

THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL
GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF TO BE GENERAL
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN
COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND LIEUTEN-
ANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF
TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2023

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CONTENTS

JULY 26, 2023

	Page
THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/ COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND LIEU- TENANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF TO BE GENERAL AND COM- MANDER, UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND	1
MEMBERS STATEMENTS	
Reed, Senator Jack	1
Wicker, Senator Roger F.	3
WITNESS STATEMENTS	
Guillot, Lieutenant General Gregory M., USAF, to be General and Com- mander, United States Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command	4
Advance Policy Questions	42
Questions for the Record	62
Nomination Reference and Report	71
Biographical Sketch	73
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire	75
Signature Page	80
Whiting, Lieutenant General Stephen N., USSF, to be General and Com- mander, United States Space Command	5
Advance Policy Questions	80
Questions for the Record	102
Nomination Reference and Report	114
Biographical Sketch	115
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire	117
Signature Page	121

This hearing is printed to include all available information
requested or required to be inserted for the record.

THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND

WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2023

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, and Schmitt

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. Good morning. The Committee meets to consider the nomination of Lieutenant General Gregory—Gregory Guillot to be Commander of U.S. Northern Command, and Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting to be Commander of U.S. Space Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your decades of service to the Nation and congratulations.

General Guillot, I would like to welcome your wife, Caroline, daughter, Elizabeth, and son, who I know is proudly watching his father. General Whining, I would like to welcome your wife, Tammy, and daughter, Allie, and the loved ones that are here today supporting your efforts.

I think you have got your son, parents, and in-laws who are probably watching from afar, and also commend him. We thank you and your family for their continued support, because I think we all recognize no one serves alone, and their efforts and your efforts have brought us to this day.

I would also like to note that you are both graduate of the Air Force Academy class of 1989, and despite that, we are holding this hearing, and I am sure many of you classmates are cheering you on from afar.

I will at this point asked that the remainder of my statement be included in the record and yield to Senator Wicker for his opening remarks. We have started early, and we start the floor procedure at about 10 a.m., so we want to explode as much as we can. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Senator Wicker.

[The prepared statement of Senator Jack Reed follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JACK REED

Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the nominations of Lieutenant General Gregory Guillot to be Commander of U.S. Northern Command, and Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting to be Commander of U.S. Space Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your decades of service to the Nation, and congratulations.

General Guillot, I would like to welcome your wife, Caroline; daughter, Elizabeth; and son, Mark, who I know is proudly watching. General Whiting, I would like to welcome your wife, Tammy; daughter, Ally; and loved ones here today, as well as your son, parents, and in-laws who are proudly watching. We thank your families for their continued support of your service. I would also note that you are both graduates of the Air Force Academy class of 1989, and I am sure many of your classmates are cheering you on from afar.

General Guillot, you are well qualified to serve as NORTHCOM Commander. You currently serve as Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command, with extensive command, staff, and instructing experience throughout the Air Force and across the globe.

U.S. Northern Command is key to our national security, as the principal command for protecting the American homeland. Indeed, the first of the four priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy is, "Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the People's Republic of China." As we consider threats from China and other competitors, our very concept of homeland defense must evolve. General, if confirmed, you will be responsible leading NORTHCOM's efforts to transform its abilities and approach to homeland defense for the 21st century. I would like to know your thoughts for how NORTHCOM can evolve to accomplish this mission.

The urgency of this mission was made clear earlier this year with the shootdowns of a Chinese surveillance balloon and three other unidentified aerial phenomena in our airspace. These events raised concerns that NORTHCOM and NORAD may have an awareness gap that needs to be resolved. America's skies and seas must be secure to protect our citizens, and the Department must pursue technologies that provide forward detection to buy decision time for decisionmakers. General Guillot, I would be interested in your assessment of these potential awareness gaps, and whether you think additional tools or resources are needed to overcome them.

Regionally, NORTHCOM also provides support to the U.S. law enforcement mission by helping to counter cartels engaged in drug smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering across the southwest border. The committee would appreciate your views on how the Department can better accomplish this mission, including through building the capabilities of partner security forces in Mexico and the Bahamas.

General Whiting, your nomination to serve as Commander of SPACECOM is welcome. You currently serve as the director of Space Operations Command—a critical Space Force organization that generates and sustains much of the service's space, cyber, and intelligence capabilities. This command experience, in addition to your expertise as a space operations officer, will serve you well.

If confirmed, you will be responsible for all military activities in a domain that is 100 kilometers above sea level. Space is inherently a complicated and dangerous domain, but it is made more so by our competition with China and Russia. These nations are increasingly aggressive toward our and our allies' space assets, and their methods of competition are quickly evolving. General, I would like to know how you would prepare SPACECOM for global offensive and defensive space operations in a contested environment, while providing support to other combatant commands.

As part of that effort, SPACECOM is responsible for integrating our space-, air-, and ground-based sensors to achieve better space domain awareness, missile defense warning and capabilities, and command and control. The Department of Defense recently transferred the global missile defense mission from Strategic Command to Space Command, and you will be responsible for integrating the Nation's fire control network with our interceptors around the world. While NORTHCOM

maintains responsibility for protecting the homeland from missile threats, your command will encompass the regions where our forces are deployed.

Finally, General, I would like to know how you plan to integrate our allies, partners, and commercial space companies so that we can successfully prevail in any conflict in space or on earth. Indeed, SPACECOM is the key enabler for supporting every other combatant command to execute their missions, whether in air, land, sea, or cyberspace.

Thank you, again, gentlemen, for your willingness to serve our Nation. I look forward to your testimonies.

Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, welcome these witnesses and their families and friends. We look forward to an excellent question and answer session today, and as the Chair has indicated, we have much to do on the floor, and so I will ask that my statement be included in its entirety in the record at this point.

Chairman REED. Well, let me first recognize General Guillot for your opening statement, and then General Whiting. General Guillot, please. Could you turn your microphone around, please, General, and bring it as close as possible.

[The prepared statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lt. General Guillot and Lt. General Whiting (WHYding), I want to say congratulations to you both. You have been tapped to lead two of the most consequential commands in our national defense.

Lieutenant General Guillot, you have been nominated to be the next commander of U.S. Northern Command. I appreciate your wife, Caroline, and your daughter, Elizabeth, for being here.

Lieutenant General Whiting, you have been nominated to be the next commander of U.S. Space Command. I appreciate your wife, Tammy, your daughter, Ally, and your friends for being here, and I also welcome your loved ones watching remotely today. From one Mississippian to another, let me say this: You bring honor to our country and to all Mississippians through your devoted service.

Your nominations come before this Committee at an important moment. Senior military and defense personnel continually tell this Committee that we are in the most dangerous national security moment since World War II.

The dual military competitions with the Chinese Communist Party and Russian Federation highlight our relative unpreparedness. Our adversaries are seizing the advantage wherever possible.

We are all familiar with a recent example of this trend. This year, a Chinese surveillance balloon breached our airspace and traversed the entire continental United States uncontested. Testimony and investigations revealed that improved radar capabilities and updated authorization protocol could have helped prevent the spy balloon situation, and despite our repeated inquiries, there are several unanswered questions that I and other members of this Committee have about this event.

General Guillot, if you are confirmed, I hope I can count on your unreserved professional military advice as you work with Congress to deliver a full accounting of this event to the American people.

The Chinese spy craft is only one example of the grave threats NORTHCOM faces when it comes to national sovereignty and security. Mexico's criminal cartels have exploited our poorly protected southern border, driving unprecedented human-and drug-trafficking.

The administration has done remarkably little to address the fentanyl crisis. The counter-cartel effort is under-resourced and poorly coordinated. In fact, the president is wasting taxpayer money letting clear border initiatives languish. He has banned border wall construction, and the Department of Defense is still paying to store border wall construction materials rather than deploying those materials to extend the wall and secure our border.

The crisis will only worsen without a more focused response. General Guillot, I would appreciate any insights you are able to provide for how NORTHCOM can help Congress secure our southern border.

General Whiting, if you are confirmed, you will face threats in space that are also alarming. China is working overtime to become a “great space power.” Beijing continues to test and build an arsenal of anti-satellite capabilities that could seriously degrade U.S. warfighting capabilities. One official even said it was plausible that China could, quote, “catch up and surpass us.”

General Whiting, I am interested in your assessment of Chinese space capabilities and your vision for how we compete with Beijing in that domain. I also look forward to your thoughts on Space Command’s role in protecting American commercial interests in space.

I thank you both for your time, and I look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/ COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.

I am deeply honored to be nominated to serve as the Commander of the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, and testify next to my Air Force Academy classmate, Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting.

I would like to begin by thanking President Biden, Secretary Austin, and Chairman Milley for their trust and confidence, and I am grateful to the Committee and leadership for their endorsement of my nomination as well. I would also like to thank General Glenn VanHerck and his wife Marilyn for their tremendous 36 years of service and example.

I would not be here without the constant support of my family. Caroline, my incredible wife of 34 years, and our daughter Elizabeth, a cyber-policy professional, are here with me today. Our son, Mark, can’t be here as he is pursuing a bachelors in nursing and he better be in class right now.

Caroline has held our family together through countless deployments and 20 moves and developed our children into outstanding young adults. All three are not only supportive of me and those with whom I serve and their families, but also strongly support our mission.

For the last 34 years, I have served alongside extraordinary Americans, allies, and partners across the globe. During that time, I have been fortunate to learn from the finest leaders, mentors, noncommissioned officers, and troops in the world. I would also like to thank and acknowledge the most influential mentors I have had, my parents, Reb, a career Air Force officer and Vietnam veteran, and Susan, who handled the challenges of military family life with strength and humor.

Also shaping me have been my operational experience and leadership assignments in three different combatant Commands, including Commanding all joint and coalition air power in the Middle East.

If confirmed, I will humbly bring the benefit of these experiences, gained in combat and in peace to appropriately, energetically, and decisively lead the women and men of NORAD and NORTHCOM in the defense of our great homeland. The United States, Canada, and our allies and partners must address an extraordinarily complicated and quickly changing strategic environment.

Competitors can hold North America at risk in multiple domains and are increasing both their capability and capacity to strike the homeland at a rate far exceeding the pace seen just a few years ago.

While NORAD and NORTHCOM are distinct Commands, they share complementary missions that are more vital today than ever. The success of both Commands in defending the homeland is only possible with strong interagency collaboration, as well as close alliances and partnerships.

If confirmed, I will remain committed to expanding those already strong relationships in order to ensure the Command's constant readiness to deter aggression and defend our Nation. I will also commit to establishing and maintaining partnerships with the National Guard Bureau, State interagency partners to conduct NORTHCOM's vital defense support of civil authorities role during catastrophic disasters and other periods of national need.

Likewise, if confirmed, I will be a strong advocate for ongoing NORAD and NORTHCOM efforts to improve domain awareness and global integration of operations, plans, and data. Our competitors' advanced long range weapons systems and delivery platforms pose challenges from within and even well beyond NORAD and NORTHCOM operational boundaries.

Therefore, it will be important that I work closely with other Combatant Commanders to deliver an integrated, layered, and seamless defense of our homeland. Finally, if confirmed, I assure this Committee that I will always provide my candid assessment and my best military judgment regarding NORAD and NORTHCOM missions.

Homeland defense is fundamental mission of the Department of Defense (DOD), and I can think of no greater honor than being nominated to lead the Commands responsible for that vital mission. Thank you for your support of the United States Armed Forces and for the honor of appearing before this Committee. I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General. General Whiting, please.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING,
USSF, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
SPACE COMMAND**

Lieutenant General WHITING. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee and the American people today. I am humbled to be the president's nominee to Command United States Space Command.

I am grateful to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their confidence and support, and I am pleased to testify beside my U.S. Air Force Academy classmate and friend, Lieutenant General Greg Guillot.

I also want to thank the current Commander of U.S. Space Command, General Jim Dickinson, and his wife, Angie, for their leadership of the Command over the past 3 years, and their personal friendship to Tammy and I. I am proud to have my family and some dear friends here with me today.

First and foremost, my wife of 34 years. Tammy has been my best friend and greatest strength during 19 moves. She is an incredible wife, mom, friend, entrepreneur, and business owner. We also have our daughter Allie in attendance. She finished her master's degree last summer and is now a tech writer for a Silicon Valley software company, but living in Nashville, Tennessee. Supporting us in spirit are our son, Chase, and his wife, Olivia.

Chase is a youth minister, also living in Nashville, and his terrific wife, Olivia, is a first grade public schoolteacher there in the Nashville schools. Chase had previously committed to accompanying the members of his youth group to support a church overseas, and he is appropriately taking care of those kids and ensuring they get back to the United States safely. Tammy and I are immensely proud of our children and the role they have played in our military career.

Joining us virtually are my parents, Larry and Helen Whiting. My dad was also a career Air Force officer and Vietnam veteran, and my mom is a retired public schoolteacher from Mississippi. My in-laws, Ken and John Pressler, are also joining us virtually. Tammy's dad is also a retired Air Force officer, and Tammy's mom is simply the glue who holds our family together.

Both sets of our parents have established legacies of service to and love of our country that Tammy and I try to live up to every day. Finally, we have five dear friends with us today, here with us today, who have adopted us along the way, David and Carmen Bell, Steve Watkins, and Missy and Levi Bonous.

No doubt our military career has been undergirded by the strength and support of our family and friends and thank you for allowing me to acknowledge them. Today, international space competition has become increasingly complex.

China and Russia are rapidly fielding counterspace capabilities to disrupt our access to space, and China is swiftly making its own military forces space enabled. These strategic competitors' irresponsible actions and assertive posturing have transformed space into a contested domain.

All the while, space continues to become more congested as more and more actors, including commercial industry, are launching an increasing number of satellites to leverage the advantages space provides. The increasing complexity of our strategic competition in space has resulted in real threats to national space power and the critical infrastructure which supports it.

U.S. Space Command's purpose is to protect U.S. interest by preserving freedom of action in space and providing critical support to the rest of the Joint Force, our allies, all while protecting the Joint Force and allied militaries from space enabled attack.

To say that more plainly, it is the moral responsibility of United States Space Command to ensure that the Joint Force, the Nation, and our allies have access to the space capabilities they have become dependent on over the decades, and that they must have through all phases of conflict to be successful.

If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. Space Command provides a formidable deterrent against potential adversary aggression, while collaborating with the Joint Force, our allies, and partners. I will ensure the Command is prepared to win in conflict through the em-

ployment of military space power and integrated trans-regional missile defense capabilities.

I will assure the Command is postured to gain and maintain space superiority, to assure freedom of action in space, and to protect the Joint Force and our allies from the space capabilities of potential adversaries.

The source of strength of any military formation is our people. Our joint space warfighters are the best in the world because of their expertise, dedication, and collective innovation.

Leadership of America's military sons and daughters is a most sacred trust. If confirmed, it will be my distinct honor and solemn duty to lead the 18,000 patriots of U.S. Space Command. Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you, General. Gentlemen, I have a series of questions that are asked of all nominees. You may respond appropriately together. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Chairman.

Chairman REED. Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. No, Chairman.

Lieutenant General WHITING. No.

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress, receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this Committee when requested?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Chairman.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Chairman REED. Do you agree, when asked before this Committee, to give you a personal view, even if your views differ from the Administration?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, sir.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such records?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Chairman.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established by this Committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefings in response to congressional requests?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for the testimony or briefings?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Chairman.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes.

Chairman REED. Thank you, gentlemen. General Guillot, you have talked about the evolving threats that are facing the Homeland. Could you give us an idea what are those most significant threats you see right now?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Chairman. The most significant threat that the Homeland faces is no longer from a single capability or a single nation, but it is the compilation of multiple actors that can threaten the homeland from multiple avenues of approach and across all domains.

So, the combination of all of those simultaneously is the biggest threat that we face now, whereas in the past it may have been a single weapon system or a single actor that presented that threat.

Chairman REED. Do you think we are appropriately postured to deal with these threats?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Chairman, I do. However, our adversaries are growing at a very fast rate, and we need to do—across the whole-of-Government, all of our effort must be to keeping pace with the rate of change of our adversary.

Chairman REED. Do you have any specific changes in mind? If confirmed, what you would like to do, say, your first 180 days?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will largely follow the outstanding course that has been set by General VanHerck, focusing on defending the Homeland, and in the first few days, as you mentioned, my goal is to make sure that there are no gaps in the transition of authorities that the Commander must take to defend the Homeland.

I would also like to strengthen the network. Everything that we do in NORAD, in NORTHCOM requires partnership, and I would like to strengthen the networks with other Combatant Commanders, the services, the National Guard, the interagency, international partners, and, of course, Congress to make sure that all those relationships are set now in steady State so we can easily enact those in times of crisis.

Then I will conduct a 90 day assessment of our people, our mission, and our resourcing to ensure that we are set for the changing environment that we see ahead.

Chairman REED. Thank you. General Whiting, what is your assessment of the threats to the United States and allied space assets by Russia and China over the next 5 years? What must we do to counter those threats?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Thank you for that question, Chairman. Certainly, we have seen a rapid increase, particularly from China, as they have built counterspace capabilities after really studying the United States and how we leveraged space for military advantage.

So, they have sought to build a series of capabilities from non-destructive to destructive to hold at risk those space capabilities. We have seen Russia do that to a lesser degree as well.

Mr. Chairman, it is our responsibility across the National Security space enterprise, but certainly, if confirmed at U.S. Space Command, to make sure that we can operate in the face of those threats that we now see to continue to support the rest of the Joint Force with the space capabilities that they have become dependent upon.

Chairman REED. Thank you. We are developing the technologies, and one of the keys is continuous encrypted communication. Can you give us a sense of where do you think we are in that process?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, sir. It is vital that we have the capability to encrypt ourselves with encryption that will last over decades as we field military space systems that last for a long time. We want to make sure that that encryption does not become compromised by other countries, potentially.

So, it is a very important partnership, Mr. Chairman, that we have with the National Security Agency, and if confirmed, I would ensure that we continue to work requirements that laid into those requirements sets, that requirement, so that we don't end up in a position where another country could compromise our communications.

Chairman REED. Thank you. General Guillot, the issue of fentanyl of crossing the Mexican border is one that is a serious crisis in the United States today. You are already, your Command is in communication and cooperation with Mexican authorities, the Mexican army and navy. How do you believe you can leverage those military forces to be more effective in disrupting this trade in fentanyl?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Chairman, the drug threat that you mentioned is acute. It is significant and it is serious, and NORTHCOM's role is as part of a whole of Government effort, NORTHCOM provides direct support to the lead law enforcement agency to attack these networks.

If I am confirmed, due to the importance of this mission, as soon as possible, after the change of Command, I will go down to the Southern border and meet with all of not only the U.S. military that are in support of the lead law enforcement agencies, but also with the interagency, the intel community, and the Mexican military partners that we have.

During that time, I will make an effort to gain a greater operational understanding, and then I will draw an assessment on how we can optimize our support to get after this very serious problem.

Chairman REED. Thank you. Thank you both, gentlemen. Senator Wicker, please.

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. General Guillot, I was going to ask the very question that our chairman just asked about the fentanyl crisis. I view it as a very serious matter, and so please understand from the chair and the ranking Member, where we rank that issue.

Let me ask you, you mentioned domain awareness in your opening statement. We are not where we need to be in domain awareness, are we?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I agree. Although the steps through the Government, Congress's funding, and industry, we are making strides in that direction, the fact that the adver-

saries we face can attack us from distances further away, at speeds, altitudes, with maneuverability, and low cross radar cross-sections that we hadn't seen in the past, it is a constant fight to have the domain awareness, the ability to detect these threats, and it takes our constant and improving effort because after all, we can't defeat what we can't see.

Senator WICKER. You know, it seems to me that the balloon fiasco that occurred several months ago is an example of this. I have a question here which I want to read word for word. Do you commit to sharing information with this Committee, even when it is contrary to the Administration communications objectives?

I ask that question because we on this side have asked some specific questions in writing of the Administration and have not gotten all of the answers we needed, and during a visit to Beijing in June, Secretary of State Blinken said publicly that the Chinese balloon matter is a chapter that should be closed.

If Members of the Congress believe their questions to be answered, you do commit to answering those questions regardless of the views of the Administration, do you not?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator, I absolutely do.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, and let me ask you, I was glad to hear that you and General Whiting were classmates at the academy. Is that correct?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator. Although I think he graduated much higher in the order of merit than I.

Senator WICKER. I was going to ask about. Did you find that his excellent high school education at Ocean Springs High School in Mississippi gave him a leg up over most of the other—?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I have no doubt that was the springboard.

[Laughter.]

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. I think you are well on your way to confirmation. General Whiting, we are—you are going to be giving up some of your more commercial duties from your predecessor and moving them over to the Department of Commerce as far as space situational awareness. Tell us about that, and I understand you think that is a good idea and that Congress made the correct move there.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Ranking Member, thank you for that question. It is a really important issue. Today, the Space Force provides space situational awareness to the entire—the entire world, really. But we do that for nonmilitary purposes. But under your leadership and the actions of Congress, that civil portion of that responsibility is now transferring to the Department of Commerce.

They are very willing partners in that, and we are working a plan with them that over the next couple of years, they will take on that nonmilitary responsibility, and that will free up capacity inside of our military formations to focus on the military unique responsibilities that we have.

So, we really appreciate that leadership from the Congress and the work of the Department of Commerce to take that on.

Senator WICKER. Okay. Now, I want to ask a question that will require a relatively brief answer, but then I will ask you to supple-

ment it on the record. Let's war game, in what we can do publicly, let's say that the Communist Party of China under Xi Jinping decides to invade their neighbor Taiwan. There will be a battle in space almost immediately, is that correct?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, I agree. We think the opening shots of such a war could happen in space or cyber.

Senator WICKER. Okay. What I would like for you to do, and I know you only got 38 seconds to speak, but if you could sort of give us an overview briefly and then supplement your answer on the record, sir.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, sir. Because the People's Republic of China has studied how we use space, we do expect that they would try to inhibit our ability to use space the way we would prefer to across the Joint Force, and, Senator, if it is good with you, I will take you up on your offer and provide additional details.

Senator WICKER. Absolutely. Because it is quite complex and requires more than 5 minutes even. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen, please.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Congratulations to both of you and your families. Thank you for your willingness to continue to serve this country. Senator Wicker raised the move of the Office of Space Commerce to the Department of Commerce, General Whiting.

As a Member of the Appropriations Committee, I remember there was some controversy at the time about that decision and a question about whether that was actually going to work.

Can you tell us how that is working at this point? I understand that there—we will have a shortfall in terms of the funding that we were planning to give to them to continue the integration. So where are we in that process and what do we still need to do?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, thank you for that question. I am not aware of the specific funding—exactly where they are in their funding in Department of Commerce, but I can say that they are an absolutely eager and willing partner.

We have multiple engagements from senior leadership down to their tactical level where they have been out to our operating locations where we conduct this mission. They have seen how we do business, and they are partnering with us on their plans for how they move forward. But, ma'am, I am just not familiar with exactly where they are in their funding profile.

Senator SHAHEEN. You—the Space Command, however, has also created a new commercial integration office to help coordinate commercial space capabilities, is that correct?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Ma'am, that is correct.

Senator SHAHEEN. So how do you see that office working with the office in the Department of Commerce?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, ma'am. Inside U.S. Space Command, that office, Senator, is figuring out ways that U.S. Space Command can take advantage of the incredible capability that U.S. space industry brings us.

That will be focused on military unique aspects of, obviously, our mission. Department of Commerce will be focused on nonmilitary

aspects, but I think there will be a chance to partner together so that, for example, the U.S. Government isn't paying twice for commercial space situational awareness data that may be useful to both of us.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Well, as you point out, commercial space is playing a greater role in what is happening with our military. We have seen in Russia's war against Ukraine the role of Starlink and how they are operating their operation—military operations. Can you talk about how you see an attack on those commercial operations? How we should view that—is that—should we consider that an act of war if we see that happening? How—where are we in the thinking about how we look at the commercial space operations in connection with what we say about our military space operations.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, that is a topic, obviously, that we are focused on very, very keenly. Inside the unified Command plan, where the President gives tasks to each of the Combatant Commanders, there is a task to United States Space Command to defend commercial space capabilities, if directed.

So, we understand that importance and have put that hook into that mission. I think moving forward, as you said, ma'am, with the Russia, Ukraine, we have only seen the growing importance of commercial space capability.

So, we must continue to partner with those companies so that they look to build resilience into their systems, and then partner with them, that if we do need to actively defend them, we have the communication avenues open to be able to do so.

Senator SHAHEEN. Have we actually defined what an attack on commercial operations would mean?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Ma'am, I think ultimately that would be a policy question. But we certainly understand what the actions are that would look like, you know, some kind of attack, whether that was a jamming or a direct physical attack on a satellite or a ground station.

Senator SHAHEEN. So, we haven't actually, in terms of policy, delineated how we would respond to that kind of a situation.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I think we have a range of options, but that they are not coded, that if x happens, then then y will follow. We have to look at each set of circumstances uniquely.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. General Guillot, how are hypersonic weapons changing the way NORAD thinks about your job?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I think that hypersonics present the greatest technical challenge that we face today. We are in a three way race strategically with our two main competitors in hypersonics, both in offensive and defensive capabilities.

We are working closely with MDA, the Missile Defense Agency, to develop our own offensive and defensive capabilities to keep pace.

If I am confirmed, I will be keenly interested in this because as the Commander of NORAD, I would be responsible for the integrated tactical warning and the attack assessment of any hypersonic attack on the continental United States, and then we

would be using United States Space Command systems to help us get that data.

So, it is a field that we are watching very closely, and we are in a tight competition with Russia and China.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer, please.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here today. I appreciate your service, and the sacrifice and service of your families as well.

General Guillot, I have heard extensively from General VanHerck about a requirement for increased domain awareness, whether that is air domain awareness or undersea domain awareness.

I would encourage you, if confirmed, to make use of the unfunded priorities requirements list that is available to you so that you have that process to inform Congress of any capability gaps that you see in this area.

You mentioned those earlier, that that was something you would look into. So, that is a tool that is available to you, and it is very helpful to us. Also, General, over the past few years, we have seen North Korea, Russia, China dramatically expand their nuclear arsenals and develop a wide range of missile systems capable of directly attacking the United States.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for our own defense capabilities, which are failing to keep pace with growing threats. Do you believe that the United States should continue to posture its homeland missile defense capabilities to stay ahead of the North Korean threat?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator, I do.

Senator FISCHER. Should the United States consider adjusting its stated missile defense policy and allow for the possibility of defending against limited missile attacks from either Russia or China?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, that policy—that would, as you stated, that would be a policy decision. But I do think that it is something we should look at based on what we are seeing in Ukraine and the way the Russians are using—weapons systems there, attacking civilian infrastructure.

I think although the policy has worked well for years. As our adversaries change their capabilities in the way they employ, I think our military should look at adapting, and on a recurring basis, assess the policy.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. You mentioned earlier about monitoring the gaps that exist in the authorities that you are given. Right at this point in time, do you believe that there any additional authorities or capabilities that NORTHCOM or NORAD missile defense system need?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. No, Senator. I don't see any gaps. My goal is just to make sure that—due to my new status in the position, I don't let any authorities or gaps that are presently set develop due to the transition.

Senator FISCHER. General Whiting, to what extent do you believe that space based capabilities can contribute to our missile defense system?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, thank you for that question. They are absolutely vital. It is space that allows us to instantly look around the globe, watch for missile launches anywhere on the globe, and report that in real time to our national leadership.

If confirmed, I would have the responsibility of providing that missile warning data to General Guillot so he could make an assessment of whether North America was under attack. So, ma'am, it is absolutely vital.

Senator FISCHER. China tested, in 2021, the fractional orbital bombardment system. Do you believe that we should explore the viability of such systems as a means of passing new and novel threats that this country faces?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, thank you for the question. Obviously, the WU-14 fractional orbital bomb system is something we are very carefully watching, and we have to be able to track that from launch all the way through to a potential impact. I think it is a matter of whether we believe such a system would fill any gaps that we have.

That is not something I have looked at, but if confirmed, I would be happy to participate in that and provide my best military advice back.

Senator FISCHER. In this setting, can you tell us the concerns that you may have with not just the abilities that Russia and China currently have, but the direction that they are headed that we are aware of, and how we are preparing to defend against that—to counter it?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator. Certainly, I mentioned that China in particular has rapidly increased their counter space capabilities, but we also see them making their—the rest of their military forces more space enabled to be more precise and more lethal.

So, it is important that we as a Nation have a range of capabilities where we can integrate intelligence, Command and control, offense, defense, cyber, joint fires to make sure that we can protect our Joint Force from those space enabled capabilities that they are developing.

Senator FISCHER. They have dual use platforms as well, correct?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. That is correct, and we assume anything commercial is dual use from the PRC.

Senator FISCHER. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine, please.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our nominees for your service. I look forward to supporting your nominations.

General Guillot, I want to tread a little ground that both the Chair and ranking Member have with respect to fentanyl. I don't need to ask the same questions, but Senator Ernst and I offered an amendment that was included in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] version that is currently pending on the Senate floor, to designate fentanyl as a National Security threat and to encourage the DOD to be more forward leaning, first within the U.S. whole of Government effort, which has tended to rely pretty heavily

on DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], DOJ [Department of Justice], DHS [Department of Homeland Security].

But we are encouraging the DOD to be more forward leaning in this fight, both within the United States Government, but also in tandem with the Mexican military. I would suspect that that responsibility is going to be pretty heavily on NORTHCOM shoulders.

So, with other Committee Members, we just see the ravages of this in all of our communities. I know you understand that, and we will look forward, should you be confirmed, to following up and talking about what we might do from the Pentagon side to really energize and amplify the efforts to counter fentanyl coming into the United States.

General Whiting, I want to ask you a question about Space Command and our allies. I am very forward leaning on the AUKUS framework that was announced by President Biden. I am the chairman of the Seapower subcommittee of Armed Services.

I think that this partnership, which I hope will be decades long, offers real opportunity to promote stability in the Indo-Pacific. As you know, pillar one is a pillar dealing with *Virginia*-class submarines, but there is a broad pillar to the talks about cooperation with Australia and the UK, and a whole variety of technologies, whether it is space, cyber, AI, hypersonics.

Should you be confirmed, talk to us a little bit about the way you would see that AUKUS framework and how you might use your position at Space Command to work together with these allies, and then just more broadly, our allies.

It is a strategic edge that we have over China and Russia, that we have such a network of allies. How should we be thinking about joint activities in the space domain with nations allied with the United States?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, thank you for that question. Space is a team sport, and it takes us and our allies to be the best we can be. In fact, Senator, 33 years ago, as a second lieutenant at my first space assignment, the very first noncommissioned officer I ever supervised was a Canadian noncommissioned officer assigned to our unit because of those partnerships.

We have a grouping of countries we call CSPO, the combined space operations, and together it is us, it is our Canadian, British, Australian, New Zealand, plus some other countries that are observers that were asking to come in. In that forum, we are able to coordinate military operations.

We are able to coordinate future architectures, policies. We have seen a real value in that as we work together, and in fact, Senator, over the last couple of years, U.S. Space Command has created a named operation called Operation Olympic Defender, where we operate in space with our Canadian, Australian, and United Kingdom allies.

So, I will, if confirmed, do everything I can to maximize those partnerships because it is an asymmetric advantage for the United States.

Senator KAINE. Tell me what the acronym CPO stands for again.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Combined Space Operations.

Senator KAINE. Right. Great. I am very glad to hear about that intentional effort to work together with allies. To followup on an earlier question that Senator Shaheen was asking, space is an interesting domain because of the massive proliferation of commercial satellites in space that can have a security connection to us.

She referenced Starlink in Ukraine. Our adversaries may have their own assets in space, but they tend not to have the same amount of government owned assets, but then private sector assets where they are at least some collaboration with them.

Talk a little bit about how you would see the—both the opportunities and challenges to work in tandem with our commercial space assets to advance our space capacities.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I like to say we are in the second golden age of space. The first golden age was when Neil Armstrong walked out onto the lunar surface. But the second golden age is really being led by American commercial industry, and it gives us so many untold advantages.

We have to maximize that, and over the last 8 years or so out at our Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, we have a grouping there called the Commercial Integration Cell, where we brought in the ten companies that we contract with the most for capability through the Department of Defense.

In that cell, we share intelligence at the highest level. We get insights into what is happening in their constellations, because we believe if we all have that insight, we operate better together.

So that is just one example of the ways that, if confirmed, I would want to continue to drive our ability to leverage U.S. American industry because of the advantages it brings for us.

Senator KAINE. Well, I hope to entertain you at Wallops Island at some point, following your confirmation. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Ernst, please.

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General Guillot and General Whiting, and to your families as well. Thank you very much for being here and supporting these gentlemen.

So, General Guillot, we have talked a lot about a number of threats. We have covered China and Russia. We have heard about North Korea's arsenal and how they are outpacing our ballistic missile defenses.

A lot of concern out there, and in your policy questions, the advanced policy questions, you stated that a second missile defense site on the East Coast is, "not operationally required at this time."

So, what advancements in adversary capabilities would lead you to reevaluate this assessment? What should be—what should we be watching for?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I understand that the assessment was recently made and said that it is not operational required at this time. But from my perspective, if I am confirmed coming into the position, all military operations require depth and dispersal, and we have to keep pace with the threat.

I do not question the assessment that was made, but it was a different context and a different threat at the time of the assessment. So, if I am confirmed, I would support recurring assessments that would ensure that we keep pace with the adversaries.

Specific to your question, the number of threats that they have that might defeat the total number that we have in our existing locations, or if another rogue State develops the capability and can attack the Homeland.

That is another reason I think that we should look at the—reassess on a periodic basis to ensure that we can keep pace with that—with the threat.

Senator ERNST. Well, I appreciate that answer very much, and I—in my estimation, that would be the correct answer, is we have threats that change, grow, morph over time, and it is important that we continually reassess that.

We have heard also from a number of my colleagues about the Southern border, and obviously that is a huge concern with all of us. Senator Kaine and I are working together on an amendment for the NDAA, and that would improve our mil-to-mil cooperation with the Mexican authorities to counter fentanyl.

We have also seen a number of National Guard troops that we have used on our Southern border, and I would like to focus on that just for a second. I have traveled a couple of times to the Southern border, and every time I am there, I have the opportunity to meet with troops from different states and, of course, Texas—those that are assisting with the civil authorities, I think we have about 2,500 National Guard. So how does defense support to civil authorities fit in those priorities as Commander?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, it is right at the top because border security is National Security, and National Security is a key element of homeland defense. So, what you just described would be in the number one priority that I think the Command would have, if I am confirmed.

Strong support within the authorities given by the Secretary of Defense to a Department of Homeland Security would be a top priority of mine.

Senator ERNST. Very good, and how would we use those reserve forces, whether it is National Guard or Reserve units? How can we continue to support the mission without hurting their readiness?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, so many of the missions that the NORAD and NORTHCOM conduct are with National Guard forces, and they are all extremely capable, extremely disciplined, mission focused.

