[Senate Hearing 118-789]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-789
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHARLES Q.
BROWN, JR., USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIR-
MAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 11, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-637 WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
july 11, 2023
Page
The Nomination of General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF, for 1
reappointment to the grade of general and to be Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Brown, General Charles Q., Jr., USAF, for reappointment to the 9
grade of general and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 43
Questions for the Record....................................... 101
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 113
Biographical Sketch............................................ 114
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 116
Signature Page................................................. 121
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHARLES Q. BROWN, JR., USAF, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 11, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth,
Rosen, Kelly, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Cramer,
Scott, Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. Let me call the hearing to
order. Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the
nomination of General Charles ``CQ'' Brown to be Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General, congratulations on your
nomination and thank you for stepping forward to lead at this
critical time.
I would like to welcome your wife, Sharene who is with us
today, and thank your sons, Sean and Ross, who I am sure are
watching proudly. We thank your family for their continued
support of your service over many years.
I would also like to thank the current Chairman, General
Mark Milley, who will retire later this year. General Milley
has served this Nation honorably for more than four decades and
has led the Joint Chiefs with skill and vision. We are grateful
for his service, and we congratulate him on his retirement.
General Brown, you are well qualified to serve as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the current Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, you have led the service as it adapts to a
rapidly changing global security environment. You bring a
record of success for leadership around the globe and command
experience at all levels of our military. This expertise will
serve you well.
If confirmed, you will serve as the principal military
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the
Secretary of Defense, and Congress. You will be expected to be
an effective strategist, advisor, and manager, and your counsel
will be relied upon as we confront the multitude of national
security issues before us.
Indeed, we face significant challenges. First and foremost,
as the National Defense Strategy makes clear, China is our
primary competitor. China is the only nation with both the
intent and the capability to challenge the interests of the
United States and our allies and partners. At the same time,
Russia remains a violent, destabilizing force, and nations like
Iran and North Korea continue to push the boundaries of
military brinksmanship.
To succeed in this environment, the U.S. Military must
better develop its joint capabilities across all domains,
including space, cyber, and information. As the Defense
Department recently released Joint Concept for Competing makes
clear, the objective of our Nation's adversaries is to win
without fighting. The document warns that if we do not adapt
our approach to competition more effectively, the United States
risks ceding strategic influence, advantage, and leverage while
preparing for war that never comes.
General Brown, I am interested to know how you would
promote the development of joint capabilities to ensure our
military remains the world's premier fighting force. While it
is the purview of the military services to equip our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians, if confirmed as
Chairman you will be responsible for identifying new joint
capabilities and performing net assessments to ensure the
services are procuring the right capabilities needed for the
Joint Force. The Chairman must review capabilities holistically
across this total force, which can conflict with the priorities
of individual services. The Committee would be interested to
learn how you plan to manage this dynamic, if confirmed.
In addition, the National Defense Strategy, the National
Military Strategy, and the annual Chairman's Risk Assessment
are vital documents this Committee relies upon to perform its
oversight functions. General Brown, I would like your
assessment of the implementation of the National Defense
Strategy and the National Military Strategy and whether you
would recommend any changes or updates to those strategic
documents. Further, it is imperative that these documents be
submitted to Congress on time. I look forward to working with
you to ensure these statutory deadlines are upheld.
The Joint Force is fundamentally about people. As the
Nation's senior-most military officer, it will be your
responsibility to understand the needs of America's
servicemembers and to be their greatest advocate. Our military
is facing its most difficult recruiting environment in decades.
Fewer and fewer young Americans are eligible for or interested
in service, and issues such as discrimination and harassment
too often push current members out.
While recruiting is one of the primary duties of the
military services, if confirmed as the Chairman, you will be
responsible for advising the Secretary on comprehensive joint
readiness, which includes assessing the effect of manpower
shortfalls across the total force. Therefore, I would like to
know your thoughts on the current recruiting crisis and the
impact it may have on the readiness of the Joint Force.
Finally, if confirmed, you will be the most visible
military officer in the Nation. It will be critical for you to
represent the force with total professionalism and
trustworthiness. Frankly, I am concerned about the health of
our Nation's civil and political military relationships. More
and more, the military is being dragged into political fights,
and public trust in the military is eroding because of it.
Civilian control of the military is a sacred duty that must be
carried out responsibly, not be exploited. General, I would
like to know how you will work to help improve civil-military
relations and demonstrate this ethos yourself.
General Brown, if confirmed, you will lead the Joint Force
at a momentous time. I am grateful for your willingness to step
forward to meet this challenge. Thank you, and I look forward
to your testimony.
Now let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that fine
statement, and General Brown, welcome to this Committee. I
welcome your nomination to serve as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It is great to see that you are accompanied by
your wife, Sharene, and the Chair has also acknowledged your
sons, Sean and Ross, who are supporting their daddy throughout
the confirmation process.
As you testify before us and prepare to assume the senior-
most position in the U.S. Military, you are continuing with a
profound concept that dates back to the founding of our
republic. It dates back to before our Constitution, to the days
of George Washington, where we established and we maintain the
proposition that the military, in our country, is answerable to
the civilian elected leadership of our country. You have been
nominated by our commander in chief for the senior-most
position, and I believe you are exceptionally qualified for
this position. And certainly, Mr. Chairman, we need an
exceptionally qualified officer during this perilous national
moment.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, multiple senior
national defense leaders have told this Committee we are in the
most dangerous global security environment since World War II,
and I agree. During that pivotal time 70 years ago, our country
faced two great military powers across different oceans, with a
capability and intent to threaten American domestic security
directly. We see a similar dual threat today, which the Chair
has already alluded to. The Chinese Communist Party is
conducting the largest and most rapid military buildup in
modern history, surpassing our own military in many places. It
is a military built for a single purpose--to undermine Indo-
Pacific and American security and prosperity by expanding the
Chinese Communist Party's totalitarian influence to the entire
globe.
In Europe, the Kremlin's brutal war in Ukraine is the most
dangerous crisis we have faced in half a century, and their
self-defeating war of aggression has brought China, North
Korea, and Iran all closer together.
This dangerous moment demands an exceptionally competent
set of uniformed leaders. Regrettably, many Americans have lost
confidence in our senior military leadership, which, for the
past 20 years, had been very high. While we all may debate the
reasons, I believe that the lack of accountability for failures
among military leadership being thrust into the spotlight of
politically divisive issues, like critical race theory and
abortion, have significantly contributed to this decline in
trust.
General Brown speaks often of accelerating innovation in
the Air Force. He recognizes the difficulties of doing so amid
an entrenched bureaucracy. And he is open about how he has
learned in his job and improved his approach. That candor and
self-accountability should serve him well in this new role,
including, as an example, to other officers.
I am hopeful that General Brown's detailed focus on
innovation and culture change will bring new thinking and
action to the massive problems that our Joint Force faces. I
hope General Brown will continue to focus on restoring a
culture built on meritocracy in the U.S. Military that
continuously fosters new approaches to readiness and
warfighting.
Make no mistake. The next few years will be critical for
our national security. As General Brown has stated, we cannot
wait for a crisis to drive change for our Joint Force. Years of
lackluster budgeting for our national defense has put us far
behind where we need to be. We have a bureaucracy and an
industrial base that is clunky, and a military promotion system
geared toward risk aversion. It will take honest and realistic
threat and capability assessments from our senior uniformed
leaders to empower lower-level personnel to fix the many
problems we face. I expect General Brown will offer his most
frank, unreserved military judgment both to the President and
to Congress, if confirmed.
During a similarly decisive moment for our national defense
in 1980, then-candidate Reagan spoke of the need for a
renaissance in American military superiority, to avoid war with
the Soviets--to avoid war. Reagan said, ``Our best hope of
persuading them to live in peace is to convince them they
cannot win at war.'' We avoided war then, but only because we
had leaders who were bold enough to pursue the wisdom of peace
through strength, with alacrity. That timeless advice still
applies today, and I am hopeful our nominee agree.
Thank you, General Brown, for being here, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
General Brown, your statement, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES Q. BROWN, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Brown. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and
distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored by the
opportunity to appear before you this morning. I want to thank
the President and Secretary of Defense for their trust and
confidence in nominating me to be the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I also thank General Mark Milley and Hollyanne
as they conclude their decades of remarkable and honorable
service to our Nation. We wish them the very best.
I would like to take a few moments to acknowledge my
family. Joining me today is my wife of 34 years, Sharene. She
has been committed to our family and to my journey and has also
tirelessly advocated for the families of our airmen. I am also
extremely proud of our two sons, Sean and Ross. They are
outstanding young men, excellent in their own right. I would
not be here today if not for their sacrifice, love, and
support.
I would like to thank my number one fan and my most vocal
supporter who played a lead role in my development into the man
I am today, my mother Kay. I also want to thank the most
influential leader in my career, who commissioned me, my father
Charles, a Vietnam veteran who retired from the United States
Army is a colonel after 30 years of service. I am also grateful
to my sister, Stephanie, for her support, as well as the
influence my younger brother, Kevin, had on me and our family
before his passing.
I want to express my gratitude to this Committee and the
Congress for your continued support, to our men and women in
uniform, DOD civilians, and their families. It is thanks to
your enduring commitment and advocacy that we remain the most
capability military force in the world.
I come before you today having served the last 3 years as a
service and joint chief. But for the 11 years prior, I served
in seven assignments across four combatant commands--EUCOM,
AFRICOM, CENTCOM, AND INDOPACOM. I have held leadership
positions focused on our five national security challenges--
China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremists. So I
arrive before you having spent less time as a general officer
in Washington, DC, and more time with our fielded forces,
allies, and partners, either in conflict or preparing for
conflict.
Having led warfighters abroad shapes my thinking. As a
result, I am mindful of the security challenges at this
consequential time and the need to accelerate to stay ahead of
the growing threat. The Department of Defense must implement
the National Defense Strategy and prepare a Joint Force that
can win the next war, if called upon, a Joint Force that serves
today and into the future to maintain peace.
If confirmed, I commit to provide the President and the
Secretary of Defense my military advice informed by the joint
chiefs and our military leaders. Throughout, I will collaborate
with the Department's civilian leadership, the interagency, and
with our allies and partners, and if confirmed, I commit to
provide candid and open communication to this Committee and the
Congress. I will work closely with you to invest in our
national defense and strengthen our national security.
Finally, I commit myself to sustaining faith and confidence
with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and DOD
civilians and their families. I will likewise work to sustain
faith and confidence with the American people and their elected
officials. Above all, I will dedicate myself to this
proposition, that the American people should understand and
know their military and its servicemembers, serve solely as
unwavering defenders of the Constitution and our Nation.
I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
There are a series of questions that are addressed to
nominees. You can respond.
Have you adhered to the applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Brown. I have.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Brown. I have not.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
Subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee, when requested?
General Brown. I do.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the Administration?
General Brown. I do.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its Subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress, and to consult with the requester
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
General Brown. I do.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
General Brown. I will.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Brown. I will.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Brown. They will.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
As I indicated in my opening statement, we are facing a
challenging environment, and one of the aspects is the
challenge of recruiting, with fewer and fewer Americans
eligible because of many factors, including health and other
aspects, but also a sense of lack of participation in the
military.
Recruiting is a primary duty of the services, the chiefs of
staff of each of the services. But what actions will you take
to ensure this recruiting process becomes successful and also
enhances readiness?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and as
service chief I have had an opportunity to really think deeply
about this, and I have had a number of opportunities to engage
with my fellow service chiefs on how best we move forward.
As the Chairman, if confirmed, one of the key areas I do
think about is ensuring that the young people and their
influencers understand the opportunity to serve and the great
opportunities provided by serving in the military. I think,
just based on my own experience, being a role model, to show
the young people and their influencers that there are many
great career opportunities within the military, and there are
many that have served in the military and have gone on to be
successful, whether they stayed for a full career or stayed for
one tour.
I really believe that young people only aspire to be what
they see or know about, and it is hard for them to be part of
an organization or aspire to go down a career path they do not
fully understand or appreciate. And so we have a responsibility
to reconnect with the Nation to talk about the opportunities
and for all of us that are interested in national defense and
national defense how we share the stories of what inspired us
to join. You know, I joined because of my father and his
recommendations, and because of opportunities I had in ROTC, I
was going to be an engineer and I decided to become a pilot
because I had to be exposed to--be able to fly at ROTC summer
camp.
So there are a number of things I think we can do, and
those are things I will do, if confirmed as the Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General. Another topic that I
mentioned is the development of joint capabilities. The
services are principally responsible for developing equipment
and operational techniques, but you will be the point of
ultimate decision on many of these proposals. And historically,
service parochialism has interfered with true jointness.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to inhibit
parochialism, encourage interoperability, and to get us the
best equipment and the best-trained people in the field?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question again,
and one of the things that was started by a couple of the Vice
Chairmen before was to rework the Department's Oversight
Council, instead of being just an Oversight Council, a bit more
directed to ensure we have the joint capabilities. I want to
continue to buildupon that, but we also need to do it based on
analysis to show the value of each part of the Joint Force and
what they provide. And there will have to be some give and take
and some hard decisions and hard calls that need to be made,
but I think that is a responsibility, not just for me but also
with the service chiefs and also service joint chiefs, that we
have to take off our service identities and think about what is
best for the Joint Force.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
We are engaged in supporting the Ukrainian people in a
critical battle because my view is if they lose, we lose also.
Are there any immediate lessons, operationally or
strategically, that you have taken away from the conflict in
Ukraine?
General Brown. Senator, I think strategically the thing I
do think about is how the value of information, before the
campaign started and before the conflict started, and how that
was able to bring not only NATO closer together but also to
bring together allies and partners around the world. So that
was one point about how we collaborate and how we build
relationships well before a crisis occurs and then how we use
the information we have available to help their decisionmakers
or local decisionmakers make those decisions and move forward.
I think the other thing I would highlight too is the value
of logistics. And I think the Russians learned if you do not
pay attention to logistics it is hard to win and hard to move
forward. I think we also learned that the timeline for military
operations, particularly in a conflict, sometimes take longer
than we might expect, and that is also a challenge.
And I think the other piece that I would highlight is just
the will to fight. The one thing about the determination and
the will of the Ukrainian people and their leadership, that is
something that is hard to measure before a conflict, but it
plays a huge dividend.
And then last thing I would say, from my own perspective as
an airman, the value of air power, and having watched what
either side has been able to do or not do, but the value air
defense, innovative air defense, and how that has been helpful
to the Ukrainians in the defense of their nation.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, General Brown. Let me first mention a statutory
requirement that you and I have discussed before, 10 USC 153.
It requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
complete a Chairman's Risk Assessment, CRA, of the National
Military Strategy each year. Now we have had a problem with
this in the past, and a frustration from Congress in not
receiving this CRA. Even the National Military Strategy itself
last time was unacceptably late.
If confirmed, I need your commitment to carrying out the
statutes governing the relationship between the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress, including submitting the
Chairman's Risk Assessment on time. Can I get your assurance
that you will do this, General Brown?
General Brown. Ranking Member Wicker, as we discussed
yesterday, I will assure you that I will do my best to make
sure we get those documents to you on time, because it is
important to allow you and the Congress to do the things you
require in order to provide the budget for us and the
authorization to execute.
Senator Wicker. Absolutely. This is a law passed by the
Congress, signed into law by the President of the United States
some years ago, and if you, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff need some additional resources or if there is something
within your jurisdiction that keeps you from doing this, will
you let us know so that we can be on time with this very
important CRA?
General Brown. Yes, sir. I will definitely communicate with
you if there are any challenges.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much for that assurance.
General Brown, let's talk about the Pacific. Congress
provided the Administration with authority to provide $1
billion in transfers of United States equipment authority to
help Taiwan. Is it your best military judgment that the usage
of this drawdown authority and training would improve Taiwan's
ability to defend itself?
General Brown. Yes, sir, it will, and it will help them
procure some asymmetric capabilities to defend their nation.
Senator Wicker. All right. So I certainly hope that we can
move forward with that.
I described, in my opening statement, General, I described
our defense capacity and our industrial base as ``clunky.'' You
and I also discussed this in our conversation. Do you agree
with my assessment that the bureaucracy and the industrial base
are clunky, based on the speed with which technology has
evolved and changes as compared to how we are able to access
that as a military?
General Brown. I do, and I think it is an area we can all
improve upon. We have a great innovation here within our
Nation, and we want to make sure that we are putting that into
the hands of our warfighters as quickly as possible. I also
believe there is an integral process to this, just based on
there are so many things that are software-based today. And if
we can knock down any barriers to be able to move faster, I am
all for it.
Senator Wicker. Well, do you have specific plans for how we
would do this, based on your experience in the various theaters
you mentioned?
General Brown. Some experience. What I have been able to do
is part of this is really how I build those relationships. That
is what I have done as the Air Force Chief of Staff. That is
what I did in my previous assignment as Commander of Pacific
Air Forces is to be engaged and be able to collaborate and
figure out where those barriers might be that prevent us from
moving as fast as we need to.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Now let's talk about the European
theater and NATO. The Department of Defense leadership
regularly states that the Department is following the normal
process for requirements generated by the European Command. Can
we agree, General, that the threat against NATO countries today
is far different than it was 3 years ago, before the Russians
invaded Ukraine and depleted much of their ammunition and
capability in this unjust and illegal war?
General Brown. Yes, sir. I would say the threat and the
security environment are both different from where they were 3
years ago.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, on a bipartisan basis, Senators
and members of the House have repeatedly asked senior joint
leadership staff to lead a dynamic requirements review of the
European theater that accounts for this reality. In other
words, we were prepared to defend NATO nations against the
threat which Russia is simply incapable of doing at this point.
Are we able to be flexible enough to admit that and to direct
more of our help toward our ally in Ukraine?
General Brown. Ranking Member Wicker, if confirmed, one of
the things I want to be able to do is actually assess where we
are. I am an engineer by background, so doing assessments and
doing analysis is how I think about things. And that is
something we do need to do, not just for Europe but I would say
for all of our major security challenges, to continue to
reassess.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations, General Brown. Thank you to your family for
being here to support you.
I just returned from a codel surveying a lot of our
operations in Europe to prepare Ukrainians to fight, to
preposition equipment, to do the type of readiness trainings
with our NATO allies that are so essential to preparation and
to give Ukrainians the ability to win their war against Russia.
And you mentioned how important logistics are and how important
readiness is and the will to fight is.
We have a growing threat from China, from the Xi regime,
with regard to Taiwan, and I would like to hear your
assessments on the challenges of that type of theater versus
the ease with which we were able to do the work with our NATO
allies in Europe, since we have allies on the border of Ukraine
that facilitate a lot of our training and exercises and
preparation. So could you talk a little bit about the
challenges with regard to that other theater and what type of
preparation you think will be essential.
General Brown. Sure. Thanks for the question. The thing
that I think about when you are looking at the two theaters,
there are a couple of factors that play in, and it is geography
and infrastructure. And when you look at the geography of
Europe, where you have a large land mass, borders, and you also
have infrastructure with roads, railroads, airfields that are
all close together.
In the Indo-Pacific you do not necessarily have that. What
you have is more maritime space, islands, but you do have
airfields. So it would be more challenge, and oh, by the way,
the size of the region is much larger than it is in Europe, so
the distances are pretty massive.
So from that perspective, one of the things that I have
thought about, going back to my time as the Commander of the
Pacific Air Forces is you cannot wait until the crisis occurs
to be able to deploy capability. You have to pre-position
capability and have that in place. You have to work with allies
and partners to have access to locations so you can put
capability into place. And that is an area that we are focused
on, not only as an Air Force but I would also say as a Joint
Force.
As a matter of fact, right now we are in the process of a
large exercise, Mobility Guardian, led by Air Mobility Command,
to really test ourselves on how quickly we can move by air and
other means to get capability into the theater as quickly as
possible. And we will take that and learn from that. We also
did, for the Air Force, did a tabletop exercise focused on the
logistics in the Indo-Pacific.
So because of those differences in geography and
infrastructure, we cannot use the same approach in both
theaters, and that is where I have been focused, as the Air
Force chief, and will continue to focus as the Chairman, if
confirmed.
Senator Gillibrand. Agreed. With regard to Asia, there will
be certain reliance on other assets such as cyber, such as
space, such Air Force, as you say, and one of the challenges
that we have is critical infrastructure that is necessary to
deploy, to stage, to prepare. And we recently heard reporting
on China's cyber threat with regard to Guam. I would like to
know your thoughts on how will cyber threats inform your
thinking in viewing these logistics and mobility plans, and
what collaboration exists between the joint staffs and DHS and
relevant senior risk management agencies to ensure whole-of-
government alignment in the event of such a conflict.
General Brown. What I do think about from the cyber threat,
it is not just for Guam, but I really say the aspect of if you
were back in the continental United States and the aspect of in
order for us to generate combat power and get it deployed we
depend on various supports and rail yards and other arrays and
airfields to get ourselves to be able to deploy. We have got to
be able to protect that critical cyber infrastructure, and if
we do not it will challenge us to be able to get ourselves
deployed. And so that is why it is very important to work
collectively, not just inside the Department of Defense,
primarily through Cyber Command, but as you highlighted, the
Department of Homeland Security and others to take a look at
the critical nodes that we have to protect.
Because I believe we are in a contested environment today
that we need to be paying attention to, and I think we have
seen that in past examples, and we have got to make sure we are
working closely together, across the entire government, and
also with our allies and partners to ensure we are protecting
ourselves in the cyber domain.
Senator Gillibrand. And with regard to cyber, services are
responsible for establishing a range of personnel policies for
cyber personnel and providing them to Cyber Command. This leads
to variations across services and length of service
requirements and length of tours at Cyber Command. As Chairman,
how would you approach working with the service chiefs to help
bring service policies into better alignment with the needs of
Cyber Command?
General Brown. I think one of the key areas is, one, to
meet the needs of Cyber Command, but at the same time align
some of our policies and processes so we are not committing
amongst ourselves for talent. If we have similar approaches it
helps us to bring in all talent across the Nation, and then
also help to retain that talent within the services as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General, to you and your wife and your family for your service
to this country.
I took note of a comment you made in your opening
statement. You said, ``Having led warfighters abroad has shaped
my thinking.'' As you know, I remain deeply concerned about our
munitions production capacity, and in the Wall Street Journal a
couple of days ago they wrote an editorial about America is
runny out of ammo, Biden admits the problem, but then why not
do something about it.
I remember hearing the President make a passing comment on
that a couple of days ago, and I was struck by it because it is
the first time I had heard from the Administration concern
about munitions for our security and our defense here in this
country. So, frankly, after years of underinvesting in
munitions production, we now find ourselves, I think, in a very
precarious position.
While this Committee has generally been supportive of
providing aid and transferring excess munitions from our
stockpiles, we also have a clear expectation that the
Department will work with us to ensure that we produce more
munitions, as many as we can, and as fast as we can, to
backfill our stockpiles, increase our margins, and support our
allies and partners.
Do you agree that we need to increase our munitions
production capacity?
General Brown. I do, and one of the areas I would highlight
is for all the services in this year's budget submission we
asked for multiyear procurement, and that multiyear procurement
was designed to help increase our stock, but also what it does
for us is help provide predictability to the defense industrial
base, to their supply chains, and to the workforce.
Senator Fischer. Yes. This Committee has led Congress in
giving more tools to the Department to address these shortages,
and that includes providing multiyear procurement authority,
modifying older and unnecessary contracting requirements so
that we can get contracting officers to move faster. We need
them to move faster.
I understand the Department is reviewing its total
munitions requirements amid the worsening geopolitical
environment. As new stockpile levels are determined,
particularly for precision guided munitions, will you work with
this Committee to identify any emerging gaps in our stockpiles?
General Brown. Yes, I will.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Do believe the tools that we
have given the Department, those contracts, multiyear, is that
going to continue to help you meet those requirements as well?
General Brown. Senator, I think it will, and one of the
areas, as we work through the contracting aspect, is how we
incentivize our contractors, contracting officers, and how we
build those contracts to make sure they are moving in the right
direction, to change the culture of how we have done things in
the past.
Senator Fischer. Right. To be clear, I think there is much
more that can be done in fiscal year 2024 to address the
munitions production challenges that what was in the
President's budget request. For example, for $67 million, the
Army could expand the capacity of the GMLRS from 120 per year
to 1,000 per year by 2025. This is a key long-range fireline
that could be relevant in multiple theaters.
And I am frequently asked, ``What can we do to help Taiwan
help themselves more?'' Well, for around $70 million more
dollars we could expand the Harpoon production capacity such
that we accelerate the final deliveries to Taiwan from 2029 to
2027, and that 2027 is an important date that we hear from Xi
himself as a goal that he hopes to reach to be able to invade
Taiwan. But it is not in the fiscal year 2024 budget request.
We could have $150 million more dollars. That buys us
another Patriot launcher battery this year alone.
These are some of the examples of what we could be doing,
and I would say what we should be doing, but we are not doing
it because of budget constraints. They have all been confirmed
by industry and by the Department that it can happen, and I
hope that you will be an advocate to be able to help us push
for what we need to address threats that we face as a country
and as a world in any emergency spending package or
supplemental that comes up.
Would you be willing to put yourself forward? We talk about
this all the time, you and I. I always say if the American
people hear about the threats that we have, we will see
tremendous support for our military and for the needs that we
have to be met, for the resources that we must have to defend
this country.
General Brown. Senator, I will definitely work with you, be
very candid about the threat, and then also be willing to make
the tough calls, if confirmed as the Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations,
General, on your nomination. I thank you and your family for
your service to our country.
To ensure the fitness of all nominees who appear before any
of the committees on which I sit I ask the nominees the
following two initial questions.
One, since you became a legal adult, have you ever made
unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or
physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
General Brown. I have not.
Senator Hirono. Two, have you ever faced discipline or
entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
General Brown. I have not.
Senator Hirono. General, I thank you for your consistent
support for our servicemembers' access to critical health care
no matter where they are stationed around the world. And as we
face recruitment and retention challenges across the services,
support for servicemembers of all backgrounds is critical. And
for almost four decades now, you have built inclusive, diverse,
and ready teams in the Air Force, and I assume you will support
such teams throughout the DOD.
When we had a chance to chat yesterday you gave me an
example of how important the DEI programs--as we refer to
diversity, equity, and inclusive programs--are within the
military. You talked about your own experience. Can you share
with this Committee what you shared with me yesterday?
General Brown. Sure, Senator. I think about, for my own
career and all of our members, all they want is a fair
opportunity to perform. And by preventing them that fair
opportunity they do not want to be advantaged or disadvantaged
or discounted based on their background. They want to have the
opportunity, but they have got to be qualified.
And I will just tell you, from my own career, when I came
in and flying F-16s, I did not want to be the best African
American F-16 pilot. I wanted to be the best F-16 pilot. I
would say the same thing when I went to Weapons School to go
back as an instructor, be the commandant, and every position I
have had throughout my career. I wanted it because I was the
best and qualified. I did not want to be provided a position or
promotion based on my background. I wanted it based on the
quality of my work. And I think that is the aspect that all of
our servicemembers look for is they want a fair opportunity,
but they also want to be rewarded for their performance.
Senator Hirono. And when we had this discussion, fair
opportunity means that they are able to have experiences that
they may otherwise not have access to, and that is the
importance, in my view, of the attention being paid to the
importance of diversity in our services and the fairness that
diversity provides.
If confirmed, you would be the highest-ranking officer in
the U.S. Military, which gives you a unique perspective on the
burden of command. I have repeatedly asked for leadership
accountability and structural changes from the DOD in the wake
of high-profile failures, in Hawaii, for example, the disaster
at Red Hill, which I am sure you are familiar with, and that
disaster has led to public mistrust in the military in Hawaii.
General Brown, how do you view the burden of command and
the ultimate responsibility entrusted in military commanders?
General Brown. There are two factors I think about in the
responsibility of command or leadership at any level. You have
the responsibility to get the mission done, but you are also
accountable for the mission as well. And that accountability,
if it does not go well, you should be held accountable. And
those are the areas that I have focused on and ensure that we
maintain the standard across the military, but at the same time
maintain the public confidence from the American people that we
do support.
Senator Hirono. I think that if we do not hold commanders
responsible that it does continue to shake the faith that
communities have in the leadership of the military, and as
chief of the joint chiefs you are going to have major
responsibility to make sure that the burden of command, as I
have expressed it, is carried through.
I just visited with the Deputy Secretary of the DOD, our
shipyards, and I just want to make sure that you will continue
to support the modernization of our shipyards, because even as
we make decisions to build new ships, i.e., assets, that we
have to make sure that we have the capability to repair and
maintain the ships that we already have, and that means that a
shipyard improvement commitment has to continue. This is a
multiyear commitment. I would like to have your commitment that
we will continue to fund this very critical part of our
military readiness.
General Brown. Senator, you have my commitment.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Brown,
first of all I want to thank you for your years of service. I
also want to thank your family, specifically Sharene, who is
with you here today, and your children. When we deploy someone,
and you have been deployed multiple times, it is not just you
that gets deployed. It is the entire family that feels that
deployment. And I thank all of you for your service to our
country.
General, earlier this year at the Air Force posture hearing
you and I discussed the impact of auctioning off portions of
the spectrum and what that would do to our defense
capabilities. Those same concerns were echoed by all of the
other service chiefs and the combatant commanders, all of them.
Based on what we have discussed before, if this report,
which is due in September, demonstrates that auctioning off the
3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz portion of the spectrum will adversely
impact our national security, what would be your advice to the
President and to the Congress, and how would you proceed?
General Brown. Senator, I would echo exactly what you just
highlighted, the impact on our national security, because that
part of the spectrum is where we have many of our capabilities
across the Joint Force, and if we had to vacate that we would
lose that capability and we would have to figure out how now to
regain that capability, and that will take time and cost money.
Now is not the time to drop our national security.
So my recommendation is we should not vacate, realizing we
have to still get through the study before we make any
decisions. But there will be an impact, and if confirmed, I
will bring, with the services, detailed information on the
challenges and how it might impact the Joint Force.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Let me just ask you, with
regard to your professional military opinion, do you think
there is a possibility that our adversaries are actually
attempting to influence the debate and to convince us that it
is appropriate to sell portions of the spectrum that are vital
to our national security?
General Brown. Well, Senator, I cannot speak positively on
that topic, but I would not be surprised if our adversaries
were always trying to do something to decrease our advance and
complicate our decisionmaking, and it is something that we need
to be paying attention to as senior leaders.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. I have gone on record many
times regarding my concerns about the DOD's approach to
providing space-based, ground moving target indication
capabilities to DOD users following the divestment of the
JSTARS platform. There is an ongoing conversation within the
interagency as to how the funding, responsibility, and priority
of GMTI, the ground moving target indication capabilities, will
be handled. And I am not confident--I am not confident--the
warfighters will get this vital capability that they need to
close the kill chain in the future.
As Chairman, will you use your position to make certain
that our men and women on the front lines have full and
priority use of the platforms conducting GMTI missions in the
future?
General Brown. Senator, I will.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. General, this is something
that I never thought I would be sitting here in the U.S. Senate
asking questions about, and yet it is one that has been brought
to my attention by our South Dakota adjutant general. General
Brown, you will take the seat in the midst of the largest
recruiting crisis in the history of DOD's 50-year, all-
volunteer force. While the services struggle to meet recruiting
numbers, there has been an increased emphasis on immutable
characteristics like race and sex, and the Department has
increasingly focused on new policies and plans in areas like
equity, extremism, gender ideology, abortion, and sex change
operations. There is even a growing bureaucracy that focuses on
these specific issues.
I am aware of a situation, and it was just brought to my
attention, where a young woman in the South Dakota National
Guard experienced a situation at basic training where she was
sleeping in open bays and showering with biological males who
had not had gender reassignment surgery but were documented as
females because they had begun the drug therapy process. This
18-year-old girl was uncomfortable with her situation but had
limited options on how to deal with it. If she raised her hand
she feared she would be targeted for retaliation. She could
have recycled, which would have delayed her freshman college
start and would not have provided a guarantee of a different
situation. She could request to leave the Guard for religious
purposes and not be able to pursue her dream of serving our
country.
General Brown, this is a challenging situation. If
confirmed as the Chairman, how do you propose to handle
situations like this which I truly believe may be impacting
recruitment and morale by placing a disproportionate emphasis
on gender-related ideology?
General Brown. Senator, one of the things I have thought
about throughout my career, as you are being inclusive you also
do not want to make other individuals uncomfortable. And so as
we look at our policies and approaches and get feedback like
this we have to take a look to see if we can improve on how we
approach situations like this. As I have done as the service
chief, as I have done throughout my career, if confirmed, I
will continue to do so.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. General Brown, congratulations to you and
your family for the nomination. You are eminently qualified for
the position.
Just situational awareness. Two events happened yesterday
that really bear upon the Nation's military mission, one very
positive, one negative. The positive event yesterday was the
announcement by the Biden administration working together with
the NATO Secretary General and the governments of Sweden and
Turkey, that Turkey would support accession of Sweden to NATO.
It was followed up immediately by an announcement from Hungry
that they would also support accession of Sweden to NATO.
Just in the last few years, people were questioning whether
NATO had value or whether the U.S. should continue in NATO. We
have demonstrated, through American leadership, the strength of
alliances, that democracies in the world can link arms, and
when we do, our alliances enable us to defend Ukraine and
promote democracy throughout the world. And I think it is
important to recognize that the U.S. and the cause of global
democracy is stronger today because of this decision announced
yesterday that Sweden would now be greenlit for NATO
membership.
The bad event that happened yesterday was the retirement of
General David Berger. It was not bad that he retired. He had a
distinguished career and served very ably, as we all know. But
for the first time after that retirement, in 164 years, the
United States Marine Corps does not have a Commandant confirmed
by the Senate of the United States.
I am the father of a United States Marine. I am unaware of
anything that the marines have done that would warrant being
punished in this way. I am unaware of anything that the marines
have done that would warrant being disrespected in this way,
having their leadership hobbled in this way.
One of my colleagues is exercising a prerogative to place a
hold on 250 generals and flag officers. I am unaware of
anything that they have done that would warrant them being
disrespected or punished or delayed in their careers. Just
because a prerogative can be exercises does not mean that it
should be exercised.
We marked up the National Defense Authorizing Act in this
Committee 2 weeks ago, and there were some things that I wanted
in the act that I did not get in. I was disappointed. There
were some things that got added to the act that I opposed. I
was disappointed. But I am not taking my disappointment out on
people who have volunteered to wear the uniform of this country
and even risk their lives in doing so.
I would urge all of my colleagues to turn away from the
path that we are on, where we are disrespecting and punishing
people because we are unhappy with policies in the military
that these individuals had nothing to do with. If I am not able
to convince my colleagues in a committee of a position, that is
on me. I will have to try to do a better job next time and
maybe try to convince more to support the position that I have
taken. But if I am unable to do that, I would never even
contemplate taking out my disappointment and punishing people
who have volunteered to wear the uniform of this country.
People who volunteer to serve in the military do so knowing
that their lives could be at risk. But if they think not only
will my life be at risk, but do I want to run the risk that a
member of the Senate being unhappy with a policy I had nothing
to do with may choose to block my career, that might be a risk
that people might choose not to undertake. That might be the
kind of thing that might make them decide if my Article I
branch is not going to respect the service that I have given
this country, including deployments overseas, maybe I should
look for a line of work where I will be respected.
General Brown, I want to ask you a question about AUKUS. I
think this Committee, and other committees, have been following
the AUKUS agreement very closely. I am particular focused on it
as the Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee and also because
some of the work on the Virginia-class submarines that are part
of Pillar 1 will be done in Virginia.
Much of the focus on AUKUS right now is about Pillar 1, the
ability to transfer Virginia-class submarines and related
technology to Australia. Pillar 2 refers to a suite of
cooperative activities in areas such as advanced capabilities,
quantum, AI, cyber, and hypersonics. If confirmed, what role do
you see for yourself in advancing integrated deterrence
initiatives in the Indo-Pacific, such as AUKUS?
General Brown. Senator, the thing I do think about, when
you do look at AUKUS, is more to the nuclear-powered
submarines, but all these other factors that we can bring
together to break down barriers, to work with allies and
partners, not just with Australia and the U.K., in this case,
but really across the Indo-Pacific.
One of the benefits that I have had, having served as the
Commander of the Pacific Air Force, is the number of air chiefs
and chiefs of defense and, in some cases, ministers of defense
that I have known personally and had a chance to engage with.
That dialog, to me, is hugely important to determine how best
we can move forward and break down barriers, and identify areas
that we can work together on, not only as a military but also
between our nations as well. And that is where my focus will
be, is to continue that dialog, to ensure we can work together
and highlight where the challenges may be and then work with
the right entities to be able to move forward to ensure that we
are able to win the next war, if called upon to do, but
definitely deter to avoid war.
Senator Kaine. I thank you for that answer. I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very
much, General Brown, for being here today, and I want to thank
your wife, Sharene, as well for being here. We appreciate your
support through the many, many years.
General Brown, you have had a very distinguished career and
have held many commands, and I want to distinguish between some
of my colleagues. I know the burden of command was referenced,
but I would State having served as a low-level commander in our
armed services that it is not a burden to be a commander. It is
a great honor and distinction, and I want to thank you for your
service to our country.
You are moving into a new position. I will assume your
confirmation, and I support your confirmation. I think you are
the right person at the right time. If confirmed, you will be
Chairman at a time when threats to the Nation are mounting
while our resources are actually shrinking. We will be
operating our Department of Defense under a constrained
environment, and under those constrained budgets we have to put
our defense dollars toward smarter investments. And you, as
Chief of the Air Force, have focused on modernizing our Air
Force. I assume that you will continue the modernization
process through the rest of our service branches.
So General, you will inform investments across what we
talked about, the Iron Triangle, of modernization, force
structure, and readiness. So I am assuming there will have to
be hard choices made and some tradeoffs. So if you could, could
you talk a little bit about your vision of modernizing our
force?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and to
your question, I have done kind of the same thing as a service
chief, and if confirmed as the Chairman, I will take that same
approach.
