[Senate Hearing 118-797]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-797
THE NOMINATIONS OF: THE HONORABLE DEREK H. CHOLLET TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY AND MS. CARA L. ABERCROMBIE TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-672 WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
________
september 28, 2023
Page
The Nominations of: The Honorable Derek H. Chollet to be Under 1
Secretary of Defense for Policy and Ms. Cara L. Abercrombie to
be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Chollet, The Honorable Derek H., to be Under Secretary of Defense 4
for Policy.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 56
Questions for the Record....................................... 103
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 156
Biographical Sketch............................................ 157
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 160
Signature Page................................................. 165
Abercrombie, Ms. Cara L., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 7
for Acquisition.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 165
Questions for the Record....................................... 188
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 200
Biographical Sketch............................................ 201
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 203
Signature Page................................................. 208
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATIONS OF THE HONORABLE DEREK H. CHOLLET TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY AND MS. CARA L. ABERCROMBIE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin,
Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets to
consider the nomination of Mr. Derek Chollet to be Under
Secretary of Defense of Policy and Ms. Cara Abercrombie to be
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.
I would like to thank the nominees for their service to the
United States and their willingness to assume these important
roles.
I would also like to welcome the guests and family members
who are here today. Mr. Chollet, I welcome your wife Heather
and children Lucas and Erin.
Ms. Abercrombie, I welcome your husband David, your mother
Michelle and father Scott. I also want to recognize your
daughter, Audrey, who I know is very proud of her mother.
The Committee is grateful to your families for their
continued support of your service.
Mr. Chollet, you have been nominated for a critical
position in the Department of Defense. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy serves as a principal advisor to the
Secretary of Defense, leading the creation and coordination of
national security policy within the department.
You are well qualified for this role, having served in a
number of key leadership positions in the Pentagon, the State
Department, and the National Security Council. I would like to
know how your interagency experience including your current
role as counselor at the State Department has prepared you for
this role.
If confirmed you would lead defense policy at a
consequential time. There is a common understanding that the
future of our national security is tied to the success of our
competition with China.
This competition is occurring across every field of
national power--military, economic, political, technological,
and more--in, of course, every region of the world. To maintain
our edge the Department of Defense most dedicate urgent and
sustained attention to each of these efforts.
In particular, United States defense leaders must evolve
the way we compete with China. The Department of Defense has
long built its competitive mindset around the idea of winning
in an armed conflict and deterring China through military
dominance.
That may no longer be enough. The game has changed and our
capacity for outright victory through military strength should
not be our only measure of success. The Defense Department
needs to better understand how China is competing, develop new
tools for competition, and integrate our activities with those
of our allies and partners.
Mr. Chollet, I would ask for your views on how the
department should pursue these efforts.
We also are in the midst of the greatest test of the NATO
alliance since World War II. Throughout the war in Ukraine a
formidable number of our allies have joined together to support
Ukraine on the battlefield and impose cost on Russia.
We are at a pivotal moment in the war and I would like to
know your views on the United States military posture in Europe
and how the United States and our allies should regard the
global security environment, moving forward.
Indeed, all of our potential adversaries including China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea are seeking ways to win without
fighting against the United States.
The department recently published its Joint Concept for
competing, which asserts that strategic competition is, I
quote, ``an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to
be solved.''
I would ask for your opinion or how this should push the
department to pursue every available opportunity to advance our
national interest including through smart investments in
infrastructure and technology.
Ms. Abercrombie, you are nominated to be the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. If confirmed, you would
serve as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, advising the under
secretary on the defense acquisition system, acquisition
policy, and contracting.
You bring an extensive record of government service to this
role including decades of leadership experience throughout the
Department of Defense.
I would like to know how your background has prepared you
for this position and how it would inform your approach to
defense acquisition.
If confirmed, one of your highest priorities must be
streamlining and expediting the acquisition process. We need to
field equipment to our warfighters quickly while also ensuring
acquisitions remain on budget.
Although some progress has been made in recent years, the
department acquisition process still remains on the Government
Accountability Office's high-risk list. I would like to know
how you plan to implement acquisition policy reforms such as
the adaptive acquisition framework to speed up the process.
Finally, in order for the department to more effectively
acquire defense weapon systems you will be responsible for
improving the data available to the department.
This should include securing access to the necessary data
rights or intellectual property as well as better understanding
cost, pricing, and contractual data.
Ms. Abercrombie, I would like to know how you would plan to
address each of these issues.
Thank you again to our nominees. Let me now recognize the
ranking member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today we are here to consider two positions that are among
those supported in the Department of Defense. I want to welcome
you, Ms. Abercrombie, as well as your family, and also welcome
Mr. Chollet and your wife and children. Glad to have you here
today.
It is worth setting some context as we begin this hearing.
Recently, the Marine Corps commandant, General Eric Smith,
noted that our country is in something of an interwar period.
He is right, and if we continue our current course we risk
transforming this moment from an interwar period to a pre-war
period. I think we need to act and act quickly to prevent a
war.
As we face a growing threat from communist China we need to
pursue a policy of peace through strength. Strength.
Unfortunately, when it comes to addressing our deterrence
gaps the current administration demonstrates a lack of urgency.
It was President George H. W. Bush who said when it comes to
national defense finishing second means finishing last.
I agree with the former president and right now we are
finishing last when it comes to the military balance in the
Western Pacific. So we must act quickly.
Ms. Abercrombie, you have been nominated to the post of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. You have had
decades of experience in the Pentagon to prepare yourself for
this position.
I hope I can receive your commitment to work together to
accelerate many of our most important procurement programs. For
example, we need to work together on Harpoon anti-ship
missiles. So let us talk about that.
Mr. Chollet, you have been nominated to serve as
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the third-ranking
position in the department. You will advise the Secretary on
some of our most sensitive national defense matters and you
will apprise Congress of the department's work.
Mr. Chollet, the recent Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy recently deflected House and Senate oversight efforts,
made partisan comments unbecoming of his station, and
demonstrated low regard for the authorities under the
Constitution of the legislative branch.
Many of his patterns of conduct were foreseeable, given his
public record. The Senate Republican Conference subsequently
voted against his confirmation. Members on my side of the aisle
have many questions still unanswered from his tenure.
Mr. Chollet, I would like you to articulate what you
understand your relationship with Congress ought to be and how
you intend to repair the degraded relations with Congress,
particularly on this side of the aisle.
The important post to which you have been nominated
requires someone with discretion and sound professional
judgment.
Mr. Chollet, you exhibit an indisputably impressive record
of public service. Yet, I need to note that you have also made
several comments in the past that cause me some concern and I
hope you can clarify them for me today.
You have trivialized the situation on our southern border.
You claim that the institutional military is infected by
systemic racism and you have suggested that our decision to
leave Afghanistan was strategically sound, and these are just
some of the disturbing comments.
As this process moves forward senators are going to have to
consider whether these views are appropriate. Many senior
general and flag officers have told this Committee we are in
the most dangerous moment since World War II.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these comments with
you in more detail and receive a full accounting of your views
and qualifications.
But for now, thank you both for being here and we look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Mr. Chollet, you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEREK H. CHOLLET, TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. Chollet. Well, thank you, Chairman Reed and Ranking
Member----
Chairman Reed. Bring that microphone as close as possible.
Mr. Chollet. Ranking Member Wicker and distinguished
Members of the Committee, I really appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today.
I would like to thank President Biden for my nomination and
Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks for their
confidence in me.
I would also like to thank Secretary of State Blinken and
all of my teammates at the Department of State for being such
terrific colleagues over the last two and a half years and for
all they do every day around the world on behalf of the
American people.
But most importantly, I would like to thank my family
without whom I would not be here today and that starts, of
course, with my parents, who are watching from home in
Nebraska, to my brother and sister to my terrific in-laws.
But most important, of course, I owe my greatest thanks to
the family that is with me here today: my son Lucas, my
daughter Erin, and my wife Heather Hostetter. They inspire me
every day. They have given me their full support and made so
many sacrifices as I have pursued this career of public
service. Quite simply, I could not do this without them.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, there is no more
sacred mission than that of the U.S. Department of Defense to
keep Americans safe and to protect our interests abroad.
I am deeply humbled at the prospect of returning to the
Pentagon to work with the inspiring men and women of our armed
forces. As the administration's National Security Strategy
makes clear, we are living in a decisive decade. This is a
moment as challenging and complex as any we have faced in our
modern history.
Foremost among those challenges is the pacing threat posed
by the People's Republic of China, the one country today with
both the intent and the growing capability to remake the world
order that we helped create.
At the same time we must also address what the National
Defense Strategy correctly calls is the acute threat posed by
Putin's aggressive Russia.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, if confirmed I will
continue this administration's work to provide military support
to Ukraine and rally the world for Ukraine's self-defense.
This has been an unprecedented effort in which Congress has
been an indispensable partner. But as we all heard last week
from President Zelensky during his visit here to Washington our
work is not yet over.
We also must remain vigilant against persistent threats
posed by countries like North Korea and Iran, supporting
diplomacy by maintaining a robust deterrence, working with
allies and partners, and being prepared to take action when
necessary to protect our troops and defend our interests.
Our forces must be as modern and capable as possible. That
means having an urgency to invest and innovate, whether that is
ensuring that our undersea warfighting capability remains
second to none or continuing to lead on AI.
It also means having a safe, reliable, and effective
nuclear deterrent, investing in our triad so it remains robust
and credible in the eyes of both our adversaries and our
allies.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, to be successful in
meeting these and so many other challenges we must work
together. Inside the executive branch that means the Defense
and State Departments working hand in hand as one team to marry
force and diplomacy, which given my experience in both
buildings I believe I can help do.
Inside the Pentagon that means working closely with the
Joint Staff, the combatant commands, our service chiefs, and
all of our warfighters to get them what they need and to make
the best possible decisions.
But no less important working together means forging a
close partnership with all of you on this Committee and the
Congress as a whole. I have long admired this Committee's
bipartisan commitment to our national security and its
thoughtful and forward thinking oversight of our military.
Throughout my career I have tried to live up to this
example of bipartisanship in our national security. It is an
example set by the two Secretaries of Defense in which I
previously worked, Secretary Panetta and Secretary Hagel, and I
know it is a priority for Secretary Austin today.
I am proud and humbled to have received the public support
from nearly three dozen senior national security professionals
who have served in the past four Republican administrations.
These are former bosses, mentors, colleagues, and friends of
mine.
So, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, you have my
word that if confirmed I will treat you as the full partner
that you need to be, to be straight with you, to be accessible,
to be responsive in a timely manner, and to be as transparent
as I can possibly be, all in our common effort to meet our
shared objectives to make this country safe, secure, and
prosperous.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of The Honorable Derek H. Chollet
follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Derek H. Chollet
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, distinguished Members of the
Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I want to thank President Biden for my nomination; and Secretary
Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks for their confidence in me. I also
want to thank Secretary of State Blinken and the entire leadership team
of the State Department for being such terrific colleagues over the
past two and a half years, and to express my gratitude to all my State
Department teammates who work tirelessly everyday around the world on
behalf of the American people.
Most of all, I would like to thank my family, without whom I would
not be here today. That includes my parents, who are watching from back
home in Nebraska, my brother and sister, and my terrific in-laws. But I
owe my greatest thanks to my family sitting behind me--Lucas, Aerin,
and my wife, Heather Hostetter--who inspire me every day, have given me
their full support and put up with so many sacrifices as I've pursued a
career of public service.
This is a rewarding profession, but it is not always an easy one,
and quite simply I could not do this without them.
Mr. Chairman, there is no more sacred mission than that of the U.S.
Department of Defense--to keep Americans safe and to advance our
interests abroad.
I am humbled at the prospect of returning to the Pentagon to work
with the inspiring men and women of our Armed Forces.
As the Administration's National Security Strategy makes clear, we
are living in a decisive decade.
This is a moment as complex and demanding as any we have faced in
our modern history--and it is a moment very different from the one in
which I began my career in Washington three decades ago.
Foremost of those changes is the pacing threat posed by the
People's Republic of China--the one country today with the intent and
growing capability to remake the world order we helped create. Meeting
this challenge will require patience and persistence, creativity,
investments in our critical capabilities; agile plans and concepts; and
an ironclad commitment to allies and partners across the globe.
We also must address what the National Defense Strategy accurately
describes as the acute threat presented by Putin's aggressive Russia.
If confirmed, I will continue this Administration's work to provide
military assistance and rally the world in support of Ukraine's self-
defense--this has been an unprecedented effort in which Congress has
been an essential partner. But our work is far from over.
We must also remain vigilant against the persistent threats of
North Korea and Iran--supporting diplomacy by maintaining robust
deterrence, working with allies and partners, and remaining prepared to
take action to defend our troops and interests when necessary.
We must ensure our forces are as modern and capable as possible. I
share this Committee's commitment to a safe, reliable, and effective
nuclear deterrent, and thank you for your leadership in this effort.
Modernization is key to maintaining this deterrent--and if confirmed, I
will ensure the nuclear triad remains robust and credible in the eyes
of both our adversaries and our allies.
Mr. Chairman, to be successful in meeting these and many other
challenges, we need to work together.
Inside the executive branch, that means the Defense and State
Departments working hand-in-glove as one team to bring together
diplomacy and force--which given my experience in both buildings, I
believe I can help do.
Inside the Pentagon, that means working closely with the Joint
Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commands and all our
warfighters--to make the best possible decisions and to get them what
they need.
But no less important, working together means forging a partnership
with all of you on this Committee and the Congress as a whole. I have
long admired this Committee's bipartisan commitment to the defense of
our Nation and its thoughtful and forward-thinking oversight of our
military.
Throughout my career I have tried to live up to this example of
bipartisanship in our national security. It is an example set by the
two Secretaries of Defense I worked for during my previous time in
Pentagon, Secretary Panetta and Secretary Hagel. And I know it is a
priority for Secretary Austin today.
I am proud and humbled to have received the public support from
nearly three dozen senior national security professionals from the past
four Republican administrations--former bosses, mentors, colleagues and
friends--for this position.
Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee: you have my word that, if
confirmed, I will treat you as the full partner you need to be--to be
straight with you, to be accessible, to be responsive in a timely
manner, and to be as transparent as I can possibly be--all in our
common effort to meet our shared objectives to make this country safe,
secure and prosperous.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Ms. Abercrombie, please?
STATEMENT OF MS. CARA L. ABERCROMBIE, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
Ms. Abercrombie. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking
Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It
is an honor to appear before you this morning.
I am humbled and grateful to have been nominated by
President Biden to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition. I greatly appreciate the trust that he,
Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary Hicks, and Under Secretary
LaPlante have placed in me, and thank you for your
consideration of my nomination.
I would also like to thank the Committee for your tradition
of bipartisan support for the Defense Department in this
decisive decade when the United States must--military must
deter further Russian aggression as well as an increasingly
capable People's Republic of China, all while mitigating and
protecting against threats from Iran, North Korea, and violent
extremist organizations. Continued bipartisan support is
essential.
I would also like to take a moment to thank my family,
whose love and support have carried me to this moment. My
parents, who are here today, both instilled in my brother and
me the spirit of service from a young age.
I would like to thank my brother, who retired from the Army
this year. He has been a source of inspiration throughout my
career.
Most of all, I want to thank my husband, David, who is here
today, and our daughter Audrey for their steadfast love and
encouragement to go for the challenging jobs even when it has
meant sacrifice at home.
I would also like to thank the many mentors who have helped
guide me over the course of my career and the distinguished
public servants I have had the privilege to work alongside at
the National Security Council and in the Department of Defense.
I joined the Department of Defense as a Presidential
management fellow 20 years ago with no expectation I would stay
more than a few years. But the sense of mission and purpose,
particularly in the shadows of the 9/11 attacks, pulled me in
and it is this sense of mission that motivates me to pursue
this position in acquisition.
Acquisition policy has always been extremely important to
the department's function but has taken on greater significance
in today's dynamic security environment as warfighting has
expanded into newer domains like space and cyber with
innovation moving at an increasingly rapid clip and with new
technologies being developed by nontraditional sources. We
cannot be satisfied with business as usual.
We no longer can wait decades to bring programs to
fruition. Our ability to deliver capability to the warfighter
rapidly is absolutely critical to ensuring the United States
military remains the finest fighting force in the world, and as
the nature of warfighting evolves so must our acquisition
policy become more agile, more responsive, and able to procure
new capabilities from a variety of suppliers.
I believe my two decades of government service have
prepared me well for this position. I have served in multiple
senior roles in the department, building and leading teams to
tackle a diverse range of issues from deepening defense
partnerships in Asia to revamping management of the security
cooperation workforce.
In my current capacity at the National Security Council I
have worked closely with leaders across the department helping
translate Presidential national security policy objectives into
concrete actions.
I have a deep understanding of defense strategy and policy
and the outcomes we need our acquisition policy to achieve. In
my years of working with our military as well as the militaries
of our allies and partners I have seen firsthand how the
limitations of our acquisition system and of our Defense
Industrial Base, such as severe barriers to entry for
nontraditional suppliers, supply chain and production delays,
and workforce recruitment, retention and training challenges
create complications not only in getting capability to
ourselves but to the partners we need to fight alongside us.
I have an intimate knowledge of the department and its
processes and a proven track record of working with and across
department components to get things done, meeting objectives
within defined timelines.
If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition I will bring to bear this expertise, my personal
credibility with stakeholders across the department, and the
leadership and management experience to head the talented OSD
acquisitions team and ensure it evolves and adapts policies and
practices to support not only the warfighter of today but the
warfighter of the future.
I commit to this Committee that I will ensure the
Department of Defense embraces flexibility, adopts new
approaches to enable speed and scale, bringing the best
capability to the warfighter from a diverse range of providers,
all while maintaining good oversight and transparency and
providing value to the U.S. taxpayer.
Chairman Reed, I pledge to do this in close partnership
with stakeholders, if confirmed, with the Committee across the
department and certainly with our industry partners as well.
If confirmed I pledge to work closely with this Committee
to maintain open lines of communication and to provide the
transparency that you require to exercise your oversight.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Abercrombie follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Cara L. Abercrombie
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and Distinguished Members of
the Committee, it's an honor to appear before you today. I am humbled
and grateful to have been nominated by President Biden to serve as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. I greatly appreciate
the trust he, Secretary Austin, and Under Secretary LaPlante have
placed in me. Thank you for your consideration of my nomination.
I would also like to thank the Committee for your tradition of
bipartisan support for the Defense Department. In this ``decisive
decade,'' when the United States military must deter further Russian
aggression as well as an increasingly capable People's Republic of
China, while mitigating and protecting against threats from Iran, North
Korea and violent extremist organizations, continued bipartisan support
is essential.
I would like to take a moment to thank my family, whose love and
support have carried me to this moment. My parents, who are here today,
both instilled in my brother and me the spirit of service from a young
age. My brother, who retired from the Army this year, has been a source
of inspiration. Most of all, I want to thank my husband who is here
today, and our daughter for their steadfast love and encouragement to
go for the challenging jobs, even when it has meant sacrifice at home.
I would also like to thank the many mentors who have helped guide me
over the course of my career, including Deputy Secretary Hicks, who was
my first boss in the Pentagon.
I joined the Department of Defense as a Presidential Management
Fellow 20 years ago with no expectation I would stay more than a few
years. But the sense of mission and purpose--particularly in the
shadows of the 9/11 attacks--drew me in. And it is this sense of
mission that motivates me to pursue this transition to acquisition.
Acquisition policy has always been important, but has taken on greater
significance in today's dynamic security environment. As warfighting
has expanded into new domains like space and cyber, with innovation
moving at an increasingly rapid clip and with new technologies being
developed by non-traditional sources, we cannot be satisfied with
business as usual. We no longer can wait decades to bring programs to
fruition.
Our ability to deliver capability to the warfighter--rapidly--is
absolutely essential to ensuring the United States military remains the
finest fighting force in the world. As the nature of warfighting
evolves, so must our acquisition policy become more agile, more
responsive, and able to procure new capabilities from a variety of
providers.
I believe my two decades of government service have prepared me
well for this position. I have served in multiple senior roles in the
Department, building and leading teams to tackle a diverse range of
issues, from deepening defense partnerships in Asia to revamping
management of the security cooperation workforce. In my current
capacity at the National Security Council, I have worked closely with
leaders across the Department, helping translate Presidential national
security policy objectives into concrete actions.
I have a deep understanding of defense strategy and policy, and the
outcomes we need our acquisition policy to achieve. In my years of
working with our military, as well as those of our allies and partners,
I have seen first-hand how the limitations of our acquisition system
and of our defense industrial base--such as severe barriers to entry
for non-traditional suppliers, supply chain and production delays, and
workforce recruitment, retention, and training challenges--create
complications not only in getting capability to ourselves, but to the
partners who we need to fight alongside us. I have an intimate
knowledge of the Department and its processes, and a proven track
record of working with and across Department components to get things
done, meeting objectives within defined timelines.
If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
I will bring to bear this expertise, my personal credibility with
stakeholders across the Department, and the leadership and management
experience to head the talented OSD Acquisitions team, and ensure it
evolves and adapts policies and practices to support not only the
warfighter of today, but the warfighter of the future. I will commit my
all to ensuring the Department of Defense embraces flexibility, adopts
new approaches to enable speed and scale, bringing the best capability
to the warfighter from a diverse range of suppliers, all while
maintaining good oversight and transparency, and providing value to the
U.S tax-payer. I will do so in close partnership with stakeholders
across the Department, with industry, and with Congress.
I pledge to work closely with this Committee, to maintain open
lines of communication, and to provide the transparency you need to
exercise oversight.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
I have a series of standard questions for all nominees. You
may respond together appropriately. Have you adhered to
applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of
interest?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
[Witnesses answer in the negative.]
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
this Committee when requested?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Do you agree when asked before this
Committee to give your personal views even if your views differ
from the administration?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requester
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[Witnesses answer in the affirmative.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chollet, we are engaged in supporting the government of
Ukraine and work for them and I think for us is an existential
conflict. The administration did a remarkable job in assembling
a strong worldwide coalition but particularly NATO.
What would be the impact if we began to cutoff funding to
Ukraine, both to the Ukrainians and to our alliance?
Mr. Chollet. Chairman Reed, thank you for the question and
thank you for the time you gave me the other day in your
office. I enjoyed the discussion.
The impact if the United States were to stop providing
significant support to Ukraine would be devastating. It would
be devastating, first and foremost, to Ukraine, which is
putting good use of the assistance we are providing them but
also to this very, very impressive alliance that has been
formed over the last 20 months.
Fifty some countries are contributing in some way to the
effort in Ukraine and these are countries not just from Europe.
These are countries all around the world that are providing
some form of military assistance.
We are leading by example. We are doing the most, thanks to
Congress' strong support here, and so I think it is absolutely
vital that we maintain our robust assistance to Ukraine.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Ms. Abercrombie, sort of working backward, particularly in
the Indo-Pacific we could have situations where we have
equipment that needs to be repaired but the prospect of getting
civilian contractors into islands in the Philippines is not
that feasible, which drives me to the point I would like to
make is that we have to be able to fix those types of equipment
in very difficult circumstances.
That means we need the intellectual property, we need the
data, which the companies now routinely keep, and I think also
you might comment on whether this would help us with respect to
sustainment costs if the work is being done by military
personnel and not exclusively by contractors. Go ahead.
Ms. Abercrombie. Chairman Reed, thanks for raising this
very important question and thank you for the time in your
office last week.
So I agree, intellectual property rights are something that
the department must take a new approach to. It is different
than we have done in the past and I do believe that the
department is moving in the right direction.
But if confirmed, Senator, what I would pledge to do is
make sure the workforce is taking adequate--making adequate use
of the flexible acquisition policies that we do have in place
for software acquisition to make sure we are building that
discussion in from the beginning of the contracting process.
I also think there is a way to work in partnership with
industry to make sure we can have that IP access to do just
precisely what you have suggested, which is to give the
warfighter access in the field in the time of need without
infringing upon industries' investments in the intellectual
property itself.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
One of the senses I have is that the COCOMs have really
specific graphic information about what they need. In your role
will you stay in close contact with the COCOMs?
In fact, some of them have resources to develop systems
that might be very effective if it is deployed throughout the
service. Will you maintain that kind of close cooperation?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, yes, if confirmed I think it is
my duty to make sure I have got good connections with all the
sources of innovation across the department including the
COCOMs.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Chollet, China is the pacing threat. Taiwan is the most
significant issue, among many, that divides us. Our strategy so
far has been deemed strategic ambiguity.
People have suggested we abandon that and declare much more
forcefully and explicitly our commitment to Taiwan. Avril
Haines before has commented that this would be deeply
destabilizing and would solidify Chinese perceptions that the
United States is bent on constraining their rise and produce
more aggressive behavior. What is your sort of take on that?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Chairman Reed.
I agree with the DNI on the importance of strategic
ambiguity. It has served us quite well for several decades now
as we have worked to provide critical military support to
Taiwan guided by the Taiwan Relations Act.
I should say that this is an area where Congress has been a
leader since 1979 and the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act.
So, if confirmed, I would look forward to working with all
of you to ensure that we are doing whatever we can to provide
support to Taiwan because the freedom of that democracy is
absolutely critical to our interests.
Chairman Reed. I have just a few seconds left so this may
be more of a comment than a question. But there is a very
difficult dynamic going on to the extent that we buildup Taiwan
and it looks as if it becomes more and more impregnable it
might force the Chinese to do something dramatic and
aggressive.
How do you ensure to balance that very difficult dynamic?
Mr. Chollet. It is a very difficult dynamic but I think the
facts show that the PRC is building up capability at a very
alarming rate to threaten Taiwan. It is important for the
United States to work with Taiwan to maintain deterrence across
the Taiwan Strait and if confirmed that will be one of my
missions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Wicker, please?
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I will try to cover a
lot of things.
Ms. Abercrombie, more than $44 billion had been
appropriated for weapons to support Ukraine since the start of
the conflict a year and a half ago. Yet, a recent factsheet
shows that 62 percent of the funds have not even been put on
contract.
Do you think this is correct and, if confirmed, will you
take steps to clear this backlog as soon as possible?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator Wicker, thank you for your
question and thank you for the time in your office last week.
If confirmed, Senator, I will absolutely commit to you that
I will focus on ensuring we are contracting using all the funds
that Congress has appropriated for the Ukraine backfill effort
and for Ukraine itself and getting those on contract.
My understanding in speaking with the Department of the
Army is that they have at least a 60 percent contracted rate,
going forward. But, Senator, I pledge to look into that, if
confirmed, across all the services.
Senator Wicker. I hope we can solve that.
A few--I understand from our experts that a few hundred
Harpoons on Taiwan could significantly blunt Chinese amphibious
advances. But the contracting timeline for Harpoons have been
far too long and senior leadership has not exerted any pressure
to fix this problem.
How can we fix this problem? Do you agree that just a few
hundred Harpoons would be a significant help to Taiwan?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, my understanding based on prior
positions is that, indeed, Harpoons would be a very effective
weapon system for Taiwan and agree with you that the
contracting process has taken far too long.
If confirmed I pledge to take a hard look at the FMS
programs with Taiwan and look at ways we can shorten the
contracting timelines through conversations with industry as
well as with the partner and take a look at foreign military
sales improvement overall.
Senator Wicker. Okay. I hope you will get back to us
quickly on that and I will make that specific request----
Ms. Abercrombie. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker.--in writing for this hearing.
Now, Mr. Chollet, you and I had a very nice conversation,
too. You had a role in--with the State Department with regard
to the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Is that correct?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, again, thanks again for the time the
other day. I really appreciated the conversation.
As a senior adviser to Secretary Blinken I am sort of a
utility infielder for the secretary. So during the evacuation
it was an all hands on deck exercise and I did whatever I could
to try to solve problems, which included working mainly with
our allies and partners as we were coordinating this
multinational effort of the evacuation.
Senator Wicker. In an interview with George Stephanopoulos
the President said, and I quote, ``If there is American
citizens left we are going to stay and get them out.'' The
question was would U.S. troops stay beyond August 31st if there
were still Americans to evacuate. The President's response was
in the affirmative.
When did you realize that the President was not going to do
this?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question. My memory is
that the President received a unanimous recommendation from his
advisors to have all of our troops out by August 31st, which
is, of course, several months after the original May 1st
deadline to have all of our troops out under the Doha
Agreement. That said----
Senator Wicker. That, in fact, did not happen.
Mr. Chollet. Sorry, sir. That said, all of our work to get
the people out of Afghanistan who had wanted to leave and it
was 120,000 during the evacuation in August 2021. It has been
in the neighborhood of 15,000 since then and that is in a
situation where the United States does not have a presence on
the ground. There is no embassy, there is no Americans there,
and it has been a very intensive effort to get those who served
alongside with us out of Afghanistan.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, the fact is--and I would like
for you to supplement your answer on the record, please, sir--
the President did in fact withdraw all U.S. troops without
evacuating all of the Americans who wanted to leave. So I will
ask you to supplement that answer on the record.
Did you say in response to an Associated Press quote about
the southern border, quote, that ``this is a security threat is
preposterous and not supported by the evidence,'' unquote? Did
you say that?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Wicker, I do not recall that comment.
But what I can tell you is I believe that we need to have a
safe and secure border. We are not there yet.
The Defense Department plays a critical supporting role to
the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border
Protection. I know Secretary Austin just recently has augmented
the troops down to help assist with the southern border, and so
if confirmed that is something I would continue to work on.
Senator Wicker. Okay. So you--at least now you do believe
that the situation on the southern border is a security threat
and you--that you at DOD now will have a specific role to
counter the cartels there on the southern border?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, yes. What I believe is the DOD plays
a critical supporting role to other agencies and State and
local partners in helping secure that border. If confirmed, I
will continue to ensure that it plays that role.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Congratulations, Mr. Chollet, Ms. Abercrombie. Excuse me.
Congratulations on your nomination. Thank you to both of you
and your families for your willingness to continue to serve
this country.
Mr. Chollet, I really have appreciated your engagement in
the Western Balkans during your time at the Department of
State. It is not lost on me that another conflict in Europe at
this time would be particularly problematic, and I know that
you were very important in helping to bring Kosovo and Serbia
to the table to try and address the conflict between those two
countries, and part of ensuring that peace in the region is
NATO's KFOR force and I wonder if you could talk about how you
see working with General Cavoli and United States European
Command to ensure that KFOR both has the resources that it
needs and looks at whether there needs to be an expanded
mission, given the recent violence in the northern part of
Kosovo.
Mr. Chollet. Senator Shaheen, thank you again for the
question. Thank you for all of your leadership in this effort
because the engagement of the Congress in the Western Balkans
has been absolutely critical to our overall efforts.
Unfortunately, the situation across the Western Balkans
remains very unstable. As you know, we both had the opportunity
to see the Bosnian foreign minister a few days ago, who said to
me we need to be worried about a Russian bear being in the
belly of Europe.
Instability in the Western Balkans would not stay in the
Western Balkans and so that is why it is important for all of
us to work to see that we can bring lasting peace to that
region.
The situation in Kosovo and Serbia has been troubling for
some time and there was another flare up of violence over the
weekend. I spoke just a few days ago with the president of
Serbia as well as the prime minister of Kosovo to try to tamp
down some of those tensions.
But the important role that the Defense Department plays in
supporting KFOR--the NATO mission in Kosovo which is helping to
keep the peace in northern Kosovo--is absolutely essential.
So, if confirmed, I would work with General Cavoli and the
entire EUCOM family as well as our NATO partners to ensure that
we are doing what we need to have enough capability so that
KFOR can help keep the peace in this critical part of the
world.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. As we think about the
need for other peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, obviously,
the EUFOR mission is very important in Bosnia Herzegovina and
they are coming up on another reauthorization that needs to
happen at the U.N. at the end of October.
Can you talk about the prospects for that reauthorization?
Mr. Chollet. Sure. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I had the opportunity to speak with the Bosnian foreign
minister about this the other day. I think the prospects are
looking better, although we are not there yet. We still have
some time before that authorization will happen.
Last year it was a close run thing and so I can tell you
that from the State Department perspective right now we are
working hard to ensure that that EUFOR mandate gets expanded or
gets renewed in Bosnia.
Thinking about, if confirmed, the Defense Department angle
it is to ensure that we are doing whatever we can from a DOD
perspective to ensure that we are trying to keep the peace in
Bosnia.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and as the foreign minister pointed
out, if EUFOR fails then NATO would be a last resort, which I
assume would not be something that some of the elements in
Bosnia Herzegovina would be interested in seeing.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, that is absolutely right.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Ms. Abercrombie, you have talked about the challenge of
balancing the commercial technology services that are available
and the department's need to use those.
One of those efforts that got a lot of attention was
Starlink's role in the Ukraine war. So how can we--how can we
ensure that if there are commercial contracts with the
department that the decisions made about how those services are
used are based on policy that the department and this country
believe are in the best interests of the department, not in the
best interests of a commercial entity?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator Shaheen, if confirmed my first
priority is looking after the American warfighter and
absolutely I think going into the contracting process, baking
that in from the get go, is absolutely necessary and this is an
evolving environment where we are working more closely with
commercial providers and that is a discussion we need to have
upfront and to be mindful of the requirements we have going
into the conversation with industry.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Fischer, please?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ms. Abercrombie and Mr. Chollet, and your families for stepping
forward to continue to serve your country. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chollet, China remains the pacing threat that we face,
and do you believe that the department is appropriately
postured to meet that threat?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Fischer, thanks for the question and
thanks for the time the other day in your office. I really
appreciated the conversation.
I know that the Defense Department is working hard at
getting at that threat. If confirmed, one of the first things I
will do on the job is open up the hood and make my own
assessment of how we are doing. But I know that there has been
a tremendous amount of investment and energy put into this.
But the PRC, as you said, is rapidly innovating and
modernizing and that is why it is the pacing challenge we face
for this century.
Senator Fischer. How do you believe the department should
balance the readiness that is needed today with the
modernization that we have to look for in the long term?
Mr. Chollet. Thanks for the question.
We have to have the urgency to innovate and invest and we
need to ensure that we are investing in the future. So it is a
very difficult balancing act.
It is one that will be foremost on my mind if confirmed in
this position because, of course, we have the threats of today
that are very urgent and complex but even more concerning the
threats of tomorrow.
Senator Fischer. How do you think the department should
prioritize those investments?
Mr. Chollet. Well, I think it is--in some ways it is going
to be case by case because it is going to be balancing risk
across regions, across priorities.
My sense from looking at it from the outside across the
river over the last several years is it has been balancing it
relatively effectively thanks to the cooperation and support
and the leadership of many in the Congress.
I think in the Indo-Pacific, for example, the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative has been a very great innovation and I am
glad the Defense Department has invested so much in its recent
budget for PDI.
Senator Fischer. How much risk--how much risk would you be
willing to assume and how do you--how do you balance that? Or
are you risk averse?
Mr. Chollet. Oh, we are going to have to balance some
risks. There is no question. I mean, there is risk in whether
we are looking at what we are doing in Europe to help support
Ukraine, whether--what we are doing in the Indo-Pacific
building up our alliances and partnerships and posturing
ourselves to deter the PRC or the risk we live with every day
in the Middle East. It is a constant effort to try to balance
risk and get it right.
Senator Fischer. What are your thoughts on the National
Defense Strategy?
Mr. Chollet. I think the 2022 National Defense Strategy is
quite strong and I think it is a natural continuation of the
2018 National Defense Strategy, which to my mind was a pivot
point from the counterterrorism global war on terror two
decades, more or less, to this new era of great power
competition.
So I see continuity between 2018 strategy and 2022. I know
that the National Defense Commission is getting its work
underway to assess our implementation of the strategy. I know
the commissioners--many of the commissioners quite well. I have
spoken to them at length, and so I will look forward to
cooperating with their efforts as their work proceeds.
Senator Fischer. Let me continue on the National Defense
Strategy and then I will get to the commission also. Some of
the main tenets that we see in the National Defense Strategy,
for example, the importance of campaigning or exercising with
partners in the Indo-Pacific, those have been undercut, I
believe, by budget requests that do not come close to fully
funding these planned exercises.
If confirmed will you advocate for additional resources
when they are needed when you have those discussions with the
administration?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Fischer, thanks for the question.
Yes, I believe that one of the most important things we can
do in the Indo-Pacific is to ensure that we have the strongest
alliances and partnerships possible.
There has been a lot of progress made over the last 2 years
to develop those relationships further and create new
configurations of partnerships through AUKUS and the Indo-
Pacific Quad.
But absolutely I will fight for those resources, if
confirmed.
Senator Fischer. How do you think we can better strengthen
those alliances? When we are watching what is going on in
Ukraine and the NATO alliance that we have there my concern is
when something would take place in the Indo-Pacific region we
will not have the strength of as many allies as we currently
have and you brought it up in your opening comments that we
currently have seen formed and strengthened in Europe with
Ukraine.
So how are we going to strengthen those partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific to make sure that not only they continue but that
they continue to be built?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Fischer, I think it is absolutely
critical that we strengthen and build the muscle tissue of
those alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. I will
just cite three examples--recent ones.
The work we have been doing with the Japanese and the
Koreans in the trilateral format trying to strengthen ties
between the two of them but also trilaterally has been
critically important.
Second, AUKUS, of course, is an innovative game changer--a
strategic pivot that is very, very important. We need to work
together to implement that and get the Optimal Pathway off and
running.
Then, third, the Indo-Pacific Quad, which this
administration has elevated to the leaders level and it has
become more and more an engine of our work in the Indo-Pacific.
Those are three examples. There is many others that, if
confirmed, I need to work to ensure that we are moving the ball
downfield.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator King, please?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chollet, you are in a key position and it seems to me
that policy--we are at a moment. You talked about 1918 and then
2022, the strategies and the shift.
But we need to have a shift toward the new kind of warfare
and I am concerned that electronic warfare, cyber, and the
vulnerability of some of our major assets have to be taken into
account.
I just--I mean, it is a cliche but I worry that we are
preparing for the last war. What is your sense in terms of
our--the adequacy of our defense in terms of electronic
warfare, cyber, hypersonics?
Mr. Chollet. Senator King, thank you for the question and
thanks for your leadership and advocacy on that issue set. It
is very, very important.
I think the National Defense Strategy does stress the
importance of those domains and ensuring the United States is
both investing the resources and having the right strategy to
get at the threats in those areas.
I remember well from when I previously served in the
Pentagon 10 years ago Secretary Panetta giving a very important
speech talking about cyber Pearl Harbor, which was one of the
first efforts of a SECDEF to talk about cybersecurity from a
Defense Department perspective.
I know there has been a lot of good work underway thanks to
the support and leadership of the Congress on these issues and
so, if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and seeing
how we can advance this issue.
Senator King. I remember using the image of a cyber Pearl
Harbor myself. I am not sure whether I stole it from Panetta or
he stole it from me. But in any case, it is an absolutely
critical element of looking forward.
I think one of the strengths you bring to this is your
experience in the State Department. Alliances are our
asymmetric advantage.
China has customers. We have allies, and to the extent we
can continue to build on those alliances particularly in Asia
and in the Pacific do you agree that that is one of the most
important strategic and policy developments both from the
Defense Department point of view but also from the Department
of State and the U.S. Government?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely, Senator King. This is our
strategic advantage. It is an enduring advantage that we have.
We need to not just tend to those alliances and
partnerships but make them stronger and expand them out. When I
previously served at the Pentagon as the Assistant Secretary
for International Security Affairs I covered the Middle East
and Europe and the Western Hemisphere and Africa and I spent
most of my waking hours working with our foreign partners on
what we are doing together either through alliances or through
strong partnerships.
I think there is a big piece of the job that I have been
nominated for and, if confirmed, I would do that I think of as
defense diplomacy, working with our allies and partners in
conjunction with the State Department to ensure that we are
doing what we can to cooperate, to give them resources, and to
find ways we can work together to solve common problems.
Senator King. One of the most important policy questions
you have already touched on is Taiwan and the challenge, it
seems to me--and we can discuss this further not in this
setting--is the line between deterrence and provocation.
We want to deter the Chinese communists from any kind of
violent attack on Taiwan. On the other hand, we do not want to
take steps that would provoke it.
Let me turn to you, Ms. Abercrombie. I was trying to get a
hold of Thom Tillis' handgun spec, which is an eight-inch stack
of paper. We have got to do more off-the-shelf acquisition and
not pay ridiculous amounts of money for custom platforms and
devices and whatever it is the military needs. Do you agree?
Ms. Abercrombie. Absolutely, Senator. Yes. I think we have
so many innovations happening in the commercial sector today
that it is incumbent upon the Defense Department to look
outside for those developments as well as inside.
Senator King. I hope you start with what can we find off
the shelf rather than what can we design and have custom built.
I hope that you want to flip that premise. You have touched on
this.
But I think it is essential that we buy the IP along with
the platform, not just for software but for the design of a
valve so that--my vision is every depot, every hangar, every
ship has a 3D printer and we do not have to wait for somebody
to make a missing valve or a missing bolt or something that is
necessary because we do not have very good availability both in
terms of our aircraft and in terms of our naval facilities.
So not just IP of software. I hope you will commit. When
you are buying a platform you should buy the IP for the whole--
for the whole project so that we can then build on that
ourselves. Do you agree?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, if confirmed I will make it a
priority to ensure the acquisition community is working to bake
that in to the contracting process from the outset.
Senator King. Thank you very much. I will have several
other questions for the record. I want to--I hope to see you do
more work with smaller businesses who tell us the Pentagon is
just so much trouble to deal with they do not submit
applications. We are missing a lot of innovations. So please
attend to that.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. Mr. Chollet, in the summer of 2020 you said
the Army is a pretty bubba-oriented system. Do you still
believe that?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I think the comment you are referring
to was one where I was talking about the importance of
leadership and mentorship and it was a colloquial way of saying
that is very, very important.
Senator Cotton. So do you still believe the Army is a
pretty bubba-oriented system?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that leadership and mentorship in
the Army is critical as it is critical in all of our services.
Senator Cotton. Do you think that that is a term of praise
or a term of criticism?
Mr. Chollet. It is a colloquial phrase to talk about the
importance of mentorship and leadership.
Senator Cotton. Why did you not you say in that New York
Times interview in the summer of 2020 that leadership is
important in the Army? Why did you call it a bubba-oriented
system?
Mr. Chollet. My recollection is that article was about the
importance of having diversity in leadership throughout the
armed forces and I was stressing the importance of leaders
making that a priority.
Senator Cotton. In the article you also imply pretty
strongly that criticism of Barack Obama's foreign policy was
driven in part by systemic racism. Do you still believe that
criticism of Barack Obama's foreign policy is in part racist?
Mr. Chollet. I think there is no question that there were
arguments made about President Obama that were rooted in race.
No question about it.
Senator Cotton. Let us consider some of those decisions in
which you played a part. You defended strongly the Syrian red
line fiasco as late as 2016. Do you still believe it was
correct for President Obama not to enforce his own red line in
Syria?
Mr. Chollet. I believe it was an accomplishment for the
United States working with a multinational coalition to get
1,300 tons of chemical weapons out of Syria.
Senator Cotton. Relying on Vladimir Putin?
Mr. Chollet. It was an accomplishment to get 1,300 tons of
chemical weapons out of Syria, Senator.
Senator Cotton. You, obviously, did not get it all out of
Syria because Bashar al-Assad later gassed his own people
again, did he not?
Mr. Chollet. He used chemical weapons that were made out of
chlorine--industrial chemicals--which is not part of his
chemical weapons program.
Senator Cotton. Do you believe it was--do you believe it
was correct for Donald Trump to enforce Barack Obama's own red
line when he bombed Bashar al-Assad after gassing his own
people?
Mr. Chollet. I believe it was important for the United
States to engage in the counter ISIL campaign, which began in
the fall of 2014, which continues to this day.
Senator Cotton. Yes or no, do you support--did you support
Donald Trump's decision to enforce Barack Obama's own red line?
Mr. Chollet. I do not recall that decision.
Senator Cotton. You do not recall bombing Syria during
Donald Trump's presidency?
Mr. Chollet. That specific incident, Senator, I do not
recall.
Senator Cotton. So one thing that Barack Obama did 10 years
ago was toss the decision to bomb Syria to Congress, looking
for a scapegoat. Obviously, he did not submit the decision to
bomb Libya to Congress in 2011.
What is the difference? Why did we need congressional
approval to bomb Syria in 2013 but not Libya in 2011?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I cannot speak for President Obama on
this.
Senator Cotton. You were on the White House staff at the
time in 2011, right?
Mr. Chollet. I was, Senator. I was not part of that
decision with President Obama. I can say they were two very
different circumstances.
Senator Cotton. What is--what is your view of that
question? Do you think we needed congressional approval to bomb
Syria?
Mr. Chollet. At the time I supported the--I was not part of
the decision but I supported President Obama coming to the
Congress to get the support of the American people to whether
or not we, the United States, were going to intervene in the
civil war in Syria.
Senator Cotton. Do you think the--do you think the
intervention in Libya was wise policy?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I have written extensively about----
Senator Cotton. I have read it. Yes, I have read it.
Mr. Chollet.--the lessons learned of our intervention in
Libya.
Senator Cotton. That is why I am asking you here publicly.
Mr. Chollet. At the time I did believe it was the right
policy, yes.
Senator Cotton. So you do not believe it anymore?
Mr. Chollet. I believed at the time, given the
circumstances we faced, it was the right policy.
Senator Cotton. So Barack Obama has said publicly that
Libya is a mess. Privately I will not say what he said since
there are young children in the audience but it ends with show
and it starts with ``sh.'' Do you agree with President Obama's
retrospective assessment about what kind of mess Libya is?
Mr. Chollet. I believe the--thanks, Senator. I believe that
the aftermath of the Libyan war including up until today,
unfortunately, with this terrible, devastating natural disaster
with the dam breaking, killing thousands of Libyans, is an
aftermath of that. But long----
Senator Cotton. But let me ask you this. So we withdrew
support for a pro-American ruler in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, when
he was toppled. We bombed a de facto pro-American leader in
Libya, Muammar Qaddafi, and he was ultimately removed from
power.
We did not bomb an anti-American dictator in Syria, Bashar
al-Assad. Can you explain that series of decisions in the Arab
Spring? Why it seems like we always topple the pro-American
rulers there and we sided with the anti-American pro-Iran
rulers?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, again, thanks for the question, and I
have thought and written extensively about this. I believe--I
believed at the time and I believe now it was the correct
decision not to intervene directly in that Syrian civil war.
But it was also the correct decision to intervene directly
to conduct the counter ISIL campaign, which the United States
began with the support of Congress in the fall of----
Senator Cotton. Okay. Let me turn to your judgment on a
contemporary matter.
So the Obama or the Biden administration has been wracked
by unwarranted anxiety about threats of escalation in Ukraine.
So members of this Committee and both parties have
repeatedly pointed out how there has been one weapon system
after another, the latest one being ATACMS, that President
Biden has refused to send to Ukraine only to reverse himself
three or six or 9 months later--a long-standing pattern.
In retrospect do you agree there is any weapon system that
the Biden administration should have sent earlier than it
finally ended up sending them or do you think it has pitched a
perfect game on every decision?
Mr. Chollet. Oh, I do not think anyone would presume there
has been a perfect game pitch for sure. But I am satisfied with
the amount of assistance the United States with the support of
the Congress has provided to Ukraine.
Senator Cotton. I did not say if you are satisfied or the
overall--I am saying that there has been probably at least a
dozen different weapon systems--the latest ATACMS, F-16s, Abram
tanks, cluster munitions--in which the Biden administration has
ruled them out only to turn around and deliver them three, six,
9 months later.
Is there any specific weapon system that you think the
Biden administration made a mistake on that it ultimately
delivered and it should have delivered earlier?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I am proud of the administration's
record on providing an unprecedented amount of assistance to
Ukraine--$44 billion dollars.
Senator Cotton. My time is up. I would take that as a no
and yet another example of the bad judgment you have displayed
for a very long time on these critical foreign policy
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask the following two initial questions of all nominees
who come before any of my committees so I will ask these
questions of you. I will start with--since you became a legal
adult have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or
committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a
sexual nature?
Mr. Chollet. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Ms. Abercrombie?
Ms. Abercrombie. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Chollet. No, Senator.
Ms. Abercrombie. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. For Mr. Chollet, the Compact of Free
Association and the monetary assistance within them are
inextricably tied to USINDOPACOM posture and national security.
Are you familiar with the compacts and their purposes?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Hirono, thanks for the question. I
really appreciate our time the other week talking about this
and many other issues in your office.
I am very familiar with the so-called COFA agreements and
their critical importance to our security.
Senator Hirono. Good, because can you expound a little bit
more about why these compacts are critically important and even
as we are pretty much negotiating those compacts even as we
speak?
Mr. Chollet. We need to----
Senator Hirono. Can you expound a little bit more on why
they are so important?
Mr. Chollet. Sure, Senator.
These compacts help provide critical access to our forces
and personnel throughout the Pacific Islands, which given the
challenges we are facing in the Indo-Pacific particularly
emanating from the PRC that access is absolutely critical to
our security.
Senator Hirono. Especially as we are very focused on the
INDOPACOM AOR, that our agreements with the compact nations--
Palau, Micronesia, and----
Mr. Chollet. I am sorry, Senator?
Senator Hirono.--Micro Islands very important. Thank you.
So for you again, missile technology has rapidly developed,
perhaps now has even outpaced our policy process. As our
adversaries modernize we must adapt to ensure strategic
locations like Hawaii are protected.
How do you believe that DOD can improve its policies
regarding cruise and hypersonic missile defense of the
homeland?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thank you, and thank you for your
continued advocacy on this issue set. Obviously, the defense of
Hawaii and defense of Guam are absolutely critical to our
security.
My understanding, Senator, is that Hawaii has the same
protection as the 49 other states and I know the department has
been making some critical investments and upgrading our missile
defense posture to cover Hawaii.
If confirmed I can pledge to you that I will continue to
remain very focused on this and will look forward, if
confirmed, and working with you and your team to ensure we are
doing what we need to do to ensure Hawaii's protection.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, because there was a
time when there was a particular kind of radar system that was
going to be placed in Hawaii and that is no longer the case and
that is why I continue to pursue missile defense of Hawaii and
I will work with you, of course, should you be confirmed.
For you again, I introduced a bill last year to establish
embassies in several Pacific islands so I particularly
appreciate the administration's announcements at the Pacific
Island Forum Summit this week improving relationships in the
Pacific both diplomatically and with military-to-military
engagements is foundational to national security.
If nominated--well, you have been nominated--how would you
use your State Department and DOD experience to build on DOD's
efforts in campaigning and demonstrating our commitment to
allies in the region?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Our work to strengthen our partnerships with the Pacific
islands has been quite intense over the last year. President
Biden, as you noted, just on Monday hosted his second summit of
Pacific island leaders.
Secretary Blinken just 2 days ago met with the Pacific
island leaders from Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia
to talk about the COFA process.
So I can tell you if confirmed I would certainly carry this
effort forward at the Pentagon because this is a critical,
critical set of relationships for the Department of Defense.
The State Department has been in the lead in negotiating these
agreements but the benefits are really with the Department of
Defense.
Senator Hirono. I think that the more we are diplomatically
engaged, not just militarily engaged, with our island nation
friends it is important because, for example, places like the
Solomon Islands that China is very much engaged in what is
going on there.
I would note that with regard to the COFA negotiations we
need to complete our agreements with the Marshallese and my
hope is that we are going to see our way through to enable them
to sign on to this 20-year compact that is critical to our
national defense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Rounds, please?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Abercrombie and Mr. Chollet, first of all, thank you to
both of you for your service to our country.
Mr. Chollet, we discussed the impact of auctioning off the
3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band of the spectrum and the impact it
would have on DOD capabilities when you were in my office
briefly.
Most importantly, we have now asked 22 separate uniformed
officers in a row about their opinion as to whether or not that
particular part of the spectrum should be sold or shared with
commercial interests.
Not one of them has been supportive of that approach. In
fact, the Navy stated that transitioning the systems operating
on the lower band would cost over $260 billion.
Additionally, the impact to homeland defense would be
dramatic and span several decades. Based on your knowledge of
this issue and the testimony of senior uniformed officers what
would be your advice to the Secretary of Defense on the
auctioning of the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz portion of the
spectrum?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Senator Rounds, and I really
appreciate the time you gave me the other day to speak in your
office and also thank you for what you have been doing to
champion this issue and make sure that we all understand the
implications and the importance of these--this part of the
spectrum.
Based on everything I have heard I would associate myself
with the concerns that have been expressed to this Committee
about the auctioning off and the importance of that part of the
spectrum to our national security and so I would advise the
Secretary to tread very carefully here, and I know that there
has been a report done that I have not yet had a chance to see.
If confirmed, I would ask to see it on day one to better
understand about how we can move forward on this. But I fully,
fully appreciate the national security implications.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Thank you. Let me just ask and--Ms.
Abercrombie, I have appreciated the discussions that we have
had. I do not have a lot of questions for you today but I do
want to followup, Mr. Chollet, with a couple of questions
specifically with regard to reports.
I agree that that report needs to come out and I think the
more we share you have indicated that you would be very open in
sharing the information back and forth.
You currently in the Department of State have the
opportunities to share information as well. You have already
had a beginning discussion with regard to what happened in
Afghanistan and I do not think there is anybody that thinks
that that was a perfect operation in any way, shape, or form.
We were able to discuss briefly in our office the
withdrawal from Afghanistan and as I mentioned before many of
us still have unanswered questions about the sequence of events
and decisions that were made over a period of time literally of
months and days.
As the State Department's counselor do you commit to making
the State Department's classified after-action report in
Afghanistan available to the members of this Committee?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Senator, for the question, and you
are absolutely right.
We need to have accountability and learn lessons from not
just what happened in August 2021 but the 20-year war that the
United States fought with Afghanistan.
Senator Rounds. Look, I am going to run out of time but
this is important because you are moving into a position in the
Department of Defense where you are going to be making policy
recommendations.
Part of that means sharing good information with Members of
this Committee to either gain support or to literally revisit
whether or not those recommendations are appropriate or not.
Pretty straightforward as to whether or not as the
counselor for the Department of State are you prepared in your
current position to make that report available?
I am not asking you to declassify it but it should be made
available to members here so that we can see it. What is your
opinion as a policymaker in your current position? Are you
prepared to make that available to members of this Committee?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, as you know, we--the State Department
has provided that report to the Oversight Committee, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee as well as on the House side and
also published portions of that report on the web--on the State
Department website.
I would commit to you to taking it back to my State
Department colleagues and noting your desire to----
Senator Rounds. That is fair, and would you be prepared to
take that back and to have the report back to us prior to a
vote on your confirmation?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, it is not my decision on whether or
not to share these reports but I certainly will take back your
question and advocate on behalf. I believe we should be as
transparent as we can be with Congress on this.
Senator Rounds. Do you believe that that should be made
available to this Committee? It was members of the Department
of Defense that actually were participating that day in
Afghanistan when we lost 13 members.
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely, and I think every day about the
2,400 lost and the 13 lost at Abbey Gate.
Senator Rounds. Okay. But the reason--the reason why I ask
it is this is a test. This is a test to find out whether or not
in the future you would also work with us on getting the
information that we need to either question the policy
recommendations that you have made or to support those
policies.
I think this Committee does a great job on a bipartisan
basis. But we have got to be able to have the information to
make those recommendations and learn the reasoning behind them.
Do you understand the reason why I am asking for that
report to be made public and the reason why I think it is so
important that you be in a position to comfortably be able to
go back to the bosses and say, we need to make these reports
available so that they can either support or ask questions
about the decisions that are made?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I can commit to you that I will take
that back to my State Department colleagues and make the case.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Thank you, Mr.--thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Warren, please?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chollet, Ms. Abercrombie, it is good to see you both
here. Congratulations on your nomination. Welcome to your
family and thank you very much for the many years that you have
both put in to public service.
When the U.S. military operations kill civilians we damage
our reputation and it becomes a national security liability,
and that is why I have worked with DOD to create a civilian
protection center of excellence as part of a comprehensive plan
to address this problem.
The State Department is also enhancing oversight to make
sure that U.S.-provided weapons do not contribute to civilian
harm. This is progress, real progress, but there is still more
that needs to be done.
In May CENTCOM conducted a strike in Syria that may have
resulted in the death of a farmer and a father of 10. It took a
litany of press coverage to convince the Joint Special
Operations Command to finally open up a civilian casualty
credibility assessment report 2 weeks later. This approach is
only one of the many instances where the public have come to
doubt DOD's credibility.
Mr. Chollet, do you agree that it is important for our
investigations to be regarded as credible around the world?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Warren, thank you for the question and
thank you for the time in your office the other day and your
leadership on this issue.
As we have discussed multiple times, ensuring that the
United States military does whatever it can and has the
capabilities it can to prevent civilian casualties is critical.
I believe the U.S. military is the most effective fighting
force in the world in doing so. But whenever there are
instances in which there may have been civilian casualties it
is important to have a credible investigation of that.
Senator Warren. Okay. A key way that these investigations
could be improved and the results more trusted by communities
that were affected by casualties is for DOD investigators to
work with civil society organizations on the ground as they
work to uncover what actually happened.
When I visited Ukraine last month I was impressed by how
closely their military works with civil society organizations
to prevent and respond to civilian casualties. It can help
improve investigations and it can help save lives in the long
run.
Mr. Chollet, will you commit to ensuring that DOD works
more closely with civil society organizations when reviewing
and responding to allegations of civilian casualties?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Warren, thanks for the question.
I know the Defense Department has revamped its efforts and
tried to add some capability to understand the civilian
casualty question whenever there is an instance where that may
have occurred. Working with civil society organizations is
absolutely critical. If confirmed I will dig into this and work
toward that objective.
Senator Warren. Okay. In 2018 a Joint Staff review found
that 58 percent of acknowledged cases of civilian harm
originated from civil society organizations and external
investigations--more than half--and yet too often DOD has seen
outsiders as the enemy rather than as the valuable resource
that they can be.
It is clear that we still need more progress, that DOD
needs to do more on engaging civil society and helping improve
its credibility in this area. I am very glad to hear you say
that you will take the lead in this because we are depending on
you to get this right.
Ultimately, this is good for America's military, this is
good for our Nation, and it helps us all around the world.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chollet.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Ernst, please?
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
Mr. Chollet and Ms. Abercrombie, for being in front of us today
and I want to thank your families as well for their support.
So, Mr. Chollet, I will start with you. I have consistently
worked hard to lead bipartisan and bicameral efforts to counter
Iran and I am very upset that the Biden administration
continues to put more Americans at risk through their strategy
of appeasement, which has emboldened Iranian aggression.
So, Mr. Chollet, you currently serve as the State
Department counselor and during your tenure with the State
Department hired a Ms. Ariane Tabatabai, who we have recently
learned was part of an Iranian Government information
operation, and according to reports Ms. Tabatabai sought
feedback from Iran's foreign minister on conferences she
attended and in testimony she provided before Congress.
She now serves in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for SOLIC--Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict--
which you will oversee if you are confirmed as under secretary.
Do you believe it is prudent to have an individual with a
history of conferring with Iranian officials in a highly
sensitive role related to counterterrorism and special
operations?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I
appreciated the time we spent together in your office last
week.
I know nothing about this particular instance. I only know
what I have read in the press. All I can say is given my
experience at the Defense Department as well as the State
Department and the National Security Council anyone who serves
in a position of national security has to go through a rigorous
background check.
But other than that, I know nothing about this episode.
Senator Ernst. Right. So let us--let us talk a little bit
about that.
So she does have a clearance. Do you believe it would be
prudent to suspend her clearance then pending review in light
of these allegations that she participated in an Iranian
information operation to mislead the American public?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, again, I know nothing about this
allegation so I am not in a position to comment on it.
Senator Ernst. Okay. It would be my opinion that it should
be suspended.
We will talk about the security clearance process as well.
It is widely known, and you just stated, that they go through a
rigorous vetting process.
So it is known that security clearances require individuals
to report personal interactions with foreign equities, and as
the chief adviser to the Secretary of State you have access to
records of State Department employees and you have stated to
the best of your knowledge then that this individual, Ms.
Tabatabai, disclosed this relationship when she worked for you
at the State Department or not?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I have no knowledge of this case at
all. I would assume that all of the normal procedures were
followed here but I do not have any direct knowledge of that.
Senator Ernst. So I would then suspect that maybe she did
not disclose this information but we need to find this out and,
again, because we do not know this I think the clearance should
be suspended.
So, if confirmed, do you commit to sharing Ms. Tabatabai's
security clearance information with this Committee?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question.
If confirmed I am not sure I would have the authority to do
that necessarily. But, if confirmed, I pledge to you that I
would look into any instance in which there is questions about
the security inside the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.
Senator Ernst. If confirmed what actions do you intend to
take to prevent department officials from further engaging in
unauthorized collaboration with Iranians?
Mr. Chollet. Well, Senator, I think it is part of the deal
in having a security clearance that one does not do that. So I
would expect that that sort of behavior would stop if it was
ever uncovered.
Senator Ernst. I would expect that as well.
Mr. Chollet, Iran continues to threaten United States
military personnel in the Middle East and remains intent on
assassinating American citizens here in the United States.
Why is it acceptable, in your view, for the administration
to continue offering Iran substantial sanctions relief while
Iran continues to target American citizens for murder?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I think one of the most foremost
responsibilities I would have if confirmed for this position is
ensuring that we are doing whatever we can to deter Iran and
push back from its malign behavior across the board in the
region and around the world.
I think we have restored some degree of deterrence over the
last several months. There has not been an attack on our forces
in Syria since March. There has not been an attack on our
forces in Iraq for over a year.
But every day we need to wake up and make sure that we are
doing what we can to deter Iran so that they do not think that
today is the day.
Senator Ernst. Obviously, Mr. Chollet, the administration's
view of Iran and my view of Iran is very, very different. I
know this will be a point of contention as we move forward
through your confirmation process.
But I appreciate your answers. Thank you very much. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Blumenthal, please?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for your public service and your families.
Ms. Abercrombie, I am deeply concerned about the apparent
shortfall that we are seeing in ammunition going to Ukraine. I
share and I have expressed very vocally some of the
reservations about the past administration delivery, sometimes
later than we would like to see, of critical weapons platforms,
whether they are armored vehicles, tanks, F-16s, and now
ATACMS, which I think are vital.
But there should be no question that the 155-millimeter
artillery shells are needed to produce at a much heightened
rate. We are now producing them I think at about one-tenth the
volume that the Ukrainians are using them and they are going to
run out of them. We are going to run out of them. That is just
one example.
What would you do in your role as, in effect, the main
Pentagon official in charge of acquisition to speed and
increase the production of key defense supplies that are needed
by the Ukrainians and would one of those possible measures
include building more production capacity in Ukraine?
I have spoken to both the White House and I have talked to
President Zelensky about it. Talked to him in Ukraine when I
visited last a number of weeks ago and here when he visited,
and the Ukrainians are ready to build.
What they need is the investment to build. They were once
the hub of the Soviet Union's defense capabilities, as you
know, and they could be again if provided with the capital to
do so and the air defense.
So two questions. What would you do, generally, and what
can we do to increase the capacity of Ukraine to build its own
production capacity?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, thank you for raising this
extremely important question.
I think from the United States standpoint a robust and
resilient Defense Industrial Base is critical, not just in
terms of providing us with capability that we need and
providing capability to allies and partners but sending a
strong deterrent signal that we can be agile.
And so one way we could do that if confirmed, Senator, in
my role would be signaling to industry the demand signal to
expand that capacity by putting things on contracts and to that
I would like to thank this Committee in particular for the
multiyear procurement authority authorized last year for
munitions.
I think that helps the Department of Defense send that
demand signal to industry to put some of their own skin in the
game to build out capacity.
But in terms of working with allies and partners, I think
we can see an opportunity for expanding the pie, if you will,
working with allies and partners to more broadly expand our
collective Defense Industrial Base.
Senator, I do think looking at industrial cooperation with
Ukraine is a very compelling idea in aiding and if confirmed I
would like to support that.
Senator Blumenthal. The President, I believe, announced an
agreement--a joint weapons production agreement with the
Ukrainian Government last week. Three Ukrainian corporations
signed agreements with more than 2,000 United States defense
companies to rebuild Ukraine's defense capacity.
What can be done to expedite those agreements and to arrive
at more of them?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, yes, I think the White House made
that announcement when President Zelensky was here, as you
noted. I think one thing we can do is use our engagement with
United States American industry to facilitate some of those
partnerships.
We cannot make decisions on behalf of industry, certainly,
but we can lend the U.S. Government's support for any potential
co-production or co-development.
Senator Blumenthal. Are there changes in the Defense
Production Act that need to be done to increase both the
production capacity in the United States of our own industrial
base as well as those of, for example, our allied nations? The
NDAA of 2024 includes now Australia and the U.K.
Ms. Abercrombie. Right.
Senator Blumenthal. But what about Ukraine?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, I think if confirmed I pledge to
you to look into that working with my colleagues in the
industrial base policy office.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Scott, please?
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
First off, congratulations on your nominations. Thanks for
your willingness to serve.
So my first question is for Mr. Chollet. So you have spent
a great deal of your career at the State Department so
congratulations on that, and I think you have served the entire
Biden administration.
During the Biden administration's time in office here is
what has happened. Russia has waged a war in Europe with its
horrible invasion of Ukraine. The United States was humiliated
by President Biden's botched withdrawal from Afghanistan which
left $80 billion of United States military equipment in the
hands of the Taliban, allowed communist China to gain an even
stronger foothold in the Middle East, and took the lives of 13
United States servicemembers.
Communist China has increased its unacceptable bullying of
our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. They are
threatening Taiwan. They are disrespecting the sovereignty of
the Philippines with illegal land use in the West Philippine
Sea. North Korea has resumed ballistic missile testing, and
while all of this is happening the United States military now
has hard time recruiting people.
I believe these issues are a reflection of unacceptable
failure by the civilian leadership at the Pentagon. Our
servicemembers are patriots who are willing to give their lives
for our freedom but they are being failed by current civilian
leadership and policy.
So here is my question. As the No. 3 at DOD what changes
would you start making on day one to fix these problems?
Mr. Chollet. Well, Senator Scott, thank you for the
question.
Look, I think that--I see things a bit differently in terms
of where we are in the world in terms of our posture in the
world.
I look across the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe
and I see in Europe a NATO that is stronger, larger, and more
united than it has been in my professional lifetime.
Senator Scott. Can I stop you there? Maybe--would we be
better off if they were not united and we were not at war?
Mr. Chollet. Oh, I mean----
Senator Scott. I mean, we are sitting there. They have--we
have got war in Europe. We are spending billions of dollars. So
I like the fact that we are unified but, golly, look at where
we are. We got people dying every day, and Russia did not do
this before.
Mr. Chollet. Well, Russia has done it before. It did it in
2008 in Georgia and then in 2014 in Ukraine and it has done it
again in 2022 in Ukraine, and so, yes, the United States--we
tried to prevent this war from happening.
We tried to release intelligence to expose what Vladimir
Putin was up to. But I think the result, again, due to in large
part to U.S. leadership----
Senator Scott. Let us go back to the question. Would you do
something different?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I think there is a very strong
foundation in terms of alliances and partnerships around the
world that I will seek to build on. But, obviously, we are
always looking for ways to innovate and go further.
Senator Scott. So there is nothing you would do different
than what was done?