I don't think that the NORAD and NORTHCOM could do their important mission without the support of the National Guard. Some of the actions that they conduct, for instance, in the Southwest border, actually build some readiness, aviation, for example. But there are some where they lose readiness in their wartime mission.

So, if I am confirmed, I would establish a routine reporting process with the deployed Commanders to see where they feel they have lost readiness in specific worldwide deployment areas and see if we could give them training opportunities while they are on the border to maintain those.

Certainly, they need to keep readiness in their current missions, but their long term readiness would be very important, and I think we need to find ways that they can keep their worldwide deploy-

ment readiness while they are conducting the Southwest border mission.

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I appreciate that, and General Whiting, because I am out of time, I will submit a question for the record that deals with our cyber and our Special Operations Forces, and space triad. It is of great interest to those that are working in Special Operations Command. So, appreciate your gentlemen. Thank you very much, and congratulations on your nominations.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Hirono, please.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to both of you and welcome to your families. I ask the following two initial questions to address the fitness of any nominee before any of the Committees that I sit on.

So, I will ask the two questions of both of you. Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. No, Senator.

Lieutenant General WHITING. No, Senator.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. Have you ever faced disciplinary or entered into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. No, Senator.

Lieutenant General WHITING. No, Senator.

Senator HIRONO. General Whiting, as space becomes exponentially busier, understanding where satellites are is increasingly important and challenging. The 15th Space Surveillance Squadron in Maui does the important work, while simultaneously conducting leading edge research.

However, they are hamstrung by aging infrastructure, and for your information, the 15 Space Surveillance Squadron operates several telescopes on Haleakala, Maui that track satellites and, in partnership with the University of Hawaii, conducts research.

It is here that a mechanical issue in a backup generator caused about 700 gallons of diesel fuel to spill after a lightning strike caused electrical grid failures on the summit.

Additionally, many of the buildings and telescope domes are leaking and Generally in bad shape. General Whiting, terrestrial infrastructure underpins our space capabilities. How does deferring maintenance at places like the 15 Space Surveillance Squadron impact SPACECOM's mission accomplishment?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, thank you for that question, and I have had the good fortune to visit the 15th on Maui multiple times. As you highlight, they are doing incredibly critical work in our number one priority area, which is space domain awareness.

So, it is vital that we invest in that infrastructure so that we can ensure that we can continue to provide that mission support. I appreciate the local leadership on Maui who has worked with us as we have worked to remediate the fuel spill.

There is more work to be done there, but we appreciate the advice and counsel that we have received from the local leaders there.

Senator HIRONO. Well, Generally we get to the infrastructure needs when a crisis has already occurred. My question has to do

with how we are going to upgrade and prevent these kinds of incidences so that our people on Maui can do their jobs?

So, I don't think we have put enough emphasis on the need for repair—repairing and maintaining our infrastructure across the DOD, and SPACECOM is included in that.

So, I would request, should you be confirmed, that there be a review and assessment of the infrastructure needs for your Command.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, thank you, and I do commit to that, and there is right now effort going on to assess all of our infrastructure across my current Command, Space Operations Command, and specifically tie it to our readiness standards.

That work is ongoing and will complete here over the next year or two. But ma'am, I absolutely commit to the review you requested.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, and again, for you, if confirmed, you will assume responsibilities as the global sensor manager for missile defense. Do you believe current missile defense policies reflect all global threats and adequately encompass rapidly changing missile technologies?

If confirmed, you will be responsible for missile warning segment sensors, and in part for the DOD's space based Command and control systems.

Do you think that these acquisition programs, including the dual use radar requested in this year's budget for Hawaii, are on track and will meet your requirements?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I think those are critical programs that we have to watch very carefully. It is vital that we continue to provide global missile warning and missile defense capabilities.

If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice after looking into those specific programs. I think we have the right investments, but we have got to make sure we execute on the program successfully now.

Senator HIRONO. I have had concerns about missile defense for Hawaii, and as you probably know, HGRH Hawaii was on track, but it is no longer and so we are looking for some other ways that we are going to make sure that there is a missile warning system that will protect Hawaii.

That also includes some responsibility that you have, General Guillot. So please, for both of you, I would very much appreciate your paying attention to the missile defense needs of Hawaii. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate both of you gentlemen and your families. I appreciate it very much your comments about your families in your opening statements.

I think it is a great reminder to Americans that it is not just people wearing the uniform. It is oftentimes the spouses and the kids behind them who, in my view, have a harder job. So, to them, thank you. General Guillot, you mentioned Canada, which I think might puzzle a lot of people.

You have a unique Command responsibility in terms of NORAD, which has to be nominated by the President and the Prime Minister. You want to just mention it very briefly. I have actually a couple of questions about Canada.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator. NORAD is a binational Command with the United States and Canada. Has been for 65 years and—65 years of defending the Homeland side by side.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, Senator Kaine mentioned the importance of our allies. I couldn't agree more. It is a giant strategic advantage to our National Security.

I do want to mention, and it is, you know, not always polite, but I am going to do it here anyway. The Wall Street Journal on July 12th had an editorial entitled, Canada Is a Military Free Rider in NATO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit that for the record.

Chairman REED. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

WSJ

July 12, 2023

Canada Is a Military Free-Rider In NATO

By The Editorial Board

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was in Lithuania this week for the annual NATO summit, but it's too bad there wasn't a junior table where he could sit. That's where his country belongs based on Ottawa's feeble commitment to alliance defense.

In 2014 all NATO members agreed to spend 2% of GDP on defense by 2024. Eleven out of 31 countries now make it, but Canada still isn't close at 1.38%. That's up from 1.01% in the nine years since 2014, but it still falls between those exemplars of muscular self-defense Italy (1.46%) and Slovenia (1.35%).

Canada ranks sixth from NATO's bottom in spending on defense as a share of GDP, and its spending on military equipment—i.e., weapons—is seventh lowest. Canada is a member of the G-7 democracies but spends less on defense than the other six.

Canada was an important contributor to the Allied effort in World War II and is a founding member of NATO. But somewhere along the way it began to think of its membership as largely a place to rub shoulders with global powers and a platform for making moral pronouncements. Last week Ottawa put in its two cents against cluster munitions. But asking its citizens to meet their actual obligations to the cause of freedom is apparently too much to ask.

One explanation may be the Trudeau government's view that its military is more of a social project than fighting force. In his December 2021 mandate [letter](#) to the new minister of defense, Mr. Trudeau wrote: "Your immediate priority is to take concrete steps to build an inclusive and diverse Defence Team, characterized by a healthy workplace free from harassment, discrimination, sexual misconduct and violence." See how that cultural manifesto works on the Ukrainian front lines.

Canada has also long been a free-rider off the U.S. military, which it knows stands guard over North America. Mr. Trudeau's Liberal Party figures it can thus afford to shirk on defense and shovel money into public unions and social-welfare programs. Canada's military is so degraded that even its role in peace-keeping missions has waned. Nowadays Ottawa can be counted on to "fight" for human rights, which is to say that it talks a lot about them.

But if sovereignty and national pride mean anything, Canada can't afford to float above the fray on defense. One clear and present danger for a country with water on three sides

and a total of four aging submarines is the Russian navy's increasing activity in the Arctic.

NATO needs members that keep their commitments, and the nations of the G-7 have an obligation to lead the way. If Canada doesn't want to play that role, then the G-7 should consider a replacement. Poland, which now spends 3.9% of GDP on defense, would be a candidate.

Senator SULLIVAN. It goes on to talk about Ottawa's feeble commitment to the alliance at the Vilnius summit. They should have been put at the kids table. I was actually at the Vilnius summit last week in NATO. Canada is not even close to its 2 percent commitment, and it was common knowledge that Prime Minister Trudeau was trying to water down the Vilnius commitment to 2 percent as a floor, all of which is incredibly disappointing.

I hope that Canadians are watching your confirmation hearing. General, you will be working closely with Canada, if confirmed.

Can you commit to this Committee that you can have discussions with the Canadians and say, hey, look, when you are not supporting NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and you are not supporting missile defense for North America, it is actually harmful to the alliance. Americans get frustrated when our allies don't pull their weight, and with regard to NATO, Canada is not even close to pulling its weight.

Can you commit us to have those tough conversations that are important with your Canadian counterparts?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator, you can count on me to do that.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. That is really important. You are both Air Force Academy grads, which is great. I am sure the Air Force Academy is very proud. We are proud. Awesome. As you know, the father of the Air Force, Billy Mitchell, had a very famous quote.

He said—it was actually in front of an Armed Services hearing in 1935. He talked about one place that actually wasn't a State yet. In America, and he called it the most strategic place in the world. Whoever holds this place literally holds the world.

Okay. Now, you guys are Air Force Academy grads. That is the father of the U.S. Air Force. What place was Billy Mitchell referring to?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Alaska, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. Alaska. General, are you going to go with that?

Lieutenant General WHITING. I am familiar with that—

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you confirm that that was Alaska. Good. You passed the test. Thank you. Now, in all seriousness, two issues. I just want to talk briefly about Alaska. We talked about domain awareness.

General VanHerck has been great on domain awareness. But when it comes to domain awareness, whether it is hypersonics or cruise missiles or balloons, where are they—what is the avenue of

approach if our adversaries are going to attack New York City, Miami, Chicago, it doesn't matter, where they come in through?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, almost any avenue of approach to the Homeland comes over the Arctic.

Senator SULLIVAN. Right. So, when we talk about domain awareness, where do we need to beef that up in particular?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, first and foremost, it needs to be the Arctic.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, America is an Arctic Nation because of what state?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Alaska, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. So, when you are talking about beefing up in the Arctic, you are talking about beefing up in Alaska, correct?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, sir, and to your previous point, to talk to our Canadian counterparts—

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, and hopefully they will pay for that at some point—

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Radars there as well.

Senator SULLIVAN. Yes, they are not very good at paying for missile defense either, even though we protect the whole North American continent.

Let me ask a final question. With regard to the Arctic, we have huge strategic interests as a country in the Arctic, natural resources, transportation routes, strategic locations, medicine, the environment, people.

The NORTHCOM Commanders, in my experience, have gone from—you are the advocate for the Arctic—have gone from essentially disinterest when I got here 8 years ago, to increasingly strong interest. I think General VanHerck has done a great job, and yet the Pentagon has been the one agency in all of Washington, DC. that, in my view, has kind of not really focused.

So, the reason America and our National Security, and even the Pentagon, are now focusing on the Arctic is almost all from this Committee, where we have put it every year in the NDAA, including this requirement, hey, guys, wake up, Pentagon, wake up. We have got big strategic interests in the Arctic.

Last year, Senator King and I got the Arctic Security Initiative, and the Pentagon fought that. By the way, icebreakers, ports in Nome. All this presence, resources issues we put in, not the Pentagon. So, can I get your commitment to work with this Committee to be 110 percent focus on the Arctic?

To be honest, it has been a little tiring to have to go to the Pentagon and say, hey, guys, focus here. Well, we are not really focused here. Then we put it into law. It would be better if you guys could help us.

Again, General VanHerck has been great, but can you continue that commitment to work with this Committee on the critical issues in the Arctic, particularly as it deals with Russia and China?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, you have my commitment.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Well first, I want to associate myself with that series of questions about the Arctic. It was a question of whether or

not Senator Sullivan and I, who would go first to ask the Arctic questions.

He has asked them. I would also have to respectfully point out that if ever our beloved chairman, John McCain, was here, he would point out that Billy Mitchell was later court martialed, but we won't go into that.

[Laughter.]

Senator SULLIVAN. I think that was rescinded later—

[Laughter.]

Senator KING. General Whiting, it has been U.S. policy for as long as anybody can remember to not militarize space, but that train has left the station, has it not? Isn't—hasn't the—haven't the Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Russians, developed the capacity for offensive weapons in space?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, they absolutely have.

Senator KING. Therefore, we need to be in a position to respond because the cornerstone of our entire defense, National Security policy, is deterrence. If they have an asymmetric advantage that we can't hold them at risk, doesn't that undermine our policy of deterrence?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, it does.

Senator KING. We are going to have to put aside the laudable policy because of a change of circumstances. Is that correct?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, Senator, and I think the creation of United States Space Command just under 4 years ago, and then by the action of the Congress, the creation of the United States Space Force just under 4 years ago, recognizes that new reality.

Senator KING. I think, my concern is that there are areas of the Federal Government that haven't quite gotten there, and I think we need to understand it not because we want to militarize space, but because we have to face the reality and the undermining of our deterrent capability if we don't match that.

General Guillot, since we have been talking almost exactly an hour in this hearing, 10 of—12 Americans have died of drug overdoses. We are under attack, and it is in large measure in your AOR. It is not a nation State, but these international organizations. Talk to me about a strategy for dealing with this.

We have been hearing hearings year after year. We don't have sufficient ISR. We don't have sufficient interdiction capability. When are we going to take this seriously for what it is, which is an attack on the people of this country?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, the threat you described is acute, it is serious, and it is very significant. As—if I am confirmed to be the NORTHCOM Commander, I will immediately, upon taking change of Command, go down to the border, meet with all of the U.S. forces that are in direct support of the lead law enforcement agencies conducting this mission, and make an assessment on what we can do to optimize our presentation of force and make suggestions to the Secretary—

Senator KING. Well, part of it is, is advocating in a vigorous way for additional ISR, for example.

I mean, plus, we have had testimony before this Committee from SOUTHCOM that we only able to interdict 25 percent of the drug

shipments coming by sea that we know about. In other words, we know they are coming. We know that they are carrying deadly cargo, and yet we don't have—there are not enough ships.

There are not enough capacity, Coast Guard, Navy. It just seems to me everybody is pointing at everybody else. Please, I would urge you to develop a special task force, a strike force, to really think about how to organize the U.S. Government response. Because what comes through to me is a lack of central authority.

You are the nearest thing to that, and I hope you will really get on this. September 11th, we lost over 3,000 people, turned our society upside down here. We are losing 100,000 a year, and yet nobody seems to be in charge. Will you take charge?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I will take charge of assessing that from the DOD standpoint and forwarding those recommendations.

Senator KING. Now, let me make—go, change the subject, again to get back to the Arctic. One of the realities—again, is like my questions about space. It is no secret that the Russians have essentially re-militarized their share of the Arctic, which really was a much more peaceful area prior to the last 10 years.

Don't we need some capacity, infrastructure in the Arctic, a port, for example, to be able to field the kind of force that's necessary again, for deterrence? This is not about offensive capability, but the best way to prevent a war is for your adversary to know that they will suffer unacceptable results if they attack us. Talk to me about infrastructure in the Arctic, for example, a port in Nome.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, presence is the best form of deterrence in the Arctic. The port of Nome is a game changer for operations in the Arctic. I understand that it is underway, and we are looking at 2027, 2028 for completion of that.

But just that port alone will add 4 to 8 days per operational sortie of our ships where they don't have to go down to Dutch Harbor to refuel. They can stay up in the high North.

So that infrastructure, and then the recurring presence of forces training and operating in the high North, in Alaska, I think is a very strong deterrent to our adversaries up there.

Senator KING. Well, both of you are taking on extraordinary responsibilities at an extraordinary time. Congratulations on your appointment. We look forward to your confirmation. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville, please.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of you for being here today. Good to meet with you in my office, and congratulations, and welcome to your families. General Guillot, several conversations with General VanHerck over the last few years. He talked about NORTHCOM's need for more assigned troops.

I know you are coming from another Command, but have you had conversations with him about your possible move to the Commander of that—of NORTHCOM?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I haven't talked with him directly about that. But in the function of my current job, I am in

several video teleconferences with General VanHerck and other leaders where the topic you mentioned is discussed.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Yes, I would hope you would get back with me on that, once you are assigned to that, and let us know what we need to do to help. As you have heard today, a lot of questions have been about certain things that is killing our people in this country and not overseas.

So, thank you for that. General Whiting, I am not going to make a long dissertation about this, but of course, Space Command is very new, and we in Alabama, in Huntsville were excited about Space Command being assigned to Huntsville in Redstone Arsenal, after 21 different criteria.

A lot of things were going through and with a fine tooth comb and we were excited about that. But, you know, unfortunately politics has got involved, and that is not you, but, you know, for a few months now, I have heard nothing but—because of some things that I am involved in, about readiness of our military. It has been 3 years and we do not have a permanent home yet for Space Command.

It is a shame that we have gotten into politics, and of course, things move slow up here. But even for Washington, it is very slow for this to have happen, to us have a permanent home for Space Command.

So hopefully we get that done in the near future. But I would like to ask you a couple of questions. How is Space Command doing in regard to this workforce? I know you have been there for a while, and what do we need to do to improve because it is very new to our country and for the world.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate you highlighting our workforce, because despite the incredible space capabilities and satellites we bring and our rockets, it is our people that are our most critical asset.

We have to ensure as a Nation that we have military and civilian who want to join our space enterprise, National Security space enterprise and are willing to be a part of that. So, I think it is important that we invest in those STEM activities that inspire our young men and women to join into space.

Then I think we have a unique opportunity, given all the great things that commercial industry and NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] are doing right now, to leverage that excitement to bring these young men and women into our organizations.

Senator TUBERVILLE. How big a role does cyber play in SPACECOM, and what are we doing to make sure that we have enough—one of my sons is in cyber and, but it is very new, and it is very complicated. What are we doing to make sure we have enough people to be involved in what we do in Space Command through cyber?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I like to say that the soft underbelly of our space capabilities is cyber, because our networks, our space networks truly are global in nature, but they also reach out to 22,000 miles above the Earth's surface to geosynchronous orbit.

That creates a lot of novel cyber-attacks surface, and so, while potential adversaries like Russia and China could attack us in the space domain directly, they would rather attack us in the cyber domain because it is cheaper for them, and it is harder for us to attribute.

So, we must work—if confirmed, I must work with the services, and in particular U.S. Space Force, to execute the excellent plan they have laid in place to pivot hundreds of Guardians into the cyber defense workforce to defend our space capabilities from cyber-attack.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Have we done any studies to where we stand with other countries, even our allies, in terms of cyber, the education part? You know, where do we stand? Are we good, bad, indifferent?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I believe the United States is at the absolute forefront of cyber capability. If confirmed, I would look to work with U.S. Cyber Command on ensuring that we are leveraging all of that partnership work they do with others to best defend U.S. Space Command in the cyber domain.

Senator TUBERVILLE. One last question, what is our top threat in space theater right now? What would be your thoughts?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, our top threat is the growing Chinese counterspace capabilities, both from reversible threats like jamming, all the way up to the direct ascent ASATs and laser capabilities we have seen them testing.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you. Thank you, and good luck to both of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator Kelly, please.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Tuberville had some good questions for the two Generals. Let me point out, though, that, you know, both General Whiting and General Guillot said, if confirmed, a number of times in your testimony.

The roles that you are going into are so critical for our national defense. But the, if confirmed, is certainly in question because of Senator Tuberville's holds on these promotions and these positions that I imagine would still be in place.

So, I think that is important to note here. General Guillot, welcome, and General Whiting, welcome to the hearing here. General Guillot, I believe you grew up in Tucson—or Tucson, Arizona, where Gabby and I live, and we talked about that in my office a couple of weeks ago.

Like, you know, Senator King and many others on this Committee, I am very concerned about transnational criminal organizations and the flow of drugs across the Southern border, fentanyl poisoning our communities.

Senator King asked about this, but I want to just get down to some resources you think you may need in your new position here. Do you anticipate needing more staffing, more authority, more funding?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I agree on the severity of the threat and the need for us to use any means available to stop that threat from coming across our border.

If I am confirmed, and when I go down to the Southwest border, and everywhere from California all the way to Texas, and look at each site, things that I will be looking for not only are what are we doing today, but what could we be doing in terms of ISR, the types of forces that we are using in supporting the lead law enforcement agency.

Then if I see anything in terms of numbers, authorities, anything along those lines or types of help, that is what I will report back to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator KELLY. All right. Thank you, and General, also, you know, related to ISR, sort of, domain awareness, Senator Budd and I introduced legislation called the SOAR Act. We hope to move this in the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] reauthorization bill.

This is bipartisan legislation that will ensure that these high altitude balloons that are released, you know, rather frequently for scientific purposes and other purposes have transponders so they can be tracked and identified.

It will take a little bit of the workload off of NORTHCOM. But it will also allow you to act more quickly to identify any activity that could be a threat, if it doesn't have a transponder on it. What could you, as the Commander of NORTHCOM, what would you do to further improve domain awareness over the NORTHCOM area of operations?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, the first and I think most important step to improving domain awareness would be to ensure that we have the types of radars in the locations needed to cover all the avenues of approach that are now vulnerable to the Homeland, and to ensure that the systems are the types that can detect the new and emerging threats that our competitors are building, higher speed, all altitude, maneuvering, low radar cross-section types of threats that we can build into a network.

The next important step, Senator, would be to bring all of those back to our Command center on a single pane of glass that we cannot only look at in NORTHCOM headquarters, but share with all the other combatant Commands like EUCOM and INDOPACOM, so it is a seamless picture of the threats that we face across all combatant Commands.

Senator KELLY. All right, thank you, and just one comment about the SPACECOM headquarters. So, you know, it is imperative that we get a decision on where SPACECOM is going to be located. I mean, this has gone on too long.

These decisions impact our Members, their families, local communities. It impacts the mission and the National Security of the United States. So, we can't—we shouldn't let indecision, bureaucracy, and politics impact our National Security like this.

So, especially on a mission set that is as critical as managing the space domain that underpins our defense, and an area where our adversaries are investing heavily in. So, you know, my hope is that we get a resolution on where SPACECOM is going to be headquartered. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Senator Scott.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. First one, I want to thank both of you for being here. Congratulations on your nominations. Thank

you for your service. I want to thank your families for what they do.

I am sure you guys have moved a lot. Hopefully spent a lot of time in Florida. Communist China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and other terrorist groups want to harm the United States at any cost and in any way they can.

They all possess ballistic missiles and will do anything they can to harm us and our national interests here in the Homeland and in space. I know you are both focused on deterring these threats, and if they are—and if they ever try to attack us here at home, to feed whatever they throw our way, I look forward to hearing about how you are going to continue to make sure we stay safe.

As our strategic focus shifts from the threat of terrorist to threats from adversarial nations like Communist China and Russia, NORTHCOM will still have to defend the Homeland from both.

I would characterize our reaction to the Chinese spy balloon incident as pretty bad—terrible. What have you learned from that and how we handle the next spy balloon when you are the Commander?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I was not personally familiar with all the factors that went into the first decision. But what I can tell you that if confirmed, air sovereignty will be the cornerstone of the NORAD and NORTHCOM mission.

If confirmed, I will aggressively execute all the authorities and the are we associated with maintaining air sovereignty of the U.S. That goes to early detection.

Making decisions that are within my authority, and then quickly passing all of the valuable information and options to my senior leadership, if it is something that is beyond my authority.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. From a strategic and resourcing standpoint, how is the feed the Homeland from terrorists and defending from adversary nations different?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Sir, Senator, they certainly overlap. Deterring from terrorist threats that are originating overseas. Other combatant Commands, like the one that I am presently proud to work in, Central Command, in cooperation with Southern—Special Operations Command, are doing a lot of work to keep the terrorists as an away game.

But as we start to develop indications that they could be working toward the U.S., then it transitions to a strong partnership from NORAD and NORTHCOM, with the law enforcement agencies that would be responsible, along with the Department of Homeland Security, to building that barrier from them actually entering the United States.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. What additional authorities or resources do you anticipate needing to defend our Homeland?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator at this time, I do not know of any, but I pledge to the Committee that if I am confirmed within 90 days, I will have completed a full assessment of all the people, the mission and the resourcing, to include authorities associated with NORAD and NORTHCOM. I will make it very clear in that assessment if there are any authorities that I need.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. In October 2018, the Department of Defense deployed 5,200 troops to the Southern border in response to migrant caravans. Currently, the Biden Administration has au-

thorized a maximum of 2,500 troops in the Southwest border to support operations.

The past year—has continued to witness a surge in migrant encounters, has made—there is about, you know, 1.5 million getaways, some of them possibly terrorists. Would you first off, agree there is a crisis at the border?

Would you assess that there is a drug smuggling emergency at the Southern border? What role do you anticipate NORTHCOM playing in addressing this emergency?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I think border security is National Security, and that would be the number one priority for me, if I am confirmed as the Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM. As for the drugs and the efforts of the transnational criminal organizations, that is a problem that is acute.

It is significant and it is extremely serious, and it falls into the same responsibility that I just mentioned.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. General Whiting, congratulations. You have a base named after you in Florida already. You have done really well. Do you believe that delaying the Space Command headquarters decision has affected readiness?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, that decision needs to be made so that we can decide where that is going to go and place it. I think until now, that headquarters has been maturing from what I have seen, but a decision is needed.

Senator SCOTT. So, what are the biggest challenges SPACECOM is facing in addressing threats in space over the next 2 years? How do you plan to address them? Have you spent any time thinking about what happens when we—when they start, you know, whatever adversary starts shooting up satellites and we get all the debris going there—and how it is going to impact our communication?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, the answer to those two questions are related. The number one thing we need to continue to build out is our space domain awareness capability. We have the best in the world and the world looks to us, but we have to continue to improve that to maintain custody of the threats we now see.

Senator, we want to avoid a future in which we do see that proliferation of debris because of anti-satellite capabilities. But if that were to happen, it would be our responsibility to quickly track that debris cloud and make sure we are providing warning to those individuals, units, companies that own those satellites so that we can mitigate that debris.

But we do not want to see that happen, which is why we must deter that from happening.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Gillibrand.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. General Guillot, General VanHerck has stated that our country is under attack every single day in the information and cyber domain. Our critical infrastructure providers on which we rely to execute NORTHCOM's mission are key targets for threat actors.

How do you envision coordinating with both DHS and CISA to protect our critical infrastructure? Can I have your commitment to directly collaborate with them and other sector management agen-

cies in order to protect critical infrastructure, ensure you can execute your mission, and will you report back to this Committee if you encounter issues in that effort?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator, you have my commitment not only to work in the manner that you described, but also to report back.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you have any ideas about what—how you will implement that coordination?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I would like to first get to know all the counterparts. As you mentioned, there are several that have overlapping responsibility for protecting defense critical infrastructure.

I would work very closely with Cyber Command Commander, if I am confirmed, as well as Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and a number of others. But more than just meeting them and talking to them, I would like to propose with them a series of high level, tabletop exercises that really push and pull at the seams of where one's authorities may start and another agency's may stop, because there is a lot of gray area in critical infrastructure.

If it is owned and operated by DOD, if it has heavy DOD influence, and our mission. I think that we need to have a strong—exercises and discussions that are really going to pull those seams to ensure that they can hold during a crisis.

Senator GILLIBRAND. I would urge you to do those tabletop exercises. We do tabletop exercises with regard to China, with regard to Taiwan, but the scenario of the first 3 months of that is almost all cyber.

So, I want to know what you are going to do every day during that first 3 months, because it is not kinetic activity that you are going to be managing. It is going to be how do we make sure we can do the work we need to do if things escalate. So, it is really important.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. I agree.

Senator GILLIBRAND. I am grateful that you are focused on that. We have talked in the hearing about domain awareness.

One of our biggest challenges in domain awareness is the space between commercial airspace and space. We saw that with the Chinese spy balloon. So, I think having domain awareness and focusing on how you are going to increase your domain awareness so that our pilots can operate safely, so that we understand if we are being spied upon by adversaries, is essential.

In that regard, can I have your commitment to collaborate with Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick and the all Domain Anomaly Resolution Office to ensure that they have what they need to identify and resolve reports of UAPs in U.S. airspace?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, you have my commitment. I read a little about AARO. I know that General VanHerck is consulting with him, and I look forward to the opportunity.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Undersea domain awareness is also critical for our national defense. Recent public reporting indicates that the Russian Navy is repainting its ships to confuse or fool tracking systems that rely on artificial intelligence. If confirmed, will you help this Committee understand the complexity of ongoing threats and

the ways that developing technology can help or hinder our defense systems?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator, you have my commitment.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. General Whiting, the PLA's, "lectures on the science of space operations," its authors describe an overawing space strike that includes both a soft strike option focused on information attacks, EM spectrum operations, cyber-attacks, and hard strike options that involve strikes against vulnerable enemy positions.

From your perspective, what are the miscalculation risks when a country's space studies documents include the execution of offensive strikes as part of their deterrence options, and how does this impact your thinking about the resiliency of the systems that would be under your Command?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, thank you for that question. Of course, when we see those kinds of writings, we have to take them at their word that that is potentially within their plans. So, deterrence is built upon a framework of, number one, we must have capabilities that deny potential adversaries the benefits of such an attack.

Second, we must have capabilities that allow us to impose costs in response to such an attack. Then finally, that we have to clearly communicate that. So, I support the effort of the Space Force to re-architect our current satellite constellations to be more resilient against those attacks.

But we also need those range of options so that we can bring intel, cyber, offense, defense, Command and control, joint fires together to also hold at risk those space capabilities of potential adversaries.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. Last month, SPACECOM announced its authority to conduct missile defense led to some confusion about NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and SPACECOM's different but related responsibilities to conduct homeland missile defense.

If confirmed, will—you will be responsible for operating the missile warning satellites, while General Guillot will be responsible for warning America's leaders in the event of a missile threat. Can you commit to work to ensure that SPACECOM's and NORAD's systems will be integrated and that you will work closely together to protect National Security?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, Senator, I commit to that.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator Cramer.

Senator CRAMER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Congratulations to both of you, Generals, and your families. Thank you for being here. Thank you for your willingness to step in the gap and into these very important positions.

Since we have been talking a lot about domain awareness, I am going to just stay with the theme, but maybe get a little bit specific. My first question is one that I didn't come in here antici-

pating, but I think is relevant, and probably start with you, General Whiting.

Over the last several years, we have had a lot of discussion and obviously noticed that the Air Force has been shedding quite successfully a lot of its legacy ISR, airborne ISR missions and equipment to afford new stuff. Makes perfect sense.

My concern has been that while they live with and plan for the promise of space being able to handle ISR for the Combatant Commanders wherever they may be, whether it is the Southern border or CENTCOM, you name it, that a gap could very well occur where there won't be adequate ISR.

Presuming for a moment that space can do that at some point, what is your comfort level that space can unilaterally handle that type of ISR that today Global Hawks and others, the MQ-9 and others are able to provide?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, Senator, thank you for that question. Space—I start from space brings us untold advantages. For example, satellites as they orbit the earth, don't go through sovereign airspace.

We can freely overfly any point of the Earth and get those—you know, get that intelligence that we need. I think it is a layered need for systems as we move forward. There will be need for ground based ISR capabilities, sea based, air based, and space based.

But I am supportive of doing the reviews to move as much to space as we can, while leveraging the unique attributes that the other domains can bring as well.

Senator CRAMER. Very good. Thank you. Since you brought up layers, I am going to ask about the Space Development Agency's, you know, tracking layer program that is going to be operated out of the Grand Forks Air Force Base.

First of all, are both of you familiar with it, and how do you see—I will start with you, General Guillot, NORTHCOM, NORAD integrating SDA into your awareness?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, as you alluded to, domain awareness, certainly in the sensing grid, takes a variety of sensors. I look forward to bringing those in, that capability, as well as the space based, long term persistence that General Whiting mentioned for space, to complement the other terrestrial systems that we are using now or bringing online here in the near future.

Senator CRAMER. So, bringing up one more legacy domain awareness that I am familiar with—of course, we are very pleased with the legacy of the PARCS radar at the Cavalier Air Force, or Space Force Station now.

I will look forward to having you up there sometime after your confirmed, which I am confident will be soon. But maybe each of you could share a little bit about the importance of that PARCS radar over the years and decades.

Of course, it has expanded its role from missile defense, or missile awareness to space obviously, just monitoring large stuff in space. But that is one of those legacy systems that we don't know the lifespan of.

What are the modernization opportunities, efforts. I would just be interested in both of your opinions on PARCS and its importance, and how we can extend it.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, PARCS at Cavalier is an essential part of the NORAD sensing grid that we have been talking about, and specifically it provides the integrated tactical warning and attack assessment capability for the NORAD Commander to use to decide if a threat is a threat to North America.

So, upgrading that radar and several just like it that we have across the network is extremely important to complement the new systems that are coming in to make sure that that sensing grid can reach out and get all types of threats, in all domains Generally.

Senator CRAMER. General Whiting.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, just building on that, I have had the good fortune to visit Cavalier multiple times over my career. I was just there last September, and General Guillot mentioned, it is vital to our missile warning capabilities.

But as you alluded to, it is also vital to our space domain awareness capabilities. Its unique position pointing North allows it to see all of our polar orbiting or all polar orbiting objects.

So, it is just absolutely critical for us, given its unique location and capabilities, and I expect we will continue to need that going forward.

Senator CRAMER. Well, thank you to both of you, and I am not going to test you the way that Senator Sullivan did, but we do think there are some other states that could be important to an Arctic mission as well. But we are all for Alaska, too. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair—Madam Chair.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Madam Chair. Thank you to you both for your service, and to your families as well. You are both graduates of the Air Force Academy, both class of 1989. You must have been an outstanding class. You must have known each other there, correct?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Known each other a long time. Yes, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You have known each other since then and worked together, so congratulations to you both.

I want to talk a little bit about artificial intelligence. I am learning about the immense and in many ways uncertain, unknown capabilities of AI in so many different areas, whether it is medicine or environmental concerns, talking about the military, particularly in space.

I wonder if each of you could share your thoughts about how you think AI will impact the challenges and work ahead for each of you.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, from a NORAD and NORTHCOM position, if I am confirmed, I look forward to using artificial intelligence to make what we do really well now, even better, maybe even easier, and certainly faster.

I have seen in my current Command under some of the initiatives that General Kurilla has undertaken, where we take a situational awareness of software, but using artificial intelligence that

can help us find equipment, pieces, targets that the naked eye would take a long time to find, cue us in, and then with the combination of a human on top of the loop, very quickly make an assessment if there is a target there.

The speed with which that improves our ability is just phenomenal. Applying another artificial intelligence and machine learning capability to the NORAD, NORTHCOM realm that, if confirmed, I would like to see is a program called Pathfinder, which takes radar data that is considered cluttered, that our radars see and throws aside so it doesn't confuse the operator, it can—those machine learning and artificial intelligence can go through there and find valid tracks that we might otherwise be overlooking that could be a threat to our Homeland.

We have used, with NORAD and NORTHCOM's permission, we have used those algorithms in the Middle East and run some of the one way attack that we have had in Iraq and Syria, taken our radar files, run it through that algorithm, and we have been able to see the UAVs that attacked our positions that we couldn't see real time.

So that is a couple of examples of ways that I would like to use artificial intelligence and machine learning to enhance the NORAD, NORTHCOM mission, if I am confirmed.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, similarly, we have missions that are very data rich. For example, our space domain awareness. We get tens upon tens of thousands of data points and tracks and observations per day.

