[Senate Hearing 118-793]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-793
THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIM-
OTHY D. HAUGH, USAF TO BE GENERAL
AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/
CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE/COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-668 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
july 20, 2023
Page
The Nomination of Lieutenant General Timothy D. Haugh, Usaf to be 1
General and Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service/Commander, United States Cyber Command.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 2
Witness Statements
Haugh, Lieutenant General Timothy D., USAF, to be general and 4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Service/Commander, United States Cyber Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 37
Questions for the Record....................................... 61
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 68
Biographical Sketch............................................ 69
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 71
Signature Page................................................. 73
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIMOTHY D. HAUGH, USAF TO BE
GENERAL AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE/COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen,
Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Scott, Mullin, Budd,
and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the nomination of Lieutenant General Timothy Haugh to
be promoted to general and to be the next commander of U.S.
Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency.
General, congratulations on your nomination. I would also
like to welcome your wife Sherry, your daughter Chandler, your
daughter-in-law Hannah, and your son Michael. We are grateful
to your family for the support they have given you and the
military over many years.
Let me also recognize the outgoing commander General
Nakasone as he prepares for retirement. I would like to express
my appreciation for his 37 years of service to the Nation
including his outstanding leadership of the United States cyber
and intelligence forces.
General Haugh, the Committee welcomes your nomination to
lead CYBERCOM and the NSA. As the current deputy you have a
comprehensive understanding of the urgent cybersecurity and
intelligence challenges facing the Nation.
You have held a number of senior positions at CYBERCOM and
within the Air Force cyber and intelligence organizations and
commands including multiple command assignments. These
experiences will serve you well.
General, if confirmed, there are a number of pressing
issues that will require your attention. First and foremost, it
is widely understood that our cyber mission forces are
struggling with readiness shortfalls caused primarily by
difficulties in training and retaining personnel in key
positions requiring special skills.
In order to mature the cyber force and advance our Nation's
capabilities to conduct cyber operations and support
intelligence operations the military services must provide
qualified and trained personnel to your command on time and at
the beginning of their tours.
I would also note that the private sector has realized the
immense value of our cyber operators and is offering them very
high compensation to leave the military. The services must
adjust accordingly by providing a creative combination of
incentives to compete for and retain these personnel. I would
like to know how you plan to address this challenge.
Additionally, over the last decade there has been a
recurring debate over whether to sustain the dual hat
arrangement whereby the commander of Cyber Command also serves
as the director of the NSA.
Recently, an independent panel established by the Director
of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense and led
by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joe
Dunford concluded that the dual hat arrangement should be
sustained and we would welcome your thoughts on that issue
also.
Finally, I would note that some of the tools in our toolbox
like section 702 authority from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, or FISA, are critical to our ability to
counter our adversaries' malign activities.
The Committee would appreciate your views on the importance
of section 702 of FISA, which sunsets at the end of this year,
and why you believe it is essential that we renew that
authority.
We would also like to know what guardrails are in place to
give the public confidence that the authority is being used
judiciously.
General, these complex challenges will require the full
complement of your skills. Thank you for your willingness to
continue your service and lead CYBERCOM and the NSA at this
critical time. I look forward to your testimony.
Let me now recognize the ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Haugh, for being here and I join the distinguished
chairman in welcoming your family.
You have been nominated by the President for commander of
the United States Cyber Command. If confirmed you will be
directly responsible for planning and executing U.S. global
cyber operations activities and missions to defend our national
interest across the full spectrum of competition and conflict
in cyberspace.
This includes Department of Defense's (DOD's) cyberspace
operations, enhancing the offensive and defensive capabilities
of the cyber mission force, and improving the readiness of the
Nation's cyber personnel to counter malicious cyber actors in a
changing digital domain.
This hearing comes at a pivotal moment for defending
cyberspace. General Nakasone, our Nation's outgoing commander
of Cyber Command, has said the growth in cyber warfare
capabilities by our near peer adversaries like China is unlike
anything he has seen before.
In recent months we have seen an increase in ransomware
attacks on critical infrastructure and aggressive cyber
espionage operations on U.S. networks by our near peer
adversaries.
Software vulnerabilities and weak network perimeter
security have added to the Nation's defensive challenges and
threaten our strategic ability and decisive advantage in
cyberspace.
We must keep that decisive advantage. Advancements in
technology such as artificial intelligence are also poised to
change the pace of the threats we face. Given these challenges,
the Committee would like to learn how you plan to address the
most pressing national security challenges facing our Nation in
cyberspace.
Specifically, I am interested in hearing what you would do
to ensure CYBERCOM's defend forward and persistent engagement
strategies. Those strategies support a proactive military
posture in cyberspace and remain capable of disrupting
malicious cyber activity at its source and keep pace with an
evolving threat.
I am concerned that our cyber readiness may suffer because
of cyber mission forces serving brief tours at CYBERCOM, and
the chair mentioned this in his statement. The services are
providing personnel to CYBERCOM who lack necessary cyber
skills, technical expertise, and training.
I would welcome your views on how to correct readiness
shortfalls within the cyber mission force including how you
would work with the services to align training across the
department and increase the resiliency of the cyber workforce.
Strengthening partnerships across the government, private
sector, and among our allies is also key to defending our
national interests in a constantly evolving threat environment.
These include Hunt Forward operations in which cyber
operators are deployed abroad to identify vulnerabilities and
malware on the networks of partner nations. The under
advisement program, which creates a forum for threat
information sharing with industry, is another example of Cyber
Command's unique contributions to national security.
These two initiatives exemplify how our cyber forces
augment Homeland and network defenses while also exposing
adversary tactics before they can be used against us in the
United States.
I hope you will speak about how you would prioritize
partnerships to meet the growing complexity of challenges in
the cyber domain.
If confirmed, General, you would serve as the chief of the
Central Security Service and would take on a dual-hatted role
as director of the National Security Agency and so we will be
interested in hearing your perspective on the dual hat
arrangement and how it impacts CYBERCOM's ability to fulfill
its individual mission.
So thank you very much, General, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
General Haugh, your statement, please?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL TIMOTHY D. HAUGH, USAF, TO BE
GENERAL AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICE/COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
Lieutenant General Haugh. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, and distinguished members of the Committee, I am
honored to appear before you today regarding my nomination as
commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National
Security Agency.
I want to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, Director
Haines, and General Milley for their trust in nominating me for
these critical positions. I would also like to thank my bride
Sherry who has served with me for the last 31 years.
I would also like to thank our children, Michael and
Chandler, who have sacrificed as military children are now
thriving as adults. Michael is a captain and company commander
in the North Carolina National Guard and Chandler is a
commercial cybersecurity analyst.
Sherry and I are incredibly grateful for their sacrifices
to enable our service as a family. Also with us today is our
daughter-in-law Hannah, a director of strategy and product
development for an advanced materials company. Joining us
virtually is my mom, Leona, who with my late father instilled
the value of service at an early age. Thank you, Mom.
I want to begin by thanking General Nakasone and Susan
Nakasone for their service to the United States Cyber Command
and National Security Agency. General Nakasone has 37 years of
dedicated service culminating as commander and director for the
last 5 years.
His commitment to both the mission and the people during a
time of unparalleled global change has continued the legacy
captured in the command's code--partner, enable, deliver. I
truly believe that Cyber Command has delivered for the Nation
due to his leadership.
A special thanks to Susan Nakasone for her commitment to
her family and for her willingness to focus on and address
tough issues facing the Army, the agency, and the command's
spouses and families.
I am a career intelligence officer who has served 31 years
in the joint force intelligence and cyber communities. My
service and command and staff positions at all levels to
include multiple assignments within Cyber Command, NSA, and the
cryptologic enterprise have given me unique insights of the
opportunities and challenges facing the Nation and the critical
roles of Cyber Command and NSA.
As part of Cyber Command's senior leadership team and in my
prior roles within the command I have gained invaluable
operational experience in cyber and an appreciation for the
unparalleled mission advantage that stems from the close
operating partnership of these two organizations.
I consider it the highest privilege to be nominated to lead
these organizations and, if confirmed, I am committed to
further buildupon our competitive strengths--people,
innovation, and partnerships.
I believe every great success starts with people. Both NSA
and Cyber Command have some of the Nation's most talented
individuals who are the backbone of mission success. To sustain
that success we must focus on recruiting, training, and
retaining talent from across the Nation and must provide an
environment where they can thrive and succeed.
For Cyber Command that means continued focus on readiness
and the growth of our acquisition force. For NSA it means
hiring the right workforce for the challenges we face during a
period of significant retirement turnover.
In an environment of accelerating change the ability to
rapidly adapt and innovate is critical to mission advantage.
Congress and the department have set the conditions for Cyber
Command to rapidly mature. The expansion of its acquisition
authorities and the ongoing implementation of enhanced budget
control will enable improved capabilities across the force.
When coupled with the authorities to partner with industry
and small business Cyber Command can deliver innovative cyber
capabilities for warfighting advantage. Partnerships are a
critical component of both organizations' success. The ability
to work in collaboration across the interagency with the
private sector and foreign partners is critically important to
our Nation's success in a world of accelerating change.
We see this in the work of both organizations with partners
throughout Government such as the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Agency (CISA), FBI, as well as expanding efforts
to build cybersecurity relationships worldwide.
The command's Hunt Forward operations and collaborative
exposure of adversary cyber actions within NSA are proven
examples to build upon.
If confirmed, I will focus on ensuring the health and
effectiveness of NSA and Cyber Command's world class personnel
in delivering outcomes to address the Nation's highest--the
nation's security priorities. Also the priorities of the
department and the combatant commands.
I will focus on strengthening the workforce, improving the
readiness of our cyber mission force, investing to leverage new
technologies and prioritizing threats facing the Nation,
especially those from the pacing challenge posed by the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
In closing, I am deeply honored to be considered for these
leadership positions. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Committee and the entire Congress to ensure we
leverage our opportunities and address these challenges.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
here this morning. I look forward to answering your question.
Chairman Reed Thank you very much, General Haugh.
I have a series of questions which are presented to all
nominees. Please respond accordingly.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of this
confirmation process?
Lieutenant General Haugh. No, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree if confirmed to appear and testify before this Committee
when requested?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree when asked before this
Committee to give your personal views even if your views differ
from the administration?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records documents
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requester
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional request?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
As we both mentioned, Senator Wicker and I, one of the
issues that you have addressed also is the cyber mission forces
and their readiness. This is, I believe, General Nakasone's
number-one challenge at this moment and it will be yours.
Where do you see this in terms of your priorities? I assume
it is very close to top. And second, these forces are composed
by members from the other services and how do you coordinate so
that these people come ready and willing to serve and to
function?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, from a cyber readiness
perspective this is the top issue for Cyber Command. We just
recently in response to requests from Congress submitted a
report for section 1502 that identified the Cyber Command
assessment of readiness and what that report says is we view
fiscal year 2024 and the overall passing of both the NDAA and
the appropriations bill as a critical moment that now aligns
the responsibilities and authorities within U.S. Cyber Command
analogous to those of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
With the passing of the fiscal year 2024 appropriations
bill U.S. Cyber Command will now have the responsibility for
the cyber mission force budget, will have the responsibility
for the acquisition of the capabilities for our cyber mission
force, and have the authority to set the training standards.
With those authorities it allows Cyber Command to set the
investment in our training infrastructure, in our training
courses, and allows the services to focus on recruiting,
initial skills training aligned to our standard, and then to
leverage the retention capabilities that Congress has given to
the services. So those are areas now that really change the
dynamic of how we will approach cyber readiness, if confirmed.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General.
General, I also mentioned in my opening remarks Section 702
of FISA, and could you comment on the importance of extending
that--it will expire at the end of this year--and also the
guardrails that are in place to protect the privacy of citizens
in the United States?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, section 702 is an
irreplaceable foreign intelligence authority. It enables the
intelligence community to collect against foreign persons
overseas.
It is a critical authority and as I think of it in my
current role as U.S. Cyber Command the ability to identify
foreign hacking of activities in the United States, whether
that be U.S. companies or individuals, it is a critical source
to be able to do that.
Section 702 supports 100 percent of the President's
intelligence priorities. In some way it reflects either in the
answer or informs that question in terms of how we ensure
oversight.
First and foremost, in my experience in working with the
National Security Agency throughout my career is a culture of
compliance. The National Security Agency and all of the
employees are focused on how to protect their fellow Americans
and that includes their civil liberties.
So that inside of section 702 is a rigorous set of
oversight both through personal accountability as well as
technical accountability to ensure that the authority is used
appropriately for its intended purpose for foreign persons
overseas.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. I also in my comments referred to
the Dunford report regarding the status of the NSA director and
commander of CYBERCOM. I assume you concur with the results of
that report and I think it establishes a very good sort of
framework to continue the dual hatting.
Your comments?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I do support the results
of General Dunford's study that was accepted by both the
Secretary and the Director of National Intelligence. What it
reflects is really a maturation of U.S. Cyber Command and that
relationship and operational partnership with the National
Security Agency being in the best interests of the Nation.
What it allows is, in reality, the signal's intelligence
and the cyber environments are overlapping. So having a single
leader with the ability to align the capabilities of NSA and
Cyber Command gives us greater speed and agility.
It also allows us to at the beginning of planning be very
considerate of how do we protect intelligence sources while
still being able to position to produce the outcomes the Nation
needs to staff.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Haugh.
Before I recognize Senator Wicker, since a quorum is now
present I ask the Committee to consider a list of 2,699 pending
military nominations. Including in this list are the
nominations of General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., United States Air
Force to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General
Randy A. George, the United States Army, be to the grade of
general and to be Chief of Staff of the Army. All of these
nominations have been before the Committee in the required
time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list?
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I so move.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Voice. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor say aye.
The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on July 20, 2023.
1. General Randy A. George, USA to be general and Chief of Staff
of the Army (Reference No. 537)
2. In the Air Force there are 83 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Julie L. Airhart) (Reference No.
599)
3. General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF to be general and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Reference No. 677)
4. In the Air Force there are 30 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Justin V. Ahrens) (Reference No.
696)
5. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Mary V. Krueger) (Reference No. 775)
6. Col. Jack J. Stumme, USA to be brigadier general (Reference No.
776)
7. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Oliver E. Barfield) (Reference No. 777)
8. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Ashley L. Shull) (Reference No. 778)
9. In the Air Force Reserve there are 73 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Ronald Mark Alligood) (Reference No. 779)
10. In the Air Force Reserve there are 158 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Brian Charles Anderson) (Reference
No. 780)
11. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Paul A. Stelzer) (Reference No. 781)
12. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Leron E. Lane) (Reference No. 783)
13. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Andres S. Pscoya) (Reference No. 784)
14. Col. James F. Porter, USAR to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 787)
15. BG Beth A. Salisbury, USAR to be major general (Reference No.
788)
16. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Andrew R. Updike) (Reference No. 789)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Erica L. Kane) (Reference No. 791)
18. In the Army there are 31 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joshua T. Ade) (Reference No. 792)
19. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (William M. Schweitzer) (Reference No. 793)
20. MG Michael J. Lutton, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command (Reference No. 818)
21. LTG James J. Mingus, USA to be general and Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army (Reference No. 819)
22. MG Thomas L. James, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, US Space Command (Reference No. 820)
23. MG Charles D. Constanza, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, V Corps (Reference No. 822)
24. MG James H. Adams III, USMC to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, US Marine
Corps (Reference No. 823)
25. LTG Michael A. Guetlein, USSF to be general and Vice Chief of
Space Operations (Reference No. 826)
26. LTG Philip A. Garrant, USSF to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Space Systems Command, US Space Force (Reference No. 828)
27. In the Space Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Donald J. Cothern) (Reference No. 829)
28. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Ryan C. Boyle) (Reference No. 839)
29. In the Air Force there are 359 appointments to the grade of
major (Feysel A. Abdulkaf) (Reference No. 840)
30. In the Air Force there are 49 appointments to the grade of
major (Scott A. Abuso) (Reference No. 841)
31. In the Air Force there are 391 appointments to the grade of
major (Nanlisha T. Abdullai) (Reference No. 842)
32. In the Air Force there are 160 appointments to the grade of
major (Matthew N. Alombro) (Reference No. 843)
33. In the Air Force there are 1,201 appointments to the grade of
major (Kevin B. Abbott) (Reference No. 844)
34. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (James H. Gutzman) (Reference No. 845)
35. In the Air Force there are 53 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Danielle N. Anderson) (Reference No. 846)
36. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Ryan C. Caguillo) (Reference No. 847)
37. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Mary M. Gutierrez) (Reference No. 848)
38. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Edward W. Hale) (Reference No. 849)
39. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Charles K. Djou) (Reference No. 850)
40. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nicholas C. Molczyk) (Reference No. 851)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(David Hernandez) (Reference No. 852)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Clydellia S. Prichard-Allen) (Reference No. 853)
43. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Espada J. Ruiz) (Reference No. 854)
44. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Mary M. Ayres) (Reference No.
856)
45. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Daniel I. Morrison) (Reference No. 857)
46. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Alan A. Gutberlet) (Reference No. 858)
47. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Guillermo M. Arguello) (Reference No. 859)
48. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Christopher S. Williams) (Reference No. 860)
49. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Kristopher M. Brazil) (Reference No. 861)
50. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Joshua P. Corbin) (Reference No. 862)
51. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Nicholas B. Artabazon) (Reference No. 863)
52. In the Navy there are 39 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Mary H. Baker) (Reference No.
864)
53. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Peter J. Maculan) (Reference No. 865)
54. MG Shawn N. Bratton, ANG to be major general (Reference No.
866)
55. MG Shawn N. Bratton, USSF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and
Requirements (Reference No. 867)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 2,699
Senator Wicker? Senator Wicker. On the dual hat, General,
is the statute where it should be with regard to what you need
in that role?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I think we have the
guidance we need to be effective. An area that we would like
to--that, if confirmed, I would like to work with the Committee
is how do we communicate and ensure oversight with all of the
respective committees to ensure that we are being very clear in
how we are using the authorities of each of those organizations
to the best effect consistent with our law, our policy, and our
values.
Senator Wicker. Do you think this arrangement should always
be the approach or do you see a time when another
administration might not choose to go the dual hat?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator and Ranking Member, in my
experience, I have now worked in each sides of these
organizations and so how we partner and be able to take the
guidance from a single leader becomes effective in our
response.
So we can move with the speed and agility today. So, from
my perspective, I think that would be very difficult to
replicate in a different configuration.
Senator Wicker. You would not change that?
Lieutenant General Haugh. In my perspective I would not
change that, Senator. Senator Wicker. Okay. And then on the
training or lack thereof or areas for improvement tell us to
what extent that is enlisted personnel officers and how about
civilian hires? Lieutenant General Haugh. Ranking Member, in
terms of training in the cyber mission force the overall makeup
of the cyber mission forces themselves, our technical
operational elements are about 80 percent military and 20
percent civilian.
So as we approach this it is, largely, a civilian force
with a significant number of officers that are balanced by
civilians.
As we look at that force one of the things that we want to
ensure as U.S. Cyber Command is that we are setting that
baseline standard so that we can ensure across the department
we get the baseline right and allow the services to do that
baseline training, and now Congress has equipped us with the
authority to build out the training ranges.
We have those in place today as U.S. Cyber Command the
authority to build out the advanced training, which we have in
place today, within U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security
Agency, and now we will have the resources to scale that
training.
Senator Wicker. Which one is the 80 percent?
Lieutenant General Haugh. The 80 percent is military--
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Lieutenant General Haugh.--and of that the majority would
be enlisted.
Senator Wicker. I see. Okay. And so they would not
necessarily have come to the service with cyber skills. They
would have learned what they need as members of the military?
Lieutenant General Haugh. We would--Ranking Member, what we
would expect is that they would all get baselined in their
service training. Many of them, the services, are doing
assessments early either in the recruiting process or at basic
training to assess and identify, and we will encourage and work
with the services to increase that as we go forward.
Senator Wicker. It does not hurt that quite a number of
whiz kids that have been playing video games since they have
been able to walk are stepping forward.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Ranking Member, there is
certainly a population that is digital--that have grown up as
digital natives.
Senator Wicker. Take a minute then and tell us about the
under advisement program and the Hunt Forward operations, which
are partnerships with your command.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, 2 years ago Congress
authorized both Cyber Command and NSA to be able to do direct
sharing with industry. Inside of U.S. Cyber Command, inside our
sub unified command of the cyber national mission force Cyber
Command created a program called Under Advisement.
Our Under Advisement program allows a small team to
interact directly with industry and it helps us to be able to
have an understanding of activities overseas through their lens
and identify cyber threats while also allowing us to provide
insights to them about threats that they might receive wherever
they operate.
The Under Advisement team is also nested very closely with
NSA's cybersecurity collaboration center that was also
authorized by the same portion of the law as well as by DOD to
do direction with industry. That is a critical component that
we will seek to expand.
The Hunt Forward operations are activities of where we
defend forward with a partner or ally within their networks. So
they ask for our assistance. We deploy a team of experts from
the cyber mission force to work with them on a network.
Provides value to us because we are able to identify
adversary malware and to be able to disclose that not just to
that company or to that nation but also to cybersecurity
industry. It also allows us to work with those partners, build
trust and confidence, and allow them to also grow their
capacity.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Lieutenant General Haugh, congratulations on your
nomination to you and thank you for your willingness to
continue to serve and thank you to your family for their
willingness to support you.
How do you see developments in AI affecting CYBERCOM and
NSA?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I think about artificial
intelligence really in three ways. One is how do we leverage it
to be able to allow our personnel to be able to move faster, do
that in a way that we can ensure from a national security
perspective we are using it in an ethical manner, that we can
see the sources of that data, ensure civil liberties are
protected. But there is great opportunity, particularly from a
cybersecurity perspective, when we think about scale.
The second component--
Senator Shaheen. Can I just interrupt for a minute? Because
you say using in an ethical manner. How do you determine that?
Because there are not really standards around AI at this point.
Lieutenant General Haugh. So DOD has published AI ethical
standards so there is a start point for us. For us, what we
really want to do is have a partnership between a human analyst
and their ability to receive data, know where that data came
from, and to be able to accelerate their work, and that is an
area that we are doing a study, building an AI roadmap as
directed by Congress to do that with the department focused on
Cyber Command and Cyber Command's interest.