Mr. Chollet. Well, there will be things I will do
different. The----
Senator Scott. I mean, China is getting worse. North Korea
is getting worse. Russia is worse. So there is nothing you
would change at DOD?
Mr. Chollet. Oh, the--if confirmed one of the first things
I will do is assess the situation and fully understand what we
could be doing differently, particularly when it comes to
advancing our alliances and partnerships.
We cannot change China or North Korea or Russia but what we
can do is make sure that we are better positioned by the United
States alone but also working with our allies and partners to
deal with the challenges those countries pose.
Senator Scott. You do not think we can deter them?
Mr. Chollet. Oh, we absolutely can deter them. We must
deter them, in fact.
Senator Scott. So what would you do--what would you do to
deter them?
Mr. Chollet. Well, so it starts with investing in ourselves
and ensuring that the Defense Department and the U.S. military,
our warfighters, have what they need to be a modern, lethal,
capable force.
It all starts with deterrence. We need our adversaries to
wake up every day and say to themselves, today is not the day.
Senator Scott. What would you do to change the recruitment?
Mr. Chollet. Well, Senator, I would work closely with my
colleague in Personnel and Readiness as well as the services to
understand what role policy would play in trying to help meet
this recruitment challenge, which no question there is across
three of the five services or four of the five services.
Senator Scott. Yes, four of the five. Thank you.
Ms. Abercrombie, so I have been up here four and a half
years. Every time somebody comes up from DOD I ask why cannot
you--why cannot you figure out how to get our military
providers to get equipment done quicker.
Everybody says they are going to go back and look at it.
Oh, they are going to try. We have passed a whole bunch of
changes in the NDAA.
Is there a culture problem at the DOD? If you did this in
private business, I mean, you would not keep your job because
it is not getting--does not seem like it is getting better.
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, thank you for the question. I do
think DOD has made some improvements in large part due to
flexible authorities authorized by--provided by the Congress.
If confirmed what I pledge to do is go in and assess are
those flex--are those new authorities being effectively
utilized across the board.
If not, I will work to make sure the workforce is getting
the training and the signals from the top that this is
important for us to do, and I would also further assess if any
additional changes might be required and would pledge to come
back to the Congress seeking those changes.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Peters, please?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chollet, I certainly believe that a close working
relationship and security cooperation between the United States
and Israel is of the utmost importance to United States foreign
policy, and in your previous role as Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security you worked closely with your
Israeli counterparts to expand security cooperation between our
two countries.
So my question for you, sir, is what did you learn from
that experience and, if confirmed, what can we expect in your
new role in terms of strengthening our defense ties with
Israel?
Mr. Chollet. Well, thank you, Senator Peters, very much for
that question.
You are, indeed, right. When I was the assistant secretary
for ISA 10 years ago I worked more closely with Israel than any
other partner we had.
I think I made about a dozen trips to Israel in the course
of 3 years to that job and hosted Israeli friends here many
times and these are relationships that I have kept up ever
since.
I can tell you that the United States-Israel defense
relationship right now is rock solid. It is based on an MOU
that was negotiated several years ago to ensure that the United
States is providing significant assistance to our Israeli
partners.
But the cooperation between the United States and Israel is
a daily, hourly enterprise and if confirmed I would make it a
high priority to continue to deepen that relationship and
ensure that our Israeli friends have what they need to defend
themselves by themselves.
Senator Peters. Just to followup then, Mr. Chollet, this
Congress I introduced along with bipartisan support from
Senator Fischer the United States-Israel Future of Warfare Act,
which would authorize $50 million in joint research and
development funds to enhance cooperation with Israel in areas
of emerging technologies, artificial intelligence,
cybersecurity, quantum computing, and other technologies.
So my question for you is if confirmed how would the--in
your opinion how would the Defense Department benefit from such
a cooperation and do you--would you continue to support
expanding our cooperation, particularly in these emerging
technology fields?
Mr. Chollet. Thanks, Senator Peters, for the question.
Absolutely I will look forward to taking a closer look at
your legislation. I can say that because of Israel's
significant capabilities on the cutting edge of technology in
warfare that is one of the reasons why this partnership is so
critical for us.
If confirmed, I would seek to advance that cooperation
because there is a lot that Israel learns from us but there is
also a lot that we learn from Israel.
Senator Peters. Absolutely.
Mr. Chollet, Israel's integration into the Middle East has
certainly been broadened by the historic normalization
agreements that we have seen with the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan. All of these are known as the Abraham
Accords, as you are well aware.
By creating defense and military partnerships with our Gulf
allies Israel is enhancing opportunities for peace and
integration while working together to counter some shared
threats including Iran's destabilizing activities throughout
that region.
My question for you is if confirmed what role do you see
the United States military playing in strengthening and
hopefully expanding the Abraham Accords?
Mr. Chollet. Thanks, Senator Peters, for the question.
In my view, the Abraham Accords were the most positive
thing to happen in the Middle East in quite some time and this
administration and I personally have worked hard in the last
few years to deepen the Abraham Accords but also expand the
network of countries in which Israel has normalized relations.
It is unquestionably in our interest to see Israel have
closer ties with her neighbors. It is a project I have worked
on intensively in my role at the State Department. It is
something I would certainly carry forward and make a priority
in the Defense Department, if confirmed.
Senator Peters. Great. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Tuberville, please?
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both
of you for being here today.
Just one question on Ukraine, Mr. Chollet. If Vladimir
Putin called you today and said, listen, if you will just tell
me that Ukraine will never be allowed in NATO we will move back
to our 2021 borders, all fighting will stop, what would you
say?
Mr. Chollet. I would say, President Putin, it is not your
decision where Ukraine is going to be allied with.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. What do you think was the biggest
misstep in the Afghanistan withdrawal and your thoughts after
looking at it?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I think there are so many lessons
that we have to learn as a country by the 20-year engagement we
had in Afghanistan--2,400 troops lost, 20,000 injured, $2
trillion spent.
It is why I applaud what Congress did with the support of
this Committee and the leadership of this Committee to create
the Afghan War Commission, and if confirmed I pledge to you
that I will do whatever I can to support the work of that
commission because it is critically important that we learn the
lessons and apply the lessons of that 20-year engagement in
Afghanistan.
Senator Tuberville. So do think we made some mistakes in
the withdrawal?
Mr. Chollet. I think, Senator, that there, of course, were
mistakes made over that 20-year period, absolutely.
Senator Tuberville. I have seen some statements that you
have made about our immigration and our border. Two years ago
you can talk to pretty much any law enforcement officer in
Alabama--they had never heard of fentanyl, okay.
We had less than a hundred overdoses a year. Now fentanyl
is number-one in our State and we will lose over a thousand
people this year.
What do we tell the families that--kids are dying because
of fentanyl--that we will not do anything at the border? What
do we tell them?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I really appreciate you asking this
question because shining a light on the scourge that is
fentanyl and the damage it is doing in so many communities
across this country is absolutely critical.
I can say that at the State Department Secretary Blinken
has tried to make this into a global issue. Fentanyl is the
number-one killer of Americans 18 to 49 and it is a problem
that we cannot solve alone because of the elaborate supply
chain that creates fentanyl that ends up in U.S. communities.
So just last week in New York Secretary Blinken hosted a
meeting of foreign ministers to talk about ways that countries
can work together to try to fight the scourge of fentanyl
because it is not just the United States alone that is facing
this challenge. Synthetic opioids are ravaging the Middle East
and Asia as well.
So we have absolutely got to get at this problem. One of
the things that I will do, if confirmed, at DOD is to
understand DOD's role and see what more DOD can do to get at
this problem.
Senator Tuberville. It does not seem like that we have
everything in order from the DOD. In May the administration
sent 1,500 troops to the border. In August we pulled out 1,100
and a few days ago we sent 800 back.
If confirmed I hope we get a little bit more consistency
down there because we are--I do not know if you have been down
there. It is a complete mess, and we need to save our kids.
Let us get to my topic. You know what I have got. I have
got a hold on admirals and generals through abortion. I am pro-
life. You will be part of solving this problem, if confirmed,
and it is a problem. I want to get this over with as much as
anybody. How do we work this out?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question.
From where I sit----
Senator Tuberville. I know you have thought about this.
Mr. Chollet. From where I sit, look, we need our team on
the field. Given the challenges that we face in the world, from
the pacing threat of China to the threat of Russia, we need all
the team on the field.
We cannot fight with one hand behind our back is my view
and the job I have been nominated for as a senior civilian at
the Defense Department I am going to want my military teammates
in their jobs as well.
So it is my humble view that this issue gets resolved as
soon as possible.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Well, there is nobody more
military up here than me. But I just hope we can work this out.
The problem that I have--and I represent people in Alabama,
and abortion is a very controversial subject and it should be
voted on by the people. My people in the State of Alabama want
say so about what happens to their tax dollars with abortion
and that is the situation that I am in. I represent the people
of my State and, hopefully, we can work this out.
But I just wanted to get your thoughts because you will be
right in the thick of this as we go along in the next few
months. Hopefully, it is not months. Hopefully, it is just
days.
But thank you for being here. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is important to point out and comment on what
Senator Tuberville just said. I think the quote was, there is
nobody more military than me.
As far as I could tell there is at least four of us, maybe
more, that served in the United States military, in some cases
for decades, and at least three combat veterans.
So I take great exception to what Senator Tuberville had to
say and I have heard him say it before and it just does not
make any sense.
So I wish you would please reevaluate what you think your
experience and just be a little bit more careful about what you
say about the United States military.
I am very happy to defer to Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. When you have a--when you have a
father--when you have had a father die on Active Duty you have
got a right to say whatever you want.
Thank you very much.
Senator Kelly. I do not think that is the case. You have
folks here that have served in the United States military and,
I think, in multiple branches.
So, Mr. Chollet, just returned from a trip to Ukraine last
week. This is my second this year and I feel it is important to
be on the ground to understand the issues we are facing and
they are significant. The holds that Senator Tuberville has
placed on our military is having an effect with our forces in
Ukraine and it is had an impact.
But I want to talk about something else and that is the
role commercial capabilities have had in Ukraine, and we have
seen this with Starlink and others and I am just a little
surprised that we got this far and realized that because of a
war in Europe that we had a gap in our own capability and I
think that is something we need to consider, going forward.
I know there has been a little controversy about the
Starlink services in Ukraine. I met with Gwynne Shotwell from
SpaceX yesterday. The details on this are a little bit
complicated and what has been publicly reported is just not--it
is not accurate.
So looking forward here it is critical that DOD structures
some of its contracts with commercial providers--I am not
specifically talking about SpaceX--to ensure that services that
our troops and allies depend upon will be there when they need
them.
So, Mr. Chollet, I would like to continue the discussion we
had in my office a couple of weeks back. If confirmed what will
your approach be to ensuring that future commercial contracts
regardless of the provider and across the department have the
provisions necessary to ensure their services will be there
when they--when they need them?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Kelly, thank you for the question and
thank you for the time the other week in your office, and thank
you for going a second time to Ukraine.
It is very, very important that Members of Congress go
regularly to Ukraine to see for yourselves what is going on and
assess the situation and what we need to do differently.
This is an issue that I will be engaged in, if confirmed,
because Ukraine has been an incubator in many ways of defense
innovation just given the way the Ukrainians have been--have
been utilizing the private sector as well as what the United
States and others have been providing them.
So if confirmed I would work closely with my colleagues in
the acquisition space to see that we are doing what we can to
ensure that we are innovating as best we can when it comes to
working with the private sector and in getting Ukraine and
anyone else the assistance that they need to protect
themselves.
Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, do you intend when you are
confirmed here--intend to review existing contracts that the
department has with our commercial providers to ensure that
they meet DOD requirements?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator, if confirmed I think it is
absolutely essential that I take a look to make sure, No. 1, we
have baked in an understanding with commercial providers from
the outset what the DOD requirements are so that we do not have
surprises down the road and we have what we need and certainly,
Senator, would commit to making sure we are retroactively
looking to ensure we have all the capability we need when we
need it.
Senator Kelly. Mr. Chollet, do you have any additional
concerns about how our adversaries might weaponize commercial
services that are available and what we could possibly do to
prevent that?
Mr. Chollet. Well, Senator, thanks for the question.
I do have concerns looking at it from the outside because
it does seem to be an area of vulnerability. If confirmed it is
something I will look into from the inside and fully understand
the scope of the vulnerability and what we can do to get at
that.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Mullin, please?
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelly, you may want to clarify those statements because
a family member serves alongside the servicemember, too,
especially a Gold Star family, and if you do not believe that
then go talk to the Gold Star families themselves because Mr.
Tuberville is part of that Gold Star family and I will comment
there----
Senator Kelly. Senator--Senator, I appreciate----
Senator Mullin. No. No. I am not yielding time. I am just
saying you may want to clarify that statement because----
Senator Kelly. Well, I can clarify it right now.
Senator Mullin. I know, but it is my time.
Mr. Chollet, you have made several comments talking about
the Biden administration's withdrawal and the success of it.
Obviously, I have some serious concerns about that.
First of all, has anybody been held accountable for the
disastrous withdrawal that took place considering the American
lives that were lost and how many Americans we left behind?
Mr. Chollet. Senator Mullin, thank you for the question and
thank you for the time in your office the other week and I
genuinely----
Senator Mullin. I just--I am short on time. I just--has
anybody been held accountable?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, accountability is critically
important as----
Senator Mullin. No, I am just saying has anybody been held
accountable. That is a simple one. It is a yes or it is a no.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, we tried to learn the lessons from
that.
Senator Mullin. Has anybody been held accountable?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, we have tried to learn the lessons
from that withdrawal and apply those lessons today.
Senator Mullin. Just--so that is a no. Just is that a no,
no one has been held accountable?
Mr. Chollet. We have tried to learn those lessons.
Senator Mullin. So no one has been held accountable?
Mr. Chollet. We tried to learn lessons.
Senator Mullin. Okay. So--well, it is not hard to really
learn lessons, especially when you do a good debrief.
In fact, when I talked to you about it in my office you
said, well, the chips need to lie where they may. That was your
comments when I was talking to you about the--about the
accountability because if we do not learn lessons then we
will--we are definitely determined to make those same mistakes
again.
Several times Secretary Blinken and this administration
lied when they said that every American that wanted out got
out. Do you believe those statements were accurate?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I do.
Senator Mullin. Oh, you do? Well, then why was there
hundreds of Americans that got out and, by the way, the night
of the 29th--the 28th and 20--and the 30th I was--I was
assisting trying to get those Americans out when you guys said
that every American that wanted out could get out.
But the truth is the Abbey Gate after the bombing HKIA was
closed and you know this as a fact. No one was getting in to
HKIA.
They were getting turned around--turned away. In fact, the
morning of the 30th--and this is recorded on your hotline that
you set up for Afghanistan--I was asked because I had a 3-year-
old-girl plus I had Mariam and her three children plus a whole
host of other people that we were trying to get in, and all
night of the 29th you guys were taking me from gate to gate to
gate to gate to gate to gate to gate trying to get these
individuals in HKIA, and all that had to be said was that you
guys had to call over to the gate and ask for them because we
were dealing with the Taliban.
See, the Taliban, ironically enough, if we paid them enough
money we could get Americans out but the State Department was
stopping us every step of the way.
The morning of the 30th your employee at the State
Department asked me personally, do you have another way to get
them out because we have closed the airport.
So for you to sit there and say that every American who
wanted to get out you are absolutely lying and you know that to
be factual and you say it with a straight face.
What is bad is that 3-year-old girl we were trying to get
out died a few days later from a leg infection and you all knew
about it because I sent you pictures of it that is still on my
phone--was why I said it was important that we got her out
through HKIA because she needed serious medical attention.
By the way, this was not a refugee. This was an American
citizen and her parents were American citizens and you all knew
this to be factual. Then when we drive her across the country
and we get her to the border to Tajikistan your Ambassador,
Ambassador Pommersheim, which this is also recorded, told me
personally, I was told by
Washington, DC, not to assist you in any way.
Who told him that?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question and thank
you----
Senator Mullin. No. No. I want to know who told him that. I
do not have much time. I do not want you to--I do not want you
to try to get around it. Who told him that?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I do not know the details of that
so----
Senator Mullin. Well, the State Department said it. Has he
been held accountable? Because that 3-year-old died because of
her leg infection before we could get her across the border.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, again, I appreciate what you did to
help many of the----
Senator Mullin. No, I do not want that. I do not need that.
I do not need that. I want accountability. I want someone to be
held accountable. Because you know what happened after that 3-
year-old girl died and I called you guys and I said that she
died?
I hung up the phone and we went black as a team and we quit
communicating with you and 3 days later you guys--the State
Department--released my photo and my approximate location to
the Washington Post and said I was lost in Afghanistan with a
bag of cash and never called my family to see if that was true.
Never called my wife.
You guys released it to a political rag and they ran it and
they put my life in serious danger, including the entire team
that was trying to get the Americans out that you guys left
behind and not one single person has been held accountable.
Then when Mariam and her three kids from Arlington--from
Amarillo, Texas, when we finally got them out across the border
of Tajikistan without your all's help because you guys refused
to help us because you told the Ambassador not to assist us in
any way, Secretary Blinken, the person who was advising, goes
to the podium and says the State Department has successfully
negotiated to get the first Americans out since the fall of
Afghanistan.
I did not know you guys were there when she had a gun held
to her hand with her 2-year-old in her arms and she started
puking because she was so scared. I did not know you guys were
helping that. I did not know you guys were making a single
phone call.
I did not know you guys were there paying off the Taliban
with that bag of cash that you said I had in my hands. I did
not know you guys were there, and you are going to tell me that
you cannot say if someone has been held accountable or not?
Chairman Reed. Senator Mullin, your time has expired.
Senator Mullin. There is a problem here and there is zero
chance I support you moving forward.
Chairman Reed. Let me now recognize Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. We are the Senate Armed Services Committee.
It is not you guys and us guys. We are Americans.
Senator Mullin.
[Off mic.]
Senator Kaine. We are Americans. This Committee, we are all
Americans. We might have different political parties and
different political views.
Criticism is an American right and we ought to be critical
when we need to be, and we can have different views about what
criticisms are fair or not. But it is not you guys and us guys
in this room. We are--we are all Americans trying to serve the
public and I hope we will act that way.
I do think the discussion about lessons learned from
Afghanistan cannot just be punted to a commission that is going
to come back with answers later because we have spent a lot of
time around this Committee table and we have views. I am not an
expert.
For those who want to read the report that has been
provided by State to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
members who are not on the Committee probably did not know that
report had been provided. I think you are entitled to it.
So you should just ask to see that report and if any of you
have a challenge getting it Senator Shaheen and I and Senator
Rounds are on the Foreign Relations Committee. Come to us and
we will go to bat for you.
A lot of reports are out there that we can see but you
never know that it has been given to another committee. Well,
now we do now that has been provided to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and if folks want to read it ask to see it
and if you have trouble come to the SFRC members and we will
work to make sure that you see it.
The mistakes that seem the most obvious ones to me and,
yet, we need to dig into it even further, the mistakes that
seem as obvious is, one, President Trump should never have
negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban and cut out the Afghan
Government.
It basically threw them under the bus. It committed to a
deal that they had no ownership in, that they found to be
unacceptable, and that caused a huge loss of Afghan morale for
the United States to negotiate a withdrawal with the Taliban
without including the Afghan Government.
Who thought that was a good idea? Who came up with that
idea of not inviting the Afghan Government to participate in
the withdrawal agreement?
Then the second agreement that goes more on the Biden
administration's shoulders is there were a variety of scenarios
presented to the administration about the Afghan military's
capacity and how strong they would be.
Some were really pessimistic, some were kind of middle of
the road, and some were quite optimistic, and what we heard
from the DOD and administration witnesses who came before us
were the optimistic ones, that the Afghan military would be
very strong.
We now know that the administration was being given
pessimistic estimates as well, and when you get a range of
estimates you should not just accept the rosy one and I think
that was, clearly, a mistake.
Now, even with those mistakes if there had been a proposal
before this Committee or before Congress to do what would have
had to be done to stay longer--put more American troops in--I
cannot imagine that would have gotten support on either side of
the aisle in this Committee, in Congress, either house. That
would have been necessary to stay longer.
But the rosy scenarios about what the Afghan military would
do probably led to some mistakes at the end. I mean, that--we
should have planned on a worst case scenario, not on a rosy
case scenario, and I think that was--that was a mistake and I
think we got to own it because people who are watching at home
they do not want to just see, well, you know, we will have a
commission that will come back and give us some recommendations
down the road.
So, anyway, to my Committee Members if you want to see the
report that has been given to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee ask for it and if you have trouble getting it ask me
and I will try to help.
Ms. Abercrombie, we talked a lot about some of the things
you would focus on if confirmed. Can you expand on for my
colleagues some of the acquisition strategies? You talked about
error reduction incentive structures for the contracting
process. Can you share some of those ideas?
Ms. Abercrombie. Thank you, Senator, for the question and
thanks for the time in your office the other week.
Senator, if confirmed I think I have got a few priorities
and that would be certainly making sure we get equipment at
speed and scale to the warfighter and so that does look to
reduce timelines both by ensuring we are using the flexible
acquisition authorities that have been provided by Congress and
the new acquisition pathways that have been implemented by DOD.
It is making sure we are training the workforce properly to
apply all those and make sure that that is--it is being applied
across the department, sharing lessons learned and also
reducing the barriers to the nontraditional suppliers, making
sure we have competition in the marketplace, so to speak,
attracting smaller businesses, disadvantaged--traditionally
disadvantaged businesses, et cetera, potentially by reducing
regulatory barriers and making sure those pathways are clear.
Senator Kaine. I look forward to working with you on those
and supporting both your nominations.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Budd, please?
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, both of
you all thank you for being here. Congrats on your nominations.
Mr. Chollet, I would like to do a bit of a quick round, if
you would, on a range of topics so if you would keep your
answers rather short.
Assistant Secretary Wallander and General Cavoli, they are
on the record stating that 2 percent of GDP is no longer a
sufficient spending goal for NATO. Do you agree?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thank you for the question. Thanks
for the time in your office the other day.
I do agree. The new NATO agreement at the Vilnius Summit is
that 2 percent is the floor, not the ceiling, for defense
spending for our NATO allies.
Senator Budd. Thank you. So one of the criticisms of
ongoing support to Ukraine is the potential tradeoff of
munitions that we are sending compared to what Taiwan requires
to defend itself from an increasingly aggressive China.
So, if confirmed, do you commit to reviewing this and
providing your best policy advice as secretary as well as to
Congress?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Senator Budd. If you determine that such tradeoffs exist do
you commit to working with your colleagues, particularly the
under secretary for acquisitions and sustainment, to request
both the resources and authorities necessary to meet our
defense requirements and commitments including maximizing
existing production lines and/or increasing production lines of
critical munitions?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Senator Budd. So in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA Congress
included Section 922 to enhance or upgrade the assistant
secretary of defense for special operations in low-intensity
conflict.
It upgraded their responsibilities to be more like those of
a service secretary. So, if confirmed, do you commit to take
actions necessary to fully implement Section 922, yes or no?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, Senator. I look forward to, if confirmed,
working to implement that and working with you on that.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Mr. Chollet, on a different topic, you are on record
stating that, and I quote--and my colleagues mentioned similar
things a few moments ago--but I quote, you said it was
preposterous and not supported by evidence that there is a
security threat along the Southwest border. But we know now
that that is objectively false.
So earlier this week Customs and Border Protection stated
that there were approximately 11,000 encounters at the
Southwest border in a 24-hour span, making it the single
highest day in recent memory.
So as of July 160 migrants who matched those listed on the
terrorist watch list have been apprehended crossing the United
States-Mexico border during 2023, compared to a hundred in all
of 2022. That is just the ones we know about.
So would you still say that there is no security threat
along the southern border?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, we need to have a safe and secure
border. DOD----
Senator Budd. Would you say that there is no security
threat along the Southwest border, sir?
Mr. Chollet. I believe there are security threats across
the Southwest border, which is why we need a safe and secure
border, yes.
Senator Budd. But at one point you said it is preposterous
and not supported by evidence that there is a security threat.
So you do not agree with your prior statement?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I do not recall the specific example
or that quote or what the security threat in question was
being--I was being asked.
But what I can tell you is if confirmed I believe we need
to have a safe and secure border and if confirmed I will work
to ensure that DOD is playing its role.
Senator Budd. You believe that there is a security threat
along the Southwest border as of now?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that Secretary Austin was absolutely
correct to add additional DOD resources----
Senator Budd. I am just--sir, I am just asking you would
you believe that there is no security threat along the
Southwest border as of right now?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that there is a threat that warrants
the deployment of United States Active Duty troops to the
border, which Secretary Austin has done.
Senator Budd. Let me broaden the aperture a bit. So is--it
is a basic matter of sovereignty for nations to secure their
border. Do you agree?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely.
Senator Budd. I understand that you would prefer not to
send troops to the border so that we can maintain readiness to
respond to the military threats posed by China, Russia, and
other bad actors.
But until the Biden administration prioritizes border
security I believe it is a necessity, do you not believe, to
secure our southern border?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question. I believe we
need to have a safe and secure border, full stop.
Senator Budd. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd.
Senator Duckworth, please?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning to our witnesses.
I want to take this opportunity to reinforce the importance
of our support for Ukraine. I attended a very important
briefing on Ukraine with members of this Committee yesterday
and I believe that the United States continue--it is vital that
the United States continue to support the Ukrainian people
against unprovoked Russian aggression and I urge my colleagues
to consider how important assistance to Ukraine is to our
national security.
Putin and the rest of the world are watching our actions
and any failure of this Congress to continue appropriating
funds to support Ukraine's defenses will have consequences
throughout the world including right here at home, and if we
fail to support Ukraine Putin will learn the lesson that he can
do whatever he wants.
Others will learn that same lesson as well. That makes the
world a less safe place, a less free place, and that impacts
our economy and our national security.
Our allies are providing immense support to Ukraine right
now but they are watching what we do closely. If we retreat
early we are jeopardizing the war effort and playing into
Putin's hands.
Ms. Abercrombie, if confirmed your position would be
responsible for working with other interagency partners to
deliver vital defense capabilities to Ukraine, and, Mr.
Chollet, you would become the lead architect of DOD policy, if
confirmed.
Can both of you speak to the importance of our assistance
to Ukraine's war effort as well as to United States national
security?
Ms. Abercrombie. Senator Duckworth, thank you for that
important question.
As President Biden has said, we want to--we will support
Ukraine for as long as it takes and then from the Defense
Department perspective that certainly includes contracting and
getting the equipment to Ukraine.
So, if confirmed, I would work very closely with
interagency partners and across the department, importantly, to
make sure as Congress has appropriated the dollars we are
getting things on contract as quickly as possible.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Mr. Chollet. Senator Duckworth, thank you for the question.
Thanks for the time in your office a few weeks ago.
Fully agree with my colleague here and fully agree with the
thrust of your statement on the importance of Ukraine winning.
It is a very simple proposition, from my perspective.
If Russia were to stop fighting the war would end. If
Ukraine were to stop fighting Ukraine would end, and I think it
is in our national security interest to continue to provide
significant support to Ukraine.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Earlier this year I introduced the Southeast Asia
Partnership Expansion Act and secured its inclusion into the
Senate version of fiscal year 2024 NDAA. My bill expands the
military's cybersecurity partnership with Southeast Asian
partners that I created in 2020.
Based on the success of that program in Thailand,
Indonesia, and Vietnam for cybersecurity training and
partnership with the United States I am now seeking to include
the Philippines and Malaysia into the program.
Additionally, I recently led a CODEL to Indonesia,
Thailand, and the Philippines to strengthen ties and reinforce
support between Southeast Asia and the United States.
During my trip I spoke with U.S. servicemembers advising
partner militaries in the region and heard that there is a huge
demand for additional training that could increase
interoperability like English language training.
In fact, they mentioned the fact that they have had some of
their candidates returned from the U.S. military academy
because they failed the English language test three times, and
this was a very capable officer and yet could not pass the
English language test.
Mr. Chollet, how important are programs like English
language training and basic cybersecurity training for
interoperability and what other ideas do you have to build our
interoperability in the region?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, and thanks for
your championing the importance of Southeast Asia. As we have
discussed many times, it has been a priority for the Biden
administration.
It has been a priority for me personally and in the last
two and a half years at the State Department I have done around
eight trips to Southeast Asia because I believe those partners
are critically important to our national security and our
posture in the Indo-Pacific.
I think we have made some very, very important strides in
deepening those relationships but I think there is much further
to go and I would--if confirmed, would look forward to work
with you closely on some of the innovative ideas you and others
have had on a way we can deepen those partnerships.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So, if confirmed, will you
work with me to help secure funding authorities and resources
for some of these ideas in future years?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely, Senator. I would like to work with
you on that. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Yes, because I want to ensure that we are prioritizing and
adequately resourcing programs that can build on these ties in
Southeast Asia.
If confirmed, Mr. Chollet, how do you plan on using your
diplomatic experience gained during your time at the State
Department to shape the DOD's policy on building relationships
with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically
Southeast Asia?
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, for the
question.
As I said earlier, I believe that what I call defense
diplomacy is a critical part of the job of Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and if confirmed I would seek to pursue that
and work with my colleagues as well who are doing that.
These relationships and partnerships are critically
important to our security. They are a force multiplier for us.
They are part of our enduring advantage and they are at the
heart of our National Defense Strategy.
So whatever we can do to make those alliances and
partnerships stronger is something that I am going to set out
to do.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Schmitt, please?
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chollet, what did you mean when you told the New York
Times that the Army in particular is a pretty bubba-oriented
system?
Mr. Chollet. Thanks, Senator Schmitt, for the question. I
really appreciate it.
As I mentioned earlier, I was referring to the importance
of mentorship and leadership. It was sort of a colloquial way
to say that mentors and leaders really matter.
Senator Schmitt. Well, you could have said that but you did
not. The Merriam-Webster defines it as--very simply as redneck
and offers that the term is, quote, ``informal and often
disparaging.'' It also cites the word's origin as a, quote,
``stereotypical nickname of Southern white males.''
Do you understand how that might be offensive?
Mr. Chollet. I do, Senator, and that was certainly not my
intent in using that.
Senator Schmitt. Right. You are asking to be promoted to
the No. 3 position at the Department of Defense. There are
recruitment challenges. I am sure that there are Southern white
males who might like to join the military. Do you think this is
helpful in that recruitment effort?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I think the most important thing we
can do to have good recruitment is ensuring that we have good
strong leadership, which was the point I was trying to make.
Senator Schmitt. Right. Do you think lobbing a slur their
way is helpful with that?
Mr. Chollet. As I said, Senator, that was certainly not my
intent.
Senator Schmitt. Okay.
In your book ``The Middle Way'' you said that--you noted
that systemic racism has been a problem in this mostly white
and male establishment for a long time, referring to the
foreign policy establishment.
Do you believe that the State Department is systemically
racist?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. Do you believe that the Department of
Defense is systemically racist?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. Do you believe that our armed services are
systemically racist?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely not.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. I want to turn your attention to
another topic. You are familiar with the department's Global
Engagement Center?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of State's Global Engagement--
yes, I am.
Senator Schmitt. Yes, yes, and working with the Election
Integrity Project?
Mr. Chollet. Only vaguely familiar with that, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, it happens to be that in the
Missouri v. Biden lawsuit that I happen to know something about
as Missouri's attorney general the State Department was
specifically part of this in their effort to censor Americans.
Judge Doughty in his order when he issued the injunction
noted that the Election Integrity Project, all 21 of the repeat
spreaders of so-called disinformation were conservative or
right-wing political--had conservative or right-wing political
views and supported President Trump.
Of those 21 included President Trump, Eric Trump, Breitbart
News, and Sean Hannity. I want to ask you, do you think that
the Government should be telling Americans what they can see or
what they can hear or what they can say?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question.
What I can say is I know the work of the Global Engagement
Center at the Department of State is critically important as we
seek to fight disinformation, misinformation, around the world.
I do not know the specifics of this incident. So I would be
happy to take this back and get back to you on a more fulsome
answer.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. So how would you combat--what would
you say is the best way to combat information that you deem to
be not accurate? What would be the way to do that?
Mr. Chollet. Well, first, when it comes to foreign source
misinformation, I mean, exposing a foreign source----
Senator Schmitt. Well, I am--let us say--let us talk about
political viewpoints of Americans because that is really what
this case is about.
What is the best way to do that?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, again, I am not familiar with this
case specifically----
Senator Schmitt. No, I am just asking your opinion. If
you--if there was an American, let us say the President of the
United States or a news outlet or somebody--a resident of the
State of Missouri had a viewpoint that you thought was
inaccurate what is the best way for you as a government actor
to deal with that?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, it is not something I am particularly
qualified to opine on. But I would say that----
Senator Schmitt. Well, you were a senior member of the
State Department when they actively engaged in censorship,
according to the judge.
Mr. Chollet. As I said, Senator, I am not familiar with
this case. I would be happy to take this back and get back to
you on a more fulsome answer.
Senator Schmitt. Do you believe that the government should
collude with big tech companies to censor speech?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. You are aware that that was actually the
finding of the court, right?
Mr. Chollet. As I said, I am not familiar with this case.
Senator Schmitt. Okay.
Well, I am informing you and I will be happy to followup,
but the judge's ruling found that the State Department through
this election integrity initiative was censoring Americans,
threatening legal action if they did not censor Americans,
threatening antitrust investigations if they did not censor
Americans.
I find that this activity that is not talked about a lot up
here is--could be devastating to the fundamental right of free
speech in this country, and the fact that people have the right
to speak their minds even if you do not agree with it, even if
you think it is an accurate, the best way to deal with that is
more information.
So I would encourage as you go back to the State Department
or whoever you talk to that is legit. But working to censor the
government has zero business--zero business--telling Americans
what they can say, what they can hear, what they can think, and
they also cannot outsource that censorship to big tech giants,
which is exactly what happened here, and I am troubled by the
fact that you were center stage in this.
Your comments that we talked about aside, the State
Department was actively working with big tech giants to shut
down American speech. Your testimony here does not give me any
greater comfort as you are seeking a promotion.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Sullivan, please?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our
nominees thank you and thank your families for service. Your
kids are doing well there, Mr. Chollet. So a long hearing.
I appreciated our meeting the other day and let me--let me
ask you directly the question that I ask, what is the number-
one goal for the Department of Defense?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thank you very much and I very much
appreciate the meeting the other day and the conversation we
had on a whole range of issues.
The number-one goal of the Department of Defense is to make
sure that we have a force that is lethal, that is precise, and
that establishes robust deterrence, and we want our
adversaries----
Senator Sullivan. To win--and to win wars if we are--our
troops are called?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. To win wars.
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So here is a big issue, and you saw the
frustration from Senator Schmitt and I am going to talk about
it. I think our civilian leadership at the Pentagon, a lot of
them, particularly your predecessor, pushed an agenda that had
a lot--that in many ways had nothing to do with that. You and I
talked about this yesterday.
Look, it was a very legitimate line of questioning, sadly,
because 3 years ago your predecessor was here in this
confirmation hearing--the under secretary for policy, who in my
view was a political hack--a political hack--and one of his
opening statements said his goal was to, quote, ``stamp out
systemic racism within the ranks of the military.''
I said, wow, that is a pretty damning question to the ranks
of the military. You ever served in the military, Mr.
Secretary--Mr. Professor? No, Senator. Do you have any data
backing that up that we have systemic racism within the ranks
of the military? No, Senator.
So let us just be--I want to get this directly. Do you
think that the U.S. military, one of the most admirable civil
rights organizations in U.S. history, has systemic racism
within the ranks and do we need to stamp that out, as your
predecessor said in his confirmation hearing? Do you agree with
him?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, as we discussed yesterday in your
office, I do not believe that----
Senator Sullivan. Okay. That was an insult to our troops
and the guy went on to be the number-three guy in the Pentagon.
Do you want to apologize, perhaps, for that even though you did
not say it?
Do you understand why that is just insulting to the men and
women who serve in the military? Do you understand? Do you
understand why Senator Schmitt gets upset about this--I get
upset about it? I was really mad at the previous under
secretary.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I fully understand.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think--would you want to apologize
on his behalf?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, it was not my statement to make. I
can just tell you my views.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Well, look, it is good that if you
are confirmed that we have an under secretary that actually
respects the troops, does not disparage them without any data.
Kahl was supposed to come back to me with his data. He never
did. Never had it.
Let me ask another agenda that is being pushed. Do you
believe--the Secretary of the Navy got his climate change
action plan to this Committee 18 months ago, got his
warfighting shipbuilding plan the night of his posture hearing
2 months ago.
What is more important, war fighting and shipbuilding for
the U.S. Navy or their climate action plan?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I would say----
Senator Sullivan. Just answer it directly. It is an easy
question. You should just give me the right answer.
Mr. Chollet. I would say they are both important but what
is the most important is getting you responses in a timely
fashion, which I commit to doing.
Senator Sullivan. Well, no, I am talking about building
ships and warfighting or some, you know, nebulous climate plan
for the U.S. Navy. What is more important for the U.S. Navy?
Come on, Mr. Secretary, this is not a hard question. Just----
Mr. Chollet. We need to have----
Senator Sullivan. I know your minders are watching and
everything. But this is what we need you to do is be strong
when you get the woke part of the military trying to shove all
this stuff down the throats of the Pentagon.
It is warfighting and shipbuilding for the Secretary of the
Navy, is it not? Is not that more of a priority than climate
change?
Mr. Chollet. Warfighting is absolutely critical and having
a capable Navy is absolutely critical. If confirmed, I will do
whatever I can do to make sure----
Senator Sullivan. More important than climate change?
Mr. Chollet. I think climate change is absolutely critical
as well. The National Defense Strategy calls----
Senator Sullivan. So equally important? Come on.
Mr. Chollet. They are both----
Senator Sullivan. This is not hard, right, and this is why
I worry about Biden administration officials who are civilian
nominees coming in. This is an easy question. Of course, it is
war fighting and shipbuilding. Just answer it.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, again, as I said to you in your
office, I think we need to be getting you your--these responses
in a timely fashion. That is the bottom line for me whether it
is about climate change or the Navy or the Air Force or
anything else.
Senator Sullivan. So this answer--this exchange is very
disappointing because part of--the biggest concern that so many
of us have is the civilians at the Pentagon are shoving down a
system of values that do not relate to warfighting, do not
relate to lethality.
Let me give you another question. This President has put
forward a budget 3 years in a row that shrinks the Army,
shrinks the Navy, shrinks the Marine Corps, shrinks the budget.
Each year the President has put forward inflation-adjusted
cuts and next year the Biden budget will take us below 3
percent of GDP for military spending. I looked it up. That will
only be the fourth time in 70 years.
Yet, everybody comes before this Committee and says it is
the most dangerous period since World War II and the President
continually puts forward budgets to cut defense spending. We
will be below 3 percent next year, I think the fifth time in 70
years.
What is your sense on where the budget should be? Do you
agree with the President of the United States that we should be
cutting the budget?
That is where he has put forward his budget and the current
budget shrinks the Army, shrinks the Navy, shrinks the Marine
Corps. Is that the signal we want to send to Xi Jinping and
Putin?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I believe we need to have a robust
defense budget. If confirmed, I am going to work to see the
Defense Department get as much resources as it can.
I, of course, support the administration's budget
submission to you but if confirmed would look forward to
working with Congress to see whatever we can do to get the
warfighter what they need.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple additional
questions, if I may, if there is no one else here--a second
round. This is a really important position and----
Chairman Reed. I would ask, Senator, to just direct your
questions and do so as succinctly as possible.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yesterday I brought to the Senate floor my bill to pay our
military if there is a government shutdown. This bill would
say, hey, even if there is a government shutdown we are going
to pay the men and women of the U.S. military because they are
not going to get a day off even if there is a government
shutdown.
Do you support that bill to pay our----
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I----
Senator Sullivan.--to pay our troops if there is a
government shut down?
Mr. Chollet. I do not know the specifics of that bill. But,
absolutely, we need to ensure that our national security needs
are being taken care of and, hopefully, we can do that by
avoiding a shutdown.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, I agree. I hope we avoid a shutdown,
too.
On Ukraine--you and I talked about this. I have been a
supporter of Ukraine. You said if aid was cutoff it would be
devastating. I have been supporting Ukraine aid.
However, there has been a pattern within this
administration, and a lot of it was--the blame was pinned on
your predecessor--is that almost every weapon systems--it is a
long list--HIMARS, Stingers, Javelins, Patriots, F-16s, tanks--
the administration has said, we are not sure we are going to do
that--there is a self-deterrence.
You know, Under Secretary Kahl would say, well, that might
make Putin mad. And then we, this Committee in particular--
Democrats and Republicans--pressure, pressure, pressure,
pressure, and you finally relent.
Now, that is really hurting the war effort and it
frustrates people. I think it undermines certain members'
support for Ukraine.
If confirmed, can you commit to actually accelerate the
ability to get the Ukrainians weapons systems and not delay it
for nine, 10, 11 months? Get pressure from the Congress and
then finally do it?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for the question.
As we discussed in your office, if confirmed I will move
heaven and earth to get the Ukrainians what they need when they
need it.
We need to think about what they can operate, what they can
maintain, and what would be most effective in the fight.
We need Ukraine to win so I would see it as one of my top
priorities to ensure that we are getting Ukraine what it needs.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just a few more quick
questions and maybe we will just get commitments for you on the
record. I care a lot about the Arctic. America has strategic--
strong strategic interests in the Arctic.
You may have seen in August Chinese and Russians sent a
joint naval patrol of 11 warships off the coast of my State,
Alaska. We are an Arctic nation because of Alaska.
The Pentagon, in my view, has been the last agency in D.C.
to understand the strategic interests of the Arctic. This
Committee has pressed the Pentagon for almost a decade to focus
on it more.
Can you give me your views on the strategic imperative and
interests we have as an Arctic nation in the Arctic?
Mr. Chollet. Absolutely, Senator, and thank you for
focusing so much on this issue. It is an issue that I have
worked on quite a bit in the last year at the Pentagon--or at,
sorry, the State Department and if I am confirmed to go to the
Pentagon I would carry that forward.
My understanding is the Defense Department is working on a
new Arctic strategy which is going to nest under the National
Strategy for the Arctic that was released last year.
Arctic is critically important to us and we have seen
Russia but then, of course, the PRC is doing more and more in
the Arctic and I would urge my colleagues at the Defense
Department, if confirmed, that we are going to do more on that.
Senator Sullivan. If confirmed, can you give us more
information----
Chairman Reed. Senator Sullivan, your second round time has
expired.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. My last question, and this is just
a quick question, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your----
Chairman Reed. Indulgence.
Senator Sullivan.--indulgence. That is the term I was
looking for.
Chairman Reed. Yes. Fine.
Senator Sullivan. The Chinese spy balloon incident--as you
know, a lot of that took place over Alaska. We have gotten
essentially zero information on the aftermath of that. Maybe a
lot of it is classified.
Can you confirm to brief this Committee soon what are the
results of that, what happened, what was it when we shot it
down, shot it down over Alaska? Two of those aircraft shot it
down over the Carolina coast.
Can you confirm to give us a detailed briefing on all of
that? The Pentagon has kind of gone silent and these are really
important issues.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, thanks for raising the question. If
confirmed, I will absolutely dig into that and get you the
information you need.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your indulgence.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan, for
your questions.
And Mr. Chollet and Ms. Abercrombie, thank you for your
testimony.
I have two administrative issues. One is I would like to
submit to the record a letter signed by 35 senior national
security professionals in the past four Republican
administrations on behalf of Mr. Chollet, including among them
is James A. Baker, who was the most outstanding civil servants
we have ever had in this country.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Reed. Now, when I asked you, Mr. Chollet and Ms.
Abercrombie, the standard nominee questions at the beginning of
this hearing I inadvertently included a question asked only of
military nominees.
That question was, quote, ``Do you agree when asked before
this Committee to give your personal views even if your views
differ from the administration?''
This question and your answer do not apply to your
positions and I ask that the record reflect this fact, and
without objection the record will reflect this fact.
Thank you very much. You have both demonstrated your
capability. I look forward to seeing your confirmation and
getting you to lead the Department of Defense.
With that, I would recess the hearing
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to The Honorable Derek H.
Chollet by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties, qualifications, challenges, priorities
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) serves
as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters
regarding the formulation of national security and defense strategy and
policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy, strategy,
plans, execution, and capabilities to achieve national security
objectives. Under the USD(P)'s Title 10 authority, he/she is the
principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense responsible for
development, implementation, and integration of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) and strategic policy guidance for DOD activities across
all geographic regions, military functions, and domains. The USD(P) is
responsible for building, managing, and maintaining U.S. defense
relationships with allies, partners, competitors, and international
organizations. Among other duties, the USD(P) serves as a statutory
member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities
do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense would have
me serve as principal advisor on all matters regarding the formulation
of national security and defense strategy and policy. In addition, I
would expect the Secretary would assign me other duties as appropriate,
such as representing the Department of Defense at the National Security
Council (NSC) Deputies Committee. If confirmed in this role, the
Secretary would expect me to have good working relationships with the
Combatant Commands, Military Services, and other DOD components, as
well as other departments and agencies within the national security
community.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you for this position?
Answer. I currently serve as Counselor of the U.S. State
Department, where at the rank of Under Secretary, I advise the
Secretary of State on a wide range of issues and conduct special
diplomatic assignments as directed by the Secretary. In prior
government service, I have held senior positions in the State
Department, White House, and Department of Defense.
From 2012-2015, I served at the Pentagon as the United States
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security
Affairs, where I managed United States defense policy toward Europe,
the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere and served as a
close advisor to two Secretaries of Defense, Secretary Panetta and
Secretary Hagel. Prior to serving as ASD, I was Senior Director for
Strategic Planning on the NSC staff. From 2009 to 2011, I was the
Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning
Staff. During the Clinton administration, I served on the staff of
Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and as chief speechwriter to United
States Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke.
Outside of government, I have held senior positions at several
leading research institutions, including the German Marshall Fund,
Center for a New American Security, Center for Strategic Studies, the
Brookings Institution, and Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns
Hopkins/SAIS. I have written extensively on U.S. foreign and defense
policy, specifically on Euro-Atlantic relations, Middle East policy,
and the post-cold war landscape.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. The Deputy Under Secretary for Policy is a key partner for
the USD(P). If confirmed, I would ensure the Deputy Under Secretary and
I maintain an open and collaborative working relationship on all
national security and defense policy matters, in order to fulfill our
roles as principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of
Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Regarding specifics, if I am
confirmed, I will examine the roles and responsibilities in
consultation with the Office of General Counsel, to ensure compliance
with the law.
Question. What are the major challenges you would expect to
confront if confirmed as the USD(P)?
Answer. If confirmed, one of the greatest challenges I would
confront is ensuring United States national security and defense policy
is adequately postured to succeed in this era of great power
competition. The United States faces not only the acute threat of
Russia, but also the pacing threat posed by the People's Republic of
China. In addition to these and other regional competitors, threats
from cyber and new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence are
evolving every day. If confirmed, one of the biggest challenges would
be to ensure the Department of Defense can compete and succeed in a
multi-domain threat environment.
Question. If confirmed, what would your policy priorities be, and
what areas of policy do you think have not been adequately emphasized
or addressed by the Department of Defense (DOD)?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my first priorities would be
implementation of the NDS which, in my view, builds upon the strong
foundation of the 2018 NDS. Another major priority, if confirmed, would
be to continue this Administration's work to provide military
assistance in support of Ukraine's self-defense, including working with
our allies and partners to contribute to this effort. Similarly, it's
essential the United States continue its support of Taiwan, in
accordance with United States law. If confirmed, I will work with the
Congress to ensure that the drawdown authority you authorized for
Taiwan's self-defense is utilized to address its requirements. Finally,
if confirmed, I would make sure the Department of Defense is meeting
its obligations to modernize our nuclear triad in order to maintain a
safe, secure, and credible deterrent.
Question. How would you characterize your views regarding the
appropriate posture of stationing of United States Armed Forces
overseas and their use in overseas operations?
Answer. Our overseas military presence is a key component to our
ability to protect and defend the Homeland. The U.S. military presence
abroad contributes to assuring allies and partners of our defense
commitments and shared values, as well as ensures our operational
responsiveness.
civilian control of the military
Question. What is your view of the role of DOD civilian leadership,
as compared to the role of the military, in the formulation of strategy
and contingency planning?
Answer. Civilian control of the military reflects the values of the
American people and is central to our system. The Department is led by
a civilian accountable to the President, an elected official, as
commander-in-chief. The Department relies on the expertise and
experience of our military leaders; but, ultimately, the decisions are
made by civilians who have been confirmed by the Senate.
Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the
military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive
branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays
a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
Answer. Congress has a key role in the civilian control of the
military, beginning with confirming leaders of the Department,
appropriating funds, and conducting oversight. The annual National
Defense Authorization Act, Appropriations Act, and other legislation
fundamentally shape DOD's activities. Additionally, in Congress'
oversight capacity, DOD is engaged daily with Congress and its staff.
Question. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, what specific actions would you take in preparing guidance for
and reviewing contingency plans? If confirmed, what actions would you
take to ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the are fully engaged
in this process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would meet with other senior leaders in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant
Commands to hear their perspectives. I was fortunate to have served in
a DOD Policy role previously--so, I am familiar with the building and
general operations--but, my role would be broader and our national
security concerns have changed. Contingency plans are elemental to
DOD's readiness and as the Secretary's senior policy advisor, I would
speak to him regularly about those plans, if confirmed.
Question. Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 authorized an increase in the number of
personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
``sunsetted'' the reduction of funding mandated in section 346 of the
fiscal year 2016 NDAA. It does not appear that the Department has used
these additional flexibilities to increase the number of civilian
billets in OSD, however.
In your view, would an increase in the number of personnel assigned
to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))
enhance civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.
(OPR: PMO)
Answer. I believe in the fundamental American principle of civilian
control of the military. Any potential for future marks against OUSD(P)
civilian pay would jeopardize the organization's ability to recruit and
retain an experienced and capable workforce that can ensure meaningful
oversight of the military. If confirmed, I intend to undertake a
rigorous analysis of current staffing levels to determine whether the
organization has a sufficiently sized civilian staff for the current--
and increasing--number of national security mission sets OUSD(P) is
responsible for. If necessary, I will seek additional permanent
personnel for OUSD(P) to ensure the organization can successfully carry
out civilian control of the military and conduct the national security
missions it is responsible for.
2022 national defense strategy (nds)
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies defending
the Homeland as the top defense priority.
In your view, is the Department making investments in homeland
defense that are consistent with this being a top priority? What
additional investments do you believe are necessary to protect the
Homeland? (OPR: HDHA, OCR: SPC)
Answer. In my view, the 2022 National Defense Strategy, along with
the embedded Nuclear Posture and Missile Defense Reviews, establishes
an effective strategic policy framework to guide investments that will
enable successful execution of the first and most important mission of
the Department, defending the United States Homeland. If confirmed, I
will continue to support investment in an integrated, layered defense
of the Homeland, and reducing strategic risk through strengthening
deterrence and enhancing resilience, in collaboration with our Allies
and Partners.
Question. In your view, to what extent should the Department
anticipate being called on to support civil authorities in the event of
a war with a peer competitor? What investments and planning do you
believe the Department should be undertaking to prepare for such a
scenario? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. DOD should plan for the possibility that it will be called
on to support civil authorities because incidents may occur during or
as a result of the conflict. For instance, DOD supported civil
authorities in responses to many natural disasters while conducting
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere from 2001 to 2021.
Of course, it is important to recognize that the U.S. Homeland is
also not a sanctuary. In a conflict, we can expect our adversaries to
seriously consider taking actions against the U.S. Homeland to impede
U.S. decisionmaking, interfere with the deployment of U.S. Forces, and
degrade our national will. DOD may be called upon to support civil
authorities in these scenarios. With regard to investments, it is my
understanding that DOD plans, programs, and budgets for national
defense missions. DOD leverages the substantial capabilities and
capacity built for national defense missions to support civil
authorities.
If confirmed, I will review the DOD planning process and DOD plans
to ensure that they account for such possibilities effectively.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the
current strategic environment, including prioritization among the most
critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United
States and its allies? Please explain your answer. (Review: SPC)
Answer. I believe the 2022 NDS accurately lays out the four top
priorities for the Department: defending the Homeland, paced to the
growing multi-domain threat posed by People's Republic of China (PRC);
deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and
partners; deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in
conflict when necessary--prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe; and building a
resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
For the first time, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducted its
strategic reviews, including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022
Missile Defense Review, in a fully integrated way. I understand the
Department developed the NDS through a process that was iterative,
inclusive, and implementable, including regular and wide-ranging
touchpoints with senior leaders across the DOD, interagency, and Allies
and partners.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
you recommend in the NDS? What changes or adjustments, if any, would
you recommend in the Department's implementation of the NDS? (OPR: SPC)
I believe the NDS accurately identifies the key defense challenges
facing the United States and the appropriate ways to respond to these
challenges. I know there is much work under way in line with the NDS to
modernize our military, pursue advanced technologies, prioritize
innovation, and invest in our defense workforce. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure continued progress in all of these areas.
The Department of Defense is required to assess the NDS annually.
If confirmed, I will continue the Department's commitment to thorough
and ongoing assessments and make any adjustments necessary to ensure
the NDS evolves in whatever ways necessary to provide for U.S. defense
requirements.
Question. Do you believe that 3 to 5 percent real budgetary growth
through the FYDP is required to implement the 2022 NDS effectively?
Please explain your answer. (OPR: SPC)
Answer. In general, I believe that a strong defense budget is
essential to our ability to implement the 2022 NDS.
I understand that for fiscal year 2024, the Department has
requested a $26.0 billion budget increase, representing a 3.2 percent
increase over the fiscal year 2023 enacted base level of $816.0 billion
and a 13.4 percent increase from the fiscal year 2022 base level. I
believe these increases address both the urgency of 2022 NDS
implementation and recent inflationary impacts.
United States competitors--especially our pacing challenge, the
PRC--continue to expand their capabilities to challenge the United
States. Deterring aggression by these actors requires investments in
United States innovation, acquisitions, and the DOD workforce. The
budget request the Department has put forward makes these necessary
investments. The fiscal year 2024 budget request for procurement and
research and development totaling $315 billion, for example, is the
largest in the history of the Department and ensures combat-credible
forces across all domains.
While resourcing levels are critical, much depends on how the
Department priorizes investments. Under any resourcing level, the
Department must continue to focus investments in line with the 2022
National Defense Strategy.
Question. Looking forward, what types of resource shortfalls, if
any, are likely to hamper the Department's execution of the 2022 NDS
and other national defense priorities, in your view? How would you
address or mitigate these shortfalls, if confirmed? (Review: SPC)
Answer. In general, I believe that a strong defense budget is
essential to our ability to implement the 2022 NDS. Although resourcing
levels are critical, much also depends on how the Department priorizes
investments. Under any resourcing level, the Department must continue
to focus investments in line with the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
global force posture
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current
U.S. global defense posture, particularly as it relates to stationing
U.S. Military Forces overseas, and where would you look to increase or
decrease U.S. Force posture overseas given current international
security dynamics? (Review: SPC)
Answer. I believe DOD has a strong global posture. If confirmed, I
am committed to continue the Department's efforts to enhance U.S. Force
posture globally, in locations and with Allies and partners that
support our ability to project integrated deterrence, campaign day-to-
day to gain and sustain military advantages, and prevail in conflict,
if necessary.
Building the necessary force posture, including infrastructure,
particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, will require funding,
manpower, and specialized requirements. If confirmed, I am committed to
working with Congress, other Federal departments and agencies, and
Allies and partners, to ensure the Department has the critical
resources we require to enhance and sustain posture, presence, and
readiness around the world.
Question. In your view, what role do forward-stationed forces play
in implementing the NDS and what is the proper balance between forward-
stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces in executing our
defense strategy? (Review: SPC)
DOD relies on a balance of forward-stationed and rotationally
deployed forces to meet our NDS objectives and mission requirements on
a daily basis. In this changing global security environment, the proper
balance among forward-stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge
forces will vary. I would want to work closely with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as he advances global force management
recommendations to the Secretary.
Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are
crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a strategic
power. If confirmed, what U.S. alliances and partnerships would you
consider most critical and what new partnerships would you pursue in
each Combatant Commander's area of responsibility?
Answer. U.S. alliances and partnerships are one of our unparalleled
advantages over our competitors, and this Administration is doing more
than ever to bolster them around the world. If confirmed, I would want
to work with the Department on how to improve our already strong
standing with Allies and partners to reflect the priorities of the
National Defense Strategy.
Question. In your view, in the event of a major conflict with a
strategic competitor such as China or Russia, what component of DOD
would be responsible for real time management of the resulting impacts
and necessary adjustments to global force posture? Is that DOD
component adequately resourced and structured to react at the speed of
relevance? (OPR: SPC)
Answer. In the event of a major conflict with a peer or near-peer
competitor, the Department would use standing processes as well as
emergent senior leader fora to manage the defense approach, resulting
impacts, and necessary adjustments to global force posture at the speed
of relevance. This includes utilization of long-standing global force
management processes, that are well functioning and adequately
resourced.
nuclear capabilities and nuclear posture review (npr)
Question. United States nuclear forces have not been meaningfully
updated since the cold war. Currently, the U.S. is the only nuclear-
armed country in the world without the ability to manufacture a fully
new nuclear weapon. If these issues are not addressed, aging and
attrition will cause the U.S. to lose the capabilities that have
deterred nuclear attacks and major conflict for over 70 years--all
while each of our major nuclear-armed adversaries are expanding and
modernizing their own forces.
What is your understanding of the State of U.S. nuclear forces, its
global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture,
and the supporting weapons sustainment and production capabilities
within the National Nuclear Security Administration? (Review: SPACE)
Answer. As Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks have
testified, nuclear deterrence is a top priority for the Department. I
am confident that our nuclear capabilities remain safe, secure, and
effective today, but as stated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, much
of our nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery systems, and supporting
capabilities have aged without comprehensive refurbishment and require
continued investment to modernize. It is vital that we maintain a
credible nuclear posture backed by a balanced and flexible nuclear
stockpile.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Austin that nuclear
deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that modernizing each
leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear
weapons complex is a critical national security priority? (Review:
SPACE)
Answer. Yes, I agree with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
Hicks that modernization of the nuclear triad, as well as our NC3
architeature and the National Nuclear Security Administration complex,
is critical to U.S. national security and should remain a top priority
for the Department.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and
North Korea have expanded or modernized their nuclear force
capabilities? (Review: SPACE)
Answer. I am concerned by the PRC's nuclear force expansion and
diversification, as well as by Russia's continued emphasis on nuclear
weapons in its strategy and North Korea's continued expansion and
diversification of its nuclear forces. We face a significant challenge
with two nuclear peers. The pace and scale of China's nuclear
development is troubling. The intelligence community estimates that
China's nuclear arsenal may exceed 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and
1,500 by 2035--rough parity with the United States. Russia's
conventional force is suffering significant losses in Ukraine,
potentially making Russia even more reliant on its nuclear arsenal.
I also understand that Russia has largely completed modernization
of its strategic forces and is pursuing new strategic-range nuclear
systems. I am also concerned by Russian assistance to the PRC's nuclear
program, as well as Russia's non-compliance with the New START Treaty.
If confirmed, I will continue to support the modernization of our
nuclear triad and regularly reevaluate what is required to maintain a
credible capability to deter strategic attacks.
Question. The last two Commanders of United States Strategic
Command have concluded that reports of China's nuclear force expansion
should be considered a ``strategic breakout,'' which represents an
unprecedented threat to global stability. Do you agree with this
assessment? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I agree that the PRC's nuclear force expansion and
diversification, as well as the PRC's lack of transparency and its
growing military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, present new
challenges for strategic stability. If confirmed, I will support the
modernization of our nuclear triad and regularly reevaluate what is
required to maintain a credible capability to deter strategic attacks,
assure our Allies and partners, and meet Presidential objectives. I
will also support efforts to engage the PRC on practical measures to
reduce risks.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its Allies? (Review: SPACE)
Answer. I am aware of reports regarding the PRC's nuclear
expansion. Based on my understanding of U.S. nuclear force posture, I
am confident that U.S. nuclear forces remain sufficient to deter and,
if necessary, respond to threats the Nation faces today and will likely
face in the coming years. If confirmed, I look forward to increasing my
understanding of developments regarding the PRC's nuclear expansion and
potential options for the Department of the Defense to consider,
consistent with existing policy and the capacity of the nuclear
enterprise.
The PRC's nuclear force expansion and diversification increase the
PRC's capabilities to threaten the United States and our Allies. A
large and diverse nuclear arsenal could also provide the PRC with new
options to leverage nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, including in
the form of military provocations against our Allies and partners in
the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
modernization of our nuclear triad and regularly reevaluate what is
required to maintain a credible capability to deter strategic attacks,
assure our Allies and partners, and meet Presidential objectives.
Simultaneously I will support ongoing efforts to engage the PRC on the
full range of strategic issues, including nuclear risk reduction and
potential approaches to arms control.
Question. Do you believe our current deterrence policy accounts for
two near peer nuclear competitors like Russia and now China? (OPR:
SPACE)
Answer. I am confident that our our existing deterrence strategy
and nuclear force posture is sufficient to deter and, if necessary,
respond to threats we face today and will likely face in the coming
years. I agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review's finding that we
must carefully assess the implications of China's ongoing nuclear
expansion for U.S. nuclear strategy, forces, arms control approaches,
and planning for regional conflict. If confirmed, I will support
efforts to assess the implications of the PRC's nuclear force expansion
and diversification and will consider whether nuclear policy and other
adjustments are necessary to achieve our deterrence objectives.
Question. Do you support the United States nuclear force structure
changes recommended by the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review? In light of
recent actions by Russia, and China emerging as a second near peer
nuclear competitor, do you believe there should be additional
consideration to revisions in nuclear force structure?
Answer. Yes, I support the NPR recommended force structure changes.
If confirmed, I will support efforts to assess the implications of the
PRC's nuclear force expansion and diversification and will consider
whether nuclear force structure adjustments are necessary to achieve
our deterrence and other objectives for the PRC as well as Russia and
other potential nuclear-armed challengers.
Question. What is your assessment of our regional and extended
deterrent capabilities in Europe and Asia and our Allies views on them?
Answer. Although I cannot speak for our Allies, I am confident that
U.S. strategic nuclear forces, as well as capabilities tailored to
extended deterrence, are sufficient to deter and, if necessary, respond
to threats we face today and will likely face in the coming years. I
agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review's findings that modern,
flexible, and tailorable U.S. nuclear forces are key to assuring Allies
and partners that the United States is committed and capable of
deterring the full range of threats they and we face.
Question. The 2010 NPR called for retaining ``sufficient force
structure in each leg to allow the ability to hedge effectively by
shifting weight from one Triad leg to another if necessary due to
unexpected technological problems or operational vulnerabilities.''
Do you agree with that requirement for our nuclear force structure?
Please explain your answer. (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes, the 2022 NPR calls for modernization of all three legs
of the triad, nuclear command and control, and recapitalization of our
nuclear weapons production complex to ensure its resilience and
responsiveness.
I agree that our nuclear forces and posture should be resilient to
geopolitical, operational, programmatic,and operational risks. The
three legs of the nuclear triad are complementary and offer unique
attributes that are mutually supporting and contribute to risk
mitigation. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we are identifying
opportunities and taking steps to manage risks to our nuclear
deterrent.
The 2010, 2018, and 2022 NPRs concluded that the United States
would maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear forces on
continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on alert, and
maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.
Question. Do you agree with that conclusion? Please explain your
answer. (Review: SPACE)
Answer. I agree that maintaining a portion of U.S. nuclear forces
on day-to-day alert maximizes decision time, preserves the range of
U.S. response options, and contributes to strategic stability. It
enhances deterrence by denying potential adversaries the capability to
destroy our nuclear deterrent forces in a surprise first strike
In response to conditions set forth in the Senate Resolution of
Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama certified on
February 2, 2011, that he intended to ``(a) modernize or replace the
triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-
launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the United States
rocket motor industrial base.''
Question. Do you agree with and support these objectives for
modernizing the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems? Please
explain your answer. (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I agree and support the findings of the 2022 Nuclear
Posture Review calling for full modernization of all three legs of the
nuclear triad and reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons production
complex and supporting industrial base. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure that modernization of the nuclear triad and our nuclear weapons
complex remains a top Department priority.
Question. In your view, is the current program of record sufficient
to support full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery
systems, warheads, while supporting National Nuclear Security
Administration infrastructure? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe the forces in the Program of Record were designed
with significant capacity to respond to a range of potential threats
and challenges, ensuring the credibility of our deterrent into the
future. I also agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review's finding
that we must continue to carefully assess the security environment. If
confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts within the Department of
Defense, in partnership with the Department of Energy, to review these
programs to ensure we are modernizing our forces and supporting
infrastructure in an effective, affordable, sustainable, and timely
manner
Question. Do you support the program of record for replacing the
Minuteman III ICBM system with the Sentinel ICBM system? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I support the finding of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
that we must replace the Minuteman III ICBM with Sentinel to ensure the
continued credibility of the ground leg of our nuclear triad.
The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to replace the
AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).
Question. Do you support the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a
replacement for the aging ALCM? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I support the finding of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
that we must replace the air-launched cruise missile with the Long
Range Stand-off weapon to ensure the continued credibility of the air
leg of our nuclear triad.
Question. If confirmed as USD(P), would you take steps to advocate
for, and ensure the continued development of, the Sentinel ICBM and
Long Range Stand-Off weapons programs? If so, what are those steps?
(OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes. I agree with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary
Hicks that modernization of our nuclear triad is a top DOD priority. If
confirmed, I will advocate within the Department and with interagency
partners, and engage with Congress for the effective and timely
modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad,including
development of the Sentinel ICBM and the Long Range Stand-Off weapon,
as well as nuclear command and control.
Question. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that current
security conditions did not warrant adoption of a nuclear ``No First
Use'' (NFU) policy by the United States. Do you believe a NFU policy
would be appropriate for the United States? Please explain your answer,
including the implications of such a policy for the U.S. extended
deterrence commitments to our Allies. (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I support the findings of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
that adoption of a No First Use declaratory policy would result in an
unacceptable level of risk given the range of non-nuclear capabilities
being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict
strategic-level damage to the United States and its allies and
partners. Some allies and partners are particularly vulnerable to
attacks with non-nuclear means that could produce devastating efforts.
I also support the NPR position that the United States retains the goal
of moving toward a sole purpose declaration and we will work with our
Allies and partners to identify concrete steps that would allow us to
do so.
Question. By statute, the USD(P) is a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council. In your view, what are the most significant issues the Council
should take up in the coming years? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. As one of six principal members of the Nuclear Weapons
Council, if confirmed I will work to ensure that the Department of
Defense, in partnership with the Department of Energy, is working to
realize the planned modernization of the nuclear triad and the National
Nuclear Security Administration production complex while identifying
opportunities to mitigate geopolitical, operational, programmatic, and
technological risks.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to fully participating in
Nuclear Weapons Council matters and personally attending meetings?
(OPR: SPACE)
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to fully supporting active and
constructive Policy leadership as one of the six principal members of
the Nuclear Weapons Council, including personally attending meetings as
appropriate and as my other responsibilities permit.
