[Senate Hearing 118-794]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-794
THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL
GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF TO BE GENERAL
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN
COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND LIEUTEN-
ANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF
TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-669 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
july 26, 2023
Page
The Nominations of: Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF 1
to be General and Commander, United States Northern Command/
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and
Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF to be General and
Commander, United States Space Command.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Guillot, Lieutenant General Gregory M., USAF, to be General and 4
Commander, United States Northern Command/Commander, North
American Aerospace Defense Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 42
Questions for the Record....................................... 62
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 71
Biographical Sketch............................................ 73
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 75
Signature Page................................................. 80
Whiting, Lieutenant General Stephen N., USSF, to be General and 5
Commander, United States Space Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 80
Questions for the Record....................................... 102
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 114
Biographical Sketch............................................ 115
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 117
Signature Page................................................. 121
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING,
USSF TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman
of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Kelly, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Tuberville, Mullin, and Schmitt
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets to
consider the nomination of Lieutenant General Gregory--Gregory
Guillot to be Commander of U.S. Northern Command, and
Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting to be Commander of U.S.
Space Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your decades of service
to the Nation and congratulations.
General Guillot, I would like to welcome your wife,
Caroline, daughter, Elizabeth, and son, who I know is proudly
watching his father. General Whining, I would like to welcome
your wife, Tammy, and daughter, Allie, and the loved ones that
are here today supporting your efforts.
I think you have got your son, parents, and in-laws who are
probably watching from afar, and also commend him. We thank you
and your family for their continued support, because I think we
all recognize no one serves alone, and their efforts and your
efforts have brought us to this day.
I would also like to note that you are both graduate of the
Air Force Academy class of 1989, and despite that, we are
holding this hearing, and I am sure many of you classmates are
cheering you on from afar.
I will at this point asked that the remainder of my
statement be included in the record and yield to Senator Wicker
for his opening remarks. We have started early, and we start
the floor procedure at about 10 a.m., so we want to explode as
much as we can. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Senator Wicker.
[The prepared statement of Senator Jack Reed follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed
Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the nominations
of Lieutenant General Gregory Guillot to be Commander of U.S. Northern
Command, and Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting to be Commander of U.S.
Space Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your decades of service to the
Nation, and congratulations.
General Guillot, I would like to welcome your wife, Caroline;
daughter, Elizabeth; and son, Mark, who I know is proudly watching.
General Whiting, I would like to welcome your wife, Tammy; daughter,
Ally; and loved ones here today, as well as your son, parents, and in-
laws who are proudly watching. We thank your families for their
continued support of your service. I would also note that you are both
graduates of the Air Force Academy class of 1989, and I am sure many of
your classmates are cheering you on from afar.
General Guillot, you are well qualified to serve as NORTHCOM
Commander. You currently serve as Deputy Commander of U.S. Central
Command, with extensive command, staff, and instructing experience
throughout the Air Force and across the globe.
U.S. Northern Command is key to our national security, as the
principal command for protecting the American homeland. Indeed, the
first of the four priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy
is, ``Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat
posed by the People's Republic of China.'' As we consider threats from
China and other competitors, our very concept of homeland defense must
evolve. General, if confirmed, you will be responsible leading
NORTHCOM's efforts to transform its abilities and approach to homeland
defense for the 21st century. I would like to know your thoughts for
how NORTHCOM can evolve to accomplish this mission.
The urgency of this mission was made clear earlier this year with
the shootdowns of a Chinese surveillance balloon and three other
unidentified aerial phenomena in our airspace. These events raised
concerns that NORTHCOM and NORAD may have an awareness gap that needs
to be resolved. America's skies and seas must be secure to protect our
citizens, and the Department must pursue technologies that provide
forward detection to buy decision time for decisionmakers. General
Guillot, I would be interested in your assessment of these potential
awareness gaps, and whether you think additional tools or resources are
needed to overcome them.
Regionally, NORTHCOM also provides support to the U.S. law
enforcement mission by helping to counter cartels engaged in drug
smuggling, human trafficking, and money laundering across the southwest
border. The committee would appreciate your views on how the Department
can better accomplish this mission, including through building the
capabilities of partner security forces in Mexico and the Bahamas.
General Whiting, your nomination to serve as Commander of SPACECOM
is welcome. You currently serve as the director of Space Operations
Command--a critical Space Force organization that generates and
sustains much of the service's space, cyber, and intelligence
capabilities. This command experience, in addition to your expertise as
a space operations officer, will serve you well.
If confirmed, you will be responsible for all military activities
in a domain that is 100 kilometers above sea level. Space is inherently
a complicated and dangerous domain, but it is made more so by our
competition with China and Russia. These nations are increasingly
aggressive toward our and our allies' space assets, and their methods
of competition are quickly evolving. General, I would like to know how
you would prepare SPACECOM for global offensive and defensive space
operations in a contested environment, while providing support to other
combatant commands.
As part of that effort, SPACECOM is responsible for integrating our
space-, air-, and ground-based sensors to achieve better space domain
awareness, missile defense warning and capabilities, and command and
control. The Department of Defense recently transferred the global
missile defense mission from Strategic Command to Space Command, and
you will be responsible for integrating the Nation's fire control
network with our interceptors around the world. While NORTHCOM
maintains responsibility for protecting the homeland from missile
threats, your command will encompass the regions where our forces are
deployed.
Finally, General, I would like to know how you plan to integrate
our allies, partners, and commercial space companies so that we can
successfully prevail in any conflict in space or on earth. Indeed,
SPACECOM is the key enabler for supporting every other combatant
command to execute their missions, whether in air, land, sea, or
cyberspace.
Thank you, again, gentlemen, for your willingness to serve our
Nation. I look forward to your testimoneys.
Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too,
welcome these witnesses and their families and friends. We look
forward to an excellent question and answer session today, and
as the Chair has indicated, we have much to do on the floor,
and so I will ask that my statement be included in its entirety
in the record at this point.
Chairman Reed. Well, let me first recognize General Guillot
for your opening statement, and then General Whiting. General
Guillot, please. Could you turn your microphone around, please,
General, and bring it as close as possible.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Roger F. Wicker
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lt. General Guillot and Lt. General
Whiting (WHY-ding), I want to say congratulations to you both. You have
been tapped to lead two of the most consequential commands in our
national defense.
Lieutenant General Guillot, you have been nominated to be the next
commander of U.S. Northern Command. I appreciate your wife, Caroline,
and your daughter, Elizabeth, for being here.
Lieutenant General Whiting, you have been nominated to be the next
commander of U.S. Space Command. I appreciate your wife, Tammy, your
daughter, Ally, and your friends for being here, and I also welcome
your loved ones watching remotely today. From one Mississippian to
another, let me say this: You bring honor to our country and to all
Mississippians through your devoted service.
Your nominations come before this Committee at an important moment.
Senior military and defense personnel continually tell this Committee
that we are in the most dangerous national security moment since World
War II.
The dual military competitions with the Chinese Communist Party and
Russian Federation highlight our relative unpreparedness. Our
adversaries are seizing the advantage wherever possible.
We are all familiar with a recent example of this trend. This year,
a Chinese surveillance balloon breached our airspace and traversed the
entire continental United States uncontested. Testimony and
investigations revealed that improved radar capabilities and updated
authorization protocol could have helped prevent the spy balloon
situation, and despite our repeated inquiries, there are several
unanswered questions that I and other members of this Committee have
about this event.
General Guillot, if you are confirmed, I hope I can count on your
unreserved professional military advice as you work with Congress to
deliver a full accounting of this event to the American people.
The Chinese spy craft is only one example of the grave threats
NORTHCOM faces when it comes to national sovereignty and security.
Mexico's criminal cartels have exploited our poorly protected southern
border, driving unprecedented human-and drug-trafficking.
The administration has done remarkably little to address the
fentanyl crisis. The counter-cartel effort is under-resourced and
poorly coordinated. In fact, the president is wasting taxpayer money
letting clear border initiatives languish. He has banned border wall
construction, and the Department of Defense is still paying to store
border wall construction materials rather than deploying those
materials to extend the wall and secure our border.
The crisis will only worsen without a more focused response.
General Guillot, I would appreciate any insights you are able to
provide for how NORTHCOM can help Congress secure our southern border.
General Whiting, if you are confirmed, you will face threats in
space that are also alarming. China is working overtime to become a
``great space power.'' Beijing continues to test and build an arsenal
of anti-satellite capabilities that could seriously degrade U.S.
warfighting capabilities. One official even said it was plausible that
China could, quote, ``catch up and surpass us.''
General Whiting, I am interested in your assessment of Chinese
space capabilities and your vision for how we compete with Beijing in
that domain. I also look forward to your thoughts on Space Command's
role in protecting American commercial interests in space.
I thank you both for your time, and I look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/
COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
Lieutenant General Guillot. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear today.
I am deeply honored to be nominated to serve as the
Commander of the United States Northern Command and North
American Aerospace Defense Command, and testify next to my Air
Force Academy classmate, Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting.
I would like to begin by thanking President Biden,
Secretary Austin, and Chairman Milley for their trust and
confidence, and I am grateful to the Committee and leadership
for their endorsement of my nomination as well. I would also
like to thank General Glenn VanHerck and his wife Marilyn for
their tremendous 36 years of service and example.
I would not be here without the constant support of my
family. Caroline, my incredible wife of 34 years, and our
daughter Elizabeth, a cyber-policy professional, are here with
me today. Our son, Mark, can't be here as he is pursuing a
bachelors in nursing and he better be in class right now.
Caroline has held our family together through countless
deployments and 20 moves and developed our children into
outstanding young adults. All three are not only supportive of
me and those with whom I serve and their families, but also
strongly support our mission.
For the last 34 years, I have served alongside
extraordinary Americans, allies, and partners across the globe.
During that time, I have been fortunate to learn from the
finest leaders, mentors, noncommissioned officers, and troops
in the world. I would also like to thank and acknowledge the
most influential mentors I have had, my parents, Reb, a career
Air Force officer and Vietnam veteran, and Susan, who handled
the challenges of military family life with strength and humor.
Also shaping me have been my operational experience and
leadership assignments in three different combatant Commands,
including Commanding all joint and coalition air power in the
Middle East.
If confirmed, I will humbly bring the benefit of these
experiences, gained in combat and in peace to appropriately,
energetically, and decisively lead the women and men of NORAD
and NORTHCOM in the defense of our great homeland. The United
States, Canada, and our allies and partners must address an
extraordinarily complicated and quickly changing strategic
environment.
Competitors can hold North America at risk in multiple
domains and are increasing both their capability and capacity
to strike the homeland at a rate far exceeding the pace seen
just a few years ago.
While NORAD and NORTHCOM are distinct Commands, they share
complementary missions that are more vital today than ever. The
success of both Commands in defending the homeland is only
possible with strong interagency collaboration, as well as
close alliances and partnerships.
If confirmed, I will remain committed to expanding those
already strong relationships in order to ensure the Command's
constant readiness to deter aggression and defend our Nation. I
will also commit to establishing and maintaining partnerships
with the National Guard Bureau, State interagency partners to
conduct NORTHCOM's vital defense support of civil authorities
role during catastrophic disasters and other periods of
national need.
Likewise, if confirmed, I will be a strong advocate for
ongoing NORAD and NORTHCOM efforts to improve domain awareness
and global integration of operations, plans, and data. Our
competitors' advanced long range weapons systems and delivery
platforms pose challenges from within and even well beyond
NORAD and NORTHCOM operational boundaries.
Therefore, it will be important that I work closely with
other Combatant Commanders to deliver an integrated, layered,
and seamless defense of our homeland. Finally, if confirmed, I
assure this Committee that I will always provide my candid
assessment and my best military judgment regarding NORAD and
NORTHCOM missions.
Homeland defense is fundamental mission of the Department
of Defense (DOD), and I can think of no greater honor than
being nominated to lead the Commands responsible for that vital
mission. Thank you for your support of the United States Armed
Forces and for the honor of appearing before this Committee. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. General
Whiting, please.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND
Lieutenant General Whiting. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
Committee and the American people today. I am humbled to be the
president's nominee to Command United States Space Command.
I am grateful to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their confidence and support,
and I am pleased to testify beside my U.S. Air Force Academy
classmate and friend, Lieutenant General Greg Guillot.
I also want to thank the current Commander of U.S. Space
Command, General Jim Dickinson, and his wife, Angie, for their
leadership of the Command over the past 3 years, and their
personal friendship to Tammy and I. I am proud to have my
family and some dear friends here with me today.
First and foremost, my wife of 34 years. Tammy has been my
best friend and greatest strength during 19 moves. She is an
incredible wife, mom, friend, entrepreneur, and business owner.
We also have our daughter Allie in attendance. She finished her
master's degree last summer and is now a tech writer for a
Silicon Valley software company, but living in Nashville,
Tennessee. Supporting us in spirit are our son, Chase, and his
wife, Olivia.
Chase is a youth minister, also living in Nashville, and
his terrific wife, Olivia, is a first grade public
schoolteacher there in the Nashville schools. Chase had
previously committed to accompanying the members of his youth
group to support a church overseas, and he is appropriately
taking care of those kids and ensuring they get back to the
United States safely. Tammy and I are immensely proud of our
children and the role they have played in our military career.
Joining us virtually are my parents, Larry and Helen
Whiting. My dad was also a career Air Force officer and Vietnam
veteran, and my mom is a retired public schoolteacher from
Mississippi. My in-laws, Ken and John Pressler, are also
joining us virtually. Tammy's dad is also a retired Air Force
officer, and Tammy's mom is simply the glue who holds our
family together.
Both sets of our parents have established legacies of
service to and love of our country that Tammy and I try to live
up to every day. Finally, we have five dear friends with us
today, here with us today, who have adopted us along the way,
David and Carmen Bell, Steve Watkins, and Missy and Levi
Bonous.
No doubt our military career has been undergirded by the
strength and support of our family and friends and thank you
for allowing me to acknowledge them. Today, international space
competition has become increasingly complex.
China and Russia are rapidly fielding counterspace
capabilities to disrupt our access to space, and China is
swiftly making its own military forces space enabled. These
strategic competitors' irresponsible actions and assertive
posturing have transformed space into a contested domain.
All the while, space continues to become more congested as
more and more actors, including commercial industry, are
launching an increasing number of satellites to leverage the
advantages space provides. The increasing complexity of our
strategic competition in space has resulted in real threats to
national space power and the critical infrastructure which
supports it.
U.S. Space Command's purpose is to protect U.S. interest by
preserving freedom of action in space and providing critical
support to the rest of the Joint Force, our allies, all while
protecting the Joint Force and allied militaries from space
enabled attack.
To say that more plainly, it is the moral responsibility of
United States Space Command to ensure that the Joint Force, the
Nation, and our allies have access to the space capabilities
they have become dependent on over the decades, and that they
must have through all phases of conflict to be successful.
If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. Space Command provides a
formidable deterrent against potential adversary aggression,
while collaborating with the Joint Force, our allies, and
partners. I will ensure the Command is prepared to win in
conflict through the employment of military space power and
integrated trans-regional missile defense capabilities.
I will assure the Command is postured to gain and maintain
space superiority, to assure freedom of action in space, and to
protect the Joint Force and our allies from the space
capabilities of potential adversaries.
The source of strength of any military formation is our
people. Our joint space warfighters are the best in the world
because of their expertise, dedication, and collective
innovation.
Leadership of America's military sons and daughters is a
most sacred trust. If confirmed, it will be my distinct honor
and solemn duty to lead the 18,000 patriots of U.S. Space
Command. Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General. Gentlemen, I have a
series of questions that are asked of all nominees. You may
respond appropriately together. Have you adhered to applicable
laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Lieutenant General Guillot. No, Chairman.
Lieutenant General Whiting. No.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress,
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee when requested?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Chairman.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee, to give you a personal view, even if your views
differ from the Administration?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, sir.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, it subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress, and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Chairman.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefings in response to congressional requests?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for the testimony or briefings?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Chairman.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, gentlemen. General Guillot, you
have talked about the evolving threats that are facing the
Homeland. Could you give us an idea what are those most
significant threats you see right now?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Chairman. The most
significant threat that the Homeland faces is no longer from a
single capability or a single nation, but it is the compilation
of multiple actors that can threaten the homeland from multiple
avenues of approach and across all domains.
So, the combination of all of those simultaneously is the
biggest threat that we face now, whereas in the past it may
have been a single weapon system or a single actor that
presented that threat.
Chairman Reed. Do you think we are appropriately postured
to deal with these threats?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Chairman, I do. However,
our adversaries are growing at a very fast rate, and we need to
do--across the whole-of-Government, all of our effort must be
to keeping pace with the rate of change of our adversary.
Chairman Reed. Do you have any specific changes in mind? If
confirmed, what you would like to do, say, your first 180 days?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I
will largely follow the outstanding course that has been set by
General VanHerck, focusing on defending the Homeland, and in
the first few days, as you mentioned, my goal is to make sure
that there are no gaps in the transition of authorities that
the Commander must take to defend the Homeland.
I would also like to strengthen the network. Everything
that we do in NORAD, in NORTHCOM requires partnership, and I
would like to strengthen the networks with other Combatant
Commanders, the services, the National Guard, the interagency,
international partners, and, of course, Congress to make sure
that all those relationships are set now in steady State so we
can easily enact those in times of crisis.
Then I will conduct a 90 day assessment of our people, our
mission, and our resourcing to ensure that we are set for the
changing environment that we see ahead.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Whiting, what is your
assessment of the threats to the United States and allied space
assets by Russia and China over the next 5 years? What must we
do to counter those threats?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Thank you for that question,
Chairman. Certainly, we have seen a rapid increase,
particularly from China, as they have built counterspace
capabilities after really studying the United States and how we
leveraged space for military advantage.
So, they have sought to build a series of capabilities from
nondestructive to destructive to hold at risk those space
capabilities. We have seen Russia do that to a lesser degree as
well.
Mr. Chairman, it is our responsibility across the National
Security space enterprise, but certainly, if confirmed at U.S.
Space Command, to make sure that we can operate in the face of
those threats that we now see to continue to support the rest
of the Joint Force with the space capabilities that they have
become dependent upon.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. We are developing the
technologies, and one of the keys is continuous encrypted
communication. Can you give us a sense of where do you think we
are in that process?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, sir. It is vital that we
have the capability to encrypt ourselves with encryption that
will last over decades as we field military space systems that
last for a long time. We want to make sure that that encryption
does not become compromised by other countries, potentially.
So, it is a very important partnership, Mr. Chairman, that
we have with the National Security Agency, and if confirmed, I
would ensure that we continue to work requirements that laid
into those requirements sets, that requirement, so that we
don't end up in a position where another country could
compromise our communications.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. General Guillot, the issue of
fentanyl of crossing the Mexican border is one that is a
serious crisis in the United States today. You are already,
your Command is in communication and cooperation with Mexican
authorities, the Mexican army and navy. How do you believe you
can leverage those military forces to be more effective in
disrupting this trade in fentanyl?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Chairman, the drug threat that
you mentioned is acute. It is significant and it is serious,
and NORTHCOM's role is as part of a whole of Government effort,
NORTHCOM provides direct support to the lead law enforcement
agency to attack these networks.
If I am confirmed, due to the importance of this mission,
as soon as possible, after the change of Command, I will go
down to the Southern border and meet with all of not only the
U.S. military that are in support of the lead law enforcement
agencies, but also with the interagency, the intel community,
and the Mexican military partners that we have.
During that time, I will make an effort to gain a greater
operational understanding, and then I will draw an assessment
on how we can optimize our support to get after this very
serious problem.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Thank you both, gentlemen.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen. General Guillot, I was going to ask the very
question that our chairman just asked about the fentanyl
crisis. I view it as a very serious matter, and so please
understand from the chair and the ranking Member, where we rank
that issue.
Let me ask you, you mentioned domain awareness in your
opening statement. We are not where we need to be in domain
awareness, are we?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I agree. Although the
steps through the Government, Congress's funding, and industry,
we are making strides in that direction, the fact that the
adversaries we face can attack us from distances further away,
at speeds, altitudes, with maneuverability, and low cross radar
cross-sections that we hadn't seen in the past, it is a
constant fight to have the domain awareness, the ability to
detect these threats, and it takes our constant and improving
effort because after all, we can't defeat what we can't see.
Senator Wicker. You know, it seems to me that the balloon
fiasco that occurred several months ago is an example of this.
I have a question here which I want to read word for word. Do
you commit to sharing information with this Committee, even
when it is contrary to the Administration communications
objectives?
I ask that question because we on this side have asked some
specific questions in writing of the Administration and have
not gotten all of the answers we needed, and during a visit to
Beijing in June, Secretary of State Blinken said publicly that
the Chinese balloon matter is a chapter that should be closed.
If Members of the Congress believe their questions to be
answered, you do commit to answering those questions regardless
of the views of the Administration, do you not?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator, I absolutely do.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, and let me ask you, I
was glad to hear that you and General Whiting were classmates
at the academy. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator. Although I think
he graduated much higher in the order of merit than I.
Senator Wicker. I was going to ask about. Did you find that
his excellent high school education at Ocean Springs High
School in Mississippi gave him a leg up over most of the
other--?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I have no doubt that
was the springboard.
[Laughter.]
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I think you are well
on your way to confirmation. General Whiting, we are--you are
going to be giving up some of your more commercial duties from
your predecessor and moving them over to the Department of
Commerce as far as space situational awareness. Tell us about
that, and I understand you think that is a good idea and that
Congress made the correct move there.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Ranking Member, thank you for
that question. It is a really important issue. Today, the Space
Force provides space situational awareness to the entire--the
entire world, really. But we do that for nonmilitary purposes.
But under your leadership and the actions of Congress, that
civil portion of that responsibility is now transferring to the
Department of Commerce.
They are very willing partners in that, and we are working
a plan with them that over the next couple of years, they will
take on that nonmilitary responsibility, and that will free up
capacity inside of our military formations to focus on the
military unique responsibilities that we have.
So, we really appreciate that leadership from the Congress
and the work of the Department of Commerce to take that on.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Now, I want to ask a question that
will require a relatively brief answer, but then I will ask you
to supplement it on the record. Let's war game, in what we can
do publicly, let's say that the Communist Party of China under
Xi Jinping decides to invade their neighbor Taiwan. There will
be a battle in space almost immediately, is that correct?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, I agree. We think the
opening shots of such a war could happen in space or cyber.
Senator Wicker. Okay. What I would like for you to do, and
I know you only got 38 seconds to speak, but if you could sort
of give us an overview briefly and then supplement your answer
on the record, sir.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, sir. Because the People's
Republic of China has studied how we use space, we do expect
that they would try to inhibit our ability to use space the way
we would prefer to across the Joint Force, and, Senator, if it
is good with you, I will take you up on your offer and provide
additional details.
Senator Wicker. Absolutely. Because it is quite complex and
requires more than 5 minutes even. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Congratulations to both of you
and your families. Thank you for your willingness to continue
to serve this country. Senator Wicker raised the move of the
Office of Space Commerce to the Department of Commerce, General
Whiting.
As a Member of the Appropriations Committee, I remember
there was some controversy at the time about that decision and
a question about whether that was actually going to work.
Can you tell us how that is working at this point? I
understand that there--we will have a shortfall in terms of the
funding that we were planning to give to them to continue the
integration. So where are we in that process and what do we
still need to do?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, thank you for that
question. I am not aware of the specific funding--exactly where
they are in their funding in Department of Commerce, but I can
say that they are an absolutely eager and willing partner.
We have multiple engagements from senior leadership down to
their tactical level where they have been out to our operating
locations where we conduct this mission. They have seen how we
do business, and they are partnering with us on their plans for
how they move forward. But, ma'am, I am just not familiar with
exactly where they are in their funding profile.
Senator Shaheen. You--the Space Command, however, has also
created a new commercial integration office to help coordinate
commercial space capabilities, is that correct?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Ma'am, that is correct.
Senator Shaheen. So how do you see that office working with
the office in the Department of Commerce?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, ma'am. Inside U.S. Space
Command, that office, Senator, is figuring out ways that U.S.
Space Command can take advantage of the incredible capability
that U.S. space industry brings us.
That will be focused on military unique aspects of,
obviously, our mission. Department of Commerce will be focused
on nonmilitary aspects, but I think there will be a chance to
partner together so that, for example, the U.S. Government
isn't paying twice for commercial space situational awareness
data that may be useful to both of us.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Well, as you point out,
commercial space is playing a greater role in what is happening
with our military. We have seen in Russia's war against Ukraine
the role of Starlink and how they are operating their
operation--military operations. Can you talk about how you see
an attack on those commercial operations? How we should view
that--is that--should we consider that an act of war if we see
that happening? How--where are we in the thinking about how we
look at the commercial space operations in connection with what
we say about our military space operations.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, that is a topic,
obviously, that we are focused on very, very keenly. Inside the
unified Command plan, where the President gives tasks to each
of the Combatant Commanders, there is a task to United States
Space Command to defend commercial space capabilities, if
directed.
So, we understand that importance and have put that hook
into that mission. I think moving forward, as you said, ma'am,
with the Russia, Ukraine, we have only seen the growing
importance of commercial space capability.
So, we must continue to partner with those companies so
that they look to build resilience into their systems, and then
partner with them, that if we do need to actively defend them,
we have the communication avenues open to be able to do so.
Senator Shaheen. Have we actually defined what an attack on
commercial operations would mean?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Ma'am, I think ultimately that
would be a policy question. But we certainly understand what
the actions are that would look like, you know, some kind of
attack, whether that was a jamming or a direct physical attack
on a satellite or a ground station.
Senator Shaheen. So, we haven't actually, in terms of
policy, delineated how we would respond to that kind of a
situation.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I think we have a
range of options, but that they are not coded, that if x
happens, then then y will follow. We have to look at each set
of circumstances uniquely.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. General Guillot, how are
hypersonic weapons changing the way NORAD thinks about your
job?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I think that
hypersonics present the greatest technical challenge that we
face today. We are in a three way race strategically with our
two main competitors in hypersonics, both in offensive and
defensive capabilities.
We are working closely with MDA, the Missile Defense
Agency, to develop our own offensive and defensive capabilities
to keep pace.
If I am confirmed, I will be keenly interested in this
because as the Commander of NORAD, I would be responsible for
the integrated tactical warning and the attack assessment of
any hypersonic attack on the continental United States, and
then we would be using United States Space Command systems to
help us get that data.
So, it is a field that we are watching very closely, and we
are in a tight competition with Russia and China.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today. I appreciate your service, and the
sacrifice and service of your families as well.
General Guillot, I have heard extensively from General
VanHerck about a requirement for increased domain awareness,
whether that is air domain awareness or undersea domain
awareness.
I would encourage you, if confirmed, to make use of the
unfunded priorities requirements list that is available to you
so that you have that process to inform Congress of any
capability gaps that you see in this area.
You mentioned those earlier, that that was something you
would look into. So, that is a tool that is available to you,
and it is very helpful to us. Also, General, over the past few
years, we have seen North Korea, Russia, China dramatically
expand their nuclear arsenals and develop a wide range of
missile systems capable of directly attacking the United
States.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for our own defense
capabilities, which are failing to keep pace with growing
threats. Do you believe that the United States should continue
to posture its homeland missile defense capabilities to stay
ahead of the North Korean threat?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator, I do.
Senator Fischer. Should the United States consider
adjusting its stated missile defense policy and allow for the
possibility of defending against limited missile attacks from
either Russia or China?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, that policy--that
would, as you stated, that would be a policy decision. But I do
think that it is something we should look at based on what we
are seeing in Ukraine and the way the Russians are using--
weapons systems there, attacking civilian infrastructure.
I think although the policy has worked well for years. As
our adversaries change their capabilities in the way they
employ, I think our military should look at adapting, and on a
recurring basis, assess the policy.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. You mentioned earlier about
monitoring the gaps that exist in the authorities that you are
given. Right at this point in time, do you believe that there
any additional authorities or capabilities that NORTHCOM or
NORAD missile defense system need?
Lieutenant General Guillot. No, Senator. I don't see any
gaps. My goal is just to make sure that--due to my new status
in the position, I don't let any authorities or gaps that are
presently set develop due to the transition.
Senator Fischer. General Whiting, to what extent do you
believe that space based capabilities can contribute to our
missile defense system?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, thank you for that
question. They are absolutely vital. It is space that allows us
to instantly look around the globe, watch for missile launches
anywhere on the globe, and report that in real time to our
national leadership.
If confirmed, I would have the responsibility of providing
that missile warning data to General Guillot so he could make
an assessment of whether North America was under attack. So,
ma'am, it is absolutely vital.
Senator Fischer. China tested, in 2021, the fractional
orbital bombardment system. Do you believe that we should
explore the viability of such systems as a means of passing new
and novel threats that this country faces?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, thank you for the
question. Obviously, the WU-14 fractional orbital bomb system
is something we are very carefully watching, and we have to be
able to track that from launch all the way through to a
potential impact. I think it is a matter of whether we believe
such a system would fill any gaps that we have.
That is not something I have looked at, but if confirmed, I
would be happy to participate in that and provide my best
military advice back.
Senator Fischer. In this setting, can you tell us the
concerns that you may have with not just the abilities that
Russia and China currently have, but the direction that they
are headed that we are aware of, and how we are preparing to
defend against that--to counter it?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator. Certainly, I
mentioned that China in particular has rapidly increased their
counter space capabilities, but we also see them making their--
the rest of their military forces more space enabled to be more
precise and more lethal.
So, it is important that we as a Nation have a range of
capabilities where we can integrate intelligence, Command and
control, offense, defense, cyber, joint fires to make sure that
we can protect our Joint Force from those space enabled
capabilities that they are developing.
Senator Fischer. They have dual use platforms as well,
correct?
Lieutenant General Guillot. That is correct, and we assume
anything commercial is dual use from the PRC.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
nominees for your service. I look forward to supporting your
nominations.
General Guillot, I want to tread a little ground that both
the Chair and ranking Member have with respect to fentanyl. I
don't need to ask the same questions, but Senator Ernst and I
offered an amendment that was included in the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] version that is currently pending on
the Senate floor, to designate fentanyl as a National Security
threat and to encourage the DOD to be more forward leaning,
first within the U.S. whole of Government effort, which has
tended to rely pretty heavily on DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency],
DOJ [Departent of Justice], DHS [Department of Homeland
Security].
But we are encouraging the DOD to be more forward leaning
in this fight, both within the United States Government, but
also in tandem with the Mexican military. I would suspect that
that responsibility is going to be pretty heavily on NORTHCOM
shoulders.
So, with other Committee Members, we just see the ravages
of this in all of our communities. I know you understand that,
and we will look forward, should you be confirmed, to following
up and talking about what we might do from the Pentagon side to
really energize and amplify the efforts to counter fentanyl
coming into the United States.
General Whiting, I want to ask you a question about Space
Command and our allies. I am very forward leaning on the AUKUS
framework that was announced by President Biden. I am the
chairman of the Seapower subcommittee of Armed Services.
I think that this partnership, which I hope will be decades
long, offers real opportunity to promote stability in the Indo-
Pacific. As you know, pillar one is a pillar dealing with
Virginia-class submarines, but there is a broad pillar to the
talks about cooperation with Australia and the UK, and a whole
variety of technologies, whether it is space, cyber, AI,
hypersonics.
Should you be confirmed, talk to us a little bit about the
way you would see that AUKUS framework and how you might use
your position at Space Command to work together with these
allies, and then just more broadly, our allies.
It is a strategic edge that we have over China and Russia,
that we have such a network of allies. How should we be
thinking about joint activities in the space domain with
nations allied with the United States?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, thank you for that
question. Space is a team sport, and it takes us and our allies
to be the best we can be. In fact, Senator, 33 years ago, as a
second lieutenant at my first space assignment, the very first
noncommissioned officer I ever supervised was a Canadian
noncommissioned officer assigned to our unit because of those
partnerships.
We have a grouping of countries we call CSPO, the combined
space operations, and together it is us, it is our Canadian,
British, Australian, New Zealand, plus some other countries
that are observers that were asking to come in. In that forum,
we are able to coordinate military operations.
We are able to coordinate future architectures, policies.
We have seen a real value in that as we work together, and in
fact, Senator, over the last couple of years, U.S. Space
Command has created a named operation called Operation Olympic
Defender, where we operate in space with our Canadian,
Australian, and United Kingdom allies.
So, I will, if confirmed, do everything I can to maximize
those partnerships because it is an asymmetric advantage for
the United States.
Senator Kaine. Tell me what the acronym CPO stands for
again.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Combined Space Operations.
Senator Kaine. Right. Great. I am very glad to hear about
that intentional effort to work together with allies. To
followup on an earlier question that Senator Shaheen was
asking, space is an interesting domain because of the massive
proliferation of commercial satellites in space that can have a
security connection to us.
She referenced Starlink in Ukraine. Our adversaries may
have their own assets in space, but they tend not to have the
same amount of government owned assets, but then private sector
assets where they are at least some collaboration with them.
Talk a little bit about how you would see the--both the
opportunities and challenges to work in tandem with our
commercial space assets to advance our space capacities.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I like to say we are
in the second golden age of space. The first golden age was
when Neil Armstrong walked out onto the lunar surface. But the
second golden age is really being led by American commercial
industry, and it gives us so many untold advantages.
We have to maximize that, and over the last 8 years or so
out at our Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, we have a
grouping there called the Commercial Integration Cell, where we
brought in the ten companies that we contract with the most for
capability through the Department of Defense.
In that cell, we share intelligence at the highest level.
We get insights into what is happening in their constellations,
because we believe if we all have that insight, we operate
better together.
So that is just one example of the ways that, if confirmed,
I would want to continue to drive our ability to leverage U.S.
American industry because of the advantages it brings for us.
Senator Kaine. Well, I hope to entertain you at Wallops
Island at some point, following your confirmation. Thank you. I
yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, General
Guillot and General Whiting, and to your families as well.
Thank you very much for being here and supporting these
gentlemen.
So, General Guillot, we have talked a lot about a number of
threats. We have covered China and Russia. We have heard about
North Korea's arsenal and how they are outpacing our ballistic
missile defenses.
A lot of concern out there, and in your policy questions,
the advanced policy questions, you stated that a second missile
defense site on the East Coast is, ``not operationally required
at this time.''
So, what advancements in adversary capabilities would lead
you to reevaluate this assessment? What should be--what should
we be watching for?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I understand that the
assessment was recently made and said that it is not
operational required at this time. But from my perspective, if
I am confirmed coming into the position, all military
operations require depth and dispersal, and we have to keep
pace with the threat.
I do not question the assessment that was made, but it was
a different context and a different threat at the time of the
assessment. So, if I am confirmed, I would support recurring
assessments that would ensure that we keep pace with the
adversaries.
Specific to your question, the number of threats that they
have that might defeat the total number that we have in our
existing locations, or if another rogue State develops the
capability and can attack the Homeland.
That is another reason I think that we should look at the--
reassess on a periodic basis to ensure that we can keep pace
with that--with the threat.
Senator Ernst. Well, I appreciate that answer very much,
and I--in my estimation, that would be the correct answer, is
we have threats that change, grow, morph over time, and it is
important that we continually reassess that.
We have heard also from a number of my colleagues about the
Southern border, and obviously that is a huge concern with all
of us. Senator Kaine and I are working together on an amendment
for the NDAA, and that would improve our mil-to-mil cooperation
with the Mexican authorities to counter fentanyl.
