures, significant incidents. And we
actually see the opposite, that there are lower failures
outside of those areas.
So I don't have a lot of answers as to why that is not
working, but I know threat identification by operators is a
problem, and we need to figure out what's not working and how
to fix it.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks, thanks.
Mr. Taylor, the EPA identified natural gas systems as a
main source of methane emissions, and the PIPES Act of 2020
mandated that PHMSA finalize a rule on methane leak detection
and repair programs, both for safety and to cut pollution,
methane pollution. Did PHMSA's final rule from December reflect
INGAA's input?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, it followed the GPAC recommendation, so
generally it followed what we were recommending. We would like
the opportunity to have it noticed and commented again, just--
again, there were a couple of small things we would like to
improve on. But ultimately, yes, it followed the GPAC
recommendations.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. It generally did, okay. I am
just--it is just--I get when administrations come in and they
want to do things differently. It just seems like both on the
methane leak and the other one I mentioned, on the CO2
pipelines, that we told PHMSA to do this, it was--these were
nearly done, there was generally a lot of consensus. Like, this
wasn't the fight to be had, but now we've got to do this all
over again. So it sounds like we have to do it all over again.
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Am I right?
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Great. Thank you very much.
I will yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. Mr.
LaMalfa, you are recognized.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Panelists, thanks for joining us here today as we review
pipeline issues, and really remember what a great job they do
for us in this country of transporting so much energy product
when you consider that there is over 1.5 million miles of
pipelines and that they are the best alternative of moving
energy and certainly the most efficient and the most
ecologically sound.
I mean, when I hear people badmouthing pipelines, well,
what's your alternative? Do you want to haul it all in trucks,
or try and get ships close enough to port--ports that are still
many miles from inland areas that need it? It is just a--it is
kind of a--sometimes a fruitless argument here.
Of course, we need to improve pipeline safety, but I guess
my questions would lead to the idea that, what are we doing to
make that as expeditious as possible? So I want a couple
thoughts from Mr. Black.
I have a figure here that says oil through pipelines is 13
times safer than alternate modes. And even an Obama-era
administration had said that same conclusion. My home State of
California, there is a lot being done in the name of the
environment, and so I guess pipelines being so strong that way,
it would seem we would have more going on with pipeline efforts
in California. So do you think, Mr. Black, that California's
reluctance or flat-out opposition for permitting new pipelines
to move these products, is it based on a safety concern or is
there something else happening there?
Mr. Black. Thank you, Congressman. As you mentioned, even
the PHMSA report for Congress and the incident data shows that
pipelines are the safest way to move the energy that Americans
use. The study showed that it is 13 times more likely to have
an incident on those other modes.
So the reason this fuel is moving on a pipeline or a train
or a truck is because the Americans need it. So if the pipeline
is stopped or is never able to enter the market, that fuel is
moving on another mode which is less safe. So if we are making
permitting decisions based just on safety, we should be adding
pipelines.
Mr. LaMalfa. Where does the politics enter in, you think?
Yes, you don't want to touch that probably, as we know
California is moving rapidly--or trying to rapidly move towards
banning fuel-powered vehicles, and they have already been very
anti-oil exploration on that order.
So what else? Let's see.
We do need permitting reform. What in the process--I know
we had the PIPES Act in 2023 that took a leap at that, but what
else could we be doing to reform PHMSA's process that is
basically just holding up--you talk about technology a little
bit on the panel. There are more things we could be doing to
have a speedier process so we actually can implement this. And
I am sure there are environmental concerns when you want to go
out and dig up a pipeline and make repairs or improvements.
What are some of the holdups, Mr. Black and Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Black. Well, PHMSA can reduce its bureaucratic redtape,
and Congress can help you do that. There is a special permit
program that Congress created because you can't do one-size-
fits-all regulations for the entire pipeline network. Wide
diameter, narrow diameter, high pressure, low pressure, large,
small, different operating environments. But that special
permit program which would allow a variance to the waivers in
an equivalent way to improve safety is basically broken because
PHMSA has been taking too long and applying unnecessary
conditions.
In your bill that you reported in the December of 2023, you
have reforms to the special permit process. Similarly, Congress
can tell PHMSA: You need to update your repair criteria, your
schedules to reflect the latest know-how in technologies and
analytics. Let's use this MRI ultrasound-type technology that
is in smart pigs, and update regulations. Let's use the
engineering assessments that give us a more precise reading on
where is an issue, a problem----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Thank you.
Mr. Black [continuing]. And when it needs to be----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Thank you, let me jump to----
Mr. Black [continuing]. Congress can help push that.
Mr. LaMalfa. Let me jump to Mr. Taylor for a moment on
that, too.
What are the roadblocks? How do we fix them?
Mr. Taylor. Yes. From the 118th Congress, the Class
Location Rule, that would be very beneficial if we could get
that completed. That would free up additional potential energy
from, as I mentioned during my oral testimony, having--where we
have maybe reduced our MAOP, maximum allowable operating
pressure, due to a class change, so allowing that flexibility.
The Technical Standards Committee, having GPAC meet more
frequently.
The incorporation by reference, having more frequent review
of those documents that are incorporated would allow the newer
technologies, newer thought processes to be implemented much
quicker and be implemented.
And then lastly, that voluntary information-sharing just
would allow lessons learned to be more widely distributed and
make sure that we can account for those----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Can these be done by executive
action or do we need to pass legislation? What do you run into?
And then I will stop, Mr. Chairman.
Quickly.
Mr. Black. If I can help.
Mr. LaMalfa. Yes.
Mr. Black. The voluntary information-sharing needs action
by Congress to create that safe space for collaboration, like
the airline industry. We need Congress to act----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Thank you.
Mr. Black [continuing]. And it is in your bill.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you. Thank you. Okay, so I appreciate
it. Indeed, in my home--for my California people that are
watching, we are really seeing it isn't about the pipeline
safety, it is about the politics of shutting down the use of
this form of energy and not allowing pipelines or any other
infrastructure.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
Mrs. Foushee.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member,
for holding this hearing. And thank you to the witnesses for
being here with us today.
Mr. Caram, on August 14, 2020, two teenagers discovered a
puddle of gasoline in the Oehler Nature Preserve near
Huntersville, North Carolina. More than 4 years later, with
over 2 million gallons spilled, it remains one of, if not the
largest, gasoline spill on land in the United States, and
cleanup is still in progress.
Just last month, there was another leak on this same
pipeline in Paulding County, Georgia, that temporarily shut
down the pipeline. Most alarmingly, the fire department was not
aware of the leak until reporters called to ask about it.
What measures are in place to ensure that first responders
and the public are aware of pipeline incidents?
And furthermore, how should pipeline operators engage with
the public in the aftermath of these incidents, especially ones
with potential public health concerns?
Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for the question. So that
particular incident on the Colonial pipeline in Huntersville
and a recent one on an energy transfer pipeline in Pennsylvania
with jet fuel illustrate something that's really lacking in
pipeline technology, and that's on leak detection.
The best leak detection system on a liquid pipeline can
detect down to a 1-percent loss of throughput, and on a large
pipeline like Colonial, that is a lot of product, and that is
what we saw in Huntersville. And so a leak detection system
won't necessarily pick up these small leaks that happen over
time, and it often is the public that sees those.
Specifically to your question, PHMSA requires operators to
develop an emergency response plan, and that gets inspected.
Part of that plan requires the operator to notify first
responders and the public in the event of a failure. Sometimes
when a failure does happen, we learn that the emergency
response plan was not appropriate or sufficient. Other times,
an operator doesn't follow the procedures in their emergency
response plans, and we end up with situations like that.
Mrs. Foushee. Mr. Taylor, I also serve on the Science,
Space, and Technology Committee, and I am interested in how new
technologies are monitoring for methane leaks from natural gas
pipelines.
I know, for instance, that the Environmental Defense Fund
recently launched a $90 million satellite to monitor both
accidental and intentional methane gas releases. Did INGAA work
with PHMSA on the final leak detection rules required by the
2020 PIPES Act, and do any of INGAA's companies use similar
technology to monitor for leaks?
Mr. Taylor. So I know some INGAA companies are utilizing
satellite technologies based off of the Leak Detection and
Repair Rule as it was proposed and worked through the process.
That wouldn't be sensitive enough for leak detection
capabilities of what we were trying to achieve. So we are
trying to utilize new technologies where we can, where there
are more laser-based technologies that are applied to flights.
So it could be fixed-wing aircraft, it could be
helicopters, but those are some additional technologies that
are able to detect a more sensitive leak, so meaning
sensitive--detecting a much smaller leak along the pipeline
right-of-way. But satellites today are not able to achieve that
sensitivity.
So it would be a very large leak. So like you mentioned,
maybe it is a--where you intended to vent a lot of gas for
whatever reason. If you were doing work, or if there was an
emergency event, maybe it can detect those types of things, but
it is not going to see those very small leaks.
Mrs. Foushee. Mr. Black, according to the Department of
Transportation's Inventory of Artificial Intelligence Use
Cases, PHMSA has explored the potential of AI to augment its
rulemaking process. PHMSA has also funded research projects to
develop AI-enabled pipeline inspection tools, a pipeline safety
data management framework, emergency response training, and a
pipeline corrosion management tool. Can you speak to the
potential for AI to improve the pipeline safety practices of
operators and emergency responders?
Mr. Black. Thank you, Congresswoman, you are definitely on
to something.
We think AI and machine learning has great opportunities
for improvements in pipeline safety. Pipeline technology right
now produces terabytes of data from the smart pigs that travel
inside a pig, and it would be great to have the opportunities
to continue the use of machine learning to tease out of the
data issues before they are a problem.
In your bipartisan bill last time, you have a voluntary
information-sharing program. That will create a safe space for
operators and regulators and stakeholders in the industry to
talk more about how to use that data, and it will help.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back. Mr.
Stauber, you are recognized.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
Mr. Black, I appreciate that comment. In order for us to
win the AI war, we need energy via the pipelines.
Mr. Taylor, what is the natural gas pipeline sector's
perspective on the value of PHMSA's advisory committee?
Mr. Taylor. Can you ask the question one more time?
Mr. Stauber. What is your perspective on the advisory
committees?
Mr. Taylor. Okay, I am sorry. Yes. Thank you, Congressman.
Very valuable. Having that meeting allows discussion of various
new topics, new technologies, different ways to address safety
concerns if we are seeing new things pop up that we are not
aware of, or something new that we can bring the players
together, the different parties together and think about, okay,
what is the right way to tackle this? How do we try to strive
for zero incidents across the pipelines?
