    [House Hearing, 119 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                              ASSESSING THE THREAT
                            TO U.S. FUNDED RESEARCH
    =======================================================================
                                   HEARING

                                 BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
                                 AND OVERSIGHT

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
                                 AND TECHNOLOGY

                                     OF THE

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 5, 2025

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 119-4

                                   __________

     Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

                                   __________

                          U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    58-978 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================

                  COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

                       HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chairman
    RANDY WEBER, Texas                   ZOE LOFGREN, California, Ranking
    JIM BAIRD, Indiana                       Member
    DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
    JAY OBERNOLTE, California            HALEY STEVENS, Michigan
    CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee         DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina
    DARRELL ISSA, California             ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon
    CLAUDIA TENNEY, New York             VALERIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina
    SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida              EMILIA SYKES, Ohio
    MAX MILLER, Ohio                     MAXWELL FROST, Florida
    RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              GABE AMO, Rhode Island
    MIKE COLLINS, Georgia                SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM, Virginia
    VINCE FONG, California               LUZ RIVAS, California
    DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         SYLVESTER TURNER, Texas
    KEITH SELF, Texas                    SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware
    PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina         LAURA GILLEN, New York
    SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          GEORGE WHITESIDES, California,
    JEFF HURD, Colorado                       Vice Ranking Member
    MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida            LAURA FRIEDMAN, California
    MIKE KENNEDY, Utah                   APRIL McCLAIN DELANEY, Maryland
    NICK BEGICH, Alaska                  JOSH RILEY, New York
    VACANT
                                     ------

                  Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

                     HON. RICH McCORMICK, Georgia, Chairman
    DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              EMILIA SYKES, Ohio,
    DARRELL ISSA, California                 Ranking Member
    PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina         SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
    NICK BEGICH, Alaska                  LUZ RIVAS, California

                            C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                 March 5, 2025

                                                                       Page

    Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                               Opening Statements

    Statement by Representative Rich McCormick, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
      Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    10
        Written Statement............................................    11

    Statement by Representative Emilia Sykes, Ranking Member,
      Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
      Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    12
        Written Statement............................................    13

    Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Committee on
      Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..    14
        Written Statement............................................    16

    Statement by Representative Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member,
      Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
      Representatives................................................    17
        Written Statement............................................    18

                                   Witnesses:

    Mr. John F. Sargent Jr., Retired, Specialist in Science and
      Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service
        Oral Statement...............................................    19
        Written Statement............................................    22

    Mr. Jeffery Stoff, President, Center for Research Security &
      Integrity
        Oral Statement...............................................    40
        Written Statement............................................    42

    Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and
      Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology Policy, MIT
        Oral Statement...............................................    84
        Written Statement............................................    86

    Discussion.......................................................    95

                 Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

    Mr. John F. Sargent Jr., Retired, Specialist in Science and
      Technology Policy, Congressional Research Service..............   112

    Mr. Jeffery Stoff, President, Center for Research Security &
      Integrity......................................................   132

    Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and
      Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology Policy, MIT....   139

                Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record

    Article submitted by Representative Emilia Sykes, Ranking Member,
      Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
      Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives
        ``Exclusive: US intel shows Russia and China are attempting
          to recruit disgruntled federal employees, sources say,''
          Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, CNN...   148

                              ASSESSING THE THREAT
                            TO U.S. FUNDED RESEARCH

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2025

                      House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
                   Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                                                       Washington, D.C.

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rich
    McCormick [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.001

        Chairman McCormick. The Subcommittee on Investigations and
    Oversight will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is
    authorized to declare recess in the Subcommittee at any time.
    I'd like to now recognize myself for 5 minutes for opening
    remarks.
        And first of all, I'd like to thank you all, my guests, for
    coming here today on my first chair. It's exciting to have here
    some delightful experts in our oversight, and it's also an
    honor to have my Ranking Member Sykes here with me today.
        I want to lay out our objectives and how we're going to run
    our Committees from here on out. In reference to former Chair
    Gallagher in a Subcommittee I was a part of, we'll start on
    time, we'll stay on time, and we'll not use acronyms to the
    best of our abilities because most people don't understand
    acronyms, even the people that use them, I've found, in the
    military.
        I even practiced this too, so this is great.
        All right. Our country is in a unique position to collect
    talent from all over the world. I think this is one of our
    greatest strengths for the last several decades, and it's made
    us this amazing hodgepodge of talent, and it's really
    accelerated our country and technologies and our ability to
    lead the rest of the world to collect ideas from all over the
    world and to accelerate that process through our educational
    system.
        It has also made us a target. When you look at the people
    who are immigrating here to do education, we have about a
    million students here every year. A large portion of them are
    from countries that are our peers and our rivals and that take
    that technology back to their countries, and we have to be
    careful of that or we'll lose our position.
        In case you haven't been keeping up with our educational
    system, it's ranked, I think, 40th in the world right now. It's
    not a good position to be, even when you're in the lead. You
    can't just steal talent and stay in front of everybody else.
    And when you're giving your information to other countries
    willingly--and I think there's something to be gained from
    collaboration. I think that's a good thing, but you have to be
    careful. You have to be smart if you're running a business or a
    country.
        I think when we have the unique and changing ways,
    especially in advanced technologies, AI (artificial
    intelligence), quantum, and everything else that we're teaching
    our children in schools now, we have to be very, very quick to
    put guardrails on that to make sure that we stay in the leading
    edge of technologies and that we continue to be competitive and
    actually lead the rest of the world.
        One of the things I realized that the CCP (Chinese
    Communist Party) has done is they refer to our fruits as their
    honey. They literally say they're coming up and suckling at
    that nectar if you will, absorbing that pretty much at cost.
    They don't have to invest in it. They just get to take it back
    to their country and benefit from it. That doesn't necessarily
    benefit the United States, though. When you have foreign
    companies and professors and other people coming here to pick
    the flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China, that
    doesn't well--bode well for us. And we need to make sure that
    this is not only a quote, but realize that this is the mantra
    of the CCP right now.
        I think we need to continue to slow the leaks, make sure we
    protect our technologies, and provide opportunities for our
    homegrown students who will remain in America and be the future
    of our technologies when we talk about developing our oversight
    for this--for these technologies.
        Starting with what is firmly within our control, we should
    review Federal regulations that are seen both as too burdensome
    and also those that are too lenient, work with researchers and
    research institutions to implement new methods to ensure
    accountability is enhanced and improved as we go forward. And
    we also need to ensure that grant awards have contractual
    mechanisms to certify that background checks on staff are done.
        And one thing that maybe you don't realize, when I was an
    associate professor at Georgia Tech and Morehouse, we had
    foreign instructors. We had foreign students, matter of fact, a
    large portion of them, and there's a financial advantage to
    that. But I was also used as an investigator or to help
    investigate from the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) a
    foreign national instructor who was then arrested because they
    were stealing secrets. This is a real thing, and this--and that
    was a couple decades ago. It hasn't gotten better. It's gotten
    worse, and we need to be careful.
        Our Nation's premier research institutes have been an all-
    you-can-eat buffet for other countries right now, and
    especially our adversaries. We cannot let this metaphorical
    buffet continue, or we risk ceding our dominance in innovation
    in scientific research. I look forward to the witnesses'
    testimony today informing our Committee on the steps we can
    take to reverse these current vulnerabilities and enlighten us
    on what we can do better.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman McCormick follows:]

        Our country is unique in that we attract the most brilliant
    minds around the world to study and learn here. This quality
    raises the bar domestically and has allowed us as a nation to
    be leaders of innovation. Unfortunately, this has also made us
    a target. Countries that do not play fair and want to thwart
    our intellectual property laws and other domestic protections
    are finding unique and ever-changing ways to acquire our
    innovations. This not only unfairly inflates the profitability
    of these foreign companies, but it also discourages and stifles
    progress at home.
        America's innovation is threatened by carelessness and the
    prying eyes of our adversaries. The Chinese Communist Party
    (CCP) has made it clear they are taking an ``all of country''
    approach to acquire sensitive information as early as possible
    and as quickly as possible. They have referred to the fruits of
    our innovation as ``honey'' and told the entirety of their
    country: researchers, professors, grad students, companies, and
    school children alike that they should ``pick flowers in
    foreign lands to make honey in China.'' This is not only a
    quote, but a mantra by the CCP to their academic and commercial
    base.
        The age of this quote and the number of times Congress has
    had hearings like this should underscore the fact that research
    security is not a new issue. For the last 20 years we as
    government have taken the issue seriously, especially as it
    applies to the CCP. U.S. taxpayers should not be subsidizing
    Chinese research and development, ever. Congress and the
    executive branch have made efforts, both legislative and
    administrative, to slow the leaks and combat the problem.
        Despite research security being directly tied to our
    national security and advancement, our efforts seem to have
    achieved limited success.
        We can look at the following opportunities for improvement:
          Starting with ourselves, we should review federal
    regulations that are both too ``burdensome'' and ``lenient'' at
    the same time.
          Researchers and research institutions are not
    diligent enough with mitigating threats of research security,
    we need new methods to ensure this accountability is enhanced
    and iterated on.
          Grant awards need to be paired with contractual
    mechanisms to ensure oversight is conducted and appropriate
    enforcement actions are taken on violators.
        Our goal here today is to learn about the state of play and
    determine how we can adjust and do better. I fear that our
    nation's premier research institutions have been all-you-can-
    eat buffets which our adversaries are using to consume untold
    numbers of innovative ideas. If this issue is not taken
    seriously here, we risk ceding our dominance in innovation and
    scientific research.
        In today's hearing, I look forward to the witnesses'
    testimony informing the Committee on what steps we need to take
    next to reverse the current vulnerabilities.