We have also seen a number of National Guard troops that we
have used on our Southern border, and I would like to focus on
that just for a second. I have traveled a couple of times to
the Southern border, and every time I am there, I have the
opportunity to meet with troops from different states and, of
course, Texas--those that are assisting with the civil
authorities, I think we have about 2,500 National Guard. So how
does defense support to civil authorities fit in those
priorities as Commander?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, it is right at the top
because border security is National Security, and National
Security is a key element of homeland defense. So, what you
just described would be in the number one priority that I think
the Command would have, if I am confirmed.
Strong support within the authorities given by the
Secretary of Defense to a Department of Homeland Security would
be a top priority of mine.
Senator Ernst. Very good, and how would we use those
reserve forces, whether it is National Guard or Reserve units?
How can we continue to support the mission without hurting
their readiness?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, so many of the
missions that the NORAD and NORTHCOM conduct are with National
Guard forces, and they are all extremely capable, extremely
disciplined, mission focused.
I don't think that the NORAD and NORTHCOM could do their
important mission without the support of the National Guard.
Some of the actions that they conduct, for instance, in the
Southwest border, actually build some readiness, aviation, for
example. But there are some where they lose readiness in their
wartime mission.
So, if I am confirmed, I would establish a routine
reporting process with the deployed Commanders to see where
they feel they have lost readiness in specific worldwide
deployment areas and see if we could give them training
opportunities while they are on the border to maintain those.
Certainly, they need to keep readiness in their current
missions, but their long term readiness would be very
important, and I think we need to find ways that they can keep
their worldwide deployment readiness while they are conducting
the Southwest border mission.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that, and General
Whiting, because I am out of time, I will submit a question for
the record that deals with our cyber and our Special Operations
Forces, and space triad. It is of great interest to those that
are working in Special Operations Command. So, appreciate your
gentlemen. Thank you very much, and congratulations on your
nominations.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to
both of you and welcome to your families. I ask the following
two initial questions to address the fitness of any nominee
before any of the Committees that I sit on.
So, I will ask the two questions of both of you. Since you
became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for
sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical harassment
or assault of a sexual nature?
Lieutenant General Guillot. No, Senator.
Lieutenant General Whiting. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Have you ever faced disciplinary
or entered into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
Lieutenant General Guillot. No, Senator.
Lieutenant General Whiting. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. General Whiting, as space becomes
exponentially busier, understanding where satellites are is
increasingly important and challenging. The 15th Space
Surveillance Squadron in Maui does the important work, while
simultaneously conducting leading edge research.
However, they are hamstrung by aging infrastructure, and
for your information, the 15 Space Surveillance Squadron
operates several telescopes on Haleakala, Maui that track
satellites and, in partnership with the University of Hawaii,
conducts research.
It is here that a mechanical issue in a backup generator
caused about 700 gallons of diesel fuel to spill after a
lightning strike caused electrical grid failures on the summit.
Additionally, many of the buildings and telescope domes are
leaking and Generally in bad shape. General Whiting,
terrestrial infrastructure underpins our space capabilities.
How does deferring maintenance at places like the 15 Space
Surveillance Squadron impact SPACECOM's mission accomplishment?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, thank you for that
question, and I have had the good fortune to visit the 15th on
Maui multiple times. As you highlight, they are doing
incredibly critical work in our number one priority area, which
is space domain awareness.
So, it is vital that we invest in that infrastructure so
that we can ensure that we can continue to provide that mission
support. I appreciate the local leadership on Maui who has
worked with us as we have worked to remediate the fuel spill.
There is more work to be done there, but we appreciate the
advice and counsel that we have received from the local leaders
there.
Senator Hirono. Well, Generally we get to the
infrastructure needs when a crisis has already occurred. My
question has to do with how we are going to upgrade and prevent
these kinds of incidences so that our people on Maui can do
their jobs?
So, I don't think we have put enough emphasis on the need
for repair--repairing and maintaining our infrastructure across
the DOD, and SPACECOM is included in that.
So, I would request, should you be confirmed, that there be
a review and assessment of the infrastructure needs for your
Command.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, thank you, and I do
commit to that, and there is right now effort going on to
assess all of our infrastructure across my current Command,
Space Operations Command, and specifically tie it to our
readiness standards.
That work is ongoing and will complete here over the next
year or two. But ma'am, I absolutely commit to the review you
requested.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, and again, for you, if
confirmed, you will assume responsibilities as the global
sensor manager for missile defense. Do you believe current
missile defense policies reflect all global threats and
adequately encompass rapidly changing missile technologies?
If confirmed, you will be responsible for missile warning
segment sensors, and in part for the DOD's space based Command
and control systems.
Do you think that these acquisition programs, including the
dual use radar requested in this year's budget for Hawaii, are
on track and will meet your requirements?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I think those are
critical programs that we have to watch very carefully. It is
vital that we continue to provide global missile warning and
missile defense capabilities.
If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice after
looking into those specific programs. I think we have the right
investments, but we have got to make sure we execute on the
program successfully now.
Senator Hirono. I have had concerns about missile defense
for Hawaii, and as you probably know, HGRH Hawaii was on track,
but it is no longer and so we are looking for some other ways
that we are going to make sure that there is a missile warning
system that will protect Hawaii.
That also includes some responsibility that you have,
General Guillot. So please, for both of you, I would very much
appreciate your paying attention to the missile defense needs
of Hawaii. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate both of you gentlemen and your families. I
appreciate it very much your comments about your families in
your opening statements.
I think it is a great reminder to Americans that it is not
just people wearing the uniform. It is oftentimes the spouses
and the kids behind them who, in my view, have a harder job.
So, to them, thank you. General Guillot, you mentioned Canada,
which I think might puzzle a lot of people.
You have a unique Command responsibility in terms of NORAD,
which has to be nominated by the President and the Prime
Minister. You want to just mention it very briefly. I have
actually a couple of questions about Canada.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator. NORAD is a
binational Command with the United States and Canada. Has been
for 65 years and--65 years of defending the Homeland side by
side.
Senator Sullivan. So, Senator Kaine mentioned the
importance of our allies. I couldn't agree more. It is a giant
strategic advantage to our National Security.
I do want to mention, and it is, you know, not always
polite, but I am going to do it here anyway. The Wall Street
Journal on July 12th had an editorial entitled, Canada Is a
Military Free Rider in NATO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
submit that for the record.
Chairman Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Sullivan. It goes on to talk about Ottawa's feeble
commitment to the alliance at the Vilnius summit. They should
have been put at the kids table. I was actually at the Vilnius
summit last week in NATO. Canada is not even close to its 2
percent commitment, and it was common knowledge that Prime
Minister Trudeau was trying to water down the Vilnius
commitment to 2 percent as a floor, all of which is incredibly
disappointing.
I hope that Canadians are watching your confirmation
hearing. General, you will be working closely with Canada, if
confirmed.
Can you commit to this Committee that you can have
discussions with the Canadians and say, hey, look, when you are
not supporting NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and
you are not supporting missile defense for North America, it is
actually harmful to the alliance. Americans get frustrated when
our allies don't pull their weight, and with regard to NATO,
Canada is not even close to pulling its weight.
Can you commit us to have those tough conversations that
are important with your Canadian counterparts?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator, you can count on
me to do that.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. That is really important. You
are both Air Force Academy grads, which is great. I am sure the
Air Force Academy is very proud. We are proud. Awesome. As you
know, the father of the Air Force, Billy Mitchell, had a very
famous quote.
He said--it was actually in front of an Armed Services
hearing in 1935. He talked about one place that actually wasn't
a State yet. In America, and he called it the most strategic
place in the world. Whoever holds this place literally holds
the world.
Okay. Now, you guys are Air Force Academy grads. That is
the father of the U.S. Air Force. What place was Billy Mitchell
referring to?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Alaska, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Alaska. General, are you going to go with
that?
Lieutenant General Whiting. I am familiar with that----
Senator Sullivan. Do you confirm that that was Alaska.
Good. You passed the test. Thank you. Now, in all seriousness,
two issues. I just want to talk briefly about Alaska. We talked
about domain awareness.
General VanHerck has been great on domain awareness. But
when it comes to domain awareness, whether it is hypersonics or
cruise missiles or balloons, where are they--what is the avenue
of approach if our adversaries are going to attack New York
City, Miami, Chicago, it doesn't matter, where they come in
through?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, almost any avenue of
approach to the Homeland comes over the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. Right. So, when we talk about domain
awareness, where do we need to beef that up in particular?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, first and foremost, it
needs to be the Arctic.
Senator Sullivan. So, America is an Arctic Nation because
of what state?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Alaska, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So, when you are talking about beefing up
in the Arctic, you are talking about beefing up in Alaska,
correct?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, sir, and to your previous
point, to talk to our Canadian counterparts----
Senator Sullivan. Yes, and hopefully they will pay for that
at some point----
Lieutenant General Guillot. Radars there as well.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, they are not very good at paying for
missile defense either, even though we protect the whole North
American continent.
Let me ask a final question. With regard to the Arctic, we
have huge strategic interests as a country in the Arctic,
natural resources, transportation routes, strategic locations,
medicine, the environment, people.
The NORTHCOM Commanders, in my experience, have gone from--
you are the advocate for the Arctic--have gone from essentially
disinterest when I got here 8 years ago, to increasingly strong
interest. I think General VanHerck has done a great job, and
yet the Pentagon has been the one agency in all of Washington,
DC. that, in my view, has kind of not really focused.
So, the reason America and our National Security, and even
the Pentagon, are now focusing on the Arctic is almost all from
this Committee, where we have put it every year in the NDAA,
including this requirement, hey, guys, wake up, Pentagon, wake
up. We have got big strategic interests in the Arctic.
Last year, Senator King and I got the Arctic Security
Initiative, and the Pentagon fought that. By the way,
icebreakers, ports in Nome. All this presence, resources issues
we put in, not the Pentagon. So, can I get your commitment to
work with this Committee to be 110 percent focus on the Arctic?
To be honest, it has been a little tiring to have to go to
the Pentagon and say, hey, guys, focus here. Well, we are not
really focused here. Then we put it into law. It would be
better if you guys could help us.
Again, General VanHerck has been great, but can you
continue that commitment to work with this Committee on the
critical issues in the Arctic, particularly as it deals with
Russia and China?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, you have my
commitment.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Well first, I want to associate myself with
that series of questions about the Arctic. It was a question of
whether or not Senator Sullivan and I, who would go first to
ask the Arctic questions.
He has asked them. I would also have to respectfully point
out that if ever our beloved chairman, John McCain, was here,
he would point out that Billy Mitchell was later court
martialed, but we won't go into that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. I think that was rescinded later----
[Laughter.]
Senator King. General Whiting, it has been U.S. policy for
as long as anybody can remember to not militarize space, but
that train has left the station, has it not? Isn't--hasn't
the--haven't the Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Russians,
developed the capacity for offensive weapons in space?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, they absolutely have.
Senator King. Therefore, we need to be in a position to
respond because the cornerstone of our entire defense, National
Security policy, is deterrence. If they have an asymmetric
advantage that we can't hold them at risk, doesn't that
undermine our policy of deterrence?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, it does.
Senator King. We are going to have to put aside the
laudable policy because of a change of circumstances. Is that
correct?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, Senator, and I think the
creation of United States Space Command just under 4 years ago,
and then by the action of the Congress, the creation of the
United States Space Force just under 4 years ago, recognizes
that new reality.
Senator King. I think, my concern is that there are areas
of the Federal Government that haven't quite gotten there, and
I think we need to understand it not because we want to
militarize space, but because we have to face the reality and
the undermining of our deterrent capability if we don't match
that.
General Guillot, since we have been talking almost exactly
an hour in this hearing, 10 of--12 Americans have died of drug
overdoses. We are under attack, and it is in large measure in
your AOR. It is not a nation State, but these international
organizations. Talk to me about a strategy for dealing with
this.
We have been hearing hearings year after year. We don't
have sufficient ISR. We don't have sufficient interdiction
capability. When are we going to take this seriously for what
it is, which is an attack on the people of this country?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, the threat you
described is acute, it is serious, and it is very significant.
As--if I am confirmed to be the NORTHCOM Commander, I will
immediately, upon taking change of Command, go down to the
border, meet with all of the U.S. forces that are in direct
support of the lead law enforcement agencies conducting this
mission, and make an assessment on what we can do to optimize
our presentation of force and make suggestions to the
Secretary----
Senator King. Well, part of it is, is advocating in a
vigorous way for additional ISR, for example.
I mean, plus, we have had testimony before this Committee
from SOUTHCOM that we only able to interdict 25 percent of the
drug shipments coming by sea that we know about. In other
words, we know they are coming. We know that they are carrying
deadly cargo, and yet we don't have--there are not enough
ships.
There are not enough capacity, Coast Guard, Navy. It just
seems to me everybody is pointing at everybody else. Please, I
would urge you to develop a special task force, a strike force,
to really think about how to organize the U.S. Government
response. Because what comes through to me is a lack of central
authority.
You are the nearest thing to that, and I hope you will
really get on this. September 11th, we lost over 3,000 people,
turned our society upside down here. We are losing 100,000 a
year, and yet nobody seems to be in charge. Will you take
charge?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I will take charge of
assessing that from the DOD standpoint and forwarding those
recommendations.
Senator King. Now, let me make--go, change the subject,
again to get back to the Arctic. One of the realities--again,
is like my questions about space. It is no secret that the
Russians have essentially re-militarized their share of the
Arctic, which really was a much more peaceful area prior to the
last 10 years.
Don't we need some capacity, infrastructure in the Arctic,
a port, for example, to be able to field the kind of force
that's necessary again, for deterrence? This is not about
offensive capability, but the best way to prevent a war is for
your adversary to know that they will suffer unacceptable
results if they attack us. Talk to me about infrastructure In
the Arctic, for example, a port in Nome.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, presence is the best
form of deterrence in the Arctic. The port of Nome is a game
changer for operations in the Arctic. I understand that it is
underway, and we are looking at 2027, 2028 for completion of
that.
But just that port alone will add 4 to 8 days per
operational sortie of our ships where they don't have to go
down to Dutch Harbor to refuel. They can stay up in the high
North.
So that infrastructure, and then the recurring presence of
forces training and operating in the high North, in Alaska, I
think is a very strong deterrent to our adversaries up there.
Senator King. Well, both of you are taking on extraordinary
responsibilities at an extraordinary time. Congratulations on
your appointment. We look forward to your confirmation. Thank
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Tuberville,
please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both
of you for being here today. Good to meet with you in my
office, and congratulations, and welcome to your families.
General Guillot, several conversations with General VanHerck
over the last few years. He talked about NORTHCOM's need for
more assigned troops.
I know you are coming from another Command, but have you
had conversations with him about your possible move to the
Commander of that--of NORTHCOM?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I haven't talked with
him directly about that. But in the function of my current job,
I am in several video teleconferences with General VanHerck and
other leaders where the topic you mentioned is discussed.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, I would hope you would get back
with me on that, once you are assigned to that, and let us know
what we need to do to help. As you have heard today, a lot of
questions have been about certain things that is killing our
people in this country and not overseas.
So, thank you for that. General Whiting, I am not going to
make a long dissertation about this, but of course, Space
Command is very new, and we in Alabama, in Huntsville were
excited about Space Command being assigned to Huntsville in
Redstone Arsenal, after 21 different criteria.
A lot of things were going through and with a fine tooth
comb and we were excited about that. But, you know,
unfortunately politics has got involved, and that is not you,
but, you know, for a few months now, I have heard nothing but--
because of some things that I am involved in, about readiness
of our military. It has been 3 years and we do not have a
permanent home yet for Space Command.
It is a shame that we have gotten into politics, and of
course, things move slow up here. But even for Washington, it
is very slow for this to have happen, to us have a permanent
home for Space Command.
So hopefully we get that done in the near future. But I
would like to ask you a couple of questions. How is Space
Command doing in regard to this workforce? I know you have been
there for a while, and what do we need to do to improve because
it is very new to our country and for the world.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Thank you, Senator. I
appreciate you highlighting our workforce, because despite the
incredible space capabilities and satellites we bring and our
rockets, it is our people that are our most critical asset.
We have to ensure as a Nation that we have military and
civilian who want to join our space enterprise, National
Security space enterprise and are willing to be a part of that.
So, I think it is important that we invest in those STEM
activities that inspire our young men and women to join into
space.
Then I think we have a unique opportunity, given all the
great things that commercial industry and NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] are doing right now, to
leverage that excitement to bring these young men and women
into our organizations.
Senator Tuberville. How big a role does cyber play in
SPACECOM, and what are we doing to make sure that we have
enough--one of my sons is in cyber and, but it is very new, and
it is very complicated. What are we doing to make sure we have
enough people to be involved in what we do in Space Command
through cyber?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I like to say that the
soft underbelly of our space capabilities is cyber, because our
networks, our space networks truly are global in nature, but
they also reach out to 22,000 miles above the Earth's surface
to geosynchronous orbit.
That creates a lot of novel cyber-attacks surface, and so,
while potential adversaries like Russia and China could attack
us in the space domain directly, they would rather attack us in
the cyber domain because it is cheaper for them, and it is
harder for us to attribute.
So, we must work--if confirmed, I must work with the
services, and in particular U.S. Space Force, to execute the
excellent plan they have laid in place to pivot hundreds of
Guardians into the cyber defense workforce to defend our space
capabilities from cyber-attack.
Senator Tuberville. Have we done any studies to where we
stand with other countries, even our allies, in terms of cyber,
the education part? You know, where do we stand? Are we good,
bad, indifferent?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I believe the United
States is at the absolute forefront of cyber capability. If
confirmed, I would look to work with U.S. Cyber Command on
ensuring that we are leveraging all of that partnership work
they do with others to best defend U.S. Space Command in the
cyber domain.
Senator Tuberville. One last question, what is our top
threat in space theater right now? What would be your thoughts?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, our top threat is the
growing Chinese counterspace capabilities, both from reversible
threats like jamming, all the way up to the direct ascent ASATs
and laser capabilities we have seen them testing.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, and good luck to
both of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Tuberville
had some good questions for the two Generals. Let me point out,
though, that, you know, both General Whiting and General
Guillot said, if confirmed, a number of times in your
testimony.
The roles that you are going into are so critical for our
national defense. But the, if confirmed, is certainly in
question because of Senator Tuberville's holds on these
promotions and these positions that I imagine would still be in
place.
So, I think that is important to note here. General
Guillot, welcome, and General Whiting, welcome to the hearing
here. General Guillot, I believe you grew up in Tucson--or
Tucson, Arizona, where Gabby and I live, and we talked about
that in my office a couple of weeks ago.
Like, you know, Senator King and many others on this
Committee, I am very concerned about transnational criminal
organizations and the flow of drugs across the Southern border,
fentanyl poisoning our communities.
Senator King asked about this, but I want to just get down
to some resources you think you may need in your new position
here. Do you anticipate needing more staffing, more authority,
more funding?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I agree on the
severity of the threat and the need for us to use any means
available to stop that threat from coming across our border.
If I am confirmed, and when I go down to the Southwest
border, and everywhere from California all the way to Texas,
and look at each site, things that I will be looking for not
only are what are we doing today, but what could we be doing in
terms of ISR, the types of forces that we are using in
supporting the lead law enforcement agency.
Then if I see anything in terms of numbers, authorities,
anything along those lines or types of help, that is what I
will report back to the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, and General, also, you
know, related to ISR, sort of, domain awareness, Senator Budd
and I introduced legislation called the SOAR Act. We hope to
move this in the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]
reauthorization bill.
This is bipartisan legislation that will ensure that these
high altitude balloons that are released, you know, rather
frequently for scientific purposes and other purposes have
transponders so they can be tracked and identified.
It will take a little bit of the workload off of NORTHCOM.
But it will also allow you to act more quickly to identify any
activity that could be a threat, if it doesn't have a
transponder on it. What could you, as the Commander of
NORTHCOM, what would you do to further improve domain awareness
over the NORTHCOM area of operations?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, the first and I think
most important step to improving domain awareness would be to
ensure that we have the types of radars in the locations needed
to cover all the avenues of approach that are now vulnerable to
the Homeland, and to ensure that the systems are the types that
can detect the new and emerging threats that our competitors
are building, higher speed, all altitude, maneuvering, low
radar cross-section types of threats that we can build into a
network.
The next important step, Senator, would be to bring all of
those back to our Command center on a single pane of glass that
we cannot only look at in NORTHCOM headquarters, but share with
all the other combatant Commands like EUCOM and INDOPACOM, so
it is a seamless picture of the threats that we face across all
combatant Commands.
Senator Kelly. All right, thank you, and just one comment
about the SPACECOM headquarters. So, you know, it is imperative
that we get a decision on where SPACECOM is going to be
located. I mean, this has gone on too long.
These decisions impact our Members, their families, local
communities. It impacts the mission and the National Security
of the United States. So, we can't--we shouldn't let
indecision, bureaucracy, and politics impact our National
Security like this.
So, especially on a mission set that is as critical as
managing the space domain that underpins our defense, and an
area where our adversaries are investing heavily in. So, you
know, my hope is that we get a resolution on where SPACECOM is
going to be headquartered. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you. First one, I want to thank both
of you for being here. Congratulations on your nominations.
Thank you for your service. I want to thank your families for
what they do.
I am sure you guys have moved a lot. Hopefully spent a lot
of time in Florida. Communist China, Russia, North Korea, Iran,
and other terrorist groups want to harm the United States at
any cost and in any way they can.
They all possess ballistic missiles and will do anything
they can to harm us and our national interests here in the
Homeland and in space. I know you are both focused on deterring
these threats, and if they are--and if they ever try to attack
us here at home, to feed whatever they throw our way, I look
forward to hearing about how you are going to continue to make
sure we stay safe.
As our strategic focus shifts from the threat of terrorist
to threats from adversarial nations like Communist China and
Russia, NORTHCOM will still have to defend the Homeland from
both.
I would characterize our reaction to the Chinese spy
balloon incident as pretty bad--terrible. What have you learned
from that and how we handle the next spy balloon when you are
the Commander?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I was not personally
familiar with all the factors that went into the first
decision. But what I can tell you that if confirmed, air
sovereignty will be the cornerstone of the NORAD and NORTHCOM
mission.
If confirmed, I will aggressively execute all the
authorities and the are we associated with maintaining air
sovereignty of the U.S. That goes to early detection.
Making decisions that are within my authority, and then
quickly passing all of the valuable information and options to
my senior leadership, if it is something that is beyond my
authority.
Senator Scott. Thank you. From a strategic and resourcing
standpoint, how is the feed the Homeland from terrorists and
defending from adversary nations different?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Sir, Senator, they certainly
overlap. Deterring from terrorist threats that are originating
overseas. Other combatant Commands, like the one that I am
presently proud to work in, Central Command, in cooperation
with Southern--Special Operations Command, are doing a lot of
work to keep the terrorists as an away game.
But as we start to develop indications that they could be
working toward the U.S., then it transitions to a strong
partnership from NORAD and NORTHCOM, with the law enforcement
agencies that would be responsible, along with the Department
of Homeland Security, to building that barrier from them
actually entering the United States.
Senator Scott. Thank you. What additional authorities or
resources do you anticipate needing to defend our Homeland?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator at this time, I do not
know of any, but I pledge to the Committee that if I am
confirmed within 90 days, I will have completed a full
assessment of all the people, the mission and the resourcing,
to include authorities associated with NORAD and NORTHCOM. I
will make it very clear in that assessment if there are any
authorities that I need.
Senator Scott. Thank you. In October 2018, the Department
of Defense deployed 5,200 troops to the Southern border in
response to migrant caravans. Currently, the Biden
Administration has authorized a maximum of 2,500 troops in the
Southwest border to support operations.
The past year--has continued to witness a surge in migrant
encounters, has made--there is about, you know, 1.5 million
getaways, some of them possibly terrorists. Would you first
off, agree there is a crisis at the border?
Would you assess that there is a drug smuggling emergency
at the Southern border? What role do you anticipate NORTHCOM
playing in addressing this emergency?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I think border
security is National Security, and that would be the number one
priority for me, if I am confirmed as the Commander of NORAD
and NORTHCOM. As for the drugs and the efforts of the
transnational criminal organizations, that is a problem that is
acute.
It is significant and it is extremely serious, and it falls
into the same responsibility that I just mentioned.
Senator Scott. Thank you. General Whiting, congratulations.
You have a base named after you in Florida already. You have
done really well. Do you believe that delaying the Space
Command headquarters decision has affected readiness?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, that decision needs to
be made so that we can decide where that is going to go and
place it. I think until now, that headquarters has been
maturing from what I have seen, but a decision is needed.
Senator Scott. So, what are the biggest challenges SPACECOM
is facing in addressing threats in space over the next 2 years?
How do you plan to address them? Have you spent any time
thinking about what happens when we--when they start, you know,
whatever adversary starts shooting up satellites and we get all
the debris going there--and how it is going to impact our
communication?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, the answer to those
two questions are related. The number one thing we need to
continue to build out is our space domain awareness capability.
We have the best in the world and the world looks to us, but we
have to continue to improve that to maintain custody of the
threats we now see.
Senator, we want to avoid a future in which we do see that
proliferation of debris because of anti-satellite capabilities.
But if that were to happen, it would be our responsibility to
quickly track that debris cloud and make sure we are providing
warning to those individuals, units, companies that own those
satellites so that we can mitigate that debris.
But we do not want to see that happen, which is why we must
deter that from happening.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator
Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. General
Guillot, General VanHerck has stated that our country is under
attack every single day in the information and cyber domain.
Our critical infrastructure providers on which we rely to
execute NORTHCOM's mission are key targets for threat actors.
How do you envision coordinating with both DHS and CISA to
protect our critical infrastructure? Can I have your commitment
to directly collaborate with them and other sector management
agencies in order to protect critical infrastructure, ensure
you can execute your mission, and will you report back to this
Committee if you encounter issues in that effort?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator, you have my
commitment not only to work in the manner that you described,
but also to report back.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you have any ideas about what--how
you will implement that coordination?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I would like to first
get to know all the counterparts. As you mentioned, there are
several that have overlapping responsibility for protecting
defense critical infrastructure.
I would work very closely with Cyber Command Commander, if
I am confirmed, as well as Department of Homeland Security,
FBI, and a number of others. But more than just meeting them
and talking to them, I would like to propose with them a series
of high level, tabletop exercises that really push and pull at
the seams of where one's authorities may start and another
agency's may stop, because there is a lot of gray area in
critical infrastructure.
If it is owned and operated by DOD, if it has heavy DOD
influence, and our mission. I think that we need to have a
strong--exercises and discussions that are really going to pull
those seams to ensure that they can hold during a crisis.
Senator Gillibrand. I would urge you to do those tabletop
exercises. We do tabletop exercises with regard to China, with
regard to Taiwan, but the scenario of the first 3 months of
that is almost all cyber.
So, I want to know what you are going to do every day
during that first 3 months, because it is not kinetic activity
that you are going to be managing. It is going to be how do we
make sure we can do the work we need to do if things escalate.
So, it is really important.
Lieutenant General Guillot. I agree.
Senator Gillibrand. I am grateful that you are focused on
that. We have talked in the hearing about domain awareness.
One of our biggest challenges in domain awareness is the
space between commercial airspace and space. We saw that with
the Chinese spy balloon. So, I think having domain awareness
and focusing on how you are going to increase your domain
awareness so that our pilots can operate safely, so that we
understand if we are being spied upon by adversaries, is
essential.
In that regard, can I have your commitment to collaborate
with Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick and the all Domain Anomaly Resolution
Office to ensure that they have what they need to identify and
resolve reports of UAPs in U.S. airspace?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, you have my
commitment. I read a little about AARO. I know that General
VanHerck is consulting with him, and I look forward to the
opportunity.
Senator Gillibrand. Undersea domain awareness is also
critical for our national defense. Recent public reporting
indicates that the Russian Navy is repainting its ships to
confuse or fool tracking systems that rely on artificial
intelligence. If confirmed, will you help this Committee
understand the complexity of ongoing threats and the ways that
developing technology can help or hinder our defense systems?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator, you have my
commitment.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. General Whiting, the PLA's,
``lectures on the science of space operations,'' its authors
describe an overawing space strike that includes both a soft
strike option focused on information attacks, EM spectrum
operations, cyber-attacks, and hard strike options that involve
strikes against vulnerable enemy positions.
From your perspective, what are the miscalculation risks
when a country's space studies documents include the execution
of offensive strikes as part of their deterrence options, and
how does this impact your thinking about the resiliency of the
systems that would be under your Command?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, thank you for that
question. Of course, when we see those kinds of writings, we
have to take them at their word that that is potentially within
their plans. So, deterrence is built upon a framework of,
number one, we must have capabilities that deny potential
adversaries the benefits of such an attack.
Second, we must have capabilities that allow us to impose
costs in response to such an attack. Then finally, that we have
to clearly communicate that. So, I support the effort of the
Space Force to re-architect our current satellite
constellations to be more resilient against those attacks.
But we also need those range of options so that we can
bring intel, cyber, offense, defense, Command and control,
joint fires together to also hold at risk those space
capabilities of potential adversaries.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Last month, SPACECOM
announced its authority to conduct missile defense led to some
confusion about NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and SPACECOM's different
but related responsibilities to conduct homeland missile
defense.
If confirmed, will--you will be responsible for operating
the missile warning satellites, while General Guillot will be
responsible for warning America's leaders in the event of a
missile threat. Can you commit to work to ensure that
SPACECOM's and NORAD's systems will be integrated and that you
will work closely together to protect National Security?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, Senator, I commit to that.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Congratulations
to both of you, Generals, and your families. Thank you for
being here. Thank you for your willingness to step in the gap
and into these very important positions.
Since we have been talking a lot about domain awareness, I
am going to just stay with the theme, but maybe get a little
bit specific. My first question is one that I didn't come in
here anticipating, but I think is relevant, and probably start
with you, General Whiting.
Over the last several years, we have had a lot of
discussion and obviously noticed that the Air Force has been
shedding quite successfully a lot of its legacy ISR, airborne
ISR missions and equipment to afford new stuff. Makes perfect
sense.
My concern has been that while they live with and plan for
the promise of space being able to handle ISR for the Combatant
Commanders wherever they may be, whether it is the Southern
border or CENTCOM, you name it, that a gap could very well
occur where there won't be adequate ISR.
Presuming for a moment that space can do that at some
point, what is your comfort level that space can unilaterally
handle that type of ISR that today Global Hawks and others, the
MQ-9 and others are able to provide?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, Senator, thank you for
that question. Space--I start from space brings us untold
advantages. For example, satellites as they orbit the earth,
don't go through sovereign airspace.
We can freely overfly any point of the Earth and get
those--you know, get that intelligence that we need. I think it
is a layered need for systems as we move forward. There will be
need for ground based ISR capabilities, sea based, air based,
and space based.
But I am supportive of doing the reviews to move as much to
space as we can, while leveraging the unique attributes that
the other domains can bring as well.
Senator Cramer. Very good. Thank you. Since you brought up
layers, I am going to ask about the Space Development Agency's,
you know, tracking layer program that is going to be operated
out of the Grand Forks Air Force Base.
First of all, are both of you familiar with it, and how do
you see--I will start with you, General Guillot, NORTHCOM,
NORAD integrating SDA into your awareness?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, as you alluded to,
domain awareness, certainly in the sensing grid, takes a
variety of sensors. I look forward to bringing those in, that
capability, as well as the space based, long term persistence
that General Whiting mentioned for space, to complement the
other terrestrial systems that we are using now or bringing
online here in the near future.
Senator Cramer. So, bringing up one more legacy domain
awareness that I am familiar with--of course, we are very
pleased with the legacy of the PARCS radar at the Cavalier Air
Force, or Space Force Station now.
I will look forward to having you up there sometime after
your confirmed, which I am confident will be soon. But maybe
each of you could share a little bit about the importance of
that PARCS radar over the years and decades.
Of course, it has expanded its role from missile defense,
or missile awareness to space obviously, just monitoring large
stuff in space. But that is one of those legacy systems that we
don't know the lifespan of.
What are the modernization opportunities, efforts. I would
just be interested in both of your opinions on PARCS and its
importance, and how we can extend it.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, PARCS at Cavalier is
an essential part of the NORAD sensing grid that we have been
talking about, and specifically it provides the integrated
tactical warning and attack assessment capability for the NORAD
Commander to use to decide if a threat is a threat to North
America.
So, upgrading that radar and several just like it that we
have across the network is extremely important to complement
the new systems that are coming in to make sure that that
sensing grid can reach out and get all types of threats, in all
domains Generally.
Senator Cramer. General Whiting.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, just building on that,
I have had the good fortune to visit Cavalier multiple times
over my career. I was just there last September, and General
Guillot mentioned, it is vital to our missile warning
capabilities.
But as you alluded to, it is also vital to our space domain
awareness capabilities. Its unique position pointing North
allows it to see all of our polar orbiting or all polar
orbiting objects.
So, it is just absolutely critical for us, given its unique
location and capabilities, and I expect we will continue to
need that going forward.
Senator Cramer. Well, thank you to both of you, and I am
not going to test you the way that Senator Sullivan did, but we
do think there are some other states that could be important to
an Arctic mission as well. But we are all for Alaska, too.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair--Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator
Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Madam Chair. Thank you to you
both for your service, and to your families as well. You are
both graduates of the Air Force Academy, both class of 1989.
You must have been an outstanding class. You must have known
each other there, correct?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Known each other a long time.
Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. You have known each other since then
and worked together, so congratulations to you both.
I want to talk a little bit about artificial intelligence.
I am learning about the immense and in many ways uncertain,
unknown capabilities of AI in so many different areas, whether
it is medicine or environmental concerns, talking about the
military, particularly in space.
I wonder if each of you could share your thoughts about how
you think AI will impact the challenges and work ahead for each
of you.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, from a NORAD and
NORTHCOM position, if I am confirmed, I look forward to using
artificial intelligence to make what we do really well now,
even better, maybe even easier, and certainly faster.
I have seen in my current Command under some of the
initiatives that General Kurilla has undertaken, where we take
a situational awareness of software, but using artificial
intelligence that can help us find equipment, pieces, targets
that the naked eye would take a long time to find, cue us in,
and then with the combination of a human on top of the loop,
very quickly make an assessment if there is a target there.
The speed with which that improves our ability is just
phenomenal. Applying another artificial intelligence and
machine learning capability to the NORAD, NORTHCOM realm that,
if confirmed, I would like to see is a program called
Pathfinder, which takes radar data that is considered
cluttered, that our radars see and throws aside so it doesn't
confuse the operator, it can--those machine learning and
artificial intelligence can go through there and find valid
tracks that we might otherwise be overlooking that could be a
threat to our Homeland.
We have used, with NORAD and NORTHCOM's permission, we have
used those algorithms in the Middle East and run some of the
one way attack that we have had in Iraq and Syria, taken our
radar files, run it through that algorithm, and we have been
able to see the UAVs that attacked our positions that we
couldn't see real time.
So that is a couple of examples of ways that I would like
to use artificial intelligence and machine learning to enhance
the NORAD, NORTHCOM mission, if I am confirmed.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, similarly, we have
missions that are very data rich. For example, our space domain
awareness. We get tens upon tens of thousands of data points
and tracks and observations per day.
Today it takes our humans kind of slogging through all of
that to find what is most important, where the threats, how do
we maintain custody.
But artificial intelligence and machine learning can help
do that for us so we can stop the humans doing the rote work
and elevate them to the more higher cognitive work, to focus on
those threats and what should we be doing about them.
So, it is an important capability for us, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. The work that you have described is in
very simplistic layman's terms, screening of information, and
in effect, organizing it, making use of, as you say, reams of
data.
