    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                           A CONTINUED PATTERN OF GOVERNMENT
                              SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. CITIZENS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL
                               GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

                                     OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2025

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 119-15

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT

                   Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    60-061                  WASHINGTON : 2025

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                            JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair

    DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking
    ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member
    TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia
    BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California
    LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California
    JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington
    TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania
    KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado
    HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia
    LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina
    WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont
    RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
    GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York
    ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas
    DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas
    BRANDON GILL, Texas
    MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington

                                     ------

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND FEDERAL
                            GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

                           ANDY BIGGS, Arizona, Chair

    TOM TIFFANY, Wisconsin               LUCY McBATH, Georgia, Ranking
    TROY NEHLS, Texas                        Member
    BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    KEVIN KILEY, California              DAN GOLDMAN, New York
    LAUREL LEE, Florida                  STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           ERIC SWALWELL, California

                   CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director
                      JULIE TAGEN, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, April 8, 2025

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    The Honorable Andy Biggs, Chair of the Subcommittee on Crime and
      Federal Government Surveillance from the State of Arizona......     1
    The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on
      the Judiciary from the State of Maryland.......................     3
    The Honorable Jim Jordan, Chair of the Committee on the Judiciary
      from the State of Ohio.........................................     5

                                   WITNESSES

    James Czerniawski, Senior Policy Analyst, Technology &
      Innovation, Americans for Prosperity
      Oral Testimony.................................................     7
      Prepared Testimony.............................................     9
    Kia Hamadanchy, Senior Policy Counsel, National Political
      Advocacy Division, American Civil Liberties Union
      Oral Testimony.................................................    16
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    18
    Philip G. Kiko, Principal, Williams & Jensen
      Oral Testimony.................................................    31
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    33
    Gene Schaerr, General Counsel, Project for Privacy & Surveillance
      Accountability
      Oral Testimony.................................................    50
      Prepared Testimony.............................................    52

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    All materials submitted by the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal
      Government Surveillance, for the record........................    76

                                    APPENDIX

    A statement from Jake Laperruque, Deputy Director, Security and
      Surveillance Project, The Center for Democracy & Technology
      (CDT), Apr. 8, 2025, submitted by the Honorable Jamie Raskin,
      Ranking Member of the Committee on the Judiciary from the State
      of Maryland, for the record

        A CONTINUED PATTERN OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. CITIZENS

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, April 8, 2025

                            House of Representatives

           Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance

                           Committee on the Judiciary

                                 Washington, DC

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Andy Biggs
    [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Biggs, Tiffany, Moore,
    Kiley, Lee, Knott, Cline, and Goldman.
        Mr. Biggs. The Subcommittee will come to order. Without
    objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any
    time. We welcome everyone to today's hearing on Federal
    Government Surveillance.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Moore, to
    lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance.
        All. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States
    of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
    Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
    all.
        Mr. Biggs. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    I welcome my colleagues to this important hearing, and I
    welcome our witnesses and thank them for being here today.
        The Fourth Amendment guarantees all Americans the right to
    be free of unreasonable government searches and seizures. With
    advances in technology, Americans' personal data has become
    easily tracked and collected and the Government can and does
    obtain this information without acquiring a warrant and without
    ever notifying an individual who is subject to a search. This
    is especially prevalent in the context of the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act.
        Reports in recent years detail how the FBI, under the
    leadership of past FBI Directors, abused its authorities under
    FISA. The FBI used its authorities under Section 702 of FISA to
    conduct millions of queries of U.S. person communications. At
    its peak, the FBI conducted nearly three million such searches
    in 2021. In recent years, those numbers have begun to decline,
    but the FBI still conducts thousands of U.S. person-queries
    every month. These actions violate the privacy and civil
    liberties of Americans and likely infringe on the Fourth
    Amendment protections.
        I have called for serious reforms to FISA for years and
    last Congress, we undertook the task of attempting to rein in
    years of FISA abuses. Congress enacted a bill that included
    various reforms such as new and heightened criminal and civil
    penalties for those who violate FISA. We significantly reduced
    the number of FBI personnel authorized to approve queries. We
    required audits of U.S. person queries and implemented many new
    reporting and transparency measures. We must still work to
    protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all Americans.
        I introduced an amendment to require a warrant for all U.S.
    person queries. This amendment included various exceptions to
    allow the FBI and the intelligence community to do its vital
    work of defending our homeland, while protecting Americans'
    privacy rights. This amendment has broad, bipartisan support
    and we worked closely with our colleagues across the aisle in
    an attempt to address this issue. I believe such a reform is
    necessary to end the abuses of Americans' rights.
        While reforming FISA itself is not enough. The Government
    has plenty of other tools at its disposal to collect
    information on Americans. Currently, the laws governing law--
    excuse me, governing how the Fourth Amendment is applied in the
    digital context is the Wild West. Key legislation in this space
    is the Electronics Communications Privacy Act which was written
    in 1986 and did not take into account all the advances in
    digital communications that have occurred since. The IPO, for
    example, did not show up for two decades after this law was
    written. These cell phones have become such an integral part of
    our lives that as the Supreme Court has held now ``hold for
    many Americans the privacies of life.''
        Federal agencies are able to sidestep the requirements of
    the Fourth Amendment and access and collect massive amounts of
    private information on Americans while exploiting a legal
    loophole in this act. Rather than obtain a warrant, government
    agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
    Intelligence Research Specialist, the Drug Enforcement Agency,
    and the Department of Homeland Security can simply turn to data
    brokers and purchase mass amounts of Americans' data. This
    includes such private information as location and health
    information and so on. Apparently, with a disturbing amount of
    frequency, data brokers sell Americans' personal information to
    law enforcement and intelligence agencies without any court
    oversight in contrast to strict rules that prevent phone
    companies and social media sites from selling such information
    to the Government.
        We also are aware of reports by the Federal Government
    using facial recognition technology. This is a powerful tool
    that can be used to help solve crimes, but this technology also
    raises serious issues concerning First and Fourth Amendment
    rights. Law enforcement agencies could potentially use this
    technology to surveil individuals who are not engaged in any
    illegal activity whatsoever. For example, we have seen reports
    of ATF using facial recognition to find gun owners.
        The Federal Government has also turned to private companies
    like Clearview AI to purchase access to facial recognition
    technology. Clearview AI pulls publicly available photographs
    from social media sites and puts them into a database marketed
    to law enforcement. Clearview AI's founders call the service a
    search engine for faces. The Government Accountability Office
    has conducted studies of Federal law enforcement entities' use
    of this technology in recent years. It found that Federal law
    enforcement agencies had not properly assessed privacy and
    other risks associated with the use of this technology. Some
    did not even know which systems their agents were using.
        As technology continues to develop, the Government has more
    and more information about Americans available to it. Used
    improperly, this will continue a pattern of government
    surveillance of U.S. citizens that we have fought so hard
    against. Congress must protect the privacy rights of Americans
    and uphold the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
        I look forward to this opportunity to discuss the dangers
    of mass surveillance and explore meaningful reforms. I
    appreciate our witnesses and the Members for being here today
    and the public for attending as well.
        I now recognize the Ranking Member of the entire Committee,
    Mr. Raskin, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Raskin. Vote taken. Thank you, very much Chair Biggs
    and thanks to our distinguished witnesses for joining us here
    today.
        The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to
    be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects against
    unreasonable searches and seizures. That right is the same
    today as it was when it was written centuries ago, but the
    facts on the ground have obviously changed. Members of Congress
    didn't have cell phones in their pockets. We didn't have Zoom.
    We didn't email. The times have changed and while the concept
    to the right of privacy has not changed, new technologies make
    it a lot harder to rein in government intrusion in the lives of
    the people.
        Artificial intelligence turbo charges surveillance
    capabilities by sifting through mountains of personal data in
    seconds, data brokers aggregate and re-identify so-called de-
    identified data blocked from apps and then sold to others,
    including the Government, allowing them real-time access to
    Americans' locations, purchasing habits, and healthcare needs.
    Cameras equipped with facial recognition technology can scan a
    crowd and instantaneously pick out specific people whether law
    enforcement targets or undocumented immigrants. You name it,
    all without a warrant.
        In an 1829 speech at the Virginia Constitutional
    Convention, Madison said to his colleagues,

            The essence of Government is power; and power, lodged as it
            must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse.