Today it takes our humans kind of slogging through all of that to find what is most important, where the threats, how do we maintain custody.

But artificial intelligence and machine learning can help do that for us so we can stop the humans doing the rote work and elevate them to the more higher cognitive work, to focus on those threats and what should we be doing about them.

So, it is an important capability for us, Senator.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The work that you have described is in very simplistic layman's terms, screening of information, and in effect, organizing it, making use of, as you say, reams of data.

Do you anticipate at some point turning decisions over to artificial intelligence? In other words, there has been discussion about how decisionmaking by artificial intelligence could be made autonomous. That machine learning could be in control more than it is now.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I will certainly look at that in the future, but at this time I do not see a place where we would take the human off the loop of an important decision. I think it is much better to use those tools to help us with our decision-making and keep the human on a loop.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I agree. General.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I agree with that as well, that right now our people are still vital for our decisionmaking and we want to make sure that any decisions we do contemplate perhaps looking at machines to make—that that is all done in concert with the Department of Defense's ethical AI guidelines.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I think that AI is going to revolutionize a lot of what we do in civilian life. Likewise, in military work, and I do think at the same time, it is important to have controls, countermeasures, and ethical standards that apply.

That is why I actually propose an independent entity or body that would establish some rules and guardrails. It is a bipartisan effort, and I hope that the military leaders like yourself will be a part of it. Thank you so much.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Rounds.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Guillot, first of all, I want to thank you for your service to this Nation and congratulate you on your nomination to be the next Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD.

General Whiting, I would also like to thank you for your service to our Nation and congratulate you on your nomination to be the next Commander of SPACECOM. I would also like to say thank you to your families as well.

As you noted, when you have to move, the family moves with you, or when you are deployed and they are not with you, that is a sacrifice which they also make, and I would like to thank your families as well for their service to our country.

General Guillot and General Whiting, as you know, I have asked every single Combatant Commander this question with regard to the spectrum. There has been an attempt lately to perhaps sell or auction portions of the S-band, the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz portion of the spectrum, which is one which I believe to be critical for our national defense.

But I have asked this, and so far I have had no one disagree with me that has been in front of this Committee. But I am going to ask both of you, please, how serious is the need for us to be able to maintain control of the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz portion of the spectrum? How do you view that in your job?

Are you aware of the different types of uses for that portion of the spectrum in the defense of our country? I will begin with General Guillot.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I am keenly aware of the impact that losing or sharing the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz range of the spectrum would bring to the homeland defense mission.

For example, three of the key capabilities that, if confirmed, I would rely upon for homeland defense, AWACS, the AEGIS cruisers, and the new long range discrimination radar, which is critical to defeating the North Korean ballistic missile threat, all operate in that range.

While I understand that there is a study ongoing, and I look forward to seeing the results of that study, and at that time, I will make my final recommendations.

My initial position is that it would have a very significant and damaging effect on homeland defense to either lose or have to share that range.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. General Whiting.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, I completely agree with General Guillot that if the study comes back and says that there will

be an impact, we absolutely cannot have a loss of operational capability and we need to make sure that that doesn't happen.

Senator ROUNDS. Are you aware—if our adversaries could choose a portion of the spectrum that would impact our national defense, would this be one of those areas that they would love to see us have a reduction in our capabilities in terms of their ability to find ways to aggressively get into the North American air defense area?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, our adversaries are very good at knowing what parts of the spectrum we rely upon and trying to take that away from us, so it would not surprise me at all.

Senator ROUNDS. General Whiting.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, I agree with that.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. Let me ask also, just with regard to cyber and the need for cyber protection, what do you think is the greatest threat that you see with regard to NORTHCOM and the use of cyber activity or the aggressive cyber activities that some of our adversaries are using right now?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I think the threat, the cyber threat to NORTHCOM is the most present and persistent threat that we see today.

I have spoken about the totality of the threats in all domains and all avenues of approach, which is certainly the largest concern that I have, if I were to take Command of NORAD and NORTHCOM upon confirmation. However, the threat that we see today and the most persistent is in cyber.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. General Whiting, same question.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, sir. For the Space enterprise, Senator, the most pressing cyber threats come from state—you know, competitors like the PRC, Russia, Iran, North Korea.

They would rather take us on in the cyber domain than try to take us on physically in the space domain, although certainly the PRC and Russia have proven they can do that, because it is cheaper for them, and it is harder for us to attribute.

So, we must build out our cyber defenses across our space enterprise to protect that soft underbelly from allowing cyber to deny that capability.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. Thank you both for your service, and we look forward to working with you in the future. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Schmitt.

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Whiting, in speaking in support of DEI initiatives, General Brown said that "there is still a lot to do because this is a cultural shift. This isn't something you can get done in just a couple of years." Do you believe that General Brown should be relieved of his Command because of those statements?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, no, I do not.

Senator SCHMITT. General Milley, in speaking in support of DEI initiative, said, "it is diversity to improve the system, improve the military, improve our problem solving capabilities, and improve our war fighting readiness in order to protect and defend the Constitution."

That is why it is so important, so fundamental, that we have this as one of our elements as we move forward to continue to develop

the Joint Force.” Do you believe General Milley should be relieved of his Command?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, no, I do not.

Senator SCHMITT. Do you believe that that is a partisan—do you believe that is partisan political speech?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, no, I do not.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier said our DEI industry and trainings we are receiving in the military via the industry are rooted in critical race theory, which is rooted in Marxism. He was relieved of his Command for those statements, correct?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, that is correct.

Senator SCHMITT. By you, right?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, there were other comments regarding specific political parties that are in addition to what you just quoted.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay, this was from the podcast which was cited by you. So, I am asking, is opposition to DEI partisan political speech?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, no, it is not, unless it advocates for a specific political party or a candidate.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. Well, I would agree with that, but Lieutenant—so your testimony today is Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier was relieved for something other than these statements on the podcast, or was that part of your consideration?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, it involved a specific quote involving a specific political party.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. In his free time or on duty, or what—

Lieutenant General WHITING. It was on a podcast where he associated himself or he identified himself as an Active Duty Space Force officer and Commander.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. On that—so there were other comments that, other than this one I read to you about DEI—

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I think that podcast was about an hour long.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. Well, we will followup with some of our questions. I guess I want to ask you, do you support DEI initiatives in the military?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I support a ready, lethal force that draws from the best talent all across America.

Senator SCHMITT. That is not my question. I support that, too. But that is not what DEI is. DEI is rooted in cultural Marxism. So, I am asking you, do you support DEI initiatives in the military?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I support a merit based approach to finding the best people across—

Senator SCHMITT. That is not DEI either. So, do you support DEI initiatives in the military?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, based on how it is defined, I want to find the best people across—anywhere in this country, geographically or any demographic, who can support the defense of this—

Senator SCHMITT. Do you believe that our brave military men and women should be pitted against one another based solely on their race?

Lieutenant General WHITING. No, sir, I do not.

Senator SCHMITT. Do you believe, or do you accept the proposition that General Brown, in his August 2022 memo, that we should have racial quotas with officer class?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I am not aware that General Brown has said that.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay, if General Brown said that we should have a reduction in the number of white officers serving to 67 percent of officers down from whatever, I think it is a total of 5,400 officers, do you support that?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Senator, I support that promotion should be based on merit.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. So, you don't support the idea that we would have racial quotas for the officer class?

Lieutenant General WHITING. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. I do want to ask you also, what role do you think DEI—what is your experience? What—firsthand for you, what have you in these trainings, what have you seen? What have been the trainings that have taken place? I am not talking about reaching for the best and the brightest. I want to understand, because we have a military recruitment problem, right.

So, the issue, I think, is if people view, and this is coming from the Department of Defense and it has been widely talked about in this Committee, if people view that politics is being infused in our military, do you think that that would hurt recruitment?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, I do, and I think the military must be rigorously apolitical and nonpartisan.

Senator SCHMITT. All right. Do think infusing abortion politics into our military hurts our recruiting?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, we in the military should not be partisan or political.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. Do you think infusing COVID politics into our military hurts our recruiting? Meaning, do you think that people should have been fired for not getting the vaccine?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, we were required to uphold a legal order.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay. Do you think we should actively recruit those 8,500 people who were fired for not getting the vaccine?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Sir, I would like to see those individuals who can come back, apply to come back. Yes, sir.

Senator SCHMITT. You think we should recruit them to come back?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, sir.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay, and then do you believe that the—are you familiar with the August memo of 2022 from General Brown?

Lieutenant General WHITING. I am not, sir.

Senator SCHMITT. Okay, we will—then some followup questions, ask you your points of view on that.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Mullin.

Senator MULLIN. Thank you. For those that are here and thank you for the family that has come along and supported—supported these two Generals here along the way. It is a family affair, and

I said this multiple times that, you know, no one can do their job at their best ability if things at home are rocky.

So those that are home, that is building that solid foundation for these Generals and others that are serving to be at their best. I want to thank you for that and thank you for the time that you have packed the houses, moved, and still held the family together. It is a sacrifice for the entire family, and from the deepest part of my heart, I want to tell you thank you so much for that. I am going to be pretty quick here just because we are running every which way direction right now.

So, I have just got questions for Guillot. General, as you know, obviously, you have spent time at Tinker, which we appreciate that. It is obviously something I am very proud to build, to represent. I would like to ask your best military advice on issues you know from your time at Tinker Air Force Base and your long career in the air battle management.

The Air Force is in the process of divesting in the E-3 fleet and switching to the E-7. The timeline as it stands now has us totally divesting the E-3 by fiscal year 2029, and at that time, I believe we are only going to have five E-7 on platforms. Are we concerned about the mission capabilities and the gap that might be taking place at that point?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, thanks for mentioning my time at Tinker. I had three assignments there and love the base, the people, and the mission, and the E-3, I have a lot of experience in the E-3 all over the world. Great capability, but it does need to be replaced by the E-7. I appreciate the Air Force and Congress's help in doing that.

The gap that you mentioned is similar to the ballistic missile defense gap that we have talked about. It has to be managed very, very carefully.

So if I am confirmed as the Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, that is a key system—not necessarily the E-3, but the airborne early warning capability, whether it is the E-3 or the E-7, would be critical and I would be very vocal about the requirements and to ensure that we don't drop in capability and create a bathtub that would keep us from doing that job before the new system comes on.

Senator MULLIN. At the current prediction—prediction—current rate to which we are going. Sorry, I didn't have my coffee this morning. At the current rate that we are headed right now, we have seen that there will be a gap.

Senator Lankford and myself have an amendment in the NDAA that hopefully is going to be helpful to fulfilling the mission while we are making the transition to the E-7, and I agree, the E-3 is—had a wonderful shelf life and it has performed this mission well, and we do need to upgrade, especially for the new threats that are facing us.

But we want to make sure that we are not, you know, hurting ourselves for National Security purposes on the way out the door. At the same time, we don't want to do something that the Air Force isn't on track with too.

You know, a lot of times as legislators, we have great ideas, but it is not practical. We want to make sure the amendment we have is actually practical. So, I would love for you to followup.

If you are not familiar with the amendment, take a look at it, because it is moving now, and so, we make sure that we are doing what is mission capable and what you think would be best in line with you too, right.

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator. I will do that.

Senator MULLIN. With that, I yield back. Thank you, sir.

Senator KELLY. Senator Cotton.

Senator COTTON. Gentlemen, congratulations on your nominations and thank you for your lifetime of service. Thanks to your families for your service and support to your missions as well. General Guillot, you believe that as part of—part of your mission as NORTHCOM Commander is airspace control over the continental United States, correct?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Senator.

Senator COTTON. Domestically, there are reports of over 57 drone incursions over nuclear sites since 2015 and at least 510 unidentified aerial objects reports since 2004, centered around restricted and sensitive airspace, with around half of those reported in the last 2 years. How do you view NORTHCOM's role in defense against the threat from such unmanned aerial vehicles?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, it is a role, to my understanding, that NORAD and NORTHCOM share with the services that have been delegated authorities around their installations to protect those. Then the NORAD responsibility picks up Generally in the airspace structure above those facilities.

Senator COTTON. Okay. I don't want to go into depth rehashing the Chinese balloon incident from earlier this year, but in general, if a malign actor illegally flies an aircraft over American territory with malign intent, do you believe that we should shoot it down?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I absolutely believe we should shoot it down if it has demonstrated hostile act or a hostile intent.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Are you aware that there were more than 10,000 violations of our airspace with drone aircraft conducting intelligence operations last year? Given the threat, we have seen that drones pose in Ukraine, increasingly in Russia, how significant are your concerns about those violations of our airspace?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I am very concerned about any airspace violation. Certainly, the unmanned capabilities that you are mentioning bring a new dimension that we haven't had to see in the recent years. If I am confirmed, that would take a great deal of my attention to address that.

Senator COTTON. Good. The vast majority of those incursions were conducted by Mexican cartels in support of drug smuggling activities. In fact, the U.S. Border Patrol chief has said that we don't have operational control of the Southern border.

Given how drones are now being used in Ukraine, and in Russia, how do you view the loss of operational control on our Southern border and the failure to establish airspace control as a threat there to our ability to defend our Homeland and our people?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I know it sounds trite, but I firmly believe that border security is National Security. If I am confirmed, the number one priority I would have is to defend the Homeland, and certainly border security is at the top of that. So, I would be very concerned about any loss of sovereignty in the airspace or the ground of our borders.

Senator COTTON. Good. Thank you for that. According to DHS data, Customs and Border Protection encounter more than 100 Russians attempting to illegally enter the United States every month near just a single location on the US-Mexico border. Russian military intelligence has more officers deployed to Mexico than any other country in the world.

The current NORTHCOM Commander has described China and Russia as, “very, very aggressive and active” in NORTHCOM. We have seen what happened with Chinese spy balloon.

We know that China is setting up shop in Cuba, which I understand is technically not a part of your area of responsibility, but it is pretty close. In the same way that North Korea and China aren’t a part of your area of responsibility, but they project threats into that area.

How do you view these actions by Russia and China through our South as a threat to our Homeland?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, I view the actions you described as a very serious threat and one that, if confirmed, I will watch very closely. As you alluded to, it is not just in the air that NORAD and NORTHCOM protect the Homeland, but also through all domains, including the ground.

Senator COTTON. Indeed. It is probably the case that Aldrich Ames, for instance, was recruited by Russian intelligence in Mexico City. We know it is a classic case that Russians—Russian agents stuck an icepick into Trotsky’s head in Mexico.

So, again, that threat is genuine and real to the United States. One final question, at least 98 terrorists were caught on the Southern border last year, and that doesn’t include any potential got-aways that we don’t know about.

General Kurilla said last year it was that it was his Commander’s estimate that ISIS-K could conduct an external operation against the United States or Western interests abroad in about 6 months, perhaps with little to no warning.

Two years ago, an Iraqi man in the United States hatched a plot to bring ISIS operatives through our Southern border to assassinate former President Bush.

Given your experience as the Deputy Commander in the Middle East, can you draw upon that to help secure our Southern border from terrorist attack and ensure it does not become yet a new vector for attack?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Senator, if I am confirmed, I absolutely will draw on the experiences from Central Command, co-operation with Special Operations Command, and then new and lasting relationships with law enforcement agencies here in the Homeland to ensure that any of the threats that General Kurilla is effectively addressing overseas do not make it to our Homeland.

Senator COTTON. Okay. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony. General Whiting, I know you are disappointed you didn't get lots of hard questions from me, but maybe next time.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Senator KELLY. Well, thank you, General Guillot and General Whiting, and congratulations on both of your nominations. Great to see you and your families here. Hopefully, we can, you know, get you through this process and get you into these important positions.

You know, NORTHCOM and NORAD and United States Space Command are so critical to our national defense. So, I look forward to voting for your nomination in Committee and then eventually on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Thank you, and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?

Answer. I understand that the duties and functions of the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) include defending the Homeland of the United States, providing defense support of civil authorities, and conducting security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated as the Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic Capabilities.

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?

Answer. I understand that the duties and functions of the Commander of NORAD include providing aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for the United States and Canada. As stated in the bi-national NORAD agreement, the chain of command for the NORAD Commander includes both the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. I have been honored to serve our Nation for over 34 years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force, and I am humbled to be nominated to be the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I have tremendous regard for both commands and their vital, no-fail missions. If confirmed, I will draw upon all my experiences to lead the men and women who provide defense of our Homeland.

I am very fortunate that during my assignments I have gained background and experience that directly relate to commanding USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I currently serve as the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). In many ways, the USCENTCOM mission is to conduct the Homeland defense "away game" by removing threats to the United States before they can strike within our borders. In this role, I see daily the importance of executing tasks as outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and coordinating with other combatant commands to provide integrated deterrence and share vital resources. I also coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters of USCENTCOM operations. As the Deputy Commander, I understand the importance of Congress' oversight role and the need to keep Congress informed with timely and transparent responses to requests for information, reports, and testimony.

I have a strong appreciation for the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions, having flown NORAD missions for over 6 years during three operational flying assignments. I also served as the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, where I directed the command's response to a wide range of multi-domain threats to the U.S., including ballistic missile defense of the Homeland and numerous actions by peer competi-

tors that challenged the security of the U.S. I also fully appreciate the importance of the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission as we executed responses to Hurricane Dorian, supported U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the United States-Mexico border, and support of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, I have a strong understanding of the need to build and maintain robust relationships with Federal, State, and international partners, and the importance of routinely updating Congress on matters of importance to national security.

I have been fortunate to command at the squadron, group, wing, and Numbered Air Force levels and to serve in a variety of Joint assignments. My most recent command was 9th Air Force/Air Forces Central Command, where I was responsible for all U.S. and Coalition combat air operations in the Middle East. During this assignment, I was responsible for ensuring the air defense of U.S. and Coalition locations, a task that helped prepare me to command NORAD's complex air defense mission, if confirmed. I also learned the value of gaining and maintaining strong relationships with foreign military partners. This experience will greatly benefit me if I am confirmed to serve as the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as working closely with military leaders from Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas will be critical to ensuring mission accomplishment across the wide spectrum of missions for which USNORTHCOM is responsible.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, NORAD?

Answer. If confirmed, I will eagerly embrace expanding my knowledge of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions and how the commands can better coordinate, integrate, and cooperate with mission partners from other combatant commands, the military Services, the U.S. interagency, and foreign partners. I will maintain an open mind and seek thoughtful insight from many sources, to include Congress, to honorably and effectively carry out the duties of Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND AUTHORITIES

Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland Security Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as State and local authorities and representatives from the private sector?

Answer. Close collaboration and effective communication between USNORTHCOM and its Federal, State, and local government partners is critical, as is the command's relationship with the private sector. If confirmed, I will establish direct relationships with my counterparts from each of the Federal agencies to ensure trust is established before a potential crisis, and I will direct the staff to do the same with counterparts at their respective levels. I will continue to build upon the command's strong partnerships, including with the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, to ensure USNORTHCOM remains ready to support DHS and other Federal partners as directed.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the military when supporting law enforcement in State or national emergencies?

Answer. The military is in a unique position to provide support to law enforcement agencies during emergencies due to its specialized personnel, equipment, facilities, and training. However, such support must always be consistent with the limitations established by Congress, especially the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits direct military involvement by Title 10 forces with civilian law enforcement. Therefore, the proper role for the military when supporting law enforcement is generally in a mission support role and not engaging in direct law enforcement activities, unless lawfully directed to do so by competent authority.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. Northern Command?

Answer. In my view, the next Commander of USNORTHCOM must be prepared to defend the U.S. Homeland against all-domain threats in a historically complex strategic environment. The People's Republic of China (PRC) will remain the pacing threat for the foreseeable future and the PRC will continue to develop increasingly advanced kinetic and non-kinetic systems capable of holding U.S. territory and interests at risk. The next commander must also deter and stand ready to defend the United States against Russian aggression, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin's blatant

aggression against Ukraine, contempt for international law, and pursuit of advanced long-range conventional and nuclear missile technologies. A modern and effective Ballistic Missile Defense System will remain necessary as North Korea continues to develop increasingly advanced ICBM technology. NORAD and USNORTHCOM must maintain vigilance against plots by Iran and Violent Extremist Organizations. Meanwhile, the next commander must ensure the command remains always ready to support civil authorities in response to disasters and public health emergencies as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. Addressing these challenges will require USNORTHCOM and NORAD to first continue to improve the capability to detect and respond to potential threats. If confirmed, I will advocate to keep modernization programs to improve USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to detect threats on track. Additionally, I will conduct seamless operations with fellow combatant commands, rapidly employ well-trained and well-equipped forces to deter or defeat aggression, and routinely communicate and operate with Federal and State partners. NORAD and USNORTHCOM's record of success is due largely to its dedicated military and civilian personnel, and if confirmed, I will also emphasize recruiting and retaining the best possible workforce to execute the commands' no-fail missions.

Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish as Commander, U.S. Northern Command?

Answer. If confirmed as Commander of USNORTHCOM, I will establish three priorities: defend the homeland; strengthen the network of Federal, State, local, and international partners; and advance the USNORTHCOM workforce. In support of these priorities, I will place heavy emphasis on integrating globally, improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority. This operational approach to achieving my priorities requires advancing the USNORTHCOM workforce with the skills, experience, professionalism, and dedication already demonstrated daily by the men and women of USNORTHCOM.

RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Question. What are your views on the State of NORTHCOM's relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

Answer. It is my understanding that USNORTHCOM has a strong, trusted relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congress in general. If confirmed, I will ensure the command continues to communicate frequently, openly, and candidly with the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congress in order to maintain mutual trust and understanding. I am mindful of, and strongly appreciate, Congress' oversight role.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and NORTHCOM?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to maintain a relationship of mutual respect and trust between USNORTHCOM and Congress. To do so, I will work closely with the Department to ensure all congressional requests for information receive timely and accurate responses, and I will provide forthright and candid assessments to Congress regarding command missions, requirements, and challenges.

MISSION OF NORTHCOM

Question. How do you define the mission of NORTHCOM?

Answer. As defined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), USNORTHCOM's assigned missions are homeland defense; security cooperation with Canada, The Bahamas, and Mexico; and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

Question. How does NORTHCOM's mission relate to the mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including with regard to homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)?

Answer. USNORTHCOM's homeland defense mission and DHS' homeland security and domestic law enforcement responsibilities are necessarily distinct, but they are complementary. Cooperation between USNORTHCOM and DHS is critical to the national security of the United States, as USNORTHCOM routinely provides defense support to DHS operations, including the DHS mission along the U.S.—Mexico border. USNORTHCOM also routinely supports DHS disaster relief operations in the United States through Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). To ensure collaborative responses that are effective and timely, USNORTHCOM and DHS routinely plan, exercise, and operate together, and each organization has senior liaison officers permanently assigned to the other's headquarters. If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM strengthens its already close relationship with DHS.

Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays a role in furthering civilian control of our military?

Answer. The United States Constitution establishes civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle of our democracy and a shared responsibility of all three branches of government. As a military officer, I have repeatedly sworn, and always adhered to, an oath to support and defend the Constitution. While the President serves as Commander-in-Chief with operational control of the military, Congress has substantial authorities that enhance civilian control of the military, including authorizing and appropriating funds, establishing rules and regulations, and the power to authorize the use of force. Additionally, the Senate advises and consents to the promotion of field grade officers and above, as well as senior-level civilian appointees. Additionally, Congress conducts oversight of the military and can compel testimony.

Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political priorities?

Answer. My obligation to give my best military advice to civilian leadership is rooted in my oath to support and defend the Constitution. It is my responsibility to provide the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States my candid and unvarnished views, informed by operational realities, to assist in the development of directives and operational direction, regardless of political priorities or established military positions. Civilian leaders are free to incorporate all, some, or none of my advice but my duty to the Constitution is to provide it.

NORAD

Question. What is your understanding of the mission of NORAD?

Answer. I understand NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in defense of North America. These missions are codified in the bi-national NORAD agreement signed by the governments of the United States and Canada.

Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to NORTHCOM's mission? With Operation Noble Eagle?

Answer. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands with complementary missions that are essential to the defense of the United States and Canada. The ironclad relationship between NORAD and USNORTHCOM and the connections between their missions are made evident by the fact that seven of the eight NORAD and USNORTHCOM joint directorates support both commands simultaneously.

Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) is a bi-national U.S.-Canadian air homeland defense mission conducted by NORAD, USINDOPACOM and, when necessary, USNORTHCOM within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). While USNORTHCOM is primarily in a supporting role to NORAD for ONE missions within the USNORTHCOM AOR, those missions directly benefit the USNORTHCOM homeland defense mission. Additionally, USNORTHCOM is prepared to conduct U.S. unilateral, non-NORAD air operations as directed. Command and control of ONE operations is conducted by the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center, allowing real-time coordination between NORAD and USNORTHCOM while ensuring alignment of the commands' distinct roles and authorities.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, NORAD?

Answer. In my view, the major challenge that will face the next Commander of NORAD is outpacing advanced peer competitors in order to effectively detect and warn of threats to the United States and Canada in the air and maritime domains and to defend against threats in the air domain. The key to addressing these challenges will be improving domain awareness and our ability to detect threats from wherever they may emanate. The challenges facing NORAD are closely linked to those facing USNORTHCOM. While NORAD maintains a distinct mission set from USNORTHCOM, the two commands' highly complementary missions, shared geographic boundaries, and the extraordinarily close working relationship inside the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters—and between the United States and Canada—means a challenge for one command is often a challenge for the other.

Question. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?

Answer. As the former Director of Operations for USNORTHCOM, I saw firsthand that maintaining a combined staff and Joint Operations Center (JOC) is important to mission success for both commands and leads to effective, efficient, and mutually beneficial operations. Although executed through distinct authorities, the complementary nature of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions, built on over two decades of experience and cooperation, are highly beneficial to the defense of North America.

Question. What is the relationship of the Commander of NORAD to the Canadian component of NORAD, and what role does Canada play in NORAD operations and planning?

Answer. Per the NORAD Agreement, if the Commander of NORAD is a U.S. officer, the NORAD Deputy will be a Canadian officer. The NORAD Commander reports to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and to the Secretary of Defense regarding NORAD matters. Members of the Canadian armed forces are fully integrated into the headquarters operations and planning staff. The Canadian NORAD Region is a subordinate NORAD organization and provides command and control of NORAD air defense forces in Canada. Additionally, the Commander of NORAD exercises operational control, as defined in the NORAD Agreement, of Canadian armed forces at the discretion of the CDS.

2022 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that one of the Department's top priorities is "Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the [People's Republic of China]". The NDS also emphasizes the importance of integrated deterrence for aligning the Department's policies, resources, and activities to strengthen deterrence and pursuing a coordinated, holistic approach both within the Department and through the interagency.

In your view, what are the major challenges for homeland defense as the United States competes strategically with China, Russia and other potential adversaries?

Answer. In my view, homeland defense is challenged by competitors' rapid capability advances that threaten the homeland in multiple domains and from multiple approaches. Further, these advances are accompanied by a highly complex and rapidly shifting strategic environment. As a result, emphasis must be placed on improving global domain awareness; integrating homeland defense into global plans, strategies, and exercises; and outpacing competitors through innovation and rapid capability acquisition.

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for how the DOD should prioritize homeland defense to meet current and future challenges, including in cyberspace and space?

Answer. Homeland defense is the Department of Defense's (DOD) number one priority per the National Defense Strategy, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the People's Republic of China. If confirmed, I recommend the DOD, first and foremost, continue to develop and invest in all domain awareness capabilities that will expand leaders' decision space. I also recommend the DOD continue to invest in command and control capabilities that will help achieve information dominance and decision superiority. Finally, the Department must increase resilience to ensure our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from any disruption in any domain.

Question. What do you see as the role of NORTHCOM in an integrated deterrence approach to implementing the NDS, both within the Department and in coordination with other departments and agencies with a mission of protecting the homeland?

Answer. Homeland defense is a whole-of-government effort to deter attacks from adversaries in all domains. If confirmed, my role as the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM will be to lead the military portion of the mission and to ensure those efforts are integrated globally, including with other combatant commands, the interagency, and allies and partners. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will be most effective when executing with other elements; they are one piece of the U.S. Government's wider efforts to ensure our Nation remains safe and secure.

Integrated Deterrence requires all-domain awareness and information dominance. This allows the DOD to anticipate competitor actions and track them globally, enabling the U.S. to generate appropriate response options. Integrated Deterrence requires the DOD to achieve decision superiority over competitors in order to preserve decision space and create options for our national leaders.

FORCE PROTECTION WITHIN NORTHCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

Question. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's responsibility for force protection and antiterrorism within its AOR?

Answer. USNORTHCOM's primary mission is to protect the Homeland, which requires increased focus on force protection and antiterrorism to ensure the safety and security of DOD critical infrastructure, personnel, information, and strategic resources. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for setting the FPCON (force protection condition) level for the CONUS (to include the National Capital Region), and Alaska, and also for United States installations in Canada and The Bahamas. This responsibility requires USNORTHCOM to constantly coordinate with law enforcement and the Intelligence Community to identify and pre-empt potential attacks. If confirmed, I will build upon the existing relationships with force protection mission partners to enhance information sharing and employ the DOD Force Protection Condition system to continuously tailor the security posture to deter and, if necessary, defend against current and anticipated threats.

Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM's AOR?

Answer. I believe the greatest challenges to force protection we currently face in the Homeland are the emerging technologies that increase both the scope and speed of threat capabilities. The challenge of identifying potential threat actors before they can conduct an attack or commit other acts of coercion and aggression requires effective integration with others whom share the responsibility for force protection. USNORTHCOM must also maintain persistent engagement with the Intelligence Community, counterintelligence, and law enforcement at all levels to improve our threat detection capabilities and mitigation options while simultaneously protecting civil liberties. USNORTHCOM will continue to explore technological solutions and partner with industry to identify new threat vectors and the means to both identify and effectively counter them.

FORCE ALLOCATION FOR NORTHCOM

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of how forces are allocated or planned to be allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements?

Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM requests forces through the Global Force Management process. USNORTHCOM has only a small number of permanently assigned forces and relies on requests for forces through the Joint Staff or as directed by the Secretary of Defense in order to meet the command's mission requirements. If confirmed, I will submit requests for forces based on mission requirements and will accompany those requests with a risk assessment.

Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM will have sufficient forces available to it that are properly trained and equipped to accomplish its assigned missions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military Service Chiefs through the Global Force Management process to ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM's mission requirements and risk are well understood. I will work closely and collaboratively with the military to assist them in their mission to man, train, and equip forces ready to take on the challenges of today's operational environment in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and Reserve) that are apportioned or assigned for the homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of NORTHCOM's contingency plans and for its DSCA missions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will use Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to assess the readiness of forces assigned, apportioned, or allocated to support USNORTHCOM's homeland defense and DSCA missions, as well as contingency plans. I will work with the Joint Staff and Service Chiefs to address and mitigate any potential readiness shortfalls identified. Once forces are assigned, I will require commanders to sustain force readiness while conducting the tasked operations and identify when or if readiness in specific mission areas cannot be maintained and recommend appropriate measures to mitigate those impacts.

NORTHCOM DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES MISSION

Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence management operations.

What is your understanding and assessment of NORTHCOM's awareness of and coordination for the support of the emergency response capabilities and contingency plans of civil authorities, including the states and territories, before a crisis arises?

Answer. I understand that USNORTHCOM continually participates in a wide variety of engagements, educational forums, and training events with Federal, State, local, and tribal partners to be ready for a variety of scenarios. At the operational and tactical field level, USNORTHCOM employs Defense Coordination Officers (DCO), Defense Coordination Elements (DCE), and Joint Regional Medical Planning Officers (JRMPO) aligned with each of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. These elements routinely coordinate, collaborate, plan, and exercise with agency partners to maintain communication and common understanding of requirements and capabilities. Finally, numerous civil Federal agency representatives have liaisons embedded in the USNORTHCOM headquarters, while USNORTHCOM has senior level staff officers assigned to several Federal agencies to increase understanding of DOD capabilities.

Question. In your view, does NORTHCOM's plans, policies, and programs optimize the Defense Department's consequence management support to civil authorities?

Answer. I know providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) has been a high priority USNORTHCOM mission for many years. The command takes great pride in assisting Federal partners and American communities in times of need, and lessons learned indicate the plans, policies, and programs are strong. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the plans, programs, and policies associated with the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission and take any steps needed to ensure the command is always prepared to provide the most effective and efficient support to the command's partners.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that NORTHCOM has sufficient knowledge of State and inter-State emergency response capabilities, including capabilities of National Guard units, capabilities of title 10 regular and Reserve component forces, and a good working relationship with State emergency response leaders?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the longstanding practice of maintaining liaison officers from the Active and Reserve components in the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters in order to maintain knowledge of State and inter-State response capabilities. We will conduct routine planning and exercising with partners at every level, hosting conferences and other events to strengthen personal relationships between the commands and their partners. Effort will be placed on improving programs that strengthen communication and collaboration between NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and all of the commands' total force and interagency partners, to include State emergency response leaders.

Question. How does the Department of Defense's assistance to DHS and other civilian agencies affect readiness? Are there steps that you would recommend, if confirmed, to mitigate any harm to readiness stemming from these deployments?

Answer. In certain circumstances, deployments in support of the Department's assistance to DHS can enhance readiness for certain occupational specialties, while in other cases it may detract from individual and unit readiness. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff, the military, and the commanders of forces allocated to USNORTHCOM to assess impacts to force readiness associated with the execution of missions assigned to USNORTHCOM and implement appropriate measures to mitigate those impacts.

PROCESS FOR ADDRESSING DSCA REQUESTS AND FUNDING

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the policies and procedures by which Federal civil authorities, states, and territories request, employ, and fund DSCA, including with respect to reimbursement of the Defense Department for such operations?

Answer. It is my understanding that states and territories request Defense Support of Civil Authorities through a lead Federal agency under the authorities provided by the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act authorizes Governors and emergency management officials to request support from a lead Federal agency as needed to safeguard life and property in the event of a disaster. In turn, Federal agencies may then request further assistance and capabilities from the DOD in support of a collaborative Federal response.

While I understand reimbursement for incurred expenses is managed at the Department level, I believe the Economy Act authorizes DOD to provide support to a lead Federal agency in certain circumstances. Based on my previous experience as the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, examples of qualifying events include National Special Security Events such as national political conventions or major

sports events. At a local level, U.S. military units are also authorized to provide temporary direct assistance to local communities in the event of a disaster using Immediate Response Authority.

Question. If confirmed, what policy or procedural changes would you propose, if any, for the processes for requesting, employing, and determining funding sources for DSCA?

Answer. Providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a critically important mission that has repeatedly delivered significant positive benefits for the Nation. While USNORTHCOM does not have a role in determining funding sources for DSCA, if confirmed, I will advocate for processes that preserve USNORTHCOM's ability to provide rapid and effective support to the command's civilian partners.

DSCA ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

Question. At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense continues to provide a mix of Active Duty and National Guard units, and other capabilities, to support U.S. Customs and Border Protection activities along the southwest border.

