[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MISSED MILESTONES: EVALUATING THE LAST FOUR YEARS IN THE EAP REGION AND
UNSEIZED OPPORTUNITIES UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
February 25, 2025
__________
Serial No. 119-2
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-092 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BRIAN MAST, Florida, Chairman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey Member
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee AMI BERA, California
MARK GREEN, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
ANDY BARR, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
RONNY JACKSON, Texas TED LIEU, California
YOUNG KIM, California SARA JACOBS, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan Florida
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, GREG STANTON, Arizona
American Samoa JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
JIM BAIRD, Indiana SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey JIM COSTA, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York GABE AMO, Rhode Island
CORY MILLS, Florida KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
KEITH SELF, Texas PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
RYAN ZINKE, Montana GEORGE LATIMER, New York
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana SARAH MCBRIDE, Delaware
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina
MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director
Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas AMI BERA, California,Ranking
ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, BRAD SHERMAN, California
American Samoa JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN ZINKE, Montana JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
JAMES MOYLAN, Guam GABE AMO, Rhode Island
SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania
Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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REPRESENTATIVES
Page
Opening Statement of Chairwoman Young Kim........................ 1
Opening Statement of Ranking Member Ami Bera..................... 3
WITNESSES
Statement of Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Statement of Craig Singleton, China Program Senior Director and
Senior Fellow, Foundation For Defense of Democracies........... 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Statement of Richard Fontaine, Chief Executive Officer, Center
for a New American Security.................................... 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 66
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 68
Hearing Attendance............................................... 69
MISSED MILESTONES: EVALUATING THE LAST FOUR YEARS IN THE EAP REGION AND
UNSEIZED OPPORTUNITIES UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP
----------
Tuesday, February 25, 2025
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mrs. Kim. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to
order.
The purpose of this hearing is to evaluate the last 4 years
of the Biden administration's policy toward East Asia and the
Pacific, address its successes and failures, and identify
opportunities for the Trump administration to strengthen our
engagement in the region. So let me now recognize myself for an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN YOUNG KIM
Again, welcome to East Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee's
hearing entitled ``Missed Milestones: Evaluating the Last Four
Years in the EAP Region and Unseized Opportunities Under
President Trump.''
As we convene for the first hearing of the 119th Congress,
our subcommittee must reflect on the past 4 years under the
Biden-Harris administration.
First, we must ask the tough questions that will help us
chart the course forward and ensure that we address the
region's challenges head on including where do we go wrong on
China policy?
Why have we failed to enact punitive measures against the
Chinese Communist Party when it was clearly warranted? Do we
effectively leverage our allies and partnership to raise
greater awareness regarding regional issues?
Have we successfully deterred China and North Korea from
advancing their dangerous agendas? Have our economic engagement
goals been aligned with the demands and needs of our partners?
While the Biden-Harris administration's strategy toward
China has been shortsighted in many ways one thing has remained
consistent across administrations. To engage effectively in the
region we must show up and work with our allies and partners.
Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with South Korea
and Japan. These two nations have put aside their longstanding
and unresolved historical disputes to tackle shared regional
threats including Kim Jong Un's nuclear ambitions and Xi
Jinping's military and economic coercion.
This is a perfect illustration of how collaboration,
despite differences, is not only possible but necessary, and
while progress has been made this administration has tremendous
opportunity to strengthen trilateral ties.
No matter the changes in domestic policies, our engagement
with South Korea and Japan as well as with Quad and ASEAN
partners must remain steadfast.
The threats posed by the CCP and North Korean regime are
not going away. Neither should our commitment to these vital
alliances.
Second, we cannot allow the global economy to yield to the
CCP standards nor can we lose the confidence of our allies and
partners in American economic strength.
In my travels across the East Asia and the Pacific region
the message was clear and consistent that the United States is
the partner of choice, but without substantial economic
incentives our allies and friends are being forced into deeper
trade dependency on China and to accept Beijing's artificially
cheap investment that always comes with a price.
The previous administration's Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework has the potential to provide a path forward to
economically engage with these nations.
Our subcommittee now has jurisdiction over the Development
Finance Corporations and we will use every tool at our disposal
to ensure the U.S. remains an active and committed economic
partner in the EAP region.
Third, we must continue our work on human rights. We cannot
ignore the ongoing human rights abuses in Xinjiang where Xi
Jinping directs the imprisonment of Uyghur Muslims and Tibetans
to erase their culture and identity.
The CCP's transnational repression tactics have also
spilled across borders with the regime's United Front Work
Department harassing and intimidating pro-democracy activists
right here on the U.S. soil.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un continues to steal from his own
people, subjecting them to torture, forced labor, and conduct
unlawful and extrajudicial killings. Across Southeast Asia
independent journalists and civilians face charges simply for
exercising their right of free press and assembly.
America is safer and more prosperous when we put U.S.
priorities first. Our allies and partners are better off when
we show up for good.
With that, I'm proud to have these witnesses before us
today. Their insights will help us shape policies that will
strengthen our position in the East Asia and the Pacific region
and advance our national interest. Thank you.
Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from
California Mr. Ami Bera for your opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
We have been partners in this region for quite a while. We
have had a chance to travel together, and I agree with your
opening statements.
You know, there's progress that's been made but, obviously,
there's progress that we can make going forward that really
shouldn't be a partisan issue.
Certainly within Congress many of these issues are
nonpartisan. We can look at the Quad coalition in the first
Trump administration. They set some of those baselines.
The Biden administration elevated to the leaders level very
early in this administration right after the swearing in. You
had a ministerial and I think that's something that we can
build on.
That partnership between the United States, Japan,
Australia, India is vitally important to not just the
geopolitical security for the region but also from an economic
perspective, you know, bringing India into the fold.
We have had the chance to travel to Japan and Korea
multiple times and, you know, the trilateral relationship is in
a much better place than it was, four or 8 years ago.
We have got to continue to keep that intact regardless of
politics in the region. Certainly, the bilateral Japan-Korea
relationship is in a strong place and we have got to build off
of that and, you know, we have a responsibility as Members of
Congress to continue that but also support the administration
in maintaining a strong trilateral.
We look at--in 2019 when I traveled to the Philippines that
relationship was in a very bad place. Philippines was headed in
the direction of China.
Now, under the Marcos administration, you know, getting the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in place I think there's
a real opportunity with the Trump administration again to build
on that.
The Philippines are right back in our fold to have regular
rotations and perhaps return to permanent basing and so forth
there. I think that's a nonpartisan issue. That's something we
can work on.
I'm just returning from Australia, New Zealand and the
region and AUKUS. Pillar one is going very well. You know,
looking at the words of Secretary Hegseth and others.
I think there's a strong foundation and support for AUKUS.
Let's get pillar two going., again, this is a good deal for the
United States. It not only establishes a presence, works with
one of our Five Eye allies.
The fact that Beijing is upset about AUKUS means we're
probably doing the right thing so let's keep doing it. Let's
build off of that., again, this will allow us to maintain naval
superiority in the region at a time when we're watching very
provocative actions around northern Australia--between
Australia and New Zealand from the Chinese.
We have got to send a strong message that that is not okay
in the 21st century because that is how accidents happen. That
is how wars get started. And, again, the behavior that we see
around there or what we see in the South China Sea, and I know
you've had a chance to see firsthand some of what's happening
around in the Philippines.
Again, we as the United States with our allies have to send
a strong message that that's not okay.
Now, if it had been up to me we would have passed TPP a
long time ago. Obviously, we find ourselves in a very different
place. One area where I didn't see as much progress with the
Biden administration was around trade, even digital trade, and
we have agreements that we can build off of.
I think it is important for us to set the contours of what
trade looks like. I don't think it's going to be joining CP-TPP
but, you know, can we do digital trade?
Can we get some progress here even in a bilateral way. I
think that would be important and, again, I think we as Members
of Congress on this subcommittee can work in that area.
One area that we were a little bit late to the game but,
you know, we did see the Biden administration reestablish
embassies in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu.
We saw important aid and development programs going there
and it's important for us to continue to support those
investments that are not big dollar items but when you talk
about the people we are the partners of choice, the United
States.
But we have to be there. We have to show up because if we
are not--you know, the PRC can show up with bags of cash and
demonstrate influence in ways that we don't do business.
So working with our allies in Australia, New Zealand. The
Japanese are showing an increased interest in the region. Those
are all things that are nonpartisan.
Those are all things that I hope to be able to work with
the Trump administration on and certainly with you, Madam
Chairwoman. But I think we can work on legislation that keeps
moving those relationships forward.
With that, I'll yield back.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Ranking Member, and I love the tone of
bipartisanship, especially when it comes to EAP--Pacific Island
region--and I cannot emphasize enough how important it is for
us to show up and engage with our EAP regions.