        Chairman McCormick. With that, I yield to the Ranking
    Member.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Chair McCormick, and congratulations
    on your chairmanship of this Subcommittee. Your practice rounds
    served you well. I also look forward to working with you and
    the entire Subcommittee for ensuring that we have robust and
    productive meetings in order to help serve the science
    community for our country.
        Before I start my remarks, I do want to take the time to
    express my condolences for the loss of one of the Members of
    our full Committee, Sylvester Turner, who passed away last
    night. He represented the State of Texas and was formerly the
    Mayor of Houston. And my husband and I have known him for some
    time, and I can't even begin to express the sadness that we
    feel, not only for the city of Houston, for his family, but for
    this country who has lost a great man, a great patron, and a
    great American. So if you have a moment to send up a prayer or
    thoughts of words of comfort for him and his family and his
    community, on behalf of the Democrats in this Committee. And
    hopefully, I speak for the full Committee in expressing my
    condolences.
        For years, this Committee has led the way in promoting
    sensible and responsible research security policy. America did
    not become the world leader in science because we cowered from
    our adversaries. We became the world leader because we created
    a welcoming research environment that set the standard of how
    global science is conducted. And while we are proud of these
    values, we are also aware that adversarial governments,
    including the People's Republic of China (PRC), often take
    advantage of our system and exploit its openness. But our
    response should not be to let our opponents fundamentally
    change our American scientific culture, and in turn, make it
    difficult for our researchers to address our most pressing
    national challenges.
        As a proud Representative of Ohio's 13th Congressional
    District in northeast Ohio, I know what's at stake. Ohio's 13th
    is home to a tech hub that received $51 million in CHIPS and
    Science investment to leverage Akron's national leadership in
    polymer science and sustainable polymers. From sustainable
    tires to cutting-edge polymers, the next generation of rubber
    and plastic products will happen in my district.
        This opportunity was not, however, created in a vacuum. It
    was made possible by fundamental researchers around the world
    working together on chemistry and engineering. Researchers at
    the University of Akron worked on these fundamental chemistry
    problems within a global science community, and we have
    benefited from international partnerships, and we welcome the
    best minds from around the world to allow our Nation and our
    expertise to grow.
        Of course, we recognize that there are valid research
    security concerns, and this Committee has worked in a
    bipartisan way to address these issues, including through the
    landmark CHIPS and Science Act that was passed in a bipartisan
    way, and we will continue to fight to maintain the CHIPS and
    Science Act. I know we heard some contrary conversation
    yesterday at the address from the President.
        Among its many actions, CHIPS and Science authorized the
    National Science Foundation (NSF) to maintain a research
    security office that works closely with law enforcement
    intelligence communities to address many of these concerns from
    a Federal agency perspective. This office, in conjunction with
    efforts from other SST (Science, Space, and Technology)
    agencies in the White House Office of Science and Technology
    Policy (OSTP), has created research security training modules,
    created frameworks to assess grant proposals for national
    security risks, and issued commonsense disclosure forms for use
    across grantmaking agencies.
        Since the Committee began looking at this issue in 2018,
    universities have also stepped up to the plate, examining their
    own research enterprise and identifying ways to make it more
    secure. MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), for
    example, compiled a report in 2022 that investigates how our
    premier research institutions can promote research security
    while preserving open scientific research, open intellectual
    exchange, and the free flow of ideas and people. I look forward
    to hearing about Dr. Zuber's experience co-chairing the
    National Academies' roundtable where academies, industry, law
    enforcement, and intelligence community worked to come to a
    common understanding of research, security threats, and best
    practices.
        It is my hope that this Committee continues to be a
    productive place to hold these very important conversations,
    particularly as we are witnessing attacks to the very core of
    our Federal research enterprise. Just as we must be clear-eyed
    about the threat posed by foreign adversaries, I hope my
    colleagues on both sides of the aisle don't shy away from
    speaking out when their own government weakens the United
    States' standing on the international stage. If we do not
    maintain American leadership in science and technology (S&T),
    we will lose what is worth protecting in the first place. And
    if we don't lead, someone else will follow. I would prefer the
    United States leads.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the Committee
    Members, to the staff for what I know will be a productive
    Congress. Thank you to our witnesses for being here. And, Mr.
    Chair, I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mrs. Sykes follows:]

        Thank you, Chairman McCormick--and congratulations on your
    Chairmanship of this Subcommittee. Also, thank you to our
    witnesses for appearing today. For years, this committee has
    led the way in promoting sensible and responsible research
    security policy.
        America did not become the world leader in science because
    we cowered from our adversaries, we became the world leader
    because we created a welcoming research environment that set
    the standard of how global science is conducted. While we are
    proud of these values, we are also aware that adversarial
    governments, including the People's Republic of China, often
    take advantage of our system and exploit its openness. But our
    response should not be to let our opponents fundamentally
    change our American scientific culture, and in turn, make it
    difficult for our researchers to address our most pressing
    national challenges.
        As a proud representative of Ohio's 13th District, I know
    what's at stake. Ohio's 13th is home to a Tech Hub that
    received $51 million in CHIPS & Science investment to leverage
    Akron's national leadership in polymer science. From
    sustainable tires to cutting-edge polymers, the next generation
    of rubber and plastics production will happen in my district.
    This opportunity was not created in a vacuum. It was made
    possible by fundamental researchers around the world working
    together on chemistry and engineering. Researchers at the
    University of Akron worked on these fundamental chemistry
    problems within a global science community. We have benefited
    from international partnerships, and we welcome the best minds
    from around the world to grow our national expertise.
        Of course, we recognize that there are valid research
    security concerns, and this committee has worked in a
    bipartisan way to address these issues, including through the
    landmark CHIPS and Science Act. Among its many actions, CHIPS
    and Science authorized the National Science Foundation to
    maintain a Research Security Office that works closely with law
    enforcement and intelligence communities to address many of
    these concerns from a federal agency perspective.
        This office, in conjunction with efforts from other SST
    agencies and the White House Office of Science and Technology
    Policy, has created research security training modules, created
    frameworks to assess grant proposals for national security
    risks, and issued common disclosure forms for use across grant-
    making agencies.
        Since the Committee began looking at this issue in 2018,
    universities have also stepped up to the plate, examining their
    own research enterprise and identifying ways to make it more
    secure. MIT, for example, compiled a report in 2022 that
    investigates how our premier research institutions can promote
    research security while preserving open scientific research,
    open intellectual exchange, and the free flow of ideas and
    people.
        I look forward to hearing about Dr. Zuber's experience co-
    chairing the National Academies roundtable, where academics,
    industry, law enforcement, and the intelligence community
    worked to come to a common understanding of research security
    threats and best practices. It is my hope that this Committee
    continues to be a productive place to hold these important
    conversations, particularly as we are witnessing attacks to the
    very core of our federal research enterprise.
        Just as we must be clear-eyed about the threat posed by
    foreign adversaries, I hope that my colleagues on both sides of
    the aisle don't shy away from speaking out when our own
    government weakens U.S. standing on the international stage. If
    we do not maintain American leadership in science and
    technology, we will lose what is worth protecting in the first
    place.
        Thank you, I yield back.

        Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Ranking Member Sykes. It's a
    pleasure. And with that, I recognize Chair Babin. And thank you
    for joining us today this morning, sir, for your opening
    remarks.
        Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, really appreciate
    it. And the first thing I want to say is--excuse me. Man, I'm
    sorry. I want to thank Ranking Member Sykes for that news, very
    sad. I want to express my condolences at the loss of former
    Mayor and our fellow Member of this Committee of Sylvester
    Turner. I'm absolutely shocked. I knew he had been having some
    health problems, but I did not know that we were going to lose
    him at this early date like this. I just want to say how sorry
    I am about it. I've worked with him for several years now and
    really appreciated his service as Mayor of Houston. He was a
    go-to guy, and he was nice. He was always a gentleman. I just
    want to say how much I appreciated his service. I'm sorry for
    his family and just shocked that we've lost him. And anyway,
    thank you for telling us about that.
        I want to thank our witnesses as well for being here and
    joining us to discuss a very serious, relevant topic, the
    security threats to our Federal research enterprise. America's
    leadership in science and technology was built on the
    foundation of Federal investment in basic research. These
    investments have enhanced our national security, strengthened
    our economy, and improved the lives of our citizens. Our unique
    research ecosystem, which combines Federal, academic, and
    private R&D (research and development) efforts, drives
    America's advancement in science and technology. However, for
    this system to work, we need a degree of open science that
    facilitates collaboration and transparency. The challenge is
    ensuring this openness does not compromise our research
    security.
        Although the United States has greatly profited from
    international scientific collaboration and the contributions of
    foreign-born scientists, other countries, both friend and foe,
    are also benefiting from U.S. investments. And while our goal
    is to ensure that all federally funded scientists adhere to the
    U.S. principles of scientific fairness and integrity,
    regardless of race or citizenship status, it is important to
    recognize that not all nations share these values.
        As this Committee is well aware, the Chinese Communist
    Party, or CCP, is determined to surpass the United States as
    the global leader in science and technology by 2050 and by any
    means necessary, including espionage, theft, or forced
    acquisition. And I think history has borne that out, that
    they're willing to do whatever it takes.
        The theft of our basic research poses a significant risk to
    our global competitiveness, handing our cutting-edge
    innovations to adversaries and undermining both our economy and
    our ability to lead in discovery. This is no idle threat, and
    it creates a serious strategic challenge. The CCP has been
    explicit about its efforts to steal our research results to
    further its technological progress.
        A 2023 survey by the Center for Strategic International
    Studies (CSIS) found 224 reported instances of Chinese
    espionage directed at the United States, and more than 1,200
    lawsuits were filed by U.S. companies against Chinese entities
    for intellectual property (IP) theft since 2000. In fact, even
    the Chinese consulate was closed in Houston, Texas, where my
    district is, from Houston over to Louisiana. It was closed back
    during the first Trump Administration for some of these very
    reasons. For the instances of espionage where the actor and
    intent were known, 49 percent of incidents directly involved
    Chinese military or government employees, 46 percent involved
    cyber espionage, 29 percent sought to acquire military
    technology, and 54 percent targeted commercial technologies.
        This Committee has passed multiple bills to protect
    American research. Some of this legislation directed the Office
    of Science and Technology Policy to coordinate efforts and
    standardize requirements across all Federal science agencies to
    provide a strong framework for research security. However, the
    previous Administration failed to execute this framework within
    the directed timeline, missing deadlines by over a year in some
    cases, and provided little to no coordination and no community
    engagement.
        The government needs clear and uniform guidance for our
    agencies and researchers, and I'm confident that this second
    Trump Administration will continue the good work of its
    previous term and reopen communication channels. Effective
    communication between law enforcement agencies and universities
    is paramount to securing our research enterprise. Universities
    need to know when researchers are targeted by nefarious actors,
    and law enforcement should be aware of the participants and
    conflicts of interest within our academic research ecosystem.
        This collaboration should also extend to our technology
    transfer systems. Startups are an important part of our S&T
    enterprise and present a vulnerability that our global
    competitors are exploiting. While universities can track
    licenses derived from on-campus research, they lack
    transparency about the startup's investors. For instance, a
    foreign entity could access sensitive research through early
    investment in a startup before the technology license is even
    granted, thereby avoiding a review by the Federal Committee on
    Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. Clearly,
    this is a complex task that requires thoughtful consideration,
    but I believe that we are up to this challenge.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and how
    we can assess and monitor these threats to our scientific
    research enterprise. And, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:]