Do you anticipate at some point turning decisions over to
artificial intelligence? In other words, there has been
discussion about how decisionmaking by artificial intelligence
could be made autonomous. That machine learning could be in
control more than it is now.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I will certainly look
at that in the future, but at this time I do not see a place
where we would take the human off the loop of an important
decision. I think it is much better to use those tools to help
us with our decisionmaking and keep the human on a loop.
Senator Blumenthal. I agree. General.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I agree with that as
well, that right now our people are still vital for our
decisionmaking and we want to make sure that any decisions we
do contemplate perhaps looking at machines to make--that that
is all done in concert with the Department of Defense's ethical
AI guidelines.
Senator Blumenthal. I think that AI is going to
revolutionize a lot of what we do in civilian life. Likewise,
in military work, and I do think at the same time, it is
important to have controls, countermeasures, and ethical
standards that apply.
That is why I actually propose an independent entity or
body that would establish some rules and guardrails. It is a
bipartisan effort, and I hope that the military leaders like
yourself will be a part of it. Thank you so much.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Guillot,
first of all, I want to thank you for your service to this
Nation and congratulate you on your nomination to be the next
Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD.
General Whiting, I would also like to thank you for your
service to our Nation and congratulate you on your nomination
to be the next Commander of SPACECOM. I would also like to say
thank you to your families as well.
As you noted, when you have to move, the family moves with
you, or when you are deployed and they are not with you, that
is a sacrifice which they also make, and I would like to thank
your families as well for their service to our country.
General Guillot and General Whiting, as you know, I have
asked every single Combatant Commander this question with
regard to the spectrum. There has been an attempt lately to
perhaps sell or auction portions of the S-band, the 3.1 to 3.45
gigahertz portion of the spectrum, which is one which I believe
to be critical for our national defense.
But I have asked this, and so far I have had no one
disagree with me that has been in front of this Committee. But
I am going to ask both of you, please, how serious is the need
for us to be able to maintain control of the 3.1 to 3.45
gigahertz portion of the spectrum? How do you view that in your
job?
Are you aware of the different types of uses for that
portion of the spectrum in the defense of our country? I will
begin with General Guillot.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I am keenly aware of
the impact that losing or sharing the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
range of the spectrum would bring to the homeland defense
mission.
For example, three of the key capabilities that, if
confirmed, I would rely upon for homeland defense, AWACS, the
AEGIS cruisers, and the new long range discrimination radar,
which is critical to defeating the North Korean ballistic
missile threat, all operate in that range.
While I understand that there is a study ongoing, and I
look forward to seeing the results of that study, and at that
time, I will make my final recommendations.
My initial position is that it would have a very
significant and damaging effect on homeland defense to either
lose or have to share that range.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Whiting.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, I completely agree with
General Guillot that if the study comes back and says that
there will be an impact, we absolutely cannot have a loss of
operational capability and we need to make sure that that
doesn't happen.
Senator Rounds. Are you aware--if our adversaries could
choose a portion of the spectrum that would impact our national
defense, would this be one of those areas that they would love
to see us have a reduction in our capabilities in terms of
their ability to find ways to aggressively get into the North
American air defense area?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, our adversaries are
very good at knowing what parts of the spectrum we rely upon
and trying to take that away from us, so it would not surprise
me at all.
Senator Rounds. General Whiting.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, I agree with that.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me ask also, just with
regard to cyber and the need for cyber protection, what do you
think is the greatest threat that you see with regard to
NORTHCOM and the use of cyber activity or the aggressive cyber
activities that some of our adversaries are using right now?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I think the threat,
the cyber threat to NORTHCOM is the most present and persistent
threat that we see today.
I have spoken about the totality of the threats in all
domains and all avenues of approach, which is certainly the
largest concern that I have, if I were to take Command of NORAD
and NORTHCOM upon confirmation. However, the threat that we see
today and the most persistent is in cyber.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Whiting, same question.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, sir. For the Space
enterprise, Senator, the most pressing cyber threats come from
state--you know, competitors like the PRC, Russia, Iran, North
Korea.
They would rather take us on in the cyber domain than try
to take us on physically in the space domain, although
certainly the PRC and Russia have proven they can do that,
because it is cheaper for them, and it is harder for us to
attribute.
So, we must build out our cyber defenses across our space
enterprise to protect that soft underbelly from allowing cyber
to deny that capability.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you both for your service,
and we look forward to working with you in the future. Thank
you, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator
Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Whiting,
in speaking in support of DEI initiatives, General Brown said
that ``there is still a lot to do because this is a cultural
shift. This isn't something you can get done in just a couple
of years.'' Do you believe that General Brown should be
relieved of his Command because of those statements?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, no, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. General Milley, in speaking in support of
DEI initiative, said, ``it is diversity to improve the system,
improve the military, improve our problem solving capabilities,
and improve our war fighting readiness in order to protect and
defend the Constitution.
That is why it is so important, so fundamental, that we
have this as one of our elements as we move forward to continue
to develop the Joint Force.'' Do you believe General Milley
should be relieved of his Command?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, no, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. Do you believe that that is a partisan--do
you believe that is partisan political speech?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, no, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier said our
DEI industry and trainings we are receiving in the military via
the industry are rooted in critical race theory, which is
rooted in Marxism. He was relieved of his Command for those
statements, correct?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, that is correct.
Senator Schmitt. By you, right?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, there were other
comments regarding specific political parties that are in
addition to what you just quoted.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, this was from the podcast which was
cited by you. So, I am asking, is opposition to DEI partisan
political speech?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, no, it is not, unless
it advocates for a specific political party or a candidate.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, I would agree with that, but
Lieutenant--so your testimony today is Lieutenant Colonel
Lohmeier was relieved for something other than these statements
on the podcast, or was that part of your consideration?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, it involved a specific
quote involving a specific political party.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. In his free time or on duty, or
what----
Lieutenant General Whiting. It was on a podcast where he
associated himself or he identified himself as an Active Duty
Space Force officer and Commander.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. On that--so there were other
comments that, other than this one I read to you about DEI----
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I think that podcast
was about an hour long.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, we will followup with some of
our questions. I guess I want to ask you, do you support DEI
initiatives in the military?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I support a ready,
lethal force that draws from the best talent all across
America.
Senator Schmitt. That is not my question. I support that,
too. But that is not what DEI is. DEI is rooted in cultural
Marxism. So, I am asking you, do you support DEI initiatives in
the military?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I support a merit
based approach to finding the best people across----
Senator Schmitt. That is not DEI either. So, do you support
DEI initiatives in the military?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, based on how it is
defined, I want to find the best people across--anywhere in
this country, geographically or any demographic, who can
support the defense of this----
Senator Schmitt. Do you believe that our brave military men
and women should be pitted against one another based solely on
their race?
Lieutenant General Whiting. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Schmitt. Do you believe, or do you accept the
proposition that General Brown, in his August 2022 memo, that
we should have racial quotas with officer class?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I am not aware that
General Brown has said that.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, if General Brown said that we should
have a reduction in the number of white officers serving to 67
percent of officers down from whatever, I think it is a total
of 5,400 officers, do you support that?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Senator, I support that
promotion should be based on merit.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. So, you don't support the idea that
we would have racial quotas for the officer class?
Lieutenant General Whiting. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. I do want to ask you also, what role
do you think DEI--what is your experience? What--firsthand for
you, what have you in these trainings, what have you seen? What
have been the trainings that have taken place? I am not talking
about reaching for the best and the brightest. I want to
understand, because we have a military recruitment problem,
right.
So, the issue, I think, is if people view, and this is
coming from the Department of Defense and it has been widely
talked about in this Committee, if people view that politics is
being infused in our military, do you think that that would
hurt recruitment?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, I do, and I think the
military must be rigorously apolitical and nonpartisan.
Senator Schmitt. All right. Do think infusing abortion
politics into our military hurts our recruiting?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, we in the military should
not be partisan or political.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Do you think infusing COVID politics
into our military hurts our recruiting? Meaning, do you think
that people should have been fired for not getting the vaccine?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, we were required to uphold
a legal order.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Do you think we should actively
recruit those 8,500 people who were fired for not getting the
vaccine?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Sir, I would like to see those
individuals who can come back, apply to come back. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. You think we should recruit them to come
back?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, and then do you believe that the--
are you familiar with the August memo of 2022 from General
Brown?
Lieutenant General Whiting. I am not, sir.
Senator Schmitt. Okay, we will--then some followup
questions, ask you your points of view on that.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Senator Mullin.
Senator Mullin. Thank you. For those that are here and
thank you for the family that has come along and supported--
supported these two Generals here along the way. It is a family
affair, and I said this multiple times that, you know, no one
can do their job at their best ability if things at home are
rocky.
So those that are home, that is building that solid
foundation for these Generals and others that are serving to be
at their best. I want to thank you for that and thank you for
the time that you have packed the houses, moved, and still held
the family together. It is a sacrifice for the entire family,
and from the deepest part of my heart, I want to tell you thank
you so much for that. I am going to be pretty quick here just
because we are running every which way direction right now.
So, I have just got questions for Guillot. General, as you
know, obviously, you have spent time at Tinker, which we
appreciate that. It is obviously something I am very proud to
build, to represent. I would like to ask your best military
advice on issues you know from your time at Tinker Air Force
Base and your long career in the air battle management.
The Air Force is in the process of divesting in the E-3
fleet and switching to the E-7. The timeline as it stands now
has us totally divesting the E-3 by fiscal year 2029, and at
that time, I believe we are only going to have five E-7 on
platforms. Are we concerned about the mission capabilities and
the gap that might be taking place at that point?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, thanks for mentioning
my time at Tinker. I had three assignments there and love the
base, the people, and the mission, and the E-3, I have a lot of
experience in the E-3 all over the world. Great capability, but
it does need to be replaced by the E-7. I appreciate the Air
Force and Congress's help in doing that.
The gap that you mentioned is similar to the ballistic
missile defense gap that we have talked about. It has to be
managed very, very carefully.
So if I am confirmed as the Commander of NORAD and
NORTHCOM, that is a key system--not necessarily the E-3, but
the airborne early warning capability, whether it is the E-3 or
the E-7, would be critical and I would be very vocal about the
requirements and to ensure that we don't drop in capability and
create a bathtub that would keep us from doing that job before
the new system comes on.
Senator Mullin. At the current prediction--prediction--
current rate to which we are going. Sorry, I didn't have my
coffee this morning. At the current rate that we are headed
right now, we have seen that there will be a gap.
Senator Lankford and myself have an amendment in the NDAA
that hopefully is going to be helpful to fulfilling the mission
while we are making the transition to the E-7, and I agree, the
E-3 is--had a wonderful shelf life and it has performed this
mission well, and we do need to upgrade, especially for the new
threats that are facing us.
But we want to make sure that we are not, you know, hurting
ourselves for National Security purposes on the way out the
door. At the same time, we don't want to do something that the
Air Force isn't on track with too.
You know, a lot of times as legislators, we have great
ideas, but it is not practical. We want to make sure the
amendment we have is actually practical. So, I would love for
you to followup.
If you are not familiar with the amendment, take a look at
it, because it is moving now, and so, we make sure that we are
doing what is mission capable and what you think would be best
in line with you too, right.
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator. I will do that.
Senator Mullin. With that, I yield back. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kelly. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, congratulations on your
nominations and thank you for your lifetime of service. Thanks
to your families for your service and support to your missions
as well. General Guillot, you believe that as part of--part of
your mission as NORTHCOM Commander is airspace control over the
continental United States, correct?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Domestically, there are reports of over 57
drone incursions over nuclear sites since 2015 and at least 510
unidentified aerial objects reports since 2004, centered around
restricted and sensitive airspace, with around half of those
reported in the last 2 years. How do you view NORTHCOM's role
in defense against the threat from such unmanned aerial
vehicles?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, it is a role, to my
understanding, that NORAD and NORTHCOM share with the services
that have been delegated authorities around their installations
to protect those. Then the NORAD responsibility picks up
Generally in the airspace structure above those facilities.
Senator Cotton. Okay. I don't want to go into depth
rehashing the Chinese balloon incident from earlier this year,
but in general, if a malign actor illegally flies an aircraft
over American territory with malign intent, do you believe that
we should shoot it down?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I absolutely believe
we should shoot it down if it has demonstrated hostile act or a
hostile intent.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Are you aware that there were more
than 10,000 violations of our airspace with drone aircraft
conducting intelligence operations last year? Given the threat,
we have seen that drones pose in Ukraine, increasingly in
Russia, how significant are your concerns about those
violations of our airspace?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I am very concerned
about any airspace violation. Certainly, the unmanned
capabilities that you are mentioning bring a new dimension that
we haven't had to see in the recent years. If I am confirmed,
that would take a great deal of my attention to address that.
Senator Cotton. Good. The vast majority of those incursions
were conducted by Mexican cartels in support of drug smuggling
activities. In fact, the U.S. Border Patrol chief has said that
we don't have operational control of the Southern border.
Given how drones are now being used in Ukraine, and in
Russia, how do you view the loss of operational control on our
Southern border and the failure to establish airspace control
as a threat there to our ability to defend our Homeland and our
people?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I know it sounds
trite, but I firmly believe that border security is National
Security. If I am confirmed, the number one priority I would
have is to defend the Homeland, and certainly border security
is at the top of that. So, I would be very concerned about any
loss of sovereignty in the airspace or the ground of our
borders.
Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you for that. According to DHS
data, Customs and Border Protection encounter more than 100
Russians attempting to illegally enter the United States every
month near just a single location on the US-Mexico border.
Russian military intelligence has more officers deployed to
Mexico than any other country in the world.
The current NORTHCOM Commander has described China and
Russia as, ``very, very aggressive and active'' in NORTHCOM. We
have seen what happened with Chinese spy balloon.
We know that China is setting up shop in Cuba, which I
understand is technically not a part of your area of
responsibility, but it is pretty close. In the same way that
North Korea and China aren't a part of your area of
responsibility, but they project threats into that area.
How do you view these actions by Russia and China through
our South as a threat to our Homeland?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, I view the actions you
described as a very serious threat and one that, if confirmed,
I will watch very closely. As you alluded to, it is not just in
the air that NORAD and NORTHCOM protect the Homeland, but also
through all domains, including the ground.
Senator Cotton. Indeed. It is probably the case that
Aldrich Ames, for instance, was recruited by Russian
intelligence in Mexico City. We know it is a classic case that
Russians--Russian agents stuck an icepick into Trotsky's head
in Mexico.
So, again, that threat is genuine and real to the United
States. One final question, at least 98 terrorists were caught
on the Southern border last year, and that doesn't include any
potential got-aways that we don't know about.
General Kurilla said last year it was that it was his
Commander's estimate that ISIS-K could conduct an external
operation against the United States or Western interests abroad
in about 6 months, perhaps with little to no warning.
Two years ago, an Iraqi man in the United States hatched a
plot to bring ISIS operatives through our Southern border to
assassinate former President Bush.
Given your experience as the Deputy Commander in the Middle
East, can you draw upon that to help secure our Southern border
from terrorist attack and ensure it does not become yet a new
vector for attack?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Senator, if I am confirmed, I
absolutely will draw on the experiences from Central Command,
cooperation with Special Operations Command, and then new and
lasting relationships with law enforcement agencies here in the
Homeland to ensure that any of the threats that General Kurilla
is effectively addressing overseas do not make it to our
Homeland.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. Thank you for your
testimony. General Whiting, I know you are disappointed you
didn't get lots of hard questions from me, but maybe next time.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, General Guillot and General
Whiting, and congratulations on both of your nominations. Great
to see you and your families here. Hopefully, we can, you know,
get you through this process and get you into these important
positions.
You know, NORTHCOM and NORAD and United States Space
Command are so critical to our national defense. So, I look
forward to voting for your nomination in Committee and then
eventually on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Thank you, and this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Gregory
M. Guillot, USAF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?
Answer. I understand that the duties and functions of the Commander
of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) include defending the Homeland of
the United States, providing defense support of civil authorities, and
conducting security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas.
The Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated as the Department of
Defense Advocate for Arctic Capabilities.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?
Answer. I understand that the duties and functions of the Commander
of NORAD include providing aerospace warning, aerospace control, and
maritime warning for the United States and Canada. As stated in the bi-
national NORAD agreement, the chain of command for the NORAD Commander
includes both the President of the United States and the Prime Minister
of Canada.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have been honored to serve our Nation for over 34 years
as an officer in the U.S. Air Force, and I am humbled to be nominated
to be the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I have tremendous regard
for both commands and their vital, no-fail missions. If confirmed, I
will draw upon all my experiences to lead the men and women who provide
defense of our Homeland.
I am very fortunate that during my assignments I have gained
background and experience that directly relate to commanding USNORTHCOM
and NORAD. I currently serve as the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM). In many ways, the USCENTCOM mission is to conduct
the Homeland defense ``away game'' by removing threats to the United
States before they can strike within our borders. In this role, I see
daily the importance of executing tasks as outlined in the Unified
Command Plan (UCP) and coordinating with other combatant commands to
provide integrated deterrence and share vital resources. I also
coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on all matters of USCENTCOM operations. As the Deputy
Commander, I understand the importance of Congress' oversight role and
the need to keep Congress informed with timely and transparent
responses to requests for information, reports, and testimony.
I have a strong appreciation for the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions,
having flown NORAD missions for over 6 years during three operational
flying assignments. I also served as the USNORTHCOM Director of
Operations, where I directed the command's response to a wide range of
multi-domain threats to the U.S., including ballistic missile defense
of the Homeland and numerous actions by peer competitors that
challenged the security of the U.S. I also fully appreciate the
importance of the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission
as we executed responses to Hurricane Dorian, supported U.S. Customs
and Border Protection along the United States-Mexico border, and
support of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result,
I have a strong understanding of the need to build and maintain robust
relationships with Federal, State, and international partners, and the
importance of routinely updating Congress on matters of importance to
national security.
I have been fortunate to command at the squadron, group, wing, and
Numbered Air Force levels and to serve in a variety of Joint
assignments. My most recent command was 9th Air Force/Air Forces
Central Command, where I was responsible for all U.S. and Coalition
combat air operations in the Middle East. During this assignment, I was
responsible for ensuring the air defense of U.S. and Coalition
locations, a task that helped prepare me to command NORAD's complex air
defense mission, if confirmed. I also learned the value of gaining and
maintaining strong relationships with foreign military partners. This
experience will greatly benefit me if I am confirmed to serve as the
Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as working closely with military
leaders from Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas will be critical to
ensuring mission accomplishment across the wide spectrum of missions
for which USNORTHCOM is responsible.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. Northern Command and Commander, NORAD?
Answer. If confirmed, I will eagerly embrace expanding my knowledge
of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions and how the commands can better
coordinate, integrate, and cooperate with mission partners from other
combatant commands, the military Services, the U.S. interagency, and
foreign partners. I will maintain an open mind and seek thoughtful
insight from many sources, to include Congress, to honorably and
effectively carry out the duties of Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD.
relationship to other federal agencies and authorities
Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you
work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland
Security Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as State and
local authorities and representatives from the private sector?
Answer. Close collaboration and effective communication between
USNORTHCOM and its Federal, State, and local government partners is
critical, as is the command's relationship with the private sector. If
confirmed, I will establish direct relationships with my counterparts
from each of the Federal agencies to ensure trust is established before
a potential crisis, and I will direct the staff to do the same with
counterparts at their respective levels. I will continue to buildupon
the command's strong partnerships, including with the Department of
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, to ensure
USNORTHCOM remains ready to support DHS and other Federal partners as
directed.
Question. In your view, what is the app]ropriate role for the
military when supporting law enforcement in State or national
emergencies?
Answer. The military is in a unique position to provide support to
law enforcement agencies during emergencies due to its specialized
personnel, equipment, facilities, and training. However, such support
must always be consistent with the limitations established by Congress,
especially the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits direct military
involvement by Title 10 forces with civilian law enforcement.
Therefore, the proper role for the military when supporting law
enforcement is generally in a mission support role and not engaging in
direct law enforcement activities, unless lawfully directed to do so by
competent authority.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, U.S. Northern Command?
Answer. In my view, the next Commander of USNORTHCOM must be
prepared to defend the U.S. Homeland against all-domain threats in a
historically complex strategic environment. The People's Republic of
China (PRC) will remain the pacing threat for the foreseeable future
and the PRC will continue to develop increasingly advanced kinetic and
non-kinetic systems capable of holding U.S. territory and interests at
risk. The next commander must also deter and stand ready to defend the
United States against Russian aggression, as evidenced by Vladimir
Putin's blatant aggression against Ukraine, contempt for international
law, and pursuit of advanced long-range conventional and nuclear
missile technologies. A modern and effective Ballistic Missile Defense
System will remain necessary as North Korea continues to develop
increasingly advanced ICBM technology. NORAD and USNORTHCOM must
maintain vigilance against plots by Iran and Violent Extremist
Organizations. Meanwhile, the next commander must ensure the command
remains always ready to support civil authorities in response to
disasters and public health emergencies as directed by the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. Addressing these challenges will require USNORTHCOM and
NORAD to first continue to improve the capability to detect and respond
to potential threats. If confirmed, I will advocate to keep
modernization programs to improve USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to
detect threats on track. Additionally, I will conduct seamless
operations with fellow combatant commands, rapidly employ well-trained
and well-equipped forces to deter or defeat aggression, and routinely
communicate and operate with Federal and State partners. NORAD and
USNORTHCOM's record of success is due largely to its dedicated military
and civilian personnel, and if confirmed, I will also emphasize
recruiting and retaining the best possible workforce to execute the
commands' no-fail missions.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish as
Commander, U.S. Northern Command?
Answer. If confirmed as Commander of USNORTHCOM, I will establish
three priorities: defend the homeland; strengthen the network of
Federal, State, local, and international partners; and advance the
USNORTHCOM workforce. In support of these priorities, I will place
heavy emphasis on integrating globally, improving domain awareness,
achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority.
This operational approach to achieving my priorities requires advancing
the USNORTHCOM workforce with the skills, experience, professionalism,
and dedication already demonstrated daily by the men and women of
USNORTHCOM.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the State of NORTHCOM's
relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular,
and with Congress in general?
Answer. It is my understanding that USNORTHCOM has a strong,
trusted relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee and
Congress in general. If confirmed, I will ensure the command continues
to communicate frequently, openly, and candidly with the Senate Armed
Services Committee and Congress in order to maintain mutual trust and
understanding. I am mindful of, and strongly appreciate, Congress'
oversight role.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
NORTHCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to maintain a relationship of
mutual respect and trust between USNORTHCOM and Congress. To do so, I
will work closely with the Department to ensure all congressional
requests for information receive timely and accurate responses, and I
will provide forthright and candid assessments to Congress regarding
command missions, requirements, and challenges.
mission of northcom
Question. How do you define the mission of NORTHCOM?
Answer. As defined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), USNORTHCOM's
assigned missions are homeland defense; security cooperation with
Canada, The Bahamas, and Mexico; and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.
Question. How does NORTHCOM's mission relate to the mission of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including with regard to
homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)?
Answer. USNORTHCOM's homeland defense mission and DHS' homeland
security and domestic law enforcement responsibilities are necessarily
distinct, but they are complementary. Cooperation between USNORTHCOM
and DHS is critical to the national security of the United States, as
USNORTHCOM routinely provides defense support to DHS operations,
including the DHS mission along the U.S.--Mexico border. USNORTHCOM
also routinely supports DHS disaster relief operations in the United
States through Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). To ensure
collaborative responses that are effective and timely, USNORTHCOM and
DHS routinely plan, exercise, and operate together, and each
organization has senior liaison officers permanently assigned to the
other's headquarters. If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM
strengthens its already close relationship with DHS.
Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the
military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive
branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays
a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
Answer. The United States Constitution establishes civilian control
of the military as a bedrock principle of our democracy and a shared
responsibility of all three branches of government. As a military
officer, I have repeatedly sworn, and always adhered to, an oath to
support and defend the Constitution. While the President serves as
Commander-in-Chief with operational control of the military, Congress
has substantial authorities that enhance civilian control of the
military, including authorizing and appropriating funds, establishing
rules and regulations, and the power to authorize the use of force.
Additionally, the Senate advises and consents to the promotion of field
grade officers and above, as well as senior-level civilian appointees.
Additionally, Congress conducts oversight of the military and can
compel testimony.
Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and
defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the
responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian
leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political
priorities?
Answer. My obligation to give my best military advice to civilian
leadership is rooted in my oath to support and defend the Constitution.
It is my responsibility to provide the Chairman of the Joints Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States
my candid and unvarnished views, informed by operational realities, to
assist in the development of directives and operational direction,
regardless of political priorities or established military positions.
Civilian leaders are free to incorporate all, some, or none of my
advice but my duty to the Constitution is to provide it.
norad
Question. What is your understanding of the mission of NORAD?
Answer. I understand NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning,
aerospace control, and maritime warning in defense of North America.
These missions are codified in the bi-national NORAD agreement signed
by the governments of the United States and Canada.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to NORTHCOM's mission?
With Operation Noble Eagle?
Answer. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands with
complementary missions that are essential to the defense of the United
States and Canada. The ironclad relationship between NORAD and
USNORTHCOM and the connections between their missions are made evident
by the fact that seven of the eight NORAD and USNORTHCOM joint
directorates support both commands simultaneously.
Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) is a bi-national U.S.-Canadian air
homeland defense mission conducted by NORAD, USINDOPACOM and, when
necessary, USNORTHCOM within their respective areas of responsibility
(AOR). While USNORTHCOM is primarily in a supporting role to NORAD for
ONE missions within the USNORTHCOM AOR, those missions directly benefit
the USNORTHCOM homeland defense mission. Additionally, USNORTHCOM is
prepared to conduct U.S. unilateral, non-NORAD air operations as
directed. Command and control of ONE operations is conducted by the
NORAD and USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center, allowing real-time
coordination between NORAD and USNORTHCOM while ensuring alignment of
the commands' distinct roles and authorities.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, NORAD?
Answer. In my view, the major challenge that will face the next
Commander of NORAD is outpacing advanced peer competitors in order to
effectively detect and warn of threats to the United States and Canada
in the air and maritime domains and to defend against threats in the
air domain. The key to addressing these challenges will be improving
domain awareness and our ability to detect threats from wherever they
may emanate. The challenges facing NORAD are closely linked to those
facing USNORTHCOM. While NORAD maintains a distinct mission set from
USNORTHCOM, the two commands' highly complementary missions, shared
geographic boundaries, and the extraordinarily close working
relationship inside the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters--and between
the United States and Canada--means a challenge for one command is
often a challenge for the other.
Question. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a
combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command
center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?
Answer. As the former Director of Operations for USNORTHCOM, I saw
first-hand that maintaining a combined staff and Joint Operations
Center (JOC) is important to mission success for both commands and
leads to effective, efficient, and mutually beneficial operations.
Although executed through distinct authorities, the complementary
nature of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions, built on over two decades
of experience and cooperation, are highly beneficial to the defense of
North America.
Question. What is the relationship of the Commander of NORAD to the
Canadian component of NORAD, and what role does Canada play in NORAD
operations and planning?
Answer. Per the NORAD Agreement, if the Commander of NORAD is a
U.S. officer, the NORAD Deputy will be a Canadian officer. The NORAD
Commander reports to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and
to the Secretary of Defense regarding NORAD matters. Members of the
Canadian armed forces are fully integrated into the headquarters
operations and planning staff. The Canadian NORAD Region is a
subordinate NORAD organization and provides command and control of
NORAD air defense forces in Canada. Additionally, the Commander of
NORAD exercises operational control, as defined in the NORAD Agreement,
of Canadian armed forces at the discretion of the CDS.
2022 national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that one
of the Department's top priorities is ``Defending the Homeland, paced
to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the [People's Republic of
China]''. The NDS also emphasizes the importance of integrated
deterrence for aligning the Department's policies, resources, and
activities to strengthen deterrence and pursuing a coordinated,
holistic approach both within the Department and through the
interagency.
In your view, what are the major challenges for homeland defense as
the United States competes strategically with China, Russia and other
potential adversaries?
Answer. In my view, homeland defense is challenged by competitors'
rapid capability advances that threaten the homeland in multiple
domains and from multiple approaches. Further, these advances are
accompanied by a highly complex and rapidly shifting strategic
environment. As a result, emphasis must be placed on improving global
domain awareness; integrating homeland defense into global plans,
strategies, and exercises; and outpacing competitors through innovation
and rapid capability acquisition.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
have for how the DOD should prioritize homeland defense to meet current
and future challenges, including in cyberspace and space?
Answer. Homeland defense is the Department of Defense's (DOD)
number one priority per the National Defense Strategy, paced to the
growing multi-domain threat posed by the People's Republic of China. If
confirmed, I recommend the DOD, first and foremost, continue to develop
and invest in all domain awareness capabilities that will expand
leaders' decision space. I also recommend the DOD continue to invest in
command and control capabilities that will help achieve information
dominance and decision superiority. Finally, the Department must
increase resilience to ensure our ability to withstand, fight through,
and recover quickly from any disruption in any domain.
Question. What do you see as the role of NORTHCOM in an integrated
deterrence approach to implementing the NDS, both within the Department
and in coordination with other departments and agencies with a mission
of protecting the homeland?
Answer. Homeland defense is a whole-of-government effort to deter
attacks from adversaries in all domains. If confirmed, my role as the
Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM will be to lead the military portion
of the mission and to ensure those efforts are integrated globally,
including with other combatant commands, the interagency, and allies
and partners. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will be most effective when
executing with other elements; they are one piece of the U.S.
Government's wider efforts to ensure our Nation remains safe and
secure.
Integrated Deterrence requires all-domain awareness and information
dominance. This allows the DOD to anticipate competitor actions and
track them globally, enabling the U.S. to generate appropriate response
options. Integrated Deterrence requires the DOD to achieve decision
superiority over competitors in order to preserve decision space and
create options for our national leaders.
force protection within northcom area of responsibility (aor)
Question. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's responsibility
for force protection and antiterrorism within its AOR?
Answer. USNORTHCOM's primary mission is to protect the Homeland,
which requires increased focus on force protection and antiterrorism to
ensure the safety and security of DOD critical infrastructure,
personnel, information, and strategic resources. The Commander of
USNORTHCOM is responsible for setting the FPCON (force protection
condition) level for the CONUS (to include the National Capital
Region), and Alaska, and also for United States installations in Canada
and The Bahamas. This responsibility requires USNORTHCOM to constantly
coordinate with law enforcement and the Intelligence Community to
identify and pre-empt potential attacks. If confirmed, I will buildupon
the existing relationships with force protection mission partners to
enhance information sharing and employ the DOD Force Protection
Condition system to continuously tailor the security posture to deter
and, if necessary, defend against current and anticipated threats.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate
force protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges
do you anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM's AOR?
Answer. I believe the greatest challenges to force protection we
currently face in the Homeland are the emerging technologies that
increase both the scope and speed of threat capabilities. The challenge
of identifying potential threat actors before they can conduct an
attack or commit other acts of coercion and aggression requires
effective integration with others whom share the responsibility for
force protection. USNORTHCOM must also maintain persistent engagement
with the Intelligence Community, counterintelligence, and law
enforcement at all levels to improve our threat detection capabilities
and mitigation options while simultaneously protecting civil liberties.
USNORTHCOM will continue to explore technological solutions and partner
with industry to identify new threat vectors and the means to both
identify and effectively counter them.
force allocation for northcom
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of how forces
are allocated or planned to be allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range
of mission requirements?
Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM requests forces through the Global
Force Management process. USNORTHCOM has only a small number of
permanently assigned forces and relies on requests for forces through
the Joint Staff or as directed by the Secretary of Defense in order to
meet the command's mission requirements. If confirmed, I will submit
requests for forces based on mission requirements and will accompany
those requests with a risk assessment.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM
will have sufficient forces available to it that are properly trained
and equipped to accomplish its assigned missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military Service Chiefs through the
Global Force Management process to ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM's
mission requirements and risk are well understood. I will work closely
and collaboratively with the military to assist them in their mission
to man, train, and equip forces ready to take on the challenges of
today's operational environment in the USNORTHCOM AOR.
Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel,
equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and
Reserve) that are apportioned or assigned for the homeland defense
mission-essential tasks in support of NORTHCOM's contingency plans and
for its DSCA missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use Defense Readiness Reporting System
(DRRS) to assess the readiness of forces assigned, apportioned, or
allocated to support USNORTHCOM's homeland defense and DSCA missions,
as well as contingency plans. I will work with the Joint Staff and
Service Chiefs to address and mitigate any potential readiness
shortfalls identified. Once forces are assigned, I will require
commanders to sustain force readiness while conducting the tasked
operations and identify when or if readiness in specific mission areas
cannot be maintained and recommend appropriate measures to mitigate
those impacts.
northcom defense support to civil authorities mission
Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to
provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) when directed by
the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence
management operations.
What is your understanding and assessment of NORTHCOM's awareness
of and coordination for the support of the emergency response
capabilities and contingency plans of civil authorities, including the
states and territories, before a crisis arises?
Answer. I understand that USNORTHCOM continually participates in a
wide variety of engagements, educational forums, and training events
with Federal, State, local, and tribal partners to be ready for a
variety of scenarios. At the operational and tactical field level,
USNORTHCOM employs Defense Coordination Officers (DCO), Defense
Coordination Elements (DCE), and Joint Regional Medical Planning
Officers (JRMPO) aligned with each of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regions. These elements routinely coordinate,
collaborate, plan, and exercise with agency partners to maintain
communication and common understanding of requirements and
capabilities. Finally, numerous civil Federal agency representatives
have liaisons embedded in the USNORTHCOM headquarters, while USNORTHCOM
has senior level staff officers assigned to several Federal agencies to
increase understanding of DOD capabilities.
Question. In your view, does NORTHCOM's plans, policies, and
programs optimize the Defense Department's consequence management
support to civil authorities?
Answer. I know providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) has been a high priority USNORTHCOM mission for many years. The
command takes great pride in assisting Federal partners and American
communities in times of need, and lessons learned indicate the plans,
policies, and programs are strong. If confirmed, I will carefully
assess the plans, programs, and policies associated with the USNORTHCOM
DSCA mission and take any steps needed to ensure the command is always
prepared to provide the most effective and efficient support to the
command's partners.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that NORTHCOM has
sufficient knowledge of State and inter-State emergency response
capabilities, including capabilities of National Guard units,
capabilities of title 10 regular and Reserve component forces, and a
good working relationship with State emergency response leaders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the longstanding practice of
maintaining liaison officers from the Active and Reserve components in
the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters in order to maintain knowledge of
State and inter-State response capabilities. We will conduct routine
planning and exercising with partners at every level, hosting
conferences and other events to strengthen personal relationships
between the commands and their partners. Effort will be place on
improving programs that strengthen communication and collaboration
between NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and all of the commands' total force and
interagency partners, to include State emergency response leaders.
Question. How does the Department of Defense's assistance to DHS
and other civilian agencies affect readiness? Are there steps that you
would recommend, if confirmed, to mitigate any harm to readiness
stemming from these deployments?
Answer. In certain circumstances, deployments in support of the
Department's assistance to DHS can enhance readiness for certain
occupational specialties, while in other cases it may detract from
individual and unit readiness. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Joint Staff, the military, and the commanders of forces allocated
to USNORTHCOM to assess impacts to force readiness associated with the
execution of missions assigned to USNORTHCOM and implement appropriate
measures to mitigate those impacts.
process for addressing dsca requests and funding
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the policies
and procedures by which Federal civil authorities, states, and
territories request, employ, and fund DSCA, including with respect to
reimbursement of the Defense Department for such operations?