Question. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and
parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the
maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review's decision to
continue the W93 warhead program and continue parallel efforts to
collaborate with the United Kingdom on its Replacement Warhead program,
the Common Missile Compartment, and the Mark 7 aeroshell.
Question. Based on your understanding of the condition of the
Nation's nuclear command, control and communications system, do you
believe the modernization of the system should be a high priority, and,
if so, what actions would you take to advocate such steps, if
confirmed? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. An effective Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
(NC3) system that can provide command and control of U.S. nuclear
forces at all times, and under all circumstances, is an essential
element of deterrence and crisis stability. If confirmed, I would use
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's chair in DOD governing and
budget processes to advocate for prioritizing the modernization of the
NC3 system, which underpins our nuclear deterrence capabilities.
During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin stated that any
future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should be taken only within
the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreements with
adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Austin's views? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes, I believe that reciprocal, verifiable nuclear arms
control offers the most effective and responsible way to enable future
reductions in nuclear forces. Unilateral steps are not an effective
approach.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or canceling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors? (OPR:
SPACE)
Answer. I support the NPR-recommended modernization of U.S. nuclear
forces and look forward to supporting this effort, if confirmed. Doing
anything less would reduce U.S. leverage with our competitors.
Question. What is your current assessment of the New START Treaty
and the likelihood of any follow-on nuclear arms control treaties with
either Russia or China? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. When fully implemented by both parties, the New START
Treaty can contribute to United States security. However, Russia's
invalid suspension of the Treaty has eroded the effectiveness of the
New START Treaty. Russian and Chinese actions to expand their
respective nuclear arsenals make negotiating any future nuclear arms
control treaties challenging.
Question. In your view, at what threshold condition should future
nuclear arms control regimes be expanded to include China's arsenal, as
well as those of the United States and Russia? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe China's nuclear buildup has already proceeded to
a point where any future arms control regime that includes the United
States must take into account both Russian and Chinese arsenals.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
China on nuclear weapons' reductions? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. No, I would not recommend accepting such asymmetrical
limitations. On nuclear weapons reductions, I agree with the 2022
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) observation that Russian and Chinese
actions to expand their nuclear arsenals make mutual and verifiable
arms control challenging. The United States will need willing partners
operating in good faith to make any meaningful progress. On missile
defense, I agree with the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR), which
states that the Department supports strengthening mutual transparency
and predictability with Russia and the China as appropriate. However,
my understanding is that no missile defense limitations are currently
under discussion. Compliance with negotiated cyber capability
limitations would be unverifiable. The United States has instead sought
to promote cyberspace stability through the recognition that existing
international law applies to cyberspace, the promotion of cyberspace
norms of responsible State behavior during peacetime, and confidence-
building measures.
missile defense
Question. Our current missile defense policy is focused on
deterring North Korea and Iran while reserving our nuclear deterrent
against missile threats from Russia and China.
What are your views on this policy, especially in light or Russia's
recent statements and actions in Ukraine, as well as China's and North
Korea's ongoing expansion of their respective nuclear and missile
forces? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I support the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR), which
continues longstanding policy stating that the United States will
continue to rely on strategic deterrence--not missile defense--to
address and deter large, intercontinental-range, nuclear-capable
missile threats to the Homeland by near-peers. Against the DPRK and
Iran, the MDR states that the United State will continue to stay ahead
of threats to the Homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat
approach, complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition
through nuclear and non-nuclear means.
Question. What role do you believe integrated air and missile
defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating smaller
scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger threats,
such as Russia and China? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I agree with the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR), which
recognizes that adversaries are pursuing and demonstrating advanced,
long-range space and missile systems capable of traversing entire
Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility, and that attacks from these
systems could increasingly blur the line between regional and homeland
defense and challenge existing integrated air and missile defense
(IAMD) architectures. In this respect, I support examining all options
to enhance our IAMD posture against conventional missile threats to the
U.S. Homeland, including limited area defense against smaller scale
missile threats. Regionally, I support the language of the MDR, which
states that the United States will continue to pursue missile defenses
in support of U.S. Forces, our Allies, and partners against all
threats--including hypersonic missile threats--emanating from any
source. Another key tenet of the MDR that I support is its emphasis on
promoting international cooperation with Allies and partners to enhance
collective IAMD efforts.
The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat
missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and
space-based system of systems, with the constituent pieces managed and
sustained by a number of different DOD components.
Question. Do you believe these various systems are appropriately
integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat
picture capable of supporting real-time operational decisions? If so,
please explain your answer. If not, please explain what steps you would
take, if confirmed, to improve global sensor integration. (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand that U.S. missile warning and tracking systems
are highly effective and that greater integration can make them even
more effective. However, offensive missile threats are growing rapidly
and our ability to keep pace is a perpetual challenge which will always
have room for improvement. If confirmed, I will work with the Military
Departments and Services, Defense Agencies, and operational commanders
throughout the Department to ensure that U.S. systems can deliver
critical, integrated and real-time information and data from ground and
space-based sensors in support of U.S. missile defense systems around
the world.
Question. If confirmed as USD(P), what would be your priorities for
U.S. missile defense capabilities for the Homeland? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities for U.S. Homeland defense would
include many of the areas of focus outlined in the 2022 Missile Defense
Review (MDR). If confirmed my top priorities would include: improving
ballistic missile defense of the Homeland, which covers all 50 states,
the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories; examining active and
passive defense options for cruise missile defense of the Homeland;
fielding active and passive defenses for the defense of Guam; and
pursuing ground and space-based sensor integration of existing and
future capabilities.
Question. What are your views about protection of the Homeland from
cruise missile threats? (OCR: HDHA, OPR: SPACE)
Answer. In my view, we are seeing the emergence of a greater, more
diverse, and more sophisticated missile threat to North America,
including advanced, long range cruise and hypersonic missiles able to
target critical infrastructure. The Department must be prepared to
respond to this threat, both to defend the Homeland and to assure our
ability to project military power globally. If confirmed, I will
continue to examine both active and passive measures to decrease the
risk from any cruise missile strike against critical assets, and work
alongside our Canadian allies to improve NORAD's ability to detect
potential threats in the approaches to North America.
Question. Do you support the current plan for modernizing the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GBMD) system, which anticipates the
deployment of a Next Generation Interceptor in about a decade? (OPR:
SPACE)
Answer. Yes. As the backbone of the U.S. Homeland ballistic missile
defense architecture, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
offers a visible measure of protection for the U.S. population and
ensures that we will not be coerced by growing DPRK intercontinental
ballistic missile threats. If confirmed, I will commit to improving the
capability and reliability of the GMD system, including deployment of
the Next Generation Interceptor to complement and potentially replace
our current Ground-Based Interceptors, as part of our comprehensive
missile defeat strategy to stay ahead of DPRK and potentially Iranian
missile threats.
Question. What is your assessment of the importance of a space-
based sensor capability to support both regional and homeland missile
defense scenarios? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand that space systems represent a critical layer
of our integrated sensor network, providing global warning and
communications for our Homeland and regional missile defense systems
positioned around the world. Proliferated space-based sensor
capabilities are resilient and enable persistent attribution,
identification, tracking, and if needed, fire control-quality data
against ballistic and hypersonic missile threats. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department has adequate spaced-based capabilities to support
its regional and homeland missile defense networks.
Question. The most recent Unified Command Plan transferred the
Joint Staff role of missile defense responsibility from Strategic
Command to Space Command. Please explain your views on this change of
oversight. (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I support the 2022 Unified Command Plan (UCP) decision to
transfer missile defense responsibilities from U.S. Strategic Command
to the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM). Bringing different mission
areas of missile warning, missile defense and space domain awareness
under one command will enable USSPACECOM to integrate and fuse all the
sensor data required--detection, characterization, tracking and
dissemination--for effective missile defense.
Question. What component of the OUSD(P) is responsible for Theater
Integrated Air and Missile Defense in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and
in your view, what should be done to improve the protection of deployed
United States and allied forces from growing missile threats in
operational theaters, particularly from advanced cruise and hypersonic
missiles? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand that within the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy there is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(DASD) for Space and Missile Defense that works closely with the
respective regional DASD responsible for Europe and the Indo-Pacific on
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). I also understand that
United States European Command (USEUCOM) and United States Indo-Pacific
Command (USINDOPACOM) are responsible for coordinating IAMD in the
European and the Indo-Pacific theaters, respectively. In Europe, given
the unprovoked and illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, IAMD plays an
especially critical role. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to
work closely with our NATO and our European allies to ensure we have
the right capacity and capabilities needed to address all types of
missile threats and ensure our freedom of movement in theater. In the
Indo-Pacific region, missile threats posed by China and others are
growing and becoming more dangerous. If confirmed, I will actively work
within the Department, as well as with allies and partners to enhance
our regional IAMD efforts against any types of offensive missiles.
Question. What is your assessment of the recent activities
associated with the missile defense of Guam? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. The defense of Guam is critical to United States presence
in the Indo-Pacific region. I fully concur with the language from the
2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR), which acknowledges that the missile
defense architecture on Guam must be commensurate with its unique
status as both part of the Homeland as well as a critical, regionally
based operational hub. If confirmed, I will support efforts to ensure
that our missile defenses on Guam strengthen deterrence while visibly
demonstrating to our Allies and partners that theUnited States stands
ready to fulfill its global security commitments.
space
Question. China and Russia are training and equipping their
military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold
United States and allied space operations and activities at risk, even
as they push for international agreements on the non-weaponization of
space.
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the strategic
environment as it pertains to the domain of space? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Absolutely. The 2022 NDS captures how China and Russia are
integrating space into their military strategies and doctrine as a way
of gaining information advantage. China in particular is integrating
space and counterspace capabilities to enhance its ability to fight and
win a modern military conflict. Specifically, China is leveraging
increasingly sophisticated and proliferated space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control to
improve the precision and accuracy of long-range missile systems, to
seek to limit the Joint Forces' ability to operate in the Western
Pacific.
Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
the 2022 NDS as it relates to the domain of space and the 2022 Defense
Space Strategy? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. In my understanding, the Department is fielding resilient
systems in an assured space posture to preserve Joint Force access to
the space-based services that underwrite combat credibility. I also
understand that the Department is posturing across all domains to
protect and defend the Joint Force from potential adversary threats
emanating from hostile uses of space, including potential adversaries'
ability to integrate space-based intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems with command and control of means to track and
strike our forces.
Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
United States national security space satellites? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe that the accelerating scope and scale of
counterspace capabilities, particularly from China and Russia, is the
most significant threat to United States national security space
satellites, as well as to allied and partner space systems. China and
Russia see counterspace capabilities as a way to gain the information
advantage that is critical in modern warfare and to undercut the
advantages that the United States Joint Force derives from space. Iran
and North Korea have similarly pursued and demonstrated some
counterspace capabilities.
Question. The DOD is increasingly reliant on commercial space
systems which can become enemy combatants in a time of conflict.
What do you perceive as the most significant threats to commercial
space systems owned by United States companies? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Our adversaries have indicated that they do not
discriminate between U.S. Government satellites and commercially owned
satellites that support us. That means Chinese and Russian counterspace
capabilities pose significant risk to these systems.
Question. What are the Department's responsibilities in defense of
U.S commercial assets in space, especially those the DOD is employing
in a time of conflict? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. DOD's responsibilities to protect and defend commercial
capabilities would be a function of the particular circumstances. My
understanding is that the Department can utilize a range of solutions
across all domains and during all phases of the spectrum of conflict to
deter attacks against U.S. national security and space interests and,
when necessary, defeat threats to those systems, including commercial
space capabilities as directed.
Question. Do you believe the Department should offer indemnity to
commercial companies supporting DOD operations? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. The Department relies on commercial services in sectors
across the economy. I believe the Department must understand the risks
it assumes under varying circumstances, just as commercial firms must
understand the risks that they assume under varying circumstances
across sectors. If confirmed, I will work with the Space Force and
other stakeholders to identify the appropriate risk management options
regarding commercial space companies supporting DOD space operations.
Question. Do you have concerns about over-reliance on commercial
systems supporting DOD operations, especially in a time of conflict who
may find it in the companies best commercial interest to cease support
to the Department? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe that reliance on a mix of government and
commercial solutions can diversify
risk. The correct balance and the degree of appropriate
diversification would correspond to the criticality of the mission and
other factors.
Question. If confirmed, would you support the development of
offensive and defensive space control capabilities to counter threats
against such assets? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the development of offensive
and defensive space control capabilities to counter threats to U.S.
national security interests in space and to counter adversaries that
may pose a threat to the men and women of the Joint Force in the case
of a conflict. I would support the development of options across all
domains, including space, to defend our critical space systems and
challenge an adversary's ability to track and strike our forces.
Question. What are your views on the U.S. Space Force? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe the creation of the U.S. Space Force was an
overdue step to strengthen U.S. national security. Space is essential
to the modern way of life and the modern way of war. Space also
connects the Joint Force, and is a central component of integrated
deterrrence. It is critical that we have a cadre of Guardians focused
on the unique challenges of the space domain to assure our space-based
missions, attribute hostile acts, and protect the Joint Force from
space-enabled attacks.
Question. What are your views on U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM)?
(OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe the creation of the U.S. Space Command was an
important step to strengthen U.S. national security. Space is a vital
interest to the United States. From commerce to warfighting, our Nation
depends on space. It is widely recognized as an operational domain, and
there are risks of conflict just as there are in any other domain. It
is important that we have a joint commander with operational
authorities, focused on delivering effects from space, and protecting
and defending our interests in space.
Question. In your view, how could the U.S. Space Force and SPACECOM
exploit commercial and small launch options to allow for more rapid
replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems,
while minimizing risk of mission failure? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command
are prioritizing initiatives that harness the innovative capacity of
the U.S. commercial space industry. Today, one hundred percent of our
payloads rely on commercial launch service providers. I understand that
the Department continues to leverage its large demand for launch
services to incentivize even more responsive options. If confirmed, I
would support such efforts.
Question. Do you believe other services should maintain organic
space capability? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand that with the establishment of the U.S. Space
Force as a separate and distinct Service, many of the DOD space
capabilities were transferred to the Space Force. That does not mean
the other military departments don't have a need for their own organic
space capabilities outside of what the U.S. Space Force can provide. If
confirmed, I would monitor the space enterprise portfolio across the
DOD and determine if additional realignments are necessary.
Question. Do you believe the Department of the Air Force is
adequately funded to handle both the Space Force and the Air Force or
should there be a TOA increase? If so, where should the increase come
from and how should ``pass through'' be handled? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. As part of strengthening U.S. military advantages, it is
critical to fund key space capabilities so that we address growing
threats, especially those that have the ability to deny hostile uses of
space by competitors and potential adversaries whose forces are
increasingly enabled from space. Though I am not currently privy to
budget details, if confirmed, I would ensure OSD Policy exercises its
role in support of overseeing the budget process and the development of
Secretary-level guidance that helps ensure the Military Departments'
appropriate resourcing levels for capability development in space and
other domains.
Question. Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the
availability of sufficient frequency spectrum that is becoming scarce.
If confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments and
Services, the Joint Staff, and other components of DOD to ensure that
the Department's frequency spectrum requirements are accounted for and
protected in interagency discussions about potential spectrum auctions?
(OPR: SPACE)
Answer. The modern electromagnetic environment is increasingly
congested, contested, and constrained. I am aware that the Joint Force
has critical reliance on the key portions of the spectrum that have
been allocated for military use. If confirmed, I would work alongside
DOD's Chief Information Officer to ensure DOD's access to critical
spectrum, including by strengthening our commercial, interagency, and
international partnerships to promote interoperability and spectrum
access policies that support the U.S. military in conducting its full
range of global operations.
Question. The fiscal year 2020 NDAA created a new Military Service
dedicated to the space domain, as well as an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy to serve as the senior civilian official in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense charged with oversight of
military and interagency space policy and operations.
Question. Do you support this current arrangement? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes. Across the U.S. Government, we now have broad
recognition that space is at the heart of integrating our strategic as
well as our conventional capabilities. I believe the creation of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, U.S. Space Force, and
U.S. Space Command were important steps to strengthen U.S. national
security.
electronic warfare
Question. Recent attention has been given Department-wide to the
importance of electronic warfare, given its use in Ukraine and the
importance which China and Russia has placed on it as a tactical
warfighting element.
What are your views on this matter? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand that the Department relies on electronic
warfare and the spectrum to conduct joint all domain operations. Our
adversaries know this and are actively seeking to deny our ability to
maintain freedom of access and maneuver in the electromagnetic
spectrum. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
efforts to ensure the Joint Force is prepared to fight through a
contested and congested electromagnetic spectrum environment,
preserving our use of the spectrum while denying its use to our
adversaries.
cyber policy and authorities
Question. What do you see as the primary cyber policy challenges
for the Department currently, and what suggestion do you have for
addressing them? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. If confirmed, what would your relationship be with:
The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
The Commander of USCYBERCOM is responsible for the planning of
cyberspace missions; serving as the cyberspace operations joint force
provider; and joint force trainer. If confirmed, I look forward to
working closely with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command on all policy
issues affecting USCYBERCOM's ability to achieve national security
objectives.
The DOD Chief Information Officer
The DOD CIO is the principal staff assistant and senior advisor
to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
information technology (IT). If confirmed, I intend to foster a close
relationship with the DOD CIO to strengthen governance of
cybersecurity, communications, and information systems.
The Military Service Principal Cyber Advisors
The role of the Military Service Principal Cyber Advisors (PCA)
is important as they work to address cyber matters to include
readiness, capabilities, budget, and strategy for their respective
Services. If confirmed, I will work closely to engage with the Service
PCAs on developing and implementing policies and strategies to
synchronize these efforts across the Department.
The Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) at DHS
The Department's relationship with the Department of Homeland
Security is imperative to ensuring the cybersecurity of U.S. critical
infrastructure systems. If confirmed, I will prioritize having a
positive relationship with the director of CISA that encourages
expanded coordination and communication between our two Departments. I
will also ensure DOD is postured to support requests for assistance
from the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal civilian
agencies.
The Director for the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
The Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) is a Federal Cyber Center
and the USDP serves as the lead official for Sector Risk Management
Agency of the Defense Industrial Base. In these roles, both share
responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure. If confirmed, I
will ensure that we are fully aligned and doing everything that we can
to protect the Defense Industrial Base from malicious cyber activity.
Given the difficulty in anticipating and defending against cyber
attacks, many suggest that the Department of Defense can only rely on a
policy of cyber deterrence to protect its and the Nation's critical
systems.
Question. Do you believe that deterrence is possible in cyberspace?
In your view, is the current level and tempo of cyber attacks on the
Department and on the Nation tolerable? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. There is no pure cyber deterrence, but it is a key aspect
of integrated deterrence which involves DOD integrating across domains,
theaters of operation, and the spectrum of conflict. Cyber is most
effective when used in concert with other instruments of national
power. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the
Department's current cyber posture and our assessment of cyber threats
to the U.S.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's current capabilities
and policies allow for the maintenance of robust cyber deterrence?
(OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Strong cyber capabilities make integrated deterrence more
potent. It is imperative that all the foundational requirements from
actionable intelligence to expeditious acquisition are in place to
deliver the cyber effects with the best mission impact. The 2023 DOD
Cyber Strategy lays out the Department's approach achieving national
objectives in this domain, if confirmed. I look forward to guiding the
implementation of this strategy.
Question. How can the Department improve its cyber deterrence
posture? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. The 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy highlights the key pillars
needed to ensure the Department can achieve the Nation's objectives in
cyberspace, defending the Homeland being one of those pillars. It is
imperative to work with the interagency, industry, and Allies and
partners to share threat information to improve the collective posture
in defense of our critical infrastructure and networks.
Question. Do you believe that the Department possesses the
necessary authorities to stand up an effective cyber deterrence
posture? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I understand the Department campaigns in and through
cyberspace in support of the objectives established in the National
Defense Strategy and as part of integrated deterrence. I believe that
the Department possesses the necessary authorities to develop offensive
and defensive cyber options to support the Joint Force and defend the
Nation.
The fiscal year 2023 NDAA required the establishment of an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy. The committee
understands that the position is being studied by an FFRDC to make
recommendations as to the structure and functions of that office, and
presumably it will subsume the functions of the DOD Principal Cyber
Advisor.
Question. What are your views on the establishment of this
position? (Review: SPACE)
Answer. I am aware of this statutory requirement and if confirmed,
will work with this Committee to ensure I am implementing this
provision in a manner consistent with our understanding of
congressional intent. I believe civilian oversight of DOD's cyber
authorities are critical. Additionally, I am committed to working with
the selected individual to ensure that the Department has the policies,
capabilities, and forces it needs to protect our Nation's interests and
deter conflict.
Question. If confirmed, what how do you plan to work with the DOD
Principal Cyber Advisor and the Military Service Principal Cyber
Advisors in the coordination of cyber policy and the many cyber
initiatives across the DOD? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. The Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) plays an important role
in providing independent advice to the Secretary of Defense on cyber
policy, programs, plans, and budgeting as well as in managing the
implementation of the DOD Cyber Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to
work closely to engage with the PCAs on developing and implementing
policies and strategies to synchronize these efforts across the
Department.
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2021 established the position of
National Cyber Director (NCD) to improve coordination and integration
across the government in developing cyberspace strategy, policy, plans,
and resource allocation.
What is your understanding of how DOD has been supporting the
National Cyber Director? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. The NCD serves as a principal advisor to the President on
cybersecurity policy and strategy, and cybersecurity engagement with
industry and international stakeholders. DOD has a role in that
process, as it oversees the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity
information sharing and Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification
programs and also partners with DHS/CISA on the new Joint Cyber Defense
Collaborative which partners directly with private sector. I also
understand that DOD supported NCD on the development and implementation
of the National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) ensured the DOD Cyber
Strategy was complementary to the NCS.
Question. Do you have suggestions for how you might improve the
relationship with the NCD if confirmed? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the close partnership
between DOD and NCD continues, especially on matters of mutual interest
in cybersecurity and in our relationships with the private sector. I
look forward to learning more about the ongoing collaboration between
the organizations.
Question. Cyber notifications from the Department for sensitive
cyber military operations, as required by law, have become increasingly
vague and do not provide enough information for the committee to
perform adequate oversight of these operations.
If confirmed, what would you do to improve these cyber operations
notifications? (Review: SPACE)
Answer. Transparency with Congress will be one of my top
priorities, and, if confirmed, I will commit to looking into this
concern and ensuring the Department provides adequate levels of
information in support of congressional oversight.
Question. Are there steps other than improving the written
notifications that you would take, if confirmed, to help Congress
perform oversight of these critical operations? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. In addition to the written notifications, I understand the
Department has a requirement to update congressional defense committees
on military activities and operations in cyberspace. If confirmed, I
will continue to support regular engagement with Congress.
Question. What is your understanding of the process for how the
Department might respond to a request for Defense Support to Civilian
Authorities (DSCA) when it comes to cyber incident? (OPR: HDHA, OCR:
SPACE)
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has a standard
process for responding to any request for DSCA, whether the request is
based on a natural disaster, a cyber incident, or a national security
special event. Consistent with the law and DOD's policies, a Federal
department or agency would request DOD assistance and DOD would review
the request to consider legal, risk, cost, impacts on readiness, and
other factors. If DOD approves the request, DOD would then source the
appropriate forces or resources to provide the DSCA.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR Program is widening its aperture to include
biological weapons and capabilities as well as biological surveillance
and early warning, and encouraging the development of capabilities to
reduce proliferation threats.
Do you support these DOD activities under the CTR program
generally? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes, I strongly support the DOD CTR program conducting
these activities. The Biodefense Posture Review states that biological
threats, whether from natural, accidental, or deliberate sources,
present significant challenges for U.S. national security, while
advancements in biotechnology and delivery system technologies have
decreased barriers for WMD development. The CTR program is uniquely
positioned to work with partner countries to eliminate biological
weapons and weapons-related materials, secure dual-use biological
materials, and build biosurveillance capacity.
Question. Do you believe the shift in focus to biological programs
is an effective use of CTR resources? Why or why not? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes, my understanding is that the CTR program has worked to
reduce biological threats for several years, including by making
contributions to managing the 2014 West Africa Ebola crisis and the
COVID-19 pandemic. Many partner countries relied on capacities built by
the CTR program for their domestic response to COVID-19, highlighting
the effectiveness of biodefense investments. If confirmed, I will work
to prioritize the CTR program's activities according to the evolving
security environment to make effective use of resources.
pandemic response
Question. Drawing on DOD efforts during the Ebola outbreak in West
Africa in 2014-2015 and the recent COVID-19 outbreak around the world,
what attributes do you believe the Department of Defense can bring to
bear to fight a global pandemic here and abroad? Please be specific.
(OPR: SPACE)
Answer. DOD is ready to support the whole-of-government response to
a global pandemic. Per the Biodefense Posture Review, DOD is developing
pathogen-agnostic capabilities to support the response to regional or
international bioincidents. In addition, DOD is working with allies and
partners to help them develop similar capabilities, aiding in their
direct ability to prevent pandemics or mitigate the effects of
bioincidents. For instance, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
works with partners to build capacity to safely and securely detect and
diagnose diseases caused by high-threat pathogens and to improve
accurate and timely reporting of such diseases. DOD also plays an
important role in supporting other U.S. departments and agencies in
their primary responsibilities for responding to pandemics, for example
the Department of Health and Human Services. Those other departments
must be adequately resourced so that DOD can prioritize biodefense
efforts that advance 2022 National Defense Strategy objectives.
Question. In May 2020, DOD partnered with the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) on Operation Warp Speed, which developed and
delivered two safe and effective COVID vaccines by December 2020.
How would you assess the effectiveness of Operation Warp Speed as a
pandemic response model? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. ``Operation Warp Speed,'' I understand, was established in
May 2020. The Food and Drug Administration approved the first COVID-19
vaccines in August 2021 and not long thereafter made them readily
available in the United States and to other nations. Given that a
typical vaccine can take 5-10 years to develop and approve, my
impression is that ``Warp Speed'' was effective.
Question. Do you believe that this DOD-HHS partnership should be
restored to expedite the development of pancoronavirus vaccines, as
well as countermeasures for other pandemic-potential pathogens? (OPR:
HDHA)
Answer. In general, DOD supporting other Federal departments and
agencies in such partnerships, when necessary and appropriate, can be
very effective. However, if confirmed, I would want to examine any
existing mechanisms to determine if there are any opportunities to
improve on them or if there are any mitigating considerations before
launching any new partnerships.
u.s. indo-pacific command (indopacom)
China
Question. The 2022 NDS describes the People's Republic of China
(PRC) as ``the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S.
national security'' and states ``The PRC seeks to undermine U.S.
alliances and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific region, and
leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and
the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and military
footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interest.''
Is the current posture of United States Forces in the Indo-Pacific
region sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your answer.
(Review: SPC)
Answer. DOD clearly has made strides in modernizing its Indo-
Pacific posture in support of the NDS. This includes expanding the
scale and scope of U.S. military operations, exercises, and
activities--many with our Allies and partners--to reinforce security
and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen deterrence.
Through expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites in the
Philippines, a new Marine Littoral Regiment in Japan, and a range of
force posture enhancements with Australia, among other initiatives
throughout Southeast Asia and the broader region, the Department is
reinforcing a resilient security architecture in the Indo-Pacific
region to maintain regional stability and deter conflict. These
capabilities will help us to strengthen integrated deterrence today and
build the force we need for the future.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make that would implement the NDS and improve the military
balance in the Indo-Pacific? (OPR: SPC, OCR: IPSA)
Answer. If confirmed, I would value consultations across Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and USINDOPACOM to assess
priority initiatives for resourcing and advancement in the region. As
Policy plays a critical role in the Department's PPBE process, I will
work with my counterparts to ensure that the Department's budget
submissions are aligned to strategy and make investments that advance
our priorities in the Indo-Pacific. This should include capabilities,
concept development, exercising, force rotations, infrastructure, and
other key areas for investment that strengthen integrated deterrence.
Question. In your view, what are the key areas in which each
Military Service must improve in order to provide the necessary
capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in a potential
conflict with China? (OPR: SPC, OCR: IPSA)
Answer. As the PRC races to modernize its military, I believe the
Department will continue to require the resources to implement the 2022
National Defense Strategy and keep our Nation safe while delivering a
combat credible Joint Force that is the most lethal, resilient, agile,
and responsive in the world.
If confirmed, I will work with Military Departments to ensure that
the Department's budget submissions links strategy to resources and
continue to execute the National Defense Strategy. As Policy plays a
critical role in the Department's PPBE process, I will work with my
counterparts to ensure that the Department's budget submissions make
investments that advance our priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.
In my view, to sustain our military advantage over China, the
Department will need to continue making investments in integrated air
and missile defense, air and maritime dominance, and in munitions,
including hypersonics. The Department will also need to invest in
advanced capabilities, new operational concepts, and more resilient
force posture in the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, investments in
resiliency are needed to ensure stability in the industrial base's
ability to produce what the Joint Force needs.
Question. Should the United States revisit or change its ``one
China'' policy, in your view? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. Our One China policy has preserved peace and stability
across the Taiwan Strait for more than four decades. The United States
defense relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA), the Three Communiques, and the Six Assurances--and backed by
strong, bipartisan support that has formed the bedrock of peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait. As the TRA makes clear: it is our
longstanding policy to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or
the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I
will seek to fulfill our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
Question. In your view, how should United States joint concepts of
operations, force posture, and investments adapt to address China's
military modernization? (Review: SPC with IPSA)
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the Department is
developing the right concepts, capabilities and investments to address
the PRC as DOD's pacing challenge. Over the past year, the Department
has delivered major achievements with Allies and partners to make
United States Force posture across the Indo-Pacific region more mobile,
distributed, resilient, and lethal.
In Japan, Australia, Guam, and the Compact States, it is essential
that the United States maintains its approach of forward-stationing and
deploying modernized and more capable forces, alongside major
infrastructure investments in airfields, logistics, domain awareness,
and resilience.
Across Southeast Asia, I understand that DOD is engaged in
rotational deployments, exercises, logistics cooperation, and targeted
security assistance to strengthen our partnerships, deepen
interoperability, and enhance collective readiness. I would seek to
continue this progress if confirmed.
Through campaigning, DOD demonstrates new capabilities with allies
and partners, while developing the concepts and experimentation
required to be successful in a high-intensity warfighting scenarios.
Question. What should the United States do, both unilaterally, and
in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing
challenge posed by China in the South China and East China Seas?
(Review: IPSA)
Answer. The United States seeks a free and open Indo-Pacific region
in which all nations are secure in their sovereignty and free from
coercion. It is the PRC that has conducted increasingly provocative
actions and dangerous operational behaviors across the Indo-Pacific
region, including in the South China Sea. DOD will continue to expand
the scale and scope of activities to reinforce security and stability
with our regional allies and partners in support of our common vision.
Question. What is your current assessment of the risk of a critical
logistics failure in any conflict with China? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to discuss
this matter further in a classified setting. Conflict in the Indo-
Pacific region is neither imminent nor inevitable, because deterrence
today remains real and strong. My view is that the Department of
Defense is doing more than ever to maintain and strengthen deterrence
across the region, and the significant investments proposed in
President Biden's fiscal year 2024 budget underscore that commitment--
particularly the budget's proposed 40 percent increase in funding for
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).
Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
presence overseas, including its base in Djibouti and other
infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean? (OPR: IPSA, OCR: SPC)
Answer. I remain particularly concerned with the PRC's attempts to
gain permanent military access in Africa, as well as the Indian Ocean
region. A global PLA military logistic network has implications for our
United States Allies and parnters. All governments should closely
examine any agreements or arrangements with China to ensure the PRC
will not be allowed to undermine sovereignty and regional stability. If
confirmed, I will continue the Department's efforts to strengthen
alliances and partnerships rooted in a shared respect for transparency,
accountability, sovereignty, and the rule of law.
Question. What non-military activities and resources do you believe
are necessary to effectively address the challenge posed by China? Do
you believe these current activities are sufficient? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. I support the Biden-Harris Administration's approach, which
draws upon a whole-of-government strategy to bring together diplomatic,
military, and economic tools to maintain stability, strengthen
deterrence, and protect the national security interests of the American
people. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
active role as part of this approach, because, as Secretary Austin said
in May, ``[t]o compete and succeed, we must use all the tools of
American power.''
Question. The ability of U.S. ground forces to hold at risk
adversary ships and aircraft; intercept missiles aimed at our ships,
airfields, ports and other fixed facilities; and provide electronic
warfare and communications support for our air and naval forces could
enable the United States to present adversaries with our own ``anti-
access/area denial'' (A2/AD) challenge.
What should be the role of ground forces in creating an A2/AD
challenge for adversaries within the First Island Chain in the Indo-
Pacific? What specifically should be the role of the Army? (OPR: SPC,
OCR: IPSA)
Answer. Rotational and forward-stationed ground forces are a key
aspect of integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. Land-based
long and medium range precision fires enhance the joint force's combat
credibility because the PLA can preclude some of our more traditional
platforms from operating inside the first island chain. We thus need
additional options to present our own A2/AD challenge, and dispersed
and resilient land-based fires are a key part of this. U.S. Army and
Marine ground forces also play an essential role in training,
assisting, and reassuring allies and partners across the conflict
continuum. Last, the United States Army supports the joint force
through theater logistics and command and control, both of which the
PLA will persistently contest in a conflict.
Question. Do you believe the current ground force posture in
INDOPACOM is adequate? If not, what would you recommend to bolster it?
(OPR: SPC, OCR: IPSA)
Answer. I commend the Department for its progress in enhancing our
ground force posture in the Indo-Pacific region. Our ground force
posture in the Indo-Pacific region is key to providing long range fires
capability and logistics support to the Joint Force. On a day-to-day
basis, ground forces play an important role in campaigning to preserve
regional stability by strengthening deterrence and enhancing
partnerships, including by conducting comprehensive exercises with
allies and partners. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to
refine exercises in the region to ensure operational relevance for the
United States and our allies and partners and assess resourcing
requirements as the Department enhances its Indo-Pacific posture.
Question. Do you support the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
(DPRI), including the realignment of some United States Marines from
Okinawa to Guam and the buildup of facilities at other locations? (OPR:
SPC, OCR: IPSA)
Answer. I support the continued implementation of the realignment
plan known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which is the
bilaterally determined way forward. The realignment of Marine Corps
forces on Okinawa and the main islands of Japan, including the
establishment of a strong presence on the United States territory of
Guam, is fundamental to the Department's effort to achieve an improved
Indo-Pacific defense posture, contributing to a free and open Indo-
Pacific region. If confirmed, I will remain regularly engaged with
United States Indo-Pacific Command, the Military Departments and
Services, and the Department of State to proactively adapt United
States access and joint presence to the realities of strategic
competition, and to ensure our posture is optimized for deterrence of
adversary aggression, ally and partner assurance, and warfighting, if
necessary.
Question. The number of nuclear weapons currently possessed by
China relative to the United States and Russia is often cited as an
impediment to comprehensive nuclear arms control talks.
What are the strategic implications of the rapid modernization of
Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to at least double by 2030, and
what approach should the United States take to address those
implications, in your view? (OPR: SPACE, OCR: IPSA)
Answer. The PRC's nuclear force expansion and diversification
increases the PRC's capabilities to threaten the United States and our
allies and partners. A large and diverse nuclear arsenal could also
provide the PRC with new options to leverage nuclear weapons for
coercive purposes, including in the form of military provocations
against our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. For the
first time, the United States will face two major nuclear powers as
strategic competitors and potential adversaries, which will create new
challenges for strategic stability, deterrence, assurance, arms
control, and risk reduction. If confirmed, I will support efforts to
assess the implications of the PRC's nuclear force expansion and
diversification and will consider whether nuclear force and other
adjustments are necessary.
Question. What do you think could motivate China to participate in
nuclear arms control negotiations in a genuine and meaningful way?
(OPR: SPACE, OCR: IPSA)
Answer. I agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review's (NPR)
observation that the scope and pace of the PRC's nuclear expansion, as
well as its lack of transparency and growing military assertiveness,
raise questions regarding its intentions, nuclear strategy and
doctrine, and perceptions of strategic stability. I believe we must
continue to convey a consistent message to the PRC that it will be more
secure in a world where it engages in and complies with meaningful
efforts to reduce strategic risks.
Question. In your view, with the rapid development in both quantity
and quality of Chinese nuclear capabilities, does U.S. nuclear posture
and nuclear doctrine need to change from its current construct based on
a single near-peer nuclear strategic competitor to a new framework
based on two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review's finding that
we must carefully assess the implications of China's ongoing nuclear
expansion for United States nuclear strategy, forces, arms control
approaches, and planning for regional conflict. If confirmed, I will
support efforts to assess the implications of the PRC's nuclear force
expansion and diversification and will consider whether nuclear posture
and other adjustments are necessary.
Question. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both
increase, do you assess that the United States has adequate military
and national security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese
leadership to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic
escalation? (OPR: IPSA, OCR: SPACE)
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
emphasis on the importance of open lines of military-to-military
communication between the United States and the PRC to ensure that
competition does not inadvertently veer into conflict. While the PLA
has remained largely unwilling to engage in substantive dialog with the
Department recently, my commitment to maintaining open lines of
communication would continue if I am confirmed.
Taiwan
Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship
between China and Taiwan, and how can the United States help prevent
miscalculation on either side? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. We have seen the PRC increasingly turn to the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) as an instrument for coercion in support of its
global ambitions, including, but not limited to, conducting more
dangerous actions in and around the Taiwan Strait.
Consistent with longstanding policy, the Administration is focused
on preventing military conflict against Taiwan using a whole of
government approach and does not support unilateral changes to the
status quo across the Strait. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's continued efforts to ensure that cross-Strait deterrence
remains real and strong.
Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
Taiwan Strait? What do you believe should be the priorities for United
States military assistance to Taiwan? Do you think Taiwan is making
appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities and if not, what
changes would you recommend? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. We have seen a growing number of states in the region and
throughout the international community reiterate the importance of
peace and stability in and around the Taiwan Strait.
Multiple Administrations and Congresses with leaders from both
parties have sustained the Taiwan Relations Act with strong bipartisan
support for providing Taiwan with self-defense capabilities and
maintaining our own capacity to resist any use of force that
jeopardizes the security of the people of Taiwan.
I know that the Administration is encouraged by Taiwan's commitment
and welcomes Taiwan's continued investment in defense and resilience.
If confirmed, I will support the Department's role in ensuring that the
United States Government continues to fulfill its longstanding
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
Question. Some have argued that the United States should explicitly
State that we would respond militarily to any Chinese use of force
against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your view, what
would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. Our longstanding policy has preserved peace and stability
across the Taiwan Strait for more than four decades. Furthermore, the
United States defense relationship with Taiwan is guided by the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), the Three Communiques, and the Six Assurances--and
backed by strong, bipartisan support that has formed the bedrock of
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. As the TRA makes clear: it is
our longstanding policy to maintain the capacity to resist any resort
to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security
or the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan. If
confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's role in ensuring
that the United States Government continues to fulfull its longstanding
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.
Japan
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with Japan? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. The United States-Japan relationship is stronger than ever.
In addition to Japan's historic participation in the Camp David Summit
earlier this year, the United States and Japan made historic
announcements over the past year to optimize Alliance posture;
modernize our roles, missions, and capabilities; and expand
multilateral partnerships.
Prime Minister Kishida's visit to Washington, DC. in January
followed the release of consequential strategic documents which which
announced Japan's intention to increase defense spending to 2 percent
of Japan's Gross Domestic Product over the next 5 years. If confirmed,
I will seek to build on this Alliance and enhance our shared security
interests.
Question. In late 2022, Japan signaled a significant change in its
defense posture with the release of a new National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.
In your view, how can the United States best support Japan's
defense transformation in line with its strategic documents? (Review:
IPSA)
Answer. I understand that Japan is seeking to substantially
increase its defense budget and acquire new capabilities, like
counterstrike, that will strengthen regional deterrence and bolster
Japan's self defense missions. Bilateral exercises, strengthening our
coordination mechanisms as an Alliance, and working collaboratively
with Japan to address future challenges are key to our security
relationship.
Question. Do you believe we should consider modifications to United
States military organizational and command and control relationships to
better align with the Permanent Joint Headquarters of the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. The Department supports Japan's decision to establish a
permanent Japan Self-Defense Forces joint headquarters. We do not have
plans to change our combatant command structure or authorities at this
time, but we will explore more effective command and control
reslationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness.
Republic of Korea
Question. How would you describe the value to United States
national security interests of the United States Republic of Korea
alliance? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. The United States and the ROK are making historic progress
in expanding multilateral defense cooperation with partners in the
Indo-Pacific region. The partnership is essential to not just deterring
and responding to the DPRK, but also furthering United States interests
in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. I know that the
Department has worked to integrate United States and ROK maritime
security cooperation programs with allies and partners in the region,
expand participation in multilateral exercises, assist allies and
partners with equipment diversification, and encourage defense
industrial cooperation.
Question. Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational
control from the United States to the Republic of Korea should be
conditions-based? If so, and if confirmed, what conditions would you
recommend that the Secretary of Defense delineate as the threshold for
transfer of control? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. The United States, and just as importantly, the ROK
continue to believe that the transfer of wartime operational control
should be conditions-based. We are making steady progress toward this
goal, which will strengthen our combined defensive posture on the
Korean Peninsula. That said, we cannot rush our efforts. As we continue
to acquire the bilaterally approved levels of capabilities to achieve
our stated goals and conditions, I would, if confirmed, recommend to
the Secretary that a stable security environment remains the threshold
for transfer of control.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to improve United States and allied defenses against North Korea's
missile capabilities, including through trilateral cooperation between
the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. The Administration made historic progress during the most
recent Camp David Summit. The United States and the ROK are enhancing
trilateral cooperation with Japan to more effectively deter the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear and missile
threats and to strengthen peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
and in the Indo-Pacific region. DOD held trilateral meetings at various
levels, most recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue with Secretary Austin
and his counterparts and at the Defense Trilateral Talks at the
Assistant Secretary-level last April to advance core trilateral
security cooperation objectives.
Australia
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with Australia? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. I believe the United States-Australia relationship is
stronger than it has ever been. I know that the Department is
broadening Force Posture Initiatives to new domains, locations,
deepening cooperation to secure our technological edge, and expanding
opportunities to enable trilateral defense ties with other regional
partners, including with Japan.
At the AUSMIN 2023 meeting this past summer, the United States and
Australia announced key advances related to force posture including new
operating locations, designating space cooperation as a Force Posture
Initiative; pre-positioning of United States Army stores and materiel
in Bandiana through the Combined Logistics, Sustainment and Maintenance
Enterprise; and enhanced regional maritime domain awareness through
rotations of United States Navy maritime patrol and reconnaissance
aircraft in Australia. They also agreed to deepen cooperation on
Australia's guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise by
collaborating on a production capability in Australia with an initial
focus on co-production of guided multiple launch rocket systems by
2025. Additionally, the trilateral AUKUS partnership is a generational
opportunity to strengthen regional deterrence by strengthening our
capabilities, as well as those of two of our closest Allies, Australia
and the UK.
In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
announced the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS)
partnership with the objective of helping Australia to acquire a fleet
of nuclear-propelled submarines and increasing collaboration on a range
of advanced technology initiatives.
Question. What are your views of the AUKUS partnership? (Review:
SPC)
Answer. AUKUS is a generational opportunity to strengthen regional
deterrence while increasing our combined advanced capabilities and
strengthening our partnerships. Congress is also a critical partner in
implementing this effort. AUKUS will support Australia's acquision of a
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine, expand trilateral
cooperation on advanced technologies, enhance global posture, and help
ensure our defense industrial bases have closer integration.
Question. In your view, are there improvements, clarifications, or
enhancements that need to be made to effectively implement the AUKUS
partnership as intended? (Review: SPC)
Answer. AUKUS is a historic opportunity for our national security,
and we know that making AUKUS work will require the Department and
Congress to to continue to work together closely. Part of this work
involves reexamining our approach to information and technology
sharing. We have reached a point in the global security environment and
technology landscape where there is not only a benefit, but an
imperative, to expand our defense technology-sharing practices. In
pursuit of this objective, the Administration has requested
Congress'oral support in enabling export licensing exemptions for
AUKUS, streamlining defense trade with two of our most trusted allies,
and raising our collective standards to protect the critical
technologies that provide U.S. Forces with warfighting advantages. We
appreciate the efforts of Congress to advance these efforts and to
realize the full potential of the AUKUS partnership.
The Philippines
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with the Philippines? (Review: IPSA)
Answer. The United States-Phillipine military-to-military
relationship, underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, is
stronger than ever. Our two countries announced in February that we
would designate four new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
sites, and President Marcos formally announced the locations in April
ahead of his meeting with President Biden. In May, we also released our
new Bilateral Defense Guidelines. The United States and the Philippines
have committed to move quickly in advancing necessary plans and
investments for the new EDCA sites, as well as United States support
for the Philippines' military modernization.
Question. In your view, are there opportunities to improve our
military-to-military cooperation with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, particularly as it relates to issues in the South China
Sea? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. The Phillipines is a treaty Ally and we have a long history
of mutual defense cooperation. If confirmed, I would continue to
prioritize military-to-military cooperation with the Philippines on
issues including maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian
assistance, defense institution building, and increasing the size and
complexity of bilateral and multilateral exercises to advance our
shared goal of a upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region,
including in response to destabilizing PRC actions in the South China
Sea.
India
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with India? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. As President Biden has said, the United States-India
relationship is the ``defining relationship'' of the 21st century, and
our defense cooperation with India has emerged as a critical pillar for
both countries. We are at a transformative moment in our defense
cooperation with India, in part because of the great strides both
countries have taken to enable our militaries to operate and coordinate
more closely across the military services and in multiple warfighting
domains. If confirmed, I would continue to bolster the Major Defense
Partnership with India by expanding our technology cooperation to
support India's military modernization and the areas of operational
collaboration between our militaries.
Question. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ``Quad'' between
the United States, Japan, India, and Australia is designed to uphold
the international rules-based order, ensure freedom of navigation,
promote democratic values, improve information sharing, and enhance
technological collaboration.
What are your views on the Quad and, in your view, how can it be
more effectively utilized as a multilateral platform for addressing
challenges in the Indo-Pacific region? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. The Quad plays an increasingly central role in promoting
peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific among like-minded
partners. The Quad has been most effective when it has worked closely
with its Indo-Pacific partners and guided by regional countries'
priorities and by responding to regional countries' needs. Over the
past several years, the Quad has emerged as an important forum for
mobilizing a collective commitment by its members to address shared
challenges, including those in the maritime domain.
united states european command (eucom)
Russia
Question. What do you believe are the greatest challenges for
United States-Russia security relations? How would you describe the
central objectives of United States security strategy regarding Russia?
(OPR: ISA)
Answer. The greatest challenge for United States-Russia security
relations is Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. Until Russia ceases
its brutal invasion, no meaningful progress on United States-Russia
bilateral relations is possible.
If confirmed, I would work to ensure a sovereign, democratic
Ukraine and to prevent the widening of the conflict outside of Ukraine,
while also maintaining Allied unity in response to Russian aggression.
Question. How do EUCOM and NATO activities fit into a ``whole of
government'' approach to deterring Russian aggression? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. As part of a whole-of-government approach, DOD's actions
contribute to a range of interagency initiatives to compete with
Russia, deter and, if necessary, defend against Russian aggression
toward NATO . Through bilateral security assistance to Ukraine,
military exercises, and deployments in theater, the United States and
its NATO Allies are able to collectively push back against Russia's war
in Ukraine and deter futhur Russian aggression.
Question. What do you see as the role of forward-deployed United
States Forces in Europe in deterring Russian aggression against our
NATO allies and partners? (Review: ISA)
Answer. The United States, along with our NATO allies, have an
important role to play to deter further Russian aggression. The
forward-deployed forces the United States has in Europe show our
resolve to defend our Allies, and have allowed us to swiftly reinforce
NATO's flanks following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. United States
Military exercises in theater also demonstrate the United States'
combat credibility, which further enhances United States deterrence
messaging.
Question. What is your view of Russia-China relations? (Review:
ISA)
Answer. Russia-China cooperation is concerning on many levels. They
collaborate in the economic, diplomatic, and military/security arenas
in a so-called ``no limits'' partnership. Although they have differing
national interests in the region and different motivations for their
actions, they share an authoritarian view that undermines global
security and the rules-based system from which we've all benefited.
Though Russia and China are not truly ``allied'' through security
guarantees, they are aligned in wanting to share a world consistent
with their authoritarian model-gaining leverage over other nations'
economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.
Question. In your assessment, does DOD currently have a mature
joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD
capabilities? If not, what changes should be implemented? (OPR: SPC,
OCR: ISA)
Answer. In my assessment, DOD has the necessary concepts,
capabilities, and capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD
capabilities. If confirmed, I would work across DOD and in close
cooperation with the Intelligence Community to continue to assess
changes in the Russian threat resulting from the war in Ukraine, and
ensure DOD makes adjustments as necessary to maintain its warfighting
advantage and achieve the Nation's strategic objectives.
Question. In your view, what are the key elements of an effective
strategy to counter Russian hybrid warfare? (OPR: SPC, OCR: ISA)
Answer. Russian authorities have demonstrated a capacity and
willingness to use irregular means of disinformation, deception, and
covert operations to accomplish its foreign policy goals as part of
Russia's broader competition. In accordance with the National Defense
Strategy, I know that DOD is working alongside allies and partners to
deter, defend, and build resilience against acute forms of ``gray
zone'' coercion.
Traditional military tools may not always be the best options to
counter competitors' coercive measures in the ``gray zone.'' In some
cases, intelligence sharing, economic measures, diplomatic initiatives,
partner-enabled national resilience operations, and activities in the
information domain may prove more effective or may be required
alongside the more traditional military activities. I believe the
Department should work with its partners in other United States
Departments and Agencies to provide an integrated response to the
challenges posed by Russia's irregular warfare.
arms control agreements with russia
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of arms
control in the United States security strategy regarding Russia?
(Review: ISA)
Answer. The appropriate role of arms control in the United States'
security strategy regarding Russia is to prevent the escalation of
military conflicts, reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use
of nuclear weapons, and maintain strategic stability between the two
nations. Arms control agreements can foster transparency and
predictability in the bilateral relationship, helping to avoid
misperceptions and miscalculations.
Question. The Department of Defense and the Department of State
must work collaboratively with our NATO Allies to develop approaches
for arms control and confidence-and security-building measures in
Europe. We must be cautious not to impose any constraints that would
hinder NATO's ability to strengthen its deterrence and defense
capabilities. It is imperative that we maintain a balance in our
objectives.
What are your views on the military significance of Russian
tactical nuclear forces not covered by the New START Treaty and whether
arms control measures can adequately address them? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I support effective efforts to address the disparity
between the non-strategic nuclear wepons stockpiles of the United
States and Russia. Formal, verifiable arms control could provide an
effective means of addressing this disparity but we need a willing
negotiating partner to make meaningful progress.
Question. Do you support mutually agreed reductions in tactical
nuclear weapons? Do you believe such reductions can be equitably
achieved given the significant quantitative disparity in the number of
Russian and U.S. weapons? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. Yes, provided any such agreement addresses the current
disparity, is verifiable, and makes the United States and it allies
more secure.
Question. Do you believe bilateral reductions serve United States
security interests considering the trajectory of China's nuclear force
expansion? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. I believe any future U.S. reductions to its nuclear forces,
bilateral or otherwise, must account for the PRC's nuclear expansion as
well as Russia's entire nuclear arsenal.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or
China on nuclear weapons reductions? (OPR: SPACE)
Answer. No, I would not recommend accepting such limitations. On
nuclear weapons reductions, I agree with the 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) observation that Russian and PRC actions to expand their
nuclear arsenals make mutual and verifiable arms control challenging.
The United States will need willing partners operating in good faith to
make any meaningful progress. On missile defense, I agree with the 2022
Missile Defense Review (MDR), which states that the Department supports
strengthening mutual transparency and predictability with Russia and
the PRC as appropriate. However, my understanding is that no missile
defense limitations are currently under discussion. Compliance with
negotiated cyber capability limitations would be unverifiable. The
United States has instead sought to promote cyberspace stability
through the recognition that existing international law applies to
cyberspace, the promotion of cyberspace norms of responsible State
behavior during peacetime, and confidence-building measures.
north atlantic treaty organization (nato)
Question. In your assessment, does the NATO Alliance continue to
benefit the national security interests of the United States? (Review:
ISA)
Answer. Yes. NATO reflects our shared values with our transatlantic
partners and is instrumental to the safety of our Nation.
Question. How important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S.
commitment to its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty? (OPR:
ISA)
Answer. The U.S. commitment to mutual defense under Article 5 of
NATO's founding treaty is essential to our strategic interests. The
commitment of all Allies to collective self-defense is the core of
NATO's strength, which has ensured Euro-Atlantic security for almost 75
years.
Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance in the coming years and what do you perceive are the
greatest challenges? (Review: ISA)
Answer. I believe the most essential strategic objective of NATO is
maintaining allied unity and ensuring collective self-defense. The
greatest challenge the Alliance will continue to face is maintaining
both Alliance unity and a ready force in light of the acute threat
posed by Russia and their continued aggression.
Question. What is your assessment of the current levels of Allied
contributions to burden sharing and should our Allies do more to meet
their commitments on defense spending and procurement? (Review: ISA)
Answer. NATO Allies have increased defense spending for nine
consecutive years. After this year, European Allies and Canada will
have invested more than $450 billion above previous levelin their
defense since 2014. In addition, many allies and partners are providing
an extraordinary amount of capability to Ukraine. Some Allies--such as
Latvia and Estonia--have committed assistance equating to more than 1
percent of their GDP as compared to .18 percent for the United States--
which ranks us 14th globally using this metric. Allies and partners can
also provide unique capabilities that the United States might not have
in inventory, including Leopard tanks, various infantry fighting
vehicles, 152mm and 122mm ammunition, and certain types of multiple
launch rocket systems. And factoring in humanitarian support, including
taking in more than 8 million refugees, it is clear our European and
Canadian allies and partners have indeed stepped up to support Ukraine.
If confirmed, I look forward to leveraging Secretary Austin's Ukraine
Defense Contact Group to drive support from around the world.
Question. If confirmed how will you encourage NATO Allies to
maintain a positive trajectory on defense spending? (Review: ISA)
Answer. NATO Allies have increased defense spending for nine
consecutive years. NATO's most recent defense spending estimates show a
real increase of 8.3 percent in 2023, the largest yearly increase in
decades. After 2023, European Allies and Canada will have invested more
than $450 billion above previous levels in their defense since the 2014
defense investment pledge. If confirmed, I will continue to press our
allies to build on this momentum.
Question. NATO has taken a number of steps to adapt to the current
security environment in Europe and globally, including issuing a new
strategic concept, developing regional defense plans for the Atlantic
and European Arctic; the Baltic region and central Europe; and the
Mediterranean and Black Sea, and building a force with higher readiness
to support these regional plans. (OPR: ISA)
Answer. I am encouraged by the steps we have taken in NATO to
respond to the changed security environment and fully support the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe in his work to enable the regional
plans.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use for defining
and measuring the success of these NATO efforts in enhancing credible
deterrence? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. NATO's new Strategic Concept is an important document that
prepares the Alliance to act in a new security environment. The
recently approved Family of Defense Plans and the NATO Force Model
enhance NATO readiness and provide for a more credible Allied
deterrence. If confirmed, I will work closely with our NATO Allies to
ensure these efforts are robust and effective.
Question. What is your assessment of the role that the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has played in increasing combat capability
in Europe and enhancing deterrence of Russian aggression? What role
would you foresee for EDI going forward? Please explain your answer.
(OPR: ISA)
Answer. The foresight of the congressionally supported EDI-
associated investments in Europe since 2015 along the five lines of
effort of : 1) Increased Presence; 2) Exercises and Training; 3)
Enhanced Prepositioning; 4) Improved Infrastructure; and 5) Building
Partnership Capacity was borne out in the robust United States response
to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These
investments enabled DOD to reinforce NATO members' security more
quickly and with more combat power than any other Ally, deterring
Russian aggression against NATO.
I understand that since EDI transitioned from the former Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to the base budget in fiscal year
2022, it no longer provides funding from a separate account. However,
DOD has given guidance to the Military Departments on how to identify
EDI-associated investments along the original five lines of effort in
their base budgets going forward. This assists the Department in
articulating tangible commitments of funding to the Russia deterrence
mission.
Question. NATO's nuclear policy states, ``The fundamental purpose
of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion,
and deter aggression. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance. NATO's goal is a safer world for all; the
Alliance seeks to create the security environment for a world without
nuclear weapons.'' This point was most recently reaffirmed within the
alliance's 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit.''
In you view, should NATO remain a nuclear alliance as long as
nuclear weapons exist? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Yes. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should remain a
nuclear alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear
capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter
aggression.
Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for
deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries? (OPR: ISA, OCR:
Space)
Answer. Yes. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture relies on United
States nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe, as well as United
States strategic forces. The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO
countries for the last 60 years has successfully deterred aggression
against the Alliance, and this cooperation continues to provide an
essential political and military link between Europe and North America.
In my view, United States nuclear weapons should remain in NATO
countries for as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat.
Question. Do you believe the existing United States nuclear force
posture should be reexamined given Russia's ongoing efforts to redeploy
tactical nuclear weapons into Belarus? (OPR: ISA, OCR: Space)
I am not aware of any reason to raise our alert levels or adjust
the U.S. nuclear posture, and, based on what I know, I am comfortable
with the United States' strategic defensive posture at the moment.
Ukraine
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Ukraine
security relationship? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. I believe the United States-Ukraine security relationship
has never been stronger. The United States has clearly demonstrated we
stand with Ukraine, as the Ukrainian people fight for freedom,
democracy, and independence. Throughout the war, the United States has
worked closely with the Ukrainian government to ensure Ukraine's most
urgent needs are met, including on the battlefield. In addition to
enabling Ukraine to defend itself from Russia's brutal invasion, United
States security assistance has shown Ukraine, Allies, partners, and
adversaries that the United States is a reliable partner and force for
political and economic stability globally.
Question. Do you support continued United States security
assistance to Ukraine? Are there specific capabilities that in your
view should be prioritized through the provision of U.S. security
assistance? (Review: ISA)
Answer. I am strongly supportive of continued United States
security assistance to Ukraine. The capabilities the United States is
providing have enabled Ukraine to push back on Russia's brutal war.
United States assistance is critical to enable Ukraine's continued
fight for freedom, to sustain Ally and partner support, and to send a
clear message to Russia and China that using force to seize territory
is a losing strategy.
I expect long-range fires to continue being a high-priority
requirement in the future, particularly as Ukraine's counteroffensive
continues. This includes critical capabilities, such as GMLRS and 155mm
artillery ammunition. As winter approaches, I also see air defense
systems as particularly important to defend Ukrainian citizens and
critical infrastructure from Russia's barbaric air campaigns. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Ukrainian counterparts at multiple
levels to understand their ongoing capability requirements.
Question. In your view, how does the provision of assistance to
Ukraine contribute to a broader United States security strategy in
Europe? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. United States security assistance to Ukraine directly
supports United States strategic aims in Europe and across the globe.
The United States is committed to, and benefits from, a peaceful,
stable Europe. Russia's brutal war in Ukraine threatens this stability
and undermines core United States values, including freedom, democracy,
and independence. Supporting the Ukrainian people as they defend
themselves and their country is not only morally right but it also
highlights to Allies and partners the United States is a reliable
partner. This support further demonstrates to adversaries around the
globe that using force to seize territory will not lead to success.
Question. Senior Ukrainian leaders have requested assistance to
enhance their deep-strike capabilities. What is your view on the
provision of deeper strike capabilities like the United States Army
Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) or the British Storm Shadow? (OPR:
ISA)
Answer. There is no doubt that deep strike, or the capability to
strike military targets beyond the forward line of troops, within
territorial Ukraine, is an important capability for the Ukrainian Armed
Forces.
However, it is important to remain realistic about the ability of
any one capability to change the outcome of the war. Deep strike
capabilities should be considered as part of the whole effort to
modernize and equip Ukraine's air and ground forces.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend DOD take in
the near term to help Ukraine to ensure the counteroffensive is
successful? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. First, it's my understanding that the Department is already
using its existing channels with Ukraine to help aid their operations
on the ground well. We are in constant and close communication with
Ukrainian military and civilian leaders to understand their battlefield
requirements. The Ukrainians know how to fight, but the Russians are
learning as well, and going forward, it will be an iterative process to
help ensure the Ukrainian military has all the faculties and
capabilities it needs to defeat Russian aggression in their country.
Concretely, I know we are working on solutions to bolster Ukraine's air
defense and ensure a steady ammunition supply, which will undoubtedly
improve their progress on the ground.
United States and NATO Force Posture in Southeastern Europe and the
Black Sea
Question. In your view, is the security and stability of the
Southeastern European region and the Black Sea in the United States
national security interest? (Review: ISA)
Answer. Absolutely. This region is home to some of our closest
Allies, and the more we improve the security situation in the Black Sea
region, the more we can increase stability and economic prosperity. If
confirmed, I'll ensure that the Department emphasizes security for the
Black Sea region--in full support of the interagency strategy submitted
in June--and strengthen security to help our Allies and partners
counter aggression from Russia and malign influence from the PRC.
Furthermore, we also recognize that we can't do this alone and that we
must approach security in the region in tandem with our partners. Since
the region lies at the crossroads of competing challenges and threats,
improving security in the Black Sea region is an important investment
in long term global stability.
Question. NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately 650
United States servicemembers. Do you believe the United States should
maintain its commitment to KFOR?
Answer. Yes. The United States commitment to KFOR demonstrates our
resolve to ensuring safety and stability in the Southeast Europe. Our
deployment facilitates the mission's success. KFOR's presence also
serves to deter malicious actors who would attempt to undermine
sovereignty and stability in the Western Balkans. The United States
relies in large part on Allied and partner contributions to KFOR, which
total more than 3,700 military personnel--up to 86 percent of the total
force.
Question. NATO has maintained an ``enhanced'' forward presence in
the eastern part of the Alliance, while deploying a more limited
``tailored'' forward presence in the southeastern region and the Black
Sea.
Do you support efforts to boost NATO's forward presence in the
southeast and Black Sea region? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Yes, I support NATO's efforts to boost presence in
southeast Europe and the Black Sea region, including the four
battlegroups in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia that Allies
approved after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These efforts are welcome
and consistent with United States strategic priorities for the region.
u.s. central command (centcom)
Question. To what extent does achieving United States national
security interests in the Middle East require a continuous United
States military presence there, in your view? In your opinion, is the
current United States Force presence in the Middle East appropriately
sized? Please explain your answer. (OPR: ISA, OCR: SPC)
Answer. In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, the
Department continues to right-size its forward military presence in the
Middle East to address major security challenges in effective and
sustainable ways. At present, over 30,000 personnel are deployed to the
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, along with critical
capabilities. The Department stands ready to flow additional forces to
the region, if necessary. The Department also integrates with allies
and partners to enhance interoperability on a daily basis, sustaining
cooperative relationships that have developed over decades.
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with United States regional and European partners to counter threats
emanating from and affecting the CENTCOM AOR? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The United States relies on its capable and resilient
partners to maintain regional stability and provide a secure
environment. Our decades-long relationships in the region focus on
advancing interoperability with partner militaries and expanding
coalitions to address shared concerns. For example, the International
Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) counters repeated Iranian attacks on
commercial shipping in the region. Jordan's recent decision to join the
IMSC demonstrates the important role our partners play in contributing
to regional security. We will continue to encourage additional
participation in security initiatives and opportunities to improve
interoperability and cooperation.
Question. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power
competition? How should DOD consider countering Russia and China in the
Middle East, in your view? Do you believe there are other elements of
national power and policy tools might be useful? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Middle East is a key theater for strategic competition.
China has demonstrated its intent to bolster its standing in the Middle
East and Russia continues to destabilize the region through its
military activities in Syria and its cooperation with Iran.
China has no intention of improving regional security. Its renewed
engagement with Iran, its use of commercial exploitation for financial
gain, and its efforts to buildup its military infrastructure in the
region are concerning. In Syria, Russia prevents the United Nations and
aid organizations from delivering critical humanitarian aid to those in
need and interferes with the efforts of the United States and coalition
partners to defeat ISIS. Russia's continued purchase of Iranian
military equipment for use in Ukraine presents a threat to security in
Europe and challenges the rules-based international order.
The United States retains many advantages, including our economic
power, democratic values, military might, and global alliances. By
supporting regional partners and affirming shared interests in common
threats, the United States can maintain its position as the partner of
choice in the Middle East. The United States can approach both
competition and cooperation from a position of strength by capitalizing
on these advantages. The United States also must pursue sustained
diplomacy to advance our interests and de-escalate regional tensions.
Afghanistan and Pakistan
Question. In your view, what are the current United States
strategic interests in Afghanistan? (OPR: OSCA)
Answer. The United States' vital national security interest in
Afghanistan is to ensure it cannot be used as a safe haven from which
terrorist groups can launch attacks against the United States or our
interests and allies abroad. Working with allies and partners to avoid
humanitarian crisis and/or economic collapse in Afghanistan is also
strategically important for broader regional stability. The United
States has further enduring interests in continuing our ongoing work to
resettle our Afghan partners and in advocating for the rights of Afghan
women and girls, in line with United States values.
Question. Is the United States adequately postured to conduct
effective over the horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan?
Please explain your answer. (OPR: SOLIC, OCR: OSCA)
Answer. A primary responsibility of the Department of Defense (DOD)
is defending our citizens from terrorist threats that could emanate
from around the globe, including Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will
review the DOD posture and ensure we maintain an operational
architecture with the capability to detect threats in Afghanistan and
conduct counterterrorism operations to disrupt potential threats.
I will also work with our COCOMs to advise the Secretary in
innovating and modernizing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to address any identified gaps.
Question. How would you assess the strategic relationship between
the United States and Pakistan? Do you view that relationship as having
changed as a result of the transition of forces from Afghanistan in
August 2021? If so, how? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. Pakistan is an important, yet challenging partner. If
confirmed, I will work with Pakistan defense leaders to build a
constructive defense relationship based on shared security objectives,
such as countering the threats from groups such as the Islamic State--
Khorasan (ISIS-K) and promoting regional stability. These objectives
are enduring and the withdrawal of United States Forces from
Afghanistan did not change the strategic rationale for our relationship
with Pakistan.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of the
bilaterial defense relationship? (OPR: IPSA)
Answer. The United States has enduring security objectives in
Pakistan, and if confirmed, my objective would be to preserve the
defense relationship based on cooperation in areas of mutual interest.
These areas could include working with Pakistan to defeat terrorist
threats posed by al Qaeda and the Islamic State--Khorasan, promote
peace and security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, enhance
Pakistan's capacity to respond to disasters and provide humanitarian
relief, and develop the next generation of Pakistan's military leaders.
Syria and Iraq
Question. What is your understanding of current United States
strategy and objectives in Syria? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The United States military mission in Syria is to ensure
the enduring defeat of ISIS. The broader objectives of United States
Government policy are to expand humanitarian access, maintain existing
cease-fires, pursue accountability measures, and ensure that ISIS
cannot resurge. The Administration continues to support a political
process led by the Syrian people, as laid out in United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2254.
