    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     EXAMINING POLICIES TO COUNTER CHINA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                        COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   ----------

                               FEBRUARY 25, 2025

                                   ----------

                                Serial No. 119-5

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

            [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILANLE IN TIFF FORMAT

                      EXAMINING POLICIES TO COUNTER CHINA

                                     ______

                      EXAMINING POLICIES TO COUNTER CHINA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                        COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 25, 2025

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 119-5

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

                                www.govinfo.gov

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                              WASHINGTON : 2025
     59-601

                     HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                        FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman

    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice        MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking
        Chairman                             Member
    FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma             SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice
    PETE SESSIONS, Texas                     Ranking Member
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  BRAD SHERMAN, California
    ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    TOM EMMER, Minnesota                 DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
    BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                AL GREEN, Texas
    JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee              EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
    BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin               JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
    WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South        BILL FOSTER, Illinois
        Carolina                         JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
    MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana             JUAN VARGAS, California
    RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina         JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
    DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania          VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
    YOUNG KIM, California                SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
    BYRON DONALDS, Florida               AYANNA, Massachusetts
    ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York        RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
    SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin          RITCHIE TORRES, New York
    MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska                 NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
    MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas             CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
    ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee              JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
    ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa                   SAM LICCARDO, California
    LISA McCLAIN, Michigan
    MARIA SALAZAR, Florida
    TROY DOWNING, Montana
    MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
    TIM MOORE, North Carolina

                          Ben Johnson, Staff Director
                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, February 25, 2025

                                                                       Page

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial
      Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas..................     1
    Hon. Maxine Waters, Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial
      Services, a U.S. Representative from California................     3

                                   STATEMENTS

    Hon. Joyce Beatty, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on National
      Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial
      Institutions, a U.S. Representative from Ohio..................    78

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. John Miller, Senior Vice President of Policy, Trust, Data,
      and Technology, and General Counsel, Information Technology
      Industry Council...............................................     4
        Prepared Statement...........................................     7
    Mr. Nicholas McMurray, Managing Director, International and
      Nuclear Policy, ClearPath......................................    13
        Prepared Statement...........................................    15
    Mr. John Cassara, Special Agent, United States Department of
      Treasury (Retired).............................................    25
        Prepared Statement...........................................    27
    Mr. Martin Muhleisen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoEconomics
      Center, Atlantic Council.......................................    62
        Prepared Statement...........................................    64
    Dr. Rush Doshi, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies, and
      Director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on
      Foreign Relations, and Assistant Professor, Edmund A. Walsh
      School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University...............    70
        Prepared Statement...........................................    73

                                    APPENDIX
                       MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Hon. French Hill:
        Build Back Nuclear, March 1, 2021............................   136
        Our Energy Future, January 16, 2025..........................   140
    Hon. Bill Huizenga:
        The IMF Reform and Integrity Act.............................   142
    Hon. David Scott:
        Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Letter......................   148
    Hon. Ayanna Pressley:
        Elon Musk's China Threat.....................................   152
        China May Welcome Elon Musk's Cuts...........................   159
        How Elon Musk's deep ties-to and admiration for-China could
          complicate Trump's Beijing Policy..........................   162
        Elon Musk: A Chinese Puppet?.................................   166
        Elon Musk Is a National Security Risk........................   171
    Mr. Martin Muhleisen:
        CFS Funding Disclosure.......................................   173
    Mr. John Miller:
        ITI's Policy Recommendation for U.S. Economic Security.......   176
    Washington Institute for Near East Policy:
        Washington Institute for Near East Policy Letter.............   186
        Beijing's Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy..............   187
        China's Security Presence in the Middle East.................   190
        North Africa in an Era of Great Power Competition............   214
        G42 and the China-UAE-US Triangle............................   265
        How Russia's Invasion of Ukraine is Reshaping the Global Arms
          Market.....................................................   270
    CATO Institute: Chinese Ownership of U.S. Farmland: Separating
      the Wheat from the Chaff                                          290
    Alliance for Peace Building                                         297
    CJPA Global Advisors LLC                                            302
    Transparency International U.S. (``TI US'')                         304
    Center for American Progress (CAP)                                  308
    Prepare Statement from Ms. Celina B. Realuyo, Adjunct Professor,
      The George Washington University Elliott School of
      International Affairs Statement                                   330

                     RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Written responses to questions for the record from Representative
      Maxine Waters
        Mr. John Miller..............................................   346
        Mr. Nicolas McMurray.........................................   348
        Mr. John Cassara.............................................   350
        Mr. Martin Muhleisen.........................................   353
        Dr. Rush Doshi...............................................   354
    Written responses to questions for the record from Representative
      Warren Davidson
        Mr. John Miller..............................................   358
    Written responses to questions for the record from Representative
      Troy Downing
        Mr. Nicolas McMurray.........................................   362
        Mr. John Miller..............................................   364
        Mr. John Cassara.............................................   366

                                  LEGISLATION

    H.R. ------, the PROTECT Taiwan Act..............................   368
    H.R. ------, the Agricultural Risk Review Act of 2025............   371
    H.R. 910, the Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act......................   375
    H.R. ------, the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2025..........   384
    H.R. ------, the International Nuclear Energy Financing Act of
      2025...........................................................   394
    H.R. ------, the Protecting America's Medical Supply Chains Act
      of 2025........................................................   402
    H.R. ------, the Stop Fentanyl Money Laundering Act of 2025......   409
    H.R. ------, the Stop Chinese Fentanyl Act of 2025...............   414
    H.R. ------, the Combating Money Laundering in Cyber Crime Act of
      2025...........................................................   422
    H.R. ------, the China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025...   425
    H.R. ------, the Neutralizing Unfair Chinese Export Subsidies Act
      of 2025........................................................   428
    H.R. ------, the Financial Privacy Act of 2025...................   433
    H.R. ------, the Financial Technology Protection Act of 2025.....   439
    H.R. ------, the International Financial Institutions Governance
      Act of 2025....................................................   448
    H.R. ------, the Aligning SEC Regulations for the World bank's
      International Development Association Act......................   453
    H.R. ------, the OFAC Licensure for Investigators Act............   456
    H.R. ------, the African Development Fund Replenishment Act of
      2025...........................................................   460

                       EXAMING POLICIES TO COUNTER CHINA

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, February 25, 2025

                         U.S. House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Financial Services,
                                                       Washington, D.C.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
    room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. French Hill
    [chairman of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Hill, Lucas, Sessions, Huizenga,
    Wagner, Barr, Williams of Texas, Davidson, Rose, Steil,
    Timmons, Stutzman, Norman, Meuser, Kim, Garbarino, Fitzgerald,
    Flood, Lawler, De La Cruz, Nunn, McClain, Downing, Haridopolos,
    Moore, Waters, Velazquez, Sherman, Meeks, Scott, Lynch, Green,
    Cleaver, Himes, Foster, Beatty, Vargas, Gottheimer, Gonzalez,
    Casten, Pressley, Tlaib, Garcia, Williams of Georgia, Fields,
    Bynum, and Liccardo.
        Chairman Hill. Without objection, the chair is authorized
    to declare a recess of the committee at any time.
        This hearing is entitled ``Examining Policies to Counter
    China.''
        Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days
    within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for
    inclusion in the record.
        I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening
    statement.

        OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE
      COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
                                ARKANSAS

        I want to welcome our members to this hearing on China, and
    I will look forward to our testimony.
        From the very first Trump Administration, many will recall
    a key China policy issue as the global race to fifth generation
    (5G) of wireless network technology. We urged caution to our
    foreign partners by both the executive and the legislative
    branch and our friends around the world about telecom
    infrastructure. We said there is a right way, and there is a
    Huawei. Yet, other technologies before 5G showed that there is
    always a country that launches an innovation first is not
    always the one that wins. Rather, it is the economy that has
    got the economic system to transform those technological
    advances into winning new products and services resulting in
    economic and productivity gains.
        I open with this example of 5G because, in the broader
    context of our economic and geopolitical rivalry with China, it
    is often neglected. Instead, narrow questions end up taking an
    existential importance. One day, it is the race to 5G; the next
    day, it is concern over a trendy Chinese app like TikTok; or,
    today, it is DeepSeek's ability to answer a question in more or
    less time than a U.S. competitor.
        Of course, these things merit our close attention but if
    these are the trees, then Congress must really still see the
    forest. For example, if we edge out China in artificial
    intelligence, but Washington prevents our companies from
    commercializing it, what happens? If we secure a 1-year lead in
    hypersonics, but a defense procurement obstacle course makes
    its deployment a pipe dream? What if we attract to our shores
    the greatest technical minds in the world, but our tangle of
    red tape regulations means that their startups being taken
    public is out of the question? In short, winning a race is no
    substitute for choosing a better way of life with a better
    political and economic system.
        At our hearing today, we will examine tools to counter
    China. Make no mistake, those tools are embedded in an American
    system, and it is the health of our thriving system that
    ultimately decides who will prevail.
        We will use sanctions, for example, but sanctions did not
    build a $30 trillion economy. We can use export controls, but
    it was not export controls that created eight American
    exceptional technology companies, each worth more than a
    trillion dollars. We can use the Committee on Foreign
    Investment in the United States (CFIUS), but CFIUS did not make
    the dollar the world's premier reserve currency.
        Today's hearing is based on the idea that beating China
    means doubling down on American strengths. First, we must
    ensure that our Federal budget, our fiscal house, is in order
    and on a sustainable path. Next, we must lead a global
    financial system where like-minded economies reject
    nontransparent, predatory lending, and mercantilism while
    crafting and enforcing rules that safeguard economic growth and
    stability.
        Second, our investors, our markets, our institutions, both
    large and small, must be able to nurture cutting-edge ideas and
    help take them from friends-and-family backed startups to an
    initial public offering.
        Third, we must ensure that access to capital is coupled
    with access to energy. That means the United States must
    champion an all-the-above energy strategy, offering real
    alternatives to failed Chinese lending and white elephants.
        Last but not least, our strength depends on prioritizing
    Americans' health and safety of our hometowns and our cities,
    which have been so devastated by an opioid surge that China has
    helped unleash.
        Each of these elements is key to any real China strategy,
    and it is critical that they are all addressed today.
        I yield back, and the chair now recognizes the ranking
    member of the committee, the gentlewoman from California, for a
    4 minute opening statement.

     OPENING STATMENT OF HON. MAXINE WATERS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
      COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
                               CALIFORNIA

        Ms. Waters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. This
    is very important.
        Good morning, everyone. I and committee Democrats have long
    recognized the national security concerns and threats to our
    economy from the Chinese Communist Party. We are very
    supportive of efforts to prevent Wall Street from investing
    Americans' hard-earned savings in the Chinese military. I have
    also pressed for the United States to use an influence at the
    IMF--that is the International Monetary Fund--the World Bank,
    and other multilateral institutions to stop the worst lending,
    contracting, and other industrial practices of China.
        Mr. Chair, while I would love to work with you in a
    bipartisan way to advance efforts to stop China's aggression, I
    am concerned that our efforts would be meaningless as President
    Trump and his unelected billionaire Co-President, Elon Musk,
    destroy the U.S. Government and our alliances. In just the past
    month, Trump has imposed import taxes on our closest allies,
    frozen aid for impoverished nations, illegally shuddered U.S.
    Agency for International Development (USAID) and Consumer
    Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and threatened to illegally
    seize Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal. Inexplicably, he
    has also sided with Russia's President Putin over allies in
    Ukraine and Europe, withholding military assistance and blaming
    Russia's murderous invasion on the victims of its war.
        As Trump tears up treaties and alliances, embraces
    dictators, and abandons America's global leadership role, he
    has given China a free pass to fill the void left by his
    retreat. We are here to talk about China and discuss bills
    about countering Chinese Government aggression, all while
    Trump, Musk, and congressional--some--congressional Republicans
    give China the green light to seize other of our allies--such
    as Taiwan. Trump and Musk have so eagerly sold-out America's
    values and workers to China because they are singularly focused
    on billionaire tax cuts and amassing more personal wealth.
        As it stands, Elon Musk makes billions in China, where more
    than half of Tesla vehicles are produced. Nearly 40 percent of
    Tesla's battery supply relies on Chinese companies, and Chinese
    buyers represent Elon Musk's largest markets. While Tesla's
    sales continue to collapse in the United States, last year,
    there was a 90 percent increase in China, and Trump is ready to
    forcibly remove Gazans to build golf courses for Trump and his
    billionaire friends and investors, just as the CCP--that is the
    Chinese Communist Party--forced removal of Uyghurs from their
    land.
        Racist nationalism, antidemocratic activity, and even
    genocide and war are not a concern if it means power and wealth
    for them and their billionaire class. While this is to be
    expected from people like Musk and Trump, I am deeply
    disappointed that my Republican colleagues, many of whom have
    previously been outspoken about the important role the United
    States plays as a beacon of freedom and defender of democracy
    around the globe. Republicans did not even speak up when the
    Trump Pentagon refused to allow one of its trafficking experts
    to join us today to speak about Chinese fentanyl precursors and
    Chinese money laundering.
        Committee Democrats believe that together we can solve the
    world's greatest problems. To counter China, we must stand with
    our allies and fight for a vibrant, effective democracy with
    respected civil servants who carry out our foreign policy.
    Democrats will not rest until we stop the unlawful effort to
    dismantle our government here and overseas. Hopefully, our
    Republican colleagues will come to their senses and join us in
    this effort.
        Thank you for the additional time, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Hill. The gentlewoman yields back. Today we----
        Ms. Waters. I yield back.
        Chairman Hill [continuing]. we welcome the testimony of
    John Miller, Senior Vice President of Policy, Trust, Data, and
    Technology, and General Counsel, Information Technology
    Industry Council; Nicholas McMurray, the Managing Director of
    International and Nuclear Policy, ClearPath; John Cassara, a
    retired Special Agent formally with the U.S. Treasury
    Department; Martin Muhleisen, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at
    the GeoEconomic Centers at the Atlantic Council; and Dr. Rush
    Doshi, the Cornelius Vander (C.V.) Starr Senior Fellow For
    Asian Studies, and Director of the China Strategy Initiative at
    the Council on Foreign Relations, and an Assistant Professor at
    Georgetown University.
        We thank each of you for taking time with us today. Each of
    you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral
    presentation of your testimony.
        Without objection, your written statements will all be made
    part of the record.
        Mr. Miller, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF POLICY,
     TRUST, DATA, AND TECHNOLOGY, AND GENERAL COUNSEL, INFORMATION
                      TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY COUNCIL

        Mr. Miller. Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, and
    distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of the
    Information Technology Industry Council, or ITI, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today on examining U.S.' policies to
    counter China.
        This is a timely topic, and I commend the committee for its
    thoughtful and sustained engagement in this area.
        ITI is a global policy and advocacy organization
    representing eighty of the world's leading tech companies. I
    lead ITI's Trust Data and Technology Policy Team, including our
    work on security, artificial intelligence, and data policy in
    the United States and globally.
        ITI's members represent every vertical of the tech
    ecosystem from cloud and artificial intelligence (AI) to
    consumer electronics, from semiconductors and data centers to
    cybersecurity. Our membership represents around 10 percent of
    the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), directly employs 9
    million Americans, and accounts for roughly 32 percent of the
    market capitalization of the 500, Standard and Poor's (S&P)
    500.
        As of 2024, there were seven companies that had reached or
    exceeded global market cap of $1 trillion. Six of those seven
    are U.S. tech companies who are ITI members. Policymakers
    should recognize the preeminence of these companies and the
    innovation economy they anchor as an asset and the envy of
    other nations.
        Indeed, the strength of the innovation economy bolsters the
    broader U.S. economy and drives the U.S. competitive advantage
    in tools and capabilities that underpin U.S. national security,
    such as semiconductors, AI, quantum and advanced manufacturing.
        Do not take for granted the current U.S. technology lead
    over China. China's longstanding disregard for international
    norms governing free trade and market access and its theft of
    information technology (IT) has been well established and must
    be addressed. However, regardless of whether China plays by the
    rules, we should be clear eyed that, over the past two decades,
    China has improved in technological development, innovation,
    and growth, and that these gains have not been achieved simply
    by virtue of stealing U.S. technologies.
        Make no mistake, ITI and the companies we represent take
    seriously the U.S. Government's obligation to protect national
    security. Successful policies to counter China's technological
    rise must enable companies to better compete globally--not wall
    the United States off from competing with China or
    inadvertently erect hurdles to U.S. tech, innovation, and
    investment.
        U.S. investments, supply chain, tax and trade policies, and
    regulations must be crafted to maintain the current asymmetric
    advantage as a key driver of U.S. economic security. We believe
    the government and industry must work together to achieve these
    objectives in a way that supports the innovation, investment,
    and economic growth that are foundational elements of economic
    security.
        This morning, ITI released a paper offering our members'
    consensus policy recommendations for U.S. economic security.
    Our paper defines economic security as encompassing elements of
    the economy that affect the stability, technological
    competitiveness, and resilience that enable the government to
    better protect national security. The ideal policy environment
    to foster U.S. economic security is one in which the global
    success of American and multinational companies operating in
    the United States supports technological leadership and
    innovation, and the government and private sector work side by
    side to safeguard critical technologies.
        Our paper, which is incorporated as part of my written
    statement, offers ten recommendations, three of which I will
    highlight now. First, in the area of financial policy,
    investment and transaction reviews should strengthen economic
    ties with allies by establishing clear and targeted national
    security criteria for what is reviewable.
        Capital investments, both inbound and outbound, are
    foundational and help companies in the United States diversify
    the supply chain, engage the research and development
    ecosystem, gain access to global talent, and gather global
    market intelligence.
        Overly broad investment restrictions, whether through CFIUS
    or the Outbound Investment Security Program, will impede
    domestic and overseas investment in and by U.S. companies and
    consequently decrease economic security.
        Second, reinvigorate U.S. trade leadership and open new
    markets to optimize for both trade and economic security. ITI
    encourages the U.S. Government to negotiate robust finding
    commitments that facilitate trade through new strategic and
    targeted bilateral and multilateral market access agreements to
    enable U.S. companies to compete on an even playing field.
        Third, continue to incentivize innovation and investment in
    foundational and emerging technology. One near-term priority
    should be restoring the immediate tax deduction of research and
    development (R&D) expenses to drive innovation and create high-
    wage jobs in the United States. Another should be maintaining
    and improving the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce
    Semiconductors (CHIPS) program by pursuing meaningful
    permitting reform and streamlined reporting requirements. Doing
    so will help promote these multibillion-dollar investments in
    semiconductors, the building blocks of the modern digital
    economy, as a strategic economic security asset.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I
    look forward to your questions.

        [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9601.017

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9601.018

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9601.019

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9601.020

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9601.021

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9601.022

        [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

        Chairman Hill. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
        Mr. McMurray, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

          STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS McMURRAY, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
              INTERNATIONAL AND NUCLEAR POLICY, CLEARPATH

        Mr. McMurray. Good morning, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member
    Waters, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
    invitation to testify today. My name is Nicholas McMurray. I am
    the Managing Director of International and Nuclear Policy at
    ClearPath.
        At ClearPath, we believe in markets over mandates and
    innovation over regulation. When it comes to energy, we want to
    make it here, sell it globally, and compete with China. The
    global energy landscape is rapidly evolving. Demand growth is
    skyrocketing----
        Chairman Hill. Could you pull your mic a little closer
    please?
        Mr. McMurray. Supply chains are shifting, and we are in a
    global competition. Countries want more reliable, affordable,
    and cleaner energy to fuel their economies. This is a major
    opportunity for U.S. companies to lead. Strategic financing
    tools can help the United States strengthen its energy
    leadership, open new markets, and counter China.
        Let me put this into context: China currently has 57
    operating nuclear reactors and 28 reactors under construction.
    While the United States has 94 operating reactors, it currently
    has no commercial reactors under construction, but several
    demonstrations are close.
        The world's electricity consumption is at an all-time high.
    The International Energy Agency says global electricity demand
    could increase up to 76 percent, and we could see double in
    U.S. electricity demand by 2050.
        American private sector innovation is the key, and it
    extends beyond domestic borders. Take advancements in liquefied
    natural gas (LNG), for example. In 2023, the United States
    surged its LNG exports. As a result, Russia's market share in
    the EU, European Union, was reduced from 40 percent in 2021 to
    8 percent in 2023. There is also a huge economic opportunity
    for American companies and other technologies.
        If the United States does not act now; the world will
    choose cheap options from China. China is already taking an
    all-of-the-above energy approach. For example, last year, China
    started construction on about 94 gigawatts of coal capacity and
    also invested $940 billion in clean energy. Without a focused
    effort to expand domestic energy production, U.S. companies
    risk being sidelined in global markets.
        To level the playing field, the United States must
    strengthen its trade and development finance toolkit. Export
    and development financing plays a pivotal role in advancing
    America's strategy for global energy dominance. Export-Import
    Bank (EXIM), and Development Finance Corporation (DFC), can
    strengthen U.S. leadership in global energy markets. America
    must take a more agile approach using financing tools to derisk
    projects and attract private capital.
        Export and development finance prioritizes investments in
    infrastructure, manufacturing, energy security, and economic
    partnerships. EXIM Bank and DFC provide loans and guarantees
    that must be repaid, ensuring taxpayers dollars are used
    efficiently while expanding opportunities for U.S. businesses.
    This approach creates American jobs, strengthens economic ties,
    and positions the United States as the global energy partner.
        Both the EXIM Bank and DFC are due for reauthorization this
    Congress, creating a prime opportunity to refine America's
    foreign policy toolkit. While EXIM Bank is one of the best
    tools for increasing export competitiveness, its current
    capabilities limit the Bank from achieving energy dominance.
        The following five recommendations could bolster U.S.
    energy leadership, enhance energy security, and create domestic
    jobs. First, create a national interest account to consider the
    geostrategic value of investments. Second, expand the China and
    Transformational Exports Program to include broader
    technologies. Third, increase the default cap rate for nuclear
    projects. Fourth, reinforce the U.S. jobs mandate. Fifth,
    bolster domestic manufacturing and overall modernize the bank's
    mission.
        I would be remiss if I did not mention DFC's
    reauthorization this year. Created during the first Trump
    Administration to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, DFC
    has established itself as an effective tool in countering
    China. For example, it now supports nuclear projects after
    removing its nuclear moratorium in 2020.
        The World Bank also plays a critical role, but its outdated
    policies have left a gap that China has eagerly exploited,
    particularly its self-imposed restrictions on financing nuclear
    power. In order to achieve energy dominance, the government
    must provide a predictable environment for developers to
    attract private investment. The work in this committee will be
    critical to providing stability for companies seeking to raise
    capital and compete globally.
        In conclusion, the United States must build domestically
    and sell globally to compete with China. Meeting growing energy
    demand and strengthening global energy leadership requires bold
    action.
        Finally, Congress has a unique opportunity to strengthen
    American solutions by modernizing export and developing
    financing to support nuclear, LNG, geothermal, and other
    technologies.
        I look forward to today's discussion. Thank you.