I have often talked about how we have to balance risk over
time and look at capability and capacity, because we cannot
just try to modernize completely at the risk of today's
operations. At the same time, we cannot maintain all capability
for today's operations and not have the capabilities because of
the threats we see forthcoming.
So as you look at that Iron Triangle, it is the balance
between those, and again, I really believe, on analysis, that
we have to do. We can work emotion, but emotion does not work.
It is really the analysis that we have to go through to be able
to determine how we make those tough calls, and then we have a
responsibility, and I have a responsibility if confirmed as
Chairman, to articulate what that risk might be from whatever
choice we make, and then we determine, as a Nation, how we
accept that, or how we mitigate that risk. Again, I think this
is where allies and partners play a key role in some of these
areas of how we ensure and think about all the capabilities
that we have available and how we might use those to make the
best decisions, based on the resources that are provided.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I was going to ask about
mitigating the risk, and you are talking about that, using
allies, partners, but spreading out the risk over time, so I do
appreciate that.
During the office call you also mentioned the constant
demand signal that we have gotten from our global combatant
commanders, and how would you strike that right balance between
our near-term readiness and those future modernizations,
including and accepting prudent risk?
General Brown. Well, I have lived on both sides of the
coin, serving as Deputy Commander in the United States Central
Command but then also as a service chief. And the way I have
always thought about this is we have got to put all of the
cards and all of the details on the table and then have a
conversation that is not tied to a particular position and
figure out what is best to do for the Joint Force, what is best
to do for all the combatant commands, because there is going to
be some give and take as we do this. And that is where those
dialogs, to me, are very important. It is really about dialog.
There are many things we can agree on, and those are the things
we need to move forward on and continue to debate the things
that we do not necessarily see eye to eye on.
But at some point you have to make a decision, and I think
my role, if confirmed as the Chairman, is to provide my best
advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President on how we
make those decisions, and again, articulate where I see the
risks of whatever path or options we do lay out.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate it. And in just my
last few moments I do want to talk about my concern that the
military is being dragged into politics. And if confirmed, how
would you keep the military out of the political limelight and
focused on the mission of our Department of Defense?
General Brown. The first thing I would do is set a personal
example, that I would stay nonpartisan and nonpolitical in how
I approach the position of Chairman, if confirmed. And I would
set that same expectation throughout the force, that we need to
stay out of politics and stay nonpartisan and nonpolitical, and
at the same time advocate that our civilian leadership does not
bring us into political situations. Part of that is a dialog
that we have to have and that we have to maintain a standard as
part of the force, and that is what is expected of the Nation,
for us as military members, to support the Constitution of the
United States and stay out of politics.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, sir. I look forward to
supporting you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
Brown, first of all let me thank you for your service. I want
to thank your wife and your children and your family for their
service and support of you for your service. It is a team
effort; I know that.
We had a nice conversation, and I appreciate that very
much, and I want to ask a question and followup on the
financial stability of what we are dealing with, and the demand
in the Department of Defense in defending our country.
The bottom line is, that we have been talking about, if we
do our job on time, and we, as Congress, get our budget done by
September 30th, what does that mean to you all as far as having
that on-timeliness as far as financial, to you? How much money
would that save you by not going into the continuing
resolutions, or an omnibus bill at the end, and now we have
been doing it for far too long.
General Brown. I do not have a figure. I would have to come
back to you, Senator, with a figure. We can get that for you.
But what I can tell you is it is the aspect of----
Senator Manchin. Let me just throw out one for you. The
American Enterprise Institute threw out a rough estimate of
$200 million per day under the latest continuing resolution,
that covered the start of fiscal 2023. That is a total of $18
billion, just that. I have been told by retired generals who
were not on the spot that basically have said that they could
save, overall, 5 percent, a minimum of 5 percent, and 5 percent
across the board of $880 billion, that is $44 billion. And we
have been talking about more appropriated funds for our
military, with all of the challenges we have. The money is
right there, the spending power of us doing our job, and we are
going to need someone like you who is going to take the
financial concerns and basically let us know how we should be
able to help by just doing our job too. We ask you to do yours.
General Brown. Yes, Senator, I would agree, and the key
area that I would highlight in challenges is we lose buying
power, as you described. At the same time we lose
predictability, not only for the force but also for our
industrial base, to be able to produce the capabilities that
are required for our joint team.
Senator Manchin. Here one other fact, too. The Department
of Defense Comptroller noted that from fiscal year 1991 to
2010, the average delay for defense appropriations was 29 days.
The average delay for appropriations for defense was 29 days.
That is a tremendous amount of money over the period of time
that we have talked about.
I would hope that you would work with us in trying to make
sure that we are keeping our feet to the fire, to make sure you
have the resources to do the job that we need you to do. That
is my commitment to you.
Going to another topic, fiscal responsibility. I have been
extremely concerned about the lack of progress in business
modernization, auditing commercial cost comparison independent
evaluations of programs, how it is run. The Department of
Defense is the only department in the Federal Government that
we do not have an audit. Myself and the late Senator John
McCain, our dear friend, worked with me on that, and we tried
our darndest, and we got a few of them done but not many. So if
you could commit to getting the Department audited and making
sure they do it in a timely fashion it would be very helpful
for us to do our job here, to make sure that we are
appropriating the funds that are needed.
General Brown. Senator, I commit to work with you on that.
Senator Manchin. Okay. The other thing is the concerns of
the abolishment of the Chief Management Officer. They abolished
the Chief Management Officer position within the Department in
2020, and most recently, with the abolishment of the cost
assessment and program evaluation, not only do they not want to
audit, they do not want anyone being held accountable to
oversee to make sure they will audit.
So thankfully I had an amendment in the NDAA this year to
reinState the Chief Management Officer, the CMO, that was
adopted into the Senate and to ensure that the Department has a
leadership position.
So based on your 40 years in military service, and your
nomination to become the most senior member of our military and
the service, do you believe that a confirmed and chartered
Chief Management Officer is a position the Department and you,
if confirmed, would benefit from and will basically support?
General Brown. Senator, I agree that having that position
filled, or someone filling that position to help us go through
the audit process, like you described, to make sure we are
doing our aspects of fiscal responsibility, is important.
Senator Manchin. The problem we had before, it never had
support from the top, and you know yourself, if the leaders do
not support it, it is not going to happen. And that is why they
said, well, it was meaningless. It was not doing the job. They
had no charter to do it. There was no direction for them to do
it. But I guarantee you it needs to be done, and no business
with any type of value to it whatsoever would ever operate
without an assessment value, an officer that can do the
management, the whole process.
So it is there. It is coming back for you, sir, so we hope
you take advantage of it.
General Brown. Thank you.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Cramer, please.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General
Brown, and to your entire family, thank you for your service.
Congratulations on the nomination.
Let me just followup with Senator Manchin's point about the
Chief Management Officer. I just had to turn around and ask
myself, why did we get rid of it again? I remember when it
happened. I remember the person in the position. We did it to,
quote, ``cut bureaucracy'' and what we did is cut our throats.
And I am with you, Joe. I hope we get it back. And then we have
to, as members, insist, regardless of who is at the top, that
we have some fiscal responsibility at the Department.
All right. Thank you for firing me up just before my
questioning, Joe.
It will not surprise you, General Brown, that over my
nearly 5 years on this Committee I have asked almost every
single combatant commander if they get enough ISR from the air,
and it will also not surprise you that every one of them says
no. Now, that is a little bit like asking the billionaire if he
has enough money, and the answer is always no, he can always
use more.
That said, you had a wonderful discussion in response to
Chairman Reed's questions about interoperability, the changing
role, as well as with Senator Ernst. But as Air Force chief,
you were making tough calls and asked for some cuts to airborne
ISR, sometimes with the hope or the promise of replacement with
space capabilities. But now, in this new role that I, like
Senator Ernst, I suspect, you will soon be confirmed, how do
you plan to bridge that gap? Again, it is a more specific
question to the broader question that Joni asked, but as you
view the needs of the combatant commanders, as they State,
versus the needs that the services want to provide,
specifically, in this case, the Air Force with eyes in the sky,
how do you see that moving forward in your decisionmaking?
General Brown. Senator, as you highlight, this has been an
ongoing debate between the services and the combatant commands
at large, and having sat as a joint chief for the past 3 years
I have really started to think through how we approach this.
There are aspects of, when you look at, not just the ISRs, what
are you trying to get from the ISR, it is information that is
being provided from the ISR. And so there is one aspect of the
platform, but how are we getting the information back to
combatant command headquarters so they can make decisions?
So with the stamp of the Space Force and access to space-
based ISR, it is the combination of the two, and it is going to
drive us to have to change some processes about how we provide
information and how then we work with the combatant commands.
And this is a conversation that we have been having. I have
had this conversation with General Saltzman, the Chief of Space
Operations, of how we lay out a different approach in some
areas to be able to get to all the information that is
available and not just what is reliable on an airborne ISR that
may not be there 24/7, 365. And that is where the focus has to
be of how do we, maybe in some cases, do things a bit
differently and provide not only the capability we have today
but even greater capability in the future.
Senator Cramer. I appreciate that. I want to piggyback a
little bit on Senator Rounds' questioning. He has become very
consistent, as I have, on what matters the most, and I have
great respect for his questions about relieving the spectrum,
particularly prior to the study that you have talked about.
So without prejudging that study, and maybe even
piggybacking a little bit on some of the things you said
earlier about specifically our defense industry base, but I am
going to talk more about the private sector in general, what I
think we do not talk about enough on the Committee is the role
that technology companies or telecommunications industry,
particularly in 5G, all important back to some of the other
discussions we are having, and you have been noted to be an
innovator, and you have been, and I appreciate that.
What role has the private sector played in the advancement
of the technological tools that are at your disposal, both in
the Air Force and now perhaps hopefully the Joint Force?
General Brown. They play a pretty big role, and I will just
tell you from my own personal experience the opportunity to go
out to Silicon Valley a couple of times and talk to those who
have an interest in national security, that is a conversation
that we need to continue to have, so we understand the aspect
of all the capabilities we have within our Nation and how they
all, in some form or fashion, contribute to our national
security. Even when we have these discussions about spectrum,
there is an economic aspect that supports our economic
security, but there is national security, and we have got to
have those conversations in the same room because it has an
impact in some form or fashion. And that is why it is important
that we build those relationships, and we have that dialog to
ensure we are doing what is right for the Nation as we make
decisions.
Senator Cramer. I appreciate that attitude. Thank you very
much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Kelly, please.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Brown,
thank you for your decades of service, and welcome today.
I want to talk to you a little bit about our military's
close air support capability. We have discussed this issue at
length a number of times, and you know how important this is to
me. And you know that our ground troops and special operators
depend on this capability, and it is often a life-or-death
matter for them. And you and I have talked through some of the
current planning that the Air Force is doing to transition to a
future CAS capability. And in my view, the design of our close
air support needs to stay centered on the guys on the ground.
So General, how will you achieve this same level of
protection for those troops with future CAS solutions, and how
are we going to avoid any kind of a gap?
General Brown. Senator, I appreciate the question, and as
we talked in your office a couple of months ago it is the
aspect of not only the platforms that we operate, it is the
technology that we use, and still be able to use the basic
tactics, techniques, and procedures we used since we started
doing close air support. It is the aspect of providing that
capability and the dialog and we will be able to move
information electronically to be more responsive, at the same
time have weapons that are highly precise to support our
servicemembers on the ground.
Senator Kelly. And one of my concerns here is, you know, F-
35s, multi-mission, and a lot of capability in the airplane. I
just ask that you continue to focus on this as an important
mission for future fighters, including the F-35.
And then I am also concerned about the personnel that
support our CAS community as we transition to these new
platforms. Are there any plans to transition some of the skill
sets that reside in our tactical air control and JTAC community
today?
General Brown. They are, and we are using their capability
to help us in our command and control as well as making sure
the procedures that we already have we do not let atrophy and
continue to work that.
One thing I will highlight to you on the F-35 is many of
our A-10 pilots, they have a lot of CAS background and are
flying and going to F-35s. As a matter of fact, I just met a
captain here this past week who has just converted from the A-
10 into the F-35. Those are the kinds of things we have got to
continue to do to ensure we do not let the skill sets that we
have atrophy.
Senator Kelly. Yes, that is a positive thing now, but when
we look at a decade from now you are not going to have that
same kind of transition. So I encourage you to continue to
focus on this and make sure we retain the unique expertise of
these other groups, not just the pilots but the tactical air
controllers and JTACs.
I want to talk about another issue. I am the only graduate
of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Congress, as far as I
know, so I pay special attention to our Nation's maritime
strength. We talked a little bit about that when Senator
Gillibrand asked her questions. And I am concerned that the
United States investment is falling dramatically behind what
the Chinese government has invested in terms of the size and
modernization of each of our respective merchant fleets.
Since the 1980's, there have been a series of policy
decisions that have brought us down to a rather startling
figure of just 80 U.S.-flagged merchant vessels operating in
international trade, and 60 of those consist of MARAD, Maritime
Security Program, that allows them to contract United States-
flagged vessels during times of war. So we have 80 ships. The
Chinese have over 5,500. And they are the world's top
shipbuilder, and they control ports that handle 67 percent of
the world's shipping containers.
As you know well, this impacts our ability to supply our
own troops in conflict. You talked about how much different the
Western Pacific is from Europe--you know, islands, mobility,
and logistical challenges. It also impacts trade and global
supply chains in peacetime, and it is critical. I mean, this is
the kind of capability that cannot be turned on and off
overnight. We need to investment now if we want to rely on it
tomorrow. I know in your new role there is a chance that you
are going to need this capability.
We also see some similar underinvestment in the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy, which is under the Department of
Transportation's purview, but it trains a lot of military
officers and the mariners that will man those ships. Our
nation's national security leaders cannot turn a blind eye to
these capabilities simply because they lie outside of the
military's and your immediate jurisdiction. And I think we
really need to increase our focus here.
So if confirmed, can I have your commitment to keep this
concern top of mind as you enter into this new role as
Chairman?
General Brown. Senator, if confirmed, you do have my
commitment.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
General.
General Brown. Good morning.
Senator Tuberville. Thanks for being here. Thanks for your
service. And in talking to you yesterday, you moved over 20
times in your career. I do not think a lot of people understand
the complexity of that with a family, so thank you for your
service.
General, I think most of us up here agree that other than
foreign countries, $32 trillion in debt is one of our biggest
threats to national security. We are broke. In the past, you
have criticized the Department of Defense's complex bureaucracy
and have expressed a desire to improve its inefficiencies. By
law, the Joint Staff is capped at around 2,300 personnel, with
some exceptions.
Can you clarify at this time, how big is our staff as we
speak? Do you have a number on that?
General Brown. Senator, I do not have an exact number. I
will have to get that for you. But I know it is somewhere
around 2,000.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. Thank you. I would appreciate
that.
You know, the House NDAA includes a study to look at
reducing the size of the office. Do you have any suggestions on
where we could look to cut staff or budget to help, and not cut
back efficiency?
General Brown. Not at the moment. As I go into this
position, if confirmed, that will be one of the things I do
take a look at when I look across the Joint Staff. And I would
also say, as we look across the aspects of our military
departments, if there are things we can do to increase our
efficiency and our capability and capacity, those are things I
would focus on.
Senator Tuberville. You know, the fiscal year 2023 budget
for the Joint Staff was around $1.2 billion, and the budget
request for fiscal year 2024 is close to $1.3 billion. I guess
you are familiar with that, right?
General Brown. Not the level of details of the Joint Staff
budget, because I have been focused on the Air Force budget.
Senator Tuberville. Okay. Thank you. That is pretty high.
But I would like you to give us kind of a rundown the next time
we see you in a hearing in terms of where we are at with that.
Is it too much? Not enough? You know, we do not want to cut
back our military. It is so important. But we also want to be
efficient in what we use. So I would appreciate anything that
you could do for us in terms of giving us an update on what you
are going to set your team up as, because you are going to be
the new leader. So I would hope you would keep an eye on that
because that is a lot of money.
I got an article yesterday that says Air Force delays some
moves, bonuses, as inflation cuts into personnel budget. Could
you explain that? That came from the Stars and Stripes.
General Brown. Sure, Senator. As we built our budget a
couple of years ago, and, you know, based on the factors we
had, the economic factors, as well as the force mix factors
based on different career fields and different rank structure,
we typically will come back and ask for reprogramming. We are
working through the process of reprogramming, so we do not go
through an anti-deficiency act and not spend money we do not
have.
And so part of this is for us to be able to work with
Congress to get the reprogramming in place so we can actually--
all the programs and impacts are outlined in that article that
we communicated to the force here recently--we can reverse and
minimize the impact to airmen and their families throughout the
rest of this fiscal year.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. And we all know how important it
is, and I think most of us have talked about it up here today,
recruiting. You and I talked about that yesterday. Our
recruiting is in a tailspin in most areas, unfortunately. And
with an all-volunteer military we are going to have to do
better. We have got to do better with salaries, incentives, all
those things to get our young men and women involved and
interested in our military. I think it is so important. We can
have all the upper echelon we can get, but unless we have the
people that actually does the job on the ground, and in the
planes, on the sea, we are going to have huge problems because
we live in a dangerous world.
So thank you for taking this on. It is going to be a hard
job, and any way we can help you we are here to help. Thank
you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you
again, General Brown, and congratulations on your nomination.
Mrs. Brown, welcome here today.
So the Department of Defense is full of talented, patriotic
leaders who are working hard to keep us safe. Even so, the
Pentagon remains too cozy with powerful defense companies that
are reaping huge profits from hundreds of billions of dollars
in government contracts.
When our top leaders leave government service and head
straight to big paydays on the boards of the Department of
Defense's largest contractors or as defense industry lobbyists
it sends the message that the Pentagon is for sale.
Now during his confirmation hearing before this Committee,
Secretary Austin publicly committed not to go to work as a
lobbyist for defense contractors after he leaves his current
job, and I appreciate the commitment, and I believe that the
American people do as well.
If confirmed, General Brown, you will be the President's
top military advisor, and your actions will set the tone for
the entire armed forces. So I would like to hear you make those
same commitments. General Brown, if confirmed, will you commit
to not going to work as a lobbyist for a defense contractor for
4 years after you leave government service?
General Brown. Senator, I am sensitive to the perceptions
of a conflict of interest that discussed in your office, and I
do not intend to pursue opportunities in the defense sector or
a lobbyist upon retirement from military service. You know, my
passion is in leadership and mentoring.
Senator Warren. Good.
General Brown. And that is where I want to focus my efforts
after military service, of building the next generation of
leaders.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that, and I will take that as
a yes.
Let's do the second part, even though I think you got the
answer in there. Lobbying is not the only way that former
officials cash in on their government service. Giant defense
contractors frequently hire former top Pentagon officials in
non-lobbying roles and add them to their corporate boards. The
former Pentagon official gets paid handsomely, and the defense
contractor touts their name in order to get more contracts.
General Dunford, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
joined the board of Lockheed Martin, DOD's top contractor, less
than 5 months after leaving government service, and so far he
has received nearly $1 million in compensation in that role. By
contrast, Secretary Austin pledge not to join the board of one
of these companies when he left government.
So General Brown, if confirmed, do you commit to not
receive compensation from a defense contractor for 4 years,
including compensation for being a board member?
General Brown. I will do the same answer I just
highlighted.
Senator Warren. Okay. I will take that as a yes then.
You know, it is really important. I am going to take you at
your word on this, and the American people and I will hold you
to it. This is a matter of personal integrity, something that I
know is very important to you.
I want to close and use our remaining time by asking about
the impact of the holds on the promotions and assignments of
senior military officers that the Senator from Alabama has
imposed. The families of these servicemembers are held at a
standstill. They are unsure about where to enroll their kids in
school or whether they need to arrange a move across country,
or even somewhere else around the world.
General Brown, can you just spend a minute here and talk to
us about the impact that these holds are having on our military
families?
General Brown. There are several factors that I think about
as we are going through this and how we are working to mitigate
the challenges associated with the holds. There are aspects of
readiness in the transition in leadership, and for our young
servicemembers to know who is in the position of leadership
that is qualified, has the experience to be there, and not, in
some cases--you know, we have strong deputies, but at the same
time they do not have the same level of experience going
forward.
In addition to the senior officers there is a whole chain
of events that go down to our more junior officers, and that
has an impact. It has an impact on their progression in their
career field, potentially, because if one does not get promoted
or move on then they are blocking a spot for someone else. At
the same time, we have several members who have served
honorably, and they are ready to retire, but they are going to,
in some cases, stay with us to help us mitigate through that
challenge.
The area that hits us, I think, that we do need to think
about is how it impacts our families, because it has an impact
not just for the senior officer but all their staff and all
those below them it has an impact. And as you highlighted,
whether it is schools, whether it is employment, or the fact
that they have already sold their home because they thought
they were going to move and now they are living in temporary
quarters, that creates a challenge.
The last thing I would highlight on that is my concern for
future retention, because we have our more junior officers who
now will look up and say, ``If that is the challenge I am going
to have to deal with in the future, I am going to balance
between my family and serving in a senior position.'' And we
will lose talent because of those challenges.
The spouse network is alive and well, and the spouses will
compare notes. And the member may want to serve, but the
spouses and the families get a huge vote on while we continue
to be able to serve. And I thank my family for that opportunity
to be able to continue to serve.
Senator Warren. I see Mrs. Brown nodding her head on this
as well.
You know, if the Senator from Alabama continues his
reckless action he will soon be holding 650 leaders, who have
served our country honorable, hostage, and as you rightly point
out, that has effects on many more of the best and brightest
who have volunteered to serve our Nation.
I heard the Senator say, as he concluded his questions,
that if there was anything he could do to help you in your
actions and help the service that he would be glad to do it.
What he could do to help is lift this stay before it does more
damage to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Budd, please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, General
Brown, and congrats on your nomination. I enjoyed our meeting
last month, just a few weeks ago, in my office.
In that discussion we talked about the importance of
securing the right capabilities to deter our Nation's
adversaries. Last week my office received a long-awaited report
on divestment of F-15 aircraft, including at Seymour Johnson
Air Force Base in my home State of North Carolina. The report
bears your signature, and it states that the Air Force plans to
divest the remaining 149 F-15Cs and Ds in the inventory and 119
F-15Es, leaving fewer than 100 E models while procuring only 24
F-15EXs in each of the next 2 years.
So I am concerned about the divestment of a very capable
fighter aircraft, particularly F-15Es with upgraded radars and
electronic warfare suites. These are the most advanced, fourth-
generation fighters in the world, with years of service left.
It is particularly concerning given the current threat window
and the fighter capacity gap that I believe you have talked
about repeatedly.
The report states that these cuts will be used to modernize
the force. My question is this. What combat-capable platforms
are ready and available today--and I emphasize today--that can
be procured now, not in the 2030's or the 2040's?
General Brown. Senator, I understand your concern in the
aspect of it as we look at this. It goes back to a comment I
made a little bit earlier about how we balance capability and
capacity. And as we do this it is not just the platforms
themselves. It is the other aspects of our command and control
in terms of bringing some reconnaissance capabilities, that we
will continue to invest in to bring those forward to make each
of the platforms we have more capable, not just for the Air
Force but I would say the same thing across the Joint Force.
And it also has to do with munitions as well.
Because of our procurement cycles for each one of these it
is typically from the time we get a budget, and if we get it on
time, which is why that is so important, it takes about a year
to 2, and in some cases, most times than not, 2 years to get
that capability. And so not only on the fighter piece but it is
also the capabilities to make those fighters more relevant and
combat capable as we go forward, and that is how we are trying
to balance between the two and make sure we have the analysis,
the research and development to make sure we are staying ahead
of the threat, which actually adds to that as well, in bringing
in advanced technologies into some of these platforms and
capabilities we are procuring, not just, again, for the Air
Force but really for the Joint Force as well.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. In your advanced policy
questions regarding the role of Special Operations Forces in
implementing the National Defense Strategy you State, and I
quote, ``SOF remains ideally suited to identify a competitor's
coercive capabilities and the Gray Zone, encounter them with
deliberate, credible actions while managing escalation,'' end
quote.
Given that SOF is ideally suited and provides expanded,
low-cost and credible options for combatant commanders and the
President across strategic competition, counterterrorism and
crisis response, would it be, in your best military advice,
would you give the advice to this Committee to cut Special
Operations Force structure?
General Brown. Well, that is something that, if confirmed,
I would do a bit more analysis on, but I would also highlight
the fact that our Special Operations Forces over the course of
the past 20 years of conflict grew a fair amount. And as we
rebalance the force and think about all the national security
challenges that we have, as outlined in the National Defense
Strategy, how can we balance that SOF capability, what it does
today and what it will do in the future. Because the aspect of
SOF, I think, will be a bit different from what we have done,
particularly in the Middle East, for the past 20 years.
Senator Budd. I understand that. I just have tremendous
concerns of what I have seen in the President's budget. But let
me ask an ongoing question on the same topic.
Do you agree that SOF play a critical role, particularly as
it relates to broader efforts to gain influence, advantage, and
leverage as part of strategic competition?
General Brown. I do.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Changing topics, military recruiting shortfalls continue to
be a grave concern as we consider how the recruiting crisis
impacts our Nation's military readiness. In our discussions in
my office we talked about diversity, equity, and inclusion
policies that, in my view, deter rather than encourage young
people to serve. I have heard from many young and qualified
individuals from North Carolina who are hesitant to join a
force they see as extremely political and defined by DEI
policies.
In August 2022, you signed a memorandum, along with the
Secretary and Under Secretary of the Air Force directing Air
Education and Training Command the Air Force Academy to achieve
diversity and inclusion goals broken down by percentage of both
race and sex. We talked about this. It was a good discussion.
But I want to give you an opportunity to respond in an open
session. What is the purpose of this memo, the once from August
2022, and how do such policies improve recruiting? Bottom line,
I think that we should be suspect of any policies that give
advantage to some groups at the expense of others. But I will
give you an opportunity.
General Brown. Senator, the goal is to tap into all the
talent across our Nation, and that memo outlined applicant
goals, and the goal there was to actually outreach to broader
aspects across the Nation and show them the opportunities to
join the force.
What the memo also says is there is a goal to allow those
young people to understand what the opportunities are but to
get selected and to come into the Academy, ROTC, or any other
program that is merit-based, and they have to be qualified and
meet the standard to join. We have got to make sure we provide
the opportunity. I have talked personally about recruiting
aspect. Young people only aspire to be what they know about,
and if they do not know anything about the military, and we do
not outreach to them, we may miss some tremendous talent.
But they have got to be qualified because we are a merit-
based organization, and that is the way we have operated for an
extended period of time, and that is the way we will continue
to operate as a military force.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Brown,
good to see you again, and congratulations on your nomination,
and thank you for your years of service.
General Brown, as we discussed, for the U.S. to be able to
successfully defend against all the threats that we face in the
21st century it is going to be absolutely vital that we are as
efficient as possible when it comes to our force structure as
well as understanding our limited manpower resources. And as
you know very well, our National Guard comprises a significant
portion of both our air and ground combat capabilities, and
oftentimes these units actually have a higher level of
experience than their Active Duty counterparts and are more
easily able to meet recruiting as well as retention goals.
The National Guard is a critical part of our domestic cyber
response and mission assurance duties and plays a key role, I
think, or I know, between the Department of State and local
officials.
In a time when innovation is absolutely critical, National
Guard installations are able to easily host private sector
partners who are conducting testing and evaluation of emerging
technologies, and every year thousands of National Guardsmen
build closer ties and increase interoperability with partners
and allies across the globe through the State Partnership
Program.
Camp Grayling, in my home State, in northern Michigan, is a
place where thousands of U.S. troops train alongside NATO and
INDOPACOM partners every summer during Exercise Northern
Strike, and I think it is just one example of the tremendous
capabilities our National Guard brings to the total force.
Simply put, the United States cannot compete with near-peer
competitors, combat long-term insurgencies, implement the
National Defense Strategy, or overcome recruiting and retention
challenges without an adequately resourced and empowered
National Guard.
So my question for you, sir, is what investments does the
Department need to make in the National Guard to build and to
maintain a force able to meet the challenges that our Nation
will face for the rest of this century?
General Brown. Well, Senator, I have tremendous value
working with the Air National Guard throughout my career, in
having had them under my command in the combat operations as
well as serving as the Air Force Chief of Staff.
I think the key area, a couple of things that we have to
think through as a Joint Force, and if confirmed as the
Chairman, is to ensure that our Guard members have the
capabilities with the resources and equipment that is
modernized so they can be a frontline institution to be ready
to go whenever the nations call. And then at the same time it
is some of the personnel programs we have to ensure that we are
taking care of those members and their families, particularly
knowing that they change status as they go on and off Active
Duty or get deployed back and forth. The better we can smooth
those processes, that helps us out.
And then the last thing I would kind of highlight is the
work we do on the Active side and how we ensure that the
process to retain that talent and bring it over into the Guard
or the Reserve component. There are areas where sometimes we
make it a little more difficult than it has to be, and we may
lose an opportunity with a great servicemember who decides to
go do something else. But the value that our Guard provides,
whether it is because of their dual status, you know, their
civilian career and their military career, I have been a great
proponent of the State Partnership Program. That has done
tremendous work for our allies and partners.
So the Guard, both the Air and the Army Guard, are great
assets to our Joint Force.
Senator Peters. Great. It is good to hear that. General
Brown, when you assumed the position of Air Force Chief of
Staff you issued a directive for airmen, quote, ``to accelerate
change or lose.'' You described this concept as a necessity for
the Air Force to be able to dominate in a very dynamic, rapidly
changing security environment.
As Chairman, if confirmed, you would have great influence
on bringing this type of attitude to what is perhaps the most
risk adverse, bureaucratic organization in the world. So my
question for you sir is, what are the biggest challenges that
you can identify to having the Department embrace this culture,
which I think is essential, of accelerating change?
General Brown. Well, one of the areas that I have found as
I try to do this--and I have made some progress in--I have been
happy with some of the progress I have made in certain areas as
the Air Force chief, but at the same time, there are some areas
that I am not as happy about.
The challenge there is having all of our servicemembers
understand the big picture and why this is so important, why we
need to modernize, and what is at stake. And from that
perspective, then you step away from your own interests and
then we do what is best, not just for your part of the
organization but what is best for the entire organization. That
is how I have approached it as the Air Force Chief of Staff. If
confirmed, that is exactly the way I would approach it as the
Chairman of the joint chiefs. And having served as a joint
chief, I have had to be able to do the same. We have got to be
able to do that a bit more across the force and put what is
best out front for the force, to ensure we are doing the right
things to protect the Nation and our national interests.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Mullin, please.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman, and going kind of on
the same lane that Mr. Peters was but not necessarily the same
question but talking about the accelerating change or lose.
When you had originally drafted that as Air Force Chief of
Staff, you outlined the urgent need for technology advancement
in your ``accelerate change or lose'' comment.
An important factor in our ability to outpace our
competitors is the health of our defense industry. Are we able
to actually leverage them in an accurate way to be able to have
the same mentality to, as you said, accelerate change or lose
with the industrial base in the current State that it is in?
General Brown. I do think we can, and the thing I have
found as a service chief for the past 2 years, after I wrote
``accelerate change or lose'' that it not a flip of a switch.
It is a bit of a culture change that takes a bit of time to get
it bought into the force and start to move.
And so what I have seen is aspects of the defense
industrial base, aspects of the defense industry to start to
shift. We have been able to do it in certain programs, a couple
of programs for the Air Force, and the B-21 program is a good
example, Sentinel is a good example, Next Generation Air
Dominance are good examples where we have taken a different
approach to drive ourselves in a different direction. I would
say the same thing with AFWERX, where we are being able to
build relationships with smaller companies and smaller
technologies, have them play in the competitive space. Because
that is what happens outside of the Department of Defense.
So we have been able to make some advancements in those
areas, but you are still going to have the major defense
acquisition programs that are a bit broader. But we are making
progress, and that is something we have got to continue to do,
and if confirmed, the same energy I put in as the Air Force
Chief of Staff on accelerating change is the same thing you can
expect from me as the Chairman, if confirmed.
Senator Mullin. I could not agree more. I mean, in the
private sector, in any sector, we have to accelerate change, or
you do fall behind. So I agree with what you are saying. But
how do you keep the industrial base nimble without sacrificing
legacy systems and knowledge at the same time?
General Brown. Well, I think part of this is the aspect of
how we write our contracts, how we incentivize and set the
business model, realizing that our defense companies have
stakeholders that they have got to report to. But at the same
time, we have got to make sure we provide the combat capability
for our Joint Force.
So it is important for us to come together so we are not
talking past each other or debating on different sides of the
aisle on this, or different sides of the perspective. It is
really how do we come together and figure out how we move
forward. The way I operate is basically on a Venn diagram.
There are some things we agree about--let's skip those and move
those forward--and the things we disagree about, how then do we
break down those barriers and then help improve. Part of that
is building relationships within industry so they understand
where we are going and what they are trying to achieve, and
then we can work together to ensure we are doing what is right
for the Nation.
Senator Mullin. All right. Switching gears a little bit,
nearly everyone that comes in front of this Committee this year
has talked about the challenges we have with recruiting. There
have also been, obviously, comments about having to change our
posture a little bit because our lag to be able to man some of
the systems that we are trying to move forward with or some of
the areas that we are trying to grow in.
But at the same time, during COVID, we had let 8,000
capable service men and women go for not wanting to get the
vaccination. As more technology has come out, we think that
they probably had the right to do so. But how do we bring those
individuals back into the fold now that the pandemic is, quote,
``over,'' and get them back, plugged in, and reinState them to
where they should be, if they choose to come back?
General Brown. Each of the services has a process to allow
those members who want to return and review them coming back
into the service.
Senator Mullin. Do you support bringing them back in?
General Brown. On a case-by-case basis with the reviews
done by the services.
Senator Mullin. What would be the case-by-case? I mean,
what are red flags for you?
General Brown. Well, in some cases maybe there were other
factors beyond just the COVID vaccination that may prevent them
from returning.
Senator Mullin. But if it was based just specifically on
the refusal to get the COVID vaccine, you support bringing them
back in?
General Brown. I would be supportive, but I would defer to
those who are going through the cases before I--I do not want--
--
Senator Mullin. Well, obviously, being the Chairman, you
are going to have a big sway in it. If you say, ``Hey guys,
let's bring these guys back,'' if this was the only thing that
was on their mark, and you say, ``Let's bring them back in,'' I
think most people would probably follow that leadership.
General Brown. Somewhat true, but I am not in the command
chain. If confirmed as the Chairman, I am not in the command
chain. There are commanders that make those decisions, but I
will provide my advice on how best to approach moving forward.
Senator Mullin. Well, thank you for your service. Ma'am,
Ms. Brown, thank you for your service too and supporting him
along the way. We really appreciate you and the sacrifice you
made in raising the family while he was serving the country,
and all the 20 moves and making the house a true home for him
to come to and feel comfortable. So thank you for that. Sir, I
appreciate your service, and I appreciate the conversation we
had in my office. I look forward to working with you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Mullin.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General Brown, again for your service to our Nation, willing to
serve in this critical role. I always thank the family members
who serve right alongside with you, so I echo Senator Mullin.
That boxing up 20 homes, it cannot be easy.
But I do want to make a quick comment before my questions
because I do want to start off by saying that I am deeply
concerned by the fact that your swift confirmation is being
held up, along with hundreds of others of senior military
promotions, including those in my State of Nevada. That would
not be acceptable for any reason, but it is even more
outrageous that these holds are to get rid of a policy that
protects our servicemembers' reproductive rights. And so this
extreme anti-choice agenda, it is jeopardizing our national
security in order to impose restrictions on our servicemembers'
reproductive freedoms. Enough is enough. We need to fill these
critical roles, and I would like to see you have a quick
confirmation. And so I am going to move onto that, General.
My colleagues have been talking about maintaining our
technological edge because we know that there is global
competition for a skilled workforce, declining investments in
R&D, and DOD contracting challenges, and the STEM workforce
gap. They are all impediments to eroding our defense
technological edge with our adversaries. Meanwhile, we also
know that China is investing heavily in advanced technologies
such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum
computing. So we talk about accelerate change or lose.
And that is why in this Congress I introduced bipartisan
legislation with Senator Blackburn to establish a pilot program
to accelerate the scaling, production, and acquisition of
advanced capabilities for national security through a public-
private partnership that is going to incentivize American
investment in small business that is working on innovative
defense technologies. This legislation has been included in
both the House and Senate version of the NDAA for fiscal year
2024.
So building on some of the prior questions, General Brown,
if confirmed, how might the public-private partnership that
catalyzes investment in advanced capabilities really enhance
our competitiveness with China?
General Brown. Well, if confirmed, what it does for us is
it actually has us being able to tap into all the technical
capability within our Nation. And that is why the aspect of
these public-private partnerships are so important, because
there are certain things that happen outside the Department of
Defense that provides great capability, that it will solve some
of the operational problems that we are faced with, that will
help us better defend the Nation.
And that partnership, to me, is so important, and it is the
aspect of how do we come together and build these
relationships, create the dialog, and solve problems together
that benefit both the private sector but also the public
sector, and particularly the Department of Defense.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to move now on to
combating Iranian aggression because just last week Iranian
naval vessels attempted to seize two foreign-flagged commercial
tankers right in international waters. Notably, this incident
involved an Iranian Navy warship, not an Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps vessel, which is a troubling escalation.
So to address Iran's growing naval aggression I introduced,
with Senator Ernst, the Maritime Act, which is bipartisan
legislation that would require the Department of Defense to
develop a strategy with our partners and allies in the Middle
East to counter these maritime threats posed by Iran.
So General Brown, if confirmed, how would you confront
Iranian aggression in all forms, and how would you leverage the
regional partnerships fostered by the Abraham Accords to deter
Iran's malign actions?
