    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    MISSED MILESTONES: EVALUATING THE LAST FOUR YEARS IN THE EAP REGION AND
                  UNSEIZED OPPORTUNITIES UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               February 25, 2025

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 119-2

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    60-092 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2025

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                         BRIAN MAST, Florida, Chairman

    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Member
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           BRAD SHERMAN, California
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California
    MARK GREEN, Tennessee                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California
    YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona
        American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
    JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey          JIM COSTA, California
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  GEORGE LATIMER, New York
    JAMES MOYLAN, Guam                   JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
    ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           JULIE JOHNSON, Texas
    JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            SARAH MCBRIDE, Delaware
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                  James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director

                     Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director

                                     ------

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

                       YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman

    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             AMI BERA, California,Ranking
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                      Member
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       BRAD SHERMAN, California
        American Samoa                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    JAMES MOYLAN, Guam                   GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland
    RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania

                     Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                                REPRESENTATIVES

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Chairwoman Young Kim........................     1
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Ami Bera.....................     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Statement of Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise
      Institute......................................................     5
      Prepared Statement.............................................     7
    Statement of Craig Singleton, China Program Senior Director and
      Senior Fellow, Foundation For Defense of Democracies...........    15
      Prepared Statement.............................................    17
    Statement of Richard Fontaine, Chief Executive Officer, Center
      for a New American Security....................................    35
      Prepared Statement.............................................    37

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    66
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    68
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    69

    MISSED MILESTONES: EVALUATING THE LAST FOUR YEARS IN THE EAP REGION AND
                  UNSEIZED OPPORTUNITIES UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, February 25, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair
    of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mrs. Kim. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to
    order.
        The purpose of this hearing is to evaluate the last 4 years
    of the Biden administration's policy toward East Asia and the
    Pacific, address its successes and failures, and identify
    opportunities for the Trump administration to strengthen our
    engagement in the region. So let me now recognize myself for an
    opening statement.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN YOUNG KIM

        Again, welcome to East Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee's
    hearing entitled ``Missed Milestones: Evaluating the Last Four
    Years in the EAP Region and Unseized Opportunities Under
    President Trump.''
        As we convene for the first hearing of the 119th Congress,
    our subcommittee must reflect on the past 4 years under the
    Biden-Harris administration.
        First, we must ask the tough questions that will help us
    chart the course forward and ensure that we address the
    region's challenges head on including where do we go wrong on
    China policy?
        Why have we failed to enact punitive measures against the
    Chinese Communist Party when it was clearly warranted? Do we
    effectively leverage our allies and partnership to raise
    greater awareness regarding regional issues?
        Have we successfully deterred China and North Korea from
    advancing their dangerous agendas? Have our economic engagement
    goals been aligned with the demands and needs of our partners?
        While the Biden-Harris administration's strategy toward
    China has been shortsighted in many ways one thing has remained
    consistent across administrations. To engage effectively in the
    region we must show up and work with our allies and partners.
        Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with South Korea
    and Japan. These two nations have put aside their longstanding
    and unresolved historical disputes to tackle shared regional
    threats including Kim Jong Un's nuclear ambitions and Xi
    Jinping's military and economic coercion.
        This is a perfect illustration of how collaboration,
    despite differences, is not only possible but necessary, and
    while progress has been made this administration has tremendous
    opportunity to strengthen trilateral ties.
        No matter the changes in domestic policies, our engagement
    with South Korea and Japan as well as with Quad and ASEAN
    partners must remain steadfast.
        The threats posed by the CCP and North Korean regime are
    not going away. Neither should our commitment to these vital
    alliances.
        Second, we cannot allow the global economy to yield to the
    CCP standards nor can we lose the confidence of our allies and
    partners in American economic strength.
        In my travels across the East Asia and the Pacific region
    the message was clear and consistent that the United States is
    the partner of choice, but without substantial economic
    incentives our allies and friends are being forced into deeper
    trade dependency on China and to accept Beijing's artificially
    cheap investment that always comes with a price.
        The previous administration's Indo-Pacific Economic
    Framework has the potential to provide a path forward to
    economically engage with these nations.
        Our subcommittee now has jurisdiction over the Development
    Finance Corporations and we will use every tool at our disposal
    to ensure the U.S. remains an active and committed economic
    partner in the EAP region.
        Third, we must continue our work on human rights. We cannot
    ignore the ongoing human rights abuses in Xinjiang where Xi
    Jinping directs the imprisonment of Uyghur Muslims and Tibetans
    to erase their culture and identity.
        The CCP's transnational repression tactics have also
    spilled across borders with the regime's United Front Work
    Department harassing and intimidating pro-democracy activists
    right here on the U.S. soil.
        Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un continues to steal from his own
    people, subjecting them to torture, forced labor, and conduct
    unlawful and extrajudicial killings. Across Southeast Asia
    independent journalists and civilians face charges simply for
    exercising their right of free press and assembly.
        America is safer and more prosperous when we put U.S.
    priorities first. Our allies and partners are better off when
    we show up for good.
        With that, I'm proud to have these witnesses before us
    today. Their insights will help us shape policies that will
    strengthen our position in the East Asia and the Pacific region
    and advance our national interest. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from
    California Mr. Ami Bera for your opening statement.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
        We have been partners in this region for quite a while. We
    have had a chance to travel together, and I agree with your
    opening statements.
        You know, there's progress that's been made but, obviously,
    there's progress that we can make going forward that really
    shouldn't be a partisan issue.
        Certainly within Congress many of these issues are
    nonpartisan. We can look at the Quad coalition in the first
    Trump administration. They set some of those baselines.
        The Biden administration elevated to the leaders level very
    early in this administration right after the swearing in. You
    had a ministerial and I think that's something that we can
    build on.
        That partnership between the United States, Japan,
    Australia, India is vitally important to not just the
    geopolitical security for the region but also from an economic
    perspective, you know, bringing India into the fold.
        We have had the chance to travel to Japan and Korea
    multiple times and, you know, the trilateral relationship is in
    a much better place than it was, four or 8 years ago.
        We have got to continue to keep that intact regardless of
    politics in the region. Certainly, the bilateral Japan-Korea
    relationship is in a strong place and we have got to build off
    of that and, you know, we have a responsibility as Members of
    Congress to continue that but also support the administration
    in maintaining a strong trilateral.
        We look at--in 2019 when I traveled to the Philippines that
    relationship was in a very bad place. Philippines was headed in
    the direction of China.
        Now, under the Marcos administration, you know, getting the
    Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in place I think there's
    a real opportunity with the Trump administration again to build
    on that.
        The Philippines are right back in our fold to have regular
    rotations and perhaps return to permanent basing and so forth
    there. I think that's a nonpartisan issue. That's something we
    can work on.
        I'm just returning from Australia, New Zealand and the
    region and AUKUS. Pillar one is going very well. You know,
    looking at the words of Secretary Hegseth and others.
        I think there's a strong foundation and support for AUKUS.
    Let's get pillar two going., again, this is a good deal for the
    United States. It not only establishes a presence, works with
    one of our Five Eye allies.
        The fact that Beijing is upset about AUKUS means we're
    probably doing the right thing so let's keep doing it. Let's
    build off of that., again, this will allow us to maintain naval
    superiority in the region at a time when we're watching very
    provocative actions around northern Australia--between
    Australia and New Zealand from the Chinese.
        We have got to send a strong message that that is not okay
    in the 21st century because that is how accidents happen. That
    is how wars get started. And, again, the behavior that we see
    around there or what we see in the South China Sea, and I know
    you've had a chance to see firsthand some of what's happening
    around in the Philippines.
        Again, we as the United States with our allies have to send
    a strong message that that's not okay.
        Now, if it had been up to me we would have passed TPP a
    long time ago. Obviously, we find ourselves in a very different
    place. One area where I didn't see as much progress with the
    Biden administration was around trade, even digital trade, and
    we have agreements that we can build off of.
        I think it is important for us to set the contours of what
    trade looks like. I don't think it's going to be joining CP-TPP
    but, you know, can we do digital trade?
        Can we get some progress here even in a bilateral way. I
    think that would be important and, again, I think we as Members
    of Congress on this subcommittee can work in that area.
        One area that we were a little bit late to the game but,
    you know, we did see the Biden administration reestablish
    embassies in the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu.
        We saw important aid and development programs going there
    and it's important for us to continue to support those
    investments that are not big dollar items but when you talk
    about the people we are the partners of choice, the United
    States.
        But we have to be there. We have to show up because if we
    are not--you know, the PRC can show up with bags of cash and
    demonstrate influence in ways that we don't do business.
        So working with our allies in Australia, New Zealand. The
    Japanese are showing an increased interest in the region. Those
    are all things that are nonpartisan.
        Those are all things that I hope to be able to work with
    the Trump administration on and certainly with you, Madam
    Chairwoman. But I think we can work on legislation that keeps
    moving those relationships forward.
        With that, I'll yield back.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Ranking Member, and I love the tone of
    bipartisanship, especially when it comes to EAP--Pacific Island
    region--and I cannot emphasize enough how important it is for
    us to show up and engage with our EAP regions.
        Thank you for that. I look forward to continue to work with
    you on this committee and beyond.
        Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
    statements may be submitted for the record, and we are pleased
    to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on
    this important topic.
        So let me introduce our distinguished panel: Mr. Zack
    Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute;
    Craig Singleton, China program senior director and senior
    fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and
    Richard Fontaine, the chief executive officer at the Center for
    New American Security.
        The chair recognizes the importance of the issues before us
    and is grateful to have you speak with us, and look forward to
    hearing your testimoneys and, you know, answering our
    questions.
        Your full statements will be made part of the record and
    I'll ask each of you to keep your remarks or spoken remarks to
    5 minutes or under in order to allow time for member questions.
        I now recognize Mr. Cooper for your opening statement.