    The U.S. Government has broad surveillance authorities. When
    properly implemented, they keep us safe from terrorists and
    foreign adversaries and gangs. Such broad grants of power are
    also fertile ground for abuse. I believe Congress has a duty to
    balance the Government's need for Americans' private data. With
    our rights, I have voted in favor of government surveillance
    authorities when they do not trespass on our constitutional
    rights, and I voted against them when they don't. We obviously
    need to keep ourselves safe both from criminals and fraudsters
    who would do us harm, as well as those in power who would
    violate our freedom.
        When we last reauthorized Section 702 of FISA which allows
    warrantless collection of the communications of non-U.S.
    persons located overseas, including when those people are
    interacting with Americans, our solution to that tension
    between privacy and security was to establish more checks on
    the Government. Congress previously imposed rules dictating
    when the FBI can search for Americans' identifying information
    in the 702 databases, but we know those rules had been honored
    only in the breach. Rather than review a sampling of those U.S.
    person searches, the FBI's National Security Division now must
    audit every search for the communications of an American. These
    watchdogs within the FBI and in other government agencies are
    an essential line of defense against government overreach. The
    problem today is that President Trump has fired all those
    people.
        A week after he was sworn in, President Trump fired every
    democratic member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
    Board. This is the board created by Congress in 2004 to make
    sure the Government does not violate Americans' civil liberties
    in the name of keeping us safe. The work of these Democratic
    Members have been lauded even by Republican Members of our
    Committee, who recognized and shared their commitment to
    protecting our rights against government overreach. Trump has
    left the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board with only
    one member, a single member who has been stripped of all
    authority because the board needs a quorum, which is three, to
    act. He cannot issue recom-
    mendations on Section 702, U.S. person searches. He cannot hold
    public meetings. Without the fired members, it is as though the
    board simply doesn't even exist. The President did not stop
    there. Remember those monthly audits of every single U.S.
    person searched of the 702 databases. He removed the individual
    responsible for managing that and rescinded offers extended to
    those who had been recruited to help her. Congress cannot
    receive the audit reports required by law because there is
    simply nobody left to audit these warrantless searches, much
    less provide the mandatory report to Congress which is why I am
    also concerned all the other things that have been done to
    remove the safeguards around Americas' right to privacy against
    government invasion. The President fired at least 17 Inspectors
    General, dismantled the Cyber Safety Review Board, and removed
    the Director of the NSA, the person in charge of collecting 702
    data responsibly and within statutory limitations.
        Just last week, he fired their four-star general in charge
    of the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command with other high ranking
    security officials because according to reports, Laura Loomer
    told him to do that. In a system that works, surveillance and
    privacy are inextricably tied and made consistent. Those
    conducting surveillance understand the threat posed to the
    country and its civil liberties and that is applied to rules in
    a precise and disciplined way. Franklin famously said that,

            Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little
            temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.

    While Trump has defied even Ben Franklin because in 78 days, we
    have lost both privacy and safety. We are less safe, and we are
    less free than we were on January 19, 2025. President Trump
    knows he is placed in charge of the FBI, like Kash Patel talked
    about using the power of the Government to visit retribution on
    anyone the President sees as an enemy.
        Over the last 78 days, we have watched the administration
    attack journalists, the free press, colleges, peaceful
    protesters, Members of Congress, lawyers and law firms, and
    even the Federal judges because they have countered his assault
    on the rights and freedoms of the people. Never have I felt
    more concerned about the extremely broad warrantless
    surveillance powers that have been entrusted to the Executive
    Branch.
        Chair Jordan and I have disagreed about various things in
    the past, but I must say he has shown commendable and strong
    leadership and worked across the aisle to ensure that
    Republicans and Democrats alike understand the dangers of
    unchecked government surveillance and the times bear him out. I
    am looking forward to working with him closely on a bipartisan
    basis in this set of hearings and the lead up to the expiration
    of FISA Section 702 next year to stand up for all Americans'
    civil liberties. I thank him for his leadership. I thank you,
    Mr. Chair, and I yield back.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. The Chair recognizes
    the Chair of the Full Committee, Mr. Jordan, for his opening
    statement.
        Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Section 702 of the
    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allows Government to
    conduct surveillance of foreigners, as the title would suggest,
    outside of the United States for intelligence information. OK,
    that is all well and good. We like that. They get that
    information. They bring in this giant database, what I call the
    haystack of information, and then they do queries which is a
    fancy word for search and they search Americans, American phone
    numbers, names, email addresses, and they search Americans.
    They call it queries, but a query is a fancy name for search.
        Three million times they did it in 2021. Here is the
    kicker. The FBI, when they did all these searches, didn't even
    follow their own rules. You don't have to take our word for it.
    The Inspector General said 278,000 times, the FBI didn't even
    follow their rules for conducting these searches on Americans,
    not foreigners. The Ranking Member is right. We have got 12
    months from now when we get a chance to go to this issue again.
    We were close last time. We lost the warrant requirement in a
    vote 212-212. I am going to do everything, and I know the Chair
    is and I appreciate the Ranking Member's comments. We are going
    to do everything we can to make sure we have that warrant
    requirement.
        Here is the way it works in our country. You are an
    American citizen, and the Government wants to go look at your
    stuff. They have got to go to a separate equal branch of
    Government and get a warrant. It is pretty simple. That is what
    we want. Plain and simple and we were one vote away from
    passing it in the House. Who knows what would have happened in
    the Senate, but I know I am committed. I know the Chair of the
    Subcommittee is committed and the Ranking Member, I appreciate
    what he has done over the years in defending the Constitution,
    the Bill of Rights, and we look forward to working with him on
    this issue.
        We need to do this to protect American citizens and as the
    Ranking Member said, ``The way it has always worked, if you
    want to look at someone's stuff, go get a warrant.'' Go to a
    separate branch of Government, get a warrant. That is how
    probable cause--and here is the other thing. We even put
    exceptions in there, exigent circumstances, something really
    bad is going to happen or you give permission because there is
    some cyber-attack on you or your company. We put exceptions in
    there. We will put them back in again. Sometimes I thought we
    made too many exceptions. We will do it again. We have got to
    win. We have got to win this issue 12 months from now, April--I
    forget the date in April, but it is April of next year and we
    have got to make sure we win this, and I appreciate the Chair
    bringing our witnesses here. Thank you for coming and having
    this hearing on this very important--a fundamental issue for
    the American people. I yield back.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields back. Without objection,
    all other opening statements will be included in the record. We
    will now introduce today's witnesses.
        First, Mr. James Czerniawski. Mr. Czerniawski is a Senior
    Policy Analyst at Americans for Prosperity where he focuses on
    issues surrounding technology and innovation. Prior to joining
    AFP, he was a technology and innovation policy analyst at the
    Libertas Institute.
        Mr. Philip Kiko is a Principal at Williams & Jenson, PLLC.
    He is a former Chief Administrative Officer in the House of
    Representatives. He has signed everybody here's checks at some
    point or other and has served on a number of positions with
    Members of Congress and the Committees including the Judiciary
    Committee. He also served in the Executive Branch at the
    Interior Department and the Department of Education.
        Mr. Gene Scaerr is a partner at Scaerr Jaffey LLP and
    serves as the General Counsel at the Project for Privacy and
    Surveillance Accountability. The Project for Privacy and
    Surveillance Accountability advocates for greater protection
    for Americans' privacy rights and civil liberties in government
    surveillance programs.
        Mr. Kia Hamadanchy, did I hit it?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Hamadanchy.
        Mr. Biggs. Hamadanchy. OK. Very good. Mr. Hamadanchy is a
    Senior Policy Counsel to the ACLU where he focuses on civil
    liberties, among other issues. He previously served as a House
    and Senate staffer.
        We welcome each of our witnesses and thank you for
    appearing today. We will begin by swearing you in. Would you
    please rise, and raise your right hand?
        Do you each of you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury
    that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to
    the best of your knowledge, information, and belief so help you
    God?
        Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
    the affirmative. Thank you, you may be seated.
        Your written testimony will be entered into the record in
    its entirety. Accordingly, we ask that you summarize your
    testimony in five minutes. We are going to go first to you, Mr.
    Czerniaski, and you may begin for your five minutes.