Thank you for that. I look forward to continue to work with
you on this committee and beyond.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record, and we are pleased
to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on
this important topic.
So let me introduce our distinguished panel: Mr. Zack
Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute;
Craig Singleton, China program senior director and senior
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and
Richard Fontaine, the chief executive officer at the Center for
New American Security.
The chair recognizes the importance of the issues before us
and is grateful to have you speak with us, and look forward to
hearing your testimoneys and, you know, answering our
questions.
Your full statements will be made part of the record and
I'll ask each of you to keep your remarks or spoken remarks to
5 minutes or under in order to allow time for member questions.
I now recognize Mr. Cooper for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ZACK COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,
and distinguished members of the committee. It's an honor to be
here today and I especially appreciate the bipartisan nature of
your leadership on Asia issues.
Despite changes in rhetoric, recent U.S. strategy in Asia
has been remarkably consistent across administrations from both
parties.
In short, the United States has made progress with those
countries that are most concerned about Chinese behavior. I
would focus here on Japan, the Philippines, India, Australia,
and South Korea, the same countries that both of you mentioned
in your opening remarks.
But we have struggled elsewhere in the region, particularly
with countries across most of Southeast Asia and they've been
disappointed by uneven U.S. engagement and inconsistent
economic visions.
These structural constraints I think are likely to continue
over the next few years and in my written testimony I assessed
the lasting impact of five different Biden administration
initiatives on Asia. The first was continued cooperation with
the Quad, the second, AUKUS security partnership, the third was
the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The fourth was deepening
of the alliance with the Philippines, and, last, U.S.-Japan-
South Korea trilateral cooperation.
I think we can say that the Biden administration made real
progress in many of these areas but that we do have to rethink
our approach to the region because much of the rest of the
region is untouched by the efforts that we have made over the
last decade or so.
With these lessons in mind I want to propose what I think
are potentially five big ideas that the Trump administration
and the Congress could take up over the next few years.
So the first is establishment of an allied defense arsenal
effort, a major new defense industry partnership with allies
taking the lead on military co-development and co-production of
precision munitions and autonomous systems.
The second I talk about in my written testimony is creation
of an allied energy initiative to boost U.S. energy production
and exports to allies in Asia who are desperate for more
reliable sources of oil and natural gas.
The third is formation of what I would call a Taiwan
contact group alongside U.S. allies to provide Taiwan with the
capabilities needed to bolster its military defenses and
societal resilience in advance of a conflict.
The fourth proposal is a trade deal with the Philippines to
maintain our recent alliance momentum and avoid China being
able to use its economic influence with Manila to undermine an
absolutely critical strategic relationship for the United
States.
The fifth proposal I would put on the table is that the
Trump administration should make a big bet on Indonesia akin to
its efforts with India. The reason is that Indonesia, as many
of you know well, is a rising giant.
It could act as a counterweight in Southeast Asia against
China's regional influence, and I think it warrants much more
attention from American policymakers.
So those are five opportunities I think the Trump
administration has. I want to recently speak--quickly speak
about five risks that I think are serious as well.
First, Washington will need to avoid ceding a sphere of
influence to China by better coordinating with its allies and
partners while finding ways to stay engaged on the principles
and priorities that matter to countries in Asia.
Second, threats to withdrawal of support from Taiwan could
further undermine the support of the Taiwanese public and their
confidence in the United States, and that is particularly true,
in my view, if it's coupled with a U.S. drawdown from parts of
Europe.
Third, the danger of South Korean nuclear proliferation is
real and I think it is growing. It is accelerated by concerns
about the risk of U.S.-South Korea alliance decoupling and that
will require new engagement from policymakers here in
Washington.
Fourth, as you know, AUKUS remains a bold and important
idea but I think we should be assessing the role that large
undersea unmanned vehicles can play in bridging some of the
capability gaps that are arising as we think about AUKUS over
the next couple of decades.
Fifth, American policymakers will have to reconsider their
approach to Southeast Asia, particularly on trade and
development, lest China continue to make significant progress
across the region.
So, in conclusion, the United States remains vital to
security and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific. I thank this
committee for its remarkable bipartisan leadership on these
issues over many years and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
Let me now recognize Mr. Singleton for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG SINGLETON
Mr. Singleton. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member
Bera, and members of the distinguished subcommittee. Thanks for
inviting me today.
I'm pleased to offer policy insights from the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute
where I serve as a senior fellow.
Over the last 4 years the Biden administration sought to
stabilize relations with Beijing through sustained diplomatic
dialog and relatively restrained responses to myriad Chinese
provocations.
On paper, this approach aims to avoid a bilateral
breakdown. In practice, however, it did amount to diplomacy
without much deterrence, emboldening Chinese Communist Party
Chairman Xi Jinping to test our resolve at nearly every turn.
Indeed, rather than reducing tensions, these well-
intentioned diplomatic overtures paradoxically fueled Xi's
worst impulses, enabling Beijing to expand its surveillance,
ramp up its maritime assertiveness, and deepen its ties to
other authoritarian regimes at next to no cost.
During Biden's tenure Chinese spy balloons entered U.S.
airspace with little consequence, while hacking campaigns Salt,
Volt, and Flax Typhoon targeted senior American officials and
sensitive networks with barely a public rebuke.
Even as Beijing dramatically intensified its incursions
around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, Washington's focus
remained on rapid de-escalation. If left unchecked, this
dynamic risks encouraging Chinese overreach, raising the
specter of miscalculation or worse, war.
Today's predicament evokes lessons from the late stages of
the cold war when Washington's misguided embrace of so-called
peaceful coexistence inadvertently prolonged the Soviet
system's survival, treating it as an immutable juggernaut
rather than one vulnerable to sustained external and internal
pressure.
By minimizing accountability for Chinese espionage,
coercion, and violations of international norms we risk
reinforcing Beijing's conviction that its revanchist ambitions
need not be curbed.
A new Trump administration and the 119th Congress can move
beyond mere coexistence with China, if for no other reason that
the U.S. and China embody fundamentally incompatible systems
and ideologies.
Simply put, today's contest cannot end in stalemate. The
United States must ensure its model prevails. Moving beyond
mere coexistence, a bold yet realistic aim, does not require an
explicit bid for regime change.
Rather, Washington should push Beijing onto an
unsustainable path where credible deterrence, targeted economic
pressure, and principled diplomacy expose the structural flaws
of Xi's Marxist-Leninist framework.
By holding out the prospect of genuine concessions on
issues like trade we can force Beijing to confront the
spiraling costs of continued hostility, potentially hastening
the CCP's own unraveling if it refuses to alter course.
Ultimately, time is on our side if we choose to make it so.
Chief among the measures Congress should consider are robust
outbound investment screening and bans accompanied with
enhanced export controls and targeted sanctions to deny Xi
access to both U.S. capital markets and critical technologies
for military-civil fusion.
Credible proactive threats of punitive action if China
crosses red lines over Taiwan or in the South China Sea
reinforce that brinkmanship will be met with real enforcement.
Meanwhile, Washington must support beleaguered democracies
on the front lines of Chinese coercion. HFAC can champion
streamlined foreign military sales and leveraged Presidential
drawdown authorities for Taiwan, ensuring swift delivery of
defensive systems and asymmetric capabilities without
bureaucratic delay.
A leaner, meaner, more focused foreign assistance regime
centered around strategic infrastructure, digital governance,
and anti-corruption programming would also deny China a
foothold in critical ports, curb risky 5G networks, and
strengthen partners' resilience to Chinese coercion.
By demonstrating that America remains both principled and
reliable we fill aid gaps that Beijing might otherwise exploit.
Finally, by insisting that allies, including Taiwan, invest
more in their own security the U.S. can spread the financial
load while preserving its leadership role.
This flexible transactional approach aligns with the
President's ``America first'' ethos. It rewards partners who
step up while denying Beijing easy wins.
Rather than striving for a fragile equilibrium in the Indo-
Pacific, Washington must create an overwhelming deterrent that
renders any attempt at forcible reunification or broader
regional domination prohibitively costly. No such deterrent
exists today.
By shifting from passive coexistence to purposeful
competition on America's terms we can challenge the illusion of
stability that has emboldened Beijing. This decisive posture
rooted in assertive reprisal rather than reflexive de-
escalation may pave the way for a new era of enduring
leadership in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies I
thank you again for inviting me to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singleton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim. I recognize Mr. Fontaine for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD FONTAINE
Mr. Fontaine. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,
distinguished members of the subcommittee and staff, thank you
for having me here today.
From the outset, the previous administration identified
China as its top priority and the Indo-Pacific as the region
most deserving of its greatest attention.
It had a number of notable successes but it also left key
opportunities unseized and so the Trump administration, along
with Congress, can and should build on the foundation laid over
the past 4 years.