                        STATEMENT OF ZACK COOPER

        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,
    and distinguished members of the committee. It's an honor to be
    here today and I especially appreciate the bipartisan nature of
    your leadership on Asia issues.
        Despite changes in rhetoric, recent U.S. strategy in Asia
    has been remarkably consistent across administrations from both
    parties.
        In short, the United States has made progress with those
    countries that are most concerned about Chinese behavior. I
    would focus here on Japan, the Philippines, India, Australia,
    and South Korea, the same countries that both of you mentioned
    in your opening remarks.
        But we have struggled elsewhere in the region, particularly
    with countries across most of Southeast Asia and they've been
    disappointed by uneven U.S. engagement and inconsistent
    economic visions.
        These structural constraints I think are likely to continue
    over the next few years and in my written testimony I assessed
    the lasting impact of five different Biden administration
    initiatives on Asia. The first was continued cooperation with
    the Quad, the second, AUKUS security partnership, the third was
    the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The fourth was deepening
    of the alliance with the Philippines, and, last, U.S.-Japan-
    South Korea trilateral cooperation.
        I think we can say that the Biden administration made real
    progress in many of these areas but that we do have to rethink
    our approach to the region because much of the rest of the
    region is untouched by the efforts that we have made over the
    last decade or so.
        With these lessons in mind I want to propose what I think
    are potentially five big ideas that the Trump administration
    and the Congress could take up over the next few years.
        So the first is establishment of an allied defense arsenal
    effort, a major new defense industry partnership with allies
    taking the lead on military co-development and co-production of
    precision munitions and autonomous systems.
        The second I talk about in my written testimony is creation
    of an allied energy initiative to boost U.S. energy production
    and exports to allies in Asia who are desperate for more
    reliable sources of oil and natural gas.
        The third is formation of what I would call a Taiwan
    contact group alongside U.S. allies to provide Taiwan with the
    capabilities needed to bolster its military defenses and
    societal resilience in advance of a conflict.
        The fourth proposal is a trade deal with the Philippines to
    maintain our recent alliance momentum and avoid China being
    able to use its economic influence with Manila to undermine an
    absolutely critical strategic relationship for the United
    States.
        The fifth proposal I would put on the table is that the
    Trump administration should make a big bet on Indonesia akin to
    its efforts with India. The reason is that Indonesia, as many
    of you know well, is a rising giant.
        It could act as a counterweight in Southeast Asia against
    China's regional influence, and I think it warrants much more
    attention from American policymakers.
        So those are five opportunities I think the Trump
    administration has. I want to recently speak--quickly speak
    about five risks that I think are serious as well.
        First, Washington will need to avoid ceding a sphere of
    influence to China by better coordinating with its allies and
    partners while finding ways to stay engaged on the principles
    and priorities that matter to countries in Asia.
        Second, threats to withdrawal of support from Taiwan could
    further undermine the support of the Taiwanese public and their
    confidence in the United States, and that is particularly true,
    in my view, if it's coupled with a U.S. drawdown from parts of
    Europe.
        Third, the danger of South Korean nuclear proliferation is
    real and I think it is growing. It is accelerated by concerns
    about the risk of U.S.-South Korea alliance decoupling and that
    will require new engagement from policymakers here in
    Washington.
        Fourth, as you know, AUKUS remains a bold and important
    idea but I think we should be assessing the role that large
    undersea unmanned vehicles can play in bridging some of the
    capability gaps that are arising as we think about AUKUS over
    the next couple of decades.
        Fifth, American policymakers will have to reconsider their
    approach to Southeast Asia, particularly on trade and
    development, lest China continue to make significant progress
    across the region.
        So, in conclusion, the United States remains vital to
    security and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific. I thank this
    committee for its remarkable bipartisan leadership on these
    issues over many years and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
        Let me now recognize Mr. Singleton for your testimony.

                      STATEMENT OF CRAIG SINGLETON

        Mr. Singleton. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member
    Bera, and members of the distinguished subcommittee. Thanks for
    inviting me today.
        I'm pleased to offer policy insights from the Foundation
    for Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan research institute
    where I serve as a senior fellow.
        Over the last 4 years the Biden administration sought to
    stabilize relations with Beijing through sustained diplomatic
    dialog and relatively restrained responses to myriad Chinese
    provocations.
        On paper, this approach aims to avoid a bilateral
    breakdown. In practice, however, it did amount to diplomacy
    without much deterrence, emboldening Chinese Communist Party
    Chairman Xi Jinping to test our resolve at nearly every turn.
        Indeed, rather than reducing tensions, these well-
    intentioned diplomatic overtures paradoxically fueled Xi's
    worst impulses, enabling Beijing to expand its surveillance,
    ramp up its maritime assertiveness, and deepen its ties to
    other authoritarian regimes at next to no cost.
        During Biden's tenure Chinese spy balloons entered U.S.
    airspace with little consequence, while hacking campaigns Salt,
    Volt, and Flax Typhoon targeted senior American officials and
    sensitive networks with barely a public rebuke.
        Even as Beijing dramatically intensified its incursions
    around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, Washington's focus
    remained on rapid de-escalation. If left unchecked, this
    dynamic risks encouraging Chinese overreach, raising the
    specter of miscalculation or worse, war.
        Today's predicament evokes lessons from the late stages of
    the cold war when Washington's misguided embrace of so-called
    peaceful coexistence inadvertently prolonged the Soviet
    system's survival, treating it as an immutable juggernaut
    rather than one vulnerable to sustained external and internal
    pressure.
        By minimizing accountability for Chinese espionage,
    coercion, and violations of international norms we risk
    reinforcing Beijing's conviction that its revanchist ambitions
    need not be curbed.
        A new Trump administration and the 119th Congress can move
    beyond mere coexistence with China, if for no other reason that
    the U.S. and China embody fundamentally incompatible systems
    and ideologies.
        Simply put, today's contest cannot end in stalemate. The
    United States must ensure its model prevails. Moving beyond
    mere coexistence, a bold yet realistic aim, does not require an
    explicit bid for regime change.
        Rather, Washington should push Beijing onto an
    unsustainable path where credible deterrence, targeted economic
    pressure, and principled diplomacy expose the structural flaws
    of Xi's Marxist-Leninist framework.
        By holding out the prospect of genuine concessions on
    issues like trade we can force Beijing to confront the
    spiraling costs of continued hostility, potentially hastening
    the CCP's own unraveling if it refuses to alter course.
        Ultimately, time is on our side if we choose to make it so.
    Chief among the measures Congress should consider are robust
    outbound investment screening and bans accompanied with
    enhanced export controls and targeted sanctions to deny Xi
    access to both U.S. capital markets and critical technologies
    for military-civil fusion.
        Credible proactive threats of punitive action if China
    crosses red lines over Taiwan or in the South China Sea
    reinforce that brinkmanship will be met with real enforcement.
        Meanwhile, Washington must support beleaguered democracies
    on the front lines of Chinese coercion. HFAC can champion
    streamlined foreign military sales and leveraged Presidential
    drawdown authorities for Taiwan, ensuring swift delivery of
    defensive systems and asymmetric capabilities without
    bureaucratic delay.
        A leaner, meaner, more focused foreign assistance regime
    centered around strategic infrastructure, digital governance,
    and anti-corruption programming would also deny China a
    foothold in critical ports, curb risky 5G networks, and
    strengthen partners' resilience to Chinese coercion.
        By demonstrating that America remains both principled and
    reliable we fill aid gaps that Beijing might otherwise exploit.
        Finally, by insisting that allies, including Taiwan, invest
    more in their own security the U.S. can spread the financial
    load while preserving its leadership role.
        This flexible transactional approach aligns with the
    President's ``America first'' ethos. It rewards partners who
    step up while denying Beijing easy wins.
        Rather than striving for a fragile equilibrium in the Indo-
    Pacific, Washington must create an overwhelming deterrent that
    renders any attempt at forcible reunification or broader
    regional domination prohibitively costly. No such deterrent
    exists today.
        By shifting from passive coexistence to purposeful
    competition on America's terms we can challenge the illusion of
    stability that has emboldened Beijing. This decisive posture
    rooted in assertive reprisal rather than reflexive de-
    escalation may pave the way for a new era of enduring
    leadership in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
        On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies I
    thank you again for inviting me to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Singleton follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Kim. I recognize Mr. Fontaine for your opening
    statement.