General Brown. Senator, if confirmed, it is building on my
vast experience, particularly in the Middle East. But you
mentioned the Abraham Accords, and what I do see is greater
cooperation between the nations within the Middle East. It is
something we would have to continue to help support. Part of
that is ensuring, as we do this we are also providing them the
capabilities to be able to support efforts to push back against
Iranian aggression in all forms. We have been able to do that
in the past, but as you highlighted, the world and the threat
has gotten more complicated, and so we cannot rest on our
laurels. We have got to continue to work hard with our partners
in the region and give them the capabilities, and also working
with them as well, because we have got to be part of the
solution as part of the United States and our military force as
well.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to talk a little bit,
again, on our capacity to really meet the challenges going
forward, and we know that cyber challenges are huge. We know in
the private sector it is really huge to get that employment,
get the skilled technologists, and we know that in the military
as well. And as I have noted before this Committee numerous
times, our Nation does face these unprecedented cyberattacks,
consistent shortage of talent, cyber talent. They pose a
significant threat to our security.
I have a bill to find solutions such as my Civilian
Cybersecurity Reserve Act. It was included in this year's NDAA
for fiscal year 2024, to provide the DOD with qualified
civilian personnel to support the Department's cyberspace
operations and ensure we have the talent needed to defeat,
deter, and respond to malicious cyber activity, especially at
times of greatest need, to provide surge capacity.
And so I know my time is just about up, but if you could
answer quickly, how might nontraditional cyber reserve models
be a possible pathway to recruit personnel who might not
otherwise choose to serve full-time but possess those valuable
cyber skills?
General Brown. Senator, it allows us to tap into the great
talent and capability across our Nation and allows us to
address national security needs. And building those
relationships, I think, are going to be important as a nation
as we go forward.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. General Brown, welcome, and congratulations
on your nomination, and thank you for you decades of service to
our Nation. And Mrs. Brown, thank you for your decades of
service as well.
There has been a lot of conversation this morning about
munitions. I want to continue that conversation because I view
it as one of the most vital challenges the Department faces
today. Obviously, this is in the context of our support for
Ukraine and its defense of its own territory and Russia's
unprovoked war of aggression.
General Brown, has the Ukraine war caused the challenge to
our munitions and defense industrial base or has it exposed
some of the fragility and cracks in the defense industrial
base?
General Brown. Senator, I would say it has exposed, and the
reason I say that is just based on experience. When I was air
component commander for United States Central Command during
the Defeat ISIS campaign we had some similar conversations.
Back in 2017-ish timeframe, when North Korea was very active,
we did some reviews and it highlighted it then.
Now it is highlighting it even more so, and it is the
aspect of why it is important for us to not only invest in the
platforms, we have got to invest in the munitions, do we have
enough stockpile, particular the advanced munitions that are
most effective. Those are the things that we need to continue
to do, not only from the Department but also as we work with
Congress to highlight those needs.
Senator Cotton. I agree with that, that the war in Ukraine
has exposed those cracks and the fragility in our defense
industrial base. Of course, those concerns are part of the
broader context of China and the threat that it poses to Taiwan
and our ability to deter Communist China from going for the
jugular in Taiwan.
One important question here is to think about the kinds of
munitions we have been providing to Ukraine and the kinds of
munitions we provide to Taiwan, or that we might provide or
might use ourselves in the future.
Speaking broadly, are the munitions used in Ukraine versus
those that might be used in Taiwan, are those completely the
same, totally different, or somewhere in the middle but closer
to one pole or the other?
General Brown. I would say they are somewhat different,
just based on the environment that they are operating in. But
there are some that are similar. I think the key part for us is
to ensure--and this is one reason why we, in this year's budget
submission, we had multiyear procurement. The more your
procurement was to actually make sure that we not only had the
munitions we are going to buy but also the facilities as well
as the workforce and the supply chain, and that is the value of
having these multiyear. It sets some predictability for defense
and the industrial base so it is not an up-and-down with each
budget cycle, and that will help them better plan and ensure we
have the capability, not only for ourselves but as we also
think about our allies and partners as well.
Senator Cotton. Well, I am glad you raised multiyear
procurement because I think that has been something that could
help address this problem. It is not a silver bullet, but it
could help address it. To be clear, multiyear procurement,
though, is not necessarily about saving money for the
Department but about giving predictability and certainty to the
companies across America that assemble or make components for
these munitions. Is that correct?
General Brown. That is correct. It is about building
capacity. It is about buying down risk in the future. You
cannot not put a price tag on risk. You know, ideally you do
want to save money, but in the big scheme of things you have
got to actually get the facilities built first. That is going
to be some capital investment. But then, when you start to
produce, that is when you may get some savings in the future.
Senator Cotton. Because if you are sitting at the head, not
of the United States military, as you will, if confirmed, but
rather, say, at the head of a major defense contractor like
Lockheed or Northrop, or even one of their subcontractors who,
say, makes parts for the rocket motors or the explosives or the
steel, those are major capital-intensive investments if you are
going to expand a line or even add a new line. And obviously
you would be concerned if you cannot have multiyear certainty
that that line is going to be at full capacity. Is that right?
General Brown. It is not only the line and the capacity but
it is also the workforce, making sure they are going to be
available, and the subcontractors to support the major aspects
that you need to pull together.
Senator Cotton. I think you and the Department have
convinced the authorizers on this point. I think maybe
appropriators still need some convincing to do. I am confident
our Chairman, who also sits on the Appropriations Committee,
can carry your points to the Appropriations Committee.
One final question I want to raise since it has been in the
news is what has sometimes been colloquially called as ``155''
over the last few days. That is a 155-millimeter artillery
shell that is one of the most basic shells that we use or that
our Western partners use. We have spent about $1.5 billion on
production of 155 shells over the last 6 months to get to a
point to quintuple our production rates.
I have looked at the inventory numbers which, in
combination with donations from other allies and partners, do
not appear to be approaching concerning levels yet. We have
also heard, on this Committee, from several leaders that 155
production rates right now are sustainable.
Do you think that we are currently low on 155-millimeter
artillery shells?
General Brown. Senator, I have not looked at it that
closely. I would have to come back to you with maybe a question
for the record on that one.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Could you do that, please? And if
confirmed, also, if you conclude that we are not, in fact, low,
could you perhaps, in your role as the principal military
advisor to the President, share the news with him, because I
think he may have misspoken somewhat in an interview recently.
Thank you, General Brown.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
General.
General, do we have too many white officers in the Air
Force?
General Brown. Senator, what I really look at is the
quality of all the officers that we have, and we look at the
aspect of everyone who is qualified, meets the qualifications,
is promoted.
Senator Schmitt. Well, I would agree with you, but that
answer is not consistent with your August 9th memo. In your
August 9th memo, you said that--you signed onto that there
should be a reduction essentially of about 9 percent of the
white officers. That is 5,400--have 5,400 too many white
officers. And this is the real impact, I think, of this desire
of the Administration, and I am saddened to see this in this
memo, of this obsession with sort of race-based politics being
interjected into our military.
How did you come up with the percentage of 67.5 percent of
the officers should be white, and how did you come up with 13
percent should be Black, and how did you come up with 10
percent should be Asian, and how did you come up with 1.5
percent should be American Indian and Native Alaskan, how did
you come up with 1 percent being Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific islander, and how did you come up with 15 percent of
our officers should be Hispanic or Latino?
General Brown. Senator, that memo is on application goals,
not the actual makeup of the force. And those numbers are based
on the demographics in the Nation.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. All right. Ten percent of our
country is Asian American? Is that where you came up with it,
just the percentage of the population?
General Brown. Essentially.
Senator Schmitt. Because right now the actual percentage--I
mean, this is where this is a ridiculous conversation, to be
perfectly honest, because why did you not come up with, or are
you going to come up with the percentage of the overall force?
Did you contemplate that, of how many, you know, Black
Americans should be in the Air Force, or how many Asian
Americans should be in the Air Force? Did you contemplate the
total force percentages?
General Brown. Senator, what we looked at was the aspect of
providing opportunities for anybody who wants to serve----
Senator Schmitt. Listen, if that were the case--listen, if
that were what was in this memo I would not be asking you these
questions. But we have in a memo, signed by you, that you think
right now there are too many white officers. This is a blanket
statement.
And so I could go down the line of questioning of which of
the 5,400 white officers that we have too many of should be
fired, because that is the actual impact of all this. I agree
with you. Your story about wanting to be the best pilot in the
Air Force, regardless of race, that is what the military is
supposed to be. It is this great meritocracy. It is why there
are uniforms and haircuts.
And I heard so many of my colleagues talk about infusing
abortion politics into this. That is exactly what is wrong.
This Administration has infused abortion politics into our
military, COVID politics into our military, DEI politics into
our military, and it is a cancer on the best military in the
history of the world. Those men and women deserve better than
this, this idea that they have to go through these struggle
sessions with DEI training.
Because trust me, I believe that we ought to have the
broadest pool of applicants and get the best and the brightest,
and we ought to be recruiting in various areas to make sure we
have the best and the brightest from every community,
regardless of your race or your gender or your ethnicity. But
that is not what DEI is. DEI is an ideology based in cultural
Marxism, and somehow, some way, we ended up in a place where a
general in the Air Force is advocating for racial quotas,
whether it be by applicants or the number of officers or maybe
the total unit, and I just think that is wrong. I think that is
the wrong approach.
You have had a distinguished career, and I thank you for
your service. I just do not know how we can continue to have
leadership that advocates for this divisive policy.
And so I will ask you also, there have been 8,500 military
men and women fired because they chose not to get a vaccine. If
confirmed, what would you do to go out, not just they can
reapply and there is a process, to go out and recruit these
folks back? What would you do to do that? What would you do to
accomplish that?
General Brown. Senator, if confirmed, I would provide them
the opportunity to reapply.
Senator Schmitt. I just do not think that is good enough. I
heard that from Secretary Austin. I just do not think that is
good enough. We did a great disservice to this country by
firing people because they made that decision. I think they
ought to be reinstated with rank and back pay. I have not heard
that from anybody that has come before this Committee, and I am
saddened by that.
I think I am out of time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Duckworth, please.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Brown,
welcome to you and your family, and congratulations on your
nomination.
I really enjoyed our discussion last month. I look forward
to continuing to work with you on our military's readiness, if
you are confirmed. Each of the military services faces
challenges in meeting recruiting goals, in part due to
historically small pool of eligible recruits, and that pool
continues to shrink.
That is why I am introducing the ENLIST Act to begin to
remedy this issue. My legislation enables the Department of
Defense to expand its recruiting pool to include long-time
residents of this country. This could include many people who
love this country and are dedicated to service, like DACA
recipients or people who originally came on a work or
educational visa and have applied to stay permanently but
cannot receive an immigrant visa due to caps in the system.
The ENLIST Act will aid recruitment efforts by allowing
highly skilled and motivated individuals to succeed in the
military while still maintaining the Department's security
requirements and high enlistment standards.
General Brown, during our discussion you described
traveling to bases and meeting new Americans eager to serve in
the Air National Guard. I would like to know if you think that
the ENLIST Act and its expansion of the pool of possible
recruits benefits the military recruitment efforts, and I would
also like to hear your perspective on the value that highly
qualified immigrants bring to the military.
General Brown. Senator, as we talked about in your office,
I do think about those who, as you mention, love this country,
want to serve, want to raise their right hand and take an oath
of enlistment, and the opportunity for them to become citizens
of the United States. It provides an opportunity because in
many cases they are very talented, and they want to stay in
this Nation. There are opportunities that the ENLIST Act would
help us in some of our recruiting, and again, talent that
resides in this Nation that wants to serve. And if they want to
serve, and meet the qualifications, I think all should be
provided the opportunity.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I cannot think of a better
way to show love of this country. You want to be an American?
Put on her colors. Stand shoulder to shoulder and help defend
her.
I would like to thank my colleagues on this Committee and
the staff for their work on this year's NDAA, which supports a
strong and ready total force. I am particularly proud of my
NDAA provision expanding TRICARE coverage of assisted
reproductive technology, or ART, for current servicemembers and
their dependents. Studies show that servicemembers have higher
rates of infertility compared to the general population, which
is only complicated by an overly restrictive DOD policy and
servicemembers' deployment schedules.
General Brown, expanding assisted reproductive technology
services to female and male members of the uniformed services
and their dependents, without regard to coital conception,
helps members to start their families that they have always
dreamed of. Do you think expanding our servicemembers' access
to this important health care is a positive recruiting and
retention tool?
General Brown. Senator, what I believe is we, as senior
leaders in the military, responsibly provide health care for
all our members. And when I think about providing health care I
do not try to determine aspects of what type of health care but
health care at large. We have done that in the past, and we
need to continue to do it and support our military members and
their families with the health care to ensure they are healthy,
and again, continue to serve and be part of the greatest
fighting force in the world.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General. And earlier this
year I led an Indo-Pacific codel that reinforced to me just how
important our alliances and partnerships are in the region. I
am going back there again in August, to the Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand. I think that these partnerships are
incredibly important, and I have asked these same questions of
every service chief who has come before this Committee because
I think we can be doing so much more to better these key
relationships.
General Brown, you have deep experience in interacting with
allies and partners in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the
Indo-Pacific. Can you speak about your personal relationships
with air chiefs from other nations and how that may benefit
your role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if you are
confirmed?
General Brown. Senator, when I think about it, it is all
about relationships, and it is the relationships I have been
able to build with these various air chiefs, and in some cases
the air chief is retiring and a new air chief comes in, so I
have relationships in the retired community as well. But it is
also providing the opportunities to meet with the various
chiefs of the defense, as I have gone and traveled around the
world, to include the Indo-Pacific. And if confirmed as
Chairman, I will have an opportunity to deepen those
relationships with other chiefs of defense, and again, the
value of these relationships I have as an air chief will open
the door. And even if I do not know that chief of defense,
having a relationship with that air chief actually helps to
open the door and build a new relationship with a chief of
defense who I do not already know, if confirmed.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And Mr. Chairman, just one
very quick, 10 seconds?
Chairman Reed. Yes.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify,
because came in late. I apologize for that. But I only heard
half of my colleague's questioning to you. And he seemed to say
that he thought that you were advocating for quotas, racial
quotas, in recruiting. I did not think that was the case. My
understanding is that you want to broaden the recruiting and
allow anybody who wants to serve, who qualifies to serve, and
making sure that people have access to service, or are you
actually implementing racial quotas and saying only a certain
number of Asians, a certain number of Blacks, a certain number
of whites can be recruited?
General Brown. No. Broaden the pool, and we do not have
quotas. That is against policy for staff quotas.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you for clarifying that, General.
Chairman Reed. Senator Scott, please. Thank you, Senator
Duckworth.
Senator Scott. Chair, first, General Brown, thank you for
your service, and I want to thank your wife for her service.
You have got a stellar background.
I just got back from the Middle East. I was in Israel when
they had to go into Jenin and kill the terrorists that were
targeting Israeli citizens. And everybody I talked to in
Israel, all they talked about was the problems with Iran. I
went to Bahrain, and they were concerned about the menace of
Iran. And I went to UAE, and it is the same thing. Everybody is
concerned about what is going on with Iran.
Also while I was over there the U.S. Navy was able to--and
you really have to admire, I think it is the 5th Fleet--what
they did. They stopped two ships from being taken over by
Iranian forces and did a great job.
So here is my question. And as far as I understand, most of
these tankers that are going through the Strait of Hormuz are
not flagged in America. They are not owned by American
companies. So can you talk about what is the value of the U.S.
Military, U.S. Navy, being there. That is number one. number
two is, are allies doing their part, or should we be doing less
and let our allies deal with it?
General Brown. Well, the role of the U.S. Navy in that
region, and along with the other services, is to help provide
security within the region, which actually may have a global
impact. And so the role that the Navy plays to help the free
flow of commerce that impacts not just the United States but,
more broadly, those countries in the region but many of our
allies and partners, and that plays a key role in our
participation there.
I think we have got to stay involved with our allies and
partners, and as you highlighted, many of the countries in the
region have started to talk more about Iran. And I think that
is one of the areas that I, having served there with United
States Central Command several times, we have been focused on
counterterrorism. You now think about the aspect of Iran in the
national security documents, the National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, the coalescing of all the nations
now to talk about this opportunity to work more closely
together in our collective efforts to deter the activities by
Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf or any other place in
the Middle East.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Another thing you brought up is--
and a lot of the leaders were concerned about what the Biden
administration is doing with regard to trying to negotiate some
sort of deal with Iran. And once I get back I hear that the FBI
is investigating Robert Malley, who recently served as
President Biden's special envoy to Iran, because his security
clearance was suspended based on mishandling of classified
information.
So does this concern you, or are you concerned when we you
are going to have an obligation to try to defend the transit
and help Israel, things like that, and then over here you have
got the Biden administration trying to negotiate some deal that
is going to possibly give Iran more resources?
General Brown. Sir, the thing that I do think about is the
role of how all parts of our government play in our overall
deterrence. And it is not just what the military does. It is
what we do in the diplomatic space, it is what we do in the
information space, what we do economically. I think all those
things work collectively together, and if confirmed as Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs I think I have a responsibility--I need to
provide the military advice, but I need to put it in the
context and understanding the other factors that are in play as
well.
Senator Scott. Okay. Thank you. Homestead Air Force Base,
we talked about that when we met. Can you talk about the
importance of continuing to find a mission for Homestead Air
Force Base, especially when you look at what now it looks like
China is doing in Cuba. Can you tell me what you believe is the
importance of Homestead?
General Brown. Well, having spent 4 years at Homestead, and
a matter of fact, that is where my wife and I, our first
assignment after we got married, we have fond memories of being
there.
But to your question, the capability we have down in
southern Florida, that Reserve unit, and having flown with that
Reserve unit when I was stationed there on Active Duty, is
still being able to have a capability. That is something that
we are working internal to the Air Force to ensure that
Homestead still has a mission, and we still have a platform to
operate there. And continuing dialog that we will have, and we
will have with you as well, and the Air Force will have with
you as well, as we look at Homestead and ensure that we
maintain a mission there.
Senator Scott. All right. Thank you, and thanks for your
service. Congratulations on your success. When I joined the
Navy, it was a melting pot. It was a great melting pot. It gave
you an opportunity to meet people that you probably would never
meet. And I do not believe in quotas. I do not think anybody
should.
But I do believe it is a great melting pot, and I think if
we can recruit more people from different backgrounds, we ought
to be doing that. But do not ever impact somebody's ability to
get ahead because they might have a different skin color or
background that somebody else. It sounds like you completely
agree with that.
General Brown. I do.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott, and
General Brown, thank you too.
I just want to raise an issue or discussion about this
August 2022 memorandum. It was designed to increase the pool of
applicants, essentially to search for more talent. It was not
designed to set the composition of the Air Force. Is that
accurate?
General Brown. That is correct. It was only application
goals. It was not designed to eliminate the opportunities for
anyone. It was just looking to open up the opportunities for as
many as we could, and make sure we are outreaching to----
Chairman Reed. And this memorandum was signed by the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, Space Operations Chief, and I believe that is it. So it
was a combined effort by the leadership of the Department of
the Air Force.
General Brown. Yes, Chairman, it was.
Chairman Reed. I would like to quote from the memorandum.
``These goals are aspirational, aligning resources to invest in
our long-term objectives, and will not be used in any manner
that undermines our merit-based processes.'' So the memorandum
clearly declares that merit is the one standard by which you
merit accession to the Air Force and promotion in the Air
Force.
General Brown. Yes, Senator. As a matter of fact, if that
kind of statement was not included I would have never signed
that letter.
Chairman Reed. I completely concur, and I know your
character. You would not have signed the letter.
General Brown, thank you. I look forward to your
confirmation. I think you will lead with distinction and set an
example of professionalism and skill that is continuing the
example set by your predecessor.
With that I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to General Charles Q. Brown,
Jr., USAF by Chairman Jack Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense,
section 153 of title 10 further assigns the Chairman responsibility for
assisting the President and the Secretary in providing for the
strategic direction of the armed forces; strategic and contingency
planning; global military integration; comprehensive joint readiness;
joint capability development; and joint force development activities,
among other matters.
Question. Given the responsibilities of the Chairman, as enumerated
in law, what background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
qualify you to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. In my over 38 years of military service, I've had the honor
of leading and serving in the world's most respected Air Force
alongside Total Force airmen--Active, guard, reserve, and civilians,
the Joint Force, and our allies and partners. My assignments have
covered issues from the operational to the strategic and have ranged
from flying in combat, to serving on joint and component staffs to
ensuring the Air Force accelerates the change necessary for us to
remain the most dominant Air Force in the world. For the past 14 years
and over 8 different assignments, I have been in leadership positions
focused on the five national security challenges--China, Russia, North
Korea, Iran, and Violent Extremists. As Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, and throughout my career, I've had the privilege of supporting
not only servicemembers, but their families as well. These experiences
have prepared me for the humbling responsibilities of being Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if confirmed.
Question. Do you believe there is any action that you need to take
to enhance your ability to exercise the responsibilities of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. If confirmed, I would carefully consider any actions that
would enhance my ability to exercise the responsibilities of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; I do not have recommendations at
present.
In matters requiring global military strategic and operational
integration, the Chairman is responsible for providing advice to the
President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing military operations and
advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces among
geographic and functional Combatant Commands, as may be necessary to
address transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats.
Question. If confirmed, how would you execute these advisory
functions, while ensuring that your role does not invoke command
authority or infringe on the responsibilities of the Combatant
Commanders?
Answer. I am keenly attuned to the distinction between the
Chairman's advisory functions and the command authority and
responsibilities of the Combatant Commanders.
If confirmed, I would conduct the Chairman's advisory functions by
maintaining detailed awareness of ongoing and emerging issues within or
across the Combatant Command areas of responsibility. Where tensions
between resourcing and other requirements may exist, I commit to
communicating my resultant advice to the President and Secretary of
Defense, always cognizant of the chain of command as described in law.
Question. If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship
with the Combatant Commanders to effect these responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Combatant Commanders
would be structured based on the existing mechanisms and procedures in
law and policy.
Question. If confirmed, and given your observations and experience
as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to
the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and operation of
the Joint Staff?
Answer. I do have some perspectives on potential opportunities
based on my experience over the past decade plus. If confirmed, I would
carefully evaluate and consider the organization and operation of the
Joint Staff before recommending any changes.
I will continue to deepen my understanding of Goldwater Nichols Act
history, current and past Joint Staff operations, processes, and
organizational construct, as well as the most recent rounds of defense
reforms codified in several National Defense Authorization Acts.
Additionally, several congressionally mandated Commissions have or
are performing invaluable service on topics such as artificial
intelligence, strategic posture, and the Department's Planning
Programming and Budget system. I'd like to take a deeper look at this
work to inform any innovative ideas or recommendations I might provide
to the Secretary of Defense.
Question. To the extent the Joint Staff performs functions that
overlap with those of other DOD Components--particularly with regard to
regional or functional topics--what would be your approach, if
confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would carefully consider this issue before
recommending any changes. I am aware that Congress worked with the
department to look at these issues in the past.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you would face if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff?
Answer. Significant shifts in geopolitics and technology are
converging with efforts by China and Russia to contest the post-World
War II international order. Our alliances endure but are subject to
stress and pressures catalyzed by intensifying and accelerating trends.
The Joint Force, along with our allies and partners must now rapidly
build appropriate capabilities and capacities to deter, and if
necessary, prevail in great power conflict.
Our greatest challenges are not necessarily always those presented
by our adversaries, but there are areas of improvement we need to
address with more discipline and urgency.
For instance, we need to improve collaboration and sharing with
trusted and new partners, whether foreign militaries or in various
commercial sectors. Time is not on our side.
Our greatest asset is the American people--and the spirit of
inspiration and innovation that have made this country a global leader.
DOD needs to recruit and retain some of America's best to defend the
Nation, while finding better ways to collaborate with America's finest
in other domains and pursuits. The same applies to collaboration with
our allies and partners.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to establish a better understanding
of where we are and where we can improve on achieving the most critical
priorities in our strategies and concepts. I am committed to open
dialog and collaboration to achieve our national security goals. With
this approach, I think I will be in a better position to work within
the Department and with Congress to share my thoughts and advice. I
look forward to engaging with you to seek your counsel and input.
Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
DOD and the Joint Staff have been unable to leverage (or have leveraged
only in part) during the period of your service as the Chief of Staff
of the Air Force and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. og with a sense of urgency and a willingness to change to
advance national security objectives, to enhance warfighting capability
and capacity, and to enhance deterrence.
There are a few opportunities that I'd like to highlight where I
would like to offer my office and energy, if confirmed.
We need to continue building an environment where all our
servicemembers and their families can reach their full potential. This
will need to be done in collaboration with DOD leaders and the civic
leaders and communities that support our bases.
There are opportunities to increase emphasis on non-
materiel efforts in DOD--education and training, experimentation, and
public-private partnerships. These need to be better coupled with the
materiel programs and initiatives of the Department.
There are opportunities to build stronger relationships
with the commercial sector and emerging technologies, both within the
U.S. and with our allies and partners.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that DOD and the Joint Staff leverage these opportunities, and
on what timeline?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make significant effort within my
authority and empower others within my span of control to encourage
innovation and initiative at speed and scale.
If confirmed, I would also make a swift and considered assessment
through the lens of the threat environment to inform specific
initiatives and milestones.
civilian control of the military
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that your tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the
Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. I am fully committed to the laws, policies, and norms
associated with civilian control of the United States Armed Forces and
look forward to working collaboratively with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
Congress is a key partner in fortifying our Nation's civil-military
foundation.
I would seek to maintain and fortify the trust of the executive
branch, Congress, and the citizens we defend. This includes supporting
the Department's civilian leadership to advance the implementation of
the National Defense Strategy in ways consistent with our Nation's
civil-military laws, policies, and norms.
I would also work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant
Commanders to affirm civilian control across our collective roles,
responsibilities, and organizations.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy are fully engaged in preparing guidance for and reviewing
contingency plans?
Answer. I support a collaborative planning relationship among
civilian and military organizations consistent with the roles and
responsibilities articulated in law and policy.
If confirmed, I would examine the efficiency, effectiveness, and
alignment of our current planning processes and constructs in achieving
our national security objectives. I would consult with the Department's
civilian and military leadership to guide and inform any recommended
actions or adjustments.
I welcome continued dialog with Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness are fully engaged in evaluating and
reporting on the readiness of DOD Components, and if necessary, in
mitigating readiness gaps and shortfalls?
Answer. The Chairman has specific responsibilities articulated in
law and policy to ensure the comprehensive joint readiness of the force
in the present, and the future.
I am committed to ensuring the Department's civilian and military
leadership are fully engaged and informed to evaluate the readiness of
DOD components to execute the National Defense and Military strategies.
I will deepen my understanding of the extensive set of issues,
processes, and existing efforts to improve our Department's
decisionmaking and reporting about joint force readiness, including
alignment with other related processes.
I will work with Congress, a key partner, to build and sustain
comprehensive joint force readiness.
Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the
military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive
branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays
a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
Answer. Congress is a critical stakeholder and partner in the
American tradition of civilian control of our military.
Congressional roles and responsibilities for oversight and funding
of the military depend on a regular and trusted dialog at multiple
levels of DOD-congressional interaction.
We are at a critical moment in geopolitics and technological change
that will require improving existing ways, new ideas, and harnessing
the power of America's powers of innovation and inspiration.
I believe it is imperative that we sustain robust congressional
oversight and the necessary and on-time funding as key components of
civilian control. But DOD also welcomes Congress' ideas and leadership
to make many of the necessary changes to retain our competitive
military advantage.
If confirmed, I will strive to be your best partner, while
affirming civilian control in both the Executive and legislative
branches.
Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and
defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the
responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian
leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political
priorities?
Answer. I view these responsibilities as complementary and
reinforcing.
Military advice should help provide options to our Nation's
civilian leaders that support policy, while providing professional
military judgments about the associated strategy, risk, readiness, and
resource considerations.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the
Department when supporting law enforcement in State or national
emergencies?
Answer. DOD should be prepared to support civilian law enforcement
agencies consistent with the legal limitations on direct DOD
involvement in civilian law enforcement activities. DOD support to law
enforcement should be considered against military readiness
requirements to execute the National Defense and Military Strategies.
If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will
testify regularly before Congress, and may be asked to comment on
partisan political matters.
Question. What is your view of your responsibility to provide your
best military advice to Congress while also ensuring that you and your
office remain apolitical, recognizing that you serve as a model for
other senior uniformed officers and the entire armed forces?
Answer. If confirmed and as I've done as the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, I am committed to maintaining regular and open lines of
communication to ensure Congress can exercise its oversight duties in
an informed and timely manner. My engagements will remain apolitical,
and I am cognizant that my actions serve as a model for other senior
uniformed officers and the entire armed forces.
Throughout my tenure, the Office of the Chairman and Joint Staff
would speak and act with the utmost respect for American civil-military
tradition and norms. I would expect no less from the Joint Chiefs and
Combatant Commands. Together, we would seek to continuously earn your
trust, and that of the American public.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the
operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary
of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the
Combatant Commands. Pursuant to Section 163(a) of title 10, the
President has directed that communications between the President or the
Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands be
transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes, I believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command.
Question. In your view, how does this chain of command and chain of
communication effectuate civilian control of the military?
Answer. chain of command facilitates effective civilian control of
the military, provides for clear lines of communication, and promotes
accountability, as intended by the Goldwater Nichols Act. The chain of
communications facilitates the Chairman's responsibility to oversee and
advocate for Combatant Commanders, while synthesizing Combatant
Commander perspectives into military advice to civilian authorities.
Question. Section 163(a) of title 10 provides that the President
may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the
Secretary of Defense in exercising their command function.
In your view, are there other roles or responsibilities that should
be assigned to the Chairman, to better enable the Chairman's assistance
to the President and the Secretary of Defense in their exercise of
command functions?
Answer. At this time, I believe the roles and responsibilities
currently assigned to the Chairman are sufficient, and do not have
recommendations for any additional roles and responsibilities.
If confirmed, I will perform the duties of the Chairman with an
open mind and consult with the Secretary and with Congress should I
conclude there are additional roles or responsibilities that should be
considered.
the joint chiefs of staff
Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, codifies the role of
the Joint Chiefs as military advisors to the President, the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense.
What is your assessment of the authorities and process by which you
and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would provide
military advice and opinions to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. The FY2017 NDAA enhanced the roles of the Chairman, the
other Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body,
to provide military advice to civilian leaders. As a member of the
Joint Chiefs for 3 years, I have seen this provision implemented, and I
assess the authorities and process as sufficient and appropriate for
providing military advice and opinions to the President, the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best
military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Homeland Security Council, even when your advice and opinions might
differ from those of other members of the Cabinet, the President's
other senior advisors, or from the President's own views?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to providing independent
military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council, even when
my advice may differ from views of other cabinet members, the
President's other advisors, or the President himself.
This is a fundamental part of performing my duties faithfully and
responsibly, and in alignment with the Chairman's statutory
responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best
military advice to the Secretary of Defense, even when your advice and
opinions might differ from those of other DOD senior officials, or from
the Secretary's own views?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, how would you elicit from the individual
Service Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the
Combatant Commanders, their best military advice, including advice and
opinions that may diverge your own?
Answer. If confirmed, I would foster an environment that encourages
dialog across a range of views and ideas, to include dissenting and
alternate viewpoints. I would faithfully represent the range of ideas
and views of the JCS and Combatant Commanders to our civilian leaders.
Question. If confirmed, how would you inform the President, the
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense, of the advice or opinion of another member of the
Joint Chiefs, which may differ from advice you have presented on a
matter?
Answer. In the instances where a Joint Chief offers a
recommendation or has views different than my own, I have a duty to
present alternate or dissenting views. When appropriate, I would
facilitate communication between my JCS teammate and the principal to
ensure effective and informed communication.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your response upon being
advised that other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually
or collectively, intend to provide their advice on a matter directly to
the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, the Secretary of Defense, or the Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the President, National
Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense
receive a well-considered range of views, expertise, and information.
Should other members of the Joint Chiefs, individually or collectively,
elect to provide advice directly, I would facilitate JCS communication
with civilian leadership, while maintaining both awareness and
engagement.
strategic guidance documents within the department of defense
Question. If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
specifically what would be your role in generating and shaping the
content of, and improving DOD component compliance with, each such
document?
National Security Strategy
Answer. The NSS outlines how the U.S. will advance its interests
and pursue a free, open, prosperous, and secure world. It provides
strategic direction for DOD and the interagency in the pursuit of
national security objectives. If confirmed, as the Chairman I will
provide my military advice to support the NSS.
Question. National Defense Strategy
Answer. The NDS directs the Department to act urgently to sustain
and strengthen United States deterrence with the PRC as the pacing
challenge. If confirmed, as the Chairman, I will provide military
advice to the Secretary of Defense to help shape those priorities and
then direct the NMS to develop the ways and means to meet those
objectives.
Question. National Military Strategy
Answer. The NMS outlines the ways and means to support the NDS
objectives. It provides strategic direction for the Joint Force, and,
if confirmed, as the Chairman I will support and provide my military
advice on implementation of the NMS.
Question. Chairman's Risk Assessment
Answer. Title 10 directs the Chairman to prepare an annual
assessment that identifies and defines the military strategic risks to
United States interests and military risks to the execution of the NMS.
The Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) is developed in collaboration with
the Services and Combatant Commands (CCMDs), with the final approval
and discretion of the Chairman, using a common methodology to appraise
and communicate risk. If confirmed, I will continue to use the CRA as
my recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and will continue to use
the CRA as my recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and
Question. Contingency Planning Guidance
Answer. The Chairman directs the implementation of the Contingency
Planning Guidance (CPG) and integrates contingency planning across
Combatant Commands for each of the NDS key threats. The Chairman uses
the guidance in the CPG in the development of the NMS and Joint
Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). Additionally, the Chairman provides
guidance for preparing and reviewing contingency plans that conform to
policy guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense. Last, the
Chairman ensures that plans are feasible, suitable, acceptable, and
complete for presentation to the Secretary. If confirmed, I will
continue directing the implementation of the CPG and its use in the
development of the NMS and JSCP.
Question. Defense Planning Guidance
Answer. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) establishes the
Secretary of Defense's strategic resource priorities. If confirmed, as
the Chairman I would produce the Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CPR) which directly informs the DPG. I would consider a multitude of
assessments to include the annual Capability Gap Assessment, Chairman's
Risk Assessment, and others to ensure the Joint Force aligns means to
ends and ways, in light of risk, allowing me to provide the best
strategic advice possible.
Question. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
Answer. The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) enables the
execution of the Chairman's statutory responsibilities for strategic
and contingency planning, global military integration, and the
Chairman's oversight prescribed in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 153,
163, and 113. If confirmed, I would use the JSCP to operationalize the
NMS into actionable tasks for global military leaders.
Question. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
Answer. The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
allows the Secretary of Defense to integrate complementary policy and
guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment,
and assessment into a single authoritative document. If confirmed, my
role is to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of readiness and
requirements of the CCMDs. Additionally, I advise the Secretary of
Defense on matters of risk related to allocation and assignment of
forces to better support resource-informed planning and enable the
force to be dynamically employed.
Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD's
processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and
reporting for each of the aforementioned strategic guidance documents?
Answer. The Department has a robust process for strategic
assessment, analysis, and decisionmaking to include several cross-
departmental senior leader decisionmaking forums, in addition to
informal processes such as the Chairman's Joint Strategic Planning
System. If confirmed, I will continue cross-departmental collaboration
to ensure decisionmaking processes are supported by all the rigorous
analyses and assessments, and properly synchronized across the
supported by all the rigorous analyses and assessments, and properly
synchronized across the supported by all the rigorous analyses and
assessments, and properly synchronized across the supported by all the
rigorous analyses and assessments, and properly synchronized across the
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to
update, improve, or make these reviews and guidance more impactful and
useful to the Department and to Congress?
Answer. The Joint Staff currently provides thorough analysis and
review of all the previously mentioned reviews and guidance,
incorporating inputs from across the Joint Force. If confirmed, I would
encourage the Joint Staff to continuously seek to improve and align
processes and products in order to clearly communicate to the
Department and Congress in a timely manner.
Question. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would undertake
all necessary action to ensure that each of these strategic guidance
documents is timely generated and issued, and updated, as necessary to
reflect changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?
Answer. Yes.
use of military force
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force
and the rules of engagement?
Answer. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to
use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the
President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on
the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.
Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
use of military force?
Answer. If confirmed, my recommendations to the President and
Secretary of Defense on the use of military force will be consistent
with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I would
consider probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and
strategic risk.
Question. What is your understanding of your role, if confirmed, in
the application of the Administration's policy and legal framework for
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force?
Answer. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
provides a legal basis for operations against certain violent extremist
organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure Joint Force operations are
consistent with the policies of current and past administrations
expressed in reports on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the
United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security
Operations.
Question. Are you satisfied that current legal authorities,
including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable
the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities
at a level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?
Answer. Yes, at present, we have the legal authorities to carry out
U.S. counterterrorism operations at the necessary and appropriate
level.
Question. In your view, is a new Authorization for the Use of
Military Force needed at this time? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The current AUMF provides the authority necessary to
conduct current operations.
Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
recommending to the Secretary of Defense which forces of other nations
should be eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. Forces, and
under what conditions?
Answer. When ``collective self-defense'' rules of engagement are
authorized, U.S. Forces may defend foreign forces against any attack or
threat of imminent attack. If confirmed, the key factors I would
consider in a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense would be the
legality of ``collective self-defense'' for the situation in question
and if its execution is in the interests of the U.S.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it
appropriate for U.S. Military Forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
established under title 10, U.S. Code?
Answer. Normally, the U.S. Armed Forces operate under the
established title 10 chain of command. However, there may be
appropriate instances for the President to establish other temporary
command relationships due to certain sensitive military operations.