        I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today to
    discuss a very serious and relevant topic: the security threats
    to our federal research enterprise.
        America's leadership in science and technology was built on
    the foundation of federal investment in basic research. These
    investments have enhanced our national security, strengthened
    our economy, and improved the lives of our citizens.
        Our unique research ecosystem, which combines federal,
    academic, and private R&D efforts, drives America's advancement
    in science and technology.
        However, for this system to work, we need a degree of open
    science that facilitates collaboration and transparency. The
    challenge is ensuring this openness does not compromise our
    research security.
        Although the U.S. has greatly profited from international
    scientific collaboration and the contributions of foreign-born
    scientists, other countries--both friend and foe--are also
    benefiting from U.S. investments.
        While our goal is to ensure that all federally funded
    scientists adhere to U.S. principles of scientific fairness and
    integrity, regardless of race or citizenship status, it is
    important to recognize that not all nations share these values.
        As this Committee is well aware, the Chinese Communist
    Party (CCP) is determined to surpass the U.S. as the global
    leader in science and technology by 2050 by any means
    necessary, including espionage, theft, or forced acquisition.
        The theft of our basic research poses a significant risk to
    our global competitiveness, handing our cutting-edge
    innovations to adversaries and undermining both our economy and
    our ability to lead in discovery.
        This is no idle threat and creates a serious strategic
    challenge. The CCP has been explicit about its efforts to steal
    our research results to further its technological progress.
        A 2023 survey by the Center for Strategic and International
    Studies found 224 reported instances of Chinese espionage
    directed at the U.S., and more than 1,200 lawsuits were filed
    by U.S. companies against Chinese entities for intellectual
    property theft since 2000.
        For the instances of espionage where the actor and intent
    were known, 49% of incidents directly involved Chinese military
    or government employees, 46% involved cyber espionage, 29%
    sought to acquire military technology and 54% targeted
    commercial technologies.
        This Committee has passed multiple bills to protect
    American research.
        Some of this legislation directed the Office of Science and
    Technology Policy to coordinate efforts and standardize
    requirements across all federal science agencies to provide a
    strong framework for research security.
        However, the previous Administration failed to execute this
    framework within the directed timeline--missing deadlines by
    over a year in some cases--and provided little to no
    coordination and community engagement.
        The government needs clear and uniform guidance for our
    agencies and researchers. I am confident this second Trump
    Administration will continue the good work of its previous term
    and reopen communication channels.
        Effective communication between law enforcement agencies
    and universities is paramount to securing our research
    enterprise.
        Universities need to know when researchers are targeted by
    nefarious actors, and law enforcement should be aware of the
    participants and conflicts of interest within our academic
    research ecosystem.
        This collaboration should also extend to our technology
    transfer systems. Startups are an important part of our S&T
    enterprise and present a vulnerability that our global
    competitors are exploiting.
        While universities can track licenses derived from on-
    campus research, they lack transparency about the startup's
    investors.
        For instance, a foreign entity could access sensitive
    research through early investment in a startup before the
    technology license is granted, thereby avoiding a review by the
    federal Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
        Clearly, this is a complex task that requires thoughtful
    consideration, but I believe we are up to the challenge.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how
    we can assess and monitor the threats to our scientific
    research enterprise.

        Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And right now,
    I'd like to recognize Representative Lofgren for her opening
    statement.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Chairman McCormick and Ranking
    Member Sykes. I really do hope that research security will
    remain a bipartisan and productive topic for this Committee. We
    have an impressive legacy of legislation and oversight on
    research security for years. On both sides of the aisle, we
    have maintained a deep understanding of and respect for, which
    the Chairman has just mentioned, the spirit of openness that
    animates fundamental research. Republicans and Democrats alike
    have taken threats to research security seriously, while
    understanding that in order to be the world leader in science
    and discovery, we must welcome international collaboration
    while guarding against espionage.
        One year ago, we sat in this hearing room and discussed the
    progress that had been made on research security. Honestly,
    it's difficult to have that same conversation today without
    acknowledging how different our scientific enterprise looks.
    The past 6 weeks have seen a widespread attack on Federal
    science. Science agencies froze their awards at the order of
    President Trump and Elon Musk, and recipients of these
    prestigious grants were worried not only about continuing their
    work, but honestly, about paying their bills. They now only
    have certainty for as long as the temporary restraining orders
    last.
        Scientists across the Federal Government were fired in
    sweeping terminations of probationary employees. And it's worth
    noting that, you know, probationary employees are people who
    received a merit-based promotion and were in a probationary
    status for the promotion, so we have singled out the most
    meritorious scientists for termination. And the Administration
    is demanding that more be fired. This will impede agencies'
    ability to disburse congressionally authorized grant money,
    among other crucial functions. The rug has really been pulled
    out from under our Federal scientific enterprise, which had
    been the envy of the world. Now, it will be naive to think that
    this won't affect our ability to attract and retain talent,
    both American and foreign-born.
        This Committee has a lot to be proud of when it comes to
    commonsense research legislation. CHIPS and Science bolstered
    our research security resources, our agencies' resources. It
    catalyzed cross-governmental harmonization of research security
    policies. More needs to be done. Unfortunately, even the
    progress that has been made will be undercut due to recent
    decisions.
        CHIPS and Science established a research security office
    within NSF. This office was seriously impacted by the
    probationary firings and the resignations amidst the hostile
    environment Elon Musk and DOGE (Department of Government
    Efficiency) has created. CHIPS and Science also mandated that
    NSF run the SECURE (Safeguarding the Entire Community of the
    U.S. Research Ecosystem) Center to support and empower research
    institutions to mitigate foreign interference. That center
    lacks a permanent Director, and NSF can't hire one while the
    hiring freeze is in place. Now, while probationary employees
    are being hired back this week because of the court decisions,
    there's no guarantee that the agency will get through the
    coming firings without again compromising the research security
    office.
        NSF is a pretty efficient agency. Only about 5 percent of
    its budget is spent on agency operations and awards management.
    By firing NSF employees and coercing others to resign, this
    Administration harms our ability to distribute grant money to
    meritorious cutting-edge research, and it's kneecapping our
    research security capabilities. We might consider the title of
    this hearing ``The most pressing threat to U.S.-funded research
    is coming from inside the house.''
        For years now when we sat for these hearings, Democrats and
    Republicans celebrated the fact that the United States was the
    chosen home of world-class talent. We took pride in the fact
    that nearly 80 percent of foreign-born STEM (science,
    technology, engineering, and mathematics) Ph.D. recipients
    chose to remain in the United States. If the destabilization of
    our research ecosystem continues, we will tarnish our
    reputation, and we will invite brain drain.
        I firmly support the bipartisan work that the Science
    Committee has done to bolster research security. I hope we can
    all stand up for that work and insist that existing laws are
    enforced, and where there are remaining vulnerabilities, I hope
    we can work together the way we have for years to find
    commonsense solutions that respect the openness of science
    first articulated at the Presidential level by Ronald Reagan in
    1985. I fear that unless Republicans and Democrats alike stand
    against the destruction of our scientific enterprise, we will
    cede our leadership to China in ways that no research security
    policies can prevent.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]

        Thank you, Chairman McCormick and Ranking Member Sykes. I
    really do hope that research security remains a bipartisan and
    productive topic for this Committee. We have an impressive
    legacy of legislation and oversight on research security. For
    years, on both sides of the aisle, we have maintained a deep
    understanding of, and respect for, the spirit of openness that
    animates fundamental research. Republicans and Democrats alike
    have taken threats to research security seriously, while
    understanding that in order to be the world leader in science
    and discovery, we must welcome international collaboration.
        One year ago, we sat in this hearing room and discussed the
    progress that had been made across the federal government on
    research security. It is difficult to have that same
    conversation without acknowledging how different our scientific
    enterprise looks today. The past six weeks have seen a
    widespread attack on federal science. Science agencies froze
    their awards at the order of President Trump and Elon Musk, and
    recipients of these prestigious grants were worried not only
    about continuing their work, but about paying their bills.
        They now only have certainty for as long as the temporary
    restraining order lasts. Scientists across the federal
    government were fired in sweeping terminations of probationary
    employees, and the Administration is demanding more workforce
    cuts, which will seriously impede agencies' ability to disburse
    Congressionally authorized grant money, among other crucial
    functions. The rug has been pulled out from under our federal
    scientific enterprise, which hasbeen the envy of the world. It
    would be naive to think that this will not affect our ability
    to attract and retain talent, both American- and foreign-born.
        This Committee has a lot to be proud of when it comes to
    common sense research securitylegislation. CHIPS & Science
    bolstered our research agencies' resources and catalyzed cross-
    governmental harmonization of research security policies.
    Unfortunately, the progress will backslide due to recent
    decisions. CHIPS & Science established a research security
    office within NSF, and this office was seriously impacted by
    the probationary firings and the resignations amidst the
    hostile environment Elon Musk and DOGE has created. CHIPS &
    Science also mandated that NSF run the SECURE Center to support
    and empower research institutions to mitigate foreign
    interference. That Center lacks a permanent director, and NSF
    cannot hire one while the hiring freeze is in place. While
    probationary employees are being hired back this week, there is
    absolutely no guarantee that the agency will get through the
    forthcoming RIFs without again compromising the research
    security office. NSF is an incredibly efficient agency--only 5%
    of its budget is spent on agency operations and awards
    management.
        By firing NSF employees and coercing others to resign, this
    administration is gutting our ability to distribute grant money
    to meritorious, cutting-edge research and kneecapping our
    research security capabilities.
        I think that we should reconsider the title of this
    hearing. The most pressing ``threat to U.S. funded research''
    is coming from inside the house. For years now, when we sat for
    these hearings, Democrats and Republicans celebrated the fact
    that the United States was the chosen home of world-class
    talent. We took pride in the fact that nearly 80% of foreign-
    born STEM PhD recipients chose to remain in the U.S. If the
    destabilization of our research ecosystem continues, we are
    actively tarnishing our reputation and inviting brain drain.
        I firmly support the bipartisan work that the Science
    Committee has done to bolster research security. I hope we can
    all stand up for that work and insist that existing laws are
    enforced. Where there are remaining vulnerabilities, I hope we
    can work together the way we have for years to find common-
    sense solutions that respect the openness of science first
    articulated at the presidential level by Ronald Reagan in 1985.
    I fear that unless Republicans and Democrats alike stand
    against the destruction of our scientific enterprise, we are
    ceding our leadership to China in ways that no research
    security policies can prevent.
        I yield back.

        Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Ranking Member Lofgren. I
    appreciate your remarks today.
        With that, Mr. John Sargent, who is not new to the halls of
    Congress, has only recently retired from Congressional Research
    Service, where he provided Members of Congress and their staffs
    with research briefings and expert insight on the litany of
    science and technology issues and policies. In addition to
    being a long-term expert on our niche issues here in SST, Mr.
    Sargent earned a degree in systems engineering from University
    of Virginia.
        With that, I yield for your comments.

             TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN F. SARGENT JR., RETIRED,

              SPECIALIST IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY,

                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Mr. Sargent. Thank you. Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member
    Sykes, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
    for the opportunity to testify today on this issue, which is of
    vital importance to U.S. national and economic security.
        Let's get right down to it. China is not our friend. I wish
    they were, but they're not. China is an ascendant economic and
    military power that seeks global tech leadership in emerging,
    enabling, and critical technologies. China has also become an
    aspiring hegemonistic power. China first seeks regional
    domination in East Asia and, from there, world dominance,
    economically and militarily. The path to their aspirations
    depends on technological preeminence.
        To realize this future, China is doing three things in
    particular. They are building a world-class military and
    drawing up battle plans against the United States, Taiwan, and
    their regional neighbors. They have adopted a comprehensive
    whole-of-nations strategy to acquire foreign technology and are
    making massive investments to develop new technologies
    indigenously. And they have adopted a civil military fusion
    strategy to deploy this technology in both their commercial
    industries and their military industrial base. More than ever,
    the future of national economic and military power will be
    built on technological leadership.
        Speaking broadly, we have it and they don't. That makes
    American companies, laboratories, and universities China's
    primary targets for the acquisition of leading-edge technology.
    And China uses a wide range of--excuse me--tools to get it,
    illegal and legal, among them, espionage, theft of U.S.
    intellectual property, forced technology transfers from U.S.
    companies, talent recruitment programs, and sending students to
    study STEM in the United States, some acting as spies.
        The Soviets sought military superiority, the Japanese
    economic superiority. China seeks both. China is not only a
    potential military adversary like the Soviet Union during the
    cold war, it's an economic juggernaut, second in GDP (gross
    domestic product) only to the United States, and larger than
    Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined. And unlike our
    relationship with the Soviets, we are actively engaged in trade
    with China, further complicating the relationship and our
    ability to limit their access to U.S. technology.
        We have a myriad of academic relationships with China as
    well, many on the cutting edge of research and development, and
    we are educating hundreds of thousands of the best and
    brightest minds from China at American universities, many in
    our top graduate science and engineering programs. Much has
    been done over the past 8 years to better protect U.S.
    universities and their research from nefarious actors, and yet
    here we are again, still trying to tamp down the seemingly
    ceaseless efforts of China and other adversaries to acquire
    U.S. scientific knowledge.
        Too often, government efforts have met resistance from the
    academic community, which in large measure would prefer to go
    about its business with no restrictions. I believe this
    attitude is detrimental to U.S. national security. It should be
    a core patriotic duty of every U.S. university to support,
    protect, and defend the country that provides them with a home,
    physical security, civil liberties, and protection of their IP,
    as well as billions of dollars in research and development
    funding and billions more for the education of their students.
        America needs its academic community as a full partner in
    the protection of our country and its investments in academic
    research. We need a sea change in the way researchers
    understand their obligations to the country. They need to bring
    an attitude toward making this work for America, not just a
    check-the-block exercise to be met with minimal compliance. We
    need the academic community to work with the Federal Government
    to further develop and strengthen research security protocols,
    and we need to more fulsomely implement what is already in
    place.
        Similarly, we need to better protect private research. For
    this, we need U.S. industry to step up as well, especially
    given the growing magnitude of the private sector's investment
    in R&D and its work on the bleeding edge of dual-use
    technologies. In addition, we should consider whether new
    regimes are needed altogether.
        Perhaps most importantly, with respect to research funding,
    the U.S. Government should start with the rebuttable
    presumption that science and technology cooperation with China
    is not in the national interest of the United States. We should
    be asking first whether any proposed research with China is
    absolutely indispensable to U.S. national security, the U.S.
    economy, or U.S. public health and the environment; second,
    whether China is the only partner in the role with whom we can
    do such proposed research; and third, whether the proposed
    research advances U.S. national security, economic, or public
    health interests more than it does China's. And every decision
    we make needs to be informed by the answer to whether our men
    and women in uniform will face these U.S.-funded technologies
    on the battlefield. In the immortal words of Thomas Jefferson,
    ``Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.''
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sargent follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.009

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.010

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.011

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.012

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.013

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.014

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.015

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.016

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.017

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.018

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.019

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.020

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.021

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.022

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.023

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.024

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.025

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8978.026

        Chairman McCormick. And thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Jeffrey Stoff is the Founder and President at the
    Center for Research Security, a not-for-profit organization
    dedicated to the protection of research and innovation from
    harmful foreign influence and interference. Mr. Stoff
    previously spent over 18 years in the U.S. Government as a
    China analyst and is recognized as an expert in technology
    protection issues.
        Please give your opening statement.

               TESTIMONY OF MR. JEFFERY STOFF, PRESIDENT,

                CENTER FOR RESEARCH SECURITY & INTEGRITY

        Mr. Stoff. Subcommittee Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member
    Sykes, distinguished Committee Members, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today on this critically important
    topic. Over the last 15 years, I focused on China's research
    ecosystem and its state-driven technology transfer apparatus.
    While in government, I worked closely with most Federal
    agencies that fund scientific research, as well as law
    enforcement and intelligence components. That support exposed
    me to deficiencies and vulnerabilities in both academia and
    government, which I describe in detail in my written testimony.
        For several years, starting in 2019, a few colleagues and I
    exerted considerable effort compiling analyses, briefing
    government leadership, and proposing programmatic changes to
    address knowledge gaps and structural impediments to
    safeguarding innovation security. Unfortunately, most of those
    efforts fell on deaf ears. My frustrations with continued
    inaction by agencies charged with protecting Federal research
    investments and our national and economic security drove me to
    leave Federal service in 2021 after 18 years.
        It is past time we have candid and perhaps uncomfortable
    conversations on how China's largely unfettered access to our
    research ecosystem undermines our national and economic
    security and that China exploits and corrupts our research,
    often through the willing participation of U.S. institutions.
    And because universities are primarily run like businesses in
    that bringing in revenue is their primary objective, the
    financial incentives of universities often run counter to U.S.
    national and economic security interests.
        Academia continues to demonstrate a systemic disregard for
    national security considerations and an indifference to or lack
    of awareness of ethical risks when collaborating with China.
    These issues persist in part because of a lack of regulatory
    oversight regarding fundamental research, which worked fine
    through the cold war but now fails to address geostrategic
    realities. Even where there are rules in place in terms of
    Federal grant contract conditions, the evidence suggests
    continued and widespread noncompliance by academia.
        Currently, only NASA (National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have
    certain research funding restrictions concerning collaborations
    with China. No other activities or sources of funding are
    proscribed. Researchers and institutions are free to partner,
    collaborate, establish cooperative programs, et cetera, with
    any PRC entity of their choosing. Academia has claimed that
    they now understand the risks much better and have a good
    handle on security concerns. Empirical studies I've produced
    and data I compiled in my written testimony prove otherwise,
    such as low estimates of over 27,000 articles published in just
    the past 5 years involving collaborations between U.S.
    institutions and PLA (People's Liberation Army) entities, PRC
    defense weapons design and production facilities, state-owned
    defense enterprises and key defense research universities.
    Additionally, neither academia nor the U.S. Government has
    taken any observable policy measures to mitigate PRC practices
    that undermine research integrity issues.
        In addition to academia's disclosure failures to the
    Department of Education on foreign sources of funding as
    required by law, nondisclosures on Federal grants of current
    and pending support, often coming from China, persist. Many of
    those grants could have gone to other universities that didn't
    have this PRC support. For the universities acting in good
    faith, losing out on these grants can result in smaller budgets
    and fewer resources to hire Ph.D. students, attract top talent,
    et cetera, which in turn makes them less competitive on future
    grant proposals. This also translates to fewer opportunities
    for our children in the United States and an erosion of STEM
    talent pipelines.
        Compounding these issues are structural problems in the
    government to identify and mitigate threats from China and
    monitor and force academia's noncompliance. These include each
    agency has its own research security and due diligence process.
    A lack of interagency data sharing results in duplicative risk
    assessments when done at all and inconsistent standards for
    assessing risks across Federal agencies. The U.S. Government
    also has few resources or processes in place to monitor for
    national security risks post-award of a grant or contract. And
    further handicapping these efforts is a dearth of subject
    matter expertise within both the intelligence and law
    enforcement communities.
        A key recommendation in my testimony is to consolidate
    government research security functions into a centralized
    organization that closes persistent knowledge, regulatory, and
    policy gaps; creates efficiencies and cost savings; builds
    subject matter expertise through training analysts and
    investigators; bolsters compliance monitoring and enforcement;
    serves as a resource to assist universities in conducting risk
    assessments; disrupts China's unfettered access to federally
    funded research; and imposes real costs to China when it
    violates values of integrity and reciprocity.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Stoff follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCormick. Thank you for your testimony.
        And now Dr. Maria Zuber is a Professor of geophysics and
    Presidential Advisor for Science and Technology Policy at
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology. And from here on, we can
    actually use MIT as an acronym since I've just explained it.
    Most people have never heard of it. She's a leading university
    voice on research security and co-chaired the National
    Academies' National Science, Technology, and Security
    Roundtable. We welcome your remarks.