Answer. It is my understanding that states and territories request
Defense Support of Civil Authorities through a lead Federal agency
under the authorities provided by the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act
authorizes Governors and emergency management officials to request
support from a lead Federal agency as needed to safeguard life and
property in the event of a disaster. In turn, Federal agencies may then
request further assistance and capabilities from the DOD in support of
a collaborative Federal response.
While I understand reimbursement for incurred expenses is managed
at the Department level, I believe the Economy Act authorizes DOD to
provide support to a lead Federal agency in certain circumstances.
Based on my previous experience as the USNORTHCOM Director of
Operations, examples of qualifying events include National Special
Security Events such as national political conventions or major sports
events. At a local level, U.S. military units are also authorized to
provide temporary direct assistance to local communities in the event
of a disaster using Immediate Response Authority.
Question. If confirmed, what policy or procedural changes would you
propose, if any, for the processes for requesting, employing, and
determining funding sources for DSCA?
Answer. Providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a
critically important mission that has repeatedly delivered significant
positive benefits for the Nation. While USNORTHCOM does not have a role
in determining funding sources for DSCA, if confirmed, I will advocate
for processes that preserve USNORTHCOM's ability to provide rapid and
effective support to the command's civilian partners.
dsca on the southwest border
Question. At the request of the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Defense continues to provide a mix of Active Duty and
National Guard units, and other capabilities, to support U.S. Customs
and Border Protection activities along the southwest border.
What is your assessment of the security situation along the United
States-Mexico border?
Answer. Security of the United States-Mexico border is of
significant importance to the United States and, as directed by
appropriate authorities, USNORTHCOM is providing support to the DHS
mission. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DHS to assess the
security situation along the United States-Mexico border. Part of that
assessment will be determining whether USNORTHCOM support to Federal
and international partners is being optimized.
Question. What are the appropriate roles and missions for the
National Guard units and active duty units, in support of DHS,
including Customs and Border Protection, and its border patrol mission?
Answer. I understand that, in response to a request for assistance
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Secretary of
Defense has approved support to Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
operations on the United States-Mexico border by United States military
personnel. I further understand that, in accordance with the DHS
request for assistance, U.S. military personnel are not engaged in
direct law-enforcement activities, but provide support that includes
aviation support, transportation of CBP personnel, mobile surveillance
camera operators, and intelligence administrative support. As I
understand them, I believe these roles and missions are appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you anticipate
making to your chain of command, if any, to make DOD's support mission
at the southwest border more effective?
Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately and carefully assess
USNORTHCOM's support of the Department of Homeland Security mission
along the United States-Mexico border and work closely with DOD and the
lead Federal agency to ensure that support is as effective as possible.
counter-drug and counter-transnational organized crime authorities and
programs
Question. The Director of National Intelligence's Annual Threat
Assessment for 2023 found that Western Hemisphere-based transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs), and Mexican TCOs in particular, endanger
the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens through the
production and trafficking of illegal drugs bound for the United
States. The rapid increase in fentanyl trafficking accounts for the
majority of more than 100,000 annual deaths from drug overdoses in the
United States.
What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. national security
posed by drug trafficking and other activities by TCOs within the
NORTHCOM AOR?
Answer. TCOs drive instability in the communities in which they
operate and challenge good governance in North America to the detriment
of the entire continent. Mitigating the negative consequences of TCO's
illicit behavior is essential to the national security of all countries
in the USNORTHCOM AOR and requires whole-of-government approaches
synchronized with partner nations.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the
Department of Defense in countering drug trafficking and the threat
from TCOs and what role should NORTHCOM play with respect to such an
effort?
Answer. It is my understanding that the threat to national security
posed by TCO networks is acute and worsening. Department of Defense and
USNORTHCOM serve in a supporting role in accordance with statutory
requirements and policy guidelines. In this role, I believe it is
appropriate for USNORTHCOM to provide intelligence and operational
support, when requested, to support U.S. Departments and Agencies and
foreign law enforcement partners in their counter-drug/counter-
transnational criminal organization (CD/CTCO) activities.
Question. In your view, does NORTHCOM have the appropriate
authorities and resources for fulfilling its counter-drug and counter-
TCOs missions?
Answer. To my knowledge, there are no shortfalls in USNORTHCOM's
existing authorities or resources to support interagency law
enforcement partners' counter-drug and counter-TCO mission. If
confirmed, I will determine whether USNORTHCOM has the appropriate
authorities and resources to conduct its support that mission as part
of my 90-day assessment.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of counter-
drug operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and along the geographic seam
NORTHCOM shares with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)?
Answer. Effective cross-combatant command integration is critical
to effective counter-drug operations. If confirmed, I will conduct a
90-day assessment, which will include an assessment of USNORTHCOM
support to counter-drug operations with a specific focus on the
cooperation and coordination with USSOUTHCOM.
Question. What metrics would you recommend the Department use to
measure the effectiveness of its counter-drug programs and counter-TCOs
in the NORTHCOM AOR?
Answer. Establishing effective metrics is essential to determine
the effectiveness and efficiency of activities in support the counter-
drug mission. If confirmed, I will assess existing metrics and, if
needed, establish new metrics to measure the effectiveness of
USNORTHCOM's support of Federal partners' counterdrug and counter-TCO
efforts as part of my 90-day assessment.
security cooperation with canada and mexico
Question. What is your assessment of the current security
relationship between the United States and Canada and, if confirmed,
what would be your priorities for strengthening that security
relationship?
Answer. It is my understanding the current security relationship
between the U.S. and Canada is extremely strong and is essential for
the defense of North America and for maintaining security in the
Arctic. I remain encouraged by the bi-national commitments to
modernizing the sensors, platforms, and capabilities necessary to
execute NORAD's missions, including Canada's fielding of the F-35 and
two over-the-horizon radars. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD remains
a modern and effective force capable of deterring and defeating threats
to North America. My priority for security relationships will be to
strengthen the various networks that are the foundation of USNORTHCOM's
relationship with Canada by integrating globally, improving domain
awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision
superiority.
Question. What is your assessment of the current security
relationship between the United States and Mexico and, if confirmed,
what would be your priorities for strengthening that security
relationship?
Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM maintains an extremely strong
security relationship with its Mexican military counterparts. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of SEMAR (Mexican
Navy) and SEDENA (Mexican Army and Air Force) to further enhance
military interoperability, cooperation, and mutual objectives. My 90-
day assessment will help inform my priorities for strengthening our
security relationship. My priority for security relationships will be
to strengthen the various networks that are the foundation of
USNORTHCOM's relationship with Mexico by integrating globally,
improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and
delivering decision superiority.
Question. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the
United States posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in
Mexico? If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for enhancing
the military-to-military cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Mexican
Army (SEDENA) and Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to address mutual security
challenges, including the threat from TCOs?
Answer. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) based in Mexico
are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths each year in the United
States and Mexico. The revenues that these organizations generate by
delivering dangerous, illicit materials to U.S. markets drive violence
in North America and undermine the safety and security of the
continent. Illicit drugs, especially fentanyl, smuggled by TCOs into
the United States have led to record numbers of overdose deaths, while
cartel violence, exacerbated by weapons smuggling into Mexico, has done
enormous harm to the Mexican people and their national institutions.
I understand USNORTHCOM's relationship with its Mexican military
partners is historically strong and that Mexico is both a willing and
capable partner across a number of areas affecting North American
defense and security. If confirmed, I will seek to further strengthen
the defense relationship between USNORTHCOM and its Mexican military
partners, ideally through training and exercises, to advance our
combined capability and capacity to address mutual security challenges,
including countering TCOs.
pandemic preparedness
Question. NORTHCOM was the lead combatant command supporting other
Federal agencies and states in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
What role, if any, should NORTHCOM have with respect to pandemic
preparedness, including its relationship to:
The Chemical and Biological Defense Program, overseen by the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs
Answer. If confirmed, USNORTHCOM will use lessons learned from the
COVID-19 Pandemic response to coordinate with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense, to propose ways to improve cross-organizational processes to
enhance the ability to respond to a Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
event quickly and effectively.
Question. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense programs
Answer. If confirmed, USNORTHCOM will use lessons learned from the
COVID-19 Pandemic response to coordinate with the Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Defense programs to propose ways to improve cross-organizational
processes to enhance the ability to respond to a Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear event quickly and effectively.
Question. The Defense Health Agency
Answer. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan (UCP),
Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning DOD efforts in
support of the U.S. Government's response to pandemics and infectious
diseases of operational significance (P&ID). As DOD's lead for Pandemic
and Infectious Disease Plan, I understand USNORTHCOM maintains a close
strategic and operational relationship with each of the combat support
agencies, including the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the combatant
commands, the military Services, and appropriate U.S. Government
departments and agencies. USNORTHCOM must coordinate with DHA and the
interagency to share real-time awareness of health care facility
capabilities and capacity, prioritization and distribution of
countermeasures, ongoing health or disease prevalence, and bio-
surveillance of current and emerging threats. USNORTHCOM also
coordinates with DHA and the military Services to provide options for
medical force employment either within the DOD or in support of
civilian authorities.
sexual assault prevention and response in northcom
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Department and
military services over the past decade to enhance their prevention of,
and response to, sexual assaults, including measures to care for
victims and hold assailants accountable, the current data continues to
show increasing prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual
conduct, primarily for female servicemembers aged 17 to 24. These
findings echo reports this year of increases in the prevalence of
sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.
Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the
Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to sexual
assault, and to protect service members who report sexual assault from
retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. Until sexual assault, harassment, retaliation, and other
harmful behaviors are eliminated from our ranks, work remains to be
done by leadership at every level. The Department of Defense has taken
important steps toward improving efforts to prevent and respond to
sexual assault, and all commanders must remain vigilant by developing,
implementing, and sustaining a culture and programs that provide the
safest possible environment for every member of their command. If
confirmed, the responsibility for establishing a culture of dignity,
respect, and accountability will start with me.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for
yourself in preventing sexual harassment witin NORTHCOM, including
within its civilian workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately establish that I do not
tolerate any abuse, harassment, assault, or other harmful behavior, to
include sexual harassment. I will publish command policies and guidance
to USNORTHCOM and NORAD to communicate my position. I will expect all
USNORTHCOM and NORAD units and organizations to establish and maintain
work environments that demand dignity and respect for all. I will
immediately and carefully assess USNORTHCOM and NORAD's policies,
programs, and training regarding sexual assault and harassment to
ensure they comply with all applicable laws and policies, and where
appropriate take corrective action. I will regularly update all members
of USNORTHCOM and NORAD on the status of those efforts.
Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from
Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment
and sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess any requirements and make
recommendations for improvement as necessary.
civilian workforce
Question. What role does the NORTHCOM civilian workforce play in
executing missions effectively and efficiently?
Answer. The civilian workforce plays a critically important role in
the effective and efficient execution of all USNORTHCOM missions. I
understand that civilian personnel comprise more than half of NORAD and
USNORTHCOM headquarters billets and serve in a wide range of roles,
including subject matter experts, intelligence analysts, supervisors,
and senior leaders. The civilian workforce lends tremendous experience,
expertise, continuity, and diversity of thought to the entire defense
enterprise, and I have no doubt the same is true at NORAD and
USNORTHCOM.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the ability
of the civilian workforce to support NORTHCOM missions? Do you have any
suggestions for legislative changes that would add flexibilities for
managing the workforce?
Answer. Given USNORTHCOM's critical mission and reliance on
civilians for over 50 percent of the headquarters workforce,
effectively managing the civilian workforce is essential to mission
success. At this time, there are no legislative changes that I would
offer, but, if confirmed, I will assess key aspects of the USNORTHCOM
and NORAD civilian workforce and provide recommended legislative
changes, if any, through the Department.
u.s. northern command-dhs relationship on critical infrastructure
protection
Question. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program manages
Department activities to address risks to critical infrastructure. Of
the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the defense industrial base is
the only sector for which the Department of Defense is designated as
the Sector Risk Management Agency.
What is your assessment of the threat in the current strategic
environment to critical infrastructure in the U.S. Homeland?
Answer. Today's threat environment is likely the most complex and
dynamic our Homeland has ever faced. Cyber actors operating under the
direction of our near-peer adversaries routinely surveil North American
critical infrastructure for intelligence purposes and could quickly
transition to cyber attack in the event of conflict. In addition,
Russian air and naval forces can hold North American critical
infrastructure at risk with conventionally armed cruise missiles.
Finally, the strategic forces of Russia, China, and North Korea are
modernizing and advancing their ability to target our critical
infrastructure with nuclear weapons, primarily to deter a United States
attack but also to impose costs and compel an acceptable resolution in
the event of a strategic conflict.
Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with
respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?
Answer. I understand that USNORTHCOM has an active program to
execute DOD's Mission Assurance Construct by assessessing its missions,
policies, plans, and programs to identify and mitigate risk from all
threats and hazards to critical capabilities, functions, and supporting
assets. If confirmed, I will ensure the command is able to execute
missions by preventing or mitigating the loss or degradation of DOD-
owned defense critical infrastructure (DCI) within the USNORTHCOM area
of responsibility in coordination with the DOD asset owner and the
other DOD commanders.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
NORTHCOM and DHS in addressing the risks to critical infrastructure?
Answer. Addressing critical infrastructure risks requires
partnership across government and with the private sector. DOD has the
authority to manage risks to DOD facilities. USNORTHCOM works closely
with OSD and DHS to address risks to non-DOD defense critical
infrastructure (transportation, communications, energy, etc) upon which
the military depends. DHS and its agencies, like the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provide an important gateway to
working with government partners and the private sector in making
critical infrastructure more secure and resilient.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for
strengthening the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS on critical
infrastructure protection?
Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM has a variety of initiatives with
DHS and its components. If confirmed, working with OSD, I will continue
these practices and endeavor to increase information sharing with
public and private sector stakeholders and foster a better
understanding of the policies, authorities, and limitations that frame
our critical infrastructure protection efforts. If confirmed, my 90-day
assessment will include an evaluation of the relationship between
NORTHCOM and DHS to determine what priorities would support the most
effective relationship for critical infrastructure protection.
relationship with the national guard
Question. What is the current status of the relationship between
NORTHCOM, the Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, and
individual State National Guard headquarters?
Answer. Based on my previous USNORTHCOM experience, I know the
National Guard is essential to USNORTHCOM and NORAD mission success.
The commands rely on well-trained and well-equipped Air and Army
National Guard forces to execute assigned missions. As a result, I
understand USNORTHCOM and NORAD routinely communicate, plan, and
integrate with the Department, the National Guard Bureau, and the State
National Guard Headquarters regarding each of the commands' missions.
If confirmed, I will continue to foster these valued relationships and
prioritize integration and coordination with the commands' National
Guard partners.
Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for
planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM;
the Department of Defense; DHS; the National Guard Bureau; Federal,
State, and local first responders; and National Guard units under State
authority?
Answer. USNORTHCOM and NORAD rely upon close partnerships with a
wide variety of DOD and interagency partners, to include the Department
of Homeland Security, the National Guard Bureau, first responders, and
the National Guard operating under State authorities. If confirmed, my
90-day assessment will include an evaluation of the current liaison
relationships to determine how they might be improved to support better
integration between USNORTHCOM and the myriad partners across the
Federal, State, local, and tribal landscape.
u.s. northern command joint task forces
Question. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-
service task forces, such as Joint Task Force-Civil Support and Joint
Task Force-North, have been placed under its authority.
What is your understanding of the mission of the Joint Task Force-
Civil Support and what changes, if any, would you recommend, if
confirmed, to its organization and resourcing to carry out that
mission?
Answer. I understand that Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS)
conducts CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear)
response planning and preparedness to maximize mission readiness and
decrease response time. If confirmed, I will assess the organization
and resourcing of JTF-CS and make recommendations as appropriate to
ensure the ability to execute its assigned missions and meet the
changing threat environment.
Question. What is your understanding of the mission of the Joint
Task Force North, including support to Federal law enforcement
activities to identify and interdict transnational criminal
organizations' activities? What changes, if any, would you recommend,
if confirmed, to its organization and resourcing to carry out that
mission?
Answer. I understand Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) is tasked to
support Federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and
interdiction of suspected transnational criminal organization
activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental
United States. I understand that JTF-N is also responsible for command
and control of units supporting the Department of Homeland Security
along the United States-Mexico border, as approved by the Secretary of
Defense. If confirmed, I will assess the organization and resourcing of
JTF-N and make recommendations as appropriate to ensure the ability to
execute its assigned missions.
unmanned aerial systems
Question. Routine access to the National Airspace System (NAS) is
severely restricted, including along portions of the borders with
Canada and Mexico. The Department of Defense, Federal Aviation
Administration, and other agencies are currently working to integrate
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the NAS and have made progress in
supporting training flights along the southwest border.
In your view, what, if any limitations are there for full
integration of government operated UAS into the NAS?
Answer. I understand there are regulatory limitations on UAS
operations that have been procedurally mitigated with the Federal
Aviation Administration. Government-operated unmanned aerial system
(UAS) operations are authorized in the national airspace under certain
conditions. If confirmed, I will work with DOD, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and other agencies to assess limitations and propose
appropriate mitigations to assure mission accomplishment.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to support the
development of training opportunities for UAS pilots that support
readiness and border security?
Answer. As I understand it, USNORTHCOM support to the Department of
Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection mission along the
United States-Mexico border provides Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
pilots and operators with practical opportunities to gain experience
while conducting missions in the NAS. Furthermore, I understand
USNORTHCOM synchronizes UAS operations in support of civil authorities
performing emergency services such as Wildland Firefighting and Search
and Rescue, missions which also reinforce UAS pilot and operator
training. Both the DOD and lead Federal/State agencies benefit from
this arrangement. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the
military Services, National Guard leadership, and supported Federal
partners to support these reciprocal missions.
The use of UAS by malign actors is a growing problem on the
battlefield and an increasing challenge for homeland defense. In
section 1692 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2018, Congress expanded the Department of Defense's existing
authorities to use counter-UAS technology and develop procedures to
protect facilities and assets associated with critical mission areas
within the United States. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command, plays a
key role in supporting homeland defense and coordinating with civil
authorities in these efforts.
Question. What is your understanding of the threat posed by UAS
operated with malign intent to Defense Department facilities and assets
in the United States?
Answer. I am concerned about the Small-UAS (sUAS) threat to the
Homeland, as sUAS technology is advancing and proliferating worldwide
at a rapid pace. sUAS incursions are becoming moreAnswer. prevalent,
and sUAS are used with regularity in other regions to attack U.S. and
friendly forces. I have strong concern that sUAS one-way attack
tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized overseas may be used here
in the future. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM
participate in cross-combatant command counter-UAS lessons learned
forums, and I will advocate for the procurement of counter-sUAS defeat
mechanisms to defend DOD critical infrastructure.
Question. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's role in the
exercise of the authorities granted by section 1692? What actions would
you take specifically to ensure the National Capital Region has the
ability to detect, and if required defeat, the UAS threat?
Answer. As I understand it, USNORTHCOM does not have standing
authority to execute the counter-UAS (C-UAS) actions authorized by
section 1692 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, codified as section 130i of
title 10. Those actions are primarily executed by the military
Services. DOD policy has delegated the authority to take C-UAS actions
authorized by the statute to commanders of covered installations and
assets. I understand NORAD and USNORTHCOM have also been tasked and are
developing an NCR sUAS common operating picture in support of the White
House Military Office in order to detect, track and identify sUAS
operating in the NCR. Additionally, NORAD is responsible for the
aerospace warning and aerospace control missions in defense of North
America, and when lawful and appropriate, NORAD may respond to UAS
events under its aerospace control mission. I understand most small UAS
(sUAS) threats do not fall within NORAD's aerospace control mission and
the responsibility and authority for defense against sUAS is
distributed across multiple DOD and non-DOD agencies. If confirmed, I
will continue to address this potential threat and ensure NORAD and
USNORTHCOM continue to collaborate with multiple DOD organizations and
interagency partners to address the emerging threat of sUAS attack.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to use the authorities
outlined in section 130i of title 10 (section 1692 of the fiscal year
2018 NDAA) to address the threat posed by UAS to Defense Department
facil]ities?
Answer. Neither NORAD nor USNORTHCOM have standing authority to
execute the counter-UAS (C-UAS) authorities outlined by section 130i of
title 10. Those actions are primarily executed by the military services
as a matter of force protection for various installations. DOD policy
has delegated the authority to take C-UAS actions authorized by the
statute to commanders of covered installations and assets. If
confirmed, I will work with the military services and advocate for all
current and future C-sUAS capability needed for the betterment of
homeland defense.
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear response capabilities
Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: homeland defense and
Defense Support to Civil Authorities, both of which include preparation
for and response to an incident or attack involving Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) materials or weapons in the
NORTHCOM AOR.
What is your assessment of the threat to the United States posed by
CBRN materials and weapons? Given the proliferation of CBRN
capabilities by State and non-State actors, how do you assess this
threat will evolve in the coming years?
Answer. I am familiar with the Intelligence Community's efforts to
monitor the CBRN programs of our princip]al State adversaries. None of
these actors is assessed to be likely to employ CBRN against the
Homeland outside a strategic conflict, but I am concerned destructive
technologies and knowledge could proliferate to State and non-State
actors whose CBRN activities may be more difficult to detect, deter, or
disrupt. In the coming years, I am concerned CBRN capabilities could be
rapidly transferred to or developed by extremists or criminals who
could use them in unattributed attacks or attempts at extortion in the
Homeland.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
Department of Defense's CBRN detection and response capabilities to
effectively address the threat?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess USNORTHCOM's role as part of
the larger DOD CBRN detection and response capabilities as part of my
90-day assessment. If the assessment indicates the threat would exceed
the Department's ability to respond, or if the response timelines are
determined to be insufficient, I will advocate to the Department for
increased or improved capabilities, as appropriate, to effectively
address the threat.
Question. If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of
ensuring adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond
to such incidents in support of civil authorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DOD, the Joint
Staff, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and partners
at all levels to make certain that all partners fully understand the
requirements associated with the Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) mission and ensure the readiness and availability of forces to
conduct this essential mission. The DSCA mission requires rapid access
to forces that are properly trained and equipped to execute a wide
range of missions under difficult circumstances, and I would ensure
sufficient cross-organizational and cross-Department training and
exercises are conducted to ensure plans are validated and readiness is
achieved and maintained.
Question. There are a variety of organizations and units intended
for CBRN response and consequence management, including Joint Task
Force-Civil Support, the Defense Consequence Management Response Force
(DCMRF), the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response
Force, National Guard Homeland Response Forces, National Guard CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Package units, and National Guard Weapons of
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.
If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities
to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities
in the event of a CBRN incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM participates with
all mission partners in planning events and Tabletop Exercises that
consider the most likely and most dangerous CBRN scenarios that the
Intelligence Community assesses the U.S. could face. These events will
help determine how best to align and employ the mix of capabilities
when responding to various threats. In crisis, when Federal Forces of
the CBRN Response Enterprise are requested, I will coordinate through
the lead Federal agency to ensure the correct capabilities are provided
to support the mission assignment.
Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the DCMRF, as
currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to support
Federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident?
Answer. I understand the Chemical Biological Radiological and
Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise provides a limited response to save
lives and prevent human suffering in the event of a catastrophic CBRN
Incident. It is designed to be a tiered response to provide civil
authorities with technical life-saving forces in the first 96 hours of
an incident. If confirmed, I will assess the capability and capacity of
the Defense Consequence Management Response Force (DCMRF) to support
Federal authorities in the event of a CBRN incident and take any needed
steps to ensure its readiness to provide support when, where, and
however needed.
Question. How would you ensure the necessary level of coordination
and planning between the DCMRF and National Guard Homeland Response
Forces to ensure an adequate response to a CBRN incident?
Answer. As currently designed, the USNORTHCOM Defense Coordinating
Officer (DCO) is responsible for coordinating with the Lead Federal
Agency to ensure requested CBRN capabilities are quickly validated and
the DCMRF and/or National Guard Homeland Response Forces are deployed
in support of civil authorities with clear guidance to conduct
lifesaving/life enabling operations. As part of my 90-day assessment, I
will assess whether this is an optimal arrangement.
Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing
defense support to civil authorities in the event of CBRN incidents
should be under the command of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command?
Answer. Yes, as the supported Combatant Commander for Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, the Commander of USNORTHCOM should assume
command of all military forces supporting a CBRN event within the
USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Additionally, the Commander of
USNORTHCOM should be the lead synchronizer of DOD capabilities with the
Lead Federal Agency to ensure unity of support. The Commander of
USNORTHCOM should relinquish Operational Control (OPCON) of those
forces upon mission completion.
wmd-csts and cerfps
Question. There are now 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), with at least one in each
State and Territory, and there are 17 National Guard CBRNE Enhanced
Response Force Package (CERFP) units. In addition, there are 10
National Guard Homeland Response Forces, one in each Federal Emergency
Management Agency region.
Do you believe the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized,
sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?
Answer. Based on my previous experience as the USNORTHCOM Director
of Operations, the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs were appropriately organized,
sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions.
Additionally, WMD-CST and CERFP capabilities and readiness were tracked
monthly in the Defense Readiness Report System. Part of my 90-day
assessment will include a determination of whether this is still the
case.
Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?
Answer. My 90-day assessment will determine if any changes are
needed. If there are required changes, I will take appropriate action
to ensure the WMD-CTSs and CERFPs can accomplish their assigned
missions.
specturm allocation
Question. Please describe the importance of spectrum allocation to
the NORTHCOM missions in defense of the homeland. Are there specific
systems that you are concerned about being impacted relative to the
3.1-3.45 GHz band that is being studied for sharing or vacating?
Answer. The importance of spectrum allocation to the USNORTHCOM
mission in defense of the Homeland cannot be overstated. There are
multiple homeland defense platforms, to include maritime, airborne, and
ground-based early warning systems (such as AWACS, AEGIS, Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR), and PATRIOT) that provide the USNORTHCOM
and NORAD threat warning, attack assessment, domain awareness, and
aerospace/maritime warning that rely on the spectrum being studied.
Part of my 90-day assessment will specifically focus on the national
security impacts if the 3.1-3.45 GHz band is shared or vacated.
missile defense
Question. One of NORTHCOM's missions is to defend the United States
against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from nations
such as North Korea and Iran.
Do you believe that it is important to conduct operationally
realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational capability and
reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system?
Answer. Yes. I believe operationally realistic flight tests provide
valuable information that informs development and operational
employment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system capabilities.
Flight tests also build confidence in the capabilities being deployed
against potential missile threats. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the Missile Defense Agency throughout testing and fielding to
maintain confidence in the GMD system.
Question. Do you support the current plan for modernizing the GMD
system, which anticipates the deployment of a Next Generation
Interceptor in about a decade?
Answer. Yes, I support continued modernization of the GMD system
and the deployment of the Next Generation Interceptor, which I
understand will provide increased capability and capacity to pace the
threat from rogue nations such as North Korea and potentially Iran. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Missile Defense
Agency to deliver the Next Generation Interceptor as early as possible.
Question. What are your views on the utility of constructing a
second GMD site on the East Coast of the United States?
Answer. It is my understanding an additional Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) interceptor site on the East Coast is not operationally
required at this time. However, as in all military operations, it is
important to incorporate depth and dispersion into operations. Given
the rapid advancement of rouge nation capabilities, I would support
recurring assessments of the advisability of constructing a second GMD
site.
Question. In your view, what should the United States be doing to
improve protection of the Homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles
in the interim?
Answer. I understand USNORTHCOM is working closely with the Missile
Defense Agency to improve the sensor architecture and interceptors
required to keep pace with the rapidly advancing North Korean ballistic
missile threat. If confirmed, I will strongly support these ongoing
efforts, while also looking for additional opportunities for enhanced
capabilities to defend the Homeland against the rogue State threat now
and in the future.
Question. Do you support the policy--reiterated by the 2022 Missile
Defense Review--that the United States should continue to rely on
nuclear deterrence to defend against large-scale missile attack from
Russia and China?
Answer. Yes, I believe strategic deterrence is the foundation for
homeland defense against the threat of a large-scale missile attack
from Russia and China.
Question. Do you believe the United States should develop the
capability to defend the U.S. Homeland against hypersonic glide
vehicles?
Answer. Yes, I believe the United States should develop the
capability to defeat hypersonic glide vehicles. NORAD is responsible
for providing tactical warning and attack assessment of hypersonic
glide vehicles, as well as defense against hypersonic cruise missiles
(a capability Russia has employed against Ukraine).
Question. What is your assessment of the importance of a space-
based sensor capability to support homeland missile defense?
Answer. I strongly support the development of a more robust space-
based sensor capability to augment the existing terrestrial and space-
based sensor architecture and provide a more comprehensive, layered
capability against all missile threats. With the advancement of
competitor missile threat capabilities, a space-based sensor capability
could support homeland missile defense by improving domain awareness
against these threats, with persistent global tracking and
discrimination of the missiles throughout their flight.
Question. The 2022 Unified Command Plan realigned missile defense
responsibilities across the combatant commands to integrate U.S. Space
Command into the mission space.
What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's role in missile defense?
Answer. I understand the 2022 Unified Command Plan (UCP) did not
change USNORTHCOM's role in homeland missile defense. Together with
NORAD, USNORTHCOM remains responsible for the planning and execution of
homeland missile defense. The 2022 UCP transitioned the missile defense
roles and responsibilities that USSTRATCOM traditionally executed in
support of all combatant commands to USSPACECOM. USSPACECOM is tasked
with trans-regional missile planning and operations support in
coordination with other combatant commands which compliments their role
of global sensor manager that USSPACECOM already executes.
cruise missile defense
Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and
defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise
missiles.
Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United States, how
would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United States and its
territories?
Answer. I assess cruise missiles to be a significant threat to the
U.S. and its territories because cruise missiles can be launched from
multiple air-, sea-, and land-based systems from significant ranges and
from multiple avenues of approach. Additionally, cruise missiles can
fly at speeds and altitudes that are difficult to detect with existing
radar systems. If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue more robust
detection and defeat capabilities that outpace advanced cruise missile
threats.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to
address this threat?
Answer. I understand NORAD is working closely with the Air Force
and the government of Canada to enhance sensor capabilities that
provide advanced detection and warning of cruise missiles before they
reach North America. If confirmed, it will be a top command priority to
continue the advancement of these capabilities. I will also advocate
for improved capabilities to defeat cruise missiles, including by non-
kinetic means.
continental air defense--norad
Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed or
evolved with the advent of a resurgent Russia, rising China, and an
ongoing terrorist threat?
Answer. Both Russia and China have significantly increased their
ability to challenge the NORAD air defense mission in recent years.
Both countries have fielded long-range cruise missiles that can be
launched from ranges that challenge NORAD's aerospace warning
capabilities. The improved cruise missiles, when launched from bombers,
can fly toward North America from a variety of avenues of approach,
making NORAD's aerospace control mission more difficult. With regards
to an ongoing terrorist threat, strong interagency partnering and
cooperation, as well as advances in intelligence, defense systems, and
procedures have improved NORAD's posture to respond to a terrorist
threat. The rapidly evolving airborne threats from peer competitors and
potential adversaries provide the greatest challenges for continental
air defense today, and if confirmed, I will work closely with
Department of Defense, international, and interagency partners to
obtain the capabilities to defend against current and emerging airborne
threats.
Question. Do you believe that current U.S. air defense capabilities
are adequate to meet national security needs with respect to great
power competition?
Answer. Yes, I believe NORAD can defend North America with current
U.S. air defense capabilities. However, strategic competitors'
capabilities are rapidly advancing, and the U.S. (and Canada) must keep
pace to maintain the ability to detect, track, and defeat all threats.
If confirmed, I will advocate for the advanced capabilities NORAD
requires to stay ahead of the threat and execute its aerospace warning
and aerospace control missions.
Question. In your view, what are the key modernization priorities
for NORAD's early warning radar systems and other air defense
capabilities?
Answer. Part of my 90-day assessment will include identifying the
key modernization priorities for NORAD's early warning radar systems
and other air defense capabilities. However, based on my prior
experience at NORAD, strategic competitors continue to develop advanced
capabilities that can range North America from greater distances. As
our competitors evolve, our detect systems must evolve faster and
ensure we have the air and missile warning systems that provide for
timely detection, tracking, and warning of threats before they reach
North America. Older technology in the legacy systems will lose its
effectiveness for warning against these increasingly complex, longer
range weapons, and NORAD's capabilities must evolve and improve to
outpace the threats.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you
prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will thoroughly evaluate the fielded and
proposed domain awareness (sensing and detection) systems and programs
NORAD uses to meet its air defense responsibilities for the United
States and Canada. I will coordinate with DOD and the Government of
Canada to prioritize identified deficiencies and address those
deficiencies to ensure NORAD can accomplish its aerospace warning and
aerospace control missions.
Question. In your view, are current NORAD modernization efforts to
replace the North Warning System on track and proceeding with an
appropriate level of urgency?
Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the current State of
the NORAD North Warning System (NWS) as part of my 90-day assessment.
Proposed modernization efforts involving other sensors in a system-of-
systems will represent a dramatic improvement over the 30-year-old NWS
which was not designed to detect modern weapons and delivery systems,
such as long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles. Ensuring effective
awareness ultimately requires a family-of-systems approach including a
network of Canadian and U.S. sensors from the sea floor to outer space.
Present investments in NORAD modernization are critical to both
continental defense and enhanced domain awareness.
Question. In February 2023, a Chinese high altitude balloon
entering United States airspace went undetected by NORAD. General
VanHerck, the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, NORAD,
said that there was a ``domain awareness gap'' that resulted in the
balloon not being detected.
What is your assessment of the threat to homeland defense from
Chinese surveillance balloons potentially entering United States
airspace?
Answer. The PRC will likely make similar attempts in the future to
gather sensitive information that might provide a competitive
advantage, including flight over sites that are critical to homeland
defense. The keys to mitigating the PRC surveillance balloon threat are
shared intelligence, improved domain awareness, and streamlined
information sharing.
Question. In your assessment, have NORTHCOM and NORAD taken
sufficient steps to address the factors causing the domain awareness
gap that led to the Chinese surveillance balloon not being detected?
Answer. Protecting U.S. sovereign airspace is a core tenet of
homeland defense. If confirmed, I will review this event closely to
determine whether NORAD and USNORTHCOM have taken sufficient steps to
address the factors causing the domain awareness gap. It is my current
understanding that USNORTHCOM and NORAD have done so.
integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (itwaa) system
Question. The ITWAA system is a set of dual phenomenology sensor
systems for which U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Air Force, and U.S.
Northern Command have shared responsibility. The U.S. Air Force, and in
particular the Space Force, is the title 10 service that manages the
material performance and acquisition of the system. Recent advances in
non-ITWAA certified sensor systems have made major progress in the
discrimination of threats to the homeland, but their integration into
the overall threat management decision process is still undergoing
review.
What is your understanding of how responsibilities for the missile
warning mission are divided under the 2022 Unified Command Plan?
Answer. The 2022 UCP specifies that the Commander of USSPACECOM
will support the combatant commands with missile and nuclear detection
warning capabilities. As the Global Sensor Manager, USSPACECOM is
responsible to plan, manage and conduct operations of the space-based
and ground-based sensors that contribute to missile and nuclear
detection warning. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is the supported
commander for these critical capabilities as they relate to homeland
defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSPACECOM to optimize
missile warning and nuclear detection in accordance with the NORAD
Agreement and to strengthen my role as the Integrated Tactical Warning
and Attack Assessment authority.