Regardless of the command relationship, U.S. military personnel are
still accountable to the Title 10 chain of command and are subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Furthermore, any operations the
armed forces support are governed by the law of armed conflict. If
confirmed, I would give the President my advice in any instance where
an exception to the Title 10 chain of command may be warranted.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel
to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? If
confirmed, how would you modify these agreements or authorities, if at
all?
Answer. I understand that relevant authorities and agreements
provide the necessary framework for military forces to support
activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies when
called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as the situation
dictates. I believe that the current authorities and agreements are
sufficient. If confirmed, I look forward to that the current
authorities and agreements are sufficient. If confirmed, I look forward
to that the current authorities and agreements are sufficient. If
confirmed, I look forward to
civilian casualties
Question. In August 2022, the Department released a Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) to address various
aspects of the Department's policy, processes, and procedures related
to investigating and responding to civilian casualty incidents.
In your view, what are the primary challenges for the combatant
commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of
civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. The largest hurdles are timely receipt of allegations and
access to evidence necessary to investigate. Implementation of CHMR-AP
will assist Combatant Commands to learn and share best practices to
improve Joint Force responses.
Question. What is your understanding of the implementation status
of the CHMR-AP and what additional actions do you believe need to be
taken to enable the Department of Defense to more effectively mitigate,
investigate, and respond to allegations of civilian casualties
resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. DOD is currently focused on hiring requisite personnel to
implement the Action Plan. I agree with Secretary Austin that the
highest CHMR-AP implementation priorities for the Department are
continuing to hire requisite staff, continuing to stand up the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence to serve as the DOD's hub of analysis,
learning, and training related to CHMR, and publishing a new DOD
Instruction on CHMR to formalize Departmental policies,
responsibilities, and procedures related to CHMR.
Question. Do you believe the combatant commands are sufficiently
resourced for mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations
of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. Yes. However, the Department can always improve our
performance. Implementation of CHMR-AP will assist the Joint Force to
improve. We are in the process of staffing the Department, to include
the combatant commands, with the personnel necessary to effectively
implement CHMR-AP.
Question. When civilian casualty allegations arise, do you believe
they should be investigated by personnel sufficiently independent of
the unit or task force which conducted the strike?
Answer. I believe civilian casualty allegations should be assessed
and investigated in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's
direction in the CHMR-AP. The CHMR-AP directs each Combatant Commander
to designate a senior official to serve as the Civilian Harm Combatant
Commander to designate a senior official to serve as the Civilian Harm
Combatant Commander to designate a senior official to serve as the
Civilian Harm Combatant Commander to designate a senior official to
serve as the Civilian Harm
Question. How can the Department more effectively capture and share
lessons learned from civilian casualty investigations so they can be
incorporated into future operations?
Answer. I support the Secretary of Defense's vision for the nascent
Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP-CoE) to institutionalize
the advancement of knowledge, practices, and tools for preventing,
mitigating, and responding to civilian harm. The CP-CoE will be the hub
and facilitator of Department-wide analysis, learning, and strategic
approaches, and will help institutionalize good practice for CHMR
during operations.
joint operations
Question. The Goldwater Nichols Act enabled an unprecedented degree
of jointness within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Combatant
Commanders. Today, both the DOD and Congress recognize the need for a
deeper level of integration and interoperability to overcome anti-
access and area denial (A2/AD) networks and to deter and defeat large-
scale aggression.
How would you characterize the jointness that is needed today?
Answer. The progress that the Goldwater Nichols Act enabled with
respect to joint operations remains foundational for our ability to
deter and if necessary, prevail in today's security environment. The
growing sophistication of current and future threats requires us to
move beyond integration between Services. To succeed we must integrate
jointly across combatant command boundaries, domains (including cyber
and space domains), the whole of government, and with our allies and
partners to successfully sustain integrated deterrence.
Question. What do you perceive to be the role and capability
requirements for close combat formations in future joint force
operations?
Answer. The ultimate role of combat units (including close combat)
will always be to engage and destroy the enemy. The future warfighting
environment will not obviate the need for close combat formations. The
changing character of war, specifically the rapidly expanding
importance of doctrine that informs commanders how to leverage the
electro-magnetic spectrum, information, space, and cyber capabilities;
requires us to reevaluate required capabilities and capacity, and how
we build, train, and employ the Joint Force. The Joint Warfighting
Concept is the unifying vision for Joint Force development, design, and
warfighting approach.
Question. Service led joint and coalition experimentation events
are improving interoperability and identifying critical gaps.
What is the Joint Staff's appropriate role in experimentation?
Answer. The Joint Staff has two roles in experimentation. First, it
should manage integrated campaigns of learning to examine specific
problems, gaps, and critical capabilities described in the Joint
Warfighting Concept. Second, with its limited ability to prioritize
joint funding on experimentation it should prioritize experimentation
for joint peculiar problems that are highlighted through concepts or
capability gaps.
Question. How would you ensure the Joint Staff is appropriately
facilitating joint experimentation during the capabilities development
process?
Answer. The Joint Staff is organized to facilitate joint
experimentation in synch with the capability's development process. If
confirmed, I would continue to integrate and synchronize
experimentation not only across the Department of Defense but also with
the Interagency and our allies and partners.
Question. What role do you foresee playing in influencing joint and
enabling capabilities development that will link or knit together
service-specific capabilities, such as Joint All Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) or contested logistics?
Answer. The recently released Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC)
provides a framework to determine which Service specific capabilities
need to be more closely integrated. If confirmed as the Chairman, I
would continue to use the JROC as an advisory council to inform my
advice to the Secretary of Defense on requirements. Specifically, the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process
was created to support the statutory responsibility of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to validate joint warfighting
requirements from Combatant Commands and Services which include CJADC2
and contested logistics.
The JROC and JCIDS processes and combined Joint Staff collaboration
with the Combatant Commands and Services identify the integration and
interoperable capabilities the Joint Force requires to operate across
all warfighting domains. These requirements will be communicated
through the Chairman's Program Recommendation to ensure the Services
understand and apply resources against our most critical operational
priorities.
joint force headquarters and component commands
Question. Is the current model for creating joint force
headquarters below the unified command level appropriate and adequate
to meet the challenges articulated in the 2022 NDS? In your view, are
there other models you have seen that we should be considering?
Answer. The current model is appropriate and adequate, but if
confirmed, I will examine joint force headquarters models.
Question. Given the time required to stand up, man, and train joint
force headquarters, and the short warning time that is expected before
a potential conflict in certain areas of operation, would Combatant
Commanders' operations and contingency planning and preparedness be
improved by creating and exercising subordinate joint force
headquarters during the competition phase?
Answer. Creating a subordinate joint force headquarters prior to
emergence of crisis could improve operations, planning, and
preparedness depending on the specific circumstances. Doing so would
require analysis to determine if and when early establishment is
warranted considering priorities for manpower allocation, staff
actions, and expense across the Joint Force. If confirmed, I will
examine this possibility with the Combatant Commanders and Joint
Chiefs.
Question. The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) required the Secretary of Defense to establish a standing joint
force headquarters (JFHQ) in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility
(AOR). What is your view on the need for a JFHQ in this AOR?
Answer. The Indo-Pacific is the United States Military's number one
area of focus and China is the pacing challenge. When the DOD is called
on to respond to international crises, we use the Joint Force to
quickly integrate forces and capabilities across the military services.
Creating a Joint Force Headquarters in the AOR can improve the
Combatant Commanders' operations, contingency planning, and
preparedness. For USINDOPACOM, the time to create and appropriately
staff a JFHQ, and establish their communication and coordination
channels across the military services, U.S. Government agencies, and
allies and partners is ahead of crisis. In accordance with the NDAA, I
believe it is prudent to conduct mission analysis to define
requirements and take the steps to establish a JFHQ in USINDOPACOM to
enable persistent, all-domain awareness and credible deterrence against
our adversaries.
Question. What are the most significant obstacles to establishing
and exercising such joint force headquarters in advance of a crisis,
and what could be done to overcome those obstacles, in your view?
Answer. Our combatant commanders are appropriately staffed to
manage day-to-day operations up to crisis. Prematurely establishing a
joint force headquarters in contingency pulls resources from other
global operations and activities. However, if confirmed, I will examine
this possibility with the Combatant Commanders and Joint Chiefs.
Question. What new technical capabilities, processes, or concepts
of employment do you think would be needed to improve our ability to
achieve high levels of readiness for, and realistically exercise, such
joint force headquarters prior to a crisis, or to rapidly establish in
the event of an unforeseen crisis?
Answer. Our combatant commanders maintain a high level of readiness
for establishing joint force headquarters and regularly exercise and
test their ability to do so in advance of an unforeseen crisis. The
joint force is always looking at emerging technical capabilities,
processes, and concepts, and we regularly conduct joint exercises to
help develop and improve processes as well as inform concepts. If
confirmed, I will continue these efforts to identify opportunities to
achieve high levels of readiness.
2022 national defense strategy (nds)
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``mutually beneficial Alliances and
partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical
and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
its allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The 2022 NDS was developed with the military advice from
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Force. In my
view, it accurately assesses the current strategic environment and
articulates the position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on
the PRC as our pacing challenge and Russia as the acute threat.
Question. The National Military Strategy (NMS) underscores the
importance of ``ruthlessly prioritizing'' to ensure the right balance
is struck between long-term modernization investments on the one hand,
and near-term efforts to enable INDOPACOM and EUCOM to deter and
counter aggression by our pacing competitors. In your view, are their
examples that substantiate this assertion?
Answer. Yes, and I would be willing to discuss further in a
classified setting.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS correctly specify the
priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can
achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic
environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?
Answer. I believe the priorities established in the 2022 NDS are
correct for the current strategic environment and that China will
remain the most consequential strategic competitor for the immediate
future, while Russia, as a major nuclear power, still constitutes an
acute threat. Our greatest risk, however, is our ability to continue to
address the current strategic environment at a level needed to deter
aggression while preparing for an uncertain future. I would be willing
to discuss more detail in a classified setting.
Question. In your view, are the plans and programs of the
Commanders of the Combatant Commands appropriately focused, scoped, and
resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security
objectives identified by the 2022 NDS?
Answer. Yes. I believe the plans and programs of the Combatant
Commanders are appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to achieve
the 2022 NDS national security objectives within acceptable levels of
risk.
Question. In your view, are the forces of each of the Military
Services appropriately sized, structured, postured, and resourced to
implement the 2022 NDS and the Combatant Commanders' associated
operational plans? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the Military Services can field sufficient,
capable forces to meet the requirements established in the 2022 NDS. I
also believe that their current posture and structure is appropriate to
address the demands of the directed CCMD operational plans, within
acceptable levels of risk. I would be happy to go into this in more
detail in a classified setting.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff has the requisite analytic
capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in evaluating the Military Services' force
design, force structure and sizing strategies, and requirements for
acquisition programs, to ensure that each Service can and will generate
forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to execute the
operational plans associated with the 2022 NDS?
Answer. DOD continually strives to deliver robust analytics
supporting future joint force design and development to meet NDS
priorities. If confirmed, I will commit assessing and making any
recommendations to ensure the Joint Staff has the capability, capacity
and tools to evaluate the Joint warfighting capabilities of the United
States, its allies and partners against those of potential NDS priority
adversaries.
Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff has, or has access to, the
requisite modeling and simulation capabilities and tools to support
you, if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in
assessing whether the Combatant Commanders' operational plans can and
will achieve the national security objectives identified by the 2022
NDS? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the warfighting modeling and simulation tools we have
help assess and refine war plans in partnership with the Combatant
Commands and Service Components. These tools help us determine the
warfighting merit of operational plans and explore alternative
approaches in pursuit of better warfighting options. It is through
these comparative analyses that we better understand and refine
operational plans; but none are predictive.
Question. In your view, are the Combat Support Agencies properly
designated, structured, and manned to support implementation of the
2022 NDS and execution of the Combatant Commanders' operational plans?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) are designated, structured,
and manned to support implementation of 2022 NDS and Combatant Command
(CCMD) operational plans. As required by Title 10, the CJCS submits
biennial assessments to Congress of the responsiveness and readiness of
each CSA to support the CCMDs. While each assessment highlights areas
for improvement, to my knowledge none have identified major shortfalls
that require changes with respect to designation, structure, or
manning.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
the missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries) of
the Combatant Commands, better to implement the 2022 NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the results of
the congressionally directed independent review of the Unified Command
Plan (UCP), to include recommendations on alternative UCP structures.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's current
implementation of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. I have none at this time but, if confirmed, I will continue
supporting the NDS implementation periodic reviews and if I think
changes are required then I will advise the Secretary of Defense at
that time. Concurrently, I will periodically review the National
Military Strategy implementation, which details specific military
policies required to meet the guidance contained in the National
Defense Strategy.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do if you determine that the
DOD cannot meet the demands placed on it by the 2022 NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I will constantly assess demands and work to
ensure our forces are postured appropriately, identify risks, and take
steps to mitigate. I will also work closely with allies and partners to
advance military interoperability and burden-sharing to help decrease
risk globally and strengthen our ability to meet current and future
defense challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments, if any,
would you recommend the Secretary of Defense make to the 2022 NDS as a
result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?
Answer. Current Title 10 responsibilities for the Chairman include
providing advice relating to global military and strategic and
operational integration. If confirmed, my recommendation would be to
ensure that the guiding policy documents including National Defense
Strategy and Contingency Planning Guidance are aligned and reflective
of strategic global integration. By doing this, I can ensure that the
National Military Strategy and associated Joint Strategic By doing
this, I can ensure that the National Military Strategy and associated
Joint Strategic By doing this, I can ensure that the National Military
Strategy and associated Joint Strategic By doing this, I can ensure
that the National Military Strategy and associated Joint Strategic
Question. How do you see the role of DOD within a broader whole-of-
government effort to compete strategically with near-peer rivals below
the level of direct military conflict?
Answer. The DOD performs an essential role in whole-of-government
competition with near-peer adversaries through the NDS concept of
integrated deterrence and campaigning to achieve enduring advantages.
Integrated deterrence and campaigning requires the Department to align
its policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen
deterrence, tailored to our competitors, and coordinated and
synchronized with our interagency partners and allies and partner
nations to maximize the effect. At the core of the 2022 NDS is the
concept of Integrated Deterrence and Campaigning ranging from our
strategic nuclear deterrent to our conventional activities that include
annual military exercises, rotational deployments, civil-military
engagements, professionalization of partner militaries, and security
cooperation activities with our allies and partners. DOD forward
presence and operations, activities, and investments deter adversaries
to prevent crises from escalating into conflict. DOD also provides
necessary support to the diplomatic, informational, and economic
instruments of national power, backing those efforts through military
diplomacy, strategic messaging, a range of military investments, and
when required, the threat of force. If confirmed, I will continue to
support the Secretary's guidance and provide advice on how the Joint
Force can support a whole of government effort to preserve the peace
and ensure security for the Nation and our allies and partners.
department of defense budget
Question. In your view, are the programs and resources required to
generate the capabilities necessary to implement the 2022 NDS properly
prioritized within the Department of Defense? If confirmed, do you
believe the Department needs to realign or refocus programs and
funding, if at all?
Answer. The FY24 budget is strategy-driven and focused on executing
the NDS. I am confident we have the right mix of capabilities and
capacity to defend against current and future threats. If confirmed, I
will continue to support the Department in aligning resources to
strategy.
In its 2018 report that evaluated the previous NDS, the National
Defense Strategy Commission recommended that Congress increase the
Department of Defense (DOD) base defense budget at an average rate of
three to 5 percent above inflation through the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP).
Question. Do you believe that 3-5 percent real budgetary growth
through the FYDP is required to implement the 2022 NDS effectively?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. What's more important than a specific percentage of real
budgetary growth through the FYDP is ensuring that our annual budgeting
cycle closely analyzes operational risk and is aligned to our strategy.
Additionally, on time appropriations enable the Department to execute
its strategy with the resources required at the time needed to fulfill
national security objectives.
Question. Looking forward, what types of resource shortfalls are
likely to hamper the Department's execution of the 2022 NDS and other
national defense priorities in your view? How would you address or
mitigate these shortfalls, if confirmed?
Answer. The PB24 request adequately resources the Department to
execute the 2022 NDS. Where I do see risk is in the possibility of a
Continuing Resolution that will delay the appropriations of those
resources and our ability to execute them. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with the Congress and advocate for on-time
appropriations so that we may fully capitalize on the resources the
American taxpayers are entrusting to us for their national defense.
Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
later than 10 days after the President's submission of the annual
defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander
must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
lists, in order of priority, the unfunded priorities of the armed force
or combatant command.
What are your views of this statutory requirement and the utility
of unfunded priorities lists?
Answer. The Department relies on several tools to illuminate our
joint priorities and develop a budget that is aligned to strategy.
While the unfunded priority lists are required by law, they are not the
only tool we rely on to build a strategy-informed defense budget.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to supporting the Service
Chiefs and Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities
lists to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with the Fiscal Year
(FY) 2025 budget request?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Service Chiefs and
Combatant Commanders continued compliance with the law.
joint officer management
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wields
significant influence over joint officer management--the policies and
procedures that guide joint officer career development and the
attainment of joint experience and education. The NDAA for fiscal year
2017 modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened
the statutory definition of ``joint Nichols Act in two significant
ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition of ``joint Nichols
Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory
definition of ``joint Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it
broadened the statutory definition of ``joint
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the fiscal year
2017 modifications to the JQO system?
Answer. The two significant modifications have provided the
Department additional flexibility in our Joint Qualification System.
The expansion of the ``joint matters'' definition has ensured the
ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making
contributions to the development and achievement of strategic
objectives. The reduced statutory tour length required for joint duty
credit has provided the Services additional flexibility in officer
assignment for tightly managed career timelines and milestones.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
eligibility for promotion to General/Flag (G/FO) officer rank,
consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service
line officers?
Answer. Yes. Although careers are managed according to Service
specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint
tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification are
appropriate and greatly enhance an officer's perspective and knowledge
to perform at the GO/FO ranks.
Question. In your view, what additional modifications to the JQO
system are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to
attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership
experience, and adequate professional development?
Answer. The existing joint officer qualification requirements
provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the
skills necessary for successful service at the operational and
strategic levels; as such, I don't see the need for any additional
modifications to the JQO system at this time.
Question. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better
to meet the needs of Reserve Component officers?
Answer. Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to
incorporate Reserve Component officers and the Reserve policy was
adjusted in 2018 to increase joint qualification opportunities for
Reserve Component officers. I do not currently recommend changing the
JQO system with respect to the Reserve Component.
Question. Should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a
consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?
Answer. No. JQO requirements enhance the ability of General/Flag
officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the
operational and strategic level. Officers who meet the requirements
provide benefit to both the Services and joint organizations, and
ultimately the Department as a whole.
Question. If confirmed, what modifications would you suggest to
provide DOD and the Military Services the Force management and talent
management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a
21st century, joint, All-Volunteer Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD and the
Service Chiefs to assess talent management strategies to maintain our
competitive edge and strengthen the lethality of the All-Volunteer
Force. I also solicit assistance from our congressional leaders to help
the American people know what it means to serve, and thereby encourage
military service.
Question. Do you believe current DOD and Military Service
procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending
the President's nomination for promotion or assignment are sufficient
to enable fully informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the President?
Answer. Yes, in my experience as CSAF, the Services evaluate
officer qualifications, past performance, future potential, and any
available adverse or reportable information, and each service has a
rigorous process in place to ensure all decisions are fully informed.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to
the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or
assignment process?
Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and
reasonable for the officers involved.
joint professional military education (jpme)
Question. Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United
States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities
will officers need to succeed in great power competition against the
Nation's adversaries?
Answer. Our education and training programs must provide an
integrated approach to understanding joint warfighting and our
adversaries from accession to senior leader courses for general and
flag officers and senior enlisted leaders within the context of a
rapidly changing character of war. Future leaders require the knowledge
and skills to prepare them for service as joint warfighting leaders,
senior staff positions, and strategists who:
a) Discern the military dimensions of a challenge affecting
national interest;
b) Anticipate and lead rapid adaptation and innovation during a
dynamic period of acceleration in the rate of change in warfare under
the conditions of great power competition and disruptive technology;
c) Conduct joint warfighting, at the operational to strategic
levels, as all domain, globally integrated warfare, including the
ability to integrate allied and partner contributions;
d) Are strategically minded warfighters or applied strategists who
can execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations; and
e) Demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills, interpersonal
skills, and effective written, verbal, and visual communications skills
to support the development and implementation of strategies and complex
operations.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
enhance DOD's JPME system to ensure that it fosters the education and
development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with the
intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and sound
judgment to lead the joint force in a transregional, multi-functional,
multi-domain ``Whole of Government'' environment?
Answer. If confirmed I will regularly review the program of
instruction of each Service's War College, their Staff Colleges, and
Senior Enlisted PME. We must develop strategically minded joint
warfighters, who think critically and can apply military power
creatively to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated
operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change. To do
this, we must create a fully aligned PME and talent management system
that identifies, develops, and utilizes, joint warfighters skilled in
the art of war and the practical and ethical application of military
power.
Question. In your view, to what degree does the Secretary of
Defense Strategic Thinkers Program, established by Directive-type
Memorandum-19-001, add to the current PME system?
Answer. I think we need to delineate between ``strategists''--those
who can imagine and write strategy from a blank page, and the
``strategically minded''--those who can effectively execute strategy
through campaigns and operations. The former are rare and the new
Defense Strategic Thinkers Program will help develop such individuals.
The NDS language refers to the latter, the development of which is a
responsibility of the larger JPME system. The inaugural execution of
this program has promise, and if confirmed, I look forward to ensuring
its success.
Question. In your view, how could the Department further increase
the throughput of the current 10-week, in-residence course required to
achieve JPME II accreditation, consistent with the need for training in
joint skills in advance assignment to the Joint Staff or a Combatant
Command, while enhancing the course's academic rigor?
Answer. I do not currently see a need to increase throughput in the
10-week resident JPME II course. If confirmed, I intend to assess the
broader Professional Military Education needs of the Joint Force (from
accession to senior leader education) with an eye toward rigor in all
academic curriculum. I will seek to ensure the timing and throughput
for curriculum align with the needs of the force.
Question. In your view, are there opportunities in JPME to improve
STEM cognizance and cyber fluency across the joint force to ensure that
leaders understand and can effectively employ technologies to fight and
win our Nation's wars?
Answer. Establishing STEM knowledge is foundational to several of
our PME institutions--the Naval Post-Graduate School, the Service
Academies, and the Air Force Institute of Technology for example. Many
of our officers enter service with excellent undergraduate STEM
backgrounds. In recent years, all JPME programs have amplified student
literacy in cyber topics. The war colleges are increasing the levels of
student learning as the integration of the cyber domain in all-domain
warfighting becomes more and more profound. Work remains to be done for
understanding and integrating disruptive technologies. This will be one
of my priorities for PME if confirmed.
Question. In your view, is there a role for JPME in developing
basic product management skills across the joint force to ensure that
military leaders are proficient in the employment of software and
automation in warfighting?
Answer. There is absolutely a role for JPME in preparing our
military leaders to understand how to fully realize our warfighting
potential using artificial intelligence/machine learning and
automation. Currently, JPME prepares our leaders to make sense of the
future battlefield through intricate knowledge of how Joint Force
fights. Without the professional knowledge our leaders develop through
JPME, commanders cannot make use of the tools that automation brings to
bear. At the same time, JPME must raise the automation acumen for our
leaders to understand the non-physical side of the future battlefield.
legal counsel to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
Question. Section 156 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be selected by
a board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. To this day,
the Chairman's Legal Counsel remains the only joint duty officer
selected from among qualified officers of the Armed Forces in this
manner.
Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156
to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to
serve in this critical joint position?
Answer. Yes, I believe the selection process for the position of
the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an
effective, efficient, and equitable means to select an officer for this
position from a pool of talented judge advocate leaders across the
Services.
Question. What lessons, if any, have been captured from this joint
process that could improve the selection board processes used by the
Military Services?
Answer. I'm not aware of any lessons that could improve the
processes for selection of officers in the military service. The
process to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff was informed by the best practices of all of the Services.
Question. Would you support expanding application of the process
employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?
Answer. I do not see a need to expand our selection process to
other joint billets. The current, well-established processes used to
select general/flag officers to joint positions are sound. First, our
process for identifying officers gives the Combatant Commander and the
Chairman flexibility. We can select from across the Services (to
include the Coast Guard) and the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components
to ensure we get the right individual with the appropriate skills and
experience. Second, the current process is efficient in that it gives
the commander and other senior leaders an opportunity to quickly review
a slate of nominated officers and conduct interviews as necessary.
Finally, our process is extremely responsive to emerging or unexpected
requirements. We can quickly alert the Services to identify eligible
personnel, select candidates, nominate them, and have them in position
in as little as 90 days, if necessary.
alliances and partnerships
Question. The 2022 NDS underscores the importance of existing U.S.
alliances and partnerships and considers these relationships our
greatest global strategic advantage. Interactions with the Armed Forces
of other nations are often conducted at the level of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen
existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and
leverage new opportunities for international cooperation--in each
Combatant Commander's geographic area of responsibility?
Answer. The National Defense strategy is a call to action for the
defense enterprise to incorporate allies and partners at every stage of
defense planning. If confirmed, I will continue to integrate our highly
capable and frontline allies and partners into our planning efforts,
operations, activities, and investments. Foreign language capabilities
are a key component in allowing for the development of relationships
and trust with our foreign allies and partners. Our Foreign Area
Officers play a crucial role in achieving the National Defense Strategy
objective to strengthen alliances. Including these capabilities in the
planning process is key to ensuring integration and interoperability
with our allies. I will personally continue to engage in regular dialog
with my ally and partner counterparts to understand their strategic
concerns and identify areas for cooperation.
If confirmed, I will ensure that our Global Campaign Plans include
actions to strengthen alliances and partnerships, build new
partnerships, and leverage new opportunities for international
cooperation. The Chairman of the Joint Staff, working in tandem with
the Combatant Commands, is uniquely suited to energize our ally and
partner networks to respond to such global security challenges. If
confirmed, I will engage with longstanding allies, traditional
partners, and look to expand relationships with new partners. This will
be a will be a priority of mine from day one.
In INDOPACOM, if confirmed, I will focus on modernizing our
alliance with Japan by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a
more integrated manner, enhancing our combined operating capability and
deterrence posture with the Republic of Korea, and deepening our
alliance with Australia through investments in posture and
interoperability.
In EUCOM, I will continue to build and lead the coalition of allies
and partners supporting Ukraine while working alongside our NATO Allies
to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military
aggression.
In CENTCOM, I will prioritize cooperation with our regional
partners that results in their increased ability to deter and defend
against Iranian aggression.
In AFRICOM, I will prioritize working ``by, with, and through'' our
African partners to build states' capacity to degrade terrorist
organizations and contribute to security and stability, supporting
implementation of the Global Fragility Act.
In SOUTHCOM, I will take specific actions to remove bureaucratic
and policy roadblocks in order to strengthen existing alliances and
partnerships, build new partnerships, and leverage opportunities for
international cooperation and education.
NORTHCOM is a unique COCOM for partner and allied security
cooperation. I will continue to nurture our bilateral relationship with
Canada and continue our efforts toward NORAD modernization and improved
coordination on security cooperation engagement worldwide to ensure our
two countries efforts are complementary. I will also continue to foster
the strong mil-to-mil relationship between the United States and
Mexico, which has grown substantially under USNORTHCOM, to confront
shared challenges.
If confirmed, CYBERCOM, SOCOM, SPACECOM, and TRANSCOM provide
additional opportunities to strengthen relationships with allies and
partner and leverage new opportunities in cooperation with the
geographic COCOMs.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for
strengthening existing alliances and partners or building new
partnerships, including for building interoperability and developing
shared operational concepts? What are the primary tools at DOD's
disposal for addressing these challenges?
Answer. Information sharing is the greatest challenge for
strengthening existing alliances and partners, especially when it comes
to interoperability and developing shared operational concepts. If
confirmed, I will promote a culture of information releasability within
the Joint Force and champion to remove barriers to information sharing
and technical cooperation with our highly capable and frontline allies
and partners. The most effective tool that could be made available to
the DoD to build interoperability are carve outs for pre-approval in
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARS) for our closest
and most capable allies.
united states africa command (africom)
Question. AFRICOM does not have any assigned forces and, as a
result, is required to compete for forces in the global force
management process.
What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
forces and capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan
and other emergency requirements?
Answer. In alignment with the 2022 NDS guidance, AFRICOM has
adequate allocated forces in addition to CONUS based regionally aligned
forces ready to rotate into the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)
to execute operations in support of the AFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan.
Additionally, current posture allows forward staging of forces to
provide required operational flexibility and a timely response to
emergency requirements.
Question. Are there any changes you would implement to the
allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?
Answer. Before providing any recommendations for changes to the
allocated or assigned forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed, I will consider
the Combatant Commander's requirements for forces and risk assessment
of the strategic environment on the African Continent within the
framework of the 2022 NDS guidance.
The 2022 NDS states that the United States will ``accept measured
risk, but remain vigilant in the face of other persistent threats,
including those posed by . . . violent extremist organizations. We will
also build resilience in the face of destabilizing and potentially
catastrophic transboundary challenges such as climate change and
pandemics.''
Question. Do you believe DOD has allotted adequate posture and
resources to ``remain vigilant'' in the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility
(AOR)?
Answer. Current allocated posture and resources are adequate to
``remain vigilant'' in the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) with in
2022 NDS guidance. However, if confirmed, I will work with the AFRICOM
Combatant Commander to evaluate requirements and requests for forces
and assess risk based on the rapidly changing strategic environment on
the African continent.
Question. What is your assessment of current U.S. approach to
strategic competition in the AFRICOM AOR? If confirmed, what changes,
if any, would you propose to DOD lines of effort in support of these
strategies?
Answer. The U.S. approach to strategic competition in the AFRICOM
AOR is adequate and in line with current NDS guidance. If confirmed, I
will consider the Combatant Commander's assessment of the current
strategic competition environment before making any recommendations for
changes to DOD lines of effort in support of these strategies.
Question. What is your assessment of current U.S. counterterrorism
strategies being executed in the AFRICOM AOR? If confirmed, what
changes, if any, would you propose to these strategies?
Answer. I agree with the current strategy to disrupt terrorists in
Africa in order to protect the United States Homeland and vital U.S.
national interests abroad. USAFRICOM accomplishes this mission
primarily by, with, and through African partners, European allies, and
multinational organizations. USAFRICOM's approach reaffirms enduring
U.S. security commitments while building partner capacity and
capabilities toward a long-term goal of these partners conducting
sustained operations with minimal U.S. presence and resources. If
confirmed, I will consider the Combatant Commander's assessment of the
current strategic competition environment before making any
recommendations for changes.
Question. What is your assessment of the efficacy of the current
United States strategy to compete against Russia and China to be the
security partner of choice in Africa?
Answer. The current U.S. strategy focuses on building our partners,
working toward shared objectives, operating transparently, promoting
good governance, and respecting human rights, while highlighting that
Russian and Chinese projects do not adhere to high standards and can
come with unseen, sometimes negative, consequences. Our competitive
edge lies in the quality of the equipment, training, and other security
assistance we provide, and our commitment to relationships based on
true collaboration with our African partners, which neither China nor
Russia currently supplies.
Increasing the speed of delivery for commonly sought-after
equipment, demonstrating our commitment and prioritization of African
needs at a high level, and developing positive messaging that will
resonate with African leaders' aspirations. I look forward to working
with Congress to achieve these goals.
Question. How will you seek to engage with African partners on
resiliency efforts as outlined in the 2022 NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I will buildupon existing resilience-related
efforts that began after the 2022 NDAA, and that are supported through
implementation of the Global Fragility Act. I will look for
efficiencies and overlap between Combatant Commands, particularly
between AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and INDOPACOM, to improve our unity of
effort as it relates to challenges posed by climate and environmental
change. These efforts foster trust among and are essential to our
approach to build allies and partners capabilities to confront these
shared are essential to our approach to build allies and partners
capabilities to confront these shared
somalia
Question. What is your assessment of current United States national
security interests in Somalia?
Answer. Our current National Security Strategy directs a ``secure
Somalia free from terrorist threat to the United States, its citizens,
and U.S. facilities overseas.'' These interests are appropriate and
drive our internal policies focused on protecting United States persons
and assets overseas, while degrading VEO capabilities to execute
operations in Somalia and against the continental United States.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the United States
should play in helping Somalia build capable security institutions?
Answer. To pursue our stated national security interests in
Somalia, it is critical that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
have a stable security environment, which is the foundation of a
successful democracy. This must be enabled by professional, civilian
led, security institutions who are not only tactically proficient, but
also well versed in ethics and the rule of law. Our strategy to achieve
this is through a ``partner-led, U.S.-enabled'' approach, where we will
work ``by, with, and through'' our partner nations to ensure U.S.
interests are safeguarded. To support this approach, the United States
should continue to assist in building the capability and capacity of
Somali security institutions to combat violent extremism and expand a
stable security environment.
u.s. central command (centcom)
Question. To what extent does achieving United States national
security interests in the Middle East require a continuous United
States military presence in the region, in your view?
Answer. The National Security Strategy directs the Department to
``retain the necessary American military presence in the region to
protect the United States and our allies from terrorist attacks and
preserve a favorable regional balance of power.'' AQAP and ISIS
originate in the Middle East, both of whom are responsible for attacks
on the United States and our allies. Iran destabilizes the Middle East,
threatening regional security through its proxy forces and desire to
obtain nuclear weapons. We must maintain an adequate level of United
States Military presence to decrease threats against the U.S. Homeland
and U.S. interests and to help build indigenous security capability of
our regional partners. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the
adequacy of U.S. Military presence and make recommendations to support
the CENTCOM Commander's requirements.
Question. How do you view the National Defense Strategy as shaping
United States Force posture in the Middle East?
Answer. The NDS force planning priorities of defending the
Homeland, maintaining strategic deterrence, and prevailing in conflict
all require a well-integrated force. As the Department's deterrence,
and prevailing in conflict all require a well-integrated force. As the
Department's deterrence, and prevailing in conflict all require a well-
integrated force. As the Department's deterrence, and prevailing in
conflict all require a well-integrated force. As the Department's
deterrence, and prevailing in conflict all require a well-integrated
force. As the Department's
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with United States regional and European partners to counter threats
emanating from and affecting the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Our partners understand that in order to maintain their
preferred strategic relationships, they will need to shoulder more
responsibility for regional security. For the military, this is best
achieved by building partner security forces through U.S. defense item
sales and with training.
Coalition partners support Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and
opportunities exist for increased burden sharing throughout all aspects
of operations: defense, diplomacy, and development. Partner Nations
could also share an increased portion of the burden for logistics,
training, stabilization, humanitarian, and financial support throughout
the broader region.
Question. To what extent do you view the CENTCOM AOR as important
terrain for strategic competition?
Answer. With China as our pacing strategic challenge and Russia re-
emerging as a strategic concern, the CENTCOM AOR will continue to be
vital for strategic competition.
The CENTCOM AOR is the doorway to global energy supply for our
allies and partners as well as China.
Multiple CENTCOM AOR locations control the flow of global maritime
commerce and are key to China achieving its economically strategic one-
belt, one-road initiative.
CENTCOM AOR military access, basing, and overflight enables the
Joint Force to operate and project power to ensure regional and global
security. These would be critical in times of conflict to rapidly re-
supply or deploy the Joint Force as well as counter Chinese or Russian
moves.
Question. In your view, how can the United States counter Russian
influence in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. Countering Russian influence in the CENTCOM AOR relies on
the continued capacity and capability of our allies and partners. While
Russia continues to build a burgeoning relationship with the Iranian
regime, the United States has opportunities to strengthen the capacity
of our partners to limit susceptibility to Russia's predatory
practices.
Continued efforts in innovation on the battlefield, multi-domain
show-of-force exercises like Juniper Oak, and further development of
concepts such as the Joint All-Domain Command and Control demonstrate
the U.S. as a valuable partner that leverages multi-domain solutions to
counter malign actors in the region. We do this in part by offering
tailored and quality equipment through foreign military sales that
liberate our partners from the predatory nature of Russia's military
sales practices. FMS remains an invaluable tool equip, train, and build
our partner forces so that they remain interoperable with the United
States and our allies. Efforts to streamline the FMS process and make
the FMS enterprise more responsive to our partners are critical efforts
by the USG.
Question. In your view, can the United States counter Chinese
influence in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The United States approach to countering Chinese influence
in the CENTCOM AOR relies on sustainable military posture,
strengthening partner capacity, enabling regional security integration,
deterring and countering threats, and ensuring freedom of navigation
and the free flow of global commerce.
The U.S. leverages these strengths to de-escalate tension in the
region, and counter malign influence while driving normalization
between our partners and allies. The U.S. is postured to sustain its
commitments to partners and address security challenges, including
those related to the PRC, regardless of Chinese efforts.
afghanistan and pakistan
Question. In your view, what are the current United States
strategic interests in Afghanistan?
Answer. The United States has a vital national interest to prevent
terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base for planning and
executing attacks against the United States Homeland, U.S. citizens,
and our interests and allies abroad. The United States must continue
engagement with partner countries and support ongoing humanitarian
assistance efforts to promote stability in the region. Our foreign
military sales to partners in the region deliver quality military
capability that outcompetes with Chinese equipment at every benchmark.
FMS remains an invaluable tool equip, train, and build our partner
forces so that they remain interoperable with the U.S. and our allies.
Efforts to streamline the FMS process and make the FMS enterprise more
responsive to our partners are critical efforts by the USG. The United
States also intends to honor its commitment to help Afghans who stood
by us during our military engagement come to the United States under
available legal pathways.