        [The prepared statement of Mr. McMurray follows:]
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        Chairman Hill. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Cassara, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

        STATEMENT OF JOHN CASSARA, SPECIAL AGENT, UNITED STATES
                    DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY (RETIRED)

        Mr. Cassara. Good morning, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member
    Waters, and distinguished members of the Financial Services
    Committee. It is an honor for me to testify.
        Communist China is an ideological, military, economic,
    commercial, high tech, intelligence, and diplomatic rival of
    the United States and the West. The People's Republic of China
    has a growing exploitative presence in the developing world.
        While these threats are known, the Chinese Communist
    Party's, involvement in transnational crime and money
    laundering is generally not recognized, understood, or
    investigated. My most recent book is ``China--Specified
    Unlawful Activities: CCP Inc. Transnational Crime and Money
    Laundering.'' I found in writing that book the criminal
    activity has seemingly become part of the CCP's overall
    strategy to grow its power.
        Regarding fentanyl, the Mexican cartels are still dependent
    on Chinese precursor chemicals and manufacturing expertise.
    Fentanyl and fentanyl-laced products are smuggled into the
    United States. In calendar year 2023 alone, the Drug
    Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized more than 77 million
    fentanyl pills and nearly 12,000 pounds of fentanyl powder.
    This is the most fentanyl the DEA has ever seized in a single
    year and more than enough to kill every single American. As it
    is, in 2023, more than 107,000 Americans lost their lives to
    drug overdose with 70 percent of those deaths attributed to
    opioids such as fentanyl. Each death a tragedy. Each individual
    that died has a story. Families and communities are devastated.
    This scourge affects every one of the Members' districts and
    our country as a whole. Of course, it all comes back to the
    money.
        Fentanyl production generates enormous proceeds, and the
    Chinese are becoming the money launderers of choice for the
    cartels. They leverage an underground banking system that has
    long served China's immigrant diaspora. They have developed
    other Chinese-centric money laundering methodologies that
    enable the laundering of their illicit proceeds, not only in
    the United States but around the world.
        In my written statement, I give an overview of some of the
    most pernicious enablers as they relate to fentanyl
    trafficking, such as trade-based money laundering, black market
    exchanges, underground financial systems like Fei-Chien or
    flying money, and mirror swaps that are facilitated by Chinese
    mobile phone apps. While my testimony focuses on U.S. efforts
    to counter illicit fentanyl trafficking and money laundering, I
    urge that we do not look at the fentanyl issue in a vacuum or
    as an isolated concern. The CCP's business model that fuels the
    fentanyl crisis is also active in many other sectors of crime,
    including counterfeit goods, intellectual property theft, human
    trafficking, illicit tobacco, and trade fraud. In fact, data
    indicates that China leads the world in 11 of the 12 largest
    categories of transnational crime. Each of these categories are
    also specified unlawful activities or predicate offenses to
    charge money laundering. CCP Inc.'s involvement in these crimes
    is approximately $2 trillion a year. To put that in
    perspective, $2 trillion is very roughly half the estimated $4
    trillion that is laundered annually around the world.
        I call corruption a great enabler for money laundering. CCP
    Inc. has taken their domestic corruption and exported it
    overseas. They excel in so-called influence operations, which
    is probably a major reason for the lack of focus on CCP Inc.'s
    criminality and money laundering. Once again, these specified
    unlawful activities, methodologies, and enablers cannot be
    viewed in isolation. Rather, they are intertwined and must be
    addressed collectively. CCP international law breaking makes
    them exposed; it makes them vulnerable.
        I conclude my written testimony with recommendations that
    emphasize law enforcement and more effectively following the
    money and value trails.
        Thank you very much.

        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cassara follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILANLE IN TIFF FORMAT

        Chairman Hill. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Muhleisen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF MARTIN MUHLEISEN, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW,
                 GEOECONOMICS CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL

        Mr. Muhleisen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Waters, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
    today. My name is Martin Muhleisen. Before joining the Atlantic
    Council's GeoEconomics Center, I retired from the International
    Monetary Fund in 2021, having served as chief of staff and
    director for strategy policy and review, among others. The
    following are my personal views and not those of the Atlantic
    Council or any other organization.
        On the topic of multilateral institutions, I would like to
    focus on three recommendations. First, China should be held
    responsible for its bad lending decisions. Chinese loans have
    contributed to rising debt vulnerabilities in low-income
    countries. In several cases, their unsustainable debt put a
    hold on new loans by multilateral lenders. The speed of debt
    workouts has picked up in recent years, but China remains
    unwilling to provide haircuts to restore solvency when needed.
        The United States should encourage the IMF to make full use
    of its debt policies when countries need deeper debt
    restructuring. For example, under certain conditions, the IMF's
    Lending Into Official Arrears Policy allows programs to proceed
    even if a country is in default to another IMF member. A more
    robust application of this policy could strengthen the
    negotiation position of debtor countries, eliciting more
    ambitious debt relief from China.
        Second, focus on quality, not quantity, of multilateral
    programs. The World Bank and other development banks have been
    leveraging their capital base to increase lending to low-income
    countries who also benefited from a $650 billion issue of IMF
    special drawing rights. These efforts are intended to meet
    large financing needs of poorer countries, often with
    relatively little conditionality. Higher debts to multilateral
    institutions, however, can drive out private lenders, resulting
    in the end in higher dependence on China.
        To attract private capital, the institution's main focus
    should therefore be on raising countries' long-term growth
    prospects, including through loan conditionality, but stepped-
    up lending by multilateral organizations alone will not win the
    struggle for hearts and minds in the global south.
        The United States should work with multilateral lenders to
    incentivize needed reforms. If multilateral programs were
    flanked by cofinancing, investment funds, specific trade
    preferences, or private capital, they would have a larger
    chance of succeeding. Especially in Africa and Southeast Asia,
    with their growing populations, this could unlock important
    markets for U.S. exports in the future.
        Third, protect the dominant role of the dollar. Large
    emerging markets have exhibited a remarkable degree of economic
    stability in recent years. Countries among this group are still
    vulnerable to external shocks. However, in case of severe
    crisis, some might need access to U.S. dollar sources to avoid
    sharp devaluations, and their financing needs could be large.
        In this case, the IMF could deploy its lending capacity,
    its full lending capacity of around $1 trillion to avoid
    contagion and preserve global financial stability. This amount
    leverages the U.S.' contribution to the IMF by a factor of more
    than 5 to 1. In the absence of this safety net, countries would
    either have to acquire additional foreign exchange reserves,
    putting upward pressure on the U.S. dollar, or they would need
    to seek help from China, which could become a factor in
    undermining U.S. dollar dominance over the long term. It would,
    therefore, be in the U.S. interest if Congress ratified the
    increase in IMF quotas agreed last year, which would provide a
    stronger capital cushion and make loans available at short
    notice, if needed.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        [The prepared statement of Mr. Muhleisen follows:]
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        Chairman Hill. The gentleman yields back.
        Dr. Doshi, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF DR. RUSH DOSHI, C.V. STARR SENIOR FELLOW FOR ASIA
     STUDIES, AND DIRECTOR OF THE CHINA STRATEGY INITIATIVE AT THE
     COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, EDMUND
       A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Doshi. Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
    the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. I will focus my
    remarks on four questions related to China. First, what are
    Beijing's economic and technology ambitions? Second, what is
    its strategy to achieve them? Third, how is the strategy
    working? Finally, what should we do about it?
        First, what are Beijing's ambitions? The People's Republic
    of China (PRC) has a grand strategy to displace U.S.-led order.
    It seeks to catch up and surpass the United States
    technologically, to reduce dependence on others while
    increasing their dependence on China economically, and to
    acquire the capability to defeat U.S.' forces militarily.
        Beijing believes economic and technology competition is
    about power--not prosperity. It believes there have been four
    industrial revolutions that determine the fate of nations. The
    first was steam power, which led to British dominance. The
    second and third were electrification and mass manufacturing,
    which led to American dominance. Now we are in the fourth, AI,
    quantum computing, smart manufacturing, biotechnology, which
    China aims to win.
        Second, what is Beijing's economic and technology strategy?
    There are three parts. First, Beijing acquires technology. It
    buys foreign companies to get it, it forces them to transfer it
    in exchange for market access, or it steals it outright through
    human intelligence and cyber espionage. Second, Beijing
    protects its companies. It uses tariffs, nontariff barriers,
    and exchange rate manipulation to keep out foreign competition.
    Third, Beijing wields industrial policy. It uses massive
    industry support, subsidies, tax breaks, R&D, support, cheap
    credit, State investment so that its companies can undercut
    rivals on price.
        Taken together, PRC companies will lose money in their home
    market. They will lose money in foreign markets, but they will
    use that win in both their home and foreign markets, and
    eventually they know they can stay solvent longer than foreign
    rivals that do not have similar State backing. Dominance in one
    sector helps them climb the ladder to the next rung.
        The scale of China's industrial policy efforts is
    breathtaking. Beijing likely stole more than a trillion
    dollars' worth of U.S.' intellectual property. Its industrial
    support is about 2 percent of the PRC economy every year. That
    is a conservative estimate, but it is more than any other
    country around the world. It is twice as much as U.S. support.
    It is probably about $400 billion a year. That is more in
    comparison with the CHIPS and Science Act, which is about $50
    billion over multiple years.
        Third, is this strategy working? In short, yes. In the last
    two decades after China joined the World Trade Organization
    (WTO), the U.S. share of global manufacturing fell by half,
    from 30 percent to 15 percent. That so-called China shock cost
    millions of jobs and shuddered thousands of factories.
    Meanwhile, in the exact same period, China's share of global
    manufacturing quintupled from 6 percent to 30 percent. China is
    a manufacturing superpower. Its capacity exceeds that of the
    next nine countries combined, and it can leverage that
    manufacturing dominance to innovate and to gain military
    advantage.
        Take innovation, China is at the leading edge of fields
    like robotics, AI, and quantum computing. It leads the United
    States in high-impact patents and scientific papers. It
    accounts for half of all industrial robot installations
    worldwide, 60 percent of all global electric vehicle
    production, 75 percent of global battery production, and over
    90 percent of solar panel, rare earth, and antibiotic
    production.
        Then take the military competition, the PRC has 200 times
    the shipbuilding capacity of the United States and is leading
    in new technologies like hypersonics.
        Now Beijing's economy has problems. It is slowing. Its
    population is aging, but we should not feel confident. Beijing
    is pouring money into industry and exports to find growth. That
    strategy is causing a second China shock that is de-
    industrializing economies around the world, including our own.
        Fourth and finally, what do we do about it? First, we
    cannot go it alone. China surpasses the United States on some
    industrial metrics, but the United States combined with its
    allies and partners has three times China's GDP, half of all
    global manufacturing, more than twice China's likely military
    spending, twice China's patents and top-cited publications, and
    massive market power. If we pull our markets, protect our
    technology, coordinate our research, and create defensive
    barriers to PRC excess capacity, we can handily weather the
    second China shock and reindustrialize and lead in technology.
        Second, we need new institutions. The United States could
    benefit from a Federal industrial investment bank that can make
    long-term loans, take equity in strategic industries, and, most
    importantly, coordinate with private capital. That could allow
    us to also fund reshoring from China to the United States or to
    allied countries.
        Third, we need a change in incentives. China can play the
    long game while our companies focus on quarterly earning
    cycles. We can consider tax policies to change that. We also
    need to invest more in basic science research where China
    outspends the United States now.
        Finally, we have to play defense. That involves calibrated
    tariffs to protect our industry from excess capacity from
    China. It requires stronger export controls, research
    protection, and regulation of inbound and outbound investment
    to maintain our lead.
        The United States has never faced an adversary quite as
    formidable technologically and industrially as China. We have
    everything that we need to succeed. We just have to make
    different choices in some cases.
        I want to thank you for your time, and I look forward to
    your questions.

        [The prepared statement of Dr. Doshi follows:]
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        Chairman Hill. Thank you, sir. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair recognizes Mrs. Beatty, the Ranking Member of the
    National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial
    Institutions Subcommittee, for 1 minute.

         STATEMENT OF HON. JOYCE BEATTY, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
        SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, ILLICIT FINANCE, AND
      INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
                               FROM OHIO

        Mrs. Beatty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, let me say, I would like to echo Ranking Member
    Waters' comments and note the incredible irony of us holding
    this hearing while Team Trump-Musk are presiding. It is--and
    they are demolishing the U.S. leadership on the international
    stage. The White House and Department of Government Efficiency
    (DOGE) are illegally deleting entire agencies in violation of
    the Constitution, siding with adversaries, calling our allies
    dictators, and abruptly and ruthlessly rescinding U.S. aid that
    fosters global goodwill and advances our national security
    goals--all of which unquestionably allows China to fill the
    void and hands them the prize of global leadership on a silver
    platter, all while colleagues across the aisle who have a long
    record in Congress of loudly supporting soft power initiatives,
    like USAID and assistance for Ukraine, are stunningly silent
    now. This is unthinkable, and I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentlewoman yields back.
        The chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes of questions.
        Mr. Muhleisen, the IMF last major report on China comes
    from 2024 on their economy, and it reads like it is a parallel
    universe to me. The report says, ``Directors''--meaning IMF
    directors--positively noted that China is a key player in
    addressing global challenges and welcomed its constructive role
    in supporting sovereign debt restructuring and low-income in
    vulnerable countries in tackling the global climate crisis.
    That is a quote from the report. They also emphasize China's
    important role in strengthening multilateral trading system in
    close cooperation with international partners. That sounds
    preposterous to me.
        Mr. Muhleisen, what is your view on that.
        Mr. Muhleisen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think--and I am not speaking for my colleagues. I want to
    just emphasize that for my former colleagues. I think that the
    staff report wanted to point out that China did make some
    progress on the debt restructuring issue. There have been
    improvements, as I mentioned earlier, because China is
    participating under the Group of Twenty (G20), common framework
    for debt restructuring, and some country cases have been
    resolved.
        Chairman Hill. You would not argue that the common
    framework has been successful, would you?
        Mr. Muhleisen. It has been a difficult effort to get China
    to contribute. It is not like the Paris Club, but it has some
    of the same principles.
        Chairman Hill. Should not China belong to the Paris Club?
    Should they not participate in the Paris Club?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I would welcome them if they did.
        Chairman Hill. Wouldn't that make all of this a lot easier?
    We would not have to have a made-up framework like the common
    framework from the G20.
        Mr. Muhleisen. I think I pointed out in my statement that I
    think there are still shortcomings in the way China does handle
    its loans to troubled countries. I would agree that having them
    in the Paris Club would make them play with the rules that are
    well established and functioning, but, obviously, this is
    China's own decision. I think at some point they considered it,
    but it was then rejected within China.
        Chairman Hill. Yes, I agree with you. I think it was a
    mistake, and I think the IMF and the IMF members should put
    more pressure on China to participate through the Paris Club.
        What should the IMF be doing now as it relates to this past
    4 years of effort that really has not been very successful?
        Mr. Muhleisen. As I mentioned, I think the only real tool
    that the IMF has is Lending Into Official Arrears Policy.
        Chairman Hill. Do they have the right information from the
    countries they are trying to lend to if the terms that China
    has are not transparent and are not disclosed?
        Mr. Muhleisen. There has been some improvement in
    disclosure. Again, I do not want to put my hand in the fire and
    say that everybody knows exactly what China is doing in member
    countries. That improvement has helped, especially to bring
    private creditors on board because now there is more of a level
    playing field. Now people understand more what the mass of
    loans is and how to negotiate that restructuring, but there is
    still a long way to go.
        Chairman Hill. Thank you.
        Mr. McMurray, I was pleased to be sponsoring in this
    Congress a bipartisan bill with Mr. Torres of New York that
    would support nuclear energy financing through the World Bank
    and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This
    legislation would not only help lift the World Bank's
    prohibition on same financing, but it would kickstart a trust
    fund to add in the assistance that you referenced in your good
    testimony.
        I would like to insert in the record two articles I have
    written on the importance on nuclear financing, ``Build Back
    Nuclear'' from 2021, and ``Our Energy Future'' from January
    2025.
        Without objection, it will be added to the record.