So it is extremely important, allows these new rules that
we are talking about--again, like Class Location Rule, how do
we try to get that completed? We are going to need to have
another GPAC discussion. So having that meeting as frequently
as we can--again, the last Congress had two times per year. The
current charter says four times per year. Somewhere in that
range would be extremely helpful to continue to have the
dialog, the conversation, and move the rules forward, move new
thoughts forward, move new technologies forward.
Mr. Stauber. Would you agree that GPAC has the ability, if
technology arises in between those meetings, to call a session
to say here, here is new technology, here is where we can make
it safer and we can implement it sooner, rather than later?
Mr. Taylor. So that is set up through PHMSA. PHMSA has to
organize those discussions and get that meeting organized. And
so it is really--we appreciate the benefit from Congress to try
to get this completed and force that discussion, because it
takes a lot of work, but it is ultimately very important to
improve safety and advance that.
Mr. Stauber. Do you think holding more frequent advisory
meetings with key pipeline safety stakeholders strengthens
PHMSA's rulemaking process?
Mr. Taylor. It would definitely improve the process
because, again, as we talk through these rules, regulations, we
get the right parties together, make sure that we are
considering all aspects, because again, it is extremely
beneficial to get the public side together, get the industry
side together, get the State entities. Because through the last
GPAC, when we talked through LDAR, we talked through class
location, everybody brought in their different thoughts and
their different concerns to make sure we come out with the best
regulation we can.
Ultimately, we want something that comes out that is
technically accurate, as well, because if something is put out
there that we can't meet, that's not going to be beneficial to
the industry----
Mr. Stauber [interposing]. Right.
Mr. Taylor [continuing]. That's not going to be beneficial
to the public.
Mr. Stauber. Right, and so I think those are some things
that will come out of that meeting.
I would just say that we know that pipelines are a very
safe and effective way of moving energy. And I think all
panelists here agree that safety is the number-one priority. I
think that if we met more often and used that technology and
actually brought it to fruition, I do believe we can make it
even safer.
And this means that Mr. Caram would be out of a job if we
make it completely safe, because then he couldn't come here and
talk about more safety. But with all due respect, I think it is
important. I think this is a very, very healthy discussion.
There is that balance.
Mr. Caram, I read your testimony and it is very sad when we
have deaths, right? But I do believe that the industry is doing
the best they can with the information given to them. I don't
believe it is anything nefarious.
We want to move together safely in this next century and
with the technology we have, because if we don't move that
energy, we won't win the AI war. If we don't move that energy,
more people in the northern climates are going to have
difficulty getting through the winters. So I think it is
important that we understand the value of the pipelines and
that safety is the number-one priority.
So I just want to thank all the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Chair, thank you for holding this very important hearing,
and I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. Mrs.
Sykes.
Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for
holding this hearing. I look forward to continuing discussions
on how we can keep pipelines safe but active in our
communities.
As some of you may know, on May 28, 2024, a natural gas-
fueled explosion occurred at the Realty Tower Building in
Youngstown, Ohio. I don't represent Youngstown, Ohio. That was
the former 13th Congressional District, and I hope this line of
questioning does not continue to confuse people as to what
communities I represent, but it is important to bring up
because it is a significant topic of discussion.
The explosion occurred at the base of the building,
destroying the facade, throwing glass, brick, and other debris
onto the sidewalk and causing the first floor of the Chase Bank
to collapse into the basement. The explosion tragically killed
27-year-old bank employee Akil Drake, who was found deceased in
the basement, along with nine other people who sustained
injuries that required hospitalization. There was significant
structural damage to the 13-story building which contained the
bank and other offices as well as a few residences.
People deserve to feel safe in their homes and in their
workplaces, and I want to express my sincere condolences to
Akil's family and everyone else whose lives were impacted or
turned upside down due to this devastating explosion.
At the time of the explosion, a four-person scrap removal
crew was working at the building's basement to remove and
relocate utilities in preparation for the city's road
improvement project. The NTSB found that during the work, a
scrap removal worker cut through an inactive but still
pressurized service line, resulting in a gas leak and a
subsequent explosion. According to the NTSB, the explosion
occurred just 6 minutes after the service line was cut.
The NTSB says the investigation will focus on the pipeline
operator's procedures and practices for meter removal,
recordkeeping, and abandoning gas facilities; ownership of the
inactive service line; the companies associated with the Realty
Tower Building; and the scrap crews' and contractors'
operational practices and policies for work crews.
However, while NTSB continues their investigation into this
tragedy, the explosion has had long-lasting consequences to the
community, especially those who called the building home and
those who had businesses there. In the aftermath, the 100-year-
old building needed to be demolished, forcing residents of the
neighboring apartment complex to be displaced for months while
demolition occurred.
This tragic pipeline explosion and the following
displacement of residents demonstrates why this committee takes
issues of pipeline safety so seriously. We must continue to
work together to prevent accidents like these from happening
again, including taking the NTSB's report and recommendations
into account.
So Mr. Caram, how are pipeline operators supposed to
indicate that a gas line is inactive?
Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for that question. As I
understand it, there are no requirements for marking or
identifying inactive service lines unless One Call has been
initiated, and in that case, they would.
When there isn't an active service line, operators have
some options on how to deal with that, how to discontinue that
line, some of which allow pressurized gas to be in that section
of the inactive service line. And so we would love to see more
specificity in the regs around this.
Mrs. Sykes. Thank you.
And Mr. Paris, just a pretty broad question. Have you seen
accidents like this before, where an excavator thought an
inactive gas line meant that it could be cut?
And if so, how should this type of accident be
characterized: as excavator damage or poor recordkeeping?
Mr. Paris. So to answer your first question, yes, we see
this. There are many times that we come across abandoned old
lines where we excavate and break those lines, and have to
either make that repair or come up with another plan.
I would like to go back to the importance of mapping, and I
do think it is an issue with what data we are given and shown
before excavation. I know a lot of the topics and incidents
that we have talked about today are after pipeline construction
is done and our job as excavators is over, but there is also an
importance of getting those lines marked before construction
starts, when we are building these things in the ground from
the start.
Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Mr. Paris. You did an incredible
job, because my next question was going to be about mapping and
so you already answered in the first question.
So with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back the remainder of my
time.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back. Mr.
Nehls, you are recognized.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses that are here today. I am happy that this
subcommittee is kick-starting the pipeline reauthorization
process again. I felt that last Congress, this committee, we
produced an excellent bill. It passed out of this committee on
a bipartisan basis. I would like to commend both sides of the
aisle, both sides working on this, for the hard work in
producing a great bill.
It is a shame. It is a shame that our Senate colleagues,
they failed to have any hearing on this pipeline
reauthorization and stalled the momentum we all garnered. And
as we look to examine the pipeline reauthorization bill, there
are several priorities that I wish to talk about and raise
awareness. As a former law enforcement official, I strongly
believe we need to protect--we have to protect our critical
infrastructure.
Mr. Black, can you talk about some of these environmental
extremists--and they are out there--who encourage violence
against this pipeline infrastructure, and why is this
dangerous? And what was included in the previous bill to
counter these activists?
Mr. Black. There have been violent attacks on pipelines,
and there are loopholes in the energy statutes that prevent
full prosecution of all of them. There have been attacks on
pipelines before they have gone into service, and they are not
covered. And then there have been attacks on pipelines
operating right now to turn a valve.
Now, a pipeline is a safe----
Mr. Nehls [interposing]. Sure.
Mr. Black [continuing]. Industrial piece of equipment
operated by trained personnel, but not somebody who is just
turning a valve. And that could hurt themselves, the public, or
the environment.
This committee--and thank you for your role as prior
chairman of the subcommittee----
Mr. Nehls [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Black [continuing]. Would close those loopholes.
Protest? Fine. Violent attacks on pipelines can hurt
themselves, the public, and the environment.
Mr. Nehls. And higher civil penalties, as well. We need to
fine----
Mr. Black [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Nehls [continuing]. These people. Thank you.
Mr. Paris, it seems most believe that exemptions to the One
Call or that 811 process are detrimental, they are detrimental
to damage prevention. Can you provide any examples of these
types of exemptions and why you would want them reduced or
eliminated?
Mr. Paris. Yes, so some of the examples of exemptions
specifically in the State of Pennsylvania include municipal
utilities that are not required to be a part of the 811 or One
Call system. Therefore, when a One Call is placed, they do not
have to go and mark the lines.
Mr. Nehls. Yes.
Mr. Paris. Another example is agriculture. So I believe in
the State of Pennsylvania, they are not required to put a One
Call in anything above 18 inches. We do find more than not that
when excavating, we come across these lines, and we do our due
diligence, we don't get a positive response rate from the
locate.
Mr. Nehls. Sure.
Mr. Paris. We go to pothole and visualize where these lines
are, they are not where they say they are, or they are not
marked at all.
So yes, these exemptions are hard for our industry in
construction and excavating.
Mr. Nehls. Yes, I can't agree with you more.
One of the greatest provisions in the previous bill was the
section 28 inspection of these in-service breakout tanks. I
know API isn't here, but these breakout tanks, they are a
critical part of the liquid energy product supply chain. The
breakout tanks are used to store product that is not currently
in the line to allow for optimum sequencing and to temporarily
hold product from the main pipeline. I believe there are more
than 8,500 breakout tanks in service that support hazardous
liquids pipelines operations.
And I find it interesting, operators are required to
inspect these in-service breakout tanks according to PHMSA
regulations, right?
Tank engineering design--we have--all about safety,
everybody is concerned about safety. I agree, safety should be
the top priority. The engineering design in these tanks and the
liner performance has improved drastically--improved
dramatically over the past 10 to 15 years, as demonstrated by
the PHMSA data. I guess there is--PHMSA says incident data for
the 12-year period from 2010 to 2022 shows a 0.5-percent
incident rate from releases from tank floors due to cracking or
pinhole corrosion. And allowing operators to base inspection
frequency on risk modeling as outlined by API will ensure that
these inspections are not conducted unnecessarily, while again
keeping safety in the front of mind.
I am assuming, Mr. Black, you would agree with these risk-
based inspections? I mean, it takes, like, 30,000 man-hours. I
mean, you've got to drain the whole damn thing, you've got to
put somebody down in there.
Mr. Black. Yes.
Mr. Nehls. We should have the technology to do this and do
it based on risk.
Mr. Black. Absolutely----
Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Correct?