Question. In your opinion, is the United States adequately postured
to conduct effective over the horizon counterterrorism operations in
Afghanistan? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the Joint Force remains organized to effectively
conduct regional counterterrorism without U.S. Military Forces on the
ground in Afghanistan. We leverage intelligence capabilities and
partnerships to maintain understanding of terrorist activities in and
emanating from Afghanistan. Since the withdrawal of United States
Forces from Afghanistan, the United States has continuously refined its
CT posture to maximize understanding of VEO operations and intentions,
and we stand ready to take actions to disrupt any threats to our
Homeland or interests abroad should it be required. We leverage
multiple capabilities to maintain an understanding of enemy networks in
Afghanistan. Key capabilities include Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance aircraft, human intelligence networks, and a coalition
of partners in and beyond the region.
Question. In your opinion, has the Taliban shown the willingness
and capacity to undertake counterterrorism efforts against ISIS?
Against al Qaeda?
Answer. The Taliban has taken aggressive action against ISIS
affiliates in Afghanistan. The United States Government continues to
press the Taliban to meet their commitment to the Doha Agreement and
prohibit any terrorist organization from planning attacks from
Afghanistan, including the remnants of Al Qaeda in the region.
Question. What do you assess to be the strategic relationship
between the United States and Pakistan? Do you view that relationship
as having changed as a result of the transition of forces from
Afghanistan in August 2021? If so, how?
Answer. The United States military maintains a constructive
relationship with Pakistani counterparts to counter extremist threats
and promote regional stability. The withdrawal of United States troops
from Afghanistan did not change the strategic rationale for our
relationship with Pakistan.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to United States relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of
military-to-military relations?
Answer. My objective would be to preserve the defense relationship
between the United States and Pakistan in areas of mutual interest. We
need to maintain military-to-military ties to address concerns and
remain focused on regional stability and counterterrorism efforts.
syria and iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current threat posed by
ISIS?
Answer. ISIS was territorially defeated in March 2019. Since then,
ISIS has worked to recruit and reconstitute its forces and
capabilities. It has failed to do so. This failure is directly
attributable to the ongoing efforts of the Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
mission, our coalition partners, including the Syrian Democratic Forces
and Iraqi partners who execute most of the C-ISIS mission. If the
constant pressure of the C-ISIS efforts were to subside then I would
expect to see an ISIS resurgence and increase in threat. ISIS still
maintains its financial network, communications network, recruiting
apparatus, and satellite cells globally. ISIS also espouses an ideology
which remains strong with the party faithful, and this ideology still
poses a threat that, without relentless pressure, could cause ISIS to
resurge once again.
Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
strategy and objectives in Syria?
Answer. The United States military mission in Syria remains the
enduring defeat of ISIS and we continue to work by, with, and through
our partners and allies. The current administration has identified four
policy priorities to meet the U.S. objective for a political settlement
to the conflict as envisioned in UNSC Resolution 2254:
Sustaining the United States and coalition campaign
against the Islamic State;
Supporting local cease-fires;
Expanding humanitarian access;
Pressing for accountability and respect for international
law while promoting human rights and nonproliferation, including
through targeted sanctions imposition.
Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
and if confirmed, what conditions would you factor into your
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on future troop levels in
Syria?
Answer. The operational environment in Syria remains uncertain and
dynamic. United States Forces have drawn down to a residual presence in
Syria to maintain counterterrorism and security operations. If
confirmed, any potential future troop level or capabilities changes
would have to be assessed based on numerous variables to include
regional security objectives, the existing and projected security
environment, and sustaining the necessary relationships and partner
force capabilities to prevent an ISIS resurgence and secure our enemy's
enduring defeat.
Question. What is your understanding of current United States
strategy and objectives in Iraq?
Answer. The United States strategy has sought the enduring defeat
of ISIS and rebuilding of independent Iraqi Security Forces. To achieve
these ends, the Coalition is currently helping the Iraqi Security
Forces to consolidate gains, improve their military and security
capability, and evolve into a more professional and representative
force that is capable of countering an ISIS insurgency. The Iraqis have
made great gains over the last few years. Now, with the newly formed
Government of Iraq, we are continuing the advise, assist, and enable
relationship with the mutually agreed goals of securing Iraq's borders,
achieve sovereignty over its territory, economic self-sufficiency, and
an independent security apparatus which can protect the people of Iraq.
Question. What steps would you recommend for continuing to
normalize security assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces in the
coming years?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assess a number of factors before
making a recommendation to support enduring normalized security
assistance to the ISF. These factors would include:
Acknowledging Iraq's sovereignty and emphasizing the
collaborative nature of the partnership.
Transitioning to less Coalition assistance and increasing
the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) some of the Operation
INHERENT RESOLVE advising roles, in addition to the more conventional
security cooperation duties such as Foreign Military Sales, bilateral
exercises, and International Military Exchange Training programs.
Full normalization of OSC-I with robust permanent manning
and access to stable, reliable funding streams that support long-term
United States national security interests in Iraq.
iran
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran?
Answer. Iran is the United States' most formidable conventional and
unconventional threat in the region. Its primary military capabilities
are missiles, naval, and unconventional forces. Iran has developed a
growing arsenal of UAS, to include one-way-attack UAVs. Iran has the
region's largest surface-to-surface missile (SSM) arsenal, including
both ballistic and cruise missiles and mobile launchers. Some of the
SSMs have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Iran's Navy is capable of
only a limited menu of operations, but it is the Arabian Gulf's
preeminent naval force and features many small boats and naval mines to
complicate adversary freedom of movement in a conflict. The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force (IRGC-QF) maintains ties to Shia
groups across the region to advance Iran's interests. Proxies give Iran
unconventional options for operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen,
and globally. The IRGC-QF also has longstanding bonds with select Sunni
groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and the Taliban.
Regular Iranian ground forces continue to focus on internal security
and territorial defense, while also deploying limited numbers to Iraq
and Syria. Iranian military leaders probably recognize they could not
defeat a modern advanced military, but they could impose significant
cost.
Question. In your opinion, are United States Military Forces and
capabilities currently deployed to the Middle East adequate to deter
and if necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
Answer. Through an approach of ``integrated deterrence'' and
growing relations with our allies and partners, the Joint Force
maintains a posture adequate to deter and respond to Iranian
aggression. Our strength in the region is built on our partnerships,
expanding those partnerships, and our ability to move forces rapidly in
a time of crisis.
Question. If the current situation vis-a-vis Iran continues to
escalate, what off-ramps exist for ``dialing down'' the tension, in
your view?
Answer. The Joint Force is postured to support military options for
the President if tension causes an escalation with Iran, however, I
defer to Secretary Blinken and the Department of State for any
realistic diplomatic off-ramps.
u.s. european command (eucom)
Question. The 2022 NDS highlights the importance of support for
``robust deterrence of Russian aggression against vital United States
national interests, including our treaty allies.''
Is the current posture of U.S. Forces in the EUCOM AOR sufficient
to support the NDS? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The U.S. Forces in EUCOM, reinforced by CONUS-based troops
and alongside NATO, are prepared to execute NDS objectives and defend
the Alliance against Russian aggression, should the situation dictate.
However, there is no scenario in which the U.S. would act alone. The
situation in Ukraine has been the greatest test of NATO cohesion and
the Alliance has shown remarkable unity and resolve, a message that has
resonated around the world with friends and adversaries alike.
Question. In light of Russia's unprovoked aggression toward
Ukraine, do you assess a need to modify or enhance United States
posture and investments under the European Deterrence Initiative?
Answer. The multi-year investments under European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI) to increase our presence, participate in training and
exercises, enhance our prepositioned materiel and supporting
infrastructure, and build partner capacity have paid dividends toward
our readiness, interoperability, and capability to rapidly project
power. This was demonstrated at the onset of the conflict in Ukraine
when large United States formations were able to flow into Europe with
ease, draw materiel, and integrate with existing C2 structures
alongside the alliance. I foresee maintaining the pace of this
initiative as it alleviates logistical burdens, enhances our
responsiveness, and demonstrates our resolve to the alliance. The most
impactful investment of EDI has been the United States' ability to draw
from Prepositioned Stock Europe (APS-2) for timely delivery of material
security assistance to Ukraine. Future and continued multi-year
investments under EDI will ensure the United States remains responsive
to our own National Security interests and those of our NATO allies and
regional partners.
Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
critical infrastructure in EUCOM, such as command and control locations
and air bases, against cruise missile attack?
Answer. First, the DOD has sufficient air and missile defense
capability in the EUCOM AOR. However, in my view, the capacity is
lacking in that it is not currently deployed in sufficient numbers to
defend EUCOM's critical infrastructure against cruise missile attacks
in large salvos. U.S. military capabilities, however, including
Integrated Air and Missile Defense have improved in recent years
through the European Deterrence Initiative and the Department will
continue to invest in capabilities that further increase the
survivability and resilience of the joint force and its command-and-
control functions in EUCOM.
Question. What is your assessment of the deepening relationship
between Russia and China, and how, is at all, should we modify our
approach to such convergence?
Answer. On 4 February 2022, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir
Putin signed a joint statement, declaring their two countries shared a
friendship with ``no limits.'' Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
the United States has observed no discernible change in Beijing and
Moscow's strategic partnership even as the international community has
united to impose costs on Russia. While China does not openly criticize
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Beijing does openly blame NATO and
supports the Russian war effort through economic, diplomatic, public
support, and non-lethal military means. We must reinforce the norm
against territorial conquest, as a key element of preserving global
stability. While the security challenges presented by Russia and China
are different, our best defense against a deepening Russia-China
relationship is investing in multinational alliances and bilateral
relationships with like-minded countries to foster and propagate our
shared values and demonstrate the strength of democracies.
nato alliance
Question. The 2022 NDS details how we will ``collaborate with our
NATO allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of
Russian aggression.''
In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S.
commitment to its obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty?
Answer. The North Atlantic Treaty is very important to U.S.
strategic interests. The U.S. must meet its treaty obligations as
agreed upon in the Washington Treaty of 1949 (also called the North
Atlantic Treaty). NATO is the strongest alliance in history, and it is
as critical to our strategic interests and to ensuring the security of
our citizens today as at any time since its founding almost 75 years
ago. In the current contested security environment, North American and
European allies must continue to stand as one, a united NATO against
the threats we face. Our and our allies commitment to article 5
underpins NATO unity. It is the linchpin of deterrence and defense
against adversaries threatening the United States Homeland and our
vital interests in Europe. Putin thought he would defeat Ukraine
quickly and expected his war would undermine NATO. The opposite
occurred. NATO is stronger, more united, and better prepared. NATO's
strength is our mutual trust, commitment, and cohesion to collectively
deter threats or respond to attacks. This was reaffirmed at the 2022
Madrid Summit and enshrined in the 2022 (8th) NATO Strategic Concept.
Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance in the coming years and what do you perceive to be
the greatest challenges in meeting those objectives?
Answer. At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the alliance reaffirmed its
essential strategic objectives in its Strategic Concept, agreed upon by
Allied leaders. Namely, they reaffirmed NATO's three core tasks:
Collective Defense, Cooperative Security, and Crisis Management. I'm
aligned with these objectives and in my view, the greatest challenge
the alliance faces is its aligned with these objectives and in my view,
the greatest challenge the alliance faces is its aligned with these
objectives and in my view, the greatest challenge the alliance faces is
its aligned with these objectives and in my view, the greatest
challenge the alliance faces is its aligned with these objectives and
in my view, the greatest challenge the alliance faces is its
NATO's nuclear policy states, ``The fundamental purpose of NATO's
nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter
aggression. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a
nuclear alliance. NATO's goal is a safer world for all; the alliance
seeks to create the security environment for a world without nuclear
weapons.'' This point was most recently reaffirmed within the
alliance's 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit.
Question. Do you endorse the goals of the NATO nuclear policy? In
you view, should NATO remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear
weapons exist?
Answer. Yes. NATO's nuclear capabilities date to the founding of
the alliance and remain the core of the alliance's deterrence and
defense policy and strategy today.
Question. Do you believe that the forward deployment of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential component of NATO's nuclear
posture?
Answer. Yes. As long as NATO is committed to remaining a nuclear
alliance, it is important for the U.S. to maintain nuclear weapons
forward deployed in NATO countries. These forward-based weapons
contribute to U.S. extended deterrence, enhance assurance of our NATO
allies, and demonstrate allies' willingness to share defense burdens.
ukraine
Question. What is your assessment of the key lessons learned from
United States engagement with and support for Ukraine dating back to
2014? Are there particular elements that you believe will be critical
for DOD to institutionalize so we are able to replicate successes and
avoid potential missteps?
Answer. Russia's war on Ukraine has shown the criticality of
alliances and partnerships, both within Europe and globally. Investing
in alliance and partnerships now pays dividends when events call for a
coordinated, international response, to address violation of national
sovereignty in violation of the United Nations Charter, as Russia has
in Ukraine. We must continue to work with allies and partners to deepen
and strengthen our cooperation, which we have always done in areas of
mutual interest and in a spirit of mutual respect.
The NDS highlights the need to develop defensive anti-access, area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the European AOR.
Question. In your assessment, does the DOD currently have a mature
joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD
capabilities? J5
Answer. Yes, the U.S., working with our allies and partners,
maintains the most effective fighting force in the world, and we are
prepared to achieve our national security objectives against any
adversary, though not without risks. To maintain the necessary
capabilities in sufficient capacity, we must continue to assess the
threat posed by Russia, continue to update NATO defense plans, and
continue to modernize force structure across the alliance.
Question. If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are
required in Europe to ensure United States Forces are able to defend
against Russian capabilities and achieve operational freedom of
maneuver at decisive points?
Answer. We continually assess our global force posture to ensure we
have appropriate capabilities in place to address the current and
projected situation. I believe the systems and processes we have in
place are ensuring our force posture in Europe is sufficient to achieve
our current national and alliance security objectives in the theater.
u.s. indo-pacific command (indopacom)
China
Question. The 2022 NDS describes the People's Republic of China
(PRC) as ``the most comprehensive and serious challenge to United
States national security'' and states ``The PRC seeks to undermine
United States alliances and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic
influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and
military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their
interest.''
Is the current posture of U.S. Forces in the Indo-Pacific region
sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Joint Force is modernizing its Indo-Pacific posture to
support the NDS. This includes the establishment of 5th Generation
fighter squadrons, the stationing of a Marine Littoral Regiment in
Okinawa, rotational U.S. Army Multi-Domain Task Forces, and other
initiatives.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make that would implement the NDS and improve the military
balance in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. The Department works closely with INDOPACOM and our allies
and partners in the region to ensure we are making investments that
advance NDS priorities, close Combatant Commanders priority gaps, and
improve integrated deterrence efforts across the AOR. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with Congress to advance investments that
improve the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and address priorities
discussed in INDOPACOMs required NDAA reports to ensure a free and open
Indo-Pacific.
Question. What are the key areas in which each Military Service
must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the
Joint Force to prevail in a potential conflict with China?
Answer. The Joint Staff is leveraging and implementing the Joint
Warfighting Concept that builds upon emerging concepts of each Service
to address potential future conflict with China. These ideas and
methods are a roadmap for U.S. Forces, empowering us to shape and
prepare the Joint Force for the changing character of war. If
confirmed, I intend to work with the Service Chiefs to continue these
efforts and will keep the committee apprised.
Question. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance
of sustained United States military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. Our military-to-military relationships around the world are
centered on reducing risk and preventing crises. Military-to-military
engagements with China are designed to maintain peace and stability in
the region. When China and the PLA operate in a manner consistent with
international norms and standards, the risk of miscalculation and
misunderstanding is reduced. With this in mind, bilateral military
engagements with China should resume and include high level visits,
policy dialogs, and functional exchanges centered on reinforcing the
procedures necessary to reduce risk and prevent and manage crises.
Question. Should the United States revisit or change its ``one
China'' policy, in your view?
Answer. The United States ``One China'' Policy based on the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), Three United States-China Joint Communiques, and
Six Assurances to Taiwan has maintained cross-strait peace, stability,
and deterrence for over fifty years. I share the commitment of leaders
within this administration to sustaining this long-standing, effective
policy.
Question. In your view, how should United States joint concepts of
operations, force posture, and investments adapt to address China's
military modernization?
Answer. We can adapt joint concepts and force posture by enhancing
interoperability among branches of the military and with regional
allies and partners to bolster deterrence capabilities. Additionally,
we should focus investments on advanced technologies, such as cyber
defense, space-based assets, and unmanned systems, that can help
maintain a competitive edge. Carefully assessing force posture in the
Indo-Pacific region and ensuring appropriate presence can deter
aggression while maintaining stability.
Question. What should the United States do, both unilaterally, and
in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing
challenge posed by China in the South China and East China Seas?
Answer. To counter the challenge posed by China, the United States
must continue to participate in developing the economies, governance,
and security of allies and partners in the region. In turn, as part of
the whole of government effort, the Joint Force continues to support
and develop the capabilities and capacity of our allies and partners
through foreign military sales such as the Advanced Capabilities
Program to support South China Seas claimant nations acquisition of
asymmetric capabilities to monitor and defend their Exclusive Economic
Zones and counter grey zone activities. Additionally, the Joint Force
builds partner interoperability through multilateral and bilateral
exercises such as SUPER GARUDA SHIELD, BALIKATAN, and KEEN SWORD.
Question. What is your current assessment of the risk of a critical
logistics failure in any conflict with China?
Answer. Any conflict with China poses formidable challenges to the
joint logistics enterprise. Joint Force leadership understands that a
critical logistics failure could lead to the failure of the United
States to achieve its national security objectives and they are
actively working to mitigate this risk. If confirmed, I will continue
our Department's efforts to ensure that logistics challenges inherent
to any conflict with China are addressed in operational concept
development, access, basing and overflight efforts, and resourcing.
Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
presence overseas, including its base in Djibouti and other
infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?
Answer. China is a strategic competitor that uses economic and
security outreach in return for access to strategic locations, natural
resources, and markets. Over the past decade, China has injected
considerable financing across the Indian Ocean region, offering
significant loans to strategically located countries such as Djibouti
and Sri Lanka. Chinese interests include expanded access to Africa's
mineral and other natural resources, opening markets, and naval
facilities, any of which places United States influence and access to
the region at risk. China's first overseas naval base in Djibouti near
a strategic maritime chokepoint, for example, poses challenges for all
international partners.
Question. The ability of U.S. ground forces to hold at risk
adversary ships and aircraft; intercept missiles aimed at our ships,
airfields, ports and other fixed facilities; and provide electronic
warfare and communications support for our air and naval forces could
enable the United States to present adversaries with our own ``anti-
access/area denial'' (A2/AD) challenge.
What should be the role of ground forces in creating an A2/AD
challenge for adversaries within the First Island Chain in the Indo-
Pacific? What specifically should be the role of the Army?
Answer. Multi-Domain Operations require ground forces to contribute
to the Joint Force's penetration and disintegration of adversary A2/AD
systems. The Army has, and should continue to maintain critical roles
in intelligence, cyber, space, electromagnetic warfare, long continue
to maintain critical roles in intelligence, cyber, space,
electromagnetic warfare, long continue to maintain critical roles in
intelligence, cyber, space, electromagnetic warfare, long
Question. Do you believe the current ground force posture in
INDOPACOM is adequate? If not, what would you recommend to bolster it?
Answer. I believe our joint force posture planning in the Indo-
Pacific is sufficient to deter aggression, maintain peace and security,
ensure a rules-based international order, and enable our ability to
rapidly respond to regional contingencies and crises. However, we must
maintain pace as the regional security landscape evolves and strategic
competition intensifies. If confirmed, I will assess and continue
efforts with allies and partners to modernize agreements to improve the
Joint Force posture and access regarding Australia, the Philippines,
and Japan.
Question. Do you support the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
(DPRI), including the realignment of some United States marines from
Okinawa to Guam and the buildup of facilities at other locations?
Answer. The governments of the United States and Japan have
discussed and aligned their respective defense strategies through
various venues to respond to the increasingly severe security
environment. To respond to this situation and strengthen the
positioning of the U.S. Forces in Japan, the governments of the United
States and Japan agreed to make necessary force posture adjustments
during this past January's 2+2 Ministerial meeting, which upheld the
main tenets of the 2012 realignment plan. If confirmed, I will take the
required steps to support these force posture initiatives, in alignment
with the 2012 plan, that will strengthen United States Force posture in
Japan by making it more versatile, resilient, and mobile.
Question. What are the strategic implications of China's rapid
modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and what approach
should the United States take to address those implications, in your
view?
Answer. Given China's nuclear trajectory, we will soon find
ourselves faced with two nuclear peer adversaries. We must begin
preparing for this challenge now. To do so, I believe we must continue
executing our current nuclear modernization programs, evaluate
sufficiency of current programs of record to fill any potential
deterrence gaps, and engage China in discussions on strategic stability
issues and arms control.
Question. In your view, with the rapid development in both quantity
and quality of Chinese nuclear capabilities, does United States nuclear
posture, and nuclear doctrine, need to change from its current
construct based on a single near-peer nuclear strategic competitor to a
new framework based on two near-peer nuclear strategic competitors? If
so, how?
Answer. I believe our strategy must be prepared to evolve with the
changing threat environment. If confirmed, I will work with key
stakeholders to assess any changes required to our nuclear doctrine and
posture to account for the changing threat environment.
Question. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both
increase, do you assess that we have adequate military and national
security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese leadership
to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation?
Answer. DOD's defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC
prioritize crisis prevention and management, risk reduction, and
limited cooperation in areas where national interests align to advance
a constructive, stable, results-oriented defense relationship with the
PLA. Our competitive relationship with the PRC requires we maintain
regular communication channels to prevent crisis and establish pathways
for timely communications now so we can communicate with the PLA should
a crisis occur. Attempting to establish those pathways once a crisis
begins is too late. I support increased dialog that enables us to
challenge PRC behaviors that are inconsistent with the free and open
international order, gain insight into China's strategic intent, manage
differences, and cooperate in areas where national interests align.
taiwan
Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship
between China and Taiwan, and how can the United States help prevent
miscalculation on either side?
Answer. I'll echo the statements of senior leaders across the
Department and administration: deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is
real and strong. The most important thing we can do to sustain the
status quo is to remain committed to our long-standing, effective
policy on Taiwan.
Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
Taiwan Strait?
Answer. As indicated in our annual China Military Power Report
(CMPR), China has been modernizing its military capabilities and
investing in advanced weapons systems. These include aircraft carriers,
anti-ship missiles, submarines, ballistic missiles, and cyber
capabilities. The PLA has the ability to project power throughout the
region and conduct operations near and around Taiwan. Taiwan's military
capability and capacity, although growing, is much smaller in
comparison to China's military.
Question. What do you believe should be the priorities for United
States military assistance to Taiwan?
Answer. Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act and the 2023 Taiwan
Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA), the United States has multiple
authorities to provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services
necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Priorities
include providing Taiwan with the arms necessary to defend itself via
foreign military sales and foreign military financing, as well as non-
materiel support, to include capacity building, international military
education and training and security cooperation. The Department has
established a Senior Integration Group to find ways to accelerate
capability delivery to established a Senior Integration Group to find
ways to accelerate capability delivery to
Question. Do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in
its defensive capabilities and if not, what changes would you
recommend?
Answer. The Department remains focused on Taiwan's acquisition and
integration of asymmetric capabilities and warfighting concepts,
commensurate with our understanding of the PRC threat. Taiwan
understands the PRC threat and is committed to improving is ability to
defend itself. It has increased its defense budget and implemented
significant defense reforms, including acquisition of necessary
asymmetric capabilities.
Question. Some have argued that the United States should explicitly
State that we would respond militarily to any Chinese use of force
against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your view, what
would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change?
Answer. Under our One China Policy, we oppose any unilateral
attempts to change the cross-Strait status quo by either side, and we
expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. We do
not seek conflict with the PRC and are committed to maintaining open
lines of communications to responsibly manage our competition under the
One China Policy and in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Japan
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with Japan?
Answer. The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our
Indo-Pacific Security Strategy. It facilitates forward basing of our
most advanced military formations and capabilities. This year is an
inflection point as our national security and defense strategies are
more closely aligned than ever before. With our shared goal of a new
era of alliance modernization, I strongly support Japan's updated
national security policies including decisions to increase defense
spending and acquiring counterstrike capabilities.
Question. In late 2022, Japan signaled a significant change in its
defense posture with the release of a new National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.
In your view, how can the United States best support Japan's
defense transformation in line with its strategic documents?
Answer. There is important alignment between Japan's National
Defense Strategy and the vision and priorities outlined in the U.S.
National Defense Strategy, both of which underpin continuing bilateral
efforts to modernize the alliance, bolster integrated deterrence
through an adjusted posture laydown in Japan, and address evolving
regional and global security an adjusted posture laydown in Japan, and
address evolving regional and global security
Republic of Korea
Question. How would you describe the value to United States
national security interests of the United States--Republic of Korea
alliance?
Answer. For nearly 70 years, the United States-ROK alliance has
been a core pillar of the U.S national security architecture in
Northeast Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred the DPRK from
large-scale conflict since 1953 and plays an integral role in managing
regional security dynamics between South Korea, Japan, and China. The
United States--ROK Alliance has also strengthened our collective
security, economic ties, and societal relationships. Considering the
unprecedented number of DPRK provocative ballistic missile launches in
2022 and 2023, the Alliance is even more critical to our national
security interests.
Question. Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational
control from the United States to the Republic of Korea should be
conditions-based? If so, and if confirmed, what conditions would you
recommend that the Secretary of Defense delineate as the threshold for
transfer of control?
Answer. Yes, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON)
should be condition-based. The United States and the ROK already have a
plan in place that serves as the roadmap for OPCON transition. This
conditioned-based plan ensures that prior to official transfer, the ROK
has the required capabilities, and that the security environment is
also conducive for the ROK to assume the lead of the United States-ROK
combined command. If confirmed, I will review the conditions outlined
within the existing plan before making any recommendations.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to improve United States and allied defenses against North Korea's
missile capabilities, including through trilateral cooperation between
the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan?
Answer. The United States, allies, and partners are currently well
postured and ready to respond to DPRK threats. We are, however, working
on strengthening trilateral cooperation between the United States,
Japan, and Republic of Korea to better deal with the challenges posed
by North Korea's growing nuclear weapons and missile programs. We are
working on greater trilateral cooperation in the areas of integrated
air and missile defense, intelligence sharing, joint training and
exercises, and technology cooperation including cybersecurity, and
electronic warfare. We are also pursuing initiatives that seek to build
greater integration among regional partners in addition to trilateral
cooperation.
Australia
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with Australia?
Answer. Australia and the United States have over 100 years of
``mateship'' and have been Allies for over 70 years. Australia is the
Indo-Pacific ``Fight Tonight'' ally that provides significant defense
integration for the United States. Expansion of United States-Australia
force posture initiatives in the areas of air, land, maritime, and
logistics enables exercises, activities, and further opportunities for
regional engagement, including for humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief response efforts. Australia clearly identifies the Alliance with
the United States as its ``single most important relationship.'' United
States Force Posture in Australia, combined development of defense
industry, logistics, and manufacturing, and improvements in information
and technology sharing are all signs of the unwavering United States-
Australia Alliance.
In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
announced the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS)
partnership with the objective of helping Australia to acquire a fleet
of nuclear-powered submarines and increasing collaboration on a range
of advanced technology initiatives.
Question. What are your views of the AUKUS partnership?
Answer. The historic AUKUS partnership announced on September 15,
2021, breaks new ground by bringing together three highly capable
allies to take on the evolving current and future security challenges
and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region. This partnership will
enhance our combined military capabilities, strengthen deterrence, and
forge a more stable balance of power in the region for generations to
come. AUKUS elevates all three nations' industrial capacity to produce
and sustain interoperable nuclear-powered, conventionally armed
submarines and advanced capabilities and contributes to global security
and stability in our priority theater, the Indo-Pacific.
Question. In your view, are there improvements, clarifications, or
enhancements that need to be made to effectively implement the AUKUS
partnership as intended?
Answer. AUKUS requires robust, novel information sharing and
technology cooperation among the three allies. For AUKUS to succeed as
intended, we must reform prohibitive policies and our approach to
defense and military technology exports to improve the FMS process. In
working with the State Department and other interagency partners, the
DOD supports drafting new legislation to streamline export controls for
AUKUS project areas and related bilateral defense trade. The most
effective method for DOD to increase information sharing and technology
cooperation is pre-approval in the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) for our closest and most capable allies. This
legislation will help build expeditiously the capacity of the
Australian submarine industrial base and advanced capabilities of the
three nations.
The Philippines
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with the Philippines?
Answer. The Philippine-United States Alliance remains ironclad and
has stood the test of time of over 70 years since our 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty. Our military-to-military relationship remains a key
pillar of this alliance, and under the 2014 United States-Philippines
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) our combined training,
exercises, and interoperability between our forces is making our
alliance stronger and more resilient and will accelerate modernization
goals of our combined military capabilities. The announcement of four
new EDCA locations shows recent progression in our bilateral defense
relationship.
India
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with India?
Answer. India is a strategic partner to the United States. Our
military-to-military relationship is robust and increasing in scope and
sophistication. If confirmed, my strategy would be to continue to
bolster the Major Defense Partnership with India by expanding our
existing bilateral military-to-military dialogs and defense industrial
and technology cooperation.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ``Quad'' between the United
States, Japan, India, and Australia is designed to uphold the
international rules-based order, ensure freedom of navigation, promote
democratic values, improve information sharing, and enhance
technological collaboration.
Question. What are your views on the Quad and, in your view, how
can it be more effectively utilized as a multilateral platform for
addressing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region?
Answer. The Quad has emerged as a significant forum for mobilizing
a collective commitment to peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-
Pacific among like-minded partners. Members are increasingly willing to
address security challenges, especially in the maritime domain. The
Quad offers a platform to ensure Maritime Domain Awareness,
transparency, and resilience across the greater Indo-Pacific. Quad
member states, while increasing cooperation amongst themselves, bring
significant benefit to non-member countries.
u.s. northern command (northcom)
Question. What threat, if any, do Russian and Chinese activities in
the Arctic pose to United States interests?
Answer. Both Russia and China have increased their desires to
exploit the opportunities of the Arctic. Russia has very clearly stated
its claims over the Arctic region, to include the right to regulate
Arctic waters, exceeding the authority permitted under international
law, with the intent to enforce this through military power. The PRC
does not yet have an ability to project significant military power into
the Arctic, but seeks to increase its influence there through an
expanded slate of economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military
activities, including its ``Polar Silk Road'', with goals of
constructing research facilities, and ensuring its access to new sea
lanes and natural resources. Over the last decade, the PRC has doubled
its investments, focusing on critical mineral extraction, and expanding
scientific activities to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or
military applications in the Arctic.
Defense of the Homeland
Question. What measures should be taken to ensure the integrity of
U.S. airspace against incursion by foreign powers?
Answer. The United States must continue to invest in the sensor
architecture needed to keep pace with competitors seeking to hold the
United States at risk. Our competitors are developing capabilities that
can evade the currently employed sensors. Against the continually
evolving threat, new sensors, both terrestrial and space-based, are
critical to maintaining airspace awareness, enabling effective defense,
and ensuring the necessary situational awareness for national
leadership. These new sensors, in conjunction with the current
expansive network of airspace surveillance systems, will ensure our
continued ability to detect threats from the surface to space. We are
and will remain postured to respond to threats to the Homeland and must
continue to invest in solutions for maintaining the integrity of our
airspace.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy lists as one of the Department's
top priorities ``Defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-
domain threat posed by'' the People's Republic of China.
Question. In your view, how have the challenges for Homeland
defense changed as we compete strategically with China and Russia? Does
the United States need to adjust its approach to Homeland defense to
meet these evolving challenges?
Answer. The security environment has certainly changed, and the
Joint Force is changing with it to defend the Homeland against the
serious threat posed by the PRC, while continuing to account for the
acute threat posed by Russia. The recently released National Defense
Strategy reiterated that the Department's number one priority is
Homeland defense. The department is now, and will continue to evaluate,
how best to protect the Homeland through a layered defense, building
resilience in our capabilities and force, and building capabilities
that enhance deterrence against any adversary's belief they can achieve
their goals by striking the Homeland.
Countering Illicit Trafficking by Transnational Criminal Organizations
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. security
interests from the illicit trafficking across the United States-Mexico
border by transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The threat to United States National Security posed by
illicit trafficking across the United States-Mexico border extends
beyond traditional challenges and directly impacts public health and
safety. Countering illicit drug trafficking is a whole-of-government
effort that the Joint Force supports intelligence and with through
detection and monitoring in support of interagency and Federal law
enforcement partners.
Question. What recommendations, if any, would you have for
strengthening DOD security cooperation with Mexico to address the
threat from illicit trafficking by transnational criminal
organizations?
Answer. Mexico is a vital partner in North America's unified
defense approach. The Mexican military prefers to engage with the Joint
Force on traditional military missions and not internal security. The
Mexican military partners with United States Federal law enforcement
agencies to counter illicit trafficking inside Mexico. The Joint Force
will continue our work and cooperation with Mexico to enhance domain
awareness in the common defense of North America.
u.s. southern command (southcom)
Question. What is your assessment of the nature and importance of
security and stability in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) for
U.S. security interests?
Answer. Security and stability in the SOUTHCOM AOR directly impact
U.S. security interests due to its geographic proximity and close
economic, and cultural ties. Importantly, most of our partners and
allies in the SOUTHCOM AOR are democracies with shared values on the
rule of law, human rights, gender equality, and climate. Unfortunately,
transnational threats, economic hardship, and malign foreign influence
are eroding peace and security, weakening democratic institutions, and
creating vacuums of power for malign actors to expand their influence.
When our neighbors are suffering from insecurity, repercussions are
felt in the United States.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. security
interests from the expanding influence of Russia, China, and their
proxies in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
Answer. There is no doubt that China is expanding its influence in
the SOUTHCOM AOR. While most of the expansion has been economic and
trade investment, China is also investing heavily in natural resource
exploitation, 5G, energy, space, and critical infrastructure. Military
expansion by China in the region has not been pronounced; although,
they have increased their security cooperation and military exchanges.
Of note, two countries in the region (Honduras and Nicaragua) have
switched their diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China in the last 2
years, with only 6 (of 12 worldwide) regional countries (Guatemala,
Haiti, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines) continuing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Answer. Russia continues to rely on its few allies in the region
like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela for influence and access. Both
China and Russia have influential conventional and social media outlets
in the AOR which allow them to spread their propaganda effectively to
wide audiences. Additionally, if the U.S. is not investing in the
region, countries will look for other sources of investment.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
have for addressing the growing challenges from Russia, China, and
their proxies to security and stability in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. The U.S. must remain the trusted partner in the region. We
must acknowledge Western Hemisphere countries' economic situation and
not present them with an ``either or'' scenario. Countries can have
constructive relationships with both the United States and China, while
we must highlight the known dangers and disadvantages of investing with
China. Additionally, if confirmed, I will recommend that the
interagency remove bureaucratic and policy roadblocks in order to
strengthen existing alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships,
and leverage opportunities for international cooperation and education
in our hemisphere.
Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?
Answer. Yes, I do support the existing standards and those outlined
in the updated DOD Directive 2310.01E, ``DOD Detainee Policy,'' dated
March 15, 2022.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD detainee
operations and interrogations comply strictly with these standards?
Answer. If confirmed, I will do my duty to ensure that all DOD
policies and plans related to intelligence interrogations, detainee
debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations.
Question. What concerns do you foresee with meeting the standards
of health care for the detainees at the Guantanamo detention facility
as that population ages?
Answer. I do not have concerns implementing the Secretary of
Defense's policy on Medical Support for Detainees as outlined in DOD
Instruction 2310.08E, ``Medical Program Support for Detainee
Operations,'' Effective: September 5, 2019, Change 1 Effective: August
25, 2021.
Cuba
Question. Under what conditions would you recommend the
establishment of military-to-military engagement between the United
States and Cuba?
Answer. Any military engagement with Cuba will be a political
decision. The United States seeks a stable, prosperous, and free
country for the Cuban people. If confirmed, I will support and provide
advice on the United States Government pursuit of limited--engagement
with Cuba that advances our national interests and empowers the Cuban
people while restricting economic practices that disproportionately
benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security
agencies at the expense of the Cuban people.
Venezuela
Question. What is your assessment of the current impact of the
situation in Venezuela on regional security and stability?
Answer. The situation in Venezuela is having a significant negative
impact on regional security and stability. Venezuela is in the midst of
a humanitarian, political, and economic crisis with food shortages and
malnutrition, increasing poverty, widespread power outages, and
increasing insecurity. Due to the dire internal situation, millions of
Venezuelan citizens have left, with millions of immigrants and refugees
stressing the support systems in neighboring countries. Colombia alone
has accepted 2.5 million Venezuelan refugees. The vacuum of security
created by ineffective governance and corrupt military and police
systems has led to an increase in violent crime and transnational
criminal organization power and influence, which has also spilled
across the Venezuelan borders.
Colombia
Question. What is your view of the United States-Colombia
relationship and the potential for expanding bilateral security
cooperation?
Answer. Last year, we celebrated 200 years of United States-
Colombian relations, and I am happy to report that the United States-
Colombia relationship remains strong. We share many priorities and
objectives with the Colombian government, and there is potential for
expanding bilateral security cooperation along areas like border
security; drug trafficking; peace plan implementation; women, peace,
and security; climate change; and democratic institution building.
u.s. space command (spacecom)
Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
both economically and militarily--from the Global Positioning System on
which many industrial and military capabilities rely, to the missile
warning systems that underpin U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our great power
competitors--China and Russia--are engaged in a concerted effort to
leap ahead of United States technology and impact U.S. freedom of
action in the space warfighting domain.
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the strategic
environment as it pertains to the domain of space?
Answer. Yes. Intensifying strategic competition presents a serious
threat to U.S. national security interests, including in space. We must
be prepared to deny a potential adversary the ability to employ space-
enabled attack capabilities that can hold our Joint Force at risk.