In the diplomatic sphere the Biden administration elevated
the Quad to the leaders level and coordinated an ambitious
effort to supply COVID-19 vaccines to Southeast Asia.
It demonstrated greater American engagement with the
Pacific Islands including a summit with leaders in Washington,
new diplomatic outposts, and as Representative Bera said,
renewing the Compacts of Free Association.
President Biden hosted the ASEAN leaders at the White House
as well, stepping ed up high-level diplomacy with what is
perhaps the Indo-Pacific's most contested region. All these
were positive diplomatic steps.
The administration also made significant moves on military
posture including winning base access for U.S. troops in the
Philippines, and securing an access arrangement with Papua New
Guinea.
Of course, it formed AUKUS, the defense technology sharing
agreement with Australia and the U.K., revised U.S. force
posture in Japan, and agreed on Defense Industrial Base
cooperation with India. Again, all positive signs.
But for all that, the net deployment of U.S. military
resources in Asia has been essentially flat for over a decade
even as China has made increases in virtually every area. and
so rRighting the military balance in the western Pacific and
ensuring deterrence remain key challenges for the new
administration.
The Biden administration also refocused some of its
economic efforts on the Indo-Pacific but away from trade
agreements and toward defensive measures like export controls
on semiconductors, outbound investment reviews, restricting
Chinese electric vehicles, and so forth.
Its one attempt at an affirmative trade policy was the
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework agreement, IPEF, which the
chairwoman mentioned.
But this was a set of agreements that rather conspicuously
lacked any market access in the United States and didn't need
to be approved by Congress and so it was very limited in what
it could actually put on the table in terms of what countries
in the region are looking for most from the U.S. and the U.S.
economy.
This recent paucity of positive economic moves in Asia
represents another opportunity, should the administration
choose to seize it.
So the Biden administration made some significant strides
in the Indo-Pacific over the past 4 years even while, of
course, it was dealing with acute crises in Europe and in the
Middle East.
But given China's increasing military strength, its
diplomatic ambition, and its technological advances, there
remains a long way to go. The Trump administration and Congress
should pursue several opportunities.
First, they should elevate regional diplomacy. The Trump
administration's first meeting with the Quad foreign ministers
took place on only, I believe, their second day in office. This
is a good step and it's already been followed with extensive
diplomacy with regional leaders.
But there are questions, of course, that are swirling about
the President's regional priorities, enthusiasm for tariffs,
pursuit of positive ties with Russia, and more.
So high-level and sustained Indo-Pacific diplomacy will be
at a premium in all of the formats available, including the
U.S., Japan, South Korea trilateral, the trilateral with Japan
and the Philippines, the Quad, and, of course, Congress has an
important role to play here with the CODELs and the visits both
to Washington and other places.
The new administration also should pursue a positive
economic vision. I think there's wide agreement that the United
States should continue to reduce its economic dependence on
China in areas that incur national security risk.
There's less agreement, but I think there should be, on the
corresponding lesson here which is you trade less with China in
sensitive areas and you trade more with your friends and
allies, and there are is the possibility of sectoral agreements
like digital trade or on critical minerals that would set
rules, reduce dependencies on China, and signal renewed U.S.
economic leadership.
The United States on the military side can't arrest the
eroding balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and meet our
critical commitments elsewhere without a major increase in
defense spending and at the same time moving some of our
military resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia,
especially in light of the prospects for peace in 2025 in each
of those two regions.
Then, finally, it would be wise to avoid some unforced
errors. The new administration, obviously, is moving quickly to
differentiate itself from its predecessor including on Asia
policy but shouldn't shoot itself in the foot by eliminating
programs that have helped the U.S. bolster friends in the Indo-
Pacific and contest Chinese influence, whether that's foreign
aid or some of the other arrangements that are currently under
question.
So by avoiding own goals, and by pursuing the many
opportunities before it, the new administration and the U.S.
Congress have a significant potential to bolster America's
position in the world's most important region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fontaine follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Kim. Thank you for your wonderful testimoneys. Your
opening statements give us a lot of food for thought and much
of which we agree on.
We all talked about how it is important for U.S. to show up
to the region to build a stronger relationship with our allies
and partners.
Also some of you also mentioned the--our ability to keep up
with our defense capabilities so I want to start my questioning
on that note.
Allies like Korea and Japan they have taken steps to assist
the U.S. Defense Industrial Base and Korea's Hanwha systems is
acquiring Philly Shipyards to bring shipbuilding experience to
America, and Japan has already committed a trillion dollars--$1
trillion--I wish it was more--in investment to assist the U.S.
with emerging technologies.
Our partners are also looking to co-produce and co-develop
with the United States so we need to ensure that these
collaborations align with our security interests and industrial
capacity without compromising our American innovation or
competitiveness.
So the first question--I think I want to--Mr. Singleton is
not listening so let me wake you up.
What steps can the Trump administration take to strengthen
our Defense Industrial Base while also working with our allies
and partners on national security priorities and technological
and economic advancements?
Sorry to put you on the spot.
Mr. Singleton. Thank you. Wide awake.
It's amazing that we are talking about enhancements to our
Defense Industrial Base today because we're actually thinking
about investments that are going to be really coming into play
tomorrow. Time is the enemy here.
I think this administration has real opportunities when
we're thinking about incentivization and also deregulation, but
where we are seeing gaps quite clearly are expanding mineral
stockpiles that we will need for tomorrow to actually feed and
drive these industries.
We actually don't have a skilled talent workforce yet for
these critical industries in the defense sector. So starting to
think about actual concrete programs that we can put into place
through legislation to buildup our tech talent workforce will
be absolutely vital.
I think--and Zack hit on this as well--trusted defense
supply chains is probably the future and I think East Asia will
play an anchor role in that structure.
Co-development with India, for example, on fighter jets,
Japan the Glide Phase Interceptor to go after hypersonic
missiles. These are all new and amazing opportunities that I
don't think we would have been talking about a few years ago.
Ultimately, a lot of that will be advanced through
memorandums of oral commitment, memorandums of understanding,
and just simple, clear-eyed engagement throughout the region. I
think there's no shortage of opportunity here as we think about
these defense supply chains and it was actually Secretary
Austin, I think, who really laid the groundwork for this last
summer and this is an area where this administration can really
proceed.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
On the economic engagement, Mr. Cooper, our ASEAN partners
continue to request market access, and we talked about that.
IPEF is good. It's a good starting point.
But, as you noted, we don't have market access there. So
market access to the United States is what our ASEAN partners
are asking. But trade appetite in Washington is severely
limited.
So in your testimony you mentioned that Trump
administration is unlikely to embrace IPEF. So what alternative
strategies can the administration pursue to maintain the U.S.
economic influence in the region without ceding grounds to
Beijing?
Mr. Cooper. Thanks, Chairwoman Kim.
I think the only answer then for the Trump team is to think
about bilateral arrangements since that's very clearly their
preference that are strategic in nature and absolutely critical
to the United States.
That's why, for me, focusing on the Philippines initially
is probably the most critical factor. You know that, of course,
we have got this Luzon economic corridor which we are trying to
do with Manila, and if that doesn't go forward it will call
into question our ability to use Philippine bases and other
facilities in the event of a crisis or conflict.
I think we're going to have to connect our economic
interests with our strategic interests to make that logical
chain clear for both this administration and, of course, for
the Congress as well.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
Mr. Fontaine, do you want to chime in on that? Since IPEF
does not provide market access how can we incentivize more
American companies--private sector engagements--in the region?
I know we talked about that a little bit--China.
Mr. Fontaine. Yes, I think it's worth pointing out that in
the first Trump administration the administration did reach a
digital trade deal with Japan and used the digital trade
chapter from USMCA there, and also had kind of managed a mini
deal on agriculture.
So it is just not completely beyond the realm of
imagination to think that over the next 4 years there are
bilateral deals, particularly in sectoral areas, you know, that
could be reached on digital trade, which and would be done
bilaterally or multilaterally, which They would be more about
setting the rules than even market access or some market
access, deals things, again, on relatively noncontroversial
areas like critical minerals and things like that.
More ambitiously, you know, if the U.S. gets back in the
business of, you know, free trade agreements, which admittedly
is a little hard to think about right now, I mean, we could
have an FTA with the Philippines.
We could have an FTA with Taiwan. I mean, tThe centerpiece
of, you know, the ill-fated TPP was essentially a U.S.-Japan
free trade agreement. And so, you know, if we could politically
get back to those areas the sky is kind of the limit for what
would be possible on policy grounds.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you very, very much.
Let me now recognize Ranking Member Bera for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I'm always going to be the optimist. I think we can always
increase our economic ties. But in the short term I think there
are some things that we can build off of.