Mr. Black [continuing]. Congressman. PHMSA should not be--
--
Mr. Nehls [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Black [continuing]. Requiring inspections of a storage
tank on----
Mr. Nehls [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Black [continuing]. A fixed interval when the technical
standard now that EPA and many States have adopted is for risk-
based inspections. It reduces worker safety threats, air
pollutant emissions, hazardous waste. Yes.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor, I am assuming you would agree. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Nehls. I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. Ms.
Friedman, you are recognized.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you, Chair Webster and Ranking Member
Titus, and for the witnesses for coming here today.
Unfortunately, California is no stranger to natural gas
transmission pipeline disasters. Fifteen years ago, of course,
we had the explosion in the San Bruno neighborhood in northern
California, where several people were killed and 47 million
standard cubic feet of natural gas was released. I believe 8
people were killed and about 38 homes were destroyed. And we
all still grieve for them in California. And closer to home for
me in Los Angeles, thousands of people are still suffering
health impacts because of the leak at Aliso Canyon.
So the question is, are we now safer since San Bruno? And
have we put into place everything we need to keep our community
safe?
And I believe the answer is no, because the last 2 years
have been the deadliest 2-year period for pipelines since the
San Bruno explosion. In the past 2 years alone, 30 people have
tragically lost their lives due to pipeline safety incidents.
And I hope to work with the subcommittee, with everyone on this
subcommittee, to develop robust standards to prevent these
disasters from occurring.
Now, L.A. has a high number of liquid and natural gas
pipelines through very densely populated areas including in my
district in Glendale and Burbank, Los Angeles, and Pasadena.
During the L.A. fires, we saw a lot of ignitions happening at
the homes that were impacted by fire because the natural gas in
the homes was on fire.
Now, I toured the Eaton Canyon area 1 and 2 and 3 days
after the fire, and those plumes of natural gas flames came up
from thousands and thousands of homes. In fact, there were
victims walking around their former homes looking to collect
their personal items, trying to navigate around 7-, 8-foot-tall
walls of flame in their houses because those natural gas
pipelines were still on, and they were still on fire, and I saw
ignitions 2 days later happening because of the winds pushing
those flames around.
So my question for Mr. Taylor is, what did your members--
what steps did they take during those fires to minimize that
kind of incident?
And should those ignitions still have been happening 2, 3
days after the fire?
How do we make sure that we don't have the public walking
through these burn areas through their homes while they have to
navigate around very intense flame plumes--I don't even know
what to call them--coming out of their former homes?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, so thank you, Congresswoman.
That specific type of fire and that specific type of
instance would be tied more towards the distribution system.
And so again, from a transmission side, we could potentially
isolate. I don't know the specific details of all the situation
there and how that gas is being fed to that exact location in
the areas you are speaking of, but that would be more of a
distribution-type focused, distribution-type question on how
they could potentially isolate those areas.
Ms. Friedman. Okay. And just so that you have it in your
head, we are talking thousands of homes, an entire--more than
one neighborhood. So not just one house at a time, but you had
entire neighborhoods that were impacted by this.
Mr. Taylor, as you know better than me, fire valves are
inexpensive, spring-loaded valves that are designed to melt
before the pipeline fails, sealing the pipeline and preventing
natural gas from fueling fires in these kinds of incidents. Why
is it important to install fire valves in gas distribution
pipelines, especially for communities like we have in Los
Angeles that are fire-prone and earthquake-prone, just
disaster-prone in general?
Mr. Taylor. I don't know if you are asking me or Mr. Caram,
but----
Ms. Friedman [interrupting]. Whoever, yes. Whoever wants
to----
Mr. Taylor [continuing]. So again, from our standpoint,
that would be more distribution-focused. We wouldn't have that
type of application for transmission pipelines. But it would
make sense for distribution.
I will let Mr. Caram answer the question, though, as well.
Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for that question, and I am so
sorry about the devastation in your district and around your
State.
And yes, what you are talking about is on the distribution
systems, which are the service lines that go into each home and
building. And you can install these fire valves on service
lines very easily, and they have a low melting point polymer
that holds the valve open. And when they are exposed to heat,
that polymer melts and the valve automatically closes because
we see in times of emergency, it is often difficult and it
takes time to shut off the valves around a system on a
distribution system. And so these would, in the case of a fire,
whether it be a home fire that started in the kitchen and
spread, or if it is something more widespread like a wildfire
through a community, these could mitigate the extra damage
caused by the gas service to the homes.
Ms. Friedman. Thank you both for your answers, and I yield
back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back. Mr.
Owens, you are recognized.
Mr. Owens. Thank you, Chairman Webster and Ranking Member
Titus. I want to thank you again for today's hearing and
opportunities to learn about the American industry and
innovation that can be liberated from the yoke of outdated
overregulation.
Operating under expired authorizations, pipelines deserve
this focus and consideration due to the positive impact they
have on everyday lives: heating our homes, cooking our food, to
powering American manufacturing. It is important we take these
opportunities today to shatter any mistruths about pipelines'
impact on the environment. I have a couple of questions and a
few comments.
Mr. Black, can you explain how pipelines often result in
lowering carbon dioxide emissions?
Mr. Black. Liquid pipelines are primarily powered by
electricity, and the other modes that energy could travel over,
diesel generates the power for those pumps--sorry, it is diesel
emissions related to train and truck, so there are less carbon
emissions. We are the most environmentally friendly way to move
the liquid energy that Americans use.
Mr. Owens. Great, thank you, and I have another question
for you. For those who are not aware, pipelines, specifically
liquid transmission pipelines, are one of the most heavily
regulated industries in this country. Can you describe the
multiple layers of safety regulations placed on these
pipelines?
And do more regulations make people and environments more
safe?
Mr. Black. Well, you are right. Liquid pipelines are very
heavily regulated. Federal, State, and even sometimes local, it
starts right here, right, with oversight over the industry and
over PHMSA and telling PHMSA what it should do, and then PHMSA
as the regulator, the enforcer. States can have intrastate
regulations. States can partner with PHMSA to be the inspector
even of an interstate pipeline. And then in some cases there
are local requirements about pipeline activity or construction.
So a very carefully regulated, comprehensive set of
regulations. Few gaps.
Mr. Owens. Okay. I have that last question. Do more
regulations make people and environment more safe?
Mr. Black. If they are smart regulations, right? Sometimes
we have PHMSA being maybe 20 years behind. It would be
beneficial for the environment if we would update those
regulations. But smart regulation absolutely has been
contributing to the continued decrease in pipeline safety
incidents.
Mr. Owens. Okay. I just have a few comments here. Through
various PIPES Acts passed through this committee, Congress
continues to authorize innovative technologies and practices
that would improve safety in this field. I want to repeat that.
We continue to authorize innovative technologies and practices
that would improve the safety. And yet, unfortunately, there
has been no implementation of this innovation due to Biden's
bureaucratic hurdles.
The intended pilot programs never move forward, and the
authorization for programs have lapsed. This, unfortunately, is
another example of the free market industry moving faster than
a non-innovative culture of bureaucratic government. We will
never know how much damage could have been mitigated or lives
saved if bureaucrats had just gotten out of the way and just
let this process move forward.
For those who are watching, I just want to just make sure
you understand what you are seeing here. This is what is called
the innovators.
This is what you guys do every single day of your lives.
You have a passion for it. You have an interest in things that
we don't have interest in doing. And what you expect, very
simply, is predictability to be given an opportunity to give
the best service, to get a great reputation so you can make a
great profit, and thousands of Americans benefit from that.
We have to recognize that the innovators is where this will
change. I will say this. I am thankful that we have a majority
now of innovators, of people who have been in business for
themselves. We are on your side. We are going to figure out how
to listen to you and provide innovative legislation, and we
have a President who understands what innovation is all about,
who wants this industry to drive the world's economy.
So I am excited about where we are today. Just know that we
are listening, and we are looking forward to getting more
impact from people like yourself, all you stakeholders, to make
sure that we truly do make our mark in the world. So thank you
so much.
And I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. Mr.
Carson.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member. Thank you all.
Regarding our critical transportation infrastructure,
including pipeline infrastructure, can you describe some of the
most important cybersecurity and information technology
challenges that have to be addressed?
Considering the growing number of malign actors that need
to be reeled in, what are your thoughts about the ransomware
attacks on entities like the Colonial Pipeline Company which
disrupted gasoline supplies throughout the east coast?
How many of these issues were impacted by insufficient
staffing and basically legacy equipment?
Are there any specific ways that our committee can provide
assistance regarding these issues and vulnerabilities, quite
frankly?
Mr. Taylor. I can first take a shot at answering that.
So from our standpoint, we know it is critically important.
We know we are critical infrastructure, so we, as INGAA member
companies, are trying to take additional steps to help prevent
that and try to address it.
My focus is more PHMSA-related, so I don't get more into
the TSA and various other areas that would be regulatory
introduction for additional cybersecurity measures. But we
definitely know, as an industry, it is critically important.
And we are taking additional steps to mitigate that concern.
Mr. Black. You are absolutely right, Congressman.
Cybersecurity is very important. The threats are real that
pipeline operators face, and they are facing them every day.
The way that these operators are trying to address them is
through improved cybersecurity technology and defenses,
developing industry standards on the use of cybersecurity to
protect the SCADA systems that power the operation of the
pipeline, and then partnering with Government--CISA, Department
of Homeland Security--to help the national security personnel
tell us what they can about threats, including in classified
settings. Very important to protect our pipeline infrastructure
from cyber threats.
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Paris. Congressman, I would like to touch on
cybersecurity when it comes to GIS mapping, because a lot of
the questions that we receive when we talk about GIS mapping
is, well, how can we protect that data?
And we obviously see that that is a potential issue, but I
would like to point all of your attention to a case study that
is being done in Minnesota, where they are doing a task called
distributive data, where they are giving the excavators and the
people involved, the utilities and facility owners, that data
for the life of the ticket and only for the life of the ticket.
So it is a way to make sure that the data is being secured. So
I just wanted to mention that.
Mr. Carson. Thank you.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Caram. A little different perspective on cybersecurity,
as integrity management regulations require an operator to
identify every potential threat against their system, and I
don't think cybersecurity has historically been included in
those potential threats. But it is a potential threat, and it
should be part of an integrity management plan.
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Thank you all.
I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Shreve [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member, and, of course, our four witnesses.
I would like to take a moment to first acknowledge that
last week, in my district, in the town of Cicero, Illinois,
there was an explosion, and it killed one person. It is, of
course, under investigation. The cause of the explosion will be
determined in part by that investigation and, of course, it is
so important that PHMSA be able to support State pipeline
safety inspectors in their work.