The other area that I think the Nation expects from us is
to understand how our adversaries use this technology and be
able to inform what that looks like in terms of threat both to
our national security and to our industry.
Senator Shaheen. And there was a lot of discussion in the
earlier questioning about training and recruitment of people to
Cyber Command. Is there particular training that you think we
ought to be doing around AI and how do you see that? Is that
something that should be done by Cyber Command? Is it a broader
concern across DOD?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in terms of Cyber
Command our close partnership with the National Security Agency
does allow us to build on a legacy of how NSA has leveraged
data, has leveraged algorithms, has done it from its outset in
a very compliant way to ensure that it is consistent with what
we would expect in terms of protecting civil liberties.
So we start with a foundation in that partnership. The
other area where AI has certainly been a key component within
our Nation is in cybersecurity. So we start from a foundation
that does look a little bit different from the rest of the
department and there are areas for us that we will certainly
need to be partnered with the services as they protect
networks, as we give guidance for how best to apply, and think
about under our acquisition authorities the ability to be able
to partner with a service, partner with a small business,
rapidly introduce that technology but do it in a way that is
consistent with overall DOD guidance for how we do that from an
ethical perspective.
Senator Shaheen. And you mentioned how our adversaries
would be using AI. We heard from some experts earlier this week
who talked about the real threat from AI and how it could be
used to harm citizens in the United States and, really, around
the world.
So do we need to be thinking about other regulatory
responses, other penalties for those nation states and other
groups that would use AI in a way that would damage the United
States?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I will not comment on
the regulatory requirement but I will talk about the threat.
When we think about where China has focused much of their AI it
is about information control. It is about facial recognition.
It is about dominating a population.
So as they consider exporting those technologies as they
have done in the past with the Great Firewall technology, it is
an area from a threat perspective that we should continue to
inform and understand what that means to any nation that they
would be considering partnering with and the implications of
that technology on that society.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I think it is something this
Committee needs to continue to look at as well.
The war in Ukraine has produced less of an attack on the
cyber infrastructure of Ukraine than I expected and I think
that most people expected. Do you think that Ukraine is
prepared to handle future attacks by Russia on their
infrastructure and other utility grid in other areas?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, Ukraine gets a lot of
credit for how they created resiliency in the face of a really
relentless cyber actor in Russia.
They have--they thought before when they were given advance
warning how to think about their data and where their data
needed to be to be resilient. They thought about their
partnerships with industry, their partnerships with NATO,
certainly with the United States and with the department to be
able to assist and how we provided an opportunity to make sure
that they understood threat and they have done an exceptional
job of thinking about what it looks like to be resilient in a
really relentless digital environment. One of the reasons
Russia has not been successful is the resilience of Ukraine.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I certainly agree. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Mullin, please?
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman. General, thank you so
much for being here. It is lovely to see your family with you.
It was a pleasure to meet them before the hearing started. And
as I said back there, I just want to thank your family and your
wife for serving alongside of you. Thank you for all that you
do in holding the family together.
I have said this many times to people that work for me and
people I have worked with, we can only be at our best if we--if
we have a stable home life. If it is rocky we can be average,
and your husband cannot afford to be average, not in this time.
So thank you for laying that foundation for him to reach
greatness.
General, I just want to ask a couple questions. I have made
no bones about it that your predecessor and I do not get along.
I do not agree with his decisionmaking.
I have made it very clear that he is very risk averse and
lacks the ability to take responsibility when things do not go
right, and so I want to make sure that we are not following
necessarily all in his footsteps.
And so some of the questions I have really deals with some
changes that you may be looking to make and I would like to get
your insight in those. In your time as the deputy commander
what was the collaboration between CYBERCOM and other combatant
commands? What does that look like?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in terms of
collaboration with the other combatant commands if we look at
the overall National Defense Strategy we do sit in a unique
place.
As a global combatant command our partnerships with each of
the other combatant commands, our missions to ensure defense of
the Department of Defense Information Network enables every
other combatant command and we are partnered with them on that.
Our mission to defend the Nation in cyberspace is to ensure
that those other combatant commands are resilient to attack by
a cyber adversary. And then our third mission is to support
those combatant commands with offensive and defensive cyber.
What you have seen is a maturation over the last 5 years of
looking at how our elements that we provide to those combatant
commands--we have teams between 30 and 50 that are embedded
inside of each of the combatant commands to be able to link
together to either enable their planning or help them to
conduct planning so that we are integrated.
And as we think about it Ukraine has provided a really good
example. I was a component to European Command at the time and
so General Wolters gave us very clear requirements for how Air
Force's cyber and then the broader Cyber Command enterprise
could support EUCOM and NATO in their efforts to enable
Ukraine.
Senator Mullin. Do you have any examples of changes that
you might want to see, moving forward--things that we could do
better in those areas?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I think the number-one
thing that we will be thinking about--we have talked about
cyber mission force and the relationship with the new
authorities that Congress and the department are giving us.
The other thing that comes with that is an opportunity to
scale. So when we think about the things that we are doing well
today and our ability to defend forward, having budget control,
having acquisition authority, having more control of the
overall advanced training will allow us to scale and scale
faster.
Senator Mullin. How has CYBERCOM collaborated with industry
partners in the past and how do we look at changing those
relationships, moving forward?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, we have today
authorities from both--from OSD that allow us to do
partnerships with small business. So whether they are
cooperative research or small contracts we have started in a
number of ways working very closely with small business.
As we continue to grow our acquisition authority we are
working with research and engineering to also begin to look at
what is our role going to be in science and technology.
Senator Mullin. Is there some changes we need to be looking
at to help you make changes to--for that relationship to build
and build to move faster?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, the most important thing
that would be the passing of the fiscal year 2024
appropriations bill and if we--with the fiscal year 2024 NDAA
and the appropriations bill that will give us those
authorities. Without that we will operate in our previous model
until the budget is passed and then we will have to undo that
work and redo it.
Senator Mullin. What are--what are some changes we need to
be making to invest in? When we are looking at the budget and
we are looking at appropriating dollars where should we be
focusing on to give you the advantages you need?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Right now, Senator, when we went
through the process of enhanced budget control the department
did a very good job of evaluating what the services had spent
on our cyber mission force and then the department added a
significant number over that in the President's budget.
So as we look at the President's budget that is an accurate
capture of where we are today that would enable our scaling and
our ability to do that. So as we look at the final of the NDAA
and the appropriations bill that is--we will be looking for
is--are those numbers in the President's budget and based on
that we will come back with the department, who has treated us
very well through this process.
Senator Mullin. General, thank you for being here. Ma'am,
thank you for, like I said, the support and the family. Thanks
for being tolerant and moving as often as you have. Really
appreciate your service. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin.
Senator Manchin, please?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Senator.
General, thank you again and I--with my fellow senator I
feel the same way about the family and the family's commitment
and the support you have.
General Haugh, I believe we strengthen our own
cybersecurity--and we have talked about that and your
experience there working with General Nakasone and continuing
on--we are only as strong as our weakest link with our partners
around the world--our allied partners.
How do you see them coming to that or lifting up, investing
enough, recruiting the right people? Are they able partners?
Are they making every effort? Are they working with you looking
for our leadership? Or where do you think we have to double
down and work harder?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, this is an area that has
really expanded in terms of what both that the geographic
combatant commands are asking us to do with partners and those
areas that the Department of Defense has asked U.S. Cyber
Command to take a leadership role with partners.
And when you think about what that gives us in terms of the
ability to scale collectively against common threats we are
seeing that. We have a continual increase every year in our
cyber flag exercise where partners come together and in a
multilateral environment we work on best practices--
Senator Manchin. Are they making the same commitment you
think as we are? Are there any of them ahead of us that we
could be doing better to catch up or are they moving with us in
that same timeframe?
Lieutenant General Haugh. I think they are moving with us.
I think there are partners that we are going to work with,
particularly with INDOPACOM. Areas that INDOPACOM has asked us
to work is a focus--in addition to our long standing
partnerships with Japan and South Korea and Taiwan, Australia,
they want us to look at other countries like Singapore,
Thailand, and also the Philippines. So those are--
Senator Manchin. As we talk about--as we talk about
retention and recruitment what is the force strength right
now--your force strength as far as cyber?
Lieutenant General Haugh. The overall billet structure of
U.S. Cyber Command within our cyber forces is right around
6,000. We hover right around an 85 percent fill rate today. I
will not do that math publicly, Senator.
Senator Manchin. No problem. Can you fill that void at 15
percent, do you believe, and how do you intend to do that?
Lieutenant General Haugh. That is a partnership with the
services and I think the more we refine what we need from the
services and then allow them to be focused on the recruiting
and the retention components and allowing us to develop that
force with advanced training there is going to be a great
opportunity for us to continue to--
Senator Manchin. And, finally, I will get to the budget
because there is so many--I have talked to so many militaries
retired and current off the record, if you will, that have told
me that if we got our budget done on time by September 30th,
which we never ever do hardly, but if we did that there would
be tremendous savings within the military, especially because
you have guarantees and certainties, contracts you have. I have
been told at least 5 percent savings.
So if you look at--I am just--I will round it off to $880
billion budget we have for military--that is $44 billion of
additional spending that you could do within the confines of
what you have. Do you think those savings--I mean, by us being
able to get a certain budget, not a CR or an omnibus, as the
games we have played here for far too long?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, for U.S. Cyber Command
for this year it is particularly acute. If for every day that
we operate under fiscal year 2023 rules when the budget is
passed we have to back out every single one of those
transactions and then execute them under the new rules that
will be passed by Congress. So we will be doubling and tripling
our work for every transaction for every day we are in a CR.
Senator Manchin. I believe so strong in that and we have
done--we have not done anything to really reprimand ourselves
from not doing our job because all we keep asking for is that
we will just give additional money for basic or lack of doing
the urgency that needs to be done for the expertise and also
for the cost savings. It is just a shame.
So with that, I appreciate it very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Scott, please?
Senator Scott. Sure. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for
being here. Congratulations on your nomination.
Thank you for your service and your sacrifice and the same
to your family. Thanks for taking time to meet yesterday. As we
know, we got a lot of enemies that are trying to infiltrate our
system. One of the things that concerns me and if you could
talk about, the DOD has a contract with the Chinese-owned
company Tutor.com, and do you have any background of why we
would contract with a Chinese company to do training?
Lieutenant General Haugh. I am not familiar with that
company.
Senator Scott. Okay. So--
Lieutenant General Haugh. I can come back for--with you.
Senator Scott. You can come back. But just the concept of
using a Chinese company to provide any service to our
Department of Defense does that make any sense to you?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I would look at that
really closely from a threat perspective.
Senator Scott. Okay. Can you talk about AI and our ability
to use AI the right way?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Senator. I think we do have
a long history of leveraging artificial intelligence,
particularly in cybersecurity, and the ability to leverage U.S.
industry from that perspective, world leader in terms of how we
approach artificial intelligence in cybersecurity. So I think
from that perspective is a well-established methodology that we
want to continue to grow and expand with the services.
In terms of how we approach that from an--if confirmed how
we approach that in the National Security Agency perspective,
in my experience a very methodical way to ensure that we
understand every piece of data that comes in, know where it
came from, under what authority, to be able to ensure analysts
touch that data to make an analysis of it, know where it came
from and know what authority and ensure that it does not impact
the civil liberties of any American.
Senator Scott. Do you feel comfortable on AI that any
significant decision will still being made by humans, not be
made by some system?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Our methodology in terms of how
we approach the things that we will require in U.S. Cyber
Command and consistent with the department's standards is a
human will be interfacing with that machine and with that data.
Senator Scott. We have another significant Presidential
election coming up. How do you--and we have watched the past.
We have watched outside groups, other countries try to
infiltrate our systems to have an impact. Do you feel
comfortable that we are in a position that we can stop that?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I have been fortunate
enough to be part of each of the department's efforts for
election defense since 2018, 2020, and 2022, working with
Homeland Security and FBI to look at foreign threats to our
elections.
And as we look at this election cycle the area that we do
have to consider that will be slightly different will be the
role of generative AI as part of this and so our concern is
foreign use attempting to be a part of our electoral process.
Senator Scott. Right. Earlier this year Communist China
used malware to hack critical infrastructure on our bases in
Guam. Experts said this is one of the largest known cyber
espionage campaigns against the United States.
I am also--I also read an article this week about a typo
leak that gave Mali, a country that has grown their
relationship with Russia, access to diplomatic documents, tax
returns, passwords, and travel details of top officers. So does
this concern you and do we have the ability to make sure this
does not happen?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, the most capable
competitor that we have in cyberspace is the PRC. They use
cyber to gain political, economic, and military advantage.
In the terms of what you describe at Guam, the example of
how we are able to be able to identify that threat, how we
communicate that threat to enable Defense, put out a joint
cybersecurity advisory with the interagency, with our allies
and with industry, we have got to continue to scale that and if
confirmed that will be one of my focus areas.
Senator Scott. How comfortable you are that our space
systems that we rely on for--especially for our defense are not
going to get hacked, do not have risk that they are going to go
down? What do you--what do you think about our ability in
space?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I will talk about two
partnerships that I have been a part of in my previous
experience. One is with U.S. Strategic Command and the work
between Cyber Command and STRATCOM on NC3 and our nuclear
command and control, which has--a critical portion of that is
space.
The other is our partnership with U.S. Space Command and
the Space Force. The Space Force since stand up has really
invested and really been a--has set some models for how to do
cybersecurity of weapon systems.
Investing in that area, establishing cybersecurity service
providers all the way down to the weapons system level those
areas are things we need to continue to grow across the
department. But within the space segment that is an area that
has been focused on by STRATCOM, Space Command, and Space
Force.
Senator Scott. Thank you for your service. Congratulations
on your nomination.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator King, please?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, if you look back at recent history the really
disastrous national security breaches have often come from
insiders--Robert Hanssen, Aldrich Ames, the most recent one,
Edward Snowden.
We will never be able to prevent human beings from
occasionally being tempted or compromised or whatever. I am
interested in the ability--our ability to develop technical
means to prevent or detect exfiltration of classified
materials.
Can you talk to me in a nonclassified setting about
thinking about that? I mean, clearly, we got to vet people and
polygraphs and all of those kinds of things. But it would
really have helped in this prior case if somebody had noticed
that materials were being extracted off of--out of a classified
server.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, it is a great question.
The protection of our classified information is paramount. It
has grave impact to our national security if classified
information is disclosed.
So how we approach that and how we think about it is really
in two ways. One is personal accountability. How do we ensure
that we are hiring the right talent and that we do maintain
visibility on that talent, and some of the things that the
Director of National Intelligence has done to transition from a
periodic reinvestigation of everyone that has access to
classified to a continuous evaluation process. That is a step
on personal accountability.
From a technical perspective it is about user activity
monitoring and our insider threat programs. Those programs
exist at various levels throughout the department.
Senator King. But I would hope in the light of this recent
egregious problem that there would be an intensity to reexamine
the technical means.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Senator, and the Secretary
has directed DOD CIO to work with the undersecretary of
intelligence security to look at our overall approach to user
activity monitoring to ensure that we have an approach that
covers our classified network.
Senator King. Thank you. I want to turn--the cornerstone of
our whole defense posture is deterrence. That is the basis of
our nuclear posture, also our development of conventional
forces. My concern is that in cyberspace deterrence has not
been a significant part of our arsenal, if you will. Basically,
we do not respond very much.
Now, I think General Nakasone has responded effectively on
elections and we saw a diminution of Russian activity in 1918,
2020, and 2022 I think in large part because of that response.
But there was a recent incursion attributed to China. I have
not seen any response yet.
Talk to me about your role at Cyber Command in deterrence.
We are calling it Hunt Forward and various--those kinds of
things--but, really, where we are talking about I want the
Politburo worried about you when they think about discussing a
cyber-attack on the United States.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, first, I think that both
of our pacing adversaries are well aware of the capabilities
that we have. The way we approach these problems and we think
about integrated deterrence from a cyber perspective and how we
partner with the interagency, with our allies, and with
industry we think about how first do--how do we generate
insights, how do we understand and articulate that threat both
inside and with our partners? Second is how do we enable
defense, and then third is if called upon we impose costs.
Senator King. That is the part that I am concerned about.
By the way, I misspoke. I do not think the Politburo exists
anymore. I think it is just Putin and that probably is one of
his problems. But the point is there should be some level of
apprehension about a response. Otherwise, they are just going
to keep coming after us. We cannot patch our way out of this.
Lieutenant General Haugh. And, Senator, from our
perspective, while not talking about in any specific operations
how we approach the--our teammates in the interagency and how
that we are able--it could be enabling a sanction. It could be
enabling a very targeted demarche that has exposed an adversary
activity. It can be public disclosure of those capabilities.
Those are cost imposing and--
Senator King. And I think that is right. I am not
suggesting it has to be cyber for cyber, but there has to be
some response and I think that is where we have failed in the
last several decades there. We have these cyber-attacks.
Nothing really happens in response.
One final question. You talked about 702. General officers
tend to be very moderate and not deal in hyperbole. But is it
possible to overState the catastrophe for national security if
702 is not reauthorized?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in my experience, 31
years, it is irreplaceable in terms of our ability to answer
critical questions for the Nation for the combatant commanders.
When we see things like the origins of fentanyl in China
and its path it takes to the United States informed by 702,
counterterrorism actions, the ability to see some of the
egregious acts that Russia has done in Ukraine informed by 702,
those are just examples at the declassified level of what it
provides while also having an extensive set of control measures
to ensure that every query, everything that we have done to
target a foreign person overseas is done consistent with the
oversight of the DOJ, of the court, of the DNI, and anytime
anything goes wrong a report to all of the oversight
committees.
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, we would be unilaterally
disarming in the face of one of the most serious threats this
country has ever faced. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Schmitt, please?
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you
and appreciate your time in my office with our visit.
Just a couple of questions. One, and I know that AI is a
big topic not just here but it has become culturally socialized
now. People have a lot of questions and do not know where this
is headed and I think that for me sort of dividing this into
from a military context and more of the commercial application
and that is--we are still trying to figure that out and get a
lot of information.
But on the military side, obviously, civilizations have
come and gone based on if somebody else gets a better
technology and moves ahead militarily. So it is a very
important race that we are engaged in.
From your perspective has the Department of Defense done
enough to integrate AI into our various platforms?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I--
Senator Schmitt. And I guess what does that look like too
is probably the followup.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, where I really focus on
are those areas that are within my responsibility, really
looking at how we think about cybersecurity. There are a couple
key areas in there that we have done really well in terms of
across each of the services. The big data platforms that we
built for cybersecurity we built them on a common framework.
One of the things that that the--that Congress authorized
and the department enabled was also a weapon system inside of
U.S. Cyber Command called Unified Platform. That allows us to
see that data across the entire department.
So we have got some foundational components in place. I
think our next challenge, and we owe you back a study by the
fall, is what does that roadmap look like to acceleration and
use of these technologies to be able to give us the greatest
advantage, give our analysts and our defenders the greatest
advantage and allowing us to scale and then doing it in a way
that you are very comfortable with.
Senator Schmitt. And I guess--we have obviously--recently
China has hacked our systems and this is not the first time. It
is not the last time. But one question is--I guess just want to
try to get at do you feel like a layered multi-vendor approach
gives us more protection?
I mean, one of the concerns that I have is if you have a
single vendor you have less competition. You have less, again,
layers of protection. I just want to get your thoughts. I am
not trying to--this is not a trick question. I am just trying
to get your feeling on this, your thoughts on this.
Lieutenant General Haugh. So when we look at it, Senator,
from a cybersecurity perspective we do have a blended series of
vendors that we leverage and from that that allows us to really
play to strengths, and when we think about where we are going
in the cloud architecture of the department, multiple vendors
to be able to leverage their inherent strengths based off
mission and I think that inherently how we then grow those
partnerships from a cybersecurity perspective is both a
strength to us and to those respective companies.
Senator Schmitt. And do you see your role--I mean, we have
talked a lot about--it is really a focus of a lot of my
questions in the INDOPACOM. You mentioned this previously and a
lot of times when you ask questions this late in the game they
get--you sort of ask them again, but that relationship, your
resources--you feel like you have the resources to be fully
integrated there? Because to me, those are where our biggest
threats are from and will be from.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, the support to Admiral
Aquilino--we just completed Cyber Command and INDOPACOM staff
talks to ensure of our alignment and how we collaborate to
ensure that we from a cyber perspective help them set the
theater and that includes our partnerships and aligning to make
sure that Cyber Command is helping enable the partnerships that
INDOPACOM feels is essential.
There are also some specific capabilities they are asking
us for. Those have been authorized and by Congress and by the
department and have put us in a position to be able to deliver
those capabilities for INDOPACOM.
Senator Schmitt. You and I had a conversation and,
obviously, I expressed to you that--a desire to get some of
this divisive politics out of our military and I think we had a
very good conversation about that of best and brightest and
merit based and that--where our focus should be and get some of
this divisive stuff out.
Also, I do want to mention that you do not have to comment
on this because this is not related to you specifically but
there are some in the intelligence community, I think, that
have viewed their role as determining what people can hear and
see and think.
CISA specifically has engaged in part of a censorship
enterprise working with big tech to shut down speech, and I do
not actually think that is debatable anymore. It is--those are
the facts.
And so I would just--a word of caution to be very aware of
that. Obviously, you are dealing with real threats. But I think
the First Amendment is very important.
If we are who we say we are and we believe in this robust
marketplace of speech people should be able to have opinions
even if they are ones that you do not agree with and I do not
think the government or the Intelligence Committee's role is to
decide those things. Let the American people decide that.
So that is just something, I think, for you to keep your
eye on is some people view their role as the decider of who
gets to hear what and I think that is the wrong approach. Thank
you for your time.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Haugh, congratulations to you. I want to followup
on two points that were raised by my colleague Senator Manchin,
budgets and allies.
So on budgets, maybe particular with some colleagues here,
we could get rid of the most commonly occurring CRs immediately
if we would switch the Federal budget year from October 1 to
January 1.