                     STATEMENT OF JAMES CZERNIAWSKI

        Mr. Czerniawski. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member
    Raskin, and the Full Chair of the Committee, Mr. Jordan, for
    holding this important hearing here today. This is an
    incredibly important topic, Government surveillance of U.S.
    citizens. This matter isn't just a question of policy or
    politics. It is a matter of principle. Our Founding Fathers
    enshrined individual liberty and privacy as bedrock ideals of
    our Constitution, yet over the years, we have seen a
    surveillance State that only continues to expand operating with
    limited accountability under the guise of national security.
        I do not believe that many would deny the importance of
    national security. Many, including myself, recognize that the
    world is a dangerous place and that there are people in this
    world that would seek to do harm to our great Nation and its
    people. I would know this firsthand growing up in Queens, New
    York, and experiencing the terrible events and aftermath of 9/
    11, a solemn day in American history that I will never forget.
    It was also a day that served as a catalyst for pushing our
    Nation down this path of increased surveillance.
        However, while national security is important, it cannot
    and must not come at the expense of the very freedoms that
    define us. Looking back at history sends a stark warning of all
    the dangers in allowing an unchecked government too much power.
    Oftentimes, unfortunately, we know all too well that granting
    such powers to the Government can result in outcomes where that
    very power gets leveraged against the very people it was meant
    to protect.
        Time and time again, we have caught the intelligence
    community with their hand in the constitutional cookie jar, if
    you will, as they use their spy powers to surveil Americans and
    when questioned on their wrongdoing and what they are going to
    do to fix it, the agency, rather than taking the moment
    seriously and implementing significant changes, puts out
    platitudes and promises that it will never happen again, until
    it does.
        One might take from this exercise that the agencies are
    seemingly more concerned with the notion of managing bad
    headlines than they are with the sanctity of Americans' privacy
    and constitutional protections against overreach and tyranny.
    This repeated cycle of violations of Americans' rights, coupled
    with the lack of serious accountability, has led to a
    significant decline in public trust in the very institutions
    charged with keep them safe.
        In December 2024, CNN's Harry Enten was on air covering
    recent Gallup polling that found that support for the FBI, in
    particular, was at an all-time low with just 41 percent of
    respondents thinking that the FBI is doing either an excellent
    or great job, representing an 18 percent drop in favorability
    in just 10 years. That is a damning indictment against one of
    the key agencies responsible for keeping Americans safe.
        When it comes to the question of what can be done to
    address this issue, particularly when it comes to FISA, there
    are a litany of great ideas floating out there, but here are
    three key ones I would like to highlight for you here today:
    (1) Closing the back door search loophole; (2) closing the data
    broker loophole; and (3) strengthening third-party oversight at
    the FISA Court.
        The key reforms I just highlighted here today will not end
    any surveillance that is going on right now or prevent those
    authorities from being utilized to ensure our national
    security. What they will do is ensure that the rights of
    Americans are not trampled on in the process of carrying out
    those duties. This is not a moment for complacency. This is a
    moment for action. We must reaffirm our commitment to the
    values that make our Nation exceptional. We must demand
    policies that protect our privacy, uphold our liberty, and
    preserve the Constitution as the cornerstone of our democracy.
    As Members of the Committee with primary jurisdiction, you are
    in the position to shape policies that properly balance
    security with liberty and to safeguard the very founding
    principles that make our Nation worth protecting.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share our thoughts with
    you today. I look forward to the conversation and answering any
    questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Czerniawski follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Hamadanchy, I recognize you now for your five minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF KIA HAMADANCHY

        Mr. Hamadanchy. Chair Biggs, and the Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
    behalf of American Civil Liberties Union regarding the myriads
    of government surveillance programs that impact Americans of
    all backgrounds.
        At the start of my testimony, I want to express the
    optimism and hope of the ACLU as the Subcommittee and this
    Congress can use the next 12 months to put into Federal statute
    not only long-overdue protections against the misuse of foreign
    surveillance authorities, but also protections for everyone
    across our country against the largely unaccountable
    surveillance State.
        A little over a year from now, Section 702 of the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Act is scheduled to expire. While
    Section 702 requires that surveillance must be targeted at
    foreigners overseas, large quantities of communications that
    Americans exchange with people abroad are also swept up and
    stored for future investigations. The FBI, NSA, and CIA then
    conduct searches of their Section 702 databases for the
    communications of Americans without having to demonstrate a
    probable cause as the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require.
        Last year, Congress, reauthorized Section 702 for two years
    with the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. While
    we await further reporting from the Intelligence Committee on
    the impact of its changes, there is one recent development
    since reauthorization I would like to note. In December, the
    District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled in a
    criminal case that the warrantless searches that the FBI
    conducted under Section 702 violated the Fourth Amendment. This
    ruling is the first of its kind and one of the rare cases where
    criminal defendants have received notice of Section 702
    surveillance. While Section 702 is of particular importance to
    this Subcommittee because it is an issue that Congress has no
    choice but what to address over the course of the next year, it
    is not the only form of government surveillance that raises
    concerns and I would like to briefly touch on a few related
    topics.
        First, as this Subcommittee is familiar, in recent years we
    have seen the ever-growing practice of law enforcement and
    intelligence agencies circumventing constitutional protections
    by purchasing access to data that they would otherwise need a
    warrant to obtain. According to former Deputy Director of the
    CIA, Michael Morrel,

            The information that is available commercially would kind of
            knock your socks off. If we collected it using traditional
            intelligence methods, you would keep it Top Secret Sensitive
            and you wouldn't put it in a database. You would keep it in a
            safe.

    The only way to ensure that protections against Federal
    agencies circumventing the Fourth Amendment by purchasing such
    data is through legislation like the Fourth Amendment Is Not
    For Sale, which passed the House Judiciary Committee last
    Congress without a single no vote.
        The second additional form of surveillance I would like to
    highlight is reverse warrants such as reverse location or
    geofence warrants and reverse key word warrants which allow law
    enforcement to secure information that implicates law numbers
    of people who are not suspected of any wrong doing. These
    broad, suspicionless dragnet searches are deeply problematic
    and are tantamount to the Revolutionary War Era general
    warrants that led our Nation's Founders to prohibit their use
    through the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. As the Fifth
    Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, the reverse location
    warrants are modern day general warrants and are
    unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
        The next issue I would like to highlight is cross-agency
    data linkages. On March 20th, President Trump issued Executive
    Order 14243 directing Federal agencies to facilitate the
    sharing and consolidation of agency records with the stated
    goal of combating waste and fraud. However, the broad and
    unregulated access to sensitive data not only breaches privacy,
    but risks the creation of a database that creates a single
    searchable profile of every American without transparency or
    clear, legal limits. Without robust privacy protections, this
    could risk the eventual creation of a vast and unaccountable
    surveillance State capable of tracking every citizen's
    activities, movements, and associations.
        Finally, all these surveillance programs run the risk of
    being super charged by the rapid growth and use of artificial
    intelligence. This Subcommittee should undertake a
    comprehensive review of AI technologies used for surveillance
    under its jurisdiction and assess their impact on privacy and
    civil liberties. This Committee and this Congress have an
    unparalleled opportunity over the next 12 months to protect all
    Americans by fundamentally reforming Section 702 starting with
    imposing a warrant requirement.
        We look forward to working with you and getting these long,
    overdue reforms to the President's desk by next April. At the
    same time, we strongly urge this Committee to also address the
    massive and growing privacy problems for Americans raised by
    the broader surveillance ecosystem.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hamadanchy follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Kiko for his five minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF PHILIP G. KIKO

        Mr. Kiko. Thank you, Chai Biggs and the distinguished
    Members of Congress, including Chair Jordan and Ranking Member
    Raskin.
        As you know, the Judiciary Committee has a long,
    distinguished, and complicated history with terrorism laws. I
    discussed the history and other legislative efforts in the
    testimony I delivered two years ago as an addendum to my
    written statement. The overreach of government agencies and
    FISA and using FISA authorities is well documented and
    Inspector General reports, FISA Court opinions, and Congress'
    oversight work.
        As a backdrop, one must contend with internet-enabled
    platforms that connect almost everyone to an extraordinary
    complex digital world which captures users' personnel data,
    records likes and dislikes, preferences, and creates a
    personality profile for every digital user some firms compile
    and sell this data to third parties. Users consent to such
    dissemination of their data by signing lengthy Byzantine terms
    of service agreements and there are passive ways that data is
    collected as well for facial recognition cameras to license
    plate readers that enable law enforcement to identify and
    investigate crime in the real world. The rise of AI makes all
    this more complicated. In a very real way, we live in a modern,
    albeit consensual surveillance State. What is needed is the
    continued bipartisan oversight by this body to rein in and
    protect the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
        How do we do this? Well, one way is continued targeted
    legislative reforms that were accomplished in the previous
    Congress in H.R. 7888. Additionally, in an age where massive
    amounts of user data has been commercialized by data brokers,
    you should ask yourself, if the Government can obtain
    information from a company or a third-party data broker which
    ordinary would require a determination of probable cause from a
    detached magistrate or judge as the Fourth Amendment requires,
    and they obtain information by paying for it without that time
    honored legal process, that undermines a crucial safeguard of
    civil liberty. I would expect we can deal with that in the next
    reiteration of 702.
        The legislative reforms are only half the battle. What is
    absolutely required here is continued vigorous targeted
    oversight by the Legislative Branch, not passing laws or
    oversight. Just as law enforcement is increasingly able to
    identify and interdict crime in real time, Congress' FISA
    oversight must also be in real time. What does that mean?
    Congress must insist on timely disclosure of information.
    Through no fault of their own, committees have received
    information in response to reporting requirements that are
    months and sometimes years old. This information is useless.
        This after-the-fact approach can be problematic. The
    provisions of H.R. 7888 are a valuable step in solving this
    problem, but this would only work if Congress received timely
    access to the information. All this must happen promptly.
    Information must be shared promptly, and Congress must allow
    real-time access. I would also direct Members' attention to
    Section 18(b) of H.R. 7888, which requires the Director of
    National Intelligence to commission a study on technological
    enhancements for the FBI to monitor compliance of the Bureau's
    702 information systems in their real time.
        Should Congress use AI to modernize FBI's compliance with
    FISA? Consider something like this in the next iteration of
    FISA. Why couldn't Congress be entitled to access of that
    information on an on-going or even rolling basis? AI would make
    that allowable. Of course, Congress must continue to include
    Sunset Provisions in the FISA reauthorization. The Sunset
    Provisions give Congress the leverage it needs to ensure
    compliance.
        In short, the short leash must be on the Intelligence
    Committee, not Congress. I would also make a pitch because I
    believe that there are over a million people in the Executive
    Branch that have access to SCI clearances, and I just wonder
    how many people on the Judiciary Committee or how many people
    in Congress have access to those to do oversight and I would
    just make a pitch to increase those clearances.
        In any event, I am not someone who is hostile to strong,
    national security laws or Federal enforcement. Congress should
    not repeal 702. However, it is Congress' constitutional duty as
    Congress' constitutional entity closer to the people, it must
    continue its vital and constitutional oversight. Thank you
    again for the opportunity to testify.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kiko follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you.
        The Chair is not recognizes, Mr. Schaerr for your five
    minutes.