So let me begin my questions. Mr. Caram, the State of
Illinois recently passed a law pausing the development of new
carbon dioxide pipelines, as you are probably aware, until a
Federal safety standard exists for those pipelines. In fact,
the bill that this committee passed last year required PHMSA to
complete a rulemaking establishing minimum safety standards for
gaseous carbon dioxide pipelines. My question is this: Why is
it important to set Federal safety standards before we build
more carbon dioxide pipelines, in your opinion?
Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for the question, and I want to
start by saying that this past Saturday marked the 5-year
anniversary of the Denbury failure in Satartia, Mississippi,
that sent 45-plus people to the hospital that night 5 years
ago.
So there are gaping regulatory gaps in the minimum safety
regulations for carbon dioxide pipelines. Depending on the
phase of the CO2, it wouldn't be subject to any minimum safety
regulations. And the regulations fall short in a number of
other areas, including emergency response, and plume dispersion
modeling, impurities, and a host of other areas. And that draft
PHMSA rule that was submitted for publication did a good job
addressing most of those risks.
Now, there is a congressional limitation on PHMSA's
authority, the non-application clause that says that PHMSA
cannot adopt design, construction, or initial testing standards
on existing pipelines. So knowing that we have these regulatory
gaps, some of them would fall under design or construction
standards. Any pipelines that get built before those new
standards come out, those design and construction standards, if
they are included in PHMSA's rule, would not apply to what is
already built.
And so we are just encouraging PHMSA to move quickly on its
rulemaking so that any pipelines that are built will be
following the modernized standards.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you. My next question has to
do with the proposed safety rule issued by the Biden
administration as required by the 2011 pipeline safety law, but
currently placed on hold.
One provision of the proposed rule focused on the right-of-
way of carbon dioxide pipelines. Specifically, for a pipeline
right-of-way within 2 miles of any building, operators would be
required to justify why that pipeline location was chosen.
In addition, the proposed rule would have required those
operators to establish an emergency planning zone extending 2
miles on either side of their pipelines to make sure that there
is a plan in case of an emergency.
I believe we can and must do more to ensure rigorous safety
standards and transparency with communities that are impacted
by these pipelines.
My question: Can you talk about the consequences, Mr.
Caram, to local communities if the proposed rules don't move
forward?
Mr. Caram. Sure. Well, I think that those proposed rules
did a good job addressing many of the regulatory gaps that we
have identified and that we are concerned about and think could
lead to increased failures. And by not adopting those rules, we
think that communities could be left with less protection, and
so we do worry about that.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Mr. Shreve. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
now recognizes Mr. Westerman for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for being here today, an important subject when we
talk about pipeline safety and innovation for the future.
But an area of concern that I have is us actually being
able to build pipelines. We already know they are a very, very
safe and efficient way of transporting gases and liquids, yet
we have a burdensome permitting process that makes it very
difficult to build new pipelines here in our country, and we
have probably a bigger need for more pipeline distribution
systems than we have ever had, especially when you look at the
demands for more electricity and what are we going to use to
generate that electricity.
We have an abundant amount of natural gas here, but if we
can't move it to where it is needed, then it doesn't do us
nearly as much good. So what I would like to ask each witness
is how you perceive if permitting delays are driving up prices,
if all this duplicative permitting and the judicial review
process--does that add anything to safety of pipelines?
And what reforms specifically in the permitting area do you
think would be beneficial for being able not just to make
pipelines safer, but to be able to build more pipelines?
I will start with you, Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. Thank you, Congressman, and I represent liquids
pipelines, and I want to thank you for your personal leadership
on permitting reform. You are absolutely right. It is very
important. As we have been discussing today, the pipeline is
the safest mode of transporting liquid energy that Americans
use. So if we can expand pipelines, we are improving safety.
On permitting reform, we support--and this will not be a
surprise to you--quick decisions by permitting agencies,
judicial reform so entire permits are not thrown out by some
small provision, and then continued use of the nationwide
permit 12 process for pipelines. If we can move better
permitting reform that allows for durable permits, we will be
able to expand the safest energy transportation infrastructure
we have.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Black.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. As Mr. Black
stated, again, a very similar situation for the natural gas
side. We definitely need permitting reform. We would definitely
support that. Obviously, we would like to advance our projects
as quickly as we can.
One step we could take in the very quick would be the
classification rule. Again, that would free up some additional
capacity because that would allow maximum allowable operating
pressures to be reinstated back to where they originally were,
and that is going to build some capacity within existing
pipeline infrastructure. So that would be extremely helpful for
us, and would be extremely helpful to get that rule completed
as quickly as possible.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Paris.
Mr. Paris. So from the excavator side, when permitting
comes into play, if permits are not approved in a timely basis,
then we are out of work, and we have to put employees on
layoff, or they are on unemployment. We have seen that in the
past.
I would like to emphasize, though, that we are working with
our customers in the safest fashion that we can, and we are
always looking to improve the way we can be safe when it comes
to pipeline infrastructure. Back in the day, it was about a
finger-pointing kind of thing, but now it is about working
together and talking about what the real issues are and moving
forward with that.
I would also like to point out within the permitting
process is part of the design phase of the project. So what is
important to get these permits through faster and more safer is
getting back to these basics in what I believe--these marked
utilities, and mapping, and making sure that these are laid out
within the permitting process.
Mr. Westerman. Good.
Mr. Caram.
Mr. Caram. Yes, yes. So this is really outside of the
focus. The primary focus of our organization focuses really on
safety regulations.
But I will say, as a public safety advocate, I am grateful
for a robust permitting process that includes opportunities for
public input. I see it as a balance between efficiency and
responsibility, and I am sure there are places where progress
on efficiency can be made, and we will just be there to make
sure that those changes are responsible and safety-forward.
Mr. Westerman. Do you see that it's in balance right now?
Do you think the permitting laws and the multiple agencies that
you have to go through, is it balanced between efficiency and
safety now, or do you think we need more regulations or less
regulations?
Mr. Caram. Again, it is really outside of the main part of
our work, and I am grateful for a robust process that has
opportunity for public input.
Mr. Westerman. All right. With that, I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Shreve. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
now recognizes Mr. Mann for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Mann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being
here today. I am Tracey Mann. I represent the Big First
district of Kansas, which is 60 primarily rural counties in the
western part of my State.
Kansas has over 48,000 miles of gas pipelines and 11,000
miles of liquid pipelines that run throughout the State to help
transport these goods across the country. I believe pipelines
are one of the safest and most efficient modes of
transportation for energy and are essential to delivering
energy from where it is produced to where it is needed around
the country.
A handful of questions.
First off for you, Mr. Black, what are some examples of how
you feel like PHMSA needs to modernize its pipeline safety
requirements?
Mr. Black. PHMSA regulations are over 20 years old,
Congressman, in many aspects. Pipelines use modern technologies
to assess pipelines through smart pigs that travel inside a
pipeline looking for features like corrosion and cracks. And
then pipelines use modern engineering assessment techniques and
predictive analytics that can help us understand with more
precision what issues need to be addressed and when. So we have
that information, that better safety technology and that better
program.
But PHMSA regulations are slow to react, and they are 20
years old, so then we need a special permit process to allow a
variance to achieve the same level of protection, but smarter,
but that process is broken. So two ways that PHMSA can improve
is to allow update of repair criteria to reflect technology,
and then to approve the special permit process and implement
safety technology demonstration programs in a bureaucratic-free
way.
Mr. Mann. My next question is, can you explain to the
committee the potential benefits of the pipeline safety
technology demonstration pilot program?
Mr. Black. Sure. This would give PHMSA the data to have the
confidence to update their regulations. We will be able to show
that new technologies traveling through the pipe and new
engineering analytics will let us more efficiently focus on
what we now know are the real threats on the proper schedule.
So if the demonstration program can help PHMSA understand that,
then they will have the confidence.
One more, we could have a demonstration program on the use
of drone technologies or satellites to replace the fixed-wing
rights-of-way patrols that pipeline operators have to do. Then
maybe we can do more patrols for the same amount of money. But
not if we have inflexible PHMSA regulations.
Mr. Mann. I could not agree more. We have got to embrace
technology for everyone's benefit, including to make everything
more safe.
Question for you, Mr. Taylor: The Class Location Rule is
one of PHMSA's outstanding mandates. Please describe the
importance of this regulation to pipeline operators.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, yes, it is extremely important. Again, it
would allow some flexibility instead of going out and
replacing, say, 1,000 feet of pipe, now I can apply subpart O
or, again, additional assessments, preventative mitigative
measures. I am going to look for those specific threats that
are applicable from launcher to receiver, and I am going to run
a battery of tools for that pipeline to make sure I am properly
addressing or assessing those pipeline threats.
It also reduces impacts on landowners because, again, now I
am not either pressure testing or replacing that pipe, I can
run that additional technology through the pipeline.
And in addition, it is an improvement to the environment
because now I am not going to have emissions related to doing
all that additional work. I can just, again, run the new
technologies as Mr. Black described.
Mr. Mann. Great. And how long has your sector advocated for
this updated rule?
Mr. Taylor. It has been over two decades.
Mr. Mann. Over 20 years.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mann. Yes, yes.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mann. Well, that says a lot right there. Thank you all
for being here today.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
Mr. Shreve. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back. I now recognize Chairman Rouzer
for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate our
panelists being here today. I hate that I had to pop out, and I
missed the benefit of the Q&A the last 30, 35 minutes or so,
but let me look at this, or let me ask you from a broad
standpoint.
As far as the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
for this year, next year, this Congress, what is the number-one
or two items of oversight that you think are really critically
important in this space?
And then, from a legislative standpoint, too, obviously, we
are going to be working on a surface transportation
reauthorization. And not that that deals directly, obviously,
with pipelines, but anything in that space that you think we
need to be pursuing legislatively I am curious about, as well.
Mr. Black, we will start----
Mr. Black [interrupting]. Well, hearings like today to
conduct oversight over PHMSA, encouraging them to reduce
bureaucracy and redtape and embrace innovation.
On legislative, a targeted pipeline safety reauthorization
bill like you have, work that you have been doing on continued
use of the nationwide permit program for oil and gas. And in
your Coast Guard reauthorization bill in the committee last
Congress, you encouraged the National Response Center to allow
online incident notification, rather than just making a call
and waiting for someone to answer the phone. Those three
legislative priorities would really help.
Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. Again, as Mr. Black mentioned, the
118th Congress had Class Location Rule. I mention again for the
same reasons I just mentioned to Mr. Mann: the Technical
Standards Committee, having that more frequent meeting with the
GPAC LPAC that would again advance pipeline safety; discuss new
technologies, look at what is working, what is not, and find
opportunities to improve; the incorporation by reference,
evaluating what are some of the more recent documents or
recommended practices that are being referenced by PHMSA. Those
would be extremely important because there are some standards
in there that are 20 years old. We obviously know technology
has significantly changed in the past 20 years, so should be
referencing newer documents.