                     STATEMENT OF RICHARD FONTAINE

        Mr. Fontaine. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee and staff, thank you
    for having me here today.
        From the outset, the previous administration identified
    China as its top priority and the Indo-Pacific as the region
    most deserving of its greatest attention.
        It had a number of notable successes but it also left key
    opportunities unseized and so the Trump administration, along
    with Congress, can and should build on the foundation laid over
    the past 4 years.
        In the diplomatic sphere the Biden administration elevated
    the Quad to the leaders level and coordinated an ambitious
    effort to supply COVID-19 vaccines to Southeast Asia.
        It demonstrated greater American engagement with the
    Pacific Islands including a summit with leaders in Washington,
    new diplomatic outposts, and as Representative Bera said,
    renewing the Compacts of Free Association.
        President Biden hosted the ASEAN leaders at the White House
    as well, stepping ed up high-level diplomacy with what is
    perhaps the Indo-Pacific's most contested region. All these
    were positive diplomatic steps.
        The administration also made significant moves on military
    posture including winning base access for U.S. troops in the
    Philippines, and securing an access arrangement with Papua New
    Guinea.
        Of course, it formed AUKUS, the defense technology sharing
    agreement with Australia and the U.K., revised U.S. force
    posture in Japan, and agreed on Defense Industrial Base
    cooperation with India. Again, all positive signs.
        But for all that, the net deployment of U.S. military
    resources in Asia has been essentially flat for over a decade
    even as China has made increases in virtually every area. and
    so rRighting the military balance in the western Pacific and
    ensuring deterrence remain key challenges for the new
    administration.
        The Biden administration also refocused some of its
    economic efforts on the Indo-Pacific but away from trade
    agreements and toward defensive measures like export controls
    on semiconductors, outbound investment reviews, restricting
    Chinese electric vehicles, and so forth.
        Its one attempt at an affirmative trade policy was the
    Indo-Pacific Economic Framework agreement, IPEF, which the
    chairwoman mentioned.
        But this was a set of agreements that rather conspicuously
    lacked any market access in the United States and didn't need
    to be approved by Congress and so it was very limited in what
    it could actually put on the table in terms of what countries
    in the region are looking for most from the U.S. and the U.S.
    economy.
        This recent paucity of positive economic moves in Asia
    represents another opportunity, should the administration
    choose to seize it.
        So the Biden administration made some significant strides
    in the Indo-Pacific over the past 4 years even while, of
    course, it was dealing with acute crises in Europe and in the
    Middle East.
        But given China's increasing military strength, its
    diplomatic ambition, and its technological advances, there
    remains a long way to go. The Trump administration and Congress
    should pursue several opportunities.
        First, they should elevate regional diplomacy. The Trump
    administration's first meeting with the Quad foreign ministers
    took place on only, I believe, their second day in office. This
    is a good step and it's already been followed with extensive
    diplomacy with regional leaders.
        But there are questions, of course, that are swirling about
    the President's regional priorities, enthusiasm for tariffs,
    pursuit of positive ties with Russia, and more.
        So high-level and sustained Indo-Pacific diplomacy will be
    at a premium in all of the formats available, including the
    U.S., Japan, South Korea trilateral, the trilateral with Japan
    and the Philippines, the Quad, and, of course, Congress has an
    important role to play here with the CODELs and the visits both
    to Washington and other places.
        The new administration also should pursue a positive
    economic vision. I think there's wide agreement that the United
    States should continue to reduce its economic dependence on
    China in areas that incur national security risk.
        There's less agreement, but I think there should be, on the
    corresponding lesson here which is you trade less with China in
    sensitive areas and you trade more with your friends and
    allies, and there are is the possibility of sectoral agreements
    like digital trade or on critical minerals that would set
    rules, reduce dependencies on China, and signal renewed U.S.
    economic leadership.
        The United States on the military side can't arrest the
    eroding balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and meet our
    critical commitments elsewhere without a major increase in
    defense spending and at the same time moving some of our
    military resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia,
    especially in light of the prospects for peace in 2025 in each
    of those two regions.
        Then, finally, it would be wise to avoid some unforced
    errors. The new administration, obviously, is moving quickly to
    differentiate itself from its predecessor including on Asia
    policy but shouldn't shoot itself in the foot by eliminating
    programs that have helped the U.S. bolster friends in the Indo-
    Pacific and contest Chinese influence, whether that's foreign
    aid or some of the other arrangements that are currently under
    question.
        So by avoiding own goals, and by pursuing the many
    opportunities before it, the new administration and the U.S.
    Congress have a significant potential to bolster America's
    position in the world's most important region.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fontaine follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Kim. Thank you for your wonderful testimoneys. Your
    opening statements give us a lot of food for thought and much
    of which we agree on.
        We all talked about how it is important for U.S. to show up
    to the region to build a stronger relationship with our allies
    and partners.
        Also some of you also mentioned the--our ability to keep up
    with our defense capabilities so I want to start my questioning
    on that note.
        Allies like Korea and Japan they have taken steps to assist
    the U.S. Defense Industrial Base and Korea's Hanwha systems is
    acquiring Philly Shipyards to bring shipbuilding experience to
    America, and Japan has already committed a trillion dollars--$1
    trillion--I wish it was more--in investment to assist the U.S.
    with emerging technologies.
        Our partners are also looking to co-produce and co-develop
    with the United States so we need to ensure that these
    collaborations align with our security interests and industrial
    capacity without compromising our American innovation or
    competitiveness.
        So the first question--I think I want to--Mr. Singleton is
    not listening so let me wake you up.
        What steps can the Trump administration take to strengthen
    our Defense Industrial Base while also working with our allies
    and partners on national security priorities and technological
    and economic advancements?
        Sorry to put you on the spot.
        Mr. Singleton. Thank you. Wide awake.
        It's amazing that we are talking about enhancements to our
    Defense Industrial Base today because we're actually thinking
    about investments that are going to be really coming into play
    tomorrow. Time is the enemy here.
        I think this administration has real opportunities when
    we're thinking about incentivization and also deregulation, but
    where we are seeing gaps quite clearly are expanding mineral
    stockpiles that we will need for tomorrow to actually feed and
    drive these industries.
        We actually don't have a skilled talent workforce yet for
    these critical industries in the defense sector. So starting to
    think about actual concrete programs that we can put into place
    through legislation to buildup our tech talent workforce will
    be absolutely vital.
        I think--and Zack hit on this as well--trusted defense
    supply chains is probably the future and I think East Asia will
    play an anchor role in that structure.
        Co-development with India, for example, on fighter jets,
    Japan the Glide Phase Interceptor to go after hypersonic
    missiles. These are all new and amazing opportunities that I
    don't think we would have been talking about a few years ago.
        Ultimately, a lot of that will be advanced through
    memorandums of oral commitment, memorandums of understanding,
    and just simple, clear-eyed engagement throughout the region. I
    think there's no shortage of opportunity here as we think about
    these defense supply chains and it was actually Secretary
    Austin, I think, who really laid the groundwork for this last
    summer and this is an area where this administration can really
    proceed.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        On the economic engagement, Mr. Cooper, our ASEAN partners
    continue to request market access, and we talked about that.
    IPEF is good. It's a good starting point.
        But, as you noted, we don't have market access there. So
    market access to the United States is what our ASEAN partners
    are asking. But trade appetite in Washington is severely
    limited.
        So in your testimony you mentioned that Trump
    administration is unlikely to embrace IPEF. So what alternative
    strategies can the administration pursue to maintain the U.S.
    economic influence in the region without ceding grounds to
    Beijing?
        Mr. Cooper. Thanks, Chairwoman Kim.
        I think the only answer then for the Trump team is to think
    about bilateral arrangements since that's very clearly their
    preference that are strategic in nature and absolutely critical
    to the United States.
        That's why, for me, focusing on the Philippines initially
    is probably the most critical factor. You know that, of course,
    we have got this Luzon economic corridor which we are trying to
    do with Manila, and if that doesn't go forward it will call
    into question our ability to use Philippine bases and other
    facilities in the event of a crisis or conflict.
        I think we're going to have to connect our economic
    interests with our strategic interests to make that logical
    chain clear for both this administration and, of course, for
    the Congress as well.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        Mr. Fontaine, do you want to chime in on that? Since IPEF
    does not provide market access how can we incentivize more
    American companies--private sector engagements--in the region?
    I know we talked about that a little bit--China.
        Mr. Fontaine. Yes, I think it's worth pointing out that in
    the first Trump administration the administration did reach a
    digital trade deal with Japan and used the digital trade
    chapter from USMCA there, and also had kind of managed a mini
    deal on agriculture.
        So it is just not completely beyond the realm of
    imagination to think that over the next 4 years there are
    bilateral deals, particularly in sectoral areas, you know, that
    could be reached on digital trade, which and would be done
    bilaterally or multilaterally, which They would be more about
    setting the rules than even market access or some market
    access, deals things, again, on relatively noncontroversial
    areas like critical minerals and things like that.
        More ambitiously, you know, if the U.S. gets back in the
    business of, you know, free trade agreements, which admittedly
    is a little hard to think about right now, I mean, we could
    have an FTA with the Philippines.
        We could have an FTA with Taiwan. I mean, tThe centerpiece
    of, you know, the ill-fated TPP was essentially a U.S.-Japan
    free trade agreement. And so, you know, if we could politically
    get back to those areas the sky is kind of the limit for what
    would be possible on policy grounds.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you very, very much.
        Let me now recognize Ranking Member Bera for 5 minutes of