Question. From a DOD standpoint, what must be done to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS, in your view? What non-military efforts are
necessary to sustain the enduring defeat of ISIS? (OPR: SOLIC, OCR:
ISA)
Answer. To ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, the United States
must maintain pressure on the remaining ISIS elements in Iraq and Syria
by advising, assisting, and enabling local vetted partner forces. The
United States, in conjunction with international and local partners,
must also seek secure and humane methods of detaining former ISIS
fighters in northeast Syria and displaced persons living in camps,
while encouraging the international community to repatriate these
individuals to their communities of origin. Stabilization and
rebuilding communities--particularly in Syria--will also require
significant non-military investment and intervention.
Partnerships are also foundationally important for the enduring
defeat of ISIS. Our leadership of the 86-member Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS is a core component of ensuring that lasting defeat.
Collectively, we and our partners have proven successful at generating
the will and capabilities--ranging from military to a broad array of
non-military capabilities--required for the defeat of ISIS. Maintaining
the Coalition's cohesion in our efforts against the ISIS global network
is essential for our success.
Question. If Assad's forces focus their attacks on United States
Forces in the region, how would you recommend that the U.S. respond?
(OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Department of Defense's mission in Syria is to enable
the enduring defeat of ISIS. United States Forces always maintain the
right to self-defense.
Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
and if confirmed, what conditions would you factor into your
recommendation to the President on future troop levels in Syria? (OPR:
ISA, OCR: SOLIC)
Answer. The Department of Defense's mission in Syria is to enable
the enduring defeat of ISIS. If confirmed, I will evaluate our strategy
and conditions for progress in Syria.
Question. In your view, do United States troops in Syria help
counter Russian influence in the Middle East? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Department of Defense's mission in Syria is to enable
the enduring defeat of ISIS. With the confluence of numerous actors in
the region, it is important that all militaries conduct themselves in a
professional manner and that we de-conflict our movements to ensure our
forces are protected.
Question. In your view, do United States troops in Syria help
counter Iranian influence in the Middle East? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Department of Defense's mission in Syria is to enable
the enduring defeat of ISIS. We encourage all actors to conduct
themselves in a professional manner, and the United States will not
hesitate to respond in self-defense to any threat.
Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
strategy and objectives in Iraq? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Department of Defense's mission in Syria is to enable
the enduring defeat of ISIS. We encourage all actors to conduct
themselves in a professional manner, and the United States will not
hesitate to respond in self-defense to any threat.
Question. What steps would you recommend for continuing to
normalize security assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the
coming years? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Normalizing our support to the Iraqi security forces
requires close partnership between DOD and the State Department. An
important factor will be Iraq's continued commitment to building on the
progress made on the operational and institutional capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces. Although the Iraqi security forces have
demonstrated tremendous progress, there is still more work to be done
together.
Question. What steps do you recommend to counter Iranian-backed
attacks on United States Forces in Syria and Iraq? (OPR: ISA)----
Answer. Normalizing our support to the Iraqi security forces
requires close partnership between DOD and the State Department. An
important factor will be Iraq's continued commitment to building on the
progress made on the operational and institutional capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces. Although the Iraqi security forces have
demonstrated tremendous progress, there is still more work to be done
together.
Iran
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran? (Review: ISA)
Answer. Iran continues to pose a serious conventional and
unconventional threat to U.S. personnel and regional partners. Iran's
continued support for violent, non-State actors, threats to the free
flow of commerce, and nuclear advances destabilize the region and
threaten U.S. and partner interests. The advances in Iran's nuclear
program shorten the timeline for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon,
should Iranian leadership decide to pursue one. Meanwhile, Tehran
continues to make progress developing its missile and UAV programs,
increasing the threat to United States personnel and facilities in the
region and partners and allies in the Middle East. The Administration
is also concerned about Iran's growing support for Russia's war in
Ukraine.
Question. Are United States military forces and capabilities
currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if
necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Department of Defense continually assesses the security
environment and reviews its military posture based on the threat and
global demand for forces. The United States has demonstrated that it
will not hesitate to respond in self-defense and that it can surge
forces to the Middle East in response to an increased Iranian threat,
as we are currently doing in the maritime domain.
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the U.S.
security strategy with respect to Iran? What is the role of the U.S.
military in this strategy? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The United States seeks to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and
to deter aggressive Iranian behavior throughout the region. The
Department of Defense seeks to achieve these goals and address Iranian
malign activity through posture, planning, and partnerships. The
Department regularly updates plans to address Iranian provocations and
is integrating the capabilities of partners to more effectively counter
Iran's destabilizing activities.
Question. How do you view military cooperation between Iran and
Russia? In your opinion, has this partnership affected Middle Eastern
regional security? Please explain your answer. (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Deepening Iranian-Russian defense cooperation is harmful to
Ukraine, Iran's neighbors, and the international community. Iran is
gaining important insights from the performance of its UAVs on the
Ukrainian battlefield, whichwill drive improvements in their
development and manufacturing of these systems. This will result in the
proliferation of better, more capable UAVs throughout the Middle East.
As Russia's top military backer, Iran is fueling Russia's war and
enabling Russia to strike Kyiv and terrorize the Ukrainian population
with Iranian UAVs. In return, Russia has been offering Iran
unprecedented defense cooperation, including on missiles, electronics,
and air defense.
Question. Are there any circumstances under which you would
recommend taking military action against Iran in response to its
support for attacks on United States personnel in the region, or in
response to its threats against former U.S. officials and American
citizens based in the United States? Please explain. (OPR: ISA)
Answer. A role of the Department of Defense is to is to provide
options for the President. The Department regularly updates plans to
address a wide variety of contingencies. If confirmed, I will seek to
provide principled and direct advice to the Secretary of Defense should
the President require miliary options.
Yemen
Question. What are the United States national security interests in
Yemen? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The primary United States national security interest in
Yemen remains ensuring that groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and ISIS-Yemen can no longer maintain a safe haven from which
to conduct attacks against the United States Homeland. Additionally,
Iran's malign activities in Yemen continue to contribute to instability
in the region by threatening the territory of our Gulf partners
(including Saudi Arabia) and freedom of navigation. It is in the United
States interest to increase pressure on all parties in Yemen to reach a
permanent cessation of hostilities. A political solution is the only
long-term solution to the crisis.
Question. What are the implications of the Biden Administration's
decision to cease offensive support operations to the Saudi-led
coalition? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Administration's decision to end offensive support to
the war in Yemen helped bring about conditions for the best opportunity
for peace since the conflict began. At the same time, the Department
has maintained its commitment to Saudi Arabia by providing air defense
support, intelligence-sharing, and other support to the Kingdom to
defend its territory, people, and the 70,000 United States citizens who
reside there. Since the policy decision on the conflict, our Saudi
partners have constructively supported the United States and UN-led
efforts with offers for comprehensive cease-fires and proposals to
negotiate an end to the war. The environment created by the April 2022
UN-mediated truce presents the best opportunity Yemen has had for peace
in several years. Since the formal truce expired in October 2022, all
sides continue to refrain from cross-border strikes, and the Republic
of Yemen Government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continue uphold
their commitments to the truce to despite its expiration.
Egypt
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Egypt and the U.S.-Egypt security relationship? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Egypt faces a number of security challenges, including
ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), the ongoing conflict in Libya, regional
tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and border
security threats. Despite the challenges, the United States considers
Egypt an essential partner for maintaining regional security and
stability. U.S.-Egypt security cooperation focuses on counterterrorism
and border security. Egypt also provides crucial assistance in anti-
trafficking and regional security operations, which advance both United
States and Egyptian security.
Question. What role does the Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO) play in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty? Should the United
States maintain its military deployment to the MFO? What would be the
risks of reducing this commitment? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) has served to
provide reassurance to both Israel and Egypt by ensuring both parties
adhere to the security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Treaty of
Peace. For over 40 years, the MFO's presence and organization have
provided Egypt and Israel a trusted mechanism to resolve disputes,
avoid conflict, and foster dialog on shared security concerns in the
Sinai Peninsula.
U.S. contributions to this mission encourage other countries'
participation and bolster U.S. credibility as a leader in diplomatic
and security initiatives globally. Any changes to the level of United
States support to the MFO would need to take into consideration
potential impacts on the MFO's mission, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty,
United States obligations under applicable international agreements,
regional stability, and would include extensive interagency and partner
consultation.
Reducing United States commitment to this vital peacekeeping
mission would risk destabilizing Israel-Egypt relations at a time in
which the Abraham Accords and Negev Forum have improved prospects for
Arab-Israeli ties.
Question. In your view, should the United States continue to
provide defense articles and services purchased by the Egyptian
military using United States Foreign Military Financing funds? (OPR:
ISA)
Answer. United States Foreign Military Financing (FMF) plays an
important role in strengthening the strategic partnership with Egypt
and supporting Egypt's legitimate defense needs. Any changes to the
United States FMF program with Egypt would require a coordinated
interagency review to ensure that United States national security
interests are protected. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing all
of our bilateral defense relationships.
Question. What is your assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood? In
your view, to what extent has the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology
influenced other Islamist groups across the region, including U.S.-
designated terrorist organizations? Please be specific. (OPR: ISA)
Answer. At this time, I understand that the Administration has not
determined that Muslim Brotherhood meets the criteria for a foreign
terrorist organization (FTO). In January 2021, the State Department
designated Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM) as an FTO. HASM is a violent
group that has carried out assassinations and other attacks that have
killed dozens of Egyptian civilians, and its leaders were previously
associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. If confirmed, I would
remain committed to working with the State Department to take
appropriate action against foreign groups engaged in terrorist
activity.
Question. What is your assessment of Egypt's deepening ties with
Russia? Where do United States and Russian interests converge in Egypt?
Where do they diverge? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Egypt is actively diversifying and deepening its military
cooperation with other foreign partners, including Russia. Egypt's
influence in the region and strategic location, including its control
of the Suez Canal, make Egypt a key leader in maintaining regional
stability.
Egypt's deepening ties with Russia have been demonstrated in recent
years through key leader engagements, military drills, joint
infrastructure projects, and Egypt's pursuit of Russian military
equipment, such as Su-35 fighter aircraft. The United States has an
interest in an Egypt that is politically inclusive and economically
secure with a professional military force that can protect its land and
maritime borders and counter terrorism in the Sinai, and that respects
civilian control of the military and human rights. Russia does not
share those interests.
united states africa command (africom)
Question. In your view, what should be the role of AFRICOM in NDS
implementation? (OPR: SPC, OCR: ISA)
Answer. The NDS indicates that the Department will prioritize VEO
threats against the United States Homeland and vital United States
national security interests, working by, with, and through our African
partners. It also states that the Department will support interagency
efforts to disrupt malign PRC and Russian activities on the continent.
USAFRICOM plays a critical role implementing the NDS--including through
executing Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security
cooperation on the African continent, island nations, and surrounding
waters.
Question. What is your assessment of the availability and
predictability of forces and capabilities to support the AFRICOM
Theater Campaign Plan and crisis response? (OPR: SPC, OCR: ISA)
Answer. The Department of Defense's priority is aligning mission
requirements with the President's strategic priorities, and evaluating
the military posture and other tools required to meet those
requirements. This is the approach taken in the United States Africa
Command area of responsibility (AOR), and every AOR. If confirmed, I
would work closely with the Joint Staff and USAFRICOM to assess the
adequacy of DOD's Joint Force approach to meet day-to-day and crisis
response requirements in theater.
Question. What is your assessment of current U.S. counterterrorism
strategies in AFRICOM? (OPR: SOLIC, OCR: ISA)
Answer. The National Defense Strategy underscored that DOD seeks a
counterterrorism approach in Africa that is sustainable, in light of
many competing interests, and calls on us to prioritize disrupting
violent extremist organization (VEO) threats against the United States
Homeland and vital national security interests by working ``by, with,
and through'' our African partners. I believe this is the right
approach--given the current strategic environment--to apply pressure on
Africa-based VEOs, supported by good governance and economic activities
to address the root causes of instability. This will create the most
sustainable, enduring framework for managing the terrorist threat
moving forward. However, the President does and should retain the
ability to take unilateral action to swiftly disrupt any imminent
threats that may arise against the U.S. Homeland or vital U.S.
interests.
Question. What do you assess to be the strategic objectives of
Russia and China in Africa? (Review: ISA)
Answer. I believe Russia and the PRC are offering African nations
short-term economic investment, destabilizing private military
companies, and security agreements to present themselves as
alternatives to western partners, without regard for long-term security
of African nations.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the current
United States strategy to compete against Russia and China to be the
security partner of choice in Africa? What metrics do you believe
should be used to assess progress in this regard? (Review: ISA, IPSA)
Answer. Russia and the PRC are offering African nations economic
investment, diplomatic engagement, and security alternatives to western
providers. If confirmed, I would seek to position the United States to
be a superior and responsible alternative. To do this, the United
States needs to develop cost competitive alternatives, demonstrate our
commitment to the continent, and communicate an affirmative message
about United States-African partnership. U.S. diplomacy is based on
partnership and respect for each other's interests.
Somalia
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
in Somalia? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. As I understand it, we are seeing the largest offensive in
5 years of Somali security forces partnering with local communities to
combat violence and extortion by al-Shabaab. This is a pivotal moment
in Somalia, and we want to ensure that our partners can capitalize on
this momentum. We have, however, also seen an uptick in al-Shabaab
activity recently. I believe this is a part of a larger effort to stoke
fear in the Somali people as the Somali National Army reestablishes
control of key Somali towns. It is ultimately for Somalia's leaders to
determine the structure of their Federal governing system, to secure
their own country, and to meet the needs of Somalia's people.
Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
strategy and objectives in Somalia? (OPR: ISA, OCR: SOLIC)
Answer. The reestablished United States presence and support from
our partners and allies and multilateral efforts have signaled a
continued commitment to our Somali partners and provides them with the
tools they need to degrade al-Shabaab in support of President Hassan
Sheikh's larger campaign to bring stability to Somalia. I believe that
the United States has a vested interest in ensuring that the partners
we have spent years training and advising to go after al-Shabaab can
seamlessly integrate into the broader Somali force structure. I
understand that we are actively working with other international
partners across many sectors of the Somali Government to ensure we are
working collectively and transparently to advance shared goals.
Libya
Question. What is your assessment of current United States national
security interests in Libya? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. I believe theUnited States seeks a unified, democratically
elected government in Libya and the removal of all foreign fighters
that prohibit Libya from moving forward to a path of democratic order
as elected by the citizens.
Question. What is your assessment of external actors operating in
Libya and where their objectives align and conflict with those of the
United States? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Some external actors appear to be working toward a unified
military and democratically elected and unified government. In this
respect their activities align with U.S. objectives. Other actors,
notably the Wagner Group, are in Libya for their own advancement and
profit, which does not align with U.S. objectives.
West Africa and the Sahel
Question. What is your assessment of current security situation in
West Africa and the Sahel and its impact on United States security
interests? (OPR: ISA)
Answer. Although USAFRICOM's first CT priority is to counter Al
Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. obtaining indicators and warnings of
Violent Extremist Organization activity in the Sahel and Lake Chad
Basin, and disrupting the efforts of these VEOs to further expand their
activities is a significant priority,. Countries where United States
efforts had been successful have been compromised by the trend in
democratic backsliding in the region, as illustrated most recently in
Niger and Gabon. This situation has been exacerbated by malign Russian
influence and has impacted DOD's cooperation with some African
partners, creating opportunities for our global competitors to exploit.
As we move forward, it will be critical to balance our imperative to
bolster our allies and partners by maintaining pressure on VEO networks
and countering Russian and PRC influence with the sometimes conflicting
requirement to bolster our allies and partners' democratic values.
Question. What is your assessment of the role and objectives of
external actors in the region, particularly Russia, or Russian back
proxies like the Wagner Group and China? (Review: ISA)
Answer. I believe Russia, the PRC, and groups like Wagner are
offering African nations economic investment, diplomatic
acknowledgment, and security agreements to present themselves as
alternatives to Western providers. In some instances, I believe the
goal of groups like Wagner is to displace United States and Western
influence and undermine democracy. For this reason, we must be able to
present an affirmative vision for the region and provide African
countries with options.
Question. What is your assessment of the utility of support
provided by the United States to regional and external partners
operating in the region in supporting U.S. security objectives,
particularly support provided pursuant to section 331 of title 10,
United States Code? (Review: ISA, SPC)
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the support the
United States provides to all partners, including those in Africa and
their utility to United States security objectives.
united states southern command (southcom)
Western Hemisphere
Question. In your view, what should be the Department's strategic
priorities in the Western Hemisphere? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. Both the U.S. National Security Strategy and National
Defense Strategy underscore the importance of a stable, peaceful, and
democratic Western Hemisphere to the security of the U.S. Homeland. If
confirmed, I would continue the Department's work to deepen
partnerships with Western Hemisphere nations based on a commitment to
democratic governance, civilian control of the military, the rule of
law, and human rights. That should be DOD's No. 1 priority in the
Western Hemisphere. If confirmed, I would also advance the Department's
priorities to counter external State actor influence in the region, and
to build the capacity of hemisphere partners to address transboundary
threats, including those posed by transnational threat networks, malign
actors in cyberspace, and natural disasters.
Question. Is the Department appropriately resourced to support
these priorities? If not, where do you assess the Department is
accepting the greatest risk? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the Department's allocation
of resources for defense efforts in the Western Hemisphere to determine
whether adjustments are appropriate. If confirmed, I will support the
Secretary in clearly communicating the Department's resourcing
priorities to Congress to ensure that our resources are aligned with
our strategic priorities in the region.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
President and Secretary of Defense to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese
influence in the SOUTHCOM AOR and do you think these influences
threaten hemispheric security and prosperity? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. I believe that malign influence from these actors in the
region is concerning and presents challenges to the security of the
United States. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department
advance its defense partnerships with countries in the region to
promote our shared values of democracy and respect for human rights,
rule of law, and a rules-based international order, which have been the
foundation of hemispheric security for decades.
The Department should continue to demonstrate why it remains the
trusted partner of our hemisphere neighbors.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Question. Many of the internal security challenges in Latin America
are associated with transnational criminal networks.
What types of United States assistance are appropriate for Latin
American countries given that these challenges emanate from non-State
actors? (OPR: HDHA)
If confirmed, I would continue the Department of Defense's
commitment to maintain strong defense ties with our key partners in the
Western Hemisphere. As the United States engages with its partners, we
recognize that many countries in the region face real and persistent
threats from non-State actors, including the transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) that derive their influence from trafficking in
narcotics and other illicit activity. TCOs pose a serious law
enforcement challenge to the United States and other countries in the
region. The response will require a whole of government approach--
including working with diplomats, law enforcement, and intelligence
agencies--and with partner nations, to combat the influence of TCOs and
uphold the rule of law.
Venezuela
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Venezuela? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. The situation in Venezuela today and into the near future
requires a whole-of-government, multinational effort to pave the way
toward free and fair elections. If confirmed, I will work with our
interagency and international partners to work toward this end.
Question. What is your assessment of the role and objectives of
external actors in Venezuela, particularly Russia, Cuba, Iran, and
China? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. I believe that external actors in Venezuela pose a
continued risk to the restoration of democracy in that country. If
confirmed, the Department of Defense will continue to monitor their
activity in Venezuela.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your policy recommendations
on how the Department should address Venezuela? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. If confirmed, I would recommend that any Department of
Defense actions be in support of a broader United States Government
strategy to enable Venezuela to move toward free and fair elections and
a peaceful transition of power.
Colombia
Question. Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to
make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia) and other paramilitary forces in Colombia. Additionally,
Colombia has become a security exporter in the region due to its
advances in capabilities and professionalism.
What are your views regarding: (1) the current military and
political situation in Colombia; and (2) the effectiveness and
sustainability of ongoing DOD programs in Colombia? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. The U.S and Colombia share a strong military-to-military
relationship, as demonstrated by Colombia's recent designation as a
Major Non-NATO ally. The United States has a history of strong
collaboration with the Colombian military.
Colombia is a core strategic partner in the region, and if
confirmed, I would continue to work with Colombia on defense sector
institution building, international security cooperation, strengthening
strategic intelligence capacity--including counternarcotics,
territorial stabilization, and peace agreement implementation--and
emergent transboundary challenges. These efforts promote regional
stability and advance United States interests in the region.
Question. Does the Department require any additional capabilities
or legal authorities in Colombia, given developments in disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Policy organization
and the broader Department of Defense to determine whether additional
capabilities or legal authorities are needed as the Department
continues its work to employ counterterrorism and counternarcotics
capabilities and authorities to the greatest extent possible in
Colombia.
Over the last two decades, United States support was central to
building up Colombia's defense and security capabilities, enabling
Colombia to become a core regional security partner. The United States
can leverage Colombia's defense and security capabilities and expertise
to train other partner governments in the region. By replicating this
model elsewhere, DOD can buildup its partners' defense capabilities and
then rely on them to train neighboring partner militaries. It could
allow for enhanced regionalization--bolstering regional security.
Question. Are there lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia that
may be useful in addressing security and governance challenges
elsewhere in the region and beyond? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. I believe that DOD has focused on building up Colombia's
defense and security capabilities, which has enabled Colombia to become
a core regional security partner. The United States can leverage
Colombia's defense and security capabilities and expertise to
train other partner governments in the region, which will help
buildup partners' defense capabilities to further bolster regional
security.
Cuba
Question. What is your assessment of Cuba's activities and
objectives in the Western Hemisphere? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. Cuba is clearly an undemocratic regime that does not
respect human rights. If confirmed, I would support the
Administration's direction to support a stable, prosperous, and free
country for the Cuban people.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend
modifications to the security relationship between the United States
and Cuba? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. I understand that DOD maintains only limited contacts with
Cuba through longstanding, practical meetings regarding routine issues
at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay. If confirmed, I will work with
interagency partners to ensure that U.S. interests are protected.
united states northern command (northcom)
Homeland Defense
Question. How do you believe the Department should best prepare for
and, if necessary, respond to airborne surveillance threats like the
Chinese surveillance balloon that passed through United States airspace
in early 2023? (Review HDHA)
Answer. The Department of Defense must be able to identify and
defend against threats to the Homeland. The 2022 National Defense
Strategy, commits the Department to enhancing domain awareness. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee to enhance the
integration of ground and space-based sensors and work bilaterally with
Canada to strengthen NORAD's capabilities.
Arctic
Question. What changes, if any, are necessary for the Department of
Defense to carry out their lines of effort in support of the 2022
National Strategy for the Arctic Region? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. The Department of Defense has not issued an Arctic Strategy
since 2019. Updating the Department's strategic approach to the Arctic
will be helpful in aligning DOD resourcing to strategy and serve as a
strong strategic messaging tool to Allies, partners, and competitors.
Question. What threat, if any, do Russian and Chinese activities in
the Arctic pose to United States security interests? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. Given its location, the Arctic is a potential forum for
expanded strategic competition. Both competitors' activities in the
Arctic could pose threats to freedom of navigation, as well as United
States sovereignty and economic interests. The United States cannot
afford to concede primacy in the region to either nation. Russia
considers itself the preeminent Arctic power and views the Arctic
region as critical to national security and a source of energy and
resources. Consequently, the Russian military has invested heavily in
its Arctic military presence in the years prior to Russia's reinvasion
of Ukraine, creating new units, refurbishing infrastructure, and
establishing new bases. Russia also asserts excessive and illegal
maritime claims in the region, including the right to regulate Arctic
waters and restrict navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed under
international law. Russia's military investments reinforce its ability
to enforce those claims and potentially seek to control what it calls
``the Northern Sea Route.''
The People's Republic of China (PRC) increasingly seeks access and
influence in the Arctic region, and its claim to be a ``near-Arctic
state'' reflects its intention to play a larger role in the region. The
PRC does not yet possess the ability to project significant military
power into the Arctic, but it is pursuing an increasing role in shaping
governance and security affairs in the region. China's activities in
the Arctic are largely civilian in nature to date, but they likely
include dual-purpose activities that could enable a future PRC Arctic
military presence.
Question. To what extent should our partners in the Arctic share
the burden of countering Russia and China where those two competitors
threaten shared security interests? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. The United States approach to the Arctic must be conducted
in close cooperation with our key Allies and Sweden. Our Arctic Allies
and partners have significant experience in and focus on operating in
extreme Arctic conditions. These nations bring additional capabilities
and geographic reach to the table, and there is great potential benefit
in increased cooperation, data sharing, joint exercises, and combined
operations if and when necessary. Our Allies are our greatest strength
in the Arctic region, and the more interoperable our militaries become,
the better prepared the United States is, alone and as part of an
alliance.
Question. What, in your view, are United States defense interests
in the Arctic region? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. As an Arctic nation, the United States's primary defense
interest in the Arctic is to secure the Homeland. The best way to
achieve this goal is to strive for an Arctic region that is stable and
characterized by high levels of cooperation among our Arctic Allies and
partners. New sea lanes that will be opening in the coming years pose a
number of challenges and opportunities. While new sea lanes mean new
opportunities for transit and commerce, the resulting competition for
resources and ocean access could bring about new flash points.
Preserving navigational rights and freedoms in Arctic waterways will be
key to maintaining a stable and secure Arctic region. Developments in
the Arctic must not be allowed to harm the ability of the United
States, its Allies, and partners, to prevail in conflict in case
deterrence fails vis-`-vis our competitors.
Question. Does the Department of Defense have the appropriate
capabilities and assets to meet its goals in the Arctic? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. The Arctic is a strategically important region for the
United States, and DOD is closely monitoring the capabilities of
competitors in the region. The National Defense Strategy makes clear
that the People's Republic of China challenge is the Department's
pacing challenge and that USINDOPACOM is the priority theater for
resourcing. By contrast, the NDS articulates a calibrated approach to
the Arctic region, with emphasis on increasing domain awareness, early
warning, and ISR capabilities and ensuring the Joint Force is prepared
for that region to become a venue for increased strategic competition.
Our Allies and partners are our greatest strength in the Arctic region,
and leading and supporting coordination and interoperability among our
Arctic Allies and partners is a capability multiplier for the United
States in the Arctic region. If confirmed, I will work within the
Department's strategy, force planning, and force employment processes
to ensure the Joint Force can effectively implement the National
Defense Strategy and other strategic guidance, including with respect
to the Arctic region.
Question. United States Forces in Alaska are assigned to INDOPACOM,
but also have homeland defense responsibilities. Are there any changes
to the force posture in Alaska, or the assignment of those forces, that
you would recommend to ensure that the INDOPACOM and homeland defense
missions are adequately staffed in the event of a contingency? (OPR:
SPC)
Answer. Alaska's location within the Indo-Pacific region makes the
State a strategically important region for our country. Alaska-based
forces provide strategic advantages across the whole national defense
spectrum, providing a deterrence to potential aggressors and security
to our allies, all while supporting critical homeland defense
requirements. If confirmed, I would seek close engagement with the
Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Military Departments to ensure no
seams in DOD's approach to achieving the range of our defense
objectives supported through United States Forces in Alaska.
defense support to civilian authorities
Question. What is the role of the Lead Federal Agency when DOD
provides support to civilian authorities? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. Consistent with their authorities and responsibilities in
law and national policy, Lead Federal Agencies coordinate the Federal
response to incidents. As such, they would normally request specific
support from DOD, for instance under the Stafford Act or the Economy
Act. When DOD support is authorized and involves the use of military
forces, DOD retains command and control of its military forces.
Question. In your view, are the procedures by which other Federal,
State, and Local agencies request DOD support efficient and effective?
(OPR: HDHA)
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, yes; however, I defer to
Federal, State, and local agencies to assess the efficiency and
effectiveness of their procedures. If confirmed, I will have the
opportunity to review the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's
assessments of and responses to Federal, State, and local agency
requests for DOD support.
Question. In your view, are DOD procedures for evaluating and
approving the provision of support requested by a civil authority
efficient, effective, and timely? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD's procedures are efficient,
effective, timely, and field-tested. DOD works with its Federal, State,
and local partners to plan, prepare, and exercise for responses to
major disasters and emergencies and the safety and security of national
special security events. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to
review these plans and procedures and evaluate how well they have
worked in real-world situations.
Question. What is your understanding of the factors that are
considered in determining whether DOD will provide support to a civil
authority? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. Consistent with the law and DOD policy, DOD considers six
factors: (1) legality (would providing the requested support be in
compliance with law?); (2) lethality (would the requested support
involve the potential use of lethal force by or against DOD
personnel?); (3) risk (would providing the requested support pose an
unacceptable risk to the safety of DOD personnel?); (4) cost (will DOD
be reimbursed for the support and what effect will providing the
support have on the DOD budget?); (5) appropriateness (would providing
the requested support be appropriate and in DOD's interest?); and (6)
readiness (how will providing the requested support impact DOD's
ability to perform its other primary missions?).
Question. Are the procedures DOD employs to secure appropriate
reimbursement for any support it provides to a civil authority
efficient and effective, in your view? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD's procedures regarding
reimbursement for support of civil authorities are efficient and
effective. If confirmed, I will review how efficient and effective
these procedures have been and, if necessary, recommend improvements.
Question. Under what conditions should DOD assist civil authorities
in securing the southwest border, particularly by providing Active Duty
forces? (Review: HDHA).
Answer. Consistent with the law and DOD policy, DOD support of
civil authorities in securing the southern border should be limited to
circumstances in which providing support does not adversely affect the
military preparedness of the United States or negatively affect
military training, operations, readiness, or other military
requirements.
If confirmed, I will also seek to work with DHS to help it develop
the capabilities and capacity to carry out its statutory mission, and
to ensure that DOD support does not pose an unacceptable risk to
military preparedness, training, operations, readiness, or other
military requirements.
Question. What types of assistance in this context are
inappropriate, in your view? (Review: HDHA)
Answer. DOD is prepared to support civilian law enforcement
agencies consistent with the needs of U.S. military preparedness and
while recognizing and conforming to the legal limitations on direct DOD
involvement in civilian law enforcement activities. Examples of
assistance that would be inconsistent with the law and DOD policy
includes direct participation in law enforcement activities or
assistance that would negatively affect military preparedness,
training, operations, readiness, or other military requirements.
covid-19
Question. What is your view of DOD's response to the COVID-19
pandemic? What aspects of it could be improved? What role do you
envision for DOD in pandemic response moving forward? (OPR: HDHA, OCR:
SPACE)
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD took great care to protect
the health of its military and civilian personnel, sustain worldwide
defense missions, and, at the same time, play an incredible supporting
role in our Nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. In future
pandemics, I expect that DOD will continue to play a very important
role. If confirmed, I will review DOD's response and plans to identify
opportunities to preserve or improve DOD's preparedness.
Question. Are there any types of support that the Department of
Defense should not provide, in your view? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. In my view, yes. For example, DOD should not provide
support that is inconsistent with the law, such as support involving
direct participation in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar law
enforcement activityies by military personnel that is not otherwise
specifically authorized by law.
Question. To what extent does providing defense support to civil
authorities during the coronavirus crisis impact readiness? How should
DOD think about these tradeoffs? (OPR: HDHA)
When military personnel provide Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA) on a large scale, there can be negative effects on
readiness. These readiness impacts should be balanced with supporting
the safety and security of the American people in times of crisis.
southwest border
Question. Fentanyl, most of which enters this country from Mexico,
is responsible for the deaths of approximately 70,000 Americans per
year. Insecurity across our southwest border also contributes to human
trafficking and illegal migration, which Mexico's criminal cartels are
exploiting for financial gain.
Is the fentanyl crisis a national security crisis in your view? Why
or why not? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. Fentanyl is a national security crisis. Drug overdose
deaths of Americans have increased 781 percent since 1999, with
fentanyl responsible for approximately 68 percent of current overdoses.
The ease of production and potency of fentanyl pose a unique danger
that challenges our ability to defend our Homeland, while financing
criminal and violent extremist organizations.
Question. What role do you believe that DOD should play in
addressing the crisis at the southwest border? What aspects of the
current DOD role at the southwest border could be improved? (OPR: HDHA)
Answer. DOD's long-standing role has been one of support to DHS,
which is, by law, responsible for securing our Nation's borders.
However, in my view, if DHS is unable to secure our Nation's borders
without DOD support, our Nation could face serious risks were DOD's
capabilities and forces required elsewhere, such as to respond to an
overseas military contingency. DOD support should be reserved for
circumstances when military-unique capabilities are critical, and even
then should only be provided temporarily.
Question. To what extent do you view the Mexican armed forces as
partners in countering fentanyl, human trafficking, illegal migration,
and the criminal cartels other illicit activities? Are there ways that
you would recommend expanding cooperation with the Mexican armed
forces? Do you see any risks in doing so? (Review: HDHA)
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department of Defense's
commitment to maintain strong defense ties with Mexico, a partner
nation that DOD works with on many important issues including trade,
immigration, climate change, and North American defense. I recognize
that Mexico, like many countries in the region, face real and
persistent threats from non-State actors, including the transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) that derive their influence from
trafficking in narcotics, illegal migration and other illicit products.
The response will require a whole of government approach--including
working with diplomats, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies--and
with partner nations in the region, in order to combat the influence of
these cartels and uphold the rule of law. I believe DOD should continue
to support law enforcement efforts to disrupt these organizations, in
partnership with the Mexican government, as part of a whole-of-
government approach.
Question. The Department purchased $260 million of border wall
construction materials, which were intended to be used for extending
the southwest border wall. Rather than using those materials for that
purpose, however, the Department paid to store those materials until
approximately May 2023, and then transferred them to other government
agencies or auctioned off those materials for other purposes.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal
agency for border security and, depending on the situation, DOD plays a
supporting role. I understand that there are provisions included in the
House and Senate-passed versions of the NDAA that, if enacted into law,
would direct the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a plan to
utilize, transfer, or donate any remaining excess border wall
construction materials to States on the southern border of the United
States. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Department acts in
accordance with the law.
Question. Do you believe that the incomplete barrier along the
southwest border should be completed as part of a broader border
security policy? Why or why not? (Review: HDHA)
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead Federal
agency for border security and DOD plays a supporting role. I
understand that there are provisions included in the House and Senate-
passed versions of the NDAA that, if enacted into law, would direct the
Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a plan to utilize, transfer,
or donate any remaining excess border wall construction materials. If
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Department acts in accordance
with the law.
special operations forces
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2017 included provisions
designed to enhance the oversight and advocacy of special operations
forces. Among other things, these reforms established an administrative
chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense, mirroring the
relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments and
their Service Chiefs.
What is your understanding of the ``service secretary-like''
responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) for special operations forces?
Answer. ASD (SOLIC) is the principal civilian advisor to SecDef on
special operations and low intensity conflict matters and exercises
authority, direction, and control of Commander, USSOCOM for all special
operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the
organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces
through the administrative chain of command specified in 10 USC 167(f).
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to affirm the
independent role of the ASD(SOLIC) as the ``service secretary-like''
civilian for special operations forces?
Answer. Civilian oversight is essential for our special operations
enterprise just as it is for the services and ASD(SO/LIC) exercises
authority, direction, and control of all specialoperations-peculiar
administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and
equipping of special operations forces. If confirmed, I will continue
to support for all elements of SO/LIC, including ASD(SO/LIC)'s role
reporting to the Secretary of Defense in conducting Service Secretary-
like responsibilities.
Question. How do you differentiate the ASD(SOLIC)'s policy
responsibilities from their ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities
for ``special-operations peculiar administrative matters relating to
the organization, training, and equipping of special operations
forces''?
Answer. I understand the ASD(SO/LIC) has a unique dual reporting
chain; maintaining a direct reporting line to the Secretary for its
Service Secretary-like role in the administrative chain of command over
USSOCOM, with full access to the same fora as the Service Secretaries
for special operations-peculiar matters; and supporting OUSD(P) in
their policy role with policy advice on counternarcotics, stability
operations, personnel recovery, crisis response, irregular warfare, and
counterterrorism, among other things.
Section 127e and Section 1202 Activities
Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
special operations forces to provide support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and
individuals supporting or facilitating military operations for the
purpose of combatting terrorism. Section 1202 of the NDAA for fiscal
year 2018 authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide similar
support to forces or individuals supporting or facilitating irregular
warfare operations.
What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
these authorities in the current strategic environment? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. I see the 127e authority as providing a relatively low-
cost, low-risk, high payoff, sustainable option to maintain pressure on
terrorist groups. I believe DOD's 127e programs are fully in line with
the intent of the Administration's CT policy to shift the burden of
countering terrorist groups to our foreign partners/local authorities.
Our 127e partners reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against the
United States Homeland and U.S. persons by maintaining pressure on
these elements, often preventing or disrupting terrorist attack
planning and operations.
``Section 1202'' programs facilitate a broad range of special
operations irregular warfare activities in direct support of authorized
irregular warfare missions, including competing with peer adversaries
and preparing for the implementation of operational plans. USSOF does
this by, e.g., leveraging 1202-resourced foreign forces, irregular
forces, groups or individuals to gain access and placement and to
establish critical infrastructure. This program also enables USSOF to
develop, enhance, and employ allied andpartner access and placement and
irregular warfare skills, and to operate in the information
environment.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply to the
evaluation of proposals for the use of each of these authorities, with
a view to mitigating the risks associated with the conduct of
counterterrorism and irregular warfare activities below the level of
traditional armed conflict? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. Implementation of the 127e and Section 1202 authorities
inherently rely on non-U.S. partners for success. As with any
organization, those that succeed have high standards for professional
conduct. If confirmed, I will ensure we select participants in these
programs based on competencies in trustworthiness and willingness to
adhere to U.S. standards, and I would also seek to provide them with
appropriate training on laws of armed conflict and human rights.
I am aware of the Feb 2023 GAO report and recommendations for DOD
to review and where necessary update guidance for 127e programs, in
particular. If confirmed, I will review the progress on implementing
these recommendations and apply any lessons learned to DOD instructions
on managing these programs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that
recipients of support under these authorities are appropriately vetted
to protect against potential human rghts and counterintelligence
concerns? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. I understand DOD's Section 127e and 1202 procedures require
that candidates be screened during selection and on an annual basis.
If confirmed, I would ensure DOD continually conducts this
screening using all available intelligence across multiple data bases.
However, the most important aspect of upholding human rights is to
continually monitor the actions and behavior of our partners once they
have been accepted into DOD programs.
Our servicemembers live and work in close contact with our
partners. If confirmed, I would ensure we are clear and open with our
expectations for ethical conduct and we remain vigilant for any
behavior that does not conform with our ethical standards and
immediately remove those people from our programs.
peacekeeping operations
Question. What should be the Department's role and objectives in
supporting global peacekeeping operations? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. The United States is the largest overall financial
contributor to the United Nations' peacekeeping budget in support of
global peacekeeping operations. DOD supports the Department of State as
the U.S. Government's policy lead for U.N. Peacekeeping by providing
U.S. military officers for assignments in peacekeeping mission
headquarters and capacity building support for troop-contributing
countries. I understand peacekeeping operations are an effective type
of stabilization activity. If confirmed, I would support DOD's
continued efforts to enhance global peacekeeping operations mission
performance.
violent extremist organizations
Question. Despite considerable global investment in the
counterterrorism fight, jihadists in dozens of groups and countries
continue to pose credible threats to local and regional U.S. interests.
What is your assessment of the threat to United States interests
posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates and
adherents? Which group(s), in your view, present the greatest threat to
the United States? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. Terrorism and violent extremism remain a persistent threat
to United States interests and our Homeland. Although our pacing
challenge is the People's Republic of China (PRC), we must protect the
United States Homeland and our citizens and facilities abroad from
violent actors who have the capability and intent to attack us.
Since September 11, 2001, al Qaeda has been degraded to the point
where it does not currently pose an acute threat to the United States
Homeland. Some of their affiliates, like al-Shabaab, may pose a threat
to United States persons in the region, which is why I believe it is
important to continue support to our partners in Somalia and the
surrounding region as they seek to break al-Shabaab's hold on parts of
their country.
I believe ISIS continues to pose the greatest terrorist threat to
the United States and our people globally. Although it may have lost
its hold on territory in Iraq and Syria, it has gone back underground
and remains committed to their goal of creating a Caliphate, governed
by its interpretation of Sharia law. ISIS still produces media that can
influence people around the world who share its ideology to conduct
attacks and it still recruits dozens of people around the world to join
its ranks.
Protecting United States citizens, personnel, and interests across
the globe remains DOD's most important task. If confirmed, I will
ensure counterterrorism remains a focus of effort at DOD as the
department prioritizes integrated deterrence against Russia and the
PRC.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the United States counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in
supporting it? What metrics would you apply to measure the
effectiveness of the strategy? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration's approach to
counterterrorism is focused on disrupting threats to the United States
Homeland and United States persons abroad while shifting the bulk of
operations countering regional terrorist groups to the authorities of
countries where they are located to prevent those groups from becoming
global threats.
I believe these are appropriate goals for a sustainable
counterterrorism posture abroad and help ensure we are continuing to
protect Americans from terrorism while we focus on our pacing
challenge: the People's Republic of China.
If confirmed, I will ensure DOD continues to work with partners and
allies and leverage technology to build an enduring, sustainable
counterterrorism posture to monitor and disrupt terrorist threats to
the Homeland. These actions will degrade the capability of terrorist
organizations to function trans-regionally, isolating branches from
outside support, and allow foreign partner security forces to address
terrorist threats before they reach the United States Homeland.
Question. Do you believe there needs to be a ``more resource
sustainable'' approach to counterterrorism, as directed by the 2018 and
2022 NDS? If so, and if confirmed, what specific actions would you take
to promote a ``more resource sustainable'' approach and how would you
assess any risks associated with such an approach? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. I believe that a resource sustainable strategy must focus
on working by, with, and through foreign partners to address the
terrorist threats that persist across the globe. This must include
degrading the capability of terrorist organizations to function trans-
regionally by targeting those elements--such as senior terrorist group
leaders--that can recruit, fund-raise, and traffic arms and people
across borders. Taking this approach serves to isolate various regional
branches from their outside support, weakens them, and allows local
security forces to handle the threat before it reaches the United
States Homeland.
The publicly stated desire of ISIS and like-minded groups to
develop global presence reflects a well-understood strategy of
extremist groups: overextend an adversary into resource-intensive
commitments that eventually deplete national resolve and popular will.
Against individual countries, this global strategy can be
effective. Against well-coordinated multilateral partnerships, such as
the 86-member Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, this strategy fails.
Collectively, the Coalition has the global presence and resources to
confront ISIS in and across any region in which it operates--in a
manner that is resource sustainable for individual partners.
If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD works with our partners and
allies--including the D-ISIS coalition--and leverage technology to
monitor these terrorist threats and share information to disrupt their
operations.
Question. Should the Department focus principally on terrorist
organizations that pose a direct threat to the United States Homeland?
If so, how would you mitigate risk posed by other terrorist groups that
have such intent but currently lack the capability to do so? (OPR:
SOLIC)
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD continues to work with its
partners and allies, particularly through multinational forums like the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, to monitor the threat from terrorist
groups that do not pose a direct threat to the United States Homeland
and ensure we both share information and work with our interagency
partners, including the Department of State, to build the capacity of
foreign partners to disrupt these other Violent Extremist Organizations
through law enforcement operations in the countries they reside in.
counternarcotics and counter-transnational organized crime activities
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Department
in combating narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime?
(Review: SOLIC)
Answer. DOD is the lead Federal agency for detecting and monitoring
aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States in
support of the counter-drug activities of Federal, State, local, and
foreign law enforcement agencies. Aside from this detection and
monitoring mission, DOD's role in combating drug trafficking and
transnational organized crime consists of support to interagency
partners through enabling capabilities .
Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize the Department's
allocation of resources to combat narcotics trafficking and
transnational organized crime? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the scope of DOD's activities
to combat narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime to
ensure we are aligned with our interagency law enforcement partners and
our international partners. I will ensure that these threats are
appropriately prioritized within the DOD Counterdrug Program.
counter threat finance
Question. What should be the Department's role in counter-threat
finance activities? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. Understanding how our adversaries generate, store, move,
and use resources, and working with other U.S. Government (USG)
departments and agencies, as well as with partner nations, to deny,
disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries' illicit financial networks
is an important Irregular Warfare capability. I understand that most of
DOD's counter-threat finance activity is currently funded by the DOD
Counterdrug program and operates within the bounds of DOD's Counterdrug
authorities.
Question. In your view, should the Department expand its support to
other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
threat finance activities? If so, how? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. DOD is not often the lead agency in countering threat
finance and works extensively with other departments and agencies. That
said, I understand that the DOD Counterdrug program currently provides
counter-threat finance analytic support to several other Departments
and Agencies, including the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury,
and Homeland Security. If confirmed, I will review the scope of DOD's
counter-threat finance activities and assess whether the Department
should expand DOD support to other U.S. Government departments and
agencies
irregular warfare
Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, commonly referred to
as irregular warfare or ``gray zone operations.''
What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
adversaries in the domain of irregular warfare? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russian Federation
are both major nuclear powers that are also adept at irregular warfare
below the threshold of armed conflict. They have both escalated their
coercive and malign activities in the ``gray zone.'' The PRC employs
state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic
coercion against the United States, its allies, and partners. Russia
employs disinformation, cyber, and space operations against the United
States and our allies and partners, and irregular proxy forces in
multiple countries. North Korea and Iran use similar means at more
limited levels. These activities, if left unaddressed, could endanger
U.S. military effectiveness now and in the future.
Question. What should be the guiding principles of any DOD strategy
to counter threats in the ``gray zone,'' in your view? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. The United States must be judicious in our use of defense
resources and efforts to counter competitors' coercive behaviors in the
gray zone, as traditional military tools may not always be the most
appropriate response. That said, campaigning serves a critical role in
disrupting competitors' attempts to advance their objectives through
gray zone tactics, especially when integrated for maximum impact with
the actions of allies, partners, and other U.S. departments and
agencies. This requires discipline, as successful campaigning begins
with focused planning that specifies how an initiative supports our
defense priorities, establishes clear connections with the Department's
strategies, and incorporates feedback loops.
information operations
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to conduct
effective military operations in the information environment to defend
U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out by State
and non-State actors? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. I understand the Department has processes and capabilities
in place, or in development, to counter and defend against foreign
malign influence operations targeting its forces and missions, such as
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Defense Deception
Activities (DDA), cyber effects operations, electromagnetic spectrum
operations, and public affairs. The Department's effectiveness to
defend U.S. interests against malign influences activities is best when
focused on defined defense and military objectives, synchronized across
all information capabilities, and when integrated into campaigning with
interagency capabilities and partners/allies. If confirmed, I would
work to strengthen these processes and capabilities.
Question. In your view, is responsibility for Information
Operations clearly delineated and properly situated within the military
services and the Department? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. Yes, in my view the responsibilities for I.O. are properly
situated. If confirmed, I will work with those in the Department to
consider ways to improve our effectiveness in this area.
Question. Do you believe the Department has a mature strategic
concept for such efforts? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. Yes, I understand that the Strategy for Operations in the
Information Environment (SOIE) was signed by Secretary Austin in July
2023. This strategy provides the framework for future efforts to
enhance; people & organizations; programs; policies & governance; and
partnerships. I understand the Department is developing an in-depth and
agile SOIE implementation plan to actualize the strategy and further
the Department's efforts to implement the National Defense Strategy.
Question. Are DOD's efforts in this regard appropriately integrated
with other U.S. Government organizations and activities? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. The Department's efforts in the information environment
work best when synchronized across other US agencies and their
activities. If confirmed, I would make it a priority for DOD to ensure
operations are integrated and deconflicted.
Question. What is your assessment of the metrics used to assess
effectiveness of DOD information operations? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. I understand that DOD continues to improve oversight and
evaluation of our operations in the information environment. The
Department is working to better understand the effects of Information
Operations and the metrics used to evaluate their performance. Some
operations provide immediate results while others require a sustained
effort over time to reach military objectives in line with national
security goals. DOD employs tools such as surveys, focus groups, and
face to face interactions to gather quantitative and qualitative
metrics required to assess operational effectiveness.
Question. Does DOD have sufficient authorities and resources to
conduct these operations effectively? If not, what additional
authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. I understand DOD currently has sufficient authorities to
conduct Information Operations but that there may be some limitations.
If confirmed, I will work to understand the nuances of those
authorities and identify any limitations.
department of defense role in election security
Question. In September 2019, at the annual National Cybersecurity
Summit, then Secretary of Defense Esper noted that ``our adversaries
will continue to target our democratic processes'', the Pentagon had
``developed our capabilities and increased our capacity to allow us to
detect, locate, and exploit threats in the cyber domain'', and that
``influence operations are at a scope and scale never before
imagined.'' In that same speech, Secretary Esper declared election
security ``an enduring mission for the Department of Defense.''
What do you see as the Department's continued role in election
security? (OPR: Space)
Answer. I understand the Department supports the whole-of-
government effort to secure and defend US. Elections. This is a no fail
mission and I will continue to support the Department's critical role
in protecting and defending the Nation.
Question. Do you agree that there is a continuing threat to our
democratic processes from foreign malign influence operations? (OPR:
Space, OCR: SOLIC)
Answer. Yes. I believe our adversaries have the intent and, in some
instances, the capability to conduct malign influence efforts against
the United States that aim to manipulate and undermine confidence in
U.S. elections. There is a low barrier for entry for adversaries to
conduct Information Operations. The United States will likely see
continued and increasingly sophisticated adversarial threats to our
democratic processes as technology matures.
Question. Do you envision election security as an enduring mission
for the Department? If so, how would OUSD(P) best support the mission
of defending our democratic processes from interference by Russia and
other foreign adversaries? (OPR: Space)
Answer. I understand election security is an enduring mission for
DOD. If confirmed, I will work with internal and interagency
stakeholders to ensure our elections are free from foreign interference
or influence.
Question. Do you assess that DOD actions to date are supporting a
whole of government approach to foreign adversaries that seek to
interfere in our elections? If not, are there additional policy steps
that you believe the Department of Defense should take to enhance
deterrence of foreign election interference? How would the actions you
list, if any, support whole of government efforts? (OPR: Space)
Answer. I understand DOD supports whole-of-government efforts to
secure and defend US. Elections. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
DOD's support enhances these whole-of-government efforts and deters
foreign election interference.
defense security cooperation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Department's
security cooperation activities in the implementation of U.S. security
strategy? (Review: SPC)
Answer. The role of the Department's security cooperation
activities is to deliver effective, timely, and sustainable solutions
to improve the military effectiveness of our allies and partners in
support of strategic interests. DOD security cooperation prioritizes
developing ally and partner capabilities to create warfighting
advantages, enhance integrated deterrence, and enable partners to act
alongside or in lieu of U.S. Forces.
For example, I understand the Department is implementing
organizational improvements, coordinating with allies and partners and
industry, and using lessons learned from the Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) Tiger Team, and its permanent body, the FMS Continuous Process
Improvement Board, to ensure that the United States can rapidly support
our Allies and Partners with the capabilities they need to buy down
risk through the FMS process.
If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress and ensuring
the Department's security cooperation capabilities are delivered
rapidly to our allies and partners and achieve our own strategic
objectives.
Question. If confirmed, how would you define the fundamental
objectives of the Department's programs and activities for building the
capabilities of foreign security forces? What changes, if any, would
you recommend to the Department's approach? (Review: SPC)
Answer. Delivering state-of-the-art capabilities at speed and scale
is critical to secure our enduring military advantage. We must provide
capabilities to our allies and partners as quickly as possible in
support of their requirements, as well as our own National Defense
Strategy. If confirmed, I am committed to working with DOD components,
the State Department, and Congress to continue to address delays and
improve the FMS process.
Question. Is the OUSD(P) appropriately organized and empowered to
fulfill its responsibilities for the oversight of strategic policy and
guidance and the overall allocation of resources for security
cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense
pursuant to section 382 of title 10, United States Code? What changes,
if any, to OUSD(P) structure, authorities, and resourcing for these
purposes, would you recommend, if confirmed? (OPR: SPC)
Answer. I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
exercises responsibility for oversight of strategic policy and guidance
and is responsible for overall resource prioritization and allocation
for security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of
Defense.
If confirmed, I will review and evaluate the organization,
authorities, and overall resourcing for the Department's security
cooperation programs and activities in alignment with the National
Defense Strategy, and will provide my recommendations to Congress.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Department
of Defense, vis-`-vis the Department of State and other civilian
departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capabilities of
foreign security forces? What is your assessment of the current level
of coordination between the Department of Defense and Department of
State on security cooperation? (OPR: SPC)
Answer. I view the Department of Defense and the Department of
State as partners in strengthening our ability to work with allies and
partners to meet shared security objectives, as articulated in the
National Security and National Defense Strategies. DOD security
cooperation prioritizes developing ally and partner capabilities to
create warfighting advantages, enhance integrated deterrence, and
enable partners to act alongside or in lieu of U.S. Forces.
Institutional capacity building efforts are integral to successful
security cooperation. I view the Department of Defense and State's
efforts to build transparent, effective, and accountable security
institutions and forces as both complementary and necessary for
enhancing military effectiveness and building sustainable partnerships.
There is a strong, collaborative relationship between DOD and State
on issues such as building the capabilities of foreign security forces.
If confirmed, I will further assess the level of coordination between
the Department of Defense and the Department of State and provide my
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the
Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)? On what
issues would you expect to consult with the Director? (OPR: SPC)
Answer. I understand that the Director of DSCA reports to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. If confirmed, I expect
to consult with the Director of DSCA on the execution of DOD and State-
led security cooperation and security assistance programs.
civilian casualties
Question. In Auguist 2022 the Secretary of Defense issued the
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP), which
included a detailed set of objectives and initiatives to ``improve its
approach to mitigating and responding to civilian harm, protecting U.S.
national security, and confronting the complex challenges of the modern
security environment.''
What is your assessment of the progress made to implement the CHMR-
AP to date? What areas do you believe require greater attention or
resources to achieve the desired outcomes? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. The CHMR-AP is a priority of Secretary Austin, and it will
improve DOD's approach to mitigating and responding to civilian harm.
The CHMR-AP creates a range of new processes and institutions dedicated
to cultivating best practices on civilian protection and learning from
previous instances of civilian harm. I understand DOD is in the process
of implementing the range of actions directed in the CHMR-AP, including
the hiring key personnel, although full implementation will take time.
If confirmed, I will work with Congress to implement fully this
important action plan.
Question. What role do you believe public transparency plays with
respect to accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian
casualties resulting from U.S. military operations? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. Transparency is important for multiple reasons, and it is
critical to both public accountability and responding appropriately to
civilian harm when it occurs. My understanding is that the CHMR-AP will
facilitate both transparency and accountability through a range of
actions, including the enhancement of assessments and investigations of
civilian harm.
Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense has achieved a
sufficient level of transparency on such matters? If not, what
additional steps do you believe are necessary? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. The extensive efforts undertaken by DOD over the past year
to implement the CHMR-AP demonstrate a strong commitment to improve the
processes in this area. Strengthening transparency requires systemic
improvements. For instance, in addition to the enhancement of
assessments and investigations of civilian harm directed by the CHMR-
AP, the action plan also directs the creation of standardized civilian
harm operational reporting and data management processes to improve how
DOD collects, shares, and learns from data related to civilian harm. It
is vital that these implementation efforts continue. If confirmed, I
will work closely with Congress and DOD components across the force to
ensure these aspects of the CHMR-AP are implemented so that our
military operations are both more effective and transparent.
use of military force
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),
enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and
activities at a necessary and appropriate level? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. I believe the current authorities are sufficient for DOD's
counterterrorism operations. I know that the President has said he is
open to working with Congress on a narrow and specific framework to
repeal and replace the current AUMF, if that is Congress' priority.
If confirmed, I would ensure Policy would work with Congress on any
legislative proposals regarding this topic toward a mutually acceptable
change in the law.
Question. The Senate voted to repeal the 2002 AUMF in March of this
year. Do you support the repeal of the 2002 AUMF? Please explain your
answer. (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. If confirmed, I would review any ongoing operations to
determine if they rely on the 2002 AUMF. However, if none rely on the
2002 AUMF, I am not opposed to repealing it.
Question. In your view, is a ``new'' authorization for the use of
military force needed at this time? If so, what should be the scope and
terms of this ``new'' AUMF? Please explain your answer. (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. I support the executive branch and Congress working
together to develop a new AUMF that better reflects the reality of the
ever-evolving threat that terrorists pose.
If confirmed, I will work with Congress to develop a narrow and
specific framework that ensures the continuity of current operations
and allows the flexibility to identify new terrorist groups or account
for name changes or splits of previously identified terrorist groups.
Question. What groups are currently assessed to be associated
forces of al Qaeda for purposes of the 2001 AUMF, and in what countries
are United States Military direct action operations against such groups
authorized? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. As cited in previous reports to Congress, including with
the so-called ``Section 1264'' reports, the current covered groups are
al Qaeda, the Taliban, certain other terrorist or insurgent groups
affiliated with al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabaab, al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Qaeda in Syria, and the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). There are also some groups that remain
classified due to the sensitivity of the collection sources that
provided us this information.
The United States used force in 2022 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
and Somalia, according to this report.
Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
recommending to the Secretary of Defense which forces of other nations
should be eligible for collective self-defense by United States
Military forces, and under what conditions? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. It is important to note that defending allies and partners
when they participate in combat operations alongside United States
Forces is a foundational element that trust is built upon. Collective
self-defense is mutual in these partnerships, and our allies and
partners have historically come to the aid of United States Forces
whose lives are in danger. We would not want to jeopardize this
inherent trust when lives are at stake.
I understand that DOD has an obligation to report to Congress when
it designates a force as eligible for collective self-defense.
If confirmed, I will advise the Secretary on the planning and
development of rules of engagement and guidance for commanders to
request and approve allied and partner forces that participate in
combat operations alongside our forces.
detainee issues
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, The
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated March 15, 2022? (Review:
SOLIC)
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
19, 2014.
Question. What are your views on the long-term use of the detention
facility at Guantanamo? Should use of the facility be terminated, as
President Biden has indicated? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. I support the Administration's stated view that the
detention facility at Guantanamo should be closed. Until that time,
however, the Department must ensure the continued safe, humane, and
legal care and treatment of the 30 remaining detainees through Joint
Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
Question. If the use of the facility should be terminated, what are
the available options for disposition of the detainees held at
Guantanamo and where should the remaining detainees in law of war
detention at GTMO be detained? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. It would be premature for me to speculate. If confirmed, I
commit to working closely with the Administration and Congress to
ensure the continued safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of the
30 remaining detainees through Joint Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
Question. If the use of the facility should be terminated, what
process would you expect to follow to bring detainee operations at GTMO
to a close? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. It would be premature for me to speculate. If confirmed, I
commit to working closely with the Administration and Congress to
ensure the continued safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of the
30 remaining detainees through Joint Task Force--Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
Question. If confirmed, would you ever advise the President to
transfer new detainees to Guantanamo, and if so, under what criteria?
(OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. It is my understanding that the Biden-Harris Administration
does not intend to bring new detainees to Guantanamo.
Question. What are your views on the objectives and outcomes of the
Department's Military Commission process? (Review: SOLIC)
Answer. In my view, the Military Commissions process provides
appropriate standards and processes for these trials.
If confirmed, to the extent possible, I will work with the Office
of Military Commissions to ensure that Policy is not an impediment to
the thorough and speedy adjudication deserved by the families of the
victims of the 9/11 attacks and other terrorist attacks.
Question. For as long as detainees are held at Guantanamo, the
Department of Defense will have an ongoing obligation to meet the
detainees' healthcare needs. Some of the detainees are approaching
advanced age, and others have serious health conditions.
In your view, is the Department adequately addressing the
healthcare needs of GTMO detainees? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. The health and well-being of the detainees at Guantanamo
are an important part of the mission of JTF-GTMO. Accordingly, United
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), through JTF-GTMO, provides
adequate and humane care for the detainees at Guantanamo that complies
with United States law and policy.
Question. What recommendations would you make to ensure the
Department can continue to meet its healthcare obligations for as long
as detainees are held at GTMO? (OPR: SOLIC)
Answer. As the detainee population ages and detainees experience
chronic medical conditions, it will remain Department policy to protect
the life and health of detainees by humane and appropriate clinical
means, and in accordance with all applicable law and DOD policy.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced
sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by ``someone at work''
in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(P)?
Answer. Sexual harassment has no place in the work place. Employees
deserve a safe and respectful work environment. If confirmed, I would
work with subject matter experts and/or Anti-Harassment Program
Managers to appropriately address the complaint in a manner that
respects the privacy and well-being of the complainant and ensures
appropriate accountability.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
arctic
1. Senator King. Mr. Chollet, Russia and China continue to rapidly
militarize the Arctic, yet I have seen little response from the
Department of Defense (DOD). What is your plan to execute the Arctic
Strategy and ensure a stronger DOD presence, to include scalable and
expeditionary basing options, and to integrate and interoperate with
our partners and allies to increase our Arctic posture?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that DOD is closely monitoring Russia's
buildup of its Arctic military capabilities, as well as the growing
cooperation between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in
the region. DOD coordinated closely with the White House on developing
an implementation plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region
(NSAR), which includes concrete steps DOD will take to achieve the
NSAR's objectives.
This includes enhancing DOD's domain awareness capabilities in the
Arctic region through upgrades to current capabilities and replacing
outdated systems that will better enable the Joint Force to monitor
Russian and PRC activity in the region. DOD is also deepening
collaboration with Canada in this area in the context of NORAD
modernization and demonstrating more regular presence in the region by
exercising alongside our allies and partners to improve
interoperability (e.g., Exercise Arctic Challenge in Europe and
Exercise ARCTIC EDGE in North America). With respect to posture, the
Department of Defense continues to assess the potential requirements
for scalable, expeditionary basing options. However, I believe that
DOD's existing infrastructure, combined with access, basing and
overflight agreements, are sufficient to meet today's national security
requirements. If confirmed, I commit to regularly reviewing DOD's
posture needs in the Arctic and keeping the committee apprised.
china commission
2. Senator King. Mr. Chollet, I believe we must establish an
unbiased and non-partisan commission to examine a grand strategy for
our approach to China, similar in intent to President Eisenhower's
Solarium Project. We need to think of a holistic approach to create a
stable international order in which China (or Russia) cannot dictate
regional developments. In order to avoid the United States trying to
``spend our way out of conflict,'' what are China's primary areas of
influence the United States and allies should focus on countering that
will provide the most?
Mr. Chollet. President Biden's 2022 National Security Strategy
clearly states that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the
greatest geopolitical challenge we face, as the only competitor that
harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the
international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field
to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing
the competition between our countries responsibly.
Likewise, the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes that the
PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological
might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region
and seeks to become the world's most influential power. The PRC's
coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the
Indo-Pacific region. This includes economic coercion of Australia,
conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India, the growing
pressure on Taiwan, and bullying of neighbors in the East and South
China Seas. The PRC is also undermining human rights and international
law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that
have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific region. The
Indo-Pacific Strategy states the United States is committed to an Indo-
Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and
resilient and will work with our allies and partners as part of that
commitment.
As part of this whole of government effort, I know the Department
of Defense is focused on the challenges posed by the PRC. The 2022 U.S.
National Defense Strategy (NDS) sets out clear strategic direction that
to advance our defense and security goals, the Department needs to act
urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as the
pacing challenge. The NDS identifies four top-level defense
priorities--to defend the U.S. homeland paced to the growing multi-
domain threat posed by the PRC; to deter strategic attacks against the
United States, our Allies, and our partners; to deter aggression, while
being prepared to prevail in conflict, should deterrence fail, focusing
first on the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, followed by the
Russia challenge in Europe; and fourth, to ensure our future military
advantage, the Department will build a resilient Joint Force and
defense ecosystem. The Strategy sets out three interlocking ways in
which the Department can achieve these priorities--integrated
deterrence, campaigning, and actions to build enduring advantages. The
NDS also makes clear that conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable
nor desirable.
The Congress plays an important role in enabling implementation of
these two strategies. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to work
together to address the challenge posed by the PRC.
3. Senator King. Mr. Chollet, what would be the greatest benefit
this commission could deliver?
Mr. Chollet. I always welcome independent, informed outside advice
and expertise on meeting our security and defense challenges, including
the challenges posed by the PRC. I know the Department is already
engaging closely with the Commission on the National Defense Strategy
for the United States on its implementation of the 2022 NDS, which
focuses the Department around the pacing challenge of the PRC. I also
see benefit in any assistance that outside voices and experts can
provide in increasing understanding in the Congress and among the
broader public of the critical challenges our Nation is facing in this
decisive decade and the actions and resources required to meet them.
4. Senator King. Mr. Chollet, what would put us in the best
position to avoid the United States and China from escalating conflict?
Mr. Chollet. Conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
neither imminent nor inevitable. We must continue to take steps to
ensure that deterrence continues to be strong today, tomorrow, and in
the future by investing in our own capabilities and operational
concepts, our alliances and partnerships, and our regional force
posture. It is also important that we maintain open lines of
communication between the United States and the PRC. I share the
Department's continued belief in the importance of open lines of
military-to-military communication between our two militaries in order
to prevent competition from inadvertently spiraling into conflict. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts keep open those
lines of communication, including at the senior-most levels.
5. Senator King. Mr. Chollet, what are the `toughest problems'
outside of military imbalances?
Mr. Chollet. President Biden's 2022 National Security Strategy
clearly states that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the
greatest geopolitical challenge we face. The National Defense Strategy
(NDS) identifies four top-level defense priorities--to defend the U.S.
homeland paced to the threat posed by the PRC; to deter strategic
attacks against the United States, our Allies, and our partners; to
deter aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict focusing
first on the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and then the
Russia challenge in Europe; and fourth, to ensure our future military
advantage, achieved by a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
delayed budget and continuing resolutions
6. Senator Manchin. Mr. Chollet, I remember in 2011, then Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen, told this Committee that
the national debt was the largest threat to U.S. national security.
Since then, our national debt has more than doubled from $15 trillion
to $33 trillion, and the delays for passing our defense appropriations
bill have increased exponentially over the last 2 decades. Multiple
sources, including retired general officers, the National Defense
Industrial Association, the American Enterprise Institute, and the
Pentagon itself have all recognized the damage failing to pass
appropriations on time has on both our national security and the
taxpayer. The American Enterprise Institute threw out a rough estimate
of $200 million per day under the latest Continuing Resolution that
covered October through December 2022, that's a total of $18 billion.
Getting the Department's fiscal house in order is my highest priority
on this Committee, and I would greatly appreciate a commitment from you
that if you are confirmed you will pull this information together and
make sure we're all informed of the consequences of putting our
military in the position we're currently in yet again. Can you commit
to that?
Mr. Chollet. The total sum of time the Department has been under a
continuing resolution from 2011 to present equals 4 years' worth of
delays. No amount of money can make up for that lost time, and the PRC
is not waiting. You have my commitment, if confirmed, to inform
Congress of the severe impacts Continuing Resolutions have on the
National Defense Strategy, from critical delays in our acquisition
programs to degraded infrastructure and readiness levels across the
force.
chief management officer
7. Senator Manchin. Mr. Chollet, continuing on the topic of fiscal
responsibility in the Pentagon, I've been extremely concerned with our
lack of progress in business modernization, auditing, commercial cost
comparison, and independent evaluations of programs. These concerns
have been validated year after year with the abolishment of the Chief
Management Officer position within the Department in 2021, and most
recently with the abolishment of the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation office, or CAPE, in the House National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) this year. Thankfully, my amendment to the NDAA to reinState
the Chief Management Officer was adopted in the Senate NDAA to ensure
the Department has a leadership position in place whose sole duty is
business modernization and fiscal responsibility. Can I have your
commitment, if you're confirmed, you will work with me to ensure this
position is implemented in a way that truly benefits the Department's
needs for real business modernization?