Mr. Fontaine, you touched on the importance of critical
minerals and, you know, some of the rare earths where we are
overly reliant on a single source, in this case Beijing, and we
know how they use economic coercion. We have seen a taste of
it.
But it could get worse if there is a real escalation in
conflict. The Biden administration had put in the mineral
security partnership.
You know, wWe have engaged in conversations with our allies
in Japan and Korea, and this is not an area where we're
necessarily in competition because we all need these supplies.
And I'd be curious, you know, from a congressional perspective
and then, you know, working with the administration if we can
work with our allies.
Obviously, the Australians want to develop this industry.
Maybe a little bit more expensive than China but, again, for
our security concerns it's a way of, you know, working with
Australians, Malaysia, Vietnam, other areas where we
strategically could go into these areas if--you know, I think
that's the right approach at this point is going in and
developing these new markets and even going into Africa and
working in some of these places and having a presence.
Mr. Fontaine. Yes, I think that's exactly right and, of
course, on the critical minerals you have to consider both the
sourcing and then the processing and so you have to solve both
of those. Otherwise, if you're dependent on China for one or
the other then you haven't solved your problem.
But that said, there are a number of countries in the Indo-
Pacific and around the world that both have sources and some
which would be the places where processing takes place. So the
U.S. should be in the business of reducing barriers to that
kind of trade in critical minerals and potentially looking to
our other tools of economic policy, you know, through the
Development Finance Corporation or, you know, some of our aid
programs and things like that in order to incentivize private
sector activity in these places.
So, again, I think the mantra should be, yes, trade less
with China in areas of national security concern and but also
trade more with our friends and allies in those very areas.
Mr. Bera. Mr. Cooper, do you want to add?
Mr. Cooper. I would just add very briefly, you know, this
is an area where I think there are some countries in Southeast
Asia that have tremendous capability to help us and help
themselves, and Indonesia is sort of the most obvious of those.
So I think the Minerals Security Partnership is the kind of
thing that should be able to last through from the Biden
administration to the Trump administration because as Craig was
saying it picks up on a lot of critical items that they've been
worried about for a long time, going back to the first Trump
term.
But I think we have got to figure out which partners we can
work with in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the region and for
me Indonesia would be the logical first partner to think about.
Mr. Bera. Right. Let me shift to the Pacific Islands.
Large economic zone, big playing field, smaller
populations. I know I've traveled extensively there. I know the
chairwoman is traveling to the region as well.
When I look at recent elections, you know, in the Solomons
and within PNG, the public seems to still want to move toward
the West and so forth.
But I really am concerned when it comes time to form a
government just Beijing's influence and, you know, we don't
have to get into the details of it but things that we're not
going to do--it's not how we do business.
But you talked about corruption, Mr. Cooper. When it comes
time to form governments, the governments are not necessarily
moving in our direction and I think we have got to come up with
some tools on how to counter that influence.
You know, if you want to talk about that, Mr. Cooper, and
then if the others want to add something.
Mr. Cooper. Yes, Ranking Member, just a brief remark, which
is, you know, I think we have had a number of wake-up calls and
every time we say it's a wake-up call and then we don't really
wake up--you know, first with Solomon Islands, then we were
worried about Vanuatu--now it's Cook Islands.
Every time we say we have woken up and then every time
there's another Pacific Island that does a deal with China that
we didn't see coming, I think the Trump team should get a lot
of credit for in the first term putting a lot of effort into
the Pacific Islands, right?
I think we have to make sure that they maintain that focus
now. There are a lot of distractions around the world and the
Pacific isn't the easiest place to maintain focus and we
haven't done that consistently over years.
So I think we have got to use the Cook Islands situation
now as another wake-up call to focus on.
Mr. Bera. Yes. Having just been in Auckland last week,
obviously, that's of concern. I mean, I think how we may
approach it this Congress is working with Australia and New
Zealand, and Japan is showing that increased--look, how do we
share the burden? How do we--even the French? I mean, pulling
the French in as well.
I don't know, Mr. Fontaine, if, in the last few----
Mr. Cooper. Well, you just made the point that I was going
to make, which is that we have got, you know, friends in this
enterprise.
So we're not going to do what the Chinese do and engage in,
you know, bribery and State capture and things like that. We're
going to have a different model and different approach to
engagement.
That has to be sustained and it has to be a long-term
effort and ultimately it's--we don't want to see China get a
foothold, certainly, in security terms in these areas, which
would constrain our own freedom of action and that of our
friends and allies.
So if you start from that point and then, look, what are
the tools that we have available to be able to influence and,
frankly, to help these countries with their own sovereignty so
that they're not ultimately undermined by Chinese activity that
is something that should appeal to these governments over time,
and in that we can enlist friends like New Zealand and
Australia.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
Let me now go to the members' questioning session and I
would like to first call upon Representative Moylan to ask your
questions.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
I want to express my disapproval of President Biden's
absence in the East Asia Summit during his tenure. The U.S.
relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nation
members is critical for the economic, political, and the
defense of prosperity in the region.
The President's participation in these diplomatic channels
is essential to ensuring that the U.S. presence in Asia remains
constructive, visible, and lasting.
Partnerships such as the AUKUS alliance or the Quad
organization have greatly enhanced the overall security of the
Indo-Pacific. Despite their significance, the United States'
over emphasis on defensive measures has alienated potential
allies and support.
The East Asia Summit and other ASEAN--sponsored discussions
are opportunities for the U.S. to cooperate on issues like
health care and trade and disaster response and even energy.
Yet, the nonparticipation or just vocalizing the anti-
Chinese sentiment is a missed opportunity that the United
States cannot afford.
Unlike the previous administration, President Trump must
approach the organization like ASEAN with the same passion as
defense partnerships, and some have even cited President Xi
Jinping and President Putin as examples of the absence to
defend President Biden's nonattendance.
But the United States can and must do better. For
diplomatic efforts we must stop looking at PRC or Russia as an
example and demonstrate that the United States will be a
lasting ally.
In the absence of our adversaries the United States can
assert itself as a preferred partner in the Pacific. The United
States has recently accomplished significant diplomatic
achievements in the Indo-Pacific such as the U.S. alliance for
international developments, disaster teams, or professional
development programs in Cambodia.
Nevertheless, the United States cannot rest on its
diplomatic laurels and these relationships need demonstration
of our commitment.
So I implore the Trump administration to learn from
President Biden's mistakes and I ask you, Mr. Singleton--you
have vast experience and appreciate that, and what actions can
the U.S. take to strengthen trust and cooperation with ASEAN
nations, particularly those growing closer to China.
Mr. Singleton. Thank you, sir.
I mean, I think we mentioned it earlier but we have to show
up. I think our greatest comparative advantage would be
presence, persistence, and partnership and that's--the region
isn't opaque. They make clear to us directly what they want
from us and I think there are transactional opportunities that
benefit both sides.
I think talk of market access, talk of economic engagement,
is the missing link today and most countries in the region are
deeply concerned about their reliance on China for key critical
supply chains.
They're concerned about Chinese companies relocating into
their markets, and those dependencies and the weaponized
interdependence that comes with them is concerning.
I think the biggest signal that the President can make,
though, is by simply having consistent outreach to countries in
the region--hosting them here, deepening people to people ties,
showing up.
President--Chinese leader Xi Jinping does it quite well.
The Chinese operate a vast diplomatic presence across the
region. I think we have a real opportunity here to actually
show up on the ground and demonstrate what we're willing to
bring to the table.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you.
And briefly, Mr. Fontaine, you spoke about the coordination
the Biden administration accomplished with Pacific Island
countries. In what areas should the Trump administration build
off these initial success?
Mr. Fontaine. There's are several. Well, one One is to, of
course, sustain the diplomatic engagement produced by having
established the embassies in Solomons and Vanuatu and Tonga.
and, you know, tThe China-Solomons security agreement was, as
my colleague said, a big wake-up call. But then we get
additional wake-up calls after additional wake-up calls.
And so to sustain sustaining the diplomatic engagement
there is one aspect of all this. Then I come back just, you
know, on to trade. I mean, these are very small economies in
all of this but one of the great advantages the United States
has its is the big economic market and ability to provide
access to that economic market, particularly for countries for
which who, you know, it's going to be almost a rounding error
in terms of their economic relationship with us. This is
another big advantage.
And then, you know, again, working with these countries in
combination together with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and
other bigger countries including from a little bit further
outside in order to demonstrate a vision which is not the U.S.
would like to dominate the region instead of China but, rather,
this is about your own independence and sovereignty and ability
to make your own sovereign decisions, that wWe want to support
that as opposed to what China has on offer.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much. Thank you to the panel.
Madam Chair, thank you.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
Let me now recognize Representative Sherman for your 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Sherman. China has been on the rise ever since at the
beginning of this century we gave them permanent most favored
nation status. I was there at the time and they told us it
would increase the trade deficit by a billion dollars. They
were off by 4,000 percent.