Question. In your view, what will ``great power competition'' look
like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia's
activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to
United States national security interests?
Answer. Russia and China continue to improve their space weapons
capabilities and better integrate space, cyberspace, and electronic
warfare into both offensive and defensive military operations. They
both have counter-space assets on the ground and in orbit today that
will continue to be developed, exercised, and integrated into war
plans. These increased capabilities will continue to threaten and
challenge U.S. national security interests.
Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
the 2022 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain
of space?
Answer. DOD is taking significant steps to implement our NDS and
national objectives in space. U.S. Space Command is working to sustain
our advantages in space, engage with allies and partners, and ensure
that space remains a free and open domain.
The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA established the Space Force as the fifth
U.S. military service.
Question. In your view, how has integration of space capabilities
into joint planning and warfighting changed as a result of the
establishment of the Space Force?
Answer. Space Force has become a great enabler to our joint
planning and warfighting by dramatically improving the integration of
space capabilities throughout our processes within DOD and across the
Joint Force. Space Force continues to deliver trained space warriors
and capabilities to maintain U.S. advantages in space.
Question. What is your view of the role, if any, of maintaining
space capabilities in the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces to
support joint planning and operations?
Answer. The Reserve component is integral to our space operations
and joint planning activities. Army National Guard and Air National
Guard and Reserve units deliver critical space capabilities to the
Joint Force. Assuming the current model continues, this role will only
grow as the Space Force matures.
Question. In your view, does the Space Force have sufficient
readiness reporting practices and systems to support the joint force?
Answer. Yes. Space Force adequately maintains the readiness of
space capabilities, including personnel and equipment, to allow
USSPACECOM in coordination with the other Combatant Commands to plan
and execute global space operations, missions, and activities in the
space and terrestrial domains which fully support the joint force.
The Chief of Space Operations is responsible for maintaining the
readiness of space capabilities, including personnel and equipment, and
the Commander, SPACECOM, is responsible for planning and execution of
global space operations, missions, and activities in the space and
terrestrial domains.
Question. What is your assessment of our defensive and offensive
space capabilities to protect U.S. and allied space assets and
terrestrial operations?
Answer. DOD will defend our national security interests from the
growing scope and scale of counterspace threats. We will assure
critical space-based missions by accelerating the transition to more
resilient architectures and by protecting and defending critical
systems against counterspace threats; strengthen the ability to detect
and attribute hostile acts in, from, and to space; and protect the
Joint Force from adversary hostile uses of space.
Question. What is your assessment of the current State of training
and testing of offensive and defensive space capabilities?
Answer. We must build the infrastructure, processes, and procedures
to make sure the Joint Force, and especially the U.S. Space Force
guardians have the capabilities they require, whether it's a test and
training infrastructure, simulators that can replicate adversary
threats, and the interactions you would get with multiple units working
together to solve operational challenges.
Question. Should there be a conflict in space or a related domain,
what are your views on the importance of unity of command as compared
to unity of effort between DOD and Intelligence Community assets, both
in space on the ground?
Answer. The DOD and Intelligence Community each have distinct
responsibilities and authorities in space. When it comes to protecting
and defending our space capabilities, however, the two organizations
must be in lock-step. USSPACECOM is our key element to integrate DOD
and IC organization. It serves as the mechanism to provide not only
unity of effort for DOD and IC assets in defense of our on-orbit
assets, but to serve as a single command charged with the preservation
of critical national capabilities with both military and civil
objectives while taking advantage of DOD and IC unique authorities.
Question. In your view, how could SPACECOM exploit commercial and
other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid
replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems,
while minimizing the risk of mission failure?
Answer. Operationally responsive replenishment capability is a
priority for the Department. The rapid growth of commercial space in
cheaper launch and proliferated satellite constellations is very
promising. U.S. Space Force, Defense Advanced Research Projects, and a
number of defense organizations are working to take advantage of the
opportunities we see in the commercial market. If confirmed, I will
work with the Service Chiefs to ensure that warfighter requirements are
met, regardless of the solution.
u.s. cyber command (uscybercom)
Question. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) continues to be
hobbled by serious readiness shortfalls. This problem is the result of
multiple factors, including the demanding technical skills required for
key work roles in the Cyber Mission Forces and the lack of
prioritization of the cyber mission within the military departments.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to address this
persistent readiness problem?
Answer. I fully support the 2023-2027 DOD Cyber Workforce (CWF)
Strategy signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Kathleen Hicks,
which sets the foundation for how the Department will foster a cyber
workforce capable of executing the Department's complex and varied
cyber missions. The strategy enables the Department to prioritize
retaining highly skilled cyber talent by closing workforce development
gaps.
If confirmed, I will support implementation of the CWF Strategy in
coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the Joint
Staff, United States Cyber Command, and the Services to focus
Department efforts on cyber-related human capital initiatives in
support of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. This would include
surging capabilities through our Reserve components and an initiative
to maintain connections with servicemembers and DOD civilians who have
separated allowing them to retain their security clearance gain access
to additional professional development opportunities. Additionally, I
would support USCYBERCOM's execution of its service-like authorities
and roles, such as enhanced budgetary control, and acquisition
authorities.
Question. What are your views on the appropriate model for ensuring
that the cyber mission is adequately resourced and prioritized?
Answer. The Director of the National Security Agency is ``dual-
hatted'' as the Commander of USCYBERCOM. The administration last year
established an independent review of the dual-hat arrangement led by
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford. The review
found that the dual hat arrangement provided substantial benefits for
both organizations and the Nation. I, as the nominee to be the CJCS,
believe this arrangement to be an effective model to ensure a high
level of collaboration and mutual support between USCYBERCOM and NSA.
Question. The Director of the National Security Agency is ``dual-
hatted'' as the Commander of USCYBERCOM. The administration last year
established an independent review of the dual-hat arrangement led by
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford. The review
found that the dual hat arrangement provided substantial benefits for
both organizations and the Nation.
Do you agree with the conclusions of the recent review led by
General Dunford on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of National Intelligence?
Answer. Yes. The review's findings were compelling and clearly
articulated the organizational synergies gained and unity of effort
granted to the Director of the National Security Agency/Commander
USCYBERCOM through the Dual-Hat arrangement. Our experiences since 2018
demonstrated that we can work at the speed or relevance, with informed
interagency support, to best serve our national security interests.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence's annual
unclassified threat assessment for Fiscal year 2023 warns that ``If
Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were
imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive
cyber operations against U.S. Homeland critical infrastructure and
military assets worldwide. Such a strike would be designed to deter
U.S. Military action by impeding U.S. decisionmaking, inducing societal
panic, and interfering with the deployment of U.S. Forces.'' It appears
that China is not deterred from conducting widespread cyber attacks on
United States critical infrastructure and it is unlikely that the
National Cyber Mission Force would be able to block such attacks.
If direct defense in cyberspace against cyber attacks on U.S.
critical infrastructure by a near-peer adversary is unlikely to be
successful, how would you propose deterring such attacks if not by
threatening some form of in-kind retaliation?
Answer. Deterring such attacks relies on the implementation of the
National Defense Strategy and the concept of integrated deterrence. If
confirmed, I would provide advice on how best to utilize all
instruments of national power across all domains and working with
allies and partners. While the U.S. is not constrained to answer a
cyber-attack with a cyber response, the Department will continue to
campaign in and through cyberspace to generate insights about malicious
cyber actors, as well as defend forward to disrupt and degrade these
actors' capabilities and supporting ecosystems. Additionally, DOD will
work with its interagency partners, leveraging all available
authorities to enable the cyber resilience of U.S. critical
infrastructure and counter threats to military readiness.
Question. Most activities taking place in the physical world are
reflected in the digital domain and captured in some form.
Increasingly, the actions of significant import are not simply
reflected in cyberspace but are carried out in and through the cyber
domain. Congress remains unsatisfied with DOD's lack of visibility,
understanding, and ability to operate effectively in this information
environment.
Do you think that the Department can plan and conduct effective
information operations (IO), intelligence collection, and military
cyber operations in the information environment without comprehensive
understanding of the cyber-social terrain in key regions of the world?
Answer. We acknowledge that understanding the cyber-social terrain
in key regions of the world is critical to conducting effective
military operations and believe that good understanding requires a
whole-of-government approach. While the DOD has unique capabilities in
this space, we often collaborate with Department of State, the
intelligence community, and other executive branch agencies to develop
a holistic understanding of the information environment. If confirmed,
I will endeavor to collaborate with our interagency partners to improve
the Department's capabilities, work with our intelligence community to
develop specific requirements and training to improve intelligence
support to operations in the information environment, and continue
updates to information forces tactics, techniques, and procedures to
take advantage of the latest developments in both academia and private
industry.
Question. What are your views on how, if confirmed, you could
improve the management of the collection and analysis cyber-social
terrain data in support of the planning and execution of DOD's IO,
intelligence, and cyber operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DOD intelligence and
analytic processes are aligned to support the unique requirements of
information and cyber operations. The volume of data related to cyber-
social terrain is immense and the variables within the data are
complex. Necessarily, the DOD analytic community is consistently
refining its ability to identify variables of importance to help drive
decisionmaking and allow the Joint Force to be responsive, agile, and
effective.
Russia has conducted ambitious and aggressive cyber-enabled
information operations against the United States and our European
allies aimed at influencing election outcomes, and undermining
democracy and collective security. Following the 2016 election, the
U.S. election system and networks have been designated as critical
infrastructure. Other adversary nations now also pose threats to the
integrity of our elections and democracy.
Question. General Nakasone, Commander of United States CYBERCOM and
Director of the National Security Agency has testified to Congress that
election security is a ``no fail'' enduring mission for both
organizations. Do you concur with that judgment?
Answer. Yes. Defending the election infrastructure is a whole of
government responsibility to include State and local agencies. Each has
roles and responsibilities that can enable the protection of technical
infrastructure from foreign interference. This is critical to ensuring
faith and confidence in the fundamental tools of democracy. The Federal
Government provides support to State governments in fulfilling their
elections security responsibilities, as appropriate with applicable
law. The DOD and the IC must work with allies and interagency partners
to detect and disrupt foreign malign cyber activity.
u.s. transportation command (transcom)
Question. In your view, what is the role of TRANSCOM in supporting
implementation of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. TRANSCOM is the engine that propels the 2022 NDS by
ensuring the viability of deterrence options and providing our national
leadership with strategic flexibility. TRANSCOM ensures rapid response
anywhere in the world by conducting globally integrated mobility
operations, leading the Unified Command Plan (UCP)-directed Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, and providing the enabling
capabilities to project and sustain the Joint Force in support of
National Objectives. Additionally, TRANSCOM's role as the Bulk Fuel
Single Manager will drive global synchronization across the Joint
Petroleum Enterprise (JPE) for posture, planning, execution, and
capabilities in support of combatant command requirements and national
security objectives.
Question. What is your understanding of how TRANSCOM balances both
organic and privately owned sealift equities to support the NDS?
Answer. TRANSCOM leverages the US-owned commercial ocean carrier
industry to provide sealift in competition, crisis, and conflict. This
capability is augmented by Reserve fleets comprised of vessels with
secure, encrypted communication and navigation capabilities that are
not available in sufficient numbers in the active U.S.-owned commercial
industry. The organic sealift fleet can be used to access areas of
increased risk that are restricted to contracted commercial vessels.
TRANSCOM balances long-term strategic requirements against crisis
response using the partnership of organic and contracted sealift to
assure strategic power projection.
Question. In your view, should there be a central lead or global
manager for contested logistics within the department?
Answer. As the global integrator, the Joint Staff is positioned to
synchronize the Department's efforts regarding contested logistics. The
Joint Staff works with the Services to align their investments in
infrastructure, force design, and posture, and supports the Combatant
Commanders as they engage with allies and partners.
u.s. special operations command (socom)
Question. In your view, what is the role of U.S. Special Operations
Forces in supporting the implementation of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. SOF campaign globally and across domains to strengthen and
sustain deterrence, supporting DOD's integrated deterrence and
campaigning activities. SOF operations, activities, and investments can
undermine adversary confidence that their aggression will succeed,
shaping their decisions, and enhancing deterrence. The access,
placement, and influence generated by SOF's long-term commitments to
building partner capacity and improving interoperability provide
expanded, low-cost options to gain awareness, shape the operating
environment, and present adversaries with multiple dilemmas. SOF remain
ideally suited to identify a competitor's coercive activities in the
``gray zone'' and counter them with deliberate, credible options while
managing escalation.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict (ASD(SOLIC))
Question. Section 922 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA empowered the
ASD(SOLIC) to serve as the ``service secretary-like'' civilian official
with responsibility for the oversight of and advocacy for special
operations forces. Among other reforms, the law defined the
administrative chain of command for SOCOM as running through the
ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense for issues impacting the
readiness and organization of special operations forces, special
operations-peculiar resources and equipment, and civilian personnel
management.
What is your view of the role of the ASD(SOLIC) in promoting
civilian control over the military?
Answer. In my view, civilian oversight and control of the military
is critically important to the Department of Defense and our Nation.
ASD(SO/LIC) exercises oversight, authority, direction, and control with
respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and support
of USSOCOM, including the readiness and organization of SOF, resources
and equipment, and civilian personnel. The role of ASD(SO/LIC) is
important for both SOF oversight and advocacy, and vital for the health
and readiness of U.S. special operations forces. If confirmed, I look
forward to strengthening this relationship and coordination.
Question. What is your understanding of the organizational and
administrative relationship between ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander of
SOCOM?
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian
advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on Special
Operations and low intensity conflict matters. The principal duty of
the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall oversight of Special Operations
activities within the Department of Defense, including USSOCOM. Section
167 of Title 10 places the ASD(SO/LIC) in the administrative chain of
command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, USSOCOM to
exercise authority, direction, and control with respect to the special
operations-peculiar administration and support of USSOCOM, including
the readiness and organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and
civilian personnel. If readiness and organization of SOF, resources and
equipment, and civilian personnel. If readiness and organization of
SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. If readiness and
organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel.
If
Section 127e and Section 1202 Activities
Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
special operations forces to provide support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and
individuals supporting or facilitating military operations for the
purpose of combatting terrorism. Section 1202 of the NDAA for fiscal
year 2018 authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide similar
support to forces or individuals supporting or facilitating irregular
warfare operations.
What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
these authorities in the current strategic environment?
Answer. I see both authorities maintaining their utility for the
foreseeable future. Terrorism and violent extremism remain a persistent
threat to U.S. interests and our Homeland. A key challenge that we face
is striking the right balance with our national security priorities to
ensure we don't overcorrect away from counterterrorism and lose the
last 20 years of hard-won experience that we've gained. The authority
provided by Section 127e is ideal to strike this balance effectively,
it allows us to meet our counterterrorism goals of shifting the burden
of operations to partners, reducing risk to U.S. persons, all at a
sustainable cost that allows the U.S. to concurrently focus on
developing new technologies and processes for conventional conflict.
Question. Section 1202 authority funds indirect action against non-
terrorist threats, including State actors. It is a highly useful tool
for enabling irregular warfare operations in support of the National
Defense Strategy emphasis on expanding the competitive space to deter
and defeat coercion and aggression by revisionist powers and rogue
regimes.
If confirmed, what criteria would you apply to the evaluation of
proposals for the use of each of these authorities, with a view to
mitigating the risks associated with the conduct of counterterrorism
and irregular warfare activities below the level of traditional armed
conflict?
Answer. Section 127e authority, or its predecessor Section 1208,
has existed since 2005, and over the years, the Department has
developed effective criteria to ensure foreign forces do not conduct
escalatory or inappropriate actions. Section 1202, while modeled after
the successful Section 127e authority, requires a careful assessment of
benefits versus risk with respect to competition against adversaries
below the level of armed conflict. Both programs involve comprehensive
selection, screening, and vetting procedures for partner forces to
ensure compliance with the laws of armed conflict. If confirmed, I will
continue the high degree of scrutiny and oversight, in conjunction with
the Department, to ensure these programs advance our aims while
reducing risk of compromise or escalation.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which partner
forces nominated to receive support under these authorities are vetted
and monitored for human rights concerns, counterintelligence threats,
and other potentially derogatory or disqualifying information?
Answer. I am committed to upholding the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) and protecting the Nation against threats. While the Leahy laws,
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 362 of Title 10,
do not apply to Section 127e or Section 1202, activities under these
programs must comply with the LOAC and are closely monitored. The
establishment of a new Section 127e or Section 1202 activity requires a
detailed description of the activity including counterintelligence and
force-protection screening, as well as a description of the steps taken
to ensure that the recipients of support have not engaged in human
rights violations.
u.s. strategic command (stratcom)
Nuclear Policy
Question. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed long-
held American doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear
weapons to ``extreme circumstances'' and the need to maintain the
Nation's nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities.
201. How does the 2022 NPR fit within the framework of the 2022
NDS, in your view?
Answer. I believe the 2022 NPR appropriately reinforced decades of
stability in U.S. nuclear policy even as it seeks to incorporate
nuclear deterrence in the broader integrated deterrence framework from
the 2022 NDS.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons
and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and
the defense of allies?
Answer. As stated in the 2022 NDS and 2022 NPR, our nuclear mission
undergirds and is foundational to all our defense priorities and it
remains indispensable to our national security. In a dynamic security
environment, a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is
foundational to broader U.S. defense strategy and the extended
deterrence commitments we have made to allies and partners.
Question. Do you agree with the assessment of the past five
Secretaries of Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest
priority mission and that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a
critical national security priority? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. Nuclear weapons pose the only existential military
threat to the Homeland, and ensuring the U.S. maintains credible and
effective nuclear forces is critical to deterring nuclear-armed
adversaries. Our ability to execute the nuclear deterrence mission
underpins our ability to successfully conduct other DOD operations in
support of our national security interests.
Question. What are your views on deterrence now that the United
States facing the prospect of simultaneously deterring two nuclear-
armed peer competitors in Russia and China?
Answer. We are facing heightened nuclear competition with Russia
and the pace and scope of the PRC's nuclear expansion will present new
strategic dilemmas, but I do not believe that fundamentally changes how
deterrence works. By maintaining credible and effective United States
nuclear forces, we seek to deter aggression from both Russia and China.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia and China have
expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?
Answer. China is rapidly expanding their stockpile of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems, while Russia is expending limited
resources to modernize their strategic nuclear forces and maintain a
large stockpile of tactical systems. While Russia remains the most
capable and diverse nuclear rival, China's increasing capability is a
growing threat to the United States and our allies and partners.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?
Answer. Yes, based on what we've already observed, I believe Russia
has already attempted multiple times to coerce Ukraine and United
States partners and allies into submitting to Putin's objectives.
Therefore, we must continue to be prepared to respond to further
irresponsible behavior by Russia.
Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
Answer. Yes, over several years, we have seen China make
substantial investments in its nuclear arsenal that are expected to
significantly expand PRC's nuclear weapons stockpile, their means of
delivery, and overall strategic deterrence capabilities. These
investments are ongoing, are expected to continue, and are consistent
with the PRC's stated goal of improving their forces to that of a
``world-class military.''
Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of ``no
first use''?
Answer. No. China's lack of transparency and refusal to engage in
meaningful dialog while expanding both scale and scope of nuclear
forces increases uncertainty over China's intentions.
Question. What do you see as the major changes in the threat
landscape between the 2010, 2018 and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews?
Answer. The threat environment has grown increasingly complex since
2010, and even since 2018. I believe China's rapid military expansion
and modernization, to include its nuclear forces, represents the most
significant change in the threat landscape since the 2018 NPR.
Question. Do you support the U.S. nuclear force structure
recommended by the 2022 NPR? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would
you recommend to that force structure?
Answer. Yes. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirmed the
U.S. commitment to full-scope modernization of our nuclear forces,
including all three legs of the U.S. strategic triad, dual-capable
fighter aircraft, and nuclear command, control, and communications
(NC3) systems. If confirmed, I will examine whether additional options
for the President are warranted to address any exploitable ``gap(s)''
in our deterrence capabilities.
Question. Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
assurances are effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to
pursue their own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?
Answer. Yes. We recognize growing concerns about nuclear and
missile developments in the PRC, North Korea, and Russia, and are
committed to strengthening deterrence in ways that are responsive to
changes in the regional security environment. Toward that end, we will
work with allies and partners to ensure an effective mix of
capabilities, concepts, deployments, exercises, and tailored options to
deter and, if necessary, respond to coercion and aggression.
Question. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation
will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear
deterrence assurances?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your understanding of the State of U.S. nuclear
forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production
capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?
Answer. Although our nuclear forces and existing NC3 architecture
are safe, secure, and effective, we have greatly exceeded their
intended design life, and they are showing their age. Deferred
modernization has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay.
This is further challenged by atrophy in both the DOD industrial base
for nuclear delivery platforms and NNSA production capabilities and
infrastructure, some of which date back to the Manhattan Project.
Question. Do you agree that modernizing each leg of the nuclear
triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a
critical national security priority?
Answer. Yes. Maintaining the nuclear triad is of vital national
importance to deter adversaries, assure allies and, if necessary,
achieve military objectives. However, the delivery platforms and
nuclear warheads of each leg of the nuclear triad are near end-of-life
and require replacement with modern capabilities. Fielding modern
nuclear weapons requires the recapitalization of the DOE/NNSA nuclear
weapons production infrastructure that was largely abandoned and at has
largely atrophied since the end of the cold war.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad,
including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?
Answer. The existing nuclear force was designed in the last decades
of the cold war when the U.S. faced a very different threat
environment. While the current program of record is sufficient to
modernize the existing nuclear force, that plan is increasingly
challenged to succeed in a timely manner. If confirmed, I intend to
consult key stakeholders to understand whether we should pursue
additional capabilities for our nuclear forces and enterprise.
Question. The previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along
with the current Vice Chairman, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
several Combatant Commanders have stated that they support the
continued development of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile as
a means of addressing Russia's advantages in theater-range nuclear
weapons, managing escalation in a potential conflict with China, and
enhancing assurance to United States allies. Do you agree with these
views?
Answer. I believe we must maintain a range of strategic military
options and capabilities to present to the President. If confirmed, I
will be able to more fully review how we can continuously improve our
ability to deter and, if deterrence fails, restore deterrence, against
our nuclear adversaries. I am aware of differing perspectives regarding
the nuclear armed sea launched cruise missile. If confirmed, I will
analyze the arguments for and against this program and will provide my
military advice to the Secretary and President.
Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to
mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will ``age
out'' simultaneously at the end of the 2020's?
Answer. I agree with the 2022 NPR direction for DOD and the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/
NNSA) to develop and implement a risk management strategy to identify,
prioritize, and recommend actions across the portfolio of nuclear
programs. This is essential for monitoring the overall health of the
nuclear deterrent as we sustain current capabilities and transition to
modernized systems.
Question. Do you believe a nuclear ``No First Use'' or ``Sole
Purpose'' policy would be appropriate for the United States? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. No. As the 2022 NPR concluded, a No First Use or Sole
Purpose policy would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light
of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by
competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United
States and its Allies and partners.
Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program
provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are
needed?
Answer. Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has
developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify
the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons
testing. However, fielding modern nuclear forces would benefit from
enhanced computing and experimental capabilities, including an enduring
exascale computing and experimental facilities to certify weapons in
hostile environments. Continued support for the National Laboratories
is crucial for the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.
Question. Do you perceive utility in the work of the Council on
Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and
Communications System? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, there is utility in the work of the Council and its
various governance forums. The utility lies in unifying efforts across
the Department for sustaining and modernizing senior leader, nuclear
command and control, and continuity of government communications.
Arms Control
Question. What are your views of the New START Treaty, taking into
account Russia's recent actions to suspend participation in the Treaty?
Answer. To date, New START has contributed to bilateral stability
by limiting the offensive strategic arms it addresses. However, New
START does not address Russia's large and growing arsenal of non-
accountable nuclear weapons and novel nuclear systems. In addition,
Russia's violations of the New START Treaty, and its claimed suspension
of the treaty, greatly undermine the viability of the treaty. Mutual
compliance with New START would strengthen the security of the United
States, our allies and partners, Russia, and the world.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges for negotiating a
follow on treaty with Russia, and would you support United States
participation in such a negotiation?
Answer. I support diplomatic efforts that contribute to national
security and in particular this effort to pursue arms control
agreements capturing the full scope of Russian nuclear capabilities,
including their non-strategic nuclear weapons and novel nuclear systems
that are not currently the subject of arms control agreement. Any such
agreements must be verifiable, enforceable, and enhance the security of
our Nation and our allies and partners. Russia's noncompliance with
many arms control arrangements--including the New START Treaty, Treaty
on Open Skies, and INF Treaty--casts a shadow over and creates
challenges for any potential negotiations that would lead to a follow-
on agreement to replace the New START Treaty when it expires in
February 2026.
Question. What are your views on the asymmetry in the number of
non-strategic weapons between Russia and the United States and should
they be accounted for in any follow-on treaty?
Answer. I am concerned by Russia's approximately 2,000 non-
strategic nuclear weapons that are not numerically constrained by any
arms control treaty. They should be accounted for in any follow-on
treaty with Russia.
Question. What are your views of missile defense and nuclear arms
control with either Russia or China?
Answer. The increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear
states demonstrates the importance of missile defense and the need for
continued investment. As important and if not more so, the United
States will continue to rely on strategic deterrence--underwritten by a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal--to address and deter large
intercontinental-range, nuclear capable missile threats to the Homeland
from Russia and China.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or canceling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
Answer. Delaying or canceling current nuclear modernization plans
and programs on a unilateral basis would reduce our strategic
deterrence and arms control leverage with Russia and China.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges for any nuclear
risk reduction or arms control negotiations with China?
Answer. China continues to deny it is conducting a crash nuclear
buildup and reject calls for even modest nuclear risk reduction
measures. China needs to be more transparent about its nuclear forces.
Any such agreement with China must be verifiable, enforceable, and
enhance the security of our Nation and our allies and partners. I
expect transparency, verification, and the security of our Nation and
our allies and partners. I expect transparency, verification, and
Missile Defense
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against United States forces, allies, and the
United States Homeland continues to grow. The 2022 Missile Defense
Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed
follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.
What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and
nuclear deterrence?
Answer. I agree with and support the 2022 Missile Defense Review's
assertion that our missile defense system is designed to deter
aggression from rogue states. We rely on a whole-of-government effort
to defeat missile technology for all adversaries while raising the
threshold of escalation by maintaining a credible kinetic defense. The
increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear states will
challenge our limited kinetic missile defenses, however, our nuclear
deterrent continues to underpin our missile defense efforts.
Question. If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
what would be your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for
the Homeland?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be aligned with
priorities set by the Missile Defense Review for Homeland missile
defense. The first priority remains protecting the Homeland from an
adversary ICBM attack. The Ground-Based Midcourse-Defense system
contributes directly to the U.S. deterrence strategies for rogue State
ICBM threats to the Homeland and would defend against an ICBM attack.
Per the NDS, another key priority remains defense of the Homeland
against cruise missile threats. We must continue to modernize and
develop both Active and passive defense capabilities that enhance
protection of the Homeland against cruise missile threats.
Question. Do you support a cruise missile defense of the Homeland?
Answer. Yes. The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Air Force and NORTHCOM have been working on a comprehensive plan to
strengthen our Homeland against air and cruise missile threats in the
continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam. We're taking a
hard look at the changing threat environment as we transition away from
a focus on violent extremists and returning our attention to states
with greater reach with advanced missile systems. The Missile Defense
Review prioritizes the examination of Active and passive defense
measures to decrease the risk of any cruise missile strike against
critical assets, regardless of origin.
Question. Do you believe the United States ground-based interceptor
fleet is appropriately sized to address potential ICBM threats from
North Korea or other rogue nations?
Answer. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Missile
Defense Executive Board review this requirement every year. Our current
fleet of Ground Based Interceptors is adequate against the existing
North Korean threat, and our planned upgrade to the Next Generation
Interceptor and modest increase to the number of interceptors in the
fleet should be sufficient to defeat a limited attack. If confirmed, I
will support continuing these annual reviews to assess and required
changes in the ground-based interceptor fleet.
Question. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy
should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea
and Iran?
Answer. I support the Missile Defense Review stipulation that the
United States maintains the right to defend itself against attacks from
any source, but GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of, defeating
large and sophisticated ICBM, air, or sea-launched ballistic missile
threats from PRC or Russia. Our strategic deterrence addresses these
threats.
Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
threats, such as Russia and China?
Answer. The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Air Force and NORTHCOM have been working on a comprehensive plan to
strengthen our Homeland against air and cruise missile threats in the
continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam. The Department
will continue to develop Active and passive defenses against regional
hypersonic missile threats and pursue a persistent and resilient sensor
network to characterizer and track all hypersonic threats, improve
attribution, and enable engagement. Integrated air and missile defense
of the Homeland is vital to our resiliency at home and to our ability
to project power abroad in support of allies and partners.
Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor?
Answer. As North Korean ballistic missile threats to the United
States Homeland continue to evolve, the United States is committed to,
and I support improving the capability and reliability of the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system. This includes development of the Next
Generation Interceptor to augment and eventually replace the existing
Ground-Based Interceptors. In addition to the GMD system, the United
States will leverage and improve its full spectrum of passive and
Active missile defeat capabilities, complemented by the credible threat
of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means, to
continue to counter North Korean missile threats to the Homeland.
Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor eventually
replacing the existing 44 ground-based interceptors?
Answer. In support of the Homeland missile defense mission,
continuous modernization and modest expansion of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system will remain an essential element of our
comprehensive missile defeat approach. I support replacing the existing
Ground-based Interceptors with Next-Generation Interceptors, expanding
the arsenal of interceptors, and leveraging the full spectrum of
current and emerging missile defeat capabilities supports this approach
and hedges against future uncertainty in missile threats against the
Homeland.
Question. What are your views on the advisability of building a
second Homeland missile defense site on the eastern coast of the United
States?
Answer. Currently, the Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) sites in
Alaska and California provide protection of all the United States
against both North Korean and any future Iranian intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) threats. This protection will be strengthened
as the Next Generation Interceptor comes online later this decade. At
this time, there is no operational requirement for a strategic missile
defense site on the eastern coast. If confirmed, I will continue to
monitor advances in adversary capabilities, and if necessary, will
assess the feasibility of enhancing our protection to ensure our
defenses remain strategically worthwhile.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. capabilities for
defending against maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicles?
Answer. Maneuvering missiles, such as hypersonic glide vehicles
(HGV), present a challenge to existing defensive systems because they
can travel on unpredictable flight paths at low altitudes making them
difficult to track using standard terrestrial radar systems. If
confirmed, I will continue to seek out asymmetric means of defeating
hypersonic threats to create cost imposition within the framework of
integrated deterrence.
Question. Recently, the Missile Defense Agency indicated that the
Glide Phase Interceptor program for hypersonic defense would not reach
initial operational capability until after 2035. Do you believe this
timeline is sufficient to meet current and anticipated hypersonic
threats?
Answer. The United States would always prefer capabilities
delivered sooner rather than later. I will ensure we work closely with
MDA and other stakeholders to prioritize and continually look to create
efficiencies within these efforts. I appreciate the GAO report from
June 2023 that examines counter-hypersonic capabilities such as the
Glide Phase Interceptor and the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor. Hypersonic glide vehicles delivered by missile boosters are an
emerging and existing threat that pose new challenges to missile
defense systems. Consequently, the continued investment in development
of long range and resilient sensor technologies and capabilities, to
include those that could support a space sensor network, is essential
for tracking and engaging advanced missile threats. When mature,
intercepting in the glide phase would become part of the overall
Department strategy for hypersonic defeat; however, we will continue to
seek many types of detect, track, and defeat solutions, to include
terminal solutions, Active and passive solutions, kinetic and non-
kinetic solutions.
Question. Do you support a space-based sensor layer for improved
tracking and targeting of advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles?
Answer. Yes, space-based sensors can monitor, detect, and track
missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe unimpeded
by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial
sensors. Active U.S. missile defense will require advanced technologies
to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. Active missile defense
capabilities, to include space-based sensors and boost-phase defense
capabilities. The exploitation of space provides a missile defense
posture that is more effective, resilient, and adaptable.
Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase
intercept and space-based intercept or directed energy programs?
Answer. I assess that the efficacy of boost-phase intercept, space-
based intercept and directed energy programs is still an open question.
While these concepts have great potential, the Department is exploring
how to best resolve the challenges associated with developing and
fielding these capabilities. For example, prototype directed energy
weapons are, or are in the process of, being tested and fielded against
small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) and on an experimental basis for
defense against cruise missiles, although the systems are neither
space-based nor for boost-phase intercept. There will be challenges in
creating these programs on the scale to provide robust coverage of
threat areas, and if confirmed I will remain involved in operational
discussions with senior Department leadership to ensure a thorough
examination of these concepts.
Question. Has DOD developed and implemented operational concepts,
plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of
such programs? What would you do to address this issue, if confirmed?
Answer. In line with the Joint Warfighting Concept, the DOD
continues to evolve with the threats that our Homeland and warfighters
face every day. To that end, the DOD must continue to parallel
assessments and updates of our acquisition and development processes
with employment and governance policies to ensure our warfighters
retain the strategic and tactical competitive advantage. If confirmed,
I will remain involved in operational discussions with senior
Department leadership to ensure a thorough examination of these
materiel concepts and their governance processes.
Question. The United States is currently developing a missile
defense architecture to better support the protection of United States
citizens and forces on Guam. What is your understanding of the status
of this effort, and its operational importance to the United States in
the Western Pacific?
Answer. As part of the United States Homeland, the protection of
Guam is critical to the U.S. National Defense Strategy, and the
Department has been focused on this subject and it is a Department
priority. IAMD of Guam has been designated as a Joint Special Interest
Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID Program.
Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations
Question. How capable do you believe Russia and China to be in
electronic warfare?
Answer. Russia recognizes electronic warfare is a critical
capability with great significance on the battlefield. Prior to the
invasion of Ukraine, there were indications that Moscow was expanding
their strategic and operation echelon capabilities, fielding new EW
systems, and ensuring these were integrated with their ground forces at
multiple command levels. These assets are intended to disrupt US/NATO's
ability to conduct ISR, communicate, and exercise command and control.
Western forces operating in the vicinity of Russian forces should
anticipate electromagnetic interference.
China anticipates EW will be a critical capability in any future
conflict. The importance of this capability is highlighted by Beijing's
2015 military re-organization that resulted in the creation of the
Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is directly subordinate to the
Central Military Commission and is tasked with providing EW, cyber, and
space capabilities in support of military operations. EW elements are
also integrated at Theater operational levels with each of the
subordinate service elements.
Question. Has DOD adequately integrated electronic warfare into its
joint concepts and operational plans?
Answer. This is a work in progress, and the biggest block to doing
this is a mindset shift. Often we think of electromagnetic warfare as a
supporting effort to enable some other weapon system or capability. In
modern warfare, electromagnetic warfare may be the main effort to
achieve the desired strategic effects, especially in the pre-conflict
phase where we ideally deter a fight from happening in the first place.
Our joint concepts and operational plans are progressing toward this
reality, but I think we have room for improvement.
Question. What major issues attend the United States' conduct of
joint electronic warfare operations, especially at the relevant
combatant commands?
Answer. Electromagnetic warfare operations are dynamic. U.S.,
allied, partner, and adversary capabilities in the electromagnetic
maneuver space are constantly changing, which creates perpetual
challenges to get the right capability to the right warfighter at the
right time to be operationally relevant against the right threat.
Question. Do you support a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations Center at U.S. Strategic Command?
Answer. Yes. U.S. Strategic Command is the operational lead for
electromagnetic spectrum operations across the Joint Force. The Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center will increase the command's
capabilities in this role.
Question. Does the DOD adequately conduct joint Tier One exercises
utilizing adversary level electronic warfare?
Answer. No. Our Combatant Commanders recognize the critical
importance of electronic warfare and prioritize the objectives of their
Tier One exercises accordingly, tailored to the threats within their
geographic or functional areas of responsibility, but frequently the
objectives of the exercise and limited threat replication capabilities
overcome the realism of the exercise. Electronic warfare continues to
evolve rapidly, and we must forecast and preemptively update our
training to remain dominant. Our Joint Warfighting Concept emphasizes
the importance of the electromagnetic spectrum and provides a unified
approach to shape joint force exercises. A live, virtual, constructive
(LVC) simulation environment will be essential in this effort. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Joint Staff issues guidance on the realism
of the training events.
Question. What is your opinion of training ranges for electronic
warfare?
Answer. Current training ranges need to evolve to capture the
evolving warfighting environment. Investments have been made through
Service live, virtual, constructive (LVC) test and training programs
that can enable a more robust and realistic threat battlespace
environment. Continued investment is necessary to ensure live ranges
can meet and exceed requirements for the high-end fight in the future.
Question. Do you believe our systems are adequately protected from
adversary electronic attack?
Answer. It depends on the adversary, but against our most advanced
adversaries, the Joint Force would likely face challenges protecting
itself from electromagnetic attack. There are two factors that
contribute to these challenges. Over the past few decades, the Joint
Force has lost some muscle memory defending against electromagnetic
attack by conducting operations within a permissive electromagnetic
spectrum. Over the same period, operations within this spectrum have
changed significantly while our most advanced adversaries have done
their best to rapidly evolve. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that we continue to invest in additional capabilities in the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Question. Does DOD have adequate simulation capability to
experiment with and test joint electronic warfare concepts, in your
view?
Answer. No. Based on identified gaps in simulation capabilities we
are modernizing training infrastructure to include joint live, virtual,
and constructive capabilities that provide space, terrestrial, and
cyber-based electronic warfare simulation for use in Joint
experimentation, testing, and training.
Question. Spectrum is a vital asset in the conduct of electronic
warfare--what is your opinion on the DOD use of the S band for spectrum
operations and potential impacts on its loss--please be specific in
citing examples.