                       STATEMENT OF GENE SCHAERR

        Mr. Schaerr. Thank you, Chair Biggs. Thank you, Chair
    Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, my own Congressman, and Chair
    Jordan, and the other Members of the Subcommittee.
        I commend my fellow panelists for their insights and their
    hard work on the issues that we're discussing today.
        I served as Chair and General Counsel to the nonpartisan,
    proprivacy organization called the Project for Privacy and
    Surveillance Accountability, which is blessed to have your
    former Chair, Bob Goodlatte, as our Senior Advisor.
        Over the last 25 years, the administrations of both
    parties, our Nation has seen an expansion of privacy-destroying
    technologies and practices--key elements of a panopticon-style
    surveillance State coming together before our eyes.
        One such element, of course, is FISA Section 702, mentioned
    repeatedly previously, in which the NSA's global trawl
    routinely catches the communication of innocent Americans. That
    program, of course, was the subject of the Reforming
    Intelligence and Securing America Act, RISAA, which passed the
    Congress last year and some have falsely claimed closed Section
    702's loopholes. As useful as RISAA was, it left important work
    undone.
        To see why, recall that RISAA primarily codified 702-
    related rules and procedures that the FBI itself adopted by
    early 2022, but the FBI failed, even by its own standards, when
    it conducted 204,000 warrantless searches for Americans'
    communications later in 2022. A DOJ audit recorded a
    noncompliance rate--that is, a noncompliance with the
    procedures rate--of at least 3,400 civil rights violations a
    year, almost 10 per day. Those included warrantless
    surveillance of a U.S. Senator, a State Senator, and a State
    judge.
        Since RISAA's passage in April 2024, the Director of
    National Intelligence has revealed additional improper
    searches, including the communications of a congressional
    candidate, a congressional Chief of Staff, numerous Federal
    employees, and even the spouse of an applicant for a security
    clearance.
        Beyond 702, routine searches of sensitive data purchased
    from data brokers are at least as serious a threat to privacy,
    but is currently shrouded in even greater secrecy than 702
    searches. As abuses continue, the legal foundation for the
    FBI's warrantless searches under both of those programs is
    collapsing.
        As Mr. Hamadanchy noted earlier, in December, building on a
    landmark Second Circuit ruling that held that a search of the
    Section 702 database constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment
    purposes, a Federal District Court ruled that the government
    had violated the Fourth Amendment when it failed to obtain a
    warrant before conducting such a backdoor search of the 702
    databases.
        Absent an explicit warrant requirement written into statute
    for searching both 702 data and purchased data, we can expect
    that such abuses will continue. Unfortunately, in the last
    Congress, this Committee demonstrated that it's possible to
    erect useful guardrails to protect Americans' civil rights
    against such abuses.
        There's wide bipartisan support for reform, and although
    the two warrant requirements that we discussed earlier for 702
    data and for purchased data ultimately did not become law,
    advancing them as far as you did was a tremendous legislative
    accomplishment.
        With a YouGov poll showing that at least 70 percent of
    Americans support these kinds of warrant requirements, you can
    now move forward with confidence. Yes, you can expect whispered
    opposition from some elements of the intelligence community or
    the IC, but your proposals last year, as Chair Jordan
    mentioned, already answered their main objections.
        An additional objection that we've heard frequently is that
    the IC will sometimes claim that a warrant requirement would
    require an additional army of FBI attorneys and FISA judges,
    but again, your proposals have a ready answer to that.
        Using the FBI's own numbers, spelled out in the exhibit
    that's attached to my written testimony, the Bureau would, at
    most, have to handle an average of three additional queries per
    day requiring a warrant. That's not an overwhelming burden, as
    former prosecutors like Mr. Knott can confirm. It's a small
    price to pay for increasing public confidence in the entire
    FISA system, not to mention complying with the Fourth
    Amendment.
        In short, this Committee has already proven that you can
    protect both the constitutional rights of your constituents and
    keep them safe. We urge the Committee to uphold the
    Constitution by, once again, boldly advancing, and then,
    persuading your colleagues to adopt these two important warrant
    requirements.
        I thank you again for the opportunity to testify and look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Schaerr follows:]
       [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Biggs. Thank you so much.
        We will now proceed under the five-minute rule with
    questions.
        I now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Tiffany.
        Mr. Tiffany. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Czerniawski, in your testimony--I'm going to read from
    it,

            RISAA did little in the form of reforms while simultaneously
            dangerously expanding the scope of surveillance by changing the
            definition of what was considered an electronic communications
            service provider.