If you look at when we actually get appropriations deals
done over the last 30 years we never get them done by September
30. We almost always get them done in December. Why is that?
It is because our leaders basically at the end of the year
when people want to go spend time with their family say we are
not going home until we get appropriations bills done.
Now, every once in a while we go into the following year
but usually we are getting them done right when we leave. If we
switched the Federal fiscal year to a January 1-December 31
fiscal year that pressure would still be on us. I do not think
we would say, well, let us do it at the end of March. I think
the leadership would still force us to do it.
This has become such a norm here that even in the debt
ceiling deal that we just did we imposed a set of punishments
on ourselves if we did not get the deal done by December 31.
We all know that that is the real time now and I just think
we could eliminate an awful lot of the CR concern that Senator
Manchin raised if we would just analyze and then be honest
about what is the real budget calendar up here.
A friend of mine who is a landscape architect said if you
are doing the landscape do not put down the sidewalks. Do the
landscape, then see where people walk, and they will make a
path and then build the sidewalks there.
We are showing where the path is to budgets and getting rid
of CRs. So I will just tell my colleagues on September 30 this
year I am going to introduce a bill to change the budget year
to a calendar year and if it turns out that we get approps
deals done by September 30 I will admit that I am wrong.
But I am not going to be wrong and I am going to introduce
that bill and I would love anybody else joining me in it. I am
on the Budget Committee. I would like to convince them to do
that budget process change.
General Haugh, Senator Manchin asked you about alliances
and I want to ask about a particular one. The NDAA that we are
debating now on the floor will include provisions regarding the
AUKUS framework.
So this is a framework that has two pillars. Pillar one
deals with submarine technology, the working with the
Australians to buildup a nuclear submarine industrial base in
the 2030's that would involve some transfer of U.S. subs should
we be able to kind of figure out the details right. In the
2040's the Australians would have their own submarine
production capacity.
But there is also pillar two of the AUKUS deal which
focuses upon cooperation with the U.K. and Australia on cyber,
artificial intelligence, hypersonics, other advanced
technologies.
You talked generally about the work that we do in the
cyberspace with allies. Recognizing we are in an unclassified
setting let us focus a little bit more on what you might see as
upside opportunities in this framework with Australia and the
U.K.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in terms of our partners
in the Indo-Pacific, Australia and New Zealand are clearly--
have been long-standing allies.
Senator Kaine. Two of the Five Eyes nations so we have huge
equities with them.
Lieutenant General Haugh. And then, of course, the U.K. and
how we think about Europe and those partners. Our partnership
with both Australia and the U.K., both bilaterally and
multilaterally, AUKUS presents another opportunity and it
presents us an opportunity to do that through the lens of the
threat of the People's Republic of China.
So from a pillar two perspective opportunity for us to
really think our way through how best as all three nations and
all three militaries to think about those technologies.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you. I noticed you are a
Russian major--Russian studies major--and I wonder in the cyber
field I would think that language fluency would be a big
component of trying to build out a good workforce and you would
be sensitive to that from that background and I know within
military speak this is often called the LREC--Language,
Regional Expertise, and Culture--as a kind of a strategic
advantage for folks.
How are you doing within Cyber Command in terms of building
out a workforce that has language capacities to enable us to be
at our best?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, we have done--we have
done well. Inside each one of our teams we do have language
capability. Different services have approached it through
different ways and how they have grown that whether through
their cryptologic community or additional training.
It is absolutely an incredibly important part of our force
and as we think about what our balance is, if confirmed, that
will also be the area that I look at in terms of the balance of
which languages based off the threats we face today.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for your testimony. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Ernst, please?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Haugh. It is good to see you and I want to thank your
family as well for joining you today. We appreciate their
support.
General, I have heard from Special Operations leaders that
they are making significant investments in what they are
calling their Cyber Special Operations Forces and Space Triad,
kind of that that grouping there, and what is your view of this
new operating concept for strategic competition and conflict?
What does that look like to you?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, starting with the
partnership with Special Operations Command, we are--and when
you look at Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Command, and
U.S. Cyber Command, really have global focus in terms of how we
approach the support with the other combatant commands.
Each of us bring really strategic competitive advantages
and from a cyberspace perspective, our unique authorities and
our global presence with Special Operations Command physical
presence with each of the combatant commands and it offers us
an opportunity to look at where each of us can come together to
work in support of a geographic combatant commander's needs and
be able to do that more effectively together.
Personal experience for me as the component to EUCOM every
day we were working with Special Operations Command Europe to
be able to look at how could we together do what the EUCOM
commander needed. We have an embedded staff with Special
Operations Command and their components. It is our Marine
component within U.S. Cyber Command, MARFORCYBER, that leads
that effort for Cyber Command.
Senator Ernst. Yes. I think that is incredibly important to
explain how all of these commands work together cohesively. You
explained the physical presence of those SOCOM operators. Can
you also explain how that ties in with Space Force then as
well?
Lieutenant General Haugh. So, Senator, when we think about
what those challenges are and we think about the resiliency
that is going to be required, as we think about what potential
future conflict could look like how do we--how do we ensure
both a redundant set of communications? Much of that is going
to be built on space.
So the partnership between Cyber Command and Space Command
and the Space Force is really inextricable in terms of how we
think about the support to the joint force.
With Special Operations Command we also want to ensure that
they are well defended from a cyberspace perspective, that we
have a responsibility to ensure that we are collaborating, we
understand those unique communications needs, and how we defend
individual SOCOM activities is also a core thing we are
thinking about.
Senator Ernst. Wonderful. Well, and I appreciate the time
that you took the other day in my office to explain this
concept to me and I know how appreciative SOCOM is as well.
And how do you do foresee this? With Cyber Command and
SOCOM working together how do you see that you will be able to
help each other fulfill your traditional missions more
efficiently?
Lieutenant General Haugh. In the way that we approach it
right now, Senator, we are looking for what is those hard
requirements that a geographic combatant commander needs and
those are the areas that we are focused on. How do we work
together to achieve something that would have been more
difficult independently?
But when we partner with unique strengths of Special
Operations Command and SOCOM components with what our cyber
mission force brings that capacity tied together, our goal is
to satisfy hard problems for the geographic combatant commands.
Senator Ernst. Really appreciate that because as we have
gone and seen in this Committee the constraints that we will be
under with the budget, moving forward, we need to make sure
that we are able to operate efficiently and all of you working
together rather than in individual silos is just much better
for us as decisionmakers and much better for the mission as
well.
So I just want for the other members on the--on the
Committee is just to once again reiterate how important it is
that we have all of our commands working together. I am glad
that you have that relationship.
You mentioned General Fenton the other day, our Special
Operations Command commander, and the relationships that have
been built there. You also mentioned General Kurilla and others
that Cyber Command will continue to work with around the globe.
So really appreciate that.
How important just from your perspective--I am saying it
but from your perspective how important it is that Cyber
Command remain tied in with all of these other combatant
commanders and the relationships there?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, when you look at the
three missions that have been assigned to U.S. Cyber Command to
defend the Department's network that really is in support of
all the combatant commands and their ability to execute, our
ability to defend the Nation and the other combatant commands
from adversary hacking and then the third very specified
mission is to deliver offensive and defensive capabilities in
support of the other combatant commands.
Senator Ernst. Very glad to have you being nominated into
this position, General Haugh, and once again, thanks to your
family as well for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Peters, please?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to
see you again. Enjoyed our conversation in the office earlier.
As you know, I chair the Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee in addition to being a member of this
Committee and so I am concerned that our military installations
here at home in the homeland may be vulnerable to attacks by
adversaries seeking to disrupt or even prevent normal
operations and the movement of forces within the United States.
These adversaries may seek to exploit base resilience on
infrastructure in the surrounding communities that help to
sustain just everyday base functions. So given the
interdependency between critical civilian infrastructure,
military installations, and local civilian communities how
would you envision CYBERCOM's role compared to the DHS role to
identify, to defend, and report cyber threats posed to DOD
installations and their surrounding communities, particularly
those installations who are charged with deploying combat
capabilities abroad are essential to national security?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, it is a great question
and to start with Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency is a
great teammate and collaborator with U.S. Cyber Command. Major
concepts that we are thinking about and what we have really
learned through our partnership with European Command, U.S.
Strategic Command, and U.S. TRANSCOM as it relates to Ukraine,
two concepts of set the theater, how do we help EUCOM ensure
their networks are secure and they have resilient
communications, and then set the globe because in reality
anytime that the Department of Defense is operating it really
is a global set of connectivity that begins in the United
States.
So when we think about generating force from TRANSCOM, when
we think about our nuclear command control, that is inherently
a partnership that rests on the infrastructure of the United
States.
Areas that in my experience--I have worked incredibly close
with CISA as part of the original lead for the cyber--for the
election defense activities that we conducted in U.S. Cyber
Command NSA in support of Homeland Security. That was one of my
first functions in U.S. Cyber Command and have now been part of
that for 3 years.
One of the areas the department is investing in we
currently have a strong liaison presence with DHS and they with
us. The department is going to expand that to allow us to have
liaisons with each sector that CISA is responsible for. So I
see this partnership only growing.
Senator Peters. Right. Are there best practices that you
would recommend to streamline and optimize the collaboration
between CYBERCOM and DHS, CISA in particular? Lieutenant
General Haugh. So I think, Senator, the area that we can
contribute with our--with our OSD colleagues and our other
combatant commands is to articulate what infrastructure is
important to the department.
So we owe that to ensure that and we do that well today.
But that will continue to change. As technology changes, as our
demands on industry change, and as our infrastructure changes
we have to ensure that there is a really clear understanding
with not only our teammates in DHS but if there is a different
sector agency that is responsible, but the infrastructure that
CISA has to be able to work with individual sectors, how their
ISACs do information sharing, those are inherent strengths for
the Nation and those are areas that we should be really good
partners.
Senator Peters. Right. I recently returned from a trip to
the Western Balkans where I heard from our Albanian allies
about the devastating Iranian cyber-attacks against their
country and it certainly--these types of attacks by both nation
State and nonState actors are going on frequently and in
severity against our allies.
I certainly want to applaud the actions of our embassy in
Tehran along with support provided by the FBI, Microsoft,
EUCOM, CYBERCOM, and others that responded very swiftly and
professionally when requested by the Albanian government.
Given that, unfortunately, those threats are only going to
increase in this space and they are likely to be the target of
increased attacks from the Iranians.
So my question for you is what actions should CYBERCOM and
interagencies be taking now to better help partners and allies
proactively defend against this threat.
And then the second part of the question is how can we
provide more robust medium to long-term cyber recovery relief
with U.S. private sector support to help these countries
rebuild their cyber infrastructure just as we would help a
country recover from a natural disaster?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, first, in terms of
Albania, I too have met with Albanian leadership and we--as
part of the team that has responded based off of guidance from
the department and then with our interagency teammates to
ensure that they--we can get their networks back up and
operating in concert also with their State partner to be able
to make them more resilient.
It is an example, I think, from our perspective of how do
we share information. So how do we share information on terms
of threats with our allies and with industry in a way that
makes everyone more resilient and that is an area that from the
Albanian perspective is a good example of areas that we can
contribute.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thanks very much, Senator Peters. Before I
recognize Senator Budd I will formally turn over the
chairmanship temporarily to Senator King. I have to go to the
Appropriations Committee.
Senator Budd, you are recognized.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman.
General, thanks for being here this morning. Again, thanks
for your family. I enjoyed our conversation last week. So it is
good to see you again.
So I want to focus on AI. I know there has been lots of
questions this morning and also I want to talk about advanced
computing.
So do you believe that the United States currently holds an
advantage in AI technologies?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I do.
Senator Budd. So one of the challenges faced by CYBERCOM
and NSA is recruiting and retaining talent and a lot of the
focus has been on cyber operators. We talked about that.
But we also need analysts with both computer science
backgrounds and also language skills. So can AI that uses large
language models to interpret and analyze audio text or--excuse
me, audio or text can that replace the need for analysts or is
that just a--is AI tooled to more empower workers and how
should we be thinking about that?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, from our perspective it
would be an enabler for an analyst to look at the most
important data that would answer a foreign intelligence
question or enable our planning. So it would be an enabler, not
a replacement.
Senator Budd. Thank you. So I want to talk about the cyber
threat posed by China. We learned this week that China hacked
the secretary--excuse me, the Secretary of Commerce Raimondo
and the State Department in advance of bilateral talks.
So when we spoke last week you mentioned that probably the
most pressing challenge is China's advanced efforts to steal
American intellectual property. So could you please further
elaborate on that threat and why it matters? And if confirmed,
what do you believe your role is to inform the public on and to
respond to those attacks?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, the PRC has done a
sustained campaign over decades to steal intellectual property
and it really is intended to enable their economy to be able
to--to create economic advantage and also to buy down the
military advantage that the United States has.
It has been persistent, it has been continuous, and it will
continue. From our perspective, it is our job both as Cyber
Command and NSA to be a part of the team that exposes that
threat. Today if you go to the National Security Agency website
you will see a series of reports that lay out in detail how
China hackers operate and what that looks like.
That is intended to very clearly pass out to not just our
allies but to our industry leaders how China operates and how
they can defend. So we should be being as transparent as we
can, we should be collaborating with industry wherever we can,
and working with our interagency teammates to ensure wherever
they have responsibility that we are clearly articulating the
threat and we are thinking about this from a common defense
perspective. Senator Budd. I appreciate you making that
publicly available and I hope, if confirmed, that you will make
that even--if you will promote that I think that would be
helpful. So you also explained that China focused its AI on
expanding information control. We talked a little bit about
that this morning. So what is CYBERCOM's role in supporting the
interagency to defeat information control and how confident are
you in your ability to accomplish that task?
Lieutenant General Haugh. So, Senator, I think when we are
thinking about that, first and foremost, is we drive--what
activities we work are really aligned against what the other
combatant commanders need. So when we are thinking from a Cyber
Command perspective we are aligning what are the capabilities
we need will be driven by those combatant commanders.
From a National Security Agency perspective, if confirmed
in that role it is really NSA's job to identify the threat and
to be able to communicate that threat across our interagency to
then be able to determine what is the best approach if that
technology is being proliferated.
Senator Budd. Thank you. So how is CYBERCOM leveraging
commercial partnerships to combat threats and maintain our
competitive advantage and are there ways to do that better?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I think right now we do
have collaborative relationships with industry and particularly
with small business. That is really where the department
focused us initially.
Now as we gain our budget control and our acquisition
authority that will allow us to expand how we interact with
industry and certainly be able to bring much more resource.
That will enable us with--to operate with more speed and
agility aligned with our requirements and we are excited about
that opportunity.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. I wish you luck.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King. [Presiding.] On behalf of the chair, Senator
Rosen?
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Senator King. Appreciate
the hearing and, General Haugh, we had such a lovely
conversation. I know everyone is saying that.
I really appreciate what we chatted about and I so
appreciate the family that moves and moves and moves along with
you and does all the hard work to be sure that you can be happy
at home and productive in your work. So thank you.
I want to talk a little bit about--my colleagues have been
talking about all these things, AI, everything else. But in
order to achieve our goals, all of these goals that everyone
has talked about, we have to have the workforce. So even with
AI that Senator Budd talked about you really need a person to
make that final important decision that takes all the data,
puts it down, and gives it to someone.
And so in March the DOD released its cyber workforce
strategy to address the gaps in workforce management to ensure
we are equipped to address the growing cyber threats from our
adversaries.
So we discussed in our meeting just this week my Civilians
Cybersecurity Reserve Act, which would provide the Department
of Defense with qualified civilian personnel in our greatest
time of need.
It was included in this year's pilot program and this year
Senate NDAA. So what is your view, as we spoke about the
nontraditional reserve models such as establishing a civilian
cybersecurity reserve to support DOD's cyberspace operation,
the kind of talent and maybe that it needs and the depth of
experience that it needs?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator Rosen, I think if
confirmed one of the roles that I have the opportunity--would
have the opportunity to do is really be an advocate for STEM
[science, technology, engineering and mathematics education.
When we think about the National Security Agency and the
need that NSA has in terms of a very technical workforce the
work that we can also be advocating for with the services to
make sure the service are able to recruit the right talent and
that really starts with being able to tap all the talent in the
United States.
So, if confirmed, I would really look forward to working
with the department, work with your team as we think about what
is the right type of pilot that would allow us to really think
through how we could leverage a broader portion of our
population.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to working on that
with you, and I think as we think about our workforce and our
reserve force and that partnership we have to think about our
international cyber partnerships, right.
And so the National Cybersecurity Strategy, well, it does
rightly identify that strengthening our international
partnerships it is--that capacity is really a pillar of our
collective cybersecurity. We do not do it alone. The threats
come from everywhere and we have to be--we are stronger
together when we can share information.
So our Hunt Forward operations in Ukraine have demonstrated
really the true value of these international partnerships that
are critical to identifying and stopping malicious cyber
activity before it threatens our critical infrastructure and
our key resources.
And so the Nevada National Guard has three partner nations
as part of the State Partnership Program--Fiji, Tonga, and
Samoa. So, if confirmed, how would you leverage the State
Partnership Program to bolster cyber partnerships with our
allies and partners?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in one of my--one of my
first Cyber Command jobs when we when--we went to operate with
one of our partners we found a State Partner Program already
there.
So we know that they are already there. They have long-
standing relationships. We ought to leverage that and we also
want to make sure that if there are some of the states that are
trying to build a cyber partnership how do we help them do
that.
How do we ensure they have the right threat information?
How do they? We want to leverage the State Partnership Program.
It has been a huge effort for us.
As the department in the new Cybersecurity Strategy
articulates the next area of priority in terms of mission is
our partners and allies and so that is clearly an area that, if
confirmed, will be a priority for me.
Senator Rosen. Well, fantastic. And I want to--I want to
build a little bit on what Senator Budd was talking about.
China and others have talked about this and Chinese cyber
aggression, particularly on Taiwan and its impact and potential
threat to us as we see that acutely aware that China poses a
threat in the cyber domain and it is using Taiwan as a testing
ground for its cyber capabilities and recent cyber-attacks have
forced Taiwan to harden their defense. What we learn there can
save us here.
So China is closely monitoring the outcome of Russia's
invasion on Ukraine to apply the lessons possibly learned to a
potential invasion of Taiwan and so that is why this Congress
with Senator Rounds and Congressman Gallagher, bipartisan
legislation that we introduced to expand American military
cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan. And so this legislation
has been included in both the House and Senate versions of the
NDAA for fiscal year 2024.
So, if confirmed, how would you work to expand military to
military cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan to strengthen
their deterrent capabilities and raise the cost of escalation
for China?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, U.S. Cyber Command
currently has a partnership with Taiwan. We will work with
INDOPACOM and ensure that that remains strong.
Senator Rosen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator King. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Haugh, first of all, you are getting a lot of
practice at this because you are responsible not just in this
Committee but also within intel in the dual hatted role that
you play.
I want to thank you for your service to our country as well
as your family. You have heard that from a number of folks up
here and we really do recognize that there is a challenge for
the family because you do move regularly and we understand that
that it is not something that a lot of folks across our country
probably understand is part of the mission that you have. So
thank you for that sacrifice for you and the family.
I have followed up in each of our hearings this year and
asked each of the individuals coming before us in command
positions the following. It has to do with I believe that we
have a very serious issue with regard to spectrum and
specifically with regard to the proposed sale by some Members
of Congress, suggesting that we should sell portions of the
spectrum in the area of 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz, and this is an
area in which we have significant defensive capabilities and
that we utilize today.
Based on your knowledge of this issue, if there is a
report, which is due out in September--if that report
demonstrates that auctioning off this 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
portion of the spectrum will adversely impact our national
security what would be your advice to the President and
Congress?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I am following the
ongoing study. If that comes back as high risk I would
recommend not to share.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. There seems to be--someone
somehow has continued to push this narrative that this portion
of the spectrum should be sold for commercial purposes.
In your professional military opinion do you believe it is
possible that our adversaries may very well be attempting to
influence this debate and push the sale of the spectrum that is
vital to our national security?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in my current role I
have not seen indications that that is occurring. I would
expect that that is a drumbeat in standards bodies and things
along that line from--in terms of trying to influence areas
that would disadvantage the United States and advantage China.
Senator Rounds. And in this particular case that would
disadvantage this country?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me move on to another area
that--this Committee was successful in including the provision
within the Senate's version of the NDAA, which would authorize
the Department of Defense to conduct cyber operations against
transnational criminal organizations including the cartels.
How would you use these increased authorities to enhance
the whole of government approach to combating transnational
criminal organizations?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, if we--if there were
authorities assigned to U.S. Cyber Command both in the law and
by the department our first stop is always the supported
commander and in this case we would have conversations with the
U.S. Northern Command commander about priorities and where we
would fit into an overall strategy that would really be
interagency approach and support to what U.S. Northern Command
needs.
Senator Rounds. Clearly, you could bring capabilities to
the fight?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. We are also undergoing the
largest overhaul of our nuclear triad in decades and we are
doing so against the specter of two nuclear near peer rivals.
All elements of our nuclear deterrent including our command
and control systems are being modernized. The cybersecurity of
our NC3 systems must be a top priority.
In the current and projected threat environment what do you
see as the biggest challenges for nuclear command and control
from a cyber perspective? And I ask that recognizing that we
are in an unclassified environment.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I think from our
perspective this is--our partnership with Strategic Command is
focused on ensuring the resiliency and health of our NC3
enterprise and so from a Cyber Command perspective both today
and if confirmed we have got a strong relationship with
STRATCOM.
We just held a collaborative conference that brought in the
services, brought in all of our partners to work--to ensure
that we are providing the best threat intelligence and also
thinking our way through the architecture as they advance to
ensure they are doing it in a way that we would recommend from
a cybersecurity perspective.
The role that Congress has done to give the U.S. Strategic
Command the responsibility for the overall NC3 enterprise has
also allowed us to really focus on the priorities that come
from General Cotton and we are closely aligned with him and
will continue to do so if confirmed.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. And, General, I do look forward
to supporting your nomination. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
Thank you, General, for being here today and my thanks to
your family for the support they offer you but also for the
sacrifices that they make for this country as well. So thank
you, sir.