    questioning.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        I'm always going to be the optimist. I think we can always
    increase our economic ties. But in the short term I think there
    are some things that we can build off of.
        Mr. Fontaine, you touched on the importance of critical
    minerals and, you know, some of the rare earths where we are
    overly reliant on a single source, in this case Beijing, and we
    know how they use economic coercion. We have seen a taste of
    it.
        But it could get worse if there is a real escalation in
    conflict. The Biden administration had put in the mineral
    security partnership.
        You know, wWe have engaged in conversations with our allies
    in Japan and Korea, and this is not an area where we're
    necessarily in competition because we all need these supplies.
    And I'd be curious, you know, from a congressional perspective
    and then, you know, working with the administration if we can
    work with our allies.
        Obviously, the Australians want to develop this industry.
    Maybe a little bit more expensive than China but, again, for
    our security concerns it's a way of, you know, working with
    Australians, Malaysia, Vietnam, other areas where we
    strategically could go into these areas if--you know, I think
    that's the right approach at this point is going in and
    developing these new markets and even going into Africa and
    working in some of these places and having a presence.
        Mr. Fontaine. Yes, I think that's exactly right and, of
    course, on the critical minerals you have to consider both the
    sourcing and then the processing and so you have to solve both
    of those. Otherwise, if you're dependent on China for one or
    the other then you haven't solved your problem.
        But that said, there are a number of countries in the Indo-
    Pacific and around the world that both have sources and some
    which would be the places where processing takes place. So the
    U.S. should be in the business of reducing barriers to that
    kind of trade in critical minerals and potentially looking to
    our other tools of economic policy, you know, through the
    Development Finance Corporation or, you know, some of our aid
    programs and things like that in order to incentivize private
    sector activity in these places.
        So, again, I think the mantra should be, yes, trade less
    with China in areas of national security concern and but also
    trade more with our friends and allies in those very areas.
        Mr. Bera. Mr. Cooper, do you want to add?
        Mr. Cooper. I would just add very briefly, you know, this
    is an area where I think there are some countries in Southeast
    Asia that have tremendous capability to help us and help
    themselves, and Indonesia is sort of the most obvious of those.
        So I think the Minerals Security Partnership is the kind of
    thing that should be able to last through from the Biden
    administration to the Trump administration because as Craig was
    saying it picks up on a lot of critical items that they've been
    worried about for a long time, going back to the first Trump
    term.
        But I think we have got to figure out which partners we can
    work with in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the region and for
    me Indonesia would be the logical first partner to think about.
        Mr. Bera. Right. Let me shift to the Pacific Islands.
        Large economic zone, big playing field, smaller
    populations. I know I've traveled extensively there. I know the
    chairwoman is traveling to the region as well.
        When I look at recent elections, you know, in the Solomons
    and within PNG, the public seems to still want to move toward
    the West and so forth.
        But I really am concerned when it comes time to form a
    government just Beijing's influence and, you know, we don't
    have to get into the details of it but things that we're not
    going to do--it's not how we do business.
        But you talked about corruption, Mr. Cooper. When it comes
    time to form governments, the governments are not necessarily
    moving in our direction and I think we have got to come up with
    some tools on how to counter that influence.
        You know, if you want to talk about that, Mr. Cooper, and
    then if the others want to add something.
        Mr. Cooper. Yes, Ranking Member, just a brief remark, which
    is, you know, I think we have had a number of wake-up calls and
    every time we say it's a wake-up call and then we don't really
    wake up--you know, first with Solomon Islands, then we were
    worried about Vanuatu--now it's Cook Islands.
        Every time we say we have woken up and then every time
    there's another Pacific Island that does a deal with China that
    we didn't see coming, I think the Trump team should get a lot
    of credit for in the first term putting a lot of effort into
    the Pacific Islands, right?
        I think we have to make sure that they maintain that focus
    now. There are a lot of distractions around the world and the
    Pacific isn't the easiest place to maintain focus and we
    haven't done that consistently over years.
        So I think we have got to use the Cook Islands situation
    now as another wake-up call to focus on.
        Mr. Bera. Yes. Having just been in Auckland last week,
    obviously, that's of concern. I mean, I think how we may
    approach it this Congress is working with Australia and New
    Zealand, and Japan is showing that increased--look, how do we
    share the burden? How do we--even the French? I mean, pulling
    the French in as well.
        I don't know, Mr. Fontaine, if, in the last few----
        Mr. Cooper. Well, you just made the point that I was going
    to make, which is that we have got, you know, friends in this
    enterprise.
        So we're not going to do what the Chinese do and engage in,
    you know, bribery and State capture and things like that. We're
    going to have a different model and different approach to
    engagement.
        That has to be sustained and it has to be a long-term
    effort and ultimately it's--we don't want to see China get a
    foothold, certainly, in security terms in these areas, which
    would constrain our own freedom of action and that of our
    friends and allies.
        So if you start from that point and then, look, what are
    the tools that we have available to be able to influence and,
    frankly, to help these countries with their own sovereignty so
    that they're not ultimately undermined by Chinese activity that
    is something that should appeal to these governments over time,
    and in that we can enlist friends like New Zealand and
    Australia.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        Let me now go to the members' questioning session and I
    would like to first call upon Representative Moylan to ask your
    questions.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.
        I want to express my disapproval of President Biden's
    absence in the East Asia Summit during his tenure. The U.S.
    relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nation
    members is critical for the economic, political, and the
    defense of prosperity in the region.
        The President's participation in these diplomatic channels
    is essential to ensuring that the U.S. presence in Asia remains
    constructive, visible, and lasting.
        Partnerships such as the AUKUS alliance or the Quad
    organization have greatly enhanced the overall security of the
    Indo-Pacific. Despite their significance, the United States'
    over emphasis on defensive measures has alienated potential
    allies and support.
        The East Asia Summit and other ASEAN--sponsored discussions
    are opportunities for the U.S. to cooperate on issues like
    health care and trade and disaster response and even energy.
        Yet, the nonparticipation or just vocalizing the anti-
    Chinese sentiment is a missed opportunity that the United
    States cannot afford.
        Unlike the previous administration, President Trump must
    approach the organization like ASEAN with the same passion as
    defense partnerships, and some have even cited President Xi
    Jinping and President Putin as examples of the absence to
    defend President Biden's nonattendance.
        But the United States can and must do better. For
    diplomatic efforts we must stop looking at PRC or Russia as an
    example and demonstrate that the United States will be a
    lasting ally.
        In the absence of our adversaries the United States can
    assert itself as a preferred partner in the Pacific. The United
    States has recently accomplished significant diplomatic
    achievements in the Indo-Pacific such as the U.S. alliance for
    international developments, disaster teams, or professional
    development programs in Cambodia.
        Nevertheless, the United States cannot rest on its
    diplomatic laurels and these relationships need demonstration
    of our commitment.
        So I implore the Trump administration to learn from
    President Biden's mistakes and I ask you, Mr. Singleton--you
    have vast experience and appreciate that, and what actions can
    the U.S. take to strengthen trust and cooperation with ASEAN
    nations, particularly those growing closer to China.
        Mr. Singleton. Thank you, sir.
        I mean, I think we mentioned it earlier but we have to show
    up. I think our greatest comparative advantage would be
    presence, persistence, and partnership and that's--the region
    isn't opaque. They make clear to us directly what they want
    from us and I think there are transactional opportunities that
    benefit both sides.
        I think talk of market access, talk of economic engagement,
    is the missing link today and most countries in the region are
    deeply concerned about their reliance on China for key critical
    supply chains.
        They're concerned about Chinese companies relocating into
    their markets, and those dependencies and the weaponized
    interdependence that comes with them is concerning.
        I think the biggest signal that the President can make,
    though, is by simply having consistent outreach to countries in
    the region--hosting them here, deepening people to people ties,
    showing up.
        President--Chinese leader Xi Jinping does it quite well.
    The Chinese operate a vast diplomatic presence across the
    region. I think we have a real opportunity here to actually
    show up on the ground and demonstrate what we're willing to
    bring to the table.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you.
        And briefly, Mr. Fontaine, you spoke about the coordination
    the Biden administration accomplished with Pacific Island
    countries. In what areas should the Trump administration build
    off these initial success?
        Mr. Fontaine. There's are several. Well, one One is to, of
    course, sustain the diplomatic engagement produced by having
    established the embassies in Solomons and Vanuatu and Tonga.
    and, you know, tThe China-Solomons security agreement was, as
    my colleague said, a big wake-up call. But then we get
    additional wake-up calls after additional wake-up calls.
        And so to sustain sustaining the diplomatic engagement
    there is one aspect of all this. Then I come back just, you
    know, on to trade. I mean, these are very small economies in
    all of this but one of the great advantages the United States
    has its is the big economic market and ability to provide
    access to that economic market, particularly for countries for
    which who, you know, it's going to be almost a rounding error
    in terms of their economic relationship with us. This is
    another big advantage.
        And then, you know, again, working with these countries in
    combination together with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and
    other bigger countries including from a little bit further
    outside in order to demonstrate a vision which is not the U.S.
    would like to dominate the region instead of China but, rather,
    this is about your own independence and sovereignty and ability
    to make your own sovereign decisions, that wWe want to support
    that as opposed to what China has on offer.
        Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much. Thank you to the panel.
        Madam Chair, thank you.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize Representative Sherman for your 5
    minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Sherman. China has been on the rise ever since at the
    beginning of this century we gave them permanent most favored
    nation status. I was there at the time and they told us it
    would increase the trade deficit by a billion dollars. They
    were off by 4,000 percent.
        I would point out that the vast majority of Democrats voted
    against that action and we did so under pressure from a
    Democratic president who turned out to be wrong on this one
    issue.
        And I would hope our Republican colleagues will take note
    of this. Perhaps your proudest hour will be on occasion where
    you say no to a Republican president.
        We now have this enormous trade deficit with China. I would
    point out that it is considerably larger under Trump 1.0 then
    it was under Biden, and that was particularly true in the pre-
    COVID years of the Trump administration.
        So while Trump talks about how other countries are eating
    our lunch, they ate our lunch and our dinner under the first
    Trump administration.
        Now, one issue we have is Americans investing in Chinese
    stocks. Now, China wants to encourage its people to invest in
    their stock and they provide tax incentives for doing so.
        But they're careful to make sure that no citizen of China
    gets an incentive--a tax credit--for investing in American
    stocks.
        But we have a capital gains allowance where we provide many
    hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies to benefit
    Americans who invest in Chinese stocks.
        If any of you think that that's a good idea could you raise
    your hand? I'm not seeing.
        But what's surprising is I only got one Republican co-
    sponsor for my bill to take away this subsidy for investing in
    the Chinese economy, and I would hope that we would do a lot
    better in this Congress.
        You'll have to stand up to billionaires to do that because
    billionaires think they should get a tax incentive for
    everything, even being Benedict Arnold when it comes to where
    they invest their money.
        I think you pointed out how some of the small countries in
    the Pacific are rounding errors when it comes to trade. It's
    even more of a rounding error when it comes to aid.
        I believe that the special--the House Select Committee on
    the Chinese Communist Party unanimously and in a bipartisan way
    called on us to fully fund USAID.
        Now, American soldiers, including my father's friends, died
    in the Pacific over the very islands that would be of great
    strategic importance if, God forbid, we ever ended up in
    another war with a major Asian power.
        Does it--raise your hand if you think it made any sense for
    us to stop all aid to the small islands in the Pacific as we
    did just a week or two ago when we froze all USAID?
        Again, I'll say that no hands went up. The Solomon Islands
    where so many Americans--Marines--died we had a $21 million
    economic support arrangement with and we have stopped that, and
    even if we started again we have proven ourselves to be
    unreliable. A $95,000 aid program to the Cook Islands and we
    stopped that. It's tragic.
        Now, I'll point out one other thing. We have got China
    making these debt trap loans where they loan money and there's
    no way that the project will pay it back.
        Should we encourage nations that are a victim of this to
    simply not pay China back? Does anybody agree with that or
    disagree?
        Should Sri Lanka be writing giant--well, so I'll point out
    that we, in effect, force these countries to pay back because
    we allow our credit rating agencies and our lenders to treat a
    country as if it's a bad credit risk because they fail to pay
    China back.
        I would say that we ought to turn to countries and say,
    don't give China your port. Give them your middle finger, and
    then you'll still be able to borrow from Europe, from the
    United States, and from the international community.
        And with that, my time has expired.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        I recognize Representative Barr for your 5 minutes of
    questioning.
        Mr. Barr. Thank you.
        Mr. Singleton, thank you for recognizing the COINS Act, the
    outbound screening legislation from the last Congress that I
    worked on, and I do agree with you that we do need legislation
    to address capital flows into China, especially to Chinese
    entities of national security concern and technologies that
    threaten our national security as well.
        Last Friday President Trump issued an executive order
    titled ``American First Investment Policy'' and issued a
    national security memorandum that was in large measure aligned
    with the principles of the COINS Act. He said in conjunction
    with that release we will adopt new rules to stop U.S.
    companies from pouring investments into China and stop China
    from buying up America, allowing all of these investments that
    serve American interests, meaning that it's exactly the right
    policy.
        It's the America first policies, red light to investments
    that compromise our national security but allow those
    investments that actually advance our interests.
        My question to you is given the fact that the
    administration has now issued an executive order--it replaces
    the Biden executive order on outbound investment screening--is
    it important that Congress act as well here? Is it important
    that Congress pass legislation to provide statutory definition
    to all of this?
        Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely, and thank you for your
    leadership on this issue.
        I mean, cutting off Xi's access, I would say, to Western
    capital and technology is like depriving a fire of oxygen. I
    think if we don't we're sort of very much fueling the system
    that is seeking to overshadow our own.
        I was very impressed with the policy release memo last week
    but it's vital that those protections be codified into law.
        In many respects, the memo released last week goes a little
    bit farther than COINS by identifying new sectors including
    biotechnology, which I would argue is the next semiconductors,
    where we need to be hyper vigilant about capital flows.
        But I think what's captured in the COINS Act is exactly the
    right pitch perfect moment. There's bipartisan consensus. I
    know it was a long road to get there but I think at this point
    it's the best hope for right now.
        Mr. Barr. Yes. And thanks, Mr. Singleton, for recognizing
    that the Treasury-White House release is slightly different
    than COINS and we have actually been reaching out to the
    administration asking for interagency technical assistance. We
    want to incorporate that into the release of COINS 2.0.
        What would you say, though, to the argument that--and
    obviously, because of my work on this I support the effort--but
    what would you say to those who make the argument, and it's not
    altogether a bad point, that under Xi Jinping China has
    abandoned the American innovation model, that the Chinese
    Communist central planning has replaced private allocation of
    capital with state-run investment and because of that between
    2018 and 2023 the number of annual startups founded in China
    has collapsed by over 97 percent and that Chairman Xi's
    crackdown has really deterred U.S. investment.
        Since 2018 U.S. venture capital deals in China have fallen
    by 87 percent. In other words, the market is taking care of
    this. China's economy is collapsing. China's disadvantage is
    that they're communists.
        And so outbound investment is slowing down because it's a
    bad place to invest. Do we still need COINS? Do we still need
    an investment screening tool?
        Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely. I mean Xi Jinping is his own
    worst enemy and his economic stewardship has led China to where
    it is today which is on the point of economic collapse, quite
    frankly.
        I think what we have to do is protect American capital,
    American investors, and American technology, and institute
    through law common sense guardrails that ensure that American
    capital isn't flowing into the very technological sectors that
    are being used to fuel Chinese military modernization and I
    think that linkage between the military and the civil,
    particularly as it relates to investment screening and bans, is
    essential if for no other reason that just because China's
    economy is suffering today doesn't mean that they can't recover
    tomorrow.
        Mr. Barr. Well, I agree with you and I agree with President
    Trump on his executive order.
        Look, it's true. Chairman Xi has, in some regards, made
    China uninvestable. Why on earth anyone would want to invest in
    a communist economy where at any moment's notice at the whim of
    the bureaucrats in Beijing all of your investment could
    disappear.
        Nevertheless, there are capital flows. There are Western
    investors, U.S. and otherwise, who are investing in some of
    these critical technologies and so we do need legislation.
        I appreciate your testimony. I yield back.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        I now recognize Representative Amo for your 5 minutes of
    questioning.
        Mr. Amo. Thank you very much, Chairwoman, and it's a
    pleasure to be on this subcommittee and I look forward to your
    leadership and that of the ranking member over this Congress.
        I know that every member of our subcommittee wants to
    advance American interests and counter China's influence in
    East Asia and the Pacific and every member should want to
    strengthen our supply chains, boost economic cooperation, and
    protect our national security.
        And I believe that every member understands the only way to
    achieve this is by building alliances and partnerships. As we
    look at the last 4 years I believe that President Biden
    understood these points.
        It's why he led a historic effort to establish one of the
    most significant security agreements in generations. Australia,
    United Kingdom, United States security pact, as everyone knows,
    is AUKUS and it's important to just break it down and share
    that, you know, AUKUS improves that monitoring and increases
    deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
        It allows the United States to continue our leadership in
    emerging defense technology. Pillar one created a pathway for
    Australia to acquire nuclear submarines. Pillar two created
    deeper cooperation between all of the three allies for advanced
    defense capabilities.
        Now, many businesses in my home State of Rhode Island are
    working on technology included in AUKUS like the Virginia-class
    submarine, or they're developing technology for pillar two like
    the next generation of underwater drones.
        And so this agreement promotes national security and boosts
    local economies with good-paying jobs. It strengthens our
    relationships around the world.
        Mr. Fontaine, could you share why it's so essential that we
    continue the work of AUKUS and how can we work to strengthen
    cooperation as we move further into pillar two?
        Mr. Fontaine. Sure. Thank you, Congressman.
        Well, pillar one, I think the case for that is probably
    straightforward, but to increase over some years but,
    nevertheless, to increase the number of allied nuclear-
    propelled submarines in the key military theater. This is a
    good thing, especially given China's increase in capabilities
    across the board.
        So we want that and, of course, the Australian
    participation in pillar one of AUKUS is a significant injection
    of several billion dollars into the submarine industrial base
    in the United States at a moment when we're behind on sub
    production, and so that's a good outcome as well.
        On pillar two, you know, in a way a lot of the hard work
    has already been done. The Congress, you know, went through the
    exercise of ITAR reform, which is always, you know, throwing
    sand in the gears of some of these ability of countries'
    ability, including some of our closest intelligence and
    military partners, to cooperate with us in technology.