    Could you expand on that a little bit? What are you talking
    about there, that RISAA actually did not solve the problem and
    may have made it worse?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Thank you for the question,
    Representative.
        When we were looking at RISAA last year, as part of the
    reforms, they included a provision that would expand the
    definition of an electronic communications service provider.
    Now, this used to be a more narrowly tailored thing to capture
    data from these particular companies. The way that they
    extended the definition would capture a wider array of
    companies, so virtually including everybody, right?
        So, what you ended up seeing was, from the Department of
    Justice, they made a promise that they were going to keep their
    searches for this kind of data a lot more limited, but again,
    it is still problematic enough that even the Chair of the
    Senate Intel Committee, Senator Warner, committed to trying to
    get a fix to that.
        Unfortunately, that still has not gotten done to date, but
    this is a real serious threat. It's now virtually any, anybody
    that has data on Americans could be subjected to being
    considered an electronic communications service provider.
        Mr. Tiffany. So, we think the new leadership at the FBI is
    going to be better in terms of respecting people's
    constitutional rights. Should Congress just move on from this
    issue or should it act?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Thank you for the question,
    Representative.
        I think that, in light of the fact that administrations can
    change, I would not want to leave it up for interpretation for
    a potential abuse underneath a future administration. So, I do
    think that Congress should act to go and fix this overly broad
    definition of an electronic communications service provider.
        Mr. Tiffany. Mr. Schaerr, could you comment on the
    amendment that Mr. Biggs had in his bill that allowed for
    limited exceptions? Yet, we were being browbeaten saying that,
    ``No, you cannot do this. You cannot pass the Biggs bill
    because there will be no way out to be able to get a perhaps
    bad actor.''
        Would you care to comment on that?
        Mr. Schaerr. Sure. Well, and a number of reasons were
    offered for that. My analysis is that it was all just
    fearmongering. Every single objection that I heard was just
    based on a misunderstanding of Mr. Biggs' amendment.
        For example, as Chair Jordan mentioned earlier, the
    amendment had an exigent circumstances exception. If there were
    a ticking time bomb, the agency could act without getting a
    warrant.
        Of course, the amendment allowed for people to consent to
    searches. So, if the FBI thought that somebody was being the
    subject of a cyberattack, for example, they could go to that
    person and say, ``We think you may be the subject of a
    cyberattack. Could we search your communications, so that we
    can find out who it is and try to forestall it?'' That person
    could then consent. That's also a well-recognized exception
    under the Fourth Amendment.
        So, the Committee very carefully, and Chair Biggs very
    carefully, built in the protections that the FBI might
    legitimately need to be able to conduct searches without a
    warrant.
        Mr. Tiffany. So, the long and short of it, the Biggs
    amendment dealt with what you term ``the exigent
    circumstances''?
        Mr. Schaerr. Yes.
        Mr. Tiffany. Is that correct?
        Mr. Schaerr. It had an express exception for that, and it
    also, it also exempted metadata searches. So, the FBI could
    actually look to see who was communicating with whom under
    Chair Biggs' amendment. It just couldn't actually search the
    communications themselves.
        Mr. Tiffany. I want to ask you another question and I'm not
    sure if you are going--you let me know if you can answer it or
    not.
        In 2021, the FBI lawyer Kevin Clinesmith was sentenced to
    12 months' probation versus a typical five years. Why was that?
        Mr. Schaerr. Yes. Well, it was an unfortunate slap on the
    wrist. I'm separately representing Carter Page in his
    litigation against the Department. I thought it was an outrage
    that Clinesmith got such a low sentence for such an egregious
    act of dishonesty before the FISA Court.
        Mr. Tiffany. Who was the judge in that FISA Court case?
        Mr. Schaerr. I believe it was Judge Boasberg.
        Mr. Tiffany. Yes. So, Mr. Chair, this is the same Judge
    Boasberg that we see regularly in the news these days. The
    ultimate insider judge here in Washington, DC, gives a slap on
    the wrist to Kevin Clinesmith, who misrepresented the
    information out there, to the detriment of, it sounds like,
    your client, now is doing everything he can to keep foreign
    alien criminals in the United States rather than sending them
    back home.
        I yield.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman yields.
        The Chair recognizes the Ranking of the entire Committee,
    Mr. Raskin.
        Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        A lot of people were willing to give 702 a chance because
    of the various exceptions and amendments that were added to try
    to protect and insulate constitutional values, and specifically
    there, the Fourth Amendment requirement of a search warrant.
        What has happened in the meantime has taught me, anyway,
    that we should never condition respect for constitutional
    values on an expectation of the goodwill of political actors in
    the Executive Branch of government.
        Mr. Hamadanchy, a week after he took office, President
    Trump fired all the Democrats on the Privacy and Civil
    Liberties Oversight Board, which we had created, leaving it
    without the quorum necessary to do business.
        Can you tell us what the Privacy and Civil Liberties
    Oversight Board does or what it is supposed to do, and why it
    is a basic defeat of the legislative design that it is no
    longer functioning?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Yes. So, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
    Oversight Board is designed to report on the privacy and civil
    liberty implications of the surveillance and counterterrorism
    programs of the Federal Government.
        These Members that have been fired, they actually had
    demonstrated independence from the Biden Administration in
    putting out a report that the Biden Administration, on 702,
    very much disagreed with.
        It's not a good thing for the President to be able to fire
    these independent Board members who are meant to provide
    independent oversight, because it chills their ability to
    provide that oversight if you think the President can fire you
    if you say something he doesn't like. That is why Congress
    actually removed from the statute language that said the
    President could fire these Board members.
        Mr. Raskin. Then, that is not a partisan thing, as you just
    pointed out. The Framers of the Constitution expected anybody
    who got in as President to push the boundaries of his or her
    own power, to the detriment of the other branches, but,
    essentially, to the detriment of the citizens, right?
        So, that is something we saw in the Biden Administration,
    as you point out, and something that we are seeing right now
    with huge red flags in the Trump Administration. So, we have
    got to write laws that insulate constitutional values against
    anybody who gets into the Executive Branch.
        Does this Board issue reports and recommendations?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Yes. When they have a quorum, they
    regularly issue reports. Last year, they did a report on 702.
    They recently, before the firings, did a report on watchlisting
    programs, and they regularly would issue reports when they are
    able, when they have a quorum. When they haven't had a quorum,
    it's the PCLOB has been much less effective.
        Mr. Raskin. All right. So, there's no quorum. There are no
    reports. There are no recommendations. Congress is not getting
    the information we need to determine whether or not in this
    difficult terrain constitutional values are being protected
    against government overreach.
        So, I take it you agree with me that it was bad for civil
    liberties and constitutional rights that the President fired
    the Democrats on the Board?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Yes, I do.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Schaerr, do you agree with that?
        Mr. Schaerr. We would like to see PCLOB reconstituted as
    quickly as possible.
        Mr. Raskin. OK. Mr. Kiko, the same question to you.
        Mr. Kiko. Yes, the same, we would like to have it
    reconstituted with the same kind of people that were there.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Czerniawski?
        Mr. Czerniawski. The same.
        Mr. Raskin. Yes.
        Mr. Czerniawski. Similar to them, yes, we would like to see
    PCLOB reinstituted with the full membership.
        Mr. Raskin. OK. Mr. Schaerr, I want to ask about the
    reforms that Congress did make to Section 702 last year when we
    reauthorized FISA. The bill mandated the FBI's National
    Security Division report to Congress the number of U.S.
    persons' so-called ``backdoor searches'' conducted each month.
        That is, as Chair Jordan explained it, the data is mocked-
    up from all the surveillance of foreign persons, but, then,
    since the theory is we are in lawful possession of the data,
    backdoor searches can exist for Americans.
        Why is it important for us to know the number of backdoor
    searches that the FBI is conducting on a monthly basis?
        Mr. Schaerr. Well, for one thing, so that you can know the
    extent of the issue. You can, with the number, you can
    understand better the risk to Americans' privacy of the whole
    702 system.
        It also enables you to evaluate claims that are made by the
    IC about the effect of additional reforms. I don't know how you
    can, how you can act and respond, respond to their arguments
    without knowing exactly how many people--
        Mr. Raskin. What was the FBI sending us before the new
    reporting requirements were put in?
        Mr. Schaerr. My understanding is that it was pretty spotty.
        Mr. Raskin. Yes. The additional reporting is going to
    require more staff and more support. I had previously learned
    from the National Security Division that they wanted 14 more
    people to comply with Congress' requirements. Not only have
    they frozen hiring, but they have also removed the person who
    was responsible for managing of the compliance and audits. So,
    what does that mean--
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Raskin. Yes, but if I could just finish this sentence?
    What does that mean for the new statutory language that we put
    in?
        Mr. Schaerr. Well, we would certainly support staffing that
    very important function at NSD.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Biggs. Without objection, Mr. Cline will be permitted
    to participate in today's hearing for the purpose of
    questioning the witnesses, if a Member yields time for that
    purpose.
        The Chair now recognizes the Chair of the Full Committee,
    Mr. Jordan.
        Chair Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Hamadanchy, what is the main argument the other side
    uses on the warrant requirement? We think there should be a
    warrant. They have an argument. Can you tell the Committee what
    that argument is?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. They will, typically, say, ``We have
    lawfully collected this information already. So, we should be
    able to search through it.''
        The Second Circuit has recognized that the search of a U.S.
    person's data is a separate Fourth Amendment event that
    requires a separate Fourth Amendment analysis.
        Chair Jordan. Yes, that is their argument, ``Oh, we
    followed the law. We were searching foreigners overseas for
    intel.'' Right? That is what the law says they can do. They
    said, ``We followed the law. So, now, we can search the data
    for Americans.'' That is the problem.
        The court in New York just last year said, ``No, no, no,
    you can't do that.'' The court said this--here's a fundamental
    question. Tell me if you agree. Should the government be
    allowed to do warrantless searches of the same information
    Section 702 says it is not allowed to collect?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. The court was very clear that they should
    not be able to do that.
        Chair Jordan. Right, and the law says it. You are supposed
    to collect information on foreigners overseas, foreign
    intelligence. Now, there are people who say, ``No, you don't
    need a warrant because we're going to do searches for Americans
    using their identifiers, their email, their phone number, their
    name.'' Well, that is not supposed to be in there. The court
    said you can't have it both ways.
        That is what the other side wants. They want to have it
    both ways. They can call it ``incidental.'' They can say,
    ``We're doing a query, not really a search.'' That doesn't fly.
        Again, don't take our word for it. The court in New York
    said so December of last year, is that right?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Yes, and the court said, like citing the
    Second Circuit, that simply storage is not enough. It said it
    in, I believe, Riley v. California, which gave the example of a
    case where they lawful possession of a cell phone. They still
    needed a warrant to be able to search the contents of that cell
    phone.
        Chair Jordan. Yes. This is, the Chair knows we spent a year
    debating this within our conference and with our friends on the
    other side last Congress. Then, we are about ready to go back
    into the same darn fight for the next year.
        This court decision, we didn't have that last year. I like
    the way they say it. They said:

            It would be paradoxical to permit warrantless searches of the
            same information that Section 702 is specifically designed to
            avoid collecting.