Question. What is your assessment of the management of the ITWAA
system and the integration of non-certified ITWAA sensors, particularly
those in space?
Answer. It is my understanding that NORAD and USSPACECOM work with
the Air Force and Space Force to ensure current ITW/AA capabilities are
sustained and modernization efforts addressing advanced threats are
funded and delivered. I believe the integration of non-ITW/AA sensors
will contribute to higher levels of attack confidence while minimizing
gaps in coverage. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing these
efforts to achieve critical all domain integration.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the ITWAA system
is sustained and modernized in order to perform its critical function?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD continues a strong
relationship with U.S. Space Command for management of the Integrated
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system, as well as with
the Department of the Air Force and mission partners to ensure the ITW/
AA system is sustained and modernized to address warfighter
requirements for the developing threats. If confirmed, I look forward
to continuing these relationships to ensure NORAD has the capabilities
required for warning and assessment of potential threats against North
America.
Question. Do you believe the concept of ITWAA as it was envisioned
in the 1970's, which focused exclusively on large formations of bomber
aircraft and long range ballistic missiles, should be revisited given
the proliferation of low-observable threats that can approach from
multiple trajectories?
Answer. Yes, I believe the ITW/AA Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures should be continually assessed and updated to reflect the
realities of the current threat. The legacy ITW/AA system was designed
to deliver early detection and threat assessment to maximize senior
leader decision space. This was possible due to easy-to-detect
ballistic missile profiles that allowed commanders to make a high-
confidence attack assessment. Today's advanced threats, including low-
observables and hypersonic glide vehicles, add ambiguity into those
determinations, potentially delaying assessment and decreasing vital
decision space.
maritime warning and maritime domain awareness
Question. NORAD has the mission of Maritime Warning for North
America. How does this mission fit into the larger Maritime Domain
Awareness mission, and what is your assessment of the ability of NORAD
and NORTHCOM to fulfill these missions?
Answer. I understand the NORAD maritime warning mission requires
broad area maritime domain awareness and information sharing across
multiple combatant commands, agencies, and Canadian areas of operation
to develop a unique bi-national, comprehensive understanding of
maritime activities with all partners. If confirmed, I will review the
ability of USNORTHCOM and NORAD to fulfill their varied maritime domain
awareness missions as part of my 90-day assessment.
arctic region mission
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the Military
Services to identify, develop and enhance DOD capabilities to protect
and defend U.S. sovereignty and interests in the Arctic region?
Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with fellow combatant
commanders and the military Services to assess requirements for
addressing threats from or through the Arctic. I believe NORAD and
USNORTHCOM's ability to defend North America depends on the commands'
ability to conduct all-domain operations in the Arctic and to interact
seamlessly with U.S. European Command and U.S. IndoPacific Command as
operations transit between the operational boundaries for each command.
Question. If confirmed, by what process will you identify
requirements for support from other Government agencies, such as the
U.S. Coast Guard, in fulfilling requirements for the Arctic region?
Answer. USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements in the Arctic may be
fulfilled by a number of DOD and interagency partners. For example, I
understand that a significant portion of the validated USNORTHCOM
requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor Alaska will be addressed by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-led expansion of the Port of Nome.
Likewise, the U.S. Coast Guard provides critically important capability
and support in the Arctic. If confirmed, I will continue to place
strong emphasis on NORAD and USNORTHCOM's longstanding partnership with
the Coast Guard and the command's other partners in the Arctic. When
needed, I will request Coast Guard support via a Request for Forces
submitted to the Joint Staff and advocate for efforts by the commands'
interagency partners to improve the overall U.S. capability and
capacity for operating in the Arctic, to include those that directly
and indirectly support NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission requirements.
Question. Does DOD currently have the appropriate capabilities and
assets to meet its goals in the Arctic?
Answer. As I understand it, DOD has improved the capability to meet
its goals in the Arctic, but much work remains ahead. If confirmed, I
will carefully assess USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements and advocate
for those requirements to be sourced. If confirmed, I will also serve
as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities, and as such, I will work
closely with the Commanders of U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific
Command to ensure their Arctic requirements are met.
Question. What changes, if any, are necessary for the Department to
support the implementation of the October 2022 National Strategy of the
Arctic Region?
Answer. I understand that more than half of the USNORTHCOM AOR and
the NORAD Area of Operations are in the Arctic. To compete in the
Arctic, it is important for the military Services to develop the
capability and capacity necessary to meet combatant command all-domain
Arctic requirements as well as the objectives detailed in the
individual Arctic strategies. If confirmed, I will closely assess both
commands' missions and associated requirements in the Arctic and make
recommendations for any changes necessary to ensure the Department's
ability to support the implementation of the National Strategy for the
Arctic Region.
law of the sea convention
Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention? If so, please explain why.
Answer. Yes, I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides a comprehensive regime for the
governance of the world's oceans, including the Arctic, and U.S.
accession would further demonstrate our commitment to an international
rules-based order. Acceding to the treaty would enable United States
representation during critical international negotiations that impact
the maritime domain, provide an additional mechanism to counter
countries like Russia and China that continue to exploit our absence
from key ocean governance diplomatic forums, and ultimately help
protect our Nation's rights and interests in this critical sphere of
operations.
Question. Given NORTHCOM's responsibilities for the Arctic region,
do you believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would
help the United States protect its interests in the Arctic, including
against competing claims from foreign nations?
Answer. Yes, I believe accession to the Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS) would help the United States protect its interests in the
Arctic. Accession would demonstrate our commitment to a rules-based
order, ensure our best interests are represented during international
negotiations regarding territorial disputes and challenges to
longstanding maritime customs and practices, and improve our ability to
advocate for our ocean governance interests around the globe, including
in the Arctic. Engagement through UNCLOS is particularly critical today
as multiple nations vie for access and control in the Arctic and seek
to modify international norms to accommodate expansionist ambitions
around the globe in general, and in the Arctic in particular. Finally,
accession would preclude Russia and China from exploiting United States
absence in forums.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and
when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other
appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the position of the Administration? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this Committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
homeland missile defense
1. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Guillot, you also have a role
in missile defense. Do you believe the Next Generation Interceptor will
meet your requirements and be capable of fully defending Hawaii?
Lieutenant General Guillot. I believe the current plans for the
Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), developed by the Missile Defense
Agency and coordinated throughout the Department of Defense will meet
existing requirements and be capable of defending Hawaii. The NGI is
designed to have the capability to defeat current and future threats
from North Korea and will have approximately the same area coverage as
the current Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), which includes Hawaii.
civil support missions and climate change
2. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Guillot, because of a warming
world there are more and more natural disasters that may require U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to execute civil support operations. How
are you working with stakeholders to update disaster planning to
reflect the realities of climate change?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Defense Support t]o Civil Authorities
is a specific U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) responsibility as
outlined in the 2022 Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I will ensure
NORTHCOM continues to regularly update plans and conduct integrated
planning and exercises with interagency partners to confirm NORTHCOM is
prepared to support civil authorities and international partners in
response to disasters, including those resulting from climate effects.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
transnational criminal organizations
3. Senator King. Lieutenant General Guillot, Transnational Criminal
Organization (TCO) networks remain a threat to the United States and
international security. These groups proliferate drugs and other lethal
and dangerous illegal items into our borders, leading to tens and
thousands of American deaths a year. What will your strategy be to
disrupt, degrade, and defeat these TCO networks?
Lieutenant General Guillot. The Secretary of Defense has directed
USNORTHCOM to conduct CD/CTOC operations, activities, and investments
in support of U.S. departments and agencies and foreign nation security
forces with CD/CTOC responsibilities in order to disrupt and degrade
TCOs, including drug cartels and other illicit trafficking networks,
which threaten U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I will
ensure USNORTHCOM continues to execute the mission as tasked by the
Secretary of Defense, to include providing intelligence and operational
support to U.S. and foreign partners, to disrupt and degrade TCO
networks and their enablers. I will also visit all support locations to
gain a full understanding of the operational environment and assess if
NORTHCOM support is optimized and will forward my assessment and any
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
arctic presence
4. Senator King. Lieutenant General Guillot, Russia and China
continue to rapidly militarize the Arctic, yet I have seen little
response from the Department of Defense. What is your strategy to
ensure a stronger naval presence, more robust military infrastructure,
scalable basing options, and to integrate and interoperate with our
partners and allies to increase our Arctic presence and posture?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, one of my specific
responsibilities as outlined in the 2022 Unified Command Plan is to
advocate for Arctic capabilities in coordination with other combatant
commands. Maintaining consistent presence in the maritime and air will
be a priority. I intend to continue NORTHCOM's leadership in Joint
Force Arctic capability advocacy by working more closely with both
combatant commands and the military services on research and
development, all domain training and exercise coordination, military
construction, and engagement with allies and partners to improve the
ability of the Joint Force to operate effectively in the Arctic in
accordance with the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy and National
Strategy for the Arctic Region.
5. Senator King. Lieutenant General Guillot, how can the Department
of Defense benefit from Arctic research particularly that conducted by
our local communities in Alaska, Maine, and other near-Arctic States?
Lieutenant General Guillot. No one knows the Arctic better than the
people who live and work in and near that environment every day. I
understand the Department of Defense and NORTHCOM are actively pursuing
partnerships to leverage local community expertise and build
communities of interest to advance national defense priorities in the
Arctic region while respecting the fragility of the Arctic environment.
If confirmed, I will enthusiastically continue those efforts.
6. Senator King. Lieutenant General Guillot, furthermore, what
coastal resilience shortfalls are in the Arctic and what are your
priorities?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, I will assess resilience
shortfalls and continue ongoing NORTHCOM advocacy for funding and
construction of coastal protective measures to guard against the
effects of climate change on Arctic coastal infrastructure (e.g.,
erosion, sea level change, and permafrost thaw). My priorities would
include assuring the resilience of Long Range Radar Sites and other
homeland defense infrastructure and facilities necessary to assure
power projection.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
critical infrastructure protection
7. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Guillot, the National Cyber
Strategy and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) have both listed critical
infrastructure protection as a top priority, and I could not agree
more. As the Chair for the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, I've been
working closely with the Army Interagency Training and Education Center
in the West Virginia National Guard to ensure they're used as a
resource in threat assessments and the response to cyber and physical
attacks on our critical infrastructure. Their work is supported by the
establishment of a mission assurance program in this year's National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that will ensure we're using the
expertise already in our National Guard units to protect our critical
infrastructure. Can you commit to receiving a briefing on this
program's work to utilize our National Guard for critical
infrastructure protection?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to
receiving a briefing on this program.
transnational organized crimes and fentanyl
8. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Guillot, the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that more than 47,000
people died from an opioid overdose in 2017 in the United States--
28,000 of those deaths were due to synthetic opioids, which the CDC
says is largely the result of the uptick in abuse of fentanyl. China
produces nearly all of the fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl
precursors in the world. Mexico is a growing transit and production
point for fentanyl. The Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel New
Generation--are the most important Mexican sellers of the drug and its
precursor. How do you view NORTHCOM's role in collaborating with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, who has the lead in the Department of Defense for the
counternarcotic mission, to combat this epidemic?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, and tasked with missions
to counter TCOs or support other Departments, Agencies, or other
mission partners in pursuit of the same objective, I commit to working
closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) through the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and
Stabilization Policy (DASD/CNSP) as the Department lead in implementing
the strategy to counter TCOs. I will also visit all support locations
to gain a full understanding of the operational environment and assess
if NORTHCOM support is optimized. I will forward my assessment and any
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
delayed budget and continuing resolutions
9. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Guillot, since the beginning
of the 118th Congress this year, I have continuously asked our
uniformed and civilian DOD leaders about the impacts of a delayed
budget and the use of continuing resolutions. The American Enterprise
Institute threw out a rough estimate of $200 million per day under the
latest continuing resolution that covered the start of fiscal year
2023, that's a total of $18 billion. I have repeatedly asked the
Pentagon for as concise a number as possible to put a figure on the
damage these delays are causing to our national security and wasted
taxpayer money, but so far I have only received an estimate from
General Brown who told me that a continuing resolution would see the
Air Force and Space Force lose $9 billion in purchasing power. I don't
blame the leaders I have questioned for not having concrete figures of
the money wasted through continuing resolutions, these leaders are
focused on using the funding they get efficiently to support our
National Defense, not the ability of Congress to get a budget passed in
a timely manner. As both of you take command, I ask that for the
remainder of your tenure in your positions, take note of the financial
cost of a delayed budget and continuing resolutions so we can hold
ourselves accountable as elected officials in the coming years as
stewards of the tax-payer's dollar. Can I count on you to come back to
this chamber every year during your posture hearings with these
detailed figures in tow?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the
committee my candid assessments of the impact delayed appropriations
and Continuing Resolutions have on NORTHCOM and NORAD missions. I
acknowledge the Department and the military services are likely better
suited to speak to the direct financial costs associated with
Continuing Resolutions. Predictable, on-time budgets and appropriations
are critical to the Department of Defense's ability to develop and
field the capabilities needed to meet combatant command requirements,
including those generated by NORTHCOM and NORAD.
statement on military holds
10. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Guillot, we cannot continue
to delay confirmation of over 250 of our General and Flag Officers.
We've reached a point where life-long careers of dedicated military
servicemembers and the lives of their families are being put in
jeopardy. We're running the risk of this delay turning into a loss of
the most critical talent in our military at a time when only the Marine
Corps is meeting military recruiting goals. How do you believe these
holds are affecting our retention efforts for younger officers who see
that their careers and their families' lives can be held up by
Congress?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Based on my personal observations and
discussions with colleagues, prolonged delayed confirmations decrease
Joint Force readiness primarily by placing officers in an acting
capacity in a position where they are limited in their ability to set
priorities, make necessary institutional changes in pursuit of
strategic goals, or otherwise move the organization and mission forward
due to their temporary status in the position. The holds are also
having an increasingly adverse impact on military families. Although I
have seen firsthand that the holds have caused some senior officers to
question continued service, I respectfully defer to the Department and
the military services regarding the comprehensive impacts on recruiting
and retention.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
homeland missile defense
11. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, we've thoroughly
established that the U.S. Homeland is no longer a sanctuary. But it's
not just our border we need to worry about. Russia can threaten targets
in the United States with long-range cruise missiles without even
leaving Russian airspace. While I commend the Department's recent
efforts to develop a homeland cruise missile defense system, I'm
concerned that we're too far behind the threat. Last year, General Glen
VanHerck, the outgoing NORTHCOM commander, said that he needs a cruise
missile defense system ``yesterday''. What are the biggest challenges
to developing a homeland cruise missile defense system?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, one of my immediate
priorities will be to carefully review homeland cruise missile defense
requirements and assess the challenges associated with developing the
capability to defend against cruise missile threats. I agree with
General VanHerck's assessment and will continue to advocate for a
cruise missile defense system that keeps pace with, or exceeds, the
rapidly advancing capabilities of our strategic competitors.
12. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, what steps need to
be taken to accelerate the development of this system?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, I will carefully review
NORAD and NORTHCOM plans, policies, and capabilities to defend the
Homeland from cruise missile threats to ensure we are staying ahead of
our adversaries. I will ensure plans, policies, and capabilities are
aligned to detect and defeat potential threats. In general, I believe
the Department must take immediate steps toward detecting advanced
cruise missile threats in order to ensure the ability to defend against
them and deter competitors from using them.
13. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, can you explain why
these threats below the nuclear threshold pose such a challenge to our
deterrence?
Lieutenant General Guillot. The PRC and Russia continue to field
cruise missiles, delivery platforms, and non-kinetic capabilities to
hold critical infrastructure in the United States and Canada at risk
below the nuclear threshold. As we have seen throughout the conflict in
Ukraine, these advanced capabilities allow potential adversaries to
strike with limited warning and significant consequences without
exceeding the nuclear threshold. This capability also creates ambiguity
and risks escalation; constrains our ability to detect, track, and
engage potential threats; and provides our competitors with a range of
options that could force U.S. and Canadian leaders to make difficult
decisions when defending or responding to an attack.
14. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, the 2022 Missile
Defense Review states that U.S. Homeland missile defense will continue
to stay ahead of the North Korean missile threat. Can you explain why,
for a rogue State like North Korea, it's important to be able to deny
an attack on the Homeland rather than only rely on deterrence?
Lieutenant General Guillot. The actions and statements from current
DPRK leadership clearly indicate their undeterred pursuit of nuclear
ballistic missiles. If they develop such capabilities, their actions
and intentions could prove unpredictable. Having the ability to defeat
an attack from North Korea allows our national leadership decision
space when determining options to deter, prevent, or respond to
possible attacks.
15. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, in your advance
policy questions, you stated your intention to help the Missile Defense
Agency deliver the Next Generation Interceptor (NGIs) as quickly as
possible. How will this capability improve your ability to defend
against the North Korean threat?
Lieutenant General Guillot. The Next Generation Interceptor (NGI)
will provide a significant performance enhancement over the current
fleet of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs). NGI will have enhanced
integration with the current homeland ballistic missile defense system
and increased kill vehicle performance that is designed to defeat
emerging future threats, to include improved capabilities the DPRK has
incorporated into its latest ballistic missiles. NGI will also have
increased reliability and survivability for a more effective and
efficient employment of these interceptors.
16. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, currently, we only
plan to field 20 of the Next Generation Interceptor to add onto the 44
ground-based interceptors we currently have deployed. But considering
the NGI's significant advantage over the current ground-based
interceptors, last year's NDAA required a cost plan to field 64 NGIs in
order to replace the current interceptors. How would fielding a larger
number of NGIs help you to meet the goal to stay ahead of the North
Korean missile threat?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Having additional Next Generation
Interceptors (NGI) in the operational inventory would increase the
overall capacity, effectiveness, and lethality of the entire homeland
ballistic missile defense system. Additional NGIs could potentially
reduce reliability concerns with the current GBI fleet. If confirmed, I
will continue to work with the rest of the Department of Defense to
determine the path forward for NGI beyond the initial fielding of 20
interceptors in order to stay ahead of the DPRK missile threat and
maintain our defensive capability in accordance with current U.S.
policy guidance.
hypersonics
17. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, our adversaries are
also becoming increasingly capable of striking the Homeland with
hypersonic weapons. In your advance policy questions, you answered
``yes'' to the question of whether the U.S. should develop the
capabilities to defend the Homeland from these hypersonic threats. Can
you explain your response?
Lieutenant General Guillot. As competitor capability and capacity
to threaten the Homeland grows, I believe the Department of Defense
should routinely re-evaluate the policies and capabilities required to
defend against those threats and seek changes to policies and acquire
capabilities to defeat the threats, if necessary and advisable. In the
case of hypersonic glide vehicles, improved domain awareness and
tracking capabilities combined with a credible and modern U.S.
deterrent and/or defeat capability are critical to stay ahead of
rapidly advancing threats and a competitor that has used hypersonic
weapons against non-military targets.
18. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, which specific
capabilities will the U.S. need to defend the Homeland from hypersonic
weapons?
Lieutenant General Guillot. In the near term, I believe the
Department of Defense must continue its efforts to improve global
domain awareness of hypersonic and other threats to the Homeland
through detection systems such as Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) and
modernized space-based sensors, as we must first see threats in order
to defeat or defend against them. The next generation defeat mechanisms
under development must be able to counter the increased speed and
maneuverability hypersonics employ. If confirmed, I will continue
NORTHCOM and NORAD's ongoing accelerated efforts to generate validated
requirements associated with the commands' assigned missions, and I
will work closely with the Department, the Missile Defense Agency, and
the military services responsible for developing and fielding the
capabilities to meet those requirements.
fighter aircraft
19. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, I'm concerned about
the capacity of our fighter aircraft fleet. We are continuing to divest
fighter aircraft without sufficient quantities of replacements and at a
time when strategic competition abroad is requiring the dispersal of
our assets. Are fighter aircraft an important part of NORTHCOM's and
NORAD's mission?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, fighter aircraft are a critical
component of NORAD and NORTHCOM's Homeland Defense Campaign and current
Homeland Defense Design due to their responsiveness, flexibility,
sensors, and, if necessary, lethality. Further, fighter aircraft are
the cornerstone of NORAD's Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) mission and
President of the United States (POTUS) support.
20. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Guillot, what steps will you
take to ensure we retain sufficient fighter capacity to defend the
Homeland while meeting requirements abroad?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, I will provide the
Secretary of Defense with requirements to meet assigned missions and
advocate with the military services to meet those requirements. A
globally integrated and layered defense of the North American Homeland
is critical to supporting national security interests both at home and
abroad. Global integration and layered defense start with conducting
integrated exercises and operations with fellow combatant commands
across all domains. Finally, ensuring the NORAD and NORTHCOM homeland
defense design combines strengthening defenses, increasing deception,
and improving resiliency in all domains to expand defense options
beyond fighter-based responses will help ensure NORAD and NORTHCOM, as
well as other geographic combatant commands, have sufficient fighter
capacity with advanced capabilities to address global threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael M. Rounds
threats to the homeland
21. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Guillot, how has the threat
environment changed in the past 5 years as it pertains to new and
emerging Russian and Chinese conventional strike capabilities targeting
our Homeland?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Over the last 5 years, Russia has
fielded hundreds of conventionally armed air-, sea-, and ground-
launched cruise missiles that can threaten critical infrastructure
throughout North America. Russia has expended a large portion of these
weapons in Ukraine since February 2022, temporarily limiting its
capacity to threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. However,
war in Ukraine has also enabled Russia's military to refine tactics,
techniques, and procedures for employing these weapons, and Russia
likely will replenish its stocks of Homeland-threatening conventional
cruise missiles quickly once hostilities cease.
Meanwhile, the PRC has also expanded its long-range conventional
strike capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain. In the last 5
years, the PRC navy has commissioned dozens of cruise missile-capable
surface combatants, including eight Renhai-class guided missile
cruisers equipped with 112 vertical launch cells each. The PRC has also
occasionally deployed these vessels within the U.S. Exclusive Economic
Zone off Alaska. In the coming years, the PRC plans to field a new
class of guided missile submarine (SSGN), which in time could provide
Beijing a clandestine land-attack capability analogous to Russia's
growing fleet of Severodvinsk-class SSGNs.
22. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Guillot, is it accurate to
say that Russia and China are developing long-range strike capabilities
that could hold our Homeland at risk, and, if so, are our current
missile defense capabilities able to defeat these non-nuclear
conventional threats from our near-peer adversaries?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes, Russia has already fielded a
family of long-range conventional weapons that can hold our Homeland at
risk, while China is developing similar capabilities that it plans to
field in the coming years. Therefore, I believe our existing sufficient
capabilities must be improved to keep pace with the rapidly evolving
Chinese and Russian threats.
23. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Guillot, are there Russian
and Chinese conventional strike weapons capable of having strategic
effects based upon their targets?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Yes. Russia's warfighting strategy
envisions creating strategic effects by striking an adversary's
economic and military infrastructure with conventionally armed weapons
to degrade the adversary's political will and terminate a conflict on
acceptable terms. Russia's development of intercontinental-range
precision-strike capabilities and its periodic deployment of air and
naval launch platforms along North America's Arctic, Pacific, Atlantic,
and Caribbean coastlines strongly suggest this ``non-nuclear'' strategy
extends to the U.S. Homeland.
PRC military theorists also likely believe conventional weapons can
have strategic effects when employed against an adversary's most
critical targets. Thus, the PRC is developing long-range conventional
strike platforms that could support such a strategy in the coming
years. While it is unclear whether the PRC would choose to employ these
capabilities against the U.S. Homeland in a conflict, its periodic
deployment of cruise missile-capable surface combatants near Alaska
suggest it is a possibility.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
missile defense against china and russia
24. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Guillot, as nuclear threats
from China and Russia grow, should we evaluate certain ballistic and
cruise missile defense systems to defend U.S. nuclear forces and
associated command-and-control against potential attacks?
Lieutenant General Guillot. I believe the Department should
routinely re-evaluate emerging threats along with the policies and
capabilities associated with deterring and defending against those
threats. If changes are necessary and advisable, the Department should
pursue those changes.
u.s. northern command cooperation with mexican military
25. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Guillot, how do you evaluate
the current U.S.-Mexico military-to-military relationship?
Lieutenant General Guillot. I am confident today's military-to-
military relationship with Mexico is strong. Our relationship is based
on mutual respect and a bilateral strategic vision. That said, a
confluence of shared regional threats and a desire by leaders on both
sides of the border to enhance North American defense and security has
revitalized and refocused U.S.-Mexico security cooperation over the
last decade. Expanded bilateral military dialog, a mutual security
cooperation strategy, and increased exercises are helping improve
interoperability to enhance the defense of North America and promote
regional security and leadership.
26. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Guillot, do you have concerns
about the Mexican military being a reliable partner to counter
fentanyl?
Lieutenant General Guillot. My intent, if confirmed, is to
buildupon the strong defense relationship between NORTHCOM and its
Mexican military (MEXMIL) counterparts. Mexico has a domestic security
problem that is directly related to the TCOs that are producing and
moving illicit drugs and other commodities with fentanyl presenting the
most significant and direct threat to Americans. NORTHCOM currently
supports U.S. Government Lead Federal Agencies as directed by the
Secretary of Defense, as well as appropriate entities within Mexico. If
confirmed, I look forward to building on NORTHCOM's military-to-
military relationship with MEXMIL. I will also conduct a visit to all
support locations to gain a full understanding of the operational
environment and assess if NORTHCOM support is optimized. I will forward
my assessment and any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
27. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Guillot, how can the U.S.
military be more forward leaning in supporting a whole-of-government
strategy to stop the fentanyl crisis?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, I will continue
NORTHCOM's active support of Lead Federal Agencies as directed by the
Secretary of Defense. I will visit all support locations to gain a full
understanding of the operational environment and NORTHCOM's ongoing
support of the lead Federal agency in countering the fentanyl crisis. I
will forward my assessment and any recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense. One of my focus areas will be evaluating how NORTHCOM can
deliver unity of effort, coordinate activities, and implement policy
guidance as effectively as possible to support the whole of government
counter-TCO effort.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
air force operations in alaska
28. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Guillot, earlier this
year, Alaska-based Air Force units performed exceptionally. From
tracking the Chinese Spy Balloon and Bear Bombers to engaging and
terminating a high altitude object, the Air Force in the great State of
Alaska has demonstrated the highest level professionalism. They have
also reminded Americans about the critical role they pay in defense of
the Homeland. Can you please comment on our servicemembers in Alaska's
recent successes?
Lieutenant General Guillot. The servicemembers assigned to the
Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) and United States Northern Command Alaska
Command (ALCOM) have proven over the last year, as they have for many
years, that they are critical to the commands' ability to conduct all-
domain operations in the Arctic. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Alaska servicemembers as they skillfully conduct their
critical Homeland Defense mission in the Arctic.
backfilling alaskan air defense
29. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Guillot, as you know, the
F-22s and F-35s based in Alaska belong to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM). In the event of a People's Republic of China (PRC)
conflict, they will almost certainly be deployed into combat, leaving
the air intercept homeland defense mission in Alaska to be performed by
whatever fighter aircraft are available. The complexities of the
mission, along with the weather, require a more defined plan to ensure
the #1 priorities of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National
Defense Strategy (NDS) are accomplished--defend the Homeland. How will
you work with the Services to ensure you have a plan in place to back
fill Alaska's air defense capability in the event of an INDOPACOM
contingency?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, it is my intent to review
existing contingency plans and, if necessary, further develop those
plans to account for the anticipated departure of NORTHCOM and NORAD
assets to other combatant commands if directed by the Secretary of
Defense. In such cases, the plans will include Force Packages that
identify resources necessary to continue performing all missions
assigned to NORTHCOM and NORAD, including the Homeland Defense mission.
I will actively communicate to the Joint Staff and the military
services NORTHCOM and NORAD's requirement for access to Arctic-trained
and ready forces as part of globally integrated contingency plans and
will advocate for regular training and exercising of those forces to
ensure preparedness to operate in the unique Arctic environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
counter-unmanned aircraft system at southern border
30. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, what is your
assessment of the growing unmanned aircraft system (UAS)/drone threat
to our Southern border, military instillations and sensitive sites in
the U.S. Homeland?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)
technology is proliferating at a rapid pace as recreational sUAS grow
increasingly capable, popular, and affordable. Consequently, sUAS
incursions over military installations and other sensitive sites in the
United States are growing more prevalent, challenging our ability to
distinguish between benign hobbyist activity and potentially nefarious
foreign or domestic malign actors. Moreover, foreign State and non-
State actors regularly employ sUAS for intelligence collection and one-
way strikes in other parts of the globe, increasing the risk that
similar tactics could be employed by foreign intelligence services or
violent extremists here in the Homeland.
31. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, what technologies
are currently being leveraged to address both the increased
proliferation of drones as well as the use of multiple drones acting in
a coordinated manner against U.S. interests?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, I commit to working
closely with the Joint Counter-small UAS Office (JCO) and the military
services to employ joint solutions that counter the proliferation and
operational employment of drones. I have extensive experience working
with JCO in my current position (Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM) and many
of the capabilities the JCO has deployed to the Middle East to defeat
sUAS threats and save American lives will have applicability in the
NORTHCOM area of responsibility. These systems include better command
and control platforms, sensors, and non-kinetic and kinetic defeat
mechanisms. One of my key concerns will be countering multiple drones
(swarms or mass attack), and work being done by the JCO and military
services with High-Powered Microwaves and other directed-energy weapon
systems is showing promise to defeat that threat. Countering the wide
and varied threats posed by proliferating drone technology also
requires integrating NORTHCOM efforts with mission partners, such as
DHS and the FAA, to determine the appropriate and safe use of counter-
capabilities within the national airspace to protect United States
interests. If confirmed, I will continue NORTHCOM's strong coordination
efforts with mission partners.
counter-unmanned aircraft system international traffic in arms
regulations export controls
32. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, is the Department
of Defense having any issues sharing these types of technologies and
capabilities due to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
restrictions?
Lieutenant General Guillot. Protecting U.S. capabilities and
technologies is critical in today's strategic competition environment.
However, rapidly sharing common capabilities and technologies is also
essential to building Allied and partner interoperability. If
confirmed, I commit to assessing the operational risk implications of
current ITAR restrictions on counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (cUAS)
and providing my recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
counter-unmanned aircraft system at southern border
33. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, what challenges to
NORTHCOM and NORAD are presented by the crisis of attritable, consumer-
grade drones at the Southern border?
Lieutenant General Guillot. I understand that, to date, NORTHCOM
and NORAD have not had any challenges presented by small drones at the
U.S. southern border. DHS is the lead for this mission with DOD
providing support to DHS and other law enforcement, and I defer to DHS
to answer this question from their perspective. If confirmed, I will
continue NORTHCOM and NORAD's close coordination with DHS regarding
drones at the U.S. southern border.
34. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, if confirmed, what
will you do to address this?
Lieutenant General Guillot. If confirmed, I will continue to look
for innovative means and efficiencies as NORTHCOM executes Secretary of
Defense-authorized support to DHS. I will advocate for the advance
counter sUAS systems necessary to detect and defeat threats within
issued authorities and will coordinate with the Joint Counter-small UAS
Office (JCO) to implement capabilities currently employed in support of
other combatant commands, as needed. I will also work closely in
support of DHS to identify any challenges posed by existing authorities
and resources in the air sovereignty mission.
counter-unmanned aircraft system authorities at southern border
35. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, what are current
DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) authorities to neutralize
drones engaged in drug-related activity that originate in Mexico and
violate U.S. airspace?
Lieutenant General Guillot. I defer to DHS on the authorities under
which their personnel operate. However, DOD personnel have all the
authorities necessary to protect themselves from hostile acts or
demonstrations of hostile intent, as well as to exercise the authority
to mitigate threats posed by UASs to the safety or security of DOD
facilities and assets covered by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 130i. As
I understand it, DOD personnel do not currently have authority to
neutralize unmanned aircraft (UAS) engaged in drug-related activity
that originate in Mexico and violate U.S. airspace. If confirmed,
assessing the counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (cUAS) authorities on
the Southern Border will be a high priority immediately upon taking
command. I will visit all NORTHCOM locations along the border to gain
an operational understanding of the various authorities held by DHS and
DOD forces and determine if changes or adjustments are necessary to
protect U.S. airspace.
36. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, are DOD or DHS
personnel allowed to neutralize drones by kinetic means?
Lieutenant General Guillot. DOD personnel have all the authorities
necessary to protect themselves from hostile acts or demonstrations of
hostile intent, as well as to exercise the authority to mitigate
threats posed by UASs to the safety or security of DOD facilities and
assets covered by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 130i. I defer to DHS on
their authorities under which their personnel operate. If confirmed, I
will visit all NORTHCOM locations along the border to gain an
operational understanding of the various authorities held by DHS and
DOD forces and determine if changes or adjustments are necessary to
protect U.S. airspace.
cybersecurity
37. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, in what ways do
you intend to make NORTHCOM ready to defend against a massive cyber-
incident?
Lieutenant General Guillot. A massive cyber incident could have
significant national impact on the U.S. Government and/or Commercial
Critical Infrastructure. If confirmed, I intend to buildupon the
existing solid foundation of cross-combatant command collaboration
between NORTHCOM and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to ensure the DOD
Information Network (DODIN) will be best postured to defend against a
cyber-threat or massive cyber-incident on DOD systems and on DODIN
Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI). I also intend to deepen critical
relationships across the U.S. Government with others responsible for
cyber-related missions, including the Department of Homeland Security
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA) to quickly
synchronize and respond to requests for assistance in CISA's mission to
manage cyber-incident impacts, including DCI that is not part of DODIN
networks. Regular exercises, including table-top exercises with senior
leadership, and building a robust network of liaison officers and
information sharing capabilities will be foundational to ensure
NORTHCOM is ready to do its part in defending against a massive cyber-
incident
38. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Guillot, in terms of
mitigating an attack, how would NORTHCOM defend against a hypothetical
massive cyberattack by an adversary on critical infrastructure, and get
back to operational as quickly as possible?
Lieutenant General Guillot. The number of variables for defending
against, responding to, and recovering from a massive cyberattack are
numerous. Thus, all U.S. Government Departments and Agencies must
constantly work together to remain vigilant while taking steps to
harden networks and integrate resiliency into systems, networks, and
infrastructure. I understand the Department of Defense takes a
proactive approach to cybersecurity on the systems, networks, and
infrastructure owned and operated by the Department, and, as the
synchronizer of DOD capabilities provided in support of lead Federal
agencies, NORTHCOM partners closely with CYBERCOM and DHS CISA (the
responsible agency for understanding and managing cyber risk to
national critical infrastructure) in the execution of Defense Support
of Civilian Authorities to prepare for, defend against, and respond to
cyberattacks. If confirmed, maintaining the relationship and close
partnership with CYBERCOM, DHS, and CISA will be a high priority in
order to deliver integrated defense of critical infrastructure against
a cyber threat that is rapidly growing in capability and prevalence.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Gregory M.
Guillot, USAF follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Gregory M.
Guillot, USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot,
USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 13,
2023, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19,
2023.]
______
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Stephen
N. Whiting, USSF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and responsibilities
Question. U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) has an area of
responsibility (AOR) equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers equal
to, or above, the earth's surface. Further, the Commander, U.S. Space
Command, is responsible to plan and execute, as directed, global
offensive and defensive space operations through all domains, including
the electromagnetic spectrum.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Commander, U.S. Space Command, within in the Department of Defense
(DOD)?