Mr. Chollet. I agree that we must modernize our business systems
and adopt best practices from across industry to ensure we remain good
fiscal stewards of the American taxpayer's dollar. I am especially
excited for the Performance Improvement Framework laid out by the
Director for Administration and Management in their Strategic
Management Plan. If confirmed, I commit to working, within my purview
in Policy, across the Department to improve our capabilities,
organizations, and processes to better our business and fiscal
practices.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
software centric capabilities
8. Senator Kelly. Mr. Chollet, as our military capabilities become
more advanced, many of our new capabilities will be software centric.
Due to the constant evolution of new capabilities, some of these
programs will remain almost continuously in research, development, and
procurement at the same time. This means that iterative improvements
will need to be baked into the acquisition plan and funded in a way
that supports that continuous process. How do you think DOD should
approach this challenge?
Mr. Chollet. In an era of rapid technological change and
innovation, we must ensure that our warfighters have access to the best
capabilities to achieve the outcomes of the National Defense Strategy.
As software will play a major role in these capabilities, the
Department will need to be able to rapidly develop, iterate, and update
software to stay relevant to changing warfighter requirements and the
evolving threat environment.
I understand that one way the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy is getting at these challenges is through the
establishment of an office, DASD Force Development and Emerging
Capabilities, focused on strategic and policy oversight of the
development of capabilities that will enable the Joint Force to deter
and build advantage vis-`-vis our competitors and interfacing with
other DOD Components that have equities in the emerging technology
space.
If confirmed, I will work closely with my colleagues in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Military
Departments to ensure that the Department has the necessary policies,
authorities, and funding mechanisms to enable continuous improvements
throughout the capability development process so that we can best
support our warfighters.
9. Senator Kelly. Mr. Chollet, do you think existing policy can
keep up with this challenge?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that policy is one part of the solution to
increase our success in incorporating iterative improvements into our
warfighting capabilities. I understand that the
Department has expanded the use of innovative acquisition pathways
to enable agility, continuous user engagement, and rapid delivery of
products to be more responsive to changing Warfighter needs, threats,
and technology. If confirmed, I will work closely with my partners from
Joint Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and in the
Services to ensure that that the Department has the necessary policies
to enable continuous improvements throughout the capability development
process.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
relationship with congress
10. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what specific steps would you take
to restore trust between the Pentagon's policy office and Congress,
which was damaged during Colin Kahl's tenure as Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
I will treat Congress as a partner. I have a history of working on
foreign policy issues in a bipartisan fashion, and I look forward to
working with both sides to meet our shared national security
objectives.
aukus
11. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, will you commit to
providing the full details of the Submarine Industrial Base study
conducted by the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
within 30 days of assuming your position?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that the Submarine Industrial Base study
conducted by the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and
the Navy was conducted to inform the President's Fiscal Year 2025
budget, and DOD is continuing to refine funding recommendations during
the program and budget review process that is underway right now. If
confirmed, I look forward to getting a full briefing on the study and
to ensuring the utmost transparency on the full findings once they are
finalized. Getting the Submarine Industrial Base right will be a top
priority for me if confirmed and will directly contribute to the
security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.
afghanistan
12. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what was your role in the State
Department's work related to the planned military withdrawal from
Afghanistan?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of Defense planned and managed the
military withdrawal from Afghanistan. As Counselor of the State
Department, my involvement prior to August 15 had been focused
principally on coordinating with allies and partners and negotiations
between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's High Council for National
Reconciliation and the Taliban--efforts led by former Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Khalilzad, and
overall policy questions. I was aware of the Department of State's work
in Afghanistan in other areas but did not direct any of it.
13. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what was your role in the State
Department's work related to the August 2021 emergency evacuation from
Afghanistan?
Mr. Chollet. As I stated in my confirmation hearing, the evacuation
of Afghanistan was an all-hands-on-deck exercise, and I did whatever I
could to try to solve problems, which included working mainly with our
allies and partners as we were coordinating this multinational effort
of the evacuation. As a general advisor, I did not direct any part of
the evacuation.
14. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, who were the principal State
Department officials with whom you worked on matters related to
Afghanistan throughout 2021?
Mr. Chollet. In addition to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretaries,
the Under Secretary for Management and other seventh-floor principals,
I was in frequent contact with Special Representative for Afghanistan
Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and his team.
15. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, who were the main executive branch
officials outside the State Department whom you worked on matters
related to Afghanistan throughout 2021?
Mr. Chollet. I maintained contact with counterparts in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence
community agencies, and National Security Council staff.
16. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, which 7th floor senior officials
at the State Department had significant involvement in work related to
the planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan, and what were their
roles?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of Defense planned and managed the
military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The State Department's role
focused on implications for our diplomatic presence and was led on the
7th floor by the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources and the
Under Secretary for Management.
17. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, which 7th floor senior officials
at the State Department had significant involvement in the August 2021
emergency evacuation, and what were their roles?
Mr. Chollet. The Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources took
the lead on the 7th floor in managing the drawdown of the Embassy and
the relocation of Afghan partners. It was a team effort, however, with
some leaders, including Ambassador Bass, deploying to Kabul and others
working around the clock in Washington. As Counselor of the State
Department, my involvement prior to August 15 had been focused
principally on coordinating with allies and partners and on
negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's High Council
for National Reconciliation and the Taliban--efforts led by former
Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador
Khalilzad, and general, policy issues.
18. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, please list all State Department
meetings related to Afghanistan that you participated in between
January 20, 2021 and September 30, 2021, including the meeting date and
subject.
Mr. Chollet. While I participated in a range of interagency
meetings related to Afghanistan during the period in question, I would
refer you to the White House which controls the records for such
interagency meetings.
19. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, please list all interagency
meetings related to Afghanistan that you participated in between
January 20, 2021 and September 30, 2021, including the meeting date and
subject.
Mr. Chollet. I am unable to provide the list of these meetings in
an unclassified setting. I can confirm that I participated in a range
of interagency and State Department meetings related to Afghanistan
during the period in question.
20. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, there is broad concern within the
Congress about the lack of accountability for the Biden
administration's poor planning for the Afghanistan withdrawal. To what
extent do you accept responsibility?
Mr. Chollet. Every member of any Administration must accept
responsibility for their actions in office--and ultimately, the
American people will ensure accountability for any Presidential
decisions. As I have publicly stated many times, and as someone who has
written several books of diplomatic history, I believe we as a
government must be committed to examining the record thoroughly and
taking a hard look at everything we've done related to Afghanistan--
from day one through the present--and to draw lessons from it so future
generations can learn from our experiences. Given the scope and scale
of our country's sacrifices in Afghanistan--with over 2,400 brave
servicemembers killed, 20,000 injured and $2 trillion in taxpayer
dollars spent--I believe the American people deserve an accounting that
is dispassionate, objective, and based on the facts, not partisanship.
Our country's military, diplomatic, and development efforts in
Afghanistan--which over 20 years involved the decisions of four
Presidents, two Democrat and two Republican--must be examined fully.
That includes not just the end of this conflict in August 2021, but how
we got there: from President Bush's decision to redirect American
resources from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003, to President Obama's
decision to surge American troops into Afghanistan in 2009, to
President Trump's decisions to sign the Doha Agreement establishing a
May 2021 timeline for withdrawal and to significantly reduce the U.S.
force presence during the U.S. Presidential transition in late 2020.
This is why I fully and enthusiastically support Congress' initiative
to establish the Afghan War Commission, and if confirmed, I commit to
ensuring the Defense Department does whatever is necessary to cooperate
fully with the Commission's essential work.
Concerning the first 6 months of the Biden administration,
Secretary Blinken has insisted that the State Department hold itself
accountable by asking the difficult questions and taking a hard look at
its performance. The independent After Action Review conducted by the
State Department--which was released publicly in its unclassified
format and made available to congressional committees in its classified
format--is one of several steps the State Department has taken to hold
itself publicly accountable and learn these critical lessons. Moreover,
current and former senior State Department officials, including me, are
voluntarily participating in congressional efforts to better understand
what happened in the last days of the U.S. military involvement in
Afghanistan.
21. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what do you believe you might have
done or recommended differently?
Mr. Chollet. I believe there are several areas where things could
have been handled differently. For example, there should have been
better planning for worst-case scenarios, such as the sudden collapse
of the Afghan Government; the State Department should have had stronger
crisis management capabilities, which it has sought to develop during
the past 2 years and has applied to recent crises; there should have
been a ``red team'' capability; and there should have been stronger
crisis communications; and there should have been a better process for
senior officials to hear a broad range of views including those
challenging underlying assumptions or policy decisions.
The State Department's After Action Review outlined a list of
specific recommendations to strengthen the Department's crisis
preparedness and response capabilities as well as offered a large
number of lessons learned to apply in any future crises. The Department
has since applied many of these lessons in places where there has been
government instability and conflict--most recently in Sudan, Ethiopia,
Ukraine, and Niger. Today, these lessons involving crisis response and
task force management to facilitate the departure of U.S. citizens is
informing our efforts operating a 24/7 coordinating group to field
requests for assistance from U.S. citizens in Israel and Gaza. Niger.
22. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, prior to the August 2021
withdrawal, did you receive any assessment from the Intelligence
Community regarding the viability of a U.S. Embassy presence in Kabul
if the United States withdrew all its troops from Afghanistan? If so,
when and what did the assessment indicate?
Mr. Chollet. Throughout 2021, the Department of State constantly
assessed the staying power of Afghan government forces and considered
multiple scenarios. As senior officials have testified on multiple
occasions, even the most pessimistic assessments did not predict that
government forces in Kabul would collapse as quickly as they did. The
expectation was that Kabul was well defended and would hold for enough
time to enablea continuation of efforts to broker a peaceful political
settlement.
23. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, at what point did you realize that
the United States would not be able to sustain an embassy in
Afghanistan without U.S. Forces?
Mr. Chollet. The non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) was
announced as Taliban forces were on the outskirts of Kabul.
24. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what, if anything, did you
recommend to Secretary of State Antony Blinken or State Department's
interagency partners if and when you realized this?
Mr. Chollet. It was not definitively clear that an Embassy presence
could not be sustained until Taliban forces were on the outskirts of
Kabul. Until then, there was a consensus among State Department leaders
to continue to support discussions regarding a negotiated political
settlement between leaders of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
the Taliban. With the collapse of the Republic, focus shifted to
executing a rapid and safe evacuation of U.S. citizens and Afghan and
Allied partners, working closely with our DOD colleagues.
25. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in light of the poor State
Department planning that preceded the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and
the 13 servicemembers who were killed during the withdrawal, what would
you say to reassure our servicemembers that you have learned from your
mistakes?
Mr. Chollet. I am proud of the courage and dedication of the
civilians and uniformed service members who answered the call and
executed the evacuation at great personal risk. We are committed to
learning the lessons from the war in Afghanistan, including the
evacuation. I would tell servicemembers that we are heartbroken for
those who lost their lives or were injured in that self-sacrificing
effort.
26. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, how many individuals with known or
suspected ties to terrorists that were later flagged by DOD, did the
State Department evacuate from Afghanistan?
Mr. Chollet. While these issues did not fall within my duties as
Counselor of the Department of State, I have been informed that the
February 15, 2022, Department of Defense Inspector General (IG) report,
``Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan,''
notes that as of November 2, 2021, the U.S. Army's National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC) identified 50 Afghans evacuated on DOD
flights during the 2-week period of the noncombatant evacuation
operation (NEO) in August 2021 who were in the United States with
information in DOD records that would indicate ``potentially
significant security concerns.'' I am told DOD responded and took steps
to implement both of the IG's recommendations, including by updating
the National Ground Intelligence Center's (NGIC) data-sharing agreement
with the Department of Homeland Security and implementing procedures
for sharing derogatory information on Afghan evacuees with DOD and
interagency stakeholders. If confirmed, I will ensure rigorous
screening and vetting processes remain in place to safeguard the
Homeland as we continue the important effort to relocate our former
Afghan allies through the Enduring Welcome program.
27. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, are any of them still in the
United States, to the best of your knowledge?
Mr. Chollet. These issues did not fall within my duties as
Counselor of the Department of State. However, based on information
provided to me from other departments and agencies, to the best of my
knowledge, the answer is yes. From what DOD has shared with me, for the
50 individuals that were initially flagged as being of concern, my
understanding is that NGIC subsequently worked with Department of
Homeland Security, the FBI and other agencies to further assess a wider
range of information held by other agencies, not just DOD, which
mitigated the concern about some of these individuals. I understand our
law enforcement organizations have taken appropriate action to minimize
any risks that may remain from a small number of Afghan evacuees in the
United States. The vast majority of the approximately 65,000 Afghans
who were evacuated during the NEO and eventually resettled in the
United States present no security concerns.
28. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, you have cited as a success the
fact that over 120,000 individuals were evacuated from Afghanistan
during the August 14-31, 2021 U.S. withdrawal. Given the large number
of people whom the U.S. evacuated, why were thousands of U.S citizens
and Afghan left partners behind?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of State is thankful for the
considerable work done by our personnel and interagency colleagues in
evacuating and relocating 120,000 individuals. The Department of State
coordinated and facilitated support for U.S. citizens who requested to
leave Afghanistan, and they were given the utmost priority. The
Administration and the Department of State continue all efforts to
support any U.S. citizens and eligible Afghans who wish to leave
Afghanistan.
29. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, at any point during the chaotic
U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan, did you express concern that the
United States was evacuating many thousands of people from Afghanistan
who were not former partners eligible for Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
or priority status, and whom the U.S. Government had been unable to vet
properly? Why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. Since this vetting process was not part of my
responsibilities as Counselor of the Department of State, I do not
recall raising such concerns. However, I do know that prioritizing SIVs
and properly vetting evacuees was a high priority. At the outset of the
Administration, the State Department quickly worked to address the
backlog of 17,000 SIV applicants that it inherited. Within 2 weeks of
taking office of January 2021, the Secretary restarted the SIV
interview process in Kabul that had been inactive since January 2020.
This proved essential when the deadline to withdraw troops arrived, and
especially after the Afghan government unexpectedly collapsed and the
Administration set to the unprecedented task of safely evacuating
124,000 people. Further supporting the U.S. government's ability to
address the high numbers of evacuations was a global effort coordinated
closely with our allies and partners as evacuees found safe harbor not
only in the United States but with our partners overseas. Ensuring
adequate vetting was central to our approach to putting in place ``lily
pads'' in UAE, Qatar, Kosovo and elsewhere to allow for proper
screening before evacuees entered the United States.
30. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, on August 27, 2021, according to
public reports, the State Department distributed an internal document
highlighting multiple incidents at intake centers where there were
credible suspicions of sexual abuse, including situations in which much
older Afghan men presented young girls to authorities as their
``wives''. The document noted that the State Department had urgently
requested guidance about how to respond to such allegations but had
failed to receive guidance on how to handle these situations. According
to other public reports, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
subsequently concluded that the situation was driven by the
``desperation'' of families to get children out of Afghanistan. On
September 14, 2021, Secretary of State Blinken confirmed to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that there had been ``a limited number of
cases where we have separated people because we were concerned''. How
many cases were there in which people were separated?
Mr. Chollet. Since this issue was not part of my responsibilities
as Counselor of the Department of State, I am not familiar with this
reported internal document and do not know precisely how many such
cases existed. However, from additional details the State Department's
CARE team has offered me, I have been told that staff supporting this
effort applied U.S. marriage and other applicable laws in reviewing
cases where there was suspicion of sexual exploitation or abuse of
minors, including applying U.S. laws prohibiting underage marriage and
informing social services and law enforcement if abuse or exploitation
were detected. Signage with translation was posted throughout centers
informing those arriving from Afghanistan of their rights and
experienced staff were assigned to speak with individuals who showed
signs they may have been the victims of abuse.
In some cases, the Department of State was the lead agency
responsible for implementing these protections, though this task more
frequently fell to the Department of Homeland Security, particularly as
our relocation effort continued through the fall of 2021. The wide
range of departments and agencies involved in the relocation effort, as
well as the individual approach taken to specific situations, and
because separation often occurred for a variety of reasons, means there
is not a recorded number that accurately captures the instances where
individuals were separated explicitly for this concern.
More broadly, I know the State Department takes preventing and
responding to sexual abuse seriously, as outlined the 2023 ``U.S.
National Plan to End Gender-Based Violence,'' the first U.S.
governmentwide plan to prevent and address sexual violence, and related
plans focused on this important topic. As the 2022 ``U.S. Strategy to
Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally'' emphasized, the
United States believes preventing and responding to gender-based
violence around the world is a matter of human rights, and our
commitment to this issue remains steadfast, even as we address a
problem we know remains all too common around the world.
31. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, were you aware that such cases
were occurring?
Mr. Chollet. The Department prioritizes the safety of all evacuees
and is grateful for the work of our Diplomatic Security colleagues, as
well as our interagency colleagues in the Departments of Homeland
Security and Defense in this regard. While I and the Department of
State take allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse seriously, this
issue is not within my duties as Counselor and my performance of those
duties did not touch upon this matter.
32. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what actions did you take
regarding these incidents?
Mr. Chollet. The Department prioritizes the safety of all evacuees
and is thankful for the work of our Diplomatic Security colleagues, as
well as our interagency colleagues in the Departments of Homeland
Security and Defense in this regard. While I and the Department of
State take allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse seriously, this
issue is not within my duties as Counselor and my performance of those
duties did not touch upon this matter.
southwest border security
33. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, despite significant differences
between Presidents Trump and Biden on border security, President Biden
has maintained the southwest border deployment that President Trump
initiated. If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, would
you recommend that the southwest border deployment continue? Why or why
not?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
requested DOD support to carry out its border security mission at the
southern land border for most of the last 23 years. If confirmed, I
would recommend that DOD continue to support DHS requests, to the
extent legal, feasible, and appropriate. In addition, if confirmed, I
would also recommend that DOD continue to work closely with DHS to
close the gaps in DHS capabilities and capacity to carry out its border
security mission.
34. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what role do you believe that DOD
should play in bolstering security along our southwest border?
Mr. Chollet. DOD's role is a supporting role. In the absence of
foreign military forces and actions, border security is a law
enforcement matter assigned by law to DHS. When DHS capabilities and/or
capacity are insufficient to meet DHS's border security mission, DHS
may, consistent with the law, request DOD assistance. DOD evaluates six
factors when considering a request for assistance: (1) legality; (2)
lethality; (3) risk; (4) cost; (5) appropriateness; and (6) readiness.
If the Secretary of Defense, or a delegee, approves the request for
assistance, DOD determines the appropriate capabilities, resources, and
forces necessary to provide the requested assistance. DOD personnel
providing DOD assistance remain under DOD command and control at all
times.
35. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, according to a recent Department
of Homeland Security report, which was reported by Politico, illegal
drugs produced in Mexico remains the deadliest threat to Americans,
killing more people nationwide than foreign or domestic terrorists. Do
you believe that the Department of Defense is doing enough to counter
fentanyl? If not, what would you recommend that the Department do
differently to counter the cartels' fentanyl trafficking?
Mr. Chollet. I believe the Department is appropriately focused on
supporting DOD's interagency and international law enforcement partners
in their efforts to counter fentanyl, in accordance with the
authorities and funding provided by Congress.
The top priority of DOD's counterdrug program is to ``Disrupt and
degrade the flow of heroin, fentanyl, and amphetamine-type like
stimulants, chiefly from Mexico, by fusing intelligence and disrupting
links among drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations,
with a focus on the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel
(CJNG) networks.''
DOD's counterdrug program, with a Fiscal Year 2023 budget of $855M
of which 59 percent is dedicated to efforts in the Western Hemisphere,
executes this priority goal by supporting other Departments' and
Agencies' efforts to investigate and interdict, arrest, seize, and
sanction CJNG and Sinaloa members and facilitators, precursor
chemicals, pill presses, die molds, containers, money laundering, and
weapons trafficking. DOD intelligence analysis is used to identify key
connections across the fentanyl precursor supply chain, illuminate key
players (cartel leaders, money launderers, chemists, brokers, chemical
companies), identify shell companies and associated financial accounts,
and provide new investigative leads for partner agencies.
If confirmed, I will review the Department's efforts, assess the
Department's support, and identify any opportunities to improve the
Department's support.
36. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what role should DOD play in the
effort to counter Mexico's criminal cartels?
Mr. Chollet. DOD should continue support to its U.S. law
enforcement partners as part of a governmentwide effort to disrupt
these cartels, in accordance with the counterdrug authorities provided
by Congress. DOD's intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting is
used to enable and assist DOD's U.S. Government partners in disrupting
and degrading these networks, not just in Mexico but wherever they
operate globally.
37. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in your opinion, what special
capabilities does DOD bring to that effort?
Mr. Chollet. DOD brings skill sets that are not typically found
with interagency partners. DOD's global footprint and corresponding
intelligence collection, analytic, and linguistic capabilities, as well
as DOD's experience in identifying, mapping, and planning to disrupt
networks, are the primary tools DOD brings to this effort. If
confirmed, I look forward to assessing the breadth of DOD support to
the mission.
38. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in February, the Senate Armed
Services Committee learned that DOD was paying $130,000 per day to
store unused border construction materials, rather than using those
materials to fix or extend the southwest border. This means that tens
of millions of dollars were spent to do literally nothing--all while
our border remained woefully insecure. Despite multiple inquiries from
the Republican members on this Committee, as well as legislation--the
FINISH IT Act--that was adopted on a bipartisan basis in both the House
and Senate NDAA bills, we learned last month that DOD is auctioning off
the materials at cut rates, rather than using them to secure our
border. While we are still awaiting a fuller accounting from DOD, we
learned, for example, that $4.4 million worth of border wall
construction materials was auctioned off for a mere $156,000--roughly 4
cents on the dollar. Would you agree that paying to store border wall
construction materials rather than using those materials to fix or
extend the southwest border wall, is an example of Government waste?
Why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. Having not worked on this issue in my capacity at the
State Department and given the limited context provided in the
question, I would need more background information before providing the
full response you deserve. But in formulating my response, here are
just some of the questions that I would ask:
1) What did the law require? How do the actions align with the
Administration's policy goals?
2) Could the construction materials be used by another government
agency?
3) Were there alternative and more effective means available to
secure the border?
4) How much would it cost to use these materials to erect a border
barrier and do funds need to be appropriated for that purpose?
5) What was in the best interest of national security? The American
taxpayer?
If confirmed, and if asked to provide information on this subject
to Congress, I would want to seek answers to these questions to be
fully informed in order to provide complete and accurate answers to
your important questions. Furthermore, I understand that the House and
Senate have adopted provisions regarding excess border wall
construction materials in their respective versions of the Fiscal Year
2024 National Defense Authorization Act. Should either provision be
enacted, I commit to ensuring that the Department will act in
accordance with the law if I am confirmed.
More generally, if confirmed, I will work to prevent waste, fraud,
and abuse within the programs under my purview, and I commit to
cooperating with any efforts by the Department of Defense Inspector
General, the Government Accountability Office, and relevant
congressional oversight committees should they conduct reviews of such
matters.
39. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, irrespective of your views on the
role that the Department of Defense should specifically play on the
border, do you believe that a physical barrier along the southwest
border should be one component of a broader border security strategy?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, in my opinion a physical barrier along the
relevant areas of the southwest border should continue to be one
component of a broader border security strategy. More broadly, border
security is a law enforcement responsibility assigned by Congress to
DHS. I defer to DHS to address the role a physical barrier might play
in DHS's broader border security strategy. If confirmed, I will have
the opportunity to work with relevant DOD Components and DHS to assess
whether physical barriers affect DHS requests for DOD support.
40. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, to what extent do you consider
southwest border security pertinent to overall Homeland defense?
Mr. Chollet. Homeland defense is the defense of the United States
from external military threats or aggression. To the extent that DHS
efforts to secure the southwest border also counter, or contribute to
countering, external military threats or aggression, such efforts would
be pertinent and complementary.
41. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
visiting the southwest border within your first 30 days on the job, and
reporting back to the Committee on your observations?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to visit
DOD personnel deployed to support DHS at the southwest border as soon
as possible and share my observations with the Committee.
syria
42. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, you defended President Obama's
decision not to enforce his own ``red line'' regarding the Assad
regime's use of chemical weapons in 2013. You wrote in an excerpt of
your book that Politico published, ``Judged by what the red line was
originally intended to do--address the massive threat from Syria's
chemical weapons--it was a success. In fact, it has been perhaps the
only positive development related to the Syria crisis.'' However, we
now know that Assad never relinquished his chemical weapons--in fact he
used them against civilians on at least two other occasions. Do you
still consider President Obama's decision a success? Why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. As a result of Syria's accession to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 2118, over 1,300 tons of chemical warfare agent were
verifiably destroyed, and Syria was required to dismantle thousands of
strategic munitions and over 20 sites involved in its chemical weapons
program. The Biden Administration has made clear it will continue to
press for the complete verified destruction of Syria's chemical weapons
and production facilities, and maintain pressure on the Assad regime,
including through the mechanisms provided for under the CWC and UNSCR
2118.
43. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in retrospect, do you believe that
President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry were mistaken in
trusting that Russia would be a credible partner in removing chemical
weapons from Syria? Why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. The Russian Federation has proven it cannot be a
credible partner in this effort. Russia was and remains influential
with the Assad regime on issues related to Syrian chemical weapons.
Unfortunately, Russia tries to impede and continues to block, when
possible, international efforts, including at the U.N. Security
Council, to hold the Assad regime accountable for repeated usage of
chemical weapons. The United States also assesses that Russia helped
the Assad regime cover up the use of chemical weapons against the
Syrian people, including in Douma in 2018.
iran
44. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, during his confirmation hearing in
January 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Biden
administration would return to compliance with the 2015 Iran deal if
Iran did the same, and then ``use that as a platform with our allies
and partners who would once again be on the same side with us to seek a
longer and stronger agreement'' \1\. A ``longer and stronger'' deal
would have theoretically addressed the broader spectrum of U.S.
concerns regarding Iran, to include its support for terrorism and its
missile program, and also eliminated the sunset clauses. But under Iran
envoy Robert Malley, there was no apparent effort toward a ``longer and
stronger'' deal. Meanwhile, Iran has made significant progress toward a
nuclear weapons capability. In February 2023, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Colin Kahl testified that Iran could produce enough
fissile material for a bomb in ``about 12 days''. Looking back on the
administration's approach, what would you have done differently?
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Mr. Chollet. President Biden has made clear this Administration
will continue to utilize all available means at its disposal to ensure
Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, constrain Iran's support to
militias and terrorist groups, and counter its missile and UAV
programs. I believe the Administration's effort to reunite our allies
to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear threat was the
right one. That included using the considerable leverage we inherited,
as well as developing additional leverage in the form of new sanctions,
to force Iran back to the negotiating table. Regrettably, last year
Iran walked away from a deal supported by all sides to return to JCPOA
after months of careful consultations that would have laid the
groundwork for a longer and stronger arrangement. In the absence of
Iran's cooperation, the Administration continues to coordinate closely
with a range of allies and partners, including the E3 and EU, to
counter Iran's nuclear and missile programs through actions such as
using domestic measures to replicate the impact of expiring provisions
of UNSCR 2231 on transfers of certain missile related technology and
UAVs, disrupting weapons shipments, and holding Iran to account at the
IAEA. Importantly, the Administration has also continued to ensure that
all options remain on the table to address the Iranian threat.
U.S. sanctions targeting Iran for its support of terrorism and
destabilizing activities in the region remain in full effect and we
will continue to enforce them and to look for ways to enhance their
effectiveness. Diplomacy is a valuable tool in the United States'
foreign policy and national security toolkit for achieving a
sustainable, effective result, but unfortunately, Iran has not yet
shown itself to be serious about engaging diplomatically with the
international community to address its concerns over its nuclear
program. If confirmed to serve in the Department of Defense, I will
ensure we are preparing for all possible contingencies across the U.S.
Government and in full coordination with our partners and allies.
45. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, the Trump administration
bequeathed President Biden significant sanctions leverage with Iran
under the ``maximum pressure'' policy. In retrospect, do you believe
that this leverage should have been used to pursue a ``longer and
stronger'' deal up front, rather than attempting to return to the
original deal whose limitations on Iran's nuclear activities will soon
expire?
Mr. Chollet. I believe Iran should never be allowed to obtain a
nuclear weapon--and since coming into office, the Biden Administration
has imposed new sanctions on Iran and has tried to use that significant
leverage to address the issue through diplomacy. I believe that
approach was right to pursue. While the JCPOA expiration date allowed
for continuous negotiations on extending the deal, now that the United
States is no longer a party to the deal, a robust deal must be agreed
to that would impose additional limitations on Iran's nuclear
activities. Nevertheless, given the current regional crisis, there is
no near-term prospect for a new diplomatic agreement further limiting
Iran's nuclear program.
46. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, on April 21, 2023, U.S. Special
Envoy for Iran Robert Malley's clearance was suspended. Congress
learned of this from the media in late June, and it was only thereafter
that Mr. Malley appears to have been placed on unpaid leave. Nearly 5
months after Mr. Malley's clearance was suspended, we still do not know
the reasons for the clearance suspension, whether Mr. Malley was
conducting official business illegally while on leave, and whether the
Biden administration intends for him to return. When did you first
learn that Mr. Malley's clearance had been suspended?
Mr. Chollet. As these matters do not come within my duties as
Counselor, what I know of them has come from public reporting and press
statements of the Department of State.
47. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what can you share about the
reasons for Mr. Malley's clearance suspension? Please answer in a
classified response if necessary.
Mr. Chollet. I reiterate that I have no knowledge of this personnel
matter beyond what has been in the public record, and that includes the
reasons for Mr. Malley's clearance suspension, which I have only read
about in media reports. I would refer you to the proper authorities in
the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security for further
information.
48. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, at what point did Mr. Malley's
deputy, Abram Paley, assume responsibility as Acting Special Envoy?
Mr. Chollet. My understanding is that Robert Malley is the Special
Envoy for Iran and is currently on leave, that Abram Paley is the
Deputy Special Envoy for Iran performing the day-to-day duties of the
Special Envoy for Iran, and that Mr. Paley is not the Acting Special
Envoy for Iran as Robert Malley remains encumbering that position,
though on leave.
49. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in retrospect, do you believe that
the State Department should have notified Congress of Mr. Malley's
status sooner?
Mr. Chollet. I have no knowledge of this personnel matter other
than what has been in the public record, and that includes what the
appropriate State Department officials knew regarding Mr. Malley's
situation or when Congress was informed. What I can unequivocally
commit to is that, if confirmed, I will treat Congress as the full
partner you are, I will be straight with you, will be accessible, will
be responsive in a timely manner, and will hold myself to account to
meet our shared objectives to make this country safe, secure, and
prosperous. This absolutely includes notifying Congress when senior
officials have their security clearances revoked as early in the
process as the law allows.
50. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in retrospect, do you believe that
the State Department should have placed Mr. Malley on unpaid leave
sooner?
Mr. Chollet. I reiterate that I have no knowledge of this personnel
matter outside of what has been in the public record, and that includes
what the appropriate State Department officials knew regarding Mr.
Malley's situation, when they knew it, and what they did about it.
Since such personnel matters are outside my responsibilities as
Counselor of the Department of State, I am not familiar with what the
law and personnel policies outline regarding placing employees on
unpaid leave. However, as a general matter, I believe that on these
kinds of personnel matters one should follow the guidance and
recommendations of those responsible for implementing those policies.
51. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, according to Iran International,
former U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley attempted to appoint
Ali Vaez, an alleged member of the Iranian Government-linked Iran
Experts Initiative, to a position on the State Department's Iran
negotiating team. However, according to the publication, Mr. Vaez was
unable to obtain a security clearance. \2\ Is it accurate that Mr. Vaez
was considered for a position at the State Department while you were
serving as State Department counselor, and is it true that he was
denied a security clearance?
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Mr. Chollet. I am not familiar with this report or was aware of any
consideration or process involving the possible hiring of Mr. Vaez at
the State Department, so have no knowledge about the alleged security
review referenced in the question or anything that may have resulted
from any review.
52. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in your view, should someone who
knowingly participates in an Iranian-Government information operation
be disqualified from obtaining a security clearance to work in a U.S.
national security position? Why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. While I have never had the authority or responsibility
to investigate or grant security clearances, in my view, I believe if a
person knowingly participates in an Iranian Government information
operation they should be disqualified from obtaining a security
clearance. It is incumbent on any national security professional to
practice sound operational security and refer concerns to the
appropriate security officers and authorities. Certainly, if I had
evidence a colleague were a foreign agent or otherwise under improper
influence of a foreign government, I would immediately refer my
concerns to the appropriate security officers and authorities do
exactly that. However, the ultimate decision to disqualify someone from
holding a security clearance rests with those charged with
investigating allegations and who have access to the complete set of
facts surrounding a case. While I have undergone numerous background
investigations and continuous vetting for my own security clearance
during the past 30 years serving in the government across different
positions and agencies, I have never served in a position with the
authority and access to make those decisions. I take safeguarding our
national security very seriously and would not choose to overstep and
make decisions I do not have the authority to make.
53. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, Iran and its terrorist proxies,
continue to target U.S. citizens, including former U.S. officials, for
assassination in the United States. Do you believe that it would be
appropriate for the Biden administration to lift sanctions on Iran
while it continues to target Americans for murder here in the United
States? Why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. This Administration has not lifted U.S. sanctions on
Iran and will continue to rigorously enforce these sanctions. Over 190
individuals and entities have been sanctioned this year alone. All
available means to protect U.S. citizens, both here at home and abroad,
from Iranian threats, will be utilized, in consultation with allies and
partners as concerted efforts to deter, contain, and counter Iranian
provocations continue.
54. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI)
was recently reported to be a foreign influence operation by the
Iranian Foreign Ministry. While serving in Government, have you ever
been contacted by a member of IEI?
Mr. Chollet. I am aware of recent media reports regarding the so-
called ``Iran Experts Initiative,'' but had not heard of it until those
reports. In my capacity as State Department Counselor, I met once with
the International Crisis Group's president and leadership, which
included Mr. Ali Vaez. I met once with Ms. Ariane Tabatabai as a
``courtesy call'' as she was departing the State Department. I am aware
that these same reports associated Mr. Vaez and Ms. Tabatabai with this
so-called ``Iran Experts Initiative.''
55. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, have you ever engaged in any way
with a member of the IEI?
Mr. Chollet. See the response to question 54 above.
56. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, are you aware are of anyone under
your leadership who has engaged with a member of IEI?
Mr. Chollet. No.
57. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if yes, did you support their
engagement or address it in some way?
Mr. Chollet. The answer to question #56 renders this question not
applicable.
58. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, have you ever engaged with a
member of IEI outside of your time as a senior U.S. Government
official?
Mr. Chollet. To the best of my recollection, I have not had any
interaction with the so called ``Iran Experts Initiative (IEI)''
outside of my time as a senior U.S. Government official.
59. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, please list and detail any
engagements or contacts you have had with members of the Iranian
Government since the end of the Obama administration.
Mr. Chollet. I have not knowingly had any interaction with any
members of the Iranian Government.
60. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, did content produced by IEI
affiliates, including the International Crisis Group, influence efforts
to complete the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?
Mr. Chollet. During my tenure as a U.S. Government official, my
observation has consistently been that critical decisions pertaining to
U.S. national security, such as the 2015 U.S. decision to enter the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), are based on a range of
official U.S. Government assessments of what is in the best interests
of U.S. national security. The JCPOA, which was reached following
nearly 2 years of rigorous and principled diplomacy between the P5+1
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany) and
Iran, was a long-term political arrangement that constrained Iran's
nuclear activities and increased international verification and
monitoring of the program to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon.
61. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, have you interacted with any of
the following individuals in your capacity as a senior Government
official?
i. Ariane Tabatabai
ii. Adnan Tabatabai
iii. Ali Vaez
iv. Dina Esfandiary
v. Saeed Khatibzadeh
vi. Mostafa Zahrani
Mr. Chollet. See the response to question 54 above.
62. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, have you ever discussed classified
information with Ali Vaez, Ariane Tabatabai, or Adnan Tabatabai? If
yes, what would be the implications of that information being shared
with Iranian officials? If necessary, you may respond in a classified
format.
Mr. Chollet. I have never discussed classified information with any
of the persons referenced in the question.
63. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, have you received briefings or
read intelligence reports on Iranian influence operations against the
United States?
Mr. Chollet. While I cannot discuss in the public record the
specifics of intelligence reports I receive, I am well aware of our
adversaries' efforts to project malign influence and undermine our
democracy. We are seeing the prospect for a much more significant
escalation targeting U.S. forces and personnel across the Middle East
region in the near term coming from Iranian proxy militants--and
ultimately from Iran. For that reason, we stand ready to continuing to
defend and respond decisively, whenever necessary, in the event of an
escalation targeting U.S. personnel and interests.
64. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, did any of these briefings concern
Iranian efforts to manipulate or co-opt progressive or pro-Iran nuclear
deal academics and experts?
Mr. Chollet. While I cannot discuss in the public record the
specifics of intelligence reports I receive, to the best of my
knowledge, I do not recall any briefing on Iranian efforts to
manipulate or co-opt so-called progressive or pro-Iran nuclear deal
academics and experts. However, I can unequivocally say that this
Administration is committed to doing everything it can to counter
threats posed by Iran's malign activities and influence. As Secretary
Blinken has said, the United States does not seek conflict with Iran,
but if Iran or its proxies attack U.S. personnel anywhere, we will
defend our people and our security swiftly and decisively. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to ensure that the United
States has everything it needs to counter threats posed by Iran and
protect our national security.
65. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you think it is inappropriate
for U.S. Government officials to seek guidance from the Iranian Foreign
Ministry or any Iranian national before attending events?
Mr. Chollet. U.S. Government personnel are required to follow all
relevant security and counterintelligence guidelines and requirements
pertaining to contacts with Iranian nationals set by their agencies.
Pursuant to Department of State policy, with limited exceptions, U.S.
Government employees are not authorized to meet with Iranian diplomats
or officials without prior Department of State approval.
66. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you think it is inappropriate
for U.S. Government officials to consult the Iranian Foreign Ministry
or any Iranian national before briefing Congress?
Mr. Chollet. U.S. Government personnel are required to follow all
relevant security and counterintelligence guidelines and requirements
pertaining to contacts with Iranian nationals set by their agencies.
Pursuant to Department of State policy, with limited exceptions, U.S.
Government employees are not authorized to meet with Iranian diplomats
or officials without prior Department of State approval.
67. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed as Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, how would you address reports that your
subordinates engaged in inappropriate contact with foreign officials
and/or foreign nationals, especially from designated State sponsors of
terrorism?
Mr. Chollet. An individual's possession of a security clearance,
access to classified information, and the trust and confidence of
national security decisionmakers must be carefully managed. In response
to reports that a subordinate engaged in inappropriate contact with
foreign officials and/or foreign nationals, I would immediately consult
with the Department's security professionals to take appropriate
precautions, undertake any necessary investigations, and direct any
follow-on actions identified from the investigation.
68. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed as Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, what would your policy be for your subordinates to
engage with foreign officials and/or foreign nationals, especially from
designated State sponsors of terrorism?
Mr. Chollet. U.S. Government officials at all levels have a
responsibility to use sound judgment in their official and personal
contacts. If confirmed, my policy would be that subordinates should
engage in their official capacity with foreign officials and/or foreign
nationals only as required by their official duties. Further, if
confirmed, my policy would be that any contact on the part of
subordinates in their personal capacity with foreign officials and/or
foreign nationals be conducted in accordance with U.S. law and U.S.
Government policy, that subordinates fully comply with all Department
of Defense requirements to self report to Policy's Security Office
those contacts, and that those contacts will be considered as part of
DOD's Continuous Evaluation program.
taiwan
69. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
uphold Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's testimony in front of the
Senate Armed Services Committee that the Biden administration will
request replenishment funds to replace defense articles transferred to
Taiwan as part of the Biden administration's decision to utilize
Presidential drawdown authority?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. If confirmed, I will advocate that the
Department's existing security assistance authorities be complemented
by adequate appropriations.
chinese spy balloon
70. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, General Glen VanHerck, Commander
of U.S. Northern Command, has testified before this Committee that he
detected the Chinese surveillance balloon, and notified his chain of
command, on January 27, 2023, but did not discuss response options with
Secretary Austin until February 1--5 days later. It remains unclear
when the Secretary of Defense and President learned of the balloon, and
why response options were not presented and considered sooner--such as
when the balloon was hovering over unpopulated parts of Alaska and
Canada.
If confirmed, do you promise to examine why it took so long for the
Department to present options to the President and Secretary and
identify the senior officials who were responsible for this delay?
Mr. Chollet. The mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) is to consistently provide responsive,
forward-thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the
Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with
national security objectives. Although I have no knowledge of the facts
and circumstances described in the question above, if confirmed, I
pledge to encourage communication across the Department as such
communication relates to the OUSD(P) portfolio.
71. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you commit to share these
findings with the Senate Armed Services Committee in an unclassified
form, with a classified annex if necessary?
Mr. Chollet. In accordance with DOD Instruction 5400.04,
``Provision of Information to Congress,'' it is essential to the proper
functioning of the U.S. Government that Congress receives adequate
information concerning all Government programs and operations. I am
committed to working in good faith to accommodate this Committee's
requests for information while taking care to preserve sensitive
executive branch confidentiality interests.
72. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in the early days of the Chinese
spy balloon crisis, the State Department appeared eager to downplay it,
because Beijing's actions jeopardized Secretary Blinken's planned trip
to China, which was subsequently canceled. It would be useful to
understand more clearly what was happening at State Department during
that period, since you were serving as counselor there. To the best of
your recollection, when did either Secretary of State Blinken or Deputy
Secretary of State Wendy Sherman first learn that a Chinese
surveillance balloon was hovering over North America?
Mr. Chollet. While I am unable to discuss here the details of
sensitive military intelligence, what I can say is the U.S. Government
was tracking the balloon for some time as we were aware of its
movements the entire time it was in U.S. airspace. Although I was not
directly involved in this issue, based on my recollection, Secretary
Blinken was prepared to depart for Beijing on the evening of February 3
for a long-planned visit to the PRC, as a follow-on to the meeting
between President Biden and President Xi in Bali last November. On that
day, he instead conveyed to PRC State Councilor and Director of the CCP
Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi that he would postpone his
travel to the PRC in light of the unacceptable presence of the PRC
high-altitude surveillance balloon in U.S. airspace. I understand the
Department of Defense has provided written communication to the
committee on this matter.
73. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, did senior State Department
leadership engage the Chinese Government during that crisis? If so,
when, and what did the State Department convey to the Chinese
Government?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, Secretary Blinken conveyed to PRC then-State
Councilor and Director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang
Yi on a February 3 telephone call that this was an irresponsible act
and a clear violation of U.S. sovereignty and international law. As I
recall, Secretary Blinken then informed Wang Yi he was postponing his
trip to Beijing until conditions would allow for it. Our former Deputy
Secretary Wendy Sherman, who at the time was leading our PRC efforts
internally, also made clear to PRC officials the presence of the
surveillance balloon in our airspace was irresponsible and
unacceptable. This same message was delivered to PRC senior levels in
Washington and Beijing. Secretary Blinken also had an exceptionally
direct exchange with Wang Yi on the margins of the Munich Security
Conference on February 18, where he relayed such an incursion must
never happen again. To manage the competition between our two
countries, our approach is to maintain open lines of communication with
the PRC at all time--including this incident.
74. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, looking back on the Chinese
surveillance balloon crisis, what, if anything, do you believe the
State Department should have done differently?
Mr. Chollet. Even before the successful operation to take down the
PRC's surveillance balloon, Secretary Blinken's decision to postpone
his visit was a significant blow to the PRC's propaganda and signaled
the Administration's position clearly to Beijing and the rest of the
world. The State Department rapidly briefed allies and partners around
the world to expose the PRC's global program. The Secretary similarly
brought a powerful message of accountability to his meeting with his
PRC counterpart at the Munich Security Conference later that month when
he condemned the incursion of the PRC surveillance balloon and stressed
it must never happen again. The State Department's response
demonstrated the importance of our close coordination with allies and
partners, and the necessity of maintaining open channels of
communication.
race and diversity
75. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in your book you refer several
times to ``systemic racism'' in the foreign policy community. Please
define the term ``systemic racism''.
Mr. Chollet. The Cambridge Dictionary defines systemic racism as
``the policies and practices that exist throughout a whole society or
organization, and that result in and support a continued unfair
advantage to some people and unfair or harmful treatment of others
based on race.'' \3\
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\3\ https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
systemic-racism
76. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in your view, was it
``systemically racist'' to disagree with President Obama's foreign
policy decisions?
Mr. Chollet. There are many legitimate criticisms of President
Obama's foreign policy--I have made many myself, in writing. So, I do
not believe that disagreements with President Obama's foreign policy
represent systemic racism.
77. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you think the U.S. military is
systemically racist?
Mr. Chollet. I do not.
78. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, you were quoted by The New York
Times as saying, ``The Army in particular is a pretty bubba-oriented
system.'' What did you mean by that?
Mr. Chollet. This article is about the importance of diversity and
leadership throughout the Armed Forces. I was stressing the importance
of senior leaders making that a priority.
79. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you believe the Army officer
promotion process is systemically racist?
Mr. Chollet. I do not. I believe it is critically important that we
have diversity in leadership throughout the Armed Forces.
80. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you think the Army should
consider an officer's race when making promotion decisions?
Mr. Chollet. I believe it is critically important that we have
diversity in leadership throughout the Armed Forces.
81. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, would you consider
an individual's race when making hiring or promotion decisions?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I commit to hiring the most experienced,
respected, and effective individuals to carry out the wide range of
roles throughout the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
82. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, how would you
approach personnel-related decisions in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I would approach personnel decisions
with the goal of recruiting and retaining a talented national security
workforce. I would seek advice from the Department's human resources
and legal experts to ensure decisions are consistent with applicable
laws, regulations, and policies.
83. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, during your tenure as the
Counselor to the Secretary of State, the Department of State
established a new mandatory requirement to denote an individual's
gender pronouns on e-mail platforms. If confirmed, would you require
similar mandatory requirements to denote an individual's gender
pronouns on e-mail platforms?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I commit to following all human resource
and personnel policies set forth by the Secretary of Defense or his
designees.
84. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if so, which gender pronouns will
be available for individuals to choose from?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I commit to following all human resource
and personnel policies set forth by the Secretary of Defense or his
designees.
personnel decisions at state department
85. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in 2022, while you served as the
Counselor to the Secretary of State, Rachel Odell--a Department of
State employee--publicly participated in a Quincy Institute event and
stated that the United States should focus less on military power in
the Indo-Pacific as part of a broader rapprochement with the People's
Republic of China. Ms. Odell's remarks clearly contradicted the Biden
administration's stated policy that the People's Republic of China is
the ``pacing challenge'' and that military power remains critical to
advancing the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Do you agree that
military power remains critical to advancing the vision of a free and
open Indo-Pacific region? Please begin your answer with yes or no.
Mr. Chollet. Yes, military power remains critical to advancing the
vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. Indo-Pacific
Strategy requires a whole of government approach, which also requires
leveraging military capability and capacity across land, air, sea,
space, and cyberspace. A free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific can
only be achieved in a stable and secure region, where governments can
make their own sovereign choices and the region's seas and skies are
governed and used according to international law. The United States is
focused on enhancing our capabilities to defend these interests and
deter aggression against U.S. territory as well as that of our allies
and partners.
86. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, did your staff in the Office of
the Counselor clear Ms. Odell's remarks for the 2022 Quincy Institute
event?
Mr. Chollet. Not that I am aware of, as my office is not required
to clear on such remarks.
87. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you agree that Ms. Odell's
remarks contradicts the Biden administration's stated policy objective
of strengthening U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Chollet. While I strongly support the Administration's policy
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, I cannot comment on individual
views that are part of an internal personnel matter.
88. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, please provide a comprehensive
list of individuals who were appointed to positions in the State
Department despite having their nominations for other Biden
administration positions returned by the U.S. Senate. For each
individual, please specify the position to which he/she was nominated,
how many times the U.S. Senate returned his/her nomination, the
authority under which the individual was hired to the non-confirmable
position, and a brief description of the specific subject-matter
qualifications that made the individual who was denied U.S. Senate
confirmation an appropriate hire for this non-confirmable position.
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor of the State Department do not
include such personnel matters, however the below was provided to me
from the State Department's Bureau of Global Talent Management:
Dilawar Syed: Syed was nominated in March 2021 to serve as Deputy
Administrator of the Small Business Administration. This nomination was
returned twice, but he was ultimately confirmed in June 2023. Syed
served in the State Department in an NC-SES position as the Special
Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs from February 2022-
June 2023. He was deeply qualified for the role having served as an
entrepreneur and CEO of several tech companies. He also was the
founding Chair of the California Entrepreneurship Task Force and was
asked to help lead Silicon Valley's pandemic economic recovery as a
member of the Silicon Valley Recovery Roundtable. Syed holds an MBA
from the Wharton School and a BA in Economics and Computer Science from
the University of Texas at Austin.
Tamara Wittes: Dr. Wittes was nominated in July 2021 to serve as
the U.S. Agency for International Development's Assistant Administrator
for the Middle East. Her nomination was returned once. She currently
serves in an NC-SES position at the State Department as the Director of
the Office of Foreign Assistance and previously served as a Senior
Advisor in the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator. Dr. Wittes is
deeply qualified for both roles, having previously served as a DAS for
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at State and in numerous roles at
the Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and the
National Democratic Institute. She is a founder of the Leadership
Council for Women in National Security and served on the board of the
National Democratic Institute. She is also a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and Women in International Security.
Calvin Smyre: Smyre was nominated in May 2022 and January 2023 to
serve as the Ambassador to Bahamas. His nomination was returned once.
He currently serves as a United States Public Delegate to the 78th
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Smyre is deeply
qualified for this role, having served for 48 years as an elected State
Representative in the Georgia General Assembly. He is the recipient of
numerous awards, including the congressional Black Caucus' prestigious
Phoenix Award, being named twice as ``Citizen of the Year'' in his
hometown of Columbus, Georgia, and he has been inducted into Georgia
Trend Magazine`s Business Hall of Fame.
Janet Keller: Janet Keller was nominated in March 2022 to serve as
Member of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.
Her nomination was returned once. Ms. Keller serves as United States
Public Delegate to the 78th Session of the General Assembly of the
United States. Ms. Keller is deeply qualified for this role. In 1990,
she founded Keller Consultants, which provides strategic advice to
candidates, campaigns, and private clients in support of their
political and philanthropic interests. In 2000, Keller was appointed by
Governor Gray Davis to serve for 6 years as a member of the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board which seeks to preserve, enhance,
and restore California's water resources. During the second term of the
Obama-Biden Administration, she served as a member of the President's
Committee on the Arts and the Humanities. Keller also served as
Secretary and a member of the Executive Committee and Board of
Directors of the California Partners Project. Ms. Keller graduated from
the University of San Diego with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Science.
89. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, according to Jonathan Guyer of
Vox, more than 30 Biden administration appointees previously worked at
WestExec, a relatively small consulting firm founded by current
Secretary of State Antony Blinken.\4\ On its website, WestExec shows a
map of the White House that shows the ``road to the Situation Room'',
clearly signaling that business with WestExec could be the ``road to
the Situation Room''. It has also been reported that many former Biden
administration officials have taken positions at WestExec since leaving
the current administration.\5\
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\4\ https://twitter.com/mideastXmidwest/status/1692279666206285848
\5\ https://twitter.com/mideastXmidwest/status/1692285094134792463
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As the Counselor to the Secretary of State, did you have any
official contact with any members of WestExec? If so, for what purpose?
Mr. Chollet. In my official capacity as Counselor of the State
Department, I spoke once with West Exec Co-Founder Michele Flournoy in
her personal capacity in the summer of 2021, prior to her making a
press appearance about the NATO Summit. This engagement was to assist
her in knowing accurate information as to the Administration's
positions in this regard. I have also solicited her advice about the
role of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
90. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, will you commit to
following every guideline, as specifically outlined in 18 U.S. Code 207
and in other parts of U.S. Code, with respect to post-government
employment ethics?
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
north korea policy and personnel
91. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, Ambassador Sung Kim, the Special
Representative for North Korea, is currently dual-hatted as the U.S.
Ambassador to Indonesia. Deputy Special Representative for North Korea
Jung Pak is currently dual-hatted as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Do you agree that North Korea remains one of the most pressing national
security challenges for the United States?
Mr. Chollet. North Korea continues to be a pressing national
security challenge for the United States. The rapid progress that North
Korea has made in both its nuclear and ballistic missile programs
represents an increased threat to the U.S. Homeland and our Republic of
Korea and Japan Allies. Moreover, advances in cruise and solid-fueled
missile systems present a growing security challenge to U.S. forces and
U.S. security goals in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD
will continue to prioritize planning against the North Korean threat.
92. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you agree that North Korea
policy is a demanding issue and requires significant coordination with
interagency partners and foreign government officials?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. North Korea policy has become an even more
demanding issue, given the high pace of missile testing activity, North
Korea's relationship with the People's Republic of China, and,
concerningly, its reinvigorated relationship with Russia. If confirmed,
I will continue to support strong interagency coordination, and further
deepen efforts with allies and partners, principally the Republic of
Korea and Japan, to take concrete actions to deter North Korean
provocation and aggression, and to assure Allies of our extended
deterrence commitments.
93. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you agree that it is hard to
oversee all aspects of North Korea policy from 11 time zones away from
Washington?
Mr. Chollet. Special Representative Sung Kim and Deputy Special
Representative Dr. Jung Pak work together to ensure that DPRK policy is
fully covered in both Washington and Asia, and their dual-hatted
portfolios are not mutually exclusive, allowing them to address all
issues in their area of responsibility simultaneously. Having Special
Representative Kim in Jakarta has been advantageous in that it allows
him to coordinate in real-time with his counterparts in the Republic of
Korea and Japan, including when developing rapid responses to DPRK
missile launches and other provocations.
94. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what percentage of Ambassador
Kim's time is spent on North Korea policy?
Mr. Chollet. Ambassador Kim works closely with EAP Assistant
Secretary Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Southeast Asia Melissa Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jung Pak, U.S.
Mission to Indonesia Staff, the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia
Affairs, and the Office of Korean and Mongolian Affairs at the
Department of State to achieve our priorities with respect to the DPRK
and the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. The Ambassador calibrates the
amount of time he spends on any given issue based on the amount of
attention it requires and is able to address all issues in his area of
responsibility simultaneously.
95. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what percentage of Ambassador
Kim's time is spent on Indonesia?
Mr. Chollet. Ambassador Kim works closely with EAP Assistant
Secretary Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Southeast Asia Melissa Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jung Pak, U.S.
Mission to Indonesia Staff, the Office of Maritime Southeast Asia
Affairs, and the Office of Korean and Mongolian Affairs at the
Department of State to achieve our priorities with respect to the DPRK
and the U.S.-Indonesia relationship. The Ambassador calibrates the
amount of time he spends on any given issue based on the amount of
attention it requires and is able to address all issues in his area of
responsibility simultaneously.
96. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what percentage of Ms. Pak's time
is spent on North Korea policy?
Mr. Chollet. Deputy Assistant Secretary Pak works closely with EAP
Assistant Secretary Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Ambassador Sung Kim, the
Office of Korean and Mongolian Affairs, and the Office of Multilateral
Affairs at the Department of State to achieve our priorities with
respect to the DPRK and multilateral issues in the region. Deputy
Assistant Secretary Pak calibrates the amount of time she spends on any
given issue based on the amount of attention it requires and is able to
address all issues in her area of responsibility simultaneously.
97. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, what percentage of Ms. Pak's time
is spent on multilateral issues?
Mr. Chollet. Deputy Assistant Secretary Pak works closely with EAP
Assistant Secretary Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Ambassador Sung Kim, the
Office of Korean and Mongolian Affairs, and the Office of Multilateral
Affairs at the Department of State to achieve our priorities with
respect to the DPRK and multilateral issues in the region. Deputy
Assistant Secretary Pak calibrates the amount of time she spends on any
given issue based on the amount of attention it requires and is able to
address all issues in her area of responsibility simultaneously.
abraham accords
98. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, according to the Washington Free
Beacon, while you served as State Department counselor, the State
Department distributed internal guidance directing officials to avoid
mentioning the Abraham Accords by name in public-facing materials. The
guidance directed officials to simply refer to the historic agreements,
which were concluded during the Trump administration, as
``normalization agreements'' \6\. Was the guidance generated in
response to requests by the White House, or wholly internal to the
State Department?
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\6\ https://freebeacon.com/biden-administration/state-department-
shuns-term-abraham-accords/
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Mr. Chollet. I am not aware of any such ``guidance.'' I have
regularly used the term Abraham Accords since assuming the role of
Counselor of the Department of State. For example, on September 17,
2021, I authored an op-ed in Newsweek for the anniversary of the
Abraham Accords, which celebrated the Abraham Accords as the historic
achievements that they are. I continue to refer to the Abraham Accords
as such in my public and private engagements.
99. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, who issued this guidance?
Mr. Chollet. I'm not aware of any such ``guidance.'' The
Administration is committed to advancing the Abraham Accords and
encouraging our partners to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel.
If confirmed, I will make it my priority to build on the progress we
have made in close consultation with Congress and our partners.
100. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, why was this guidance issued?
Mr. Chollet. I'm not aware that any such ``guidance'' was issued.
This Administration has been clear, privately and publicly, that the
United States strongly supports the Abraham Accords, which continues to
be the linchpin for advancing peace and prosperity in the Middle East
and protecting our national security interests in the region. As such,
we are continuing to work with Israel and other regional countries to
deepen them, buildupon them, and expand the circle of peace.
101. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, were you aware of this guidance
at the time it was issued?
Mr. Chollet. No, I am not aware of any such ``this guidance.'' As
the Counselor of the Department of State, I have strongly and
consistently supported the Abraham Accords, and if confirmed, I will
continue to do so in my new role as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
102. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, why was this guidance later
rescinded, when was it rescinded, and who rescinded it?
Mr. Chollet. I was not aware of any such ``guidance,'' nor am I
aware of any ``rescission.'' Since joining the Administration, I have
repeatedly referred to the Abraham Accords, as have a host of other
senior Administration officials. The Abraham Accords are historic, and
this Administration strongly supports them.
caesar act
103. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, while you served as State
Department counselor, the Biden administration negotiated a deal in
which gas would have been delivered to Lebanon through a route that
included Syria. Experts have described the arrangement as a
straightforward violation of American sanctions, including the Caesar
Act. To what extent were you involved in diplomacy related to this
policy?
Mr. Chollet. In my role as Counselor, I have not been personally
involved in these discussions. I understand that other U.S. officials
across the executive branch have been supportive of this potential
World Bank project, but no final determination has been made about the
U.S. sanctions implications of that proposal. The United States is
focused on maximizing the benefits to the Lebanese people--who continue
to struggle with an acute energy crisis--while minimizing any potential
benefit to the Assad regime.
104. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, do you believe that the scheme
would violate American sanctions, including the Caesar Act, and if not
why not?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding that no final determination has
been made about the U.S. sanctions implications of that proposal. The
Administration received provisional contracts for the electricity and
gas deals last year. The final financing terms and contracts are still
being discussed by the parties and the World Bank. The Departments of
the Treasury and State will review details of the final financing terms
and contracts to assess any relevant sanctions concerns. Only at that
time will there be the information needed to make any final
determinations.
diversity, equity and inclusion
105. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, on April 16, 2022, an internal
email was circulated inside the State Department stating ``over the
past several months, a number of people have reported comments that
certain candidates could not be hired because: * they have a disability
* they are white men * they are straight white men * they are not of
the `right' religion.'' On July 26, 2022, State Department Chief
Diversity and Officer, Ambassador Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley testified
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that she had never seen or
cleared that email. Were you aware of that email?
Mr. Chollet. No, I was not aware of that email.
106. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, did you have any role in clearing
that email?
Mr. Chollet. No.
107. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, after the email was publicly
revealed and discussed in testimony, did you take any action regarding
the concerns outlined by that email?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding that no action was necessary as
the e-mail made clear that hiring decisions should never be made on the
basis of protected classes, including gender, race, religion, etc. It
is my understanding the guidance email was sent in order to clarify
that such rumored actions do not comport with Department policy and are
illegal.
108. Senator Wicker. Mr. Chollet, in May 2023, the State Department
rolled out a feature that mandated the inclusion of officials' gender
pronouns in e-mail correspondence. In your view, should the U.S.
Government, departments, or agencies require employees to include their
gender pronouns in official correspondence?
Mr. Chollet. In May 2023, the Bureau of Information Resource
Management (IRM) was testing a new Outlook feature that would provide
users with the option to voluntarily include their pronouns in the
Department's Global Address List. During the test, some employees
mistakenly had randomly assigned pronouns added to their profiles. IRM
immediately corrected the error, and all errant pronouns were removed
from profiles by May 20. The Department of State's position, and mine,
is that including pronouns in official correspondence should not be
mandatory but rather voluntary and determined by the employee.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
iran
109. Senator Cotton. Mr. Chollet, you spoke previously about your
concerns regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions and the work of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to reassure allies in the region
of continued U.S. support. Iran seemingly showed a willingness to
cooperate and sign onto this deal because of the diplomatic isolation,
economic sanctions, and strong military pressure. Now that we know that
Iran wasn't fully compliant with the JCPOA and is continuing to mature
their nuclear program at an alarming rate, what further steps do you
believe are necessary to effectively deter and not simply delay their
nuclear ambitions?
Mr. Chollet. I believe diplomacy is the best, most enduring path to
ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. However, as President
Biden has made clear, the United States is committed to preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon and every option remains on the table.
Through a combination of posture, planning, and partnerships, the
Department of Defense backstops diplomacy with Iran and deters
conflict. I understand that the Department of Defense regularly updates
plans to address Iran contingencies and is working with allies and
partners to integrate their capabilities to more effectively counter
Iran's .
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
foreign military sales reform
110. Senator Rounds. Mr. Chollet, there continues to be delays in
the provision of weapons and equipment to our partners and allies, and
a years-long foreign military sales (FMS) backlog. What do you see as
the primary challenges to improving the timeliness of delivery of the
equipment and services in the FMS backlog and are additional
authorities needed to help solve this problem?
Mr. Chollet. The FMS system writ-large continues to deliver
important capabilities to our allies and partners, and a preponderance
of those cases are meeting partner needs and expectations. I understand
the Department of Defense is pursuing several initiatives to tackle FMS
reform, for example accelerating acquisition and contracting support
for FMS and further incentivizing the defense industrial base to expand
capacity. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and supporting
these efforts moving forward to better meet partner demands.
111. Senator Rounds. Mr. Chollet, to what extent is DOD
coordinating with State Department to work with our international
partners in order to leverage the current historic demand signal for
critical munitions and equipment into increased DIB production
capacity?
Mr. Chollet. The United States faces unprecedented demand from our
allies and partners for defense equipment and support. To better
coordinate with the private sector on emergent national security needs
and surge requirements, DOD is focused on sending a clear, stable
demand signal. I understand DOD and the Department of State are closely
working with allies and partners to address their most critical defense
needs and ensure our ability to provide those capabilities in line with
U.S. National Security objectives. If confirmed, I will work with the
USD(A&S) to ensure partner requirements are factored into ongoing
efforts to encourage industry to address global increased demand and
expeditiously deliver critical systems in line with the National
Defense Strategy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
ariane tabatabai's role in the state and defense department
112. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, during your confirmation hearing,
you told me that you ``know nothing'' about the circumstances
surrounding Ms. Tabatabai's case. During your tenure at the State
Department, did anyone raise concerns about Ms. Tabatabai's connections
with Iranian officials?
Mr. Chollet. No person has raised concerns about any State
Department employee's alleged connections with Iranian officials with
me during my tenure at the State Department, and that includes Ms.
Tabatabai.
113. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in 2021, Iranian dissidents raised
concerns about Ms. Tabatabai when she was first hired on to the State
Department. The dissidents claimed that Ms. Tabatabai's history of
parroting pro-Iran talking points, as well as her familial ties to the
Iranian Government, are problematic. At the time, the State Department
spokesman dismissed the claims as ``personal smears and slander'' and
stood by Ms. Tabatabai. During this time, you served as the counselor
of the State Department. Did you play any role in determining the State
Department's response to the 2021 allegations made against Ms.
Tabatabai?
Mr. Chollet. No. I was not consulted and played no role in the
State Department's response to these allegations.
114. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, as the chief of staff to Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SO/LIC)), Ms. Tabatabai played a key role in forming our counter-
terrorism strategy, which often involves countering Iran-backed
proxies. Do you believe it is appropriate to have an individual with a
history of conferring with Iranian officials in a highly sensitive role
related to counter-terrorism and special operations?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that any qualified individual who has taken
an oath to serve their country and has not been found to have violated
the rules and regulations governing their ability to hold a security
clearance or have been otherwise found to be disqualified should be
able to serve.
115. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you believe it would be prudent
to suspend Ms. Tabatabai's clearance pending review?
Mr. Chollet. In any of these kinds of personnel matters I believe
it is essential to follow the guidance and recommendations of the
proper authorities--those who know all the relevant facts, have
investigative responsibilities, and are charged with enforcing the
appropriate laws, rules and procedures. Although I have no knowledge of
this specific personnel matter as it does not involve my
responsibilities as Counselor of the Department of State, the
Department of Defense has informed me that Ms. Tabatabai's employment
and clearance processes were carried out in accordance with all
appropriate laws and policies. As a general matter, my understanding is
that with respect to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency (DCSA)'s continuous vetting (CV) program, all DOD Service
members, civilian employees, and contractor personnel with a security
clearance undergo this process. My understanding is that the CV process
involves automated record checks that pull data from criminal,
terrorism, and financial data bases, as well as public records, at any
time during an individual's period of eligibility. When DCSA receives
an alert, it assesses whether the alert is valid and worthy of further
investigation. DCSA investigators and adjudicators then gather facts
and make clearance determinations. CV helps DCSA mitigate personnel
security situations early in the process, either by working with the
cleared individual to mitigate potential issues, or in some cases
suspending or revoking clearances. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring
that everyone under my area of responsibility adheres to highest
security standards and will work with all relevant authorities to
enforce that effort.
116. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you believe it would be prudent
to suspend Ms. Tabatabai's clearance pending review?
Mr. Chollet. See the response to question 115 above.
117. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, will you commit to taking steps to
suspend her clearance once confirmed?
Mr. Chollet. See the response to question 115 above.
118. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, according to the Department of
Justice, ``an `agent of a foreign principal' is any person who acts as
an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or otherwise acts at
the order, request, or under the direction or control of a `foreign
principal' and . . . engages within the United States in political
activities, such as intending to influence any U.S. Government official
or the American public regarding U.S. domestic or foreign policy.'' An
`agent of a foreign principal' is legally required to register as a
foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). In your
view, does Ms. Tabatabai's activities require her registration as an
`agent of a foreign principal'?
Mr. Chollet. As stated above, I have no knowledge of this
individual's alleged activities, nor do I have any expert knowledge of
the operation or application of the statute referenced. However, I
believe that anyone operating in a position of public trust should
abide by the law and act in accordance with U.S. interests and the
highest security standards. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that
everyone under my area of responsibility does just that and I will work
with all relevant authorities to enforce that effort.
119. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, DOD told media outlets that the
Department ``thoroughly and properly vetted'' Ms. Tabatabai before her
employment. If confirmed, would you commit to sharing information on
whether DOD's vetting process flagged Ms. Tabatabai's association with
Iranian officials?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I commit to following the law. I
understand that the Department of Defense has confirmed that Ms.
Tabatabai's employment and clearance processes were carried out in
accordance with all appropriate laws and policies. The Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency has enrolled all DOD Service
members, civilian employees, and contractor personnel with a security
clearance in its continuous vetting program, which is a process that
involves regularly reviewing a cleared individual's background to
ensure they continue to meet security clearance requirements and may
continue to hold positions of trust.
iran's threat to u.s. citizens and residents
120. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, American taxpayers are footing the
bill to fund the protection of U.S. officials reportedly targeted by
Iran. If confirmed, would you commit to sharing with the Committee
details on how many U.S. officials are currently targeted by Iran and
how much the protection is costing American taxpayers?
Mr. Chollet. The mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy is to consistently provide responsive, forward-
thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of
Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with national
security objectives. I defer all counterintelligence and security
questions to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence & Security.
121. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, during Iranian President Ebrahim
Raisi's recent trip to New York City for the United Nations General
Assembly, he reiterated Iran's efforts to target former U.S. officials
involved in the operation against Qassem Soleimani. Given your current
role in the State Department, please explain the State Department's
justification in granting President Raisi a waiver for a visa to enter
the United States.
Mr. Chollet. Visa records are confidential under U.S. law;
therefore, I regret I am unable to comment on an individual case. It is
my understanding that as host nation of the United Nations, the United
States is generally obligated under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement to
issue visas to representatives of U.N. member states to travel to the
U.N. headquarters district and the United States takes those
obligations seriously. At the same time, I know the Biden
Administration has not and will not waver in protecting and defending
all Americans.
122. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if the State Department is aware
of the Iranian official responsible for the assault, would the State
Department give a visa to this official the next time he wishes to
enter the United States?
Mr. Chollet. Visa records and processes are confidential under U.S.
law; therefore, I regret I am unable to comment on an individual case,
in particular a hypothetical case. At the same time, I know the
Department and the Administration condemns the reported harassment,
intimidation, and assault of journalists everywhere, including New
York, and continue to forcefully criticize Iran's treatment of
journalists and actions which degrade press freedoms, both in Iran and
internationally.
123. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in June, the Washington Post
obtained classified intelligence reports that said ``Iran and its
allies are building and training forces to use more powerful armor-
piercing roadside bombs intended specifically to target U.S. military
vehicles and kill U.S. personnel'' in Syria. Since the report's
publication, have you seen any uptick in the threat posed by Iran and
its allies to U.S. personnel, particularly those in Special Operations
Forces (SOF), in Syria?
Mr. Chollet. I cannot comment on any classified intelligence
matters. What I will say is that we have not seen any Iran-backed
attacks on U.S. personnel in Syria since the Administration's strikes
on Iran-affiliated targets in March 2023.
124. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, what steps would you
take to protect U.S. personnel in Syria against increased Iranian
aggression?
Mr. Chollet. The United States has repeatedly demonstrated our
readiness to take necessary and proportionate military action to defend
U.S. forces and facilities from attack, or threat of attack. The United
States will not hesitate to respond in self-defense. If confirmed, I
will ensure that the Department of Defense remains positioned with
executable options to respond to any Iranian attacks.
iran's maritime threat
125. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in your response to the advance
policy questions, you noted that ``The United States has demonstrated
that it will not hesitate to respond in self-defense and that it can
surge forces to the Middle East in response to an increased Iranian
threat, as we are currently doing in the maritime domain.'' In May, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew from the Combined Maritime Forces,
reportedly due to frustration that the United States is not doing
enough to counter Iran's maritime aggression. Do you think the UAE is
wrong to believe that the United States is not doing enough to counter
Iran's maritime aggression, given your response that the ``United
States has demonstrated . . . that it can surge forces to the Middle
East in response to an increased Iranian threat''?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding the United Arab Emirates is
still a member of the Combined Maritime Forces. I believe that U.S.
posture adjustments and related U.S.-led efforts--like the June 25
maritime security conference hosted at our naval headquarters in
Bahrain--to uphold freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce
have been effective. I understand that in response to an increased
Iranian threat to commercial shipping this summer, the United States
deployed a number of air and maritime capabilities to the region. We
have repeatedly made clear that we can and will surge forces to the
Middle East in response to an elevated threat environment and will take
coordinated and appropriate action with our allies and partner to
counter Iranian maritime harassment. On at least three occasions since
March, U.S.-led efforts and presence have deterred the seizure of oil
tankers in the Gulf region. If confirmed, I will continue the
Department of Defense's engagement with key allies and partners to join
multilateral efforts to ensure freedom of navigation in the maritime
domain.
126. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, given UAE's withdrawal from the
U.S.-led maritime coalition to counter Iran's maritime aggression, once
confirmed, do you commit to strengthening U.S. commitment to deterring
Iran's maritime aggression in the region to reassure our allies and
partners?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding the United Arab Emirates is
still a member of the Combined Maritime Forces. I share the
Administration's commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation and
deterring Iran's destabilizing activities in the maritime domain, as
outlined in the National Security Strategy. The United States will
continue to work with like-minded allies and partners who are committed
to the free flow of commerce to take appropriate, coordinated actions
against threats to this fundamental principle of the rules-based
international order.
127. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, I have led multiple oversight
efforts to pressure the Biden administration to enforce on-the-books
oil sanctions against Iran. And yet, when the United States seized the
Suez Rajan for illegally exporting Iranian oil, U.S. companies were
reluctant to unload the oil on the Suez Rajan because they feared
Iranian retaliation. Do you think the United States is adequately
responding to Iran's maritime threat when Iran has successfully
intimidated our own companies?
Mr. Chollet. The United States has clearly demonstrated that is it
committed to ensuring the free flow of commerce and will not tolerate
Iranian maritime threats. In response to those threats, the Department
of Defense has increased its presence and ability to monitor the Strait
of Hormuz and surrounding waters. Additionally, I understand that DOD
continues to work with our allies and partners to improve
interoperability and cooperation against Iranian maritime threats.
128. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
strengthening U.S. response to Iran's maritime aggression to assure
U.S. companies that they are safe from Iranian maritime coercion?
Mr. Chollet. The United States is committed to ensuring freedom of
navigation and upholding the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the
sea for the benefit of all countries. For example, in early July, U.S.
forces deterred the Iranian military from seizing two commercial
tankers, one of which belonged to Chevron, in international waters off
the coast of Oman.
129. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, Task Force 59 in U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command (NAVCENT) has played a crucial role in countering
Iranian maritime aggression in U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR). If confirmed, what steps do you intend to take to
apply lessons learned from Task Force 59 to other combatant commands
(COCOM), including U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding Task Force 59 provides a window
into the possibilities of all-domain attritable autonomy, by operating
platforms equipped with sensors, radars, and cameras for navigation,
data collection, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
These new data flows enhance the Navy's ability to persistently monitor
the surrounding seas and enable the Navy to be more predictive and
precise in deploying its crewed assets. We're already seeing the value
of these small, technologically advanced, and affordable systems in
other theaters, including USINDOPACOM. If confirmed, I will work with
the appropriate offices within Policy and across DOD to identify new
opportunities to scale up these systems and explore how we can
integrate partners into these innovation efforts.
130. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what steps do you intend to take
to counter Iranian cyber and hybrid warfare tactics, especially in the
maritime domain?
Mr. Chollet. Iran continues to improve its cyber capabilities,
threatening the United States, Israel, and other nations with malicious
cyber activities and cyber-enabled malign influence activities. The
Department's 2023 Cyber Strategy highlights the Department's efforts to
mitigate the threat of State and non-State malicious cyber actors, to
include Iran, while defending U.S. national interests. If confirmed, I
will support the Department's implementation of our 2023 Cyber Strategy
as well as whole-of-government efforts to degrade and disrupt malicious
cyber activity.
hostages negotiations
131. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, this administration finalized a
prisoner swap with Iran that not only granted clemency to five Iranian
nationals charged with sanctions violations and other Federal crimes,
but also gave Iran access to previously frozen funds. Why do you think
it is advisable to give money to Iran who will likely to use the $6
billion dollars to fund terrorist activities?
Mr. Chollet. The funds are intended to be used for humanitarian
purposes only and are inaccessible to Iran. As NSC Spokesman John Kirby
stated at a press conference on October 12th, the funds would go to
``approved vendors, that we approved, to go buy food, medicine, and
medical equipment, agricultural products, and ship it into Iran
directly to the benefit of the Iranian people.'' In an interview on
October 13th, Kirby further elaborated that ``Tehran would never see a
dime of it,'' and this is ``the exact same arrangement that Secretary
Pompeo, when he was secretary of State, set up under the previous
administration. We didn't change those rules.'' Given the fluidity of
this situation, I commit to keeping Congress informed if there are any
changes to report.
132. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what safeguards do you have in
place to ensure these funds will not be spent on supporting Iran's
proxies and terrorist activities?
Mr. Chollet. The funds are intended to be used for humanitarian
purposes only and are inaccessible to Iran. As NSC Spokesman John Kirby
stated at a press conference on October 12th, the funds would go to
``approved vendors, that we approved, to go buy food, medicine, and
medical equipment, agricultural products, and ship it into Iran
directly to the benefit of the Iranian people.'' In an interview on
October 13th, Kirby further elaborated that ``Tehran would never see a
dime of it,'' and this is ``the exact same arrangement that Secretary
Pompeo, when he was secretary of State, set up under the previous
administration. We didn't change those rules.'' Given the fluidity of
this situation, I commit to keeping Congress informed if there are any
changes to report.
133. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, on September 12, 2023, Iranian
President Raisi told U.S. media that Tehran would spend the $6 billion
released by the Biden administration ``wherever we need it''. When he
was further asked whether the money would be used for other purposes
apart from humanitarian needs, Raisi said: ``Humanitarian means
whatever the Iranian people needs, so this money will be budgeted for
those needs, and the needs of the Iranian people will be decided and
determined by the Iranian Government.'' When the Iranian leader has
already publicly committed to using the funds for ``wherever we need
it,'' can you really trust that Iran would only use the released $6
billion on humanitarian needs?
Mr. Chollet. I do not trust Iran, nor do I take at face value any
assertion members of that regime may make. That's why the funds in
question have strict oversight, are intended to be used for
humanitarian purposes only, and are inaccessible to the Iranian regime.
As NSC Spokesman John Kirby stated at a press conference on October
12th, the funds would go to ``approved vendors, that we approved, to go
buy food, medicine, and medical equipment, agricultural products, and
ship it into Iran directly to the benefit of the Iranian people.'' In
an interview on October 13th, Kirby further elaborated that ``Tehran
would never see a dime of it,'' and this is ``the exact same
arrangement that Secretary Pompeo, when he was secretary of State, set
up under the previous administration. We didn't change those rules.''
Given the fluidity of this situation, I commit to keeping Congress
informed if there are any changes to report.
Yet to be clear, to date none of these funds have been spent or
accessed by Iran or third-party vendors for any purposes. And whenever
they are, no one in the regime will touch them, and they can only be
spent on humanitarian items for the Iranian people. Across multiple
U.S. administrations, including prior administrations of both political
parties, it has remained longstanding U.S. policy to ensure our
sanctions do not prevent humanitarian goods from flowing to ordinary
people, no matter how objectionable their governments. The availability
of these funds for the purchase of food, medicine, medical devices, and
agricultural products is consistent with that policy.
134. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, does the State Department have any
concern whatsoever that the $6 billion deal might incentivize Iran to
take more U.S. hostages in the hope of a big payday?
Mr. Chollet. The funds are intended to be used for humanitarian
purposes only and are inaccessible to Iran. As NSC Spokesman John Kirby
stated at a press conference on October 12th, the funds would go to
``approved vendors, that we approved, to go buy food, medicine, and
medical equipment, agricultural products, and ship it into Iran
directly to the benefit of the Iranian people.'' This Administration
will continue taking steps to reduce the risk of wrongful detentions
through a variety of tools including sanctions and travel advisories.
135. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, are you concerned that the release
of these legally frozen funds will work against deterrence efforts with
not only Iran, but also against Russia, China, and other states from
viewing hostage-taking as a profitable enterprise?
Mr. Chollet. The Biden administration has been quite public that it
is committed to bringing home Americans wrongfully detained overseas
and promoting accountability for those responsible. The Administration
is committed to using all available tools to increase pressure on those
who would engage in the practice of unlawful arbitrary detention.
security clearance incident surrounding mr. robert malley
136. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, many of my colleagues were alarmed
to learn that senior diplomat and top Iran envoy Robert Malley could
have mishandled classified information, yet kept doing State Department
work for weeks after his clearance was suspended. The Department of
State Inspector General has also determined that these actions warrant
a special review. Do you commit to providing Congress with information
regarding the reasons for Mr. Malley's security clearance suspension?
Mr. Chollet. I have no knowledge of this personnel matter other
than what has been in the public record, and that includes what the
appropriate State Department officials knew regarding Mr. Malley's
situation. What I can unequivocally commit to is that, if confirmed, I
will treat Congress as the full partner you are, I will be straight
with you, will be accessible, will be responsive in a timely manner,
and will hold myself to account to meet our shared objectives to make
this country safe, secure, and prosperous. This absolutely includes
notifying Congress when senior officials have their security clearances
revoked as early in the process as the law and proper procedure allows.
137. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you commit to providing
Congress with information on the delay in Mr. Malley's suspension as
Special Envoy following his security clearance suspension?
Mr. Chollet. The information you have requested is controlled by
the Department of State and relates to matters that lay outside my
duties as Counselor, and any inquiries in this regard should be
addressed to the Department of State.
138. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you commit to providing
Congress with information on whether Mr. Malley properly disclosed his
connections to the Iran Experts Initiative and its members during his
security clearance investigation process?
Mr. Chollet. The information you are requesting relates to issues
that are not within my duties as Counselor. The Department of State
controls any such information that might exist in this regard, and any
inquiries should be addressed to the Department of State.
139. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in August, regime mouthpiece
Tehran Times published what the outlet said was a Sensitive But
Unclassified U.S. Government memo on Mr. Malley's suspension. Is the
memo an authentic U.S. Government document?
Mr. Chollet. The information you are requesting relates to issues
that are not within my duties as Counselor. The Department of State
controls any such information that might exist in this regard, and any
inquiries should be addressed to the Department of State.
140. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if the memo is an authentic U.S.
Government document, we would like to know how a regime mouthpiece
obtained it. If confirmed, would you commit to sharing what we know
today about how Tehran Times obtained the memo?
Mr. Chollet. None of these matters fall within my duties as
Counselor. The Department of State controls any information on these
topics, and inquiries in this regard should be addressed to the
Department of State.
coordination with regional partners in the middle east
141. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, last year, I spearheaded the
DEFEND Act, which has helped unite our Middle East partners against
Iranian aggression. Senator Jacky Rosen and I recently advanced that
effort with the MARITIME Act to direct similar integration at sea. How
do you plan to coordinate DOD efforts with regional partners, such as
Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Israel, to address shared
concerns related to Iran?
Mr. Chollet. Regional initiatives such as the Abraham Accords and
the Negev Forum provide opportunities for Israel and its neighbors to
increase cooperation in the defense and regional security sectors. The
United States is regularly convening defense working groups with the
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to include one working group
specifically focused on air defense. The alignment of Israel into the
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility expands opportunities for
regional defense integration, including improving military
interoperability across all U.S. partners in the Middle East and
increasing opportunities to share information and early warning. If
confirmed, I intend to continue these critical efforts by setting a
leadership environment that priorities integration and interoperability
in policy, practice, and senior leader engagements.
142. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what role do you believe regional
defense integration against Iran could play in deepening and expanding
the Abraham Accords?
Mr. Chollet. The Abraham Accords marked a critical, strategic
milestone for normalized relations between Israel and its neighbors.
The Administration continues efforts to deepen that integration across
all sectors--as envisioned in the Abraham Accords--to include defense
and security. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2022
Missile Defense Review (MDR) advanced this focus on integrating by
calling for a multilateral and integrated approach to deterring
adversaries and improving regional defense. In the Middle East, the NDS
prioritizes efforts to cooperate with regional partners to advance an
integrated air and missile defense capability to address the persistent
threat of Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles, manned and unmanned
aerial systems, and rocket attacks. If confirmed, I will continue the
Department's work to widen the circle of integration by demonstrating
that increased interoperability among Abraham Accords nations and the
United States improves collective defenses against Iran-backed threats.
143. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what role do you believe that the
Department of Defense has in strengthening defense cooperation and
integration in the Middle East, especially among Abraham Accord members
and potential members?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of Defense, along with the Department
of State, is actively working to advance multilateral efforts to
address shared threats in the Middle East. These efforts include
diplomatic engagement and defense regional constructs, as well as U.S.
Central Command-led efforts at the operational level to demonstrate the
tangible benefits of integration and interoperability.
iran nuclear deal
144. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, the Iran nuclear agreement clearly
failed to curtail Iran's missile program and regional influence since
Iran has continued to ignore limitations on its nuclear program. Do you
think that any regime that is actively trying to kill American citizens
both at home and abroad would be responsible with nuclear material?
Mr. Chollet. U.S. policy is to prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon. The United States is pursuing principled diplomacy in
coordination with allies and partners to constrain Iran's nuclear
activities. Further, I understand that DOD supports measures to limit
Iranian nuclear activities applicable to a nuclear weapons program and
to ensure the greatest possible level of international transparency and
verification. A verifiable diplomatic agreement provides the most
enduring pathway to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
However, should diplomacy fail, the Department of Defense must continue
to prepare for all possible options and contingencies with our allies
and partners to ensure Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
145. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, just last month, the United
Nations (U.N.) nuclear watchdog harshly criticized Iran for barring
several of its most experienced inspectors from monitoring the
country's disputed atomic program. What do you believe needs to be done
to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Chollet. U.S. policy is to prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon. I understand that DOD supports measures to limit
Iranian nuclear activities applicable to a nuclear weapons program and
to ensure the greatest possible level of international transparency and
verification. However, as President Biden has made clear, the United
States is committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The Department of Defense regularly updates plans to address Iran
contingencies and is working with allies and partners to integrate
their capabilities to more effectively counter Iran's destabilizing
activities. This includes strengthening Israel's military capabilities.
146. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in 2015, you told Politico that:
``we have a huge problem with Iran outside of the nuclear space . . .
and that will continue to exist even if we get a nuclear deal.'' Today,
do you agree with your own statement from 2015?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. Iran's malign behavior, and the threat it poses
to both U.S. forces and allied and partners forces in the region,
remains a major issue. One of the foremost responsibilities I would
have if confirmed for this position is ensuring that we are doing
whatever we can to deter Iran and push back from its malign behavior
across the region and around the world.
147. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you have any concerns that a
new nuclear deal with Iran would exacerbate the ``huge problem with
Iran outside of the nuclear space,'' specifically by giving Iran the
oil money it needs to sponsor anti-U.S. terrorist and proxy groups
across the Middle East?
Mr. Chollet. I believe it is in U.S. national interests to prevent
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and to the best extent possible,
to do so without exacerbating other aspects of Iranian-based threats.
Previous agreements had strict guidelines in place as to who could
access any funds involved in any arrangements with Iran. For instance,
in the case of the recent prisoner release arrangement, the funds are
intended to be used for humanitarian purposes only and are inaccessible
to the Iranian regime. As NSC Spokesman John Kirby stated at a press
conference on October 12th, the funds would go to ``approved vendors,
that we approved, to go buy food, medicine, and medical equipment,
agricultural products, and ship it into Iran directly to the benefit of
the Iranian people.'' In an interview on October 13th, Kirby further
elaborated that ``Tehran would never see a dime of it,'' and this is
``the exact same arrangement that Secretary Pompeo, when he was
secretary of State, set up under the previous administration. We didn't
change those rules.''
Across multiple U.S. administrations, including prior
administrations of both political parties, it has remained longstanding
U.S. policy to ensure our sanctions do not prevent humanitarian goods
from flowing to ordinary people, no matter how objectionable their
governments. The availability of these funds for the purchase of food,
medicine, medical devices, and agricultural products is consistent with
that policy.
sanctions on iranian oil exports
148. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, according to an August report by
Bloomberg News, ``U.S. officials privately acknowledge they've
gradually relaxed some enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil sales.
Tehran has restored production to the highest level since the ban
kicked in 5 years ago and is shipping its most crude to China in a
decade.'' During your time at the State Department, were you part of
any policy decisions to relax enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil
sales?
Mr. Chollet. To my knowledge, this Administration has not lifted
Iran energy-related sanctions and will continue to enforce U.S.
sanctions on Iran. Since 2021, over 180 individuals and entities
related to Iran's petroleum and petrochemical sectors or related to
moving and laundering the illicit proceeds of these sectors have been
sanctioned. Over 40 vessels have been identified as blocked property of
these sanctioned entities. There is frequent engagement with other
countries to strongly discourage them from taking steps that contravene
sanctions on Iran.
149. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, has the Biden administration made
any policy decisions to relax enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil
sales?
Mr. Chollet. No. The U.S. Government continues to enforce our
sanctions on Iran and pursue sanctions evaders. We also regularly
engage with other countries to strongly discourage them from taking
steps that contravene sanctions on Iran.
150. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, please explain why Tehran has been
able to attain record oil export volumes despite persistent U.S.
efforts to fully enforce sanctions on Iranian oil sales.
Mr. Chollet. Although the regime continues to make efforts to evade
U.S. sanctions, evasion is very costly. My understanding is that the
regime receives only a fraction of the market price for the oil it can
sell.
151. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in what ways have U.S. enforcement
efforts fallen short to allow record Iranian oil exports?
Mr. Chollet. The U.S. Government continues to enforce our sanctions
on Iran and pursue sanctions evaders. Although Iranian regime continues
to make efforts to evade U.S. sanctions, evasion is very costly. Since
January 2021, the U.S. has sanctioned dozens of individuals and
entities across multiple jurisdictions, including in the PRC, UAE, and
Southeast Asia for playing a critical role in the production, sale, and
shipment of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian
petrochemicals and petroleum products. We also continue to regularly
engage with other countries to strongly discourage them from taking
steps that contravene sanctions on Iran. We have also engaged in an
extensive diplomatic campaign to ensure Iran is not able to sell oil to
new buyers. If confirmed, I commit to working with my interagency
partners to strengthen and enforce our sanctions regime.
152. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
directing DOD to fully enforce U.S. sanctions on Iran?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. The Administration continues to enforce our
sanctions on Iran and pursue sanctions evaders.
153. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you agree that Tehran is using
its record oil export revenue to support its destabilizing activities,
including funding its nuclear program and supporting Iran-backed
proxies and terrorist groups?
Mr. Chollet. Under the Biden Administration, the U.S. Government
has designated numerous regime officials, affiliates, and supporters,
countering the full range of Iran's destabilizing behavior, from its
terrorist plots to its missile program. The impact of our efforts is
clear in the economic data.
abortion travel policy
154. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, as Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD (P)), you are the principle staff for all matters
concerning the exercise of policy. As such, you will be in charge of
the National Defense Strategy, which is the policy to protect the
Nation and others. If confirmed, would you continue to support the DOD
abortion travel policy that continues to harm that which you are in
charge of protecting?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed as the USD(P), I would not have oversight
of the DOD reproductive healthcare policy. That responsibility falls to
the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness. However, I fully agree
with Secretary Austin that the health and readiness of our force is
critical to implementing our National Defense Strategy. Women make up
17 percent of the force and are the fastest growing subpopulation in
the military. Women's health is important to the overall readiness of
America's military. They deserve to have access to reproductive care.
reducing u.s. presence in the middle east
155. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in November 2021, you endorsed a
report published by the Center for New American Security that argued in
favor of a ``smaller and smarter footprint'' in the Middle East. At a
Center for New American Security event discussing the report, you said
that ``our goal is to right-size that military presence'' in the Middle
East. Do you have any concerns that reducing U.S. presence in the
Middle East might send the wrong messages to our allies and partners
about U.S. commitment to the region?
Mr. Chollet. DOD has a significant force presence in the Middle
East, supported by forces that our allies and partners contribute, and
continuously evaluates the appropriate mix of forces around the world.
Earlier this year, the Department supported Juniper Oak, the largest,
most complex combined exercise DOD had ever conducted with the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF), which increased the U.S. ability to respond to
contingencies without major impacts to the European and Indo-Pacific
theaters. No one should doubt our resolve or capabilities to defend
ourselves and all those who work alongside us to keep the Middle East
region secure.
156. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you have any concerns that
reducing U.S. presence in the Middle East might send the wrong messages
to our adversaries, especially Iran, about U.S. commitment to the
region?
Mr. Chollet. The National Security Strategy directs the Department
to ``retain the necessary American military presence in the region to
protect the United States and our allies from terrorist attacks and
preserve a favorable regional balance of power.'' We must continue to
address major security challenges in the region in effective and
sustainable ways, including prioritizing cooperation with our regional
and global partners, and demonstrating the United States' capability to
rapidly project power if our interests are threatened. If confirmed, I
will continue to assess U.S. military presence in the region and make
recommendations to support our national security interests.
157. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, which military
assets and programs in the Middle East would you ``right-size''?
Mr. Chollet. The National Defense Strategy prioritizes the need to
sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence against China, the PRC, our
pacing challenge, and then Russia, while remaining vigilant against
other persistent threats, including those posed by North Korean, Iran
and other Violent Extremist Organizations. If confirmed, I will seek to
ensure that our global resources are being prioritized in alignment
with the Strategy, while also maintaining the necessary balance of
military assets and programs in other critical regions such as the
Middle East.
158. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, China is increasing its influence
in the Middle East, conducting its first ever military exercise with
the UAE in August and concluding a Saudi-Iran agreement earlier this
year. How do we ``right-size'' U.S. military presence in the region
without inviting China to fill the vacuum?
Mr. Chollet. Maintaining the United States' position as the
``partner of choice'' for our allies and partners across the globe is
critical to our ability to maintain and strengthen deterrence. If
confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Department of Defense
supports a whole of government effort to enhance cooperative activities
and integrate our regional security approach, while also prioritizing
resources against the greatest threats to our Nation.
159. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in the Middle East to
assure our allies and deter our adversaries, including Iran and
extremist terrorist groups?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding the Department of Defense
constantly monitors the environment and adjusts forces globally to
address threats and global priorities. If confirmed, I will seek to
ensure a sufficient level of U.S. military presence is maintained in
the Middle East to assure our allies and partners and deter our
adversaries. As the Department's response to Iranian maritime
provocations and Hamas' attack on Israel demonstrates, the United
States can rapidly flow forces into the region to defend U.S.
interests.
southern border and the fentanyl crisis
160. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, when the Trump administration
deployed troops on the Southern border in 2018, you told the Associated
Press that ``this is not a good use of U.S. military resources''. Do
you still believe this to be the case, even as fentanyl and fentanyl
precursors smuggled across the Southern border contributes to a
fentanyl epidemic responsible for the death of 70,000 Americans every
year?
Mr. Chollet. As part of the National Drug Control Strategy, DOD
counterdrug efforts support interagency and foreign law enforcement
partners, who have the authority to conduct interdiction operations and
make arrests. The Department of Homeland Security and partner nations
have the lead for interdiction and apprehension of illicit drugs
passing through the transit zone. The Department of Defense has
supported the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission at the
southwest border for 18 of the last 22 years. In many cases, this
support has been provided on a non-reimbursable basis. DOD does not
plan or program for this Defense Support of Civilian Agencies support.
It is an important DHS mission, and the Department's goal is to ensure
DHS has the capabilities and resources to continue this mission with
only in-extremis support from DOD. This will allow DOD to focus time
and resources on execution of the 2022 National Defense Strategy
priorities of Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain
threat posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC); Deterring
strategic attack against the Unites States, Allies, and partners;
Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when
necessary--prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific region,
then the Russia challenge in Europe; and Building a resilient Joint
Force and defense ecosystem.
161. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you agree with the statement:
``border security is national security''?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, I agree that border security is integral to our
Nation's national security.
162. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
making a visit to the southwest border one of your first stops?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to visit
DOD personnel deployed to support DHS at the southwest border as soon
as possible.
163. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in your response to advance policy
questions, you responded that the DOD's role at the southwest border
``should be reserved for circumstances when military-unique
capabilities are critical, and even then should only be provided
temporarily''. Please explain what are some specific ``circumstances''
that you believe DOD should play a role in at the southwest border.
Mr. Chollet. In general, the circumstance in which I believe it is
appropriate for DOD to play a role at the southwest border is when DHS
requests critical, military-unique capabilities that are not inherent
to DHS and is allowed by law. Some of these capabilities include:
1. Unmanned Aircraft. In the past, DOD provided unmanned aircraft
in support of DHS. At that time, unmanned aircraft were, from a DHS
perspective, a military-unique capability. Today, DHS has unmanned
aircraft, but periodically may not have enough unmanned aircraft to
meet mission requirements.
2. Planning assistance and process improvement. For example, DOD
recently provided planners to assist with the development of air
transportation schedules. By providing support in this capacity, DOD
can enable process improvements that create operational efficiencies,
free up DHS resources, and enhance DHS capabilities.
3. Rapid contracting capability. DOD's rapid contracting capability
means that DOD can identify, source, and resource requirements more
quickly than most other Federal agencies. By bringing this resource to
bear, on a reimbursable basis, DOD can rapidly and efficiently
establish facilities and provide requested services while long term
sustainment plans are developed. (AFCAP, LOGCAP, etc.)
It is my understanding that the Department of Defense has helped
the Department of Homeland Security fill critical capabilities and
capacity gaps in its efforts to secure the southern border for 18 of
the last 22 years. DOD supports DHS's work with Congress and the
Administration to sustainably increase DHS's resources so that DHS can
manage its mission at the southern border and reduce or end reliance on
DOD support.
164. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, how would you prioritize and
allocate DOD resources, including personnel and technology, to support
border security?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense,
with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Commander of U.S. Northern
Command, and other key DOD officials, prioritizes and allocates DOD
capabilities, resources, and personnel to all DOD missions and
activities, including when DOD supports approved DHS requests for
assistance.
Currently, I understand the Secretary of Defense has authorized up
to 3,300 soldiers for detection and monitoring; information analysis;
aviation; logistical support; support for operation and maintenance of
aerostat balloons; and use of Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas, to
transport undocumented noncitizens from Del Rio, Texas, to DHS custody
locations throughout the United States.
165. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, how can DOD support a whole-of-
government strategy to counter the fentanyl crisis?
Mr. Chollet. I understand DOD is already supporting a whole-of-
government strategy through multiple lines of effort in the National
Drug Control Strategy put out by the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, as well as the Administration's Strategic Implementation Plan
to Commercially Disrupt the Illicit Fentanyl Supply Chain. If
confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to ensure that DOD's
support for the whole-of-government strategy is as effective as
possible. DOD provides substantial intelligence support across the
Federal Government, enabling and enhancing U.S. Government actions to
target drug traffickers and their networks, including illicit precursor
chemical supply chains, and illicit financial flows. DOD intelligence
has supported numerous successful seizures and interdictions of illicit
drugs, money, and weapons.
Stemming the flow of fentanyl and fentanyl precursors and
disrupting the organizations responsible for these flows is a priority
for DOD's counterdrug program. DOD's counterdrug program does not have
a single specific line item or budget category associated with
countering fentanyl; over 59 percent of the $855 million counterdrug
budget is focused on the Western Hemisphere. While fentanyl is the top
priority because of its deadly effects, supporting efforts to reduce
the flow of other illicit drugs remains an important part of the
overall campaign against Mexican and other drug trafficking
organizations, as they derive significant revenue from the trafficking
of these drugs. For example, the flow of cocaine from South America to
Europe generates billions of dollars of revenue each year for the
Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
166. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, the U.S. military must coordinate
with our allies and partners, especially Mexico, to meet the
unprecedented challenge posed by fentanyl trafficking across the
Southern border. If confirmed, how would you engage with foreign
governments to address this fentanyl crisis?
Mr. Chollet. DOD works to maintain strong defense relationships
with its international partners, including Mexico. However, countering
drug-trafficking and border security are law enforcement matters, and
the Department of State leads engagement with allies and partners in
such matters. I understand that DOD supports civilian-led,
governmentwide efforts to work in partnership with allies and partners
to address the fentanyl threat. If confirmed, I will work in
collaboration with interagency counterparts to ensure DOD is
contributing effectively in the whole-of-government engagement to
address this urgent administration priority.
167. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, the U.S. military has a key role
in countering the trafficking of illicit drugs, including fentanyl, and
their precursors across the Southern border. How would you coordinate
and collaborate with other Federal agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security and the Drug Enforcement Agency, to tackle this
threat?
Mr. Chollet. Countering the trafficking of illicit drugs, including
fentanyl, across the southern border of the United States is a law
enforcement matter. I understand that DOD works closely with
interagency partners at the national, Combatant Command, and country-
team level to align its support with the needs of law enforcement
partners.
DOD is a National Drug Control Program Agency and works with other
members to implement the actions assigned by the National Drug Control
Strategy. DOD is also a supporting agency for the Administration's new
Strategic Implementation Plan to Commercially Disrupt the Illicit
Fentanyl Supply Chain. DOD participates in multiple interagency bodies,
such as the Interdiction Committee and the U.S. Council on
Transnational Organized Crime, to coordinate at the strategic level.
At the operational level, DOD supports interagency partners
primarily through detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime
trafficking of illegal drugs into the United States and through
provision of intelligence analysis to support investigations,
interdictions, arrests, and designations of drug traffickers. If
confirmed, I will assess how effectively the Department works with its
interagency partners to address the threat of illegal drugs and
identify any opportunities for improvement.
war in ukraine and european security
168. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what does victory in Ukraine look
like to you, and does it involve Ukraine's re-conquest of all its
occupied territories, including Crimea?
Mr. Chollet. I believe we should not decide anything about Ukraine
without Ukraine. As Secretary Austin has stated, Ukraine will decide
what victory looks like, and I won't presume to speak for the Ukrainian
people or their leadership. However, as I have discussed with Ukrainian
officials, I believe the end State should be a democratic, independent,
sovereign and prosperous Ukraine able to defend its borders and deter
further aggression. The United States has been very clear that this war
could end immediately if Russia were to withdraw today. Until then, I
believe the U.S. Government should continue to provide Ukraine with the
security assistance it needs to defend itself from, and push back
against, Russian aggression. And if confirmed, I will work to support
Ukraine to that end. That means getting Ukraine what it needs to defend
itself but also helping to build out its future force so it can deter
future Russian threats, defend itself, and if necessary defeat Russia
on the battlefield.
169. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what would DOD do to support your
vision of victory in Ukraine?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, and with the support of the Congress, I
will continue to build on the Department of Defense's immense efforts
by regularly engaging Ukrainian counterparts--as well as Allies and
partners--to ensure we maintain a good understanding of Ukraine's
ongoing capability requirements and get Ukraine the urgent capabilities
needed to counter Russia's ongoing war of aggression.
170. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you believe the U.S. Government
has given all the weapons necessary to Ukraine to secure victory?
Mr. Chollet. Throughout Russia's war, I believe the Department of
Defense has been committed to sending Ukraine what Ukrainian forces
need to be successful on the battlefield, when they need it. If
confirmed, I am committed to continuing the Administration's historic
efforts to enable Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression
and retake its sovereign territory.
171. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
directing DOD to give Ukraine all the weapons they need to win their
war?
U.S. equipment has been critical in supporting Ukraine's ability to
push back Russia's aggression. If confirmed, I am committed to
continuing this historic effort. Ultimately, there are several factors
that shape U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, including resource
constraints, training requirements, technology security considerations,
and readiness impacts on U.S. forces, as well as the capacity of the
industrial base.
172. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in January 2015, less than a year
after Russia's first invasion of Ukraine, you played a critical role in
the implementation of the European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC)
initiative, which sought to shutter 15 U.S. bases in Europe. The
initiative would have closed bases in Britain, Germany, Italy, and
Portugal. At the time, you said that ``the EIC adjustments do not
diminish our ability to meet our commitments to allies and partners''.
In March 2019, you criticized President Trump's push to seek greater
contribution from European allies as a ``totally self-defeating''
measure that harms ``U.S. bases [that] are an essential part of
protecting American interests''. Why did you support closing European
bases in 2015, when you said in 2019 that these bases are an
``essential part of protecting American interests''?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that posture decisions should depend on
military advice and assessments. The changes in EIC in 2015 occurred at
a time when troops were rotating through facilities that were not up to
standard. Meanwhile, DOD had invested $985 million into the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI) for new exercises, patrols, and shows of
force, which later informed the development of the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI). In July 2021, DOD approved Army's request to maintain
several sites from the original list, given their operational value and
change in the security environment. These changes helped consolidate
U.S. posture priorities at a lower cost and did not hurt our
operational capabilities.
173. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you commit to avoid closing
U.S. bases in Europe without consulting Congress?
Mr. Chollet. As senior DOD officials have said, posture decisions
must be informed by military advice and assessments. If confirmed, I
commit to working closely with my counterparts in the combatant
commands and Joint Staff to think about our requirements and the best
balance of forces across global posture to ensure all of the commands
are resourced appropriately for the challenges and threats we face.
174. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, in July 2018, the New York Times
published a story about then-President Trump's letter to NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies warning that the United States
expects the allies to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product
(GDP) on defense spending. In this story, you gave the following
statement: ``Trump still seems to think that NATO is like a club that
you owe dues to, or some sort of protection racket where the U.S. is
doing all the work protecting all these deadbeat Europeans while
they're sitting around on vacation, and now he is suggesting there are
consequences.'' On June 13, 2023, President Biden said the following:
``I expect allies to agree that 2 percent of GDP for defense has to be
a minimum of what allies have to invest in our shared security.'' Do
you believe President Biden's expectation that NATO allies spend 2
percent of their GDP for defense reflects his thinking that ``NATO is
like a club that you owe dues to, or some sort of protection racket
where the U.S. is doing all the work protecting all these deadbeat
Europeans''?
Mr. Chollet. European NATO Allies and Canada have increased defense
spending for nine straight years, and all agree with the idea of fair
burden sharing. According to the Alliance's most recent estimates,
there is an 8.3-percent real increase in defense spending in 2023,
which is the largest yearly increase in decades. After this year, our
NATO Allies will have invested more than $450 billion extra in defense
since 2014.
175. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, do you believe that NATO allies
must spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense spending?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. At this year's NATO Summit in Vilnius, Allies
agreed to a renewed Defense Investment Pledge, making an enduring
commitment to invest ``at least 2 percent'' of GDP annually on defense
and ``recognizing that more is needed urgently'' to meet NATO's
requirements. We have made progress since 2014, but we still have more
work to do across the Alliance.
afghanistan withdrawal
176. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, on August 30, 2023, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Office requested a
transcribed interview with you as part of the Committee's investigation
into the Afghanistan withdrawal. The Committee requested you to reach
out to the Committee to schedule an interview by September 7, 2023. On
September 8, 2023, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul said that the State
Department has yet to schedule the interview. Since then, have you
scheduled the interview with HFAC?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of State informed HFAC, in writing, on
September 7, 2023, that pursuant to its request of August 30, 2023, I
had agreed to appear for a transcribed interview, subject only to
mutually acceptable logistical arrangements. I continue to be ready to
make myself available when HFAC has agreed to a specific date and time.
work from home
177. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, remote work provides Federal
agencies with an opportunity to reduce costs for taxpayers and increase
the ability to recruit and retain talent for public service. However,
such arrangements only work for taxpayers when telework does not (1)
harm the agencies' ability to achieve their mission, (2) adversely
impact the timely delivery of quality services, or (3) impede or impair
the management of the Federal workforce and taxpayer money. Based upon
information technology (IT) login information, office swipe-ins, and
other measurable and observable factors, how many State and DOD
employees spend the majority of their working hours in a region with a
lower locality pay rate than where their designated primary workstation
is located, but continue to receive the higher locality pay associated
with the primary workstation?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
178. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, how much money could be saved by
adjusting locality pay for teleworking employees who reside outside of
the region in where their primary workstation is located to the true
location from where they perform the majority of their work?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
179. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, has the State or Defense
Department taken any action to readjust current locality pay or
calculate the locality pay of new or existing hires accounting for the
true geographical location from where each employee who teleworks
spends the majority of their working hours, rather than the physical
location of their position of record?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
180. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what is the typical daily onsite
attendance in the DOD and State office buildings as a proportion of its
total workforce?
Mr. Chollet. My understanding is across all domestic offices State
Department employees currently report to the office in-person, on
average, 5 days per pay period.
181. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, has DOD or State issued any
guidance, established incentives, or otherwise enticed its workforce to
return to working from the office buildings, and if so, have these
efforts proven successful?
Mr. Chollet. As I understand it, the State Department has been
ramping up domestic onsite work steadily over the past 2 years, and
currently, across all domestic offices Department employees currently
report to the office in-person, on average, 5 days per pay period.
182. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, comparing the capacity of usable
area to the actual in-office attendance, what is the utilization of
building space?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
183. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what is the monetary and
environmental cost of maintaining underutilized space in terms of
energy usage and emissions?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
184. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, what, if any, actions are being
taken or planned to reduce underutilization of building and office
space?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
185. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, how is telework impacting the
delivery of services and response times by DOD or State?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
186. Senator Ernst. Mr. Chollet, have waiting lists or backlogs
increased or decreased?
Mr. Chollet. My duties as Counselor do not include any of these
issues. Any information in this regard is controlled by the Department
of State. Any inquiries in this should be addressed directly to the
Department of State.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
iran
187. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, you have previously touted the
2015 Iran nuclear deal as a significant accomplishment that validated
President Obama's foreign policy approach. Would it be appropriate for
the Biden administration to lift sanctions on Iran while Iran continues
to target Americans for murder here in the United States?
Mr. Chollet. The U.S. Government continues to enforce our sanctions
on Iran and pursue sanctions evaders, and regularly engage with other
countries to strongly discourage them from taking steps that contravene
sanctions on Iran. We also work closely with our allies and partners to
constrain and deter Iran's destabilizing behavior with a wide range of
diplomatic and economic tools. Regarding the threats to DOD personnel,
I understand the Department takes the safety of all current and former
personnel seriously and closely monitors threats against them.
188. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, during the hearing you stated
the United States has recently achieved some level of deterrence
against Iran as exhibited by the lack of Iranian attacks targeting U.S.
military personnel in the Middle East. How many times has Iran or its
proxies attacked U.S. Forces in the Middle East since 2011?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding since the drawdown of U.S.
forces from Iraq in 2011, Iran and its proxies have conducted at least
185 attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East. The Department
remains prepared to take necessary and proportionate military action to
defend U.S. forces, as demonstrated by our strikes in Syria in March
2023. The President has been clear that he will not hesitate to defend
U.S. forces. Regarding the threats to DOD personnel, I understand the
Department takes the safety of all current and former personnel
seriously and closely monitors threats against them.
189. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, how many times has the United
States responded kinetically to attacks by Iran or its proxies on U.S.
servicemembers in the Middle East?
Mr. Chollet. President Biden has directed four major strikes
against Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Syria; in February 2021; June
2021; August 2022; and March 2023. Since our strikes in March 2023,
there have not been any Iranian-aligned militia group attacks on our
forces in Syria, highlighting the deterrent value of these actions. If
confirmed, I will support continuing to take necessary and
proportionate military action to defend U.S. forces and facilities from
attack, or threat of attack.
190. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, during the Iraq War, the
Iranian Quds Force supplied Sunni militias in Iraq with training,
intelligence, and deadly Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs). How
many American servicemembers was Iran responsible for wounding and
killing during the war?
Mr. Chollet. U.S. Central Command assesses at least 603 U.S.
personnel killed in Iraq were attributed to Iran-backed Shia militants
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) between 2003 and 2011. Of those,
448 U.S. personnel were killed by EFPs and other improvised explosive
devices. I do not have an estimate for how many of the tens of
thousands of U.S. personnel wounded during OIF could be attributed to
Iran/Iran-backed Shia militants.
191. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, in 2020, Quasem Soleimani, the
leader of the Quds Force and the orchestrator of dozens of attacks that
killed scores of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, was killed by a U.S.
drone strike. Do you support this operation?
Mr. Chollet. Qasem Soleimani and his Qods Force were responsible
for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. and coalition service members, and
orchestrated several attacks in the months prior to his death that
killed and wounded U.S. and Iraqi personnel. In executing the strike,
the United States demonstrated that it will continue to take all
necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they
are around the world.
afghanistan
192. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, as the State Department's
counselor, what was your role at the State Department in managing the
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Mr. Chollet. In addition to the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and
other seventh-floor principals, I was in regular contact with Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and his
team regarding the ongoing negotiations for a political settlement and
was consulted on policy matters, particularly those related to
coordinating with allies and partners. I maintained contact with
interagency counterparts at OSD, JCS, the intelligence community
agencies, and the National Security Council staff.
193. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, when did State realize a non-
combatant evacuation operation (NEO) would be required in Afghanistan?
Mr. Chollet. It was not definitively clear that an Embassy presence
could not be sustained until Taliban forces were on the outskirts of
Kabul. Until then, there was a consensus among State Department leaders
to continue to support discussions regarding a negotiated political
settlement between leaders of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
the Taliban. With the collapse of the Republic, focus shifted to
executing a rapid and safe evacuation of American citizens and Afghan
partners, working closely with our DOD colleagues.
194. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, was this before or after the
administration decided to withdrawn from Bagram Air Base?
Mr. Chollet. The United States evacuated Bagram in July 2021,
before the non-combatant evacuation operation was initiated.
195. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, when did State start contacting
American citizens in Afghanistan about a possible evacuation?
Mr. Chollet. The Travel Advisory for Afghanistan already in effect
strongly suggested U.S. citizens plan to leave Afghanistan as soon as
possible. The State Department issued 19 security alerts warning U.S.
citizens to leave Afghanistan between January 17, 2021 and August 14,
2021. The Department published a security alert on May 15, 2021,
reminding U.S. citizens that on April 27, 2021, the Department had
ordered the departure from U.S. Embassy Kabul of U.S. Government
employees whose functions can be performed elsewhere due to increasing
violence and threat reports in Kabul. From August 14 through August 31,
State officials reached out directly to every American known to the
U.S. Government, repeatedly and through multiple channels--making
55,000 phone calls and sending 33,000 e-mails during those 17 days
alone--to help facilitate evacuations for those who wished to leave.
196. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, do you consider leaving
American citizens and Afghan interpreters who worked with the U.S.
military behind but evacuating 36,000 Afghans with no connection to the
United States to be a success?
Mr. Chollet. From August 14 through August 31, State officials
reached out directly to every American known to the U.S. Government,
repeatedly and through multiple channels--making 55,000 phone calls and
sending 33,000 e-mails during those 17 days alone--to help facilitate
evacuations for those who wished to leave. No American, to my
knowledge, was barred by U.S. forces from leaving Afghanistan, and no
one was turned away because our coalition partners and NGO's were also
utilizing the airport to evacuate the Afghans who worked for them. We
made every effort to get those U.S. citizens who wanted to leave out of
Afghanistan before and during the evacuation; some chose to stay
despite our warnings and some have chosen to return since the
withdrawal. Over 6,000 U.S. citizens were evacuated during the non-
combatant evacuation operation, and we are continuing to assist
Americans who have since decided to leave. President Biden made a
promise to provide every American who wanted to leave the opportunity
to do so, and he has kept that promise.
197. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, despite the fact that the Biden
administration left Americans and Afghan partners behind in
Afghanistan, you previously said you view the evacuation as a
successful multinational effort. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Mark Milley has called the evacuation a ``strategic failure''.
Do you agree with his assessment?
Mr. Chollet. I agree with the President's assessment that no amount
of time, money, or troops would have yielded a fundamentally different
result in Afghanistan. The decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from
Afghanistan has put us on stronger strategic footing vis-`-vis the
People's Republic of China and Russia and better positioned us to meet
other pressing security commitments globally.
198. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, you have previously said no one
could predict how fast the Afghan Government would fall, although
publicly the Central Intelligence Agency warned of a rapid collapse of
the Afghan Government in July 2021. Were you aware of any U.S.
assessments that indicated the Afghan Government could quickly collapse
in the summer of 2021?
Mr. Chollet. No. According to unclassified reports, the
Intelligence Community assessed that such an outcome was not likely for
six to 12 months after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. I am not aware of
any assessments that placed the collapse of the Afghan government
before the withdrawal of U.S. forces--which is what ultimately
necessitated the non-combatant evacuation operation.
199. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, after the Afghanistan
withdrawal you stated there were lessons to be learned. Specifically,
what are those lessons?
Mr. Chollet. The State Department's After Action Review (AAR) on
Afghanistan highlights a number of lessons learned. It acknowledges,
for example, that the State Department could have been better prepared
for a worst-case scenario, including through the establishment of a red
team capacity to challenge underlying assumptions. The Administration
has also discussed how, as a lesson learned from the Afghanistan
evacuation, we are now prioritizing earlier drawdowns of our personnel
in capitals under threat. This lesson has already been put into
practice in Ukraine, Ethiopia, Sudan, and most recently Niger.
The AAR processes that have taken place across multiple agencies
provide good insights regarding the final chapter of the war in
Afghanistan, but I believe it is also vital to look more broadly--
across the entire 20 years of war--to examine the key decision points,
assumptions, and constraints that led us to this outcome. If confirmed,
I look forward to working closely with the Afghanistan War Commission
and other lesson-learning efforts.
200. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, do you commit to making the
State Department's classified After-Action Review (AAR) available to
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) members and appropriately
cleared staff at least 72 hours before any Committee vote on your
nomination?
Mr. Chollet. A publicly available summary of the AAR has been made
available and can be found at https://www.State.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2023/06/State-AAR-AFG.pdf. I am committed to providing the Committee
such information as it needs to consider my nomination.
Though I do not control access to the AAR, my understanding is that
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has made this available for SASC
members.
extremism in the military
201. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, you previously stated that you
believe the Army is ``a pretty bubba-oriented system,'' and that
criticism of President Obama's foreign policy reflected ``systemic
racism''. Do you believe the U.S. military has a systematic racism
problem?
Mr. Chollet. I do not.
202. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, do you believe, as your
predecessor previously stated, that the officer promotion process is
systemically racist?
Mr. Chollet. I do not. I believe it is critically important that we
have diverse representation in leadership throughout the Armed Forces.
203. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, I have previously spoken about
the reading list former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael
Gilday distributed that contained several books focused on racism,
politics, anti-racism, and other issues which had zero to do with
warfighting and lethality. What should be the focus of books on a
military reading list?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I would defer to the Chiefs of the
Military Services regarding what material they select for their reading
lists.
204. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, how many U.S. servicemembers
were punished for extremist activity as defined by the Department of
Defense since January 6, 2021?
Mr. Chollet. I do not have access to this information in my current
role as Counselor to the Secretary of State.
205. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, what is the mission of the U.S.
Department of Defense?
Mr. Chollet. The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide
the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our Nation's
security.
206. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, if you are confirmed, will you
require reading lists for service chiefs to focus on lethality,
history, heritage, and winning wars as service chief reading lists
typically do?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I would defer to the Chiefs of the
Military Services regarding what material they select for their reading
lists.
importance of strategic documents
207. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, the Navy released its Climate
Change Plan nearly 18 months before its 30-year shipbuilding plan. Is
warfighting and shipbuilding more important to the mission of the Navy
than climate change? Please answer ``yes'' or ``no''.
Mr. Chollet. Consistent with the NDS, I agree that to sustain and
strengthen deterrence, the Department of Defense requires the design
and development of a combat-credible U.S. military fit for advancing
our highest defense priorities. The NDS also highlights climate change,
among other transboundary threats, as a feature of the security
environment that will increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force
and the systems that support it. DOD's future force must therefore be
lethal, sustainable, resilient, survivable, and agile and responsive--
including to climate change impacts.
My understanding is that the time it takes to develop strategic and
planning documents varies according to a range of factors, including
complexity of data input and analysis and degree of internal and
external coordination. It does not necessarily reflect prioritization.
208. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, during your confirmation
hearing you dodged the previously mentioned question which was very
disappointing. Please directly answer this question with a ``yes'' or
``no'' answer.
Mr. Chollet. My response is the same as to the previous question.
russia-ukraine
209. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, the Biden administration's
approach to arming Ukraine has been marked by hesitancy, delays, and
concerns about so-called ``escalation'' from the Russian side. A single
instance of excessive caution is perhaps excusable. The administration
has so far delayed the approval of much needed equipment to the
Ukrainians, including HIMARS, ATACMS, cluster munitions, Patriot air
defense missiles, Abrams tanks, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and F-16s.
Do you believe this pattern of hesitancy has produced a negative impact
on Ukraine's ability to defend itself?
Mr. Chollet. I believe U.S. security assistance has been focused on
getting Ukraine what it needs, when it needs it, to achieve successes
on the battlefield. My understanding is that these decisions are
ultimately based on a collective assessment of what Ukraine needs,
while balancing U.S. readiness requirements, training, sustainability,
and other factors. Over the past 19 months, U.S. security assistance
has continually adapted to Ukraine's evolving battlefield requirements,
and U.S.-provided training and equipment has been critical to Ukraine's
ability to push back on Russian aggression. From providing Stinger
missiles, Javelin anti-tank weapons, and loitering munitions early on,
to artillery, long-range fires, and advanced armored capabilities as
the fight moved to the South and the East, the Administration has been
responsive to Ukraine's needs. Away from the frontlines, U.S.-provided
air defense systems like NASAMS and Patriot have been essential to
protecting Ukraine's civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
U.S. security assistance has unequivocally played a critical role in
Ukraine's successes and will continue to do so.
210. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, which administration official
had the ultimate approval authority on the provision of weapon systems
listed in the above question?
Mr. Chollet. These determinations generally fall within the
authority of the President of the United States, which he may delegate.
department of defense policies
211. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, do you believe DOD paying for
Active Duty servicemembers to get gender reassignment surgery, a
procedure that can take months or years to heal before a servicemember
is deployable, advances DOD's primary mission of warfighting and
lethality?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that our Service members should have access
to the medically necessary health care they need to ensure their
physical and mental health.
212. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, in October 2022 Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin issued a memo entitled ``Ensuring Access to
Reproductive Healthcare''. Do you agree with the directives in this
memo?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I will follow all DOD policies.
213. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, there is a strong argument that
the ``Ensuring Access to Reproductive Healthcare'' memo violates the
Hyde Amendment, a law established more than 40 years ago that prevents
the Federal Government from using Federal funds to pay for abortion
outside of the exceptions for rape, incest, or if the pregnancy is
determined to endanger the woman's life. Do you agree that Secretary
Austin's memo violates the Hyde Amendment?
Mr. Chollet. I am aware that in a published October 2022 legal
opinion, the Department of Justice determined that DOD ``may lawfully
expend funds to pay for Service members and their dependents to travel
to obtain abortions that DOD cannot itself perform due to statutory
restrictions'' and that ``DOD may lawfully expend funds to pay for such
travel pursuant to both its express statutory authorities and,
independently, through the necessary expense doctrine.'' The Department
of Justice also concluded that section 1093 of title 10, United States
Code, ``does not prohibit the use of funds to pay expenses, such as a
per diem or travel expenses, that are incidental to the abortion.''
214. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, do you believe a compromise
position exists between the current policy as outlined in Secretary
Austin's ``Ensuring Access to Reproductive Healthcare'' memo and the
previous policy?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I will follow all DOD policies.
215. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, is it your position that there
should be no changes to Secretary Austin's ``Ensuring Access to
Reproductive Healthcare'' memo?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I will follow all DOD policies.
foreign military sales
216. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, the Statement of Administration
Policy (SAP) on the SASC-reported Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA objected to
deadlines for FMS processing included in section 1299K (1399K in the
Senate-passed NDAA). These deadlines, both with regard to letters of
request (LOR) for pricing and availability and LORs for offer and
acceptance, are drawn from current Defense Security Cooperative Agency
(DSCA) guidelines. Do you think these guidelines should be changed to
better measure performance?
Mr. Chollet. I support DOD's ongoing commitment to continuous
process improvement in the area of Foreign Military Sales, which
represents a sensible path forward to reduce timelines, manage cost,
and deliver capability to our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to reviewing and supporting these efforts moving forward.
With regard to specific guidelines, it appears that meeting the
timelines and waiver requirements contained in the proposed legislation
would likely require a substantial increase in manpower across both the
security cooperation and acquisition communities, a cost that--by law--
would be recouped from supplemental charges to allies and partners.
This could potentially make the United States less competitive in its
efforts to be the partner of choice for allies and partners.
217. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, the SAP objection to section
1299K cited a need to account for complexity and priority. The section
already does this, using the same categories used by DSCA, allowing for
45, 100, and 150 days depending on the level of complexity. DSCA's own
metrics measure performance according to these categories. Should DSCA
develop new categories to better sort complexity and account for the
Department's performance?
Mr. Chollet. I support the DOD's ongoing commitment to continuous
process improvement in Foreign Military Sales. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with DSCA to review these metrics and
support their efforts moving forward.
218. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, the SAP objects to section 922
of the SASC-reported Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA transferring oversight
responsibility of the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
from the Under Secretary for Policy to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Base Policy. The SAP cites legal issues with
this change, but presents no substantive objection. Recognizing that
Congress can resolve problems presented by conflicting legal
authorities, will you work with me to identify the legal changes
necessary to address the conflict identified in the SAP?
Mr. Chollet. The Administration strongly opposes moving the Defense
Technology Security Administration from the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy (USD(P)) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy. Export controls and technology security are,
per the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Control Reform Act,
national security functions and support U.S. foreign policy objectives.
These functions are not industrial base issues. OUSD(P) provides
political-military/security cooperation perspectives on exports of
military and dual-use technologies in direct support of the promote and
protect objectives of the National Defense Strategy. DTSA works closely
with A&S, R&E, the Services, as well as Policy components, in
identifying critical and emerging technologies that should require U.S.
Government review prior to being transferred to another country of
national security concern, particularly to strategic competitors in
order to protect the qualitative military superiority of the United
States military. DTSA works closely with A&S/Industrial Base Policy in
developing the Department's risk assessments of foreign acquisitions of
U.S. businesses as part of the Treasury-led CFIUS process. At the same
time, DTSA is deeply involved in facilitating security cooperation by
working closely with Policy regional components and with allies and
partners to ensure allies and partners have required legal and
structural measures in place to protect sensitive U.S. military
technology.
DTSA is responsible for ensuring that policies regarding transfers
of defense and dual-use technologies are consistent with the National
Defense Strategy and with protecting the qualitative military
superiority of the United States military. This is accomplished through
Department-wide policies, specific technology release approvals
recommended by the Services, and through providing a national security
position on export licenses coordinated with DOD by State and Commerce.
USD(P)'s responsibility is codified in 10 U.S. Code Sec. 134(b)(3)
``(3)Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary
of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for
supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense
relating to export controls.''
This is consistent with the overall responsibilities of the USD(P)
to the Secretary to establish technology transfer policies for the
Department. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
Policy (10 U.S. Code Sec. 138) is responsible for advice to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (10 U.S. Code
Sec. 133b) on industrial base matters. The USD(A&S) has no
responsibilities regarding export control or technology security
policies.
219. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, industry complaints about
DTSA's lack of speed and cutting-edge technological expertise indicate
a need for stronger, more qualified oversight than the current
structure, wherein DTSA reports directly to the Under Secretary for
Policy. If the Assistant Secretary for Defense Industrial Base cannot
provide effective alternative oversight, would you recommend DTSA
report instead to a different office, for instance, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering or Under Secretary for
Acquisition and Sustainment?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that DTSA is providing cutting-edge
technological expertise and works closely with counterparts with the
DOD organizations with equities in specific transfers or policies, for
example, the Services, the Office of the USD(R&E), the Office of the
USD(A&S), DOD Labs, DARPA, Department of Energy, NSA, and others.
DTSA licensing timelines are determined by the Executive Order
authority for Departments of State and Commerce. With National Security
in mind, DTSA works within those timelines to ensure our technical U.S.
military advantages remain intact.
The DTSA technical staff consists of senior engineers, scientists,
patent holders, subject matter experts and licensing analysts who
contribute to maintaining and promoting the U.S. military's advantages
on the battlefield. Most of the technical analysts have advanced
degrees, and approximately 15 percent have PhDs. In addition, the
knowledge and expertise residing in DTSA influences and helps shape
DOD's technology security policies. To accomplish the DTSA mission in a
timely manner, DTSA scientists and engineers are experts on both
domestic and foreign defense-related technology and capabilities. They
are also highly proficient at applying their technical knowledge in a
manner consistent with the U.S. Government's policy and regulatory
framework, as well as a variety of multilateral forums concerned with
technology security such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Additionally, DTSA's technical expertise is often
called upon by the Department of Justice to be technical experts for
criminal cases involving export controls. DTSA's Senior Technical
Advisor works closely with other parts of the Department of Defense to
identify the latest trends and innovations in critical and emerging
technologies, keeping DTSA staff up to date with the latest
technologies and continually evaluate their relevance and potential
impact on the organization.
DTSA maintains an outstanding record in working with industry and
U.S. Government stakeholders to reach decisions on exports. In the case
of Ukraine, DTSA has demonstrated unprecedented, rapid-turn (less than
24 hours, sometimes less than 4 hours) ability to assess technology
risk while providing Ukraine with the capabilities to fight against
Russian aggressors. DTSA is appropriately placed under the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the Department in protecting the military
superiority of the U.S. warfighter while promoting defense cooperation
through transfers of military and dual-use technologies to partners and
allies.
DTSA operates and maintains the U.S. Government IT system and data
base where all export license applications are staffed and adjudicated.
Under ECR, USXPORTs was directed to be the system utilized by all
agencies to expeditiously adjudicate and record decisions regarding
export licenses, and if modernized to utilize current technologies
regarding data analytics and automation, this would certainly assist
U.S. industry.
220. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, what other new legal
authorities do you believe would allow DTSA to move faster on
technology release and licensing decisions?
Mr. Chollet. I believe DTSA has sufficient legal authorities to
make timely technology release and licensing decisions.
221. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, foreign partners--especially
those facing the most serious security threats--are often prepared to
assume more operational risk than America's own Armed Forces. Whether
in technology release or sale of non-programs of record, how should the
Department account for this difference in risk tolerance levels?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that our foreign partners are willing to
take operational risks and include those risks in our analysis of
proposed arms transfers. For example, if there is a high likelihood of
battlefield loss of U.S.-provided technology, the U.S. Government's
release approvals are predicated on ensuring that the compromise of the
system and its embedded technology will not have an adverse impact on
the U.S. qualitative military superiority. As the technological leader
of the world in many areas, we must be vigilant in protecting those
technologies that the U.S. warfighter needs to maintain superiority in
the battlespace.
222. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, whether by law, regulation, or
practice, what percentage change in price from LOA to contract do you
think should trigger the need to amend an existing LOA?
Mr. Chollet. I support DOD's ongoing commitment to continuous
process improvement in Foreign Military Sales. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with DSCA to review these metrics and
support their efforts moving forward.
223. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, to your knowledge, what law,
regulation, or policy bars a prime contractor from entering into an
agreement with a manufacturer to begin the process of acquiring long-
lead government-furnished equipment (GFE), including sensitive and
closely controlled items such as communications security devices,
military grade GPS [global positioning system], and anti-spoofing
devises, on forecast, without reference to a specific LOR and prior to
execution of any signed commercial contract or issuance of an LOA?
Mr. Chollet. I am not familiar with the specific details of the
contracting and acquisition processes, particularly as it relates to
agreements between a prime contractor and manufacturer. However,
Section 30 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2770, only
authorizes the U.S. Government to sell a defense article or service to
a commercial company to support that company's sale of an end item via
a direct commercial sale and an export license to a foreign armed
forces or an international organization. It is my understanding that it
would be difficult for the U.S. Government to justify a Section 30 sale
in the absence of any identifiable direct commercial sales end item
requirement.
224. Mr. Chollet, the FMS pipeline is filled with $19 billion in
arms contracted by Taiwan and scheduled for delivery. In the meantime,
deliveries of similar systems are being made to other foreign
customers. Will you explore options for adjusting production and
delivery schedules in ways that puts Taiwan ahead of all others--except
Ukraine and Israel?
Mr. Chollet. I understand DOD is working closely with the U.S.
defense industrial base, and will continue to do so, to support our
partners with critical systems for their national defense. If
confirmed, I will review how the DOD has prioritized Taiwan's Security
Cooperation program to assess how new approaches can expeditiously
deliver critical systems in line with our national defense strategy.
225. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, arms deliveries should not be
determined by which defense contractors can best access and manipulate
the FMS process. They should be prioritized according to America's
strategic needs. How will you work to reconcile arms deliveries and
strategic priorities?
Mr. Chollet. Security Cooperation programs are first and foremost a
tool of national security and diplomacy, and decisions made to provide
capabilities to our foreign partners are based on U.S. strategic
priorities. DOD executes the FMS process in close partnership with the
Department of State and works closely with industry to reconcile
production and delivery timelines and align them with the U.S. National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
226. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, will you prioritize the next
delivery of weapons to Taiwan under Presidential drawdown authority
before the end of the 2023 calendar year?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
expeditious use of available authorities--matched with appropriations--
to support Taiwan's self-defense in a manner that is consistent with
long-standing U.S. policy.
227. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, will you schedule a robust
delivery of weapons deliveries to Taiwan under Presidential drawdown
authority?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
expeditious use of available authorities, including implementation of
Presidential Drawdown Authority, for Taiwan. If confirmed, I will also
continue to deepen the Department's work to provide Taiwan the
capabilities critical for its self-defense through other mechanisms and
authorities.
228. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, will you assess the
advisability and feasibility of using the fund to make investment
decisions for the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) independent
of the requirements of the United States Armed Forces and report your
findings to the Committee in a timeframe that will allow us to
incorporate them into the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA cycle?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. The Department of Defense, in consultation with
the Department of State, uses the SDAF to purchase equipment and
materiel that our international partners are expected to urgently need
in the future. The Fund enhances U.S. military readiness by reducing
the need to divert equipment and materiel from DOD inventories. In
accordance with Section 51 in the Arms Export Control Act, when making
investment decisions, DOD prioritizes equipment that is an established
acquisition objective for the U.S. Armed Forces when compatible with
security assistance requirements.
china/taiwan
229. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, over the last year, the
administration has down-played its earlier sense of urgency around the
prospects of Chinese military aggression aimed at Taiwan. To what do
you attribute this change?
Mr. Chollet. The 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the
People's Republic of China (PRC) as the Department of Defense's top
pacing challenge, and the Department has made it clear that it views
the PRC as waging a significant pressure campaign against Taiwan
involving military, diplomatic, and economic instruments. It is
important that we maintain deterrence today, tomorrow, and in the
future.
230. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, at a SASC hearing in 2021, I
asked then INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Philip Davidson about when
assessed a People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of Taiwan would
occur. He replied that such an invasion ``manifest within the next 6
years,'' around 2027. Do you agree with this timeline?