        You are not supposed to collect information on Americans,
    but, ``Oh, we did this search of foreigners and we got some. So
    now, we can search Americans.'' No, that makes no sense, but
    that has been the argument year after year, Congress after
    Congress. Hopefully, we can get to commonsense and what the
    court said this Congress and say, ``Time out. You can't do it
    anymore.''
        We will still put the exceptions in, for goodness' sake.
    So, to answer their other argument, ``Oh, there could be an
    emergency situation, imminent threat.'' OK, fine. We don't want
    bad things to happen to America. Fine, you can do that.
        If we can't get this passed, it is--I don't know; I was so
    frustrated because winning beats losing every time and a tie is
    a loss. That is what we had last time. We have got to make sure
    we win this time, Mr. Raskin.
        [Laughter.]
        We need to make sure we win this time.
        I will yield my time either to the Chair or to Mr. Cline. I
    have a minute and 40 seconds left.
        Mr. Cline?
        Mr. Biggs. Mr. Cline?
        Mr. Cline. Thank you.
        Mr. Kiko, if the government can't articulate how many
    Americans care being surveilled under Section 702, how can it
    claim the program is narrowly tailored to national security
    threats?
        Mr. Kiko. If they can't articulate it, then they--I won't
    say what they're doing. It's certainly not telling the truth.
        Mr. Cline. Is it really a national security risk to require
    a warrant to search the communications of Americans, especially
    if there is probable cause?
        Mr. Kiko. No, it's not a national security risk.
    Everybody--it's we collect all this incidental information, and
    you should have a, you should have a warrant to search it.
    That's not why it was collected. It was incidental.
        As other witnesses said, ``there's other ways to check on
    this information without like metadata and stuff like that.''
    So, that's my opinion.
        Mr. Cline. Mr. Czerniawski, you have spoken about
    government overreach and tech policy. So, how do we justify
    allowing the government to query vast databases of Americans'
    private communications without a warrant, especially when those
    queries are increasingly used in routine criminal
    investigations?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Yes, thank you for the question,
    Representative.
        I don't think you can justify it. At the end of the day,
    when people discover that the government has violated their
    trust by violating their Fourth Amendment rights to search for
    these vast databases for their communications, that undermines
    their faith and trust in a key institution that they believe is
    supposed to be protecting them. It's quite chilling for them to
    realize that that weapon is being turned inward and being
    leveraged against them to spy on them, when they have not
    necessarily done anything wrong.
        Mr. Cline. I'm going to ask the ACLU witness, whose name I
    can't read on that.
        Can you give us an update on the status of the decision?
    Was it appealed from the Second Circuit?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. So, the decision was a District Court
    decision. The defendant lost on separate grounds. So, it would
    actually be the defendant who has to appeal it, not the
    government. The government can't actually appeal that. I'm not
    sure what the defendant plans on doing.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Cline. Thank you.
        Mr. Biggs. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New
    York, Mr. Goldman.
        Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I do look forward to having this debate. As someone who
    spent 10 years writing, drafting, and getting warrants through
    courts, and recognizing, also, the exigent circumstances that
    often exist with the 702 information, it is not as simple as my
    friend, the Chair at the end, would have you believe. I
    probably disagree with some of the witnesses here today as
    well.
        The problem I have with this hearing is, this is an
    important argument, but it pales in comparison to what is going
    on right now with Americans' privacy, with Americans' national
    security. We are talking about whether there should be a
    warrant to search a certain amount of information lawfully
    collected from foreigners. It's not a broad set of information.
        Yet, some nongovernment employee, Elon Musk, is getting
    access to every single American's personal identification
    information. His employees, some of whom have already been
    found to have stolen information from one company to bring to
    another competitor, are getting access to Americans' personal
    identification information, whether it be through the Social
    Security Administration, it be through the Department of
    Treasury.
        So, it feels like this hearing, while important, is
    somewhat misguided at this time, when the privacy
    considerations of every American are at risk, rather than a
    very narrowly tailored set of Americans who are communicating
    with foreigners who are suspected, or potentially suspected, of
    being involved in adversarial actions against the United
    States.
        The other thing that I want to bring up with our friends
    here is the threat to national security. We are talking a lot
    about that in this hearing. Obviously, 702 is designed to
    protect our national security.
        As many of you know, I'm sure, last week I believe it was,
    the NSA Director General Timothy Haugh, widely, widely
    respected, a career national security official overseeing the
    NSA, which is principally responsible for using Section 702
    materials and gathering Section 702 materials, he was fired. Do
    you know why he was fired, Mr. Hamadanchy?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. The reporting is that there were certain
    people commenting to the President, specifically, Laura Loomer,
    that he should be fired.
        Mr. Goldman. Laura Loomer. Yes, Laura Loomer went in and
    had a meeting with the President and urged that General Haugh
    should be fired because he was handpicked by General Mark
    Milley, who was the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2023,
    when Haugh was nominated to lead both the Cyber Command and the
    NSA.
        Now, this is the same Laura Loomer who says 9/11 was an
    inside job; who has openly advocated at a White nationalist
    conference that she is a White advocate; who said during the
    campaign that, if Kamala Harris, who is half-Indian, won, that,
    quote, ``The White House would smell like curry and White House
    speeches will be facilitated via a call center''; who has said
    that numerous mass shootings are all hoaxes and conspiracies;
    who calls herself a proud Islamophobe, and perpetuated the
    completely bogus conspiracy theory about Haitian immigrants in
    Ohio. Yet, she is given access to the President of the United
    States to make a national security recommendation that,
    coincidentally or not, the next day happened.
        How does this affect our national security, Mr. Hamadanchy,
    when a conspiracy theorist who is denounced by numerous
    Republicans is effectively making decisions about who oversees
    our most sensitive collection agency?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. So, I think the first question is whether
    or not the NSA Director was refusing to follow any illegal
    orders. The reporting does not indicate that.
        The second question is, have there been any policy changes
    at the NSA since President Trump took office? That's something
    that this Committee should look at.
        The third question is, who is the President going to
    replace the NSA Director with? If that person is unqualified,
    if that person has the potential for abuse, to abuse the
    authority of NSA? That's something that Congress should weigh-
    in on, if that's the case.
        Mr. Goldman. I agree--
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Goldman. Mr. Chair, I will. I will, if I could just
    have one second?
        Mr. Biggs. No, you can't.
        Mr. Goldman. I agree that--
        Mr. Biggs. Your time has expired.
        Mr. Goldman. --I hope we do look into all that because
    that's far more important than Section 702 right at this
    minute.
        Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Goldman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
    Moore.
        Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Chair, a quick question.
        The Crossfire Hurricane investigation and subsequent
    surveillance of Carter Page, a real dysfunction and political
    bias, obviously, on the part of the FBI leadership, but also
    real problems with FISC, is that correct?
        Mr. Schaerr. It did. It illustrated that FISC does not
    always examine the warrant applications under Title I with
    sufficient care, and that's one of the reasons that our
    organization, working with Senator Lee and many others, has
    been pushing for reforms at the FISC that would allow amici,
    friends of the Court, to participate in important FISC
    proceedings to ensure that privacy is protected.
        Mr. Moore. One of the reforms--are there other reforms, as
    you recommend, to help as we work through this process of
    reauthorizing 702 that we could put into the law that would
    help eliminate some of these abuses? Lord, there have been a
    number of them.
        Mr. Schaerr. Well, the amicus requirements were
    strengthened somewhat in RISA. I think they can be strengthened
    still further. RISA did contain a very useful provision in that
    it allowed the Chair and the Ranking Member of this Committee,
    for example, to sit in on FISC proceedings so that there's more
    of a window of transparency there.
        Certainly, FISC needs additional staff. They need to have
    additional people who are cleared, so that they can process
    their business more expeditiously, but--
        Mr. Moore. Also, RISA--and I think we put in the--require
    the same judge to renew the application process.
        Mr. Schaerr. Yes.
        Mr. Moore. There were some other things, too. One of the
    things that--the reason I was a no-vote is I thought there
    should be a warrant requirement. Would you agree with that?
        Mr. Schaerr. Absolutely.
        Mr. Moore. That was stripped out at the end. That was a
    tough vote for many of us. We wanted to do what we could to
    renew this thing, but when you got--when I came to D.C., they
    wanted to issue me another government phone. I said, ``I think
    you just need to put everything on one phone.'' They were like,
    ``Well, sir, if we do that, we're going to know everything that
    is on your phone.'' I thought to myself, ``Like you don't
    already.'' Right?
        So, as we are going through these hearings, we understand
    they are spying on U.S. citizens without warrants. That was one
    of the things that I thought we absolutely needed to do. What
    are improvements that Congress can consider to--for FISC on how
    it operates, some other improvements as we're going through
    this process?
        Mr. Schaerr. None beyond those I have just mentioned.
        Mr. Moore. OK. So very good.
        Mr. Czerniawski, will you explain how the government has
    abused nondisclosure orders relating to the use of information
    obtained under FISA?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Yes. Thank you for the question,
    Representative. The government has utilized the information
    gathered under the FISA in numerous of instances to spy on
    Americans, whether that was spying on protestors during the
    Black Lives Matter riots or looking at the communications of
    19,000 donors to a political campaign. The list goes on and on.
        Really, when people see that revelation coming up after the
    fact, it does undermine their trust because they feel that the
    government now is starting to snoop at them. That has a real
    chilling effect if now, simply because you want to support a