Answer. I will execute the following primary duties of the CCDR,
IAW 10 U.S.C. Sec. 164. Commanders of combatant commands: assignment;
powers and duties: (b3A) To produce plans for the employment of the
armed forces to execute national defense strategies and respond to
significant military contingencies; (b3) To take actions, as necessary,
to deter conflict; and (b3C) To command United States armed forces as
directed by the Secretary and approved by the President. The
CDRUSSPACECOM's responsibilities are assigned by the POTUS in the
Unified Command Plan: (1) Space Operations; (2) Global Sensor Manager.
(CDRUSSPACECOM is responsible for planning, managing, and conducting
operations of DOD Space Domain Awareness, missile defense and missile
warning sensors, global integrated networks, and associated command and
control networks); (3) Global Satellite Communications Operations
Manager; (4) Trans-Regional Missile Defense. (CDRUSSPACECOM conducts
trans-regional missile defense planning and operations support in
coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed,
appropriate U.S. Government agencies, Allies and partners; supports
assessment of missile defense operational capabilities; and ensures
continuity of operations, as required); (5) Space Joint Force Provider.
Question. Specifically, what are your views with respect to
operations that involve offensive and defense space operations?
Answer. The USSPACECOM Commander ensures the successful execution
of the missions assigned in the UCP. In particular, the Commander
deters threats to US/Allied interests and, if deterrence fails, defeats
those threats. Space is considered a warfighting domain and as with all
regional domains, and any use of force must comply with domestic law,
international law, the U.N. Charter, and applicable treaties,
regardless of the domain in which the use of force originates,
transits, or terminates. We must also factor in our assessment of the
costs, risks, and benefits of any offensive or defensive space
operation. My recommendation of military force in space operations will
always be balanced, measured, and proportional to the hostile act or
intent of an adversary. I will also factor in external issues such as
non-military assets.
Question. What background, expertise, and experience do you possess
that qualify you to serve as Commander, U.S. Space Command?
Answer. It is a privilege to be nominated by the President to serve
as the next Commander, United States Space Command. I have been a
career-long space operations officer since I was a Second Lieutenant in
1990 and have served during a period of consequential change in our
military space enterprise for almost 33 years. I have commanded space
units at the squadron (2004), group (2006-2008), wing (2009-2011),
Numbered Air Force (2017-2019), Joint Component (2019), and Field
Command (2020-2023) levels. I have also served in numerous Joint
positions, including as a staff member at the first instantiation of
United States Space Command (2002), as a staff member at United States
Strategic Command (2002-2004), as the Director of the Joint Space
Operations Center (2006-2008) during the historic Chinese ASAT test in
2007, as the Military Assistant and Acting Senior Military Assistant to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense (2011-2013), as the Deputy Joint Force
Space Component Commander for United States Strategic Command (2017-
2019), as the first Combined Force Space Component Commander (2019) for
the new United States Space Command when it stood up in 2019, and as
the Space Force Service Component Commander to United States Space
Command (2020-2023). I believe these experiences have prepared me, if
confirmed, to serve as the next Commander, United States Space Command.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
Commander, U.S. Space Command?
Answer. I am devoted to being a life-long learner, and I look
forward, if confirmed, to engaging with this committee, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Service, the Combatant
Commands and Agencies, and key Interagency and Allied stakeholders to
continue to learn what they need from United States Space Command to be
successful. I am committed to being a productive team member to ensure
the success of all stakeholders in our national security space
enterprise.
Question. What are your views on protecting U.S. Allied, partner,
and critical commercial space capabilities.
Answer. We must be prepared to defend U.S., and as directed,
Allied, partner, and key commercial space capabilities in order to
prevent and/or mitigate hostile and/or irresponsible acts in space. Our
adversaries continue to reinforce the fact that space is a warfighting
domain with the capabilities they are developing and we should address
this in kind. The best way to protect and defend U.S., Allied and
partner space operational capabilities is to deter adversary aggression
toward them. Deterrence only occurs from a position of strength and
posture--therefore, strengthening our relationships with our Allies and
partners as well as fielding new capabilities are key steps to
protecting and defending on-orbit capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the DOD
manager for human space flight operations?
Answer. I expect USSPACECOM's support to human space flight
operations will be increasingly important as NASA's Commercial Crew
Program and the Artemis program move forward. USSPACECOM serves as the
DOD entry point for NASA's requests and requirements for human space
flight support (HSFS) and should continue to do so ensuring safety and
success of those programs and pursuits. Part of this responsibility
continues to include integrating with other Combatant Commands with
HSFS activities and involves the C2 of the actual rescue forces by 1st
Air Force, USSPACECOM's Air Force Service component. USSPACECOM will
continue to coordinate with commercial, civil, and international
partners to help facilitate safe and reliable human space flight
operations.
Question. What are your views on providing warning and assessment
of attack on space assets, defending on-orbit space assets, and data
links including SPACECOM terrestrial assets?
Answer. Within USSPACECOM's UCP missions, the Command is tasked to
ensure our assets are survivable, defended, and enabled for adaption to
the threat environment. Examples to accomplish this, but not limited
to, are our close working relationship with USSTRATCOM to support and
provide Missile Warning, and working closely with USCYBERCOM to provide
the necessary defenses against cyber attacks. USSPACECOM must continue
to monitor potential adversary space and counterspace developments to
provide effective indications and warning analysis to inform U.S.
military decisionmakers. We will continue to closely work with other
OSD, Joint Staff, and Intelligence Community partners in this effort to
coordinate assessments and plan for adaptation to adversary threats.
Question. What are your views on advocating for space operations
capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate for, and set priorities for
space operations capabilities through the Combatant Command's
Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DOD, Intelligence
Community, and the military Services to identify seams in our current
capabilities, establish warfighting requirements, and develop future
space capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space
superiority.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on providing space
capabilities to the Joint Force including communications; missile
warning; nuclear detonation detection; environmental monitoring; space
domain awareness; military intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that providing these critical
space capabilities to the Joint Force will remain the top priority for
the command. These mission-essential space capabilities are a key force
multiplier for other Combatant Commands, Allies, and agencies. While
the capabilities themselves are predominantly provided by the U.S.
Space Force, all of the Services may contribute to these mission areas,
and in such a way that enables the command to maximize its Department-
wide support. As China and Russia field new capabilities, we
collectively need to improve and adapt our Nation's response to these
challenging new threats. To that end, USSPACECOM must continue to work
closely with the Services and with other government organizations
defining command warfighter requirements that will drive the
development and fielding of the next generation of space capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the
Global Sensor Manager?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the Command continuing to partner
with the Joint, Combined, and Interagency community to build a robust
picture of the space domain, with emphasis on identifying threats and
maintaining our Nation's space superiority. We will continue to use
traditional and long-proven space surveillance network assets, while at
the same time look to incorporate not only more modern assets already
being developed but also non-traditional sensors and techniques from
across the Services, agencies and partners. Our current sensors support
multiple mission areas include missile warning, missile defense and
space domain awareness. Support is from the tactical through the
strategic level. As the DOD Global Sensor Manager, if confirmed, I will
leverage the USSPACECOM staff to manage and synchronize support from
these multi-mission sensors to ensure all mission areas are served as
operationally and technically feasible.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the
Global Satellite Communications Manager?
Answer. If confirmed, USSPACECOM will continue to partner with the
Joint, Combined, and Interagency community to facilitate reliable
satellite communications for the Joint Force to ensures decisionmakers
and stakeholders at all levels of government have access to satellite
communications (SATCOM) on a prioritized basis. As the DOD modernizes
its SATCOM force design and expands the use of commercial and Allied
satellite services, USSPACECOM will play a central role in
operationally integrating these services into a cohesive and
interoperable enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on serving as the Joint
Staff lead and global synchronizer for Missile Defense, as well as
supporting assessments of missile defense capabilities through the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?
Answer. USSPACECOM is now assigned the UCP mission of Trans-
Regional Missile Defense, and this new mission is well-suited to
USSPACECOM's current sensor and C4 responsibilities and capabilities as
the Global Sensor Manager, as well as USSPACECOM responsibilities for
prompt and accurate Missile Warning. Trans-Regional Missile Defense
complements USSPACECOM's other UCP missions including Space Operations
and Space Domain Awareness. Many systems used for space missions are
also used for Missile Defense so assigning all these missions to a
single CCMD creates clear command and control. Over the last several
years, USSPACECOM HQs and USSTRATCOM HQs prepared for transferring both
the Trans-regional Missile Defense mission and the executing unit,
JFCC-IMD. USSPACECOM ensured USSTRATCOM's divestiture plan nested with
USSPACECOM's assumption plan, and USSPACECOM is currently executing the
mission.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as the Commander, U.S. Space
Command?
Answer. The space domain is a competitive, contested, and congested
environment:
Per the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the most
significant challenge is China as the pacing challenge. China is moving
fast in space and has demonstrated cutting-edge capabilities and
technologies routinely. Additionally, Russia, as evidenced by the
Ukraine conflict, demonstrates a degree of unpredictability and remains
a significant threat as well:
1. Since 2015, Beijing and Moscow have reorganized their
militaries to place increased emphasis on the space domain, both in
accelerating their R&D efforts and analyzing our capabilities and
reliance
2. PRC and Russia are committed to fielding diverse counterspace
capabilities across multiple domains
3. Over the past 4 years, Chinese on-orbit satellites more than
doubled (from 335 in 2019 to 681 in 2023 to date)
4. Russian on-orbit satellites increased ?40 percent
(from 143 total in 2019 to 197 in 2023)
USSPACECOM provides the Joint Force, partners, and Allies
assured space capabilities they have come to rely on in all phases of
conflict.
USSPACECOM must continue the critical work of building
unity of effort with other national security space stakeholders and
international partners enabling an ``asymmetric advantage'' for the
U.S.
There is a clear debris concern (e.g. 58 percent increase
of ISS conjunctions). Irresponsible use of space includes the 2007
China's ASAT test which resulted in an additional 3000+ pieces of long-
lived debris, and the 2021 Russia's ASAT test which resulted in 1788
pieces of debris.
Operational lessons from Russia's Ukraine conflict
revealed effects on PNT EW jamming of friendly GPS, advantages of
incorporation of commercial ISR, and observation of Russia's battle
rhythm and use of space.
Integration of systems is complex yet vital. Through my
experience, I understand that integrating capabilities from the
Services, Agencies, Allies, and Partners, including industry and the
commercial market, allows seamless and expedited flow of concise
information for C2 of the space Joint Forces.
Continuing expansion of command talent is key. They are
our strongest and most valuable asset. I will also focus on providing
purpose-built, permanent facilities (after a final basing decision has
been made) to optimize our critical workforce with the necessary
security, IT systems, resilience, and equipment needed.
USSPACECOM also must maximize the amount space-related
information shared with Allies and Partners while minimizing risk.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. Conflict is not inevitable, but we have a responsibility to
be ready to protect and defend the domain and ensure exquisite support
to the Joint Force. We need to normalize the domain by continuing to
improve our awareness and knowledge of the threats, which then drives a
need to change how we approach the domain. If confirmed, I will focus
on capabilities, plans, training, and innovative/disruptive solutions
to outpace the threat to ensure we maintain superiority in the domain.
I will continue to set requirements and the operational demand signal.
Alliances and partnerships provide a critical advantage our adversaries
cannot match. Since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine,
USSPACECOM has provided approximately 14,500 indications and warning of
theater ballistic missile launches to NATO Allies and other U.S.
partners. We must continue to leverage these partnerships for military
advantage and to promote deterrence.
Manpower is the driving force to success. The Command's culture and
reputation of professional excellence will attract and retain the best
talent our Nation has to offer.
With regard to establishing the permanent USSPACECOM HQ, once the
basing decision is announced, I am confident the staff is postured to
move out rapidly to design and construct mission-enabling facilities
that put us in the best position to fight and win. I will seek your
support for resourcing a unique facility and implementing mitigations
to offset risk for whatever location is selected.
If confirmed, I will ensure that USSPACECOM will sustain
USSTRATCOM's missile defense procedures, instructions, and arrangements
as the command initially executes this mission. Over the next 18-24
months, USSPACECOM will deliberately assess and adjust procedures and
operations to achieve the efficiencies envisioned by merging Space
Operations, Global Sensor Manager, and Trans-regional Missile Defense
responsibilities under a single CCMD.
This Command has been leveraging and will continue to leverage, if
I'm confirmed, the increasingly vast and capable group of Allied and
partners in support of the space domain and ensuring integration of our
space and space-enabling capabilities where feasible. Being able to
aggregate capabilities with Allies and partners enables greater
operational flexibility and global response options and fully supports
the NDS's approach to ``Anchoring our Strategy in Allies and
Partners.''
Additionally, to effectively address the pacing challenge and other
emerging threats, now and in the future, I plan to take calibrated
risks between campaigning and deterring today and building warfighting
advantage for the future. This balance, in line with the 2022 NMS's
concept of Strategic Discipline, requires calculated risk and concerted
coordination between the CCMD and the Services.
The Department is faced with multifaceted challenges across all
domains that necessitate a robust, cyber-secure, AI/ML-driven Command
and Control (C2) system, built on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and
Control (CJADC2) tenets. This system, integrating space platforms,
sensors, and weapons, is vital to safeguarding U.S. national security
interests. Addressing hurdles in integration, interoperability, threat
intelligence, cybersecurity, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), global
cooperation, resilience, and training requires a common operational
picture, effective intelligence partnerships, proactive cyber defenses,
enhanced SDA, international collaborations, resilient architectures,
and frequent training. CJADC2 provides the framework for achieving
these, offering open system architectures, real-time cyber threat
response, data fusion capabilities, Interagency networking, and
training simulations. If confirmed, I aim to leverage these CJADC2
principles fully, optimizing mission command and control.
Question. Given the major challenges you identified, what other
priorities would you set for your term as Commander, U.S. Space
Command, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on:
(1) building a coalition of superior military spacepower by
strengthening alliances and establishing new partnerships to make the
U.S. the preferred partner by the international community of nations
(2) Incorporating greater Space Ops / Missile Warning / Missile
Defense integration using multi-mission sensors supporting situational
awareness and weapon systems enhancing Integrated Deterrence, and if
needed, achieve all-domain dominance
(3) Master understanding of activities in and affecting the space
domain through space domain awareness
(4) Continued expansion of redundancy and cyberspace monitoring
capability ensuring our network and control nodes are protected and
resilient against adversary offensive cyberspace operations against
space superiority capabilities to protect and defend space missions
which support the Joint Force, Allies, and the Nation (e.g. MW, PNT,
and SATCOM), as well as to protect the Joint Force and Allies from the
space-enabled capabilities of potential adversaries.
(6) Enhancing integration with the other Combatant Commands,
Allies, and Interagency stakeholders to ensure we have the plans in
place to maximize our ability to deter potential adversaries and the
readiness to win if conflict materializes
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus
SPACECOM, and the Department of Defense, on each of these priorities?
Answer. Within the UCP assigned areas for USSPACECOM, I will
collaborate with:
1. OSD leadership on the Combined Space Operations initiative.
2. JS support for MD capability development affecting both MDA
and the Services' development and acquisitions.
3. USSF and NRO for space capability development.
4. Other CCDRs and our Allies and partners for all-domain
Integrated Deterrence and dominance.
5. Industry and academia to continue to pursue R&D activities
seeking the next generation of space capabilities.
6. Institutionalizing and advocating for ``Allied by Design''
multilateral approaches to CCMD-level operational planning efforts.
7. Leverage the Integrated Priority List, Joint Urgent
Operational Need, and Joint Emergent Operational Need submissions to
drive the Services toward more rapid acquisitions that deliver
capabilities on relevant timelines.
8. Coordinate with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD for
commercial augmentation capabilities and framework.
9. Participates in Joint Exercises to train and validate the
command's global capabilities while simultaneously supporting other
Combatant Commanders.
10. Conduct experiments to provide technical demonstrations of
emerging capabilities and analysis of tactics, techniques, and
procedures to address emerging threats.
11. Pursue Wargaming opportunities to provide an analytic
operational environment promoting the collaboration and coordination
required to inform decisions across all event horizons and mission
sets.
Further, I will certify USSPACECOM's readiness to win in
competition, crisis, and conflict. In collaboration with all USG
agencies, we will maintain the U.S.'s position of advantage in the
space domain to ensure it remains sustainable, safe, stable, and secure
for all.
civil-military relations
Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the
military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive
branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays
a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
Answer. Both the executive branch and Congress play vital
Constitutional roles in civilian control of the military. Congress is
Constitutionally empowered to declare war, raise and support armies,
provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and
regulation of the armed forces, and to make all laws that are necessary
and proper for executing these constitutional powers. The President is
Constitutionally the Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of Defense
is responsible to the President for all facets of the Department of
Defense.
Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and
defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the
responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian
leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political
priorities?
Answer. Military personnel, and commanders in particular, must be
rigorously apolitical in all their actions. This is also true when
providing best military advice. My best military advice will always be
based on a factual assessment of any given situation or issue, informed
by discussions with key staff members, and presented clearly. It will
not be swayed by civilian political priorities. When our civilian
leaders then make a decision, I will also faithfully follow their
lawful orders in accordance with the framework established in our
Constitution of civilian leadership of the military.
use of military force
Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making
recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
Answer. Space is a warfighting domain and we must be prepared to
defend U.S., Allied and partner space capabilities, in accordance with
the rules of engagement as approved by the National Command Authority,
and consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, in order to prevent and/
or mitigate hostile acts in space. We must also factor in our
assessment of the potentially hostile intent of adversaries, as well as
the costs, risks, and benefits of potential options.
Question. Are there other factors that, in your view, should be
considered in making recommendations on the use of military force in
space operations, whether conducted in the terrestrial or space
domains, or through the electromagnetic spectrum?
Answer. We must always be cognizant that in space, we operate in an
area of close proximity to non-military and commercial assets. My
recommendation of military force in space operations will always be
balanced, measured, and proportional to the hostile act or intent of an
adversary. I will also factor in external issues, such as civilian
assets.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of a combatant
commander in establishing policies for the use of military force and
rules of engagement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that my civilian and military
subject matter experts shape any revised policies. In parallel action,
we will work to establish policy in coordination with stakeholders
across the Department of Defense. We believe that close partnership
with all stakeholders is essential to establish the most appropriate
policies on the use of force and rules of engagement.
Question. In your view, should a combatant commander's role in this
regard differ when establishing policies for the use of military force
and the rules of engagement for space operations?
Answer. All Combatant Commander's must apply the same framework in
establishing policies for their respective area of responsibility.
While each Combatant Commander has the same role, the unique
circumstances of each AOR do impact that analysis. I believe it would
be my responsibility to advise the Secretary of Defense in establishing
policies that apply the uniqueness of the space domain across the
spectrum of military conflict. I realize that a policy cannot be a
``one size fits all'' approach, but we will work within the framework
of existing international law and domestic policies for the use of
military force and the rules of engagement. We will also not hesitate
to request additional authorities, when necessary for national
security.
national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``[m]utually beneficial Alliances and
partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical
challenges and enduring threats to the national security of the U.S.
and its Allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the NDS correctly recognizes the shift from great
power competition with the PRC and Russia in favor of prioritizing
strategic competition specifically with the PRC as our pacing
challenge, including other strategic challenges such as Russia as an
acute threat and threats to the U.S. Homeland. Additionally, I concur
with the characterization of space as a ``rapidly evolving domain''
instead of as ``emerging'' domain. While norms and considerations of
competition and conflict in space may be relatively new, the domain
itself no longer is. With the democratization of actors in space,
diffusion of space technology, and increasing relevance of space
activities to support terrestrial domains, the domain's overarching
maturation is accurately represented and facilitates the normalization
of space throughout Joint Force processes.
Question. Does the 2022 NDS properly focus the U.S. on preparing to
compete, deter, and win against the range of threats in the domain of
space? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the three-pronged approach through integrated
deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages enables the
Department and USSPACECOM more specifically to address threats across
the competition continuum in space. It provides a balance between
addressing the current challenges with preparing for the future across
readiness, OAIs, and capabilities development.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. strategic objectives
in space and what role do you believe SPACECOM should play in
supporting these objectives?
Answer. The strategic objectives in space are supporting the four
defense priorities as outlined in the NDS: defend the Homeland, deter
strategic attack, deter aggression while prepared to prevail in
conflict, and building a resilient Joint Force. With that in mind, our
strategic ends for national security space are twofold based on
Secretary of Defense guidance:
Maintain the benefits derived by all from space by
preserving stability in, access to, and freedom to operate in, from,
and through the space domain.
Deter hostile uses of space that threaten the national
security interests of the US and its Allies and partners; if deterrence
fails, be prepared to prevail in conflict.
USSPACECOM's roles in achieving these objectives are in line with
the Command's delineated UCP responsibilities as the warfighting
combatant command for the defined AOR.
Question. In your view, how should SPACECOM be sized, structured,
and resourced to implement the 2022 NDS and execute U.S. strategic
objectives in the space domain?
Answer. We continue building the command toward Full Operational
Capability and demonstrating that we can meet our assigned
responsibilities in the UCP. The PB24 request maintains the command's
path to its validated manpower requirement.
Going forward, we will continue to conduct our operations and
planning, assess our effectiveness, and make changes to our
organizational structure and allocation of resources as required.
Additionally, our components that were established more recently
continue to mature and offer us increased capability. As these
capabilities continue to grow, USSPACECOM will depend even more on our
components to develop robust support plans and execute our operations.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls
in the ability of SPACECOM to meet the demands placed on it by the 2022
NDS and the operational plans that implement the strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate, and set priorities for space
operations capabilities through existing DOD processes like the
Combatant Command's Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DOD,
IC, and the Military Services, to identify seams in our current
capabilities, establish requirements and develop future space
capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space superiority.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to make in DOD's implementation of the 2022 NDS as
regards the domain of space?
Answer. As we implement the NDS, it is important to continue to
evolve the Department's approach to global integration by leveraging
space capabilities to achieve effects that allow us to compete with the
PRC and enable the warfighter in all domains. If confirmed, I would
advise both the Secretary and the Chairman to continue this global
focus over a regional approach when establishing DOD priorities. We
must acknowledge the global nature of strategic competition, the
iterative strategic gains made by our pacing challenge in other
regions, and the irreplaceable relationships we have our Allies and
partners external to the region. Further, if confirmed, I would
recommend that we prioritize campaigning and effects geared toward the
global PRC challenge.
dod readiness in space
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DODand
the U.S. Government as a whole--across the domains of materiel and
equipment, personnel, and training--to implement the 2022 NDS and U.S.
strategic objectives as they relate to the domain of space?
Answer. I assess that the United States currently enjoys both a
qualitative and quantitative advantage over any potential adversary,
including our world-class space professionals who provide us
significant advantage. However, competitors are actively and
aggressively seeking to close the gap by developing, deploying, and
demonstrating counterspace capabilities. Potential adversaries are also
rapidly expanding their space-based capabilities that will enable their
forces to monitor, track, and target U.S. and Allied forces. Such
efforts create the potential for an adversary to negate U.S. space
advantage, reduce U.S. and Allied military effectiveness, and impede
our freedom of action in, through, and from the space domain.
Accordingly, the DOD must further develop and enhance integration of
space warfighting doctrine, capabilities, and personnel into national,
Joint, and Combined operations if we are to maintain our warfighting
advantage.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to move DODand,
as appropriate, other U.S. Government organizations toward full
spectrum readiness to execute global space operations and missions, and
under what timelines?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the processes begun by my
predecessors integrating our Allies and partners in which synergies
between our different capabilities add to our capacity to provide space
effects for the Joint and Combined force. USSPACECOM has already
established itself as a key partner in planning and integrating with
other combatant commands in plans, exercises, and operations enhancing
the readiness of the Joint Force. I would continue this and expand
where and when possible.
Question. If confirmed, how would you oversee compliance with your
timelines to ensure that readiness goals are met?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the military Services, space
agencies and this committee to develop, implement, and oversee
compliance with readiness standards. I will utilize existing processes
for readiness reporting and oversight. Prioritization of resources must
be a part of any solution to ensure readiness goals are met.
alliances and partnerships
Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are
crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great
power. To this end, the 2022 NDS stresses the importance of
strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or
enhancing new ones, and promoting ``mutual respect, responsibility,
priorities, and accountability'' in these relationships. If confirmed
as Commander, U.S. Space Command, you would serve as the single point
of contact for military space operational matters to U.S. Government
agencies, U.S. commercial entities, and international agencies for
matters related to military space operations.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen
existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and
exploit opportunities for cooperation in space operations activities
and missions?
Answer. First, we need to continue to expand space cooperation with
our Allies and partners. Led by ASD Plumb, significant effort is
underway to break down the barriers to cooperation. If confirmed, I
would continue to support, expand, and accelerate this work. For
example, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy (OSD-SP) and the Joint Staff, I would work to expand
Allies membership in the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO).
CSpO improves cooperation, coordination, and interoperability to
sustain freedom of action in space, optimize resources, enhance mission
assurance and resilience, and deter conflict. I believe the initiative
is ripe for further expansion. Additionally, I would continue to work
with Allies to enhance Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (OOD). In addition to
strengthening and expanding collective space power with Allies and
partners multi-laterally, USSPACECOM has entered into bi-lateral
Enhanced Space Cooperation (ESC) MOUs which codify cooperative
activities with three key space Allies: United Kingdom (UK), Canada
(CAN), and Australia (AUS). The ESC MOUs are the command's primary
vehicle by which to increase bi-lateral interoperability, bolster
capabilities, and increase information sharing. Additionally, we will
continue to encourage participation by additional Allies and partners
through avenues such as GLOBAL SENTINEL and Joint Task Force-Space
Defense Joint Commercial Operations (JCO). Last, I would expand our
reciprocal network of exchange and liaison officers.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the
leaders of other nations' military space operations enterprises,
international consultative forums regarding space operations, and
processes for enhancing space-related interoperability between Allies
and partners?
Answer. I have a solid working relationship with the military
leaders of our most capable Allies and partners in the space arena. I
plan to continue to foster relationships with Allied and partner space
leadership should I be confirmed through engagements in a variety of
forums and specific strategic engagements. These include the CSpO
Initiative, annual Space Symposium, USSPACECOM Commander's Conference,
as well as numerous opportunities to engage Allied and partner leaders
at home and abroad. Given the global nature of the space domain, I
intend to reach out to space leaders across the globe to further
strengthen relationships that can help us achieve our objectives in
support of the National Defense Strategy.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with the
leaders of the private sector commercial space operations community and
how would you engage with them if confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space
Command?
Answer. I have a solid working relationship with a number of
commercial space leaders, and have worked with them in various forums
and activities for the past decade. Further, USSPACECOM published the
Combatant Command's (CCMD) Commercial Integration Strategy during the
summer of 2022, which seeks to partner, collaborate, and integrate
commercial capabilities into the CCMD's space warfighting architecture.
If confirmed, I would continue implementing the various lines of effort
within the Commercial Integration Strategy with the ultimate end-State
of enhancing overall military space power through commercial
integration.
Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits
associated with building partnerships with private industry to
accomplish certain SPACECOM missions and activities? How would you
mitigate any risks you identify?
Answer. Building partnerships with private industry expands the
ability for USSPACECOM to conduct its mission. Many space effects and
capabilities can be accomplished or conducted by private industry in
ways that are advantageous, because: (1) commercial funding is not
beholden to the POM cycle, (2) they have access to independent research
and development funding (IRAD), and (3) their acquisition process is
agile and is based on market principles. Some examples are Space Domain
Awareness, SATCOM, and space-based imaging/surveillance. Risks which we
must closely watch are the targeting of commercial assets by potential
adversaries, to include the risk of cyberattack. By working in close
partnership with commercial industry and relevant agencies such as
USCYBERCOM and the Services, we can reduce this risk.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve
information-sharing, integration, coordination, and collaboration
between SPACECOM, other DOD commands and organizations, the
Intelligence Community, and other governmental agencies?
Answer. The Command's success relies on a Whole of Government
approach and integration of Allies and partners, including commercial
entities. We will proactively seek to expand our influence through
space domain awareness sharing agreements, technology exchanges, and
transparency through routine engagements. USSPACECOM works with OSD to
prioritize information within USSPACECOM's areas of responsibilities
for sharing with the interagency and our allies and foreign partners.
USSPACECOM continues to grow an embedded presence of national agencies
at our headquarters to facilitate integration and information exchange.
Likewise, the Command has embedded Joint Integrated Space Teams at each
combatant command.
spacecom
Question. In your view, what are the priority tasks you will, if
confirmed, undertake as the Commander, U.S. Space Command?
Answer. The CCDR's priority tasks, IAW 10 U.S.C. Sec. 164, are to
exercise the authority of combatant command giving authoritative
direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out
missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction
over all aspects of military operations, Joint training, and logistics;
prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the
command; organizing commands and forces within that command as he
considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;
employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry
out missions assigned to the command; assigning command functions to
subordinate commanders; coordinating and approving those aspects of
administration and support (including control of resources and
equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline
necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and exercising
the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders,
selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and
convening courts-martial.
Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, how would
you structure the command and its subordinate components to unify the
command and control of operational forces in the space operations
domain across the Intelligence Community and the Military Services?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to structure USSPACECOM and
subordinate components to drive an integrated unity of effort across
the Services, the Intelligence Community, and the Combatant Commands to
enable a warfighting space architecture that unifies C2 while
increasing the speed and effectiveness of response. As the Space
Operations Command (SpOC) Commander, I have had the opportunity to
participate in key USSPACECOM exercises and assess options to better
enable our warfighting approach. If confirmed, I am committed to
continuing those reviews and maintaining an agile and lean staff
structure that remains focused on maintaining our competitive advantage
in the space domain for years to come.
Question. If confirmed, what first steps would you take to
integrate space operations and activity planning and execution across
all combatant commanders' campaign and contingency plans?
Answer. With space as a global domain that enables all other
warfighters, it is critical that USSPACECOM plans are integrated with
other combatant commands. If confirmed, I will continue the integration
that was the hallmark of the process which produced USSPACECOM's first
operational plan (OPLAN). USSPACECOM planners conducted over 30
engagements with fellow combatant command planners and the Joint Staff
to ensure this plan enabled their warfighting objectives and to
establish requirements for when terrestrial and cyber effects would be
required to meet USSPACECOM OPLAN objectives. Additionally, we will
continue our campaign efforts and work with other combatant commands to
compete with the pacing challenge on all fronts. This includes ensuring
that space capabilities are synchronized with other combatant command
efforts for integrated deterrence. Finally, we must coordinate and
collaborate with other combatant commands as we build our partnerships
with countries from around the globe to enhance operational capability,
leverage key terrain, and shape strategic messaging to provide a
competitive advantage over the PRC.
Question. In your view, where is SPACECOM in its ongoing effort to
reach Initial Operating Capability? Full Operating Capability?
Answer. USSPACECOM achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in
the summer of 2021. The Command will soon reach full operational
capability (FOC) having surpassed several milestones: (1) Accomplishing
its UCP missions alongside global campaigning, exercising, and
responding to crisis; (2) Attaining the right number and skills for
human capital; (3) Acquiring the infrastructure needed to support C2
across USSPACECOM mission and business functions; (4) Establishing
necessary command processes and functions; (5) Setting the conditions
and requirements for the future fight; (6) Strengthening Allied and
international partnerships; and (7) Integrating commercial
capabilities.
Question. In your view, what missions, functions, and tasks should
remain in each Service and which should transfer to U.S. Space Force?
Answer. The Services' functions as force and capability providers
to the CCMDs are generally clear in the lanes of organizing, training,
and equipping personnel, producing and providing equipment, and support
to fielded systems. In the space domain, it is not surprising that
United States Space Force, as a Service singularly focused on this
domain, is the primary force provider to United States Space Command.
The other Services, however, continue to provide critical capabilities
to USSPACECOM as well in fulfillment of UCP responsibilities. Like the
USSF, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force may retain some space
capabilities within their Service combat elements to further their
Service-particular missions. Those capabilities should not be
duplicative to the global capabilities provided by United States Space
Force. In general, with the planned transfer of the Joint Tactical Air
Ground System (JTAGS) from the Army to the Space Force planned for
FY24, I think the missions, functions, and tasks will be appropriately
aligned within the Services.
spacecom operational missions and tasks
The Commander, U.S. Space Command, is responsible for the planning
and execution of global space operations missions and activities,
providing space-related support to other combatant commands and their
operational plans, and the defense of space assets.
Question. What are your views on the ``pros'' and ``cons'' of unity
of command as compared to unity of effort in space with respect to
other assets in space under the Intelligence Community?
Answer. Today we effectively execute unity of command of our Joint
space forces and unity of effort among USSPACECOM and NRO forces. The
relationship between USSPACECOM and the NRO is excellent and effective.
We're well aligned through our protect and defend strategy, concept of
operations, programs, and organizations. We have built a strong ``unity
of effort'' construct at the National Space Defense Center, which
serves us very well in day-to-day space operations. If confirmed, I
look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship.
Question. Should there be a conflict--whether in space or another
domain--what are your views on the importance of unity of command or
unity of effort between DODand Intelligence Community assets, both in
space on the ground?
Answer. Given the integral nature of our civilian and military
space systems to our way of life and way of warfare, it is absolutely
essential to have unity of command and unity of effort where and when
required to maximize delivery of effects and optimized efficient use of
space capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with every
organization that operates U.S. Government space assets to ensure all
US national security assets are protected and defended, and will, as
directed, protect those Allied, partner, and critical commercial space
capabilities as well.
Question. In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of
command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in
ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and Allied space
assets? Please explain you answer.
Answer. Unity of command is absolutely required for Joint forces
during a time of conflict, and the creation of USSPACECOM clearly
provides that in the space AOR. For organizations and assets not placed
under Combatant Command authority, unit of effort is a sound approach,
even in a time of conflict and even when protecting and defending space
assets. Today, USSPACECOM and the NRO have created an effective unity
of effort construct to ensure we protect and defend our assets in
concert from the National Space Defense Center.
Question. Do you believe that in the event of a conflict in space,
reliance on a single operational commander would benefit or detract
from U.S. success? Please explain you answer.
Answer. The creation of USSPACECOM in 2019 provides the single
Combatant Commander responsible for operations in the space AOR and for
supporting the rest of the Joint Force. Since the creation of the
command, it has produced unity of command inside the Department and
unity of effort with organizations outside of DOD. It is vital we
sustain USSPACECOM, and if confirmed, I will continue to look for ways
to optimize the internal command and control of the command.
The tasking of on-orbit assets must be conducted, and the data
collected made available in a timeframe relevant to the warfighter, in
order to ensure mission accomplishment.
Question. Given the current allocation of authorities and
responsibilities across DODand the Intelligence Community, in your view
can these processes be accelerated to increase mission impact? If so,
how?
Answer. USSPACECOM is a warfighting combatant command focused on
protecting and defending national security on-orbit space capabilities,
which allows for the continuous delivery of sensor data, satellite
communications, and navigation to the Joint Force, the Nation, and our
Allies and partners. A comprehensive review of classification for
collection data would ensure widest dissemination possible to the
warfighter in a timely fashion. Additionally, continued integration and
exchange of personnel between USSPACECOM and intelligence organizations
will foster common understanding of strategic, operational, and
tactical uses of on-orbit data collection. Leveraging technology, in
particular machine to machine interfaces and machine learning/
artificial intelligence, will better orchestrate collection and
accelerate existing processes to a greater degree.
Question. Given the growth of both the space enterprise and threats
to space assets, how will you ensure the mission resiliency and
survivability of SPACECOM assets?