        [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

        Chairman Hill. Mr. McMurray, can you help us understand why
    funding for nuclear and other energy projects is so critical in
    countering China's influence in the world?
        Mr. McMurray. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for your
    leadership on this issue.
        China is actively building almost 30 nuclear reactors
    today, poising them to prepare to export and build their
    technologies elsewhere. The World Bank has a really important
    role to fund large global infrastructure projects so, by them
    not supporting nuclear, that limits the effectiveness of the
    World Bank and cedes that leadership to China.
        As you mentioned, the trust fund is actually an excellent
    tool for the World Bank to do two things: One, build that
    internal expertise so it can start educating its own staff as
    well as its members; and then, two, lay out some of those early
    stage projects so ultimately entities like the EXIM Bank can
    start funding and support additional projects globally.
        Chairman Hill. Thank you very much. My time has expired
        I now yield to the Ranking Member of the full committee for
    5 minutes.
        Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Doshi, in the Caribbean, nations increasingly
    disillusioned by the U.S.' unpredictability are turning to what
    is known as BRICS--that is Brazil, Russia, India, China, South
    Africa--including of course both in a very, very real way China
    and Russia for investment and financial support. China's Belt
    and Road Initiative have brought investments to the region,
    from ports and energy resources to hotels and highways,
    although often with predatory loan arrangements. In light of
    these developments, what strategic actions should the United
    States take to counterbalance China's growing influence and
    provide a more reliable, attractive alternative for Caribbean
    nations and other regions? I just want you to know that, when
    any of us participate in activities with our Caribbean
    countries, that is all we hear: ``What are you guys doing?
    Cannot you help us to avoid what China is doing in the
    Caribbean?'' What do you know about this?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Waters. Let
    me just say this is a very important issue. Every great power
    adversary the United States has ever faced has wanted a role in
    the Caribbean, whether that was Germany, even the First World
    War, but especially the Second, with the Soviet Union and the
    Cold War. China is no different. They also want a role in the
    Caribbean because they know it is a weak spot for us
    potentially. They know about our reliance on the Panama Canal.
    The history here shows that China will want to be involved and
    if looking at their own statements, you know it.
        I would add a few things. China's involvement picked up
    really in the early 2000s. They have accelerated their
    involvement in recent years. As you correctly noted, they are
    focused on a whole-of-government approach in the Caribbean.
    That means military assistance in some cases to a Caribbean
    country. That means law enforcement and military assistance. It
    also means investment, significant investment in Jamaica,
    investment in port infrastructure, including the operation of
    ports in the Caribbean, so they are there. They are present. In
    many ways, their economic relationship is growing rapidly.
    Tourism is another component.
        What do we do about it? There are a few things. First, a
    little bit of support from us goes a long way. These are not
    large economies. Taken together, the entire GDP of the region
    is about the GDP of Kansas, maybe a little bit less. We can do
    more by being present and by increasing our aid activity.
        Second, Caribbean countries, as you know well, want
    commercial engagement with the United States. We should find
    ways to make it easier, whether that is through EXIM Bank, DFC,
    or other institutions, for our businesses to be involved in the
    Caribbean.
        Finally, we should remember that we have an asymmetric
    advantage. Those countries, as you noted, they want to be with
    us--not with China. They are not happy about the corruption
    that China sometimes brings to their economies. Transparency
    and sunlight are the best disinfectants. We should fight in the
    information space that people know that we stand for anti-
    corruption and that the Chinese stand for corruption.
        Finally, we have to worry about the military role that
    China is building there, and we should make sure that our
    Department of Defense is doing everything it can to strengthen
    military diplomacy with our Caribbean friends.
        Ms. Waters. Thank you very much and speaking about what
    more we can do. Some of our Caribbean Island states do not
    receive foreign aid because they say they make a little too
    much money. They are hit with storms, and they are in great
    debt as they try to reconstruct and renovate and all of that.
    Is this an area that we could help them in because of the debt
    that is incurred with all of these Mother Nature events?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Waters. You
    brought an important point up, which is debt. Many of these
    countries are heavily indebted to China, increasingly indebted.
    Jamaica is another good example of that. In many cases,
    Suriname is another recent example. In many cases, they cannot
    pay back the debt, so that is a problem. It speaks to the
    previous discussion earlier about China's nonparticipation in
    the Paris Club, but I would just add that, yes, storm relief,
    we can do more there. Finally, very quickly, we might want to
    consider changing the thresholds for aid for some of these
    countries so that we can make sure that we can be more useful
    to them.
        Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. Quickly, do we have a
    security problem with China getting so much influence in the
    Caribbean and being so close to us, should we be concerned
    about that?
        Dr. Doshi. We should, in my opinion. It has somewhat
    compromised some of the activities that we undertake in the
    Caribbean. We have U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) operations
    and others that are worried about this. In particular, I would
    note just two things: First, that the PRC operates out of Cuba
    a number of sensitive sites, and we should worry about those
    and their ability to collect on our operations in the
    Caribbean. Second, I would also add to that the PRC's ownership
    of port infrastructure in the region, including on the Panama
    Canal, can pose security threats as the Trump Administration
    and the Biden Administration have identified.
        Ms. Waters. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentlewoman yields back.
        The gentleman from Michigan, the vice chair of the full
    committee, Mr. Huizenga, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Huizenga. Hey, everybody. I want to get to IMF reform
    and some other things but, Dr. Doshi, I want to very, very
    quickly hit on this. I learned a new phrase recently, which is
    the lie-flat generation in China. My question is, can China
    survive economically from the downturn that they are seeing? It
    seems to me, as a child of the Cold War, in that era, the
    difference between our space race and the Cold War race that we
    had with Russia is they had a much smaller economy. I am very
    curious, very quickly, your view on China with that.
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congressman. It is a very important
    question. Very quickly, I would say that, yes, they can
    survive. We have generally underestimated China's ability to
    compete. Very importantly, China has scale, and every rising
    power that has scale tends to do pretty well.
        The Soviets did not have the scale that China does. Happy
    to go into more detail.
        Mr. Huizenga. Okay, all right. Mr. Muhleisen, I want to
    turn to you about your work at IMF and your views from the IMF,
    not necessarily your particular work there. According to the
    Wilson Center, 80 percent of China's government supported loans
    are to countries that are in some sort of debt stress. The IMF
    has failed to convince China to work on restricting this debt,
    which some estimate is in excess of a trillion dollars. To me,
    having worked with IMF and World Bank and others over the
    years, I would argue it seems to be a strategy, not a
    coincidence, that oftentimes they are lending into these
    countries that have a debt strain and then they are then
    utilizing the loan documents and the profile of that to then
    flip that into an asset that they either control or own. My
    question is, what roles should these International Financial
    Institutions (IFIs) play here? Should they simply just back
    away from countries when that sustainability is unclear?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Thank you, Congressman.
        I would put it this way, I do not see China engaging in
    some kind of debt trap, if that is what you meant, where they
    entrap countries.
        Mr. Huizenga. I think a clear-eyed look at what is
    happening in Africa and the rest of Asia would contradict that.
        Mr. Muhleisen. What I would rather look--how I would rather
    look at it is they are getting a lot of benefits out of that
    engagement because what they do is, of course, they have these
    trade relations also with countries----
        Mr. Huizenga. I am sorry, are you saying that they have a
    higher risk profile than the rest of the world does?
        Mr. Muhleisen. To some extent, I think China was not even
    aware of the risks they got into. I could speak to that in a
    second, but what I meant is the strategic advantage is they are
    getting access to ports and access to other facilities----
        Mr. Huizenga. Including in Latin America and other places
    now.
        Mr. Muhleisen. Exactly and Caribbean. That is, I think, the
    main benefit. It is not like they would kind of own a port that
    a country has to hand over because they cannot pay their debt.
        Mr. Huizenga. Staying with you, in your testimony, you
    mentioned that the United States should insist on, ``improved
    transparency'' at the IMF. I am also curious, what can the U.S.
    Treasury do to encourage the IMF to adopt a more forceful
    approach, including that transparency?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I did not mean to say that the United States
    should push the IMF to be more transparent. It is actually the
    debt transparency of China that needs----
        Mr. Huizenga. Yes, I understand that, but the IMF is the
    tool for that, correct?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Yes. I myself----
        Mr. Huizenga. Is the IMF doing enough to push that
    transparency and to push a country like China to give that
    transparency?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I myself have worked with Chinese officials
    in my formal capacity to help them understand how much actually
    countries are owed to China because, within China, their
    facilities as lenders of all these different institutions that
    are lending are kind of not as far developed as we in the West
    would have it. They are not kind of set up to do that. They are
    only slowly getting into the business of lending.
        Mr. Huizenga. I have got 45 seconds. I think the Chinese
    are far better businesspeople than what you seem to be
    implying, but--the latest shareholder review at the IMF did not
    increase China's voting power. They were pushing to do so. What
    conditions should the IMF insist on in the future if China
    lobbies for more shares would be a question, but I am going to
    actually get that in writing because I do have to hit this, Mr.
    Chairman. I previously introduced a bill, the IMF Reform and
    Integrity Act, that would prevent any shareholder increase at
    the IMF for a country such as the PRC that does not meet basic
    obligations codified in the organization's articles of
    agreement. I believe, and this goes back to my time working
    with Madame Lagarde, when she was there, the IMF needs to get
    tougher and tighter about enforcing its own rules. I would like
    to include--submit a copy of my bill.
        Chairman Hill. Without objection.

        [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

        Mr. Huizenga. I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York, the
    Ranking Member of the Small Business Committee, Ms. Velazquez,
    for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Velazquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me start off by saying that I am glad we are having
    this hearing discussing the rising threat of China, but holding
    this hearing is not enough. If we want to talk about countering
    China, then we need to be discussing how President Trump and
    his unelected President, Elon Musk, are the biggest threat to
    the United States in countering China. President Trump has
    abandoned our closest allies in favor of cozying up to
    dictators, illegally closed down USAID, and cutting off aid for
    needy nations, destroyed our national security apparatus, and
    installed conspiracy theorists, like Kash Patel, at the top
    levels of our government. Dismantling this institution that has
    helped keep our Nation and the world safe since World War II
    opened the door for China. Countries across Africa and Latin
    America are turning to China for financing and leadership, a
    geopolitical move China is facilitating and exploiting.
        Mr. Cassara, by hollowing out the government through
    illegal firings and layoffs, Elon Musk and DOGE are making
    Americans less safe from financial scams coming from China and
    encouraging corruption both home and abroad.
        An article printed in The Wall Street Journal, not exactly
    a bastion of liberal media, last week describes how illegal
    proceeds from fentanyl sales are being laundered through China
    for reinvestment in real estate and other vehicles here in the
    United States. The proceeds and flow of illegal fentanyl from
    China is an issue Members on both sides of the aisle care
    about. How can Congress bolster current Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/
    Anit-money Laundering (AML) statutes to reduce the reinvestment
    of illegal fentanyl proceeds here in the United States?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. Regarding BSA,
    Bank Secrecy Act, financial intelligence reporting
    requirements, I think one of the best things that could happen
    to counteract some of the issues that are developing is for
    real estate agents, for example, to not--no longer be exempted
    from Know Your Customer (KYC), reporting requirements, and to
    follow suspicious activity reports.
        I think something else needs to be done that is more
    efficient utilization of suspicious activity reports in
    general, which is going to require additional personnel. It is
    going to require technology. Most importantly, it is going to
    require additional resources on the ground for agents to work
    cases.
        Ms. Velazquez. Would not you agree that to reduce the
    laundering of money from Chinese fentanyl sales, we are going
    to need to continue to crack down on anonymous shell companies
    here in the United States?
        Mr. Cassara. Absolutely, in money laundering, there are
    three stages of money laundering, placement, layering, and
    integration. Shell companies, LLCs, Delaware corporations,
    whatever you want to call them, are one of the premier tools of
    choice by money launderers in the layering stage of money
    laundering. It makes it very, very difficult for criminal
    investigators to follow the money trail. Same thing with the
    integration stage. Once the money is layered and integrated
    into the economy, we do not know who owns that shopping center,
    who owns that yacht, who owns that property. We need beneficial
    ownership information.
        Ms. Velazquez. Thank you for that answer.
        Dr. Doshi, how important is it for both the United States
    and the allied nations to adopt and enforce transparency
    measures like beneficial ownership registries and anti-
    corruption laws to prevent bad actors from abusing our
    financial system.
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think it is
    incredibly important. Every step that we want to take, whether
    on law enforcement with anti-money-laundering, with export
    controls or with investment restrictions, all of those steps
    are going to require knowing essentially the beneficial owner.
    If we do not have that, then the PRC can always set up shell
    companies and get around our restrictions, and they have been
    doing that. I think it is indispensable to our competitiveness
    agenda.
        Ms. Velazquez. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentlewoman yields back.
        The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas, the Chair of the
    Task Force on Monetary Policy, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lucas. Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr.
    Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for testifying today.
        As the former Chairman of the Science Committee and
    representing an energy-dominant State, I am particularly
    sensitive how China weaponizes energy as a geopolitical tool.
    The United States must continue to prioritize targeted
    investments in clean, reliable, and affordable nuclear energy,
    which will contribute to enhanced energy security, geopolitical
    stability, and emissions reductions.
        Mr. McMurray, can you touch on why maintaining U.S.
    leadership in energy production is so critical in countering
    China in energy security national issues?
        Mr. McMurray. Thank you, Congressman and thank you for your
    leadership on clean energy innovation, especially as the former
    Chair of Science, Space and Technology (SST) Committee.
        China is activity building projects, and right now,
    countries around the world want and need more energy for either
    energy access, as they are just having more manufacturing or as
    they are growing. They are going to look at whatever options
    are cheap and available. Right now, in many cases, that is
    China. The United States has to look at, how does the
    government support private companies, which are developing all
    sorts of innovative technologies, such as nuclear energy, to be
    able to make it easier to compete on an unlevel playing field.
    Some of the best tools are EXIM Bank and DFC to kind of help
    with that financing piece, but, ultimately, we have to be able
    to make these technologies here and build them here. That
    requires support from the Department of Energy and National
    Labs so we can demonstrate these technologies so we can
    ultimately sell them.
        Mr. Lucas. Thank you.
        Authorities at the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics have
    identified transnational criminals that are moving illicit
    drugs on the black market and laundering money in China. Mr.
    Cassara, how can Congress address the financial streams that
    are the foundation of this illegal activity so we can cutoff
    these very sophisticated criminal enterprises? I know it is a
    complex question.
        Mr. Cassara. It is a complex question, but I think to get
    to the heart of the matter, I think we have made a mistake over
    the last so many years. Our enforcement agencies have been
    putting emphasis on what I call the product, for example,
    illegal drugs, and the people, meaning like drug kingpins and
    those involved with it. I think what we have been missing is to
    really truly and finally go after the money because all of
    these organizations are motivated by greed and avarice. The way
    to hurt these individuals, these organizations, better than
    anything is to identify their assets and take them away. The
    reason we have not been doing this is because going after the
    money is hard. Enforcement agencies are statistic-driven,
    metric-driven. They want measurements of success. Instead of
    going after a meaningful, long-term complex money laundering
    investigations that may take 2 years or more, they are content
    to go after these quickie little buy-bust cases that really do
    not make any difference. We have to change the incentives for
    law enforcement.
        Mr. Lucas. Play chess, not checkers.
        Mr. Cassara. Yes.
        Mr. Lucas. Turning back to the EXIM Bank for a moment, Mr.
    McMurray, in the most recent re--or authorization of EXIM Bank,
    Congress built the China Transformational Exports Program, or
    CTEP. That program reserves at least 20 percent of EXIM's
    authority to neutralize China's export subsidies. How can we
    improve on that program and scale it up to match their actions?
        Mr. McMurray. Thank you, Congressman. CTEP has been an
    excellent tool to compete with the very competitive financing
    that China is able to offer. Right now, CTEP focuses on only a
    certain subset of technologies. One of the best ways to
    increase the competitiveness of U.S. companies is to expand
    that, for example, including nuclear energy as part of CTEP's
    mandate. I would also want to just mention DFC was also created
    under the first Trump Administration directly as a counter to
    China's Belt and Road, and there is an opportunity as well to
    strengthen DFC to make U.S. companies, again, more competitive.
        Mr. Lucas. I just want to simply note in my closing
    comments; we cannot afford to get caught flat footed on the
    issues we are discussing today. Outcompeting China in export
    markets, financing energy investments must be a top priority. I
    am thankful to the chairman for focusing on this in our hearing
    today.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Hill. Mr. Lucas yields back.
        The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, the Ranking
    Member on our Capital Markets Subcommittee, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Some of our witnesses seem to be here advocating what they
    would advocate in any other committee that was not even talking
    about China. If you are paid to convince Congress to let you
    drill for oil in Yellowstone National Park, you can then come
    to a hearing on China and say, ``Well, that is the way to take
    care of China.''
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for focusing on the importance of
    the U.S.' world reserve currency, and we should remember that
    the announced purpose of crypto is to partially displaces the
    U.S. dollar. There is a bill in the Senate to make crypto the
    reserve currency of the dollar, and I think you understand how
    important it is that nothing displace the dollar as the world's
    reserve currency.
        Likewise, I think it was Mr. Cassara who focused on money
    laundering. Crypto is advocated by its own supporters as a way
    to do massive transactions or large transactions out of the
    view of the U.S. Government, and that is perhaps why 100
    percent of the ransomware attacks in recent years have demand
    payment in crypto.
        Mr. Muhleisen, I would like--I hear what you say about
    China debt. Too many small countries are being told, ``Well,
    you borrowed China's money, so you have to give us your port.''
    What we need to do is say to every lender and every credit
    rating agency that, when China makes an unfair loan and you do
    not repay, that cannot be used against the country's credit
    rating. Countries who face this circumstance will, instead of
    giving China their port, they can give China their middle
    finger and still borrow from American corporations, banks, and
    international lending institutions.
        We have made some unforced errors, one of those, as The
    Wall Street Journal points out, is we should be focused on
    China, and, instead, we go to economic war with Canada and
    Mexico. Second, we have cut aid in some cases to tiny countries
    in the Pacific, to the Cook Islands, to Solomon Islands, to
    Tonga, where we just have million-dollar programs. These are
    the islands where my father's friends gave their blood in the
    last war in the Pacific, and now we are turning over control of
    those islands to China for a few--to save a few million
    dollars.
        The original sin was giving China most-favored-nation
    status. Before then, their economy was tiny. The majority, the
    vast majority of Democrats voted against that, and we stood up
    to our own President. I turn to my Republican colleagues and
    say, perhaps your proudest moment this year will be when you
    stand up to one of--to a Republican President.
        In capital flows, it is nice to say, ``Well, we should not
    send any capital to China.'' Keep in mind, because of that huge
    trade deficit, which I might add was much bigger under Trump
    than it was under Biden and was even bigger still in the pre-
    coronavirus disease (pre-COVID) years of Trump. Trump gave us
    the worst trade deficit in history vis-a-vis China. We are
    dependent for over $1.5 trillion of investment in our debt
    instruments on China, but we have got to look at equity flows.
        Believe it or--right now, we subsidize Americans who invest
    in Chinese stocks. We do so through our tax system and the
    capital gains allowance. I am going to ask all witnesses here,
    please raise your hand if you believe that we should provide
    subsidies to Americans who choose to invest in Chinese stocks.
        Let the record show, no hand went up.
        Yet, I have great difficulty--I have only gotten one
    Republican cosponsor for the bill that I am going to
    reintroduce--I hope all of you join me in cosponsoring this--to
    say no capital gains allowance for investment in Chinese
    stocks. Now, I know that offends the billionaire class, but you
    cannot go--you cannot stand up to China if you are unwilling to
    offend the billionaire class.
        Dr. Doshi--I am not able to read your sign so well, so I
    might have mispronounced your name--are there unique risks for
    Americans when they invest in Chinese stocks, such as
    appropriation, that should be part of the disclosures they get
    from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think that there are
    significant risks. I am not sure that we have--I mean, that
    market itself is highly volatile, unpredictable. There is no
    adequate auditing of these companies. Our due diligence----
        Mr. Sherman. The auditing, Senator Kennedy and I did
    something about.
        Dr. Doshi. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. But there is everything else.
        Dr. Doshi. And----
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sessions, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am
    delighted we are having this hearing today. I think that the
    panel is well positioned to provide a lot of information to us.
        Mr. McMurray, I want to go directly to your testimony, and
    we are talking about China. China currently has 57 nuclear
    reactors in operation and 28 reactors under construction. The
    United States has 94 reactors, none currently evidently on the
    books to replace them. What is the major reason why we cannot
    build economic--the funding that is necessary for these? Is the
    market not robust? Is there not an understanding? What is the
    reason why America would not be building at least one or two?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. China over the
    last several years has made a concentrated focus on building
    new nuclear, and that has played out in the number of reactors
    under construction. I would say, the United States has also
    done that. There has been significant bipartisan policy for the
    past several years focused along every step to build new
    nuclear, whether it is demonstrating early technologies,
    developing the fuel supply chain, providing tax credits,
    improving the regulatory framework. Congress has really focused
    on this for the last several years.
        Mr. Sessions. The market has not gathered itself together
    to take advantage of this?
        Mr. McMurray. Today there are several projects that are
    very close to breaking ground. There are two research reactors
    that are under construction. There are several reactors through
    the Department of Energy's Advance Reactor Demonstration
    Program that are also nearing construction, as well as several
    private companies that are also looking to build, so the United
    States is close.
        Mr. Sessions. They are trying to go to next-generation
    (NextGen). They are waiting for the newest research in
    development.
        Mr. McMurray. There is an interest in all sorts of
    technologies, after the Vogtle plants came online in Georgia,
    pairing that with the projected demand increases for
    electricity in the United States. There is also a renewed
    interest in large reactors as well. It is important for policy
    in the market to kind of recognize all of these different
    technologies have a role to play domestically because there is
    also an interest in all of these technologies internationally.
        Mr. Sessions. Yes. In Texas, we have a lot of land, but a
    lot of that land is being grabbed up 30,000 and 40,000 acres at
    a time for solar panels, taking then agricultural ability off
    that land. We know, as you alluded to, we are going to double
    the amount of electricity that is necessary.
        Tell me about the proposed Trump tax cuts. Will that
    provide more capital available for these kinds of projects to
    where they do not have to come to the Federal Government?
        Mr. McMurray. Focus on Texas for a moment. There has been a
    lot of great work out of the State to build new nuclear,
    including through the Governor directing the Public Utilities
    Commission to figure out what State policies would help attract
    new nuclear. I think, on the Federal level, we have seen
    significant support going back to nuclear specific tax credits
    that have supported the Vogtle plants, as well as existing
    policies that support the new technologies today. I think
    Congress has the opportunity to continue that support and
    continue that focus so it can provide certainty and
    predictability for the companies looking to build.
        Mr. Sessions. Great. We need them, because we cannot
    continue to grab 30,000, 40,000, 50,000 acres to meet the needs
    of not just the electrical system, electrical grid system, but
    we need it because we are going to grow exponentially, and we
    have that issue.
        I want to thank you. I think that the--if we are going to
    be a capitalist nation and we want to grow and meet the demand
    for all this, we need to move toward what I would call all of
    the above, and that has to be a better reliance upon what we
    are doing with nuclear. I want to thank you very much for being
    here today.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, the Ranking Member
    on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As the chairman has just indicated, I now serve as the
    Ranking Member of the--and formerly Chairman of the House
    Foreign Affairs Committee. When we are discussing the topic at
    hand, I have to say, I come here gravely concerned about our
    great country. China and Russia, both nuclear-armed permanent
    members of the U.N. (United Nations) Security Council have a
    vastly different vision of the world than we do--at least that
    used to be the case.
        The first month of the Trump Administration, however, has
    confirmed my worst fears, that it has severely undermined
    American global leadership, not just for the next 4 years but
    for decades to come. Just yesterday, the United States, along
    with a few other tin-pot dictators, Russia and Russian
    satellite states, voted at the U.N. not to condemn Russia's
    aggressive, unprovoked, and unjustifiable invasion into the
    Ukraine.
        Dr. Doshi, just give me a yes or a no, do you believe it is
    in our interest to stand with Russia over Ukraine?
        Dr. Doshi. To stand with Ukraine.
        Mr. Meeks. I would also ask--just yesterday, I dropped a
    resolution. I would ask my colleagues on the other side of the
    aisle to join us on this resolution that just basically says we
    are--because this is the third year of Russia's invasion into
    Ukraine. Join our resolution. All it says is that we condemn
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of which the U.N. tried to pass,
    and we voted--or the Administration voted against.
        Dr. Doshi, let me ask you another question, this time as
    you are an expert on China. Do you believe that China will read
    into our failure to stand up to--Ukraine as it thinks about
    aggressive action against Taiwan or in the South China Sea?
        Dr. Doshi. I am always reluctant to say that credibility
    transfers like that. In this case, however, everything I have
    ever learned about the Chinese Communist Party tells me two
    things: First, they are disproportionately focused on the
    United States use of power; that is, if they think we are
    weakening, they are more bold; and, number two, if they think
    domestically we cannot rise to the occasion against Russia,
    they will think we would not rise in defense of Taiwan.
        If we do not stand for Ukraine, they will be emboldened in
    the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. That is a strong
    belief that I have based on everything I have ever studied
    about them.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you for that. All we have to do is let us
    review our record of our President and his positions on China.
    Back in 2017, he signed a deal to let Zhongxing
    Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE) off the hook,
    despite their record of violating U.S. sanctions, which to this
    very day undermines telecommunications security around the
    globe.
        In 2020, he repeatedly praised Xi for the job he did
    regarding COVID-19 instead of criticizing China's secretive
    response and failure to allow an impartial investigation into
    the origins of the coronavirus. Since returning to office,
    President Trump allowed TikTok to continue to operate in the
    United States, despite clear congressional intent to the
    opposite effect.
        Second, he has severely undermined economic trust in the
    United States among allies worldwide by aggressively
    threatening tariffs on our allies. This includes tariff threats
    on semiconductors from our close Taiwanese partners. He has
    allowed Elon Musk to decimate USAID, which is the tip of the
    spear of American soft power and good will around the globe.
        Dr. Doshi, do you think it is in the U.S.' interest to
    compete with China for commercial and soft power projects
    around the globe?
        Dr. Doshi. Yes, I do.
        Mr. Meeks. I do, too. Mr. Miller, do you agree?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, absolutely, it is in our interest to
    compete.
        Mr. Meeks. Mr. McMurray, do you agree?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes, we need to make sure we can compete.
        Mr. Meeks. Now I am hearing that the President wants to
    sign a big deal with China to get them to buy more of our
    commodities while allowing the PRC to build up its military and
    undercut our workers. All of this is encouraged by Elon Musk
    and others who have enormous business interests there.
        Let me be clear, I think we need to continue to trade with
    China, and I am not supportive of the trend of stoking
    xenophobia or undermining our economy just to spite the PRC.
    The Chamberlain policy of appeasement coming out of the White
    House is about self-enrichment, affinity for dictators, not
    Americans' economic growth or national security, and we should
    be competing with the PRC across the globe, not shutting down
    agencies. We should be cracking down on the China-Russia no-
    limits partnership, not trying to join it.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentlewoman from Missouri, Mrs. Wagner, the Chair of
    the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    vitally important hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses
    certainly for being here today.
        Back in my home State of Missouri, it is estimated that
    three people lose their lives every single day from an
    overdose. I have heard from countless constituents who tell me
    about a neighbor, a friend, a family member who has lost their
    life due to an accidental overdose of fentanyl. Transnational
    criminal organizations, many of them based in China, make
    millions of dollars off the illegal production and trafficking
    of this deadly narcotic. The CCP knows this and is allowing it
    to continue.
        There are many different ways in which Federal policy needs
    to be strengthened to combat this crisis, but to quote the
    testimony of one of our previous witnesses, ``Financing serves
    as the oxygen for criminal networks. We must coordinate our
    government response to identify, isolate, and interdict the
    financing, manufacturing, and trafficking apparatus of fentanyl
    and its precursors from China through Mexico and into our
    neighborhoods. We must cutoff the oxygen to these criminal
    networks.''
        Mr. Cassara, can you describe how Chinese entities exploit
    both the Chinese and American financial systems to launder
    illicit funds gained through fentanyl trafficking, being
    mindful of my time?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. I think one of the
    primary ways they undermine the integrity of our financial
    system is they use a lot of methodologies and enablers that are
    Chinese centric, and many of these are designed to bypass our
    financial transparency reporting requirements. Meaning, they
    use things like trade-based money laundering, underground
    financial systems, value transfers, mobile phone apps. These
    types of things that we are not set up to capture from our
    primarily money-laundering countermeasures, financial
    intelligence.
        Mrs. Wagner. In what ways is the Chinese Government
    complicit in this illicit financing?
        Mr. Cassara. As you said yourself, China, CCP is its
    command State. They are aware of what they are doing. They are
    aware of criminal triads and criminal organizations committing
    crime and laundering money. If they wanted to shut a lot of
    this stuff down, they could. Nothing happens in China, or for
    that matter, with their diaspora, without their permission.
        Mrs. Wagner. How does the U.S. Government need to change or
    alter its current oversight or enforcement to ensure Chinese
    entities are not laundering funds in these illicit ways, as you
    have outlined, through American companies?
        Mr. Cassara. There is a number of things that I put in my
    written statement as far as recommendations, but if you are
    talking about underground financial systems, illegal or
    unregistered money remitted services; for example, we need to
    do a much better job of enforcing the fact that these companies
    need to be registered with Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
    (FinCEN) and, I think, licensed in 49 of the 50 States. We are
    not ensuring that is done.
        Mrs. Wagner. On his first day in office, President Trump
    issued an executive order to designate drug cartels as foreign
    terrorist organizations. Mr. Cassara, how will terrorist
    designations affect the flow of funds between China and drug
    cartels in Mexico?
        Mr. Cassara. I think we have to wait a little bit to see
    how this plays out, but I think it will give the Administration
    and the executive branch, including law enforcement and intel,
    and even our diplomatic corps, more tools to go after these
    organizations.
        Mrs. Wagner. Clearly, that is the intention. Does this
    designation impact any potential U.S. intermediaries that the
    drug cartels use to launder funds?
        Mr. Cassara. I think it depends on the specifics, but I
    think this is focused on those cartel organizations if they use
    third parties or whatever. We will see what happens.
        Mrs. Wagner. Are there stronger steps, sir, that Congress
    can take to disrupt these financial networks?
        Mr. Cassara. I would go back, again, to some of the
    recommendations I put in my statement, but I think we need to
    enhance and prioritize law enforcement. This is where they are
    most vulnerable, but we are not making cases, and there is a
    lot--there is a number of reasons for this. Some of it we are
    just not aware of it. We do not have the tools. Most
    importantly, law enforcement does not have the resources.
        Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, and hopefully we are going to be
    getting them, the resources, here soon to dig even deeper now
    that we have designated them as terrorist organizations.
        My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentlewoman yields back.
        The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Scott. Ladies and gentlemen, China is taking advantage
    of us. They are looking at the United States now as weaker than
    ever. Reports now indicate an increase in efforts by Chinese
    hackers to infiltrate U.S. Government networks and classified
    systems with backing directly from the Chinese Government. Need
    I look at fentanyl that is destroying the very fabric of our
    Nation, our young people, in record numbers? It is almost like
    China has declared war on the United States and, damnit, we
    need to declare war back. I hope this hearing will go far and
    loud. We are tired of China taking advantage of the United
    States. Our young people are too precious. As you know, CFIUS
    recently experienced a CCP-backed cyber breach meant to
    undermine the committee's integrity. This is too significant a
    threat to our national security and economic security--some of
    you all may remember, I sat right here in this committee when
    we let the damn balloon go over there after China had taken all
    their data from our farmland, our food, and from our sensitive
    areas, our military bases, and waited until they got over there
    off of Myrtle Beach and the Atlantic Ocean, then we shoot it
    down. They take these things as a sign of weakness.
        Mr. Miller, let me get to my first question here. How
    effective has CFIUS been at reviewing--listen to me carefully--
    Chinese companies' attempts to invest in U.S. businesses,
    particularly involving critical infrastructure, large amounts
    of personal data, or sensitive technologies?
        Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
    think that the CFIUS investment review regime has been
    effective particularly in recent years at making those types of
    reviews and particularly after CFIUS was revised after the, via
    the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA).
        Mr. Scott. Let me just interrupt----
        Mr. Miller. Yep. Sure.
        Mr. Scott [continuing]. you briefly on that. I have got to
    get to this other question. I might have taken too long in the
    first--Earlier this month, Congressman Frank Lucas and I sent a
    letter to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent signed by both
    Democrats and Republicans on this very committee urging him to
    take a stronger, more proactive approach to embattling future
    cyber breaches.
        I would like to insert the letter for the record, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Hill. Without objection.