What is your assessment of the security situation along the United States-Mexico border?

Answer. Security of the United States-Mexico border is of significant importance to the United States and, as directed by appropriate authorities, USNORTHCOM is providing support to the DHS mission. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DHS to assess the security situation along the United States-Mexico border. Part of that assessment will be determining whether USNORTHCOM support to Federal and international partners is being optimized.

Question. What are the appropriate roles and missions for the National Guard units and active duty units, in support of DHS, including Customs and Border Protection, and its border patrol mission?

Answer. I understand that, in response to a request for assistance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Secretary of Defense has approved support to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations on the United States-Mexico border by United States military personnel. I further understand that, in accordance with the DHS request for assistance, U.S. military personnel are not engaged in direct law-enforcement activities, but provide support that includes aviation support, transportation of CBP personnel, mobile surveillance camera operators, and intelligence administrative support. As I understand them, I believe these roles and missions are appropriate.

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you anticipate making to your chain of command, if any, to make DOD's support mission at the southwest border more effective?

Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately and carefully assess USNORTHCOM's support of the Department of Homeland Security mission along the United States-Mexico border and work closely with DOD and the lead Federal agency to ensure that support is as effective as possible.

COUNTER-DRUG AND COUNTER-TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AUTHORITIES AND PROGRAMS

Question. The Director of National Intelligence's Annual Threat Assessment for 2023 found that Western Hemisphere-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and Mexican TCOs in particular, endanger the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens through the production and trafficking of illegal drugs bound for the United States. The rapid increase in fentanyl trafficking accounts for the majority of more than 100,000 annual deaths from drug overdoses in the United States.

What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. national security posed by drug trafficking and other activities by TCOs within the NORTHCOM AOR?

Answer. TCOs drive instability in the communities in which they operate and challenge good governance in North America to the detriment of the entire continent. Mitigating the negative consequences of TCO's illicit behavior is essential to the national security of all countries in the USNORTHCOM AOR and requires whole-of-government approaches synchronized with partner nations.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in countering drug trafficking and the threat from TCOs and what role should NORTHCOM play with respect to such an effort?

Answer. It is my understanding that the threat to national security posed by TCO networks is acute and worsening. Department of Defense and USNORTHCOM serve in a supporting role in accordance with statutory requirements and policy guidelines. In this role, I believe it is appropriate for USNORTHCOM to provide intel-

ligence and operational support, when requested, to support U.S. Departments and Agencies and foreign law enforcement partners in their counter-drug/counter-transnational criminal organization (CD/CTCO) activities.

Question. In your view, does NORTHCOM have the appropriate authorities and resources for fulfilling its counter-drug and counter-TCOs missions?

Answer. To my knowledge, there are no shortfalls in USNORTHCOM's existing authorities or resources to support interagency law enforcement partners' counter-drug and counter-TCO mission. If confirmed, I will determine whether USNORTHCOM has the appropriate authorities and resources to conduct its support that mission as part of my 90-day assessment.

Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of counter-drug operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and along the geographic seam NORTHCOM shares with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)?

Answer. Effective cross-combatant command integration is critical to effective counter-drug operations. If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment, which will include an assessment of USNORTHCOM support to counter-drug operations with a specific focus on the cooperation and coordination with USSOUTHCOM.

Question. What metrics would you recommend the Department use to measure the effectiveness of its counter-drug programs and counter-TCOs in the NORTHCOM AOR?

Answer. Establishing effective metrics is essential to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of activities in support the counter-drug mission. If confirmed, I will assess existing metrics and, if needed, establish new metrics to measure the effectiveness of USNORTHCOM's support of Federal partners' counterdrug and counter-TCO efforts as part of my 90-day assessment.

SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CANADA AND MEXICO

Question. What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Canada and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for strengthening that security relationship?

Answer. It is my understanding the current security relationship between the U.S. and Canada is extremely strong and is essential for the defense of North America and for maintaining security in the Arctic. I remain encouraged by the bi-national commitments to modernizing the sensors, platforms, and capabilities necessary to execute NORAD's missions, including Canada's fielding of the F-35 and two over-the-horizon radars. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD remains a modern and effective force capable of deterring and defeating threats to North America. My priority for security relationships will be to strengthen the various networks that are the foundation of USNORTHCOM's relationship with Canada by integrating globally, improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority.

Question. What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Mexico and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for strengthening that security relationship?

Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM maintains an extremely strong security relationship with its Mexican military counterparts. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of SEMAR (Mexican Navy) and SEDENA (Mexican Army and Air Force) to further enhance military interoperability, cooperation, and mutual objectives. My 90-day assessment will help inform my priorities for strengthening our security relationship. My priority for security relationships will be to strengthen the various networks that are the foundation of USNORTHCOM's relationship with Mexico by integrating globally, improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority.

Question. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the United States posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Mexico? If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for enhancing the military-to-military cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Mexican Army (SEDENA) and Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to address mutual security challenges, including the threat from TCOs?

Answer. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) based in Mexico are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths each year in the United States and Mexico. The revenues that these organizations generate by delivering dangerous, illicit materials to U.S. markets drive violence in North America and undermine the safety and security of the continent. Illicit drugs, especially fentanyl, smuggled by TCOs into the United States have led to record numbers of overdose deaths, while cartel violence, exacerbated by weapons smuggling into Mexico, has done enormous harm to the Mexican people and their national institutions.

I understand USNORTHCOM's relationship with its Mexican military partners is historically strong and that Mexico is both a willing and capable partner across a number of areas affecting North American defense and security. If confirmed, I will seek to further strengthen the defense relationship between USNORTHCOM and its Mexican military partners, ideally through training and exercises, to advance our combined capability and capacity to address mutual security challenges, including countering TCOs.

PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS

Question. NORTHCOM was the lead combatant command supporting other Federal agencies and states in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic. What role, if any, should NORTHCOM have with respect to pandemic preparedness, including its relationship to:

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program, overseen by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs

Answer. If confirmed, USNORTHCOM will use lessons learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic response to coordinate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense, to propose ways to improve cross-organizational processes to enhance the ability to respond to a Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological event quickly and effectively.

Question. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense programs

Answer. If confirmed, USNORTHCOM will use lessons learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic response to coordinate with the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense programs to propose ways to improve cross-organizational processes to enhance the ability to respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear event quickly and effectively.

Question. The Defense Health Agency

Answer. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan (UCP), Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning DOD efforts in support of the U.S. Government's response to pandemics and infectious diseases of operational significance (P&ID). As DOD's lead for Pandemic and Infectious Disease Plan, I understand USNORTHCOM maintains a close strategic and operational relationship with each of the combat support agencies, including the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the combatant commands, the military Services, and appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies. USNORTHCOM must coordinate with DHA and the inter-agency to share real-time awareness of health care facility capabilities and capacity, prioritization and distribution of countermeasures, ongoing health or disease prevalence, and bio-surveillance of current and emerging threats. USNORTHCOM also coordinates with DHA and the military Services to provide options for medical force employment either within the DOD or in support of civilian authorities.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN NORTHCOM

Question. Despite significant efforts by the Department and military services over the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to, sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female servicemembers aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.

Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect service members who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?

Answer. Until sexual assault, harassment, retaliation, and other harmful behaviors are eliminated from our ranks, work remains to be done by leadership at every level. The Department of Defense has taken important steps toward improving efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and all commanders must remain vigilant by developing, implementing, and sustaining a culture and programs that provide the safest possible environment for every member of their command. If confirmed, the responsibility for establishing a culture of dignity, respect, and accountability will start with me.

Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for yourself in preventing sexual harassment within NORTHCOM, including within its civilian workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately establish that I do not tolerate any abuse, harassment, assault, or other harmful behavior, to include sexual harassment. I will publish command policies and guidance to USNORTHCOM and NORAD to communicate my position. I will expect all USNORTHCOM and NORAD units and organizations to establish and maintain work environments that demand dignity and respect for all. I will immediately and carefully assess USNORTHCOM and NORAD's policies, programs, and training regarding sexual assault and harassment to ensure they comply with all applicable laws and policies, and where appropriate take corrective action. I will regularly update all members of USNORTHCOM and NORAD on the status of those efforts.

Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess any requirements and make recommendations for improvement as necessary.

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

Question. What role does the NORTHCOM civilian workforce play in executing missions effectively and efficiently?

Answer. The civilian workforce plays a critically important role in the effective and efficient execution of all USNORTHCOM missions. I understand that civilian personnel comprise more than half of NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters billets and serve in a wide range of roles, including subject matter experts, intelligence analysts, supervisors, and senior leaders. The civilian workforce lends tremendous experience, expertise, continuity, and diversity of thought to the entire defense enterprise, and I have no doubt the same is true at NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the ability of the civilian workforce to support NORTHCOM missions? Do you have any suggestions for legislative changes that would add flexibilities for managing the workforce?

Answer. Given USNORTHCOM's critical mission and reliance on civilians for over 50 percent of the headquarters workforce, effectively managing the civilian workforce is essential to mission success. At this time, there are no legislative changes that I would offer, but, if confirmed, I will assess key aspects of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD civilian workforce and provide recommended legislative changes, if any, through the Department.

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND-DHS RELATIONSHIP ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Question. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program manages Department activities to address risks to critical infrastructure. Of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the defense industrial base is the only sector for which the Department of Defense is designated as the Sector Risk Management Agency.

What is your assessment of the threat in the current strategic environment to critical infrastructure in the U.S. Homeland?

Answer. Today's threat environment is likely the most complex and dynamic our Homeland has ever faced. Cyber actors operating under the direction of our near-peer adversaries routinely surveil North American critical infrastructure for intelligence purposes and could quickly transition to cyber attack in the event of conflict. In addition, Russian air and naval forces can hold North American critical infrastructure at risk with conventionally armed cruise missiles. Finally, the strategic forces of Russia, China, and North Korea are modernizing and advancing their ability to target our critical infrastructure with nuclear weapons, primarily to deter a United States attack but also to impose costs and compel an acceptable resolution in the event of a strategic conflict.

Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?

Answer. I understand that USNORTHCOM has an active program to execute DOD's Mission Assurance Construct by assessing its missions, policies, plans, and programs to identify and mitigate risk from all threats and hazards to critical capabilities, functions, and supporting assets. If confirmed, I will ensure the command is able to execute missions by preventing or mitigating the loss or degradation of DOD-owned defense critical infrastructure (DCI) within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility in coordination with the DOD asset owner and the other DOD commanders.

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS in addressing the risks to critical infrastructure?

Answer. Addressing critical infrastructure risks requires partnership across government and with the private sector. DOD has the authority to manage risks to DOD facilities. USNORTHCOM works closely with OSD and DHS to address risks to non-DOD defense critical infrastructure (transportation, communications, energy, etc) upon which the military depends. DHS and its agencies, like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provide an important gateway to working with government partners and the private sector in making critical infrastructure more secure and resilient.

Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for strengthening the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS on critical infrastructure protection?

Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM has a variety of initiatives with DHS and its components. If confirmed, working with OSD, I will continue these practices and endeavor to increase information sharing with public and private sector stakeholders and foster a better understanding of the policies, authorities, and limitations that frame our critical infrastructure protection efforts. If confirmed, my 90-day assessment will include an evaluation of the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS to determine what priorities would support the most effective relationship for critical infrastructure protection.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD

Question. What is the current status of the relationship between NORTHCOM, the Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, and individual State National Guard headquarters?

Answer. Based on my previous USNORTHCOM experience, I know the National Guard is essential to USNORTHCOM and NORAD mission success. The commands rely on well-trained and well-equipped Air and Army National Guard forces to execute assigned missions. As a result, I understand USNORTHCOM and NORAD routinely communicate, plan, and integrate with the Department, the National Guard Bureau, and the State National Guard Headquarters regarding each of the commands' missions. If confirmed, I will continue to foster these valued relationships and prioritize integration and coordination with the commands' National Guard partners.

Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM; the Department of Defense; DHS; the National Guard Bureau; Federal, State, and local first responders; and National Guard units under State authority?

Answer. USNORTHCOM and NORAD rely upon close partnerships with a wide variety of DOD and interagency partners, to include the Department of Homeland Security, the National Guard Bureau, first responders, and the National Guard operating under State authorities. If confirmed, my 90-day assessment will include an evaluation of the current liaison relationships to determine how they might be improved to support better integration between USNORTHCOM and the myriad partners across the Federal, State, local, and tribal landscape.

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND JOINT TASK FORCES

Question. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-service task forces, such as Joint Task Force-Civil Support and Joint Task Force-North, have been placed under its authority.

What is your understanding of the mission of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support and what changes, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to its organization and resourcing to carry out that mission?

Answer. I understand that Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) conducts CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) response planning and preparedness to maximize mission readiness and decrease response time. If confirmed, I will assess the organization and resourcing of JTF-CS and make recommendations as appropriate to ensure the ability to execute its assigned missions and meet the changing threat environment.

Question. What is your understanding of the mission of the Joint Task Force North, including support to Federal law enforcement activities to identify and interdict transnational criminal organizations' activities? What changes, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to its organization and resourcing to carry out that mission?

Answer. I understand Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) is tasked to support Federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected transnational criminal organization activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental United States. I understand that JTF-N is also responsible for command and control of units supporting the Department of Homeland Se-

curity along the United States-Mexico border, as approved by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will assess the organization and resourcing of JTF-N and make recommendations as appropriate to ensure the ability to execute its assigned missions.

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

Question. Routine access to the National Airspace System (NAS) is severely restricted, including along portions of the borders with Canada and Mexico. The Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, and other agencies are currently working to integrate unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the NAS and have made progress in supporting training flights along the southwest border.

In your view, what, if any limitations are there for full integration of government operated UAS into the NAS?

Answer. I understand there are regulatory limitations on UAS operations that have been procedurally mitigated with the Federal Aviation Administration. Government-operated unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations are authorized in the national airspace under certain conditions. If confirmed, I will work with DOD, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other agencies to assess limitations and propose appropriate mitigations to assure mission accomplishment.

Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to support the development of training opportunities for UAS pilots that support readiness and border security?

Answer. As I understand it, USNORTHCOM support to the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection mission along the United States-Mexico border provides Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) pilots and operators with practical opportunities to gain experience while conducting missions in the NAS. Furthermore, I understand USNORTHCOM synchronizes UAS operations in support of civil authorities performing emergency services such as Wildland Firefighting and Search and Rescue, missions which also reinforce UAS pilot and operator training. Both the DOD and lead Federal/State agencies benefit from this arrangement. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the military Services, National Guard leadership, and supported Federal partners to support these reciprocal missions.

The use of UAS by malign actors is a growing problem on the battlefield and an increasing challenge for homeland defense. In section 1692 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Congress expanded the Department of Defense's existing authorities to use counter-UAS technology and develop procedures to protect facilities and assets associated with critical mission areas within the United States. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command, plays a key role in supporting homeland defense and coordinating with civil authorities in these efforts.

Question. What is your understanding of the threat posed by UAS operated with malign intent to Defense Department facilities and assets in the United States?

Answer. I am concerned about the Small-UAS (sUAS) threat to the Homeland, as sUAS technology is advancing and proliferating worldwide at a rapid pace. sUAS incursions are becoming more prevalent, and sUAS are used with regularity in other regions to attack U.S. and friendly forces. I have strong concern that sUAS one-way attack tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized overseas may be used here in the future. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM participate in cross-combatant command counter-UAS lessons learned forums, and I will advocate for the procurement of counter-sUAS defeat mechanisms to defend DOD critical infrastructure.

Question. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's role in the exercise of the authorities granted by section 1692? What actions would you take specifically to ensure the National Capital Region has the ability to detect, and if required defeat, the UAS threat?

Answer. As I understand it, USNORTHCOM does not have standing authority to execute the counter-UAS (C-UAS) actions authorized by section 1692 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, codified as section 130i of title 10. Those actions are primarily executed by the military Services. DOD policy has delegated the authority to take C-UAS actions authorized by the statute to commanders of covered installations and assets. I understand NORAD and USNORTHCOM have also been tasked and are developing an NCR sUAS common operating picture in support of the White House Military Office in order to detect, track and identify sUAS operating in the NCR. Additionally, NORAD is responsible for the aerospace warning and aerospace control missions in defense of North America, and when lawful and appropriate, NORAD may respond to UAS events under its aerospace control mission. I understand most small UAS (sUAS) threats do not fall within NORAD's aerospace control mission and the responsibility and authority for defense against sUAS is distributed

across multiple DOD and non-DOD agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to address this potential threat and ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to collaborate with multiple DOD organizations and interagency partners to address the emerging threat of sUAS attack.

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to use the authorities outlined in section 130i of title 10 (section 1692 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA) to address the threat posed by UAS to Defense Department facilities?

Answer. Neither NORAD nor USNORTHCOM have standing authority to execute the counter-UAS (C-UAS) authorities outlined by section 130i of title 10. Those actions are primarily executed by the military services as a matter of force protection for various installations. DOD policy has delegated the authority to take C-UAS actions authorized by the statute to commanders of covered installations and assets. If confirmed, I will work with the military services and advocate for all current and future C-sUAS capability needed for the betterment of homeland defense.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities, both of which include preparation for and response to an incident or attack involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) materials or weapons in the NORTHCOM AOR.

What is your assessment of the threat to the United States posed by CBRN materials and weapons? Given the proliferation of CBRN capabilities by State and non-State actors, how do you assess this threat will evolve in the coming years?

Answer. I am familiar with the Intelligence Community's efforts to monitor the CBRN programs of our principal State adversaries. None of these actors is assessed to be likely to employ CBRN against the Homeland outside a strategic conflict, but I am concerned destructive technologies and knowledge could proliferate to State and non-State actors whose CBRN activities may be more difficult to detect, deter, or disrupt. In the coming years, I am concerned CBRN capabilities could be rapidly transferred to or developed by extremists or criminals who could use them in unattributed attacks or attempts at extortion in the Homeland.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the Department of Defense's CBRN detection and response capabilities to effectively address the threat?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess USNORTHCOM's role as part of the larger DOD CBRN detection and response capabilities as part of my 90-day assessment. If the assessment indicates the threat would exceed the Department's ability to respond, or if the response timelines are determined to be insufficient, I will advocate to the Department for increased or improved capabilities, as appropriate, to effectively address the threat.

Question. If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such incidents in support of civil authorities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DOD, the Joint Staff, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and partners at all levels to make certain that all partners fully understand the requirements associated with the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission and ensure the readiness and availability of forces to conduct this essential mission. The DSCA mission requires rapid access to forces that are properly trained and equipped to execute a wide range of missions under difficult circumstances, and I would ensure sufficient cross-organizational and cross-Department training and exercises are conducted to ensure plans are validated and readiness is achieved and maintained.

Question. There are a variety of organizations and units intended for CBRN response and consequence management, including Joint Task Force-Civil Support, the Defense Consequence Management Response Force (DCMRF), the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, National Guard Homeland Response Forces, National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package units, and National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM participates with all mission partners in planning events and Tabletop Exercises that consider the most likely and most dangerous CBRN scenarios that the Intelligence Community assesses the U.S. could face. These events will help determine how best to align and employ the mix of capabilities when responding to various threats. In crisis, when Federal Forces of the CBRN Response Enterprise are requested, I will coordinate through

the lead Federal agency to ensure the correct capabilities are provided to support the mission assignment.

Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the DCMRF, as currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to support Federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident?

Answer. I understand the Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise provides a limited response to save lives and prevent human suffering in the event of a catastrophic CBRN Incident. It is designed to be a tiered response to provide civil authorities with technical life-saving forces in the first 96 hours of an incident. If confirmed, I will assess the capability and capacity of the Defense Consequence Management Response Force (DCMRF) to support Federal authorities in the event of a CBRN incident and take any needed steps to ensure its readiness to provide support when, where, and however needed.

Question. How would you ensure the necessary level of coordination and planning between the DCMRF and National Guard Homeland Response Forces to ensure an adequate response to a CBRN incident?

Answer. As currently designed, the USNORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is responsible for coordinating with the Lead Federal Agency to ensure requested CBRN capabilities are quickly validated and the DCMRF and/or National Guard Homeland Response Forces are deployed in support of civil authorities with clear guidance to conduct lifesaving/life enabling operations. As part of my 90-day assessment, I will assess whether this is an optimal arrangement.

Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing defense support to civil authorities in the event of CBRN incidents should be under the command of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command?

Answer. Yes, as the supported Combatant Commander for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, the Commander of USNORTHCOM should assume command of all military forces supporting a CBRN event within the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Additionally, the Commander of USNORTHCOM should be the lead synchronizer of DOD capabilities with the Lead Federal Agency to ensure unity of support. The Commander of USNORTHCOM should relinquish Operational Control (OPCON) of those forces upon mission completion.

WMD-CSTS AND CERFPS

Question. There are now 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), with at least one in each State and Territory, and there are 17 National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) units. In addition, there are 10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces, one in each Federal Emergency Management Agency region.

Do you believe the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?

Answer. Based on my previous experience as the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs were appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions. Additionally, WMD-CST and CERFP capabilities and readiness were tracked monthly in the Defense Readiness Report System. Part of my 90-day assessment will include a determination of whether this is still the case.

Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?

Answer. My 90-day assessment will determine if any changes are needed. If there are required changes, I will take appropriate action to ensure the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs can accomplish their assigned missions.

SPECTRUM ALLOCATION

Question. Please describe the importance of spectrum allocation to the NORTHCOM missions in defense of the homeland. Are there specific systems that you are concerned about being impacted relative to the 3.1–3.45 GHz band that is being studied for sharing or vacating?

Answer. The importance of spectrum allocation to the USNORTHCOM mission in defense of the Homeland cannot be overstated. There are multiple homeland defense platforms, to include maritime, airborne, and ground-based early warning systems (such as AWACS, AEGIS, Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), and PATRIOT) that provide the USNORTHCOM and NORAD threat warning, attack assessment, domain awareness, and aerospace/maritime warning that rely on the spectrum being studied. Part of my 90-day assessment will specifically focus on the national security impacts if the 3.1–3.45 GHz band is shared or vacated.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. One of NORTHCOM's missions is to defend the United States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran.

Do you believe that it is important to conduct operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system?

Answer. Yes. I believe operationally realistic flight tests provide valuable information that informs development and operational employment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system capabilities. Flight tests also build confidence in the capabilities being deployed against potential missile threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Missile Defense Agency throughout testing and fielding to maintain confidence in the GMD system.

Question. Do you support the current plan for modernizing the GMD system, which anticipates the deployment of a Next Generation Interceptor in about a decade?

Answer. Yes, I support continued modernization of the GMD system and the deployment of the Next Generation Interceptor, which I understand will provide increased capability and capacity to pace the threat from rogue nations such as North Korea and potentially Iran. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Missile Defense Agency to deliver the Next Generation Interceptor as early as possible.

Question. What are your views on the utility of constructing a second GMD site on the East Coast of the United States?

Answer. It is my understanding an additional Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptor site on the East Coast is not operationally required at this time. However, as in all military operations, it is important to incorporate depth and dispersion into operations. Given the rapid advancement of rogue nation capabilities, I would support recurring assessments of the advisability of constructing a second GMD site.

Question. In your view, what should the United States be doing to improve protection of the Homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles in the interim?

Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM is working closely with the Missile Defense Agency to improve the sensor architecture and interceptors required to keep pace with the rapidly advancing North Korean ballistic missile threat. If confirmed, I will strongly support these ongoing efforts, while also looking for additional opportunities for enhanced capabilities to defend the Homeland against the rogue State threat now and in the future.

Question. Do you support the policy—reiterated by the 2022 Missile Defense Review—that the United States should continue to rely on nuclear deterrence to defend against large-scale missile attack from Russia and China?

Answer. Yes, I believe strategic deterrence is the foundation for homeland defense against the threat of a large-scale missile attack from Russia and China.

Question. Do you believe the United States should develop the capability to defend the U.S. Homeland against hypersonic glide vehicles?

Answer. Yes, I believe the United States should develop the capability to defeat hypersonic glide vehicles. NORAD is responsible for providing tactical warning and attack assessment of hypersonic glide vehicles, as well as defense against hypersonic cruise missiles (a capability Russia has employed against Ukraine).

Question. What is your assessment of the importance of a space-based sensor capability to support homeland missile defense?

Answer. I strongly support the development of a more robust space-based sensor capability to augment the existing terrestrial and space-based sensor architecture and provide a more comprehensive, layered capability against all missile threats. With the advancement of competitor missile threat capabilities, a space-based sensor capability could support homeland missile defense by improving domain awareness against these threats, with persistent global tracking and discrimination of the missiles throughout their flight.

Question. The 2022 Unified Command Plan realigned missile defense responsibilities across the combatant commands to integrate U.S. Space Command into the mission space.

What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's role in missile defense?

Answer. I understand the 2022 Unified Command Plan (UCP) did not change USNORTHCOM's role in homeland missile defense. Together with NORAD, USNORTHCOM remains responsible for the planning and execution of homeland missile defense. The 2022 UCP transitioned the missile defense roles and responsibilities that USSTRATCOM traditionally executed in support of all combatant

commands to USSPACECOM. USSPACECOM is tasked with trans-regional missile planning and operations support in coordination with other combatant commands which compliments their role of global sensor manager that USSPACECOM already executes.

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise missiles.

Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United States, how would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United States and its territories?

Answer. I assess cruise missiles to be a significant threat to the U.S. and its territories because cruise missiles can be launched from multiple air-, sea-, and land-based systems from significant ranges and from multiple avenues of approach. Additionally, cruise missiles can fly at speeds and altitudes that are difficult to detect with existing radar systems. If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue more robust detection and defeat capabilities that outpace advanced cruise missile threats.

Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to address this threat?

Answer. I understand NORAD is working closely with the Air Force and the government of Canada to enhance sensor capabilities that provide advanced detection and warning of cruise missiles before they reach North America. If confirmed, it will be a top command priority to continue the advancement of these capabilities. I will also advocate for improved capabilities to defeat cruise missiles, including by non-kinetic means.

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE—NORAD

Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed or evolved with the advent of a resurgent Russia, rising China, and an ongoing terrorist threat?

Answer. Both Russia and China have significantly increased their ability to challenge the NORAD air defense mission in recent years. Both countries have fielded long-range cruise missiles that can be launched from ranges that challenge NORAD's aerospace warning capabilities. The improved cruise missiles, when launched from bombers, can fly toward North America from a variety of avenues of approach, making NORAD's aerospace control mission more difficult. With regards to an ongoing terrorist threat, strong interagency partnering and cooperation, as well as advances in intelligence, defense systems, and procedures have improved NORAD's posture to respond to a terrorist threat. The rapidly evolving airborne threats from peer competitors and potential adversaries provide the greatest challenges for continental air defense today, and if confirmed, I will work closely with Department of Defense, international, and interagency partners to obtain the capabilities to defend against current and emerging airborne threats.

Question. Do you believe that current U.S. air defense capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs with respect to great power competition?

Answer. Yes, I believe NORAD can defend North America with current U.S. air defense capabilities. However, strategic competitors' capabilities are rapidly advancing, and the U.S. (and Canada) must keep pace to maintain the ability to detect, track, and defeat all threats. If confirmed, I will advocate for the advanced capabilities NORAD requires to stay ahead of the threat and execute its aerospace warning and aerospace control missions.

Question. In your view, what are the key modernization priorities for NORAD's early warning radar systems and other air defense capabilities?

Answer. Part of my 90-day assessment will include identifying the key modernization priorities for NORAD's early warning radar systems and other air defense capabilities. However, based on my prior experience at NORAD, strategic competitors continue to develop advanced capabilities that can range North America from greater distances. As our competitors evolve, our detect systems must evolve faster and ensure we have the air and missile warning systems that provide for timely detection, tracking, and warning of threats before they reach North America. Older technology in the legacy systems will lose its effectiveness for warning against these increasingly complex, longer range weapons, and NORAD's capabilities must evolve and improve to outpace the threats.

Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly evaluate the fielded and proposed domain awareness (sensing and detection) systems and programs NORAD uses to meet its air defense responsibilities for the United States and Canada. I will coordinate with DOD and the Government of Canada to prioritize identified deficiencies and address

those deficiencies to ensure NORAD can accomplish its aerospace warning and aerospace control missions.

Question. In your view, are current NORAD modernization efforts to replace the North Warning System on track and proceeding with an appropriate level of urgency?

Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the current State of the NORAD North Warning System (NWS) as part of my 90-day assessment. Proposed modernization efforts involving other sensors in a system-of-systems will represent a dramatic improvement over the 30-year-old NWS which was not designed to detect modern weapons and delivery systems, such as long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles. Ensuring effective awareness ultimately requires a family-of-systems approach including a network of Canadian and U.S. sensors from the sea floor to outer space. Present investments in NORAD modernization are critical to both continental defense and enhanced domain awareness.

Question. In February 2023, a Chinese high altitude balloon entering United States airspace went undetected by NORAD. General VanHerck, the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, NORAD, said that there was a “domain awareness gap” that resulted in the balloon not being detected.

What is your assessment of the threat to homeland defense from Chinese surveillance balloons potentially entering United States airspace?

Answer. The PRC will likely make similar attempts in the future to gather sensitive information that might provide a competitive advantage, including flight over sites that are critical to homeland defense. The keys to mitigating the PRC surveillance balloon threat are shared intelligence, improved domain awareness, and streamlined information sharing.

Question. In your assessment, have NORTHCOM and NORAD taken sufficient steps to address the factors causing the domain awareness gap that led to the Chinese surveillance balloon not being detected?

Answer. Protecting U.S. sovereign airspace is a core tenet of homeland defense. If confirmed, I will review this event closely to determine whether NORAD and USNORTHCOM have taken sufficient steps to address the factors causing the domain awareness gap. It is my current understanding that USNORTHCOM and NORAD have done so.

INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT (ITWAA) SYSTEM

Question. The ITWAA system is a set of dual phenomenology sensor systems for which U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Northern Command have shared responsibility. The U.S. Air Force, and in particular the Space Force, is the title 10 service that manages the material performance and acquisition of the system. Recent advances in non-ITWAA certified sensor systems have made major progress in the discrimination of threats to the homeland, but their integration into the overall threat management decision process is still undergoing review.

What is your understanding of how responsibilities for the missile warning mission are divided under the 2022 Unified Command Plan?

Answer. The 2022 UCP specifies that the Commander of USSPACECOM will support the combatant commands with missile and nuclear detection warning capabilities. As the Global Sensor Manager, USSPACECOM is responsible to plan, manage and conduct operations of the space-based and ground-based sensors that contribute to missile and nuclear detection warning. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is the supported commander for these critical capabilities as they relate to homeland defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSPACECOM to optimize missile warning and nuclear detection in accordance with the NORAD Agreement and to strengthen my role as the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment authority.

Question. What is your assessment of the management of the ITWAA system and the integration of non-certified ITWAA sensors, particularly those in space?

Answer. It is my understanding that NORAD and USSPACECOM work with the Air Force and Space Force to ensure current ITW/AA capabilities are sustained and modernization efforts addressing advanced threats are funded and delivered. I believe the integration of non-ITW/AA sensors will contribute to higher levels of attack confidence while minimizing gaps in coverage. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing these efforts to achieve critical all domain integration.

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the ITWAA system is sustained and modernized in order to perform its critical function?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD continues a strong relationship with U.S. Space Command for management of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system, as well as with the Department of the Air Force

and mission partners to ensure the ITW/AA system is sustained and modernized to address warfighter requirements for the developing threats. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing these relationships to ensure NORAD has the capabilities required for warning and assessment of potential threats against North America.

Question. Do you believe the concept of ITWAA as it was envisioned in the 1970's, which focused exclusively on large formations of bomber aircraft and long range ballistic missiles, should be revisited given the proliferation of low-observable threats that can approach from multiple trajectories?

Answer. Yes, I believe the ITW/AA Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures should be continually assessed and updated to reflect the realities of the current threat. The legacy ITW/AA system was designed to deliver early detection and threat assessment to maximize senior leader decision space. This was possible due to easy-to-detect ballistic missile profiles that allowed commanders to make a high-confidence attack assessment. Today's advanced threats, including low-observables and hypersonic glide vehicles, add ambiguity into those determinations, potentially delaying assessment and decreasing vital decision space.

MARITIME WARNING AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

Question. NORAD has the mission of Maritime Warning for North America. How does this mission fit into the larger Maritime Domain Awareness mission, and what is your assessment of the ability of NORAD and NORTHCOM to fulfill these missions?

Answer. I understand the NORAD maritime warning mission requires broad area maritime domain awareness and information sharing across multiple combatant commands, agencies, and Canadian areas of operation to develop a unique bi-national, comprehensive understanding of maritime activities with all partners. If confirmed, I will review the ability of USNORTHCOM and NORAD to fulfill their varied maritime domain awareness missions as part of my 90-day assessment.

ARCTIC REGION MISSION

Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the Military Services to identify, develop and enhance DOD capabilities to protect and defend U.S. sovereignty and interests in the Arctic region?

Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with fellow combatant commanders and the military Services to assess requirements for addressing threats from or through the Arctic. I believe NORAD and USNORTHCOM's ability to defend North America depends on the commands' ability to conduct all-domain operations in the Arctic and to interact seamlessly with U.S. European Command and U.S. IndoPacific Command as operations transit between the operational boundaries for each command.

Question. If confirmed, by what process will you identify requirements for support from other Government agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, in fulfilling requirements for the Arctic region?

Answer. USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements in the Arctic may be fulfilled by a number of DOD and interagency partners. For example, I understand that a significant portion of the validated USNORTHCOM requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor Alaska will be addressed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-led expansion of the Port of Nome. Likewise, the U.S. Coast Guard provides critically important capability and support in the Arctic. If confirmed, I will continue to place strong emphasis on NORAD and USNORTHCOM's longstanding partnership with the Coast Guard and the command's other partners in the Arctic. When needed, I will request Coast Guard support via a Request for Forces submitted to the Joint Staff and advocate for efforts by the commands' interagency partners to improve the overall U.S. capability and capacity for operating in the Arctic, to include those that directly and indirectly support NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission requirements.

Question. Does DOD currently have the appropriate capabilities and assets to meet its goals in the Arctic?

Answer. As I understand it, DOD has improved the capability to meet its goals in the Arctic, but much work remains ahead. If confirmed, I will carefully assess USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements and advocate for those requirements to be sourced. If confirmed, I will also serve as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities, and as such, I will work closely with the Commanders of U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command to ensure their Arctic requirements are met.

Question. What changes, if any, are necessary for the Department to support the implementation of the October 2022 National Strategy of the Arctic Region?

Answer. I understand that more than half of the USNORTHCOM AOR and the NORAD Area of Operations are in the Arctic. To compete in the Arctic, it is important for the military Services to develop the capability and capacity necessary to

meet combatant command all-domain Arctic requirements as well as the objectives detailed in the individual Arctic strategies. If confirmed, I will closely assess both commands' missions and associated requirements in the Arctic and make recommendations for any changes necessary to ensure the Department's ability to support the implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention? If so, please explain why.