Answer. In order to achieve both resiliency and survivability of
space combat power, I will advocate for a multi-faceted and multi-
layered approach that leverages diversity in assets, orbits, and
relationships with Allies, partners, and commercial suppliers, as well
as integration of defensive technologies in our space systems. I also
recognize that the defense of space assets may require support from
other combatant commanders, and USSPACECOM must be integrated into the
Joint fires planning process to ensure those supporting requirements
are established. With strong budget support, improvements are underway
in both offensive and defensive space capabilities. We are developing
new counterspace systems while new and legacy space systems are
incorporating defensive measures, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
We'll need to effectively integrate those capabilities across all
domains and ensure requisite authorities are in place.
DOD military operations against peer competitors and rogue nation
threats require constant monitoring and tracking of critical ground and
air mobile targets, close integration between space and airborne
intelligence systems, and tight coupling with strike planning and
execution systems.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to satisfy these
warfighting requirements from space?
Answer. If confirmed, I will push for an integrated approach to
defend our space capabilities and provide space-based capabilities to
the warfighter. On orbit we are building capacity to secure our
satellites systems which provide these essential services. We are
increasing our ability to see satellites on orbit and identify
nefarious actions of our peer competitors. We are working with our
Allies and partners to establish norms of behavior for responsible
nations to follow and enhance security of our orbiting systems. Space
is increasingly congested and contested. Nefarious actions of our
competitors necessitate we adapt and build our capacity to defend our
critical space systems. Defending against the scope and scale of
existing and emerging threats necessitates close cooperation in all
warfighting domains. Delivering space-based capabilities to the
warfighter is our top priority given the high ground of space delivers
a critical advantage to our Nation's warfighters.
Question. What are the implications of these tactical military
requirements for constellation planning, processing agility, speed of
dissemination, and coordination with the Military Services and
commanders?
Answer. Tactical requirements necessitate greater integration of
space warfighting operations, intelligence, capabilities, and personnel
into military plans and staffs. The integration of superior space
capabilities into and throughout the Joint Force, along with
operational integration with Allies and partners, is essential for
securing our military advantage against threats in space. The
establishment of USSPACECOM, with a full-time operational focus on the
integration and employment of military space power, further enables DOD
to meet tactical warfighter needs on operationally relevant timelines.
USSPACECOM has embedded Joint Integrated Space Teams within each of the
other combatant commands to globally integrate space operations for
execution.
Question. Tasking and control between overhead satellites has grown
and evolved significantly.
If confirmed, what would you do to ensure unity of effort and
deconfliction of taskings in the space warfighting domain across DOD
and the Intelligence Community?
Answer. USSPACECOM ensures unity of effort and deconfliction
through existing processes and mechanisms for the Intelligence
Community and United States Space Command. The Command leverages the
large, embedded presence of the national agencies in the headquarters
to facilitate integration. The Intelligence Community responds to the
National Intelligence Priorities Framework to which we have input. The
Command prioritizes and coordinates our needs through the intelligence
requirement systems managed by the national agencies. I will focus on
the National Defense Strategy, our UCP responsibilities, our approved
Operations Plan, and resulting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
to drive Joint Force operations in the space domain. The Command's
Joint Reconnaissance Center and J2 collections team emphasize those
PIRs, ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across the DODand IC
to meet warfighting needs.
Question. In your view, would there be operational advantages in
National Security Agency (NSA) and National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) overhead tasking organizations fully integrated their
operations? Please explain your answer.
Answer. USSPACECOM ensures unity of effort and deconfliction
through existing processes and mechanisms for deconfliction between the
Intelligence Community and United States Space Command. The Command
leverages the large, embedded presence of the representatives from
Intelligence Community organizations in the headquarters to facilitate
integration. The Intelligence Community responds to the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework to which we have input. The Command
prioritizes and coordinates our needs through the intelligence
requirement systems managed by the national agencies. I will focus on
the National Defense Strategy, our UCP responsibilities, our approved
Operations Plan, and my resulting Priority Intelligence Requirements
(PIR) to drive Joint Force operations in the space domain. The
Command's Joint Reconnaissance Center and J2 collections team emphasize
those PIRs, ensuring unity of effort and deconfliction across the
DODand IC to meet warfighting needs.
Question. In your view, would operational advantages accrue to our
military forces if operations tasking National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) satellites were closely integrated with DOD airborne intelligence
collection and targeting operations? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Intelligence Community provides timely, and relevant
intelligence to United States Space Command that enables the Command to
execute our UCP responsibilities. I would defer to the Secretary of
Defense on how to best organize the elements of the Intelligence
Community to support the warfighter, including the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise.
Question. What are your views and long-term vision of tactically
responsive space?
Answer. USSPACECOM's top priority is delivering space-based
capabilities to warfighters around the globe in the face of the threats
now arrayed against us. The needs of all Joint warfighters will always
be paramount as we work to improve the delivery of those capabilities
and protect and defend them against threats.
The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency that is not
designated as a combat support agency (CSA) as defined in the
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Historically, the NRO
has asserted that is should not be designated as a CSA because it does
not make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds
and controls. In NRO's view, others, principally its Intelligence
Community mission partners NSA and NGA, both of which are designated as
CSAs, are responsible for determining the requirements that guide NRO
satellite designs and the operational tasking of deployed satellites.
However, there exists a class of operational decisions for which the
NRO Director is responsible. In situations in which U.S. satellites are
under attack or threatened with the same, the NRO Director has the
authority to make operational decisions regarding space control.
Question. In your view, what should be the relationship between the
Commander, U.S. Space Command, and the Director of the NRO when
responding to hostile acts or evidence of hostile intent that threaten
or could threaten DODand NRO space assets?
Answer. USSPACECOM and the NRO have developed Loki's Gambit, an
exercise specifically designed to develop vignettes which test the two
organizations current roles, responsibilities, and authorities to
ensure a seamless relationship at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. This has paid dividends in establishing and codifying
processes at the National Space Defense Center (NSDC) as well as
coordination between the two headquarters. Much like our role with the
other Combatant Commands, we have seen vignettes which require a myriad
of supported/supporting relationships and we continue to work through
each to ensure synergistic operations.
Question. Do you agree with maintaining separation between the NRO
and the U.S. Space Force?
Answer. I do. I believe maintaining distinction between military
operations and intelligence activities is appropriate. The current
division of National ISR acquisition and operations conducted by NRO
and defense acquisition and operations conducted by the Services and
USSPACECOM respectively nsures each organization maintains focus on
their respective mission set.
Question. Are there any conditions or circumstances, in your view,
in which NRO and space operations forces should be integrated, going
forward?
Answer. We have co-located USSPACECOM and NRO protect and defend
operations today in a unity of effort construct at the National Space
Defense Center (NSDC) at Schriever Space Force Base. It has become a
model for integrated protect and defend operations between USSPACECOM,
the NRO, and USSF. At the NSDC, we coordinate, collaborate, and
deconflict operations and support program protections to ensure all
these organizations meet protect and defend mission requirements as an
integrated team.
Question. Would it be advisable, in your view, for the Commander,
U.S. Space Command, to be in the chain of command for the tasking of
NRO satellites in conflict situations, as a means of rationalizing
space command and control in support of U.S. military forces?
Answer. Though our current unity of effort construct with the NRO
at the NSDC, we have shared plans, procedures, and tactics for
protecting and defending our space capabilities together. This allows
us to act in a unified manner even during higher states of readiness.
Question. In your view, would it be feasible and advisable to apply
the model in which the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, serves also as
the Director of NSA and reports to the DNI on national intelligence
operations, to the Commander, U.S. Space Command, in order to grant
authority to control the tasking of national intelligence space assets
in support of military forces in combat?
Answer. I do not believe this is necessary at this time. Policies,
directives, and processes continue to assure our military forces in
combat will obtain the necessary tasking of national intelligence space
assets for support in combat.
Space Operations Joint Force Provider to other Combatant Commands
If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Space Command, you will be charged
with providing trained and ready Joint space operations forces to other
Combatant Commands. If confirmed, what would be your approach to
executing each of following responsibilities:
Question. Identifying and recommending global Joint sourcing
solutions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination
with the military Services and other combatant commands.
Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the existing Global Force
Management process and work with the supported combatant commands and
Services to ensure the priorities and weight of effort are best suited
to the supported commander. USSPACECOM has made tremendous strides
aligning Service presented forces to supported commanders identifying
risks, tradeoffs, and opportunities for employment of space
capabilities. If confirmed, I will advocate and integrate with other
combatant commands determining the best courses of action for global
Joint sourcing solutions.
Question. Inculcating in space operations forces across all
military Services and in the active and Reserve components a
warfighting culture and ethos.
Answer. USSPACECOM has made significant progress in developing the
warfighting spirit within the command. If confirmed, I will build on
those efforts, leveraging the efforts by the military Services to grow
that warfighting culture. Space is a warfighting domain and requires a
warfighting mentality by the men and women charged with defending it.
Question. Embedding at each combatant command staff a space
planning cell, consistent with SPACECOM's overall responsibilities
under the UCP.
Answer. USSPACECOM's Joint Integrated Space Teams (JIST) are
designed to provide space operational expertise to all combatant
commands enabling the integration of space operations into combatant
command operational planning. The JIST support intelligence, planning,
and executing, through education, integration, advocacy, and
communication of all space-related activities that pertain to
USSPACECOM UCP-assigned roles and responsibilities. JIST intelligence
professionals link the USSPACECOM J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations
Center to the other combatant commands.
Question. Establishing enterprise-wide standards for the training
and readiness of space operations forces across all military Services
and in the active and Reserve components.
Answer. USSPACECOM J7 has drafted training tasks and learning
outcomes for all DOD non-space personnel at various levels of
responsibility, ranging from our most junior enlisted troops to senior
flag and general officers. Once approved, these tasks will be provided
to the Services for inclusion in their common task training programs.
Question. Validating space operations forces are fully trained and
interoperable with other forces.
Answer. Recently, USSPACECOM moved the J7 directorate from the J3
directorate and assigned a general officer directly responsible for
these efforts. This was the right move as the command started to reach
its directed end strength. If confirmed, I will ensure the J7 is
providing the most robust training possible to supplement Service-
provided education and remain flexible to the changes in the operating
environment. As required, our training will also include coalition
forces ensuring a more lethal and ready Combined force.
Question. Conducting and supporting Joint exercises, experiments,
and war games.
Answer. With the changes in the strategic threat environment, if
confirmed, I will continue to prioritize the integration of
counterspace scenarios into exercises to ensure the Joint Force is
ready to protect and defend its space Area of Responsibility. This
requires the CDR to simultaneously be the supported and supporting
commander. To adequately exercise the duality of this position, and
fully exercise the physical and cognitive actions required to defend
the space AOR, USSPACECOM established its own Tier-1 Exercise series,
APOLLO GRIFFIN. USSPACECOM's first Tier-1 exercise campaign will
commence with a scaled-down event in FY24, preceding a full event in
FY25. Additionally, the command will continue to participate in other
CCMD and Allied exercises, Joint Wargames and Experimentation events to
continue to strengthen our Joint and Combined interoperability as well
as evaluate our force design considerations.
Question. Developing recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff regarding strategy; doctrine; concepts of operation;
tactics; and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Joint
employment of space operations forces and space capabilities.
Answer. Continue advancing the institutionalization of the space
domain across Joint Force processes to bring space into planning
processes early and often. This will ensure that space requirements are
captured and integrated from the onset to inform critical analyses and
decisionmaking considerations. USSPACECOM continues to infuse space
equities and representation in applicable Joint Staff forums, ensuring
that fellow combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and OSD understand the
underpinning that space-based and space-enabling capabilities provide
across Joint Force activities. USSPACECOM's approach to developing
doctrine is two-fold. As a member of the Joint Doctrine Development
Community, USSPACECOM ensures space is appropriately represented in all
Joint Publications.
equipping space operations forces and providing space operations
capabilities
Question. Part and parcel of DOD's enhanced approached to the
domain of space, the Department has established the Space Development
Agency (SDA). In testimony before this Committee, DOD officials
reinforced that the first and most important task assigned to the SDA
is to develop, in cooperation with the space industry, a highly
distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting
operations. In 2018, the NRO published a document stating:
``NRO provides the Nation's unified space-based ISR overhead
architecture, addressing the needs of both national and tactical users.
The nation does not need a competing and duplicative set of
capabilities from what is currently being provided and developed to
address these needs. Setting up a competing, tactically focused ISR
overhead architecture will cause budgetary and congressional issues for
both DODand IC, and should be avoided. Splitting the national overhead
architecture into capabilities that focus on IC customers vs. DOD
customers will create a seam where a seam does not exist today--all
will lose in this proposed end-State. The nation is better off with a
national agency chartered to develop intelligence capabilities that are
operated/orchestrated as an architecture to support both IC and
DODmissions.''
Do you share the view that neither the SDA nor the Space Rapid
Capabilities Office should be engaged in acquiring and fielding
satellites that provide tactical support to military operations?
Answer. While these organizations are not assigned to USSPACECOM, I
think that SDA and the SpRCO should be engaged in acquiring and
fielding satellites as long they deliver rapidly developed, and
effective systems for warfighting, to include providing tactical
support to military operations.
Question. Should NRO be the only organization in the U.S.
Government with the mission of acquiring satellites capable of
collecting intelligence from space? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The NRO has proven itself to be the world's premier
provider of ISR from space, and they have developed deep expertise in
the acquisition of ISR satellites. As ISR from space continues to grow
and evolve, we should be open to other organizations leading
acquisition efforts which provide ISR from space when required. This
should be done in full collaboration with the NRO to deconflict
efforts, leverage best of breed capabilities, and take advantage of
organizational strengths among the various acquisition organizations.
Question. In your view is there an appropriate role for the SDA in
providing a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support
military targeting operational requirements?
Answer. Yes, and I look forward to the delivery of the current
systems being developed by the SDA.
Question. Do you perceive any advantages to establishing the SDA as
the defense organization charged to focus on tactical space capability
speed to market by leveraging commercial technologies and products?
Answer. There are advantages in leveraging commercial technologies
and products; however, this must also be balanced with operational
needs, data sharing requirements/constraints, data assurance (open
architectures), and technological advances with the business models of
the commercial partners. Many of the Services and agencies that develop
space capabilities are charged with the responsibility to bring
tactical space capability by leveraging commercial technologies and
products at speed. Additionally, all acquisition organizations should
be taking advantage of leveraging commercial technologies and products
to improve the speed and cost of capability development efforts.
Question. In addition to sharing technology, how could the
capabilities vested in the NRO and the SDA be employed to rationalize
and harmonize the efforts of both organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts of the
Program Integration Council (of which USSPACECOM is a member) which
brings together all the acquisition organizations (to include the NRO
and SDA) providing capability in support of United States Space Command
and the national security space enterprise, to ensure the programs
being delivered by these various organizations integrate together to
improve the combat effectiveness and resiliency of our systems.
Question. As regards the SDA's role in equipping space operations
forces and providing innovative capabilities and capacity for space
operations, how would you propose to solve, in short order, the long-
standing problems associated with overly bureaucratic and late-to-need
systems and processes for identifying requirements for, and developing,
procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities?
Answer. I think SDA needs to continue to operate under their
authorities to rapidly field current technologies to stay ahead of our
competitors. To field space warfighting capabilities on time, we need
to hold our contractors and acquisition centers accountable, while
ensuring requirements creep does not affect delivery of weapon systems.
Continued legislative reforms coupled with a number of internal DOD
reforms to the requirements and acquisition processes, are putting us
on the right trajectory to speed development and fielding of critical
space capabilities.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DODhas
identified ten key areas--space among them--in which investment to
develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative. Much of
the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for
national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional
defense industry.
What do you see as the most significant challenges, to include
technical, organizational, or cultural challenges, to U.S. development
of technologies key to dominance in space, or gaining access to such
technologies from the commercial marketplace?
Answer. DOD acquisitions processes have traditionally been slow to
integrate new technology into program of record activities due either
to funding limitations or concerns with mission assurance. Prioritizing
R&D funding and recognizing that U.S. space capabilities will be
aggressively targeted by our competitors, we must shift our focus from
solely maximizing capability on orbit and prioritize R&D resources to
equally maximize survivability of those capabilities. Key force
enhancement technology remains a focus, to provide space-based force-
multiplier capabilities to warfighters in all domains. Now we must also
address our expanded mission and necessary competitive viability, and
therefore expect increased focus in defending the space domain and
providing for the freedom of action in space.
Question. In your view, has DOD properly integrated and
synchronized investments in technologies key to space across all its
components?
Answer. The DOD strategically prioritizes it investments in
capabilities, platforms and other vital technologies based on the needs
of components and urgency of their missions.
Question. How has DOD prioritized limited research and development
(R&D) funding across key areas of space-related technology?
Specifically, in your view, where is DOD either increasing, or
decreasing, its focus and funding?
Answer. In this rapidly developing era of competition, it is
important that we have the ability to direct R&D funds and efforts
critical to developing the right space technologies at the right time.
Additionally, US Space Command is collaborating with the other CCMDs
and Services on numerous Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations
(JCTD) and Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER). These valuable
programs award short term funding for critical experiments in S&T using
federally funded R&D centers.
Question. In your view, how is the Department balancing space-
related revolutionary capability advancements compared to ``quick win''
incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?
Answer. By engaging private industry for commercial off the shelf
solutions and simultaneously working experimentation projects, DOD is
always moving forward to maintain a technological advantage. Utilizing
DOD programs such as the Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of
Innovative Technologies (APFIT), USSPACEOM encourages expeditious
transition of technologies from development into production and is
working to accelerate the fielding of those technologies to the
warfighter.
Question. In your view, how can the Department better integrate the
operational experience of the warfighter into the R&D process? Are
there appropriate places to interject warfighter input into the
interaction between the DOD research and engineering community and the
private sector?
Answer. It is vital warfighters, requirement generators, and
acquisition organizations collaborate early and often in the
development of new capabilities. If confirmed, I will maximize this
engagement through the Program Integration Council, the Space
Acquisition Council, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office's Board of
Directors, and other existing forums.
Question. If confirmed, how would you leverage experimentation and
prototyping opportunities for new technologies and concepts that might
be beneficial for the space enterprise, or better support specific
Service or CCMD roles in Joint operations?
Answer. USSPACECOM must continue to support rapid prototyping and
development to expedite the integration of new technology into DOD
space operations at a pace which exceeds that of our potential
adversaries. We need to leverage front-end, low-cost, higher-risk
prototyping and experimentation to buy down overall enterprise risk,
refine capability requirements, and progress at a competitively viable
pace.
Commercial technology often surpasses the innovative edge once held
by the military and the Intelligence Community in the domain of space.
Industry is rapidly expanding into space, and may eclipse the
capabilities of our national security satellites in both technology and
ability to reconstitute in space.
Question. Do you believe it wise for DOD to take advantage of these
commercial developments? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, we must take advantage of the capabilities American
industry brings to us in space. The accelerating commercialization of
space presents new and significant opportunities across the Joint
Force. Partnering with commercial entities enables USSPACECOM to adapt
faster, innovate more reliably, integrate cutting-edge technology on an
accelerated timeline, bolster space architecture resilience, develop a
better understanding of the space domain, expedite decisionmaking, and
devise economical solutions to strategic problems.
Question. What is your understanding of the efforts DOD is making
to identify space-relevant new technologies developed commercially and
apply them to military and national security purposes?
Answer. DOD seeks to accelerate space-relevant technology
development across the commercial space enterprise through numerous
innovative programs, to include the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and
AFWERX/SpaceWERX. These programs allow for DOD requirements advocacy
and investment opportunities that help steer the commercial space
enterprise toward filling select DOD capability gaps.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that commercial
technology is appropriately incorporated into SPACECOM mission
execution at acceptable risk levels? What are the challenges that you
perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and
DOD?
Answer. At all times, we will encourage the Services and other
acquisition organizations to first look to buy existing commercial
capabilities when it can meet our requirements, then look to exploit
available commercial technologies for military purposes, and finally,
to build military-unique systems only when required. American industry
is an asymmetric advantage for the United States and USSPACECOM.
Question. In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and
strengthen our National Security Innovation Base both to promote space-
related innovation and to ensure that critical information is
protected?
Answer. DOD seeks to identify common cyber security standards for
commercial space capabilities within the NSIB in order to protect and
strengthen critical information. If confirmed, I will work with the
Services and other acquisition organizations to encourage them to
include sufficient cyber defense language in their contracts with
commercial industry.
The national security space community has begun to blend the use of
traditional spacecraft and new flexible small satellites to provide
improved mission support to users.
Question. In your view, how can SPACECOM exploit commercial launch
and other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid
replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems,
while minimizing the risk of mission failure?
Answer. USSPACECOM relies on the Space Force to launch the
capabilities needed for employment in the space AOR. Given the
remarkable string of successes we have seen over the past couple of
decades in national security launch, I have full faith in the Space
Force's efforts to continue to onboard new launch providers who may
offer reduced costs. Further, if confirmed, I will continue
USSPACECOM's efforts to work with the Space Force on responsive launch
demonstrations as we work to operationalize a responsive launch
capability.
One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to
develop advanced technologies that will benefit the warfighter. In this
regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the
development phase to testing and evaluation, and ultimately into a
program of record in order to deploy the capability to the warfighter.
Question. What challenges do you perceive to effectively
transitioning technologies development from research programs into
programs of record?
Answer. Timing and funding--USSPACECOM must work with the Services,
CCMDs and other transition partners to better align POM requirements
during important milestones in technology development and throughout
the program's lifecycle. It is vital that new programs of record are
delivered as ``fully burdened'' programs with all the DOTMLP-F
considerations funded, to include sufficient test and training ranges
which will allow the Services to demonstrate the effectiveness of their
new systems before they are fielded and presented to USSPACECOM.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to ensure
that the DOD space enterprise is quickly and directly benefiting from
research being performed across the defense research enterprise?
Answer. USSPACECOM will execute a robust communication strategy
between the Services, CCMDs and DOD S&T organizations to prioritize R&D
funding and bolster inter-Service efforts. I will also work with the
military Services, developers, acquirers, commercial partners and the
Intelligence Community to ensure we're seeking the right capabilities
and systems that enhance the readiness and lethality of our space
systems. I will work with all appropriate stakeholders to ensure we're
defining and relaying the warfighting requirements that will keep our
Nation ahead of the threat.
Question. How do you see the laboratory facilities across the DOD
research enterprise contributing to DOD's goals for developing
technology for the warfighter?
Answer. USSPACECOM will continue to collaborate on numerous Joint
Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) and Rapid Defense
Experimentation Reserve (RDER) with the other CCMDs and Services,
awarding short-term funding for critical experiments in S&T using
federally funded R&D centers and labs.
Question. Do you think these in-house R&D facilities are keeping
pace with the needs of the Department? If not, what do you think could
be done to improve our ability to modernize R&D infrastructure?
Answer. I do not have sufficient personal information about the
labs to answer this question at this time. If confirmed, I look forward
to working closely with the committee on any concerns I may develop
about DOD's in-house R&D facilities and laboratories.
china
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
China in space?
Answer. The PRC has a grand strategy for economic and military
dominance in the space domain that extends for decades as a national
priority; the PRC aims to be a global space leader by 2030. Over the
past two decades, the PRC has worked to develop capabilities and
advanced technologies to erode core U.S. military advantages such as
power projection and rapid global space-enabled fires. Its military is
actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into
multi-domain warfighting strategies to position themselves as space
powers and create improved balance of power dynamics in their near
abroad as well as globally.
Question. In what ways, if any, do China's strategic objectives in
space conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?
Answer. The PRC has a grand strategy for economic and military
dominance in the space domain that extends for decades as a national
priority; the PRC aims to be a global space leader by 2030. Over the
past two decades, the PRC has worked to develop capabilities and
advanced technologies to erode core U.S. military advantages such as
power projection and rapid global space-enabled fires. Its military is
actively integrating advanced space and counterspace systems into
multi-domain warfighting strategies to position themselves as space
powers and create improved balance of power dynamics in their near
abroad as well as globally.
Conversely, the U.S. promotes space activities that can be
conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner. Because
space capabilities, both government and commercial, enable the entire
American way of life from our economy to how we enable our Joint Force,
the PRC's commitment to both economic and military dominance in space
along with development of counter-space capabilities place the entire
U.S. system at risk.
Question. To what extent do you view China's activities related to
the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security
interests?
Answer. The PRC is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in
space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that the
U.S. has accrued from space leadership. The PRC continues to strengthen
its military space capabilities, investing in space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and
navigation. It is also improving satellite meteorology, human
spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. The PLA owns and operates
about half of the world's space based ISR systems. These capabilities
support the PLA's ability to monitor, track, and target U.S. and Allied
forces worldwide. In July 2021, the PRC conducted the first fractional
orbital bombardment system test with a hypersonic glide vehicle that
circumnavigated the Earth, starting from and returning to China. This
demonstrated the greatest distance flown and the longest flight time
(?100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapon system to date.
Question. In your view, which Chinese initiatives and capabilities
pose the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets?
Please explain your answer?
Answer. The rapid advancement and proliferation of the PRC's
counterspace capabilities, and efforts to integrate those capabilities
into their Joint military operations, presents a significant risk to
U.S. space-related capabilities and assets. In just the last decade,
the PRC has doubled its launches per year, and significantly increased
the number of satellites in orbit. They have developed and tested
multiple ASAT missiles and space-based robotic arm technology that is
able to destroy or manipulate satellites. The PRC has also developed
multiple jammers to deny satellite communications and our Global
Positioning System. These counterspace capabilities have the potential
to target other space-based capabilities that support both military
power and civilian life. The wide array of tools being developed by the
PRC could be utilized to hinder U.S. military response to a conflict,
target U.S. civilian infrastructure, and hold U.S. and Allied space
assets in multiple orbits at risk.
Question. In your view, are U.S. policies and associated
authorities, as applicable to space operations and assets, sufficient
to counter China's activities and influence, or are there additional
measures we should be considering? What role should SPACECOM play in
this regard?
Answer. I support the policies and authorities outlined in the
Defense Space Strategy and other relevant strategic document.
USSPACECOM leads the Department's effort countering China's malign
activities and influence in the space domain. Similar to other
Combatant Commands, USSPACECOM has a Secretary of Defense-approved
Operational Plan which identifies the authorities required to execute
that plan. USSPACECOM's role is to identify and advocate for
authorities required to execute its responsibilities as stipulated in
its OPLAN. If I am confirmed and additional authorities are needed to
meet USSPACECOM UCP responsibilities, I would pursue those additional
authorities with the Secretary to ensure USSPACECOM has the ability to
counter China's activities if required.
Question. Which additional capabilities will be most important to
maintaining the U.S. advantage over China in space, in your view?
Answer. We must deliver space-enabling capabilities to the Joint
warfighter for all our UCP missions and this requires both resilient
systems and the ability to impose costs and hold the PRC systems at
risk. This includes on-orbit, link, and ground segments, exploiting
commercial capabilities like artificial intelligence, data analytics,
and advanced computing. We must invest in and continue to develop
offensive and defensive space control capabilities, along with the
associated command and control architecture that will enable us to
achieve and sustain space superiority throughout the spectrum of
conflict. Finally, we need to continue to reform our acquisition
processes to make them more agile and risk tolerant.
Finally, as the PRC pursues space technologies that can provide
them strategic advantages in space, we cannot overestimate the
importance of attracting and retaining the most talented people our
Nation can offer--those who can out-think and out-perform the
competition.
russia
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
Russia in space?
Answer. Russia sees space as integral to winning modern wars and
seeks to better incorporate space operations and counterspace
capabilities. According to President Putin, ``Russia must maintain its
status as a leading nuclear and space power.'' Russia's likely
strategic objective in space is to negate perceived U.S. military
dominance in space while maximizing Moscow's declining resources to
regain a leading position in space.
Question. In your view, in what ways, if any, do Russia's strategic
objectives conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?
Answer. Russia sees space as integral to winning modern wars and
seeks to better incorporate space operations and counterspace
capabilities. According to President Putin, ``Russia must maintain its
status as a leading nuclear and space power.'' Russia's likely
strategic objective in space is to negate perceived U.S. military
dominance in space while maximizing Moscow's declining resources to
regain a leading position in the space domain.
Conversely, the U.S. promotes space activities that can be
conducted in a responsible, peaceful, and sustainable manner.
Question. To what extent do you view Russia's activities related to
the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security
interests?
Answer. Russian military doctrine clearly articulates that Russia
views space as a warfighting domain and that achieving supremacy in
space will be a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. Russia
perceives the U.S. dependence on space as our Achilles' heel, which can
be exploited to achieve Russian conflict objectives. Russia is
therefore pursuing counterspace systems to neutralized or deny U.S.
space-based services, both military and commercial, as a means of
offsetting a perceived U.S. military advantage
Question. In your view, which Russian initiatives and capabilities
poses the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets?
Please explain your answer?
Answer. Russia seeks to deny US advantages in space, and as a
result the Kremlin will seek ways to strengthen its counterspace
programs. In the near-term, Russian electronic warfare and cyber
capabilities represent the greatest threat to US systems in terms of
scope and scale. Beyond that, Russian introduction of developmental
ASAT systems present an additional kinetic threat. In the longer term,
there are a number of developmental (or aspirational) systems such as
``inspector'' satellites that could increase the reach of Russian
counterspace systems. All Russian counterspace program advances and
developments are subject to delay due to systemic corruption and/or the
effects of sanctions.
Question. In your view, are U.S. policies and the associated
authorities, as applicable to space operations and assets, sufficient
to counter Russia's activities and influence, or are there additional
measures we should be considering? What role should SPACECOM play in
this regard?
Answer. I understand the policies and authorities as outlined in
the published Defense Space Strategy and other relevant strategic
documents are sufficient. The U.S. continues to be the best in space
and, if confirmed, I will ensure USSPACECOM continues to lead the
Department of Defense's progress toward countering Russia's activities
and influence in the domain. USSPACECOM has a central role in the
shared interest and responsibility of all space-faring nations to
create the conditions for a safe, stable and operationally sustainable
space environment. If I, as the confirmed USSPACECOM commander,
determined additional authorities were required to confront a specific
threat, I would follow department policies and engage with DOD leaders
as needed.
Question. In your view, what types of activities are most important
to deterring Russian aggression in space and mitigating any threat it
may present?
Answer. In my opinion, to deter Russian aggression in space,
building a coalition of nations willing to hold Russia accountable for
their actions in space will allow the U.S. to create collective cost
imposition advantages over Russia by leveraging information sharing
with Allies and partners. If Russian aggression in space presents a
threat to critical U.S., Allied, or partners' space capabilities,
USSPACECOM must have the authorities and capabilities to enable
responses in operationally relevant timelines and negate Russian fait
accomplis. Further, the U.S. and its Allies and partners can leverage
commercial space assets to facilitate releasing information in the
public sphere, generating visceral reactions and catalyzing collective
responses that alter Kremlin cost-benefit analyses.
dodsenior official education and training
Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag
officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the
advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and
technical disciplines needed to lead the future Joint Force and the
scientific and technical civilian workforce?
Answer. Yes, but we must be diligent to attract and retain the best
talent possible into SES positions while promoting scientific and
technical expertise in the Services to grow the General/Flag officers
of the future. Equally important, we must maintain a robust training,
education and experiential program to afford our leaders to keep pace
with the evolving operational environment and technologies.
Question. In your experience, are the career paths for General/Flag
officers and SES with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DODand
its components can develop capability performance requirements that
will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex
acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not,
what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?
Answer. Yes, in my experience, we have the right human capital in
our GO/FO and SES ranks. However, I know that the Department continues
to refine career paths by tailoring requirements to fit specific
mission needs.
Question. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES
assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to
serve in scientific and technical programs? If not, what changes do you
believe are necessary to incentivize qualified senior leaders to seek
assignment to such positions and duties?
Answer. I am not aware of any problems in this regard. The Services
set their requirements for scientific and technical proficiencies for
both General/Flag officers and SES leaders, and assign people with
those capabilities where needed most.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military Services have in place
sufficient training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and
members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance needed to meet
ethical requirements? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, I am satisfied. The principles of ethical conduct
[established by 5 C.F.R Sec. 2635.101 (B)] apply to every military and
civilian employee of the Federal Government. The expectations are clear
and training and resources are provided to address situations
implicating ethics rules. Moreover, every organization I have been a
part of has taken steps to hold General/Flag officers and SES personnel
to the highest standards by continually reminding them of the rules and
putting measures in place with their support staff to encourage direct
identification of any potential violation of those rules either to the
individuals or the IG.
Sexual Assault and Harassment Prevention and Response
Despite significant efforts by the Department and military Services
over the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to,
sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold
assailants accountable, the current data continues to show increasing
prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for
female Service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this
year of increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at
the Military Service Academies.
Question. Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that
the Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to
sexual assault, and to protect Service members who report sexual
assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. I understand that the decision to report sexual assault is
compounded by the very real fear of retaliation. I am now, and always
have been, committed to enforcing zero tolerance for sexual assault and
will continue to support those who make the difficult decision to
report sexual assault to ensure zero reprisal. The Department has
improved its approach to prevention and response and current policies
and programs have come with the resources to ensure victims have
multiple avenues to seek assistance and or file a report of
retaliation. It is vital we complete the implementation of these
programs and ensure they are executed as designed.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for
yourself in preventing sexual harassment witin SPACECOM, including
within its civilian workforce?
Answer. Sexual harassment and sexual assault are crimes, and they
have no place in our military. As the Commander, UnitEd States Space
Command, if confirmed, I will articulate that we will not tolerate
sexual harassment and sexual assault, I will provide training
opportunities to our personnel to prevent future instances of these
crimes, and I will make available resources to those who have been the
victims of these crimes so that they can get the care they need and
also have their cases fully and impartially investigated. I will also
work to eliminate the stigma victims of these crimes may feel which
could prevent them from reporting these crimes.
Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from
Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment
and sexual assault?
Answer. No, not at this time. However, if confirmed, I look forward
to working with the Committee to secure additional authorities if
needed.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
homeland missile defense
1. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Whiting, if confirmed, you
will assume responsibilities as the Global Sensor Manager for missile
defense. Do you believe current missile defense policies reflect all
global threats and adequately encompass rapidly changing missile
technologies?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The DOD's missile defense policies are
evolving to meet the world's rapidly changing missile technologies.
Demonstrated Chinese and Russian investment in hypersonic vehicles and
launch platforms, tests of fractional orbital bombardment systems, and
continued development of missile technologies by Iran and North Korea
have highlighted the need to modernize missile warning and tracking, as
well as continually assess our missile warning and defense policies.
2. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Whiting, if confirmed, you
will be responsible for missile warning sensors and in part for the
Department of Defense's (DOD) space-based command and control systems.
Do you feel these acquisition programs, including the dual use radar
requested in this year's budget for Hawaii, are on track and will meet
your requirements?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The Hawaii radar is a multi-mission
sensor capable of providing missile search, tracking, discrimination,
and space domain awareness. It is a desired capability, but is
currently early in the development and acquisition phase. The
challenges of tracking modern missile threats require continual rigor
in the program management and engineering processes for follow-on
missile warning systems and architectures. If confirmed, I will assess
the Hawaii radar as part of the planned missile defense network to
ensure the Command's requirements are met. While awaiting delivery of
these new systems, I will, if confirmed, continue to assess our
existing missile warning and command and control capabilities to wring
all possible capability out of them.
private sector capabilities
3. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Whiting, the private sector
is leading the way in creating a distributed space sensor network. As
both DOD and the wider U.S. economy rely more on these commercial
technologies, the need to make sure they are cyber resilient and
integrated to DOD systems increases. How are you working with civilian
companies to ensure their capabilities can integrate with existing
Department of Defense systems, which are often highly classified?