        [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

        Mr. Scott. Now, our letter asks the Secretary to give a
    firm commitment to CFIUS would continue to move on with longer
    review processes and detailed investigations of Chinese
    Government-linked investments. How can Treasury improve the
    parameters in oversight necessary in its service providers and
    refocus training to better identify potential Chinese cyber
    threats, particularly those targeting CFIUS?
        Mr. Miller. Thank you for that, as well. We need to take
    all cyber threats very seriously, and that means starting with
    getting full visibility of the networks, including the networks
    at Treasury monitoring systems. As always, using a risk-based
    approach is really important, and also, just using the tools
    that we have, the basic risk management tools such as end-to-
    end encryption, multifactor authentication, and logging. It
    sounds like a broken record----
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Miller [continuing]. because we say this all the time,
    but we need to do this.
        Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Scott. I just want to end with this; it is very
    important that we understand China is targeting our food supply
    system--and our national security----
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired, and his
    closing remarks are so noted. Thank you.
        The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr, the Chair of the
    Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Last Friday, Mr. Miller, President Donald Trump issued an
    executive order titled ``America First Investment Policy.'' He
    also issued a national security policy memorandum in which he
    stated that we will adopt new rules to stop U.S. companies from
    pouring investments into China, stop China from buying up
    America, and allowing at the same time all of those investments
    that serve American interests.
        It seems to me this is exactly the right policy. This is
    the America First policy. It is the policy that says that
    investments that help advance our national and economic
    security should go forward, green light, and investments that
    undermine our national security should not go forward, red
    light. A red light/green light system.
        I appreciate that because it is common sense, and this
    Congress has been focused on an outbound screening tool and
    legislation over the past several years. I introduced the
    Chinese Military and Surveillance Company Sanctions Act, which
    was a sanctions-entity-based approach. We also introduced the
    Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security (COINS)
    Act, at the end of the last Congress working with the Speaker's
    Office. It was a bipartisan effort and a bicameral effort, and
    we added an additional focus on specifically defined
    technologies.
        Now, what I have always said on this committee and on the
    Select Committee on the Strategic Competition with the Chinese
    Communist Party is that our advantage is that we are
    capitalists, and we allocate capital effectively and
    efficiently. Their disadvantage is that they are Communists,
    and they misallocate capital. This is perhaps why Chairman Xi's
    crackdown has actually backfired on the Chinese economy and why
    U.S. venture capital deals have fallen in China by 87 percent,
    and, by 2023, net foreign investment into China turned negative
    for the first time on record. It is also true that U.S.
    investments made in China still are valued at about $127
    billion.
        I want you to address specifically this first comment you
    make in your written testimony, Mr. Miller, that overly broad
    investment restrictions could actually decrease economic
    security and that policymakers should be mindful of the
    economic security value of outbound investments. Explain that a
    little bit.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question, Congressman Barr.
    Yes, if--I think that--in my experience anyway companies
    absolutely want to and make their best efforts to comply with
    these regimes, but if the scope is overly broad or it is not
    clear and defined as to what exactly the companies are supposed
    to be doing, it really does create some headwinds there in
    terms of compliance. I think specifically with respect to the
    outbound regime that you are talking about, it is----
        Mr. Barr. I think one thing that you said that I agree with
    is that some outbound investment could provide insights into
    competitor activities.
        Mr. Miller. Right.
        Mr. Barr. Not all outbound investment is bad. I think
    clarity is very, very important. That is why I talked about why
    the President's approach, green light/red light, is the right
    approach, and that is what we tried to do in our sanctions
    bill. Sanctions do provide clarity. Companies know how to
    comply with it and, if properly defined in terms of these
    technologies, we can also provide private investors with
    clarity. There are also advantages of multilateralism with
    sanctions approach.
        Here is the next question. In a post-Chevron world--and
    this is for anyone--what is the benefit of having a statute
    that guides this policy consistent with executive order as
    opposed to just relying on the Biden executive order or the
    Trump executive order? Any one of you.
        Mr. Miller. I will take that. Yes, you are right, in a
    post-Chevron world, under Loper Bright, the onus really is on
    Congress to write these rules as clearly as possible so that
    there really is not--it is not left to executive agency
    discretion which might be overturned by the courts.
        Mr. Barr. I think, here is the bottom line in my remaining
    30 seconds. Is the President's approach in his national
    security memorandum and executive order exactly right? It is
    America First. It recognizes that some outbound investment
    actually is in the interest of our country. Some foreign direct
    investment is in the interest of the country, but not all of
    it. We need to provide clarity, and we need to do it through a
    statute consistent with the Treasury Department's guidance
    here. That is what we are going to be working on, and we invite
    the expertise of the panel to work with us on that, and we look
    forward to getting this policy exactly right.
        With that, I yield.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, the Ranking
    Member of the Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Financial
    Technologies, and Artificial Intelligence, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Lynch. By the time you announce me, I will not have
    time to speak. That is a pretty long title. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, and I want to thank the Ranking Member. This is a
    great hearing and one that is both timely and incredibly
    important.
        I want to thank the witnesses for your very thoughtful
    testimony, not always in agreement, but always thoughtful.
        China has developed extensive cyber capabilities
    offensively over the past 10 years or so and now I think is
    admittedly a world leader in vulnerability exploitation, either
    directly or through proxies. The Chinese Government's targets
    in the United States have included infrastructure, our
    government agencies, companies, private organizations, and
    individuals as well.
        They use tools and methods that breach international law.
    These malicious acts can be aimed at control or just simply
    disruption and exposing vulnerabilities in our electrical grid
    and critical infrastructure. It also involves economic
    espionage and international property theft. Those are among the
    most concerning intrusions.
        Most recently, China had a state-backed Chinese malicious
    cyber group. They hacked the U.S. Treasury Department, and they
    gained access to hundreds of workstations and sensitive but
    unclassified documents from the Committee on Foreign
    Investments in the United States, CFIUS, and the Office of
    Foreign Asset Control.
        With that backdrop, we have right now Elon Musk, who has
    got massive, massive investments in China. He has this giga
    factory that produces two of his most popular cars there. He
    has billions and billions of dollars in investment in China. He
    has employees there. He is now inside Treasury and has had, at
    least for a while, before the judge stopped him, access to U.S.
    Treasury payment systems.
        It really worries me that he has young kids in there who--I
    have a letter here from five Treasury Secretaries that are
    expressing concern that these individuals with no training and
    no ethics requirements and no security requirements are all
    inside Treasury. Meanwhile, they work for a guy that has
    billions of dollars of investments in China. It just looks like
    a bad, bad situation.
        Dr. Doshi, as Elon Musk and DOGE continue to have access to
    personal and payments data inside Treasury, along with
    sensitive information about what we are doing with defense
    contractors and other initiatives, what sanctions could they
    potentially open up holes in our security system and make
    Americans' financial information vulnerable to attacks from
    China?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congressman. China is the most
    capable cyber actor the United States faces. I think that there
    is a risk that efforts to kind of take data off government
    systems and put them perhaps even on private systems so they
    can be run through artificial intelligence will create
    additional vulnerabilities that China will be very happy to
    exploit.
        Mr. Lynch. What are the strongest measures we can take in
    terms of requiring the people who have access to that system to
    maintain the integrity of the financial system itself?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congressman. I think that there are a
    number of technical steps that have to be taken on the end-to-
    end encryption side, on securitization--security essentially
    for that equipment, technology, the data. There is also a human
    element as well, and I worry about mass firings leading to
    insider threats particularly of people with clearances.
        Mr. Lynch. Should those individuals, if they have access to
    any of that, all go through a lengthy and robust security
    clearance process?
        Dr. Doshi. My personal view, based on my time working in
    the National Security Council (NSC), is that more and more of
    U.S. Government work in these sensitive areas should be moved
    to classified systems. That does not mean it cannot be
    democratically accountable, but the unclassified systems are
    compromised whether at State Department, Treasury, or the U.S.
    Trade Rep, which gives China insight into what we are doing and
    an advantage in negotiation. We should move that into a more
    secure system.
        Mr. Lynch. All right. Mr. Chairman, that just about wraps
    up my time. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Williams, Chairman of the
    House Small Business Committee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Williams of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    all of you for being here today. I appreciate it.
        The lack of transparency into the Chinese economy is a
    large concern of mine and one of the world's largest creditors.
    This lack of insight presents extreme risk to the U.S.' economy
    and our national security. This is why I introduced the China
    Financial Threat Mitigation Act, which my colleague,
    Representative Gottheimer, and I have joined together. This is
    a bipartisan legislation that would require a study on the
    exposure of the U.S. financial sector to risks from China.
    Reliable data is crucial for the U.S. Government to accurately
    assess our financial exposure to the Chinese, and through this,
    we will be able to better protect the U.S.' financial interest
    and our own national security.
        Mr. Muhleisen, how can the United States best hold China
    accountable for the lack of transparency in their financial
    system?
        Mr. Muhleisen. The IMF has certain tools, like, for
    example, the financial sector assessment programs and the like,
    that look at whether member countries live up to standards by
    the Basel Committee, for example, among others. Of course, as a
    multilateral organization, it has limits as far as it can go,
    because it needs to look at these standards and can only assess
    those that exist.
        The IMF as such has no direct tools to increase
    transparency, but it can publish their findings. It can rely on
    peer pressure and shareholders in the IMF to then exert
    pressure on China to improve its policies.
        Mr. Williams of Texas. Thank you.
        China has continuously exploited global supply chains to
    advance their strategic ambitions using economic coercion or
    slavery and predatory trade practices to dominate key
    industries. This has created vulnerability to the United States
    and puts American businesses and consumers at the mercy of the
    Chinese Communist Party policies. In addition to their use of
    global supply chains, the CCP's opaque lending practices and
    state-subsidized competition have undercut American
    manufacturers, making it increasingly difficult for them to
    compete on a level playing field.
        Mr. Miller, what specific policy should Congress pursue to
    counteract China's stranglehold on critical goods and
    manufacturing? Additionally, how can we create a stronger
    incentive for American companies to diversify their supply
    chains and reduce dependence on China?
        Mr. Miller. Thanks very much for the question, Congressman.
    It is absolutely critical that we focus on supply chain
    resiliency and security. I think companies, certainly in the
    technology sector, for some time have been working to increase
    supply chain diversity. We have to be realistic that we have
    complex global supply chains right now, and it will not be an
    overnight process. Moving certain parts of manufacturing and
    supply to friends and allies as well as the United States is
    something that is already underway.
        Mr. Williams of Texas. In the short time I have left,
    throughout your career, Mr. Cassara, you have investigated
    international money laundering networks and underground
    financial systems that enable transnational crime. Today we see
    Chinese financial networks playing a key role in laundering
    fentanyl profits from Mexican cartels using trade-based money
    laundering and underground banking to move illicit funds while
    evading U.S. authorities.
        Given China's history of shielding these operations from
    scrutiny, what steps should the United States take to disrupt
    these financial channels, and what is China's end game, do you
    believe, in weaponizing fentanyl in the United States?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. Regarding
    fentanyl, I believe it is a form of asymmetric warfare that the
    Chinese are employing against the United States. Maybe some of
    this goes back to the opium wars of a century or so ago. I
    think it is, in effect retribution.
        To answer your question about what can we do for
    underground financial systems, we could talk for a great length
    of time about this. I think one of the most important
    initiatives that we came up with a number of years ago is trade
    transparency units. Basically, having customs information
    exchanged back and forth just like the Egmont Group of
    financial intelligence units, where we exchange financial
    intelligence, exchange customs-related information, imports and
    exports to help look for anomalies in specific trade
    transactions, over and under invoicing, for example.
        This initiative has been stalled. In my opinion, one of the
    reasons it has been stalled is because legacy customs have been
    shortchanged through an emphasis on immigration enforcement
    under Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
        Mr. Williams of Texas. My time is up. Thank you for your
    testimony.
        Chairman Hill. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, Ranking Member on
    the Housing and Insurance Subcommittee, is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        A couple of years ago, I was in Addis, in Ethiopia, Addis
    Ababa, and as I moved around the city, I was walking by a
    building, large, majestic building, and the Ethiopian friends
    who were carrying me around said, ``Do you want to go in?'' and
    I said, ``Sure.'' We went in. It was the African Union
    building. As you walk into the building, there is a sign about
    the gift of this building to Ethiopia by the Chinese.
        When I went on down south to Tanzania, or Tanzania, where I
    have about 50, 75 family members--actually, our Ranking Member
    met some of my family members from Tanzania--all they could
    talk about was the money China was spending in Tanzania. The
    Ambassador appointed by Bill Clinton, Charles Stith, Dr.
    Charles Stith, had really revved up everything he could in
    Tanzania to attract the attention of the United States because
    China was steadily investing in Tanzania.
        Unfortunately, as China was investing, we were
    decelerating. If you go all the way through the continent, you
    will see that China has created quite a relationship with the
    entire continent. Dr. Stith wrote a book called ``For Such A
    Time As This,'' and I think that book would be contrary to what
    we have just seen with USAID so we cannot take advantage of
    anything now.
        China has had some failures. They did establish 25 economic
    zones on the continent and in 16 different countries, by the
    way. When USAID shut down, let me find out from those of you if
    we move on down, how many of you think that it was a mistake--
    it is a mistake for us to cancel out all of the work that
    people have been trying to do, like Dr. Stith, in Africa, and
    all of a sudden we make a statement that we are first. We do
    not--we are not that interested in helping anybody except
    ourselves? How do you think that is coming across, and does it
    impact the economy of the continent when obviously China is
    trying to take over? Anybody? Did we make a mistake? Is there a
    mistake with USAID?
        Please.
        Dr. Doshi. Yes, Congressman, I think it is a mistake to cut
    USAID in this fashion. It needs reform, but this is not the
    way.
        Mr. Muhleisen. I think it will hurt unless it is replaced
    by something else relatively quickly.
        Mr. McMurray. I think we need to take all the available
    tools to compete with China.
        Mr. Miller. I agree. We need to compete with China
    everywhere we can by using all the tools that we have.
        Mr. Cleaver. We had a good chance if we would work. Most
    people probably do not even know. One of the Members of
    Congress during the 1990s, Mickey Leland, had become so
    familiar with Africa, he and Donald Payne, Sr., that they were
    invited to everything that went on in the continent. In fact,
    Mickey Leland's plane went down just outside of Addis Ababa,
    and there is a statute of him built in downtown Addis Ababa. We
    were moving through Africa and making friends, and all of a
    sudden, that had just been blown to pieces.
        I know, I am not trying to get any of you in politics. I do
    not like politics, but I do think that this is more than
    political. I think it is a futuristic look of where we need to
    go back.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams of Texas [presiding]. The gentleman's time has
    expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
    Davidson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Davidson. I thank the chairman.
        I really appreciate our witnesses.
        Confronting China is certainly one of the central things
    for American foreign policy and frankly for governments around
    the world. They are confronting the same kinds of practices by
    China. When they were admitted into the World Trade
    Organization as a, quote, ``developing country,'' they promised
    to become a market economy, and clearly, they are not a market
    economy. In fact, they use the same kinds of practices
    everywhere to block market access, to use a whole-of-government
    approach, using their intelligence services and everything
    else, to steal intellectual property, and then to subsidize and
    dump to take over market shares strategically. Confronting
    outbound investment is one of the most important things that
    this committee, and frankly this Congress, is going to deal
    with, and it comes in the context of a whole host of other
    policies.
        I want to go back to the Dodd-Frank Act. When I was in
    manufacturing, prior to coming to Congress, I owned a group of
    small manufacturing companies in Ohio. Early on, after one
    acquisition, someone came to me with a form and said, ``You
    need to sign this form saying that none of the steel that we
    buy contains, quote, `conflict minerals.' ''
        Now, at that time, we had under 50 employees, and they are
    coming to me, and I am like, ``I am buying steel from U.S.
    Steel, and you are asking me, a small manufacturing guy in
    western Ohio, where the tin that coats the steel comes from?''
    Might it come from this place in Central Africa? How am I
    supposed to know that? Why are not you--if the government cares
    to know that, why is not the government doing that?
        This is the fallacy behind one of the approaches to our
    Outbound Investment Act. This is the Cornyn approach in the
    Senate. This has been one of the approaches presented through
    the Foreign Affairs Committee. Thankfully, in this committee,
    this Financial Services Committee, where we follow the money,
    we know that really does not work. It just shifts the burden to
    the private sector. The reality is the private sector does not
    even have the resources to know the answer to some of these
    things. We do not do that when it comes to sanctions. We use an
    aggressive licensing approach that targets specific actors. It
    does take a lot of work, and the sanctions regime itself is
    stressed. It goes back to 1975.
        I am going to butcher your name, but, Mr. Muhleisen, I
    cannot find the note here, and I cannot see you without reading
    glasses, so can you highlight the problem with this approach
    where you put the burden on the companies.
        Mr. Muhleisen. Thank you, Congressman. I am not really an
    expert on regulation of American companies, but I do think that
    light regulation in general and something that is in the power
    of companies to live up to and fulfill is the right way to go.
        Mr. Davidson. Thank you.
        One of the other challenges that we confront as we deal
    with outbound investment is our international institutions, and
    we have since, the end of World War II, structured things like
    the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank. We have
    development--Inter-American Development Bank. We have the Asian
    Development Bank. The idea that we are subsidizing China with
    this makes little sense to me.
        From 1981 to 2001, the World Bank lent China over $40
    billion for 280 projects. Since 1986, almost 40 years now, the
    Asian Development Bank has committed 1,218 public sector grants
    totaling $44.3 billion. Right now, the current portfolio, as of
    right now, 77 loans worth $12.55 billion. We have the Chinese
    Currency Accountability Act, where the IMF wants to grow the
    influence. I guess, Mr. Muhleisen, why would that make sense?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Personally, I do not wish for China to gain
    a bigger share in these institutions at the moment, in part for
    the reasons you mentioned, also in part of the strategic
    competition that the United States and other countries are
    engaged with against China. The IMF and other institutions are,
    I think, really important assets for the United States where a
    lot of capital and human capital is invested in. It would be, I
    think, not right to allow China to interfere with the work of
    these institutions if they wanted, if they would get a bigger
    voting share.
        Mr. Davidson. Yes, thank you for that.
        Mr. Miller, unfortunately, I missed the question to you,
    but on the outbound investment if you could respond, we will
    send a note following the hearing. My time sadly has expired,
    and I yield back.
        Mr. Williams of Texas. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
    Foster, Ranking Member on the Subcommittee on Financial
    Institutions and an old colleague of mine from the Science
    Committee. You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
        Mr. Foster. Thank you.
        I would like to--I will focus on artificial intelligence
    and anti-corruption efforts. Mr. Miller and Dr. Doshi probably,
    are the right ones for this. Artificial intelligence is coming
    at us, and we are not ready for it. It is probably the most
    important area of competition between China and the United
    States. The first country that gets what amounts to an
    artificial general intelligence (AGI), this is an ability to
    simply--an artificial intelligence agent that can outperform
    humans in most things.
        I think computer coding is arguably already here. Just in
    the last few days, there was an announcement about a--from
    Google about a co-scientist, a device that actually
    outperformed a small scientific group who worked for 4 years at
    a problem that it solved in 48 hours. We are almost there, and
    whichever country gets that capability first will have
    effectively an infinite army of highly skilled technical
    workers that will make all of our efforts at workforce
    education irrelevant. This is the battle we cannot lose.
        Now, the free world is in a very fortunate position that
    the production of the graphics processing unit (GPU) is the key
    core elements of these, is almost entirely in the free world.
    We rely on the Dutch systems, the German optics, the Tokyo
    Electron, and a number of companies in the United States, and
    final production of many of these chips in Korea and Taiwan. We