The voluntary information-sharing, that is another great
aspect that we could have a proper space to make sure that we
can collect that information and can share that out so that
different operators can learn from maybe a mistake or a mishap,
a near-miss, an incident from another operator.
And then that workforce development, just trying to have
PHMSA have the right resources available at their needs to be
able to conduct inspections and audits as they need to.
Mr. Paris. I think for us it sounds simple, but it is very
complex, and that is just a full and balanced statewide
enforcement of damage prevention laws which includes full
participation in an 811 process, accurate and timely locating
for all facility owners, and the opportunity to move the needle
towards GIS mapping.
Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Caram.
Mr. Caram. Yes, for us it is the increased resources to
PHMSA and the State programs that was identified in the bill,
and appreciate industry support on that, as well. The increased
enforcement authority to PHMSA, I think, will make a
difference. I want to reiterate support for standardizing
damage prevention.
A couple of things that were not in the bill would be the
implementation of fire valves and then, more broadly, figuring
out a path forward to encourage widespread adoption of safety
management systems.
Mr. Rouzer. Now, the next item is not directly related to
pipeline safety, but an issue of concern of mine. Several years
ago, we had the shutdown of the Colonial pipeline,
cybersecurity and that realm. Talk to me about our strengths
and weaknesses and anything that we need to be doing as a
Congress, as a House, as a Senate to help you address those
issues better.
Mr. Black. Cybersecurity is very important. We have many
threats pipelines face every day.
The way the pipeline operators are approaching this is to
increase investment in cybersecurity defenses, develop best
practices among the industry for protecting the systems that
operate the pipeline, and then partnering with Government so
that we can learn from the national security and the
intelligence community about those threats. So it is making
sure that Government has whatever resources it needs just on
this issue to help identify the threats for us to partner
together so we don't have to have voluntary shutdowns on
ransomware like we had with Colonial or cyber breaches of
operating equipment. Important issue. Thank you.
Mr. Rouzer. Yes, anybody else real quick?
Mr. Taylor. Not necessarily my area of focus, but just
again maybe piggybacking off the volunteer information-sharing,
maybe there are opportunities to better communicate some of the
concerns or risks. If we are seeing certain issues that pop up
across the industry, just how do we get that information out
there as quickly as possible so that all operators can put up
their defenses or develop new defenses, whatever the concern
is, but just trying to share that information more quickly,
more broadly so that we can address it.
Mr. Rouzer. Yes. I am out of time, but any quick thought?
Mr. Paris. The operation side is a little bit out of my
wheelhouse, but I had pointed to Congressman Carson about a
case study that is being done when it comes to GIS mapping out
of the State of Minnesota. And it has proven that cybersecurity
and protection of that kind of thing is working with our kind
of data.
Mr. Caram. Very quickly, I would just encourage operators
to identify cyber threats in their threat identification for
integrity management, and mitigate against those threats as
part of their integrity management program in addition to
specific prescriptive cybersecurity regulations.
Mr. Rouzer. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Taylor of Ohio [presiding]. The gentleman yields back,
and I recognize Member Burlison for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Burlison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just got back from a conference, a global conference
called ARC, Alliance for Responsible Citizenship. We had world
leaders from most of the Western nations: Britain, the United
States, Canada, a lot of the European nations. And really, the
common theme was that we have had a lost decade, if not two
decades of economic growth, of industrialization that has been
outsourced to countries like China that are not exactly the
cleanest country to send your industry to.
And so the other thing that concerned me is the question
of, history tends to repeat itself. And about every 80 to 90
years, the world reserve currency moves to a different nation.
And we in the United States, we are well beyond that 80 or 90
years. We are at about 120 years being the world reserve
currency. It generally follows the nation that is the
industrial powerhouse in the world, the manufacturing leader.
That being said, energy costs are a key driver of this. Cheap,
abundant, and affordable energy is what every manufacturer is
seeking.
And so with that question, Mr. Black, in your testimony,
you emphasized that expanding American energy production will
send new supply to the market and pressure prices downward as
building energy infrastructure like pipelines will help us
deliver more energy to the American people. Can you highlight
why investments in energy infrastructure is essential if we are
going to maintain world dominance economically?
Mr. Black. We have tremendous energy supplies in the United
States and, of course, Canada with our integrated market both
in liquids and in natural gas. When we can get that energy to
market, to the people and the businesses who use it, that
produces downward pressure on prices.
If we have additional energy made that we don't need in
this country, we can sell it in the world market, helping our
trade balance and helping push global prices down and
increasing global prosperity. But in order to do that, you have
to be able to expand pipeline capacity. In both cases, it is
the most economical and most reliable way to move that energy
to where it can be beneficially used.
Mr. Burlison. It is my belief that the one common
denominator that the poor and the rich have to deal with is the
cost of energy. Unfortunately, the poor have much more as a
percentage of their income, greater harm from those costs.
Mr. Black. Yes.
Mr. Burlison. And so would you agree with me when I say:
Show me a nation that is abundant in energy and cost-effective,
affordable energy, and I will show you a nation that has low
poverty rates?
Mr. Black. Affordable, reliable energy lifts people out of
poverty, lifts nations out of poverty and helps them grow, yes.
Mr. Burlison. Let me ask this. You mentioned in your
testimony that smart pipeline policies will promote the
pipeline energy infrastructure that we need to deliver and keep
American energy dominance. Can you describe what is smart
pipeline policies?
Mr. Black. Well, one is making targeted improvements to
PHMSA, rather than adding new mandates, harsh penalties that
aren't called for. If we can help the public understand that
the pipeline network--liquids and gas--is well regulated and it
is safe, there will be more support for that pipeline
expansion. We need PHMSA on the case, showing that they are
doing things, that they are holding companies accountable, and
that they are reassuring the public that pipelines are safe. We
will be able to expand pipelines better than we have been.
Mr. Burlison. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor, in your testimony, you highlighted the
important role that the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee plays.
And yet, since 2021, that committee has only convened three
times. How often are they supposed to convene?
Mr. Taylor. The charter states they should be meeting
approximately four times per year. So obviously, not meeting
that charter.
Mr. Burlison. Can you expand on the role and how that
impacts the industry, them not meeting impacts the industry?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. So it definitely impacts the industry
because, again, you can get different thought processes
involved. Obviously, there is public, there is the industry,
there is PHMSA, so you are getting the different players
involved and discuss key safety concerns, advancements,
technology changes. So you are just trying to look at the
regulations and figure out how can we continue to move and
strive for zero incidents across the industry.
Mr. Burlison. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Taylor of Ohio. The gentleman yields back. I recognize
myself for 5 minutes of questions.
First, I want to thank Chairman Webster and Ranking Member
Titus for holding this hearing today, and thank you to the
witnesses for your testimony and insight.
Ohio contains over 100 pipeline operators that oversee
56,000 miles of distribution lines, over 10,000 miles of
transmission lines, and over 1,100 miles of gathering lines. My
district is home to the Buckeye XPress and Tennessee Gas
Pipeline, both of which provide pivotal natural gas for the
State and the country. With a large network of pipelines, I am
proud to work with my colleagues on this committee to pass
legislation that ensures that our pipelines are safe across the
great State of Ohio and the Nation.
People across the country want lower energy costs, and that
means the United States needs to unleash its natural resources.
I am proud that this administration wants to prioritize oil and
natural gas production to create jobs and economic development
for both consumers and industries. Mr. Paris, what has been
Pennsylvania's experience with shale gas, and how have you
worked to ensure that this energy is developed and transported
safely?
Mr. Paris. So like I said before, we are working with our
customers on a day-to-day basis to improve safety. Safety is
number one, and it is a part of every task that we complete.
Now, as far as our local economy, the gas industry, since
it has come to Pennsylvania, it has bolstered our local
economies. We have seen businesses that were ready to shut
their doors be brought back to life. So we take that as a
responsibility on us to make sure that we are installing these
pipelines correctly and following safe practices.
Mr. Taylor of Ohio. Thank you.
More often than not, regulations have hindered industry
from adopting the best technologies, practices, and standards
that allow for their businesses to thrive. I was disappointed
to learn in your testimony, Mr. Black, about how the pipeline
safety technology demonstration pilot program, created to test
some of the latest and advanced inspection programs and
analytics, was ineffective because of the previous
administration's practices and policies. Mr. Black, could you
please elaborate on the benefits of this program if it were to
be implemented properly?
Mr. Black. Thank you. This was a great opportunity that
Congress created, and we missed as a nation, and I hope that we
can retry that.
The pipeline safety technology demonstration program was
put by PHMSA into the special permit process, and the special
permit process is broken. There are conditions unrelated to
variances that are requested, there are delays, there were
unusual procedures for temporary R&D programs that we just
don't need. So if Congress can reauthorize the pipeline safety
technology pilot demonstration program and tell PHMSA, ``Don't
apply those unnecessary conditions,'' let's get to work, let's
find a way to benefit from the newer technologies and improve
PHMSA regulations. But we will need congressional action.
Mr. Taylor of Ohio. Thank you. Is there anyone on the panel
that disagrees that Congress should reimplement this program?
Okay, thank you. I yield back.
Are there any further questions from any members of the
subcommittee who have not been recognized?
Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today. I would
like to thank each of the witnesses for your testimony.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Statement of Rob Benedict, Vice President, Petrochemicals and Midstream,
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Daniel Webster
The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) is the
leading trade association representing the manufacturers of the fuels
that keep America moving and petrochemicals that are the essential
building blocks for organic chemistry, including plastic products that
improve the health, safety, and living conditions of humankind and make
modern life possible. AFPM members keep America moving and growing as
they meet the needs of our nation and local communities, strengthen
economic and national security, and support over three million American
jobs.
Our membership includes operators of pipelines as well as
manufacturers that rely on pipelines to safely transport feedstocks and
petroleum products. Pipelines continue to be the safest and most
efficient means of transporting natural gas, crude oil and petroleum
products. The safety and security of pipelines is important not only to
the American economy, but to the men and women who work to keep America
moving.
AFPM encourages efforts to ensure our nation's essential pipeline
systems continue to operate safely and efficiently. Policies that allow
our nation to maintain our current critical infrastructure while
building new needed infrastructure in turn bolster our economy, allows
increased transportation of more energy products, and keeps energy
affordable. We support the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration's (PHMSA) mission ``to protect people and the
environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
hazardous materials that are essential to our daily lives'' and in turn
we support reauthorization of PHMSA's pipeline safety programs.