I would like to just followup a little bit with my
colleague questioning you on NC3. I understand the relationship
you have with STRATCOM, with General Cotton. I am very pleased
to hear about your work in establishing that architecture.
But can you tell us where you believe we are in the process
there and in this setting what has been done, what still needs
to be done, and if you think the timeline we are currently on
is appropriate?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, what I can speak to is
in terms to how STRATCOM has really approached ensuring they
have visibility of the NC3 enterprise, how they have aligned
their components to ensure that they are focused on the
cybersecurity of the enterprise, and then the clear
requirements that STRATCOM has given to U.S. Cyber Command and
our components to ensure that it is secure.
In terms of the investment strategy I would defer that to
General Cotton.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
I appreciated our discussion earlier this week on CYBERCOM
and NSA's efforts to share more information with the public
especially about network vulnerabilities.
As I told you in our conversation, I think that the more
the American people have a fuller understanding of the threats
we face I know that they would be very, very supportive of the
actions we need to take to make sure this country is safe.
In this setting can you speak to the value of those types
of advisories on known cybersecurity threats and how they can
be better leveraged to protect nongovernment--governmental
assets?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I think this is an area
that from an NSA and a Cyber Command perspective the ability to
share information that allows both our companies to be more
resilient, so a complete understanding of what the threat
environment looks like at an unclassified level, makes
everything go more quickly so we can move with speed.
In terms of sharing what those threats look like, we would
want every American to be able to understand what is the
threat, particularly if we are thinking about ransomware or in
the future what threats come from generative AI and how would
that enable a hacker.
Those are conversations that we should be having very
routinely both in how we communicate and in the documents that
we put out but also in how we engage the U.S. population.
Senator Fischer. You not only protect the Department of
Defense, our national security, the assets that we have, but
also what is your relationship to private companies that have
critical infrastructure, for example, transmission lines, our
ports, our airports, nuclear power facilities? Can you just on
a high level tell us what your relationship is there and your
feelings about it, how secure it is?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, from our perspective and
U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency the
Department of Defense is the sector specific lead for the
Defense Industrial Base.
So in terms of a series of direct sharing relationships
with that segment our close partnership with CISA in terms of
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency as they are--as
they lead and in this case for those type of activities with
the Department of Energy they are our partners and we want to
ensure that both to CISA and the DOE they are getting the best
threat information to allow them to ensure the sector leads
across the sector councils within Energy are getting that data.
I have seen that. I have been a part of that activity in
the past. Our ability, if confirmed, to sustain that and expand
it that will be an area that will be a priority.
Senator Fischer. When we go outside of the United States it
is important that we collaborate with our allies as well and
have our partners in a cyber domain.
It is important in this country. It is important with other
governments as well. How do you believe that you will be able
to increase that collaboration?
Lieutenant General Haugh. In terms of our partners today we
have a really good set of international partnerships and as
U.S. Cyber Command continues to grow, if confirmed, how we
apply our budget that allows us to also look at how we expand
those foreign partnerships is an area that we will certainly
consider.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator King. On behalf of the chair, Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our Nation's adversaries use crypto to evade sanctions and
to fund their weapons programs, spying, and cyber-attacks. Now,
dirty crypto transactions are often hidden but here is the part
we know for sure. In 2022 cyber criminals aligned with rogue
nations received over $8 billion in crypto payments in
violation of U.S. sanctions.
Top of the list in its love for crypto is North Korea. Last
year North Korea stole a record-breaking $1.7 billion in
crypto, about two-thirds of which was stolen from crypto's so-
called decentralized finance, or defi, space which allows
actors to bypass traditional regulated financial intermediaries
to move funds around.
Over the past 5 years North Korean hackers have stolen,
that we know of, more than $3 billion in crypto. So where does
that money go? Straight into North Korea's illegal nuclear
program.
General Haugh, as deputy commander of U.S. Cyber Command
you have seen the scale of North Korea's campaign to pay for
its nuclear program with stolen laundered crypto. Do you know
how much of North Korea's missile program has been funded by
the spoils of crypto crime and cyber-attacks?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I do not have a specific
number but I do know that from a nation State, a ransomware
actor, and DPRK both in their cryptocurrency theft and how they
enable IT workers to gain funds it is an enabler for both the
hackers and from a nation State and ransomware perspective and
it is certainly an enabler for the DPRK to raise funds focused
on their military program.
Senator Warren. Okay. And I think the best estimates are
about half of their nuclear program is paid for with stolen
crypto funds. Would that number surprise you?
Lieutenant General Haugh. It would not, Senator.
Senator Warren. All right. So according to a recent Wall
Street Journal report, since 2018 when North Korea began
ramping up its large-scale crypto attacks its missile launch
attempts and successes have, quote, ``mushroomed.''
In other words, that money has been valuable to advance
what they want to do. Cyber Command, the agency that you are
nominated to lead, has played a critical role in helping law
enforcement agencies track and seize crypto wallets used by
North Korean hackers to steal millions of dollars in crypto and
to launder that money through Chinese crypto networks.
From your experience, General Haugh, when North Korea
steals billions of dollars worth of crypto and uses Chinese
money laundering networks and pours that money into its nuclear
programs does that pose a threat to our national security?
Lieutenant General Haugh. It does, Senator.
Senator Warren. So I really appreciate your forthright
comments here. As you know, North Korea is not the only issue.
Russian ransomware gangs, Chinese fentanyl manufacturers,
transnational drug cartels, and others are using crypto to
exploit the loopholes in our Nation's anti-money laundering
network.
General Haugh, the Treasury Department recently recommended
that the government strengthen our Nation's anti-money
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism rules by,
quote, ``closing any identified gaps in the Bank Secrecy Act to
the extent that they allow certain DeFi services to fall
outside the scope of the BSA's definition of financial
institutions.''
So let me ask you, do you agree that we need to stitch the
loopholes that allow the DPRK and other dangerous actors to use
crypto to fill their coffers?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, I am not--I am not
really aware of that specific recommendation. We would--that is
certainly an area that we are focused on from a threat
perspective and would love to be able to work with you on what
is the way that we can limit adversary hackers that threaten
the United States through every means.
Senator Warren. All right. Senator Roger Marshall and I are
reintroducing our crypto anti-money laundering legislation to
close the gaps that let these bad actors skirt our country's
laws and threaten our national security.
Congress cannot continue to sleep while North Korea and
China and Russia are using crypto to threaten America's
national security. So I want to close--I know I am out of time.
I just want to say one word, if I can, with your indulgence,
about the impact of the senator from Alabama's holds on our
senior military nominees.
These officers have served our country honorably for
decades and they do not deserve to be treated like a political
football. I very much hope that the hold will be lifted so that
we can move forward on these nominations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, sir. On behalf of the chairman,
Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, the vulnerabilities, equities, policy, and
process establish how the government balances equities and
makes determinations regarding the disclosure or retention of
newly discovered zero day vulnerabilities.
As we saw in recent reporting about PRC compromise of
critical infrastructure in Guam the PRC is looking to hold our
critical infrastructure at risk in the event of a crisis
between our countries.
How will this increased threat to U.S. infrastructure
inform your thinking regarding retention versus disclosure of
identified vulnerabilities?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, in my experience I have
worked as part of the vet process. It is effective at ensuring
that that there is a really good balance, and if I look at how
we approach this in a transparent way we publish what that
looks like as the U.S. Government and then counterbalance that
with the law that China has passed and how they are thinking
and mandating each company having to turn over every
vulnerability directly to the People's Republic of China and
their cyber actors. Certainly, we are taking a very transparent
balanced approach versus an information control approach.
Senator Gillibrand. You recently commanded the 16th Air
Force, which executes the Air Force's cyber missions. The 16th
Air Force has entered into a range of cooperative research and
development agreements with public and private entities to
advance its cyber missions.
As the commander what do these agreements offer you and how
do they advance our Nation's cybersecurity?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Senator, the cooperative nature
of them really help both sides of each of those partnerships.
An example of those we really looked in particular at things
that would have been threats to our bases, in particular the
electrical systems that were on our bases.
So allowing us to do cooperative research within academia
and with industry to be able to think about those threats
internally as they also then apply that research to be a part
of our Nation's response.
Senator Gillibrand. Section 1502 of the fiscal year 2023
NDAA requires an annual report on the support Cyber Command
receives from the military services. We have had several
hearings on this to see which services are providing personnel,
which ones are having challenges.
Will you commit to being direct and candid with Congress in
your 1502 reports and working to ensure that those are
submitted on time each year and will you make recommendations
to this Committee about how to make sure you have the
complement of cyber warriors that you need to complete your
missions?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator. On behalf of the chair
before I close the Committee session, General, I want to thank
you again for your service.
Thank you to your family, which has been very much
appreciated and observed today. Your answers have been
impressive, thoughtful, and forthright and I think it speaks
very well for your continued or your prospective stewardship of
these two important agencies.
I also hope that you will convey my deep regard and respect
to your predecessor, General Nakasone, who I believe is one of
the most capable public servants I have ever worked with.
I think the work that he did subsequent to the 2016
election, in 2018, and 2020 was leadership at its best--
creative leadership at its best and I hope you will convey that
thought to General Nakasone and to Susan.
Thank you again for your testimony today. Thank you for
your willingness to serve and we look forward to working with
you in these incredibly important and dangerous times that we
can turn to our advantage, given the skills of yourself and the
great people that you will be leading. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Timothy
D. Haugh, USAF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. The Commander, USCYBERCOM, is responsible for the planning
of cyberspace missions; serving as the cyberspace operations joint
force provider; and joint force trainer, as specified in the Unified
Command Plan and 10 U.S.C. Sec. 167b. In coordination with mission
partners, USCYBERCOM: directs Department of Defense information network
(DoDIN) operations; secures and defends the DODIN; maintains freedom of
maneuver in cyberspace; executes full-spectrum military cyberspace
operations; provides shared situational awareness of cyberspace
operations, including indications and warning; integrates and
synchronizes cyberspace operations with other Combatant Commands and
other appropriate U.S. Government Agencies tasked with defending our
Nation's interests in cyberspace; and supports civil authorities and
international partners. These efforts support DOD's overall mission in
cyberspace of defending the Nation, supporting the Combatant Commands,
and defending Department of Defense (DoD) networks.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Director of the National Security Agency/Chief of the Central
Security Service?
Answer. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security (USD (I&S)) and the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) is responsible for ensuring the NSA successfully
conducts two missions: signals intelligence (SIGINT), and
cybersecurity. The SIGINT mission provides America's leaders with
critical foreign intelligence to defend our country, save lives, and
advance U.S. goals and interests. The cybersecurity mission prevents
and eradicates threats to U.S. national security systems with a focus
on the Defense Industrial Base, and the U.S. Military's weapon systems.
NSA's SIGINT and cybersecurity missions are also critical to
fulfillment of NSA's combat support responsibilities.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I am a career intelligence officer who has served 31 years
in intelligence positions in the Air Force, the Joint Force, and the
Intelligence Community (IC). I have commanded intelligence units at the
Squadron, Wing, and Numbered Air Force level, and served as a Senior
Intelligence Officer in special operations, a combatant command, and
Air Force intelligence units in garrison and deployed. Trained as a
Signals Intelligence officer, I have served in many operational
assignments within the joint and Air Force cyber force, and in
intelligence assignments within the NSA and the Air Force's cryptologic
component. In my cyber assignments, I have commanded units within the
Air Force and Joint Force responsible for executing all of USCYBERCOM's
assigned missions. I have also been part of combined operations with
NSA that allowed me to partner with or support NSA's Cybersecurity and
SIGINT missions. I have been honored to serve with the military cyber
forces and the NSA for most of my career, and have a deep appreciation
for the talented professionals who execute both organizations'
important missions in service of the Nation.
Question. What qualifications do you have to command military
forces and military operations?
Answer. Over the past 31 years, I have served in leadership
positions across the Air Force, the Joint Force, and the Intelligence
Community in peacetime and during conflict. I have commanded units at
the Squadron, Group, Wing, Joint Task Force and Numbered Air Force
levels prior to my current assignment as the Deputy Commander of US
Cyber Command. My assignments, both in command and as a staff officer,
have afforded me broad insight into command and leadership from the
tactical to the strategic level, and provided substantial experience
coordinating with senior government officials, congressional members
and staff, senior military leaders, foreign partners, members of
industry, and academia. Finally, I have been privileged to attend a
number of schools for further professional education designed to
prepare me for leadership and command at the senior levels of our armed
forces.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command or the Director of the National Security Agency/
Chief of the Central Security Service?
Answer. I am a firm believer in life-long learning. If confirmed, I
would strengthen our relationships with industry, coalition partners,
and interagency stakeholders, while learning from their perspectives
and equities to enhance the effectiveness of our cyber and cryptologic
efforts. Additionally, I intend to continue a program of self-study
that involves regular interaction with those in academia, industry, the
interagency, and select coalition partners to further my knowledge on
leadership, technology, acquisition and cybersecurity.
relationships
Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S.
Cyber Command, to the following officials:
Question. The Secretary of Defense
Answer. The Commander, USCYBERCOM performs duties under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and is
directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the
command to carry out its assigned missions. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
question. the deputy secretary of defense
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and
exercises such powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the
Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is
vacant. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary, as
appropriate.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence
Answer. As the head of the Intelligence Community, the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) acts is the principal advisor to the
President and the National Security Council on intelligence matters
pertaining to national security; and oversees and directs the
implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The Director of
National Intelligence coordinates national intelligence priorities and
facilitates information sharing and coordination across the
Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Director of National Intelligence in the exercise of her authorities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the
Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense for matters regarding the formulation of national
security and defense policy, and the integration of DOD policy,
strategy, plans, execution, and capabilities to achieve national
security objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely
with the USD(P) on all policy issues affecting USCYBERCOM and NSA.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security
(USD(I&S)) is the advisor and PSA to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense for all intelligence, counterintelligence, security,
sensitive activities and other intelligence-related matters. Moreover,
the USD(I&S) exercises authority, direction, and control on behalf of
the Secretary of Defense over the National Security Agency / Central
Security Service, subject to authority of the DOD Chief Information
Officer concerning the activities of the Cybersecurity Directorate. The
USD (I&S) also exercises authority, direction and control over the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and serves as the Director of Defense
Intelligence and principal advisor to the DNI on Defense Intelligence
matters. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
USD(I&S) on matters relating to USCYBERCOM's and NSA's
responsibilities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD(A&S)) is the PSA and advisor to the Secretary of
Defense for all matters relating to acquisition and sustainment in the
DOD, and serves as the senior procurement executive for the Department
of Defense, with the mission of delivering and sustaining timely, cost-
effective capabilities for the armed forces. Acting through the Command
Acquisition Executive (CAE), the Commander of USCYBERCOM is responsible
for the development, acquisition and (as applicable) sustainment of
cyber operations-peculiar equipment, capabilities and services. If
confirmed, in coordination with the PCA, I look forward to working
closely with the USD(A&S) to ensure that the USCYBERCOM CAE executes
the command's acquisition authorities consistent with Department
policies in support of national priorities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is responsible for overseeing the research, engineering, and
technology development activities across the DOD enterprise to ensure
technological superiority for the Department. If confirmed, I look
forward to working closely with the USD(R&E), in coordination with the
PCA, to drive innovation and accelerate the advancement of cyber
capabilities, thereby ensuring we maintain dominance in cyberspace.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Hemispheric Affairs (ASD (HD&HA)), under the authority, direction, and
control of the USD(P), executes responsibilities including overall
supervision of the homeland defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA) activities of the DOD, as well as defense continuity
and mission assurance, and U.S. defense and security policy for other
nations in the Western Hemisphere. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the ASD (HD&HA) and the USD(P) on matters regarding
USCYBERCOM's assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy and
Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense
Answer. As a result of the recent establishment of the position of
the ASD(Cyber Policy), I understand the Department is evaluating the
future cyber policy roles of the new ASD (Cyber Policy) and PCA, as
well as other leaders involved in the formulation of the Department's
cyber policy, such as the USD(Policy), the ASD(Space Policy), and the
DOD CIO. If confirmed, I will partner with USD(Policy) and DOD CIO to
ensure alignment as these changes are implemented.
Question. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer
Answer. The DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) is the PSA and
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on
policy, oversight, guidance, and coordination for all Department of
Defense matters related to architecture and programs related to the
networking and cyber defense architecture of the Department;
information resource management; information technology;
electromagnetic spectrum, including coordination with other Federal and
industry agencies; coordination for classified programs; and in
coordination with the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness,
policies related to the Cyber Operations Force (COF); for nuclear
command and control systems; positioning, navigation and timing.
Additionally, the CIO exercises authority, direction, and control over
the Defense Information Systems Agency and the activities of the
Cybersecurity Directorate of the National Security Agency. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Chief Information
Officer on matters regarding USCYBERCOM's and NSA's responsibilities.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and
Secretary of Defense. Communication between the President or the
Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders flows through the
Chairman. By custom and tradition, and as instructed by the Unified
Command Plan, if confirmed, I would routinely communicate with and
through the Chairman regarding matters within USCYBERCOM's and NSA's
responsibilities to ensure that he or she remains fully informed and
able to provide sound and timely military advice to senior
policymakers.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments
Answer. The USCYBERCOM Commander's authority over assigned Service
components is clear in the Goldwater-Nichols Act but requires close
coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure
that USCYBERCOM does not intrude upon the responsibilities of the
Secretaries of the Military Departments. Close coordination between the
USCYBERCOM Commander, the Principal Cyber Advisor, and each of the
Secretaries of the Military Departments is also essential for gaining
and maintaining the Services' support to cyber operations forces as an
integral part of the Joint Force.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services
Answer. The Service Chiefs are charged to provide organized,
trained, and equipped forces to be employed by Combatant Commanders in
accomplishing their assigned missions. Additionally, these officers
serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as such have a lawful
obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively,
the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and conferring
regularly with the Service Chiefs.
Question. The Combatant Commanders, and, specifically, the
Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command
Answer. The Commander, USCYBERCOM, has both supported and
supporting relationships with other Combatant Commanders, largely
identified within the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, execute orders, and operation orders. In general,
the Commander, USCYBERCOM, is the supported commander for trans-
regional and global cyberspace operations and is a supporting commander
for cyberspace operations specific to a single Combatant Commander's
area of responsibility. Specific relationships with the Commander, U.S.
Northern Command, and Commander U.S. Strategic Command, will be
delineated by the President or the Secretary of Defense in execute and/
or operation orders. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Combatant Commanders to deepen these relationships to support national
and theater security objectives.
Question. The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency
Answer. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a DOD
Combat Support Agency that provides, operates, and assures command and
control, information sharing capabilities, and a globally accessible
enterprise information infrastructure in direct support of national
leaders, joint warfighters, and other mission and coalition partners
across the full spectrum of operations. The Commander, USCYBERCOM, must
maintain a close relationship with the DISA Director to coordinate and
represent requirements in this mission area in order to accomplish
assigned missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
the DISA Director on matters of shared interest and importance.
Question. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
Answer. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
manages and executes specified Defense Intelligence and
counterintelligence functions across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise and for select functions across the greater Intelligence
Community. The DIA analyzes and disseminates military intelligence in
support of combat and noncombat military missions, and serves as the
Nation's primary manager and producer of foreign military intelligence.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the DIA Director
on matters relating to USCYBERCOM's assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
Answer. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is
the principal advisor on overhead reconnaissance to the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant
Commanders, responsible for developing, acquiring, launching, and
operating space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities to secure and expand the U.S. intelligence advantage. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the NRO Director on
matters relating to USCYBERCOM's assigned responsibilities.
Question. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
Answer. The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO)
is DOD's senior official responsible for the acceleration of adoption
of data, analytics, and AI to generate decision advantage. To this end,
the CDAO leads strategy and policy on data, analytics, and AI adoption;
provides oversight for efforts throughout the Department; develops
digital and AI-enabled solutions at scale; and provides expertise to
address urgent requirements and emergent challenges. If confirmed, I
look forward to working closely with the CDAO, in coordination with
other DOD and OSD component heads, to integrate efforts to build
enduring advantage for the Department and the Nation.
Question. The National Cyber Director
Answer. The National Cyber Director is the principal advisor to the
President on cybersecurity policy and strategy, and leads whole-of-
government coordination of programs and policies to improve the
cybersecurity posture of the United States, increase information and
communications technology security, understand and deter malicious
cyber activity, and advance diplomatic and other efforts security,
understand and deter malicious cyber activity, and advance diplomatic
and other efforts security, understand and deter malicious cyber
activity, and advance diplomatic and other efforts security, understand
and deter malicious cyber activity, and advance diplomatic and other
efforts security, understand and deter malicious cyber activity, and
advance diplomatic and other efforts security, understand and deter
malicious cyber activity, and advance diplomatic and other efforts
Question. The Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency
Answer. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Director is the operational lead for Federal cybersecurity and the
national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and
resilience, facilitating collaboration and partnership between all
levels of government, industry, educational institutions, and the
American public to reduce risk to the Nation's cyber and physical
infrastructure. The CISA Director reports to the Secretary of Homeland
Security and is also responsible for fulfilling the Secretary's
responsibilities for the security of Federal information and
information systems, except for National Security Systems. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing the close partnership my
predecessors have each enjoyed with the CISA Director to deter, prevent
and disrupt threats to the Nation's information systems and critical
infrastructure.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander of U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. In my view, the principal threats to national security stem
from the People's Republic of China, which continues to challenge the
United States on a global scale while seeking to expand its malign
influence, and Russia, which remains engaged in unlawful military
aggression in Ukraine and malicious cyber activity. We must constantly
posture to gain and maintain enduring advantages throughout the
competition/crisis/conflict continuum. Our ability to move with agility
and seize fleeting opportunities in our campaigning efforts rest on
rapid maturation of USCYBERCOM's service like authorities to: improve
readiness across the force; implement new technologies; and scale
capabilities that will outpace the threat.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Director of the National Security Agency/Chief of the
Central Security Service?