    have, by luck maybe or maybe by not luck, we have all of the
    chokepoints to control that technology and potentially keep it
    out of Chinese hands.
        However, we tried to do that with normal export controls
    and found that people are simply smuggling those devices out.
    You saw deepfake is widely believed--deepfake--sorry, DeepSeek
    is widely believed to have trained their cutting-edge model
    using systems smuggled out of the United States because our
    export controls exist but are not enforceable. What are the
    things that we can do that will actually get enforceable
    controls on these, assuming that we get the entire free world
    to buy into the need to keep these out of Chinese hands?
        Dr. Doshi, you and I have been on a panel discussing this
    recently, and so I will start with you.
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congressman, and I appreciate your
    leadership on this issue. As you know I am partial to a
    solution that is technical, that would make it difficult for
    GPUs to be operated in jurisdictions where there is hardware
    built into it preventing the operation unless, again, it is in
    the correct jurisdiction. There are----
        Mr. Foster. If they were smuggled into China, they would
    simply stop working----
        Dr. Doshi. Exactly.
        Mr. Foster [continuing]. or smuggled outside of their
    licensed area, they would simply stop working.
        Dr. Doshi. In addition to enforcement mechanisms, which we
    need to strengthen. In addition to better controls, which we
    have not really tried. We should also look at these hardware-
    based solutions to keep our chokepoints strong.
        Mr. Foster. Yes. There was a very impressive hardware
    demonstration near the Executive Office Building with one of
    these systems that showed this can be done if we choose to do
    it.
        Mr. Miller, any comments?
        Mr. Miller. Yes. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
    Just to go back to your lead-up to the question talking about
    the fact that we are working with allies in Taiwan and in
    Germany and the Netherlands, et cetera. I think it underscores
    the fact that for any export control to really be effective, it
    should be, of course, targeted at the bad actors and the
    national security risks that we are trying to control. It
    really needs to be multilateral, and we need to get buy-in from
    all of our partners and allies on a unified approach if we are
    really going to be successful.
        Mr. Foster. Yes. That is why things like voting along with
    all the rogue states in the United Nations are not a good step
    forward. The way this Administration is frankly destroying the
    confidence in our allies is not going to make those necessary
    negotiations work easier.
        Let us say, I would like, Mr. Muhleisen, one of the best
    areas that IMF has been involved in is anti-corruption. You
    correctly point out in your testimony that the Chinese Belt and
    Road loans should be treated very skeptically by the
    international community because they are frequently involved--
    created through corrupt payments and that result in white
    elephants built by Chinese contractors and unpayable loans
    behind them.
        Traditionally, the United States has been at the forefront
    of anti-corruption efforts. Can you just say quickly how the
    United States benefits from leadership in anti-corruption
    efforts as opposed to what we have seen with the Administration
    announcing recently they are no longer going to enforce the
    Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, because apparently the President
    believes that it has blocked some deals that he wanted to do?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I think----
        Mr. Foster. You have got a few seconds here, so----
        Mr. Muhleisen. I think it is important to pursue the avenue
    that bad loans start from the corrupt practices, and China has
    demonstrated that. While there is a need to respond and to
    expand U.S. loans and projects, one has to very carefully weigh
    the pros and cons of what has just been proposed.
        Mr. Lucas [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.
    Rose, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Rose. Thank you, Chairman, and thanks to Chairman Hill
    and Ranking Member Waters for holding this hearing and thank
    you to our witnesses for taking time to be with us.
        Last Congress, Ari Rubenstein testified that we should be
    more concerned about how prepared American capital markets are
    for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Dr. Doshi, I know that you
    believe the Chinese market is highly volatile. As we look to
    prepare our markets for geopolitical instability, would it not
    be beneficial to have better market data regarding our
    systematic and material risk exposure to China?
        Dr. Doshi. Congressman, I think you are exactly right, we
    need better information about our vulnerabilities across a
    variety of sectors, in the financial sector, supply chains. In
    addition, this is harder to do because our due diligence firms
    in China where--are being shut down.
        Mr. Rose. I think we are woefully underprepared in the
    event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and I know that my
    colleagues plan to introduce widely supported legislation that
    would provide us with key data on exposure risk. I believe
    that, coupled with a heavy-handed tariff strategy, will
    incentivize American industry to return home and protect our
    markets.
        Just to further comment, I am just always kind of struck by
    the difficulty in getting visibility for the exposure to China.
    I sit on the board of a nonprofit with investments across a
    range of assets and I have been asking this question now for a
    number of years and have yet to get a really clear dial in on
    exactly what our exposure is. I think if there was a terrible
    event vis-a-vis Taiwan, we would find out really quickly
    exactly what that exposure looks like, but that would be too
    late, of course.
        Shifting gears now. In Tennessee, we are proud to be a
    leader in nuclear energy innovation through the Oak Ridge
    National Laboratory and the efforts at the Tennessee Valley
    Authority; however, we are not innovating fast enough, in my
    view. China is building dozens of nuclear reactors, you have
    testified to that today, witnesses have. Looking to finance--
    China is looking to finance even more abroad. We are learning
    now that China is expanding its nuclear influence
    internationally by funding projects in Pakistan and Argentina.
        Mr. McMurray, how does China incentivize foreign nations to
    accept their funding for these international nuclear projects?
        Mr. McMurray. Thank you, Congressman. China is able to
    offer very competitive financing packages, and they have done
    that, for example, in Pakistan, to--some loans, 2 percent
    interest, for example. That is very hard for private U.S.
    companies to compete with. That said, there is a real
    opportunity, then, to leverage other financial institutions
    such as EXIM Bank and DFC.
        Two really recent examples are in Romania where the
    Department of Energy and the EXIM Bank worked together to,
    essentially, finish a project in Romania where China was also
    competing. The United States ultimately won that project,
    issued a loan for some preconstruction work that directly
    benefited U.S. jobs, then also signed a letter of interest for
    a multi-billion dollar loan there as well.
        We have seen examples where, when U.S. companies are on
    more of level playing field, they are able to compete in other
    countries.
        Mr. Rose. Do you think that our technology and our focus on
    maintaining American superiority in terms of just the
    technology available, is that an issue, number one. Number two,
    our own failure to move forward with projects here
    domestically, how big of an impact does that have on our
    ability to provide or to win projects overseas?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes. The private companies developing new
    technologies are one of the United States' greatest assets.
    That gives us the ability to compete globally, because
    countries want to work with the United States and build these
    technologies. The challenge is, if we are not at the table by
    either building them or developing them, they are going to turn
    to other options. Recently, that has been, Russia and China are
    well poised to take that if the United States does not make
    sure we have the tools to be able to compete.
        Mr. Rose. As we have been discussing, part of what has made
    Oak Ridge National Lab in Tennessee so successful is how it
    leverages public-private partnerships to resolve technical
    hurdles and develop industry-leading technology.
        Mr. McMurray, using Oak Ridge National Lab as an example,
    how can the government improve American private corporations'
    abilities to compete with China?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes. The Department of Energy and the
    national lab system are incredible resources for private
    companies. The public-private partnerships to develop
    technologies allow these early ideas to really get to market.
        A great example recently out of Oak Ridge is the
    development of Tri-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel, which is
    the type of fuel for a lot of new reactors. There is going to
    be a fuel facility being built near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and
    this technology is going to be built here in the United States
    as well. Taking those ideas from market or from the lab to the
    domestic market and then to the global market really should be
    the goal for a lot of these public-private partnerships.
        Mr. Rose. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio, Mrs.
    Beatty, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on National
    Security, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Beatty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My first question here goes to you, Mr. Cassara. As a
    member of this committee, I am proud to support legislation
    that would protect Ohioans from dirty money and harmful effects
    that it has on our communities. For example, the Corporate
    Transparency Act passed by Congress with bipartisan support and
    signed into law by President Trump will help us understand who
    really owns anonymous shell companies and will give our law
    enforcement more tools to keep our community safe.
        For example, in my home State of Ohio, which has suffered
    the brunt of the Nation's lethal opioid epidemic, the threat of
    anonymous shell companies is very, very real. In just one
    instance a Chinese synthetic opioid trafficker manufactured and
    shipped deadly fentanyl analogs to 37 United States, using
    shell companies formed in Massachusetts to run their operation.
    This scheme led, as you can imagine, to multiple fatal
    overdoses in Ohio.
        Now, I agree that we must work with small businesses to
    help them comply with reporting requirements but cannot abandon
    these landmark anti-money laundering policies all together,
    because the human cost is just unacceptable.
        Here is my question. Mr. Cassara, you have worked to
    counter illicit finance for decades. Can you please address why
    understanding the true owners behind U.S. anonymous companies
    would be important for countering China's role in the fentanyl
    trade?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. I have looked at
    anti-money laundering, counterterrorism finance for over 30
    years. In my opinion, lack of beneficial ownership information
    surrounding anonymous shell companies is kind of like the last
    hurdle. I remember back in the day when we started passing a
    series of laws, rules, and regulations but kind of, in my
    estimation, this is the last major hurdle that we have to
    overcome.
        The current legislation, in my opinion again, is not
    perfect, but it is something. It is something that we can work
    with going forward. The reason it is so important is, again,
    following the money and the value trails and finding out who is
    actually behind all this. Myself, my colleagues, constantly we
    get to a certain stage in an investigation, and they bump into
    one of these anonymous companies and we cannot go any further.
    As I explained earlier in testimony, they are very active in
    the layering stage of money laundering, and they are very
    active in the integration stage of money laundering. We need
    something, some tools to avail ourselves.
        The other thing is--very, very quickly--we are being
    criticized around the world for lack of beneficial ownership
    information. We failed the most recent mutual evaluation from
    Financial Action Task Force without having this type of
    information available. Personally, when I have been overseas
    mentoring, teaching our colleagues overseas, talking about the
    importance of transparency, they come back to me and say, well,
    Mr. John, we are doing an investigation into your company--in
    your country and it goes to these anonymous shell companies.
    Can you help us?
        Mrs. Beatty. Sure.
        Mr. Cassara. There is nothing I can do.
        Mrs. Beatty. Thank you. I have time for maybe one more
    question.
        Let me go to you, Mr. Muhleisen. In your testimony, you
    outlined that China has become the largest sovereign lender to
    emerging and developing countries over the past two decades.
        Now, we all know that Project 2025's agenda, which
    President Trump denies ownership of despite executing its
    provision by provision by provision by provision, proposed that
    the United States withdraw from the IMF and the World Bank. Can
    you discuss how the United States withdrawing from these IFIs
    would affect our ability to preserve dominance of the U.S.
    dollar and compete with China on the global stage?
        Mr. Muhleisen. First of all, I mentioned earlier that the
    institutions really leverage U.S. contributions by a large
    amount. Second, if the United States were to exit from the
    institutions, they would still exist. The headquarters would
    move to the largest second shareholder, but probably they would
    not be able to access easily the dollar anymore. Therefore,
    they would have to loan in other currencies. That would be, for
    example, one way that other currencies would gain in stature.
    Of course, the effect of the fall in U.S. leadership would
    contribute also to that.
        Mrs. Beatty. It would affect it. Can you give me a yes or
    no on that?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Yes.
        Mrs. Beatty. Okay, thank you. My time is up.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
    Mr. Timmons, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
    the witnesses for being here today.
        China poses the most significant risk to both global
    financial markets and our country's economic future. With its
    growing influence over the global economy, technology, and key
    industries, China has the potential to disrupt financial
    systems worldwide. Institutions like the IMF and the World Bank
    help maintain stability, but China's increasing role within
    these organizations raises concerns about the direction of the
    global economy.
        That said, we should not be anti-China. Instead, we need to
    hold China accountable for issues like currency manipulation,
    unfair trade practices, and the rising debt they impose on
    other countries. This is important. The United States cannot do
    all of this alone. We must work with our allies to protect the
    global economy, without creating unnecessary conflict, by
    pushing for greater transparency and fairness in international
    financial institutions.
        Mr. Miller, could you please explain the role China's Belt
    and Road Initiative has played in exporting emerging Chinese
    technologies to developing nations worldwide, and how
    significant is the cyber security risk these technologies pose
    within the economic frameworks of these countries?
        Mr. Murray. Thank you for the question. Yes, China Belt and
    Road Initiative is--has definitely increased the availability
    of Chinese technologies around the world. When it comes to
    cybersecurity, I think, the first principles are always that we
    need to mitigate risks and be as targeted as possible in doing
    so.
        As we saw during the 5G debates here, when it was
    determined that there were risks involved in certain of those
    Chinese technologies, steps were taken to both mitigate the
    cyber risks--I am happy to get into more details on that--but
    also to exclude equipment when there has been a judgment made
    that it is causing those types of issues.
        Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. We are talking about
    Huawei, a global player in 5G technology, and the risks posed
    by the Chinese Communist Party. In 2019, the U.S. Government
    lead the effort, alongside allies like the United Kingdom
    (U.K.) and Australia, to restrict Huawei's access to global
    supply chains, citing national security concerns over the
    potential for espionage through 5G networks. Despite this, many
    developing countries continue to adopt Huawei's technology,
    drawn in by the lower cost, because the Chinese Government
    subsidizes the entire thing and the company's alleged
    commitment to investing in local infrastructure when they just
    want a back door into their system.
        Huawei's growing presence in the global infrastructure,
    particularly in developing nations, has caught the attention of
    the IMF. The IMF highlights the complex relationship between
    economic development and geopolitical risks. For many of these
    countries, Huawei's affordable and advanced 5G technology is
    vital for building telecommunications networks, which are
    crucial for economic growth and modernization. At the same
    time, the United States has urged nations to reconsider their
    reliance on Huawei, citing concerns over espionage and Chinese
    influence on communication systems.
        This has created a challenge for the IMF because they have
    to balance the need for financing and long-term stability with
    the political and security risk that could impede development.
        In 2020, I introduced the Promoting Secure 5G Act to
    counter China's efforts to expand its telecom influence in
    countries receiving aid from international financial
    institutions, particularly the IMF and the Interagency Security
    Committee (ISC). I was pleased to see that bill was passed into
    law as a part of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA).
        Mr. Muhleisen, how has the IMF approached the challenge of
    balancing its mission to support global development with
    concerns raised by Western nations about potential security
    risks linked to Huawei and other innovative Chinese companies
    that have close ties to the CCP?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I think the IMF as a multilateral
    institution cannot really assess the technological risks. The
    money that is being provided is for balance of payment support,
    and, of course, it is up to the countries how to spend it and
    use it. The IMF as a macroeconomic organization cannot go into
    the details of how it is used.
        Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that.
        I think the Huawei example is a perfect way to chart a path
    forward to hold China accountable. Obviously, Huawei was
    engaging in untoward behavior in exposing the cybersecurity
    risks associated with them, essentially giving away 5G to
    developing countries and getting our allies to get onboard to
    essentially force Huawei to become an arms-linked transaction
    in the future. I think it is a perfect example of how we can
    ban together with our allies to hold China accountable.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
    Casten, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Casten. Thank you, Mr. Lucas, and thank you all for
    coming here today. I really appreciate the chair bringing up
    this important hearing.
        I want to focus--there is a lot about sort of theoretical
    future risks. I want to talk about real-time ongoing risks and
    things that 6 months ago were very bipartisan. I hope they are
    still bipartisan.
        We had, as part of the continuing resolution, an agreement
    to block outbound investment in China. I think Mr. Davidson;
    Mr. Barr have alluded to pieces of that. I suspect from their
    comments they may not have agreed with all of it, but it was a
    very bipartisan agreement that had been developed.
        That package was removed under pressure from Elon Musk
    right at the end of the last term, and so now we do not have an
    outbound investment screen that we would have had but for that
    pressure.
        Are any of you familiar enough with the terms of that
    proposal for me to just ask you a couple of follow up
    questions?
        You are all--well, let me just share with you the concern
    and what is going on there. That provision would have
    required--restricted or required notification of U.S.
    investments in Chinese companies that were involved in
    semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum information
    technologies, and AI.
        If that is the only thing you know, I see--Dr. Doshi, I see
    you nodding your head, so I am going to pick on you here.
        Let us say that you owned a U.S. automobile-based company
    that got its start in an infusion from capital from a
    Department of Energy loan from the Loan Program Office. You
    wanted to build factories in China to bring self-driving cars
    from China. Does that sound like something that might be
    restricted or retained under that program?
        Dr. Doshi. I think it is possible under that program that
    could be restricted.
        Mr. Casten. Okay, and you would also like to build an AI
    data center in China to train the algorithm that is needed for
    your autonomous vehicles. That sure sounds like something that
    would also probably be restricted given the data collection.
        Dr. Doshi. Yes, Congressman, I think a sectoral approach
    does make sense.
        Mr. Casten. Okay. That, of course, is Elon Musk I am
    talking about. It makes perfect sense if he is only looking out
    for his self-interest that he might have pressured Speaker
    Johnson or others to pull that from the floor. I am
    speculating, but why else would he. Right?
        Now, we also 6 months ago had a very bipartisan agreement
    to force the sale of TikTok from a CCP-controlled company. We
    had lots of hearings, lots of scary information about the way
    that the CCP was taking data, the way they were weaponizing
    that data in places like Taiwan and could potentially weaponize
    it in the United States. All of sudden, Trump comes into office
    and that deal is indefinitely postponed, not legally, because
    the law is very clear the sale should have happened. Again, one
    questions the motives.
        We have had Elon Musk who has said--this is a direct quote
    from him. He said that ``Taiwan is an integral part of China.''
    From a diplomatic perspective, that sounds an awful lot like
    Donald Trump saying Zelenskyy is a dictator.
        Dr. Doshi, any comments on what that might do to Chinese
    aggression in the region if they hear the United States--the
    leader of the United States suggesting that Taiwan is integral
    and Russia can take land by force?
        Dr. Doshi. Congressman, I think that the PRC looks very
    carefully at our statements and actions on Taiwan and in
    Ukraine. They think that if we, for example, abandon Ukraine in
    a fit of dysfunction, then that means that we are not going to
    come to Taiwan's defense. It will embolden them, as will
    statements that suggest that Taiwan should pay us for defense.
        Mr. Casten. I share the concern.
        Last thing that happened. Trump gets into office, issues a
    meme coin. The meme coin, as all meme coins do, surges in value
    and then collapses because it is a piece of garbage. Along the
    way, there are $120 million worth of trades made by Chinese
    investors. The Trump family and entities controlled by the
    Trump family made over $100 million in brokerage fees. Even
    though they did not get the value of the coin, because there is
    no value of the coin, they have made $100 million in deal fees.
        The World Liberty Financial, Trump's entity, which was
    about to hit a liquidity crisis, all of a sudden got a $30
    million infusion of capital from Justin Sun, whose Real-time
    Operating System Nucleus (TRON) blockchain is used by drug
    traffickers and terrorist groups, that all of a sudden gave
    Donald Trump access to the cash-flows from that company under
    their terms of agreement.
        My question for you all--and I say this is an immediate
    concern--is there a national security concern if entities
    affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party have direct
    economic involvement with the President of the United States
    and Elon Musk?
        If you are hesitating on that question, let me put it
    another way. Should we care about national security only when
    it is bipartisan or should we care even more when the call is
    coming from inside the damn building?
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
    Meuser, Chairman of the Oversight and Investigation
    Subcommittee.
        Mr. Meuser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
    witnesses.
        China is outpacing us, leveraging trade practices, currency
    manipulation, and aggressive state-backed investment to
    dominate critical industries. The Biden Administration did
    absolutely nothing to change that. Under President Trump, we
    are seeing a different approach, one that puts America first,
    by attracting over a trillion dollars in foreign and domestic
    investment from the likes of Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Oracle,
    Apple, Nippon Steel. Securing critical industries and