I would point out that the vast majority of Democrats voted
against that action and we did so under pressure from a
Democratic president who turned out to be wrong on this one
issue.
And I would hope our Republican colleagues will take note
of this. Perhaps your proudest hour will be on occasion where
you say no to a Republican president.
We now have this enormous trade deficit with China. I would
point out that it is considerably larger under Trump 1.0 then
it was under Biden, and that was particularly true in the pre-
COVID years of the Trump administration.
So while Trump talks about how other countries are eating
our lunch, they ate our lunch and our dinner under the first
Trump administration.
Now, one issue we have is Americans investing in Chinese
stocks. Now, China wants to encourage its people to invest in
their stock and they provide tax incentives for doing so.
But they're careful to make sure that no citizen of China
gets an incentive--a tax credit--for investing in American
stocks.
But we have a capital gains allowance where we provide many
hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies to benefit
Americans who invest in Chinese stocks.
If any of you think that that's a good idea could you raise
your hand? I'm not seeing.
But what's surprising is I only got one Republican co-
sponsor for my bill to take away this subsidy for investing in
the Chinese economy, and I would hope that we would do a lot
better in this Congress.
You'll have to stand up to billionaires to do that because
billionaires think they should get a tax incentive for
everything, even being Benedict Arnold when it comes to where
they invest their money.
I think you pointed out how some of the small countries in
the Pacific are rounding errors when it comes to trade. It's
even more of a rounding error when it comes to aid.
I believe that the special--the House Select Committee on
the Chinese Communist Party unanimously and in a bipartisan way
called on us to fully fund USAID.
Now, American soldiers, including my father's friends, died
in the Pacific over the very islands that would be of great
strategic importance if, God forbid, we ever ended up in
another war with a major Asian power.
Does it--raise your hand if you think it made any sense for
us to stop all aid to the small islands in the Pacific as we
did just a week or two ago when we froze all USAID?
Again, I'll say that no hands went up. The Solomon Islands
where so many Americans--Marines--died we had a $21 million
economic support arrangement with and we have stopped that, and
even if we started again we have proven ourselves to be
unreliable. A $95,000 aid program to the Cook Islands and we
stopped that. It's tragic.
Now, I'll point out one other thing. We have got China
making these debt trap loans where they loan money and there's
no way that the project will pay it back.
Should we encourage nations that are a victim of this to
simply not pay China back? Does anybody agree with that or
disagree?
Should Sri Lanka be writing giant--well, so I'll point out
that we, in effect, force these countries to pay back because
we allow our credit rating agencies and our lenders to treat a
country as if it's a bad credit risk because they fail to pay
China back.
I would say that we ought to turn to countries and say,
don't give China your port. Give them your middle finger, and
then you'll still be able to borrow from Europe, from the
United States, and from the international community.
And with that, my time has expired.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
I recognize Representative Barr for your 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Singleton, thank you for recognizing the COINS Act, the
outbound screening legislation from the last Congress that I
worked on, and I do agree with you that we do need legislation
to address capital flows into China, especially to Chinese
entities of national security concern and technologies that
threaten our national security as well.
Last Friday President Trump issued an executive order
titled ``American First Investment Policy'' and issued a
national security memorandum that was in large measure aligned
with the principles of the COINS Act. He said in conjunction
with that release we will adopt new rules to stop U.S.
companies from pouring investments into China and stop China
from buying up America, allowing all of these investments that
serve American interests, meaning that it's exactly the right
policy.
It's the America first policies, red light to investments
that compromise our national security but allow those
investments that actually advance our interests.
My question to you is given the fact that the
administration has now issued an executive order--it replaces
the Biden executive order on outbound investment screening--is
it important that Congress act as well here? Is it important
that Congress pass legislation to provide statutory definition
to all of this?
Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely, and thank you for your
leadership on this issue.
I mean, cutting off Xi's access, I would say, to Western
capital and technology is like depriving a fire of oxygen. I
think if we don't we're sort of very much fueling the system
that is seeking to overshadow our own.
I was very impressed with the policy release memo last week
but it's vital that those protections be codified into law.
In many respects, the memo released last week goes a little
bit farther than COINS by identifying new sectors including
biotechnology, which I would argue is the next semiconductors,
where we need to be hyper vigilant about capital flows.
But I think what's captured in the COINS Act is exactly the
right pitch perfect moment. There's bipartisan consensus. I
know it was a long road to get there but I think at this point
it's the best hope for right now.
Mr. Barr. Yes. And thanks, Mr. Singleton, for recognizing
that the Treasury-White House release is slightly different
than COINS and we have actually been reaching out to the
administration asking for interagency technical assistance. We
want to incorporate that into the release of COINS 2.0.
What would you say, though, to the argument that--and
obviously, because of my work on this I support the effort--but
what would you say to those who make the argument, and it's not
altogether a bad point, that under Xi Jinping China has
abandoned the American innovation model, that the Chinese
Communist central planning has replaced private allocation of
capital with state-run investment and because of that between
2018 and 2023 the number of annual startups founded in China
has collapsed by over 97 percent and that Chairman Xi's
crackdown has really deterred U.S. investment.
Since 2018 U.S. venture capital deals in China have fallen
by 87 percent. In other words, the market is taking care of
this. China's economy is collapsing. China's disadvantage is
that they're communists.
And so outbound investment is slowing down because it's a
bad place to invest. Do we still need COINS? Do we still need
an investment screening tool?
Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely. I mean Xi Jinping is his own
worst enemy and his economic stewardship has led China to where
it is today which is on the point of economic collapse, quite
frankly.
I think what we have to do is protect American capital,
American investors, and American technology, and institute
through law common sense guardrails that ensure that American
capital isn't flowing into the very technological sectors that
are being used to fuel Chinese military modernization and I
think that linkage between the military and the civil,
particularly as it relates to investment screening and bans, is
essential if for no other reason that just because China's
economy is suffering today doesn't mean that they can't recover
tomorrow.
Mr. Barr. Well, I agree with you and I agree with President
Trump on his executive order.
Look, it's true. Chairman Xi has, in some regards, made
China uninvestable. Why on earth anyone would want to invest in
a communist economy where at any moment's notice at the whim of
the bureaucrats in Beijing all of your investment could
disappear.
Nevertheless, there are capital flows. There are Western
investors, U.S. and otherwise, who are investing in some of
these critical technologies and so we do need legislation.
I appreciate your testimony. I yield back.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
I now recognize Representative Amo for your 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Amo. Thank you very much, Chairwoman, and it's a
pleasure to be on this subcommittee and I look forward to your
leadership and that of the ranking member over this Congress.
I know that every member of our subcommittee wants to
advance American interests and counter China's influence in
East Asia and the Pacific and every member should want to
strengthen our supply chains, boost economic cooperation, and
protect our national security.
And I believe that every member understands the only way to
achieve this is by building alliances and partnerships. As we
look at the last 4 years I believe that President Biden
understood these points.
It's why he led a historic effort to establish one of the
most significant security agreements in generations. Australia,
United Kingdom, United States security pact, as everyone knows,
is AUKUS and it's important to just break it down and share
that, you know, AUKUS improves that monitoring and increases
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
It allows the United States to continue our leadership in
emerging defense technology. Pillar one created a pathway for
Australia to acquire nuclear submarines. Pillar two created
deeper cooperation between all of the three allies for advanced
defense capabilities.
Now, many businesses in my home State of Rhode Island are
working on technology included in AUKUS like the Virginia-class
submarine, or they're developing technology for pillar two like
the next generation of underwater drones.
And so this agreement promotes national security and boosts
local economies with good-paying jobs. It strengthens our
relationships around the world.
Mr. Fontaine, could you share why it's so essential that we
continue the work of AUKUS and how can we work to strengthen
cooperation as we move further into pillar two?
Mr. Fontaine. Sure. Thank you, Congressman.
Well, pillar one, I think the case for that is probably
straightforward, but to increase over some years but,
nevertheless, to increase the number of allied nuclear-
propelled submarines in the key military theater. This is a
good thing, especially given China's increase in capabilities
across the board.
So we want that and, of course, the Australian
participation in pillar one of AUKUS is a significant injection
of several billion dollars into the submarine industrial base
in the United States at a moment when we're behind on sub
production, and so that's a good outcome as well.
On pillar two, you know, in a way a lot of the hard work
has already been done. The Congress, you know, went through the
exercise of ITAR reform, which is always, you know, throwing
sand in the gears of some of these ability of countries'
ability, including some of our closest intelligence and
military partners, to cooperate with us in technology.
So that part has been done. We have taken our lumps from
the French for having, you know, participated in the sub
contract. So a lot of the hard work has been done.