Answer. In my view, the principal threats to national security stem
from the People's Republic of China, which continues to challenge the
United States on a global scale while seeking to expand its malign
influence, and Russia, which remains engaged in unlawful military
aggression in Ukraine and malicious cyber activity. We must continue to
execute our mission to deliver outcomes against National priorities in
foreign intelligence, cybersecurity, protecting our national security
systems and provide combat support to the Department of Defense. To do
that, we must focus on strengthening the workforce, ensuring a culture
of compliance, investing to leverage new technologies, and focusing on
threats facing the Nation, especially the pacing challenge posed by the
People's Republic of China.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will perform a review of both USCYBERCOM
and NSA's plans and approaches to our missions and emerging
requirements; gain better understanding of challenges, gaps, and
opportunities; and then work with Congress, the Department, and the DNI
to address requirements and adjust approaches in each area as required.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities for U.S. Cyber
Command?
Answer. If confirmed as the Commander of USCYBERCOM, my priority
lines of efforts will be People, Innovation, and Partnerships. People
are the foundation of everything we do; therefore, we must carefully
mature the entire talent management lifecycle in order to improve
training and readiness. We must stay on the cutting edge of new
innovations and technological advances, especially in terms of
artificial intelligence and advanced computing, to build and maintain
warfighting advantage. And finally, we will expand capacity by ensuring
trusted collaborative relationships with our combatant command,
interagency, international partners, and academia and industry.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities as the
Director of the National Security Agency/Chief of the Central Security
Service?
Answer. If confirmed as the Director of the NSA/Chief of the CSS, I
will use the same priority framework described above: People,
Innovation, and Partnerships. I will focus on ensuring the health and
effectiveness of NSA's world-class personnel in delivering outcomes
against National priorities and providing combat support to the
Department of Defense. I will look for opportunities to invest in new
technologies that will allow us to outpace threats facing the Nation-
especially the pacing challenge posed by the People's Republic of
China. And finally, NSA's ability to work in collaboration across the
interagency, the private sector, and foreign partners is one of the
agency's greatest strengths and critically important to our Nation's
success in a world of accelerating change.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the State of U.S. Cyber Command's
relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular,
and with Congress in general?
Answer. In my current role, I have seen first-hand USCYBERCOM's
positive interactions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
and Congress. Our relationship is strong, built on transparency and
responsiveness, and supports the requirements of advancing USCYBERCOM's
mission and ensuring oversight. Members of the SASC have been very
supportive of USCYBERCOM through office calls, briefings, hearings and
visits. Additionally, SASC professional staff members (PSMs) have
supported USCYBERCOM through meetings, attendance at conferences and
staff delegations. These efforts help build relationships and ensure a
common understanding to include capabilities, threats, authorities and
mission execution. If confirmed, I look forward to maintaining and
growing this relationship.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
U.S. Cyber Command?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure a strong dialog exists between
Congress and USCYBERCOM, and look forward to building an engaged
partnership. I will ensure compliance with relevant statues, including
provisions of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and
other relevant law. I will buildupon the close relationship with
members of the SASC and other congressional defense oversight
committees, ensuring my Legislative Liaison office continues to work
closely with the PSMs and personal staff members.
cyber threats
Question. In your view, what are the most serious cyber threats
facing the United States today, and what potential targets are the most
vulnerable or susceptible to cyber attacks?
Answer. In my view, the principal threats to national security stem
from the People's Republic of China, which continues to challenge the
United States on a global scale while seeking to expand its malign
influence, and Russia, which remains engaged in unlawful military
aggression in Ukraine and malicious cyber activity. However, threats to
our Nation's security are numerous--actors such as Iran and North Korea
attempt to coerce their respective regions with both conventional and
cyber weapons, while terror groups, malicious cyber actors, and drug
cartels present ongoing and transnational threats. Rapid changes in the
technological environment will require the constant development of new
and better approaches in response to these threats to maintain the
safety of the Nation and our allies. USCYBERCOM is addressing these
challenges through a constructive plan that secures, operates and
hardens our critical networks in addition to reinforcing the fabrics of
our international partners.
Question. What future strategic cyber threats should the United
States prepare for?
Answer. We face a challenging and volatile threat environment, and
cyber threats to our national security interests and critical
infrastructure rank at the top of the list. Rapid changes in the
technological environment will require the constant development of new
and better approaches in response to these threats to maintain the
safety of the Nation and our allies; this will be a priority for me if
confirmed. USCYBERCOM must continue to impose costs on our adversaries
whenever we detect them conducting reconnaissance, espionage,
influence, and even attacks in cyberspace.
Question. What are your views on Russia's cyber capabilities as
well as intentions in light of the invasion of Ukraine?
Answer. Russia is a highly capable cyber adversary, possessing deep
technical knowledge and advanced tools, tactics, and techniques. Its
cyber actors employ these capabilities to conduct information
operations, cyberespionage, and cyberattacks using open source,
commercially available, and custom-developed tools to persistently
target government networks, commercial networks and critical
infrastructure within the United States, EU, and NATO. Cyber espionage
likely remains the most persistent cyber threat from Russian government
cyber actors. Russia will likely continue to integrate cyberwarfare
into its military plans and operations to keep pace with USCYBERCOM
efforts, and conduct cyberspace operations in response to perceived
domestic threats.
Question. What are your views on China's cyber capabilities and
intentions, especially regarding potential cyber attacks on United
States critical infrastructure prior to and during any possible
military operations against Taiwan?
Answer. The People's Republic of China poses one of the most
advanced cyber threats to the United States and employs its
capabilities to support Beijing's political, diplomatic, and military
goals. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is investing in strong cyber
capabilities as a counterbalance to United States military superiority
by exploring options to attack essential warfighting networks and
critical infrastructure supporting U.S. military operations and other
U.S. Government activities. If Beijing feared a major conflict with the
United States were imminent, the PRC might consider conducting
aggressive cyberspace operations against United States critical
infrastructure and military assets worldwide.
Question. What are your views on North Korea's cyber capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's cyber program poses a sophisticated threat to
the United States and its allies. State actors conduct malicious cyber
activity to collect intelligence, conduct attacks, and generate revenue
to bypass sanctions and fund regime goals (to include its nuclear and
missile programs). North Korea continues to adapt to global trends in
cybercrime by stealing cryptocurrency to bring in significant amounts
of revenue.
Question. What are your views on Iran's cyber capabilities?
Answer. Iran's growing expertise and demonstrated willingness to
conduct aggressive cyberspace operations makes it a major threat to
United States and partner networks and data. Iran likely considers its
cyber program as an important tool to retaliate and gather intelligence
against adversaries, as demonstrated by Iran's cyberattack last year
against Albanian government networks. Domestically, Iran uses its
capabilities to help control the population.
Question. What are your views on transnational terrorist groups'
and transnational criminal organizations' cyber capabilities? In
particular, do you believe U.S. Cyber Command should have a role in
assessing and undermining these capabilities?
Answer. Transnational terrorist groups primarily leverage
cyberspace to conduct activities in support of their kinetic
operations. They use cyberspace for secure communications, recruitment,
financial transactions, media and propaganda, and research. Foreign
terrorist groups have marginal limited offensive cyber capabilities,
and those they do have are largely unsophisticated and limited to
website defacements. Transnational criminal organizations facilitate
the flow of illicit drugs, including Fentanyl, into the United States.
These TCOs are sophisticated and possess notable capability, capacity,
and resources. USCYBERCOM works closely with the other combatant
commands on transnational issues.
Question. Do you believe that China and Russia are engaging in
cyber cooperation activities with other United States adversaries to
help amplify the impact and effect of their cyber operations against
the United States?
Answer. The PRC is unlikely to engage in cyber cooperation with
other United States adversaries outside of a specific subset of
activities, that include: attempting to set new norms in cyberspace
governance, collaborating on cybersecurity by exporting Chinese
information technology hardware and software, and as demonstrated
following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the spreading of disinformation
that amplified Russia's themes against the United States and NATO.
Russia is unlikely to share capabilities and accesses with other United
States adversaries, as these remain largely the purview of Moscow's
intelligence agencies. Cyberspace operations collaboration among
adversary intelligence agencies is low and distrust is high.
u.s. cyber command missions
Question. In a strategic sense, how do you define the U.S. Cyber
Command mission?
Answer. In line with title 10, U.S. Code, Section 167b, the
principal mission of USCYBERCOM is to direct, synchronize, and
coordinate military cyberspace planning and operations to defend and
advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and
international partners. USCYBERCOM also has Unified Command Plan
responsibilities for: planning and executing cyberspace operations, as
directed, the Cyberspace Operations Joint Force Provider, and the Joint
Cyberspace Trainer.
Question. How do you define the role of the National Cyber Mission
Force in countering adversary cyber forces in the event that such
forces undertake destructive or obstructive attacks on the United
States?
Answer. The Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) focuses on
countering cyber threat actors and maneuvering against those
adversaries to preclude malicious cyberspace activities, including
cyberattacks and to shape adversary behavior. CNMF accomplishes this by
executing cyber operations, building and refining the processes to
share adversary threat data across the government and with industry;
engaging with sector-specific agency partners to help them build
greater resiliency within our critical infrastructure; and supporting a
whole-of-nation approach to deter malicious cyber activities.
Question. Do you believe the existing command and control
relationships between U.S. Cyber Command and the geographic combatant
commands need to be reevaluated given the need and opportunity to
provide cyber support to tactical military operations?
Answer. No, not at this time. The current command and control
relationship between USCYBERCOM and the geographic combatant commands
enables effective employment of cyberspace operations to achieve our
assigned missions. The Department reached this model over years of
maturation, which includes a close working relationship between the
Combatant Commands' leadership, a heightened emphasis on the general
support relationship between the Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-
C) and the other combatant commands, and the direct support of the
Cyberspace Operations--Integrated Planning Elements established within
each combatant command staff. This model has proven itself through
multiple crises and is one I intend to continue to support, if
confirmed.
Question. How successful has U.S. Cyber Command been at integrating
its national defensive, national offensive, and command support
missions with the missions and kill chains of the non-cyber operational
components of the Department of Defense?
Answer. The success of USCYBERCOM's integration across the
Department and its warfighting domains has been proven out through
several crises. We have shown ourselves to be adaptive and responsive
through the employment of the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) and
Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) for
national requirements. USCYBERCOM supports requirements of other
combatant commands via our general support assignment of the Joint
Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C), and the direct support of the
Cyberspace Operations--Integrated Planning Elements.
Question. What organizational and authorities challenges remain at
U.S. Cyber Command related to its missions? Specifically, do you think
that additional organizational changes and authorities will be needed
to resolve the readiness problem within the Cyber Missions Force?
Answer. Congress and the Department of Defense have given
USCYBERCOM significant authorities to address the issues. Some of these
authorities include Enhanced Budgetary control (EBC); establishing
standards for Joint cyberspace training; strategy, doctrine and tactics
development; and an expanded role in acquisition. Additionally, our
Cyber Excepted Service (CES) enables us to offer civilian cyber
professionals opportunities to use their skills in support of the
Command. These authorities allow USCYBERCOM to align its priorities, in
partnership with the Services, with its ability to execute more
effectively.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes
in the missions currently assigned to U.S. Cyber Command given that
some experts have recommended that U.S. Cyber Command assume
responsibility for additional elements of information warfare,
including information operations and electromagnetic spectrum
operations? If so, what changes would you recommend?
Answer. I don't recommend changes to the current missions assigned.
USCYBERCOM has an important role to play in cyber-enabled information
activities, but believe it is best done in partnership with the other
combatant commands. If confirmed, this will be an area that I will
review closely with the Joint Staff, USSOCOM, and the Services.
Question. Do you agree with General Nakasone that election security
and defending the United States from foreign influence campaigns were
``no fail'' missions of both the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command? Please
explain your answer. If possible, give some examples of how we are
better positioned to defend against such attacks today than we were
prior to 2016.
Answer. I absolutely agree. As the co-lead of the Russia Small
Group during the 2018 mid-term elections, as the USCYBERCOM lead for
the NSA-USCYBERCOM Election Security Group in 2020, and, as Deputy
Commander of USCYBERCOM, overseeing USCYBERCOM's support to defend the
2022 U.S. elections from foreign actors, I have seen the scale of our
operations and our partnerships grow exponentially. The sustained focus
on this mission by NSA and USCYBERCOM, enables speed, agility, and
breadth of operations to persistently engage these adversaries and
postures the organizations to defend against foreign threats to the
2024 election.
national security agency (nsa) missions
Question. What is your understanding of the NSA mission?
Answer. It's my understanding that NSA's principal missions, SIGINT
and Cybersecurity, are key to the safety and security of our Nation.
The NSA's SIGINT mission plays a vital role in our national security by
providing America's leaders with the critical foreign intelligence they
need to defend our country, save lives, and advance U.S. goals and
alliances. The cybersecurity mission prevents and eradicates threats to
U.S. National Security Systems (NSS), as well as identifying cyber
threats the defense industrial base (DIB) and the U.S. military's
weapon systems. NSA's SIGINT and Cybersecurity missions are also
critical to fulfillment of NSA's combat support responsibilities.
Question. What is your understanding of the NSA mission as it
relates to cyber?
Answer. NSA is responsible for securing NSS as well as preventing
and eradicating threats to NSS with a focus on the DIB and the U.S.
military's weapon systems. NSA also produces cyber threat intelligence
products for a wide array of consumers, including making many of these
products available to the public.
Question. In your view, what role should the NSA play in support of
U.S. Cyber Command and does it differ from the support that NSA
provides to other combatant commands?
Answer. The signals intelligence and cyber operating environments
intersect in an inextricable way. As a foreign intelligence
organization and a Combat Support Agency (CSA), NSA plays a significant
role in generating timely and relevant intelligence that supports
operational commands like USCYBERCOM. NSA's Signals Intelligence
mission and the Agency's role in cybersecurity are complementary to
USCYBERCOM's role in cyberspace operations and, thus, provide a unique
opportunity for collaboration.
Question. In your view, in developing capabilities to support the
objectives of regional combatant commanders in a conflict, should U.S.
Cyber Command explore the development of strategies and operational
objectives that are separate from those of kinetic conventional forces?
Or should U.S. Cyber Command continue to strive to complement and
reinforce traditional forms and modes of warfare?
Answer. USCYBERCOM should strive to do both. USCYBERCOM should
employ strategies and operational objectives that support the Combatant
Commands both defensively and offensively in support of the Joint
Force. In close coordination with the other combatant commands and the
interagency, USCYBERCOM should also develop strategies to defend
forward by leveraging unique authorities and capabilities to degrade
nation-State cyber actors seeking to target the DOD or U.S. critical
infrastructure.
Question. Do you believe that any of the mass or narrow
surveillance capabilities currently employed by the NSA should be
reconsidered or adjusted?
Answer. As the President articulated in recent Executive Order (EO)
14086, which was issued on October 7, 2022, the United States collects
signals intelligence so that decisionmakers have access to the critical
information necessary to advance the national security interests of the
United States and to protect its citizens and allies from harm. The
signals intelligence capabilities of the United States are of the
utmost importance to the ability of the executive branch to protect our
security, but such capabilities also come with tremendous
responsibilities and obligations, to include ensuring that all persons
are treated with dignity and respect, despite their nationality, and
that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of
their personal information.
From my current perspective and information made known to me
through my current position, I believe that all of NSA's signals
intelligence activities are authorized and consistent with the
principles recently articulated by the President in EO 14086. Among
others, NSA's signals intelligence activities are authorized and
undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and applicable statutes,
EOs, proclamations, and other Presidential directives. Further, NSA's
activities are subject to appropriate safeguards, and are only
conducted in a manner that is proportionate to the validated
intelligence priorities for which they have been authorized. Finally,
NSA conducts all of its signals intelligence activities in pursuit of
only those legitimate objectives contained within EO 14086. NSA does
not conduct signals intelligence collection capabilities for any of the
prohibited objectives identified in the EO. If confirmed, I would
ensure that NSA's signals intelligence activities will continue to be
carried out in adherence to all safeguards contained within EO 14086.
Question. Do you believe that the NSA is appropriately transparent
about its surveillance priorities and processes? If improvements are
possible, how do you intend to ensure that they are carried out?
Answer. Transparency in the IC is a balancing act, since the IC
cannot perform its mission effectively unless it protects its
classified intelligence sources and methods from disclosure to the
Nation's adversaries. Maintaining public trust, however, is essential
for the IC to be successful in its foreign intelligence mission. If
confirmed, I would ensure that NSA complies with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution and statutes, and exercises candor with all
overseers across all three branches of government. Additionally, NSA
must make available to the public information about its activities to
the greatest extent possible.
section 702 of the foreign intelligence surveillance act
Question. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
will expire at the end of calendar year 2023 unless renewed by
Congress. There is bipartisan concern that queries of data collected
under 702 using U.S. Persons search terms are conducted without a
probable cause-based court order.
In your view, what is the continuing value of section 702
collection?
Answer. As a current customer of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) Section 702 derived products, I recognize the value and
importance of this key authority in providing unique foreign
intelligence to fulfill national priorities. In my experience,
intelligence derived from Section 702 has been critical in
counterterrorism, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, countering
international drug trafficking, and strategic competition. It is also
my understanding that all of the President's intelligence priority
topics reported on by NSA were supported by Section 702. I defer to the
White House, ODNI, DOD, and NSA leadership, however, to fully
characterize the value of this authority. If confirmed, I commit to
working with Congress to ensure that surveillance conducted pursuant to
Section 702, and all activities governed by FISA, are performed
consistent with the Constitution, U.S. law and policy.
Question. What is your understanding of the guardrails and
processes in place to ensure that this authority is executed within
current statutory guidelines and to protect U.S. citizens from the
possible abuse of this authority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to evaluate
the specifics of NSA's Section 702 compliance and oversight systems.
From my current vantage point I am aware that NSA has a robust
compliance regime designed to ensure adherence to all statutory and
procedural requirements, including those relating to Section 702. I
know NSA's workforce is dedicated to compliance with the laws and
policies that govern NSA's missions, including its Section 702
activities. NSA has a dedicated corporate compliance organization, and
has instilled a culture of compliance within its workforce. Based on my
prior experiences, I know that NSA's compliance team is part of each
stage of the analytic process--from initial targeting decision to
review of the responsive content--supporting the mission and ensuring
that NSA's culture of compliance is maintained day in and day out.
Where possible, and consistent with the need to continue to protect
classified sources and methods, NSA and the U.S. Intelligence Community
have publicly released materials describing the compliance processes in
place that pertain to Section 702. For example, NSA's Section 702
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures are all available to
the public with minimal redactions. These documents describe how NSA
uses Section 702 to target the communications of non-U.S. persons
located outside of the United States to collect foreign intelligence,
and the protections that NSA applies to ensure that NSA properly
handles any U.S. person information within Section 702 collection.
Additionally, NSA's Section 702 activities are overseen by an internal
compliance organization as well as NSA's independent Inspector General.
Every NSA Section 702 targeting decision is reviewed by the Department
of Justice (DoJ), and NSA must report any incidents of non-compliance
to DoJ and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. DoJ
attorneys investigate each potential incident of non-compliance, work
with agencies to remediate any such instances, and report any incidents
of non-compliance to the FISC and to Congress.
Question. If section 702 were to be extended without limiting the
authority to query the data using U.S. persons' identifiers or search
terms, how do you think that would impact NSA's mission?
Answer. Although I am generally familiar from sources such as the
IC's Annual Statistical Transparency Reporting that NSA at times
performs queries relating to U.S. persons, this is an issue I have
limited familiarity in my current role with USCYBERCOM. At this time, I
defer to current NSA leadership to fully characterize the impact to
NSA's missions and other aspects of the current efforts taking place
under this authority. If confirmed, I fully commit to working with
Congress on all matters related to this important authority.
Question. If 702 data base is queried using U.S. persons
identifiers for the positive purpose of victim notification, in your
view, is it feasible to construct a set of rules that would permit such
searches while requiring a court order for criminal or intelligence
investigations? How do you think that would impact NSA's mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be in a better position to judge how
technically feasible such a change would be for NSA systems, and
whether that would negatively impact the ability of NSA to carry out
its missions effectively.
Question. What is your understanding of the Attorney General-
approved guidelines pursuant to Executive Order 12333 for the
government to query data that NSA has collected outside the United
States using U.S. persons identifiers or search terms without reaching
the probable cause standard?
Answer. Based on training and past experience, I am aware that NSA,
as a component of the Department of Defense (DoD), is required to
follow the Attorney General (AG)-approved procedures contained in DOD
Manual 5240.01 when the Agency conducts activities pursuant to
authority granted by EO 12333. NSA's signals intelligence (SIGINT)
activities are further regulated by the AG-approved procedures
contained in the Manual's SIGINT Annex (DoDM S-5240.01-A). In general,
DODM 5240.01 permits DOD components to evaluate U.S. person information
(USPI) acquired during intelligence activities to determine if the USPI
qualifies for permanent retention. The SIGINT Annex adopts all of the
requirements contained in the Manual, but places additional
restrictions on the circumstances under which NSA may conduct queries
of raw SIGINT information to intentionally retrieve communications of
or concerning a U.S. person. The SIGINT Annex permits multiple types of
U.S. person queries of raw SIGINT without requiring a probable cause
finding, and I understand that many of these queries can be approved
internally by NSA personnel. Examples include, but are not limited to
situations where the United States person:
1) has consented to the query;
2) appears to be a victim of foreign cyber activities;
3) is being held overseas as a hostage of a foreign power; or
4) may be referenced in a foreign power dataset.
combat support agency
Question. What is your understanding of the role of a combat
support agency?
Answer. Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, as amended by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, a Combat Support Agency (CSA) is one that
provides combat support or combat service support functions to joint
operating forces across a range of military operations and in support
of Combatant Commanders executing these operations. CSAs perform
support functions or provide supporting operational capabilities,
consistent with their established directives and pertinent DOD planning
guidance. The combat support mission of a CSA is that portion of its
mission involving support for operating forces engage in planning for,
or conducting, military operations, including support during conflict
or in the conduct of other military activities related to countering
threats to U.S. national security.
Question. If confirmed, how would you delineate the roles and
activities of the NSA as a combat support agency in support of U.S.
Cyber Command versus the support provided to U.S. Cyber Command as a
cyberspace domain partner under the dual-hat arrangement?