                     TESTIMONY OF DR. MARIA ZUBER,

                 E.A. GRISWOLD PROFESSOR OF GEOPHYSICS

                  AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FOR SCIENCE

                       AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, MIT

        Dr. Zuber. Chairman McCormick, Ranking Member Sykes, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
    testify today.
        Striking the right balance on how the U.S. research
    enterprise should interact with China is critical to U.S.
    national security and competitiveness. Getting that balance
    right is not easy or obvious. We know that China is an
    economic, geopolitical, and military rival and that China has
    sought to advance through illicit means. Even now, when China
    has considerable strengths of its own, it tries to take undue
    advantage of U.S. research efforts. Yet cutting all ties to
    China would likely hobble the U.S. competitiveness as much as
    it would harm China.
        Finding the right balance starts with clearly assessing
    current practices at U.S. universities. While many universities
    were slow to appreciate the threat posed by China, that has
    changed. From what I have seen as co-chair of the
    congressionally mandated National Academies' Roundtable on
    Science, Technology, and Security, universities are now largely
    aware of the legitimate concerns about China, and they have put
    in place new procedures, still a work in progress, and many
    coordinate regularly with law enforcement.
        MIT has been a leader in responding to the changing nature
    of China. MIT was the first university to cut ties with Huawei
    more than 6 years ago. We created a special review process for
    research collaborations with China in 2019 and issued a public
    report laying out our approach to China in 2022. At MIT, any
    proposed collaboration with China is reviewed for its potential
    impact on national security, economic security, and human
    rights.
        We do not believe, though, that research collaborations
    should be cutoff entirely. Properly structured engagement can
    be beneficial to U.S. researchers. Collaboration is also a way
    to stay abreast of developments in China, which is now a leader
    in key fields. There are also still some areas like climate
    science, food safety, and certain areas of health where there
    is much to gain from joint work and little risk. This is all
    publishable basic research.
        Research funding from China should, of course, be
    disclosed. Congress has usefully clarified and tightened
    disclosure requirements in recent years, and National Security
    Presidential Memorandum 33 (SPM 33), with input from both the
    Trump and the Biden Administrations, and from me, by the way,
    provides an effective framework for disclosing foreign
    collaborations.
        Perhaps above all else, it has been a critical competitive
    advantage to the United States that we are able to attract the
    top scientific talent from around the world, including from
    China. The vast majority of Chinese Ph.D. students, more than
    80 percent remain in the United States after getting their
    degrees, and more likely would if our policies were more
    supportive. Students pose a relatively low security risk since
    they work in an environment where research is published. Visa
    applicants should be more rigorously vetted, but I am not aware
    of evidence that students are extensively involved in illicit
    activities. If such information exists, I'd love to see it.
        In my written testimony, I go into some detail on existing
    policies to protect U.S. technology, where they could be shored
    up, and where they should be left alone. But I'd like to close
    here with a broader point. Protective policies are needed, but
    they're not enough. We have to strengthen our own research
    enterprise. One need look no farther than the recent
    announcement by the China--Chinese AI firm DeepSeek to know
    that restrictions may buy us some time but they will not
    prevent Chinese technological advancement.
        We must win this race by running faster, not just by trying
    to trip up the competition. We must continue to ensure that the
    United States is a magnet for the world's top talent by
    investing in U.S. science and technology and by offering
    reliable funding for competitively awarded research projects.
    That means taking steps like funding the National Science
    Foundation, as envisioned in the CHIPS and Science Act that
    this Committee helped draft on a bipartisan basis. Instead, we
    seem to be fighting about how much to slash its budget and
    personnel, including personnel hired to bolster research
    security.
        We shouldn't be naive about China, but that includes not
    denying its strengths. We're not going to compete successfully
    just by building a moat around the United States. We'd better
    be sure that everything we need from others, especially talent,
    can get across that moat, and we'd better be sure that nothing
    inside our moat is deteriorating.
        Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Zuber follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCormick. Thank you to my witnesses for your
    opening remarks, and now I will recognize Representative
    Harrigan from North Carolina. Welcome to our Committee, and I
    look forward to your questions.
        Mr. Harrigan. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of
    our witnesses for your testimony today.
        I wanted to talk about Chinese espionage in science and
    academia from the CSIS report and give you a couple examples
    here that will frame my question. In January 2020, a Harvard
    University professor and two Chinese nationals, Yanqing Ye and
    Zaosong Zheng, were indicted for attempted theft of biological
    research. Dr. Lieber was a participant in the Thousand Talents
    Plan, while actively accepting National Institutes of Health
    (NIH) and Department of Defense funding. Ye, a lieutenant of
    the PLA, compiled information on U.S. military projects for the
    CCP. Zheng committed the theft of 21 biological research vials
    to promote Chinese projects.
        In July 2020, Saw-Teong Ang, a University of Arkansas
    professor, was indicted for wire fraud for his acceptance of
    U.S. contracting funds related to NASA and the Air Force while
    being simultaneously employed by Chinese entities.
        In August 2020, Zhendong Cheng, a professor at Texas A&M,
    was charged with wire fraud for concealing his affiliation with
    Chinese universities and enterprises while accepting a NASA
    grant. His position allowed him access to sensitive NASA
    projects. He was also a participant of the Thousand Talents
    Plan.
        I have only 5 minutes, so I cannot read the other countless
    examples of CCP infiltration into our national research
    apparatus, but my team compiled 58 different instances of
    various forms of research espionage that has occurred just in
    the last 6 years. So after reading this report and after
    listening to your testimony today, it is incredibly troubling,
    and I simply want to know one thing. Why do we still have any
    Chinese nationals inside of our research institutions,
    especially within institutions that participate in research
    that is critical to our national interests and our national
    security? Mr. Sargent?
        Mr. Sargent. I have no idea. I have no idea. I don't think
    it makes any sense at all. I think we need to be far more
    secure in who we allow into this country and who we allow to
    conduct research, especially on U.S. taxpayer-funded dollars.
    And I think it's very dangerous for us not to carefully vet all
    the people that are coming to the United States to study to
    make sure that they in fact are not linked to PLA institutions
    or universities.
        And one thing we know for sure is that not only is China
    after our technology, they are constantly adapting and adopting
    new strategies to acquire it, so we can't think we have now,
    after 4 years of efforts, reached the pinnacle of security and
    put everything in place we need to do because the Chinese are
    going to adapt to it, and they're going to find ways around it.
    So we need to--as I say, you know, eternal vigilance is the
    price of liberty, and we've got to continue to remain vigilant.
    And, again, going back to the answer to your question, I don't
    think they should be.
        Mr. Harrigan. Thank you. Mr. Stoff?
        Mr. Stoff. Obviously, I think this is a very complex issue.
    I think that definitely--and I agree with Mr. Sargent that at
    least within critical technology fields, within STEM fields, a
    far more rigorous process--and I talk about this in my
    testimony--that needs to be done that requires the kind of
    vetting and due diligence and assessments that have.
        There may be other areas--like, from my perspective, any of
    the humanities and social sciences and other things, I--that's
    not a concern to me. The Chinese should come here and learn how
    our democratic governance systems work, our legal structures,
    things like that. So I think a complete and total ban doesn't--
    isn't necessarily--meet the objectives that you're seeking.
        But I also want to point out something that I think is not
    really well understood, and that is the examples that you're
    describing relate primarily to these constructs of economic
    espionage, espionage, and intellectual property theft. And most
    of the problems and the threats that were occur--that's
    occurring on campus are none of those things. They're not
    illicit. And the scale and scope of the other ways in which
    they're acquiring technology and knowhow, is often not
    espionage, and that is completely underrepresented, not
    understood in the scale and the scope, and we need to be more
    diligent about that.
        Mr. Harrigan. I have very limited time, so, Dr. Zuber, I
    don't know that we're going to get to you, but I think we've
    got to keep in mind here, we've got access, and we have
    placement with all of these individuals, and the CCP will exert
    leverage. That is a problem for our country. We need to deal
    with this, and we need to deal with it swiftly in our research
    institutions.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCormick. The gentleman's time has expired.
        With that, I recognize Ranking Member Sykes for her
    questions.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you. Dr. Zuber, I am extremely concerned
    that the weakening of our scientific enterprise will lead to
    self-inflicted research security catastrophes. On Friday, CNN
    reported that the Naval Criminal Investigative Service has
    determined that China and Russia are attempting to recruit
    Federal employees who have been laid off. Scientists are
    specifically being targeted by Chinese institutions, as seen in
    advertisements to recruit researchers in institutes in China. I
    ask unanimous consent to enter the article and the
    advertisement into the record.
        Chairman McCormick. No objections.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And as the Trump Administration casts off scientists and
    destabilizes research in the name of efficiency, our
    adversaries celebrate and look to fill that vacuum. Dr. Zuber,
    can you please describe the relationship between funding our
    research enterprise and bolstering research security?
        Dr. Zuber. OK. Thank you for that question. So absolutely,
    I mean, the fundamental basis of my testimony was that we
    absolutely need compliance. We absolutely need to keep critical
    and sensitive research secure, agree with that, but we're not
    going to get there if we don't invest, OK? So last week, also
    in the first round of funding cuts, the NSF SECURE Center,
    which was noted in the Member statements, had five out of their
    nine employees laid off in the probationary. They may get one
    back, OK? So in a very--area that we all consider high
    priority, they're laying off people.
        So I mean, count me at the front of the line that the
    Federal bureaucracy could be more efficient and ought to be
    more efficient, but it ought to be done thoughtfully and
    strategically, and we ought to be thinking about what functions
    the Federal Government really ought to be executing and what
    functions should be done by others, and then we ought to
    identify the jobs and the employee talent that is needed to
    fill those roles.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Dr. Zuber. And thank you for
    highlighting that in your testimony. And I do want to ask you
    all a question, and if you can answer it in maybe 15 words or
    less.
        Yesterday, during the joint address to Congress, President
    Trump said, quote, ``You should get rid of the CHIPS Act.''
    Your response to that in 15 words or less?
        Mr. Sargent. I would be happy to start. So I covered the
    CHIPS Act for the Congressional Research Service. I know it----
        Mrs. Sykes. You're getting a little bit beyond your 15
    words. We don't have the time.
        Mr. Sargent. I think we need to be very judicious in what
    we choose to accept and reject in the CHIPS Act.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you. Mr. Stoff?
        Mr. Stoff. I think it needs to be continued, and it's
    really important for our innovation and security.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you. Dr. Zuber?
        Dr. Zuber. It needs to be continued, and there's $13
    billion of R&D investment, and we have to train a new
    generation of chip makers in this country.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you very much. We have heard rumors that
    DOGE has arrived at the National Science Foundation. This is
    extremely worrying under the guise of making government more
    efficient. I think we all have the idea to make government
    efficient and to curb waste, but as we've identified, some of