Specifically, AFPM supports a five-year reauthorization of PHMSA's
pipeline safety programs. PHMSA plays an essential role in developing
and enforcing regulations for the safe, reliable, and environmentally
sound transportation of energy and other hazardous materials by
pipeline and other modes. AFPM looks forward to a continued partnership
with PHMSA as we help build a safe and reliable transportation network.
PHMSA has long sought the ability to gather more pipeline incident
information from operators, including close calls, to aid in their
decision making. AFPM supports PHMSA establishing a voluntary
information sharing (VIS) system to gather, evaluate, and quantify
critical pipeline safety data and information to improve safety. This
type of system has proven beneficial in other sectors. Any VIS must
include appropriate safe harbor provisions, that ensure data is only
used for the intended purpose of improving pipeline safety.
AFPM supports PHMSA finalizing workable pipeline safety standards
for carbon dioxide (CO2) facilities. While current federal pipeline
safety standards already regulate the design, construction, operation,
maintenance and emergency response for CO2 and hydrogen pipelines, the
regulations could be updated to ensure they are consistent and foster
needed innovation. PHMSA should ensure the regulations address any
specific safety concerns for these materials, but at the same time not
be so burdensome that they stifle development of this critically
important infrastructure.
AFPM supports increased frequency of meetings of the Technical
Safety Standards Committees as well as the development of pipeline
safety enhancement programs. Technical Safety Standards committees are
integral to the advancement of pipeline safety and have proven to
result in good policy. AFPM has long supported pilot programs as they
are important in testing the efficacy of safety innovations and
advanced technologies. Though they can be useful, it is important that
pilot programs are not overly restrictive and encourage industry
participation.
AFPM supports strengthening penalties for damaging, destroying, or
impairing the operations of pipeline facilities. Under current PHMSA
authority, there are inadequate penalties for vandalism of pipeline
facilities, and those in place are unused by PHMSA.
Pipelines must be protected, and deterrents must be in place to
dissuade such actions. AFPM encourages Congress to clarify PHMSA's
authority to penalize vandals, either through its own action or in a
referral to the Department of Justice. We also support, and encourage
the Committee to include in its bill, the creation of a ``worker safety
zone'' around pipeline construction and repair operations, to protect
pipeline workers and the public.
PHMSA is a small agency with an important mission. While previous
reauthorizations authorized PHMSA with resources, PHMSA has not
completed many of its priority rulemakings. AFPM supports Congress
reauthorizing PHMSA with the resources to achieve its safety mission.
Thank you again for your attention and work on Pipeline Safety
reauthorization. We appreciate your leadership on this important issue
and look forward to working with lawmakers as the reauthorization
process moves forward.
Statement of the American Gas Association, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Daniel Webster
The American Gas Association (AGA) is pleased to provide our input
for the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials hearing on Promoting and
Improving Safety and Efficient Pipeline Infrastructure. AGA shares the
same goals as safety advocates, the public, pipeline sector industry
partners, and Congress: Ensuring America's pipeline system remains the
safest, most secure, most reliable in the world. To that end, we
applaud the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's bipartisan
work to draft, negotiate and pass the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline
Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023 (H.R. 6494) last Congress,
and we look forward to working with the Committee in the 119th Congress
to help push pipeline safety reauthorization through the legislative
process and into law.
AGA, founded in 1918, represents more than 200 local energy
companies that deliver clean natural gas throughout the United States.
There are more than 77 million residential, commercial, and industrial
natural gas customers in the U.S., of which 96 percent--more than 74
million customers--receive their gas from AGA members. AGA advocates
for natural gas utility companies and their customers and provides a
broad range of programs and services for member natural gas pipelines,
marketers, gatherers, international natural gas companies, and industry
associates. Today, natural gas meets more than one-third of the U.S.'
energy needs. Natural gas pipelines are an essential part of the
nation's energy infrastructure. Indeed, natural gas is delivered to
customers through a safe, approximately 2.7-million-mile underground
pipeline system, including 2.3 million miles of local utility
distribution pipelines, 100,000 miles of gathering lines, and 300,000
miles of transmission pipelines providing service to more than 189
million Americans.
Distribution pipelines are operated by natural gas utilities, or
``local distribution companies (LDCs).'' Gas utility distribution pipes
are the last, critical link in the natural gas delivery chain that
brings natural gas from the wellhead to the burner tip. AGA member
utilities are the ``face of the gas industry,'' embedded in the
communities they serve, and interact daily with customers and the state
regulators who oversee pipeline safety locally. The distribution
industry takes very seriously the responsibility of continuing to
deliver natural gas to our families, neighbors, and business partners
as safely, reliably, and responsibly as possible. The industry is
committed to providing life-sustaining energy to the thousands of
communities in our country who count on it, every second of every day
of the year.
Our Number One Priority: Pipeline Safety
The domestic shale revolution has resulted in an abundant supply of
clean, affordable, and reliable natural gas. This robust supply has
translated into stable natural gas prices and an increasing number of
utility customers who use this resource for residential and commercial
applications like cooking, space and water heating, and manufacturing.
Last year alone, natural gas utilities added 730,000 customers and
20,700 miles of pipeline to serve these new customers. Alongside this
tremendous opportunity comes the absolute necessity of operating safe
and reliable pipeline infrastructure to help ensure dependable natural
gas delivery to homes, businesses, and essential facilities like
hospitals. Every year the industry invests $33 billion on the safety of
our pipeline systems. Unquestionably, pipeline safety is our industry's
number one priority, and through critical partnerships with state and
federal regulators, legislators, and other stakeholders, AGA member
companies are continually working to enhance pipeline safety,
integrity, and system resiliency.
Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
AGA and its members support fact-based, reasonable, flexible, and
practicable updates to pipeline safety regulation that build upon
lessons learned and evolving improvements to pipeline safety and
related programs and technology. In that spirit, AGA wishes to
highlight 5 high-level priorities as the House-Senate reauthorization
process moves forward.
Support Limiting Pipeline Excavation Damage Incidents. Excavation
damage is the primary cause of distribution pipeline incidents.
According to PHMSA data, in the past 20 years, excavation damage
incidents on natural gas pipelines have resulted in 57 deaths, 254
injuries, and over $300 million in property damage. These often tragic
incidents are preventable. States that have healthy excavation damage
prevention and enforcement programs typically experience lower rates of
damages to pipelines. AGA supports directing PHMSA to incentivize
states to adopt One Call program leading practices, derived from the
best state excavation damage programs, and condition their grants to
State One Call programs based upon adoption of these best practices. We
are confident this program will save lives.
Support Pipeline Technology Alternatives. Modern pipeline safety
technologies--not contemplated when many pipeline safety regulations
were first implemented--can, if deployed, meet the intent of these
older existing regulations and improve the overall safety of natural
gas, hazardous liquid, underground storage, and liquefied natural gas
infrastructure. For example, satellite technology has advanced to the
point where it can be used to comply with leak detection regulation and
breakaway meter technologies and excess flow valves can stop the flow
of gas if a meter is hit, eliminating the need for physical meter
protection barriers. AGA supports a PHMSA regulatory process to
identify technology alternatives that, if utilized, will meet the
intent of existing pipeline safety regulations and provide an equal or
greater level of pipeline safety.
Strengthen Criminal Penalties for Damage to Pipelines. Natural gas
utilities are experiencing an uptick in criminal attacks on property,
equipment and facilities. These activities range from gunshots
targeting pipelines, IEDs placed on gas delivery equipment, and the
damaging of facilities and equipment necessary for safe natural gas
delivery. These activities are not only hazardous to the safety and
property of the public and member company employees, they also threaten
an LDC's ability to deliver natural gas to thousands of homes,
hospitals, schools, government and military facilities, and other
critical infrastructure customers. AGA supports increased criminal
penalties on bad actors who intentionally damage, destroy or impair
pipelines and pipeline facilities, including those under construction.
Hydrogen-Natural Gas Blending R&D Study. Hydrogen is an emerging
solution for achieving gas LDC energy storage and decarbonization
goals. Natural gas projects in North America and worldwide demonstrate
successful blending of hydrogen into the existing natural gas
distribution network or utilizing natural gas that has a naturally
occurring higher hydrogen content. Hawai'i Gas has successfully
utilized a natural gas hydrogen blend of 15% for decades and many
systems overseas are operating at approximately a 20% blend. It is
important to understand how companies operating natural gas
distribution systems with a higher hydrogen content are operating these
systems safely. As such, we suggest GAO conduct a review of natural gas
distribution systems worldwide that utilize hydrogen-natural gas
blending applications, or utilize gas with a higher hydrogen content,
to identify processes, materials, and standards the operators have
implemented to operate safely. The results of this study will help
underpin the safety of ongoing domestic hydrogen R&D and blending
operations.
5-Year Reauthorization for PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Program. PHMSA's
Pipeline Safety program was reauthorized most recently in the PIPES Act
of 2016 and PIPES Act of 2020. As PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program
expired again in 2023, the frequency of reauthorization has been
squeezed to just 3 years. This interval is inappropriate given the
significant time it takes to conduct studies, publish reports, move
reauthorization priorities from legislation to Proposed Rulemaking,
address comments, and develop and publish Final Rules. Acknowledging
the time required to conduct studies, publish reports, and develop
feasible, reasonable, cost effective, and practical rulemaking
(including stakeholder input), and in keeping with reauthorization
intervals that preceded the PIPES Act of 2016 (1996, 2002, 2006, 2011),
Congress should reauthorize PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program for not
less than 5 years.
Conclusion
America's gas utilities' commitment to pipeline safety relies on
sound engineering principles and best in class technology, a trained
professional workforce, effective community relationships, and a strong
partnership with state pipeline safety authorities and PHMSA. As
pipeline safety reauthorization legislation is drafted this year, AGA
encourages Congress to work in a bipartisan fashion to move reasonable
and consensus changes to pipeline safety law and regulation, support
PHMSA's primary role as pipeline safety regulator, and recognize the
great strides in pipeline safety engineering and operating practices
that pipeline companies are putting into practice across the country.
Pipeline sector companies and their trade associations stand ready to
assist in this process with real world operations, engineering and
safety data and experience. Please use us as a resource.
Letter of February 21, 2025, from Sarah K. Magruder Lyle, President &
Chief Executive Officer, Common Ground Alliance, to Hon. Daniel Web-
ster, Chairman, and Hon. Dina Titus, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, Submitted for the Record
by Hon. Daniel Webster
February 21, 2025.