Answer. USCYBERCOM follows standard processes for submitting
signals intelligence requirements to NSA to enable combat support. As
cyberspace domain partners, NSA and USCYBERCOM have distinct and
complementary authorities. If confirmed, I will direct clear
recognition across both NSA and USCYBERCOM that each organization has
separate roles, resources, and responsibilities, and that our inter-
service support agreements, memoranda of understanding, and special
partnership agreements are followed and enforced.
Answer. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is required to regularly conduct assessments of the
readiness of combat support agencies to support the combatant commands.
Question. What is your understanding of how the NSA has performed
in these assessments?
Answer. It's my understanding that the CJCS is required by law to
submit biennial assessments to Congress of the responsiveness and
readiness of each CSA to support the combatant commands (CCMDs). In my
current position, I do not have insight into how NSA has performed in
these assessments, but if confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the
CJCS's assessment of NSA.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Director of
National Intelligence has expressed concern, if any, that the support
NSA provides to U.S. Cyber Command is excessive or unjustified in light
of NSA's role as a combat support agency or as a cyberspace domain
partner with Cyber Command under the dual-hat arrangement?
Answer. Last year the DNI and the Secretary of Defense commissioned
a study of the dual-hat arrangement led by the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ret. General Joseph Dunford. The review found
that the dual-hat arrangement provided substantial benefits for the
Nation. The study found that although there have been concerns in the
past with respect to structure, budget, and oversight, any negative
effects in these areas have been effectively mitigated by agreements
and processes now in place to ensure clear accountability, cost
reimbursement, and oversight. Following a review of findings from the
Joint Study, the Secretary of Defense, Director of National
Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it
is in the best interest of the Nation to maintain the Dual-Hat
leadership arrangement of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the
United States Cyber Command.
act of war in cyberspace
Question. In general, what do you believe would constitute an act
of war in cyberspace?
Answer. It is generally accepted that cyber operations that cause
death, injury, or significant damage to property would likely be
considered a use of force, triggering a nation's inherent right of
self-defense under international law. Ultimately, whether an act in
cyberspace warrants a U.S. response in self-defense is a determination
for our civilian leadership.
Question. Do you believe that current U.S. Government policy
provides adequate guidance and decision space for making a
determination of what types of actions might constitute an act of war
in cyberspace?
Answer. Yes. U.S. policy and domestic and international law provide
a sufficient framework and decision space to advise our civilian
leadership whether malicious cyber acts, alone or in concert with other
acts, warrant invoking the U.S. right to use force in self-defense.
Question. Concerning acts of aggression in cyberspace, do you
believe the Department of Defense has a comprehensive understanding of
the actions that may constitute a hostile act under the Law of Armed
Conflict, particularly as it relates to U.S. critical infrastructure,
and the energy, transportation, power, and financial sectors within the
U.S.?
Answer. As with malign activity in any other domain, Departmental
leaders, in coordination with the Intelligence Community, the State
Department, and other key executive branch partners, are able to assess
and advise the President whether malicious cyber acts alone or in
concert with other acts, are sufficient to invoke the U.S. right to use
force in self-defense. It is important to note that malicious cyber
activities that do not constitute hostile acts of aggression may
nonetheless cause strategic effects, constitute violations of other
international legal rules or international norms, or warrant
appropriate responses.
department of defense's role in defending the nation from cyber attack
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Department
of Defense in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In
what ways is this role distinct from those of the homeland security and
law enforcement communities?
Answer. DoD employs the military instrument of national power while
defending the homeland from foreign threats abroad. DOD, through
USCYBERCOM and NSA, works together with a larger Executive branch team
to defend the Nation from malicious cyber activity, including cyber
attacks. In order to defend the Nation from malicious cyber activities,
the Department can defend forward in three ways: generating insights
about the threat; providing advice to Federal, State, local, and
foreign partners to enhance their defenses; and, acting when necessary
and consistent with DOD's authorities, to disrupt adversary cyber
actors. DOD may also provide defense support of civil authorities, upon
request, should a cyber incident exceed the capacity of another
department or agency.
Question. What is your understanding of the specific role of the
Cyber National Mission Force in disrupting cyber attacks on U.S.
critical infrastructure and other non-military targets?
Answer. The CNMF works abroad to persistently engage foreign
malicious cyber actors who threaten U.S. critical infrastructure.
Through Hunt Forward missions, where we deploy teams of cyber operators
to work with allies and partners to find and enable them to defend
against malicious cyber actors operating on foreign partner networks,
we discover cyber threats before they reach the United States. These
operations do several things: they enable USCYBERCOM to posture to take
action to disrupt the threat to the United States, they strengthen
partners and allies' defenses, and they give us insight into new
threats. We then share that threat information with domestic partners
like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and with industry to enable measures to harden
cyber-defenses here at home.
Question. Can you describe how a request for Defense Support to
Civil Authorities (DSCA) by appropriate civilian leadership might be
made in the event of a cyber incident? Are those processes trained for
and exercised with U.S. Cyber Command, and the inter-agency community?
Answer. When requested by another Federal department or agency and
approved by the appropriate DOD official, or as directed by the
President, DOD responds to a cyber incident pursuant to the long-
standing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) process. The DOD
weighs each DSCA request individually to determine if it has sufficient
capability and capacity to support. Through collaborative partnerships
with NSA, DHS/CISA, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and/or U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), the National Guard Bureau, and
others, USCYBERCOM is well-postured to respond to such requests when
they occur.
Question. In your view, does U.S. Cyber Command have the capacity
and the authority to directly operate in the networks of domestic
critical infrastructure providers to defend against major cyber
attacks?
Answer. As an Active component military force, USCYBERCOM's mission
and authorities are focused on foreign operations against foreign
actors. The command does not conduct operations inside the United
States, but enables those domestic partners with appropriate
authorities, including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI.
As directed, USCYBERCOM can support civil authorities to defend U.S.
critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activities in and through
cyberspace, in coordination with or in support of USNORTHCOM and/or
USINDOPACOM in the exercise of their homeland defense and DSCA
missions.
Question. What is your understanding of the expected role of the
National Guard in defending critical infrastructure from cyber attacks
in support of civil authorities?
Answer. The National Guard is both a force multiplier for
USCYBERCOM missions and a critical capacity for their states. Many of
our U.S. National Guard and Reserve members have significant and
relevant private-sector experience and can rapidly share appropriate
information on malicious cyber activity with State and local
authorities. These members can conduct state-authorized operations
domestically under State law to protect critical infrastructure while
in a State Active Duty status or , if need be, can be mobilized on
Federal Active Duty to join the USCYBERCOM mission directly.
Question. What is your understanding of the government's policies
in recognizing and responding to cyberspace gray zone activities below
the threshold of war in which cyber attacks might be used against U.S.
Homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide to deter
U.S. Military action by impeding U.S. decisionmaking, inducing societal
panic, and interfering with the deployment of U.S. Forces?
Answer. U.S. policy is to use all instruments of national power to
counter cyber attacks and malicious cyber activity of foreign
adversaries that target the United States and threaten our national
security. Executive branch policies prioritize enhanced cybersecurity
for U.S. critical infrastructure and National Security Systems, and DOD
has been granted statutory authorities to conduct appropriate and
proportionate military activities in foreign cyberspace to disrupt and
defend against foreign malicious cyber activity directed against our
government, people and critical infrastructure. These policies have
contributed to DOD's ability to recognize and mitigate these threats in
collaboration with domestic and international partners.
deterrence through cost imposition
Question. Multiple annual threat assessments of the U.S.
Intelligence Community have concluded that the People's Republic of
China (PRC) would attack United States critical infrastructure through
cyber operations if Beijing decided to invade Taiwan and expected the
United States to intervene. The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force
report on Cyber Deterrence, issued in February 2017, concluded that it
is critical for the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop cost-
imposing deterrence options based on scalable offensive cyber
capabilities to hold at risk a range of assets that the leaders of
strategic adversaries value most highly. The DSB report urged the
Secretary of Defense to develop ``a policy framework for cyber
deterrence including: updated declaratory policy relating to U.S.
responses to cyber attack and use of offensive cyber capabilities,
guidance for the employment of offensive cyber, a public affairs plan,
and an engagement plan for adversaries and allies.''
What are your views on the conclusions and recommendations of this
Task Force?
Answer. I believe that USCYBERCOM's role in campaigning in
cyberspace below the level of armed conflict is critical to reinforce
deterrence and to impose costs on our adversaries. The DSB study
predated Congress' action on declaring cyber a domain of traditional
military activity, enabling alignment of U.S. law, policy, and
authorities to DOD. The 2023 National Cyber Strategy and 2023 DOD Cyber
Strategy--which nests within the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS--
address many of the areas of the DSB study by clearly and publicly
articulating that all tools of national power will be used in a more
intentional, more coordinated approach to cyber defense. For the
Department of Defense, that means that USCYBERCOM will work with the
interagency, private sector, and our partners and allies to deliver
cyberspace options in combination with other kinetic and non-kinetic
capabilities to deter, disrupt, and respond to malicious cyber actors.
Question. Do you believe it is important to adopt and articulate a
cost-imposing deterrence strategy based on credible options for
responding against targets that adversaries' value with offensive cyber
operations to cyber attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure?
Answer. Cost imposition is one of three DOD approaches to
deterrence--all are important. DOD's potential responses, however,
should not be limited to the cyber domain. USCYBERCOM is participating
in Department-wide and whole-of-government collaboration and
coordination efforts to reduce the perceived and actual utility of
cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, and USCYBERCOM is also
collaborating with allies and partners to develop options to impose
collective costs, leveraging the convergent power that remains a U.S.
competitive advantage. As we implement the department's National
Defense Strategy, our focus on integrated deterrence, campaigning, and
building enduring advantage will support deterrence efforts to prevent
strategic attacks, aggression, and defense of the homeland.
Question. In light of the conclusions of the Intelligence
Community, what is your assessment that the PRC is currently deterred
from conducting cyber attacks against United States critical
infrastructure?
Answer. I assess that the PRC understands the potential for a high
cost in response to a cyber attack against United States critical
infrastructure during peacetime. However, during conflict, it remains a
potential option for the PRC.
Question. In your view, how effective is U.S. Cyber Command's
current deterrence posture, and are there areas for improvement?
Answer. The command supports the whole of government approach to
deterrence in support of national security objectives. We implement our
part on national strategic deterrence through the department's
integrated deterrence effort and our role in providing cyberspace
operations options to senior leadership. We can further enable this
effort by investing in the resilience of the Department's Information
Networks, enabling the defense of non-Department networks, building the
cyber capacity of, and generating cyberspace options for, allies and
partners, and investing in strategic cyberspace attack capabilities. We
will also aggressively utilize our new enhanced budget and acquisition
authorities to meet future deterrence needs with the continued support,
sustainment, and growth of the CMF.
dual hat
Question. Last year, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense conducted a study of whether to continue the
``dual hat'' arrangement whereby the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
also serves as the Director of the National Security Agency.
Do you believe that the dual hat arrangement should be maintained?
Answer. Yes, maintaining the dual hat arrangement enhances the
effectiveness of both organizations and is in the best interests of the
Nation. The signals intelligence and cyber operating environments
substantially overlap. Eliminating the dual hat would reduce relevant
visibility and understanding across both mission sets, increasing risk
to intelligence sources and operational activities. It would reduce the
speed and effectiveness of cybersecurity collaboration in the
protection of National Security Systems (NSS), the DODIN, and the DIB
by slowing and complicating information sharing and work with
overlapping partners. Finally, ending the dual hat would complicate
relationships with allies and partners that conduct their own signals
intelligence and cyberspace operations.
Question. In your view, are the demands of both commanding U.S.
Cyber Command and directing NSA overly stressing for a single official?
Answer. No, the demands of each position are effectively managed
given the separate and distinct missions, authorities, and
organizational structures senior leadership teams, staffs, and
organizational structures of each organization.
Question. In your view, would it be as time-consuming and complex
for separate NSA Directors and Commanders of U.S. Cyber Command to
coordinate and integrate their mission sets and capabilities?
Answer. Yes. It would be more time consuming, more complex and less
effective. Fracturing the current USCYBERCOM--NSA command arrangement
would degrade flexibility, adaptability, and speed of action now
provided through close and interconnected processes; ultimately
impacting mission outcomes.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on NSA's budgets and
personnel subsidizing U.S. Cyber Command and the non-National
Intelligence Program budget of the DOD?
Answer. All resources must be used for the purposes appropriated.
NSA's budget and personnel do not subsidize USCYBERCOM. The Senior
Steering Group that was commissioned to study the dual hat found that,
although there have been perceptions in the past with respect to
structure, budget, and oversight, any negative effects in these areas
have been mitigated by agreements and processes now in place to ensure
clear accountability, cost reimbursement, and oversight. If confirmed,
one of my priorities would be to ensure that the teams at USCYBERCOM
and NSA continue those best practices, and if necessary, buildupon the
activities that have made those agreements and processes effective.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on U.S. Cyber Command
often gaining accesses to targets from NSA for military purposes that
negates their significant value for NSA's national intelligence
mission?
Answer. As a result of the overlap of the signals intelligence and
cyber operations environments, NSA and USCYBERCOM have developed a
close partnership in this area. Under the current leadership
arrangement, a single, fully informed decisionmaker, responsible for
the separate and distinct mission outcomes of both organizations, is
able to protect our Nation's most sensitive signals intelligence
equities while operating in defense of national interests and ensuring
both organizations are aligned with the Nation's priorities. If
confirmed, I will continue to utilize and improve processes for
identifying and evaluating the sharing of accesses, where appropriate,
from NSA to USCYBERCOM, from USCYBERCOM to NSA, and with other key
partners, to deliver the best outcomes for the Nation.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on U.S. Cyber Command
preparing for or undertaking operations against targets due to
objections that such actions would jeopardize intelligence collection?
What are your views of such tradeoffs?
Answer. This is perhaps the most critical advantage of the dual
hat--a single decisionmaker, responsible and accountable for the
mission outcomes of both organizations, is best equipped to protect
critical intelligence equities while executing national priorities, as
directed. It ensures fully informed tradeoff decisions are made under
accountability to both the Secretary of Defense and Director of
National Intelligence.
Question. In your view, is the degree of support that U.S. Cyber
Command receives from the NSA detrimental to the support that NSA
provides to other combatant commands and to national policymakers?
Answer. No. The Senior Steering Group that was commissioned to
study the dual hat found that, although there have been perceptions in
the past with respect to structure, budget, and oversight, any negative
effects in these areas have been mitigated by agreements and processes
now in place to ensure clear accountability, cost reimbursement, and
oversight.
crypto modernization
Question. In fiscal year 2022, the Joint Staff Director for
Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4)/Cyber, and Chief
Information Officer refused to continue issuing waivers for
cryptographic systems that NSA had determined were obsolete, vulnerable
and should be replaced.
What is your understanding of the problems in the overall
cryptographic system modernization program?
Answer. It is my understanding that there are two overarching
challenges associated with cryptographic modernization across the
Department. The first is that a significant portion of the existing
cryptographic inventory is, by NSA's assessment, either obsolete or
approaching obsolescence--meaning that it is within reach of today's
technology and vulnerable to compromise by a meaning that it is within
reach of today's technology and vulnerable to compromise by a
The second cryptographic modernization challenge, more vast in
scope and scale, is proactively preparing for potential future
realization of a sufficiently large quantum computer in adversary hands
that could break public-key cryptosystems used within the U.S. and
around the world.
Modernization efforts are focused on the elimination of the already
vulnerable cryptography in use today and also ensuring that the DOD's
cryptographic inventory is completely quantum resistant by the year
2034.
Question. In your view, has the Department of Defense made
significant changes in the way that cryptographic modernization is
overseen and managed that make that program more effective? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. In light of the threat posed by technologically advanced
near peer nation states, significant changes to the oversight of crypto
modernization have occurred. DOD, under Joint Staff oversight, has made
tremendous strides in completing and advancing cryptographic
modernization across a number of systems. However, challenges remain
with completing modernization on several operational systems due to
their sheer volume of material and scale of operations. Military
Department sponsors of systems that are not yet fully modernized from
obsolete cryptography are required to provide plans, with resources
aligned, to the Joint Staff outlining their path to full modernization.
Joint Staff, with NSA support, then adjudicates the way forward.
Significant planning measures are underway in DOD and, via NSM-10,
have also now begun for the Federal Government at large with the goal
of full modernization across Government systems by 2035 (2034 for DOD).
Though this end goal is 12 years away, success in the coming years will
require continued, significant inter-agency coordination as well as
alignment of budgetary and technical resources needed to accomplish the
goal. The DOD CIO is coordinating an integrated DOD cryptographic
modernization roadmap that will be delivered to OMB this summer.
Additionally, cryptographic modernization progress across DOD is
reported quarterly to the DEPSECDEF.
Question. In your view, will the tracking and reporting
requirements established in Section 1512 of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law
117-263) significantly improve compliance with cryptographic
modernization requirements? If not, what changes to those requirements
might be needed to make it more effective?
Answer. There is certainly an expectation that Section 1512 of NDAA
2023 will be effective in driving compliance and reporting of
cryptographic modernization progress, reinforcing and complementing
directives already in place.
Question. If confirmed, what are your views on the pace of progress
in developing and deploying quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions
in the Department of Defense, in National Security Systems across the
government, and in the private sector, as compared to the pace of
progress of the development of quantum computers that would be able to
break public key encryption?
Answer. An end goal of full post-quantum cryptographic
modernization will touch the vast majority of today's cryptographic
inventory, including commercial cryptographic technologies. In DOD and
across the executive branch, this will affect almost every National
Security System. NSM-10 establishes a goal of full post quantum
cryptographic modernization by 2035 for the Federal Government. We
believe this is a challenging, yet manageable, end goal, after which
the risk accelerates in terms of the potential for adversary
availability of a sufficiently large quantum computer. Within DOD, we
have an excellent start and are working toward full modernization by
2034. NSA and the Military Departments issue cryptographic
modernization roadmaps annually. DOD CIO, NSA, and the Military
Departments are collaborating on delivering an integrated DOD
cryptographic modernization roadmap and implementation plan later this
Summer. At the Federal Government and commercial level, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is aggressively leading
the assessment and selection of commercially available quantum
resistant cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
radio-frequency enabled cyber operations
Question. It is recognized that a wide variety of military systems
may be vulnerable to cyber attacks through radio-frequency apertures.
These systems include command and control networks, data links, sensor
systems (both active and passive), weapons platforms and systems, and
navigation systems. Section 1647 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 required the Department of Defense (DOD) to
assess and remediate the cyber vulnerabilities of all major weapons
systems. However, these assessments reportedly did not factor in the
attack vector presented by radio-frequency apertures.
In your view, do you think that the Department of Defense is
sufficiently focused on the threat posed by Radio-Frequency (RF)
enabled cyber attacks?
Answer. The Department needs to be able to identify, characterize,
and generate agile responses to all shapes and forms of threats, that
include RF threats, based on intelligence driven assessments as well as
assessments of individual weapons systems. RF-enabled cyber threats
pose real risks to operation of weapons systems, but must be considered
in context of a full risk analysis and addressed as part of system-wide
mitigations.
Question. Do you think such threats should be addressed by such
vulnerability assessment programs, such as the one mandated by Section
1559 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263)?
Answer. While the assessment programs defined in Section 1559 of
the NDAA are a good start, the implementation and robustness of those
assessment programs are key to accurate assessment of warfighter
mission risk, and to applying full-spectrum mitigations. The most
important value of the programs defined in Section 1559 will be
informing overall cyber risk assessments of weapons systems and
expanding the scope of potential mitigations against cyber threats.
Question. What are your views on the potential utility of tactical
cyber forces able to deliver such non-kinetic effects?
Answer. Expeditionary cyber forces have already demonstrated
potential to extend the reach of cyber enabling activities and close
the gaps that limit cyber forces' ability to access important tactical
targets in forward locations. If confirmed, I will work with the
Services to ensure any tactical forces will meet USCYBERCOM training
standards, follow Department deconfliction policies, and when
leveraging USCYBERCOM authorities, ensure interoperability with Joint
Cyber Warfighting Architecture.
Question. Do you think such forces should be service-retained and
controlled by the geographic combatant commands or should they be part
of the Cyber Mission Force under the command of U.S. Cyber Command?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Services and
geographic combatant commands as we study the issue to include
training, standards, interoperability, and authorities to implement
requirements under Section 1510 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Integrated Non-Kinetic Force
Development, to optimize the delivery of effects.
Question. In your view, do you think that cyber operations against
tactical military systems will become more common in the future? If so,
are we developing the technology and the operational concepts needed to
enable such operations at an adequate pace?
Answer. Yes. The nature of modern network-centric warfighting is
such that nearly every piece of electronic equipment represents a
potential cyber-attack surface, to include tactical military systems.
USCYBERCOM capabilities are always evolving to take advantage of
cutting-edge technology, research, and development. Just as we
continually improve our own defenses against novel cyber threats, so do
our adversaries; if confirmed, it is my intent for the Command to seek
new and innovative means, methods, and doctrine to achieve our mission
and provide a comprehensive suite of non-kinetic effects when called
upon to do so.
Question. In your view, will this lead to a higher valuation of the
cyber mission by the combatant commands and the military services?
Answer. Yes. In my opinion, developing new and novel capabilities
and approaches to deliver non-kinetic effects will benefit the
Combatant Commands and the Services. The unique value of the cyber
domain is that it crosses, supports, and enhances every warfighting
domain by ensuring the secure operation of the Department's
decisionmaking systems, disrupting malicious cyber actors' capabilities
and ecosystems before they can threaten our networks and platforms,
and, when called upon, deliver non-kinetic effects to enable Joint
Force Commanders to achieve early initiative during contingencies.
enhanced budget control (ebc)
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022 (Public Law 117-81) included legislation that provided enhanced
budget control (EBC) for the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. This EBC
authority included the ability to propose a budget for the cyber
mission to the leadership of the Department of Defense.
In your view, what impact, if any, has the EBC authority had on the
resources allocated to the cyber mission?
Answer. EBC authority allows USCYBERCOM to articulate cyber
resource requirements directly into Department PPBE processes. EBC
authority will allow USCYBERCOM to ensure resources for Cyber Mission
Forces (CMF) are aligned with the USCYBERCOM Commander's priorities.