Mr. Chollet. In my view, an invasion of Taiwan by the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is neither imminent nor inevitable. It is
critical that we continue to strengthen deterrence through our efforts
to support Taiwan's self-defense, maintain our own capacity to resist
any use of force that jeopardizes the security of the people on Taiwan,
and work with our allies and partners to ensure a free and open Indo-
Pacific region. I believe the Department is clear-eyed about this
challenge and working with urgency and confidence to meet it; if
confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts to do more than ever
to fulfill its commitments consistent with longstanding U.S. policy,
including the Taiwan Relations Act.
231. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, should the ``Davidson Window''
be accounted for in the development of defense budgets, acquisition,
global posture of U.S. Forces, and foreign military sales?
Mr. Chollet. I believe the breadth and pace of the People's
Republic of China's (PRC) military modernization is a significant
reason why the National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the
Department of Defense's pacing challenge. It is also a significant
reason why the President's budget requests have prioritized investments
in the capabilities our military needs right now, as well as what we
need to maintain deterrence in the future. I believe that the
Department is doing more than ever to meet its pacing challenge; if
confirmed, I will work to ensure that these efforts continue to receive
the increased urgency, prioritization, resources, and attention they
deserve.
232. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, would you support increased
combined planning with Taiwan for the defense of the island and its
territories as an integral part of deterrence?
Mr. Chollet. I support continuing our robust unofficial
relationship with Taiwan, including the provision of defense articles
and services. If confirmed, I will continue to uphold our One China
policy, as enumerated in the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. In accordance with our long-
standing policy, the support that the U.S. Government provides Taiwan
is commensurate with the threat posed by the People's Republic of
China.
233. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, would you support increased
cooperation between Taiwanese and U.S. defense industries, including
joint production of weapons systems?
Mr. Chollet. This discussion with Taiwan has been ongoing for
years, with U.S. industry capabilities and expertise serving as a
backdrop for Taiwan's indigenous defense production priorities.
Joint production is primarily an industry discussion, with market
forces driving investment and opportunities. The U.S. Government is
involved to protect vital U.S. defense technology, access to
technology, and data associated with certain programs--all roles that I
would continue to support if confirmed.
234. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, how do you see the value of
direct U.S.-China defense talks and military-to-military dialogs?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense
is committed to maintaining open lines of communication with the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) to ensure competition does not veer into
conflict. Unfortunately, the PLA has largely denied, canceled, and
ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DOD requests for senior-
level military-to-military communication. This refusal by the People's
Republic of China to engage with the United States in military-to-
military communication channels, combined with the PLA's increasingly
coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk of an
operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis.
235. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, will you actively work with
allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond to gain clarity and
commitments around what they could provide in terms of military support
in a Taiwan contingency and U.S.-led effort to defend the island and
its territories?
Mr. Chollet. There is a growing chorus of countries around the
world emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan
Strait. I understand that the Department of Defense is building
historic momentum working with our allies and partners to support
Taiwan and is seeing results. If confirmed, I will continue to actively
work with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific region to support
Taiwan.
236. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, how do you see American
interests in the South China Sea and the People's Republic of China
(PRC) threat to them?
Mr. Chollet. The South China Sea is a vital global trade route. The
United States, our allies and partners, and all nations have
significant interest in the South China Sea remaining free and open, in
accordance with international law. I understand that over the last
decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has accelerated its
efforts to assert control over the entirety of the South China Sea. It
continues to expand its military and law enforcement presence, harass,
or block the legitimate economic activities of other states, and
interfere with the ability of other states to exercise navigational
rights and freedoms under international law. If confirmed, I would work
to ensure the United States supports our allies and partners as they
seek to uphold their rights under international law, and that the
United States continues to oppose PRC efforts to assert unlawful
maritime claims in the South China Sea.
237. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative (PDI) is an effective budget tool to track efforts to deter
Chinese aggression in the INDOPACOM AOR. Do you believe PDI has been
effective in forcing DOD to align resources against the problems the
INDOPACOM commander has identified?
Mr. Chollet. I understand the Department of Defense is prioritizing
the PRC as its top pacing challenge and that significant DOD
investments and efforts are focused on this threat and strengthening
Indo-Pacific deterrence. I also understand the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative (PDI) is a key part of these endeavors, capturing the
Department's efforts and investments that strengthen regional
deterrence. I further understand that DOD is focused on moving and
sustaining its forces farther forward, west of the International Date
Line, and making its force posture more mobile, distributed, resilient,
and lethal.
238. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, it has been 8 months since the
Chinese spy balloon was shot down off the coast of South Carolina.
Since then, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in partnership with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Intelligence
Community (IC) agencies, has been conducting an investigation on the
military-equipment in the spy balloon. When will DOD provide a briefing
on the findings of the investigation to Congress?
Mr. Chollet. Although the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy is not responsible for this investigation, it is my
understanding that the Intelligence Community has shared its
preliminary analysis of the high-altitude balloon's capabilities to the
congressional intelligence committees. I will have to refer you to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and I have referred
your question to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security to arrange an update for you on the status of
the IC analysis.
239. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, in my ``Why Taiwan Matters
Speech'' I provided to you during our office call describes three
levels of deterrence. Please comment on your view on the framework of
deterrence and how to implement it.
Mr. Chollet. I appreciate that your framework takes a whole of U.S.
Government approach to maintaining cross-strait peace and stability.
The Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six
Assurances--key elements of the U.S. One China policy--are inherently
whole-of-government approaches that have enabled multiple
administrations and Congresses to support Taiwan and deter the People's
Republic of China. I believe that current Department actions are
enhancing Taiwan's defensive capability, maintaining the United States'
military and economic strength as a deterrent, and supporting allies
and partners who share our interests in maintaining cross-strait peace
and stability.
240. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, please describe how to
implement the three levels of deterrence as detailed in my ``Why Taiwan
Matters'' speech.
Mr. Chollet. Current U.S. policy provides the U.S. Government with
the means to support Taiwan's defense capabilities, leverage the
support of allies and partners, and bolster U.S. strength--both
military and economic--to counter the People's Republic of China if it
chooses to unilaterally change the cross-strait status quo.
241. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, as detailed in my ``Why Taiwan
Matters'' speech, there are three levels of deterrence. We need to be
actively leading on all three. The first is getting Taiwan the weapons
it needs to effectively contribute to its own defense against PRC
military action. The second is maintaining our own capacity to help
defend Taiwan. We have challenges dealing with these two levels. But
the level that is proving the most difficult to build consensus around
is the third and probably most effective--signaling devastating
economic and financial sanctions in the event Beijing resorts to use of
force, as required by my STAND with Taiwan Act. Will you work within
the administration to support development of such a robust package of
sanctions in advance of any PRC use of force on Taiwan?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that the Department of Defense works
closely with its interagency colleagues, including those at the
Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and State, to ensure that the
U.S. Government effectively leverages our financial and economic tools
to protect national security. If confirmed, I would prioritize and
continue that close collaboration.
alaska and the arctic
242. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, Alaska's location at the seams
of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), INDOPACOM, and U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) makes it the most strategic location in the world for power
projection into these AORs. Please describe how you see Alaska's role
in projecting American power into these three combatant command AORs.
Mr. Chollet. Alaska's strategic location is incredibly important
for the Joint Force's ability to project power across all three of
these Combatant Commands' areas of responsibility (AORs). Its location
places it closer to these AORs than many places in the Lower 48,
meaning that U.S. forces can more quickly reach these regions from
Alaska. This is one of the reasons that Alaska is home to the largest
concentration of fifth-generation airpower anywhere in the world at
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson Air Force Base. The Alaska
Air National Guard supports this capability through the 168th Air Wing,
which is the only Arctic region refueling unit for Pacific Air Forces.
Alaska is, therefore, key to ensuring a globally deployable Joint
Force. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department regularly
reviews its force posture and force management decisions pertaining to
Alaska cognizant of its importance to DOD operations around the world.
243. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, over the last year, the entire
Nation has seen how important Air Force assets in Alaska are to our
Homeland defense, particularly during the Chinese spy balloon and
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) incidents. Active Duty and Air
National Guard units detected, tracked, and shot down UAPs during the
dead of winter in bad weather with almost no daylight. The 100 5th
generation fighters in Alaska--F-22s and F-35s--execute the Homeland
defense mission with support from E-3s and KC-135s. These aircraft are
all under the commander of INDOPACOM and can be expected to deploy
forward in the event of a conflict with the PRC. In your opinion,
should the command and control relationship of these aircraft in Alaska
be changed to ensure they are available for Homeland defense?
Mr. Chollet. From my vantage point, command and control
relationships between USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM, while complex, are
working and ensure Alaska-based 5th generation fighters and enablers
are used effectively in the homeland defense mission. Although these
forces are assigned to USINDOPACOM, the Department of Defense
effectively balances their use to meet NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and
USINDOPACOM missions. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to
review command and control relationships and identify opportunities for
improvement.
244. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, if you do not believe that the
command and control relationship of these aircraft in Alaska should be
changed to ensure they are available for Homeland defense, how should
U.S. Forces conduct Homeland defense in Alaska during a conflict with
the PRC?
Mr. Chollet. From my perspective, current command and control
relationships have proven adequate to carry out the Department's
missions globally. However, as I understand things, the Secretary of
Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the applicable
Secretaries of the Military Departments, may make changes he determines
are necessary to adapt to emerging threats and crises. I look forward
to reviewing this issue further, if confirmed.
245. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, in 2020 the Air Force released
its first Arctic strategy which the Army and Navy followed with their
own approximately 1 year later. Each of these strategies seek to
identify how the respective branch can regain Arctic dominance. Are you
familiar with each of the Service Arctic strategies?
Mr. Chollet. I am familiar with all of the Services' Arctic
strategies, and I understand the Department of Defense is currently
updating its Department-wide Arctic strategy, the last version of which
dates from 2019. I understand this updated strategy will take into
account the significant changes in the Arctic security environment that
have occurred over the past few years and provide DOD Components,
including the Combatant Commands, with refreshed guidance that will
nest under the 2022 National Defense Strategy and the National Strategy
for the Arctic Region.
246. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, Russia has welcomed Chinese
investment in ports and energy projects along the Northern Sea Route.
Chinese financers provided up to 60 percent of the capital for Russia's
Yamal liquefied natural gas project terminating in the port city of
Sabetta on Russia's northern coast. The project is considered the
``crown jewel'' of Russia's investments in the Northern Sea Route and
could produce up to 926 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas
from the South Tambey field. In the last year, the PRC has become the
largest importer of Russia oil. Last month, the PRC imported a record
high quantity of oil from Russia's Arctic. Do you see Russia and China
continuing to deepen ties, especially Russian energy exports to China
and Chinese investment in port and energy infrastructure projects along
the Northern Sea Route?
Mr. Chollet. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) approach to the
Arctic has expanded and created new opportunities for engagement
between the PRC and Russia. If confirmed, I would work to ensure
neither country's activities in the Arctic threaten freedom of
navigation, U.S. sovereignty, or U.S. economic interests.
247. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, how might this economic
development impact our security interests in Europe and the Indo-
Pacific?
Mr. Chollet. People's Republic of China (PRC) support to Russia's
economy, in the Arctic and elsewhere, negatively impacts the ability of
Western nations to hold Russia to account for its aggression in
Ukraine. More broadly, the PRC and Russia's increased alignment,
military modernization, desire to undermine the international rules-
based order, and use of common coercive strategies against U.S. allies
and partners in Europe and Asia are of significant concern to the
United States, and to like-minded allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific
region. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department's
efforts to address the PRC as its top pacing challenge, with Russia as
an acute threat.
248. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chollet, according to unclassified
reporting, as of October 1, 2023, Russia may be preparing to test the
Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile with a range of up to 14,000
miles in the vicinity of Novaya Zemlya, an island archipelago in the
Arctic region. Please describe the importance of the Arctic to Russia's
military advancements.
Mr. Chollet. The Arctic plays a critical role in Russia's military
calculations. Russia's strategic second-strike capabilities are based
in the Arctic on the Kola Peninsula. Over the past decade, Russia has
invested significantly in renovating Soviet-era bases and new
infrastructure across the Russian Arctic. The Arctic has also been an
important weapons-testing ground for Russia historically, given its
vast area and sparse population. I understand that the Department
monitors closely Russia's development of new or enhanced capabilities
that could threaten the national security of the United States, our
allies, and partners, including in or through the Arctic region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
illegal immigration in alabama
249. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, between 2018 and 2020,
Alabama experienced 4 times the increase in fentanyl deaths (121 to
428). Between 2020 and 2022 that number doubled to 835. We know that a
lot of this fentanyl is coming across our southern border which has
essentially been erased by this administration. We also know that once
these illegal immigrants come into our country, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) cannot effectively track these individuals in
our own country.
Since President Biden took office and refused to secure the border,
over 6 million illegal immigrants have been apprehended by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and a majority of whom, have been released
into the United States. Since March 2021, CBP has released more than
127,000 illegal immigrants who were later arrested in the United
States. This includes 5,500 criminal arrests.
You've previously stated that the security threat at the border is
``preposterous and not supported by the evidence''. Can you explain to
me how 4 times the amount of fentanyl deaths in my State and how over
127,000 illegal immigrant's arrests is ``not supported by the
evidence'' to deem the situation at the southern border as a disaster?
Mr. Chollet. The loss of so many lives due to fentanyl in our
Nation and across the world is a terrible tragedy. It is my
understanding that, while illicit drug trafficking and immigration
enforcement are law enforcement matters that are best be addressed law
enforcement agencies, the Department of Defense actively supports our
Nation's whole-of-government efforts to combat the illicit trafficking
of fentanyl.
250. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, in May, the administration
sent 1,500 troops to the border. In August, they pulled 1,100 troops
from the border. A few days ago, they sent 800 back. It almost sounds
like they may be confused as to whether or not there is anything
noteworthy happening out there. Clearly, if National Guard is assisting
at the border, DOD has a role to play in border management.
As the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, how would you advise
the Secretary of Defense on what further actions DOD should do when. .
. . not if . . . this trajectory of illegal immigrants continues to
rapidly increase due to this administration's refusal to handle the
situation?
Mr. Chollet. It is my understanding that DOD support is largely
driven by DHS requests for assistance. I am not aware of a DOD
authority to take independent border security actions at the southwest
border.
If confirmed, I would, consistent with the law and with the
military advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide
the Secretary of Defense with my best advice based on the specific
circumstances at the southwest border. Should DOD receive a DHS request
for assistance, I would consider--again, with the advice of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--the specific capabilities,
resources, or tasks requested, taking into account the availability of
DOD capabilities, resources, and personnel, and weigh the potential
risks to military personnel, readiness, and DOD's ability to respond to
potential contingencies.
If confirmed, I would also work closely with DHS in order to advise
the Secretary of Defense on how DOD can most appropriately help DHS
build the capability and capacity DHS needs to carry out its statutory
border security mission.
afghanistan withdrawal
251. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, I want to touch on what
several of my colleagues have mentioned, the botched withdrawal from
Afghanistan. In 2021, President Biden determined the previously
selected date of May 1st was not viable for a complete withdrawal of
military forces from Afghanistan. Instead, he chose a date 5 months
later. This gave the administration 5 months to prepare for the
withdrawal. Despite having these 5 months to prepare, the
implementation of the action was extraordinarily chaotic and
sorrowfully fatal.
You've previously come out and stated that you believe the botched
withdrawal from Afghanistan was a successful multinational effort.
Looking back at lessons learned, unfortunately lessons learned the hard
way, how would you now rate the botched withdrawal on a scale from 1 to
10. One being absolutely devastating, incredible tragic and ill-
planned, and 10 being you wouldn't change a single thing and everything
went according to plan?
Mr. Chollet. I'm not able to provide a number. What I can say is
that no operation is ever perfect. A NEO, in particular, is one of the
highest risk operations our military personnel are asked to undertake;
they are rare, they are rapid, and they are conducted as a last resort,
often in very dangerous circumstances. In this case, the Taliban had
entered Kabul, our partner forces had collapsed, and there was an
active and lethal terrorist threat on the ground. The fact that we were
able to execute the largest airlift in U.S. history in such a dangerous
and fluid environment speaks to the extraordinary skill and bravery of
our military personnel and diplomats on the ground.
I know the Administration is committed to learning the lessons from
Afghanistan, including the evacuation operation. We need to understand
what happened--what went right and what went wrong--in the final days,
weeks, and months of the war in Afghanistan. It is incumbent upon us to
ask tough questions. Learning the lessons of two decades of conflict is
critically important, even though it may be difficult at times. This is
why both State and DOD conducted extensive and deliberate After Action
Reviews of the withdrawal--including going through hundreds of
interviews and thousands of documents--to try to capture ground truth
and identify lessons that can be incorporated going forward. I believe
it is also vital to look more broadly--across the entire 20 years of
war--to examine the key decision points, assumptions, and constraints
that led us to this outcome. If confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with the Afghanistan War Commission and other lesson-learning
efforts. .
252. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, do you feel the President
should have allotted more time for the withdrawal or done more during
the 5 months?
Mr. Chollet. The State Department's planning was extensive but, as
stated in the After Action Reviews, should have included more red
teaming, worst-case scenarios, and challenging of core assumptions. We
were surprised, for example, by how quickly more than 300,000 trained
and equipped Afghan National Defense and Security Forces melted away,
that President Ghani would flee as quickly as he did, and that the
Taliban would be able to capture all provincial capitals including
Kabul in 9 days, among other uncomfortable truths. The withdrawal
timeline was sound; the unforeseen circumstances necessitating the NEO
forced us to change our calculations.
253. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, what sort of policy would you
recommend to ensure a similar situation does not reoccur?
Mr. Chollet. We must learn the lessons of America's longest war.
The State and DOD AARs are one piece of that effort, but far from the
only one. DOD has created the Office of Special Coordinator for
Afghanistan that will report directly to me, if confirmed. The
elevation of this office within the OSD(Policy) organization reflects
the importance the Department places on continuing to learn the lessons
of the war in Afghanistan; being fully responsive and available to the
Afghanistan War Commission; and serving as faithful stewards of the
legacies of the thousands of servicemembers and civilians who dedicated
their careers and lives to this war. I share these priorities. I know
that the Department is actively working with Congress to appropriately
respond to its oversight inquiries related to Afghanistan and has
produced several thousand pages of documents already. If confirmed, I
will support these efforts and work to facilitate Congress's ability to
get the information it needs to perform its oversight responsibilities.
diversity, equity and inclusion
254. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, I'm curious about your
opinion on ``systemic racism'' within various governmental
organizations. You have previously stated that any criticisms of
President Obama's foreign policy reflected ``systemic racism''. How do
you define systemic racism?
Mr. Chollet. The Cambridge Dictionary defines systemic racism as
``the policies and practices that exist throughout a whole society or
organization, and that result in and support a continued unfair
advantage to some people and unfair or harmful treatment of others
based on race.''
255. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, do you feel DOD is
systemically racist? If so, what policy changes would you advise?
Mr. Chollet. I do not believe that DOD is systemically racist.
256. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Chollet, please elaborate how a
difference of opinion with regard to a person's foreign policy beliefs
reflects ``systemic racism''?
Mr. Chollet. I do not believe that a difference of opinion with
regard to a person's foreign policy beliefs reflects systemic racism.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
abraham accords
257. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, how would an expansion of the
Abraham Accords advance U.S. national security interests in the Middle
East?
Mr. Chollet. The United States strongly supports the Abraham
Accords and normalization agreements between Israel and Arab countries.
These historic agreements have made Israel and its neighbors more
secure and created new opportunities to strengthen cooperation across
the region. The United States is implementing our strategy to advance
opportunities to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation between
Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries across a variety of
fields. This effort will increase stability and prosperity across the
Middle East and the broader region by enhancing regional economic
integration, security cooperation, and cultural understanding among
U.S. partners. These new regional partnerships also afford the
opportunity to develop globally transformative partnerships with Israel
at the core.
258. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, what role does the Abraham Accords
play in countering Russia and China's influence in the Middle East and
how could this be strengthened?
Mr. Chollet. The Middle East is a key theater for strategic
competition. The PRC has demonstrated its intent to bolster its
standing in the Middle East, and Russia continues to destabilize the
region through its military activities in Syria and its cooperation
with Iran. The United States retains many advantages, including its
economic power, democratic values, military might and global alliances,
and diplomatic capacity. Through the Abraham Accords, the United States
is implementing our strategy to advance opportunities to promote
bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Israel, Arab states, and
other relevant countries across a variety of fields. This effort will
increase stability and prosperity across the Middle East and the
broader region by enhancing regional economic integration, security
cooperation, and cultural understanding among U.S. partners. These new
regional partnerships also afford the opportunity to develop globally
transformative partnerships.
259. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, how do you view the potential for
Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel and join the Abraham
Accords?
Mr. Chollet. We continue our support for Arab states' full
normalization with Israel, including Saudi Arabia, and continue to talk
to our regional partners about how more progress can be made. This is
consistent with the National Defense Strategy's focus on collaboration
with a growing network of U.S. allies and partners to advance shared
objectives and deter aggression. We remain committed to working closely
with Israel to jointly address the many challenges and opportunities
facing Israel and the Middle East region, including countering threats
from Iran. Normalization with Israel advances U.S. foreign policy goals
for a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, integrated, and stable Middle
East region.
global posture review
260. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, Secretary of the Air Force Frank
Kendall spoke recently about combatant commands' ``insatiable demand''
for forces, and the impact that demand has had on our ability to
implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Do you share Secretary
Kendall's concern, and if so, how will you manage competing demands for
forces from combatant commands, consistent with the priorities laid out
in the 2022 National Defense Strategy?
Mr. Chollet. Implementing the 2022 National Defense Strategy is the
highest priority of the Department of Defense and will be my north star
if confirmed. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, Services,
Combatant Commands, and other Office of the Secretary of Defense
Components to ensure that we are adequately balancing Combatant
Commander's operational requirements and global risks and tradeoffs
with the priorities laid out in the National Defense Strategy.
261. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, according to the unclassified
summary, the Department of Defense's 2021 Global Posture Review
recommended minimal changes to America's global posture, in effect
validating how U.S. Forces are already positioned around the world.
This surprised many analysts who expected the Department to identify
opportunities to shift resources toward the Indo-Pacific and away from
lower-priority theaters, consistent with the 2022 National Defense
Strategy's prioritization of China. Are you satisfied with the results
of the 2021 Global Posture Review and why or why not?
Mr. Chollet. I understand the Department of Defense has adjusted
its global force posture to align with the 2022 National Defense
Strategy's priorities in an orderly and deliberate manner, while still
ensuring sufficient posture in other regions of the world that continue
to require the United States' attention. If confirmed, I will continue
to ensure that DOD adjusts its global posture, if needed, and is
prioritizing resources for the Indo-Pacific region.
262. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, if you have not yet reviewed the
2021 Global Posture Review, do you commit to reviewing that document;
preparing a written assessment of the review's findings,
recommendations, and potential shortfalls; and delivering such
assessment to my office and the Committee on Armed Services within 60
days of your confirmation?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that OSD Policy provides a ``Global
Defense Posture'' report to Congress on an annual basis and includes
within it a review of global posture adjustments for the reporting
period. I commit to reviewing the 2021 Global Posture Review to
baseline my understanding of the review's findings, recommendations,
and potential shortfalls.
assault breaker ii
263. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of
Indo-Pacific Command, recently stated publicly that his metric of
success is the ability to maintain custody of and prosecute 1,000
targets within a 24-hour period. If confirmed, do you commit to
ensuring that the Department fully resources the programs of record,
including critical munitions and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms across the Military Services, necessary to
accomplish that?
Mr. Chollet. The National Defense Strategy directs the Department
to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the
People's Republic of China as the Department's pacing challenge. If
confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that the Department has the
necessary resources to implement that strategy, which includes fully
resourcing critical program across the Military Services. If confirmed,
I will prioritize getting briefed on the Assault Breaker II program to
better understand the underlying programs of record necessary to
accomplish that concept and commit to advocating for full resources for
Assault Breaker II programs aligned to our National Defense Strategy.
264. Senator Budd. Mr. Chollet, if confirmed, do you commit to
informing Congress within 60 days if intelligence resources needed to
maintain custody of those 1,000 targets are shifted away from the Indo-
Pacific or otherwise redirected in a manner that limits U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command and its partners' abilities to develop and maintain
custody of those targets?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that the Department
has the necessary resources to implement its National Defense Strategy,
which includes the underlying intelligence resources. If confirmed, I
will prioritize getting briefed on the Assault Breaker II program to
better understand the required intelligence resources to accomplish
that concept and commit to fully resourcing intelligence requirements
are aligned to our National Defense Strategy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
censorship at state department
265. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Chollet, do you believe the State
Department should have any role whatsoever in identifying and targeting
Americans' speech for censorship here in the United States?
Mr. Chollet. The Department of State does not--and should not--
censor speech of U.S. persons that is protected by the First Amendment.
election integrity partnership
266. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Chollet, [the below is paraphrased from
page 19 of a 25 September 2023 letter from the State of Louisiana to
the Supreme Court Re: Murthy, et al. v. Missouri, et al., No. 23A243--
Panel Rehearing Granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.] Leah Bray, the GEC's [Global Engagement Center] Deputy
Coordinator, attested that ``[d]uring the 2020 U.S. election cycle, the
GEC discovered certain posts and narratives on social media and digital
media that originated from, were amplified by, or likely to be
amplified by foreign malign influence actors. . . [T]he GEC flagged
these posts and narratives for the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP)
on approximately 21 occasions.'' GEC provided ``tickets'' or
information for EIP to censor speech. That means that the State
Department submitted entire ``narratives'' of protected speech by
Americans--including speech that was merely ``likely'' to be amplified
by foreign actors, on the GEC's view--to the EIP on 21 occasions. And a
single ``narrative'' can encompass hundreds of thousands of posts.
As a senior official in the State Department while this was taking
place, how can you justify these actions by the State Department?
Mr. Chollet. My understanding is that this case remains in active
litigation and therefore I cannot comment upon it.
censorship at department of defense
267. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Chollet, I am concerned about the
Department of Defense's participation in the pseudoscientific efforts
to identify and filter ``misinformation'' and ``disinformation'' by
using firms like NewsGuard and PeakMetrics in ways that infringe upon
the fundamental rights of Americans. If confirmed, how would you use
your position and influence to ensure that the rights of Americans to
speak freely and to access information are not impacted by the work of
the Department of Defense?
Mr. Chollet. I understand that the Department of Defense focuses
its counter disinformation efforts on foreign audiences and takes every
available measure to ensure that information provided to domestic
audiences is truthful. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department
leverages its capabilities to effectively compete in the information
environment against foreign actors in the protection of national
interests while continuing to provide the American public, Congress,
and the news media timely and accurate information, all of which is
critical to the Department's ongoing efforts to implement the National
Defense Strategy. If confirmed I will ensure that the Department
continues to not censor speech of U.S. persons that is protected by the
First Amendment.
______
[The nomination reference of Honorable Derek H. Chollet
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Honorable Derek H. Chollet,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Honorable
Derek H. Chollet in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Honorable Derek H. Chollet was returned
to the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI,
paragraph 6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate on January 3,
2024.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Cara L. Abercrombie by
Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
qualifications
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD(A&S)) has been designated as the Chief Acquisition and
Sustainment Officer of the Department of Defense (DOD). If confirmed,
in supporting the USD(A&S), you will be responsible for establishing
policy and conducting oversight of an acquisition system through which
the Department spends more than $500 billion each year.
What background or experience do you have that qualifies you for
this position?
Answer. My two decades of Federal service have prepared me well for
the position of AssistantSecretary of Defense for Acquisition. If
confirmed, I will bring a fresh perspective toacquisition policy,
grounded in a deep understanding of defense policy and strategy,
DODstrategic objectives, and the outcomes our acquisition policy needs
to achieve for thewarfighter. I have demonstrated throughout my career
my willingness to make harddecisions, take risks and challenge the
status quo, and work across the Department to achievedesired outcomes.
I have extensive experience building and leading high performing
teamsthat consistently meet mission objectives. I am a quick learner,
able to enter a neworganization, change culture, and drive performance.
Notably, as the first President of theDefense Security Cooperation
University, I moved a congressionally mandated securitycooperation
workforce certification program from concept to pilot program within 1
year. As Acting Deputy Director of the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, managing an 800-person organization, I routinely engaged with
the Services, Service program offices, as wellas industry, to monitor
progress in allied and partner foreign military sales cases.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
executing programs to acquireproducts and/or services in both
government and industry?
Answer. In successive roles in the Department of Defense, I have
applied the types of managementapproaches that are essential to the
successful execution of programs. This includes scopingrequirements and
expectations up front, setting target deadlines and milestone reviews
toassess progress and holding personnel accountable.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
overseeing the execution ofprograms to acquire products and/or services
in both government and industry?
Answer. As the first President of the Defense Security Cooperation
University, I oversaw theacquisition of software systems to support
university management and workforcecertification program compliance.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
managing portfolios of programsin both government and industry?
Answer. As a leader in the Department of Defense and at the
National Security Council, my role hasbeen to set the vision for my
teams, along with clear objectives, put in place the management
structure with feedback loops to drive and monitor execution, and
facilitate the training and tools that enable the workforce to achieve
objectives.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
developing policy and processes for programs to acquire products and/or
services, as well as policies and processes for oversight of such
programs?
Answer. During my tenure as President of the Defense Security
Cooperation University, I set clear guidance for the leadership team to
pursue automated software solutions where possible to reduce manpower
requirements to implement the new Security Cooperation Workforce
certification program. I established clear milestones across multiple
lines of effort to ensure the University would meet the target opening
date, and launch date of the pilot certification program. I built in
feedback loops with stakeholders across the Department to allow
iterative adjustments to the program structure and content during the
pilot period.
Question. What qualifications, if any, do you have using modern
data approaches, tools, and methods that prepare you to maintain
visibility of, analyze, and manage data on the volume, variety, and
complexity of the inventory of acquisition initiatives and programs in
the Department?
Answer. I have consistently pursued use of modern data approaches
and tools to support organizational and program management. As
President of the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU) I
worked with the Services to begin the process of linking their manpower
data bases to the DSCU learning management system, in order to create
an automated system by which individuals in positions requiring
security cooperation workforce certification will be able to
automatically track their certification requirements and progress on
the DSCU website, while DSCU program managers and the individuals
supervisors will track their compliance with program requirements. I
understand the completion of this process is projected for fiscal year
2024.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
managing contracts for services?
Answer. Throughout my career in Federal service, I have had
responsibility for overseeing contracting officer representatives
managing a variety of contracts. As Acting Deputy Director of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, I was the chief operating officer
of an agency responsible for management oversight of hundreds of
billions of dollars in foreign military sales.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the State of the relationship
between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (ASD(A)) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in
particular, and with Congress in general?
Answer. In my view, it is imperative that the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition work in partnership with
the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in
general, so that the Department of Defense has the acquisition
authorities it needs to provide capability to the warfighter, while
ensuring necessary oversight, accountability, and value for the
taxpayer. If confirmed, I look forward to strengthening that
partnership.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the Office of the ASD(A)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would maintain open and transparent
communications with Members of Congress and professional staff, and
promptly respond to requests for information. I would proactively
engage Congress regarding new initiatives or significant programmatic
developments.
priorities and challenges
Question. If confirmed, what are the top priorities you would plan
to focus on during your tenure as the ASD(A)? What would be your plans
for achieving these priorities?
Answer. If confirmed as the ASD(A), I plan to focus on three
overarching priorities: increasing the speed of acquisition; reducing
barriers to attract non-traditional suppliers; and workforce
development. The acquisition community must work to get capability into
the hands of the war fighter at the speed of relevance. To do this, we
must aim to quickly move from prototyping to production at scale, and
ensure the workforce is fully leveraging new, flexible authorities like
Middle-Tier Acquisition and Other Transaction Authorities effectively.
Attracting non-traditional providers helps ensure the Department
accesses the latest technological innovations and fosters competition.
We must reduce barriers to entry for small businesses and non-
traditional suppliers while maintaining rigor and necessary oversight.
Finally, we must ensure we can recruit, train, and retain an
acquisition workforce that has the skills and expertise to meet the
warfighter needs of the future. If confirmed, I would draw on best
practices in the private and public sector for recruitment and training
models to bring top talent into the acquisition community, and ensure
they have the tools they need to thrive.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges facing
the DOD s acquisition community? What would be your plans for
addressing these challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. The Department of Defense acquisition community faces many
of the same challenges as the broader Federal Government. An aging
workforce, and generational changes in the expectations of the labor
force present recruitment and retention challenges. Additionally, the
technical nature of Defense acquisition requires a highly trained
workforce with practical experience to effectively meet acquisition
objectives. If confirmed, I would build on the recent workforce
initiatives like back-to-basics, and the Defense Civilian Training
Corps pilot, and pursue practical, innovative approaches to recruiting,
and ensuring training is fit to purpose.
Question. If confirmed, by what metrics will you measure your
progress toward achieving these priorities and addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would establish clear metrics for measuring
progress across priority lines of effort. Where necessary, I would
establish new data collection requirements. Specifically, I would seek
to track metrics such as the length of time it takes to go from
prototype to contract, the frequency with which certain pathways are
utilized, by component, or the number of contracts going to non-
traditional suppliers. Similarly, I would work with the Services to
track acquisition workforce data to identify trends. I would also seek
subjective feedback from stakeholders in the Department, in industry,
and Congress on whether policy changes are having the desired effect,
or whether course corrections may be required.
implementation of acquisition reforms
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the
Department continues its progress in implementing congressionally
mandated and Department-driven reforms to the acquisition system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to continue the momentum
generated by the reforms to the defense acquisition system and I look
forward to partnering with Congress going forward to implement,
institutionalize, and ensure the continued success of these reforms.
Question. In your view, are there any congressionally mandated or
Department-driven reforms that you would recommend be modified or
suspended? If so, why?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with leaders throughout the
Department, the Congress, and our industry partners to ensure that
ongoing efforts are effectively implementing the reforms and consider
modification to legislation or Department policy as appropriate.
Question. In your view, of the congressionally mandated or
Department-driven reforms, which specifically have been the most
successful and impactful acquisition reform initiatives of the past
decade?
Answer. The Department recently established a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Integration and Interoperability
(DASD(AI2)) with the intent to address the joint acquisition management
gap and to enable truly joint capabilities being delivered to the
warfighter. Also, The Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked USD(A&S) with
executing the Competitive Advantage Pathfinder (CAP) initiative that is
aimed at identifying critical process barriers in the Big A acquisition
system and institutionalizing the necessary reforms to deliver
impactful warfighter capabilities at speed and at scale. If confirmed,
I will work to deliver on this effort and coordinate between the
requirements, resourcing, and acquisition communities to find other
pathfinder efforts to speed delivery and inform the acquisition
enterprise of lessons learned on how to reduce roadblocks.
Question. If confirmed, what additional acquisition reforms, if
any, would you recommend?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the reform of the Defense
Acquisition System. I understand that the major acquisition reform
efforts implemented several years ago are now at a point where we can
measure, analyze, and collect data on those reforms and use that
knowledge to improve upon them and pursue further reforms.
Question. The Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) pathway was established
in the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act to enable
rapid prototyping and fielding of capabilities. Now that the first
series of programs has reached the 5-year transition period, what are
your observations about MTAs?
I believe that the development of the Adaptive Acquisition
Framework has allowed for the speed of development and fielding of new
capabilities to the warfighter. If confirmed, I would continue to
expand this effort to coordinate between the requirements, resourcing,
and acquisition communities to continue efforts to further speed
delivery and inform the acquisition enterprise of lessons learned on
how get new products to the warfighter. Additionally, I understand
smaller programs are becoming more comfortable with the flexibility of
the MTA pathway and the ability to expeditiously prototype without
required documents from the JCIDS process that can slow down a program
initiation. Through collaboration with the Components, the Department
is gaining greater insight into the methodology behind selection of the
MTA pathway and how it can update guidance to better facilitate MTA
program success.
Question. What types of capabilities do you believe are best suited
to the MTA pathway, and what capabilities should use the Major
Capability Acquisition pathway?
Answer. I understand that the MTA pathway is suited for rapid
prototyping before a larger investment is made into a more sustainable
program. Rapid prototyping allows for the development of greater
technical maturity, along with increasing a program s test readiness
level before entering production to ensure successful operation. Use of
the MTA rapid fielding pathway allows for programs to begin development
within 6 months of program start, assists with the purchase of long
lead items, and rapid production of already developed capabilities to
accelerate delivery to the warfighter. Emerging capabilities that are
immediately needed for the warfighter are best suited for the MTA
pathway. The Major Capability Acquisition pathway is more suited for
larger, longer-term production programs, and for acquiring and
modernizing military-unique programs that provide enduring capabilities
and is better suited for large dollar programs. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure these pathways are being fully leveraged by the
acquisition community to meet intent.
Question. MTA was explicitly designed to be an alternative to the
traditional acquisition and requirements processes. However, over time,
additional oversight and certification requirements have been imposed
on MTAs that discourage its use.
Answer. I understand that, while this is true, the Components have
used the MTA pathway for approximately 216 MTA programs since enactment
of the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA, and in the last fiscal year alone there
were approximately 76 new programs that entered the MTA pathway. While
there has been some additional oversight added to the process, it has
not discouraged usage of the MTA Pathway which the Components find an
extremely useful tool. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the MTA
pathway is used as intended.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure MTA is a viable
option that balances speed with oversight rigor?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review plans to update the DODI
5000.80, since it has been almost 4 years since the policy was
approved. This update will balance the benefits of the speed of an MTA
program while continuing the acquisition oversight rigor already
contained in the policy. I will also conduct reviews on programs that
exceed the major defense acquisition program dollar threshold
requesting use of the pathway, a waiver of the 5-year limitation, and
conduct bi-annual reviews with the Service Acquisition Executives on
the portfolio of MTA programs.
The Software Acquisition Pathway (SWP) was established in the
Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act to facilitate
iterative delivery and user feedback for software solutions.
Question. How do you compare metrics for large hardware systems to
the value-assessments performed for the SWP pathway?
Answer. I understand that metrics for longer-running hardware
programs are mostly focused on cost, schedule and performance and are
based on a program s projected trajectory from a key decision point,
such as Milestone B or Critical Design Review. Although hardware
programs are becoming more adaptable to incorporate technology
insertion, software-intensive programs have much greater opportunity to
adapt as they capture and incorporate user feedback into the resulting
solution. For programs on the software pathway, value assessments
performed by users measure the actual trajectory of the program as it
delivers value to the end user. Frequent engagement of both broadens
awareness/understanding of modern software development practices and to
establish feedback loops to identify what those customers/end-users of
the SWP value and how to maximize its usage and value in the future.
Therefore, whereas hardware program metrics compare expected progress
against actual progress, which may not lead to a product in the short
term that the user values, software program value assessments track
actual value delivered.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to work with the
services to ensure the success of the SWP pathway?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Service Acquisition
Executives to mature how each organization employs modern software
approaches to deliver results. The Department s software policy is
relatively new and both OSD and the Services will need to share lessons
learned and adapt policy accordingly. Furthermore, I would work to
ensure that software acquisition professionals and their supervisors
have access to the quality training they need through the Back-to-
Basics initiative.
key relationships
Question. Recent National Defense Authorization Acts have directed
significant changes to the assignment of responsibilities within the
defense acquisition system. For example, the Fiscal Year 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act split the former Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) into the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD(A&S)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (USD(R&E)).
In your view, in what ways could you strengthen the collaborative
working relationship between the acquisition and sustainment and the
research and engineering communities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OUSD(R&E) to address the
broad challenges we face in accelerating innovation and more quickly
fielding capability to the warfighter. I will be mindful of the
challenges and risks as we transition emerging technologies from
research and development programs into fielded capabilities. Open
communication and a close working relationship between A&S and R&E and
other stakeholders can reduce these challenges and risks to the benefit
of the Department.
In recent years, considerable authority and responsibility for
acquisition activities have been given to the Services through: (1) the
Secretary s delegation of Milestone Decision Authority for most
acquisition programs to the Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) and
(2) Congress emphasis on the Service Chiefs role in requirements
development, resourcing discussions, and tradeoff decisions for major
defense acquisition programs.
Question. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages
of delegating more responsibility for managing acquisition programs to
the Services and away from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD)?
Answer. It is my understanding that the delegation of much of the
program management has provided OSD with the ability to focus on
implementing reform efforts and transforming the defense acquisition
system. It has also enabled OSD to strengthen its ability to perform
portfolio-based oversight. One disadvantage is maintaining access to
data on programs, which is vital to OSD oversight efforts. If
confirmed, I will fully review the advantages and disadvantages of the
delegation of authority and responsibility to the Services and make
recommendations as appropriate to Congress.
Question. In this construct, where more responsibility for managing
acquisition programs has been delegated to the Services, what
suggestions would you make for USD(A&S) to maintain oversight and
insight into programs while reducing excess bureaucratic burden on the
process?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department must gain or
maintain data access to programs that have been delegated to the
Services in order to enable oversight, and if confirmed I will work
with the Services to ensure this access without causing excess
bureaucratic burden. This data-driven oversight reduces the amount of
time that program managers must spend in providing information to
USD(A&S) and provides the OUSD(A&S) staff with a greater understanding
of their portfolio and potential areas of risk.
Question. If confirmed as the ASD(A), how would you structure your
relationship with the SAEs and the Service Chiefs? Are there any
programs for which Milestone Decision Authority should be moved to the
OSD-level or, conversely, returned to the SAEs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that decision authority is
aligned between OSD and the Services and maintained at the proper level
to account for program complexity, dollar value, and technological
maturity. I would work with the SAEs to understand their issues with
executing efforts under the current Defense Acquisition System and, as
warranted, make recommendations to change a programs milestone decision
authority.
Question. In your view, what should be the respective roles and
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, USD(A&S), and the SAEs in
ensuring acquisition programs deliver promised capabilities to the end
user on time and on budget? In your view, how should the role of the
ASD(A) support that?
Answer. I believe the role of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Service
Acquisition Executives is to operate in partnership, consistent with
their statutory responsibilities, to ensure the effective operation of
the Defense Acquisition System. If confirmed as the ASD(A), I would
work with my counterparts in the services to support the Under
Secretary of Defense in delivering capabilities.
Question. If confirmed as the ASD(A), how would you structure your
relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment to
ensure acquisition programs consider sustainment planning and costs so
that systems are sustainable over their lifecycle?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my counterpart in ASD(S) to
ensure open lines of communication between our offices. I will work to
collaborate on sustainment and life cycle costs of acquisitions within
DOD.
Question. What further steps, if any, do you believe are necessary
to properly align authority and accountability in the acquisition
system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make the assessment of the authorities
and accountability a high priority. I will work with the USD(A&S) to
ensure the authorities are appropriately aligned, as this is critical
to ensure the effectiveness of the system.
Question. The acquisition of information technology, ranging from
embedded software in weapons systems to the procurement of commercial
cloud computing services, is an increasingly important challenge for
defense acquisition programs. If confirmed, what role will you have in
developing acquisition strategies for information technology systems
and services and how is that role different, in your view, from that of
the Chief Information Officer?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the USD(A&S),
CIO, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), and
the Components on information technology systems and service
acquisition strategies. The Office of the USD(A&S) can provide
oversight and guidance to ensure those systems and services are
effectively and efficiently developed and integrated with hardware and
service contracts.
Question. If confirmed, what responsibilities related to policies
for, and oversight of, the acquisition of information technology
systems and services should be delegated to the Chief Information
Officer?
Answer. If confirmed, I will help ensure an effective partnership
between the USD(A&S), CIO and CDAO and determine an appropriate balance
of technical, functional and acquisition oversight. Having properly
supported SAEs is critical to successfully implementing acquisition
programs.
Question. If confirmed as the ASD(A), how would you structure your
relationship with the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
(CDAO)?
Answer. Data, Artificial Intelligence, and innovation must become
the cornerstones of the Department s abilities to measure, monitor and
transform. If confirmed, I would actively partner with CDAO, in pursuit
of effectively leveraging CDAO efforts.
The acquisition system relies on the investment, development, and
production of key strategic resources and components within the
industrial base including rare earth minerals, microelectronics, and
solid rocket motors, to name just a few. However, within the
Department, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
Policy (ASD(IBP)) is responsible for coordinating DOD s industrial base
policy, including providing support to industry through tools like the
Defense Production Act.
Question. If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship
with the ASD(IBP) to ensure DOD has a coordinated industrial base
policy to develop and protect key strategic materials and industries?
Answer. The Acquisition community needs the Defense Industrial Base
(DIB) to execute its programs. As partners, we need a ready DIB to
deliver the capabilities at the scale and speed the warfighter needs.
If confirmed, I would work closely with my peers across the Acquisition
and Sustainment Office, including ASD(IBP), to ensure the Defense
Industrial Base is ready to support the delivery of critical
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
have for providing the Department additional statutory tools to enable
better management of the defense industrial base?
Answer. The Acquisition community needs a strong and resilient
Defense Industrial Base to execute its programs and support the
warfighter. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
Policy (ASD(IBP)) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment for developing DOD policies
regarding the Defense Industrial Base. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the ASD(IBP), USD(A&S), and Office of Management and
Budget on assessing the need for additional statutory tools.
Question. Small business programs and international cooperation
activities also fall under the ASD(IBP) but are important elements of a
comprehensive acquisitions approach. If confirmed, how would you better
integrate small business and international cooperation considerations
into your acquisition oversight activities?
Answer. Small business is critical to fostering innovation in in
our defense industrial base. In addition, developing greater industrial
base cooperation among our close allies and partners is important to
supporting supply chain resiliency. If confirmed, I would work with the
ASD(IBP), as well as the Director for the Office of Small Business
Programs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial
Base Development and International Engagements, who have direct
oversight of small business programs and international cooperation
activities, respectively, to ensure that their considerations and
equities are incorporated into the Department s acquisition oversight
activities.
managing the performance of the defense acquisition system
Question. Many of the Department s major defense acquisition
programs have established overly optimistic cost, schedule, and
performance goals that they have subsequently struggled to achieve,
resulting in cost growth and schedule delays.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to accelerate speed to
fielding of capabilities users find most relevant in major warfighting
and business system programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Acquisition
Executives to accelerate speed to fielding of capabilities relevant to
warfighters. I will focus on the early phases of program and technology
development to provide these programs with a solid foundation, and I
will emphasize the need for innovation and data-driven decisionmaking
to ensure that we are pursuing all options at the speed of relevance.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department s ability to
estimate lifecycle costs for its programs and activities? If confirmed,
what specific changes would you make to improve this ability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(Sustainment),
CAPE, and the Service Acquisition Executives to develop and refine
accurate lifecycle cost estimates. Both estimation and management of
sustainment costs is a significant challenge, but I will utilize proven
cost estimation methodologies to assist in making accurate assessments
of lifecycle costs.
Question. What is your understanding of the role the office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) plays in these areas of
lifecycle cost estimation and program performance monitoring?
Answer. Estimating and managing sustainment costs is a significant
challenge. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CAPE cost
assessment group and the Service Acquisition Executives to understand
the status of the Department s current lifecycle costing capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship
with CAPE to best leverage their independence and expertise in these
topics?
Answer. If confirmed, I would recognize CAPE s statutory equities
in the acquisition process and ensure its views are considered in
decisions related to the CAPE s responsibilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department s ability to
assess and appropriately manage programs based on the programs
technical maturity?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with OUSD(R&E) and
Service Acquisition Executives to assess the status of relevant data,
its availability and accessibility, and use that data to inform
decisions on managing programs. I will build on progress made to date
to make data accessible and usable at all levels of the Department.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department s ability to
assess a program s health over its lifecycle, with respect to the
availability of the necessary industrial base and supply chain?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD for
Industrial Base Policy to assess a program s health over its lifetime,
with respect to the defense industrial base and supply chain risk
management. Risks develop when our defense systems depend on outdated
technologies with diminishing manufacturing sources or foreign sources
of supplies. The Department s capabilities are dependent on a ready and
reliable access to a robust supply chain.
Question. Traditionally, acquisition programs are managed on a
program-by-program basis. In your view, are there advantages in moving
toward a more portfolio-based management approach? What would be the
disadvantages of adopting such an approach?
Answer. We are now over 5 years beyond a transformative acquisition
reform effort that, among other things, moved management of acquisition
programs to a portfolio-based approach. If confirmed, I will work with
the SAEs to determine lessons learned, best practices, and advantages
and disadvantages they have found in the portfolio-management approach.
I will welcome oversight by GAO and the IG and give full consideration
to recommendations they may make on potential improvements.
Question. In your view, what are the strength and weaknesses of the
current Adaptive Acquisition Framework?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the USD(A&S) s
data driven review of the strengths and weaknesses of the Adaptive
Acquisition Framework to capitalize and expand on our strengths and
mitigate our weaknesses.
Question. In your view, what further changes, if any, should be
made to DOD s Adaptive Acquisition Framework?
Answer. As of now, I am not aware of the need for any significant
changes. However, if confirmed, I will work with the SAEs, to use a
data-driven review to continuously monitor and, as warranted, recommend
ways to improve the performance of the Defense Acquisition System.
Question. What is one major initiative you would like to
accomplish, if confirmed, while serving as Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition?
Answer. Acquisition policy has undergone significant change in
recent years. If confirmed, I will work with the broader acquisition
community to ensure policy changes and new authorities are being
implemented as intended, and will recommend any improvements or
adjustments that will further improve overall performance.
acquisition data
Question. The production of Selected Acquisition Reports will
sunset this year and will be replaced with a new reporting system. To
implement a risk-based approach for managing acquisition programs, many
experts believe that DOD needs to adopt modern tools and methods for
collecting and analyzing large amounts of acquisition data. Congress
has mandated that the new reporting system include acquisition data and
metrics recommended by CAPE and is seeking more timely and useful
reporting of programs cost, schedule, and performance.
In your opinion, does the Department have sufficient and timely
data to assess the full range of risks facing acquisition programs,
including risks pertaining to development and sustainment costs,
schedule, performance, integration, supply chains, and technical
maturity, among others?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to determine the status of access
to relevant data and to prioritize availability, accessibility, and use
of that data to inform decisionmaking within the Acquisition and
Sustainment community and at all levels of the Department. I will
prioritize engagement with Department, congressional, executive branch,
and Industry leaders to address any identified shortcomings.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for employing
other metrics to measure the health and effectiveness of the
acquisition system than those currently in use?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize review of existing metrics
for measuring the health and effectiveness of the Defense Acquisition
System to determine their adequacy and identify potential improvements.
I will work with the Services to make any needed changes and to
prioritize collection of data required to achieve needed insight.
Question. What specific steps would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure the acquisition enterprise is collecting authoritative data,
including data from industry partners and other DOD organizations to
effectively model risk, and using appropriate indicators of program and
portfolio health?
Answer. Availability and use of authoritative data has long been a
Department focus, with recent efforts focused on implementation of the
CDAO s Advana platform. If confirmed, I will continue scaling these
efforts with particular focus on policy and incentives to remove the
cultural barriers to open sharing of the data required for risk
modeling and program and portfolio health insight. I recognize that
data from industry and other DOD organizations is critical to this kind
of insight and will prioritize engagement across organizational and
corporate boundaries to foster transparency and sharing and use of data
to manage risk and improve acquisition.
Question. In your view, what ways do you think the Department could
better use the acquisition data it collects to improve decisionmaking
for both the acquisition and sustainment of systems and services in the
Department?
Answer. I recognize the importance of considering both acquisition
and sustainment of systems and services in assessing acquisition health
and risk. If confirmed, I will work with USD(A&S) and ASD(S) to review
the quality, accuracy, and timeliness of collected data and to improve
its use for insight and decisionmaking. I will prioritize improvements
in understanding acquisition program, sustainment system, and services
interdependencies through portfolio analysis.
Question. If confirmed, what suggestions, if any, do you have for
the format, content, and tailoring of future congressional reporting on
acquisition programs?
Answer. My understanding is that dashboards for acquisition program
(Major Capability Acquisition and Middle Tier of Acquisition) insight
are now available to congressional users. I also understand that OSD
CAPE has identified data additions to the Selected Acquisition Reports.
If confirmed, I will work to review the existing products and plans and
adjust as appropriate with the goal of maintaining transparency while
modernizing format.
software and it acquisition
Question. Software has become one of the most critical components
of DOD systems, but recent studies by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), the Defense Innovation Board, and the Defense Science
Board, among others, show the Department s software development
practices have not kept up with leading industry practices. While DOD
has taken significant steps in the last few years to improve program
management, such as establishing a software acquisition pathway
emphasizing rapid delivery and user engagement, programs have yet to
consistently incorporate leading software development practices.
What do you believe are the major barriers to DOD fully adopting
modern software development approaches and what additional steps would
you take to drive their adoption throughout DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate with OSD, Joint Staff, the
Services, and others to build on the Department s initial momentum, and
modernize enterprise processes, strategies, and tools for rapid digital
capability delivery. I believe it is essential to tailor Department
interoperability and requirements processes for software. Although the
Department has made strides in adoption of modern software development
approach with the software acquisition pathway policy, given that
software is pervasive in almost all DOD systems, regardless of how they
are acquired, and that must be taken into account across the other
pathways.
Question. What is your assessment of the current capabilities of
the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) to properly execute agile software
development?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(A&S) to promote
leading private-sector industry practices throughout DOD where delivery
of capability is done iteratively and collaboratively with the
government, which can reduce cycle times and be more responsive to
changing technologies, operations, and threats.
Question. In your view, how are initiatives like the Defense
Digital Service and Software Factories helping or hindering the
Department s progress in acquiring software intensive systems?
Answer. DOD is scaling its software production capabilities by
adopting a framework that follows commercial industry s model for
modern infrastructure and deploying digital products with security,
reliability, and speed. DOD still has more to do to build on this
momentum, and modernize its enterprise processes, strategies, and
culture for rapid digital capability delivery, including improving
transparency and understanding of the transition to scale.
If confirmed, I will work with DOD CIO, and the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officerto provide our programs the enterprise
tools and processes they need to support more rapid and secure digital
product delivery. While most companies in the Defense Industrial Base
have started to adopt agile software development methodologies, it is
important to ensure that DOD programs require agile methodologies in
their Request for Proposals and evaluate the agile capabilities of the
offerors. It is also important to ensure the capabilities of the
acquisition program offices align with the agile ceremoneys recommended
for modern development processes.
Question. In your view, are the training, education, and workforce
development activities the Department has instituted helping to prepare
the acquisition and development workforce to better absorb and adapt to
these changes?
Answer. OUSD(A&S) has a leadership role over the Defense
Acquisition University and shared chair responsibilities in the Digital
Talent Management Forum. The Department has continued to develop
specialized training for DOD software acquisition professionals and is
also providing them access to commercial training outlets through
partnerships managed by the Defense Acquisition University. While the
opportunities are in place to support the workforce, it will be
critically important for leaders and supervisors to emphasize the areas
where our workforce members need to grow. If confirmed, I will work
with the members of the acquisition Workforce Leadership Team to
connect practitioners with the opportunities that will help them adapt
to modern software approaches.
In recent years, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) was granted
acquisition authority for the cyber programs under its purview, and has
been actively working to grow the workforce, processes, and
capabilities necessary to be effective.
Question. What is your assessment of CYBERCOM s progress in this
respect?
Answer. USCYBERCOM is doing meaningful work, but faces many of the
same challenges with workforce, processes, and capabilities as the
broader DOD Acquisition community. I am aware of the enhanced budget
control authority granted to the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command by
Congress in the Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA. If confirmed, I would work with
The Principal Cyber Advisor and USCYBERCOM to ensure it is drawing from
and sharing best practices and lessons learned with the broader
acquisition community.
Question. If confirmed, what do you see as your role in helping
provide oversight during this formative stage in the development of
these cyber programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide oversight and guidance, in
conjunction with The Principal Cyber Advisor, as USCYBERCOM works to
identify any shortfalls and risk in organization, process,
documentation, and capability development that limits the Cyberspace
Operations Enterprise s capability and efficacy. This would include
engagement and collaboration with The Principal Cyber Advisor,
USCYBERCOM and other key stakeholders to advise on governance boards;
leverage Integrated Acquisition Portfolio Reviews (IAPR) to identify
broader portfolio interdependences, risks, and opportunities; and
ensure associated directives and action items are executed accordingly.
Question. In your view, what metrics or methodologies should the
Department be using to better understand and measure the progress and
maturity of the acquisition structure?
Answer. Cyberspace is a critical warfighting domain. As such, a
balanced acquisition process executing at mission levels while
retaining and reinforcing acquisition rigor and discipline should be
the first and foremost measurement for DOD. If confirmed, I would work
with The Principal Cyber Advisor and USCYBERCOM to introduce a process
for measuring the progress and maturity of the acquisition structure.
iterative development approaches
Question. What is your opinion on ways DOD could incorporate
iterative development approaches centered on fielding minimum viable
capabilities?
Answer. In my view, DOD should work to embrace rapid, iterative
product development that encourages innovation. If confirmed, I would
look to draw from industry best practices in this area to reduce cycle
times and be more responsive to changing technologies, operations,
priorities, and threats. If confirmed, I will work to incorporate
iterative product development to facilitate innovative capabilities.
Question. To what extent do you believe DOD has broadly implemented
commercial best practice agile development approaches adequately for
software and hardware systems?
Answer. I believe DOD has made significant progress over the last
few years enabling more modern agile development and acquisition
practices, policies, pilots, and training thanks in large part to
strong congressional support. Congress s support enabled DOD to develop
the new Software Acquisition Pathway to acquire and deliver software
using modern, commercial software development practices including agile
software development. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the
Department builds on this momentum, and continues to modernize its
enterprise processes, strategies, and culture for agility and rapid
digital capability delivery.
advanced technology adoption
Question. The rapid pace at which our adversaries are fielding
technological advancements demands the Department establish an
acquisition system that can deliver capabilities that are responsive to
new threats and emerging technological opportunities.
In your view, do the current policies and practices of the defense
acquisition system sufficiently encourage and support the adoption of
disruptive technologies in the Department s acquisition programs? If
not, what changes would you recommend in support of these initiatives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure we meet the imperative to offer
a range of options to programs, such as applying new technologies and
concepts. I believe we have improved flexibility in the Defense
Acquisition System, but we must continue to evolve to become more agile
and leverage these innovative technologies. I will also leverage the
recent legislation that authorized the establishment of an Acquisition
Innovation Research Center to research, model, and pilot innovative
practices for adoption by the Department.
Question. What do you believe are the specific technologies that
will be critical to defeating a near-peer competitor?
Answer. The Department has many opportunities to leverage current
and emerging technologies to ensure military superiority. If confirmed,
I will work the Services, the Combatant Commanders, and USD(R&E) to
ensure we are successful in converting those technologies into
warfighting capabilities. I support Under Secretary Heidi Shyu s recent
Technology Priorities memo that outlined 14 technologies across 3 major
areas including hypersonics, directed energy weapons, and integrated
sensor and cyber resiliency. If confirmed, I will place special
attention on ensuring we can attract commercial industry partners in
areas, such as AI, autonomy, and advanced computing so that the
Department can obtain the most cutting-edge technology at the most
affordable price.
Question. In your opinion, how should the Department define and
manage concepts like risk and failure so that program managers can try
new technologies and acquisition practices, derive lessons learned and
establish a common understanding of best practices, and more quickly
drive technological advancement in ongoing acquisition programs and
into current fielded capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage acquisition decisionmakers
at all levels to balance risk and reward when crafting technology
development and fielding strategies. To achieve the desired outcomes
and innovation, I believe that some failure is to be expected and
accepted as part of the learning and discovery process. This learning
will occur throughout the program lifecycle but with the appropriate
application of prototyping and experimentation, major issues should be
identified as early as possible. Embracing the concept of iterative
development whereby a basic capability is delivered and improved over
time will also reduce the number of risks a program has to manage,
increase technology insertion opportunities, increase user feedback,
and enable accelerated fielding.
Question. What do you view as the major barriers to entry for new
companies that want to do business with DOD? How would you address
these barriers, if confirmed?
Answer. Non-traditional companies struggle with long timelines from
DOD budgeting and contracting, concerns about intellectual property,
and regulatory requirements. I understand the Deputy Secretary of
Defense has established an Innovation Ecosystem initiative to address
some of these challenges. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and USD(A&S) to address these barriers to include
engaging with industry, working with the Services to simplify contract
requirements, and maximizing usage of varied contracting mechanisms
(e.g., Other Transactions and Commercial Solutions Openings).
DOD continues to struggle with the transition of new technologies
into existing programs of record. The USD(R&E) enterprise has primary
responsibility for the development of new advanced technologies, but
the Acquisition and Sustainment enterprise must do its part to address
the transition of technology development programs into procurement and
fielding.
Question. In your view, what impediments to technology transition
do you see within the Department?
Answer. Technology transition continues to be a critical issue
across the Department of Defense. In my view, there are a number of
challenges that make this difficult: budgeting timelines and the PPBE
process, outmoded requirements systems preventing programs from moving
rapidly, and complex decisionmaking processes. If confirmed, I will
work closely with USD (R&E) to address these issues, and will work to
fully leverage the new Competitive Advantage Pathfinders (CAPs) managed
by the new DASD for Acquisition Integration and Interoperability.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the
rate and frequency at which proven technologies developed by DOD,
defense industry, international partners, or the commercial sector are
transitioned into programs of record?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with OUSD(R&E) to align
acquisition programs with advances in the technology sector, such a
building and delivering capabilities iteratively to reduce cycle times
that are more responsive to changing technologies, operations, and
threats. This is particularly true for software which is central to
every major DOD mission and weapon system. DOD should continue to
employ modular, open systems approaches as well as commercial as-a-
service models and invest in foundational enterprise infrastructure
that allow rapid insertion of emerging technologies.
other transaction authority (ota)
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to promote the
appropriate use of OTAs to encourage the participation of new and non-
traditional defense contractors in the defense industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I will champion appropriate use of OTAs as a
means for the Department to access innovative solutions from the
private sector. I will ensure the acquisition workforce has the
necessary resources to effectively use this authority. I will ask the
Principal Director of Defense Pricing and Contracting to advise me on
the guidance, training, and tools that have been issued to address
recent statutory changes and recommendations from the DOD Inspector
General and Government Accountability Office.
Question. In your view, what do you see as the benefits and
downsides of using OTA consortium agreements?
Answer. In my view, the consortium model is beneficial to the
Department because it helps stimulate innovation, attract Non-
Traditional Defense Contractors (NDCs) to expand the defense industrial
base, and deliver innovative technologies and capabilities to the
warfighter. If confirmed, I will work to enhance transparency in other
transaction agreements that are executed under the consortium approach.
earned value management
Question. The earned value management system (EVM) is used to
assess the cost and schedule of major capability acquisitions for
proactive course correction. However, the Section 809 Panel reported
that EVM does not measure product quality and concluded, EVM has been
required on most large software programs but has not prevented cost,
schedule, or performance issues. In 2009, DOD reported to the committee
that a program could perform ahead of schedule and under cost according
to EVM metrics but deliver a capability that is unusable by the
customer and stated the program manager should ensure that the EVM
process measures the quality and technical maturity of technical work
products instead of just the quantity and timeliness of work performed.
If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, to re-evaluate the
performance metrics collected by DOD of its contractors that correspond
with leading practices?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with colleagues across the
Department to ensure DOD is continuously re-evaluating the metrics used
by contractors to measure performance. Activities such as creating a
more robust structure to capture schedule risk assessments (SRA);
developing metrics for technical baselines; and reducing the cost
burden by reducing paper reporting and removing nonvalue analysis will
allow for data collection while minimizing the impact of collection.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, to
require contractors that employ the DOD Digital Engineering (DE)
Strategy to maintain valid information in the digital authoritative
source of truth that is sufficient for program managers to make
informed and timely decisions to manage the risk of achieving cost,
schedule, and performance objectives?
Answer. Use of a DE strategy should be coupled with an overall
program strategy that addresses all types of program risk and must look
at the entire program life cycle from design and development through
production and sustainment. These DE models are key in all aspects of
the program and must be tightly coupled with the Intellectual Property
strategy and the use of Modular Open System features. If confirmed, I
will ensure that contractors maintain valid information in the digital
authoritative source of truth in order to allow program managers to
make informed and timely decisions.
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (ppbe)
Question. The Department s acquisition process is closely linked
with its PPBE process, and acquisition programs can move only as nimbly
as the budget process can allocate resources that fund them. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 established a
Commission to examine and make recommendations for PPBE reform.
Are you aware of the Commission s interim report and its
recommendations? If so, what are your views of those recommendations?
Answer. The PPBE process requires years of planning before finally
getting funds appropriated, which is not conducive to the kind of
responsiveness and agility necessary to counter adversaries who do not
have to operate under similar constraints. I am aware of the Commission
s interim report and understand that the team in ASD(A) is working
closely with the Commission. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the PPBE Commission and stakeholders across the Department and in
Congress to examine the system issues and develop proposals to address
these challenges.
Question. In your view, what other changes, if any, are needed to
the PPBE process to ensure it can effectively support ongoing
acquisition reforms, including by improving timeliness, reducing
bureaucracy, and increasing flexibility?
Answer. Refining the PPBE process is important to realizing agile
and timely procurement of key emerging technology. If confirmed, I will
assess what changes, beyond those recommended by the PPBE commission
may be necessary to improve the acquisition process.
Question. In your view, what steps can the Department take under
the current PPBE construct to ensure acquisition programs are
appropriately resourced in a timely manner?
Answer. The Competitive Advantage Pathfinders (CAPs) initiative is
aimed at identifying ways to align PPBE with the requirements and
acquisition systems. To my understanding, the A&S team is also working
closely with the PPBE Commission through the Acquisition Innovation
Research Center and the DASD for Acquisition Integration and
Interoperability. If confirmed, I will work partners in CAPE, the
Comptroller, and Congress to apply lessons learned to accelerate
acquisition of important technologies.
One of the major obstacles to successfully bringing emerging
technologies into the Department s acquisition system is the so-called
valley of death, or the gap in funding between the development of a new
technology and its transition into a program of record.
Question. In your view, what changes are needed to the PPBE and
other processes to help bridge the valley of death ?
Answer. The Defense budget development and appropriation process
can make it difficult to fund an unproven technology as an acquisition
program. If confirmed, I will continually assess our processes to
ensure transparency and security while balancing the imperative for
speed. I would advocate for re-evaluating our decision processes to
ensure we are event driven vice calendar driven, responsive to change,
and incentivizing innovation.
Question. In your view, to what extent should the role of the
government s systems engineering commands (e.g., Naval Warfare Centers
and the Air Force Research Laboratory), as the government s technical
experts in particular technology areas, be used to help emerging
technologies bridge the valley of death ?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work diligently with my USD (R&E)
counterparts to ensure the warfighter's prioritized capability gaps are
appropriately communicated and aligned with the efforts of our
laboratories and industry partners, to include small businesses and
venture capitalists. Organizations such as Warfare Centers and Research
Labs provide great opportunities to engage with non-traditional
companies and create long lasting partnerships and talent pipelines to
form bridges over the valley of death.
Question. In your view, do the military departments and defense
agencies have different results in transitioning technology developed
in-house, versus technology developed by others, such as DARPA, the
Strategic Capabilities Office, or the commercial sector?
Answer. In my view, aligning the requirements, resources and
development communities is critical to preserving the United States
technical advantage. The Military Departments have processes to align
technology investments from within their own centers to acquisition
partners. Defense agencies can look at needs in a different way and
bring cross functional and joint requirements to the forefront of
emerging technologies development. If confirmed, I will work with my
counterparts in Comptroller, CAPE, Joint Staff, and the Services to
identify the best way to transition technology and institutionalize
those pathways into the Defense Acquisition System.