Answer. Yes, I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides a comprehensive regime for the governance of the world's oceans, including the Arctic, and U.S. accession would further demonstrate our commitment to an international rules-based order. Acceding to the treaty would enable United States representation during critical international negotiations that impact the maritime domain, provide an additional mechanism to counter countries like Russia and China that continue to exploit our absence from key ocean governance diplomatic forums, and ultimately help protect our Nation's rights and interests in this critical sphere of operations.

Question. Given NORTHCOM's responsibilities for the Arctic region, do you believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would help the United States protect its interests in the Arctic, including against competing claims from foreign nations?

Answer. Yes, I believe accession to the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) would help the United States protect its interests in the Arctic. Accession would demonstrate our commitment to a rules-based order, ensure our best interests are represented during international negotiations regarding territorial disputes and challenges to longstanding maritime customs and practices, and improve our ability to advocate for our ocean governance interests around the globe, including in the Arctic. Engagement through UNCLOS is particularly critical today as multiple nations vie for access and control in the Arctic and seek to modify international norms to accommodate expansionist ambitions around the globe in general, and in the Arctic in particular. Finally, accession would preclude Russia and China from exploiting United States absence in forums.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic commu-

nications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Senator HIRONO. Lieutenant General Guillot, you also have a role in missile defense. Do you believe the Next Generation Interceptor will meet your requirements and be capable of fully defending Hawaii?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. I believe the current plans for the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), developed by the Missile Defense Agency and coordinated throughout the Department of Defense will meet existing requirements and be capable of defending Hawaii. The NGI is designed to have the capability to defeat current and future threats from North Korea and will have approximately the same area coverage as the current Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), which includes Hawaii.

CIVIL SUPPORT MISSIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

2. Senator HIRONO. Lieutenant General Guillot, because of a warming world there are more and more natural disasters that may require U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to execute civil support operations. How are you working with stakeholders to update disaster planning to reflect the realities of climate change?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Defense Support to Civil Authorities is a specific U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) responsibility as outlined in the 2022 Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM continues to regularly update plans and conduct integrated planning and exercises with interagency partners to confirm NORTHCOM is prepared to support civil authorities and international partners in response to disasters, including those resulting from climate effects.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

3. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Guillot, Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) networks remain a threat to the United States and international security. These groups proliferate drugs and other lethal and dangerous illegal items into our borders, leading to tens and thousands of American deaths a year. What will your strategy be to disrupt, degrade, and defeat these TCO networks?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. The Secretary of Defense has directed USNORTHCOM to conduct CD/CTOC operations, activities, and investments in support of U.S. departments and agencies and foreign nation security forces with CD/CTOC responsibilities in order to disrupt and degrade TCOs, including drug cartels and other illicit trafficking networks, which threaten U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM continues to execute the mission as tasked by the Secretary of Defense, to include providing intelligence and oper-

ational support to U.S. and foreign partners, to disrupt and degrade TCO networks and their enablers. I will also visit all support locations to gain a full understanding of the operational environment and assess if NORTHCOM support is optimized and will forward my assessment and any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

ARCTIC PRESENCE

4. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Guillot, Russia and China continue to rapidly militarize the Arctic, yet I have seen little response from the Department of Defense. What is your strategy to ensure a stronger naval presence, more robust military infrastructure, scalable basing options, and to integrate and interoperate with our partners and allies to increase our Arctic presence and posture?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, one of my specific responsibilities as outlined in the 2022 Unified Command Plan is to advocate for Arctic capabilities in coordination with other combatant commands. Maintaining consistent presence in the maritime and air will be a priority. I intend to continue NORTHCOM's leadership in Joint Force Arctic capability advocacy by working more closely with both combatant commands and the military services on research and development, all domain training and exercise coordination, military construction, and engagement with allies and partners to improve the ability of the Joint Force to operate effectively in the Arctic in accordance with the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy and National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

5. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Guillot, how can the Department of Defense benefit from Arctic research particularly that conducted by our local communities in Alaska, Maine, and other near-Arctic States?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. No one knows the Arctic better than the people who live and work in and near that environment every day. I understand the Department of Defense and NORTHCOM are actively pursuing partnerships to leverage local community expertise and build communities of interest to advance national defense priorities in the Arctic region while respecting the fragility of the Arctic environment. If confirmed, I will enthusiastically continue those efforts.

6. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Guillot, furthermore, what coastal resilience shortfalls are in the Arctic and what are your priorities?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, I will assess resilience shortfalls and continue ongoing NORTHCOM advocacy for funding and construction of coastal protective measures to guard against the effects of climate change on Arctic coastal infrastructure (e.g., erosion, sea level change, and permafrost thaw). My priorities would include assuring the resilience of Long Range Radar Sites and other homeland defense infrastructure and facilities necessary to assure power projection.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

7. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Guillot, the National Cyber Strategy and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have both listed critical infrastructure protection as a top priority, and I could not agree more. As the Chair for the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, I've been working closely with the Army Interagency Training and Education Center in the West Virginia National Guard to ensure they're used as a resource in threat assessments and the response to cyber and physical attacks on our critical infrastructure. Their work is supported by the establishment of a mission assurance program in this year's National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that will ensure we're using the expertise already in our National Guard units to protect our critical infrastructure. Can you commit to receiving a briefing on this program's work to utilize our National Guard for critical infrastructure protection?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to receiving a briefing on this program.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIMES AND FENTANYL

8. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Guillot, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that more than 47,000 people died from an opioid overdose in 2017 in the United States—28,000 of those deaths were due to synthetic opioids, which the CDC says is largely the result of the uptick in abuse of fentanyl. China produces nearly all of the fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl precursors in the world. Mexico is a growing transit and production point for fentanyl. The

Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel New Generation—are the most important Mexican sellers of the drug and its precursor. How do you view NORTHCOM's role in collaborating with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, who has the lead in the Department of Defense for the counternarcotic mission, to combat this epidemic?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, and tasked with missions to counter TCOs or support other Departments, Agencies, or other mission partners in pursuit of the same objective, I commit to working closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) through the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy (DASD/CNSP) as the Department lead in implementing the strategy to counter TCOs. I will also visit all support locations to gain a full understanding of the operational environment and assess if NORTHCOM support is optimized. I will forward my assessment and any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

DELAYED BUDGET AND CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS

9. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Guillot, since the beginning of the 118th Congress this year, I have continuously asked our uniformed and civilian DOD leaders about the impacts of a delayed budget and the use of continuing resolutions. The American Enterprise Institute threw out a rough estimate of \$200 million per day under the latest continuing resolution that covered the start of fiscal year 2023, that's a total of \$18 billion. I have repeatedly asked the Pentagon for as concise a number as possible to put a figure on the damage these delays are causing to our national security and wasted taxpayer money, but so far I have only received an estimate from General Brown who told me that a continuing resolution would see the Air Force and Space Force lose \$9 billion in purchasing power. I don't blame the leaders I have questioned for not having concrete figures of the money wasted through continuing resolutions, these leaders are focused on using the funding they get efficiently to support our National Defense, not the ability of Congress to get a budget passed in a timely manner. As both of you take command, I ask that for the remainder of your tenure in your positions, take note of the financial cost of a delayed budget and continuing resolutions so we can hold ourselves accountable as elected officials in the coming years as stewards of the tax-payer's dollar. Can I count on you to come back to this chamber every year during your posture hearings with these detailed figures in tow?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the committee my candid assessments of the impact delayed appropriations and Continuing Resolutions have on NORTHCOM and NORAD missions. I acknowledge the Department and the military services are likely better suited to speak to the direct financial costs associated with Continuing Resolutions. Predictable, on-time budgets and appropriations are critical to the Department of Defense's ability to develop and field the capabilities needed to meet combatant command requirements, including those generated by NORTHCOM and NORAD.

STATEMENT ON MILITARY HOLDS

10. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Guillot, we cannot continue to delay confirmation of over 250 of our General and Flag Officers. We've reached a point where life-long careers of dedicated military servicemembers and the lives of their families are being put in jeopardy. We're running the risk of this delay turning into a loss of the most critical talent in our military at a time when only the Marine Corps is meeting military recruiting goals. How do you believe these holds are affecting our retention efforts for younger officers who see that their careers and their families' lives can be held up by Congress?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Based on my personal observations and discussions with colleagues, prolonged delayed confirmations decrease Joint Force readiness primarily by placing officers in an acting capacity in a position where they are limited in their ability to set priorities, make necessary institutional changes in pursuit of strategic goals, or otherwise move the organization and mission forward due to their temporary status in the position. The holds are also having an increasingly adverse impact on military families. Although I have seen firsthand that the holds have caused some senior officers to question continued service, I respectfully defer to the Department and the military services regarding the comprehensive impacts on recruiting and retention.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON

HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE

11. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, we've thoroughly established that the U.S. Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. But it's not just our border we need to worry about. Russia can threaten targets in the United States with long-range cruise missiles without even leaving Russian airspace. While I commend the Department's recent efforts to develop a homeland cruise missile defense system, I'm concerned that we're too far behind the threat. Last year, General Glen VanHerck, the outgoing NORTHCOM commander, said that he needs a cruise missile defense system "yesterday". What are the biggest challenges to developing a homeland cruise missile defense system?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, one of my immediate priorities will be to carefully review homeland cruise missile defense requirements and assess the challenges associated with developing the capability to defend against cruise missile threats. I agree with General VanHerck's assessment and will continue to advocate for a cruise missile defense system that keeps pace with, or exceeds, the rapidly advancing capabilities of our strategic competitors.

12. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, what steps need to be taken to accelerate the development of this system?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, I will carefully review NORAD and NORTHCOM plans, policies, and capabilities to defend the Homeland from cruise missile threats to ensure we are staying ahead of our adversaries. I will ensure plans, policies, and capabilities are aligned to detect and defeat potential threats. In general, I believe the Department must take immediate steps toward detecting advanced cruise missile threats in order to ensure the ability to defend against them and deter competitors from using them.

13. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, can you explain why these threats below the nuclear threshold pose such a challenge to our deterrence?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. The PRC and Russia continue to field cruise missiles, delivery platforms, and non-kinetic capabilities to hold critical infrastructure in the United States and Canada at risk below the nuclear threshold. As we have seen throughout the conflict in Ukraine, these advanced capabilities allow potential adversaries to strike with limited warning and significant consequences without exceeding the nuclear threshold. This capability also creates ambiguity and risks escalation; constrains our ability to detect, track, and engage potential threats; and provides our competitors with a range of options that could force U.S. and Canadian leaders to make difficult decisions when defending or responding to an attack.

14. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, the 2022 Missile Defense Review states that U.S. Homeland missile defense will continue to stay ahead of the North Korean missile threat. Can you explain why, for a rogue State like North Korea, it's important to be able to deny an attack on the Homeland rather than only rely on deterrence?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. The actions and statements from current DPRK leadership clearly indicate their undeterred pursuit of nuclear ballistic missiles. If they develop such capabilities, their actions and intentions could prove unpredictable. Having the ability to defeat an attack from North Korea allows our national leadership decision space when determining options to deter, prevent, or respond to possible attacks.

15. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, in your advance policy questions, you stated your intention to help the Missile Defense Agency deliver the Next Generation Interceptor (NGIs) as quickly as possible. How will this capability improve your ability to defend against the North Korean threat?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. The Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) will provide a significant performance enhancement over the current fleet of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs). NGI will have enhanced integration with the current homeland ballistic missile defense system and increased kill vehicle performance that is designed to defeat emerging future threats, to include improved capabilities the DPRK has incorporated into its latest ballistic missiles. NGI will also have increased reliability and survivability for a more effective and efficient employment of these interceptors.

16. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, currently, we only plan to field 20 of the Next Generation Interceptor to add onto the 44 ground-based interceptors we currently have deployed. But considering the NGI's significant advantage over the current ground-based interceptors, last year's NDAA required a cost plan to field 64 NGIs in order to replace the current interceptors. How would fielding a larger number of NGIs help you to meet the goal to stay ahead of the North Korean missile threat?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Having additional Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) in the operational inventory would increase the overall capacity, effectiveness, and lethality of the entire homeland ballistic missile defense system. Additional NGIs could potentially reduce reliability concerns with the current GBI fleet. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the rest of the Department of Defense to determine the path forward for NGI beyond the initial fielding of 20 interceptors in order to stay ahead of the DPRK missile threat and maintain our defensive capability in accordance with current U.S. policy guidance.

HYPERSONICS

17. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, our adversaries are also becoming increasingly capable of striking the Homeland with hypersonic weapons. In your advance policy questions, you answered "yes" to the question of whether the U.S. should develop the capabilities to defend the Homeland from these hypersonic threats. Can you explain your response?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. As competitor capability and capacity to threaten the Homeland grows, I believe the Department of Defense should routinely re-evaluate the policies and capabilities required to defend against those threats and seek changes to policies and acquire capabilities to defeat the threats, if necessary and advisable. In the case of hypersonic glide vehicles, improved domain awareness and tracking capabilities combined with a credible and modern U.S. deterrent and/or defeat capability are critical to stay ahead of rapidly advancing threats and a competitor that has used hypersonic weapons against non-military targets.

18. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, which specific capabilities will the U.S. need to defend the Homeland from hypersonic weapons?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. In the near term, I believe the Department of Defense must continue its efforts to improve global domain awareness of hypersonic and other threats to the Homeland through detection systems such as Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) and modernized space-based sensors, as we must first see threats in order to defeat or defend against them. The next generation defeat mechanisms under development must be able to counter the increased speed and maneuverability hypersonics employ. If confirmed, I will continue NORTHCOM and NORAD's ongoing accelerated efforts to generate validated requirements associated with the commands' assigned missions, and I will work closely with the Department, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military services responsible for developing and fielding the capabilities to meet those requirements.

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

19. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, I'm concerned about the capacity of our fighter aircraft fleet. We are continuing to divest fighter aircraft without sufficient quantities of replacements and at a time when strategic competition abroad is requiring the dispersal of our assets. Are fighter aircraft an important part of NORTHCOM's and NORAD's mission?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, fighter aircraft are a critical component of NORAD and NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense Campaign and current Homeland Defense Design due to their responsiveness, flexibility, sensors, and, if necessary, lethality. Further, fighter aircraft are the cornerstone of NORAD's Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) mission and President of the United States (POTUS) support.

20. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Guillot, what steps will you take to ensure we retain sufficient fighter capacity to defend the Homeland while meeting requirements abroad?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary of Defense with requirements to meet assigned missions and advocate with the military services to meet those requirements. A globally integrated and layered defense of the North American Homeland is critical to supporting national security interests both at home and abroad. Global integration and layered defense start with conducting integrated exercises and operations with fellow combatant commands across all domains. Finally, ensuring the NORAD and NORTHCOM homeland defense design

combines strengthening defenses, increasing deception, and improving resiliency in all domains to expand defense options beyond fighter-based responses will help ensure NORAD and NORTHCOM, as well as other geographic combatant commands, have sufficient fighter capacity with advanced capabilities to address global threats.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MICHAEL M. ROUNDS

THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

21. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Guillot, how has the threat environment changed in the past 5 years as it pertains to new and emerging Russian and Chinese conventional strike capabilities targeting our Homeland?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Over the last 5 years, Russia has fielded hundreds of conventionally armed air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles that can threaten critical infrastructure throughout North America. Russia has expended a large portion of these weapons in Ukraine since February 2022, temporarily limiting its capacity to threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. However, war in Ukraine has also enabled Russia's military to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing these weapons, and Russia likely will replenish its stocks of Homeland-threatening conventional cruise missiles quickly once hostilities cease.

Meanwhile, the PRC has also expanded its long-range conventional strike capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain. In the last 5 years, the PRC navy has commissioned dozens of cruise missile-capable surface combatants, including eight *Renhai*-class guided missile cruisers equipped with 112 vertical launch cells each. The PRC has also occasionally deployed these vessels within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska. In the coming years, the PRC plans to field a new class of guided missile submarine (SSGN), which in time could provide Beijing a clandestine land-attack capability analogous to Russia's growing fleet of *Severodvinsk*-class SSGNs.

22. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Guillot, is it accurate to say that Russia and China are developing long-range strike capabilities that could hold our Homeland at risk, and, if so, are our current missile defense capabilities able to defeat these non-nuclear conventional threats from our near-peer adversaries?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes, Russia has already fielded a family of long-range conventional weapons that can hold our Homeland at risk, while China is developing similar capabilities that it plans to field in the coming years. Therefore, I believe our existing sufficient capabilities must be improved to keep pace with the rapidly evolving Chinese and Russian threats.

23. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Guillot, are there Russian and Chinese conventional strike weapons capable of having strategic effects based upon their targets?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Yes. Russia's warfighting strategy envisions creating strategic effects by striking an adversary's economic and military infrastructure with conventionally armed weapons to degrade the adversary's political will and terminate a conflict on acceptable terms. Russia's development of intercontinental-range precision-strike capabilities and its periodic deployment of air and naval launch platforms along North America's Arctic, Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean coastlines strongly suggest this "non-nuclear" strategy extends to the U.S. Homeland.

PRC military theorists also likely believe conventional weapons can have strategic effects when employed against an adversary's most critical targets. Thus, the PRC is developing long-range conventional strike platforms that could support such a strategy in the coming years. While it is unclear whether the PRC would choose to employ these capabilities against the U.S. Homeland in a conflict, its periodic deployment of cruise missile-capable surface combatants near Alaska suggest it is a possibility.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JONI K. ERNST

MISSILE DEFENSE AGAINST CHINA AND RUSSIA

24. Senator ERNST. Lieutenant General Guillot, as nuclear threats from China and Russia grow, should we evaluate certain ballistic and cruise missile defense systems to defend U.S. nuclear forces and associated command-and-control against potential attacks?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. I believe the Department should routinely re-evaluate emerging threats along with the policies and capabilities associated with deterring and defending against those threats. If changes are necessary and advisable, the Department should pursue those changes.

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND COOPERATION WITH MEXICAN MILITARY

25. Senator ERNST. Lieutenant General Guillot, how do you evaluate the current U.S.-Mexico military-to-military relationship?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. I am confident today's military-to-military relationship with Mexico is strong. Our relationship is based on mutual respect and a bilateral strategic vision. That said, a confluence of shared regional threats and a desire by leaders on both sides of the border to enhance North American defense and security has revitalized and refocused U.S.-Mexico security cooperation over the last decade. Expanded bilateral military dialog, a mutual security cooperation strategy, and increased exercises are helping improve interoperability to enhance the defense of North America and promote regional security and leadership.

26. Senator ERNST. Lieutenant General Guillot, do you have concerns about the Mexican military being a reliable partner to counter fentanyl?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. My intent, if confirmed, is to build upon the strong defense relationship between NORTHCOM and its Mexican military (MEXMIL) counterparts. Mexico has a domestic security problem that is directly related to the TCOs that are producing and moving illicit drugs and other commodities with fentanyl presenting the most significant and direct threat to Americans. NORTHCOM currently supports U.S. Government Lead Federal Agencies as directed by the Secretary of Defense, as well as appropriate entities within Mexico. If confirmed, I look forward to building on NORTHCOM's military-to-military relationship with MEXMIL. I will also conduct a visit to all support locations to gain a full understanding of the operational environment and assess if NORTHCOM support is optimized. I will forward my assessment and any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

27. Senator ERNST. Lieutenant General Guillot, how can the U.S. military be more forward leaning in supporting a whole-of-government strategy to stop the fentanyl crisis?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, I will continue NORTHCOM's active support of Lead Federal Agencies as directed by the Secretary of Defense. I will visit all support locations to gain a full understanding of the operational environment and NORTHCOM's ongoing support of the lead Federal agency in countering the fentanyl crisis. I will forward my assessment and any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. One of my focus areas will be evaluating how NORTHCOM can deliver unity of effort, coordinate activities, and implement policy guidance as effectively as possible to support the whole of government counter-TCO effort.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN ALASKA

28. Senator SULLIVAN. Lieutenant General Guillot, earlier this year, Alaska-based Air Force units performed exceptionally. From tracking the Chinese Spy Balloon and Bear Bombers to engaging and terminating a high altitude object, the Air Force in the great State of Alaska has demonstrated the highest level professionalism. They have also reminded Americans about the critical role they play in defense of the Homeland. Can you please comment on our servicemembers in Alaska's recent successes?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. The servicemembers assigned to the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) and United States Northern Command Alaska Command (ALCOM) have proven over the last year, as they have for many years, that they are critical to the commands' ability to conduct all-domain operations in the Arctic. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Alaska servicemembers as they skillfully conduct their critical Homeland Defense mission in the Arctic.

BACKFILLING ALASKAN AIR DEFENSE

29. Senator SULLIVAN. Lieutenant General Guillot, as you know, the F-22s and F-35s based in Alaska belong to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). In the event of a People's Republic of China (PRC) conflict, they will almost certainly be deployed into combat, leaving the air intercept homeland defense mission in Alaska

to be performed by whatever fighter aircraft are available. The complexities of the mission, along with the weather, require a more defined plan to ensure the #1 priorities of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) are accomplished—defend the Homeland. How will you work with the Services to ensure you have a plan in place to back fill Alaska's air defense capability in the event of an INDOPACOM contingency?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, it is my intent to review existing contingency plans and, if necessary, further develop those plans to account for the anticipated departure of NORTHCOM and NORAD assets to other combatant commands if directed by the Secretary of Defense. In such cases, the plans will include Force Packages that identify resources necessary to continue performing all missions assigned to NORTHCOM and NORAD, including the Homeland Defense mission. I will actively communicate to the Joint Staff and the military services NORTHCOM and NORAD's requirement for access to Arctic-trained and ready forces as part of globally integrated contingency plans and will advocate for regular training and exercising of those forces to ensure preparedness to operate in the unique Arctic environment.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ERIC SCHMITT

COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AT SOUTHERN BORDER

30. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, what is your assessment of the growing unmanned aircraft system (UAS)/drone threat to our Southern border, military installations and sensitive sites in the U.S. Homeland?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technology is proliferating at a rapid pace as recreational sUAS grow increasingly capable, popular, and affordable. Consequently, sUAS incursions over military installations and other sensitive sites in the United States are growing more prevalent, challenging our ability to distinguish between benign hobbyist activity and potentially nefarious foreign or domestic malign actors. Moreover, foreign State and non-State actors regularly employ sUAS for intelligence collection and one-way strikes in other parts of the globe, increasing the risk that similar tactics could be employed by foreign intelligence services or violent extremists here in the Homeland.

31. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, what technologies are currently being leveraged to address both the increased proliferation of drones as well as the use of multiple drones acting in a coordinated manner against U.S. interests?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with the Joint Counter-small UAS Office (JCO) and the military services to employ joint solutions that counter the proliferation and operational employment of drones. I have extensive experience working with JCO in my current position (Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM) and many of the capabilities the JCO has deployed to the Middle East to defeat sUAS threats and save American lives will have applicability in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. These systems include better command and control platforms, sensors, and non-kinetic and kinetic defeat mechanisms. One of my key concerns will be countering multiple drones (swarms or mass attack), and work being done by the JCO and military services with High-Powered Microwaves and other directed-energy weapon systems is showing promise to defeat that threat. Countering the wide and varied threats posed by proliferating drone technology also requires integrating NORTHCOM efforts with mission partners, such as DHS and the FAA, to determine the appropriate and safe use of counter-capabilities within the national airspace to protect United States interests. If confirmed, I will continue NORTHCOM's strong coordination efforts with mission partners.

COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS EXPORT CONTROLS

32. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, is the Department of Defense having any issues sharing these types of technologies and capabilities due to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. Protecting U.S. capabilities and technologies is critical in today's strategic competition environment. However, rapidly sharing common capabilities and technologies is also essential to building Allied and partner interoperability. If confirmed, I commit to assessing the operational risk implications of current ITAR restrictions on counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (cUAS) and providing my recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AT SOUTHERN BORDER

33. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, what challenges to NORTHCOM and NORAD are presented by the crisis of attritable, consumer-grade drones at the Southern border?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. I understand that, to date, NORTHCOM and NORAD have not had any challenges presented by small drones at the U.S. southern border. DHS is the lead for this mission with DOD providing support to DHS and other law enforcement, and I defer to DHS to answer this question from their perspective. If confirmed, I will continue NORTHCOM and NORAD's close coordination with DHS regarding drones at the U.S. southern border.

34. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, if confirmed, what will you do to address this?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. If confirmed, I will continue to look for innovative means and efficiencies as NORTHCOM executes Secretary of Defense-authorized support to DHS. I will advocate for the advance counter sUAS systems necessary to detect and defeat threats within issued authorities and will coordinate with the Joint Counter-small UAS Office (JCO) to implement capabilities currently employed in support of other combatant commands, as needed. I will also work closely in support of DHS to identify any challenges posed by existing authorities and resources in the air sovereignty mission.

COUNTER-UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AUTHORITIES AT SOUTHERN BORDER

35. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, what are current DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) authorities to neutralize drones engaged in drug-related activity that originate in Mexico and violate U.S. airspace?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. I defer to DHS on the authorities under which their personnel operate. However, DOD personnel have all the authorities necessary to protect themselves from hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent, as well as to exercise the authority to mitigate threats posed by UASs to the safety or security of DOD facilities and assets covered by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 130i. As I understand it, DOD personnel do not currently have authority to neutralize unmanned aircraft (UAS) engaged in drug-related activity that originate in Mexico and violate U.S. airspace. If confirmed, assessing the counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (cUAS) authorities on the Southern Border will be a high priority immediately upon taking command. I will visit all NORTHCOM locations along the border to gain an operational understanding of the various authorities held by DHS and DOD forces and determine if changes or adjustments are necessary to protect U.S. airspace.

36. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, are DOD or DHS personnel allowed to neutralize drones by kinetic means?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. DOD personnel have all the authorities necessary to protect themselves from hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent, as well as to exercise the authority to mitigate threats posed by UASs to the safety or security of DOD facilities and assets covered by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 130i. I defer to DHS on their authorities under which their personnel operate. If confirmed, I will visit all NORTHCOM locations along the border to gain an operational understanding of the various authorities held by DHS and DOD forces and determine if changes or adjustments are necessary to protect U.S. airspace.

CYBERSECURITY

37. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, in what ways do you intend to make NORTHCOM ready to defend against a massive cyber-incident?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. A massive cyber incident could have significant national impact on the U.S. Government and/or Commercial Critical Infrastructure. If confirmed, I intend to build upon the existing solid foundation of cross-combatant command collaboration between NORTHCOM and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to ensure the DOD Information Network (DODIN) will be best postured to defend against a cyber-threat or massive cyber-incident on DOD systems and on DODIN Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI). I also intend to deepen critical relationships across the U.S. Government with others responsible for cyber-related missions, including the Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA) to quickly synchronize and respond to requests for assistance in CISA's mission to manage cyber-incident impacts, including DCI that is not part of DODIN networks. Regular exercises, including table-top exercises with senior leadership, and building a robust network of liaison officers and

information sharing capabilities will be foundational to ensure NORTHCOM is ready to do its part in defending against a massive cyber-incident

38. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Guillot, in terms of mitigating an attack, how would NORTHCOM defend against a hypothetical massive cyberattack by an adversary on critical infrastructure, and get back to operational as quickly as possible?

Lieutenant General GUILLOT. The number of variables for defending against, responding to, and recovering from a massive cyberattack are numerous. Thus, all U.S. Government Departments and Agencies must constantly work together to remain vigilant while taking steps to harden networks and integrate resiliency into systems, networks, and infrastructure. I understand the Department of Defense takes a proactive approach to cybersecurity on the systems, networks, and infrastructure owned and operated by the Department, and, as the synchronizer of DOD capabilities provided in support of lead Federal agencies, NORTHCOM partners closely with CYBERCOM and DHS CISA (the responsible agency for understanding and managing cyber risk to national critical infrastructure) in the execution of Defense Support of Civilian Authorities to prepare for, defend against, and respond to cyberattacks. If confirmed, maintaining the relationship and close partnership with CYBERCOM, DHS, and CISA will be a high priority in order to deliver integrated defense of critical infrastructure against a cyber threat that is rapidly growing in capability and prevalence.

[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN679

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 30, 2023.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To Be General

Lt. Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, 6461

_____, 2023.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

 BIOGRAPHY	 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT

Lt. Gen. Gregory M. Guillot is Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, where he oversees military security cooperation and combat operations within the Arabian Peninsula, Northern Red Sea, Arabian Gulf and Central and Southern Asian States.

Lt. Gen. Guillot received his commission in 1989 from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has commanded a flying squadron, operations group, two flying wings, and a numbered Air Force. He has served on numbered Air Force, major command, air and combatant command staffs, was an Air Force Weapons School instructor, and is a graduate of the National War College. Prior to his current assignment, Lt. Gen. Guillot was Commander, Ninth Air Force (Air Forces Central), Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command.

The general is a senior air battle manager with more than 1,380 flying hours.

EDUCATION

1989 Bachelor of Science, General Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1994 Distinguished Graduate, U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
1995 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1998 Honor Graduate, Master of Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Fla.
2004 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., by correspondence
2008 Master of Strategic Studies, National War College, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
2008 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
2015 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2017 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2017 Combined Force Maritime Component Commander Course, Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Manama

ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 1989–July 1990, Student, 82nd Training Wing, Williams Air Force Base, Ariz.
2. July 1990–October 1990, Student, Undergraduate Controller Course, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
3. October 1990–June 1995, Chief, Weapons and Tactics, 607th Air Control Squadron, Luke AFB, Ariz.
4. June 1995–June 1998, Weapons School Instructor, U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev.
5. July 1998–January 2000, Chief, Weapons and Tactics, 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron, Tinker AFB, Okla.
6. January 2000–August 2000, Deputy Chief, Wing Weapons and Tactics, 552nd Operational Support Squadron, Tinker AFB, Okla.
7. August 2000–July 2001, Chief, Weapons and Tactics, 607th Air Support Operations Group/Seventh Air Force, Osan Air Base, South Korea
8. July 2001–July 2003, Airborne Warning and Control System Program Manager, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
9. July 2003–August 2004, Director of Operations, 966th Airborne Air Control Squadron, Tinker AFB, Okla.
10. August 2004–February 2006, Commander, 965th Airborne Air Control Squadron, Tinker AFB, Okla.
11. February 2006–July 2007, Deputy Director, Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Executive Action Group, the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.
12. July 2007–June 2008, Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
13. July 2008–May 2010, Chief, Command and Control Division, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.
14. May 2010–May 2011, Commander, 380th Expeditionary Operations Group, Al Dhafra, United Arab Emirates
15. June 2011–June 2012, Deputy Director of Operations, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va.
16. June 2012–June 2013, Commander, 552nd Air Control Wing, Tinker AFB, Okla.
17. June 2013–June 2015, Commander, 55th Wing, Offutt AFB, Neb.



EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant May 31, 1989	
First Lieutenant May 31, 1991	
Captain May 31, 1993	
Major September 01, 2000	
Lieutenant Colonel April 01, 2004	
Colonel September 01, 2008	
Brigadier General August 14, 2014	
Major General August 02, 2018	
Lieutenant General July 16, 2020	

18. June 2015–July 2016, Director of Strategic Plans, Requirements, and Programs, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, JB Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii
 19. July 2016–March 2018, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, JB Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii
 20. April 2018–May 2019, Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command; Deputy Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command, Southwest Asia
 21. June 2019–June 2020, Director of Operations, Headquarters U.S. Northern Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
 22. July 2020–August 2020, Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Combined Force Air Component Commander, USCENTCOM, Southwest Asia
 23. August 2020–July 2022, Commander, Ninth Air Force (Air Forces Central), Combined Force Air Component Commander, USCENTCOM, Southwest Asia
 24. August 2022–present, Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 2008–May 2010, Chief, Command and Control Division, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., as a colonel
 2. April 2018–May 2019, Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central Command; Deputy, Combined Force Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command, Southwest Asia, as a brigadier general
 3. June 2019–June 2020, Director of Operations, Headquarters U.S. Northern Command, Peterson AFB, Colo., as a major general
 4. August 2022–present, Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM, as a lieutenant general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: senior air battle manager
 Flight hours: more than 1,380
 Aircraft flown: E-3B/C/G, RC-135V/W/S, KC-10A, F-15D and U-2ST

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal
 Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Bronze Star Medal with two oak leaf clusters
 Meritorious Service Medal with silver and bronze oak leaf clusters
 Air Medal
 Aerial Achievement Medal
 Air Force Commendation Medal
 Army Commendation Medal
 Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTIONS

Second Lieutenant May 31, 1989
 First Lieutenant May 31, 1991
 Captain May 31, 1993
 Major Sept. 1, 2000
 Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 2004
 Colonel Sept. 1, 2008
 Brigadier General Aug. 14, 2014
 Major General Aug. 2, 2018
 Lieutenant General July 16, 2020

(Current as of September 2022)



[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF in connection with his nomination follows:]

118th CONGRESS, 2023 -- 2024
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):** Gregory M. Guillot
2. **Position to which nominated:** Commander, United States Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command
3. **Date of nomination:**
4. **Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the Committee by the applicable agency/department/board):**

I do not have any government experience other than what is listed in the service record extract provided to the Committee.
5. **Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of**

any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):

I do not have any business relationships.

6. **Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held, in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations):**

I do not currently hold any memberships or offices. I held two previous non-voting positions on school boards as part of my community partnership responsibilities as a wing commander in Nebraska.

Non-Voting member – Bellevue Public School Board (June 2013-June 2015, Inactive). I enjoyed no benefits as a result of my membership.

Non-Voting member – University of Nebraska at Omaha Board (June 2014, departed for my next assignment before conducting any duties or participating in meetings, etc., Inactive). I enjoyed no benefits as a result of my membership.

7. **Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements, in addition to those listed in the service record extract and biographical provided to the Committee by the agency or department):**

I have not received any honors or awards other than those listed in the service record extract and biographical provided to the Committee.

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

8. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress? Yes.
9. Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate Committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration? Yes.
10. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such

witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely? Yes.


11. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Yes.

12. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Yes.
13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Yes.
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Yes.
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein, and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



This ____ day of _____, 20 ____

[The nomination of Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 13, 2023, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2023.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) has an area of responsibility (AOR) equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers equal to, or above, the earth's surface. Further, the Commander, U.S. Space Command, is responsible to plan and execute, as directed, global offensive and defensive space operations through all domains, including the electromagnetic spectrum.

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Space Command, within in the Department of Defense (DOD)?

Answer. I will execute the following primary duties of the CCDR, IAW 10 U.S.C. § 164. Commanders of combatant commands: assignment; powers and duties: (b3A) To produce plans for the employment of the armed forces to execute national defense strategies and respond to significant military contingencies; (b3) To take actions, as necessary, to deter conflict; and (b3C) To command United States armed forces as directed by the Secretary and approved by the President. The CDRUSSPACECOM's responsibilities are assigned by the POTUS in the Unified Command Plan: (1) Space Operations; (2) Global Sensor Manager. (CDRUSSPACECOM is responsible for planning, managing, and conducting operations of DOD Space Domain Awareness, missile defense and missile warning sensors, global integrated networks, and associated command and control networks); (3) Global Satellite Communications Operations Manager; (4) Trans-Regional Missile Defense. (CDRUSSPACECOM conducts trans-regional missile defense planning and operations support in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate U.S. Government agencies, Allies and partners; supports assessment of missile defense operational capabilities; and ensures continuity of operations, as required); (5) Space Joint Force Provider.