        So that part has been done. We have taken our lumps from
    the French for having, you know, participated in the sub
    contract. So a lot of the hard work has been done.
        On pillar two I think that the key is to have some quick,
    visible wins because this is a proof of concept, right? This is
    not only something that could work for the U.S.--the United
    States--the U.S., U.K. and Australia., but iIf this goes well,
    and we can show that things are possible with pillar two that
    otherwise wouldn't be then Japan, South Korea, India, other
    countries can plug in on particular projects in a similar sort
    of fashion.
        But we haven't seen the quick wins yet and there's are a
    bunch of potential projects. I mean, tThe Australians have some
    unique capabilities on quantum PNT--position, navigation, and
    timing--you mentioned unmanned undersea capabilities--in a
    matter of, you know, months--12 months, 18 months, 24 months on
    the back end, not years.
        To show some quick wins on pillar two would give some
    serious momentum to AUKUS and I think demonstrate its utility
    to everybody.
        Mr. Amo. And I greatly appreciate your point of emphasis on
    growing partnerships and I'm hopeful that, you know, after the
    past 36 days of the Trump administration that the
    administration will demonstrate that they value these
    partnerships, that they understand the value therein because,
    you know, we have seen questioning our transatlantic alliances,
    we have seen foreign aid freezes, and we want to, you know,
    lower the temperature and ensure that our friends around the
    world aren't going to question our commitment to our values,
    and jeopardizing those would be a problem to proceeding as we
    should in AUKUS.
        And so, you know, it is my hope that we don't have an
    absence of American leadership because if that is the case
    China will take advantage to fill that vacuum, reaching out to
    our allies and partners, being more of a threat in the Indo-
    Pacific and doing the work to really combat our values, our
    sense of our leadership in the world, and that's a message that
    I think we can all agree on.
        With that, I yield.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you very much.
        Let me recognize Representative Radewagen for your 5
    minutes of questioning.
        Mrs. Radewagen.
        [Foreign language spoken.]
        Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim and Ranking
    Member Bera, for holding this hearing and thank you to the
    panel for testifying today.
        As you may be able to tell how I'm dressed I am a Pacific
    Islander and represent the beautiful territory of American
    Samoa, the only United States soil south of the Equator.
        So this hearing is especially important to me as we are
    discussing my home, the Pacific. I want to highlight some
    recent developments in the Pacific Islands.
        Within the past 3 weeks both independent Samoa and the Cook
    Islands have signed major agreements with China. Unfortunately,
    I don't have a map here but independent Samoa is my neighbor 60
    miles to the west.
        Cook Islands are my neighbor to the east, along with
    Kiribati. My home district is now surrounded on three sides by
    countries that have signed major economic and security deals
    with China.
        And since this hearing is on opportunities for the new
    administration what are actions that President Trump and
    Secretary Rubio can do to counteract China in the Pacific
    Islands?
        And I'd like all three of you to answer, please.
        Mr. Fontaine. Well, we talked earlier about, you know,
    potential trade opportunities and things like that, and there's
    also the aid aspect of this.
        As we were discussing before, the amounts of aid are
    relatively small that go into these countries when you look in
    at the grand scheme of the amount of foreign aid that the
    United States has provided to countries all over the world, but
    it makes a big difference there and we, frankly, are in a
    competition with China for influence.
        I think what we don't want to see is exactly what you
    described where we have sovereign U.S. soil surrounded on three
    sides by countries that wish to be closer to China economically
    and certainly security wise.
        So to use the various tools in our tool kit on aid, on
    trade, on diplomatic engagement, on, you know, security support
    and things like that, those are the things that can make a
    difference.
        But, again, it has to be sustained. We have to demonstrate
    that this is not just an kind of epiphenomenon where we are
    suddenly interested in the Pacific Islands and we develop some
    initiatives and then they start to fade in a couple of years.
    We have to sustain these efforts over a long period of time.
        Mr. Cooper. Congresswoman, I would just add briefly I think
    it's absolutely critical that the United States explain not
    just to policymakers but also to the American people why this
    is in the American interest and, you know, those of us in the
    think tank community probably have our work cut out on that
    issue.
        But I think it's actually pretty clear. If you're President
    Trump and you're looking for areas where a little bit of money
    goes a long way what better place than the Pacific? Relatively
    small populations that are desperate for greater engagement
    from the United States.
        Sometimes they're not even looking for a lot of money,
    right? Sometimes it may just be a little bit of diplomatic
    engagement, right--opening embassies in some places that's
    relatively cheap. And the strategic logic is extremely clear
    and anyone that's read their history knows why that's the case.
        So I think the challenge we're going to have is that some
    of these ongoing programs I think are probably paused at the
    moment and so we're going to have to explain both, you know, to
    the American people but also to some people within the
    government why these are so critical and why spending a little
    bit of money now in these areas is absolutely important in the
    long term.
        Mr. Singleton. I would agree with everything that's been
    said and just add on that beyond the deal with the Cook Islands
    we also saw live fire drills around Australia this week. Quite
    alarming, demonstrating, I think, a capability and an intent
    from the Chinese to project much farther from their shores.
        I think as it relates specifically to Pacific Island
    countries there are several opportunities. One is seabed
    mineral mining, which is an area that's ripe for, I think,
    opportunity for the United States.
        I think fishery management, maritime transport, and
    security are other areas that closely align with this
    administration and the previous administration--even
    educational exchange, climate change assistance and support.
    These are all, I think, basic programs that I think to the
    points raised are relatively inexpensive but go a long way to
    deepen people to people ties.
        Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back
    the balance of my time.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        I recognize Representative Castro for your 5 minutes of
    questioning.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman.
        Mr. Fontaine, in your testimony you note that in 2022 Nepal
    accepted a $500 million grant through the Millennium Challenge
    Corporation to expand its electricity grid and improve road
    infrastructure.
        China and their supporters in Nepal fought hard to try to
    prevent this. They argued that Nepal was making a mistake in
    working with the United States and I'm glad that they were
    unsuccessful in their argument.
        The Trump administration has abruptly frozen this
    assistance with no transparency. Many government officials in
    Nepal now worry whether they made the right decision in
    partnering with the United States.
        How do you think Nepal's leaders feel about their decision
    to make the politically difficult decision to ignore China, to
    bypass China, and to work with the United States?
        Mr. Fontaine. Well, I suppose they're waiting for the
    outcome of this review and I hope that this gets turned back on
    because this is the reason I mentioned it in my testimony.
        If you look at this $500 million MCC compact with Nepal, it
    took the--it took Kathmandu about 5 years to actually come to
    the point where they agreed to do it for exactly the reasons
    that you said, because they were being lobbied by the Chinese
    not to do it, because this is kind of a declaration of
    strategic intent that they, you know, had to think pretty hard
    about.
        And it's also worth noting that this all took place during
    the first Trump administration. This is a Trump administration
    idea to do this with Nepal, and so now that this is frozen the
    Chinese would love to march in and say, we will replace the
    Americans here, and also point out American unreliability if we
    were able to say once this was going and now this is not.
        And it's also worth noting that Nepal agreed to kick in
    $200 million of its own money toward all of this. So it wasn't
    just us putting in our own.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you. And I guess--well, let me ask you,
    do you have confidence that that aid will be unfrozen? That
    that deal will be unfrozen? And bear in mind the National
    Endowment for Democracy their funding has been frozen. IRI is
    frozen. NDI is frozen.
        That represents, along with what USAID represented on the
    development side, a way that the United States engaged the
    world and also promoted democracy around the world.
        So I would ask the panel, having seen what you have seen of
    the Trump administration, the United States, for example, just
    voted with Russia this week to prevent a resolution that
    essentially would have placed the blame on Russia for the
    invasion of Ukraine.
        From what you've seen so far do you have confidence that
    these funds will be unfrozen?
        Mr. Fontaine. I don't know what's going to happen with the
    funds. But I can point out in addition to the Nepal example I
    gave how I think some of this if not corrected is--amounts to
    shooting ourselves in the foot.
        So iIf you look at what NDI and IRI has have been doing,
    they funded, for example, groups in Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal,
    and Sri Lanka, which have already been approached by the
    Chinese saying--because the funds have been frozen saying, we
    will replace the American funds.
        Now, these are democracy groups so they don't have much
    interest in taking money from the Chinese in the first place.
    But that's not going to be the case for everybody.
        And so, again, there's--you know, the Chinese are sort of
    ready to----
        Mr. Castro. So it's created an opportunity for China to
    come in as we----
        Mr. Fontaine. Correct.
        Mr. Castro [continuing]. pulled back or receded.
        Mr. Fontaine. Or, you know, IRI, for example, provides
    cyber tools for circumvention technologies and other things
    that allow dissidents and democracy activists in places like
    China to be able to communicate with each other away from the
    watchful eye of the State.
        Well, that's frozen now, and so I think those are the kinds
    of things that we would want to have in our arsenal as we
    compete with China.
        Mr. Castro. Gentlemen, you will have--and I would just also
    note real quick that I think what's especially troubling is
    while these funds are frozen, these deals are frozen, it's not
    as if there's been some other plan that's been laid out to
    describe, you know, what else is going to go on in lieu of
    these things, right?
        Like, you know, then you could have some debate about
    whether that's better. Here, everything is just frozen.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, I think it was, you know, Secretary
    Mattis that said that if we don't end up spending a little bit
    of development assistance in places then we end up having to
    use bullets, and that certainly, I think, would be the concern.
        I'll just say very briefly that I think at the end of the