The Honorable Daniel Webster,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2184 Rayburn
House Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Dina Titus,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2370 Rayburn
House Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20515.
RE: The importance of improving facility mapping records to enhance
public safety, protect underground infrastructure and ensure
reliability
Dear Chairman Webster and Ranking Member Titus,
The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is a member-driven association of
nearly 4,000 damage prevention professionals committed to saving lives
and preventing damage to North American underground infrastructure by
promoting effective damage prevention practices of today and tomorrow.
CGA is the preeminent source of damage prevention data and information
to reduce damages to underground facilities through the shared
responsibility among all stakeholders. We are pleased to provide the
committee with an overview of the state of damage prevention and the
potential GIS mapping has to reduce excavation damages to our Nation's
pipeline infrastructure.
According to CGA's Damage Information Reporting Tool (DIRT) Report,
the annual rate of damages to buried infrastructure in the U.S. has
remained stagnant for most of the last decade and costs our communities
a staggering $30 billion every year. Each of the hundreds of thousands
of dig-ins to underground utilities that occur annually has the
potential to cripple communities and businesses by cutting them off
from critical services, causing injury or even loss of life.
As our Nation's underground infrastructure system continues to
grow, the damage prevention industry faces increasingly complex
challenges. We must encourage innovation and incentivize the
development of damage prevention solutions for the future. To do this,
CGA has elevated the work of its traditional programs (Best Practices,
DIRT and 811 awareness and use) and launched three new efforts to
expedite the industry's achievement of the next significant reduction
in damages:
The Next Practices Initiative--Launched in 2020, the Next
Practices Initiative's goal is to encourage innovation and new
practices to address the most critical challenges facing the damage
prevention industry. The Next Practices Advisory Committee uses
industry data, quantitative surveys, and stakeholder input to clearly
identify and focus the industry on the advancement of the most
effective solutions to address critical damage prevention challenges.
The Damage Prevention Institute (DPI)--Launched in
January 2023, the DPI mission builds on the industry-leading insights
of CGA's Next Practices Initiative by utilizing a stakeholder-centered
approach to develop performance metrics that reflect a commitment to
Best Practices and dedication to improving the reliability of the U.S.
damage prevention system for everyone involved.
The 50-in-5 Industry Challenge--Announced in 2023, this
effort challenges stakeholders to reduce damages to critical
underground utilities by 50% in five years by bringing damage
prevention advocates together around a targeted set of strategic, data-
driven priorities. This call to action encourages the damage prevention
industry to concentrate on three focus areas that prioritize critical
issues identified by CGA's Next Practices Initiative and the top damage
root causes that contribute to more than 76% of damages to buried
infrastructure (according to CGA's most recent DIRT Report):
Effective and Consistent Use of 811
Key Excavator Practices (potholing, maintaining
clearance, etc.)
Accurate, Timely Utility Locating
CGA recently introduced the CGA Index, a metric for evaluating
year-over-year damage trends, to measure industry progress in reducing
damage. The status of the CGA Index will be updated annually in
conjunction with the release of the DIRT Report.
Safety Risks of Inadequate Mapping
Access to accurate utility mapping records can provide stakeholders
with a critical tool to prevent damage to underground utilities. In
order to take full advantage of the opportunity mapping provides, the
accuracy of mapping records has to be prioritized and stakeholders
across the damage prevention process need to have greater access to
excavation site mapping information.
In 2023, failure to locate accurately and on time was the root
cause attributed to 34% of damages to underground utilities. CGA's
Locator White Paper and the work of the Next Practices Initiative
reveal that improving the accuracy of facility maps and implementing
electronic white-lining would help locators complete their work more
quickly and accurately.
Records of underground utilities are often inaccurate or incomplete
and are largely unavailable to damage prevention stakeholders like
designers, locators, and excavators. Increasing adoption of mapping
technology and map accessibility for damage prevention stakeholders has
the potential to reduce damages and increase the efficiency of the safe
excavation process.
Additionally, excavators continue to emphasize the importance of
greater access to mapping records. The results of a 2024 national
survey of excavators conducted by CGA revealed that 89% of professional
excavators believe that having access to utility maps would reduce
excavation damage.
Improved Facility Mapping Records
Although there is much work to do to enhance mapping record
accuracy and availability, many stakeholders are implementing programs
and initiatives to improve mapping records. Featured in CGA's
Leadership in Mapping video series, Jerry Schmitz, VP of Safety &
Online Quality for Southwest Gas, describes his company's commitment to
using maps as the foundation for its asset management and damage
prevention efforts. Consumer's Energy has recently implemented a
program to map its own natural gas distribution pipelines in addition
to sewer facilities in close proximity to those assets.
In California, Senate Bill 865 (SB 865), introduced and passed in
2020, takes the improvement of mapping records further by requiring
that new installations be mapped using GIS. The legislation aims to
enhance safe excavation practices in the state by requiring all new
subsurface installations to be mapped using a GIS starting from January
1, 2023, except for specific oil and gas flowlines within oil fields.
Increased availability and accessibility of GPS-enabled locating
devices is also providing the industry with greater opportunities to
effectively map facilities. UtiliSource, a Missouri-based utility
design, engineering, and project management company, rolled out a
program to record the location of all third-party locates throughout a
fiber installation project. They will then be able to utilize this
mapping record as they continue to do work in the same area, improving
future project efficiency.
Gopher State One Call's GPS-enabled locator program in Minnesota
partners with locating technology providers to equip damage prevention
stakeholders across the state with utility line locators integrated
with RTK GNSS accuracy and GPS collection capabilities. This program
has been particularly beneficial to small municipalities, for whom
updating legacy paper maps can be prohibitively time-consuming and
expensive.
Expanding Access to Utility Mapping Information
Important Concepts and Terminology
It is not necessary to consolidate utility mapping data in a single
location to enable visualization of mapping data in support of damage
prevention processes.
The term ``distributed GIS'' refers to geographic information
systems that do not have all of the system components in the same
physical location. In the context of this letter, ``distributed GIS''
refers specifically to the rendering (or display) of geospatial data
for an end user without that user having access to the underlying data.
Current GIS technology allows geospatial data owners to publish
their data through a ``Web Mapping Service,'' or ``WMS.'' Publishing a
WMS is a means of displaying view-only map data over the internet.
Publishing a WMS empowers a data owner to completely control their own
data, including where the data is stored, how the data is rendered/
displayed for end users, and who may view the data. A WMS can be
configured to prohibit copying or downloading GIS data underlying an
internet-based map.
Creating GIS Mashups
In a distributed GIS, the term ``mashup'' refers to a web-based
mapping application that combines mapping content from disparate
sources (such as web mapping services). Mashups separate the underlying
geospatial data from the presentation of the data.
GIS mashups that incorporate mapping content from multiple
utilities--who maintain full control over their own data--present many
opportunities to support the damage prevention process. For example, an
811 center could create a mashup of member utility data. The 811 center
could then provide a display of the mapping data for dig tickets. The
display would be limited to the extent of the excavation area and would
only be available for the life of the ticket. An example of a mashup
created by an 811 center is presented in CGA's Next Practices Case
Study--Minnesota Utilities Mapping Project. The case study clearly
demonstrates the concepts described in this letter. Additionally,
Texas811 has created a mashup to provide map renderings of select
facility participants' abandoned lines. CGA is following several
mapping pilot projects and industry efforts to document practical
options, effective protocols, and successful practices.
Efforts such as these have the potential to increase locating
efficiency, decrease over-notification practices utilized by both
contractors and facility owner/operators, and help decrease overall 811
request volume so locators' workloads are more manageable.
Additionally, increasing access to facility map information during the
planning and design phase of large projects will improve overall
project and process efficiency.
Documenting Industry Best Practices for Distributed GIS for Damage
Prevention
Effectively using distributed GIS for damage prevention will
require identifying Best Practices to address issues that arise with
increased sharing of mapping records such as the following:
Geospatial data accuracy
Map feature attribute data
Geospatial data projections and coordinate systems
Adoption of protocols for publishing web mapping services
to support damage prevention processes while also protecting data
owners' information security
As the only trade association that brings together stakeholders
from all facets of the damage prevention industry, CGA is facilitating
industry-wide dialogue to identify and document Best Practices that are
creating an environment in which distributed GIS can serve the damage
prevention process. This includes consideration of the items outlined
above, which would provide the guardrails needed to provide greater
access to facility mapping information prior to and during excavation
projects.
Taking Demonstration to Deployment
An effective option to provide greater access to facility map
visualization for planned excavation would require selecting a finite
area where map information would be provided to end users. Currently,
the most widely adopted process for providing facility location
information is when excavators make a locate request through the 811
process--this occurs over 42 million times per year. Through this
process, 811 centers use facility owner/operator map information to
identify utilities that may be affected during an excavation project.
Those utilities are then notified to locate and mark their facilities
during a specified period of time prior to the excavation project. This
well-understood process can be applied more broadly to provide affected
stakeholders with facility visualization prior to and during an
excavation project. This would not replace locating and marking but
would greatly enhance the entire 811 damage prevention process.
This summary we have provided is not intended to outline all of the
issues that must be addressed, but to serve as a starting point to
establish a process that has the potential to significantly enhance the
current 811 system and focus the industry on taking damage prevention
to the next level to keep our communities safe and connected to the
utilities we depend on every day.
The Common Ground Alliance appreciates the Committee's interest in
the importance of GIS mapping to protect our Nation's critical pipeline
infrastructure and keep our communities safe and connected.
Sincerely,
Sarah K. Magruder Lyle,
President & CEO, Common Ground Alliance.
Letter of March 6, 2025, from Hon. Chrissy Houlahan, a Representative in
Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to Hon. Sam Graves,
Chairman, and Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Trans-
portation and Infrastructure, and Hon. Daniel Webster, Chairman, and
Hon. Dina Titus, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipe-
lines, and Hazardous Materials, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Dina
Titus
March 6, 2025.
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Daniel Webster,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, U.S.
House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Dina Titus,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, U.S.
House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairmen Graves and Webster and Ranking Members Larsen and
Titus:
Thank you for your leadership in ensuring the safe and efficient
operation of our nation's hazardous liquid and gas pipelines in your
forthcoming pipeline safety reauthorization legislation. I write
following your subcommittee's February 25, 2025 hearing titled
``Promoting and Improving Safety and Efficient Pipeline
Infrastructure'' to emphasize the need for action to address issues
related to ``Aldyl A'' plastic piping.