These resources fund the CMF Teams, their operational headquarters, the
Cyber National Mission Force Headquarters, the USCYBERCOM Headquarters,
the cyber planning elements at each Combatant Command, and the
development and fielding of the capabilities required by each of those
organizations needed to conduct operations.
Question. In your view, is the increase in funding in the
President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2024 a result of actions
taken due to EBC invested in the Command?
Answer. The President's Budget Request for fiscal year 2024
includes increased funding for readiness, forces, and capabilities.
Select programs with requested funding increases include: the
Persistent Cyber Training Environment, continued growth of the Cyber
Mission Force, and the Joint Common Access Platform.
Question. What is your understanding of the effectiveness of the
transition to this new budget process?
Answer. This transition is ongoing. We effectively participated in
the Department's process to build the President's Budget for fiscal
year 2024. Funding the fiscal year 2024 budget request will allow
USCYBERCOM to demonstrate competence in execution of EBC. Concerns
remain about the impact of a fiscal year 2024 continuing resolution. A
continuing resolution will delay the implementation of EBC and generate
a significant amount of re-work based on the shift in appropriation
between fiscal year 2023and fiscal year 2024.
Question. In your view, are there any indications that the military
services will as a result of EBC reduce the level of support for the
cyber mission in those areas where budget authority was not transferred
to the Command, such as basic research and intelligence analysis?
Answer. USCYBERCOM has not seen any indications that the military
services will reduce their level of support for the Cyber Mission
Forces. We will continue to partner with the services in a number of
areas, to include: the assignment and initial training of their
military personnel, some administrative and logistics support for their
teams, as well as basic research and intelligence analysis.
Question. What mechanisms do you have to monitor and respond if the
services take such action?
Answer. There are a number of mechanisms that will allow USCYBERCOM
to monitor and respond if the services reduce their level of support.
We will have an opportunity to review each service's program and
highlight any issues during DOD's program budget review process. We
will also be able to engage with the Principal Cyber Advisor and the
Chief Information Officer to monitor and respond to unanticipated
reductions in the levels of support from the services.
cyber force
Question. Since the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command in 2010,
Congress and the leadership of the Department of Defense have modeled
the evolution of the Command on U.S. Special Operations Command.
However, there has been some support for creating a separate Cyber
Force, partly in response to persistent readiness problems.
What are your views on whether DOD should continue to mature U.S.
Cyber Command according to the SOCOM model or instead create a separate
cyber service? Please explain your answer in detail.
Answer. We have patterned USCYBERCOM after the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) model that vests Service-like authority
within a combatant command. USSOCOM has proven that this model is
successful in leading a formidable capability for our Nation. Congress
and the Department have set the conditions for U.S. Cyber Command to
achieve this same success, leveraging expanded acquisition authorities
and enhanced budget control to train and equip our cyberspace forces.
These tools are just now coming to a point that will allow the command
to ensure prioritization, resource allocation, and efforts to deliver
the necessary cyber systems and capabilities. We should continue this
approach to allow adequate time to see the results of these authorities
in improving the readiness and capabilities of our cyberspace forces.
Additionally, there are several statutorily required tasks from the
fiscal year 2023 NDAA that are currently underway to examine readiness
and force generation challenges. If confirmed, I will work with
Congress to understand the results of these assessments and any
associated recommendations for improving the USSOCOM-like model for
U.S. Cyber Command.
Question. What are some of the potential downsides that could
result from a decision to establish a separate cyber service?
Answer. The success of our operations to support the 2022 National
Defense Strategy depends on training and readiness. We have prioritized
improving the readiness of our cyber forces since USCYBERCOM became a
unified Combatant Command in 2018, and there has been progress. With
the passage of the fiscal year 2024 budget, USCYBERCOM will now have
the USSOCOM-like authorities and resources to improve readiness and
capabilities across the force. Changing course to stand up a new Cyber
Service before allowing sufficient time for these authorities to impact
readiness would be premature, necessitating significant additional
resources and would actually detract from our efforts to improve
readiness over the next 3-5 years.
Question. In your view, can DOD solve the readiness problem in the
Cyber Mission Force units pursuant to legislative actions and direction
from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. For USCYBERCOM, fiscal year 2024 is the first year
USCYBERCOM will be able to fully realize the opportunities provided
with the newly granted EBC and service-like authorities. The command
will work with the Services to develop a strategy to increase and
sustain readiness by prioritizing billets for CMF that require
sustained, high fill rates from each service; codifying assignment
policies that ensure at least two consecutive tours in the CMF;
improving service-level training courses; providing consistent
incentives across the services to recruit and retain the best cyber
talent; and standardizing cyber readiness reporting requirements. If
confirmed, I will brief Congress on the progress of these efforts and
any further recommendations.
Question. Do you think that it is necessary to enhance the
authority of the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command in the area of
personnel policy, training, and retention in order to ensure stability
in the readiness of the Cyber Mission Force? If so, what specific steps
would you recommend?
Answer. At this time, I do not think it is necessary to enhance the
authority of the Commander of USCYBERCOM in the area of personnel
policy, training, and retention in order to ensure stability in the
readiness of the Cyber Mission Force. Our service-like authorities
allow the Commander to establish readiness standards for the Department
and at the same time identify unique service initiatives that could be
scaled into Departmental policy/practice.
impact of artificial intelligence/machine learning
Question. Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) promise
to enable the automation of sophisticated analysis of situations and
conditions, and adept control of large numbers of complex machines and
operations. Subject to appropriate human controls, in the cyber domain,
AI may enable even modest numbers of cyber operators to achieve much
greater levels of scale, speed and impact. However, in contrast,
intelligence collection operations in cyberspace are generally
characterized as slow, methodical, and manually intensive because of
the care that must be taken to avoid detection. U.S. Cyber Command,
having emerged from the U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) culture,
remains strongly influenced by the SIGINT community's tactics,
techniques, and procedures and emphasis on careful preparation and
covert tradecraft.
Is there potentially a different model for operating in cyberspace
that would be more conducive to the application of AI to achieve scale
and speed in offensive cyber operations? For instance, could focusing
on exploiting known vulnerabilities with existing, well-known tools
make it easier for AI technologies to be adapted to helping orchestrate
cyber intelligence and attack operations at greater rates and scales?
Answer. AI offers a wide range of new opportunities for operating
in cyberspace. When applied to the cyberspace missions, AI has the
potential to enhance exploitation of vulnerabilities, improve
vulnerability research and access development, and accelerate the speed
and scale of many aspects of conducting cyberspace operations.
USCYBERCOM is in collaboration with partners across the Department to
create the AI Roadmap and Implementation Plan for the Cyber Operations
Force to determine how to most effectively utilize these new
applications. As we begin executing enhanced budget control and
acquisition authorities, CYBERCOM will be well postured to align and
accelerate the delivery of AI capabilities to the warfighter.
Question. Alternatively, are recent advances in AI better suited to
supporting defensive cyber missions, where spotting and correlating
anomalous but ambiguous events in noisy environments is at a premium?
Answer. ill be a force multiplier for network defenders in threat
hunting, incident response, terrain introspection, security compliance,
patching, and the deployment of zero-trust policy engines. We have
collaborated with NSA and our Service Cyber Components to leverage
Commercial off the Shelf AI capabilities for malware analysis.
USCYBERCOM continues to evaluate additional applications of AI in
support of defensive cyberspace operations through the development of
the AI Roadmap and Implementation Plan.
Question. What are your views about the potential impacts of AI on
the future cyber threat, the information warfare threat, and military
operations in cyberspace, and when would you expect to see them?
Answer. The enhancement of cyberspace operations with AI could be a
disruptive technology change. Cyberspace operations enhanced by AI have
the potential to achieve an accuracy and precision which were
previously only attainable through skillful interaction between
computer systems and human operators exercising strategic
decisionmaking--at a competitively advantageous scale, speed, and rate
of discovery. Sustaining a global advantage will require continual
adoption and evolution of both the technology and the processes,
doctrine, and culture of our organization.
Question. Are U.S. Cyber Command and the military services, and the
defense agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), investing aggressively in AI technology in direct support to
the cyber mission, and is there now a heightened awareness and
acceptance of the significance of this technology for offensive and
defensive cyber warfare, and information warfare more broadly?
Answer. USCYBERCOM is working to identify applications for an
increased adoption of AI/ML technologies for the cyber mission. We are
most mature in leveraging AI/ML techniques that are integrated in
commercial off-the-shelf tools or services. Through the recently
established Constellation pilot program, CYBERCOM will be able to more
quickly leverage DARPA's investments in this area to mature and
transition new cyber capabilities to the operational warfighter.
USCYBERCOM is in collaboration to create the AI Roadmap and
Implementation Plan for the Cyber Operations Force with DOD Chief
Information Office (CIO), Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence
Office (CDAO), DARPA, NSA, OUSD(R&E), and other partners. We expect
this to be transformative for our operations.
Question. In all of these cases, what data sources or repositories
are needed to enable these activities? Is the problem one of better
leveraging sources we already have, or developing all new data sources
and repositories?
Answer. Computational infrastructure and data sources to meet
current operational requirements with AI/ML analytics largely exist
across USCYBERCOM and NSA systems. The Joint Cyber Warfighting
Architecture (JCWA) programs are continually working to optimize data
movement and system access to expand the use of AI/ML. Establishment of
the JCWA Program Office will help facilitate efforts to optimize and
better leverage our current architecture.
Question. How would you assess the AI capabilities of U.S.
adversaries and near-peer competitors?
Answer. China and Russia are both pursuing AI to support military
decisionmaking, weapons systems, and autonomous vehicles. Over the past
decade, China has established a robust framework to bolster its AI and
made contributions to the field on a global scale. Rapid changes in the
technological environment will require the constant development of new
and better approaches to collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence about these threats to maintain the safety of the Nation
and our allies; this will be a priority for me if confirmed.
cyber posture review
Question. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted a cyber posture
review, including a gap analysis, in 2022 to inform the development of
the DOD Cyber Strategy and future capability planning and funding.
In your view, what are the most significant findings of the posture
review?
Answer. In my opinion, the most significant findings of the posture
review relate to people, partners and capabilities. Beginning with
people, USCYBERCOM must recruit and retain the talent to efficiently
and effectively perform the mission. USCYBERCOM must better integrate
partners across foreign military, intelligence, and the private sector
to meet growing defensive requirements by burden sharing. Finally,
USCYBERCOM must invest in developing capabilities to enhance
flexibility and options for cyberspace operations.
Question. If confirmed, where in your priority list does addressing
the gaps identified in the posture review fall?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities are people, innovation, and
partners. We have to work with the Services to bring in capable people,
train them, and provide them career opportunities to retain them.
USYCBERCOM must invest in the technology, capabilities, and
infrastructure necessary to support the joint force. Critical to the
Department's success is the ability to build and maintain strong
collaboration with the agency partners, industry, academia, and our
allies and partners to counter the threats to our national security.
Question. Do you have any concerns with any significant findings
and recommendations of the posture review?
Answer. The CPR highlights the use of our Cyber Protection Teams.
USCYBERCOM's Cyber Protection Team is a capability that defends
friendly networks, bolster tactics, technics, and produces, and enhance
collaboration with allies and partners. This supports each of
USCYBERCOM's enduring missions in cyberspace and mitigates attacks
against the Department's networks, the Nation, and our allies and
partners. We reviewed the CPR and have incorporated feedback to improve
Cyber Protection Teams operations.
national cyber strategy
Adversary Cyber Presence in the United States
TQuestion. he intelligence and military cyber forces of adversary
nations such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are effectively
deployed and constantly operating inside the United States. However,
the vast U.S. private and commercial cyberspace is largely a sanctuary
for adversary cyber actors, allowing them to essentially deploy forces
inside the United States and operate clandestinely. The March 2023
National Cybersecurity Strategy contends that the very technically
proficient American commercial internet industry, with incentives and
assistance, could provide a potent solution to this problem without
impinging on privacy.
What is your assessment of the potential for the major U.S.
Internet service providers and platforms, if incentivized and
motivated, to prevent malicious cyber actors from abusing their
platforms and services?
Answer. U.S. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and platforms have
an enormous responsibility and are faced with many challenges, to
include the misuse and abuse of their infrastructure by foreign
malicious cyber actors. Many ISPs already taken action to prevent and
eradicate malicious cyber actors on their services, though more can be
done. There are efforts being considered across the U.S. Government to
review and implement incentives for the private sector to increase
their level of cybersecurity for their products and services. NSA
certainly plays a role in this effort by sharing information an ISP
will need to identify foreign malicious activity in an effective and
efficient manner and to educate the ISP cybersecurity personnel
regarding what measures will be effective at mitigating the threats,
thus reducing the resources required on the part of the company to
better secure their platforms against misuse and abuse. If confirmed, I
will partner with other Federal agencies and continue to work with
service providers on this issue.
Question. How do you think the next iteration of the Cybersecurity
Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program that is in development may
help improve the cybersecurity posture of businesses to defend against
such malicious actors?
Answer. The theft of intellectual property from U.S. companies for
both espionage and economic gains has long been a problem, especially
within the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). These companies are critical
to the defense of our Nation and the effectiveness of our warfighters.
Therefore, it is imperative that we protect the sensitive information,
operational capabilities, and product integrity created, housed, and
used by the DIB to ensure the generation, reliability, and preservation
of U.S. warfighting capabilities, and CMMC is a key tenet in this
strategy. CMMC will ensure baseline security is in place for
organizations supporting sensitive, but unclassified DOD programs,
ensuring that a minimum standard be met prior to contract award. While
advanced nation-State actors will continue to pursue ways into these
networks and systems, CMMC could greatly diminish both the attack
surface across the DIB, and the amount of time malicious cyber actors
may spend in these networks before they are detected and eradicated,
ultimately reducing data theft.
Question. In your view, how useful is the NSA Cybersecurity
Collaboration Center in scaling this model by providing intelligence-
and technology-driven cybersecurity assistance through open,
collaborative partnerships with industry and the Department of Homeland
Security?
Answer. antage point, I believe that NSA's Cybersecurity
Collaboration Center (CCC) has made tremendous strides in scaling the
public-private partnership model for collective cyber defense. The U.S.
technology and cybersecurity sectors build, maintain, and defend the
infrastructure upon which DOD, USG, and critical infrastructure
operate. We find that many of these companies are motivated to keep
those technologies secure from state-sponsored malicious actors. The
CCC provides information and context that helps inform and prioritize
those efforts. Those companies also have unique insights through their
routine business and are able to share those back with NSA to help
inform its cybersecurity and foreign intelligence missions, creating an
iterative communications cycle that improves the collective
understanding of the actor, their activities, and ways to defend
against them.
u.s. cyber command role in disruption campaigns
Question. The National Cybersecurity Strategy (March 2023)
establishes the goal to ``make malicious actors incapable of mounting
sustained cyber-enabled campaigns that could threaten the national
security or public safety of the United States'' by disrupting and
dismantling such actors.
In your view, would you expect that U.S. Cyber Command will be
called upon to execute ``sustained'' offensive operations against cyber
adversaries to disrupt their ability to conduct malicious operations,
including operations to disrupt malicious activity before it effects
its intended targets?
Answer. Yes, USCYBERCOM remains committed and ready to defend the
homeland, support the Joint Force, and safeguard and advance U.S.
national interests in and through the cyber domain. This requires
USCYBERCOM to execute sustained cyber operations in campaigning with
the combatant commands, the interagency, industry, and our allies and
partners.
cyber intelligence center
Question. Every operational domain other than cyberspace--land,
sea, air, and space--has a dedicated Science and Technology and
Foundational Intelligence Center. U.S. Cyber Command has concluded that
the cyberspace operational domain also merits such an intelligence
center.
What is your understanding of the result of the recent study on
this topic by the Defense Intelligence Agency?
Answer. The offices of Undersecretaries of Defense for Intelligence
and Security and Policy are engaged with DIA and USCYBERCOM for a
review of the Command's requirement for foundational intelligence
consistent with the support that every other Combatant Command receives
from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Foundational intelligence in
the domain of cyberspace is critical to conducting all of USCYBERCOM
missions, and if confirmed, ensuring that Cyber Command's requirements
are met will be a focus of mine.
Question. In your view, is such a center is necessary?
Answer. Yes. A consolidated Cyber Intelligence Science and
Technology Center would close gaps in intelligence support to
cyberspace operations. If confirmed, I will work with USD(I&S) and DIA
to evaluate feasibility and executability of solutions to close these
intelligence gaps.
Question. Do you think that NSA could provide much-needed technical
intelligence if additional resources were available?
Answer. Yes. NSA's technical intelligence capabilities are superb.
If confirmed, I will work with USD(I&S) to evaluate any additional
resource requirements.
Question. In your view, would there still be a shortfall in the
provision of all-source intelligence analysis?
Answer. Yes. The Intelligence Community is still maturing all-
source analysis, particularly as it relates to Order of Battle of
Cyberspace Forces and targeting in the cyberspace domain.
the nature of offensive cyber operations in a conflict
Question. The NSA, as an intelligence agency, appropriately places
the highest importance on remaining undetected, and accordingly invests
in high-end--and therefore expensive and hard-to-develop--technical
tools and tradecraft, following a deliberate methodology for developing
and maintaining capability. U.S. Cyber Command, as a military combatant
command, could in many circumstances have different interests and
objectives. For example, it could seek the capability to act rapidly
against targets for which there has been no time available to
methodically access, and it may need tools and processes that can be
used without fear of compromise during military operations. It could be
argued that supported combatant commanders cannot wait weeks or months
once a conflict has started for U.S. Cyber Command to be able to
conduct follow-on operations to those which may have been pre-planned.
What are your views on these tradeoffs? Do you have any ideas for
how to balance the competing institutional needs and goals for U.S.
Cyber Command and NSA in this respect?
Answer. The most positive aspect of the dual hat is the ability of
a single decisionmaker, responsible for the separate and distinct
mission outcomes of both organizations, to allocate resources, set
priorities, and execute complementary actions to produce critical
outcomes for the Nation. It ensures that a single, fully informed
decisionmaker is able to protect our Nation's most sensitive signals
intelligence equities and ensure both organizations are aligned with
the Nation's priorities.
Question. In your view, are there ways in which U.S. Cyber Command
can operate effectively against meaningful targets in a conflict for
which there has been no prior preparation?
Answer. Developing cyber capabilities in support of the Combatant
Commanders in conflict is a key element of USCYBERCOM's mission. If
confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to have a deeper discussion in the
appropriate setting.
Question. In your view, should it be accepted that the most
important offensive cyber contributions to combatant commanders'
objectives in a conflict will be limited to a series of unique, pre-
planned operations?
Answer. Developing cyber capabilities in support of the Combatant
Commanders in conflict is a key element of USCYBERCOM's mission. If
confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to have a deeper discussion in the
appropriate setting.
acquisition of accesses and exploits and the joint cyber warfighting
architecture
Question. Congress transferred responsibility for acquiring the
Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA) from military department
executive agents in the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).
In your view, is it critical to the success of the JCWA initiative
that the military services sustain support for the JCWA programs until
U.S. Cyber Command has acquired the workforce and acquisition expertise
necessary to manage and integrate these programs effectively?
Answer. Yes, JCWA's success is predicated on support from all
branches of the military. In conjunction with other stakeholders,
USCYBERCOM is working to establish the Program Executive Office (PEO)
JCWA, as directed in Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA Sec. 1509.
Question. What is your understanding of the military services
commitment to providing that support until a suitable transition can be
planned?
Answer. The military services have agreed to the establishment
timeline, which will result in a PEO JCWA being fully operational by
fiscal year 2027. Accordingly, the Army remains responsible for
sustaining the Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE) and Joint
Common Access Platform (JCAP). The Air Force remains responsible for
sustaining Unified Platform (UP) and Joint Cyber Command and Control
(JCC2).
Question. In your view, is it critical that U.S. Cyber Command also
receive support from the Secretary of Defense and Principal Staff
Assistants to acquire the necessary acquisition expertise to manage the
complex JCWA acquisition and integration challenges?
Answer. Yes. USCYBERCOM has received strong support from OSD(A&S)
on this issue.
Question. If confirmed, are you confident that you will receive
that support? What tools or processes will you have to monitor and
enforce any support commitments that need to be sustained from the
services?
Answer. Yes. USCYBERCOM will use enhanced budget control and
different acquisition authorities to ensure continued support from the
services. Beginning in fiscal year 2024, USCYBERCOM will meet with the
service's program management offices (PMO) monthly to track fund
execution status. In relation to acquisition, USCYBERCOM meets with the
services PMOs quarterly to provide prioritized operational and
engineering requirements for development. These regular engagements
allow issues to be quickly identified and remedied.
Question. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has
volunteered, and U.S. Cyber Command accepted the offer, to provide a
flow of software-based capabilities to the Command for integration into
JCWA.
In your view, what are the important features and advantages of
this initiative, both for the Command and DARPA?
Answer. The Constellation program aims to quickly transition
technologies, capabilities, and prototype systems into JCWA to enable
full spectrum cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and defeat
adversary cyber actors, through close coordination between the cyber
mission force (CMF), DARPA and the DOD S&T community. Through
streamlined acquisition, assessment, approval, deployment processes,
and modern DevSecOps development processes, Constellation will enable
the rapid and continuous delivery of cyberspace technologies,
capabilities, and prototype systems to the warfighter.
Question. In your view, does U.S. Cyber Command have the necessary
authorities and processes to acquire accesses and tools to support
offensive and defensive capabilities from the private sector when the
opportunity arises?
Answer. orities to acquire tools and capabilities from the private
sector. I will continue to work with R&E on the evolving role of
USCYBERCOM in the DOD S&T community to ensure USCYBERCOM is properly
postured to provide the COF with the most advanced and extensive cyber
capabilities.
Question. Does the Department possess the requisite relationships
with private sector entities and vendors to rapidly acquire cyber
capabilities? If not, what recommendations would you make to build
those relationships?