On pillar two I think that the key is to have some quick,
visible wins because this is a proof of concept, right? This is
not only something that could work for the U.S.--the United
States--the U.S., U.K. and Australia., but iIf this goes well,
and we can show that things are possible with pillar two that
otherwise wouldn't be then Japan, South Korea, India, other
countries can plug in on particular projects in a similar sort
of fashion.
But we haven't seen the quick wins yet and there's are a
bunch of potential projects. I mean, tThe Australians have some
unique capabilities on quantum PNT--position, navigation, and
timing--you mentioned unmanned undersea capabilities--in a
matter of, you know, months--12 months, 18 months, 24 months on
the back end, not years.
To show some quick wins on pillar two would give some
serious momentum to AUKUS and I think demonstrate its utility
to everybody.
Mr. Amo. And I greatly appreciate your point of emphasis on
growing partnerships and I'm hopeful that, you know, after the
past 36 days of the Trump administration that the
administration will demonstrate that they value these
partnerships, that they understand the value therein because,
you know, we have seen questioning our transatlantic alliances,
we have seen foreign aid freezes, and we want to, you know,
lower the temperature and ensure that our friends around the
world aren't going to question our commitment to our values,
and jeopardizing those would be a problem to proceeding as we
should in AUKUS.
And so, you know, it is my hope that we don't have an
absence of American leadership because if that is the case
China will take advantage to fill that vacuum, reaching out to
our allies and partners, being more of a threat in the Indo-
Pacific and doing the work to really combat our values, our
sense of our leadership in the world, and that's a message that
I think we can all agree on.
With that, I yield.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you very much.
Let me recognize Representative Radewagen for your 5
minutes of questioning.
Mrs. Radewagen.
[Foreign language spoken.]
Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim and Ranking
Member Bera, for holding this hearing and thank you to the
panel for testifying today.
As you may be able to tell how I'm dressed I am a Pacific
Islander and represent the beautiful territory of American
Samoa, the only United States soil south of the Equator.
So this hearing is especially important to me as we are
discussing my home, the Pacific. I want to highlight some
recent developments in the Pacific Islands.
Within the past 3 weeks both independent Samoa and the Cook
Islands have signed major agreements with China. Unfortunately,
I don't have a map here but independent Samoa is my neighbor 60
miles to the west.
Cook Islands are my neighbor to the east, along with
Kiribati. My home district is now surrounded on three sides by
countries that have signed major economic and security deals
with China.
And since this hearing is on opportunities for the new
administration what are actions that President Trump and
Secretary Rubio can do to counteract China in the Pacific
Islands?
And I'd like all three of you to answer, please.
Mr. Fontaine. Well, we talked earlier about, you know,
potential trade opportunities and things like that, and there's
also the aid aspect of this.
As we were discussing before, the amounts of aid are
relatively small that go into these countries when you look in
at the grand scheme of the amount of foreign aid that the
United States has provided to countries all over the world, but
it makes a big difference there and we, frankly, are in a
competition with China for influence.
I think what we don't want to see is exactly what you
described where we have sovereign U.S. soil surrounded on three
sides by countries that wish to be closer to China economically
and certainly security wise.
So to use the various tools in our tool kit on aid, on
trade, on diplomatic engagement, on, you know, security support
and things like that, those are the things that can make a
difference.
But, again, it has to be sustained. We have to demonstrate
that this is not just an kind of epiphenomenon where we are
suddenly interested in the Pacific Islands and we develop some
initiatives and then they start to fade in a couple of years.
We have to sustain these efforts over a long period of time.
Mr. Cooper. Congresswoman, I would just add briefly I think
it's absolutely critical that the United States explain not
just to policymakers but also to the American people why this
is in the American interest and, you know, those of us in the
think tank community probably have our work cut out on that
issue.
But I think it's actually pretty clear. If you're President
Trump and you're looking for areas where a little bit of money
goes a long way what better place than the Pacific? Relatively
small populations that are desperate for greater engagement
from the United States.
Sometimes they're not even looking for a lot of money,
right? Sometimes it may just be a little bit of diplomatic
engagement, right--opening embassies in some places that's
relatively cheap. And the strategic logic is extremely clear
and anyone that's read their history knows why that's the case.
So I think the challenge we're going to have is that some
of these ongoing programs I think are probably paused at the
moment and so we're going to have to explain both, you know, to
the American people but also to some people within the
government why these are so critical and why spending a little
bit of money now in these areas is absolutely important in the
long term.
Mr. Singleton. I would agree with everything that's been
said and just add on that beyond the deal with the Cook Islands
we also saw live fire drills around Australia this week. Quite
alarming, demonstrating, I think, a capability and an intent
from the Chinese to project much farther from their shores.
I think as it relates specifically to Pacific Island
countries there are several opportunities. One is seabed
mineral mining, which is an area that's ripe for, I think,
opportunity for the United States.
I think fishery management, maritime transport, and
security are other areas that closely align with this
administration and the previous administration--even
educational exchange, climate change assistance and support.
These are all, I think, basic programs that I think to the
points raised are relatively inexpensive but go a long way to
deepen people to people ties.
Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
I recognize Representative Castro for your 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Mr. Fontaine, in your testimony you note that in 2022 Nepal
accepted a $500 million grant through the Millennium Challenge
Corporation to expand its electricity grid and improve road
infrastructure.
China and their supporters in Nepal fought hard to try to
prevent this. They argued that Nepal was making a mistake in
working with the United States and I'm glad that they were
unsuccessful in their argument.
The Trump administration has abruptly frozen this
assistance with no transparency. Many government officials in
Nepal now worry whether they made the right decision in
partnering with the United States.
How do you think Nepal's leaders feel about their decision
to make the politically difficult decision to ignore China, to
bypass China, and to work with the United States?
Mr. Fontaine. Well, I suppose they're waiting for the
outcome of this review and I hope that this gets turned back on
because this is the reason I mentioned it in my testimony.
If you look at this $500 million MCC compact with Nepal, it
took the--it took Kathmandu about 5 years to actually come to
the point where they agreed to do it for exactly the reasons
that you said, because they were being lobbied by the Chinese
not to do it, because this is kind of a declaration of
strategic intent that they, you know, had to think pretty hard
about.
And it's also worth noting that this all took place during
the first Trump administration. This is a Trump administration
idea to do this with Nepal, and so now that this is frozen the
Chinese would love to march in and say, we will replace the
Americans here, and also point out American unreliability if we
were able to say once this was going and now this is not.
And it's also worth noting that Nepal agreed to kick in
$200 million of its own money toward all of this. So it wasn't
just us putting in our own.
Mr. Castro. Thank you. And I guess--well, let me ask you,
do you have confidence that that aid will be unfrozen? That
that deal will be unfrozen? And bear in mind the National
Endowment for Democracy their funding has been frozen. IRI is
frozen. NDI is frozen.
That represents, along with what USAID represented on the
development side, a way that the United States engaged the
world and also promoted democracy around the world.
So I would ask the panel, having seen what you have seen of
the Trump administration, the United States, for example, just
voted with Russia this week to prevent a resolution that
essentially would have placed the blame on Russia for the
invasion of Ukraine.
From what you've seen so far do you have confidence that
these funds will be unfrozen?
Mr. Fontaine. I don't know what's going to happen with the
funds. But I can point out in addition to the Nepal example I
gave how I think some of this if not corrected is--amounts to
shooting ourselves in the foot.
So iIf you look at what NDI and IRI has have been doing,
they funded, for example, groups in Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal,
and Sri Lanka, which have already been approached by the
Chinese saying--because the funds have been frozen saying, we
will replace the American funds.
Now, these are democracy groups so they don't have much
interest in taking money from the Chinese in the first place.
But that's not going to be the case for everybody.
And so, again, there's--you know, the Chinese are sort of
ready to----
Mr. Castro. So it's created an opportunity for China to
come in as we----
Mr. Fontaine. Correct.
Mr. Castro [continuing]. pulled back or receded.
Mr. Fontaine. Or, you know, IRI, for example, provides
cyber tools for circumvention technologies and other things
that allow dissidents and democracy activists in places like
China to be able to communicate with each other away from the
watchful eye of the State.
Well, that's frozen now, and so I think those are the kinds
of things that we would want to have in our arsenal as we
compete with China.
Mr. Castro. Gentlemen, you will have--and I would just also
note real quick that I think what's especially troubling is
while these funds are frozen, these deals are frozen, it's not
as if there's been some other plan that's been laid out to
describe, you know, what else is going to go on in lieu of
these things, right?
Like, you know, then you could have some debate about
whether that's better. Here, everything is just frozen.
Mr. Cooper. Well, I think it was, you know, Secretary
Mattis that said that if we don't end up spending a little bit
of development assistance in places then we end up having to
use bullets, and that certainly, I think, would be the concern.