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 was enacted just
prior to the explosion in information technology. The GNA successfully
instilled a joint culture in the Department's warfighting operations,
but the PPBE, requirements, and systems acquisition processes have
remained service centric.
What are your views on how to address jointness in the acquisition
and sustainment system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with colleagues across the
Department to identify ways to increase interoperability, including by
ensuring the recently established DASD for Acquisition Integration and
Interoperability, can successfully identify and address portfolio
capability gaps in the joint force .
Question. As there are few options other than the military
departments, Special Operations Command, and Cyber Command to field and
maintain systems, do you believe consideration should be given to
creating some joint acquisition and sustainment capabilities? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. Ensuring acquisition and sustainment of joint capabilities
is critical to meeting warfighter requirements. If confirmed, I would
work with Department leaders to review the effects of previous joint
efforts to understand the utility of applying those concepts to future
efforts.
requirements
Question. The Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System
(JCIDS) process was established nearly 20 years ago with the intention
of addressing overlap and duplication in the Military Services
acquisition programs.
With respect to driving the acquisition system to deliver
capabilities that meet the national security needs of the Nation, in
your view, what do you see as the primary shortfalls of the current
requirements building process?
Answer. The Joint Staff has made strides in the last few years to
take a more strategic look at requirements through the Joint
Warfighting Concept (JWC) and the Capability Portfolio Management
Reviews (CPMRs). These efforts provide the acquisition community with a
clear signal on the highest priority capabilities in the Department. If
confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the acquisition community
and the Joint Staff to translate these capabilities into requirements
documents.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to reform the
process?
Answer. I understand the Department recently introduced the
Competitive Advantage Pathways process, which is focused on integrating
the requirements, budgeting and acquisition processes to provide
capabilities in a shorter timeframe. If confirmed, I would assess the
progress of this effort, and apply and lessons learned to the Defense
Acquisition System.
Question. The requirements process has often been incapable of
developing requirements that consider technological advances made by
DOD s own research programs. In recent years,
DOD has also undertaken several initiatives to improve the
Department s connectivity with commercial technology companies.
If confirmed, what changes would you suggest to ensure that
emerging technologies from within DOD, defense industry, and the
commercial sector are better accounted for and leveraged within the
requirements process?
Answer. The Department has established two efforts, Rapid Defense
Experimentation Reserve (RDER) and Competitive Advantage Pathways
(CAPs), to find ways to accelerate the introduction of new capabilities
to the warfighter. If confirmed, I would work with USD(R&E), and the
Services to institute lessons learned from RDER and CAPs to identify
how to transition capabilities rapidly and efficiently from prototype,
to production, to fielding, into the hands of our warfighters.
Question. Many requirements are established with technical goals
that are unachievable at any reasonable cost or schedule.
If confirmed, what changes would you recommend to the requirements
development process, including workforce changes, to support the
development of requirements that allow for risk-informed tradeoffs that
are technically feasible or commercially available at reasonable costs
and schedules?
Answer. The Joint Warfighting Council (JWC) and Capability
Portfolio Management Reviews (CPMRs) give the acquisition community an
understanding of the capability gaps we much address to reverse the
erosion of our technical edge. If confirmed, I would work with
colleagues in the Office of USD(A&S), the Joint Staff, CAPE, and the
Services to convert these capability gaps into requirements.
joint acquisition programs
Question. What are your views regarding the merit and feasibility
of joint development and acquisition programs?
Answer. Every acquisition program is different, which necessitates
a Defense Acquisition System that provides flexible tools and pathways
for the acquisition workforce to use the right tools for the specific
capability being acquired. To deliver integrated capabilities that span
across Service domains, a joint acquisition program can make sense.
However, it can take many forms as a joint program office, like F-35's
fully staffed program office, or the Chem-Bio program that serves as an
integrator. If confirmed, I will work across the Department to ensure
the Acquisition workforce continues to have flexible tools and pathways
available to deliver capability at speed and scale.
Question. What programs would you consider to be candidates for
joint development and acquisition?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure the
workforce is using the right tools and pathways for the capability
being delivered.
Question. What are your views on joint, enabling or cross-cutting
capabilities that may not be treated as acquisition programs, such as
JADC2? In your view, does the Department or the individual services
have sufficient authority to advocate or manage these capabilities to
ensure there are no seams in planning or execution of such efforts?
Answer. I understand the USD(A&S) recently established the DASD for
Acquisition Integration and Interoperability to address cross-cutting
capabilities that may not be treated as individual acquisition
programs. If confirmed, I will work ensure this office, which would
report to me, is able to execute this mission effectively.
Question. If confirmed, how would you facilitate processes for the
services to empower acquisition professionals and reduce institutional
policy barriers to enable cross service requirements development and
capabilities discussions?
Answer. If confirmed, in addition to championing the Competitive
Advantage Pathfinders effort, being managed by the office of the DASD
for Acquisition Integration and Interoperability, I would work closely
with the Services to identify other areas for reducing barriers to
cross-service requirements development and capabilities discussions. I
would also ensure the workforce has access to the tools and the
training to effectively advance these objectives.
test and evaluation
Question. Test and evaluation activities ensure that system
performance meets specifications and requirements, and that deployed
capabilities are operationally effective against threats.
In your opinion, what is the appropriate role of developmental,
operational, and live-fire testing in the acquisition process?
Answer. In my opinion, realistic testing throughout all system
lifecycle stages is critical to providing measures of effectiveness and
performance of our systems and is a key to the success of the
acquisition process. If confirmed, I will work with the Service
Acquisition Executives, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, and the USD(R&E) to ensure the acquisitions process
adequately accounts for necessary testing.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure
acquisition programs efficiently address issues and deficiencies
identified through test and evaluation?
Answer. In my opinion, at each milestone and key knowledge point of
a system s development, relevant test information must be available as
one of the inputs to measure program maturity. It is necessary to
identify issues during development so they can be corrected going
forward. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Acquisition
Executives, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the
USD(R&E) to address issues and deficiencies that arise in testing as
part of acquisition policy and process.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe DOD
should procure weapon systems that have not demonstrated, through test
and evaluation, to be operationally effective and operationally
suitable?
Answer. In my view, DOD must appropriately manage risks throughout
all acquisition programs. As we deliver new capabilities that are in
urgent need by our warfighters, we must do it right. If confirmed, I
will work with my staff, the Service Acquisition Executives, the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the USD(R&E), and the
warfighter to manage this risk calculus.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances would you support
accepting more risk in programs, specifically test failures, to
accelerate the fielding of new systems and capabilities to counter an
advanced threat?
Answer. In my opinion, we learn from every test and the knowledge
gained from each test informs the ultimate risk versus benefit calculus
that we must use assess whether to accelerate a given capability in a
given situation. If confirmed, I will coordinate with all stakeholders
to weigh the risk to field an urgent need versus a delay for additional
testing.
Question. In recent years, the Department s test and evaluation
community has sought to integrate aspects of developmental and
operational testing and conduct such testing earlier in the acquisition
process. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages of
increasing the integration among the developmental, acquisition, and
testing communities?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department s test and
evaluation policy emphasizes integrated testing. Acquisition,
development, and testing of a given system are intertwined throughout
the program lifecycle. If these efforts are not integrated, they will
impact the pace of development and the ultimate quality of the
delivered system. If confirmed, I will work to ensure our requirements,
engineering, test, and acquisition organizations work together.
Question. What other reforms would you recommend improving the
timeliness, efficiency, and effectiveness of the test and evaluation
process to correct technical deficiencies more quickly in weapon
systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of current
policies to ensure they facilitate the acquisition community s ability
to correct deficiencies identified in test and evaluation in an
efficient and effective manner.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with USD(R&E), the
developmental test and the modeling and simulation communities, the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and the Military Services
to ensure the Department has the infrastructure, workforce, and other
resources it needs to support the test and evaluation needs of current
and future acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USD(R&E), the test community
and the Services to ensure their organizational expertise is leveraged
and integrated into the acquisition system. I will do this by ensuring
program data is freely accessible and transparent through system
development, production, deployment and sustainment. I will ensure
research, engineering, and test equities are heard at program reviews
and decision gates for Military Service programs. If confirmed, I will
assess the existing infrastructure, workforce, and other resources
needed to support the test and evaluation of our acquisition programs.
intellectual property/technical data rights
Question. In your view, do you believe DOD has implemented
intellectual property (IP) best practices sufficiently to ensure that
the government has appropriate access to IP and technical data to give
proper return on investments in Federal research and development (R&D),
retain the ability to re-compete programs to control costs or improve
quality, and exercise better control over program sustainment costs?
Answer. In my view, the Department has taken important steps to
better address the implementation of intellectual property (IP) best
practices. Nevertheless, we must continue to focus on IP challenges as
a strategic priority. This issue must be addressed to ensure
sustainment costs are more affordable and that the DOD can take full
advantage of industry s faster pace of technology innovation. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure IP and technical rights are considered
early in the acquisition process.
Question. What is your understanding of how recommendations from
the Intellectual Property Cadre have improved the Department s ability
to negotiate appropriate IP data rights for contracts, or helped
identify areas where additional focused training might improve
negotiation outcomes?
Answer. I believe that the recent creation of the Intellectual
Property (IP) Cadre office has resulted in expanded awareness of IP
challenges and best practices in the Department and is an important
step in helping the Department rise to meet these challenges. If
confirmed, I would work to modernize IP acquisition regulations and
related guidance, and to update and improve the delivery of IP training
for the acquisition workforce. These activities are important to
emphasize early planning for programs long-term IP needs and
negotiation of tailored, flexible, licenses that provide a more
effective balance of DOD and industry interests.
Question. If confirmed, what adjustments would you recommend to DOD
s practices in negotiating IP and technical data rights for programs to
improve DOD s ability to develop, procure, and sustain new systems and
technologies affordably?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the DOD acquisition
workforce has the necessary training to take greater advantage of agile
and flexible tools such as negotiating specialized licenses and fully
implementing modular open systems approaches (MOSA) in DOD programs.
Question. In your view, does DOD have appropriate access to
technical data packages for weapons systems and software in development
and sustainment?
Answer. I understand that many DOD programs consider IP to be a
continuing challenge, especially for sustainment and upgrade activities
happening later in the program life cycle. If confirmed, I will place
greater emphasis on planning for data and software needs throughout the
program life cycle, and will ensure such planning is happening earlier,
most preferably during the competitive phases of a program.
Question. In your view, is it worth spending more money on programs
earlier to obtain technical data packages, and if so, how could a fair
price be determined?
Answer. I believe that planning for, and taking concrete steps to
acquire, technical data and computer software should occur early in the
program life cycle. By doing so, the Department should be able to
capture IP resulting more effectively from its investments in
technology development, and to leverage the competitive environment to
more affordably acquire preexisting IP that has been developed and
funded privately by industry. Additionally, this proactive approach to
acquiring IP will better enable the Department to apply its cost and
pricing expertise to competitive offers that meet programs long-term IP
needs. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department has effective
policies, guidance, and tools for planning and acquiring technical data
and computer software earlier in the program life cycle.
Question. In your view, what methods does DOD have available to
obtain data rights or data delivery on existing systems while still
protecting legitimate industry needs?
Answer. DOD should develop IP strategies that incorporate strategic
planning for long term needs, negotiation of flexible and tailored
licensing arrangements, and the application of modular open systems
approaches. These methods and approaches can effectively balance the
needs of the Government and industry s IP interests, considering the
investments of both parties. If confirmed, I will place a greater
emphasis on tools and resources to facilitate early and continuous
acquisition and product support planning, most preferably during the
competitive phases of a program.
Question. In your view, how extensive is the issue of DOD
inadequately performing data rights analysis, ordering, inspection, and
performance, leading to improper limited rights assertions by industry?
Answer. I believe it is critical that the Department leverages its
existing legal and contractual tools to ensure that IP is acquired and
managed more effectively. If confirmed, I would seek to remove or
mitigate impediments to doing so through a combination of improved
workforce training and education, as well as addressing any needed
changes to the governing regulations and DOD policies, as appropriate.
Question. In your view, how will the use of open systems
architectures and acquisition strategies improve the Department s
ability to modernize and sustain its systems?
Answer. I believe the combined implementation of best practices in
modular open systems approaches (MOSA) and IP strategic planning is
critical to improve the Department s posture for competitive and
affordable sustainment and modernization of its systems. MOSA allows
greater tailoring and flexibility when allocating IP rights to better
balance DOD s and industry s return on investment in individual system
components. Additionally, it is enabled more efficiently by best
practices in digital engineering. If confirmed, I will identify and
implement steps necessary to improve the Department s use of MOSA and
execution of IP strategies in a manner that effectively balances the
needs of DOD and industry.
Question. In your view, does the Department need a different
approach to access technical data when dealing with primarily
commercial companies?
Answer. I understand that DOD policy is generally to acquire the
same data, software deliverables, and license rights provided to
commercial customers, except in cases when DOD s specialized national
defense needs require additional or specialized arrangements. In those
cases, the Department should negotiate with the commercial vendors to
develop licensing arrangements that better balance the operational and
business interests of both parties. If confirmed, I will ensure that
Department continues to develop tools and resources for licensing
arrangements that balance the needs of DOD and industry for both
commercial and noncommercial technologies.
reform of the protest process
Question. To what extent do you think that the time required to
settle protests warrants reform to protect the interests of both
industry and the government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the recent and relevant studies
on protests to determine what, if any, additional changes should be
made to protect the interests of both industry and the government.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, do you have
to improve the protest process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with subject matter experts to
gain a better understanding of challenges and opportunities that may
improve the protest process for the Department and industry.
small business
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the
participation of small businesses in the defense technology and
industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Base Policy and the Director of the Office of
Small Business Programs, who have direct oversight over the Department
s small business activities, to support their programs to increase the
participation of small businesses in the defense industrial base.
Question. In your view, what are the biggest barriers that prevent
small businesses from becoming prime contractors to the Department?
Answer. It is my understanding that some of the biggest barriers
include difficulty navigating the defense acquisition process,
navigating the complex structure of DOD, often lengthy procurement
timelines from opportunity announcement to contract award, and limited
access to information on upcoming procurement opportunities. If
confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy and the Director of the Office of Small Business
Programs, who have direct oversight over the Department s small
business activities, to help more small business become prime
contractors to the Department.
Question. Do you believe the Department is using all available
authorities to provide small businesses the opportunity to subcontract
with existing prime contractors to ensure programs of record have
access to the most advanced and effective technologies?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department of Defense manages
various small business programs that assist Small Businesses with
opportunities to subcontract with existing prime contractors. If
confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy and the Director of the Office of Small Business
Programs, who have direct oversight over the Department s small
business activities, to help identify any improvements in the way that
the Department can utilize its small business authorities.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
small businesses that provide goods and services to the Defense
Logistics Agency are monitored and supported when facing financial
pressures that challenge their viability?
Answer. I believe that the Department should do all it can to
support small businesses facing undue financial pressures, while
balancing the readiness and cash-flow needs of the Department. If
confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy, who has oversight over the Department s small
business programs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Sustainment, who has oversight over the Defense Logistics Agency, to
ensure that the Acquisition Community is doing its best to minimize
undue financial burden on the small business community.
Question. What do you see as the benefits of diversifying the
defense industrial base through more engagement with small and
disadvantaged businesses?
Answer. I believe small business participation in defense
procurements as prime and subcontractors is vital to the defense
mission, competition, and the health of the defense industrial base
(DIB). Small businesses spur innovation, represent the majority of new
entrants into the DIB, and, through their growth, create a pipeline of
the next generation of suppliers with diverse capabilities to support
the DOD mission. They are essential to the Nation s economic prosperity
as their ingenuity, agility, and capabilities are inextricably tied to
the Nation s national and economic security.
Question. In confirmed, what role do you see for your office in
identifying small businesses that should be monitored to ensure mergers
and acquisitions involving those companies does not negatively impact
competition and access in the commercial marketplace?
Answer. Defense industry mergers and acquisitions have a profound
impact on the level of economic competition in the DIB. Competition
within the DIB is critical to national and economic security, and
increased competition is in the Department s best interest. If
confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy, who has direct oversight over the Department s
merger and acquisitions monitoring program, to ensure that the
Acquisition community best supports the Department s M&A objectives.
acquisition workforce education and training
Question. A well-trained and empowered acquisition workforce is a
critical enabler in the implementation of acquisition reform and in the
management of acquisition programs.
What is your assessment of the Department s acquisition workforce,
both in terms of its capacity and capability? Does the Department have
enough acquisition professionals with the right skills?
Answer. I believe in the exceptional talent of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce. Over the past few years, the Department has
diligently dedicated itself to revitalizing and transforming the
acquisition workforce and modernizing the execution of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. Should I be confirmed, my
priority will be to comprehensively evaluate the outcomes of these
concerted efforts.
Furthermore, I am committed to closely examining the specialized
knowledge, skills, and functions of acquisition that are essential for
the Department to provide cutting-edge capabilities to our warfighters.
This entails an analysis of how we can best leverage the expertise of
our existing workforce and upskill where needed, as well as developing
strategies for attracting and retaining top-tier talent.
If confirmed, I will conduct a rigorous assessment of targeted
capacity requirements and skill prerequisites that ensure the
Department maintains an ample bench of skilled acquisition
professionals to enable the consistent delivery of superior
capabilities to maintain a distinct advantage for our warfighters.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the
acquisition workforce is fully trained on the new acquisition
authorities and best practices, so that it can make informed decisions
about when and how to use the different acquisition pathways and tools?
Answer. I believe close coordination with the Department s
Acquisition Executives, functional leaders, and the Defense Acquisition
University is key to ensuring the workforce is provided with an agile
learning environment that meets the needs of today's workforce,
including how to use different acquisition pathways and tools. Through
DAU, nearly 160,000 acquisition professionals across all Military
Services and Defense agencies have access to career-long learning and
support, through courses acquisition professionals need to achieve
DAWIA certification and other skill enhancing tools and techniques. If
confirmed, I will work with my counterparts across the Department to
ensure the acquisition workforce is fully trained on new acquisition
authorities and best practices.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to empower
program managers to execute acquisition programs and hold them
accountable for how their decisions contribute to program performance,
including over the life of the system?
Answer. I believe program managers will be successful if they are
empowered to execute their programs using all the available legal and
policy authorities as well as functional support. This will enable them
to meet the cost, schedule, and performance goals of their specific
programs. If confirmed, I will exercise robust oversight to hold
program managers accountable for program performance.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department s training,
education, certification, and credentialing programs for the
acquisition workforce?
Answer. Training and learning in new and emerging areas and
throughout one s career, not just in the first few years on the job, is
essential to deliver necessary capability to the warfighter.
Additionally, the Defense Acquisition Workforce must be able to adapt
to a variety of new and rapidly evolving threats. It is my
understanding that DAU, the Services, and Components have been
collaborating to better meet the training needs of the workforce. If
confirmed, I will review such efforts to make sure we have effective
planning and investments.
Question. In your view, should the Department look at ways to
integrate commercially provided or academic credentials to complement
and enhance DOD provided training?
Answer. I believe the Department should consider and, where
applicable, offer commercially provided and academic credentials to the
Defense Acquisition Workforce. To that end, DAU has already established
formal agreements with multiple commercial and academic institutions,
such as Coursera, LinkedIn Learning, Skillsoft Precipio, Harvard
Business School, and others. DAU currently offers thousands of courses
from these institutions to complement and enhance its own DOD-unique
training resources to the acquisition workforce, at no cost.
Integrating external credentials can help our workforce diversify their
skillsets and adapt to emerging technologies and methodologies,
ensuring they remain competitive and effective in their roles.
Integrating commercially provided or academic credentials to
complement and enhance DOD-provided training is a prudent approach that
can significantly benefit the Department of Defense, particularly in
the acquisition domain. By leveraging partnerships with trusted
providers and carefully managing the integration process, we can ensure
our Defense Acquisition Workforce remains well-prepared and adaptable
in an ever-evolving defense landscape. If confirmed, I would look to
buildupon these initiatives.
Question. In your view, what role should the Department play in
ensuring that there is an adequate supply of technical talent available
for the Department and industry partners to meet the challenges of the
future?
Answer. The Department's role in securing an ample supply of
technical talent for future challenges is critical. If confirmed, I
will work to achieve this by strategically planning our workforce
needs, investing in education and training initiatives, fostering
innovation through R&D, streamlining recruitment, and prioritizing
retention and career development. Collaboration with industry,
academia, and diverse talent pools are essential, as is a commitment to
lifelong learning and adaptability. Additionally, I support
opportunities, such as the Defense Civilian Training Corps, to develop
the next generation of acquisition leadership. If confirmed, I will
regularly assess and refine efforts to ensure alignment with our
mission and evolving demands of the future. By doing so, the Department
is positioned (as are our industry partners) for success in addressing
the challenges ahead.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to fully staff
the Software Cadre to support software modernization across the
Department?
Answer. I believe the most important resource of any organization
is its people. Our acquisition workforce must be flexible in leveraging
new, evolving software capabilities and technologies. If confirmed, I
will work with the Services and Components toward enabling a fully
staffed Software Cadre that supports the Department s software
modernization strategy, which provides the approach for achieving
faster delivery of software capabilities to gain a competitive
advantage.
Question. What recommendations would you make, if confirmed, to
improve the recruitment efforts of acquisition professionals by the
Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to enhance the recruitment
efforts for acquisition professionals in the Department through a
comprehensive approach that includes collaborating with educational
institutions and leveraging digital platforms. Barriers to entry can be
broken down to allow for flexible career paths, to foster
collaboration, and to collect feedback for continual improvement. By
implementing these measures, the Department can attract a skilled and
diverse acquisition workforce, ensuring the success of our mission. If
confirmed, I would continue to the support for the Defense Civilian
Training Corps (DCTC) that equips college scholars with the skills and
knowledge necessary as a future DOD leader where they will innovate
processes, policies, and methods to enable acquisition, adoption and
transition new technologies into military capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to onboard more
Highly Qualified Experts and scientific or professional personnel that
have expertise in relevant technology fields to support DOD acquisition
professionals?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize the strategic recruitment
of Highly Qualified Experts (HQE) in cyber and technology fields to
strengthen the DOD's acquisition capabilities and support the National
Defense Strategy. I will emphasize that talent can be found both within
the Department, as well as identify industry leaders to help build the
HQE cadre. Additionally, by streamlining recruitment, offering
competitive compensation, promoting diversity, professional
development, and strategic partnerships, the Department can attract and
retain top talent. In addition, to improve employee satisfaction,
flexible work arrangements should be explored, feedback encouraged, and
resources should be resourced appropriately.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
improve the effectiveness of the Defense Acquisition University?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate DAU s ongoing efforts to
transform its training content and delivery methods, while ensuring its
products and services are aligned to the strategic needs of the
acquisition workforce. It is my understanding that DAU is working to
build enduring, productive relationships with the Services and
Components as part of a modernized implementation of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. The skills and abilities of the
workforce are critical to ensuring our warfighters have necessary
capabilities on the battlefield, and if confirmed, I will review the
steps being taken to provide for upskilling and talent development.
Question. In your view, how effective has the Department been in
utilizing the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Account (DAWDA)
to support its overall talent management initiatives?
Answer. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Account is
provided for the sole purpose of recruitment, training, development,
and retention of qualified acquisition talent. It is a powerful tool in
the competition for talent. DAWDA has effectively supported a wide-
range of robust talent management initiatives across DOD since 2009 and
can be credited for eliminating a gap of mid-career (10-20 years of
experience) personnel.
If confirmed, I am committed to assessing the DAWDA's effectiveness
in collaboration with Acquisition Executives. This assessment will help
identify areas of success and improvement to better align the DAWDA
with the Department's talent management goals. Optimizing use of DAWDA
resources can support modern talent management and development tools
and training for the acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
assess and ensure the DAWDA is adequately resourced to meet the needs
of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the process to assess
acquisition workforce requirements and ensure planned budget levels are
requested to meet requirements to continue with modern talent
development initiatives. I will also ensure DAWDA resources are
prioritized and allocated to the greatest need.
Question. If confirmed, how would you engage with the
congressionally mandated Acquisition Innovation Research Center (AIRC)
to perform research on acquisition issues of interest, and to enhance a
future workforce for defense acquisition?
Answer. DAU is a direct interface with the Defense Acquisition
Workforce and the acquisition challenges they face. If confirmed, I
will ensure DAU continues to collaborate with the AIRC to share
information and identify research areas on issues of interest to the
workforce. DAU and AIRC will continue to co-produce Quarterly Research
Forums where AIRC s principal investigators share their research with
and receive feedback directly from the workforce.
nunn-mccurdy process
Question. The Nunn-McCurdy process, as established by section 2433
of title 10, United States Code, has not been revisited since Congress
and the Department began implementing significant acquisition reforms 5
years ago.
Given recent acquisition reforms, in your view, is the Nunn-McCurdy
process still an appropriate and effective mechanism for reporting to
Congress on troubled acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Nunn-McCurdy process and
recommend changes, as appropriate. This process has been a significant
and important process for Major Defense Acquisition Program reporting
and accountability and is utilized for metrics and analysis within the
Department.
Question. In your view, are changes needed to the Nunn-McCurdy
process, such as expanding its scope beyond major defense acquisition
programs or adjusting the thresholds for significant and critical
breaches?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Nunn-McCurdy process to
determine if changes are necessary to expand the scope beyond MDAPs.
Question. If confirmed, what principles would guide your thinking
on whether to recommend terminating a program that has experienced
significant or critical cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use the principles of the Nunn-McCurdy
law along with data driven analyses to inform my recommendation
regarding termination. Program decisions must balance between
delivering warfighter capability and controlling cost growth. Programs
experiencing significant or critical cost breaches must present a
credible plan to meet performance requirements at acceptable cost
levels.
foreign military sales
Question. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process has long been
criticized for being too slow and cumbersome to meet the needs of our
allies and partners. There are ongoing efforts in Congress, the Defense
Department, and the State Department to improve the process, especially
considering the Ukraine conflict and reequipping our NATO allies,
providing equipment for Taiwan, and the Trilateral Security Partnership
Between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. (AUKUS).
In your opinion, what are the primary hurdles to streamlining the
FMS process?
Answer. The Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales Tiger Team
identified six broad areas for improvement in the phases of the Foreign
Military Sales process: improving understanding of ally and partner
requirements; enabling efficient review of technology; providing allies
and partners relevant priority capabilities; accelerating acquisition
and contracting support; expanding defense industrial base capacity;
and ensuring broad U.S. Government support. I fully concur with these
findings.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations do you have to address
these hurdles?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the FMS Continuous Process
Improvement Board, established as part of the Department s Foreign
Military Sales Tiger Team review, and the Department of State, which is
the U.S. Government s lead on Foreign Military Sales, to address any
hurdles that the Acquisition community can help overcome.
Question. In your view, what problems can DOD address on its own,
and what problems require coordination with the State Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with colleagues in OSD Policy
and counterparts in the Services to address any deficiencies in the FMS
process that the Acquisition community can help improve.
Question. In your view, is there adequate data to be able to
measure the time taken by the various steps in the FMS process to
determine where there might be bottlenecks in the process?
Answer. I am aware that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) maintains data on many aspects of the foreign military sales
process. If confirmed, I would work closely with DSCA and the Services
to ensure we are collecting the necessary data to monitor individual
FMS cases, identify any patterns, and address bottlenecks.
international armaments cooperation
Question. The Department conducts a number of activities that
support International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) that are used to
promote U.S. strategic goals. IAC is defined as cooperative research,
development, test, and evaluation of defense technologies, systems, or
equipment; joint production and follow-on support of defense articles
or equipment; and procurement of foreign technology, equipment,
systems, or logistics support. In addition to activities like
information exchange agreements, defense trade, and cooperative
logistics, the Department also funds activities that can be used to
promote interoperability and joint development, such as the Defense
Exportability Features (DEF) program, the Coalition Warfare Support
Program, and the Foreign Comparative Test Program.
In your view, how effective have international armaments
cooperation activities been in shaping and supporting broader DOD
warfighting needs and priorities? Are there new approaches or
activities we should consider to be more effective and strategic?
Answer. Across numerous positions in OSD Policy, and as Acting
Deputy Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, I have seen
first-hand that IAC activities provide opportunities to share in the
identification, development and advancement of military capability that
support coalition operations and enable our international partners to
provide for their defense and create stability within key regions of
the world. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Base Policy, who has oversight over IAC
activities, to ensure that the Acquisition community supports this
important mission.
Question. Based on current experiences with the conflict in
Ukraine, what recommendations would you have, if confirmed, to help
streamline or improve our security cooperation, foreign military sales,
and cooperative logistics processes to be more responsive to rapidly
changing security situations?
Answer. The Department of Defense has demonstrated incredible speed
and agility in providing critical security cooperation to Ukraine to
meet its requirements over the course of the conflict. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with stakeholders across the Department of
Defense and interagency to capture lessons learned from the Ukraine
experience that we can apply to improve security cooperation and
cooperative logistics processes moving forward.
Question. In your view, how effective have newer initiatives like
the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) with India, the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), or the AUKUS initiative been
in supporting our defense posture, and are there recommendations for
improving those activities that should be considered to make them more
effective?
Answer. As the Director for South Asia policy in 2014, I worked
with colleagues in the office of International Armaments Cooperation to
establish the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative with India as a
means to building habits of cooperation across our respective
bureaucracies and industry partners. In my view, initiatives like DTTI,
the Quad and AUKUS provide valuable opportunities to enhance
international cooperation, strengthen alliances and partnerships, and
improve industrial base cooperation. If confirmed, I look forward to
exploring the details of the work underway and seek opportunities to
enhance outcomes and identify new opportunities for partnership.
Question. If confirmed, how would you manage your relationship with
USD (Policy), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the
Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) in structuring
international cooperation activities?
Answer. I have worked in and with USD (Policy), DSCA, and DTSA
throughout my career. If confirmed, I will leverage my close personal
relationships with senior officials throughout those organizations, as
well as my deep understanding of their roles and missions, to ensure
ASD/A and the broader acquisition community is fully aligned and
supportive of the Department s international cooperative activities.
Question. If confirmed, do you see opportunities to streamline
those relationships to reduce the time to get agreements in place so
actual cooperative work can begin more quickly?
Answer. If confirmed, I will build bridges to OSD Policy, DSCA and
DTSA to bring the Acquisition community into policy discussions of
potential cooperation with allies and partners at the front end, so
that the acquisition community is poised to provide robust and
expeditious support to cooperative work.
sexual harassment
Question. In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace
and Gender Relations survey, approximately 17.7 percent of female and
5.8 percent of male DOD respondents indicated that they had experienced
sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by someone at work in
the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or
otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee of the ASD(A)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would send a clear message to the workforce
from the outset that there will be zero tolerance for sexual harassment
or gender discrimination. I would further ensure employees are made
aware of their rights, options for reporting, and the resources and
recourse available to them should they experience sexual harassment or
gender discrimination. I would reinforce this important message with my
leadership team, and set a clear expectation of leaders throughout the
organization to set a climate where such behavior is not tolerated.
Should I become aware of any complaints within the organization, I
would first ensure proper actions are taken through personnel
processes. I would then undertake a more extensive messaging campaign,
using direct communications and official correspondence to the
workforce to reinforce the message that everyone deserves a safe and
respectful work environment and behavior such as sexual harassment or
discrimination will not be tolerated.
congressional oversight
Question. To exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities,
it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other
appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings,
reports, records including documents and electronic communications, and
other information from the executive branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records including documents and electronic communications, and
other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or
no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes,
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
defense civilian training corps
1. Senator Kaine. Ms. Abercrombie, what do you see as the potential
for the Defense Civilian Training Corps to bolster the acquisition
workforce and are there other modernization initiatives you think would
complement the push for faster and more efficient acquisition
processes?
Ms. Abercrombie. As I understand it, the Department has modeled the
Defense Civilian Training Corps (DCTC) on the Reserve Officer Training
Corps program for military officers. DCTC will recruit and
comprehensively prepare the Nation's next generation of talent to be
civilian professionals, ready to contribute with agile and innovative
skills to address the acquisition community's most vexing technical,
operational, and business challenges.
I am also aware of the new Acquisition Innovation Research Center
(AIRC), which was established to address, accelerate, exploit and
transition cutting edge practices into the Defense acquisition system.
AIRC and DCTC form a foundation for the Department to meet the Nation's
current threats and will establish a path for an agile, accelerated,
and efficient acquisition system. If confirmed, I intend to assess and
emphasize efforts being performed by the AIRC and implement DCTC and
other workforce initiatives. I will also work with the Defense
Acquisition University to leverage and accelerate acquisition workforce
initiatives such as the Defense College Acquisition Internship Program,
the Public Private Talent Experience, and Back-to-Basics.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
small businesses
2. Senator King. Ms. Abercrombie, Procurement Technical Assistance
Centers (PTAC), now known as Apex accelerators, have continued to usher
along small business as they attempt to participate in Federal, State,
and local government contracts. Can you convey how imperative these
organizations are to DOD?
Ms. Abercrombie. From my perspective, APEX Accelerators have been a
critical resource for small businesses and the Department by helping a
wide range of businesses enter Federal contracting and navigate a
complex DOD contracting process. If confirmed, I will work with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, and the
Director of the Office of Small Business Programs, to ensure that the
acquisition community continues to support and leverage the important
work of APEX Accelerators.
additive manufacturing
3. Senator King. Ms. Abercrombie, Large-scale Additive
Manufacturing is becoming a possibility for the Department of Defense
rapid production needs. Do you believe the establishment of an Additive
Manufacturing University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) would be
beneficial to growing and establishing this essential capability for
DOD?
Ms. Abercrombie. Expanding the Department's advanced manufacturing
capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, will allow our forces
to produce crucial parts closer to the point of need, reduce
manufacturing and transportation costs, and improve our ability to
provide support in contested and disconnected environments. If
confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering to review whether establishing an Additive
Manufacturing UARC would be beneficial to grow this essential
capability for DOD.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future use of unfunded priorities lists
4. Senator Warren. Ms. Abercrombie, do you agree that if funding is
needed for a project, it should be a part of the command or Military
Service's budget?
Ms. Abercrombie. The Department's budget request process is an
important part of the appropriations cycle and represents the
Department's highest priorities. It is my understanding Congress
created the unfunded priority list structure in 10 USC 222a, and that
the Department supports efforts to repeal the requirement. If
confirmed, I will work with my counterparts within the Department to
learn about their specific budget requests and will support the
Department's efforts to repeal the requirement.
defense mergers
5. Senator Warren. Ms. Abercrombie, what do you see as the major
risks of further consolidation in the defense sector in terms of
national security, innovation, and costs?
Ms. Abercrombie. In my view, while consolidation can have
beneficial impacts--like preserving a capability that might otherwise
disappear if a company went out of business--excessive consolidation in
the defense sector can reduce innovation, increase costs to the
Department, weaken our supply chains, and negatively impact U.S.
national and economic security. I would point to the Department's 2022
Report on the State of Competition in the Defense Industrial Base for a
fuller accounting of the major risks of further consolidation in the
Defense sector, but I firmly believe that increased competition is
generally in the Department's best interest.
6. Senator Warren. Ms. Abercrombie, do you agree that Congress has
a right to know how DOD assesses mergers and acquisitions in order to
oversee how competition policies are being applied?
Ms. Abercrombie. I agree that the Department should follow all
applicable laws and policies regarding assessment of the national
security impacts of mergers and acquisitions. I am aware that DOD works
closely with the FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to analyze the
potential benefits and risks of cases impacting the Department and
defense industrial base. If confirmed, I commit to working with
colleagues in Industrial Base Policy to review proposed mergers and
acquisitions as necessary to determine potential effects on acquisition
and competition.
7. Senator Warren. Ms. Abercrombie, what is your plan to promote
competition in your role?
Ms. Abercrombie. Competition is essential to U.S. national and
economic security. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, who is charged with
developing DOD policies for maintaining the Defense Industrial Base,
and other stakeholders in the Department, to help the acquisition
community foster competition in the industrial base by attracting
smaller businesses, disadvantaged businesses, reducing regulatory
barriers, and making sure that acquisition pathways are as navigable as
possible.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
allegany ballistics laboratory
8. Senator Manchin. Ms. Abercrombie, thank you very much for the
conversation in my office last week, and one of the many topics we
covered was the need to support our munitions industrial base. I'm
proud to say that the most unique munitions manufacturing site in the
United States exists in West Virginia. Allegany Ballistics Laboratory
(ABL) is publicly owned by the Navy, which sets it apart from other
privately owned facilities, but is unique from our public facilities in
that it builds over 17 different types of munitions for each of our
Military Services and allies, including: the Guided Multiple Launch
Rocket System (GMLRS) that is used in our High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System (HIMARS), which are having great effect in Ukraine; the
Patriot missiles that are used to defend our Forces and our allies
around the world; the next-generation Precision Strike Missile that is
replacing the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS); Hellfire Missiles;
and the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile. I've been discussing
this unique, taxpayer owned, facility with Department leadership for
the better part of a year now, and they've agreed that we need to
invest in modernizing and expanding this facility. I will never support
funding for a military capability just because it is in West Virginia,
but only because it will benefit our warfighters. If confirmed, can you
get back to my office within 3 months with a reasoning as to why the
Department provided more than $200 million to a purely private company,
Aerojet Rocketdyne which has also had production and quality issues
with their products, instead of investing in publicly owned
infrastructure at ABL?
Ms. Abercrombie. I understand how important the ABL facilities are
to the success of delivering munitions to the warfighter. The work
being executed at ABL is something to take pride in, and I would like
to take the opportunity to celebrate the hard-working employees that
support our Defense Industrial Base, in both the private and public
sectors. I know that the Department has been working to identify all
production constraints and bottlenecks to accelerated munitions
production, including solid rocket motors. I look forward to engaging
with you and your staff, if confirmed, to identify opportunities to
support all production challenges and identifying the potential
resourcing and mitigation options to ensure the continued success of
these facilities.
9. Senator Manchin. Ms. Abercrombie, do I have your personal
commitment to make a trip to ABL within 3 months of your confirmation?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to
visit ABL as soon as possible.
commercial cost comparison of department of defense purchases
10. Senator Manchin. Ms. Abercrombie, are you familiar with the
language Senator Warren and I secured in section 803 of the Fiscal Year
2023 NDAA? This language was specifically included to give the
Department of Defense (DOD) a very simple tool in contract
negotiations, the ability to require the commercial cost of an item
that is being sold to DOD.
Ms. Abercrombie. I am familiar with the Section 803 Fiscal Year
2023 NDAA language and appreciate its importance in helping ensure the
Department pays a reasonable price for contracted commercial items. As
I see it, this language provides Department contracting officers the
ability to accomplish two important goals: making accurate commercial
product determinations and determining price reasonableness for
military-unique products proposed as commercial.
Contracting officers will now be able to require offerors to
provide important product information that contracting officers can use
to make accurate commercial product determinations more quickly.
Additionally, the language requires offerors to provide sales data and,
in some cases, cost data that contracting officers can analyze to
ensure they pay a reasonable price, which is critically important.
11. Senator Manchin. Ms. Abercrombie, if confirmed, this is the
exact type of common-sense authority I hope you will ensure is used
throughout the Department. Can you comment on whether or not this
authority has been used in any current contract negotiations the
Department is undertaking?
Ms. Abercrombie. I certainly support Section 803 and if confirmed
will strive to ensure Department contracting officers are empowered to
use this language to the maximum extent. At this time, I am not sure if
any Department contracting officers have used this language in contract
negotiations, but this is something I will take a personal interest in,
prioritize, and champion.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
software centric capabilities
12. Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, as our military capabilities
become more advanced, many of our new capabilities will be software
centric. Due to the constant evolution of new capabilities, some of
these programs will remain almost continuously in research,
development, and procurement at the same time. This means that
iterative improvements will need to be baked into the acquisition plan
and funded in a way that supports that continuous process. How do you
think DOD should approach this challenge?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding the Department recently
updated its acquisition policies to promote adaptive, tailored
approaches such as the Software Acquisition Pathway for iterative
software development. This allows DOD acquisition programs to work
closely with the requirements community to ensure capability is
delivered in a more timely manner to meet warfighter needs. If
confirmed, I will work with various DOD stakeholders to champion the
delivery of military capabilities enabled by software centric
solutions.
13. Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, do you think existing policy
can keep up with this challenge?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will work with DOD stakeholders to
apply lessons learned in implementing the recent adaptive acquisition
pathways, including the software acquisition pathway. I will ensure the
Department understands how A&S policy and guidance are effective in
achieving mission success in acquisition programs. I will also assess
whether any additional policy changes may be required.
14. Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, is there policy that needs to
change to reflect the changes in development cycles?
Ms. Abercrombie. I am not aware of policies that might need to be
altered to reflect changes in the development cycle, but if confirmed I
will examine the effectiveness of existing acquisition policies that
are aimed at continuous, iterative delivery of capability to meet
warfighter needs. If I determine changes are necessary to acquisitions
policies to be more responsive, I will not hesitate to advance those
changes.
15. Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, do we need to consider a new
funding approach to keeping pace with the rapid change of new software
technology?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding the Department has been
piloting several approaches related to funding software technology
development, such as the BA-8 pilot. If confirmed, I look forward to
exploring how the Department might implement related recommendations
from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
Commission.
effective approach to autonomous capabilities
16. Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, the Services are all working on
autonomous capabilities: the Army has Optionally Manned Fighting
Vehicles and Robotic Combat Vehicles; the Air Force is working on
Collaborative Combat Aircraft; and the Navy is developing unmanned
surface and underwater systems. These are important capabilities that
will change the way our military fights in the future--and can decrease
risks to the men and women who serve. These programs will need to
tackle many of the same challenges as they develop. If confirmed, what
ideas do you have for how we can facilitate and encourage better
collaboration across the Services in the area of autonomy?
Ms. Abercrombie. Autonomous capabilities will provide the Joint
Force with critical pathways to operational success while decreasing
risk to our warfighters. If confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with the Department of Defense's Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Office (CDAO) to further policy and solutions for
autonomous capability acquisition in close coordination with the
Services, Joint Staff, DOD CIO, and USD(R&E).
17. Senator Kelly. Ms. Abercrombie, how should we ensure the
Department is taking lessons onboard as we go so that each Service is
learning from each other?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring lessons learned
from recent rapid acquisition efforts, such as the response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic, and security assistance to Ukraine, are shared
across the Department, and incorporated into future acquisition
strategies to better meet the demands of the warfighter and stay ahead
of our peer competitors. I understand that A&S has already made
progress in this area, for example by creating multiple Competitive
Advantage Pathfinders, which are designed to identify processes that
can be scaled to overcome typical transition barriers and accelerate
critical capabilities into fielding. If confirmed, I would look to
build on this effort.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
spectrum
18. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, I am very concerned about the
impact auctioning off the spectrum's 3.1--3.45 GHz band would have on
the Department's capabilities, readiness, and training. Every senior
defense official I have asked said they could not share the band
without negatively impacting our capabilities and training. Secretary
of the Navy Carlos Del Toro stated, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Lisa Franchetti confirmed, it would take decades and over $260
billion before the Navy would be fully mission capable if forced to
share that portion of the spectrum. Dr. John Plumb, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Space Policy, stated that if the Space Force were to
vacate the S-band in that range, it would cost a minimum of $120
billion and take at least 20 years.
Based on your knowledge of this issue and the testimony of senior
uniformed officers, what would be your advice to the Secretary of
Defense on auctioning off or sharing all or some of the 3.1-3.45 GHz
portion of the spectrum?
Ms. Abercrombie. Use of electromagnetic spectrum is fundamental to
both our national security and economic strength. Within the 3.1-3.45
GHz band, DOD relies on hundreds of air-, sea-, and land-based systems
for a wide range of missions. I am aware that DOD, in coordination with
the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, the military services, other Federal
agencies, and industry, conducted a study on the feasibility of Federal
and commercial entities sharing spectrum in accordance with the 2021
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. I understand DOD continues
coordination with the White House, Department of Commerce, and other
Federal stakeholders on next steps in the process.
If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
I commit to working with my colleagues across the Department and with
interagency partners to ensure DOD maintains capabilities crucial to
our national defense and invests in advanced technologies to preserve
our innovative edge.
19. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, in your view, how would
sharing or vacating that portion of the spectrum impact our national
security?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding that the 2021
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directed DOD to study the
potential effects of, and the necessary conditions for, sharing that
band of spectrum with non-Federal users. If confirmed, I will work
within DOD and with our interagency partners to ensure our military has
access to spectrum to perform all missions.
foreign military sales reform
20. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, there continues to be delays
in the provision of weapons and equipment to our partners and allies,
and a years-long foreign military sales (FMS) backlog. What do you see
as the primary challenges to improving the timeliness of delivery of
the equipment and services in the FMS backlog and are additional
authorities needed to help solve this problem?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I expect to prioritize FMS reform,
leveraging my experience in security assistance to streamline the
process and provide timely delivery of much needed capability to our
allies and partners. I will support establishing contract award
standards and metrics and will develop associated process maps to
monitor the FMS prioritization and award process. I will review options
to expand our ability to support exportability work.
I understand that the Department is also developing a comprehensive
strategy to incentivize DIB investment in production capacity and
building surge capability for high-demand, low-supply platforms,
systems, munitions, and services. If confirmed, I expect to examine
suggestions for incorporating partner nation FMS requirements into the
acquisition process sooner.
acquisition modernization
21. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, Ukraine, Taiwan, and other
international security challenges have revealed the urgent need for
U.S. defense capability at scale. We continue to see limitations to the
U.S. defense industrial base (DIB) and concerns about limited
manufacturing capacity. What is the DOD doing to diversify and expand
the DIB, reduce over-reliance on single-source suppliers, and mitigate
supply chain vulnerabilities?
Ms. Abercrombie. I understand the Department of Defense is working
to ensure access to a secure and resilient industrial base to support
the war fighter by building a resilient industrial and supply chain
ecosystem called for by the National Defense Strategy. Modernizing the
industrial base and supporting supply chains will require increasing
partnerships with commercial industry and our international partners.
If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy to better understand our supply chains and
mitigate vulnerabilities.
22. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, to what extent is DOD
coordinating with State Department to work with our international
partners in order to leverage the current historic demand signal for
critical munitions and equipment into increased DIB production
capacity?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding the Department of Defense
is working closely with the Department of State to ensure the United
States is poised to meet our international partners' requests for
defense articles. As one example, per Section 51 in the Arms Export
Control Act, the Department of Defense consults with the Department of
State prior to purchasing any critical munitions or equipment through
the Special Defense Acquisition Fund. When evaluating a potential
purchase, the Department evaluates historical and expected sales, how
the purchase will impact the defense industrial base, and whether the
procurement will enhance U.S. force readiness by reducing the need to
divert critical munitions and equipment from DOD stocks to support
urgent international needs. If confirmed, I will work with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base policy, colleagues
in OUSD(P), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the Department
of State, as well as with industry to ensure DIB production capacity
meets U.S. and partner requirements.
23. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, how can the Department lean-in
on successful rapid acquisition authorities and apply them at a larger
scale across the Department?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding that the Department is
actively utilizing the authorities provided by the Congress, including
authorities for rapid acquisition pathways such as Urgent Capabilities,
Middle Tier, and the agile policy for the Software Pathway. It uses
these rapid acquisition authorities both independently and in
combination with existing authorities like Major Capability
Acquisition, to speed our responsiveness to the warfighter. If
confirmed, I will ensure programs are appropriately and effectively
utilizing these pathways, both independently and in coordination with
one another. I will also work with Congress to ensure we find the most
efficient way to scale these authorities to ensure application across
the Department.
24. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, what steps can DOD take to
foster greater innovation within the DIB, particularly in critical
areas such as emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and advanced
manufacturing processes?
Ms. Abercrombie. The Department of Defense (DoD) can consider
increased use of Other Transaction Authority to transition more DOD
programs from R&D and successful prototype to production. Innovation
could also be improved in the DIB by DOD developing sustainable
technical requirements early in the product development cycle to help
the acquisition process move ``at the speed of relevance.'' The
addition of non-traditional defense contractors will also help
alleviate issues with sole source suppliers and the declining number of
companies participating in defense innovation activities. Additionally,
DOD can maintain and fully utilize DOD rapid acquisition organizations,
such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, to expedite the fielding of
solutions in critical technology areas. These steps collectively aim to
create an environment conducive to innovation within the DIB with a
focus on DOD critical technologies.
If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Industrial Base Policy on fostering greater innovation in
industrial base areas critical to our national security, including
emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and advanced manufacturing
processes.
25. Senator Rounds. Ms. Abercrombie, from a broad perspective, what
must DOD do to stockpile munitions and equipment, or keep production
lines warm, in order for the United States to be prepared to defend its
interests for longer than a very short (30-day) period of time?
Ms. Abercrombie. I assess that DOD should send a strong and
consistent demand signal to industry that it will pursue a healthy
amount of munitions procurements over time, enabling sustainable
support to the defense industrial base. This demand signal is what
enables industry to increase its production capacity, keeping workers
onsite, supply chains moving, and equipment maintained. If confirmed, I
will work with my team to support munitions procurement, including
working to leverage existing authorities to ensure continued and timely
deliveries to the warfighter.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
use of emerging technologies
26. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, there is a history of private
sector frustration with the ``not made here'' attitude in DOD, and as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (ASD(A)), you would be
responsible for a defense acquisition system that enables speed to
deliver capability at the point of need. If confirmed, what efforts are
you going to make to better leverage the disruptive technologies being
developed in the private sector that are years ahead of the traditional
requirements process?
Ms. Abercrombie. Better incorporating dual-use technology in
defense acquisitions is crucial to meeting warfighters' needs. I
understand DOD has made progress in this area, with the A&S team more
actively engaging with program offices, through an effort called
``Acquisition Concierge Service'' to promote non-traditional industry
engagement and ensure programs understand potential commercial
opportunities while also identifying challenges that can be addressed
in the acquisition process or policy. If confirmed, I will continue to
work closely with Joint Staff and the Services to influence
requirements for joint capabilities, particularly in the digital space,
that are flexible enough to avoid solution lock. If confirmed, I commit
to working across the requirements and acquisition community to expand
knowledge of commercial opportunities and encourage adoption using the
authorities of my position.
27. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, how are you going to ensure
disruptive technologies are integrated in current and future DOD
systems?
Ms. Abercrombie. A challenge that coincides with the adoption of
commercial technologies, is integrating disruptive technology into
existing systems, concepts of operation and processes. A&S has created
the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Integration and Interoperability (DASD(AI2)) to address some of those
challenges, specifically with an eye on CJADC2 but also looking across
broader operational areas as part of the Department's Integrated
Acquisition Portfolio Reviews. As I understand it, the AI2 office has
developed an initial methodology for measuring transition readiness and
is actively applying it to ongoing USINDOPACOM joint efforts to rapidly
experiment, integrate, test and field capability in theater on a
timespan of months instead of years. The AI2 office is also championing
an effort to enable faster integration and joint interrogability,
through a DOD-wide Application Programming Interface strategy that
ensures DOD software acquisitions are designed to securely share data
between platforms and rapidly adopt new innovative software. If
confirmed, I commit to ensuring that this strategy, methodology and
lessons learned from these efforts will be propagated to the broader
community to improve integration of disruptive technology across the
Department.
28. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, how will your office plan to
work with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)?
Ms. Abercrombie. DIU is the Department's focal point for commercial
technology adoption, and their recent reorganization to report to the
Secretary will open more opportunities for collaboration with A&S. If
confirmed, I will treat DIU as a partner in the execution of the A&S
mission and will work closely with them to better understand available
or emerging commercial solutions that can be applied to DOD's most
pressing challenges.
acquisition reform
29. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, as ASD (A), you play a major
role in transitioning a defense acquisition that is currently
expensive, slow, and burdensome, especially under FAR Part 12, which
was designed to speed up and reduce timelines. If confirmed, what
specific aspects of FAR Part 12 do you believe need reform or
improvement?
Ms. Abercrombie. The Department must continue to take full
advantage of available and evolving technological innovations in the
commercial sector which includes improving the way we do business. FAR
Part 12 allows for streamlined contracting procedures with regards to
soliciting, response times, and contract terms and conditions. By
developing and implementing best practices using existing tools and
authorities under FAR Part 12 the Department can maximize efficiency,
reduce timelines, and minimize the burden and administrative cost to
both Government and industry. If confirmed, I will work to review the
previously submitted recommendations and initiatives to reduce
timelines; determine if there are any additional recommendations that
would improve our processes for commercial acquisitions; and identify
what changes, if any, are necessary. Additionally, I will continue
efforts to educate the acquisition workforce on strategies and
techniques that help streamline the acquisition process.
30. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, how will you engage with
industry stakeholders, including contractors and suppliers, to gather
input and feedback on proposed reforms to FAR Part 12?
Ms. Abercrombie. Any reforms needed to FAR Part 12 will require
feedback not only from the Department's acquisition workforce, but also
from industry stakeholders. To ensure synergy between the Department
and industry stakeholders we must have meaningful discussions about any
improvements needed to FAR Part 12. If confirmed, I will to engage and
encourage engagements across the DOD enterprise with industry to
support transparency in sharing information and solicit feedback.
31. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, how will you consider impacts
on small businesses and encourage innovation in defense acquisition?
Ms. Abercrombie. I believe small businesses and non-traditional
businesses are essential to promoting competition and fostering
innovation in the defense sector. Earlier this year the Department
released its Small Business Strategy that outlines a Department-wide
approach to increasing opportunities for small businesses through
establishing a unified management approach to small business programs
and activities, reducing barriers to entry, long-term planning for
small business programs and increasing engagement and support of small
businesses. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in the DOD
Office of Small Business Programs and others across the Department and
stakeholders outside the Department to ensure that the acquisition
community strongly supports the needs of small and non-traditional
businesses.
anti-tank guided missile shortfalls
32. Senator Ernst. Ms. Abercrombie, with current production lines
stressed, and growing demands for munitions, what do you think DOD can
do to help open the aperture to look at additional munitions or
manufacturers to meet shortfalls and, in the process, attract more
companies to manufacture in the United States?
Ms. Abercrombie. The National Defense Strategy emphasizes the
importance of a robust defense ecosystem of manufacturers--including
large and small businesses, non-traditional suppliers, and
opportunities to ``friend-shore'' production where appropriate. The DOD
recognizes that a diverse industrial base is necessary to ensure
resiliency. For example, I saw that in late September, the
Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization office
announced the establishment of the Munitions Campus pilot program.
Partnerships such as these, between public and private sectors, can act
as a force multiplier when it comes to buying down risk and finding
insertion points for new technology. If confirmed, I look forward to
engaging with my colleagues within OSD Acquisition and Sustainment and
in other agencies to make sure we are using every lever available to
attract new entrants to the defense ecosystem.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
acquisition
33. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, over the past decade, DOD
has brought new companies into the sector. Most of these companies are
stuck in what is called the ``valley of death''. They receive small
research or prototyping contracts for $1 million or less, and often are
successful, but never scale up into production. Do you believe DOD
spreads dollars too thinly across companies seeking to enter the
defense business?
Ms. Abercrombie. Prototyping agreements are an important mechanism
for the Department to do business with small businesses including new
entrants to the defense marketplace and commercial companies. I also
understand that helping small businesses cross the ``valley of death,''
between prototyping agreements and production contracts is a major
priority for the Department. If confirmed, I would work with the DOD
Office of Small Business Programs to identify ways the acquisition
community could help tackle this issue and support leveraging any
programs that can help small businesses become prime contractors to the
Department.
34. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, should DOD be ``picking
winners'' based on execution of small contracts and, for expendable
items like munitions, re-competing the projects yearly?
Ms. Abercrombie. In my view, the Department should continue taking
steps to build resilience in the Defense Industrial Base, including by
encouraging the entry of non-traditional suppliers, as well as by
sending a consistent demand signal of intent to procure predictable
amounts of munitions over time. If confirmed, I would work with
colleagues across A&S and the Services to do so.
35. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, RAND and other research
institutions have previously conducted studies focused on barriers
faced by nontraditional DOD suppliers. Some of these barriers include
lack of access to and communication from DOD, DOD's complex and
inefficient bid and selection process, the extra work and delays
entailed in DOD's administration and management of contracts, and the
lengthy funding time line and delays in final payments. Do you agree
that these barriers exist?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will review the studies from RAND
and other research institutions that have highlighted these barriers,
and I will work with colleagues in A&S and other key stakeholders
within the Department to pursue actions that will reduce the barriers
for nontraditional suppliers. In addition, I will seek opportunities
and assess expanding use of flexible contracting authorities to access
capabilities from nontraditional sources.
36. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, if confirmed, what
initiatives will you led to help nontraditional DOD suppliers overcome
these previously mentioned barriers?
Ms. Abercrombie. I understand the Department has instituted several
initiatives over the last several years to assist nontraditional
suppliers, such as Other Transaction Authority as a means of employing
new business models. If confirmed, I will work closely with key
stakeholders to assess the sufficiency of current actionable strategies
to reduce these barriers.
foreign military sales
37. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, foreign partners--especially
those facing the most serious security threats--are often prepared to
assume more operational risk than America's own Armed Forces. Whether
in technology release or sale of non-programs of record, how should the
Department account for this difference in risk tolerance levels?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and other stakeholders in the
Department's FMS process to address discrepancies in risk tolerance
levels.
38. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, would you support a
requirement to develop alongside a standard FMS acquisition path a
second ``fastest acquisition path'' that takes into account urgency,
risk mitigation, and input form the foreign customer concerning its
risk tolerance?
Ms. Abercrombie. As Deputy Assistant to the President and
Coordinator for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National
Security Council, and as former Acting Deputy Director of the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, I understand well the challenges facing
the acquisition community in executing FMS cases in a timely manner. If
confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Department to identify
ways that the acquisition community can improve FMS execution.
39. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, valuable time is lost on FMS
cases in the time between final letter of acceptance (LOA) and getting
on contract due to DOD prohibitions on multiple modifications on a
contract in a year. For this reason, an approved sale must sometimes
wait another year from the last modification to get on contract.
Meantime, over the year of waiting, the price may have changed enough
to require the LOA process to begin again, adding more time. In some
cases, it may change in size and scope enough to require a new
congressional notification, adding more time still. Will you work with
me to identify the legal authority for prohibiting more than one
contract modification per year and if there is none, making clear this
is the case?
Ms. Abercrombie. I am not aware of any constraints on the number of
contract modifications set out in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) or Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS). I think the issue you are
referencing is related to the timelines specified in contracts to
exercise options or place orders. Aligning FMS sales with these dates
allows for efficiencies within the process. These timelines are defined
in each contract and should be clearly known by those developing the
FMS requirements. The Department recently conducted an extensive review
of FMS processes, policies, and practices, through an FMS Tiger Team.
If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders across the Department, and
with Congress to identify and implement potential improvements to the
system, to include identifying key pressure points to help speed up the
acquisition process.
40. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, if there is no law,
regulation, or policy that prohibits multiple contract modifications
per year, what do you think Congress could do to give contract officers
reassurance that it is permitted?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will work with Defense Pricing and
Contracting to understand the extent to which Contracting Officers are
already empowered in law, regulation, and policy to make acquisition
decisions to include issuing multiple contract modifications, when
necessary, on a specific contract.
41. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, in your opinion, are there
practical or financial reasons for prohibiting more than one contract
modification per year?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will work to remove any barriers
that introduce unnecessary delays to the FMS contracting process. I am
not aware of any such prohibition, and I presume this is a matter of
practice, practicality, and efficiency on the part of both government
and industry to minimize the administrative burden and cost of
executing modifications to existing contracts.
42. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, will you work with me to
identify legislative fixes to address other delays in getting approved
FMS cases on contract?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to
identify potential improvements to the FMS process that may be
addressed with changes to the law.
43. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, the FMS pipeline is filled
with $19 billion in arms contracted by Taiwan and scheduled for
delivery. In the meantime, deliveries of similar systems are being made
to other foreign customers. Will you explore options for adjusting
production and delivery schedules in ways that puts Taiwan ahead of all
others--except Ukraine and Israel?
Ms. Abercrombie. I am aware that DOD is working with the defense
industrial base to examine options to increase support to our allies
and partners with the most acute national defense needs. If confirmed,
I commit to reviewing our security cooperation with Taiwan to assess
what policies or processes may need adjustment to prioritize capability
delivery as necessary.
44. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Abercrombie, will you explore ways that,
with appropriate levels of funding, the Department could facilitate the
retooling of production lines to get Taiwan weapons faster?
Ms. Abercrombie. As Deputy Assistant to the President and
Coordinator for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National
Security Council, and as former Acting Deputy Director of the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, I understand the challenges facing the
acquisition community in executing FMS cases in a timely manner. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on leveraging
existing authorities to accelerate FMS weapons production for priority
partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
acquisition
45. Senator Budd. Ms. Abercrombie, more than any other time in
history, it is essential that our warfighters acquire state-of-the-art
and innovative commercial technologies to outpace our adversaries as
they acquire and deploy new technologies. If confirmed, how will you
approach this issue and ensure emerging capabilities are quickly
transitioned and scaled for DOD use?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will work to buildupon DOD actions
to date to overcome technology transition barriers, both from the
military labs and the commercial sector. I understand OUSD (A&S) has
recently created multiple Competitive Advantage Pathfinders designed to
identify processes that can be scaled to overcome typical transition
barriers and accelerate critical capabilities into fielding. A&S is a
key member of the Joint Fires Network transition team and is
documenting lessons learned and best practices through the fielding of
this capability. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that lessons are
shared and incorporated into future acquisition strategies to meet the
evolving demands of the warfighter and stay ahead of our peer
competitors.
46. Senator Budd. Ms. Abercrombie, in your written testimony, you
State that your top priorities are ``increasing the speed of
acquisition; reducing barriers to attract non-traditional suppliers;
and workforce development.'' How do you plan to increase the speed of
acquisition and what reforms to the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement would you recommend, if any? Please explain.
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will assess whether the
acquisition workforce is fully leveraging the flexible pathways
available in the adaptive acquisition framework to maximize speed and
seek to apply lessons learned where this has been successful.
Additionally, I will work to identify and remove areas of unnecessary
bureaucracy in the DFARS and to implement initiatives to speed up the
acquisition process.
critical munitions
47. Senator Budd. Ms. Abercrombie, if confirmed, do you commit to
conducting a comprehensive review of critical munition acquisition
programs within 60 days of confirmation, including, but not limited to,
SM-6, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Long Range Anti-
Ship Missile (LRASM), Naval Strike Missile, Tomahawk, and torpedoes,
and to provide the Committee on Armed Services with a briefing on your
findings as well as the resources and authorities necessary to meet our
defense requirements and international commitments, including, but not
limited to, maximizing existing production lines and/or increasing
productions lines of those critical munitions?
Ms. Abercrombie. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Secretary of
Defense is provided timely analysis of acquisition programming and
resourcing, including that of critical munitions, for U.S. and allied
defense requirements in connection with preparation and presentation of
the President's Budget Request and I commit to ensuring the Committee
is apprised of the latest analysis underpinning the President's
Request.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
fair and open competition for cybersecurity contracts
48. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, the Committee is concerned
about fair and open competition generally and specifically in
cyberspace. Because of that concern the Committee adopted section 143
of the Senate's NDAA (S. 2226) requiring a report on the decision to
exercise the option on an existing contract from a single vendor. Our
concern is that a sole source contract when there are multiple vendors
available might reduce the effectiveness of our cybersecurity
capabilities. If you are confirmed, will you work with the Chief
Information Officer in the Department to ensure that the Committee
along with the other congressional Defense Committees receive requested
information and briefings in this section?
Ms. Abercrombie. Yes, if confirmed, I will work closely with the
CIO and look forward to briefing or providing any requested information
by this Committee and any other congressional Defense Committees.
harpoon foreign military sales to taiwan
49. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, it is our understanding that
it took the Navy from 2021 to April 2023 to get the Taiwan Harpoon
Coastal Defense System on contract. For a matter that is urgent from a
national security perspective, what is the Navy doing to help expedite
processes such as this going forward?
Ms. Abercrombie. I am not aware of all of the details of the
contracting for the Taiwan Harpoon Coastal Defense System, but if
confirmed, I commit to working with Navy on this critical matter. I
also commit to working to streamline and accelerate the foreign
military sales acquisition process, working with industry and
stakeholders across the Department.
harpoon and standoff land attack missile-expanded response sale to
taiwan
50. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, in addition to the Harpoon
Coastal Defense System, there are two additional Taiwan Foreign
Military Sales cases for Harpoon and Standoff Land Attack Missile-
Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), a total of 195 cruise missiles, that have
been approved by Congress and have signed Letters of Request, yet the
Navy has still not awarded a contract for these urgently needed
missiles to ensure that they can be delivered as soon as possible. What
actions are you taking to expedite this process to ensure that these
assets can be quickly delivered to Taiwan?
Ms. Abercrombie. I recognize the critical importance to timely
deliveries of these assets. It is my understanding, these LORs were
signed in December 2022, and the Navy is pursuing an Undefinitized
Contract Action, or other accelerated contracting initiatives to
expeditiously award the contract for these missiles. If confirmed, I
will work with the Navy to ensure that Taiwan F-16 aircraft will be
ready to operate these missiles upon delivery.
future harpoons sales to taiwan
51. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, I understand that the
Taiwanese have also expressed an interest in an additional 100 Harpoon
coastal defense cruise missiles. Will you ensure the Navy pursues the
fastest possible path to get these missiles approved for FMS, on
contract, and delivered to Taiwan?
Ms. Abercrombie. Yes, if confirmed, I will remain committed to
ensuring the fastest path to additional Harpoon capability in Taiwan.
52. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, is the fastest path for
Taiwan to acquire Harpoons a new FMS case or an amendment to the 2020
FMS case?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding the decision regarding
whether to Amend the 2020 Case or issue a new FMS case is ultimately
Taiwan's decision. However, if confirmed, I would recommend amending
the 2020 FMS Case to minimize administrative lead times.
f/a-18 procurement schedule
53. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, considering the Navy's
significant strike fighter shortfall, I am concerned the Navy has yet
to contract for the 20 additional F/A-18 Super Hornets that Congress
appropriated for in fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Given this ongoing
delay, do you assess that the Navy will still be able to procure the
full complement of 20 F/A-18s with the funding that Congress
appropriated?
Ms. Abercrombie. It is my understanding that the Navy intends to
procure 20 aircraft; however, until negotiations are complete, it is
premature to speculate whether the Navy will be able to procure the
full complement of 20 F/A-18s with the funding that Congress
appropriated. If confirmed, I will work with the Navy to ensure I am
fully informed on the program.
f/a-18 intellectual property concerns
54. Senator Schmitt. Ms. Abercrombie, what is the impetus for the
Navy's change in technical data requirements for this particular round
of F/A-18 procurement considering the Navy's long history of procuring
F/A-18s?
Ms. Abercrombie. I have not previously been involved in this matter
and am not aware of the details for what I suspect is a complex issue.
If confirmed I look forward to the opportunity to understand these
issues more thoroughly and to take appropriate action to ensure the
Department can meet its sustainment, support, and readiness objectives
for this weapon system.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Cara L. Abercrombie
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Cara L. Abercrombie, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Cara L.
Abercrombie in connection with her nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Ms. Cara L. Abercrombie was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Reed on February 8, 2024, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 27, 2024.]
[all]