    day the Trump administration--I understand the logic of why
    they want to cut down on government spending, right? But I
    think the point that's critical is we have got to do an
    assessment of each of these projects to see whether it's
    worthwhile.
        And so doing anything across the board doesn't make sense,
    especially when we can't turn them back on after that, and so I
    worry a huge amount about the damage that that could do over
    the long term.
        Mr. Singleton. I would add, I mean, China routinely
    criticized IRI, NDI, and NED projects, and I think they claimed
    that they were--we were smearing Beijing. I think that is
    reason enough to keep a lot of them.
        But I think a wholesale review is important. That should be
    done expeditiously and I think to the extent possible a lot of
    these projects should be reinstated.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you. I yield back, Chair.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        I now recognize Representative Biggs for your 5 minutes of
    questioning.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I appreciate
    our witnesses today for your testimoneys this afternoon.
        As the engine of the global economy, East Asia and
    Pacific--and I'll just say EAP here on out--the Pacific's
    stability is fundamentally linked to our prosperity and
    security.
        Maritime domain awareness is therefore paramount within
    this vast space, demanding a comprehensive approach that
    recognizes the interconnectedness of security and economic
    environment.
        So serving on both the subcommittee and the Homeland
    Security, Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee
    grants me a unique dual perspective. From my vantage point the
    United States Coast Guard's leadership in enhancing the
    region's maritime domain awareness is undeniable.
        We see the Coast Guard standing shoulder to shoulder with
    nations across the EAP region, from Palau in the Pacific
    Islands to Japan in northeast Asia.
        In Palau this partnership focuses on countering illicit
    maritime activities like illegal, unreported, and unregulated
    fishing which safeguard our vital resources.
        Further north the Coast Guard conducts engagement with
    Japanese counterparts by collaborating on regular western
    Pacific exercises and active intelligence sharing that
    strengthens interoperability and ultimately contributes to a
    more transparent and secure maritime environment.
        Across the EAP the Coast Guard embodies this proactive
    approach, not simply reacting to crises but actively fostering
    maritime safety and security by assisting nations in incident
    response, providing essential support, and building critical
    maritime domain awareness.
        This vital work takes on even greater significance as
    maritime domain awareness becomes a central pillar of the Quad
    initiative, which recognizes that a stable and secure maritime
    domain is foundational for regional peace and prosperity.
        This brings me to my first question, and I would like to
    ask each of you to please respond briefly. What specific role
    can an increased Coast Guard presence play within the Quad
    framework to address the complex and evolving regional security
    challenges that we face today?
        Mr. Singleton. I'll go first.
        I mean, I think countering Chinese illegal fishing is one
    area where the Coast Guard has an important role to play as a
    force multiplier but, frankly, is an untapped resource and it's
    not limited to the EAP region.
        There are news reports this week of Chinese illegal fishing
    fleets operating off the coast of Argentina where the Argentine
    military actually had to intervene.
        I think these are areas where the Coast Guard has
    tremendous experience and expertise and technology and where we
    can really have value add.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.
        Mr. Fontaine. I would just add, ma'am, the--it's so
    critical in many of these countries that--you know, they don't
    have the ability to easily cooperate with our Navy.
        Our naval ships tend to be much larger and much more
    capable than their navies are and much of the time their navies
    are doing missions that are much more similar to our Coast
    Guard with vessels that are closer in size to Coast Guard
    vessels.
        And so often they actually, I think, prefer to be able to
    work with our Coast Guard than sometimes the Navy, which is a
    little bit more challenging for them to deal with in on a
    symmetrical basis.
        So I think there's tremendous interest across the region,
    really, not just in the Pacific but the whole region in having
    a much greater U.S. Coast Guard presence.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.
        Mr. Fontaine. I guess just violently agreeing with my
    colleagues. I mean, the--I think the appetite for greater
    maritime domain awareness by the countries in the region is
    almost unlimited.
        I mean, tThey don't have the capabilities often to
    understand the environment themselves, and by plugging into
    activities and information gathering activities that the United
    States does, especially through the Coast Guard, that's a major
    service that the United States can provide and ultimately is
    good for us because it's not just about, you know, fending off
    China.
        It's about illegal fishing but it's also piracy and
    humanitarian response and natural disasters and things like
    that. If there's an area to do more there's been some
    activities through the Quad and things but, you know, the--more
    the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean are particularly not
    well defined in terms of maritime domain awareness.
        And so those would be--that would be an obvious region in
    order to--an obvious region to look for if we wanted to do
    more.
        Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. My time is up.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        I recognize Representative Olszewski for your 5 minutes of
    questioning.
        Mr. Olszewski. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        I'll just echo the sentiments of my colleagues earlier
    about how grateful I am to be serving on the Subcommittee on
    East Asia and the Pacific.
        It is rewarding and gratifying to see the level of
    bipartisanship already being displayed both on this side of the
    dais but also some of the unanimity from our witnesses today.
    So thank you all for taking the time to be with us.
        I look forward to working with you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking
    Member Bera. Thank you for leading the way in that work as
    well.
        I just want to dive in a little bit. I think the stage has
    sort of been set earlier. I loved, Mr. Cooper, your comment
    about what better place than the Pacifics to sort of make these
    small investments for big return--small amounts of diplomacy
    for big return.
        I really appreciate you all sharing the concern about
    damage over the long term. I appreciate your candor and the
    uncertainty as to if or when or which pieces of aid might be
    restored but they're all so critical.
        I guess just taking a slightly different look at it is can
    you one or several of you speak briefly to the fact of now that
    aid has been stopped are we seeing and to what degree are we
    seeing China step in? Do you have any specific examples or data
    that you can share in terms of what we're seeing now that that
    aid has dried up?
        Mr. Fontaine. Well, I gave a couple before but on Nepal,
    certainly, the potential demise of the MCC compact with--the
    $500 million compact with Nepal gives China an opportunity.,
    which iIt has been attempting to make political and economic
    inroads in Nepal for a long time., and tThen, you know, the
    other specific examples whereon, you know, include the freeze
    in the availability of cyber tools that are provided through
    IRI in particular to dissidents in places, including inside
    China and be able enable them to communicate safely and
    securely. tThose are frozen now.
        That would, obviously, give the government of China an
    opportunity. and at least mMy understanding is that partners of
    both IRI and NDI in Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have
    been already approached by China to say if the Americans won't
    fund you we will.
        So those are a few specific examples.
        Mr. Cooper. Can I just add a broad point to build on
    Richard's, which is if you look at polling data across
    Southeast Asia the data has not been great for the United
    States over the last 5 years. It showed a decreasing confidence
    in continued American engagement and, unfortunately, that's
    true from both of the last two administrations.
        Now, I think if you overlap that with, you know, what you
    were just talking about, Congressman, that it's just going to
    accelerate these questions about whether the United States is
    really a reliable partner and, unfortunately, that's happening
    at a time that China is already making even more inroads and
    building more influence in parts of Southeast Asia and the
    Pacific and South Asia and elsewhere.
        So I worry that this is reinforcing trends that were
    already occurring in the region, and so if we're going to
    reverse those trends not only do we have to turn the money back
    on in most cases, we're also going to have to think of new
    ideas and new proposals to add to that.
        So I think it's not just a question of stopping the damage.
    We also have to reverse the momentum and put some ideas on the
    table ourselves.
        Mr. Singleton. I would agree wholeheartedly. I mean, we
    have seen indications in places like Cambodia as well, Myanmar,
    about deactivation of these programs particularly in the civil
    society and reporting space--journalist space.
        I think one thing we have all realized is that a lot of
    Chinese coercion is quite corrosive on civil society and it's
    very important that we fund free academic journalist exchanges
    on the ground so they can report the situation fairly and
    accurately and we're not ceding the information space to the
    Chinese.
        Mr. Olszewski. So just fair to say the longer this goes on
    the harder it's going to be not only to get back to where we
    were but to also--fair to say? Yes.
        I'll just reaffirm to my colleagues here and to others I
    think many of us are committed to rooting out waste and abuses
    that are legitimate.
        So to the extent we continue this conversation I very much
    want to be a part of stopping aid that does not advance
    American interests while not having the damage done that we're
    seeing today.
        So thank you all very much. With that, Madam Chair, I
    yield.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        We do have some time so I would like to take the
    opportunity to go for a second round of questioning and the
    first question I would like to address is the CCP and its IP
    theft that we're all concerned about.
        According to FBI, the CCP steals up to $600 billion worth
    of U.S. intellectual property every year. So we need to use
    every tool available to stop this obvious theft and hold the
    CCP accountable.
        So I would like to first ask Mr. Singleton maybe start and
    then you can all chime in. How can the U.S. leverage existing
    partnerships that we have in the Indo-Pacific with our allies
    and partners so that we can create a unified or united front
    against the CCP's IP theft?
        Mr. Singleton. No, absolutely. So much of the IP theft that
    we discuss is occurring in the commercial space but I also
    focus on the academic space as well.
        Congress recently reintroduced the DETERRENT Act, which
    aims to crack down on Chinese attempts to secure intellectual
    property from our college campuses, much of which is funded by
    Congress.
        I think these are basic common sense measures that will
    force universities to reckon with the fact that they're going
    to have to diligently report their entanglements with Chinese
    universities and Chinese companies, particularly those tied to
    Chinese civil-military fusion.