I'll just say very briefly that I think at the end of the
day the Trump administration--I understand the logic of why
they want to cut down on government spending, right? But I
think the point that's critical is we have got to do an
assessment of each of these projects to see whether it's
worthwhile.
And so doing anything across the board doesn't make sense,
especially when we can't turn them back on after that, and so I
worry a huge amount about the damage that that could do over
the long term.
Mr. Singleton. I would add, I mean, China routinely
criticized IRI, NDI, and NED projects, and I think they claimed
that they were--we were smearing Beijing. I think that is
reason enough to keep a lot of them.
But I think a wholesale review is important. That should be
done expeditiously and I think to the extent possible a lot of
these projects should be reinstated.
Mr. Castro. Thank you. I yield back, Chair.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
I now recognize Representative Biggs for your 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I appreciate
our witnesses today for your testimoneys this afternoon.
As the engine of the global economy, East Asia and
Pacific--and I'll just say EAP here on out--the Pacific's
stability is fundamentally linked to our prosperity and
security.
Maritime domain awareness is therefore paramount within
this vast space, demanding a comprehensive approach that
recognizes the interconnectedness of security and economic
environment.
So serving on both the subcommittee and the Homeland
Security, Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee
grants me a unique dual perspective. From my vantage point the
United States Coast Guard's leadership in enhancing the
region's maritime domain awareness is undeniable.
We see the Coast Guard standing shoulder to shoulder with
nations across the EAP region, from Palau in the Pacific
Islands to Japan in northeast Asia.
In Palau this partnership focuses on countering illicit
maritime activities like illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing which safeguard our vital resources.
Further north the Coast Guard conducts engagement with
Japanese counterparts by collaborating on regular western
Pacific exercises and active intelligence sharing that
strengthens interoperability and ultimately contributes to a
more transparent and secure maritime environment.
Across the EAP the Coast Guard embodies this proactive
approach, not simply reacting to crises but actively fostering
maritime safety and security by assisting nations in incident
response, providing essential support, and building critical
maritime domain awareness.
This vital work takes on even greater significance as
maritime domain awareness becomes a central pillar of the Quad
initiative, which recognizes that a stable and secure maritime
domain is foundational for regional peace and prosperity.
This brings me to my first question, and I would like to
ask each of you to please respond briefly. What specific role
can an increased Coast Guard presence play within the Quad
framework to address the complex and evolving regional security
challenges that we face today?
Mr. Singleton. I'll go first.
I mean, I think countering Chinese illegal fishing is one
area where the Coast Guard has an important role to play as a
force multiplier but, frankly, is an untapped resource and it's
not limited to the EAP region.
There are news reports this week of Chinese illegal fishing
fleets operating off the coast of Argentina where the Argentine
military actually had to intervene.
I think these are areas where the Coast Guard has
tremendous experience and expertise and technology and where we
can really have value add.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.
Mr. Fontaine. I would just add, ma'am, the--it's so
critical in many of these countries that--you know, they don't
have the ability to easily cooperate with our Navy.
Our naval ships tend to be much larger and much more
capable than their navies are and much of the time their navies
are doing missions that are much more similar to our Coast
Guard with vessels that are closer in size to Coast Guard
vessels.
And so often they actually, I think, prefer to be able to
work with our Coast Guard than sometimes the Navy, which is a
little bit more challenging for them to deal with in on a
symmetrical basis.
So I think there's tremendous interest across the region,
really, not just in the Pacific but the whole region in having
a much greater U.S. Coast Guard presence.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.
Mr. Fontaine. I guess just violently agreeing with my
colleagues. I mean, the--I think the appetite for greater
maritime domain awareness by the countries in the region is
almost unlimited.
I mean, tThey don't have the capabilities often to
understand the environment themselves, and by plugging into
activities and information gathering activities that the United
States does, especially through the Coast Guard, that's a major
service that the United States can provide and ultimately is
good for us because it's not just about, you know, fending off
China.
It's about illegal fishing but it's also piracy and
humanitarian response and natural disasters and things like
that. If there's an area to do more there's been some
activities through the Quad and things but, you know, the--more
the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean are particularly not
well defined in terms of maritime domain awareness.
And so those would be--that would be an obvious region in
order to--an obvious region to look for if we wanted to do
more.
Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. My time is up.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
I recognize Representative Olszewski for your 5 minutes of
questioning.
Mr. Olszewski. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I'll just echo the sentiments of my colleagues earlier
about how grateful I am to be serving on the Subcommittee on
East Asia and the Pacific.
It is rewarding and gratifying to see the level of
bipartisanship already being displayed both on this side of the
dais but also some of the unanimity from our witnesses today.
So thank you all for taking the time to be with us.
I look forward to working with you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking
Member Bera. Thank you for leading the way in that work as
well.
I just want to dive in a little bit. I think the stage has
sort of been set earlier. I loved, Mr. Cooper, your comment
about what better place than the Pacifics to sort of make these
small investments for big return--small amounts of diplomacy
for big return.
I really appreciate you all sharing the concern about
damage over the long term. I appreciate your candor and the
uncertainty as to if or when or which pieces of aid might be
restored but they're all so critical.
I guess just taking a slightly different look at it is can
you one or several of you speak briefly to the fact of now that
aid has been stopped are we seeing and to what degree are we
seeing China step in? Do you have any specific examples or data
that you can share in terms of what we're seeing now that that
aid has dried up?
Mr. Fontaine. Well, I gave a couple before but on Nepal,
certainly, the potential demise of the MCC compact with--the
$500 million compact with Nepal gives China an opportunity.,
which iIt has been attempting to make political and economic
inroads in Nepal for a long time., and tThen, you know, the
other specific examples whereon, you know, include the freeze
in the availability of cyber tools that are provided through
IRI in particular to dissidents in places, including inside
China and be able enable them to communicate safely and
securely. tThose are frozen now.
That would, obviously, give the government of China an
opportunity. and at least mMy understanding is that partners of
both IRI and NDI in Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have
been already approached by China to say if the Americans won't
fund you we will.
So those are a few specific examples.
Mr. Cooper. Can I just add a broad point to build on
Richard's, which is if you look at polling data across
Southeast Asia the data has not been great for the United
States over the last 5 years. It showed a decreasing confidence
in continued American engagement and, unfortunately, that's
true from both of the last two administrations.
Now, I think if you overlap that with, you know, what you
were just talking about, Congressman, that it's just going to
accelerate these questions about whether the United States is
really a reliable partner and, unfortunately, that's happening
at a time that China is already making even more inroads and
building more influence in parts of Southeast Asia and the
Pacific and South Asia and elsewhere.
So I worry that this is reinforcing trends that were
already occurring in the region, and so if we're going to
reverse those trends not only do we have to turn the money back
on in most cases, we're also going to have to think of new
ideas and new proposals to add to that.
So I think it's not just a question of stopping the damage.
We also have to reverse the momentum and put some ideas on the
table ourselves.
Mr. Singleton. I would agree wholeheartedly. I mean, we
have seen indications in places like Cambodia as well, Myanmar,
about deactivation of these programs particularly in the civil
society and reporting space--journalist space.
I think one thing we have all realized is that a lot of
Chinese coercion is quite corrosive on civil society and it's
very important that we fund free academic journalist exchanges
on the ground so they can report the situation fairly and
accurately and we're not ceding the information space to the
Chinese.
Mr. Olszewski. So just fair to say the longer this goes on
the harder it's going to be not only to get back to where we
were but to also--fair to say? Yes.
I'll just reaffirm to my colleagues here and to others I
think many of us are committed to rooting out waste and abuses
that are legitimate.
So to the extent we continue this conversation I very much
want to be a part of stopping aid that does not advance
American interests while not having the damage done that we're
seeing today.
So thank you all very much. With that, Madam Chair, I
yield.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
We do have some time so I would like to take the
opportunity to go for a second round of questioning and the
first question I would like to address is the CCP and its IP
theft that we're all concerned about.
According to FBI, the CCP steals up to $600 billion worth
of U.S. intellectual property every year. So we need to use
every tool available to stop this obvious theft and hold the
CCP accountable.
So I would like to first ask Mr. Singleton maybe start and
then you can all chime in. How can the U.S. leverage existing
partnerships that we have in the Indo-Pacific with our allies
and partners so that we can create a unified or united front
against the CCP's IP theft?
Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely. So much of the IP theft that
we discuss is occurring in the commercial space but I also
focus on the academic space as well.
Congress recently reintroduced the DETERRENT Act, which
aims to crack down on Chinese attempts to secure intellectual
property from our college campuses, much of which is funded by
Congress.
I think these are basic common sense measures that will
force universities to reckon with the fact that they're going
to have to diligently report their entanglements with Chinese
universities and Chinese companies, particularly those tied to
Chinese civil-military fusion.