Answer. Spectrum is a vital asset in the conduct of electronic
warfare--I recognize that spectrum is a precious resource and that our
national economic prosperity and position as a global leader in
technology innovation has vital dependencies, however, we must ensure,
first and foremost, that we preserve and protect our vital National
Security and operational readiness equities.
Proposals for DOD to share or vacate the S band may result in
setting the DOD back several decades compared to near peer adversary
nations and result in significant financial costs. Vacating this band
is not an option, and no decision should be made prior to the current
study is completed and reviewed. I and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
appreciate deliberate efforts to preserve and develop spectrum as a
vital national resource and look forward to helping ensure that we are
mindful of the national security implications and unique Joint Force
operational requirements are clearly understood and preserved.
security cooperation and arms transfers
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend, if any, to
ensure that the Department of Defense is taking a strategic approach to
its security cooperation with allies and partners?
Answer. The Joint Force executes the NDS which is strategically
focused on security cooperation with allies and partners. Through the
Combatant Command activities with allies and partners, we will build,
and exercise force elements needed in crisis, conflict, or
stabilization, such as infrastructure, logistics, command and control,
dispersal and relocation, information sharing, and mobilization. If
confirmed, I will ensure security cooperation activities remain
foundational to U.S. national security interests and to our collective
ability to maintain access and address the challenges we will face
globally.
Question. What is your understanding of DOD's role in the foreign
military sales and arms transfer process? In your view, what are the
greatest challenges for DOD in fulfilling this role in a timely and
effective manner?
Answer. The role of DOD in Foreign Military Sales is to effectively
execute the FMS programs in coordination with Department of State, the
Defense Industry and other government agencies. There are many
challenges in executing an FMS case from inception to construction,
through initial delivery, training and then maintenance and support.
Last year the Department conducted an extensive review of FMS
processes, policies, and practices to identify potential improvement to
the system. That review produced tangible identify potential
improvement to the system. That review produced tangible identify
potential improvement to the system. That review produced tangible
identify potential improvement to the system. That review produced
tangible identify potential improvement to the system. That review
produced tangible
Question. Is DOD appropriately organized, trained, and resourced to
execute security cooperation and foreign military sales effectively? If
not, and if confirmed, what changes to defense security assistance
organizations, training, and processes would you recommend?
Answer. The DOD is appropriately organized and trained to execute
security cooperation and foreign military sales effectively, but these
are areas we must continuously adapt and improve. Similarly, resources
are always limited and take strategic planning to effectively execute
security cooperation and foreign military sales. If confirmed, I will
fully support the Continuous Process Improvement Board that the
Department has established as an enduring body to improve speed and
transparency of the foreign military sales process. Additionally, I
will ensure the Joint Force organization and training continues to be
refined to optimally support the National Defense Strategy.
contested logistics
Question. Who do you believe acts as the lead for contested
logistics in how both efficiencies are created and executed to support
the NDS?
Answer. As the global integrator, the Joint Staff is positioned to
synchronize the Department's efforts regarding contested logistics. The
Joint Staff works with the Services to align their investments in
infrastructure, force design, and posture, and supports the Combatant
Commanders as they engage with allies and partners.
Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense needs to
identify a single service or entity to act as the global contested
logistics manage?
Answer. At this time, I do not. As the global integrator, the Joint
Staff is positioned to synchronize the Department's efforts regarding
contested logistics. The Joint Staff works with the Services to align
their investments in infrastructure, force design, and posture, and
supports the Combatant Commanders as they engage with allies and
partners. If confirmed, I will continue to assess any changes in how
global contested logistics is managed.
Question. What is your current assessment for how the Department of
Defense views contested logistics when it comes to both war games and
operational planning?
Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept and supporting concepts have
focused the Department's attention on the contested logistics problem
set. Logistics was once considered an enabling function and now it is
clearly a pacing function. Today, wargamers are concentrating on the
logistics challenges posed by the current environment and incorporating
outcomes from joint logistics wargames into higher level wargames that
merge all warfare domains.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. Many DOD officials, including previous Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated for accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes. Like my predecessors, I support joining the
Convention. Being a party to the Convention enhances the United States'
security posture by reinforcing freedom of the seas and rights vital to
ensuring our global force posture. The Convention provides legal
certainty in the world's largest maneuver space.
Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would United States
accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on emerging maritime
disputes, such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
Answer. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen our credibility
and strategic position on issues pertaining to these regions. While we
do not take sides in the various territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, we do have a national security interest in ensuring disputes
are resolved peacefully, that countries adhere to the rule of law, and
that all nations fully respect freedom of the seas. However, we
undermine our influence by not signing up to the same rule book which
we ask other countries to accept. As for the Arctic, the other Arctic
coastal nations (Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland))
understand the importance of the Convention and are in the process of
utilizing the Convention's procedures to establish the outer limits of
their extended continental shelves (ECS) in the Arctic. The United
States has a significant ECS in the Arctic Ocean but cannot avail
itself of the Convention's mechanisms to gain international recognition
of its ECS. Acceding to the Convention would put our rights in the
Arctic on a treaty footing in order to more fully and effectively
interact with the other Arctic Council nations who are parties to the
Convention, as well as strengthen our position on freedom of navigation
in this increasingly important region.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR Program, which has focused historically on
accounting for, securing, and eliminating cold war era weapons of mass
destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has
expanded its focus to other countries. In addition, the CTR Program is
widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including
biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the
development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats as well as
working with host nations to secure stockpiles of dangerous pathogens
at their high containment laboratories.
What are your views on the efficacy of the CTR Program?
Answer. The CTR program has consistently provided capabilities for
allies and partners to reduce or eliminate their WMD stockpiles, secure
their WMD facilities, and secure their borders against trafficking of
WMD and related materials. CTR has unique attributes to include multi-
year funding structure, rapid response capabilities, and authorities to
directly engage with ally and partner civilian and military entities,
making it a highly effective tool to address current and emergent WMD
threats.
Question. Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical
weapons documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60 percent of CTR
resources are allocated to biological programs.
Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
accurately reflects the current threat?
Answer. Yes. CTR had already begun to focus on biological programs
before the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lessons learned during the
worldwide response to the pandemic validated the need for continued
engagement with our allies and partners to assist them in bolstering
their biological surveillance and detection capabilities and securing
their biological facilities.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you recommend to
ensure the CTR program is capable of meeting its mission to roll back
the threat of weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize collaboration with
Department stakeholders and interagency partners to ensure CTR program
activities align with our Biodefense Strategy, Countering WMD Strategy,
and Combatant Commander Countering WMD priorities.
dod auditability
Question. The Department of Defense has invested significant effort
and dollars in preparing its financial information for annual audit
reviews. However, the 2022 DOD-wide financial audit again resulted in a
disclaimer of opinion.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or direct to
improve DOD auditability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our partners to address
issues identified in the 2022 audit:
Prioritization of resources toward obtaining a clean
audit opinion
Enhanced focus on leadership accountability toward
reaching target audit goals
Employing automated processes to enhance financial system
outputs and reliability
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to inculcate
auditability as a command leadership responsibility, and not just
default to a financial management community?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take steps to inculcate auditability
as a responsibility of leaders at every level through emphasis on audit
priority areas, partner collaboration for a strong financial management
strategy, and developing a comprehensive audit roadmap with a clear
vision for achieving a clean audit opinion.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
identified 14 critical technology areas in which investment to develop
next generation operational capabilities is imperative. These areas
include: hypersonics; future generation wireless technology; advanced
materials; integrated network systems-of-systems; directed energy;
integrated sensing and cyber; space technology; quantum science;
trusted artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy; microelectronics;
renewable energy generation and storage; advanced computing and
software; human-machine interfaces; and biotechnology. Much of the
innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national
defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense
industry.
What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to DOD's development of these
key technologies, or gaining access to such technologies from the
commercial marketplace?
Answer. As I understand it today, the leading challenges include
the adequate protection of our intellectual property, insufficient
integration between the public and private defense-related industries
required to bridge the valley of death in support of technology
transition, and risk aversion that leads to a lack of agility in the
development of key technologies.
Question. How well do you think those Department investments in
these technologies are appropriately focused, integrated, and
synchronized across all Military Departments and Agencies?
Answer. There continues to be room for improvement in this area.
Each Military Department and Agency has its own priorities, but it is
imperative that we focus and synchronize our efforts. If confirmed, I
will work diligently with Congress, the Department, and our Allies and
Partners to ensure that we build an interoperable future Joint Force.
Question. In addition to the technologies identified in the 2022
NDS, are there other technology areas in which you believe DOD must
invest to ensure that the United States maintains its technological
superiority in the long-term?
Answer. The 14 critical technology areas represent investments
necessary to maintain technological superiority in the long-term and
achieve NDS priorities.
Question. What efforts is DOD making to identify new technologies
developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to national
security and warfighter purposes?
Answer. DOD has multiple initiatives within the defense research
enterprise that are specifically focused on identifying commercial
technologies that are currently in the private sector but have
potential uses for national security and warfighter purposes. Examples
include the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), AFWERX, Army Futures
Command, and NavalX which are all focused on accelerating technology
interface.
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that technologies
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment
of capability to the warfighter.
What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning
technologies from research programs into programs of record or deployed
capabilities?
Answer. Effectively transitioning technologies from a research
program to a program of record can be difficult because it requires
significant cooperation and alignment across the R&D, acquisition,
requirements, and resourcing processes.
Question. How can the operational experience of the warfighter
better be integrated into the research and development process? Are
there appropriate places to interject warfighters in the interaction
between the DOD research and engineering community and the private
sector?
Answer. Warfighters need to be actively involved in the research
process, incorporating their operational experience, so that we can
bridge the gap between research and practical application. This will
ensure that their operational experience is effectively incorporated
into decisionmaking processes, research efforts, and technology
development, ultimately leading to solutions that better meet their
needs. Additionally, integrating experimental capabilities into
exercises allows a more rapid feedback approach for the researchers
while also preparing the force for emerging capabilities. We should
also continue to leverage and increase warfighter interaction with
innovation focused organizations such as SOFWERX and AFWERX that help
to close the gap between DOD R&D and industry.
Question. If confirmed as Chairman, what specific steps would you
take to ensure that the warfighter is benefiting more quickly and
directly from research being performed across the defense research
enterprise?
Answer. My approach, if confirmed, would be to increase
experimentation with emerging technology inside joint exercise venues
thereby exposing more of the Joint Force early in the development phase
of promising prototypes. Diverse teams comprised of warfighters,
technologists, transition agents, all working together to better
understand operational concepts, employment options, and desired
outcomes could shorten evaluation and adoption timelines, and provide
more operational context for the research enterprise. By actively
involving warfighters in the research process and incorporating their
operational experience, we can bridge the gap between research and
practical application, resulting in solutions better suited to meet the
warfighter's real-world challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to increase the
interaction between DOD labs and the private sector, and between DOD
labs and the rest of the DOD innovation enterprise to include the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency?
Answer. The Joint Force relies on advanced technologies to outpace
the threat. Accelerating innovation is a known challenge; however, the
Department has implemented several key pilot initiatives to transition
emerging technologies into warfighting capability. If confirmed, I will
work across the Department and innovation enterprise to break down
barriers and drive open dialog among stakeholders to enable timely
transition of critical capabilities into the hands of the Joint Force.
Question. What steps should the Department take to ensure that the
foreign technical talent that we educate and support remains in here in
the United States and commits to working on our high-priority national
missions to maintain our technological superiority?
Answer. The Joint Force relies on advanced technologies to outpace
the threat. Accelerating innovation is a known challenge; however, the
Department has implemented several key pilot initiatives to transition
emerging technologies into warfighting capability. If confirmed, I will
work across the Department and innovation enterprise to break down
barriers and drive open dialog among stakeholders to enable timely
transition of critical capabilities into the hands of the Joint Force.
Question. How could we leverage our defense labs and DOD research
funding programs to overmatch Chinese efforts by providing resources
and facilities to attract technical talent to stay and work in the
United States?
Answer. A primary way to attract and retain technical talent within
the United States is to expand our defense labs to partnerships with
universities and small businesses around the country. Our ability to
tap into the intellectual capital of the American people, their
innovative ideas, and our production capacity, has made, and will
continue to give, the U.S. military competitive advantage.
joint acquisition
Question. What are your views regarding the effectiveness of joint
acquisition programs, especially in delivering integrated and
interoperable solutions for the Department and which programs would you
consider to be candidates for joint development and acquisition?
Answer. Developing, procuring, delivering, and sustaining our
Nation's needed joint warfighting capabilities and capacity requires
the continued successes of joint acquisition programs. For example, the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program provides the Joint Force with
needed current capabilities. Integrated and interoperable solutions are
particularly important for the future all-domain warfighting
environment. If confirmed, I will look for other opportunities to
pursue joint development and acquisition programs to address joint
warfighting requirements.
Question. What are your views on joint, enabling or cross-cutting
capabilities that may not be treated as acquisition programs, such as
JADC2? Do you have sufficient authority to advocate or direct the
services to ensure there are no seams in planning or execution of such
efforts?
Answer. In the current global security environment, the United
States military faces agile adversaries who increasingly seek to
undermine our strategic and operational strengths by impeding, and
where possible, denying our command and control (C2) capabilities. The
ability of the U.S. Military to regain and maintain information and
decision advantage through non acquisition programs such as JADC2 must
remain a top priority for the Department. CJCS has full authority to
advocate for Combatant Command and services' capabilities and if
confirmed, I will use the granted authorities and assess whether
additional authorities are required to assist the Combatant Commands
and services with planning to foster joint capability and manage Joint
Force development. I will continue to partner with OUSD (A&S) to
strengthen planning and execution to enable integrated, end-to-end
mission capability.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you assign to yourself in
ensuring that joint acquisition priorities are given full and fair
consideration in Military Service budget processes?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide my military advice to the
Secretary of Defense on all matters, including the formulation of the
budget. The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) provides the
Chairman with a formal mechanism to communicate statutory military
advice on programs and budget issues, to include joint acquisition
priorities.
Question. Do you believe that the combatant command's role in the
acquisition process is sufficient to ensure that they can get needed
capabilities fielded to them in a timelier manner? If not, are there
other tools or authorities needed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and
consider input from the Combatant Commanders. Combatant Commanders
serve as advisors to the JROC. Combatant Commanders serve a critical
role in developing requirements and addressing capability gaps. The
Combatant Commanders specifically identify risk and what is hindering
the accomplishment of their Global Campaign Plan objectives via their
Integrated Priority List, the Annual Joint Assessment, and the
Capability Gap Assessment processes. If confirmed, I see my role as an
integrator between the needs of the Combatant Commanders, the realities
of Service budgets, and the priorities of DOD leadership.
joint requirements oversight council (jroc)
Question. The JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess
joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance
requirements that ensure interoperability between military
capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on
advances in technology and concepts of operation.
How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in establishing
joint requirements for submission to the DOD acquisition process?
Answer. The JROC recently incorporated a top-down approach to
concept-driven, threat-informed, capability development. The JROC is
using the Joint Warfighting Concept as the starting point to establish
requirements from a joint perspective. This changed process is still
nascent and it is too early to accurately determine effectiveness.
Question. In your view, have recent acquisition reforms that
shifted authorities to the Military Services affected the JROC's
ability to assess joint performance requirements? If so, how?
Answer. No. The Joint Performance Requirement (JPR) guidelines
enable the JROC to delegate authorities where appropriate to support a
streamlined and responsive system that retains the ability of the JROC
to meet statutory responsibilities. The Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) manual was revised to address these
shifting authorities. JCIDS specifies the JROC's oversight of the
streamlined joint performance requirements enabled through the existing
rapid capabilities development programs. Additionally, the JROC works
closely with the complementary capability development processes further
supporting interoperability and special authorities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the JROC has the
authority and information it needs to execute its statutory functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the JROC remains
flexible, adaptable, and postured to ensure joint interoperability.
the joint capabilities integration and development systems (jcids)
Question. The JCIDS process was established to address overlap and
duplication in Military Services' programs. JCIDS is intended to
provide the information the JROC needs to identify the capabilities and
associated operational performance requirements needed by the joint
warfighter.
Is the JCIDS process effective in providing the information the
JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of
the joint force?
Answer. Yes. JCIDS is flexible and adaptable, allowing it to
transform to meet emerging needs of the joint force. The recent
incorporation of a top-down approach allows the JROC to holistically
look at joint force needs across time horizons that are threat-informed
and joint concept-driven.
Question. How would you, if confirmed, drive the development and
articulation of future joint concepts from which each Military
Service's concept development, requirements generation, and acquisition
processes will derive? Does DOD have the requisite analytic
capabilities to develop and assess future joint concepts, and the
associated capabilities and force structure?
Answer. The Joint War fighting Concept (JWC) began under GEN
Milley's tenure and is in its third iteration. The JWC provides an
overarching approach to describe how the joint force will fight in a
future conflict and aligns Service concepts. If confirmed, I would
continue refining the JWC and using it to drive development of
supporting and Service concepts, requirements generation, and
acquisition processes.
Yes. I believe DOD has the requisite analytic capabilities to
develop and assess future joint concepts, capabilities, and force
structure.
Question. How have recent acquisition reforms, including the
implementation of rapid acquisition pathways in which requirement are
not generated via JCIDS, affected the ability of the JROC to identify
and advocate for joint requirements?
Answer. Recent acquisition reforms, including the implementation of
rapid acquisition pathways have not affected the JROC's ability to
identify and advocate for joint requirements. The JROC's top-down
approach linked to Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) publication, and
adoption of the capability portfolio management review (CPMR) process
enabled it to continue to advocate for joint requirements. However, if
confirmed, I will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs to ensure that
Service controlled initiatives are not stove-piped or duplicated, and
that all strive to present joint integrated solutions.
Question. With increasing emphasis on how to leverage commercial,
dual use technologies to support national security needs, do you have
the access to expertise and interchange you need to assess and
integrate an understanding of the commercial technology marketplace
into the requirements generation process?
Answer. Increasingly yes. Initiatives at the Department level such
as the Defense Innovation Unit, Service rapid acquisition operations,
and programs such as the Small Business Innovation Research/Small
Business Technology Transfer are providing increased access into the
commercial technology spaces. The Deputy Secretary of Defense's current
Innovation Steering Group will also drive the Department to continue to
better take advantage of its opportunities in the area of commercial,
dual technologies and incorporate these efforts into the requirements
generation processes.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Combatant
Commanders in the JCIDS process? If confirmed, how would you improve
the effectiveness of the process in identifying both the near-term and
long-term needs of the Combatant Commander?
Answer. Combatant Commanders serve as advisors to the JROC when
matters related to their area of responsibility or function are under
consideration. Combatant Commanders serve a critical role in
identifying capability gaps to inform development of near-and far-term
solutions. The Combatant Commanders specifically identify risk and what
is hindering the accomplishment of their Global Campaign Plan
objectives via the Annual Joint Assessment and the Capability Gap
Assessment processes. The Urgent Acquisition pathway allows for the
Combatant Commander to raise issues for acceleration. If confirmed, I
will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the
Combatant Commanders.
Question. Do you believe that today's JROC and JCIDS processes are
sufficient to identify where opportunities for multi-Service
collaboration exist, or where programs could or should be modified to
take advantage of a related acquisition program?
Answer. Yes. JROC and JCIDS processes are flexible and adaptable.
The JROC, and through its subordinate bodies and working groups,
provide forums for all Services to collaborate on joint requirements.
Question. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the
structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?
Answer. Not at this time. However, if confirmed, I will continue to
assess the structure, authority, and processes of the JROC and JCIDS to
bring forward any recommendations.
Question. The streamlined middle-tier acquisition authorities
enacted in Section 804 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA seek to speed
fielding of advanced technologies and systems by waiving the JCIDS
process.
What do you perceive as the downsides of not using the formal JCIDS
process?
Answer. JCIDS was created to ensure joint interoperability, so
avoiding JCIDS could put the onus of joint interoperability on the
proposing Service. JCIDS, along with providing interoperability review,
and providing enterprise awareness of capability development effort,
supports the fulfillment of the Title 10 requirements to review,
assess, and prioritize Joint Force Capabilities. Early identification
of interoperability and potential redundancy is key to ensuring we get
capability development right, early on avoiding delay in fielding to
the Joint Force.
Question. What is your opinion of the initial efforts in using 804
authorities?
Answer. I am pleased to see the depth and breadth of activities
looking to accelerate the delivery of warfighting capabilities to the
field. If confirmed, I will continue to work with stakeholders to
evaluate the use of 804 authorities and provide feedback as necessary.
Question. One of the challenges facing many acquisition programs--
ranging from weapons systems to business systems--is unrealistic and
unfeasible technical requirements.
What best practices can the Department employ to generate realistic
and technically feasible requirements, particularly in sophisticated,
rapidly evolving technical areas such as cybersecurity, hypersonics,
and artificial intelligence?
Answer. The DOD requirements process must be informed by the
results of its rapid prototyping authorities such as Section 804 to
ensure requirements are realistic and feasible. Additionally, to the
maximum extent possible, the DOD should require its systems to be open
and modular to minimize upgrade costs as technology continues to
rapidly evolve, especially in areas such as cybersecurity, hypersonics,
and artificial intelligence.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to strengthen
or support the technical knowledge, capabilities, and talent management
of personnel responsible for requirements generation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts by OUSD
(A&S) and the Defense Acquisition University to develop training
programs for DOD personnel with the responsibility for developing
requirements.
test and evaluation
Question. A natural tension exists between the goals of major
defense acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and
the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--
the objective of the test and evaluation function.
Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it appropriate to
procure weapon systems and equipment that have not been demonstrated
through test and evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable,
and survivable?
Answer. The Department has a robust T&E program that identifies a
tailored plan for each program based on its unique specifications and
intended operational environment. I don't see any circumstances where
it would be appropriate to not conduct some level of testing of weapons
and/or equipment before fielding.
Question. Do you think the current operational test and evaluation
system also provides for the flexibility to assess commercial
technologies that might be acquired or fields by DOD through means or
processes that are not traditional acquisition programs of record?
Answer. The operational test and evaluation system is designed to
test major defense programs or items/components of a weapon system,
equipment, or munitions under realistic combat conditions. I do believe
the current operational test and evaluation system provides the
flexibility to assess commercial technologies.
Question. Are you satisfied with DOD's test and evaluation
capabilities, including the test and evaluation workforce and
infrastructure of the Military Services? In which areas, if any, do you
feel the Department should be developing new test and evaluation
capabilities?
Answer. Yes. The DOD possesses robust test and evaluation
capabilities. I have observed areas where the Joint Force could
advance. Emerging technologies in cyber, space, AI and quantum
computing are potential growth areas and may require new test and
evaluation capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you approach your relationship
with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, particularly in
light of the independence and direct reporting relationships and
responsibilities accorded the Director in law?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to build a close working
relationship with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to
maximize the lethality, sustainability, and survivability of the Joint
Force.
Question. If confirmed, how would you approach your relationship
with the Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation and the Director
of the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC), both of which sit within
the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering?
Answer. The Joint Staff maintains strong relationships OSD R&E
across the board. Our Force Development and Capability Development
communities have close working relationships with OUSD(R&E). The Joint
Warfighting Concept and the Capability Gap Assessment inform alignment
and prioritization of R&E initiatives to address our most pressing
challenges and gaps. If confirmed, I would approach my relationship
with Director of OT&E and Director of TRMC in the same collaborative
manner to find ways to share resources and information while
accelerating opportunities to drive new capabilities into the Joint
Force.
dod readiness
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
Components--across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel,
and training--to execute the 2022 NDS and Combatant Commanders'
associated plans?
Answer. I am confident that we can protect the Homeland, meet our
alliance commitments, and maintain a competitive advantage over any
potential adversary. Through stable and adequate levels of funding we
are working to improve readiness and modernization across the force
considering the geostrategic environment and threat in order to
increase our lethality, flexibility, and resilience.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant
Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to
their readiness to execute the operational plans associated with the
2022 NDS?
Answer. Exercising strategic discipline to continuously calibrate
Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning and rapidly building
warfighting advantage to deter now and reduce future risk is the
central premise of the 2022 NDS and NMS. With stable and adequate
levels of funding we have been able to address risk in force readiness
and are restoring capability to respond to contingencies. The Joint
Force must balance risk between its ability to deter our adversaries
through operational campaigning and prioritizing Service modernization
efforts to achieve superiority in multiple domains. This is not done
without challenges and/or tough choices. Our competitive advantage has
eroded over time because of two decades of continuous operations, an
advancing threat, and exacerbated by continuing resolutions. With
sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely funding we can continue to
improve readiness, build the future force that maintains our
competitive advantage, and decrease risk.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you
recommend to restore full spectrum readiness in all DOD Components--
across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training--
and on what timelines?
Answer. If confirmed, my actions will center on continuing our
current efforts to address joint readiness and further develop the
warfighting capabilities needed to defend the Nation in the future. We
face very real and significant challenges today, and we must continue
to adequately invest in the future. To address this dynamic, we need to
provide the Joint Force the required capabilities and capacity through
sustained and predictable funding, to maintain a robust exercise
program, and to continued talent management improvements over the
course of several years to maintain our qualitative and quantitative
competitive advantage.
operational energy and energy resilience
Question. The Department defines operational energy as the energy
required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and
weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by
tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. On the
battlefield of the future, warfighters will need exponentially more
energy with rapid recharge and resupply over longer operating
distances. The quality of electricity will matter too--the DOD's
vehicles, sensors, robots, cyber forces, directed energy weapons, and
artificial intelligence will be controlled by systems sensitive to
fluctuations in voltage or frequency.
If confirmed, are there actions you can take to harness innovations
in operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational
concepts?
Answer. The need for large volumes of Operational Energy remains
one of the Department's greatest logistical burdens and largest
vulnerabilities especially in a contested environment. In line with the
National Defense Strategy, we will prioritize energy demand reduction
and the adoption of technologies that reduce logistics requirements in
contested or austere environments. Through the implementation of the
Joint Warfighting Concept, we are seeking innovative capabilities to
address key operational problems. Operational energy innovations
contribute to offsetting those problems and are being examined in
wargames, tested in field experiments, and integrated into joint
exercises.
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe DOD needs
to improve the incorporation of energy considerations in strategic
planning processes?
Answer. In my view, DOD can improve the incorporation of energy
considerations in the following specific areas:
Continue to assess Combatant Command posture and
readiness annually. These reviews can highlight where energy
considerations may be overlooked within the strategic planning process.
Ensure that our Joint concepts and operational plans are
fully informed of risks associated with contested logistics and threats
to the assured delivery of energy.
Align our force development and design efforts with
appropriate risks to energy supportability and required posture.
If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff to include
requirements for joint force energy supportability and demand reduction
in recurring strategic guidance and endorse energy efficiency, water
conservation, use of renewable energy, and emerging technologies
throughout strategic planning processes.
Question. How can DOD acquisition systems better address
requirements related to a military platform's use of energy?
Answer. Energy supportability is one of the four mandatory Key
Performance Parameters (KPPs) required for all Department programs. The
Joint Staff conducts an energy supportability analysis for all
requirements documents when the JROC designates the energy KPP as a
Joint Performance Requirement. If confirmed, I will continue to support
the Joint Staff's role in prioritizing energy supportability for new
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, are there actions you can take to
prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DOD, including
acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to
support mission critical functions, and address known vulnerabilities?
Answer. Energy resilience is part of every assessment performed on
existing critical infrastructure. If confirmed, I will ensure the
identification, vulnerability assessment, and risk mitigation of
mission critical assets remain a Joint Staff priority.
environmental contaminants
Question. The environmental and health effects associated with
exposure to Per-and Poly fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) have long been a
major concern for Congress, DOD, military families, and communities in
the vicinity of military installations.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to address PFOS/PFOA
contamination on DOD installations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Department's commitment to
addressing DOD's PFAS releases as quickly as possible in a
deliberative, holistic, and transparent manner. I understand that DOD
is conducting assessments of PFAS use and potential release at 707
installations and National Guard locations. I will support the PFAS
Task Force in those efforts and support the Department's commitment to
protect the health of its servicemembers, their families, and the
communities in which DOD serves.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your approach to addressing
the health concerns of servicemembers and their families regarding
alleged exposures to potentially harmful contaminants on U.S. military
installations and in the context of performing military duties?
Answer. I support DOD's priority to quickly address risks to human
health from drinking water impacted by PFAS releases. If confirmed, I
would continue and buildupon the actions already underway to address
servicemember concerns including streamlining processes by which
housing residents can raise health concerns to leadership, testing of
DOD-owned water sources at all installations, site cleanup, supporting
research to determine potential health effects from exposure, and
ongoing action by our health providers to document and treat issues, as
appropriate. Ultimately, our servicemembers and their families should
not have to worry about their health while living in homes on U.S.
Military installations or when performing their military duties.
readiness and resource impacts from extreme weather
Question. In 2017, three hurricanes resulted in over $1.3 billion
in damage to military installations across the U.S. In 2018, extreme
weather events caused roughly $9 billion in damage at Tyndall Air Force
Base, Camp Lejeune, and Offutt Air Force Base.
How would you assess the readiness and resource impacts on DOD from
recent extreme weather events?
Answer. The impacts are significant by disrupting operations and
damaging critical infrastructure. Based on the severity of the event,
the cost creates a strain on our finite resources and forces tough
decisions if not supplemented with additional funding. These extreme
weather events impact infrastructure related to mission execution and
disrupts scheduled training for operational and supporting units. The
combination of which creates challenges to maintain readiness. The
impacts can also extend to family support issues. The loss of affected
services, housing, schools, and exchange services for example, is an
inconvenience that can affect servicemember mission focus, morale, and
retention.
Question. Based on these readiness and resource impacts, do you
believe it necessary to use more resilient designs in DOD
infrastructure?
Answer. Yes. As we design, site, and build future infrastructure,
we should take advantage of emerging information on changing conditions
and engineering standards to reduce the impacts of extreme weather and
changing climate. If confirmed, I will continue supporting ongoing DOD
actions to implement appropriate planning and design standards that
account for extreme weather events, projected sea level rise, and other
climate change impacts.
defense department and intelligence community collaboration
Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
and operational--between DOD and the Intelligence Community has grown
increasingly close. On one hand, seamless collaboration is vital to an
effective and rapid response to non-traditional threats, and bringing
together the strengths of the full spectrum of defense and intelligence
capabilities can generate more effective solutions to complex problems.
On the other hand, without effective management and oversight, such
collaboration risks blurring distinct agency missions, authorities, and
funding, as well as creating redundant lines of effort.
In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between
the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-
examined or modified?
Answer. The Department and the IC have developed a great
relationship that has led to some remarkable collaboration in
identifying and analyzing adversaries and threats. As we face near-peer
competitors, this collaboration needs to increase to maintain our
competitive edge.
If confirmed, I am interested in exploring improvements in
information sharing, leveraging industry lessons learned, and the
development and integration of emerging technologies to keep ahead of
our adversaries. This includes quickly developing and integrating
artificial intelligence, machine learning, cyber, big data for
warfighting, multi-level security, and collection capabilities.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
Question. Demand for ISR of every kind has grown exponentially in
recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and
targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the
geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are
not being met.
What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets
across the Combatant Commands?
Answer. ISR asset allocation to Combatant Commands is aligned with
National Defense Strategy priorities. The current ISR asset allocation
is a result of a deliberative planning process and can be adjusted to
meet emergent Combatant Command needs.
Question. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in
both the capability and availability of ISR assets?
Answer. Demand for ISR has and will likely always outpace supply.
The Services continue to deploy ISR forces at the maximum sustainable
capacity with nothing held in reserve. Simultaneously, evolving
adversary capabilities are driving a deliberate move toward higher
capacity modernized ISR systems. This would include developing tools to
take advantage of space-based ISR and publicly available information.
Question. What is you assessment of current service efforts to
develop increased capabilities?
Answer. The DOD is in the process of modernizing ISR capabilities
by investing in platforms, sensors, and communication networks that
will operate at greater capacity in high-threat and denied
environments. The Department's focus on space, cyber, and other domains
will produce survivable and resilient ISR capabilities for the future
Joint Force.
Question. How does increased demand square with Services' plans to
divest many of the platforms providing ISR to the Combatant Commanders?
Answer. The DOD needs to divest of legacy ISR platforms in order to
invest in robust survivable ISR capabilities that will provide sensing
and targeting at speed in a highly contested environment against a peer
adversary. The investments in space-based ISR will provide greater
collection capacity and access for the Combatant Commands particular in
a denied environment. The Department will remain vigilant to ensure
Combatant Commanders are appropriately resourced as new ISR systems are
fielded.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services over
the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to sexual
assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants
accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence
of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
servicemembers aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of
increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the
Military Service Academies.
Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that DOD and
the Military Services have put in place to prevent and respond to
sexual assault, and to protect servicemembers who report sexual assault
from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. The Department remains committed to the well-being of our
servicemembers and we must continue to invest in prevention and
response resources to prevent harmful behavior. As a leader I am
determined to create an environment where each servicemember is treated
with value, dignity, and respect. I will continue to support efforts to
address chain of command accountability and prevent retaliatory
behavior.
The Independent Review Commission's on Sexual Assault in the
Military (IRC) recommendations are instrumental in the Department's
efforts to produce meaningful change; however, the results of these
efforts are not yet observable in Force-wide assessments. I am
committed to seeing these changes through and will be prepared to
identify additional actions or adjustments as the IRC recommendations
are implemented.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for
yourself in preventing sexual harassment in the armed forces and in the
DOD civilian workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs to
continuously evaluate and refine prevention and response policies to
improve oversight and accountability.
I will emphasize that Joint Force readiness depends on the
readiness of our servicemembers and readiness is most prevalent in
cohesive units with empowered chains of command. I will emphasize the
imperative to continue improving the military's ability to cultivate
healthy command climates and stop harmful behaviors before they occur.
Finally, I will ensure leaders and servicemembers have access to the
existing resources and those being implemented as result of Independent
Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military (IRC) like the
climate assessments and the prevention workforce. Sexual assault and
harassment have no place in the DOD, and harmful to building a cohesive
team.
Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from
Congress to improve the Department's programs to prevent sexual
harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. I believe we have sufficient authorities to implement the
remaining IRC recommendations. I will always support continually
evaluating our efforts to prevent sexual harassment and assault, while
working with partners in Congress on these issues.
Question. The most recent report on the prevalence of sexual
assault and harassment at the Military Service Academies revealed
disturbing levels of sexual harassment in particular, placing the
Service Academies among the poorest performing military units in
incidents of harassment, suggesting an environment conducive to sexual
assault and other misconduct.
What is your reaction to this report, and what actions would you
propose to reduce the prevalence of sexual harassment at the Service
Academies?
Answer. I am deeply troubled by this information about what has
been occurring. The behaviors highlighted in that report have no place
at the Academies, let alone the Force writ large.
The Superintendents' leadership in this space is critical in
changing course. Much of their solution set is to implement the
recommendations of the Secretary's Independent Review Commission. These
recommendations focus on changes that help work toward the positive,
professional climates we not only expect but demand in the military.
The Secretary of Defense recently directed onsite evaluations of
the Service Academies designed to identify gaps and best practices in
command climate and the prevention of harmful behaviors. If confirmed,
I will work with Secretary Austin, the Services, and the Service
Academies' leadership to address the forthcoming recommendations from
those evaluations and continuously evaluate and refine prevention and
response policies to improve oversight and accountability.
I plan to stay fully engaged with Service leadership to ensure
leaders create environments where our future leaders can live and learn
in a culture of dignity and respect.
active and reserve component end strength
Question. In the face of historic recruiting challenges, Active
force end strength continues to shrink across all military services
except the Space Force.
What aggregate Active end strength do you believe is necessary to
meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the 2022 NDS and
associated operational plans?
Answer. The strength requested in the FY24 budget submission
represents manpower requirements across the services and supports the
direction of the 2022 NDS. The services remain committed to ``quality
over quantity''. This budget seeks to meet this critical challenge
today, tomorrow, and into the future by providing resources to support
the National Defense Strategy.
Question. In your view, do the Reserve Components serve as an
operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your
answer, should the Reserve Components be supported by improved
equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing
for readiness going forward?
Answer. The Reserve Component is an integral part of the total
force. The Reserve Component serves as both an operational and
strategic reserve. The Reserve Component deserves to train on and
operate the best equipment possible in order to execute their key role.
Training standards for the Active and Reserve components should be the
same.
religious accommodation
Question. As mandated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
the Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA and Fiscal Year 2014 NDAA, do each of the
Military Service's policies and processes appropriately accommodate the
religious practices of individual servicemembers, in your view?
(Chaplain)
Answer. Yes. Each of the Services recognizes the importance of
religious liberties and accommodation for servicemembers, not only in
support of their fundamental human rights but also to support broader
Service cultures of spiritual fitness, readiness, diversity, tolerance,
and inclusion. The existing Service policies ensure that each request
for religious accommodation is reviewed on a case basis, considering
the full range of facts and circumstances relevant to each specific
request, and analyzing these against the compelling governmental
interest of mission accomplishment to find the least restrictive means
to accommodate.
Question. In your view, would a more comprehensive Department-wide
policy on religious accommodation promote consistency and uniformity
across the services? (Chaplain)
Answer. No. Each of the Service policies on religious accommodation
is already in compliance with the Department of Defense Instruction on
Religious Liberty in the Military Services, providing a foundational
consistency and uniform processes. There is also a need for Service-
specific deliberation. Mission requirements can differ between
Services, to include differences in Service culture related to unit
cohesion, order, and discipline. The current practice provides
foundational consistency and uniform processes across Services while
also allowing for Service-specific considerations. It should be
maintained.
military quality of life and family readiness
Question. The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of
key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
advocacy and parenting skills programs; childcare; spouse education and
employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation
(MWR) services such as Commissary and Military Exchange stores.