Question. Specifically, what are your views with respect to operations that involve offensive and defense space operations?

Answer. The USSPACECOM Commander ensures the successful execution of the missions assigned in the UCP. In particular, the Commander deters threats to US/ Allied interests and, if deterrence fails, defeats those threats. Space is considered a warfighting domain and as with all regional domains, and any use of force must comply with domestic law, international law, the U.N. Charter, and applicable treaties, regardless of the domain in which the use of force originates, transits, or terminates. We must also factor in our assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of any offensive or defensive space operation. My recommendation of military force in space operations will always be balanced, measured, and proportional to the hostile act or intent of an adversary. I will also factor in external issues such as non-military assets.

Question. What background, expertise, and experience do you possess that qualify you to serve as Commander, U.S. Space Command?

Answer. It is a privilege to be nominated by the President to serve as the next Commander, United States Space Command. I have been a career-long space operations officer since I was a Second Lieutenant in 1990 and have served during a period of consequential change in our military space enterprise for almost 33 years. I have commanded space units at the squadron (2004), group (2006–2008), wing (2009–2011), Numbered Air Force (2017–2019), Joint Component (2019), and Field Command (2020–2023) levels. I have also served in numerous Joint positions, including as a staff member at the first instantiation of United States Space Command (2002), as a staff member at United States Strategic Command (2002–2004), as the Director of the Joint Space Operations Center (2006–2008) during the historic Chinese ASAT test in 2007, as the Military Assistant and Acting Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (2011–2013), as the Deputy Joint Force Space Component Commander for United States Strategic Command (2017–2019), as the first Combined Force Space Component Commander (2019) for the new United States Space Command when it stood up in 2019, and as the Space Force Service Component Commander to United States Space Command (2020–2023). I believe these experiences have prepared me, if confirmed, to serve as the next Commander, United States Space Command.

Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Space Command?

Answer. I am devoted to being a life-long learner, and I look forward, if confirmed, to engaging with this committee, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Service, the Combatant Commands and Agencies, and key Interagency and Allied stakeholders to continue to learn what they need from United States Space Command to be successful. I am committed to being a productive team member to ensure the success of all stakeholders in our national security space enterprise.

Question. What are your views on protecting U.S. Allied, partner, and critical commercial space capabilities.

Answer. We must be prepared to defend U.S., and as directed, Allied, partner, and key commercial space capabilities in order to prevent and/or mitigate hostile and/or irresponsible acts in space. Our adversaries continue to reinforce the fact that space is a warfighting domain with the capabilities they are developing and we should address this in kind. The best way to protect and defend U.S., Allied and partner space operational capabilities is to deter adversary aggression toward them. Deterrence only occurs from a position of strength and posture—therefore, strengthening our relationships with our Allies and partners as well as fielding new capabilities are key steps to protecting and defending on-orbit capabilities.

Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the DOD manager for human space flight operations?

Answer. I expect USSPACECOM's support to human space flight operations will be increasingly important as NASA's Commercial Crew Program and the Artemis program move forward. USSPACECOM serves as the DOD entry point for NASA's requests and requirements for human space flight support (HSFS) and should continue to do so ensuring safety and success of those programs and pursuits. Part of this responsibility continues to include integrating with other Combatant Commands with HSFS activities and involves the C2 of the actual rescue forces by 1st Air Force, USSPACECOM's Air Force Service component. USSPACECOM will continue to coordinate with commercial, civil, and international partners to help facilitate safe and reliable human space flight operations.

Question. What are your views on providing warning and assessment of attack on space assets, defending on-orbit space assets, and data links including SPACECOM terrestrial assets?

Answer. Within USSPACECOM's UCP missions, the Command is tasked to ensure our assets are survivable, defended, and enabled for adaption to the threat environment. Examples to accomplish this, but not limited to, are our close working relationship with USSTRATCOM to support and provide Missile Warning, and working closely with USCYBERCOM to provide the necessary defenses against cyber attacks. USSPACECOM must continue to monitor potential adversary space and counterspace developments to provide effective indications and warning analysis to inform U.S. military decisionmakers. We will continue to closely work with other OSD, Joint Staff, and Intelligence Community partners in this effort to coordinate assessments and plan for adaptation to adversary threats.

Question. What are your views on advocating for space operations capabilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for, and set priorities for space operations capabilities through the Combatant Command's Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DOD, Intelligence Community, and the military Services to identify seams in our current capabilities, establish warfighting requirements, and develop future space capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space superiority.

Question. If confirmed, what are your views on providing space capabilities to the Joint Force including communications; missile warning; nuclear detonation detection; environmental monitoring; space domain awareness; military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that providing these critical space capabilities to the Joint Force will remain the top priority for the command. These mission-essential space capabilities are a key force multiplier for other Combatant Commands, Allies, and agencies. While the capabilities themselves are predominantly provided by the U.S. Space Force, all of the Services may contribute to these mission areas, and in such a way that enables the command to maximize its Department-wide support. As China and Russia field new capabilities, we collectively need to improve and adapt our Nation's response to these challenging new threats. To that end, USSPACECOM must continue to work closely with the Services and with other government organizations defining command warfighter requirements that will drive the development and fielding of the next generation of space capabilities.

Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Global Sensor Manager?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the Command continuing to partner with the Joint, Combined, and Interagency community to build a robust picture of the space domain, with emphasis on identifying threats and maintaining our Nation's space superiority. We will continue to use traditional and long-proven space surveillance network assets, while at the same time look to incorporate not only more modern assets already being developed but also non-traditional sensors and techniques from across the Services, agencies and partners. Our current sensors support multiple mission areas include missile warning, missile defense and space domain awareness. Support is from the tactical through the strategic level. As the DOD Global Sensor Manager, if confirmed, I will leverage the USSPACECOM staff to manage and synchronize support from these multi-mission sensors to ensure all mission areas are served as operationally and technically feasible.

Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Global Satellite Communications Manager?

Answer. If confirmed, USSPACECOM will continue to partner with the Joint, Combined, and Interagency community to facilitate reliable satellite communications for the Joint Force to ensure decisionmakers and stakeholders at all levels of government have access to satellite communications (SATCOM) on a prioritized basis. As the DOD modernizes its SATCOM force design and expands the use of commercial and Allied satellite services, USSPACECOM will play a central role in operationally integrating these services into a cohesive and interoperable enterprise.

Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Joint Staff lead and global synchronizer for Missile Defense, as well as supporting assessments of missile defense capabilities through the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?

Answer. USSPACECOM is now assigned the UCP mission of Trans-Regional Missile Defense, and this new mission is well-suited to USSPACECOM's current sensor and C4 responsibilities and capabilities as the Global Sensor Manager, as well as USSPACECOM responsibilities for prompt and accurate Missile Warning. Trans-Regional Missile Defense complements USSPACECOM's other UCP missions including Space Operations and Space Domain Awareness. Many systems used for space missions are also used for Missile Defense so assigning all these missions to a single CCMD creates clear command and control. Over the last several years, USSPACECOM HQs and USSTRATCOM HQs prepared for transferring both the Trans-regional Missile Defense mission and the executing unit, JFCC-IMD.

USSPACECOM ensured USSTRATCOM's divestiture plan nested with USSPACECOM's assumption plan, and USSPACECOM is currently executing the mission.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as the Commander, U.S. Space Command?

Answer. The space domain is a competitive, contested, and congested environment:

- Per the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the most significant challenge is China as the pacing challenge. China is moving fast in space and has demonstrated cutting-edge capabilities and technologies routinely. Additionally, Russia, as evidenced by the Ukraine conflict, demonstrates a degree of unpredictability and remains a significant threat as well:
 1. Since 2015, Beijing and Moscow have reorganized their militaries to place increased emphasis on the space domain, both in accelerating their R&D efforts and analyzing our capabilities and reliance
 2. PRC and Russia are committed to fielding diverse counterspace capabilities across multiple domains
 3. Over the past 4 years, Chinese on-orbit satellites more than doubled (from 335 in 2019 to 681 in 2023 to date)
 4. Russian on-orbit satellites increased 40 percent (from 143 total in 2019 to 197 in 2023)
- USSPACECOM provides the Joint Force, partners, and Allies assured space capabilities they have come to rely on in all phases of conflict.
- USSPACECOM must continue the critical work of building unity of effort with other national security space stakeholders and international partners enabling an "asymmetric advantage" for the U.S.
- There is a clear debris concern (e.g. 58 percent increase of ISS conjunctions). Irresponsible use of space includes the 2007 China's ASAT test which resulted in an additional 3000+ pieces of long-lived debris, and the 2021 Russia's ASAT test which resulted in 1788 pieces of debris.
- Operational lessons from Russia's Ukraine conflict revealed effects on PNT EW jamming of friendly GPS, advantages of incorporation of commercial ISR, and observation of Russia's battle rhythm and use of space.
- Integration of systems is complex yet vital. Through my experience, I understand that integrating capabilities from the Services, Agencies, Allies, and Partners, including industry and the commercial market, allows seamless and expedited flow of concise information for C2 of the space Joint Forces.
- Continuing expansion of command talent is key. They are our strongest and most valuable asset. I will also focus on providing purpose-built, permanent facilities (after a final basing decision has been made) to optimize our critical workforce with the necessary security, IT systems, resilience, and equipment needed.
- USSPACECOM also must maximize the amount space-related information shared with Allies and Partners while minimizing risk.

Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Answer. Conflict is not inevitable, but we have a responsibility to be ready to protect and defend the domain and ensure exquisite support to the Joint Force. We need to normalize the domain by continuing to improve our awareness and knowledge of the threats, which then drives a need to change how we approach the domain. If confirmed, I will focus on capabilities, plans, training, and innovative/disruptive solutions to outpace the threat to ensure we maintain superiority in the domain. I will continue to set requirements and the operational demand signal. Alliances and partnerships provide a critical advantage our adversaries cannot match. Since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine, USSPACECOM has provided approximately 14,500 indications and warning of theater ballistic missile launches to NATO Allies and other U.S. partners. We must continue to leverage these partnerships for military advantage and to promote deterrence.

Manpower is the driving force to success. The Command's culture and reputation of professional excellence will attract and retain the best talent our Nation has to offer.

With regard to establishing the permanent USSPACECOM HQ, once the basing decision is announced, I am confident the staff is postured to move out rapidly to design and construct mission-enabling facilities that put us in the best position to

fight and win. I will seek your support for resourcing a unique facility and implementing mitigations to offset risk for whatever location is selected.

If confirmed, I will ensure that USSPACECOM will sustain USSTRATCOM's missile defense procedures, instructions, and arrangements as the command initially executes this mission. Over the next 18–24 months, USSPACECOM will deliberately assess and adjust procedures and operations to achieve the efficiencies envisioned by merging Space Operations, Global Sensor Manager, and Trans-regional Missile Defense responsibilities under a single CCMD.

This Command has been leveraging and will continue to leverage, if I'm confirmed, the increasingly vast and capable group of Allied and partners in support of the space domain and ensuring integration of our space and space-enabling capabilities where feasible. Being able to aggregate capabilities with Allies and partners enables greater operational flexibility and global response options and fully supports the NDS's approach to "Anchoring our Strategy in Allies and Partners."

Additionally, to effectively address the pacing challenge and other emerging threats, now and in the future, I plan to take calibrated risks between campaigning and deterring today and building warfighting advantage for the future. This balance, in line with the 2022 NMS's concept of Strategic Discipline, requires calculated risk and concerted coordination between the CCMD and the Services.

The Department is faced with multifaceted challenges across all domains that necessitate a robust, cyber-secure, AI/ML-driven Command and Control (C2) system, built on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) tenets. This system, integrating space platforms, sensors, and weapons, is vital to safeguarding U.S. national security interests. Addressing hurdles in integration, interoperability, threat intelligence, cybersecurity, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), global cooperation, resilience, and training requires a common operational picture, effective intelligence partnerships, proactive cyber defenses, enhanced SDA, international collaborations, resilient architectures, and frequent training. CJADC2 provides the framework for achieving these, offering open system architectures, real-time cyber threat response, data fusion capabilities, Interagency networking, and training simulations. If confirmed, I aim to leverage these CJADC2 principles fully, optimizing mission command and control.

Question. Given the major challenges you identified, what other priorities would you set for your term as Commander, U.S. Space Command, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on:

(1) building a coalition of superior military spacepower by strengthening alliances and establishing new partnerships to make the U.S. the preferred partner by the international community of nations

(2) Incorporating greater Space Ops / Missile Warning / Missile Defense integration using multi-mission sensors supporting situational awareness and weapon systems enhancing Integrated Deterrence, and if needed, achieve all-domain dominance

(3) Master understanding of activities in and affecting the space domain through space domain awareness

(4) Continued expansion of redundancy and cyberspace monitoring capability ensuring our network and control nodes are protected and resilient against adversary offensive cyberspace operations against space superiority capabilities to protect and defend space missions which support the Joint Force, Allies, and the Nation (e.g. MW, PNT, and SATCOM), as well as to protect the Joint Force and Allies from the space-enabled capabilities of potential adversaries.

(6) Enhancing integration with the other Combatant Commands, Allies, and Interagency stakeholders to ensure we have the plans in place to maximize our ability to deter potential adversaries and the readiness to win if conflict materializes

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus SPACECOM, and the Department of Defense, on each of these priorities?

Answer. Within the UCP assigned areas for USSPACECOM, I will collaborate with:

1. OSD leadership on the Combined Space Operations initiative.
2. JS support for MD capability development affecting both MDA and the Services' development and acquisitions.
3. USSF and NRO for space capability development.
4. Other CDDRs and our Allies and partners for all-domain Integrated Deterrence and dominance.
5. Industry and academia to continue to pursue R&D activities seeking the next generation of space capabilities.
6. Institutionalizing and advocating for "Allied by Design" multilateral approaches to CCMD-level operational planning efforts.

7. Leverage the Integrated Priority List, Joint Urgent Operational Need, and Joint Emergent Operational Need submissions to drive the Services toward more rapid acquisitions that deliver capabilities on relevant timelines.
8. Coordinate with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD for commercial augmentation capabilities and framework.
9. Participates in Joint Exercises to train and validate the command's global capabilities while simultaneously supporting other Combatant Commanders.
10. Conduct experiments to provide technical demonstrations of emerging capabilities and analysis of tactics, techniques, and procedures to address emerging threats.
11. Pursue Wargaming opportunities to provide an analytic operational environment promoting the collaboration and coordination required to inform decisions across all event horizons and mission sets.

Further, I will certify USSPACECOM's readiness to win in competition, crisis, and conflict. In collaboration with all USG agencies, we will maintain the U.S.'s position of advantage in the space domain to ensure it remains sustainable, safe, stable, and secure for all.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays a role in furthering civilian control of our military?

Answer. Both the executive branch and Congress play vital Constitutional roles in civilian control of the military. Congress is Constitutionally empowered to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, and to make all laws that are necessary and proper for executing these constitutional powers. The President is Constitutionally the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for all facets of the Department of Defense.

Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political priorities?

Answer. Military personnel, and commanders in particular, must be rigorously apolitical in all their actions. This is also true when providing best military advice. My best military advice will always be based on a factual assessment of any given situation or issue, informed by discussions with key staff members, and presented clearly. It will not be swayed by civilian political priorities. When our civilian leaders then make a decision, I will also faithfully follow their lawful orders in accordance with the framework established in our Constitution of civilian leadership of the military.

USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President on the use of military force?

Answer. Space is a warfighting domain and we must be prepared to defend U.S., Allied and partner space capabilities, in accordance with the rules of engagement as approved by the National Command Authority, and consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, in order to prevent and/or mitigate hostile acts in space. We must also factor in our assessment of the potentially hostile intent of adversaries, as well as the costs, risks, and benefits of potential options.

Question. Are there other factors that, in your view, should be considered in making recommendations on the use of military force in space operations, whether conducted in the terrestrial or space domains, or through the electromagnetic spectrum?

Answer. We must always be cognizant that in space, we operate in an area of close proximity to non-military and commercial assets. My recommendation of military force in space operations will always be balanced, measured, and proportional to the hostile act or intent of an adversary. I will also factor in external issues, such as civilian assets.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of a combatant commander in establishing policies for the use of military force and rules of engagement?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that my civilian and military subject matter experts shape any revised policies. In parallel action, we will work to establish policy in coordination with stakeholders across the Department of Defense. We believe

that close partnership with all stakeholders is essential to establish the most appropriate policies on the use of force and rules of engagement.

Question. In your view, should a combatant commander's role in this regard differ when establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement for space operations?

Answer. All Combatant Commander's must apply the same framework in establishing policies for their respective area of responsibility. While each Combatant Commander has the same role, the unique circumstances of each AOR do impact that analysis. I believe it would be my responsibility to advise the Secretary of Defense in establishing policies that apply the uniqueness of the space domain across the spectrum of military conflict. I realize that a policy cannot be a "one size fits all" approach, but we will work within the framework of existing international law and domestic policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement. We will also not hesitate to request additional authorities, when necessary for national security.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China as the "most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department" and stated that Russia poses an "acute threat," as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The NDS also identifies "[m]utually beneficial Alliances and partnerships" as "an enduring strength for the United States."

In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical challenges and enduring threats to the national security of the U.S. and its Allies? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes, the NDS correctly recognizes the shift from great power competition with the PRC and Russia in favor of prioritizing strategic competition specifically with the PRC as our pacing challenge, including other strategic challenges such as Russia as an acute threat and threats to the U.S. Homeland. Additionally, I concur with the characterization of space as a "rapidly evolving domain" instead of as "emerging" domain. While norms and considerations of competition and conflict in space may be relatively new, the domain itself no longer is. With the democratization of actors in space, diffusion of space technology, and increasing relevance of space activities to support terrestrial domains, the domain's overarching maturation is accurately represented and facilitates the normalization of space throughout Joint Force processes.

Question. Does the 2022 NDS properly focus the U.S. on preparing to compete, deter, and win against the range of threats in the domain of space? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes, the three-pronged approach through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages enables the Department and USSPACECOM more specifically to address threats across the competition continuum in space. It provides a balance between addressing the current challenges with preparing for the future across readiness, OAI, and capabilities development.

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. strategic objectives in space and what role do you believe SPACECOM should play in supporting these objectives?

Answer. The strategic objectives in space are supporting the four defense priorities as outlined in the NDS: defend the Homeland, deter strategic attack, deter aggression while prepared to prevail in conflict, and building a resilient Joint Force. With that in mind, our strategic ends for national security space are twofold based on Secretary of Defense guidance:

- Maintain the benefits derived by all from space by preserving stability in, access to, and freedom to operate in, from, and through the space domain.
- Deter hostile uses of space that threaten the national security interests of the US and its Allies and partners; if deterrence fails, be prepared to prevail in conflict.

USSPACECOM's roles in achieving these objectives are in line with the Command's delineated UCP responsibilities as the warfighting combatant command for the defined AOR.

Question. In your view, how should SPACECOM be sized, structured, and resourced to implement the 2022 NDS and execute U.S. strategic objectives in the space domain?

Answer. We continue building the command toward Full Operational Capability and demonstrating that we can meet our assigned responsibilities in the UCP. The PB24 request maintains the command's path to its validated manpower requirement.

Going forward, we will continue to conduct our operations and planning, assess our effectiveness, and make changes to our organizational structure and allocation of resources as required. Additionally, our components that were established more recently continue to mature and offer us increased capability. As these capabilities continue to grow, USSPACECOM will depend even more on our components to develop robust support plans and execute our operations.

Question. If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls in the ability of SPACECOM to meet the demands placed on it by the 2022 NDS and the operational plans that implement the strategy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate, and set priorities for space operations capabilities through existing DOD processes like the Combatant Command's Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DOD, IC, and the Military Services, to identify seams in our current capabilities, establish requirements and develop future space capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space superiority.

Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make in DOD's implementation of the 2022 NDS as regards the domain of space?

Answer. As we implement the NDS, it is important to continue to evolve the Department's approach to global integration by leveraging space capabilities to achieve effects that allow us to compete with the PRC and enable the warfighter in all domains. If confirmed, I would advise both the Secretary and the Chairman to continue this global focus over a regional approach when establishing DOD priorities. We must acknowledge the global nature of strategic competition, the iterative strategic gains made by our pacing challenge in other regions, and the irreplaceable relationships we have our Allies and partners external to the region. Further, if confirmed, I would recommend that we prioritize campaigning and effects geared toward the global PRC challenge.

DOD READINESS IN SPACE

Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD and the U.S. Government as a whole—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to implement the 2022 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain of space?

Answer. I assess that the United States currently enjoys both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over any potential adversary, including our world-class space professionals who provide us significant advantage. However, competitors are actively and aggressively seeking to close the gap by developing, deploying, and demonstrating counterspace capabilities. Potential adversaries are also rapidly expanding their space-based capabilities that will enable their forces to monitor, track, and target U.S. and Allied forces. Such efforts create the potential for an adversary to negate U.S. space advantage, reduce U.S. and Allied military effectiveness, and impede our freedom of action in, through, and from the space domain. Accordingly, the DOD must further develop and enhance integration of space warfighting doctrine, capabilities, and personnel into national, Joint, and Combined operations if we are to maintain our warfighting advantage.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to move DOD and, as appropriate, other U.S. Government organizations toward full spectrum readiness to execute global space operations and missions, and under what timelines?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the processes begun by my predecessors integrating our Allies and partners in which synergies between our different capabilities add to our capacity to provide space effects for the Joint and Combined force. USSPACECOM has already established itself as a key partner in planning and integrating with other combatant commands in plans, exercises, and operations enhancing the readiness of the Joint Force. I would continue this and expand where and when possible.

Question. If confirmed, how would you oversee compliance with your timelines to ensure that readiness goals are met?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the military Services, space agencies and this committee to develop, implement, and oversee compliance with readiness standards. I will utilize existing processes for readiness reporting and oversight. Prioritization of resources must be a part of any solution to ensure readiness goals are met.

ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the 2022 NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships,

building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in these relationships. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, you would serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters to U.S. Government agencies, U.S. commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and exploit opportunities for cooperation in space operations activities and missions?

Answer. First, we need to continue to expand space cooperation with our Allies and partners. Led by ASD Plumb, significant effort is underway to break down the barriers to cooperation. If confirmed, I would continue to support, expand, and accelerate this work. For example, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (OSD-SP) and the Joint Staff, I would work to expand Allies membership in the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO). CSpO improves cooperation, coordination, and interoperability to sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission assurance and resilience, and deter conflict. I believe the initiative is ripe for further expansion. Additionally, I would continue to work with Allies to enhance Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (OOD). In addition to strengthening and expanding collective space power with Allies and partners multi-laterally, USSPACECOM has entered into bi-lateral Enhanced Space Cooperation (ESC) MOUs which codify cooperative activities with three key space Allies: United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CAN), and Australia (AUS). The ESC MOUs are the command's primary vehicle by which to increase bi-lateral interoperability, bolster capabilities, and increase information sharing. Additionally, we will continue to encourage participation by additional Allies and partners through avenues such as GLOBAL SENTINEL and Joint Task Force-Space Defense Joint Commercial Operations (JCO). Last, I would expand our reciprocal network of exchange and liaison officers.

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the leaders of other nations' military space operations enterprises, international consultative forums regarding space operations, and processes for enhancing space-related interoperability between Allies and partners?

Answer. I have a solid working relationship with the military leaders of our most capable Allies and partners in the space arena. I plan to continue to foster relationships with Allied and partner space leadership should I be confirmed through engagements in a variety of forums and specific strategic engagements. These include the CSpO Initiative, annual Space Symposium, USSPACECOM Commander's Conference, as well as numerous opportunities to engage Allied and partner leaders at home and abroad. Given the global nature of the space domain, I intend to reach out to space leaders across the globe to further strengthen relationships that can help us achieve our objectives in support of the National Defense Strategy.

Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the leaders of the private sector commercial space operations community and how would you engage with them if confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command?

Answer. I have a solid working relationship with a number of commercial space leaders, and have worked with them in various forums and activities for the past decade. Further, USSPACECOM published the Combatant Command's (CCMD) Commercial Integration Strategy during the summer of 2022, which seeks to partner, collaborate, and integrate commercial capabilities into the CCMD's space warfighting architecture. If confirmed, I would continue implementing the various lines of effort within the Commercial Integration Strategy with the ultimate end-State of enhancing overall military space power through commercial integration.

Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits associated with building partnerships with private industry to accomplish certain SPACECOM missions and activities? How would you mitigate any risks you identify?

Answer. Building partnerships with private industry expands the ability for USSPACECOM to conduct its mission. Many space effects and capabilities can be accomplished or conducted by private industry in ways that are advantageous, because: (1) commercial funding is not beholden to the POM cycle, (2) they have access to independent research and development funding (IRAD), and (3) their acquisition process is agile and is based on market principles. Some examples are Space Domain Awareness, SATCOM, and space-based imaging/surveillance. Risks which we must closely watch are the targeting of commercial assets by potential adversaries, to include the risk of cyberattack. By working in close partnership with commercial industry and relevant agencies such as USCYBERCOM and the Services, we can reduce this risk.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve information-sharing, integration, coordination, and collaboration between SPACECOM, other DOD com-

mands and organizations, the Intelligence Community, and other governmental agencies?

Answer. The Command's success relies on a Whole of Government approach and integration of Allies and partners, including commercial entities. We will proactively seek to expand our influence through space domain awareness sharing agreements, technology exchanges, and transparency through routine engagements. USSPACECOM works with OSD to prioritize information within USSPACECOM's areas of responsibilities for sharing with the interagency and our allies and foreign partners. USSPACECOM continues to grow an embedded presence of national agencies at our headquarters to facilitate integration and information exchange. Likewise, the Command has embedded Joint Integrated Space Teams at each combatant command.

SPACECOM

Question. In your view, what are the priority tasks you will, if confirmed, undertake as the Commander, U.S. Space Command?

Answer. The CCDR's priority tasks, IAW 10 U.S.C. § 164, are to exercise the authority of combatant command giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, Joint training, and logistics; prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command; organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; assigning command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.

Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, how would you structure the command and its subordinate components to unify the command and control of operational forces in the space operations domain across the Intelligence Community and the Military Services?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to structure USSPACECOM and subordinate components to drive an integrated unity of effort across the Services, the Intelligence Community, and the Combatant Commands to enable a warfighting space architecture that unifies C2 while increasing the speed and effectiveness of response. As the Space Operations Command (SpOC) Commander, I have had the opportunity to participate in key USSPACECOM exercises and assess options to better enable our warfighting approach. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing those reviews and maintaining an agile and lean staff structure that remains focused on maintaining our competitive advantage in the space domain for years to come.

Question. If confirmed, what first steps would you take to integrate space operations and activity planning and execution across all combatant commanders' campaign and contingency plans?

Answer. With space as a global domain that enables all other warfighters, it is critical that USSPACECOM plans are integrated with other combatant commands. If confirmed, I will continue the integration that was the hallmark of the process which produced USSPACECOM's first operational plan (OPLAN). USSPACECOM planners conducted over 30 engagements with fellow combatant command planners and the Joint Staff to ensure this plan enabled their warfighting objectives and to establish requirements for when terrestrial and cyber effects would be required to meet USSPACECOM OPLAN objectives. Additionally, we will continue our campaign efforts and work with other combatant commands to compete with the pacing challenge on all fronts. This includes ensuring that space capabilities are synchronized with other combatant command efforts for integrated deterrence. Finally, we must coordinate and collaborate with other combatant commands as we build our partnerships with countries from around the globe to enhance operational capability, leverage key terrain, and shape strategic messaging to provide a competitive advantage over the PRC.

Question. In your view, where is SPACECOM in its ongoing effort to reach Initial Operating Capability? Full Operating Capability?

Answer. USSPACECOM achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in the summer of 2021. The Command will soon reach full operational capability (FOC) having surpassed several milestones: (1) Accomplishing its UCP missions alongside global campaigning, exercising, and responding to crisis; (2) Attaining the right number and

skills for human capital; (3) Acquiring the infrastructure needed to support C2 across USSPACECOM mission and business functions; (4) Establishing necessary command processes and functions; (5) Setting the conditions and requirements for the future fight; (6) Strengthening Allied and international partnerships; and (7) Integrating commercial capabilities.

Question. In your view, what missions, functions, and tasks should remain in each Service and which should transfer to U.S. Space Force?

Answer. The Services' functions as force and capability providers to the CCMDs are generally clear in the lanes of organizing, training, and equipping personnel, producing and providing equipment, and support to fielded systems. In the space domain, it is not surprising that United States Space Force, as a Service singularly focused on this domain, is the primary force provider to United States Space Command. The other Services, however, continue to provide critical capabilities to USSPACECOM as well in fulfillment of UCP responsibilities. Like the USSF, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force may retain some space capabilities within their Service combat elements to further their Service-particular missions. Those capabilities should not be duplicative to the global capabilities provided by United States Space Force. In general, with the planned transfer of the Joint Tactical Air Ground System (JTAGS) from the Army to the Space Force planned for FY24, I think the missions, functions, and tasks will be appropriately aligned within the Services.

SPACECOM OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AND TASKS

The Commander, U.S. Space Command, is responsible for the planning and execution of global space operations missions and activities, providing space-related support to other combatant commands and their operational plans, and the defense of space assets.

Question. What are your views on the "pros" and "cons" of unity of command as compared to unity of effort in space with respect to other assets in space under the Intelligence Community?

Answer. Today we effectively execute unity of command of our Joint space forces and unity of effort among USSPACECOM and NRO forces. The relationship between USSPACECOM and the NRO is excellent and effective. We're well aligned through our protect and defend strategy, concept of operations, programs, and organizations. We have built a strong "unity of effort" construct at the National Space Defense Center, which serves us very well in day-to-day space operations. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship.

Question. Should there be a conflict—whether in space or another domain—what are your views on the importance of unity of command or unity of effort between DOD and Intelligence Community assets, both in space on the ground?

Answer. Given the integral nature of our civilian and military space systems to our way of life and way of warfare, it is absolutely essential to have unity of command and unity of effort where and when required to maximize delivery of effects and optimized efficient use of space capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with every organization that operates U.S. Government space assets to ensure all US national security assets are protected and defended, and will, as directed, protect those Allied, partner, and critical commercial space capabilities as well.

Question. In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and Allied space assets? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Unity of command is absolutely required for Joint forces during a time of conflict, and the creation of USSPACECOM clearly provides that in the space AOR. For organizations and assets not placed under Combatant Command authority, unity of effort is a sound approach, even in a time of conflict and even when protecting and defending space assets. Today, USSPACECOM and the NRO have created an effective unity of effort construct to ensure we protect and defend our assets in concert from the National Space Defense Center.

Question. Do you believe that in the event of a conflict in space, reliance on a single operational commander would benefit or detract from U.S. success? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The creation of USSPACECOM in 2019 provides the single Combatant Commander responsible for operations in the space AOR and for supporting the rest of the Joint Force. Since the creation of the command, it has produced unity of command inside the Department and unity of effort with organizations outside of DOD. It is vital we sustain USSPACECOM, and if confirmed, I will continue to look for ways to optimize the internal command and control of the command.

The tasking of on-orbit assets must be conducted, and the data collected made available in a timeframe relevant to the warfighter, in order to ensure mission accomplishment.

Question. Given the current allocation of authorities and responsibilities across DOD and the Intelligence Community, in your view can these processes be accelerated to increase mission impact? If so, how?

Answer. USSPACECOM is a warfighting combatant command focused on protecting and defending national security on-orbit space capabilities, which allows for the continuous delivery of sensor data, satellite communications, and navigation to the Joint Force, the Nation, and our Allies and partners. A comprehensive review of classification for collection data would ensure widest dissemination possible to the warfighter in a timely fashion. Additionally, continued integration and exchange of personnel between USSPACECOM and intelligence organizations will foster common understanding of strategic, operational, and tactical uses of on-orbit data collection. Leveraging technology, in particular machine to machine interfaces and machine learning/artificial intelligence, will better orchestrate collection and accelerate existing processes to a greater degree.

Question. Given the growth of both the space enterprise and threats to space assets, how will you ensure the mission resiliency and survivability of SPACECOM assets?

Answer. In order to achieve both resiliency and survivability of space combat power, I will advocate for a multi-faceted and multi-layered approach that leverages diversity in assets, orbits, and relationships with Allies, partners, and commercial suppliers, as well as integration of defensive technologies in our space systems. I also recognize that the defense of space assets may require support from other combatant commanders, and USSPACECOM must be integrated into the Joint fires planning process to ensure those supporting requirements are established. With strong budget support, improvements are underway in both offensive and defensive space capabilities. We are developing new counterspace systems while new and legacy space systems are incorporating defensive measures, tactics, techniques, and procedures. We'll need to effectively integrate those capabilities across all domains and ensure requisite authorities are in place.

DOD military operations against peer competitors and rogue nation threats require constant monitoring and tracking of critical ground and air mobile targets, close integration between space and airborne intelligence systems, and tight coupling with strike planning and execution systems.

Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to satisfy these warfighting requirements from space?

Answer. If confirmed, I will push for an integrated approach to defend our space capabilities and provide space-based capabilities to the warfighter. On orbit we are building capacity to secure our satellites systems which provide these essential services. We are increasing our ability to see satellites on orbit and identify nefarious actions of our peer competitors. We are working with our Allies and partners to establish norms of behavior for responsible nations to follow and enhance security of our orbiting systems. Space is increasingly congested and contested. Nefarious actions of our competitors necessitate we adapt and build our capacity to defend our critical space systems. Defending against the scope and scale of existing and emerging threats necessitates close cooperation in all warfighting domains. Delivering space-based capabilities to the warfighter is our top priority given the high ground of space delivers a critical advantage to our Nation's warfighters.

Question. What are the implications of these tactical military requirements for constellation planning, processing agility, speed of dissemination, and coordination with the Military Services and commanders?

Answer. Tactical requirements necessitate greater integration of space warfighting operations, intelligence, capabilities, and personnel into military plans and staffs. The integration of superior space capabilities into and throughout the Joint Force, along with operational integration with Allies and partners, is essential for securing our military advantage against threats in space. The establishment of USSPACECOM, with a full-time operational focus on the integration and employment of military space power, further enables DOD to meet tactical warfighter needs on operationally relevant timelines. USSPACECOM has embedded Joint Integrated Space Teams within each of the other combatant commands to globally integrate space operations for execution.

Question. Tasking and control between overhead satellites has grown and evolved significantly.

If confirmed, what would you do to ensure unity of effort and deconfliction of taskings in the space warfighting domain across DOD and the Intelligence Community?