    leveraging tariffs creates a more competitive playing field.
        Mr. McMurray, AI data centers demand significant power, as
    we all know, including nuclear to power the investments
    President Trump recently secured. I do have a nuclear plant in
    my district working to power an AI data center. How critical
    would you put it that strong energy infrastructure in
    attracting AI investment, in keeping the United States ahead?
    How important is----
        Mr. McMurray. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
        Access to electricity and power is going to be incredibly
    important for technologies like AI. Domestically we have to
    make it easier to build the different generation sources to
    provide that power, nuclear being one of the many technologies
    to do that. Looking at the broader permitting system and making
    it easier to build new generation, to build new transmission
    lines all needs to happen so the United States can continue to
    lead on AI.
        Mr. Meuser. Nuclear will play a big role in this?
        Mr. McMurray. Hope so.
        Mr. Meuser. Okay, great.
        Mr. Muhleisen, my bill recently passed the House, the China
    Exchange Rate Transparency Act, directing the U.S.
    representative of the IMF to hold China accountable for
    currency manipulation. With China's unreliable economic data,
    opaque exchange rate practices, first off, do you agree with
    that, and how can the IMF be effective in stopping such
    currency manipulation by China?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Yes, IMF assesses the exchange rate policies
    of its members annually in the external sector report. It has
    not found evidence of strong misalignment. There are issues
    with some of the data that go into that assessment. There is a
    very interesting debate about the discrepancy between China's
    current account and trade account. That is an ongoing
    discussion, but truly in terms of macroeconomic variables,
    imbalances have come down and there is no evidence of currency
    manipulation, which I think has also been found----
        Mr. Meuser. Excuse me. That is like saying there is no
    gambling at Rick's. That is just not correct, sir.
        Mr. Miller, I am going to move on to you. CFIUS is focused
    more on scrutinizing allies and stopping China from bypassing
    investment restrictions. President Trump's National Security
    Memorandum correcting this by expediting allied investments
    over 1 billion, like tightening controls on Chinese
    investments, is critical, sectors like AI and healthcare. Does
    this--do you think this addresses flaws in CFIUS?
        Mr. Murray. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
    absolutely agree that we should be incentivizing investments
    with U.S. allies. The National Security Presidential Memorandum
    (NSPM), that you mentioned, I think it is commendable in that
    it seems to address a risk-based approach. Allied investments
    would seem to present a very low risk, so why would we not want
    to fast-track those types of investments. I think--so I do
    think that there are improvements there for the overall CFIUS
    process.
        Mr. Meuser. Okay. Mr. Muhleisen, I know I cut you off fast.
    I will send you the facts and evidence that I have, which show
    that it does happen in a very slick manner, but it is a regular
    activity that takes place.
        Mr. Miller, President Trump's approach to outbound
    investment focus specifically on ensuring U.S. dollars do not
    fund the CCP's military buildup. How does this targeted
    approach better protect national security and economic interest
    compared to a broad one-size-fits-all investment ban?
        Mr. Murray. You are absolutely right that one-size-fits-all
    approach is not the right approach to outbound investment, and
    I would suggest not the right approach to really any economic
    security issues. We really need to target these policies to
    clearly identifiable risks so that we do not accidentally
    undermine the U.S. investment and competitiveness that we know
    is so key.
        I do think that the implementation details will matter as
    we see more details regarding the NSPM but--and also
    enforcement resources, right. If we do not have the resources
    to enforce these policies, then it also can be very difficult.
        Mr. Meuser. All right. I am out of time. Mr. Chairman, I
    yield back.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman's time expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms.
    Tlaib, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Tlaib. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I just came from my office in meeting some of my
    constituents, and I can tell you overwhelmingly right now, this
    week, I am not getting calls about this particular issue. I
    wish we were using the power to convene and discuss the issues
    that matter to many of our families in our district more
    directly. Right now, they are very worried about the budget
    proposal. They are very worried about families being impacted
    by the illegal firings. It is just important to say for them
    the biggest threat right now is, again, unchecked balances. You
    have court decisions after court decisions saying that there
    are unconstitutional moves in regard to this Administration. I
    really stress to my colleagues, anything we can do to be more
    transparent with our residents about what is going on
    specifically right now with our Federal Government.
        Instead of--right now sometimes I feel like we are
    scapegoating foreigners, and we continually target people that
    are sometimes even our most vulnerable among us. Again, I think
    the real threat right now in our country is what is going on
    with this Administration and the lack of accountability on the
    part of Congress to hold them in check.
        I do want to ask Mr.--is it Muhleisen? Am I saying it
    right? Thank you. One of the things that I think that is
    critically important about United States and China and how we
    can tackle global challenges, from the climate crisis to public
    health crises, that we continue to see unequal growth, require
    multilateral collaboration and so forth. We have got to create
    some sort of opportunities to have some sort of dialog to,
    again, address some of these concerns.
        For instance, take the global overcapacity. Many United
    States critics demand that China end its industrial policies to
    reduce excess production. Instead of making this a zero-sum
    problem where one country must produce less, we could work
    together so that all countries--they all can consume more. That
    means focusing on development, higher wages, and more global
    public goods.
        How can you see the United States working more closely with
    China and other countries to reduce global overcapacity by
    expanding global consumer demand?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Expanding global consumer demand in the
    current situation could be potentially inflationary. Having
    said that, of course there is a need to ensure that China does
    not unfairly subsidize its manufacturing exports. I think the
    multilateral approach would, of course, be through the World
    Trade Organization, but I think in the forthcoming trade
    negotiations between the United States and China this should be
    a key focus.
        Given the current situation, multilateral institutions can
    only be of limited help in contributing to a bilateral trade
    dispute. Although, I personally, of course, very much support
    the objectives of getting China to play fair and by the rules.
        Ms. Tlaib. Dr. Doshi, in the long game, you state that
    countries could engage in co investment with China on Belt and
    Road Initiative projects in exchange for improved standards. Do
    you see an opportunity for co investment by United States to
    improve standards, including labor standards?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I think it
    is possible. When I wrote that 4 or 5 years ago, it seemed like
    it was more plausible than it is today, given the competitive
    dynamics between the United States and China. I do think that
    if there were some projects where the United States came in and
    said, we will come in, but it has to be done in X, Y, and Z
    way, with perhaps certain U.S. companies, with certain U.S.
    labor standards, the Chinese would be interested, because for
    them it would help legitimize some of the projects.
        That being said, I think this is a very hard thing to do
    because they are not necessarily as inclined to work with us in
    some of these places because they are using their
    infrastructure loans to get ports and other things for their
    own strategic benefit.
        Ms. Tlaib. Yes, I have seen that. Let us talk a little bit,
    Dr. Doshi, about nuclear deescalation. Of course, there is--do
    you see any openings for us in regard to arms control talks
    with China?
        Dr. Doshi. When I worked for President Biden and we were
    thinking about stuff like this, we were unable to really get
    the Chinese to engage. When they did engage, they did it for
    one simple reason, they wanted to whitewash their mass of
    nuclear buildup, and they could look like they were being
    responsible.
        That being said, there is a lot we have to do, and I was
    grateful to work on the ability for the United States to
    basically come with China and say, nuclear weapons should not
    be connected to artificial intelligence. There are things we
    can do like that we should keep working on, and I think the
    Trump Administration will build on that foundation.
        Ms. Tlaib. Yes. I will just lead with folks. As we talk
    about these issues and they are real issues, I just hope we do
    not racialize it. One of the things, just as a Muslim American
    in the United States, I know, for instance, when many countries
    are doing, bad things or--it is not reflective on a whole
    people. I say that because there are so many folks, I think,
    directly impacted sometimes in how we approach accountability
    with China.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentlelady yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
    Garbarino, Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital
    Markets, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        For years we have heard warnings to the intelligence
    community on the threat of state-sponsored cyber actors
    conducting malicious activity on our Nation's critical
    infrastructure. These warnings have now become reality.
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
    National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI), and other governmental agencies confirmed
    the People's Republic of China have successfully infiltrated
    the networks of U.S. critical infrastructure. PRC-sponsored
    Volt Typhoon hackers are prepositioning themselves on IT
    networks to enable lateral movement to OT (operational
    technology) assets that is to disrupt functions within our
    water, energy, communication sectors. Then you have Flax
    Typhoon hackers who take directions from the Ministry of State
    Security and have unleashed a large-scale botnet targeting
    American Taiwanese computer networks.
        As a result of these discoveries, Treasury issued a series
    of sanctions aimed at combating increasingly aggressive cyber
    activity by PRC-sponsored actors. We must do everything in our
    power to hold nation-states like the PRC accountable. Recent
    events prove that cyber risk is an evolving and persistent
    problem that is not isolated to one sector nor one threat
    actor.
        Mr. Miller, what should the United States do to best
    mitigate the impact of PRC cyber incursions now that we have
    acknowledged so publicly that they are currently in our
    networks?
        Mr. Murray. Thank you for the question, Congressman
    Garbarino.
        Yes. As you know well and as you mentioned, state-sponsored
    cyber attacks from China and elsewhere have been a problem for
    quite a while. In terms of mitigating these risks I would say
    we really do need to go back to some cyber-first principles,
    right. There are--once they have breached the networks, which
    they obviously have in this case, organizations need to,
    frankly, follow the advice of CISA and others and do things
    like using end-to-end encryption. It is something that has been
    flagged a number of different times. Multifactor authentication
    logging so that you can really figure it out. Then maybe even
    more fundamentally it is so important to get visibility into
    your network and your assets to really understand the scope of
    the breach.
        Those are some of the very basic cyber things that we all
    need to be doing and doubling down on.
        Mr. Garbarino. Yes, absolutely. Cyber hygiene, I have
    always pushed, is something that everybody needs to do. Better
    cyber hygiene. FBI disrupted Flax Typhoon's grasp on these
    compromised devices. They were being run by a company called
    Integrity Technology Group, which was sanctioned by the
    Treasury office. This is, I think, now the second major Chinese
    hacking group that has been disrupted and sanctioned.
        I am wondering, do you think sanctions, more sanctions
    could deter China from future attacks? Do you think that is
    worth it, or is there something that we can do to deterring
    Chinese actors?
        Mr. Murray. I think particularly when we have been able to
    verify or, more specifically, when national security and law
    enforcement agencies are able to verify the attribution of an
    attack, absolutely, sanctions targeted at those bad actors are
    a way to not only hold them accountable but to deter other
    actors. I do not think we should look at sanctions as a silver
    bullet solution here. Something that we all know is that this
    is a continuous process when we are dealing with cybersecurity.
    I do not think we are ever going to eliminate all risks.
        We are always going to have to be manage these risks, and
    there probably are always going to be new actors too, but the
    more we can do to hold them accountable the better.
        Mr. Garbarino. Absolutely. I appreciate that answer. Thank
    you very much. I wish there was a silver bullet.
        Nuclear energy is one of our largest sources of clean power
    and advanced nuclear energy shows a lot of promise. The
    International Atomic Energy Agency says that nearly 30
    countries are looking to build nuclear power. However, over the
    last several years, the export markets for this energy have
    been dominated by Russia and China. We must do more to make
    sure that we have a robust supply chain to build new nuclear
    reactors domestically so that we can become leaders in the
    international marketplace.
        Mr. McMurray, how does innovation at home translate to our
    ability to export these technologies internationally?
        Mr. McMurray. Thank you, Congressman. Ultimately, we need
    to make it easier for private U.S. companies to compete
    globally. I think especially for countries that are interested
    in building nuclear power for the first time. The United States
    can offer a lot of other things, whether it is the Department
    of Energy and the national labs and the technical expertise
    there, the regulatory expertise from the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, and just the operations expertise that we have from
    our existing fleet.
        When we look to compete, we have to think broader than just
    competing financially, although EXIM Bank and DFC can help play
    a role in that, but really try to focus on the broader suite of
    offerings and technologies that we have.
        Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that. I am out of time. Thank
    you very much for your interest.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Liccardo, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Liccardo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Miller, I very much appreciate your testimony. As
    someone who lives in Silicon Valley and represents Silicon
    Valley, particularly to your emphasis on ensuring U.S.
    competitiveness through better tax policy, financial policy,
    and particularly the deductibility of research and development
    expenditures, which I know is of great interest to many
    entrepreneurs and small companies in my district. As I recall,
    those expenditures--I am sorry--the expensing of the
    deductibility of those expenditures was phased out in 2022. Is
    that right?
        Mr. Murray. I am not 100 percent sure on the year, but I
    believe that did happen, yes.
        Mr. Liccardo. It happened as a result of the passage of the
    Trump tax law in 2017.
        Mr. Murray. I believe so.
        Mr. Liccardo. In fact, we are now faced with proposals to
    extend those tax cuts for the next decade or so at a cost of
    $4.6 trillion or so. In fact, the expensing deductibility of
    research and development expenditures, that was largely
    sacrificed as a way to pay for those very expensive tax cuts in
    2017, was it not?
        Mr. Murray. I am not certain that is the exact exchange
    there, but both those things did happen, yes.
        Mr. Liccardo. They happened to happen in the same tax law;
    that is, we gave very large tax cuts in other areas and we got
    rid of this critical provision that has been part of the U.S.
    Tax Code for more than half a century to provide entrepreneurs
    and small companies the ability to expense in the current year
    research and development expenditures.
        Mr. Murray. We released a paper on economic security today,
    and one of our recommendations is that we should absolutely
    reinstate that ability to expense in the year that the--, to
    not amortize over 15 years, yes.
        Mr. Liccardo. I very much share your perspective on that,
    so I appreciate your point.
        As we think about competitiveness with China, certainly
    those kinds of tax provisions are very important. How important
    is it that we would exempt the first $13 million of someone's
    estate from an estate tax to our competitiveness with China?
        Mr. Murray. I am not a tax expert, I will be honest with
    you, but so--I am happy to take some of these tax questions
    back and get you an answer for sure.
        Mr. Liccardo. Okay. Thank you, sir.
        I very much appreciate your advocacy, and I hope that all
    of us will come to the same conclusion that we need sensible
    tax policy that makes us more competitive and not tax giveaways
    that simply amount to handouts for very, very wealthy
    individuals.
        Dr. Doshi, I appreciate that you have certainly been
    studying and working in this space for many, many years. You
    undoubtedly remember a situation more than a decade and a half
    ago, I think, with Huawei and several other Chinese companies
    that were essentially caught in trade secret theft. As we think
    about our intellectual property (IP), many of those companies
    are still operating in the United States, are they not?
        Dr. Doshi. They are sir.
        Mr. Liccardo. They would be subject to U.S. laws and to
    Federal investigation.
        Dr. Doshi. They should be Congressman.
        Mr. Liccardo. If we have a challenge being able to find FBI
    agents or assistant U.S. attorneys to be able to investigate
    and prosecute those cases, that will not help in our efforts to
    crack down on trade secret theft and the IP theft.
        Dr. Doshi. Congressman, yes. The FBI has indicated it needs
    more resources for the China challenge across Administrations.
        Mr. Liccardo. The current Administration's position so far
    has been to essentially fire thousands of FBI agents and
    Federal prosecutors. Is that right?
        Dr. Doshi. Yes, Congressman, and to reprioritize the FBI
    for other missions.
        Mr. Liccardo. Is that going to make us better or worse at
    halting trade secret theft in this country?
        Dr. Doshi. I think it is important to invest in
    enforcement. The Chinese Communist Party is one of the most
    formidable challengers for IP theft that the country has ever
    faced, and so more enforcement on this issue is always better.
        Mr. Liccardo. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California,
    Mrs. Kim, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you, chairman and I want to thank our
    witnesses for joining us today to talk about some of the ways
    that we can compete against China.
        Dr. Doshi, good to see you again.
        Mr. Miller, I know I read your testimony, and I agree with
    you about not taking our current U.S. technology edge over
    China and other competitors for granted. We all saw how China
    shocked the world in global markets when it unveiled DeepSeek
    as a competitor to many of our domestic AI companies. Can you
    elaborate on what policies should the United States implement
    and/or expand on to better compete against China, and why do
    you believe DeepSeek has found success competing against our
    more established AI companies?
        Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. In
    terms of the policies that we should be pursuing, as I
    mentioned to your colleague, just a moment ago, ITI released a
    paper just today with 10 different recommendations to promote
    economic security and innovation, including on a number of
    different areas. Many of those relate specifically to
    competition in emerging technologies and promoting competition
    in emerging technologies such as AI.
        In the economic security context what we really want to do
    is calibrate our policies so that we are--whether it is
    investment restrictions or export controls targeting national
    security risks but not doing anything to undermine the U.S.
    ability to compete. We have the leading innovation companies in
    the world and that is a source of strength not only for the
    economy----
        Mrs. Kim. Mr. Miller, we are introducing the legislation
    that I co-led with Congresswoman Beatty on the other side of
    the aisle, this is a bipartisan bill, the Strengthening Exports
    Against China Act. This is to give the EXIM Bank the tools to
    better support exports of American emerging technologies like
    AI, 5G, and advanced semiconductors. Do you believe this type
    of legislation will be helpful to implement or complement our
    competition against China?
        Mr. Miller. Yes. Obviously, exports are a key part of that
    U.S. economic strength in technology. We want to really promote
    all tools that we can to really help facilitate companies of
    all sizes in making those exports abroad.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you. Since 2015, the Chinese Communist
    Party has been the largest creditor to low-income countries.
    According to the World Bank's figures, the total external
    government debt of low and middle-income countries increased
    from 1.7 trillion in 2011 to 3.5 trillion in 2021. A large part
    of that is a huge increase that can be directly attributed to
    the CCP's irresponsible and opaque lending programs like the
    BRI, Belt and Road Initiative.
        I want to ask this question to Mr. Muhleisen? Right there,
    Okay. In your testimony, you mentioned that since China joined
    the G20 common framework for debt restructuring in 2020, the
    speed of debt workouts has picked up somewhat. Why have our
    debt workouts picked up at full speed? Can you start that?
        Mr. Muhleisen. It would be ideal if China would be part of
    the Paris Club that has long experience in procedures for how
    to restructure that. The common framework is kind of, I would
    say, a follow up attempt to bring China into some process, but
    it is not as elaborate as the Paris Club.
        China is finding its way how to contribute to it. It is
    very reluctant for deep discounts, which makes it difficult to
    get countries to a sustainable debt level. There is a lot of
    progress still needed. That improvement is noteworthy, it has
    been for a few countries, but it needs to be sustained, and it
    needs to be accompanied by deeper willingness to do the
    restructuring.
        Mrs. Kim. Can you tell us what are some of the hurdles, the
    biggest hurdles to ensure that the CCP agrees to collecting
    debt restructuring, and if you can tell us how debtor countries
    are affected when the CCP delays debt restructuring due to the
    bilateral actions?
        Mr. Muhleisen. My understanding is that Chinese officials
    that work for various State banks and other entities do not
    want to take a loss, a nominal loss on their loans. They are
    totally reluctant to do that, so they are trying to do all
    sorts of other things that are not as beneficial for the debtor
    countries to restructure their debt. It is really an internal
    Chinese issue that needs to be overcome.
        Mrs. Kim. Thank you. My time is up. I yield back.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentlelady's time is expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
    Massachusetts, Ms. Pressley, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Pressley. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the
    witnesses for being here today, sharing your expertise on
    information technology, trade policy, international relations
    and more.
        The threat the Chinese Communist Party poses to the United
    States is one that my colleagues and I take seriously, from
    egregious violations of human rights to manipulation of our
    global economy to supporting drug trafficking and stealing
    intellectual property. The United States must take action to
    confront these issues.
        While many of these problems have been around for years or
    even decades, there is a new threat emerging, deeply
    intertwined with the Chinese Government that deserves our full
    attention, and that threat is Elon Musk.
        Chair, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the
    following articles: Elon Musk's China Threat; China May Welcome
    Elon Musk's Cuts; How Elon Musk deep ties to--and admiration
    for--China could complicate Trump's Beijing policy; Elon Musk:
    A Chinese puppet; and Elon Musk, A National Security Threat.
        Mr. Lucas. Seeing no objection, so ordered.