    this has been more of a wrecking ball rather than a scalpel.
        When it comes to research security, that means that any
    information shared between Federal science agencies and
    universities could be ripe for--by hacking of our--by our
    adversaries, including China and Russia. Would you have
    concerns if the information at MIT, Dr. Zuber, has transmitted
    to NSF will transfer to nonsecure data servers, and what is the
    risk of research security-related information being accessed by
    unvetted DOGE representatives and potentially foreign
    adversaries?
        Dr. Zuber. OK. Well, what I will tell you is that at MIT,
    we don't do any classified research on campus. When technology
    gets to the point where it gets complex and concerning for
    either economic or national security, we send it to a
    classified area. So nothing on campus is classified. However,
    it is intellectual property, and if it were to get out, it
    would compromise the IP of the creators, and it could
    potentially give somebody maybe a 6-month to a year head start
    on something. But ultimately, everything we do on campus is
    unclassified, so it's going to get out there eventually.
        Mrs. Sykes. And, Mr. Sargent, if you can do it in 10
    seconds--not my rule, but the Committee's--do you have any
    concern about keeping this data private?
        Mr. Sargent. Of course I do.
        Mrs. Sykes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Thank you
    for cooperating with me.
        Chairman McCormick. And obviously, 5 minutes is not much
    time. We'll do a second round of questioning if anybody's
    interested to stay on. It'll be rapid, but I just want to make
    sure that--she's being great, respectful. Thank you, Ranking
    Member, for staying in your time limit. We'll have a second
    round for people who want to ask additional questions.
        With that, I recognize Chairman Babin for his questions.
        Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
        Mr. Stoff, why is it important for agencies to share
    information regarding research security threats to each other?
    Is there a better system that the Federal Government could
    adopt to analyze research security threats?
        Mr. Stoff. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. Yes,
    yes to all. There are--it is essential, both from a compliance,
    monitoring, enforcement, investigative function to have
    interagency share in ways that they're not really doing very
    much now because of different sharing rules, authorities, what
    have you. And this is a particular problem with academic
    research because a lot of the issues in the compliance or
    threats that are coming are often involving more than one
    Federal funding agency. You know, there are a lot of scientists
    that get money from NSF but also Department of Defense or NIH
    or others. And so it is really important that there has to be a
    much more centralized sort of structure where these can work in
    a more efficient way where data is shared.
        Similarly, I think the U.S. Government needs to do a much
    better job at sharing not necessarily specific details, but the
    trends and patterns of behavior when they investigate a lot of
    these activities. And they, in my opinion, have not done a very
    good job, particularly law enforcement, explaining to academia,
    hey, there are all these things that are happening or
    behaviors, not all of which is illicit but compromises the
    integrity, the value system, the honesty that you depend on to
    conduct research and in a trusted fashion.
        And we see that, and I've seen that. When I worked in
    government, I supported a lot of these investigations. Many of
    them never become an actual public record or an indictment or
    what have you. And so there's all this information that's not
    being adequately shared, so you need to have both. And having a
    centralized structure--in my written testimony, I talk about
    basically building a national center. A crude analogy would be
    an NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center).
        Chairman Babin. OK. Thank you very much. And Mr. Sargent,
    under the first Trump Administration, OSTP established an
    interagency working group on research security under the Joint
    Committee on Research Environments (JCORE). Under the Biden
    Administration, this effort was discontinued. Could you
    describe the purpose and the role of JCORE Subcommittee on
    Research Security to coordinate activities for identifying and
    addressing threats to our academic research enterprise?
        Mr. Sargent. Honestly, that's not an area of my expertise.
    However, I will just say that, having had extensive experience
    with the National Science and Technology Council, of which
    JCORE is a part of, that the purpose of these interagency
    activities is the sharing of information, the coordination of
    best practices, so I imagine that's what they were doing in the
    context of our research security.
        Chairman Babin. Right. OK. Thank you. And then finally, Dr.
    Zuber, what resources are available to universities for
    assessment, identification, and analysis of research security
    threats, and how are these tools informing and promoting
    information sharing of risks among universities?
        Dr. Zuber. OK. There's a--senior research officers of the
    research universities coordinate information. The presidents
    coordinate information. The NSF SECURE Center, DARPA (Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency) has put out guidance, and
    the NIH had put out guidance, and the DOE (Department of
    Energy) had put out guidance. But it's--in many cases, it's
    vague. And National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 was
    meant to standardize a lot of the reporting across and the
    implementation, which is underway but still not finally there.
    So if it were done properly, that would theoretically take care
    of all of the compliance that is--the lack of compliance that's
    accidental, OK, where people thought they reported something,
    but they reported it there, not here, OK? It would not take
    care of somebody who truly wants to do something wrong, OK? And
    those are actually difficult to root out.
        But the--you know, we're still--despite two Presidential
    Administrations that have gone over and SPM 33, the guidance is
    still sufficiently vague that, you know, universities are
    supposed to put a research integrity plan in place, but they
    don't tell us what the plan should constitute and how a
    university can certify that it's actually meeting those
    criteria that it has to.
        Chairman Babin. Thank you. I see the others nodding their
    heads. Would you like to add into that as well?
        Mr. Stoff. No, I just--I strongly agree with Dr. Zuber that
    a lack of clarity, a lack of guidance, a lack of granular sort
    of level, what is it that we need to do, what are the tools,
    infrastructures that need to be placed? The SECURE Center may
    be able to start addressing those issues, but this has been
    going on, as Dr. Zuber said, for multiple Administrations, and
    there's still a lot of work that needs to be done, and I don't
    think we have the time to kind of do this as slow rolling as we
    have.
        Chairman Babin. Yes. And I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. I'm
    sorry, so I yield back, unless you'll----
        Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. We will have a
    second round for anybody who wants to participate. I just want
    to keep this on track if you don't mind, sir.
        Chairman McCormick. With that, we recognize Ranking Member
    Lofgren for questions.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I see a lot of agreement among our witnesses. We do
    need clear standards, we need clarity, we need adherence, we
    need to protect our country. I think there's bipartisan
    agreement on those things. But as Ranking Member Sykes
    mentioned in her statement, there is an unconfirmed report that
    DOGE has arrived at NSF. Now, reportedly, one of the Musk
    hackers setting up shop at headquarters is Edward Coristine.
    Coristine is better known in his various online communities by
    the moniker ``Big Balls.'' Now, this 19-year-old is allegedly
    gaining access to NSF data systems. I'll try and be brief when
    I go through the laundry list of reasons why I believe this
    teenager is unfit to serve in government.
        I am advised that Mr. Big Balls started a company called
    Tesla.Sexy LLC, a site that allowed users to share images
    confidentially. The URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) created
    redirected images hosted on his website and apparently included
    references to the sale of child sexual abuse material, among
    other really horrible topics. It's reported that in 2022 he was
    fired from an internship after leaking confidential business
    information to competitors. He bragged about this online,
    boasting that he had access to every single machine. It's
    reported that he also participated in chatrooms with U.S. law
    enforcement that have monitored his cybercrimes, investigating
    cybercrimes. And now, apparently, he has access to government
    data systems, most recently, allegedly, NSF.
        NSF hosts personally identifiable information of employees,
    principal investigators, confidential business information,
    trade secrets when relevant to project proposals and controlled
    unclassified information related to law enforcement, sensitive
    information.
        Dr. Zuber, you have plenty of 19-year-olds working at MIT
    labs. If an MIT student admitted to stealing data from a lab in
    order to share it with people not authorized to access it, do
    you have disciplinary procedures that would prevent that
    student from ever accessing sensitive information again?
        Dr. Zuber. Well, so all this is alleged. I----
        Ms. Lofgren. Correct.
        Dr. Zuber. I can't vouch for it. But we do have
    disciplinary procedures. It's actually potentially a research
    integrity violation, and we have--you know, there are very
    clear rules for how to deal with research integrity. And when
    there is a finding, there are consequences.
        Ms. Lofgren. Let me just say, as a hypothetical because
    these have been reported. Obviously, we haven't done an
    independent investigation. But if someone with the alleged
    background that I've just outlined had access to sensitive
    information at U.S. research agencies, would that be a cause
    for concern?
        Dr. Zuber. Well, even if there were no research involved,
    if there was access to personally identifiable information of,
    you know, any member of our community or any community, that
    would clearly be a great concern.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Sargent, you're an expert on our science
    and technology enterprise, and you feel strongly that certain
    information must be stringently protected, and I agree with
    you. What do you think about allowing an individual access to
    our science agencies' controlled unclassified information if
    that individual had a history of sharing confidential business
    information with competitors, or if that person had been known
    to host images with titles alluding to child sexual abuse, or
    if that person participated in forms monitored by law
    enforcement during cybercrimes investigations? If that were the
    background, would that cause concern?
        Mr. Sargent. Absolutely.
        Ms. Lofgren. Well, I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman,
    that while we are of one mind that we must protect ourselves
    from threats from those abroad, we ought to be alert to the
    threat that is being posed by this army of teenage and 20-
    something hackers that have invaded our government, that are
    accessing our private information, and including our science
    information, including individuals such as Mr. Big Balls, who
    is now apparently rooting through the NSF data base.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCormick. Thank you, Ranking Member. Just to
    clarify as Chair, just to make sure we're on the same page, my
    Committee staff has just been officially told that no one from
    DOGE has entered the NSF. That's official. Eighty-four of 86
    probationary employees at NSF have been reinstated. No grants
    at the National Science Foundation have been canceled. There is
    no funding freeze. All those things are now official.
        Since January 20, nearly 500 awards have gone out, and more
    than 200 panels have taken place. I just want to make sure that
    we're clarifying the details since we're getting real-time
    information, just don't want to confuse or confound any real
    information. And I'm not trying to make this partisan. I just
    want to make sure it's factual. Thank you.
        With that, I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
        Mr. Sargent, this is somewhat of a rhetorical question, but
    are American graduate students any less intelligent or
    qualified than Chinese graduate students?
        Mr. Sargent. I always forget that. Mr. Chairman, I love
    rhetorical questions.
        Chairman McCormick. It's a yes or no question, sir.
        Mr. Sargent. American students are as capable as Chinese
    students, or more so.
        Chairman McCormick. Of course. And I wouldn't want to be
    the person who said they weren't. But then, why do you think
    that certain universities insist on hiring Chinese graduate
    students when there are plenty of American students available?
    Literally, up to 50 percent of all graduate students hired are
    from foreign areas, that go back to foreign areas. Why do we
    keep doing that?
        Mr. Sargent. Well, a good question. Part of it is momentum.
    A good deal of universities' prestige is the ability to attract