Answer. USSPACECOM ensures unity of effort and deconfliction through existing processes and mechanisms for the Intelligence Community and United States Space Command. The Command leverages the large, embedded presence of the national agencies in the headquarters to facilitate integration. The Intelligence Community responds to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to which we have input. The Command prioritizes and coordinates our needs through the intelligence requirement systems managed by the national agencies. I will focus on the National Defense Strategy, our UCP responsibilities, our approved Operations Plan, and resulting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) to drive Joint Force operations in the space domain. The Command's Joint Reconnaissance Center and J2 collections team emphasize those PIRs, ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across the DOD and IC to meet warfighting needs.

Question. In your view, would there be operational advantages in National Security Agency (NSA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) overhead tasking organizations fully integrated their operations? Please explain your answer.

Answer. USSPACECOM ensures unity of effort and deconfliction through existing processes and mechanisms for deconfliction between the Intelligence Community and United States Space Command. The Command leverages the large, embedded presence of the representatives from Intelligence Community organizations in the headquarters to facilitate integration. The Intelligence Community responds to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to which we have input. The Command prioritizes and coordinates our needs through the intelligence requirement systems managed by the national agencies. I will focus on the National Defense Strategy, our UCP responsibilities, our approved Operations Plan, and my resulting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) to drive Joint Force operations in the space domain. The Command's Joint Reconnaissance Center and J2 collections team emphasize those PIRs, ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across the DOD and IC to meet warfighting needs.

Question. In your view, would operational advantages accrue to our military forces if operations tasking National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellites were closely integrated with DOD airborne intelligence collection and targeting operations? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The Intelligence Community provides timely, and relevant intelligence to United States Space Command that enables the Command to execute our UCP responsibilities. I would defer to the Secretary of Defense on how to best organize the elements of the Intelligence Community to support the warfighter, including the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

Question. What are your views and long-term vision of tactically responsive space?

Answer. USSPACECOM's top priority is delivering space-based capabilities to warfighters around the globe in the face of the threats now arrayed against us. The needs of all Joint warfighters will always be paramount as we work to improve the delivery of those capabilities and protect and defend them against threats.

The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency that is not designated as a combat support agency (CSA) as defined in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Historically, the NRO has asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and controls. In NRO's view, others, principally its Intelligence Community mission partners NSA and NGA, both of which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational tasking of deployed satellites. However, there exists a class of operational decisions for which the NRO Director is responsible. In situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threatened with the same, the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions regarding space control.

Question. In your view, what should be the relationship between the Commander, U.S. Space Command, and the Director of the NRO when responding to hostile acts or evidence of hostile intent that threaten or could threaten DOD and NRO space assets?

Answer. USSPACECOM and the NRO have developed Loki's Gambit, an exercise specifically designed to develop vignettes which test the two organizations current roles, responsibilities, and authorities to ensure a seamless relationship at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This has paid dividends in establishing and codifying processes at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) as well as coordination between the two headquarters. Much like our role with the other Combatant Commands, we have seen vignettes which require a myriad of supported/supporting relationships and we continue to work through each to ensure synergistic operations.

Question. Do you agree with maintaining separation between the NRO and the U.S. Space Force?

Answer. I do. I believe maintaining distinction between military operations and intelligence activities is appropriate. The current division of National ISR acquisition and operations conducted by NRO and defense acquisition and operations conducted by the Services and USSPACECOM respectively ensures each organization maintains focus on their respective mission set.

Question. Are there any conditions or circumstances, in your view, in which NRO and space operations forces should be integrated, going forward?

Answer. We have co-located USSPACECOM and NRO protect and defend operations today in a unity of effort construct at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) at Schriever Space Force Base. It has become a model for integrated protect and defend operations between USSPACECOM, the NRO, and USSF. At the NSDC, we coordinate, collaborate, and deconflict operations and support program protections to ensure all these organizations meet protect and defend mission requirements as an integrated team.

Question. Would it be advisable, in your view, for the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to be in the chain of command for the tasking of NRO satellites in conflict situations, as a means of rationalizing space command and control in support of U.S. military forces?

Answer. Though our current unity of effort construct with the NRO at the NSDC, we have shared plans, procedures, and tactics for protecting and defending our space capabilities together. This allows us to act in a unified manner even during higher states of readiness.

Question. In your view, would it be feasible and advisable to apply the model in which the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, serves also as the Director of NSA and reports to the DNI on national intelligence operations, to the Commander, U.S. Space Command, in order to grant authority to control the tasking of national intelligence space assets in support of military forces in combat?

Answer. I do not believe this is necessary at this time. Policies, directives, and processes continue to assure our military forces in combat will obtain the necessary tasking of national intelligence space assets for support in combat.

Space Operations Joint Force Provider to other Combatant Commands

If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, you will be charged with providing trained and ready Joint space operations forces to other Combatant Commands. If confirmed, what would be your approach to executing each of following responsibilities:

Question. Identifying and recommending global Joint sourcing solutions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the military Services and other combatant commands.

Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the existing Global Force Management process and work with the supported combatant commands and Services to ensure the priorities and weight of effort are best suited to the supported commander. USSPACECOM has made tremendous strides aligning Service presented forces to supported commanders identifying risks, tradeoffs, and opportunities for employment of space capabilities. If confirmed, I will advocate and integrate with other combatant commands determining the best courses of action for global Joint sourcing solutions.

Question. Inculcating in space operations forces across all military Services and in the active and Reserve components a warfighting culture and ethos.

Answer. USSPACECOM has made significant progress in developing the warfighting spirit within the command. If confirmed, I will build on those efforts, leveraging the efforts by the military Services to grow that warfighting culture. Space is a warfighting domain and requires a warfighting mentality by the men and women charged with defending it.

Question. Embedding at each combatant command staff a space planning cell, consistent with SPACECOM's overall responsibilities under the UCP.

Answer. USSPACECOM's Joint Integrated Space Teams (JIST) are designed to provide space operational expertise to all combatant commands enabling the integration of space operations into combatant command operational planning. The JIST support intelligence, planning, and executing, through education, integration, advocacy, and communication of all space-related activities that pertain to USSPACECOM UCP-assigned roles and responsibilities. JIST intelligence professionals link the USSPACECOM J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center to the other combatant commands.

Question. Establishing enterprise-wide standards for the training and readiness of space operations forces across all military Services and in the active and Reserve components.

Answer. USSPACECOM J7 has drafted training tasks and learning outcomes for all DOD non-space personnel at various levels of responsibility, ranging from our

most junior enlisted troops to senior flag and general officers. Once approved, these tasks will be provided to the Services for inclusion in their common task training programs.

Question. Validating space operations forces are fully trained and interoperable with other forces.

Answer. Recently, USSPACECOM moved the J7 directorate from the J3 directorate and assigned a general officer directly responsible for these efforts. This was the right move as the command started to reach its directed end strength. If confirmed, I will ensure the J7 is providing the most robust training possible to supplement Service-provided education and remain flexible to the changes in the operating environment. As required, our training will also include coalition forces ensuring a more lethal and ready Combined force.

Question. Conducting and supporting Joint exercises, experiments, and war games.

Answer. With the changes in the strategic threat environment, if confirmed, I will continue to prioritize the integration of counterspace scenarios into exercises to ensure the Joint Force is ready to protect and defend its space Area of Responsibility. This requires the CDR to simultaneously be the supported and supporting commander. To adequately exercise the duality of this position, and fully exercise the physical and cognitive actions required to defend the space AOR, USSPACECOM established its own Tier-1 Exercise series, APOLLO GRIFFIN. USSPACECOM's first Tier-1 exercise campaign will commence with a scaled-down event in FY24, preceding a full event in FY25. Additionally, the command will continue to participate in other CCMD and Allied exercises, Joint Wargames and Experimentation events to continue to strengthen our Joint and Combined interoperability as well as evaluate our force design considerations.

Question. Developing recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding strategy; doctrine; concepts of operation; tactics; and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Joint employment of space operations forces and space capabilities.

Answer. Continue advancing the institutionalization of the space domain across Joint Force processes to bring space into planning processes early and often. This will ensure that space requirements are captured and integrated from the onset to inform critical analyses and decisionmaking considerations. USSPACECOM continues to infuse space equities and representation in applicable Joint Staff forums, ensuring that fellow combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and OSD understand the underpinning that space-based and space-enabling capabilities provide across Joint Force activities. USSPACECOM's approach to developing doctrine is two-fold. As a member of the Joint Doctrine Development Community, USSPACECOM ensures space is appropriately represented in all Joint Publications.

EQUIPPING SPACE OPERATIONS FORCES AND PROVIDING SPACE OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

Question. Part and parcel of DOD's enhanced approach to the domain of space, the Department has established the Space Development Agency (SDA). In testimony before this Committee, DOD officials reinforced that the first and most important task assigned to the SDA is to develop, in cooperation with the space industry, a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operations. In 2018, the NRO published a document stating:

"NRO provides the Nation's unified space-based ISR overhead architecture, addressing the needs of both national and tactical users. The nation does not need a competing and duplicative set of capabilities from what is currently being provided and developed to address these needs. Setting up a competing, tactically focused ISR overhead architecture will cause budgetary and congressional issues for both DOD and IC, and should be avoided. Splitting the national overhead architecture into capabilities that focus on IC customers vs. DOD customers will create a seam where a seam does not exist today—all will lose in this proposed end-State. The nation is better off with a national agency chartered to develop intelligence capabilities that are operated/orchestrated as an architecture to support both IC and DOD missions."

Do you share the view that neither the SDA nor the Space Rapid Capabilities Office should be engaged in acquiring and fielding satellites that provide tactical support to military operations?

Answer. While these organizations are not assigned to USSPACECOM, I think that SDA and the SpRCO should be engaged in acquiring and fielding satellites as long as they deliver rapidly developed, and effective systems for warfighting, to include providing tactical support to military operations.

Question. Should NRO be the only organization in the U.S. Government with the mission of acquiring satellites capable of collecting intelligence from space? Please explain your answer.

Answer. The NRO has proven itself to be the world's premier provider of ISR from space, and they have developed deep expertise in the acquisition of ISR satellites. As ISR from space continues to grow and evolve, we should be open to other organizations leading acquisition efforts which provide ISR from space when required. This should be done in full collaboration with the NRO to deconflict efforts, leverage best of breed capabilities, and take advantage of organizational strengths among the various acquisition organizations.

Question. In your view is there an appropriate role for the SDA in providing a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operational requirements?

Answer. Yes, and I look forward to the delivery of the current systems being developed by the SDA.

Question. Do you perceive any advantages to establishing the SDA as the defense organization charged to focus on tactical space capability speed to market by leveraging commercial technologies and products?

Answer. There are advantages in leveraging commercial technologies and products; however, this must also be balanced with operational needs, data sharing requirements/constraints, data assurance (open architectures), and technological advances with the business models of the commercial partners. Many of the Services and agencies that develop space capabilities are charged with the responsibility to bring tactical space capability by leveraging commercial technologies and products at speed. Additionally, all acquisition organizations should be taking advantage of leveraging commercial technologies and products to improve the speed and cost of capability development efforts.

Question. In addition to sharing technology, how could the capabilities vested in the NRO and the SDA be employed to rationalize and harmonize the efforts of both organizations?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts of the Program Integration Council (of which USSPACECOM is a member) which brings together all the acquisition organizations (to include the NRO and SDA) providing capability in support of United States Space Command and the national security space enterprise, to ensure the programs being delivered by these various organizations integrate together to improve the combat effectiveness and resiliency of our systems.

Question. As regards the SDA's role in equipping space operations forces and providing innovative capabilities and capacity for space operations, how would you propose to solve, in short order, the long-standing problems associated with overly bureaucratic and late-to-need systems and processes for identifying requirements for, and developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities?

Answer. I think SDA needs to continue to operate under their authorities to rapidly field current technologies to stay ahead of our competitors. To field space warfighting capabilities on time, we need to hold our contractors and acquisition centers accountable, while ensuring requirements creep does not affect delivery of weapon systems. Continued legislative reforms coupled with a number of internal DOD reforms to the requirements and acquisition processes, are putting us on the right trajectory to speed development and fielding of critical space capabilities.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION

Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas—space among them—in which investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative. Much of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

What do you see as the most significant challenges, to include technical, organizational, or cultural challenges, to U.S. development of technologies key to dominance in space, or gaining access to such technologies from the commercial marketplace?

Answer. DOD acquisitions processes have traditionally been slow to integrate new technology into program of record activities due either to funding limitations or concerns with mission assurance. Prioritizing R&D funding and recognizing that U.S. space capabilities will be aggressively targeted by our competitors, we must shift our focus from solely maximizing capability on orbit and prioritize R&D resources to equally maximize survivability of those capabilities. Key force enhancement technology remains a focus, to provide space-based force-multiplier capabilities to

warfighters in all domains. Now we must also address our expanded mission and necessary competitive viability, and therefore expect increased focus in defending the space domain and providing for the freedom of action in space.

Question. In your view, has DOD properly integrated and synchronized investments in technologies key to space across all its components?

Answer. The DOD strategically prioritizes its investments in capabilities, platforms and other vital technologies based on the needs of components and urgency of their missions.

Question. How has DOD prioritized limited research and development (R&D) funding across key areas of space-related technology? Specifically, in your view, where is DOD either increasing, or decreasing, its focus and funding?

Answer. In this rapidly developing era of competition, it is important that we have the ability to direct R&D funds and efforts critical to developing the right space technologies at the right time. Additionally, US Space Command is collaborating with the other CCMDs and Services on numerous Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) and Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER). These valuable programs award short term funding for critical experiments in S&T using federally funded R&D centers.

Question. In your view, how is the Department balancing space-related revolutionary capability advancements compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?

Answer. By engaging private industry for commercial off the shelf solutions and simultaneously working experimentation projects, DOD is always moving forward to maintain a technological advantage. Utilizing DOD programs such as the Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies (APFIT), USSPACECOM encourages expeditious transition of technologies from development into production and is working to accelerate the fielding of those technologies to the warfighter.

Question. In your view, how can the Department better integrate the operational experience of the warfighter into the R&D process? Are there appropriate places to interject warfighter input into the interaction between the DOD research and engineering community and the private sector?

Answer. It is vital warfighters, requirement generators, and acquisition organizations collaborate early and often in the development of new capabilities. If confirmed, I will maximize this engagement through the Program Integration Council, the Space Acquisition Council, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office's Board of Directors, and other existing forums.

Question. If confirmed, how would you leverage experimentation and prototyping opportunities for new technologies and concepts that might be beneficial for the space enterprise, or better support specific Service or CCMD roles in Joint operations?

Answer. USSPACECOM must continue to support rapid prototyping and development to expedite the integration of new technology into DOD space operations at a pace which exceeds that of our potential adversaries. We need to leverage front-end, low-cost, higher-risk prototyping and experimentation to buy down overall enterprise risk, refine capability requirements, and progress at a competitively viable pace.

Commercial technology often surpasses the innovative edge once held by the military and the Intelligence Community in the domain of space. Industry is rapidly expanding into space, and may eclipse the capabilities of our national security satellites in both technology and ability to reconstitute in space.

Question. Do you believe it wise for DOD to take advantage of these commercial developments? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes, we must take advantage of the capabilities American industry brings to us in space. The accelerating commercialization of space presents new and significant opportunities across the Joint Force. Partnering with commercial entities enables USSPACECOM to adapt faster, innovate more reliably, integrate cutting-edge technology on an accelerated timeline, bolster space architecture resilience, develop a better understanding of the space domain, expedite decisionmaking, and devise economical solutions to strategic problems.

Question. What is your understanding of the efforts DOD is making to identify space-relevant new technologies developed commercially and apply them to military and national security purposes?

Answer. DOD seeks to accelerate space-relevant technology development across the commercial space enterprise through numerous innovative programs, to include the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and AFWERX/SpaceWERX. These programs allow for DOD requirements advocacy and investment opportunities that help steer the commercial space enterprise toward filling select DOD capability gaps.

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that commercial technology is appropriately incorporated into SPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DOD?

Answer. At all times, we will encourage the Services and other acquisition organizations to first look to buy existing commercial capabilities when it can meet our requirements, then look to exploit available commercial technologies for military purposes, and finally, to build military-unique systems only when required. American industry is an asymmetric advantage for the United States and USSPACECOM.

Question. In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and strengthen our National Security Innovation Base both to promote space-related innovation and to ensure that critical information is protected?

Answer. DOD seeks to identify common cyber security standards for commercial space capabilities within the NSIB in order to protect and strengthen critical information. If confirmed, I will work with the Services and other acquisition organizations to encourage them to include sufficient cyber defense language in their contracts with commercial industry.

The national security space community has begun to blend the use of traditional spacecraft and new flexible small satellites to provide improved mission support to users.

Question. In your view, how can SPACECOM exploit commercial launch and other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems, while minimizing the risk of mission failure?

Answer. USSPACECOM relies on the Space Force to launch the capabilities needed for employment in the space AOR. Given the remarkable string of successes we have seen over the past couple of decades in national security launch, I have full faith in the Space Force's efforts to continue to onboard new launch providers who may offer reduced costs. Further, if confirmed, I will continue USSPACECOM's efforts to work with the Space Force on responsive launch demonstrations as we work to operationalize a responsive launch capability.

One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will benefit the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase to testing and evaluation, and ultimately into a program of record in order to deploy the capability to the warfighter.

Question. What challenges do you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies development from research programs into programs of record?

Answer. Timing and funding—USSPACECOM must work with the Services, CCMDs and other transition partners to better align POM requirements during important milestones in technology development and throughout the program's lifecycle. It is vital that new programs of record are delivered as "fully burdened" programs with all the DOTMLP-F considerations funded, to include sufficient test and training ranges which will allow the Services to demonstrate the effectiveness of their new systems before they are fielded and presented to USSPACECOM.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to ensure that the DOD space enterprise is quickly and directly benefiting from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?

Answer. USSPACECOM will execute a robust communication strategy between the Services, CCMDs and DOD S&T organizations to prioritize R&D funding and bolster inter-Service efforts. I will also work with the military Services, developers, acquirers, commercial partners and the Intelligence Community to ensure we're seeking the right capabilities and systems that enhance the readiness and lethality of our space systems. I will work with all appropriate stakeholders to ensure we're defining and relaying the warfighting requirements that will keep our Nation ahead of the threat.

Question. How do you see the laboratory facilities across the DOD research enterprise contributing to DOD's goals for developing technology for the warfighter?

Answer. USSPACECOM will continue to collaborate on numerous Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) and Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) with the other CCMDs and Services, awarding short-term funding for critical experiments in S&T using federally funded R&D centers and labs.

Question. Do you think these in-house R&D facilities are keeping pace with the needs of the Department? If not, what do you think could be done to improve our ability to modernize R&D infrastructure?

Answer. I do not have sufficient personal information about the labs to answer this question at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the

committee on any concerns I may develop about DOD's in-house R&D facilities and laboratories.

CHINA

Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of China in space?

Answer. The PRC has a grand strategy for economic and military dominance in the space domain that extends for decades as a national priority; the PRC aims to be a global space leader by 2030. Over the past two decades, the PRC has worked to develop capabilities and advanced technologies to erode core U.S. military advantages such as power projection and rapid global space-enabled fires. Its military is actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into multi-domain warfighting strategies to position themselves as space powers and create improved balance of power dynamics in their near abroad as well as globally.

Question. In what ways, if any, do China's strategic objectives in space conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?

Answer. The PRC has a grand strategy for economic and military dominance in the space domain that extends for decades as a national priority; the PRC aims to be a global space leader by 2030. Over the past two decades, the PRC has worked to develop capabilities and advanced technologies to erode core U.S. military advantages such as power projection and rapid global space-enabled fires. Its military is actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into multi-domain warfighting strategies to position themselves as space powers and create improved balance of power dynamics in their near abroad as well as globally.

Conversely, the U.S. promotes space activities that can be conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner. Because space capabilities, both government and commercial, enable the entire American way of life from our economy to how we enable our Joint Force, the PRC's commitment to both economic and military dominance in space along with development of counter-space capabilities place the entire U.S. system at risk.

Question. To what extent do you view China's activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. The PRC is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that the U.S. has accrued from space leadership. The PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities, investing in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and navigation. It is also improving satellite meteorology, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. The PLA owns and operates about half of the world's space based ISR systems. These capabilities support the PLA's ability to monitor, track, and target U.S. and Allied forces worldwide. In July 2021, the PRC conducted the first fractional orbital bombardment system test with a hypersonic glide vehicle that circumnavigated the Earth, starting from and returning to China. This demonstrated the greatest distance flown and the longest flight time (?100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapon system to date.

Question. In your view, which Chinese initiatives and capabilities pose the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets? Please explain your answer?

Answer. The rapid advancement and proliferation of the PRC's counterspace capabilities, and efforts to integrate those capabilities into their Joint military operations, presents a significant risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets. In just the last decade, the PRC has doubled its launches per year, and significantly increased the number of satellites in orbit. They have developed and tested multiple ASAT missiles and space-based robotic arm technology that is able to destroy or manipulate satellites. The PRC has also developed multiple jammers to deny satellite communications and our Global Positioning System. These counterspace capabilities have the potential to target other space-based capabilities that support both military power and civilian life. The wide array of tools being developed by the PRC could be utilized to hinder U.S. military response to a conflict, target U.S. civilian infrastructure, and hold U.S. and Allied space assets in multiple orbits at risk.

Question. In your view, are U.S. policies and associated authorities, as applicable to space operations and assets, sufficient to counter China's activities and influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should SPACECOM play in this regard?

Answer. I support the policies and authorities outlined in the Defense Space Strategy and other relevant strategic document. USSPACECOM leads the Department's effort countering China's malign activities and influence in the space domain. Similar to other Combatant Commands, USSPACECOM has a Secretary of Defense-approved Operational Plan which identifies the authorities required to execute that plan. USSPACECOM's role is to identify and advocate for authorities required to

execute its responsibilities as stipulated in its OPLAN. If I am confirmed and additional authorities are needed to meet USSPACECOM UCP responsibilities, I would pursue those additional authorities with the Secretary to ensure USSPACECOM has the ability to counter China's activities if required.

Question. Which additional capabilities will be most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage over China in space, in your view?

Answer. We must deliver space-enabling capabilities to the Joint warfighter for all our UCP missions and this requires both resilient systems and the ability to impose costs and hold the PRC systems at risk. This includes on-orbit, link, and ground segments, exploiting commercial capabilities like artificial intelligence, data analytics, and advanced computing. We must invest in and continue to develop offensive and defensive space control capabilities, along with the associated command and control architecture that will enable us to achieve and sustain space superiority throughout the spectrum of conflict. Finally, we need to continue to reform our acquisition processes to make them more agile and risk tolerant.

Finally, as the PRC pursues space technologies that can provide them strategic advantages in space, we cannot overestimate the importance of attracting and retaining the most talented people our Nation can offer—those who can out-think and out-perform the competition.

RUSSIA

Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of Russia in space?

Answer. Russia sees space as integral to winning modern wars and seeks to better incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. According to President Putin, "Russia must maintain its status as a leading nuclear and space power." Russia's likely strategic objective in space is to negate perceived U.S. military dominance in space while maximizing Moscow's declining resources to regain a leading position in space.

Question. In your view, in what ways, if any, do Russia's strategic objectives conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?

Answer. Russia sees space as integral to winning modern wars and seeks to better incorporate space operations and counterspace capabilities. According to President Putin, "Russia must maintain its status as a leading nuclear and space power." Russia's likely strategic objective in space is to negate perceived U.S. military dominance in space while maximizing Moscow's declining resources to regain a leading position in the space domain.

Conversely, the U.S. promotes space activities that can be conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner.

Question. To what extent do you view Russia's activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. Russian military doctrine clearly articulates that Russia views space as a warfighting domain and that achieving supremacy in space will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. Russia perceives the U.S. dependence on space as our Achilles' heel, which can be exploited to achieve Russian conflict objectives. Russia is therefore pursuing counterspace systems to neutralized or deny U.S. space-based services, both military and commercial, as a means of offsetting a perceived U.S. military advantage.

Question. In your view, which Russian initiatives and capabilities poses the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets? Please explain your answer?

Answer. Russia seeks to deny US advantages in space, and as a result the Kremlin will seek ways to strengthen its counterspace programs. In the near-term, Russian electronic warfare and cyber capabilities represent the greatest threat to US systems in terms of scope and scale. Beyond that, Russian introduction of developmental ASAT systems present an additional kinetic threat. In the longer term, there are a number of developmental (or aspirational) systems such as "inspector" satellites that could increase the reach of Russian counterspace systems. All Russian counterspace program advances and developments are subject to delay due to systemic corruption and/or the effects of sanctions.

Question. In your view, are U.S. policies and the associated authorities, as applicable to space operations and assets, sufficient to counter Russia's activities and influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should SPACECOM play in this regard?

Answer. I understand the policies and authorities as outlined in the published Defense Space Strategy and other relevant strategic documents are sufficient. The U.S. continues to be the best in space and, if confirmed, I will ensure USSPACECOM continues to lead the Department of Defense's progress toward countering Russia's activities and influence in the domain. USSPACECOM has a central role in the

shared interest and responsibility of all space-faring nations to create the conditions for a safe, stable and operationally sustainable space environment. If I, as the confirmed USSPACECOM commander, determined additional authorities were required to confront a specific threat, I would follow department policies and engage with DOD leaders as needed.

Question. In your view, what types of activities are most important to deterring Russian aggression in space and mitigating any threat it may present?

Answer. In my opinion, to deter Russian aggression in space, building a coalition of nations willing to hold Russia accountable for their actions in space will allow the U.S. to create collective cost imposition advantages over Russia by leveraging information sharing with Allies and partners. If Russian aggression in space presents a threat to critical U.S., Allied, or partners' space capabilities, USSPACECOM must have the authorities and capabilities to enable responses in operationally relevant timelines and negate Russian fait accomplis. Further, the U.S. and its Allies and partners can leverage commercial space assets to facilitate releasing information in the public sphere, generating visceral reactions and catalyzing collective responses that alter Kremlin cost-benefit analyses.

DOD SENIOR OFFICIAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future Joint Force and the scientific and technical civilian workforce?

Answer. Yes, but we must be diligent to attract and retain the best talent possible into SES positions while promoting scientific and technical expertise in the Services to grow the General/Flag officers of the future. Equally important, we must maintain a robust training, education and experiential program to afford our leaders to keep pace with the evolving operational environment and technologies.

Question. In your experience, are the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DOD and its components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?

Answer. Yes, in my experience, we have the right human capital in our GO/FO and SES ranks. However, I know that the Department continues to refine career paths by tailoring requirements to fit specific mission needs.

Question. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in scientific and technical programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to incentivize qualified senior leaders to seek assignment to such positions and duties?

Answer. I am not aware of any problems in this regard. The Services set their requirements for scientific and technical proficiencies for both General/Flag officers and SES leaders, and assign people with those capabilities where needed most.

Question. Are you satisfied that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance needed to meet ethical requirements? Please explain your answer.

Answer. Yes, I am satisfied. The principles of ethical conduct [established by 5 C.F.R. §2635.101 (B)] apply to every military and civilian employee of the Federal Government. The expectations are clear and training and resources are provided to address situations implicating ethics rules. Moreover, every organization I have been a part of has taken steps to hold General/Flag officers and SES personnel to the highest standards by continually reminding them of the rules and putting measures in place with their support staff to encourage direct identification of any potential violation of those rules either to the individuals or the IG.

Sexual Assault and Harassment Prevention and Response

Despite significant efforts by the Department and military Services over the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to, sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female Service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.

Question. Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect Service members who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?

Answer. I understand that the decision to report sexual assault is compounded by the very real fear of retaliation. I am now, and always have been, committed to enforcing zero tolerance for sexual assault and will continue to support those who make the difficult decision to report sexual assault to ensure zero reprisal. The Department has improved its approach to prevention and response and current policies and programs have come with the resources to ensure victims have multiple avenues to seek assistance and or file a report of retaliation. It is vital we complete the implementation of these programs and ensure they are executed as designed.

Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for yourself in preventing sexual harassment within SPACECOM, including within its civilian workforce?

Answer. Sexual harassment and sexual assault are crimes, and they have no place in our military. As the Commander, United States Space Command, if confirmed, I will articulate that we will not tolerate sexual harassment and sexual assault, I will provide training opportunities to our personnel to prevent future instances of these crimes, and I will make available resources to those who have been the victims of these crimes so that they can get the care they need and also have their cases fully and impartially investigated. I will also work to eliminate the stigma victims of these crimes may feel which could prevent them from reporting these crimes.

Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault?

Answer. No, not at this time. However, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to secure additional authorities if needed.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Senator HIRONO. Lieutenant General Whiting, if confirmed, you will assume responsibilities as the Global Sensor Manager for missile defense. Do you believe current missile defense policies reflect all global threats and adequately encompass rapidly changing missile technologies?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The DOD's missile defense policies are evolving to meet the world's rapidly changing missile technologies. Demonstrated Chinese and Russian investment in hypersonic vehicles and launch platforms, tests of fractional orbital bombardment systems, and continued development of missile technologies by Iran and North Korea have highlighted the need to modernize missile warning and tracking, as well as continually assess our missile warning and defense policies.

2. Senator HIRONO. Lieutenant General Whiting, if confirmed, you will be responsible for missile warning sensors and in part for the Department of Defense's (DOD) space-based command and control systems. Do you feel these acquisition programs, including the dual use radar requested in this year's budget for Hawaii, are on track and will meet your requirements?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The Hawaii radar is a multi-mission sensor capable of providing missile search, tracking, discrimination, and space domain awareness. It is a desired capability, but is currently early in the development and acquisition phase. The challenges of tracking modern missile threats require continual rigor in the program management and engineering processes for follow-on missile warning systems and architectures. If confirmed, I will assess the Hawaii radar as part of the planned missile defense network to ensure the Command's requirements are met. While awaiting delivery of these new systems, I will, if confirmed, continue to assess our existing missile warning and command and control capabilities to wring all possible capability out of them.

PRIVATE SECTOR CAPABILITIES

3. Senator HIRONO. Lieutenant General Whiting, the private sector is leading the way in creating a distributed space sensor network. As both DOD and the wider U.S. economy rely more on these commercial technologies, the need to make sure they are cyber resilient and integrated to DOD systems increases. How are you working with civilian companies to ensure their capabilities can integrate with existing Department of Defense systems, which are often highly classified?

Lieutenant General WHITING. United States Space Command has developed multiple partnership forums with commercial companies who support the Department of Defense. I will, if confirmed, continue to support and strengthen the Commercial Integration Cell at Vandenberg Space Force Base which provides the Command the ability to share information with these companies at the appropriate classification levels. I will also, if confirmed, continue to encourage participation by additional industry partners through avenues such as the Joint Commercial Operations cell. Finally, if confirmed, I will work to further the relationship of United States Space Command with the Space Information Sharing Awareness Center (ISAC) given that one of the ISAC's focus areas is cyber security of the space enterprise.

4. Senator HIRONO. Lieutenant General Whiting, how is U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) working with businesses, and especially small businesses, to ensure they are resilient from disruption?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The accelerating commercialization of space presents new and significant opportunities across the Joint Force. Partnering with commercial entities enables United States Space Command to adapt faster, innovate more reliably, integrate cutting-edge technology on an accelerated timeline, bolster space architecture resilience, develop a better understanding of the space domain, expedite decisionmaking, and devise economical solutions to strategic problems.

If confirmed, I will encourage the Services and other acquisition organizations to first look to buy existing commercial capabilities when it can meet our requirements, then look to exploit available commercial technologies for military purposes, and finally, to build military-unique systems only when required. American industry

is an asymmetric advantage for the United States and United States Space Command.

If confirmed, I will support the further strengthening of partnerships with commercial industry through the Commercial Integration Cell, the Joint Commercial Operations cell, and the Space Information Sharing Awareness Center.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

ARCTIC PRESENCE

5. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Whiting, what is your strategy to improve space-based domain awareness capabilities in the Arctic?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The Arctic is a vital operating location for United States Space Command and the Department of Defense as a whole. With space units located at Pituffik Space Base, Greenland, 750 miles north of the Arctic Circle, as well as sub-Arctic units in Alaska, domain awareness is as vital for United States Space Command as it is for the rest of the Joint Force and the Nation. Working with the other CCMDs, Services, agencies, Allies and partners, I will, if confirmed, work to ensure capabilities such as space-based environmental monitoring, missile warning, friendly force tracking, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance provide improved coverage at higher latitudes. This will facilitate a deeper understanding of the operating environment, monitoring of activities for efficient commerce by ensuring maritime and air safety, and modernize our awareness to detect and track potential activities and threats in the region. Our efforts will directly support the October 2022 United States' National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

6. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Whiting, what capability shortfalls and gaps do you see today?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Today's space architectures were largely developed and built in a time before space threats from China and Russia had become such a significant aspect of the space operating environment. Given these threats, we must continue to pivot our space systems toward more resilient architectures, while fielding capabilities to protect and defend our current systems. We must continually assess our existing architectures and planned capabilities against evolving threats in the space domain to identify specific gaps and shortfalls in order to support the development of responsive solutions. I would welcome the opportunity, if confirmed, to discuss the specifics of these shortfalls and gaps at the appropriate classification level.

7. Senator KING. Lieutenant General Whiting, what do you need to close these gaps?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Fielding the next generation of resilient architectures and protect and defend systems requires the continued support and cooperation of agencies and departments across the United States Government, as well as our partners in academia, commercial, Allied, and S&T communities. We also require and appreciate the ongoing support from the Congress in the form of resources and authorities to pursue new solutions and keep pace in the rapidly changing operational environment.

Challenges in the space domain are complex and dynamic. If confirmed, I will ensure United States Space Command works closely with the Services and development agencies to accelerate space-relevant technology development across the commercial space enterprise through numerous innovative programs, to include the Defense Innovation Unit and AFWERX/SpaceWERX. These programs allow DOD to help guide the commercial space enterprise toward filling select DOD capability gaps.

Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure United States Space Command continues to document its requirements to close identified gaps through the development of warfighter capability requirements documents that will be validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and will drive material solutions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

GLOBAL THREATS AND REQUIREMENTS

8. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Whiting, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), China's official defense budget has grown by an average of 12.1 percent each year since 2001. According to reports earlier this week, China's defense

budget is now expected to double by 2025, making it more than all the rest of the Asia Pacific regions combined. What is your assessment of the strategic intent behind China's military modernization, both in the region and globally?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) grand strategic intent is clear as they aim to be a global space leader by 2030. The 2023 ODNI annual threat assessment states that the PRC is accelerating the development of key capabilities the People's Liberation Army (PLA) requires to confront the United States in a large-scale, sustained conflict. By 2027, they plan to have a military designed to deter United States intervention in a future cross-strait crisis. The PLA is actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into multi-domain warfighting strategies to create improved balance of power dynamics in their near abroad as well as globally. The PLA's Navy and Air Force are the largest in the region and continue to field advanced platforms that improve China's ability to establish air superiority and project power beyond the first island chain. The PLA Rocket Force's short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional systems may hold at risk United States forces and bases in the region.