        [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

        Ms. Pressley. Witnesses, I am going to ask you to answer
    the following questions to the best of your ability. Please do
    not feel like you have to pretend that you know the answer but
    also do not pretend that you do not know the answer. You have
    taken an oath to be honest, and the American public is
    watching.
        Dr. Doshi, who is the CEO of Tesla and makes the majority
    of its profits through manufacturing in China?
        Dr. Doshi. That would be Elon Musk, Congresswoman.
        Ms. Pressley. Elon Musk and not just the vehicles. Forty
    percent of his battery supply chain is with Chinese companies.
        Mr. Miller, who worked with the Chinese Communist Party to
    receive $1.4 billion in loans to support his Tesla business?
    Mr. Miller?
        Mr. Miller. I--I am not--I do not have the information.
        Ms. Pressley. Reclaiming my time. Elon Musk.
        Mr. Miller. Okay, right.
        Ms. Pressley. OK?
        Ms. Realuyo, who did Republican Senator Tom Cotton accuse
    of chasing Chinese dollars to help his businesses, Tesla and
    SpaceX?
        Oh, Okay. It is Elon Musk.
        In our global economy it is not uncommon that a rich CEO
    would do business in China. In this case, it is a five-alarm
    fire when that rich CEO doing business with China is also
    running the U.S. Federal Government.
        Mr. Muhleisen, do you know what billionaire had a private
    meeting with China's Vice President literally the day before
    Trump's inauguration?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I do not know.
        Ms. Pressley. Elon Musk.
        Then on inauguration day, who became the head of DOGE, a
    Federal agency created by Trump? Elon Musk.
        Mr. Miller, as head of DOGE, who has accessed private,
    sensitive government data, including U.S. Treasury payment
    systems?
        Reclaiming my time. Elon Musk.
        Dr. Doshi, given all this information, who do you think
    should undergo a rigorous investigation?
        Dr. Doshi. I think anybody with conflicts potentially in
    China should be investigated if they are having a position of
    influencing government. I would say the CEO of Tesla, Elon
    Musk.
        Ms. Pressley. Elon Musk.
        Unfortunately, Elon Musk has not even gone through a simple
    Federal background check. He is a citizen of three countries,
    has business dealings with adversarial governments, and is
    leading an assault on our Federal Government workers.
        The Financial Services Committee is one of the most
    powerful committees in Congress. There should be an
    investigation into Elon Musk's conflicts of interest with China
    or at least, how about a Federal background check. This should
    not be a partisan issue. No billionaire, Republican or
    Democrat, should get a free pass.
        If Republicans are serious about countering China's threat
    to the United States; you all will support this investigation
    of Elon Musk. Elon Musk has already bought the Presidency, and
    we should all be concerned, he will sell out that Presidency
    and our Nation to China.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentlelady yields back.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
    Fitzgerald, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here. I know it is a long day.
        U.S. Secret Service investigates a variety of cyber-related
    criminal activities, including the illicit use of digital
    assets through its global network of 44 cyber fraud task
    forces. Significant aspects of this illicit activity involve
    unlicensed money transferring businesses, the illicit
    structuring of transactions, and other criminal activity
    against organizations that are not federally insured financial
    institutions but are financial institutions as defined under
    the Bank Secrecy Act.
        To address this problem, I was pleased to work last
    Congress and this Congress with colleagues to advance Combating
    Money Laundering in Cyber Crime Act out of both Financial
    Services and Judiciary Committee, of which I am a member of
    both.
        This bill could harmonize kind of the criminal activity and
    the banking statutes to clarify kind of specifically where
    Secret Service has the ability to investigate authority over
    crimes related to illicit digital asset transactions.
        Mr. Cassara, could you just briefly touch on the important
    role that the Secret Service plays in fighting these illicit
    transactions?
        Mr. Cassara. Congressman Fitzgerald, thank you for the
    question.
        I actually started my career in Treasury as a special agent
    for the U.S. Secret Service back in the 1980s--mid 80s. I am
    very, very aware of the dual missions of the Secret Service;
    basically, enforcement and investigations. A lot of people do
    not recognize how important financial crimes investigations are
    to the U.S. Secret Service. It got its start right after the
    Civil War investigating counterfeit, and that has progressed
    over the years. The Secret Service has gotten involved with
    forgery of U.S. Treasury checks, credit card fraud, computer
    fraud, identity fraud.
        More recently, I think it was started about 2004, 2005,
    they initiated the Cyber Investigative Section, one of the
    first U.S. law enforcement units dedicated to strategically
    tackling significant cyber crime actors and groups. This type
    of threat is becoming more and more important. Cyber
    currencies, for example, definitely involved with things like
    ransomware, all these types of payments.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Does the Department of Justice and law
    enforcement prioritize kind of the financing side of the
    relationship which we are exploring right now related to the
    fentanyl crisis, or is the emphasis right now placed on kind of
    the interdiction of drugs themselves? There is this kind of
    discussion that has been going on in Congress for the last
    couple of Congresses on that.
        Mr. Cassara. Yes, this is an issue that has been discussed
    within law enforcement many times. Per a kind of a previous
    answer of mine, law enforcement has been emphasizing the
    product, for example, drugs and people, instead of following
    the money trail. There are lots of different reasons for that.
    In my opinion, one of the primary reasons is because
    investigating the product, interdiction, for example, is much
    easier than going after the money trails.
        These are long-term, complex investigations. Sometimes they
    do not bear any results. It takes extreme commitment to put the
    manpower and the resources into these investigations, but these
    are the investigations that actually pay dividends over time,
    taking the motivation away from the criminals.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. There is a lot of discussion, obviously,
    about the border. Specifically, the most alarming thing that a
    lot of the border agents, when I have been there and other
    Members of Congress have been down there; one of the most
    alarming is the Chinese nationals that were being caught on a
    regular basis.
        The fentanyl crisis is obviously something that we are all
    aware of. It is really Beijing and the flow of dollars that are
    coming across with the drug trade that, in my estimation, has
    really underscored the whole idea that this is in fact
    happening in a larger and larger kind of magnified area,
    specific to the San Diego sector, which we see a lot of that
    happening right now.
        Any thoughts on that piece?
        Mr. Cassara. I think I would just like to pick up on one of
    your comments as far as the Chinese nationals of military age
    males primarily----
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Right.
        Mr. Cassara [continuing]. are the largest ethnic group, if
    you will, we will use for lack of a better term, other than
    Latinos that are coming across our southern border. Once again,
    it frightens me because the CCP, China, Communist China, is
    skilled with asymmetric warfare. We do not know who these
    people are, we do not know where they are, we do not know what
    they are doing.
        Any Chinese that come to this country, basically come with
    permission of the Chinese Government. Once they are here, they
    are obligated by Chinese intelligence law to answer to and take
    orders from Chinese intelligence services.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you.
        Mr. Lucas. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Fitzgerald. I yield back, Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Lucas. The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
    Texas, Ms. Garcia, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
    witnesses.
        One of the things that I am most concerned about, and I
    have watched over the years when it comes to China and,
    frankly, even other--even Russia, is the rise of its influence
    in Latin America. By 2021, China has become the second largest
    trading partner for the entire region, just behind the United
    States, by $150 million in imports and $399 billion in exports.
    China is also making foreign investments in Latin America
    within the infrastructure, energy, and military sectors.
        Clearly, China's Belt and Road Initiative is working. China
    is slowly but surely expanding its influence throughout Latin
    America. It is only a matter of time before China surpasses the
    United States as the top trade partner in Latin America. In my
    view, tariffs on Mexico does not help one bit.
        We must reprioritize investing and recommit to our partners
    in Latin America to stop China's growing influence.
        Dr. Doshi, what can we do to better counter growing Chinese
    investments and influence in Latin America?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you very much for the question,
    Congresswoman.
        I will note a few things. First, a significant amount of
    Chinese investment in Africa--sorry, in Latin America involves
    a degree of corruption, not all of it but a lot of it. If you
    look at, for example, a significant dam project in Ecuador, the
    dam did not work, there were a lot of cracks, and there was
    also direct evidence of corruption.
        One thing that we can do is bring some sunlight as a
    disinfectant. The more people know about what is happening in
    their backyard, the more that they see that there is sort of
    corruption behind some of this investment, the easier it is to
    push back.
        The second thing we have to do is we cannot fight something
    with nothing. It is important for us to reauthorize the DFC and
    other institutions as well, EXIM Bank, to be players in this
    space, help our companies compete commercially, and make sure
    we provide aid where it is necessary.
        Ms. Garcia. You think we can do it?
        Dr. Doshi. I think that the United States can certainly
    outcompete the PRC for influence in Latin America. We are still
    the preferred partner of choice. I will note that, in addition
    to the problems that we have with the development financing
    that we need to offer or on the commercial side, China is a
    major goods exporter to Latin America. The fact that China is
    the world's biggest manufacturer and superpower with a $1
    trillion global goods surplus gives them a lot that they can
    send to Latin America. We have to figure out how we are going
    to deal with their manufacturing heft if we want to retain our
    influence in that region.
        Ms. Garcia. Right. Of course, we have talked a lot this
    morning about fentanyl, and we know that the drug trade is
    global. Money laundering is a global issue. Despite the global
    reach that illicit finance has, our financial institutions have
    their hands tied and cannot share information or seamlessly
    track concerning actors.
        The existing guidance from the Financial Crimes Enforcement
    Network and other Federal regulators prohibits U.S. financial
    institutions from sharing the SARs, the suspicious activity
    reports, with foreign branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates.
    It is a slow and hard process to counter illicit finance.
        Mr. Cassara--where are you? There you are--would it not be
    useful to let financial institutions share information on a
    case-by-case basis via a pilot program established through the
    Anti-Money Laundering Act?
        Mr. Cassara. Yes, Congressman--Congresswoman, excuse me. I
    believe it would be very, very useful to share information on
    that pilot program, taking into consideration issues like
    privacy, third party, and this type of thing. Yes, I think it
    would be very useful to make SARs more effective for law
    enforcement.
        Ms. Garcia. More beneficial and helpful to law enforcement.
        Mr. Cassara. More beneficial and--yes.
        Ms. Garcia. All right. Would not you agree that this is a
    potential solution to helping financial institutions better
    detect intentionally opaque connections to foreign terrorist
    organizations----
        Mr. Cassara. I think it----
        Ms. Garcia [continuing]. and other illicit actors across
    national borders?
        Mr. Cassara. I think it could certainly help, yes.
        Ms. Garcia. Mr. Chairman, that is why I am excited to
    reintroduce my bill, the Foreign Affiliates Pilot Sharing
    Program Extension Act, very soon. The bill extends a pilot
    program that allows financial institutions to share information
    about suspicious activity reports with their foreign affiliates
    to combat illicit financial activity. The pilot program, which
    was authorized through the Anti-Money Laundering Act but was
    never executed, would only allow financial institutions to
    share that there is a concern about an illicit actor but not
    what the concern is.
        I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman. This bill
    was passed under suspension last Congress, so I look forward to
    working with you and the Ranking Member to pass it again this
    Congress.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Meuser [presiding]. The gentlelady yields.
        The gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. McClain, Conference
    Chair, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I think we all know China is a threat to our country, and
    every other country, educationally, militarily, and
    economically, yet we enable China by letting them benefit from
    these very institutions. For example, Xi Jinping's daughter
    went to Harvard. Countless other children of their elite seek
    education in this country, and high-ranking officials in the
    CCP have burrowed themselves into our financial institutions.
    While they brainwash their poverty-stricken citizens about the
    evils of the West, they themselves benefit from our
    institutions. If they move against our democratic ally Taiwan,
    their free ride, I believe, should come to an end.
        Mr. Muhleisen--I hope I am saying that correctly--in your
    opinion, how would cutting off high-ranking CCP officials from
    our financial sector affect their behavior both individually
    and overreaching government policies?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Congresswoman, that is an answer I cannot
    respond to. This is really not in my expertise.
        Mrs. McClain. You do not have an opinion on how we should
    deal with high-ranking officials----
        Mr. Muhleisen. To the extent that they are pursuing illegal
    or corrupt practices, I am sure the United States has enough
    tools to go against them. My expertise is in multilateral
    institutions, not so much in financial institutions. That is
    why I do not really--I am not really in a position to answer
    your question.
        Mrs. McClain. Do you have an opinion on that?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I think it is--from a moral perspective, it
    is--I think if Chinese ordinary citizens would hear about that,
    they would certainly question what is going on. In that sense,
    it is something that conflicts between what you do and what you
    say, and I found that, of course, morally reprehensible.
        Mrs. McClain. Is it safe to say, and I do not want to put
    words in your mouth, that actions should have consequences?
        Mr. Muhleisen. Certainly, Chinese citizens should see
    whether they could not----
        Mrs. McClain. What about the high-ranking officials?
        Mr. Muhleisen. That is what I mean.
        Mrs. McClain. Okay.
        Mr. Muhleisen. The consequences should be in China, because
    that is, in a way, where the disadvantages are for their
    citizens.
        Mrs. McClain. I am looking as well to protect our citizens,
    our financial institutions, and really try to deter the Chinese
    and disincentivize them for taking advantage of our
    institutions, whether it be educationally, or our financial
    institutions, and try to hold them accountable. We know they
    are bad actors, so how do we hold them accountable, and what
    incentives or disincentives do we put in place for the CCP to
    get them to be good actors, which they have proven time and
    time again that they are not good actors?
        What I have tried to do, and what I am doing, is I am proud
    to lead the Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act along with my
    colleague Sherman in this Congress. I think it is very
    important. In the event that China moves against Taiwan, this
    bill would take effect and publish the financial institutions
    providing services to senior Chinese Government officials--we
    are all about transparency, right--and it would prevent them
    from being able to live here in the United States.
        It will show the Chinese citizens who live under the
    repression and suffer daily that their hypocritical, tyrannical
    leaders live lavishly by gifting and grifting off of their
    U.S.' colleagues. This bill has an exemption, carveout, for
    those who cooperate--being the operative word--with the United
    States. I would love to see which members of the elite have
    more loyalty to the U.S. dollar than they do to Chairman Xi
    Jinping. I think that would be kind of interesting.
        Is there more, in your opinion, that Congress or other
    countries can do to use financial tools to sway or incentivize
    or disincentivize the CCP, Mr.----
        Mr. Muhleisen. I cannot really answer your question,
    Congresswoman.
        Mrs. McClain. Wonderful. Thank you.
        I am out of time. I yield.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentlelady yields.
        The gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, is now
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you.
        With today's hearing, my Republican colleagues are trying
    to find the most inflammatory way to say something that we all
    should agree on. You all, the United States' competitiveness in
    a global economy is a shared goal amongst Democrats and
    Republicans, Independents, people who do not even care about
    politics. Why do we get partisan hearing titles like
    ``Examining Policies to Counter China?''
        My Republican colleagues would rather demonize an entire
    country for the fact the United States is lagging behind in
    global competitiveness than talk about the real problem. The
    real problem, you might ask, is that my colleagues in the
    Republican Party have refused to invest in America for decades.
        When Congress made historic investments in roads, bridges,
    ports, rail, you all, we were on the right track but just
    catching up. Unfortunately, President Trump and his Co-
    President Elon Musk refused to build on that progress. Instead,
    they are gearing up today for a budget resolution that would
    roll back Congress' historic investments over the last 4 years,
    and that is not to mention that they are crippling the very
    agencies that are making these investments by firing as many
    Federal employees as possible.
        Let us really ask ourselves, how do we make America
    competitive in a global economy? Let us start by fixing this
    hearing title, ``Examining Policies to Counter Elon Musk''
    because that is what really needs to happen. If we do not want
    our government and economy to become the laughingstock that
    Twitter became when Elon Musk took over, it is time for us to
    take back our power as Congress, Article I, Section 1 of the
    U.S. Constitution.
        Elon Musk does not want a serious discussion in this
    hearing because, you all, he makes money when his Tesla stocks
    do well in China. Let us stop pretending that the whole country
    of China is the problem when Elon Musk is right here in our
    country and is a huge problem. Let us talk about policies to
    counter Musk and his agenda of destroying investments in
    America. You all, the way that I was raised, you take care of
    home first.
        Let us talk about a few policies that hit right at the
    heart of what Musk is doing to my fighting Fifth District in
    Atlanta. Atlanta is home to the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention (CDC) and every dollar that we invest in public
    health yields up to $88 that benefits our society. Congress has
    been investing nearly $10 billion per year in the CDC, so we
    are talking about a potential value of $880 billion.
        Dr. Doshi, what do you think? If we stop making those
    investments, who is going to step up and get access to that
    $880 billion in investments? The research that we are doing,
    how does that help our competitiveness with China? Does that
    benefit the United States or China?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
        I think over the last 8 to 10 years there has been a
    growing bipartisan consensus on the need to invest in American
    competitiveness, not just to focus on China, although that is a
    principal challenge for us, but also to make ourselves more
    prosperous, more secure, and quite frankly, more advanced when
    it comes to technology.
        I think it is important for us to think about the CHIPS and
    Science Act as a critical way of strengthening American
    investment in the future of technology, along with the
    Inflation Reduction Act, which make the United States more
    competitive in everything from batteries to electronic vehicles
    (EVs). Batteries are relevant also for military advantage, also
    infrastructure, basic infrastructure. China invests enormous
    sums in infrastructure. We do not invest very much.
        That is why right now, Congresswoman, our percentage share
    of manufacturing has fallen from 30 percent to 15 percent in
    two decades, while China's has gone from 6 percent to 30
    percent. I think more investment across the board is a priority
    and maybe something that has bipartisan support.
        Ms. Williams of Georgia. It absolutely should be
    bipartisan, and I look forward to working with my Republican
    colleagues on these very policies.
        Also, Atlanta is home to the world's busiest and most
    efficient airport, providing countless contributions to the
    United States' position in the global economy.
        Dr. Doshi, if we do not have the air traffic controllers
    and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents
    that we need to keep travelers safe and coming into America,
    are people going to want to keep coming to the United States
    for global commerce or could that competitive edge also be
    taken by another country like China?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. I
    think American State capacity is one of those things that needs
    to be improved, and some significant cuts to it without
    thinking about how to retain capacity in areas we already have
    can cause competitive disadvantage across the board, including
    in the sector that you identified.
        Ms. Williams of Georgia. I have many more questions,
    because I also went into the grocery store this weekend, and
    there were no eggs on the shelf, so my 9-year-old was quite
    upset when he could not get his cheese eggs for breakfast on
    Sunday morning. We have a lot of issues that we need to
    discuss----
        Mr. Meuser. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Ms. Williams of Georgia. My time has expired, and I yield
    back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentlelady yields.
        The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. De La Cruz, Vice Chair of
    Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, is now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Ms. De La Cruz. Thank you so much, Chairman and thank you
    to all the witnesses for being here today.
        This is an important topic when we discuss China and the
    United States and the competitiveness especially. There is so
    much going on in our country, but one of the things that has
    affected Americans from Deep South Texas, which is where I am
    from, to Chicago, Atlanta, California, is fentanyl and the rise
    of fentanyl that has happened under the Biden Administration.
    Under the Biden Administration we saw fentanyl pouring into our
    borders. We saw deaths due to the fentanyl crisis that happened
    under the Biden Administration.
        That being said, fentanyl comes from China. It has
    destroyed our families. I sat with mothers over the holidays
    who had empty chairs at their holiday tables because they lost
    a child or a spouse. This is a very important and difficult
    topic.
        Drug overdoses are the leading cause of deaths between 18
    and 45-year-olds, with fentanyl being responsible for 70
    percent of those overdoses. One gram of fentanyl can kill
    potentially 500 people.
        In Deep South Texas, in the last Congress, one of our brave
    law enforcement officers found 3 gallons of fentanyl in South
    Texas. That was enough to kill two times the size of Houston,
    Texas. Can you imagine that just--thousands and thousands of
    people who would be affected had that drug successfully gotten
    to its destination.
        Part of the solution is we need better border security, and
    part is that we can do work on this committee to stop the
    financing of fentanyl. I am proud to say that last year my
    bill, H.R. 1076, Preventing the Financing of Illegal Synthetic
    Drugs Act, was signed into law to start taking real steps to
    address the financing of these drugs.
        To my question. Mr. Cassara, what role does Chinese money
    laundering organizations (CMLOs) play in laundering proceeds
    from drug trafficking, and how critical are CMLOs to the U.S.
    drug trade?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. I have a
    perspective of decades going back, anti-money laundering work,
    and I have examined hemispheric laundering, for example, the
    Colombian black market peso exchange evolving into the Mexican
    black market peso exchange. Then maybe 10 years ago or so, the
    Chinese, Chinese presence, Chinese money laundering
    organizations started to become the money launderers of choice
    for the cartels, and they have pioneered innovative methods of
    laundering the proceeds.
        Ms. De La Cruz. Why do you think that is?
        Mr. Cassara. Why do I think that is?
        Ms. De La Cruz. Yes.
        Mr. Cassara. I think that the Chinese are very skilled in
    what they do. They are very, very good businesspeople, and they
    are incentivized to undercut their competitors. They also take