I think that's probably one key area where partners and
allies are on board with rigorous academic partnership
screening. It's an area where other countries, including
Canada, are actually ahead of us.
I think we have a lot to learn. But this is an area where I
think you're going to see broad agreement and recognition that
we have to close those loopholes beyond the corporate IP theft
that we see every day.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Just to add to that, I a number of years ago
had the chance to do a report with the Foundation for Defense
of Democracies on this very specific issue and one thing that
we pointed out in that report is there are a number of products
in which the U.S. Government has charged Chinese agents with
stealing American technology and the businesses that were
engaged in that stolen technology are still selling the
products back into the United States--solar cells, for
example--at massive scale, and they drove the American
producers out of business in so doing.
I don't understand how we can't just turn the spigot off of
the ones where--we actually indicted people in China working
for the government who are stealing this technology and we're
still letting them drive our companies out of business years
later.
So I think there are areas like that where we just
absolutely have to take action and until we do I don't think
that Beijing is going to take us seriously on this issue.
Mrs. Kim. Please chime in, Mr. Fontaine.
Mr. Fontaine. Well, the--China's theft of intellectual
property from the United States and other countries as well has
described by some as, you know, one of the greatest wealth
transfers in history and I think probably rightly so., and
wWhen you look at it, it truly is outrageous, both in terms of
scale and just the substance of what the Chinese have been
doing over time with this expensive time--you know, the amount
of time that it takes to develop technology and intellectual
property that haven't been stolen and then exploited for
economic reasons, including sometimes in our own markets.
The only thing that I would add in terms of potential
remedies is to the degree to which the intellectual property is
stolen or is resident in cyberspace and through cyberspace I
think there's a role for offensive cyber activities in all of
this.
I mean, tThis is something--somewhat controversial inside
the government and policymaking circles. You have to be careful
about these things.
But we do have a lot of insights into who some of these
actors are, how they operate, and the cyber tools that they use
in order to conduct this theft and we have a lot of our own
that we should be using just to protect ourselves and to exact
a price on those who have engaged in these transgressions.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you. I would like to talk about one other
issue, which is North Korea policy. We need to make some
adjustments, you know, and the U.S. needs to make some policy
changes toward North Korea, considering the evolving nuclear
ambitions and continued weapons development, and I would like
to see how you can--you know, talk to us about the U.S. taking
leverage, existing mini lateral frameworks to strengthen the
extended deterrence and enhance our regional security.
Do you want to go, Mr. Cooper?
Mr. Cooper. Sure. I think this is an incredibly important
issue and, you know, unfortunately, I think our approach in
recent years is probably best termed strategic patience 2.0.
We have just sort of waited and put our attention into
other things and the reality is is that the problem has gotten
worse and so bad, in fact, that I think the risk is that now
our allies in South Korea are actually fairly serious about
developing their own independent nuclear capabilities because
they worry about the pathway that North Korea is on.
So I don't know whether Donald Trump can engage with Kim
Jong--un directly and address some of these issues but I think
we absolutely have to think about a renewed campaign to shift
the direction because otherwise we're going to end up with an
even larger North Korean arsenal, even more missiles, and
without a strategy to deal with it.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
Ranking Member?
Mr. Bera. Sure. I'll just make a few closing comments.
And I should have said this off the top. Yes, I appreciate
the bipartisan nature of this but to, you know, our Foreign
Service officers, folks that are working overseas, you know, I
visit with them. They're often working in tough places, in
refugee camps, et cetera.
These are patriotic Americans and I feel for what they're
going through right now, the uncertainty, having just traveled
abroad, having had side conversations with folks. These are not
folks that see the world as Democrats or Republicans.
They see themselves as patriotic Americans, and I do want
to publicly say thank you for your service and thank you for
what you're doing, and hang in there.
You know, again, we don't want to lose that talent,
especially some of the younger folks but also the folks that
have made a 30-, 35-year career out of this. These are
patriotic Americans.
I'm glad to hear in a bipartisan way, you know, the
importance of some of these programs and some of these programs
started in the first Trump administration.
So we had Congressman Yoho, our former colleague, here 2
weeks ago and just kind of watched him work the BUILD Act with
Senator Coons and others.
The Trump administration should be proud about that. They
should not take that apart. As we come up on reauthorizing the
DFC these are tools that I'd actually like to see us expand.
They're tools that are good for America. They're good for
American businesses. They're good for our influence.
You know, in February 2020 right before the pandemic shut
things down I led a CODEL to Sri Lanka and Nepal, largely,
because both of them had MCC compacts that were sitting on the
table that we absolutely saw Chinese misinformation. Like,
these are grants. These are not Belt and Road type of debt
diplomacy. These were direct grants.
Now, the Rajapaksa administration ultimately turned that
down and, you know, we did see the debt trap that Sri Lanka
ended up in and what it did to its economy. It did take a lot
of work to get Nepal and Kathmandu to agree it was a good deal.
It is still a good deal for them.
To the Nepalese, hang in there. You know, we will do
everything we can to get those dollars flowing. Do not take
that--you know, aAgain, look eyes wide open with how the
Chinese do aid and development and use debt traps and, you
know, you can look around the world and see the downside and
the danger of that.
That said, I do think with this America first initiative we
are going to have to rethink a little bit how we do aid
development finance and I touched on in my earlier comments how
we leverage our resources with our like-minded, like-valued
allies that have interest in this region. And, again, you know,
I think that is where we, you know, with the European Union,
with Japan, Korea, Australia, even India that has an older
relationship with Africa and a broad diaspora is there.
We ought to be looking for places where we can work and
leverage our resources to go further to develop these economies
and go into places like Kenya to develop things.
We also should look at programs. You know, when I've
traveled around the Pacific Islands there's a really elegant
program called the Pacific Island Tuna Program that the Nature
Conservancy with Wal-Mart, using DFC funds and so forth.
Like, tThese are great programs that, you know, are public-
private partnerships and, you know, help build the resilience
of fisheries and do development projects in some of these
Pacific Islands.
I would urge us as a subcommittee to look at how we can
support and broaden some of these programs like Pacific
Islands. That's not unique to Wal-Mart, and we have had those
conversations.
But, again, it's a really elegant program that is really
appreciated in the Marshall Islands and, you know, a place like
PNG would be the perfect place for us to go and expand a
program like that.
So I look forward to working with the witnesses in your
organizations. I think it's an incredibly important time. You
know, government efficiency is fine. You know, looking at
programs and how we bring these programs to the 21st century is
fine.
But as we come out of this initial period of disruption I
think it behooves all of us as Democrats, Republicans,
academics, and the think tank community to say, OK, what would
the right aid and development programs for the 21st century be
like?
What would the right strategy be? How do we partner with
our allies and others to create that 21st century that we
really want to see.
So it'll be different than the past but what does that
future geopolitical strategy for the 21st century look like. So
thank you again for being here and, again, thank you, Madam
Chairwoman.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Ranking Member.
As we close, I'd like to, you know, just echo how important
the East Asia and the Pacific Region is for the United States
and its role in the world stage.
As we reflect on the last 4 years, and I think we have done
that very constructively and productively through our
engagements and our dialog today, so I want to thank you again
for your insights.
Moving forward, I think it is very, very essential that we
focus on strengthening our alliances and partnerships
throughout the region and collectively we can combat the shared
threats from North Korea, China, and these are the threats that
we face today and it's not going away anytime soon.
So our engagement must remain steadfast regardless of
domestic political changes and we must also ensure that our
economic strategy aligns with the needs of our partners. It's
not something that is one sided so we need to really, really
find ways to work together with our partners and allies.
We must offer alternatives to China's state-driven economic
model that too many countries have been forced to accept. So we
need to show up. We need to bring alternative solutions to them
and we cannot allow the global economy to be dictated by
Beijing's standards.
So while we stay resilient and steadfast, again, we need to
be mindful of what our allies' and partners' needs are.
Washington must use every available tool to advance our
economic agenda while punishing the CCP's unfair trade
practices.
Finally, we talked about human rights in my opening
remarks, and I don't think we went into that in depth today in
our conversation but I truly believe human rights needs to
remain a top priority in our foreign policy, and the Chinese
Communist Party's repression both at home and abroad demands
our action, our attention, and we need to be steadfast in that
area as well.
So as we look ahead we already recognize there are several
significant opportunities for the U.S. to strengthen its
influence in the region and to secure a future that reflects
our values and our interest.
So I look forward to working closely together with--not
only with my colleagues here but with, you know, folks like you
who are working on the ground, and you are experts in the field
so we want to stay engaged in our conversation and we want to
work with you as resource to many of us.
So let's work together to ensure that our policies align
with our--with the challenges and opportunities that East Asia
and the Pacific region faces.
With that, I want to thank you again for joining us. The
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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