DELAYED BUDGET AND CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS

9. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Whiting, since the beginning of the 118th Congress this year, I have continuously asked our uniformed and civilian DOD leaders about the impacts of a delayed budget and the use of continuing resolutions. The American Enterprise Institute threw out a rough estimate of \$200 million per day under the latest continuing resolution that covered the start of fiscal year 2023, that's a total of \$18 billion. I have repeatedly asked the Pentagon for as concise a number as possible to put a figure on the damage these delays are causing to our national security and wasted taxpayer money, but so far I have only received an estimate from General Brown who told me that a continuing resolution would see the Air Force and Space Force lose \$9 billion in purchasing power. I don't blame the leaders I have questioned for not having concrete figures of the money wasted through continuing resolutions, these leaders are focused on using the funding they get efficiently to support our National Defense, not the ability of Congress to get a budget passed in a timely manner. As both of you take command, I ask that for the remainder of your tenure in your positions, take note of the financial cost of a delayed budget and continuing resolutions so we can hold ourselves accountable as elected officials in the coming years as stewards of the tax-payer's dollar. Can I count on you to come back to this chamber every year during your posture hearings with these detailed figures in tow?

Lieutenant General WHITING. If confirmed, I will work to quantify the impact of continuing resolutions on the United States Space Command budget.

STATEMENT ON MILITARY HOLDS

10. Senator MANCHIN. Lieutenant General Whiting, we cannot continue to delay confirmation of over 250 of our General and Flag Officers. We've reached a point where life-long careers of dedicated military servicemembers and the lives of their families are being put in jeopardy. We're running the risk of this delay turning into a loss of the most critical talent in our military at a time when only the Marine Corps is meeting military recruiting goals. How do you believe these holds are affecting our retention efforts for younger officers who see that their careers and their families' lives can be held up by Congress?

Lieutenant General WHITING. I have not yet seen specific data linking retention to the holds on military confirmations, but our military families are the bedrock of our retention efforts. To the maximum extent possible, I encourage providing them sufficient time to plan for their next move in order to arrange schools for children, find places to live, and to support spouse employment. Without the prospect of having such time, families may decide the sacrifices of military service are no longer worth it for them.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON

COMMERCIAL INTEGRATION

11. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, as I've discussed with your predecessor, SPACECOM has been a leading force in commercial integration with the stand up of its commercial integration cell. In fact, we included language in the NDAA urging other combatant commands to replicate SPACECOM's success. Would you tell me your impression of the role of the commercial integration cell?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The Commercial Integration Cell (CIC) is vital to our ongoing efforts to more closely partner with the United States commercial companies who support the national security space enterprise. Its purpose is to improve cooperation and operational effectiveness between United States Space Command forces and commercial space capability providers so that we can share intelligence, domain awareness, and details of operating in the space environment at the appropriate classification levels. In a previous job, I had the good fortune to lead the CIC at Vandenberg Space Force Base from 2017–2019, and I saw firsthand how the CIC supports United States Space Command's mission and the value it brings to the United States. If confirmed, I will work to continue to strengthen the CIC as a model for the entire United States Government.

12. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what steps will you plan on taking to build on this success?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The Commercial Integration Cell (CIC) has been a hallmark of United States Space Command efforts to share information and deepen integration with commercial companies which support the national security space enterprise. If confirmed, I will work to expand the CIC to include new entrant space companies who are now supporting national defense efforts. I will also work to improve the infrastructure used to share information within the CIC. Finally, I will build on the success of the CIC by continuing to develop additional venues to partner with commercial industry such as United States Space Command's Joint Commercial Operations cell.

13. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, would you explain the role of the commercial sector in U.S. space operations?

Lieutenant General WHITING. American commercial space companies are an asymmetric advantage for the Department of Defense and United States Space Command. Not only does United States commercial industry build the systems which we use in United States Space Command and across the national security space enterprise, and launch those systems for us, but more and more we are looking to commercial industry to provide capabilities as a service. United States commercial industry provides robust capabilities across a spectrum of space services, to include space launch, communications, broadband internet, weather, earth observation, on-orbit servicing, space domain awareness, and ground-based infrastructure. It is vital DOD and United States Space Command continue to leverage United States commercial industry's innovation and capabilities while finding ways to improve our partnerships, information sharing, and integration.

14. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what steps need to be taken to further improve this key relationship?

Lieutenant General WHITING. If confirmed, I will encourage the Services and development agencies to first look to buy existing commercial capabilities when it can meet our requirements, then look to exploit available commercial technologies for military purposes, and finally, to build military-unique systems only when required. Additionally, overclassification and disclosure barriers continue to hinder integration and information sharing. Small businesses and space industry startups are the most heavily impacted, limiting commercial partner abilities to contribute to the problem-solving processes. We must continue to carefully review and evolve our security requirements for what we can do to improve information sharing while also protecting the Nation's vital information.

OFFENSIVE SPACE OPERATIONS

15. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, for years we thought of space as merely a supporting domain and tried to deny that it would ever become weaponized. We've since learned that our adversaries had other ideas. Both China and Russia have developed several types of offensive space weapons capable of damaging or destroying U.S. satellites in space. Do you believe the U.S. will also need offensive weapons in order to secure our interests in the space domain?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The United States continues to be the world's responsible leader in space. A safe, secure, and stable space domain is in the interest of all mankind. In order to support our primary goal of deterring aggression in space, United States Space Command will need a variety of capabilities able to protect and defend our space systems as well as protecting the Joint Force from the space-enabled capabilities of potential adversaries. Like in other domains, achieving success will require a mix of systems including resilient architectures, intelligence, cyber, command and control, offense, defense, and supporting Joint fires.

JOINT ALL-DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL

16. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, as you know SPACECOM plays a crucial role in warfighting, especially in areas like intelligence and command and control. How important is an effective joint all domain command and control (JADC2) network to your mission?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Having an effective Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) network is vital to the United States Space Command mission. Threats to United States satellites from other domains must be planned for and the United States will need to be able to respond rapidly to these threats using capabilities from all domains. United States Space Command must have all-domain integration to support operations within the space area of responsibility while also having the ability to support other Combatant Commanders, Allies, and partners with critical space-based effects. If confirmed, I will aim to leverage JADC2 fully, optimizing mission command and control.

17. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, in your experience what steps do we still need to take to realize the vision of JADC2 and ensure effective coordination between space and the other domains?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The nature of warfare is changing rapidly toward an information-centric, networked effort that will involve simultaneous, multi-domain operations all around, and above, the globe. The United States military's industrial age way of waging war from the past century will not be good enough in the future. United States Space Command must play a central role in implementing JADC2, and space requirements and capabilities must be addressed from the foundation of JADC2. We are already pursuing critical capabilities needed to implement the inter-connectivity the military will need in future fights with tech-savvy potential adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue cloud-based data structures, resilient architectures, common data standards, common interfaces, and reliable, scalable data transport capabilities that promote integration between United States Space Command and other Combatant Commands, Services, and agencies.

18. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what will you do if confirmed to help achieve those steps?

Lieutenant General WHITING. JADC2 is about making sure that all operations in all domains can rapidly share information with one another and be part of a common picture. There are many instances where we've had weapon systems that can't talk to other weapon systems or can't link into the same common operational picture. This is not an option in a 21st Century fight in which we must be able to leverage capabilities from across multiple domains simultaneously to create dilemmas for our adversaries. We must be able to command and control our space forces using the same models and methods for decision superiority that every Combatant Command is using for their Joint, all-domain command and control. If confirmed, I will ensure United States Space Command plans and practices all-domain command and control together with other Combatant Commands, Services, Allies, and partners, using common terminology and advanced all-domain C2 concepts as a Joint team moving forward. It is important that space information, space capabilities, and space decisionmakers are foundational parts of all-domain solutions.

SPACE THREATS

19. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, recognizing this is an unclassified setting, would you give us an overview of how you view the space threat environment?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The threats we have seen emerge in space over the past two decades are the distinguishing feature of the modern space environment. Our strategic competitors, namely China and Russia, have made significant strides in the development of counterspace capabilities and their own space-enabled military capabilities in recent years. Both of these countries seek to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms. The PRC is the pacing challenge. They have accelerated the development of key capabilities, specifically terrestrial and space-based counterspace systems, to confront the United States in a large-scale, sustained conflict. The PRC combines growing military power with economic, technological, and diplomatic influence to secure what it views as its sovereign territory and pursue global influence and regional preeminence.

20. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what are your biggest challenges?

Lieutenant General WHITING. I agree with the National Defense Strategy that the most significant challenge is the PRC as the pacing challenge. The PRC is moving fast in space and has routinely demonstrated cutting-edge capabilities and technologies. Additionally, Russia, as evidenced by the Ukraine conflict, demonstrates a degree of unpredictability, and remains a significant threat as well. Since 2015, the PRC and Russia have reorganized their militaries to place increased emphasis on the space domain, both in accelerating their R&D efforts into operational capabilities and analyzing our capabilities and reliance. Both the PRC and Russia are committed to fielding diverse counterspace capabilities across multiple domains. Further, irresponsible use of space has resulted in a clear debris concern for operations in, to, and from the domain. The PRC and Russia have both contributed to this with their reckless ASAT tests which resulted in a cumulative 4788+ pieces of debris placing assets and human spaceflight at risk. We must work with the Services and development agencies to ensure we field the next generation of resilient space architectures and protect and defend capabilities to be able to operate in the face of these threats and protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attack.

21. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what additional capabilities, resources, or authorities do you need to address those challenges?

Lieutenant General WHITING. We need the continued commitment of timely resources as we develop and field the next generation of resilient space architectures and the protect and defend systems we need to operate in the face of the threats we now see arrayed against our space capabilities. We also need the continued authority to pursue rapidly developing technologies vital to counter evolving threats.

United States Space Command is continuing to work with the Services and with other government organizations to define the requirements that will drive the development and fielding of the next generation of space capabilities. In order to achieve both resiliency and survivability of our space systems, we will need a multi-faceted and multi-layered approach that leverages diversity in assets, orbits, and partnerships with Allies and commercial suppliers, as well as integration of offensive and defensive technologies in our space systems.

The defense of space assets will also require support from other Combatant Commands, so United States Space Command must be fully integrated into the Joint planning processes of these commands to ensure supporting plans are established.

SPACE ARCHITECTURE

22. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, space architecture will almost certainly play a key role in any future fight. There has been much discussion as of late of the need to move away from large satellites to a more proliferated and resilient architecture. Would you discuss how SPACECOM will approach this transformation?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Proliferated architectures allow for resilience by providing capabilities that are more difficult to compromise by disruption or defeat of a small number of assets. As an example, the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) is built to continue functioning in the event that individual nodes become unavailable. The satellites that comprise the PWSA are smaller, cheaper, and faster to place on orbit than our existing defense space assets.

If confirmed, I will ensure United States Space Command will continue in close coordination and cooperation with all relevant stakeholders to assess the space domain environment and threats to ensure we are building a space architecture prepared for the modern space environment while providing the space-based capabilities Joint warfighters rely upon. Additionally, as proliferated and resilient architectures are fielded, United States Space Command must be ready to full integrate those capabilities into our operational plans to take advantage of the positive attributes they will bring.

23. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what are your biggest concerns related to ensuring our space assets are resilient?

Lieutenant General WHITING. First, we must develop and field the next generation of resilient architectures and protect and defend systems to allow our existing space systems to operate in the face of the threats we now see arrayed against us. Second, we must protect our space systems in the cyber domain given that space networks are truly global in nature and extend out to 22,000 miles above the Earth's surface to geosynchronous orbit. Third, we also need to bolster the critical ground infrastructure which supports our space missions by improving the resiliency of facilities and utilities, as well as improving their physical protection and cyber security.

24. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, how will you approach these concerns if confirmed?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Resiliency is a combination of diversification of capabilities, of redundancy, and of hardening. We must consider this by examining spacecraft, ground stations, and links. Investment in lower-cost and higher-count constellations is one avenue. Providing redundant and multi-mission support constellations gives potential adversaries more targets to consider. Maneuver capability and hardening will also demonstrate and deflate adversary assurance of damage or destruction of critical constellation nodes.

If confirmed, I will work with the other Combatant Commands, the Services, and development agencies to field the next generation of resilient space architectures as well as to bolster the cyber defenses of our space systems and to improve the resiliency of our critical ground infrastructure.

OVERALL SPACE COMMAND

25. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, SPACECOM is still a relatively new combatant command. How would you evaluate your current State of readiness, particularly in regards to personnel?

Lieutenant General WHITING. I assess that the United States currently enjoys both a qualitative and quantitative advantage, including our world-class space professionals who provide us significant advantage over any potential adversary. Still, the DOD must further develop and enhance integration of space warfighting doctrine, capabilities, and personnel into national, Joint, and Combined operations if we are to maintain our warfighting advantage. United States Space Command's readiness is tied to achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC). The Command is fast approaching FOC, having surpassed several milestones, including attaining the right number and skills for its workforce. United States Space Command manning is on track due to the presence of a robust contractor workforce and augmentation from Guard/Reserve members. As the Command receives its final manpower authorizations over the next 2 years, I will, if confirmed, continue to refine and manage our talent to ensure we have the staff required to execute or vital missions.

26. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what challenges do you anticipate facing if confirmed?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Our primary challenge will continue to be ensuring that United States Space Command can support the Joint Force, our Allies, and the Nation in the face of the rapidly growing threats we now see arrayed against our space systems.

27. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, do you have the authorities you need to operate?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The Combatant Commander's responsibilities are assigned by the President in the Unified Command Plan. Specific authorities delegated to United States Space Command in time of conflict are identified in a Secretary of Defense-approved operation plan (OPLAN). With the Secretary of Defense's approval of United States Space Command's OPLAN earlier this year, United States Space Command has identified the appropriate authorities needed in a conflict, and specified when those authorities will be required.

28. Senator COTTON. Lieutenant General Whiting, what can Congress do to help?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Congress can assist not just United States Space Command but the entire DOD by passing the FY24 Defense Appropriations bill on time. Budget instability complicates capability development and the start of new initiatives. In light of the pace the PRC has adopted in their race to weaponize the space domain, America and its Allies can ill afford delays in fielding new capabilities.

I would also ask you to fund the FY24 Unfunded Priorities submitted by GEN Dickinson and by the Space Force. I would ask you to support the draft language in the House NDAA which authorizes additional, more flexible hiring authorities for United States Space Command similar to what the Services have available through Acquisition Demo hiring authorities today. The ability to recruit and retain the right human capital is vital to United States Space Command's readiness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MICHAEL M. ROUNDS

CONTESTED SPACE DOMAIN

29. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Whiting, what is your assessment of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) ability to threaten our space assets and how would you characterize SPACECOM's readiness to deter aggression, defend national interests, and to defeat threats in a contested space domain?

Lieutenant General WHITING. The PRC is working to match or exceed United States capabilities in space by 2045 to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that the United States has accrued from space leadership. By 2030, China may achieve world-class status in all but a few space technology areas. The PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities through integration of its weapons and command and control systems to erode the United States military's information advantage. They invest in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and navigation. They are also improving satellite meteorology, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. They own and operate about half of the world's space based ISR systems. These capabilities support the PLA's ability to monitor, track, and target United States and Allied forces worldwide. In July 2021, the PRC conducted the first fractional orbital bombardment system test with a hypersonic glide vehicle that circumnavigated the Earth, launching from and impacting back in China. This demonstrated the greatest distance flown and the longest flight time (~100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapon system to date. The PRC continues to reinforce that space is a warfighting domain with the capabilities it has fielded and continues to develop.

We must protect and defend United States (and as directed, Allied, partner, and key commercial) space capabilities to prevent or mitigate hostile or irresponsible acts in space. The best way to protect and defend is to deter aggression. Reinforcing our relationships with our Allies and partners as well as fielding new capabilities are key steps to securing in the space domain. With United States Space Command approaching Final Operational Capability, the Command is well postured to address these threats and execute assigned missions based on the current investment plans of the Services and other development agencies.

30. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Whiting, in your assessment, what are the Command's highest priority efforts to ensure it is ready to execute its mission, should conflict in or through the space domain arise?

Lieutenant General WHITING. There are a number of priorities required to ensure United States Space Command readiness. These include, reaching the required manning and funding levels as initially established in FY21. These investments are vital to United States Space Command achieving and maintaining Full Operational Capability. Another priority is working with the Services, Space Force in particular, to build, field, and sustain a resilient space warfighting architecture capable of operating in the face of the threats now arrayed against our space systems, as well as protecting and defending our vital interests in space and protecting the Joint Force from space-enabled attack. Also, an additional priority would be to continue building on the quickly growing legacy of commercial and international partnership United States Space Command has achieved in its first 4 years since re-establishment in 2019. Our partners across the globe and in industry are a strategic advantage, and I am committed, if confirmed, to strengthening the work already being done to enhance that advantage.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

31. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Whiting, how would you describe our military space related partnerships with key allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom and Australia?

Lieutenant General WHITING. United States Space Command's partnerships with the United Kingdom and Australia are critical as these are two of our most capable Allies with whom we have a long history of cooperation in space. We remain committed to the Combined Space Operations Initiative vision, which is instrumental in integrating United States space operations with Allied space capabilities around the globe. We have also signed Enhanced Space Cooperation Memorandums with both nations for improved development of space-specific mission areas to guarantee the security, sustainability, and safety of space for all. We continue to strengthen our relationships with these Allies and Canada, another highly capable partner with whom we have decades of cooperation in space, through combined space operations in the conduct of Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER. Moreover, if confirmed, I will ensure the Command continues to grow our circle of Allies and partners who can

support our missions where feasible. Being able to integrate capabilities with Allies and partners enables greater operational flexibility, global response options, and fully supports the National Defense Strategy's approach to "Anchoring our Strategy in Allies and Partners."

32. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Whiting, as Commander of SPACECOM, what would you suggest we do to further leverage these partnerships in support of U.S. military space capabilities?

Lieutenant General WHITING. We should continue to normalize space cooperation with our Allies and partners. Significant effort is underway to break down the barriers to cooperation, both multilaterally and bilaterally. These efforts include continuing to address the challenges of overclassification, information-sharing, and interoperability. I intend, if confirmed, to assess and expand this work. I will also continue working with Allies to evolve and enhance Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER. This multinational operations order is currently under revision to ensure it includes broader Allied and partner participation. This will allow us to drive integration to a level we have not previously seen, and I am confident that it will continue to be a tool that brings together and strengthens our Alliances and partnerships.

33. Senator ROUNDS. Lieutenant General Whiting, what do you see as untapped areas for increased cooperation?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Overcoming the hurdles of information sharing with our Allies and partners would increase the effectiveness of the coalition and the Joint Force. Getting this right will signal to our competitors the resolve of the U.S. Government and highlight the benefits of additional resiliency, capability, and capacity as we continue to evolve our national security space enterprise into tighter integration with our Allies and partners.

We should also look to continue improving the interoperability of our space systems with our Allies, and vice versa. By partnering with Allies and partners early in the capability development process, we can acquire systems which complement each other rather than serving duplicative purposes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JONI K. ERNST

SPACE INTEGRATION

34. Senator ERNST. Lieutenant General Whiting, how can space power integrate with special operations capabilities to deter adversaries across the spectrum of conflict? Please provide an unclassified answer to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer, if necessary.

Lieutenant General WHITING. Space operations and special operations can play a complementary role in supporting and enabling each other's operations. For example, for special operations to be successful in the modern threat environment, they must have access to the complete set of space capabilities which United States Space Command provides: satellite communications; space-based environment monitoring; positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Conversely, for space operations to be successful in the modern operating environment, special operations can execute operations and activities intended to support protect and defense missions for the space domain through their unique ability to gain access to critical terrestrial locations. If confirmed, I'm committed to continuing and strengthening the work United States Space Command is already undertaking with United States Special Operations Command to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures to support and enable each other.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

U.S. SPACE COMMAND DETECT AND TRACK CAPABILITY

35. Senator SULLIVAN. Lieutenant General Whiting, during U.S. Space Command's (SPACECOM) fiscal year 2024 posture hearing, General James Dickinson's stated "today, China can hold U.S., Allied, and Partner assets at risk in all orbits ... The PLA [People's Liberation Army] has tested hypersonic glide vehicles aimed at defeating traditional missile warning systems and ballistic missile defenses." After the Chinese spy balloon incident, NORTHCOM/NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] adjusted the sensitivity on certain sensors to detect

a wider array of objects. While the Chinese spy balloon was outside of space, China is seeking to use similar high-altitude balloons and lighter than airships to exploit the near space domain. How does SPACECOM detect objects from ground-level to near-space?

Lieutenant General WHITING. For high-altitude balloon events over North America, United States Space Command supports United States Northern Command by bringing to bear the capabilities of the Command's ground-based and space-based sensors. While these sensors are optimized to track objects in the space domain, I will, if confirmed, use the authorities of United States Space Command as the Global Sensor Manager to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures to attempt to improve tracking in near-space as an augmentation for other Combatant Commands' sensors.

36. Senator SULLIVAN. Lieutenant General Whiting, how will that capability evolve in the future?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Our future capabilities will be proliferated, networked, and redundant. United States Space Command will continue to work with the Services in force design efforts as we identify requirements and address gaps through the Integrated Priority List process. Future architectures will address the evolving threats that our adversaries are developing.

LONG RANGE DISCRIMINATION RADAR CAPABILITIES

37. Senator SULLIVAN. Lieutenant General Whiting, last summer NORTHCOM completed its testing of the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) for missile defense at Clear Space Force Station in Alaska. According to NORTHCOM, the LRDR demonstrated initial promise in discriminating threats to the Continental United States to make ground-based interceptor engagement more lethal. The LRDR has a primary purpose of differentiating between intercontinental ballistic missiles and decoys but can also assist Space Force in tracking satellites and other objects in space. How has the LRDR at Clear Space Force Station improved our missile defenses?

Lieutenant General WHITING. LRDR, when fielded, will be a critical sensor within the missile defense architecture that enhances the United States Space Command Unified Command Plan trans-regional missile defense mission. The discrimination capability of LRDR will provide better quality shot data in distinguishing lethal objects from decoys/debris to prosecute an engagement against missile threats to the Homeland. LRDR is designed to provide higher-fidelity information supporting the United States Ground Based Midcourse Defense, improving probability of kill against an inbound threat. As LRDR is fielded, United States Space Command will work to integrate it fully into the missile defense architecture.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ERIC SCHMITT

RELIEF OF COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOHMEIER

38. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Whiting, can you specify exactly which comments led to your decision to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lohmeier of his command? Please include a complete copy of the transcript of the podcast you referenced, along with the name, date, and episode, along with any additional identifiable information you think would be helpful to further understand your decision.

Lieutenant General WHITING. On May 14, 2021, in my role as the Space Operations Command (SpOC) Commander, I made the decision to relieve then-Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier from command of the 11th Space Warning Squadron because of a loss of trust and confidence in his ability to lead. The basis for that decision includes public statements where he engaged in prohibited partisan political activity and disparaged his chain of command.

It was on May 12, 2021 when I first learned that Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier had made statements to media outlets to promote his newly published book. A review of those appearances uncovered a number of statements that led to my decision to relieve him of his command. For example:

- 23:41—Lohmeier stated, "I'll tell you at the moment, because in recent American history, Neo-Marxist thought has found a welcome home in the Democratic Party. I'll put it that way, or in left domestic politics."
- 19:18—Lohmeier stated, "Your question was that, do senior leaders or other service members who are in charge pushing these policies understand exactly what they're doing? I hope not. I think some do, but I couldn't tell you exactly who they are."

- 22:34—Lohmeier characterized the messaging in DOD as “toxic, poisonous rhetoric.”
- 27:24—Lohmeier agreed with the host characterizing DOD as a “re-education camp.”

During the Information Operation podcast, Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier tied his political stance to being an Active Duty member, a Lieutenant Colonel, and a Commander. Specifically, Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier was introduced by the host (and recognized himself again later in the podcast) as an Active Duty Space Force officer and commander. He failed to State that the DOD did not endorse his statements or that he was making the partisan political statements in his personal capacity.

Requested information:

- Information Operation, Episode 26 entitled “Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lohmeier, USAF on Cultural Marxism in DOD, His Book Irresistible Revolution.”
- May 7, 2021
- Podcast transcript:
- Podcast link: <https://rumble.com/vgnxbf-io-26-interview-with-lt-col-matthew-lohmeier-usaf-on-crt-in-dod-his-book-ir.html?fbclid=IwAR3v7bdevSGsooInbFcEL6h15RXzKFk0wNqu25cqaoFbpCs8ud5FPDMD3—w>

39. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Whiting, can you also provide comment on how the comments you identify are in violation of DOD Directive 1344.10?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Department of Defense regulations prohibit Active Duty members from engaging in partisan political activities (DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2). The Directive states, “A member of the Armed Forces on Active Duty shall not . . . [p]articipate in any radio, television, or other program or group discussion as an advocate for or against a partisan political party, candidate, or cause.” The Directive also states, “Any activity that may be reasonably viewed as directly or indirectly associating the Department of Defense—with a partisan political activity or is otherwise contrary to the spirit and intention of this Directive shall be avoided.” (Paragraph 4.1.5.)

Specifically, the comments Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier made on the Information Operation podcast where he entered into prohibited partisan political activity while identifying himself as a commander in the USSF, was when he stated “Neo-Marxist ideology has found a welcome home in the Democratic Party.” As previously mentioned, then-Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier identified himself as an Active Duty Space Force officer and commander, did not couch any of his statements as not being that of the DOD position/policy, and no disclaimer was made.

40. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Whiting, can you explain why you chose to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier of his command before receiving the findings of the investigation that you ordered?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Commanders are required to execute the lawful orders of those appointed over them and to follow appropriate guidance and directives in leading their units. All commanding officers in the Department of the Air Force are required to show themselves as a good example of subordination. (10 U.S.C. § 8583.) At all times, commanders must lead by personal example and enforce standards. (AFI 1–2, paragraph 3.2.) Under our democratic system, the military, as a group, must remain politically neutral and divorced from partisan politics. (AFI 1–1, paragraph 2.13.) While on Active Duty, all Department of the Air Force members are prohibited from engaging in certain political activities in order to maintain good order and discipline and to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of improper endorsement in political matters. (AFI 51–508 (October 12, 2018), paragraph 1.1.1.) Specifically, the Department of the Air Force prohibits military members from participating “in any radio, television, or other program or group discussion as an advocate of a partisan political party, candidate, or cause.” (AFI 51–508 (October 12, 2018), paragraph 2.3.1.6.) Department of the Air Force standards also clearly State, “Any activity that may be reasonably viewed as directly or indirectly associating the AF or DOD with a partisan political activity or is otherwise contrary to the spirit and intention of this Instruction shall be avoided.” (AFI 51–508 (October 12, 2018), paragraph 2.4.3.)

Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier was removed from command based on my lost trust and confidence in him to effectively lead due to his public partisan political statements. Command is a privilege, not a right. (AFI 51–509, paragraph 14.) Under Air Force rules, “An officer may be relieved of command for cause, including instances where the superior competent authority has lost confidence in the officer’s ability to command due to misconduct, poor judgment, . . . the interests of good order and discipline, morale, the good of the organization, or other similar reasons.” (AFI 51–

509, paragraph 14.2.) Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier's public partisan political statements made on the podcast while associated with his Active Duty status as a commander violated DOD and Department of the Air Force standards, reflected poor judgment, and were contrary to the interests of good order and discipline, morale, and the good of the organization.

It is my conviction the military must be rigorously apolitical and nonpartisan. I believe it is my duty to judiciously guard the apolitical nature of the United States military. My trust in Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier's ability to uphold standards and embody himself as a good example of subordination was lost once I was made aware that he publicly appeared on the podcast using his official rank and position, without disclaimer, and broadcasted partisan political comments. No formal investigation was necessary to confirm the nature of the comments or the public forum (the podcast) in which they were broadcast.

In addition to removing Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier from command, I intended to initiate a Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) to further examine the matter, and related matters, and document Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier's partisan political activity. However, DAF/IG decided to launch its own inquiry due to the complexity and sensitivity of the issues under consideration, as well as the potential for Department of the Air Force-wide impact, thereby precluding a CDI. I understand DAF/IG ceased the investigation when Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier voluntarily separated from the Space Force.

OTHER ACTIONS RELATED TO PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS

41. Senator SCHMITT. Lieutenant General Whiting, in your career, how many officers have you relieved of command, and what proportion of those firings did you act upon prior to being presented with findings of any investigation?

Lieutenant General WHITING. Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier was the only commander I have directly relieved in my career

[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN827

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 11, 2023.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Space Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To Be General

Lt. Gen. Stephen N. Whiting, 6886

_____, 2023.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

□ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE



Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting

Lt. Gen. Stephen N. Whiting is Commander, Space Operations Command, Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado.

Space Operations Command is a Field Command of the U.S. Space Force, comprising thousands of Space Professionals and Airmen worldwide. As Commander, Lt. Gen Whiting leads the preparation, generation, and sustainment of combat-ready intelligence, cyber, space and combat support forces and serves as the U.S. Space Force Service Component to U.S. Space Command.

Lt. Gen. Whiting is a 1989 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy with a degree in aeronautical engineering. He is a space operations officer and has commanded the 13th Space Warning Squadron; the 614th Air and Space Operations Center and Joint Space Operations Center; the 21st Space Wing; and the Combined Force Space Component Command and 14th Air Force.

Lt. Gen. Whiting's staff assignments include positions at Headquarters U.S. Air Force; U.S. Space Command; U.S. Strategic Command; the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group; the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Headquarters Air Force Space Command; and Headquarters U.S. Space Force.



EDUCATION

1989 Distinguished Graduate, Bachelors of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colo.

1990 Top Graduate and Distinguished Graduate, Undergraduate Space Training, Lowry AFB, Colo.

1993 Distinguished Graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

1997 Master of Arts degree in Administrative Sciences (Organizational Management), The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

2001 Top Graduate (tied) and Distinguished Graduate, Master of Arts degree in Military Operational Arts and Sciences, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

2002 Master of Arts in Airpower Strategy, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

2008 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

2017 Senior Executives in National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Executive Education, Cambridge, Mass.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. July 1989 - November 1990, Student, 14th Student Squadron, Columbus AFB, Miss.

2. November 1990 - November 1993, Crew Commander, Deputy Chief of Training, and Chief of Standardization and Evaluation, 6th Space Warning Squadron, Cape Cod AFS, Mass.

3. November 1993 - December 1994, Radar Systems Officer, 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colo.

4. December 1994 - July 1995, Executive Officer, 21st Operations Group, Peterson AFB, Colo.
5. August 1995 - May 1997, Air Force Intern, HQ U.S. Air Force and The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
6. August 1997 - June 1999, UHF F/O Satellite Vehicle Operator, Crew Commander, and Operations Flight Commander, 3rd Space Operations Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colo.
7. June 1999 - July 2000, Operations Officer, 22d Space Operations Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colo.
8. August 2000 - June 2001, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
9. July 2001 - June 2002, Student, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
10. July 2002 - August 2003, Regional Policy Officer, Headquarters U.S. Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command West, Peterson AFB, Colo.
11. August 2003 - June 2004, Special Assistant to the Commander, Headquarters U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
12. July 2004 - July 2005, Commander, 13th Space Warning Squadron, Clear AFS, Alaska
13. July 2005 - May 2006, Air Force Fellow, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.
14. June 2006 - June 2008, Commander, 614th Air and Space Operations Center and Director, Joint Space Operations Center, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
15. September 2008 - August 2009, Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force Fellow, with duty at the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group, Newport, R.I.
16. August 2009 - June 2011, Commander, 21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, Colo.
17. July 2011 - July 2013, Military Assistant and Acting Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
18. July 2013 - July 2015, Vice Commander, U.S. Air Force Warfare Center, Nellis AFB, Nev.
19. July 2015 - October 2015, Space Enterprise Vision Team Lead, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
20. November 2015 - August 2017, Director of Integrated Air, Space, Cyberspace and ISR Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
21. August 2017 - November 2017, Joint Force Space Component Command Integration Team Lead, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
22. December 2017 - August 2019, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and Deputy Joint Force Space Component Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
23. August 2019 - November 2019, Combined Force Space Component Commander, U.S. Space Command, and Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
24. November 2019 - December 2019, Deputy Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
25. December 2019 - October 2020, Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. Space Force, Peterson AFB, Colo.
26. October 2020 - present, Commander, Space Operations Command, Peterson SFB, Colo.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. and 2. July 2002 - August 2003, Regional Policy Officer, Headquarters U.S. Space Command and then U.S. Strategic Command West, Peterson AFB, Colo., as a Lieutenant Colonel
3. August 2003 - June 2004, Special Assistant to the Commander, Headquarters U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a Lieutenant Colonel
4. July 2011 - July 2013, Military Assistant and Acting Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., as a Colonel

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal Meritorious
 Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Air Force Achievement Medal
 Combat Readiness Medal
 National Defense Service Medal
 French Order of Merit

DATES OF PROMOTIONS

Second Lieutenant May 31, 1989
 First Lieutenant May 31, 1991
 Captain May 31, 1993
 Major July 1, 1999
 Lieutenant Colonel March 1, 2002
 Colonel March 1, 2006
 Brigadier General July 8, 2013
 Major General May 2, 2017
 Lieutenant General October 21, 2020

(Current as of June 2022)

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF in connection with his nomination follows:]

**118th CONGRESS, 2023 – 2024
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050**

**SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS**

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. **Name (Include any former names you have used):** Stephen Newman Whiting
2. **Position to which nominated:** Commander, United States Space Command
3. **Date of nomination:** 23 Jun 2023
4. **Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the Committee by the applicable agency/department/board):** None
5. **Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution):** None

6. **Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held, in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations):**
 -- Treasurer-United States Air Force Academy Class of 1989, USAFA Association of Graduates (since 1989)- I enjoy no benefits as a result of my membership.
 -- Member- Air and Space Forces Association (Inactive) - I enjoy no benefits as a result of my membership.
 -- Member- Space Force Association (Inactive) - I enjoy no benefits as a result of my membership.
7. **Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements, in addition to those listed in the service record extract and biographical provided to the Committee by the agency or department):**
 -- 2008 O'Malley Award Recipient, Lance P. Sijan Chapter, Air Force Association
 -- 2019 General Thomas D. White Space Award Recipient, Bernard Schriever Chapter, Air Force Association
 -- 2022 General James Hartinger Award Recipient, Rocky Mountain Chapter, National Defense Industrial Association

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

8. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress? Yes**
9. **Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate Committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration? Yes**
10. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such**

witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely? Yes

11. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Yes


12. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Yes
13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Yes
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Yes
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Yes

7

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein, and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



STEPHEN N. WHITING
Lt Gen, USSF

This 23 day of June, 2023

[The nomination of Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on September 27, 2023, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2023.]