Lieutenant General Whiting. United States Space Command has
developed multiple partnership forums with commercial companies who
support the Department of Defense. I will, if confirmed, continue to
support and strengthen the Commercial Integration Cell at Vandenberg
Space Force Base which provides the Command the ability to share
information with these companies at the appropriate classification
levels. I will also, if confirmed, continue to encourage participation
by additional industry partners through avenues such as the Joint
Commercial Operations cell. Finally, if confirmed, I will work to
further the relationship of United States Space Command with the Space
Information Sharing Awareness Center (ISAC) given that one of the
ISAC's focus areas is cyber security of the space enterprise.
4. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Whiting, how is U.S. Space
Command (SPACECOM) working with businesses, and especially small
businesses, to ensure they are resilient from disruption?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The accelerating commercialization of
space presents new and significant opportunities across the Joint
Force. Partnering with commercial entities enables United States Space
Command to adapt faster, innovate more reliably, integrate cutting-edge
technology on an accelerated timeline, bolster space architecture
resilience, develop a better understanding of the space domain,
expedite decisionmaking, and devise economical solutions to strategic
problems.
If confirmed, I will encourage the Services and other acquisition
organizations to first look to buy existing commercial capabilities
when it can meet our requirements, then look to exploit available
commercial technologies for military purposes, and finally, to build
military-unique systems only when required. American industry is an
asymmetric advantage for the United States and United States Space
Command.
If confirmed, I will support the further strengthening of
partnerships with commercial industry through the Commercial
Integration Cell, the Joint Commercial Operations cell, and the Space
Information Sharing Awareness Center.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
arctic presence
5. Senator King. Lieutenant General Whiting, what is your strategy
to improve space-based domain awareness capabilities in the Arctic?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The Arctic is a vital operating
location for United States Space Command and the Department of Defense
as a whole. With space units located at Pituffik Space Base, Greenland,
750 miles north of the Arctic Circle, as well as sub-Arctic units in
Alaska, domain awareness is as vital for United States Space Command as
it is for the rest of the Joint Force and the Nation. Working with the
other CCMDs, Services, agencies, Allies and partners, I will, if
confirmed, work to ensure capabilities such as space-based
environmental monitoring, missile warning, friendly force tracking, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance provide improved
coverage at higher latitudes. This will facilitate a deeper
understanding of the operating environment, monitoring of activities
for efficient commerce by ensuring maritime and air safety, and
modernize our awareness to detect and track potential activities and
threats in the region. Our efforts will directly support the October
2022 United States' National Strategy for the Arctic Region.
6. Senator King. Lieutenant General Whiting, what capability
shortfalls and gaps do you see today?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Today's space architectures were
largely developed and built in a time before space threats from China
and Russia had become such a significant aspect of the space operating
environment. Given these threats, we must continue to pivot our space
systems toward more resilient architectures, while fielding
capabilities to protect and defend our current systems. We must
continually assess our existing architectures and planned capabilities
against evolving threats in the space domain to identify specific gaps
and shortfalls in order to support the development of responsive
solutions. I would welcome the opportunity, if confirmed, to discuss
the specifics of these shortfalls and gaps at the appropriate
classification level.
7. Senator King. Lieutenant General Whiting, what do you need to
close these gaps?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Fielding the next generation of
resilient architectures and protect and defend systems requires the
continued support and cooperation of agencies and departments across
the United States Government, as well as our partners in academia,
commercial, Allied, and S&T communities. We also require and appreciate
the ongoing support from the Congress in the form of resources and
authorities to pursue new solutions and keep pace in the rapidly
changing operational environment.
Challenges in the space domain are complex and dynamic. If
confirmed, I will ensure United States Space Command works closely with
the Services and development agencies to accelerate space-relevant
technology development across the commercial space enterprise through
numerous innovative programs, to include the Defense Innovation Unit
and AFWERX/SpaceWERX. These programs allow DOD to help guide the
commercial space enterprise toward filling select DOD capability gaps.
Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure United States Space
Command continues to document its requirements to close identified gaps
through the development of warfighter capability requirements documents
that will be validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
will drive material solutions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
global threats and requirements
8. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Whiting, according to the
Department of Defense (DOD), China's official defense budget has grown
by an average of 12.1 percent each year since 2001. According to
reports earlier this week, China's defense budget is now expected to
double by 2025, making it more than all the rest of the Asia Pacific
regions combined. What is your assessment of the strategic intent
behind China's military modernization, both in the region and globally?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The People's Republic of China's (PRC)
grand strategic intent is clear as they aim to be a global space leader
by 2030. The 2023 ODNI annual threat assessment states that the PRC is
accelerating the development of key capabilities the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) requires to confront the United States in a
large-scale, sustained conflict. By 2027, they plan to have a military
designed to deter United States intervention in a future cross-strait
crisis. The PLA is actively integrating advanced space and counterspace
systems into multi-domain warfighting strategies to create improved
balance of power dynamics in their near abroad as well as globally. The
PLA's Navy and Air Force are the largest in the region and continue to
field advanced platforms that improve China's ability to establish air
superiority and project power beyond the first island chain. The PLA
Rocket Force's short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional
systems may hold at risk United States forces and bases in the region.
delayed budget and continuing resolutions
9. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Whiting, since the beginning
of the 118th Congress this year, I have continuously asked our
uniformed and civilian DOD leaders about the impacts of a delayed
budget and the use of continuing resolutions. The American Enterprise
Institute threw out a rough estimate of $200 million per day under the
latest continuing resolution that covered the start of fiscal year
2023, that's a total of $18 billion. I have repeatedly asked the
Pentagon for as concise a number as possible to put a figure on the
damage these delays are causing to our national security and wasted
taxpayer money, but so far I have only received an estimate from
General Brown who told me that a continuing resolution would see the
Air Force and Space Force lose $9 billion in purchasing power. I don't
blame the leaders I have questioned for not having concrete figures of
the money wasted through continuing resolutions, these leaders are
focused on using the funding they get efficiently to support our
National Defense, not the ability of Congress to get a budget passed in
a timely manner. As both of you take command, I ask that for the
remainder of your tenure in your positions, take note of the financial
cost of a delayed budget and continuing resolutions so we can hold
ourselves accountable as elected officials in the coming years as
stewards of the tax-payer's dollar. Can I count on you to come back to
this chamber every year during your posture hearings with these
detailed figures in tow?
Lieutenant General Whiting. If confirmed, I will work to quantify
the impact of continuing resolutions on the United States Space Command
budget.
statement on military holds
10. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Whiting, we cannot continue
to delay confirmation of over 250 of our General and Flag Officers.
We've reached a point where life-long careers of dedicated military
servicemembers and the lives of their families are being put in
jeopardy. We're running the risk of this delay turning into a loss of
the most critical talent in our military at a time when only the Marine
Corps is meeting military recruiting goals. How do you believe these
holds are affecting our retention efforts for younger officers who see
that their careers and their families' lives can be held up by
Congress?
Lieutenant General Whiting. I have not yet seen specific data
linking retention to the holds on military confirmations, but our
military families are the bedrock of our retention efforts. To the
maximum extent possible, I encourage providing them sufficient time to
plan for their next move in order to arrange schools for children, find
places to live, and to support spouse employment. Without the prospect
of having such time, families may decide the sacrifices of military
service are no longer worth it for them.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
commercial integration
11. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, as I've discussed
with your predecessor, SPACECOM has been a leading force in commercial
integration with the stand up of its commercial integration cell. In
fact, we included language in the NDAA urging other combatant commands
to replicate SPACECOM's success. Would you tell me your impression of
the role of the commercial integration cell?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The Commercial Integration Cell (CIC)
is vital to our ongoing efforts to more closely partner with the United
States commercial companies who support the national security space
enterprise. Its purpose is to improve cooperation and operational
effectiveness between United States Space Command forces and commercial
space capability providers so that we can share intelligence, domain
awareness, and details of operating in the space environment at the
appropriate classification levels. In a previous job, I had the good
fortune to lead the CIC at Vandenberg Space Force Base from 2017-2019,
and I saw firsthand how the CIC supports United States Space Command's
mission and the value it brings to the United States. If confirmed, I
will work to continue to strengthen the CIC as a model for the entire
United States Government.
12. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what steps will you
plan on taking to build on this success?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The Commercial Integration Cell (CIC)
has been a hallmark of United States Space Command efforts to share
information and deepen integration with commercial companies which
support the national security space enterprise. If confirmed, I will
work to expand the CIC to include new entrant space companies who are
now supporting national defense efforts. I will also work to improve
the infrastructure used to share information within the CIC. Finally, I
will build on the success of the CIC by continuing to develop
additional venues to partner with commercial industry such as United
States Space Command's Joint Commercial Operations cell.
13. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, would you explain
the role of the commercial sector in U.S. space operations?
Lieutenant General Whiting. American commercial space companies are
an asymmetric advantage for the Department of Defense and United States
Space Command. Not only does United States commercial industry build
the systems which we use in United States Space Command and across the
national security space enterprise, and launch those systems for us,
but more and more we are looking to commercial industry to provide
capabilities as a service. United States commercial industry provides
robust capabilities across a spectrum of space services, to include
space launch, communications, broadband internet, weather, earth
observation, on-orbit servicing, space domain awareness, and ground-
based infrastructure. It is vital DOD and United States Space Command
continue to leverage United States commercial industry's innovation and
capabilities while finding ways to improve our partnerships,
information sharing, and integration.
14. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what steps need to
be taken to further improve this key relationship?
Lieutenant General Whiting. If confirmed, I will encourage the
Services and development agencies to first look to buy existing
commercial capabilities when it can meet our requirements, then look to
exploit available commercial technologies for military purposes, and
finally, to build military-unique systems only when required.
Additionally, overclassification and disclosure barriers continue to
hinder integration and information sharing. Small businesses and space
industry startups are the most heavily impacted, limiting commercial
partner abilities to contribute to the problem-solving processes. We
must continue to carefully review and evolve our security requirements
for what we can do to improve information sharing while also protecting
the Nation's vital information.
offensive space operations
15. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, for years we
thought of space as merely a supporting domain and tried to deny that
it would ever become weaponized. We've since learned that our
adversaries had other ideas. Both China and Russia have developed
several types of offensive space weapons capable of damaging or
destroying U.S. satellites in space. Do you believe the U.S. will also
need offensive weapons in order to secure our interests in the space
domain?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The United States continues to be the
world's responsible leader in space. A safe, secure, and stable space
domain is in the interest of all mankind. In order to support our
primary goal of deterring aggression in space, United States Space
Command will need a variety of capabilities able to protect and defend
our space systems as well as protecting the Joint Force from the space-
enabled capabilities of potential adversaries. Like in other domains,
achieving success will require a mix of systems including resilient
architectures, intelligence, cyber, command and control, offense,
defense, and supporting Joint fires.
joint all-domain command and control
16. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, as you know
SPACECOM plays a crucial role in warfighting, especially in areas like
intelligence and command and control. How important is an effective
joint all domain command and control (JADC2) network to your mission?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Having an effective Joint All-Domain
Command and Control (JADC2) network is vital to the United States Space
Command mission. Threats to United States satellites from other domains
must be planned for and the United States will need to be able to
respond rapidly to these threats using capabilities from all domains.
United States Space Command must have all-domain integration to support
operations within the space area of responsibility while also having
the ability to support other Combatant Commanders, Allies, and partners
with critical space-based effects. If confirmed, I will aim to leverage
JADC2 fully, optimizing mission command and control.
17. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, in your experience
what steps do we still need to take to realize the vision of JADC2 and
ensure effective coordination between space and the other domains?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The nature of warfare is changing
rapidly toward an information-centric, networked effort that will
involve simultaneous, multi-domain operations all around, and above,
the globe. The United States military's industrial age way of waging
war from the past century will not be good enough in the future. United
States Space Command must play a central role in implementing JADC2,
and space requirements and capabilities must be addressed from the
foundation of JADC2. We are already pursuing critical capabilities
needed to implement the inter-connectivity the military will need in
future fights with tech-savvy potential adversaries. If confirmed, I
will continue to pursue cloud-based data structures, resilient
architectures, common data standards, common interfaces, and reliable,
scalable data transport capabilities that promote integration between
United States Space Command and other Combatant Commands, Services, and
agencies.
18. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what will you do if
confirmed to help achieve those steps?
Lieutenant General Whiting. JADC2 is about making sure that all
operations in all domains can rapidly share information with one
another and be part of a common picture. There are many instances where
we've had weapon systems that can't talk to other weapon systems or
can't link into the same common operational picture. This is not an
option in a 21st Century fight in which we must be able to leverage
capabilities from across multiple domains simultaneously to create
dilemmas for our adversaries. We must be able to command and control
our space forces using the same models and methods for decision
superiority that every Combatant Command is using for their Joint, all-
domain command and control. If confirmed, I will ensure United States
Space Command plans and practices all-domain command and control
together with other Combatant Commands, Services, Allies, and partners,
using common terminology and advanced all-domain C2 concepts as a Joint
team moving forward. It is important that space information, space
capabilities, and space decisionmakers are foundational parts of all-
domain solutions.
space threats
19. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, recognizing this is
an unclassified setting, would you give us an overview of how you view
the space threat environment?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The threats we have seen emerge in
space over the past two decades are the distinguishing feature of the
modern space environment. Our strategic competitors, namely China and
Russia, have made significant strides in the development of
counterspace capabilities and their own space-enabled military
capabilities in recent years. Both of these countries seek to position
themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space
norms. The PRC is the pacing challenge. They have accelerated the
development of key capabilities, specifically terrestrial and space-
based counterspace systems, to confront the United States in a large-
scale, sustained conflict. The PRC combines growing military power with
economic, technological, and diplomatic influence to secure what it
views as its sovereign territory and pursue global influence and
regional preeminence.
20. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what are your
biggest challenges?
Lieutenant General Whiting. I agree with the National Defense
Strategy that the most significant challenge is the PRC as the pacing
challenge. The PRC is moving fast in space and has routinely
demonstrated cutting-edge capabilities and technologies. Additionally,
Russia, as evidenced by the Ukraine conflict, demonstrates a degree of
unpredictability, and remains a significant threat as well. Since 2015,
the PRC and Russia have reorganized their militaries to place increased
emphasis on the space domain, both in accelerating their R&D efforts
into operational capabilities and analyzing our capabilities and
reliance. Both the PRC and Russia are committed to fielding diverse
counterspace capabilities across multiple domains. Further,
irresponsible use of space has resulted in a clear debris concern for
operations in, to, and from the domain. The PRC and Russia have both
contributed to this with their reckless ASAT tests which resulted in a
cumulative 4788+ pieces of debris placing assets and human spaceflight
at risk. We must work with the Services and development agencies to
ensure we field the next generation of resilient space architectures
and protect and defend capabilities to be able to operate in the face
of these threats and protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attack.
21. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what additional
capabilities, resources, or authorities do you need to address those
challenges?
Lieutenant General Whiting. We need the continued commitment of
timely resources as we develop and field the next generation of
resilient space architectures and the protect and defend systems we
need to operate in the face of the threats we now see arrayed against
our space capabilities. We also need the continued authority to pursue
rapidly developing technologies vital to counter evolving threats.
United States Space Command is continuing to work with the Services
and with other government organizations to define the requirements that
will drive the development and fielding of the next generation of space
capabilities. In order to achieve both resiliency and survivability of
our space systems, we will need a multi-faceted and multi-layered
approach that leverages diversity in assets, orbits, and partnerships
with Allies and commercial suppliers, as well as integration of
offensive and defensive technologies in our space systems.
The defense of space assets will also require support from other
Combatant Commands, so United States Space Command must be fully
integrated into the Joint planning processes of these commands to
ensure supporting plans are established.
space architecture
22. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, space architecture
will almost certainly play a key role in any future fight. There has
been much discussion as of late of the need to move away from large
satellites to a more proliferated and resilient architecture. Would you
discuss how SPACECOM will approach this transformation?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Proliferated architectures allow for
resilience by providing capabilities that are more difficult to
compromise by disruption or defeat of a small number of assets. As an
example, the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) is built
to continue functioning in the event that individual nodes become
unavailable. The satellites that comprise the PWSA are smaller,
cheaper, and faster to place on orbit than our existing defense space
assets.
If confirmed, I will ensure United States Space Command will
continue in close coordination and cooperation with all relevant
stakeholders to assess the space domain environment and threats to
ensure we are building a space architecture prepared for the modern
space environment while providing the space-based capabilities Joint
warfighters rely upon. Additionally, as proliferated and resilient
architectures are fielded, United States Space Command must be ready to
full integrate those capabilities into our operational plans to take
advantage of the positive attributes they will bring.
23. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what are your
biggest concerns related to ensuring our space assets are resilient?
Lieutenant General Whiting. First, we must develop and field the
next generation of resilient architectures and protect and defend
systems to allow our existing space systems to operate in the face of
the threats we now see arrayed against us. Second, we must protect our
space systems in the cyber domain given that space networks are truly
global in nature and extend out to 22,000 miles above the Earth's
surface to geosynchronous orbit. Third, we also need to bolster the
critical ground infrastructure which supports our space missions by
improving the resiliency of facilities and utilities, as well as
improving their physical protection and cyber security.
24. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, how will you
approach these concerns if confirmed?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Resiliency is a combination of
diversification of capabilities, of redundancy, and of hardening. We
must consider this by examining spacecraft, ground stations, and links.
Investment in lower-cost and higher-count constellations is one avenue.
Providing redundant and multi-mission support constellations gives
potential adversaries more targets to consider. Maneuver capability and
hardening will also demonstrate and deflate adversary assurance of
damage or destruction of critical constellation nodes.
If confirmed, I will work with the other Combatant Commands, the
Services, and development agencies to field the next generation of
resilient space architectures as well as to bolster the cyber defenses
of our space systems and to improve the resiliency of our critical
ground infrastructure.
overall space command
25. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, SPACECOM is still a
relatively new combatant command. How would you evaluate your current
State of readiness, particularly in regards to personnel?
Lieutenant General Whiting. I assess that the United States
currently enjoys both a qualitative and quantitative advantage,
including our world-class space professionals who provide us
significant advantage over any potential adversary. Still, the DOD must
further develop and enhance integration of space warfighting doctrine,
capabilities, and personnel into national, Joint, and Combined
operations if we are to maintain our warfighting advantage. United
States Space Command's readiness is tied to achieving Full Operational
Capability (FOC). The Command is fast approaching FOC, having surpassed
several milestones, including attaining the right number and skills for
its workforce. United States Space Command manning is on track due to
the presence of a robust contractor workforce and augmentation from
Guard/Reserve members. As the Command receives its final manpower
authorizations over the next 2 years, I will, if confirmed, continue to
refine and manage our talent to ensure we have the staff required to
execute or vital missions.
26. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what challenges do
you anticipate facing if confirmed?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Our primary challenge will continue to
be ensuring that United States Space Command can support the Joint
Force, our Allies, and the Nation in the face of the rapidly growing
threats we now see arrayed against our space systems.
27. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, do you have the
authorities you need to operate?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The Combatant Commander's
responsibilities are assigned by the President in the Unified Command
Plan. Specific authorities delegated to United States Space Command in
time of conflict are identified in a Secretary of Defense-approved
operation plan (OPLAN). With the Secretary of Defense's approval of
United States Space Command's OPLAN earlier this year, United States
Space Command has identified the appropriate authorities needed in a
conflict, and specified when those authorities will be required.
28. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Whiting, what can Congress
do to help?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Congress can assist not just United
States Space Command but the entire DOD by passing the FY24 Defense
Appropriations bill on time. Budget instability complicates capability
development and the start of new initiatives. In light of the pace the
PRC has adopted in their race to weaponize the space domain, America
and its Allies can ill afford delays in fielding new capabilities.
I would also ask you to fund the FY24 Unfunded Priorities submitted
by GEN Dickinson and by the Space Force. I would ask you to support the
draft language in the House NDAA which authorizes additional, more
flexible hiring authorities for United States Space Command similar to
what the Services have available through Acquisition Demo hiring
authorities today. The ability to recruit and retain the right human
capital is vital to United States Space Command's readiness.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael M. Rounds
contested space domain
29. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Whiting, what is your
assessment of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) ability to
threaten our space assets and how would you characterize SPACECOM's
readiness to deter aggression, defend national interests, and to defeat
threats in a contested space domain?
Lieutenant General Whiting. The PRC is working to match or exceed
United States capabilities in space by 2045 to gain the military,
economic, and prestige benefits that the United States has accrued from
space leadership. By 2030, China may achieve world-class status in all
but a few space technology areas. The PRC continues to strengthen its
military space capabilities through integration of its weapons and
command and control systems to erode the United States military's
information advantage. They invest in space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, and
navigation. They are also improving satellite meteorology, human
spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. They own and operate about
half of the world's space based ISR systems. These capabilities support
the PLA's ability to monitor, track, and target United States and
Allied forces worldwide. In July 2021, the PRC conducted the first
fractional orbital bombardment system test with a hypersonic glide
vehicle that circumnavigated the Earth, launching from and impacting
back in China. This demonstrated the greatest distance flown and the
longest flight time (8100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapon
system to date. The PRC continues to reinforce that space is a
warfighting domain with the capabilities it has fielded and continues
to develop.
We must protect and defend United States (and as directed, Allied,
partner, and key commercial) space capabilities to prevent or mitigate
hostile or irresponsible acts in space. The best way to protect and
defend is to deter aggression. Reinforcing our relationships with our
Allies and partners as well as fielding new capabilities are key steps
to securing in the space domain. With United States Space Command
approaching Final Operational Capability, the Command is well postured
to address these threats and execute assigned missions based on the
current investment plans of the Services and other development
agencies.
30. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Whiting, in your assessment,
what are the Command's highest priority efforts to ensure it is ready
to execute its mission, should conflict in or through the space domain
arise?
Lieutenant General Whiting. There are a number of priorities
required to ensure United States Space Command readiness. These
include, reaching the required manning and funding levels as initially
established in FY21. These investments are vital to United States Space
Command achieving and maintaining Full Operational Capability. Another
priority is working with the Services, Space Force in particular, to
build, field, and sustain a resilient space warfighting architecture
capable of operating in the face of the threats now arrayed against our
space systems, as well as protecting and defending our vital interests
in space and protecting the Joint Force from space-enabled attack.
Also, an additional priority would be to continue building on the
quickly growing legacy of commercial and international partnership
United States Space Command has achieved in its first 4 years since re-
establishment in 2019. Our partners across the globe and in industry
are a strategic advantage, and I am committed, if confirmed, to
strengthening the work already being done to enhance that advantage.
strategic partnerships
31. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Whiting, how would you
describe our military space related partnerships with key allies and
partners, such as the United Kingdom and Australia?
Lieutenant General Whiting. United States Space Command's
partnerships with the United Kingdom and Australia are critical as
these are two of our most capable Allies with whom we have a long
history of cooperation in space. We remain committed to the Combined
Space Operations Initiative vision, which is instrumental in
integrating United States space operations with Allied space
capabilities around the globe. We have also signed Enhanced Space
Cooperation Memorandums with both nations for improved development of
space-specific mission areas to guarantee the security, sustainability,
and safety of space for all. We continue to strengthen our
relationships with these Allies and Canada, another highly capable
partner with whom we have decades of cooperation in space, through
combined space operations in the conduct of Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER.
Moreover, if confirmed, I will ensure the Command continues to grow our
circle of Allies and partners who can support our missions where
feasible. Being able to integrate capabilities with Allies and partners
enables greater operational flexibility, global response options, and
fully supports the National Defense Strategy's approach to ``Anchoring
our Strategy in Allies and Partners.''
32. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Whiting, as Commander of
SPACECOM, what would you suggest we do to further leverage these
partnerships in support of U.S. military space capabilities?
Lieutenant General Whiting. We should continue to normalize space
cooperation with our Allies and partners. Significant effort is
underway to break down the barriers to cooperation, both multilaterally
and bilaterally. These efforts include continuing to address the
challenges of overclassification, information-sharing, and
interoperability. I intend, if confirmed, to assess and expand this
work. I will also continue working with Allies to evolve and enhance
Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER. This multinational operations order is
currently under revision to ensure it includes broader Allied and
partner participation. This will allow us to drive integration to a
level we have not previously seen, and I am confident that it will
continue to be a tool that brings together and strengthens our
Alliances and partnerships.
33. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Whiting, what do you see as
untapped areas for increased cooperation?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Overcoming the hurdles of information
sharing with our Allies and partners would increase the effectiveness
of the coalition and the Joint Force. Getting this right will signal to
our competitors the resolve of the U.S. Government and highlight the
benefits of additional resiliency, capability, and capacity as we
continue to evolve our national security space enterprise into tighter
integration with our Allies and partners.
We should also look to continue improving the interoperability of
our space systems with our Allies, and vice versa. By partnering with
Allies and partners early in the capability development process, we can
acquire systems which complement each other rather than serving
duplicative purposes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
space integration
34. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Whiting, how can space power
integrate with special operations capabilities to deter adversaries
across the spectrum of conflict? Please provide an unclassified answer
to the extent possible; please provide an additional classified answer,
if necessary.
Lieutenant General Whiting. Space operations and special operations
can play a complementary role in supporting and enabling each other's
operations. For example, for special operations to be successful in the
modern threat environment, they must have access to the complete set of
space capabilities which United States Space Command provides:
satellite communications; space-based environment monitoring;
positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Conversely, for space
operations to be successful in the modern operating environment,
special operations can execute operations and activities intended to
support protect and defense missions for the space domain through their
unique ability to gain access to critical terrestrial locations. If
confirmed, I'm committed to continuing and strengthening the work
United States Space Command is already undertaking with United States
Special Operations Command to develop new tactics, techniques, and
procedures to support and enable each other.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
u.s. space command detect and track capability
35. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Whiting, during U.S. Space
Command's (SPACECOM) fiscal year 2024 posture hearing, General James
Dickinson's stated ``today, China can hold U.S., Allied, and Partner
assets at risk in all orbits . . . The PLA [People's Liberation Army]
has tested hypersonic glide vehicles aimed at defeating traditional
missile warning systems and ballistic missile defenses.'' After the
Chinese spy balloon incident, NORTHCOM/NORAD [North American Aerospace
Defense Command] adjusted the sensitivity on certain sensors to detect
a wider array of objects. While the Chinese spy balloon was outside of
space, China is seeking to use similar high-altitude balloons and
lighter than airships to exploit the near space domain. How does
SPACECOM detect objects from ground-level to near-space?
Lieutenant General Whiting. For high-altitude balloon events over
North America, United States Space Command supports United States
Northern Command by bringing to bear the capabilities of the Command's
ground-based and space-based sensors. While these sensors are optimized
to track objects in the space domain, I will, if confirmed, use the
authorities of United States Space Command as the Global Sensor Manager
to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures to attempt to improve
tracking in near-space as an augmentation for other Combatant Commands'
sensors.
36. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Whiting, how will that
capability evolve in the future?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Our future capabilities will be
proliferated, networked, and redundant. United States Space Command
will continue to work with the Services in force design efforts as we
identify requirements and address gaps through the Integrated Priority
List process. Future architectures will address the evolving threats
that our adversaries are developing.
long range discrimination radar capabilities
37. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Whiting, last summer
NORTHCOM completed its testing of the Long Range Discrimination Radar
(LRDR) for missile defense at Clear Space Force Station in Alaska.
According to NORTHCOM, the LRDR demonstrated initial promise in
discriminating threats to the Continental United States to make ground-
based interceptor engagement more lethal. The LRDR has a primary
purpose of differentiating between intercontinental ballistic missiles
and decoys but can also assist Space Force in tracking satellites and
other objects in space. How has the LRDR at Clear Space Force Station
improved our missile defenses?
Lieutenant General Whiting. LRDR, when fielded, will be a critical
sensor within the missile defense architecture that enhances the United
States Space Command Unified Command Plan trans-regional missile
defense mission. The discrimination capability of LRDR will provide
better quality shot data in distinguishing lethal objects from decoys/
debris to prosecute an engagement against missile threats to the
Homeland. LRDR is designed to provide higher-fidelity information
supporting the United States Ground Based Midcourse Defense, improving
probability of kill against an inbound threat. As LRDR is fielded,
United States Space Command will work to integrate it fully into the
missile defense architecture.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
relief of command of lieutenant colonel lohmeier
38. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Whiting, can you specify
exactly which comments led to your decision to relieve Lieutenant
Colonel Matthew Lohmeier of his command? Please include a complete copy
of the transcript of the podcast you referenced, along with the name,
date, and episode, along with any additional identifiable information
you think would be helpful to further understand your decision.
Lieutenant General Whiting. On May 14, 2021, in my role as the
Space Operations Command (SpOC) Commander, I made the decision to
relieve then-Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier from command of the 11th Space
Warning Squadron because of a loss of trust and confidence in his
ability to lead. The basis for that decision includes public statements
where he engaged in prohibited partisan political activity and
disparaged his chain of command.
It was on May 12, 2021 when I first learned that Lieutenant Colonel
Lohmeier had made statements to media outlets to promote his newly
published book. A review of those appearances uncovered a number of
statements that led to my decision to relieve him of his command. For
example:
23:41--Lohmeier stated, ``I'll tell you at the moment,
because in recent American history, Neo-Marxist thought has found a
welcome home in the Democratic Party. I'll put it that way, or in left
domestic politics.''
19:18--Lohmeier stated, ``Your question was that, do
senior leaders or other service members who are in charge pushing these
policies understand exactly what they're doing? I hope not. I think
some do, but I couldn't tell you exactly who they are.''
22:34--Lohmeier characterized the messaging in DOD as
``toxic, poisonous rhetoric.''
27:24--Lohmeier agreed with the host characterizing DOD
as a ``re-education camp.''
During the Information Operation podcast, Lieutenant Colonel
Lohmeier tied his political stance to being an Active Duty member, a
Lieutenant Colonel, and a Commander. Specifically, Lieutenant Colonel
Lohmeier was introduced by the host (and recognized himself again later
in the podcast) as an Active Duty Space Force officer and commander. He
failed to State that the DOD did not endorse his statements or that he
was making the partisan political statements in his personal capacity.
Requested information:
Information Operation, Episode 26 entitled ``Interview
with Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Lohmeier, USAF on Cultural Marxism in
DOD, His Book Irresistible Revolution.''
May 7, 2021
Podcast transcript:
Podcast link: https://rumble.com/vgnxbf-io-26-interview-
with-lt-col-matthew- lohmeier-usaf-on-crt-in-dod-his-book-
ir.html'fbclid=IwAR3v7bdevSGsooInbFc EL6hI5RXzKFk0wNqu25cqaoFbp
Cs8ud5FPDMD3--w
39. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Whiting, can you also
provide comment on how the comments you identify are in violation of
DOD Directive 1344.10?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Department of Defense regulations
prohibit Active Duty members from engaging in partisan political
activities (DODD 1344.10, paragraph 4.1.2). The Directive states, ``A
member of the Armed Forces on Active Duty shall not . . . [p]articipate
in any radio, television, or other program or group discussion as an
advocate for or against a partisan political party, candidate, or
cause.'' The Directive also states, ``Any activity that may be
reasonably viewed as directly or indirectly associating the Department
of Defense--with a partisan political activity or is otherwise contrary
to the spirit and intention of this Directive shall be avoided.''
(Paragraph 4.1.5.)
Specifically, the comments Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier made on the
Information Operation podcast where he entered into prohibited partisan
political activity while identifying himself as a commander in the
USSF, was when he stated ``Neo-Marxist ideology has found a welcome
home in the Democratic Party.'' As previously mentioned, then-
Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier identified himself as an Active Duty Space
Force officer and commander, did not couch any of his statements as not
being that of the DOD position/policy, and no disclaimer was made.
40. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Whiting, can you explain
why you chose to relieve Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier of his command
before receiving the findings of the investigation that you ordered?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Commanders are required to execute the
lawful orders of those appointed over them and to follow appropriate
guidance and directives in leading their units. All commanding officers
in the Department of the Air Force are required to show themselves as a
good example of subordination. (10 U.S.C. Sec. 8583.) At all times,
commanders must lead by personal example and enforce standards. (AFI 1-
2, paragraph 3.2.) Under our democratic system, the military, as a
group, must remain politically neutral and divorced from partisan
politics. (AFI 1-1, paragraph 2.13.) While on Active Duty, all
Department of the Air Force members are prohibited from engaging in
certain political activities in order to maintain good order and
discipline and to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of
improper endorsement in political matters. (AFI 51-508 (October 12,
2018), paragraph 1.1.1.) Specifically, the Department of the Air Force
prohibits military members from participating ``in any radio,
television, or other program or group discussion as an advocate of a
partisan political party, candidate, or cause.'' (AFI 51-508 (October
12, 2018), paragraph 2.3.1.6.) Department of the Air Force standards
also clearly State, ``Any activity that may be reasonably viewed as
directly or indirectly associating the AF or DOD with a partisan
political activity or is otherwise contrary to the spirit and intention
of this Instruction shall be avoided.'' (AFI 51-508 (October 12, 2018),
paragraph 2.4.3.)
Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier was removed from command based on my
lost trust and confidence in him to effectively lead due to his public
partisan political statements. Command is a privilege, not a right.
(AFI 51-509, paragraph 14.) Under Air Force rules, ``An officer may be
relieved of command for cause, including instances where the superior
competent authority has lost confidence in the officer's ability to
command due to misconduct, poor judgment, . . . the interests of good
order and discipline, morale, the good of the organization, or other
similar reasons.'' (AFI 51-509, paragraph 14.2.) Lieutenant Colonel
Lohmeier's public partisan political statements made on the podcast
while associated with his Active Duty status as a commander violated
DOD and Department of the Air Force standards, reflected poor judgment,
and were contrary to the interests of good order and discipline,
morale, and the good of the organization.
It is my conviction the military must be rigorously apolitical and
nonpartisan. I believe it is my duty to judiciously guard the
apolitical nature of the United States military. My trust in Lieutenant
Colonel Lohmeier's ability to uphold standards and embody himself as a
good example of subordination was lost once I was made aware that he
publicly appeared on the podcast using his official rank and position,
without disclaimer, and broadcasted partisan political comments. No
formal investigation was necessary to confirm the nature of the
comments or the public forum (the podcast) in which they were
broadcast.
In addition to removing Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier from command, I
intended to initiate a Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) to
further examine the matter, and related matters, and document
Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier's partisan political activity. However,
DAF/IG decided to launch its own inquiry due to the complexity and
sensitivity of the issues under consideration, as well as the potential
for Department of the Air Force-wide impact, thereby precluding a CDI.
I understand DAF/IG ceased the investigation when Lieutenant Colonel
Lohmeier voluntarily separated from the Space Force.
other actions related to previous investigations
41. Senator Schmitt. Lieutenant General Whiting, in your career,
how many officers have you relieved of command, and what proportion of
those firings did you act upon prior to being presented with findings
of any investigation?
Lieutenant General Whiting. Lieutenant Colonel Lohmeier was the
only commander I have directly relieved in my career
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Stephen N.
Whiting, USSF follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Stephen N.
Whiting, USSF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Stephen N. Whiting,
USSF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on September
27, 2023, with the recommendation that the nomination be
confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on
December 19, 2023.]
[all]