DuPont's Aldyl A has a long and well-documented history of ``poor
performance histories relative to brittle-like cracking,'' including
several Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration warnings
dating back to 1999.\1\ Concerningly, Aldyl A has been involved in two
deadly incidents in the past two years in the United States. This
includes the R.M. Palmer Company Chocolate Factory explosion in West
Reading, Pennsylvania in my district two years ago, which led to the
death of seven workers, injured eleven people, displaced three
families, and destroyed property.\2\ The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) recently met in December 2024 to review the incident and
found that degradation of the retired Aldyl A tee from elevated ground
temperatures allowed the gas to escape from the gas pipeline.\3\ In
November 2024, the NTSB issued a preliminary report for another
explosion involving an Aldyl A pipeline in South Jordan, Utah, which
led to the death of a 15-year-old child, displaced families, and
damaged several residences.\4\ This troubling acceleration of Aldyl A
tragedies underscores the need for urgent congressional action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2002/11/26/02-30055/
notification-of-the-susceptibility-to-premature-brittle-like-cracking-
of-older-plastic-pipe and
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-09-06/pdf/07-4309.pdf
\2\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD23LR002.aspx
\3\ https://www.windrosemedia.com/livewebcast/version9/
WebcastPortal/webcast.php?webcast_
id=371&rpath=/clients/ntsb/public
\4\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD25FR001.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In your subcommittee's pipeline safety hearing last week \5\, and
previous hearing in May 2024 \6\, Mr. Bill Caram, Executive Director of
the Pipeline Safety Trust, underscored the need for action to remove
Aldyl A from pipelines, referencing both incidents in West Reading and
South Jordan and stating, ``I look forward to the day when I can speak
before you to let you know that there were no fatalities since the last
time I testified, but today is not that day. The last two years have
been the deadliest two-year period for pipelines in nearly 15 years.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW14/20250225/117825/HHRG-
119-PW14-Wstate-CaramB-20250225.pdf
\6\ https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW14/20240507/116970/HHRG-
118-PW14-Wstate-CaramB-20240507.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The upcoming pipeline safety reauthorization presents an
opportunity for Congress to finally act before any more lives are lost.
In the 118th Congress, I introduced the bipartisan Aldyl A Hazard
Reduction and Community Safety Act \7\ (H.R.5638), which would require
the proper documentation and subsequent removal of Aldyl A in high
consequence areas, including considerations to minimize costs and
service disruptions. As your subcommittee works to advance pipeline
safety reauthorization legislation in the 119th Congress, I
respectfully ask to work with you to reintroduce and include this
critical legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/5638
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you for your attention to this pressing issue, especially
considering the increase in deadly Aldyl A incidents recently. I stand
ready to work with you to ensure that no other lives are lost on
account of this problematic piping material.
Sincerely,
Chrissy Houlahan,
Member of Congress.
Appendix
----------
Question to Eric V. Taylor, P.E., Director, Engineering Serv-
ices, BHE GT&S, on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America, from Hon. Dina Titus
Question 1. Thank you for sharing with the Committee during our
hearing that the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)
supports the leak detection final rule as required in the Protecting
Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 that
PHMSA announced in mid-January 2025. Without its publication in the
final register, I am concerned that known leaks will continue to go
unrepaired and may cause further tragedies.
INGAA would like to see changes made to the final rule, what are
those changes, and does INGAA believe it can garner consensus with the
government and public members of the gas pipeline advisory committee
for the changes in a timely manner?
Answer. Thank you for the question on Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America's (INGAA) perspective on the Gas Pipeline Leak
Detection and Repair (LDAR) rule. INGAA generally supports the proposed
regulation but would like to see the rule noticed again and offered for
comment by the current Administration to make changes.
First, I would like to provide background on existing leak
detection requirements for transmission pipelines. Transmission
pipelines are generally larger in diameter and operate at higher
pressures than distribution pipelines. During the hearing, you noted
Nevada has strict annual leak survey requirements for distribution
pipelines. However, as transmission pipeline operators, the federal
regulations \1\ also require annual surveys but also more frequent leak
surveys depending upon the surrounding population of the pipeline.
Current regulations \2\ also require hazardous leaks be promptly
repaired. The PIPES Act of 2020 \3\ contained a self-executing mandate
in Section 114, which requires pipeline operators to eliminate
hazardous leaks and minimize releases of natural gas from pipeline
facilities. Further, the self-executing mandate required an operator's
plan include replacement or remediation of pipelines that are known to
leak based on the material (including cast iron, unprotected steel,
wrought iron, and historic plastics with known issues), design, or past
operating and maintenance history of the pipeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 49 C.F.R. Part 192.706
\2\ 49 C.F.R. Part 192.703
\3\ P.L. 116-260
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INGAA remains supportive generally of the LDAR rule. The Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) followed the Gas
Pipeline and Advisory Committee (GPAC) recommendations. INGAA and other
industry associations submitted joint industry comments relating to the
GPAC meetings held to review and discuss PHMSA's proposed LDAR rule and
associated regulatory analyses. Included below are examples of proposed
modifications from joint industry comments PHMSA received \4\ and
concerns that have recently emerged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ PHMSA-2021-0039 docket
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Strike the proposed modifications made to 49 C.F.R. Part
192.199. By design, relief valves are intended to vent gas at an
operator selected set pressure and then closed, ending gas venting,
once the pressure is below the set point. PHMSA's proposed modification
incorrectly assumes operators set relief valves to vent more gas than
appropriate.
2. Strike ``Unintentional estimated gas loss of three million
cubic feet or more'' from the definition of an Incident \5\ so those
losses can be captured in the proposed large volume release report.
Removing this language would allow incident reporting to be solely
focused on safety events and would provide PHMSA and industry better
data to drive improvements in safety and reduce methane emissions. In
reviewing current incident information, it appears the industry is
experiencing a greater number of incidents, but this increase is due to
an equipment malfunction. As an example, equipment malfunctions may be
due to a relief valve that operated and vented more than 3 million
cubic feet of gas. This data is valuable to track and measure to
understand causal factors for this equipment malfunction and
communicate to industry for continuous improvement, but this is not a
safety related concern since the gas is vented from a device intended
to vent gas. It is, however, an environmental issue, and INGAA supports
having this information captured in a large volume release report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 49 C.F.R. Part 191(1)(iii)
3. Adjust the submission date for annual reports from the natural
gas distribution, transmission, gathering, and LNG industries to June
15th. This date aligns with the much smaller Hazardous Liquids annual
report submission date. Additional time will be needed to account for
the recent addition for records evaluations and remediation, as well as
the proposed requirements to evaluate leak data and associated
estimates. This extra time helps to better ensure the full and accurate
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
completion of the annual report.
Finally, and of particular concern, PHMSA recently created an
exclusion for compressor stations that are subject to methane fugitive
emission monitoring and repair requirements under the following:
i. 40 CFR 60.5397(a) (including alternative means approved through
the process described by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
under 40 CFR 60.5398(a) or 60.5399(a), or
ii. 40 CFR 60.5397(b) (including alternative test methods approved
under 60.5398b and alternative means approved through the process
described by the EPA under 40 CFR 60.5399b); or
iii. an EPA-approved State or Tribal plan, or Federal plan, which
includes methane emissions monitoring and repair standards equivalent
to the model rule presumptive standards in 40 CFR 60.5397(c) (including
alternatives approved according to 40 CFR 60.5398(c)
The EPA is currently reviewing these regulations. The LDAR rule
must be modified if the EPA withdraws these regulations. If these EPA
regulations are retained, compressor stations subject to EPA
regulations should comply with EPA reporting requirements rather than
duplicative reporting requirements in the proposed LDAR rule.
Unfortunately, I am not able to determine when or how quickly the
GPAC could develop a consensus to address the issues I have noted
above. Another factor which may impact when the LDAR rule is finalized
is scheduling GPAC meetings. Since January 2021, GPAC has only convened
three times. It is imperative the Committee require at least two annual
GPAC meetings to ensure regulations are reviewed and new technologies
adopted. The last GPAC meeting was held in March 2024. At the time, the
Committee voted to reconvene in one year to discuss potential changes
to the class analysis process as part of the class location rule.
However, no GPAC meeting is currently scheduled.
Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust, from Hon. Dina Titus
Question 1. We need to implement the final rule that Congress
advanced in 2020 to require operators to repair known leaks on a more
consistent basis. After the tragedy of the explosions and subsequent
fires in Jackson, Mississippi, Atmos categorized known leaks in the
area as non-hazardous and therefore did not immediately fix them. We
also need to ensure sufficient penalties are in place to incentivize
operators to detect and repair leaks.
Question 1.a. What are the benefits to enacting this rule that
Congress required in 2020?
Answer. The current gas pipeline safety regulations on leak
detection and repair were written largely in the 1970's. Congress
recognized the need to modernize these regulations and mandated that
PHMSA adopt a final rule by January of 2022. First and foremost, the
resultant fires and explosions from pipeline leaks continue to kill
people every year, and setting standards for how operators need to look
for those leaks and how quickly they need to repair them is critical.
Also, we now know that methane is a potent greenhouse gas, and leaks
that have historically been allowed to emit methane into the atmosphere
so long as they don't pose an immediate risk of explosion to nearby
buildings should also be repaired.
Your example of the Atmos Energy pipeline failures is apt. NTSB is
still conducting its investigation, but based on the factual report we
know that the leaks were categorized as Grade 2, meaning that they were
not deemed ``immediately hazardous.'' That appears to be a tragic
error. The final rule that PHMSA published, but then withdrew, would
have set standards for the type of equipment operators need to use to
find leaks, set clearer standards on how to grade the leaks they find,
and set schedules for repair of those leaks based on their grade. 2023
and 2024 were especially deadly years for pipeline failures, with 30
people killed. We don't have time to lose.
Question 1.b. Your testimony stated that PHMSA's civil penalties
are not ``financially meaningful.'' Should Congress increase civil
penalties to encourage pipeline operators to repair leaks more quickly?
Answer. Yes, Congress should absolutely give PHMSA more effective
enforcement authority by increasing civil penalties. Again, using Atmos
Energy as an example, after a separate tragic pipeline incident that
killed a 12-year-old girl in Dallas, TX in 2018, the Texas Railroad
Commission, whose pipeline safety program is overseen by PHMSA,
proposed a $1.6 million fine in 2021. For perspective, Atmos brought in
$3.5 billion in revenue in 2021. The proposed fine represents 0.05% of
Atmos's revenue for the year. Even when looking at Atmos's 2021 net
income of $697 million, the fine is only 0.2% of that. These fines are
not financially meaningful and will not, on their own, drive change in
behavior.
[all]