        I think that's probably one key area where partners and
    allies are on board with rigorous academic partnership
    screening. It's an area where other countries, including
    Canada, are actually ahead of us.
        I think we have a lot to learn. But this is an area where I
    think you're going to see broad agreement and recognition that
    we have to close those loopholes beyond the corporate IP theft
    that we see every day.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. Just to add to that, I a number of years ago
    had the chance to do a report with the Foundation for Defense
    of Democracies on this very specific issue and one thing that
    we pointed out in that report is there are a number of products
    in which the U.S. Government has charged Chinese agents with
    stealing American technology and the businesses that were
    engaged in that stolen technology are still selling the
    products back into the United States--solar cells, for
    example--at massive scale, and they drove the American
    producers out of business in so doing.
        I don't understand how we can't just turn the spigot off of
    the ones where--we actually indicted people in China working
    for the government who are stealing this technology and we're
    still letting them drive our companies out of business years
    later.
        So I think there are areas like that where we just
    absolutely have to take action and until we do I don't think
    that Beijing is going to take us seriously on this issue.
        Mrs. Kim. Please chime in, Mr. Fontaine.
        Mr. Fontaine. Well, the--China's theft of intellectual
    property from the United States and other countries as well has
    described by some as, you know, one of the greatest wealth
    transfers in history and I think probably rightly so., and
    wWhen you look at it, it truly is outrageous, both in terms of
    scale and just the substance of what the Chinese have been
    doing over time with this expensive time--you know, the amount
    of time that it takes to develop technology and intellectual
    property that haven't been stolen and then exploited for
    economic reasons, including sometimes in our own markets.
        The only thing that I would add in terms of potential
    remedies is to the degree to which the intellectual property is
    stolen or is resident in cyberspace and through cyberspace I
    think there's a role for offensive cyber activities in all of
    this.
        I mean, tThis is something--somewhat controversial inside
    the government and policymaking circles. You have to be careful
    about these things.
        But we do have a lot of insights into who some of these
    actors are, how they operate, and the cyber tools that they use
    in order to conduct this theft and we have a lot of our own
    that we should be using just to protect ourselves and to exact
    a price on those who have engaged in these transgressions.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you. I would like to talk about one other
    issue, which is North Korea policy. We need to make some
    adjustments, you know, and the U.S. needs to make some policy
    changes toward North Korea, considering the evolving nuclear
    ambitions and continued weapons development, and I would like
    to see how you can--you know, talk to us about the U.S. taking
    leverage, existing mini lateral frameworks to strengthen the
    extended deterrence and enhance our regional security.
        Do you want to go, Mr. Cooper?
        Mr. Cooper. Sure. I think this is an incredibly important
    issue and, you know, unfortunately, I think our approach in
    recent years is probably best termed strategic patience 2.0.
        We have just sort of waited and put our attention into
    other things and the reality is is that the problem has gotten
    worse and so bad, in fact, that I think the risk is that now
    our allies in South Korea are actually fairly serious about
    developing their own independent nuclear capabilities because
    they worry about the pathway that North Korea is on.
        So I don't know whether Donald Trump can engage with Kim
    Jong--un directly and address some of these issues but I think
    we absolutely have to think about a renewed campaign to shift
    the direction because otherwise we're going to end up with an
    even larger North Korean arsenal, even more missiles, and
    without a strategy to deal with it.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you.
        Ranking Member?
        Mr. Bera. Sure. I'll just make a few closing comments.
        And I should have said this off the top. Yes, I appreciate
    the bipartisan nature of this but to, you know, our Foreign
    Service officers, folks that are working overseas, you know, I
    visit with them. They're often working in tough places, in
    refugee camps, et cetera.
        These are patriotic Americans and I feel for what they're
    going through right now, the uncertainty, having just traveled
    abroad, having had side conversations with folks. These are not
    folks that see the world as Democrats or Republicans.
        They see themselves as patriotic Americans, and I do want
    to publicly say thank you for your service and thank you for
    what you're doing, and hang in there.
        You know, again, we don't want to lose that talent,
    especially some of the younger folks but also the folks that
    have made a 30-, 35-year career out of this. These are
    patriotic Americans.
        I'm glad to hear in a bipartisan way, you know, the
    importance of some of these programs and some of these programs
    started in the first Trump administration.
        So we had Congressman Yoho, our former colleague, here 2
    weeks ago and just kind of watched him work the BUILD Act with
    Senator Coons and others.
        The Trump administration should be proud about that. They
    should not take that apart. As we come up on reauthorizing the
    DFC these are tools that I'd actually like to see us expand.
    They're tools that are good for America. They're good for
    American businesses. They're good for our influence.
        You know, in February 2020 right before the pandemic shut
    things down I led a CODEL to Sri Lanka and Nepal, largely,
    because both of them had MCC compacts that were sitting on the
    table that we absolutely saw Chinese misinformation. Like,
    these are grants. These are not Belt and Road type of debt
    diplomacy. These were direct grants.
        Now, the Rajapaksa administration ultimately turned that
    down and, you know, we did see the debt trap that Sri Lanka
    ended up in and what it did to its economy. It did take a lot
    of work to get Nepal and Kathmandu to agree it was a good deal.
    It is still a good deal for them.
        To the Nepalese, hang in there. You know, we will do
    everything we can to get those dollars flowing. Do not take
    that--you know, aAgain, look eyes wide open with how the
    Chinese do aid and development and use debt traps and, you
    know, you can look around the world and see the downside and
    the danger of that.
        That said, I do think with this America first initiative we
    are going to have to rethink a little bit how we do aid
    development finance and I touched on in my earlier comments how
    we leverage our resources with our like-minded, like-valued
    allies that have interest in this region. And, again, you know,
    I think that is where we, you know, with the European Union,
    with Japan, Korea, Australia, even India that has an older
    relationship with Africa and a broad diaspora is there.
        We ought to be looking for places where we can work and
    leverage our resources to go further to develop these economies
    and go into places like Kenya to develop things.
        We also should look at programs. You know, when I've
    traveled around the Pacific Islands there's a really elegant
    program called the Pacific Island Tuna Program that the Nature
    Conservancy with Wal-Mart, using DFC funds and so forth.
        Like, tThese are great programs that, you know, are public-
    private partnerships and, you know, help build the resilience
    of fisheries and do development projects in some of these
    Pacific Islands.
        I would urge us as a subcommittee to look at how we can
    support and broaden some of these programs like Pacific
    Islands. That's not unique to Wal-Mart, and we have had those
    conversations.
        But, again, it's a really elegant program that is really
    appreciated in the Marshall Islands and, you know, a place like
    PNG would be the perfect place for us to go and expand a
    program like that.
        So I look forward to working with the witnesses in your
    organizations. I think it's an incredibly important time. You
    know, government efficiency is fine. You know, looking at
    programs and how we bring these programs to the 21st century is
    fine.
        But as we come out of this initial period of disruption I
    think it behooves all of us as Democrats, Republicans,
    academics, and the think tank community to say, OK, what would
    the right aid and development programs for the 21st century be
    like?
        What would the right strategy be? How do we partner with
    our allies and others to create that 21st century that we
    really want to see.
        So it'll be different than the past but what does that
    future geopolitical strategy for the 21st century look like. So
    thank you again for being here and, again, thank you, Madam
    Chairwoman.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        As we close, I'd like to, you know, just echo how important
    the East Asia and the Pacific Region is for the United States
    and its role in the world stage.
        As we reflect on the last 4 years, and I think we have done
    that very constructively and productively through our
    engagements and our dialog today, so I want to thank you again
    for your insights.
        Moving forward, I think it is very, very essential that we
    focus on strengthening our alliances and partnerships
    throughout the region and collectively we can combat the shared
    threats from North Korea, China, and these are the threats that
    we face today and it's not going away anytime soon.
        So our engagement must remain steadfast regardless of
    domestic political changes and we must also ensure that our
    economic strategy aligns with the needs of our partners. It's
    not something that is one sided so we need to really, really
    find ways to work together with our partners and allies.
        We must offer alternatives to China's state-driven economic
    model that too many countries have been forced to accept. So we
    need to show up. We need to bring alternative solutions to them
    and we cannot allow the global economy to be dictated by
    Beijing's standards.
        So while we stay resilient and steadfast, again, we need to
    be mindful of what our allies' and partners' needs are.
    Washington must use every available tool to advance our
    economic agenda while punishing the CCP's unfair trade
    practices.
        Finally, we talked about human rights in my opening
    remarks, and I don't think we went into that in depth today in
    our conversation but I truly believe human rights needs to
    remain a top priority in our foreign policy, and the Chinese
    Communist Party's repression both at home and abroad demands
    our action, our attention, and we need to be steadfast in that
    area as well.
        So as we look ahead we already recognize there are several
    significant opportunities for the U.S. to strengthen its
    influence in the region and to secure a future that reflects
    our values and our interest.
        So I look forward to working closely together with--not
    only with my colleagues here but with, you know, folks like you
    who are working on the ground, and you are experts in the field
    so we want to stay engaged in our conversation and we want to
    work with you as resource to many of us.
        So let's work together to ensure that our policies align
    with our--with the challenges and opportunities that East Asia
    and the Pacific region faces.
        With that, I want to thank you again for joining us. The
    committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                   APPENDIX

                                  ----------

                   Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 [all]