    candidate, now you could be subjected to government
    surveillance. That is a pretty unnerving outcome for people to
    see this carried out.
        Even in this most recent iteration of the FISA
    reauthorization fight, to see that those surveillance
    authorities had been abused to spy on a sitting Member of
    Congress, a sitting Member of the Senate, it showed to me that
    the intelligence community seemingly had no self-restraint on
    what they were willing to do to get access to whatever
    information they thought was necessary. That is really
    alarming.
        Mr. Moore. Extremely alarming. For those of us that--one of
    the top issues was always the weaponization of the government,
    and certainly, certain Members were spied on and, like you
    said, Members of Congress.
        With that, Mr. Chair, I yield my remaining time to our
    friend Mr. Cline if he wants to take it. If not, I will yield
    back to you.
        Mr. Cline. I appreciate the yielding.
        Mr. Kiko, do you think you would support an independent
    audit of these queries conducted under 702?
        Mr. Kiko. Yes, I would support that.
        Mr. Cline. How else can we ensure meaningful congressional
    oversight when most of the relevant details are classified and
    shielded from public scrutiny?
        Mr. Kiko. Well, I just think there are a lot of
    requirements that are already in the law. I just would hope
    that the requirements are adhered to in a very quick manner,
    the audits are done in a very quick manner, and the audits and
    requirements are audited in the next year, so if they are not
    complied with, then you can deal with that through the next
    reauthorization.
        I do think that the IG was very good in coming up with all
    the problems and everything, and Congress responded to 15 or 20
    requirements. It is, basically, oversight is--you have to bring
    the intelligence community to heel.
        Mr. Cline. Thank you.
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired. I now
    recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, for five
    minutes.
        Mr. Kiley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I think it is important to note at the outset the successes
    that we did have in the last Congress in reauthorizing FISA for
    the protection of America and American national security while
    instituting some truly significant reforms, which were
    developed through the painstaking work of this Committee and in
    a bipartisan way in a Committee that is not always known for
    its spirit of kumbaya bipartisanship. We were able to find a
    lot of common ground in protecting civil liberties without
    burdening the ability of our national security officials to
    protect Americans.
        However, there is, as Chair Jordan noted, more work to do.
    I do think it is important to look at what was done in the bill
    that was signed into law in the last Congress. We had reforms
    that included new and heightened civil and criminal penalties
    for those who violate the terms of the FISA authorities and
    that required reporting on FBI disciplinary investigations. It
    requires the FBI to establish minimum accountability standards
    for violations of the querying process. The bill significantly
    reduced the number of FBI personnel authorized to approve
    queries, required audits of U.S. person queries, and included
    increased transparency measures, among other important reforms.
        There is a broader question here, though, when it comes to
    the pace at which we are seeing technology develop and the
    newfound opportunities that this opens up for very problematic
    violations of privacy or uses of surveillance, but then at the
    same time, the opportunities to perhaps use that technology not
    only to advance national security and public safety, but to do
    so in a more narrowly tailored way.
        Advances in AI are an example of that where there are
    obviously a host, an unlimited variety, of potentially
    problematic uses by those who are entrusted with the power to
    investigate American citizens, but then there are also already
    a number of very positive proven use cases.
        So, my thought--and I will maybe direct this at you, Mr.
    Hamadanchy--is on how we can harness this technology in the
    right way going forward. You gave an example of how there was
    one police agency in Florida that--or maybe this was you, but--
    so either of you can weigh in on it, but that used an algorithm
    to try to predict where crimes were more likely to occur. That
    seems like it actually could be helpful if it allows us to
    allocate police resources in the right way, but may be
    unhelpful if it leads to people being targeted prematurely or
    in a way that violates their civil liberty.
        I guess I will give either of you an opportunity to opine
    on that. Maybe we will start with Mr. Hamadanchy, and then
    since I misremembered who actually gave this example, I will
    give you the opportunity as well.
        Mr. Hamadanchy. I would say we are definitely concerned
    about the use of AI in surveillance. More than four years ago,
    we had a report where intelligence agencies were saying they
    want to embed AI in every stage of the intelligence cycle. The
    NSA stands out in this context because it just described itself
    as a leader in integrating AI into intelligence-gathering.
        There are real concerns that AI is being used to automate
    target selection and potentially initiating surveillance
    without adequate human review. That is something the Committee
    should look into as it considers these issues.
        Mr. Czerniawski. Thank you for the question,
    Representative. I think that it is incredibly important. As you
    rightly note, artificial intelligence is a tool. It is a pretty
    neutral values/neutral kind of thing. It depends on who is
    using it as to whether or not that can be used for good or for
    bad.
        It is really unfortunate when we see instances like what
    happened in Florida where they were using AI to develop this
    algorithm to identify prolific offenders and then give them
    community visits. One such person ended up in the hospital with
    symptoms of an anxiety attack because of the presence of law
    enforcement coming up and showing on their door. You can
    imagine that this is a very frightening experience for some
    people.
        That it just reinforces the need--I don't want to go and
    take away a tool from law enforcement from being able to
    leverage a tool like artificial intelligence or other
    technologies that are out there, but I do think that it is
    important to make sure that if they are going to be using it,
    that we have proper rules and guidelines and procedures in
    place to minimize the potential downside here because when the
    State does leverage these technologies and they get it wrong,
    the costs are really high both for the city that ultimately
    bears the responsibility of the legal action that follows and
    for the victims in that case.
        There is a really good conversation to be had about what we
    can do to go and better set guardrails around this so that law
    enforcement doesn't lose access to critical tools that can help
    them with their public safety functions while simultaneously
    protecting people's Fourth Amendment rights.
        Mr. Kiley. Yes, and I will add to that this--getting this
    right is really important, not just for protecting civil
    liberties in the first instance, but also because there are so
    many truly beneficial applications of AI in this and other
    contexts, and that if we don't--
        Mr. Biggs. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Kiley. --get these threshold questions right for
    protections, then it could lead to a backlash that undoes those
    possibilities. With that, I yield back to the Chair.
        Mr. Biggs. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair recognizes now the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
    Lee.
        Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for convening this important
    hearing.
        Thank you to our witnesses who have joined us today to
    provide testimony. This Committee remains committed to
    restoring public trust in our Federal law enforcement agencies,
    and a critical part of that involves holding open, informed
    conversations with experts like yourself to identify areas of
    proposed reform and change that we can then use to inform our
    work and collaboration with the intelligence community.
        Last Congress, I was proud to lead the RISA bill that we
    have been discussing here today, which made significant reforms
    to how our Federal law enforcement agencies handle, collect,
    and retain critical intelligence. This legislation was an
    important first step in our broader effort to rebuild
    confidence in the intelligence community and to keep America
    secure.
        There is no question that the abuses that we have seen,
    particularly in the FBI's handling of Section 702 information,
    are deeply troubling, and the surveillance unauthorized or
    unlawful of American citizens must be stopped. It should not
    have happened, and it must not happen going forward, which is
    why accountability and transparency and the things that we are
    discussing here today are so important.
        It is also important that any discussion that we have about
    702 include a recognition of why we have it and why it exists
    and that this is a vital part of our country's intelligence-
    gathering capabilities. It is an essential component of what we
    do, and it is necessary that this conversation center on how we
    make it better, how we ensure accountability and transparency
    without dismantling it.
        With that in mind, I appreciate your efforts to help us
    strike that balance and identify where we can further improve
    and strengthen FISA overall and Section 702 in particular.
        Mr. Schaerr, I would like to start with you and in
    particular return to the discussion you were just having about
    the FISC and some of the reforms that we implemented in the
    FISC to ensure a greater level of accountability and prevention
    of some of the abuses that we've seen in the past.
        In particular, as you know, the RISA bill implemented
    inclusion of a more adversarial process for FISC proceedings.
    You just mentioned you thought we could do more there with
    amici. I would love to hear more about your thoughts about how
    that program could be further enhanced.
        Mr. Schaerr. My recollection of RISA is that--and I agree
    with you, Congresswoman Lee, that there were some very useful
    reforms in RISA, and we should look to build on those rather
    than tear them down.
        With respect to amici and the FISA court, I think that one
    limitation is that, currently, amici are only appointed if the
    judge decides that an amicus would be helpful. That obviously
    leaves the FISC judge with lots of discretion as to whether to
    appoint an amicus.
        We would prefer to see that expanded somewhat so that there
    is a category of cases where the judges are expected to appoint
    amici, for example, cases that obviously involve sensitive
    political issues or religious issues, like the FBI's
    investigation of the traditionalist Catholics down in Richmond
    last year or a couple of years ago.
        Those kinds of situations--and you can identify categories
    of situations where an amicus, at least presumptively, should
    be appointed. If an amicus is not going to be appointed, then
    the judge should have to explain why not.
        Ms. Lee. I would note a couple of additional reforms we
    made specifically in the FISC that were targeted to prevent
    some of the past abuses we have seen--first, a requirement that
    exculpatory evidence be included in an application before the
    FISC; and second, also that opposition research could not be
    the basis for granting of a warrant by the FISC.
        Are there other things that you think--first, do you find
    those reforms to be something that was productive and useful?