    the best international students, and it allows for these
    connections and relationships to be made back to the home
    countries of these students. And so by continuing to recruit
    them and allowing them to, you know, be a part of our
    university education system, they develop these relationships,
    and these relationships go on long beyond the time that those
    students are there because those students then matriculate out,
    and they go into other positions in academia, they go into
    industry, and those ties allow that university to benefit from
    that relationship.
        Chairman McCormick. So there's probably a financial
    incentive of some kind because, otherwise, it doesn't really
    make sense, right? A lot of that talent goes back to their
    foreign national lands, and then a lot of talents goes out into
    the community, but they're not really citizens unless they so--
    go down that path.
        Mr. Sargent. It's almost always follow the money.
        Chairman McCormick. Very good. Putting research security
    aside, what is the long-term impact of U.S. students if
    universities continue to fill graduate posts with foreign
    nationals? In other words, we're not filling it with Americans.
    What is the long-term impact?
        Mr. Sargent. Well, it's been self-fulfilling. You know, if
    you continue to bring foreign students in because they're the
    best, those spots are not available for excellent U.S. students
    to go and become Ph.D.'s and themselves become principal
    investigators. And so then you find yourself in the position of
    not having Americans to fill these positions, and so it's a
    self-fulfilling behavior.
        Chairman McCormick. And I just want to highlight this. In a
    university system that's ranked not even in the top 30 in the
    world, the United States, which puts more money into education
    than any other country by far, and yet we're spending half of
    the research dollars--half of the money that we spend to
    develop instructors goes to foreign nationals here in the
    United States. We are basically cutting off the head of our
    future teachers, researchers, innovators, and we're going to
    fall further behind. If we're not even the top 30 and we're
    falling further behind, why would we train other countries to
    subvert our education system? I don't understand.
        Dr. Zuber, one of the things I noticed is that we have a
    lot of money from endowments. Even MIT does. I don't know why,
    but, you know, they happen to have a lot of pride in their
    university. Do you think that that's what they intend? When we
    give U.S. dollars, taxpayers say, hey, you know what? I'm going
    to give you a lot of money to develop--and I think U.S.
    students is what most people think. When they give--when U.S.
    citizens give money to an endowment, they want to see a
    university develop U.S. talent. And we give money to see U.S.
    talent develop. Why are we bringing in so many people from
    other countries when you--literally up to 50 percent of the
    people? Why do you think that is?
        Dr. Zuber. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
    So MIT is 97 percent STEM students, OK, and we accept all the
    top U.S. students that apply. And let me tell you, when we have
    a FIRST Robotics Competition for middle school students in the
    United States, we fill up high school gyms. When the Chinese
    hold first robotic competitions, they fill up stadiums, OK? So
    it's a question of students going into STEM, OK?
        Then, interesting question--or interesting statistic, U.S.
    students who graduate, OK, with STEM fields, only 1/3 of them
    go into STEM careers. So they're----
        Chairman McCormick. I would make the case that part of that
    is because of the way we influence our students to begin with.
    If you look at even the way that TikTok was used here in
    America, a Chinese-controlled TikTok, by the way, they want to
    develop influencers in America instead of scientists, whereas
    it's used in China on a limited basis to develop people to get
    into science. This is a systemic problem in the education
    system. And we are in a competition with these folks that are--
    we are literally educating and bringing in talent, but we're
    then divesting from that in the way that we're giving up that
    talent. And I think it's a very dangerous precedent.
        I'm going to go ahead and yield because I'm out of time,
    and I want to stay on and not be a hypocrite.
        With that, Ms. Bomici out of Oregon--Bonamici, sorry, out
    of Oregon, my hometown, is recognized.
        Ms. Bonamici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you have some
    Oregon Connections. And thank you to the Ranking Member. Thank
    you to the witnesses for your expertise and being here today. I
    want to join the Ranking Member Sykes in sending deepest
    condolences to the family of Representative Turner. He will be
    missed.
        So this hearing, Mr. Chairman, you talked about--I didn't
    have a chance to fact-check your numbers and facts about the
    NSF, but I do know that they have laid off many people. Even
    though they may be trying to bring some of them back, they're
    still facing significant budget cuts, as are most agencies, and
    the disruption and chaos has been really concerning.
        This hearing is titled ``Assessing the Threat to U.S.
    Funded Research,'' and it is indeed an important topic, but
    threats to American research and research security do not only
    come from foreign actors. They also come from the reckless
    actions of this Administration that are destabilizing our
    scientific enterprise and purging Federal scientists at NOAA
    (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), at NSF, at
    NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), at DOE.
    And Ranking Member Sykes mentioned that intelligence is already
    showing that China and Russia are eager to exploit that by
    trying to recruit some of our scientists, particularly
    scientists with national security experience.
        And I want to note as well, and to follow up to Ranking
    Member Lofgren's comments that--about DOGE, the Trump
    Administration sent via an unsecure email server the names of
    CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) employees, which is
    incredibly dangerous. You might have seen that there--they seem
    to be pretty good at hacking in but not in protecting data
    bases. And I'm sure everyone saw the takeover of the screens at
    HUD (Housing and Urban Development). They couldn't even figure
    out how to get the images off the screen. They had to go unplug
    the televisions. So, I mean, my point is, what are these people
    doing that--is creating a lot of instability, insecurity, and
    uncertainty about the safety of our data and research.
        So instead of strengthening our defenses, the
    Administration seems to be gutting key research agencies, as I
    mentioned, and purging experienced scientists, sending a
    chilling message to researchers that their work might be under
    constant suspicion.
        The so-called China Initiative that was implemented during
    the first Trump Administration as an example of mismanagement
    and certainly some racial profiling, it disproportionately
    targeted scientists of Chinese descent, drove talent away, and
    ultimately did more harm than good. The Brennan Center for
    Justice rightly called it a failure, warning against reviving
    such misguided efforts. And meanwhile, as our institutions are
    struggling with frozen grants and reduced indirect cost support
    and uncertainty about whether international collaboration will
    be discouraged or even criminalized, other nations, especially
    China, as I mentioned, have seized on the opportunity.
        So the United States cannot afford to keep making these
    mistakes. Our science enterprise thrives on openness,
    collaboration, and stability, not on paranoia and politically
    driven purges. So we need a serious evidence-based discussion.
    We all take this seriously. I want to ask you, Dr. Zuber,
    because I know you've been at MIT for a while. and we think
    back to the China Initiative from the first Trump
    Administration. Assuming that there's going to be something
    similar, what would you change and what would you keep the
    same?
        Dr. Zuber. Well, I think, actually, Mr. Stoff touched on
    it, I think in his--both in his remarks and in more detail in
    his testimony. But the--I mean, the China Initiative initially
    focused on espionage, and they started with industry, and then
    they moved to universities. And there was very, very little
    espionage in universities. The kinds of indiscretions within
    universities are transmission of information that will be
    published anyway, but it doesn't rise to the level of
    espionage. And so these should be adjudicated by agencies, you
    know, if you're caught----
        Ms. Bonamici. And you talk about the balance that's needed.
        Dr. Zuber. If you're caught, you lose funding for 5 years,
    and that will take care of that problem. And, in fact, there
    was a report by the JASONs that put out--that said this sort of
    thing should be treated as a research integrity violation,
    which is----
        Ms. Bonamici. Thank you. And in my remaining half a minute,
    Mr. Stoff, you advocated basically for cutting ties with
    Chinese researchers, but would shutting out top-tier talent
    like an AI or quantum computing limit our potential?
        Mr. Stoff. Well, I don't necessarily agree that we
    completely cut everything off, but we're not even cutting off--
    we're not even restricting the most high-risk collaborations or
    people. We're still letting them in. We're still collaborating
    with defense and weapons programs and state-owned enterprises
    in China. So can we start with that? And I would say we need to
    start restricting that, and then we can be more nuanced.
        Ms. Bonamici. Appreciate that. My time is expired. I yield
    back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCormick. Thank you. And with that, we recognize
    Representative Begich from Alaska.
        Mr. Begich. Thank you, Chairman. First question for Mr.
    Stoff. China has labeled itself a near-Arctic State and has
    invested in Arctic research collaborations with U.S.
    institutions. Have Chinese-linked researchers or institutions
    attempted to establish partnerships with Alaska-based Arctic
    research programs.
        Mr. Stoff. Thank you for the question. Unfortunately, I
    have no knowledge or expertise in the area with regards to
    Alaska, but I can quickly say that China has aggressively done
    this with other polar nations like Norway, for example, where
    their largest state-owned defense conglomerate that builds
    radar systems and communication systems for the PLA established
    ground stations for Norway under the guise of scientific
    purposes. And this is happening, I believe, elsewhere. I don't
    know if it's happening in Alaska, but they have a practice of
    doing this, and it's a big problem because they're actually
    developing more advanced radar systems as a result.
        Mr. Begich. Thank you. And given that Arctic focus, are you
    aware of any efforts that the Chinese have made with respect to
    Greenland as well?
        Mr. Stoff. No, not personally. That hasn't--I haven't
    looked into it, but I would be surprised if they were not
    pursuing those regions because of their strategic import that
    they represent.
        Mr. Begich. Let me ask you this. Given that Alaska hosts
    key U.S. Coast Guard operations and Arctic maritime research,
    are you aware of any instances in which foreign adversaries
    have attempted to infiltrate federally funded programs tied to
    maritime security?
        Mr. Stoff. Yes, that's actually fairly extensive, but we
    don't get--we don't have a good handle on it. We do know that a
    number of civilian PRC defense institutions that are heavily
    involved in PLA, navy, submarine, underwater warfare,
    underwater weaponry, systems, communications, et cetera,
    collaborate extensively almost without any sort of restriction
    with most U.S. universities, some of which even involve
    Department of Defense funding. Because it's in a fundamental
    research area, as I mentioned earlier, there's really no
    regulatory oversight over it.
        Mr. Begich. Do you believe that the Coast Guard should be
    given additional resources to protect research collaborations
    involving Arctic defense infrastructure?
        Mr. Stoff. Possibly, but I do think a better approach is
    what I mentioned my testimony is if you have a centralized
    government entity that kind of does this for all Federal
    agencies, it would be far more efficient and effective.
        Mr. Begich. Thank you. And an additional question for Mr.
    Sargent. Do you believe that Congress should require enhanced
    security screening for federally funded researchers in critical
    areas such as Arctic security, Arctic energy, or climate
    studies?
        Mr. Sargent. For U.S. researchers?
        Mr. Begich. Yes, or any additional researchers that may be
    coming from an--from a place outside the United States but are
    working with U.S. researchers?
        Mr. Sargent. Yes, absolutely. I think any area that has
    potential national security implications, we need to make sure
    that the people who are working on them don't have any ties
    that make them of--question their loyalty to the United States.
        Mr. Begich. So you don't believe the current screening
    practices are sufficient in order to address the security
    concerns that we have.
        Mr. Sargent. I can't speak to the adequacy of the current
    security screenings.
        Mr. Begich. OK. Thank you. Do you know whether--again, to
    Mr. Sargent. Do you know whether Federal agencies have
    conducted comprehensive research security audits of
    institutions in the Arctic which engage in Arctic science,