    advantage of the Chinese presence here in the United States. A
    lot of them are upstanding citizens, but nevertheless, some of
    these people wittingly or unwittingly get involved in taking
    some of this illicit money, putting it into their regular
    business activities, and laundering that money through
    underground financial systems and mobile phone apps, other
    techniques and enablers that I described in my testimony.
        Ms. De La Cruz. Excellent. What vulnerabilities in the
    United States are CMLOs most effectively exploiting, and where
    do gaps in regulatory oversight persist?
        Mr. Cassara. I think the biggest vulnerabilities that we
    have vis-a-vis Chinese money laundering organizations in the
    United States is their ability to bypass our most important
    anti-money laundering countermeasure, which is financial
    intelligence, Bank Secrecy Act information. The techniques they
    use pretty effectively go around these types of reporting
    requirements, whether it be trade-based money laundering, Fei-
    Chien, flying money, trade-based value transfer, this type of
    thing. We need to crack down in these areas. Once again, in my
    written testimony I gave some ideas on how that can be done.
        Ms. De La Cruz. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentlelady yields.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, the Ranking Member on
    the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, is now
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
    very kind and warm expression of an introduction.
        I would like to associate myself with the comments of the
    Ranking Member as they relate to China. I think she spoke well
    and covered much of what I would say. I do agree that there is
    a problem with fentanyl, but I am also concerned about Russia.
    I am concerned about Russia because it seems that we have
    embarked upon a course of conduct that would allow us to reward
    Russian aggression. You cannot reward aggression and assume
    that you will have peace.
        I am concerned about what is happening with Ukraine and
    this belief that somehow Ukraine is the aggressor and started
    this war. I think that we would have to suspend all of our
    common sense to agree with this premise, because we saw the
    tanks moving into Ukraine. It is very difficult to even
    consider the notion that one would now blame Ukraine for
    Russian aggression.
        It seems that our President, unfortunately, has embarked
    upon a course of appeasement. Russia wants to surrender, no
    land taken, President agrees. That is appeasement. Russia is
    desiring that there be no security provided Ukraine. Looks like
    we are backing off, but as we back away, we will take precious
    minerals that Ukraine might have. Russia is of the opinion that
    Ukraine should not be a part of North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO), seems like our President agrees. That is
    appeasement.
        I am really concerned about the President's approach to
    Russia. When on--just yesterday, we had a U.N. resolution
    blaming Russia for its encroachment, its invasion of Ukraine.
    We voted against that resolution, The United States of America.
    In 2023, a similar resolution was presented. We voted for it.
    Has so much changed in such a short period of time that we
    would now support Russian aggression?
        I am concerned about China. My colleagues on both sides
    have made good points, but we cannot overlook the fact that
    China and Russia are in bed together. After China abstained
    yesterday on this resolution condemning Russia, President Xi
    Jinping called--called Putin, President--called him and
    explained, I am with you, we are neighbors.
        There has to be some concern shown for what is happening
    with this country as it relates to Russia and the way we are
    turning our back on our allies.
        What has Canada done to deserve this sort of treatment?
    Canada has been a loyal, faithful ally of the United States for
    years upon years, yet we find ourselves now cozying up to Putin
    directly. I am not sure that there is a lot of space between
    the efforts to cozy up to China with the President.
        Here is my question, and I will ask the question of--I am
    hoping that I will pronounce your name correctly, sir. Let us
    see. I have it here. At the very end. Yes, sir, would you
    pronounce your name for me, sir?
        Dr. Doshi. Dr. Doshi, sir. Thank you.
        Mr. Green. Okay. Thank you, sir. My question to you, sir.
    What signal did we send yesterday when we voted to oppose
    blaming Russia for the invasion of Ukraine?
        Dr. Doshi. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
        I think China was watching that very closely. They are
    interested in whether or not we will successfully pry Russia
    from China. I think, as you note, that is very hard to do, and
    we might be sending the signal that we would not necessarily
    stand with Taiwan if the question were called.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Steil, Chair of the
    Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Financial Technology and
    Artificial Intelligence, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here. This is a really important
    hearing.
        I want to start with you, Mr. Muhleisen, if I can. In your
    testimony today, you spoke about the importance of the U.S.
    dollar being the world reserve currency, how we maintain that
    position. We are seeing advancements in China in artificial
    intelligence, in AI, a position where the United States has
    really been a leader for some time. As we look at the
    development of Web 3.0, as we look at the need for the future
    in the financial services space, I think we have to focus on
    what is going to make sure that the United States maintains its
    dominant position.
        If we look back to Web 1, Web 2.0, what you saw was a
    development that occurred inside the United States. Whatever
    your issue is with Big Tech, and I have plenty of them. One of
    them, with one exception really being TikTok, is that these
    tech companies are at least domiciled in the United States.
    Whether or not that is Google or Amazon, et cetera, they are
    domiciled here. If we do not have rules and regulations of the
    road, we risk allowing other countries to move forward to
    being--and to outcompete the United States. It needs to be a
    premise, I believe, for policymakers here to make sure that we
    are outcompeting other countries, and in particular China.
        The question that I would have for you as it relates to
    China specifically is, what regulatory approaches are they
    taking that can impact their financial services markets or U.S.
    consumers?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I am not an expert on the Chinese financial
    system, but it would behoove China as a big player to make
    sure--also for the stability of its financial institutions--to
    make sure that the investments are sound and that they follow
    international standards. China's financial sector has many
    weaknesses, because of the crisis from the real estate sector,
    and the market for artificial intelligence, cryptocurrencies
    and the like is very volatile. From a prudential perspective
    that would also minimize the potential spillovers to the rest
    of the world, one would hope that China adopts very prudential
    regulations and enforces those.
        Mr. Steil. They are not today, right? I think that is one
    of the big distinctions is that they are not really enforcing
    in a manner that the U.S. markets are, which is a benefit to
    U.S. consumers and U.S. investors, right?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I do not know exactly what standards you
    mean that they are enforcing. Again, I do not know too much
    about the Chinese financial sector, per se.
        Mr. Steil. Okay. Let me shift and come to you, Mr. Cassara,
    if I can. You wrote an essay last year, ``China's Digital
    Authoritarianism Is Coming Our Way.'' Can you just put a little
    meat on the bone on digital authoritarianism and what financial
    levers the CCP has at its disposal? There is a lot of
    discussion about Central Bank digital currency, the concern of
    that. I share a lot of those concerns. Could you comment?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. Yes, I am
    concerned as well about the Chinese development of the Central
    Bank digital currency. That is exactly why I wrote the article.
    There are various models, as you know, of Central Bank digital
    currencies. What concerns me the most is what I call the
    Chinese model, the authoritarian model, because they overlay it
    with social monitoring, social control, social scoring,
    intensive and intrusive surveillance.
        Basically, they are doing this to control their population,
    and they can do this basically with the flip of a switch. They
    can demonetize a citizen. That individual is not able to get on
    a metro, not able to pay for their child's education, not able
    to buy groceries, this type of thing. It scares me from a civil
    libertarian perspective, and I do not want that model to be
    adopted here or anywhere else.
        Mr. Steil. I 100 percent share your concern. It is
    something that we are going to have to remain vigilant of to
    make sure that we do not allow our Federal Government in the
    United States to have that type of control.
        In my final minute left, I want to come to you, Mr. Miller.
    AI is going to be critical for development of new technology
    here in the United States. A question that we are going to be
    looking at is how do we make sure that we are extending the
    Trump tax cuts in particular on the R&D or accelerated
    depreciation? In 20 seconds, could you explain the importance
    of that as it relates to financial services?
        Mr. Miller. Yes, absolutely. We should be doing everything
    we can to incentivize R&D, including through the Tax Code.
    Every dollar saved, quite frankly, through taxes is being
    plowed by American companies back into innovation.
        Mr. Steil. In the final 5 seconds, you would agree that it
    has a direct impact on the investment that is needed for AI and
    the technology----
        Mr. Miller. Yes, absolutely.
        Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Flood, the Chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, is now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Flood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Maybe somebody has bugged the doors to this chamber. They
    seem to keep opening on their own today.
        Mr. Cassara, in your testimony, I found it was interesting.
    You wrote at length on customs fraud, which is when an importer
    and exporter work together to misrepresent the value of goods
    transferred for illicit reasons. Now, given President Trump's
    interest in using tariffs on Chinese goods, I would imagine
    that customs fraud could become even more common the next 4
    years.
        Do you agree with that assessment? How would authorities
    work to combat that, and particularly, how would we combat that
    from Chinese vendors looking to avoid tariffs?
        Mr. Cassara. Thank you for the question. I believe that
    trade-based money laundering and value transfer is probably the
    largest, most pervasive money laundering methodology in the
    world today, if you take into consideration all the various
    iterations of it and various models.
        As far as countermeasures go, it is very hard, because what
    happens is the occasional illicit transaction gets intermingled
    with the overwhelming licit trade transactions. Because trade
    volume is so high, it is very, very difficult to pick out those
    isolated illicit transactions. Nevertheless, the volume of
    trade being so high, the amount of trade-based money laundering
    (TBML) is off the charts, and we do not have good
    countermeasures in place.
        The best countermeasure, in my estimation, is something I
    came up with a number of years ago that was adopted by the U.S.
    Government, and that is the formulation of trade transparency
    units, or TTUs, looking at customs data between countries,
    spotting those anomalies between trade. It is going to be very,
    very problematic, particularly with countries like China, but
    it is something we have to look at.
        Mr. Flood. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        One of the things I find very interesting about China's
    extension of credit to these developing nations is that it has
    led to a serious default risk. Sixty percent of China's
    overseas lending was owed by countries experiencing debt
    distress in 2022, but yet they are all over the African
    Continent. They are expanding their reach.
        Mr. Muhleisen, at some point inability to pay back hefty
    loans will start to become a problem for China, but they can
    also use their loans as leverage to obtain unrelated
    concessions from developing nations. Is seeking troubled
    customers for their loans a feature or a bug as it relates to
    China's global strategy?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I would say that looking for geopolitical
    allies in developing countries and emerging markets is a
    feature. Putting countries into debt distress, I do not want to
    say it is a feature. It is probably a bit more than a bug. It
    is maybe carelessness. It is certainly something that, as I
    said in my statement, China should be held responsible for. I
    have various proposals there, especially the IMF's Lending Into
    Official Arrears Policy.
        Mr. Flood. Do you think that--how should that change our
    national strategy around international finance? Should we be
    more aggressive ourselves or is China's strategy unsustainable
    in the long term?
        Mr. Muhleisen. China will certainly take losses from its
    strategy, like many countries before it has already done over
    the last century. The growing demand or the demand for these
    loans also reflects a big need on the part of the recipient
    countries. The United States has a chance to leverage its own
    capital into international financial institutions by extending
    loans to these countries to compete, but also by using these
    institutions to provide not necessarily monetary incentives but
    other geopolitical incentives or trade incentives to get back
    into closer relations with low-income and developing countries.
    There is a need to compete, because right now there is one kid
    on the block with a lot of money in its pockets, and they are
    spending it like crazy.
        Mr. Flood. I am going to stop you right there. I just want
    to say before my time is up, thank you for the discussion. On
    one hand, it is clear that many Americans are not interested in
    further extending our global reach and feel we need to be more
    focused on what is happening here at home. I understand that
    sentiment, but China is not going to sit back. China will be
    aggressive in expanding their influence through whatever means
    they have available, and I am interested in working to figure
    out what we can do to project American power in a way that is
    cost effective and sensible without running afoul of legitimate
    sentiments of many that we need to remain focused on what is
    going on at home.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Stutzman, is now recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Stutzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. A very
    important topic and interesting topic, and one that obviously
    is going to affect not only us but future generations here in
    America.
        Mr. McMurray, I would like to come to you and talk a little
    bit about how energy security is national security. My district
    in Northeast Indiana, we are a heavy manufacturing and
    agricultural (AG) district. We have a heavy footprint, and so
    we rely on an abundance of energy of all types. We just
    actually had a Google announcement. They are going to put in a
    data center in the district which consumes a lot of energy, and
    so there is concern about our ability to maintain and sustain
    strong energy supply and dependence and sustainability.
        We have--generally, in Indiana, we rely on affordable
    energy, but lately we felt some pain after the previous
    Administration. I am really looking forward to working with my
    colleagues in Congress to make sure that we here in the United
    States dominate in the energy supply and production. As we saw,
    President Trump took significant steps to move us in that
    direction.
        I would like to talk to you or ask a little bit about the
    IFIs like the World Bank. What disadvantages do U.S. energy
    companies currently face in their attempt to secure
    international energy financing projects?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. As you said,
    energy security is national security. Right now, we need to
    make it easier for U.S. companies to be able to build and
    compete abroad. Right now, that is very challenging when it
    comes to different state-owned enterprises that can offer very
    lucrative financing packages and leveraging either our
    institutions, such as EXIM Bank or DFC or entities like the
    World Bank can help put our companies on a level playing field.
        Now, there is a big opportunity this Congress with both
    EXIM Bank and DFC needing to be reauthorized to give them more
    tools so U.S. companies can compete, which will also have
    direct benefits for U.S. jobs.
        Mr. Stutzman. Do the Chinese firms or in the state-backed
    energy firms, do they face similar disadvantages?
        Mr. McMurray. In some cases, no. They do not comply by
    Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
    rules so they can offer financing packages that are more
    competitive than what other countries can offer. That is also
    where entities like CTEP, China Transformational Exports
    Program, part of EXIM Bank, and the DFC are tailored to be able
    to try to compete with those financing packages.
        Mr. Stutzman. I mean, we know China plays by their own set
    of rules. Any suggestions or any reforms that you would suggest
    needed here in the United States to maintain and to outpace
    China?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes. I think, first, domestically we have to
    make it easier for U.S. companies to be able to build. In many
    cases, countries are going to want to see projects built in the
    United States before they are sold abroad. That requires
    improving the permitting system. That require continued
    investments in support to innovative companies through the
    Department of Energy and the national labs, and then it
    requires predictability for these companies to be able to make
    investments in the long term.
        Looking globally, that is where the upcoming
    reauthorization has the ability to kind of sharpen some of
    those tools to expand eligible technologies that EXIM Bank is
    able to support, also make it very clear of what is the right
    metric or outcome that EXIM Bank should be focused on, such as
    jobs. Taking that together can really help U.S. companies
    compete globally and ensure that the United States is a player
    when it is looking--when it is considered by other countries.
        Mr. Stutzman. Yes. I know that in Indiana, of course, we
    used to be a coal-producing State, a lot of coal power, and now
    we are shifting more to natural gas. A lot of talk about
    nuclear. It seems like the permitting process is always the
    piece that hangs us up. Can that be streamlined? What can be
    done to make our permitting process better?
        Mr. McMurray. Yes. Indiana's Governor is making great
    strides in trying to attract nuclear to the State, and as well
    as working with other States, which I think is a really
    exciting opportunity to----
        Mr. Stutzman. Yes.
        Mr. McMurray--deploy nuclear here in the United States.
        As for the permitting process, I used to work at the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, so there have been a lot of
    prog---there has been a lot of progress at the NRC, U.S.
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There has also been a lot of
    bipartisan support in Congress to improve the licensing
    process. Just last Congress, both the House and the Senate
    enacted, with overwhelming bipartisan support, the Accelerating
    Deployment of Versatile Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy
    (ADVANCE) Act. The Energy and Commerce's bill, the Atomic
    Energy Advancement Act, really tried to tailor a couple of key
    provisions to improve the licensing and permitting process at
    the NRC so those companies can have better outcomes and better
    predictability.
        Mr. Stutzman. Yes, thank you. I appreciate your comments. I
    just know that we have the ability, we have the know-how, we
    have everything in place. We just need to make sure government
    does not stand in the way of progress, and we need to continue
    to make sure our nuclear power is at the forefront of our
    minds, and we can outpace China.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentleman yields.
        The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Nunn, Vice Chair of the
    Subcommittee on National Security, is now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate you all
    joining us for this very important conversation on China and
    its role in the world.
        I am coming at it from a decade-plus as a
    counterintelligence officer working out of facilities, running
    operations in Guangzhou. I now serve on the China Select
    Committee.
        We have all seen firsthand how dangerous China can be in
    its predatory lending practices. Here in the United States, we
    very much support an open opportunity for free trade for
    mercantilism for the opportunity for an entrepreneur to really
    take off. Obviously, China has a much more opaque, closed
    system, one that not only suppresses its own population, but
    one that will cannibalize its own industry and that of others
    to try and effectively take over countries and how they
    operate.
        We have seen this since 2017 as China being the world's
    largest official creditor, and this is concerning to the global
    financial system, because it is cheap, it is predatory. Its
    infrastructural aids aim to buy up global influence, undercut
    other countries, export and distort international trade. I
    mean, if this was a used car company, it would have been shut
    down a long time ago.
        The reality is here that they have been able to lead an
    entire initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative, that has
    targeted a number of areas specifically of interest to China
    and developed nations, now over 10 percent of their GDP to the
    Chinese State. Pakistan owes China $77 billion and climbing,
    Sri Lanka, $11 billion, and Kenya, $9 billion. The list goes on
    and on, all areas where China has purchased and now owns its
    way to controlling these countries and certainly their
    governments.
        The time to combat China, I think we all agree, is not
    yesterday, but it is today. It is not in the next 10 years. The
    greatest threat from China is not its military. I would offer,
    Mr. Chairman, it is their economic tactics, including
    intellectual property theft to drain skills and inventions
    created right here in the United States, as well as pull our
    trade jobs and other profits outside of our country. It is one
    of the reasons I am so proud to be working with this committee
    on a bill that I led called the Neutralizing Unfair Chinese
    Subsidy Act of 2025. It is to counter China's predatory lending
    practices.
        Now, Mr. Muhleisen, you are an expert on Chinese lending.
    Do you agree that we need a strategy here in the United States
    to combat these destabilizing tactics and ensure that China
    follows OECD's arrangement on officially supported export
    credits?
        Mr. Muhleisen. I agree with what you just said about what
    happens, and also, I agree with what you just proposed.
        Mr. Nunn. Talk to us a little bit. When we talk about
    neutralizing unfair Chinese subsidies, how China has done this
    not just in the past but how it continues to be a predatory
    lender in this space.
        Mr. Muhleisen. China has pursued two objectives. First, it
    wanted to export its construction services to generate jobs at
    home; and second, it acquired strategic advantages in exchange
    for its loans from many countries. It has not, in my opinion,
    shrunk back from all sorts of means to sway decisions into
    Chinese companies getting orders, but it also has affected the
    quality of the projects, and I think it is backfiring on China.
        Countries would, I think, prefer not to have to pay a lot
    of money for projects that are either not really providing an
    economic return or have to be repaired and replaced within a
    short period.
        Mr. Nunn. Absolutely right. In fact, it ends up costing
    everybody more in the long run.
        Mr. Miller, you are a leader here when it comes to
    addressing what America does, I think, very well in the world,
    competitive bids, being able to grow, harnessing innovation in
    a way that really takes off. It is one of the reasons why nine
    of the top ten companies valued at over $1 trillion reside
    right here in the United States. How many reside in China?
    Zero. That is a direct result of a state-owned entity which
    capitalizes on everything.
        I think that there is no accident here that the free market
    helps us foster our innovation. Could you explain the
    importance of strengthening our American markets on the
    international scene with the time that we have left?
        Mr. Miller. Sure, I would be happy to do that. I mean, you
    are absolutely right that--to say that we need to focus on
    economics and economic security and not just view China as a
    national security threat, again, not understating that at all.
    We really need a balanced and holistic approach to this entire
    set of issues. We released a paper today on economic security
    that offers 10 recommendations dealing with everything from
    sanctions and investment reviews to trade policy and other
    innovation-friendly policies, and we really need to double down
    on our strengths.
        You were not here for the chair's opening statement, but he
    mentioned that beating China means doubling down on U.S.
    strengths, and I completely agree with that.
        Mr. Nunn. Mr. Miller, I yield my time back just to say
    thank you for providing a playbook that this government can
    start using today.
        With that, I yield my time. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Meuser. The gentleman yields.
        We would like to thank all the witnesses for your testimony
    today.
        Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days
    to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the
    chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witness for his
    response. Witnesses, please respond no later than March 31,
    2025.

        [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

        This hearing is adjourned.

        [Whereupon, at 1:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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