Answer. USCYBERCOM has worked to establish and maintain its
private-sector relationships, which are critical to our ability to
rapidly acquire cyber capabilities. Through this continued utilization
of our authorities, USCYBERCOM is able to leverage internal activities,
as well as partner with other Department entities, in order to acquire
cyber capabilities on a scale and tempo that supports our operations.
force mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel in u.s. cyber
command
Question. In your view, describe any legal restrictions concerning
whether a given position must be filled by military personnel, rather
than a government civilian?
Answer. Determinations regarding how positions must be filled are
made using the guidelines in
department of defense instruction (dodi) 1100.22, policy and procedures
for determining
Question. Workforce Mix. Planners review mission requirements and
organizational structure to determine the appropriate workforce mix.
The guidelines in DODI 1100.22 identify which functions are inherently
governmental, then determine which will be performed by DOD civilian
employees, and which will or must be performed by military personnel.
What are the legal and policy parameters surrounding the use of
contractor personnel for the execution of military cyber operations?
Answer. Contractor-provided services support a variety of important
functions for USCYBERCOM. These functions encompass vital support to
both the Command, and the CMF. DOD policy requires that military
operations involving the planned use of destructive capabilities,
including offensive cyber capabilities, must be performed by Federal
military personnel, rather than civilian or contractor personnel.
Civilian and contractor personnel may perform other cyberspace
operations, including support to offensive cyber operations not meeting
the policy requirement described above, although contractor personnel
may not perform inherently governmental functions. It is essential that
Federal military personnel and U.S. Government civilian employees
maintain proper oversight and ensure inherently government functions
are performed by government personnel.
Question. What do you believe is the appropriate force mix between
civilian, military, and contractor personnel accounting for the
mission, educational requirements, any legal restrictions, the ability
to recruit and retain military personnel in this field, and career
progression for cyber personnel?
Answer. As USCYBERCOM engages in worldwide operations, the mission
will determine the necessary mix of Active forces, the Reserve
component, DOD civilians, and contracted workforce to achieve our
military objectives. We will continue our efforts to recruit well-
trained and educated professionals.
USCYBERCOM continues to achieve the appropriate force mix.
USCYBERCOM has received additional civilian employee allocations under
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Manpower Validation Board, and these
will take the command staff to a mix of approximately 41 percent
military members and 59 percent civilian personnel. This mix is
appropriate given the specific functions of staff personnel.
Question. What recommendations might you make for policies to
improve recruiting and retaining cyber military and civilian personnel
to help reduce the increasing competition for these professionals with
the commercial sector?
Answer. Future talent management, with a focus on recruitment,
retention, and equipping warfighters in targeted areas, is part of the
effort to retain a high-quality workforce. We are working with the
Services and across the Command to identify recruiting practices to
gain talent, which is innovation and enduring advantage. We need
motivated and talented people to serve our Nation, and USCYBERCOM
continues its commitment to attract candidates with a wide range of
backgrounds and experiences.
Congressional Oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
sexual harassment
1. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, since you became a
legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors, or
committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Lieutenant General Haugh. No.
2. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, have you ever faced
discipline, or entered into a settlement, related to this kind of
conduct?
Lieutenant General Haugh. No.
extremism's role in unauthorized disclosures
3. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, earlier this year the
Department of Defense (DOD) suffered a major intelligence leak due to
the actions of someone with a deeply troubling history of racist and
violent remarks. Though not the norm, what threat does domestic
extremism pose to our national security and if confirmed, how would you
lead U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) in defending against it?
Lieutenant General Haugh. As reflected in the oath every service
member takes, extremist activities are inconsistent with the
responsibilities and obligations of military service. Active
participation in extremist activity is prohibited. Extremist behavior
undermines good order and discipline, erodes the effectiveness of the
Command, and challenges national security. If confirmed, I will ensure
leaders take appropriate steps to identify, intervene, and take
appropriate actions to eliminate extremist behaviors if discovered
within our ranks.
section 702 abuses
4. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, your predecessor has
cited the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Section 702
authorization as critical to intelligence gathering for the military.
Yet, there have been clear examples of Americans' 702 communications
getting searched in inappropriate ways. With respect to these
``backdoor searches'' or ``U.S. person queries,'' some discussed
solutions are warrant requirements, statutory limits, greater judicial
oversight, or prohibiting such queries entirely. Would any of these
solutions--which would only affect the subsequent use of data already
collected under existing section 702 authorities--prevent you from
conducting your national security mission against foreign actors?
Lieutenant General Haugh. My answer below is predicated on my
current understanding of the issue, noting that in my current role I am
not directly involved in the oversight of NSA's use of FAA Section 702.
It is my understanding that NSA's use of U.S. person query terms is
limited, carefully controlled, and subject to robust internal and
external oversight. Restricting NSA's authority to conduct queries
using U.S. person query terms in section 702 data, including requiring
a probable cause determination or prior FISC authorization on some or
all such queries, would undermine the effectiveness of the tool for
national security purposes. It would create a significant
administrative burden and time delay in a process that is valuable
particularly for its efficiency. When time is of the essence, such a
change may require NSA to identify alternative means of locating
critical foreign intelligence. In many circumstances, it would be
extremely challenging, if not impossible, to pinpoint this information
in time to protect U.S. national security interests, including victims
of malicious cyber activity, hostages, or targets of malign activity by
hostile foreign intelligence services.
As noted at the outset, this position is based on my current
understanding. I also understand that the Administration and Congress
are currently considering a variety of reforms to U.S. person queries
into section 702 data. If confirmed, I look forward to studying this
issue further and participating in those discussions.
5. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, do you have
recommendations for additional safeguards to prevent the abuse of data
collected under section 702?
Lieutenant General Haugh. If confirmed, I will be in a better
position to evaluate the specifics of NSA's Section 702 compliance and
oversight systems in order to offer recommendations for additional
safeguards. I am aware that NSA has a robust compliance regime designed
to ensure adherence to all statutory and procedural requirements,
including those relating to section 702. I know NSA's workforce is
dedicated to compliance with the laws and policies that govern NSA's
missions, including its Section 702 activities. NSA has a dedicated
corporate compliance organization, and has instilled a culture of
compliance within its workforce. Based on my experiences, I know that
NSA's compliance team is part of each stage of the analytic process--
from initial targeting decision to review of the responsive content--
supporting the mission and ensuring that NSA's culture of compliance is
maintained day in and day out.
Additionally, NSA's Section 702 activities are overseen by an
internal compliance organization as well as NSA's independent Inspector
General. Every NSA Section 702 targeting decision is reviewed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and NSA must report any incidents of non-
compliance to DoJ and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. DoJ attorneys investigate each potential incident of non-
compliance, work with agencies to remediate any such instances, and
report any incidents of non-compliance to the FISC and to Congress.
ensuring election security
6. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, if confirmed, you will
have an important responsibility to help maintain our Nation's free and
open democratic elections. In your prospective role, how would you
prevent foreign actors from interfering with our democratic process,
whether through disinformation campaigns or cyber-attack?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Foreign adversaries such as Russia,
China, Iran and their proxies persistently use their cyber and
disinformation capabilities to shape, target, and influence the United
States democratic process. State-sponsored online influence operations
are unremitting and increasingly sophisticated. In addition,
developments in artificial intelligence could provide new opportunities
to spread disinformation to U.S. audiences. If confirmed, I will uphold
our focus on the election security mission to ensure USCYBERCOM and NSA
continue to operate at the necessary speed and agility to persistently
engage adversaries that seek to threaten our elections.
7. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, how would you ensure
that any information your team may discover gets passed to the relevant
local election officials, who do not have security clearances?
Lieutenant General Haugh. USCYBERCOM passes relevant, elections-
related information to the appropriate Federal agency--typically DHS or
FBI, which have established relationships with the states. The
appropriate Federal agency then disseminates to the relevant local
election officials.
cyber workforce development and retention
8. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Haugh, CYBERCOM has gained
increased responsibilities for joint and advanced cyber operations
training; but, CYBERCOM has little role in ensuring that trained talent
is retained by the Services. How do you envision CYBERCOM conducting
advanced cyber professional training and what changes are needed to
ensure this cyber talent is retained by DOD?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Using the authorities provided to the
Command, USCYBERCOM works closely with the Services to resolve
readiness challenges across the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). With the
passage of the fiscal year 2024 budget, USCYBERCOM will increase its
role under enhanced budgetary control, and the expanded role in
acquisition Congress gave USCYBERCOM in the Fiscal Year 2023 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) will provide USCYBERCOM with the
ability to provide additional supporting infrastructure for this
training. As we progress under these expanded authorities, we will
provide updates to Congress regarding our readiness and retention
initiatives with the services under Section 1502 of the Fiscal Year
2023 NDAA. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee through
regular updates and other reports to address challenges in resolving
readiness and retention shortfalls.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
academia partnership
9. Senator King. Lieutenant General Haugh, collaboration and
partnership between academia and the Department can bring about
positive contributions for future research and activities. Places like
the University of Maine and the Roux Institute at Northeastern, are
doing amazing things in the world of cybersecurity, data analytics,
systems modeling, network science, and artificial intelligence. How is
CYBERCOM and the National Security Agency (NSA) partnering and
leveraging academia to develop novel ideas and concepts along with the
future cyber workforce?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Academic partnerships are a critical
enabler for the USCYBERCOM and NSA workforce in meeting challenges to
our national security. The Academic Engagement Network (AEN) of
colleges and universities at USCYBERCOM has grown to over one hundred
colleges and universities. Through these partnerships, the Command
leverages innovative thinking in cybersecurity, data analytics,
artificial intelligence, networks, and modeling and simulation, which
inform and equip our cyberspace forces to address our ever-changing
national security challenges.
The National Security Agency (NSA) manages the National Centers of
Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity (NCAE-C) program. This program
aims to create and manage a collaborative cybersecurity educational
program with community colleges, colleges, and universities that
establishes standards for cybersecurity curriculum and academic
excellence; addresses challenges facing cybersecurity education. There
are more than 400 colleges and universities identified as NCAE-Cs,
spanning 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
2023 and 2024 national defense authorization act reporting requirements
10. Senator King. Lieutenant General Haugh, the 2023 and 2024
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Senate Armed Service (SASC)
reports require multiple CYBERCOM-related direct reports: (1) Election
Security Group report (2023): This is a biennial report on CYBERCOM's
efforts to ensure election security throughout the preceding Federal
election cycle and a briefing to the committees on the election
security threat assessment preceding each Federal election through the
2032 election cycle; (2) Classified Report (2023): Without going into
detail, a classified report is required of CYBERCOM by the 2023 NDAA--I
wanted to make sure the requirement was understood and on track at
CYBERCOM; and (3) Cyber Personnel Readiness Report (2024): Calls for
the service secretaries to report how they Man, Train, and Equip (MET)
the 133 Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams.
a. Please assure me you will comply with these reports and inform
my staff and I when you brief the committee.
Lieutenant General Haugh. Yes, you have my assurance.
b. Request your review of the classified reporting requirement from
the Fiscal Year 2023 SASC Report 117-30 and provide me a followup
assessment should you be confirmed.
Lieutenant General Haugh. I have reviewed the reporting
requirements and, if confirmed, will followup with my assessment.
c. Please provide an update on your assessment in preparedness for
the next Federal election cycle.
Lieutenant General Haugh. In my various positions leading election
security efforts since 2018, I have seen the scale of our operations
and our partnerships grow significantly. The sustained focus on this
mission enables speed and agility with which we have been able to
engage adversaries that threaten our elections. The resulting insight
into adversaries' plans and intentions against U.S. elections helps
secure election infrastructure and mitigate adversary activities,
degrading and exposing adversary capabilities and operations. If
confirmed, this will remain a priority.
d. Please provide your initial assessment on the progress the
Services are making for providing trained and ready forces for
CYBERCOM.
Lieutenant General Haugh. We work closely with the Services to
provide trained and ready forces to the CMF. Through their
collaboration with each Service and routine dialog with the Service
Chiefs and Principal Cyber Advisors, we assess quarterly progress on
readiness and address issues in need of attention.
Under Section 1534 of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), the Command is working with the Department
and the Services to develop a plan to improve recruitment and retention
of our cyber teams. When combined with the annual report required by
Section 1502 of the same NDAA, the Command will relay to Congress the
outstanding challenges in readiness, and work with the Services to
identify appropriate solutions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Gary Peters
electronic warfare/cyberspace convergence
11. Senator Peters. Lieutenant General Haugh, as you're aware, my
colleagues and I in Congress are heavily focused on electronic warfare
issues. As head of CYBERCOM, you would be critical in facilitating
electronic warfare operations across the Services. How can CYBERCOM
take a more active role in helping to synchronize electronic warfare
capabilities across the Joint Force, both in a training context and for
real-world defensive and offensive operations?
Lieutenant General Haugh. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Services as well as the combatant commands to ensure we meet the
Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA requirement to develop a strategy for converged
cyber and electronic warfare, specifically for service-retained assets.
As evident within the conflict in Ukraine, both sides of the conflict
have extensively engaged in military electronic warfare (EW)
operations. The Services have deployed organic electronic warfare
capabilities to support joint requirements, and USCYBERCOM closely
coordinates with other combatant commands to synchronize EW
capabilities on the battlefield. We must continue to plan and
participate in large-scale, realistic, joint exercises to jointly
operate in combat environments.
12. Senator Peters. Lieutenant General Haugh, the Fiscal Year 2023
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) mandated requirements for the
Department of Defense to develop a strategy for ``converged cyber and
electronic warfare'' conducted by and through deployed military and
intelligence assets operating in the radio frequency domain to provide
strategic, operational and tactical effects in support of combatant
commanders. Given this mandate and your recommendations as the 16th Air
Force Commander to converge and grow cyber and electronic warfare, how
do you envision mandated collaborations between CYBERCOM, combatant
commands (COCOMs), and the Services who have the primary task to man,
train and equip forces with capabilities to deploy and employ cyber and
electronic warfare capabilities abroad?
Lieutenant General Haugh. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Department and USSTRATCOM to develop a strategy for converged
cyber and electronic warfare. The opportunities inherent in a more
holistic view of the electro-magnetic spectrum and cyberspace makes
USCYBERCOM's role even more important as we seek to gain information
advantage over our adversaries. Linking Combatant Commander
requirements with our Service components ensures that future force
development, including the capabilities of cyberspace and EW forces,
are effective. This level of force integration contributes to the
information advantage for the joint force and enables the
responsibilities of USCYBERCOM as Joint Force Provider for cyberspace
operations.
13. Senator Peters. Lieutenant General Haugh, in the fiscal year
2023 budget, CYBERCOM requested $16.7 million to adapt electronic
warfare technologies and cyber-peculiar capabilities to gain access to
targeted enemy forces. With increased funding, how would you envision
CYBERCOM supporting service requirements to build and expand electronic
warfare capabilities to support COCOMs and their requirements to access
hardened internet protocol (I.P.) tactical networks via close access
radio frequency (R.F.) capabilities normally employed via electronic
warfare tools and authorities?
Lieutenant General Haugh. As Joint Force Provider for cyberspace
operations, the Command monitors the capability and capacity of all
units contributing to the fight in cyberspace. This includes our
expeditionary cyberspace operations, which have collectively served as
a force multiplier. With expanded acquisition and budget authorities
starting in fiscal year 2024, USCYBERCOM will collaborate with
Combatant Commands and the Services to identify requirements and
solutions for RF-enabled capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
narrative intelligence
14. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Haugh, propaganda and
foreign malign influence activities disseminated constantly on
traditional media and social media by non-State actors and nation-State
rivals undermines U.S. interests, exacerbates conflicts, and subverts
democracy. Social media-enabled influence operations serve as a
powerful force in shaping modern battlefields through activities short
of kinetic warfare. The digital dimension, including, social media, and
emerging domains of virtual and augmented reality change rapidly and
may make it difficult for U.S. Agencies and, particularly, the
Department of Defense to keep pace.
What are the key capability and resource needs (e.g. a skilled
workforce, technology, or analytics) for operations in the information
environment and countering foreign adversaries' malign influence
campaigns against the United States population, systems, and processes?
Lieutenant General Haugh. USCYBERCOM collaborates with partners in
developing a coordinated effort to repel foreign actors' attempts to
conduct malign influence activity against us. USCYBERCOM will continue
to pair its skilled workforce with advanced technology and analytical
capabilities. These resources will provide the synergy needed to remain
ahead of foreign efforts in the information domain, while ensuring our
actions protect the rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens.
15. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Haugh, how are you working
with colleges and universities to counter foreign malign influence
against allies and U.S. institutions and systems?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Through the Academic Engagement Network
(AEN), USCYBERCOM works closely with colleges and universities to find
innovative approaches to address the most pressing cyber challenges
facing the Command. The National Security Agency (NSA) manages the
National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity (NCAE-C)
program. There are more than 400 colleges and universities identified
as NCAE-Cs, spanning 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico. If confirmed, I will ensure we are leveraging both organizations'
academic partnerships to counter foreign malign influence.
16. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Haugh, what resources do you
need to counter foreign malign influence beyond additional funding?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Most pressing is on time passage of the
fiscal year 2024 defense appropriations bill. This legislation will
fully enable USCYBERCOM's enhanced budget authorities. If confirmed, I
will analyze USCYBERCOM's execution of our budget and authorities to
determine if additional gaps remain.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
national security agency hunt forward teams
17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Haugh, a November 2022
press statement released by CYBERCOM detailed how U.S. Joint Forces, in
close cooperation with the Government of Ukraine, conducted defensive
cyber operations prior to Russia's invasion last year. According to
CYBERCOM, hunt forward operations are purely defensive activities and
are key to CYBERCOM's persistent international engagement strategy.
Most recently, in early June of this year, hunt forward teams conducted
their first engagements in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR). As our strategic competitors' cyber capabilities
grow so must ours and those of our partners, I think hunt forward is an
excellent initiative that will provide tremendous benefits to our
national security. Can you describe how hunt forward teams were
employed to support Ukraine?
Lieutenant General Haugh. In response to a request for support,
USCYBERCOM deployed hunt forward operators to work with our Ukrainian
partners against malicious cyber activity on their networks. While hunt
forward forces were on the ground, remote forces provided critical
analytic and advisory support. Together, the combined forces analyzed
adversary tactics and tools, sharing their findings with government and
industry partners to bolster defense in both the U.S and other partner
nations.
18. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Haugh, how might hunt
forward teams be employed in Taiwan?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Hunt forward operations bring us closer
to adversary activity and are key to protecting our networks and
critical infrastructure against shared threats. These operations are
mutually beneficial because they bolster the security of our partners
and the U.S. When invited to hunt on partner networks, our combined
forces discover malicious cyber activity, imposing costs on our
adversaries by exposing their tools and tradecraft, and providing
advance notice of adversary tactics that enable us and our allies and
partners to harden our networks against these threats.
19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Haugh, do you see hunt
forward teams enhancing our relationships with our U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (INDOPACOM) partners?
Lieutenant General Haugh. USCYBERCOM works by, with, and through
USINDOPACOM in our collaboration with partners in the Indo-Pacific area
of operations. Our partnerships represent a unique, collaborative
advantage and accelerate our partners' capacity to defend against cyber
espionage and strategic attacks. In order to achieve this mission, the
Command establishes secure communications and information sharing with
our partners. Through this foundation, we keep our partners informed
and align our actions, building an environment of enduring
cybersecurity. Hunt forward teams are a part of this equation.
the role of cyber in deterring a taiwan invasion
20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Haugh, in General Paul
Nakasone's testimony for CYBERCOM's fiscal year 2024 posture hearing,
he identified CYBERCOM's fourth line of effort as ``developing options
for full-spectrum cyberspace operations to assist combatant commanders
. . . to achieve their objectives.'' He further noted China was
``building capabilities far in excess of its defense needs.''
Deterring, and if necessary defeating, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is
certainly one of INDOPACOM's objectives. A key Chinese capability to
conduct such an invasion is the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy).
The Secretary of the Navy has acknowledged we cannot match the output
of Chinese shipyards and the PLAN is already numerically larger than
the United States Navy. The PLAN also uses civilian RO-ROs (Roll on/
Roll Off) ferry vessels to practice the same type of amphibious
operations it needs to conduct to invade Taiwan. What capabilities does
CYBERCOM bring to the fight to help INDOPACOM achieve its objectives,
specifically deterring and defeating a PLAN amphibious invasion of
Taiwan?
Lieutenant General Haugh. The ability to command and control forces
is essential to any combatant commander and will be essential to
USINDOPACOM in any contingency. Securing, operating, and defending DOD
Information Networks will be critical and essential role in such a
scenario. Additionally, USCYBERCOM, in support of INDOPACOM and in
cooperation with its allies and partners, remains focused on deterring
threats. Our efforts include defending forward and providing cyberspace
options to the USINDOPACOM Commander. Enhanced Budget Control will
ensure that the cyber mission force is organized, trained, equipped,
and ready to address the challenges of the region, giving USCYBERCOM
authorities to field capabilities necessary to deter aggression.
cyber security in the arctic
21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Haugh, receding sea ice in
the Arctic has brought increased opportunity for access to the Arctic
Ocean and with it new potential trade routes and access to natural
resources. Our partners in the region have taken notice as have Russia
and the People's Republic of China (PRC), who has declared itself a
near Arctic State. Additionally, over the last year, Alaska, our
Nation's gateway to the Arctic, has been the site of several attempted
shows of strength by Russian Bear Bombers (Tupolev Tu-95) and likely
collection efforts by PRC spy balloons. Relatedly, several of our
Arctic partners have either already experienced or are bracing to
experience cyber threats from our strategic competitors. At the
appropriate classification level, what is your understanding of the
cyber threat in the Arctic?
Lieutenant General Haugh. Russia and the PRC have demonstrated
their intent and capability in the cyber domain and their interest in
the Arctic. Russia's cyber capabilities are particularly concerning
given the significant United States energy, telecommunications, and
transportation critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in the
Arctic region. Similarly, Beijing's quest for a polar ``silk road'' and
interest in becoming a ``near-Arctic State,'' suggests cyber espionage
will be a means to augment its intelligence collection activities to
influence Arctic nations.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Timothy D.
Haugh, USAF follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Timothy D.
Haugh, USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time
the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Timothy D. Haugh, USAF in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Timothy D. Haugh,
USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 13,
2023, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19,
2023.]
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