    climate research, or strategic defense studies? Do you know if
    that's happening?
        Mr. Sargent. I don't know anything of that nature, no.
        Mr. Begich. OK. Thank you. With that, I yield back.
        Chairman McCormick. And now Representative Rivas from
    California is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Rivas. Thank you, Chairman McCormick and Ranking Member
    Sykes.
        First, I join my colleagues in expressing condolences to
    the family of my fellow freshman colleague, Sylvester Turner.
    He will be missed by all of us.
        I'd like to start by taking a moment of personal privilege
    and thank Dr. Zuber for appearing before the Subcommittee
    today. As an MIT alum myself, it gives me great pride to see an
    MIT Professor discussing the importance and the challenges
    facing the scientific community and the research ecosystem.
        Over the last 7 weeks, we have seen a complete disruption
    and attack to one of America's pillars for the future, our
    scientific and academic community. Our research ecosystem
    depends on a steady stream of educated experts. As co-chair of
    the bipartisan STEM Education Caucus, I take great pride in
    America's leadership to produce the next generation of
    researchers and scientists of the future. The future will only
    come from early and continued STEM investments in every ZIP
    code in America. I have spent most of my career engaging and
    preparing students, American students, to get into STEM fields.
    It's our responsibility to provide the current and future
    workforce with the tools to innovate and create technological
    solutions and emerging and essential technologies and
    industries like AI, healthcare, and the environment.
        However, a major threat to U.S.-funded research is this
    Administration's reckless actions that include layoffs of about
    800 employees at NOAA, up to 2,000 employees at the Department
    of Energy, and more than 150 employees at the National Science
    Foundation. Despite those dizzying acts against our Nation's
    science corps, one of the most worrying cuts has been the NIH
    policy, capping indirect cost at 15 percent. I worry about the
    capacity of smaller institutions to keep up, and that concern
    has only grown in recent weeks, as I hear from constituents and
    organizations serving my district. Indirect costs are
    expenditures that aren't tied directly to research staffing or
    supplies, but they nonetheless support infrastructure and
    activities that are vital to the function of research
    institutions.
        The reality is that this is a drastic reduction in
    reimbursement that will result in more than 800 million in cuts
    for my home State of California. This will devastate the
    development of lifesaving research, inhibit patient access to
    groundbreaking treatments and clinical trials, and will cede
    American dominance in biomedical research to our foreign
    competitors like China, Russia, and Iran for years to come.
        Dr. Zuber, I've joined my colleagues in two letters to the
    acting NIH Director, expressing my deep concerns on these NIH
    cuts and how they will impact my State and district. Can you
    elaborate on how these cuts will impact research universities'
    ability to compete and how you anticipate smaller institutions
    will be impacted?
        Dr. Zuber. OK. Thank you very much. A lot of thoughts
    there, and thank you for raising the indirect cost because
    people don't understand indirect costs, OK? It's--whether a
    cost is a direct cost or an indirect cost, that's determined by
    uniform guidance. Both are the costs of doing research. You
    could put it in one column, or you could put it in the other
    column, but that's what it costs, OK? If we don't get the
    indirect cost reimbursement, the larger schools that have
    endowments have to use their endowments to cover that. And at
    MIT, we already--I won't say subsidize; I will say coinvest in
    research 100 percent, OK? So we--our research volume, we put in
    an equal amount from our endowment to kind of double the impact
    from the Federal and other funding that we receive.
        Schools with--either smaller schools or R1 research
    institutions with small endowments, especially those with
    medical centers, don't have any funds to draw on, OK? So we
    would do less research, OK, so less impact in the world. And
    MIT grads have started, as you know, tens of thousands of
    companies, OK? But it--for schools without endowments and have
    medical schools, they're going to be out of business, OK? And
    these are economic drivers in their areas and educational--
    important educational institutions producing the workforce for
    tomorrow. So the impacts are potentially huge.
        Ms. Rivas. Thank you. With that, I yield back.
        Chairman McCormick. Thank you. And next, we recognize
    Representative McClain Delaney from Maryland for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. McClain Delaney. So I thank the panelists and our
    Ranking Members for convening this important hearing. Can you
    hear me? Hi. Hello. So thank--I thank the panelists and our
    Ranking Members for convening this important hearing, striking
    the right balance between cyber and research vis-a-vis China
    and Russia with respect to our research universities. And I
    really appreciated Dr. Zuber's comments how there are
    legitimate concerns with respect to China with--and research,
    but how we cannot, you know, throw the, you know, baby out with
    the bath water, and we really need to not cutoff entirely and
    really preserve some of this for U.S. competitiveness.
        I represent the 6th District of Maryland, and in my
    district is NIST, parts of NIH, the National Institutes of
    Cancer, Fort Detrick, which deals with some of our pathogens,
    you know, our fire academy, and our nearby--my--next door is
    NOAA, of course, so research and innovation through these
    incredible agencies. And the hiring freezes by Rep. Bonamici is
    really important that we drive--continue to understand how
    these freezes and cuts will really undercut both our
    cybersecurity and other institutions.
        But building on some of the--two questions I have because I
    have only limited time. In terms of under-resourced
    universities--and building on Rep. Rivas' questions concerning
    indirect costs, I ask the panel, but Dr. Zuber first, do
    indirect costs contribute to universities' compliance with
    laws, including those related to research security? And do you
    believe that universities should be able to classify research
    security support as a direct cost so to ensure the protection
    of sensitive research and data?
        Dr. Zuber. OK. So I don't know all the details, but I can
    tell you that indirect costs, part of it is facilities--the
    larger part of it is facilities and taking care of the
    buildings that you wouldn't have unless you were doing research
    in them, OK? And then the other part is administrative costs.
    And those administrative costs, you know, the compliance has
    been going through the roof for years and years and years. And
    it--you know, more rules come in, and no rules ever seem to go
    away, and so you need staff to be able to handle that.
        The recent focus on research security has caused a big
    increase. We've had to hire a lot more people to do compliance.
    And most universities in the indirect cost system are out--
    already maxed out in the administrative part, so, obviously, if
    you could--you know, it doesn't matter to me if they're direct
    costed or indirect costed, but all this has got to be paid for.
        Mrs. McClain Delaney. Yes. Well, our research institutions
    are our Nation's jewels and why we are where we are in America,
    and so just making sure that we are able to protect that
    information and those collaborations.
        I want to move on to cybersecurity. I worked at the Biden
    Administration as Deputy Secretary at NTIA (National
    Telecommunications and Information Administration) and actually
    worked on a lot of cyber national security issues vis-a-vis
    some of--even Huawei and 5G and AI. But just this week,
    following orders from Defense Secretary--our Defense Secretary,
    DOD's U.S. cyber command suspended operations and planning for
    offensive cyber operations against Russia. And we're--weakening
    our cybersecurity posture with Russia will hurt our national
    security and make us more vulnerable.
        Research conversations have largely revolved around a
    threat posed by China, but we cannot forget Russia as a serious
    threat. I guess I ask all of you, can--well, Dr. Sargent, what
    potential is there for harm if the Trump Administration
    continues to weaken our offensive cyber operations against
    foreign adversaries? And to the panel, can the Federal
    Government play a role in bolstering the cybersecurity defenses
    of our universities against threats from foreign adversaries?
        Mr. Sargent. Thank you for the question. First of all, let
    me correct you on one thing. I have not earned my Ph.D. I am
    a--just a mainstream engineer, systems engineer from the
    University of Virginia. But--and, by the way, let me say, with
    NIST in your district, I am a massive fan of NIST. I think
    they're an outstanding----
        Mrs. McClain Delaney. We are too.
        Mr. Sargent [continuing]. Institution with great civil
    servant employees who do a fantastic job in a wide range of
    areas.
        With respect to cybersecurity, I don't think you can begin
    to overstate its importance. And the risk that we face from
    both China and Russia to our--every system in the United
    States, including our water systems, our power systems, our
    transportation systems, all of them are at risk. And China is--
    I'm told, I don't have any inside information, but I am told,
    and I have read that they are dropping all kinds of malware in
    our systems so that if we find ourselves in conflict with them,
    they can flip a switch and cause a lot of internal damage in
    the United States. So I don't think you can overestimate the
    importance of cybersecurity.
        Mrs. McClain Delaney. Thank you. Any other comments if I
    have time?
        Chairman McCormick. The Member's time has expired, but
    thank you very much.
        And with that, I'm going to go and give closing remarks.
    First of all, thank you all for being here today. It's an
    honor. I know it's at your own expense, and I know that
    sometimes it's thankless, but we want to thank you for being
    here today. I thank Ranking Member Sykes for being here and
    being a joy to work with.
        I want to address a couple things that were brought up
    during the hearing. Obviously, we talked about NSF funding or--
    and also staffing. We understand that DOGE is going to make
    some mistakes along the way. I get it. They're being very
    aggressive, and they've admitted that they're going to make
    mistakes.
        I want to address the issue of age. Some people say age is
    a concern for DOGE, those members who are--or those people who
    are actually doing the hard work and labor, realizing that
    Einstein, I believe, was, what, 26 years old when he published
    the theory of relativity, that you have--Zuckerberg invented
    Facebook at the age of 19, that we have 17-, 18-, 19-year-olds
    in school right now coming up with brilliant theories on the
    next evolution of science, that my great uncle was, I think,
    about 26 years old when he was a division commander as a B-17
    pilot and was shot down in the greatest air war of all time and
    became one of the senior officers in Stalag III.
        Age is not really the consideration when we talk about
    people who are going to create and sacrifice in this next
    generation. Matter of fact, we should be asking people to step
    in earlier. Matter of fact, coddling our kids certainly doesn't
    help them do what we need them to do for this next generation
    of competition.
        And I think the only numbers that we talk about when--it's
    not about age, but it's about the numbers we need to say
    because our government is far too invested in waste, fraud, and
    abuse. and we have a $36 trillion deficit right now. The
    interest payments alone on the debt that we have incurred
    exceed not only the military investment we do per year, but
    also the research we do. If we don't do something to trim the
    waste, we won't have the amount of money we need to invest in
    the future generations of America.
        And I think this hearing is really all about protecting our
    investments, the money we spend on education to develop the
    next generation of science and technologies. When you talk
    about the most transformational technologies that this
    generation has ever seen, in AI, in quantum, in other
    technologies, they're going to literally change the face--the
    way that we employ, the way we explore, the way we create jobs,
    and how we fight the next war. We're on the frontline. You are
    on the frontline.
        And we need to make sure that our peers aren't getting
    advantages from our hard work and our investments. And I think
    that's what this entire Committee hearing has been about, and I
    hope we continue this dialog because if we don't--if we're not
    careful about what we do, it will result in some catastrophic
    results.
        God bless you. Thank you for being here. Thank you for
    participating. And with that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                   Appendix I

                                  ----------

                       Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  Appendix II

                                  ----------

                       Additional Material for the Record

               Article submitted by Representative Emilia Sykes
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     [all]