    Second, are there other things you think we should get at or
    address there with the FISC?
        Mr. Schaerr. Absolutely. Those were important reforms, for
    sure. One additional thing that would be very useful is to
    create a system whereby people whose rights are abused in the
    FISC court--for example, like the Kevin Clinesmith situation--
    make clear in the law that people who are victims of that are
    entitled to compensation when that happens. That will not only
    be fair to those people, but also will provide an added
    deterrent to abuse.
        Ms. Lee. Thank you.
        Mr. Chair, my time is expired.
        Mr. Biggs. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
    Mr. Knott.
        Mr. Knott. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for having this
    hearing. To all the Members and the guests, thank you for your
    participation.
        I come at this line of questions from my own experience as
    a Federal prosecutor. I have actually engaged in surveillance
    of American citizens through a process called the Title III
    wiretap. The level of protections that are required to get to
    the actual flipping of the switch--it is fairly astounding.
    Obviously, it is one of the more intrusive investigative
    techniques, so you have to demonstrate necessity. You have to
    demonstrate why other techniques are futile.
        Candidly, once we would go to trial or once we would charge
    the case, the rigor that we had to exercise was very important
    for a number of reasons. Obviously, it kept the internal
    investigators accountable. It kept the process--once we were--
    the investigation was ongoing, it kept it open and honest. They
    knew that their actions were going to be subject to pen and
    paper. They were going to be subject to judicial review, and
    then obviously, with opposing counsel, they would review it.
    Also, when we would go to court, if there was a jury trial, the
    jury themselves would know these actions; this evidence, was
    collected with sufficient predication.
        I do find it somewhat--I don't want to say troubling yet,
    but it is amazing to me that there is so much resistance to the
    warrant requirement alone. In that vein, with the Title III
    wiretap on one side, I am very familiar with how the evidence
    is collected, how it is stored, how it is accessed.
        Mr. Czerniawski, if you could explain, with the 702 program
    and the FISA court, how is the data that is collected under
    that subsection--how is it, again, collected, stored, and then
    accessed? Does that make sense? Just tactically and in a
    physical server, how is it collected and stored and accessed?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Yes, so it is stored on a secure server.
    The backdoor search loophole really is why this is so
    important, right? Because this is basically allowing the
    government's ability to search the communications that they
    have incidentally collected or, as Chair Jordan has referred to
    it, incidental collection of Americans' information during the
    surveillance of foreign targets, all without a warrant, right?
        Mr. Knott. Right.
        Mr. Czerniawski. This warrant requirement that we have been
    advocating for adds that necessary layer of protection because,
    as you pointed out, as we are--we are using warrants,
    basically, as a procedure matter of demonstrating why we got to
    where we got. That is really important that--when we are
    talking about foreigners that is fine if we are going to go and
    engage in surveillance, but once those surveillance powers turn
    inward and we are trying to tap into that data that we have
    collected, that we have that warrant process carried out, so
    that way we have due process.
        Mr. Knott. When that much information is readily available,
    the natural trend throughout history, regardless of who is in
    power--obviously, people on my side of the aisle are very
    distrustful given what happened with President Trump. There
    have been conservative abuses when we are in power, without
    question.
        Mr. Czerniawski. Absolutely.
        Mr. Knott. In regard to that information, how easy is it to
    access once it is collected?
        Mr. Czerniawski. It is fairly easy for people to go and
    access that, and that is why we have seen the litany of abuses
    as to why that information needs to have a better, tightened
    control. Now, admittedly, as Representative Lee was talking
    about, they have done some limited changes in RISA to go and
    talk about what kinds of members of the FBI can go and query
    that data.
        We believe that this is still not sufficient. This is why
    we want that warrant requirement, so that way we can have that
    procedural accountability of who is tapping into it, and be
    able to have the necessary--
        Mr. Knott. Is there any way, with the current technology
    infrastructure, to determine how often that material is
    accessed and by whom?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Right now, I think that it is a challenge
    in its own right because we don't have full transparency into
    who is querying it.
        Mr. Knott. That is a huge problem.
        Mr. Czerniawski. It is a massive problem.
        Mr. Knott. That is a huge problem.
        Mr. Czerniawski. Yes. Absolutely, Representative.
        Mr. Knott. Mr. Chair, let me talk to you really quickly. In
    regards to you mentioned earlier that you worked with Carter
    Page. That obviously highlights a lot of abuse, again, for
    political purposes, right? Which is what the Fourth Amendment
    is designed in part to protect against.
        What type of penalties, what type of deterrences, are there
    for the law enforcement community if they abuse the 702 access
    to information currently?
        Mr. Biggs. Well, currently, there is--for one thing, there
    is no personal liability if somebody abuses that system. There
    is only the potential for liability against the government
    itself if you can jump through the necessary hoops.
        Mr. Knott. Given how opaque this process is, that is very
    hard to build a case against.
        Mr. Biggs. It is very difficult.
        Mr. Knott. Yes. In the Title III wiretap affidavit, if you
    lie, if you submit false information, you will be charged. You
    could lose your law license, et cetera.
        Mr. Biggs. Right. Right. We don't yet have those kinds of
    protections in the 702 area. We moved a lot closer to them with
    RISA, but--
        Mr. Knott. Yes. Well, I could go a lot longer, but, Mr.
    Chair, five minutes goes very fast.
        Mr. Biggs. Thanks. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I now yield to myself for five minutes. I, like all you--I
    want to see PCLOB back up and running.
        I will ask you, Mr. Hamadanchy, is this the first time that
    we have been without a quorum on PCLOB?
        Mr. Hamadanchy. It is not.
        Mr. Biggs. Yes. It is not. We need to get it up and run as
    quickly as possible, but it is not--this isn't necessarily
    unique. It needs to get fixed, though. I wanted to ask you a
    question because you responded, and I am going to tell you how
    I interpreted your answer why the firing took place. You said
    it was reported that Laura Loomer recommended that. I interpret
    that as meaning that you are like me. I don't know why he was
    fired.
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Yes, I only know the reports that I read.
        Mr. Biggs. Yes.
        Mr. Hamadanchy. I will say there is a difference, also,
    between a job like the NSA where the President has the
    authority to fire someone, where with PCLOB, it is an
    independent oversight board, and the President should not be
    able to fire those board members.
        Mr. Biggs. He currently has the authority now, but maybe
    some reform there is what you are suggesting.
        Mr. Hamadanchy. Yes. Well, we would argue that he did not
    have the authority to fire the board members.
        Mr. Biggs. OK. All right. Fair enough.
        I am going to go on here. Mr. Schaerr, you reported that
    there was--you indicated that there was some reported abuse,
    even perhaps post-RISA. Can you give us an idea?
        Mr. Schaerr. Yes.
        Mr. Biggs. Right.
        Mr. Schaerr. That is from an ODNI report from after RISA
    was passed that described a number of additional abuses,
    including congressional staffers and a number of Federal
    employees and even the spouse of somebody who had requested a
    security clearance.
        Mr. Biggs. It is remarkable because RISA was supposed to
    take care of probably that very kind of thing and failed to do
    so, which is indicative that we need to do more.
        Mr. Schaerr. Right.
        Mr. Biggs. Mr. Kiko, I would venture to say, the Chair is
    gone, but the Ranker is still here. RISA allowed for the Chair
    and the Ranker to attend FISC hearings. My guess is that they
    haven't been able--actually, we have got a busy schedule, so
    probably did not get to do that. We actually were trying to get
    that expanded, those of you who are participating with us, so
    there would be more Members of Congress who could actually get
    there.
        Do you know if the Chair or the Ranker have been able to
    actually attend a FISC hearing?
        Mr. Kiko. No, I do not.
        Mr. Biggs. You have indicated there should be some more
    oversight. How do we get more vigorous oversight, and in a
    shortened answer, how would you say we do that?
        Mr. Kiko. I would just--
        Mr. Biggs. You need your microphone, please.
        Mr. Kiko. Yes, I see that. I would just have meetings all
    the time. I would have somebody, whoever is your oversight
    person, call these people up and say, ``Where are you on this?
    Give a report,'' because there are 15 or 20 requirements that
    are new requirements in RISA. You should hold their feet to the
    fire and get in coordination with the Inspector Generals and
    have a whole bunch of stuff done that way.
        I did mention in my testimony, though, there was a
    requirement that--for one of the intelligence agencies to use--
    I think it was the FBI--AI to make sure that there is
    compliance.
        Mr. Biggs. Right.
        Mr. Kiko. I don't know why this body, your Committee,
    shouldn't be able to real-time make sure that there is
    compliance, and what does that compliance look like? Just make
    sure that they are complying with everything because you are
    going to be reauthorizing the bill in a year.
        Mr. Biggs. I agree with you. We need to be more vigorous in
    oversight, definitely and for sure.
        Mr. Czerniawski, the warrant requirement--and Mr. Knott
    alluded to this. A lot of people think that is just too onerous
    to get. With a recent court ruling, but beyond that, if there
    are exigencies in there--did we miss any exigencies, any
    sections, when we put together the amendment to the proposed
    bill last year?
        Mr. Czerniawski. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chair. I
    believe that the warrant--the sections to the warrant
    amendments that you put together during the last Congress were
    quite robust in terms of providing the needed flexibility for
    the agencies to conduct their surveillance without necessarily
    needing to worry about that. You did a very good job with that,
    sir.
        Mr. Biggs. Thank you. I would say that I am where Chair
    Jordan is. I thought we actually opened the door up too wide,
    broader than you would have in a normal Fourth Amendment
    exigency circumstance.
        Needless to say, we are going to work on this. I appreciate
    all of you being here today. I appreciate your testimony, and I
    think more reforms ahead, to be frank with you. So, with that,
    thank you all, and we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

        All materials submitted for the record by Members of the
    Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance can
    be found at: https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent
    .aspx?EventID=118101.

                                     [all]