If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
consider a priority?
Answer. The Department of Defense has a sacred obligation to take
care of our servicemembers and their families. Quality of Life is
fundamental to recruiting and retaining the all-volunteer force today
and in the future. The most important aspects of servicemember quality
of life are economic stability, first rate medical care, improved
housing, spouse employment, and childcare.
I will continue to encourage the advancement of MWR programs and
community partnerships that both promote well-being while also adapting
to the current demands of our servicemembers. These programs include
outdoor recreation, sports and fitness, and child development and youth
programs. If confirmed, I will unite with the Service Chiefs to promote
and sustain effective quality of life programs to meet the needs of our
servicemembers and their families.
Question. What factors would you consider in assessing which MWR
programs are ineffective or outmoded and thus potentially suitable for
elimination or reduction in scope?
Answer. The maintenance and the development of effective quality of
life programs is a priority for our servicemembers and their families.
If confirmed, I would work with the Service Chiefs and look primarily
at usage metrics, benefit, cost, and servicemember and family feedback.
These programs are critical recruiting and retention tools and must be
adequately resourced to ensure a resilient force.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that support related
to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness is provided to Army
Reserve and National Guard families, as well as to Active Army families
who do not reside near a military installation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs to ensure
the needs of family members, both Active and Reserve Component, of
mobilized and/or deployed servicemembers are met. As the Department
continues to emphasize Total Force policies, programs such as the
Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, Military One Source, community
partnerships, and others that address challenges unique to military
service are vital in developing and sustaining resilience among
servicemembers and their families.
military health system reform
Question. Section 702 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, as modified by
Sections 711 and 712 of the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, transferred the
administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from
the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), a Combat
Support Agency. Additionally, Section 732 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
required the development of joint force medical capabilities that meet
the operation planning requirements of the combatant commands.
In your view, in the aggregate, how many military medical providers
and what medical capabilities, are required to support the Combatant
Commanders' operational plans associated with the 2022 NDS?
Answer. The National Defense Strategy contains globally integrated
medical requirements of rapidly aggregating medical capabilities during
conflict, moving casualties in a contested environment, and expanding
military trauma centers in the Homeland to care for casualties. Our
medical force of roughly 180,000 will be close to fully employed to
execute and sustain operational plans for a large-scale overseas
conflict. Our medical force does require additional surge medical
capacity within medical centers of the Department, as well as
leveraging partnerships with Veterans Health Administration and
National Disaster Medical System to execute Homeland contingency plan
requirements. As we design a future medical force, the Military Health
System needs to prioritize efforts to meet these globally integrated
requirements and enable air, land, and sea platforms to deploy agile
medical capabilities worldwide. If confirmed, I will work across DOD
and with Congress on these efforts.
Question. In your view, do military medical providers across the
Military Departments possess today the critical wartime medical
competencies required to save the lives of servicemembers injured in
combat or contingency operations?
Answer. Yes. I believe the joint medical force possesses the
competencies necessary to save lives in a kinetic environment, as
evidenced by their performance in overseas contingency operations over
the last 20 years. As we continue to lose personnel with combat
casualty care experience, it is imperative that we invest in the
workforce to generate critical wartime medical professionals in our
military medical centers and hospitals. The Department must also
leverage partnerships with Veterans Health Administration, Health &
Human Services, and National Disaster Medical System, and in private
sector partnerships to treat complex care patients in peacetime and
sustain the competency and capacity to recover combat casualties in
wartime. Additionally, we must embed medical capabilities far forward
to increase survivability in a contested, degraded, and contaminated
wartime environment of the future.
Question. In your view, are the Services adequately supporting DHA
by assigning to MTFs the appropriate number of military medical
providers in the specialties needed at the MTFs?
Answer. The Department is working to invest in the healthcare
workforce that includes the Services' military medical providers and
Defense Health Agency civilian medical providers to improve primary and
specialty care access in our MTFs. We continue to assess the adequacy
of military medical providers in the MTFs and their overall readiness.
Additional military and civilian workforce in the MTFs improve access
to care for 9.6 million beneficiaries, improves readiness and maximizes
education programs for our medical professionals, and mitigates the
rising costs to provide care in the civilian network. If confirmed, I
will work across DOD and with Congress on these efforts.
suicide prevention
Question. On May 17, 2022, Secretary Austin established the Suicide
Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (SPRIRC) to
conduct a comprehensive review of clinical and non-clinical suicide
prevention and response programs across the force.
If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for
yourself and for the Joint Staff in implementing the SPRIRC's
recommendations?
Answer. The health, safety, and well-being of our Force is a top
priority for the Department. If confirmed, I will continue to support
the Department's efforts in addressing suicide in the military. I
support the on-going strategies to encourage help-seeking behavior,
minimize stigma, and increase visibility and access to necessary
resources and communication tools. The Department is firmly committed
to preventing suicides in our Joint Force because one suicide is one
too many.
I support the rapid implementation of the ten (10) recommendations
outlined in Phase 1 of the SecDef's 16 March 2023, Next Steps on
Suicide Prevention in the Military memo and will support any follow-on
recommendations that are approved for implementation.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that sufficient suicide prevention and mental health resources are
available to deployed servicemembers, as well as to servicemembers and
their families at home station?
Answer. The Services have been providing leadership guidance on how
to build resiliency in the force. This is supporting an environment of
trust and cohesion that's foundational in suicide prevention.
Commanders and leaders at all levels must have the required training
and resources to identify and treat all health requirements in garrison
and deployed environments. Embedding mental health resources and
capabilities within deploying units has been very well received and had
a positive impact. I support the Services and their efforts to recruit
and retain mental health providers and other related entities in
support of our servicemembers and their families.
mental health
Question. DOD has made great strides in reducing the stigma
associated with help-seeking behaviors, but many servicemembers,
especially senior leaders, remain concerned that their military careers
will be adversely affected should their chains of command become aware
that they are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same
time, the military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware
of physical and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness
of the servicemembers under their command.
In your view, does DOD effectively bridge the gap between a
servicemember's desire for confidentiality and the chain of command's
legitimate need to know about matters that may affect individual
servicemember and the unit readiness?
Yes, I believe DOD has made significant changes to bridge the gap
between servicemembers' desires and the chain of command's legitimate
need to know. We continue to assess how we can help those who struggle
with complex issues, while still ensuring the readiness and lethality
of the force. Mental health is health, and we need to optimize every
aspect of the Warfighter and their families. I fully support
servicemembers and their families seeking mental health care.
service of transgender persons
Answer. Each of the Service Chiefs has testified before this
Committee that in their personal experience, the service of transgender
individuals in their preferred gender has had no negative impact on
unit or overall military readiness.
In your personal experience, has the service of transgender
individuals in their preferred gender had any negative impact on unit
or overall military readiness?
Answer. I am not aware of any significant impacts to unit readiness
based on transgender persons serving in the Air Force.
Question. What would be the impact on readiness of requiring the
separation of all transgender soldiers currently serving in the
military? Please provide specific data to support your view.
Answer. Any reduction in ready and fully deployable servicemembers
that meet all standards associated with military service would
presumably have an effect on readiness.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
missile defense policy review
1. Senator Hirono. General Brown, I am concerned that the last
Missile Defense Review did not adequately clarify U.S. policy toward
defense of the Homeland from peer adversary missiles that could be
thought of as existing below the threshold that would warrant a nuclear
response. Do you think the next missile defense policy review should
include greater detail on U.S. policy for defense of the Homeland from
all types of missiles, including hypersonic and cruise missiles, from
all likely adversaries?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will continue to support policies
and subsequent reviews which strengthen defense of the Homeland. That
said, the 2022 MDR does address defense of the Homeland from a variety
of missile systems, and the Department continues to make progress in
creating a force design that spans all integrated air and missile
defense. The 2022 MDR directs the Department to continue developing and
fielding defenses against hypersonic weapons and uncrewed systems in
addition to developing the next generation of ground-based midcourse
interceptors. It also stipulates that systems designed for regional
defense can and will be used to defend the Homeland against attacks
from any adversary and any direction, while accurately stating that our
missile defense systems are designed to counter ICBM threats from rogue
nations like North Korea.
ship, submarine, and infrastructure maintenance
2. Senator Hirono. General Brown, the best way to get more
operational ships this decade is to maintain our existing fleet better
and faster. To successfully get ships and submarines out of maintenance
periods on time requires a sustained, long-term effort to re-vitalize
our public shipyards. Will you ensure the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP) remains a point of focus for the Department
of Defense (DOD) and receives the funding it requires?
General Brown. The Department is thankful for the support Congress
has shown the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), a
once-in-a-generation optimization of our Nation's public shipyard
infrastructure. SIOP is a key enabler for the naval component of Joint
Force readiness. If confirmed, I will focus on ensuring SIOP is
adequately resourced and the entire Joint Force remains ready and
lethal.
3. Senator Hirono. General Brown, the majority of the piers and
wharves at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard are unable to be used for
significant pier-side maintenance because of structural
vulnerabilities. How does this disrepair impact the capabilities of the
Joint Force and its ability to execute operational plans?
General Brown. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard pier and wharf degraded
status has some impact on capabilities of the Joint Force and its
ability to execute operational plans. Potential effects of the degraded
pier infrastructure include reduced maintenance capacity, resulting in
delays or limitations to crucial repairs, maintenance, and
modernization work on naval vessels, longer turnaround times for ships
requiring servicing and limited berthing space impacts capacity to
manage the flow of ships in and out of the shipyard for maintenance,
refitting, or other operational requirements. It also impacts the
readiness of naval vessels, affecting the availability of ships offered
to the Joint Force. The limitations have also forced some of the
workload to shift to other facilities. This creates additional strain
on maintenance facilities, potentially leading to increased congestion,
longer wait times, and decreased overall efficiency in support of the
Joint Force's operational plans.
4. Senator Hirono. General Brown, in your role as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, will you provide the necessary supervision to ensure the
individual Services adequately prioritize and maintain their
infrastructure?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will work with OSD and the Services
to advocate for the infrastructure investments necessary to meet the
needs of the Joint Force.
5. Senator Hirono. General Brown, how do you weigh the
recapitalization of DOD infrastructure with the acquisition of new
platforms and weapons systems when making budget-based decisions?
General Brown. Infrastructure is a key enabler to both readiness
and lethality. The State of our infrastructure contributes to how we
take care of our people and supports a ready and capable force.
Balancing infrastructure recapitalization costs with new acquisition of
systems is not a binary decision. Careful analysis of required
capabilities and infrastructure recapitalization are factors considered
as part of the total ownership cost of operating the force.
acquisition policy
6. Senator Hirono. General Brown, most people agree the way DOD
acquires new systems is flawed. I have heard combatant commanders do
not have enough input into a process that is far too slow and directs
money into too concentrated an industrial base. Do you believe the
Pentagon should re-evaluate the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process with an eye toward getting the
combatant commanders what they need faster?
General Brown. Combatant Commanders serve a critical role in
identifying capability gaps to inform development of near-and long-term
solutions. JCIDS is one of several requirements identification pathways
within the Department of Defense Acquisition process. If confirmed, I
will continually evaluate the JCIDS process and other supporting
processes focused on making improvements to meet Combatant Command
requirements in a timely manner.
climate resiliency
7. Senator Hirono. General Brown, Typhoon Mawar is going to end up
costing DOD multiple billions of dollars in damages to installations in
Guam. The tragedy of the storm highlights the importance of climate
resilient construction as a cost saving measure and as a readiness
requirement while showing the dangers of relying too heavily on single
locations for DOD operations. How would you, if confirmed, work to
improve the resiliency of DOD installations and quantify the risks
commanders incur as a result of climate change?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will continue to support ongoing
Department of Defense efforts to address installation resiliency,
including actions to implement appropriate planning and design
standards to account for extreme weather events, projected sea level
rise, and other climate change effects.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
nuclear modernization
8. Senator King. General Brown, how will you ensure oversight of
all critical DOD nuclear modernization program components, including
the aging infrastructure, the recovering industrial base, and
maintaining and growing the critical workforce?
General Brown. The newly established Nuclear Deputy's Management
Action Group (NDMAG) and separate NC3 DMAG provide a governance
structure for Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman level oversight to
identify and manage nuclear opportunities and risks. If confirmed, I
intend to stay fully engaged in ensuring a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent as we transition to modern systems.
9. Senator King. General Brown, what is your biggest concern in
terms of nuclear modernization--LGM-35A, B-21, Long-Range Stand-off
Weapon, B-52, NC3 modernization?
General Brown. The Department has made significant investments in
the modernization of our nuclear platforms and our NC3 systems. These
programs underpin Strategic Deterrence and are key to meeting the
National Defense Strategy priority of deterring strategic against the
United States, and our allies and partners. Although our nuclear forces
and existing NC3 architecture are safe, secure, and effective, we have
greatly exceeded their intended design life. Deferred modernization,
coupled with emerging threats to our nuclear forces and NC3 enterprise,
has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay. This is
further challenged by atrophy in both the DOD industrial base for
nuclear delivery platforms, NC3 systems, and National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) production capabilities and infrastructure. If
confirmed, I will continue to focus on the execution of these
modernization programs and ensure they remain a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent to our adversaries.
10. Senator King. General Brown, how can we ensure the LGM-35
Sentinel isn't the next F-35?
General Brown. The complexity and challenges of the LGM-35 Sentinel
program are unique for this once in a generation recapitalization. The
LGM-35 Sentinel is a complex system of systems requiring an industrial
base for nuclear delivery platforms and warheads that have
significantly atrophied over the past three decades. The DOD, in
collaboration with our interagency and industry partners, will continue
to actively manage schedule pressures by identifying opportunities and
risk mitigation efforts to ensure a smooth Minuteman III to Sentinel
transition.
11. Senator King. General Brown, are these programs funded properly
in the 2024 President's Budget?
General Brown. The 2024 President's Budget continues to fully fund
our nuclear enterprise and NC3 modernization programs to provide a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent consistent with the
National Defense Strategy.
12. Senator King. General Brown, what should our nuclear posture be
to best deter competitors along the continuum of conflict?
General Brown. I believe the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review accurately
lays out how the United States should best posture itself to deter
competitors across the spectrum of conflict. Nuclear weapons pose an
existential military threat to the United States and our allies and
partners. Maintaining the nuclear triad is of vital national importance
to deter adversaries, assure allies and, if necessary, achieve military
objectives through integrated deterrence. We must also work with allies
and partners to diversify our posture and broaden the scope of our
cooperation, adding complexity to our competitors' military planning
and execution.
13. Senator King. General Brown, how are you developing our
intellectual capital in deterrence theory?
General Brown. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)
opportunities ensure that our Joint Force understands deterrence
principles and offers specializations in strategy and deterrence theory
to strengthen intellectual capital within the Department of Defense. If
confirmed, I will continue to prioritize and advocate for JPME while
partnering with National Laboratories, NGO's, and academic institutions
to leverage their invaluable contributions on deterrence theory and
strategic issues.
department of defense security policy
14. Senator King. General Brown, after reading Secretary Lloyd
Austin's most recent update on the DOD's security policy, I noticed a
focus on vetting and personnel practices. However, there was no mention
of efforts to integrate upgraded technology to detect potential data
exfiltration attempts. My belief is that such technology is the surest
way to prevent incidents like last winter's. Are any steps being taken
in this direction?
General Brown. Yes. The DOD is implementing a data-security
methodology based on Zero Trust principles to ensure that DOD networks
remain resilient by integrating technology that delivers access
control, sensing, and monitoring of our networks and weapon systems,
while enabling the detection of and response to cybersecurity events.
Partners across the Department have already started to develop, test,
and integrate critical technology that will enhance our ability to
limit the damage of malicious cyber actors and insider threats;
however, we must scale these efforts and continue to look for
technological advances to prevent further incidents. If confirmed, I
will prioritize and advocate for the Department's implementation of
critical sensing and monitoring solutions and work with key partners
such as OUSD A&S, U.S. Cyber Command, the DOD CIO, and others to ensure
the resiliency of our networks and data.
15. Senator King. General Brown, there appears to be a notion
shared among top military officials that security clearances and access
are an administrative problem. The last two incidents have shown that
that is not the case. Do you see security clearances and access as an
administrative problem?
General Brown. This is first and foremost a leadership issue.
Leaders at all levels have a responsibility for ensuring the adherence
to security program policies and procedures. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with OSD, the Service Chiefs, and other stakeholders
to ensure our senior leaders continue to optimize and improve their
personnel vetting programs remaining adaptive to societal norms,
changes in threat landscapes, and evolving technologies.
mental health and transition assistance program resources
16. Senator King. General Brown, what will you do in this position
to ensure Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is being leveraged to its
fullest extent and we are returning our servicemembers into society
happy, healthy, and ready to contribute to society?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the
Services to ensure that TAP remains a leadership priority.
Additionally, I will work with the Department to ensure TAP remains
evolutionary, adapting to meet the needs and goals of our
Servicemembers, families, and the modern workforce.
gapped general/admiral billets across the department of defense
17. Senator King. General Brown, how will the absence of confirmed
combatant commanders and service chiefs affect the overall readiness of
the military?
General Brown. The absence of confirmed leadership impacts the
entire chain of command. The absence of confirmed Combatant Commanders
and Joint Chiefs limits the ability of our leaders to make
authoritative decisions and undermines trusted relationships with our
allies and partners. It influences the progression of careers at all
levels, which creates negative effects across the Joint Force.
18. Senator King. General Brown, how does it impact the retention
of servicemembers and their families?
General Brown. Servicemembers and their families are subject to the
corresponding uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly in the
areas of childcare, housing, education, and spouse employment. Due to
the uncertainty and unpredictability, servicemembers and their families
miss opportunities that best support their family needs at the next
location and/or endure additional financial impacts waiting to
transition. This creates conditions that may cause our members and
families to seek greater stability elsewhere versus continuing to
serve. We face increasing risk of losing talent because of these
challenges.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
china's coercive activity toward taiwan
19. Senator Rosen. General Brown, we are all acutely aware of the
threat China poses in the cyber domain. China has used Taiwan as a
testing ground for its cyber capabilities, and recent cyberattacks have
forced Taiwan to harden their defenses. Moreover, China is closely
monitoring the outcome of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in an effort to
apply lessons learned to a potential invasion of Taiwan.
That's why this Congress I introduced, with Senator Rounds and
Congressman Gallagher, bipartisan legislation to expand American
military cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan. This legislation has
been included in both the House and Senate versions of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024.
If confirmed, how would you work to expand military-to-military
cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan to strengthen their deterrent
capabilities and raise the cost of escalation for China?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will continue to work with United
States Cyber Command to assess vulnerabilities and understand Taiwan's
cyber requirements to strengthen their deterrent capabilities and raise
the cost of escalation for China.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
diversity, equity, and inclusion
20. Senator Wicker. General Brown, how do you define the term
``equity'' as it relates to racial diversity?
General Brown. It is the consistent and systematic fair, just, and
impartial treatment of all individuals, including those who belong to
underserved communities and minority groups.
21. Senator Wicker. General Brown, in your view, is there any
difference in meaning between ``equity'' and ``equal opportunity''?
General Brown. I believe there are sometimes differences in policy
and common use, but I believe we seek a common outcome: That, all
servicemembers, regardless of background, should be afforded the same
opportunities to excel based on merit and their qualification.
22. Senator Wicker. General Brown, what evidence would you provide
that demonstrates the benefits of the numerous Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion positions hired in the Department of Defense in the last
several years?
General Brown. The Department needs to attract all those willing to
serve in order to remain a global leader, deter war, and ensure
national security. Individuals hired into these positions ensure the
Department's implementation and compliance with laws and policies that
attract, retain, and advance the best talent our Nation has to offer.
Having the best talent ensures the Department will be able to outthink,
outmaneuver, and outfight any adversary or threat.
department of defense transgender service policies
23. Senator Wicker. General Brown, should a servicemember who
objects to being forced to share intimate living quarters with a
transgender servicemember be accommodated with a change in his or her
living situation?
General Brown. It is important to have an environment where all
individuals feel welcomed, valued, and safe. There are opportunities to
review our policies, approaches, and obtain feedback to see what we can
improve with regards to personal privacy. We work to ensure all members
have safe and appropriate living quarters.
24. Senator Wicker. General Brown in your view, what effect to good
order and discipline is the likely result if servicemembers are forced
to live with a transgender servicemember against their will?
General Brown. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the
morale, welfare, good order, and discipline of the unit while fostering
a command climate of dignity and respect. Commanders at all levels have
this responsibility no matter the situation. As with any issue that
affects good order and discipline, servicemembers can and should
address any concerns they have through their chain of command.
25. Senator Wicker. General Brown, how are female servicemembers
supposed to know if a transgender woman (biological male) has changed
his Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) gender
marker and thereby has official permission to use the female
facilities?
General Brown. By DOD policy, servicemembers are responsible for
meeting military standards and will use berthing, bathroom, and shower
facilities associated with their gender marker in DEERS. As this policy
is implemented, we want to be respectful of all servicemembers and
their privacy. There are opportunities to review our policies,
approaches, and obtain feedback to see what we can improve. If there is
any concern, servicemembers can and should address concerns through
their chain of command.
26. Senator Wicker. General Brown, if confirmed, will you provide
general (non-personal) information about suicide ideation and
completion rates among persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and
data regarding mental health visits associated with gender dysphoria,
since January 2021?
General Brown. As Secretary Austin stated: mental health is health,
and the health, safety, and well-being of our force is a top priority
for the Department. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively within
existing authorities to provide a response to these inquiries.
27. Senator Wicker. General Brown, if confirmed, will you also
provide costs and data on non-deployable days for persons undergoing or
completing gender transition?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively within
existing authorities to provide a response to these inquiries.
drag shows in the services
28. Senator Wicker. General Brown, do you agree with Defense
Secretary Lloyd Austin's recent memorandum ending drag queen
performances on military bases, and, if confirmed, will you continue
that policy?
General Brown. I agree with this policy. Hosting these types of
events in federally funded facilities is inconsistent with regulations
regarding the use of Department resources. Although I don't set or
decide policy, if confirmed, I will follow the policies set by the
Department.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
kc-46
29. Senator Cotton. General Brown, the U.S. military is in a joint
exercise this week, Juniper Oak 23.3 in Israel. The exercise involves
United States and Israeli aircraft including the KC-46 and Israeli
fighter aircraft. It is our understanding that the Israeli aircraft
will not be practicing refueling with the U.S. KC-46 while this
exercise is ongoing. The United States has already agreed to sell the
KC-46 aircraft to Israel but has not allowed Israeli planes to refuel
from a United States KC-46 or allowed Israeli pilots to fly the
refueling aircraft itself. Why are Israeli jets not refueling with
United States Air Force KC-46?
General Brown. Juniper Oak concluded as of 12 July. The KC-46 was
part of this exercise and did provide some training and familiarization
to the Israelis regarding the USAF platform as they prepare to purchase
their own. However, the Israelis did not conduct refueling from the KC-
46 because they have not yet had a chance to conduct training and
certification with this specific platform. The Department of the Air
Force (DAF) is actively planning KC-46 training and exchange programs
with the Government of Israel and will execute such programs on a
timeline, and in a manner, that is mutually agreeable between the DAF
and Israeli Air Force (IAF).
30. Senator Cotton. General Brown, do you believe that that this
exercise is key to building a deterrent capability with a key U.S. ally
in the region?
General Brown. The Juniper Oak series of exercises, which began
this past January, has been tremendously beneficial in building our
security relationship and interoperability with the Israelis in our
mutual effort to deter competitors in this region.
31. Senator Cotton. General Brown, why has training not yet begun?
General Brown. The Department of the Air Force is actively planning
KC-46 training and exchange programs with the Government of Israel and
will execute such programs on a timeline, and in a manner, that is
mutually agreeable between the DAF and Israeli Air Force (IAF).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
unmanned aircraft system threats
32. Senator Rounds. General Brown, in 2022, then Commander of U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), General Kenneth McKenzie, said ``The growing
threat posed by [unmanned aircraft system (UAS)] systems coupled with
our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to counter them is the
most concerning tactical development since the rise of the improvised
explosive devices in Iraq.''
Given the volume of UAS strikes we are seeing in the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, as well as what we have seen employed in the
CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) against U.S. and partner nations,
are you concerned about the growing use of UAS and their use against
U.S. infrastructure and interests at home and around the world?
General Brown. Yes, I am concerned. UAS technology is evolving and
proliferating rapidly. We continue to develop capability and capacity
to defend against these threats in all environments. The war in Ukraine
demonstrates the adaptive, lethal, and relatively inexpensive
attributes of these systems. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department
continues to develop, procure, and field this mission essential defense
capability.
33. Senator Rounds. General Brown, what is your operational
assessment of the Department of Defense's capability to defend
installations and critical infrastructure against UAS threats, to
include UAS swarms?
General Brown. Defending against the rapidly evolving UAS threat
set presents both a capacity and capability challenge. The Department
is developing effective capability to defend against UAS swarms and
other threats. Nonetheless, we have a capacity challenge in ensuring
the hundreds of DOD installations and critical infrastructure locations
have that necessary capability. As we continue to develop these
systems, the Department will work to fund and field them as efficiently
and effectively as possible.
34. Senator Rounds. General Brown, what current directed energy
capabilities, to include high power microwave, has the Department of
Defense fielded or has in development to defeat the growing UAS and UAS
swarm threat?
General Brown. The Department has a wide array of developing and
deployed capabilities. High power microwave is one form of directed
energy, as are high energy lasers. The Department has made great
strides in ensuring these capabilities are suitable for operation.
Programs such as the Army's Palletized High Energy Laser (P-HEL),
Navy's High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and
Surveillance (HELIOS), or Air Force's Tactical High Power Operational
Responder (THOR), are designed to defeat the UAS and swarm threats and
change the cost imposition of force protection. If confirmed, I will
continue to support the development, fielding, and integration of novel
solutions such as directed energy.
35. Senator Rounds. General Brown, what efforts is the Department
of Defense taking to rapidly field new counter-UAS technologies,
including directed energy systems such as high power microwave?
General Brown. I support the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering designation of directed energy as a Critical
Technology Area. Additionally, the Joint Counter-small UAS Office (JCO)
has transformed our research and development processes to field such
capabilities effectively and efficiently. These focus areas, paired
with Service-led efforts to integrate new technology into platforms,
concepts, and warfighting tactics, are critical to ensuring that the
United States retains its competitive advantage.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
threat assessment
36. Senator Ernst. General Brown, in your advance policy questions,
you said the State of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is ``real and
strong,'' yet senior leaders have said that an attack on Taiwan could
come as soon as this decade. How do you evaluate that threat, and what
factors influence your assessment?
General Brown. This assessment is based on our military readiness
and unmatched ability to conduct joint operations, our long-term
relationships with global allies and partners, and knowing that the PRC
understands an invasion would be extraordinarily complicated and costly
for an untested force. However, China is still pursuing the development
of the PLA into a more credible force for a potential cross-strait
contingency.
partner absorptive capacity
37. Senator Ernst. General Brown, would you agree that DOD security
assistance programs should systematically and rigorously evaluate the
capacity of partner forces to absorb U.S. defense articles and
services? Please explain.
General Brown. Yes. Our Security Cooperation efforts are informed
by analysis of partner nations' absorptive capacity. For security
assistance to have its intended effect, the partner force must be able
to employ and sustain it effectively. As such, the Department uses a
standard framework for evaluating the capabilities and performance of
security cooperation program recipients. The Learning and Evaluation
Agenda for Partnership Framework includes a variety of evidence-
building activities to support the assessments.
38. Senator Ernst. General Brown, would you agree that partner
forces should have the capacity to absorb U.S. defense articles and
services within operationally relevant timelines to deter potential
threats? Please explain.
General Brown. Yes. Last year the Department conducted an extensive
review of FMS processes, policies, and practices, which produced
tangible recommendations to improve the system and reduce burdens. The
Department has also established a Continuous Process Improvement Board
to monitor the implementation of these recommendations.
defense planning
39. Senator Ernst. General Brown, how would you mitigate
modernization risk across the Services, with each modernizing at the
same time?
General Brown. It will be important to balance modernization risk
across Service portfolios and the operational risk in meeting Combatant
Command requirements. If confirmed, I expect to use sound analysis and
effective communication across DOD, between the Services, and Combatant
Commands to ensure the right mix of capability and capacity for our
warfighters to campaign and win, both today and tomorrow, with a
modernized force.
40. Senator Ernst. General Brown, how would you strike the right
balance between the near-term readiness demand signal from global
combatant commanders and future modernization, including by accepting
measured risk?
General Brown. The Joint Force must balance risk between its
ability to deter our adversaries through operational campaigning and
prioritizing Service modernization efforts to achieve superiority in
multiple domains. If confirmed, I will use sound analysis and effective
communication to strike the right balance between current readiness and
modernization. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and timely
funding we can continue to improve readiness, build the future force
that maintains our competitive advantage and decrease risk.
41. Senator Ernst. General Brown, how would you strike the right
balance between maintaining extant force structure and modernization?
General Brown. If confirmed, I would use sound analysis and
effective communication to inform recommendations and decisions
regarding the extant force structure and modernization. The 2022 NDS
and supporting strategic documents establish the framework for the
Services to strike the right balance and field sufficient and capable
forces to meet requirements. With sustained, predictable, adequate, and
timely funding we can continue to maintain sufficient force structure
and build the future force that maintains our competitive advantage and
decreases risk.
42. Senator Ernst. General Brown, how will you approach Congress
about making necessary divestments to support modernization?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will focus on how the Joint Force is
balancing current force structure with urgent need to modernize and
pace the growing threat from China and the acute threat Russia poses to
the United States and our allies and partners. As we look to our most
significant challenges, we must divest vulnerable capabilities that can
no longer be affordably modernized or maintained to provide credible
combat power. I will have candid and open communication with Congress
ensuring the Joint Force has the required capabilities based on the
threat while managing transition risk between divestments and bringing
new advanced capabilities online.
counter-unmanned aircraft systems
43. Senator Ernst. General Brown, does DOD require additional
investment or authorities to accelerate fielding of Counter-Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) to pace the threat of adversary UAS? Please
explain.
General Brown. PB24 requests $1.2B to address Counter small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) requirements. The JROC iteratively
reviews the Joint Counter-small UAS Office's (JCO) efforts to develop
and field the capabilities for the Joint Force to address this threat.
The JCO also advocates for accelerated capability development and
adjustments to authorities to keep pace with the evolving threat. If
confirmed, I will ensure we continue to explore, develop, and provide
recommendations that could further enhance our posture, either through
investment or authorities, in this key capability area.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
fighter aircraft
44. Senator Budd. General Brown, do you believe that the current
joint force posture provides adequate fighter aircraft coverage
worldwide to meet combatant commander requirements? Please answer this
question as it relates to current obligations in peacetime, in 2027,
and in the event of supporting an operation plan (OPLAN).
General Brown. We continually assess our global fighter aircraft
posture in response to regional and global threats to ensure the force
is best positioned to carry out the Nation's priorities. That includes
the prioritization of Combatant Command requirements across various
environments and time horizons to provide adequate fighter coverage for
present operations and modernization recommendations for future
operations. Where requirements exceed available capacity, the
Department develops plans to mitigate these shortfalls with preferred
sourcing options, ally and partner contributions, the reallocation of
fighters from lower priority missions, and modernization
recommendations. If confirmed, I will continue assessments to inform
recommendations regarding Joint Force capability and capacity to
address current and future requirements.
45. Senator Budd. General Brown, if confirmed, what will you do to
adjudicate combatant commander requirements for fighter aircraft with
limited resources that will be even more severely strained if the
Department is allowed to divest the F-15 fleet as planned?
General Brown. The Department uses management and assessment
processes that review and adjudicate fighter levels across all
combatant commands to balance risks globally. If confirmed, I will use
these processes to inform my recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense on how to balance risk in accordance with the National Security
Strategy priorities.
46. Senator Budd. General Brown, if the United States goes to war
with China, will we still be able to maintain fighter aircraft presence
worldwide as we are obligated to do or will the military be unable to
fight in the Pacific?
General Brown. If confirmed, I will ensure we review a variety of
factors to plan for and allocate Joint Force capabilities to cover
global contingencies and commitments in collaboration with our allies
and partners.
47. Senator Budd. General Brown, do you believe that U.S. Military
Forces, especially fighters, are already overextended?
General Brown. Modernization, readiness, and operational
requirements collectively create a challenging environment with respect
to current fighter aircraft posture. The Department employs management
and assessment processes to deliberately ensure we assess global risk
and make informed decisions on the distribution of forces. I believe we
are balancing those competing priorities effectively to modernize the
force while simultaneously addressing global threats. Overall, while
these forces are in high demand globally, I would not consider them
overextended at this point. If confirmed, I will continually assess
modernization, readiness, and operational requirements to balance risk
and impacts across the Joint Force to include fighter aircraft.
2001 authorization for the use of military force
48. Senator Budd. General Brown, as Chairman, your powers and
duties to advise on the use of military force must be executed to the
letter of the law with no room for error in the terms used to target
individuals or groups with lethal force. You stated in your advance
policy questions that ``[t]he 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force [AUMF] provides a legal basis for operations against
certain violent extremist organizations''; however, the 2001 AUMF does
not use the term ``violent extremist organizations''. What is your
understanding of the legal authority provided by the 2001 AUMF?
General Brown. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons. The 2001 AUMF intended to give the President the statutory
authority needed to prevent future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. As
such, the 2001 AUMF authorizes the use of force against al Qaeda and
associated forces, including ISIS, that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners.
49. Senator Budd. General Brown, what legal definition of ``violent
extremist organizations'' were you using in your advance policy
question response?
General Brown. In my advance policy questions, I stated that the
2001 AUMF provided the legal basis for operations against ``certain''
violent extremist organizations (VEO). The ``certain'' VEOs to which I
was referring were al Qaeda and associated forces, including ISIS.
50. Senator Budd. General Brown, under what legal authority is the
term ``violent extremist organizations'' synonymous with the 2001 AUMF
authorization to use military force against ``nations, organizations,
or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001''?
General Brown. The 2001 AUMF provides authority for the President
to use force against those VEOs that the President determined planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons. The ``certain'' VEOs to
which I was referring were al Qaeda and associated forces, including
ISIS, that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners.
51. Senator Budd. General Brown, when describing who can be legally
targeted, is it appropriate to use an umbrella term like ``violent
extremist organizations'' which could be interpreted to include
domestic groups comprised entirely of U.S. citizens, when only a subset
of that umbrella term can legally be targeted under the 2001 AUMF?
General Brown. The 2001 AUMF does not authorize the President to
use force against every terrorist organization in the world. Instead,
the 2001 AUMF only authorizes the President to target al Qaida and
associated forces, including ISIS, that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners. The President
routinely informs Congress through periodic reporting of all groups he
determines are targetable pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. If confirmed, in
my role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am committed to
ensuring that my advice to the President and Secretary of Defense on
issues involving the application of the 2001 AUMF, to include
targeting, will be firmly rooted in the existing legal framework.
52. Senator Budd. General Brown, if the President of the United
States asked you for advice on the use of force, would you advise him
using umbrella terms that contain both legally targetable groups and
non-targetable groups, or would you refer specifically to only those
individuals or groups targetable under domestic and international law?
General Brown. If confirmed, it will be my duty to provide the
President with my military advice. When it comes to the solemn decision
to use force, I will ensure I consult with my legal counsel and offer
advice that fully comports with domestic and international law.
53. Senator Budd. General Brown, what groups does the 2001 AUMF
apply to?
General Brown. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force
provides a legal basis for operations against al Qaida and associated
forces, including ISIS.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
race based admission policies
54. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, do you agree with the
Government's position presented in oral arguments in front of the
Supreme Court in the University of North Carolina and Harvard case that
racial preferences at the military service academies and Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs exist and should continue as a
matter of national security?
General Brown. I am not familiar with the details of the oral
arguments presented, but I understand the Supreme Court declined to
address the issue of propriety of race-based admissions systems at the
military academies. Therefore, it is my understanding the ruling does
not apply to military academies.
55. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, if you are confirmed, will you
take steps to ensure that the service academies eliminate the
consideration of race as a factor in admissions decisions as other non-
military universities are now required?
General Brown. With their Title 10 responsibilities to organize,
train, and equip, each Service develops their own service academy
accession criteria consistent with laws and policies. If confirmed as
the principal military advisor, I will recommend that our policies
remain in accordance with the law and ensure individuals be given a
fair opportunity to be selected for service academy admissions based on
their merits, qualifications, and needs of the Services.
56. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, why should the Service
Academies be permitted to continue race-based affirmative action
admissions policies when universities who operate Reserve Officers'
Training Corps programs will now be prohibited from considering race in
admissions decisions?
General Brown. I believe there are educational and military
benefits to diversity. If confirmed, as Chairman my statutory role is
to provide my military advice to the President of the United States,
the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and Congress
as requested. In this role and in accordance with the law, I will
continue to support the proposition that admission to our service
academies is open all students who meet standards, regardless of race.
diversity, equity, and inclusion
57. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, do you believe that decisions
on recruiting, accessions, assignments, promotions, and other personnel
matters should be made on race-conscious basis?
General Brown. Our servicemembers want and deserve a fair
opportunity to perform. The best qualified servicemembers must be the
deciding factor to sustain our military superiority, strengthen
national security, and maintain high morale throughout the Services.
58. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, in your view, is there any
difference in meaning between ``equity'' and ``equal opportunity''?
General Brown. I believe there are sometimes differences in policy
and common use, but I believe we seek a common outcome: That, all
Servicemembers, regardless of background, should be afforded the same
opportunities to excel based on merit and their qualification.
59. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, do you have any evidence to
demonstrate the benefits of the numerous Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion positions hired in the Department of Defense in the last
several years?
General Brown. The Department needs to attract all those willing to
serve in order to remain a global leader, deter war, and ensure
national security. Individuals hired into these positions ensure the
Department's implementation and compliance with laws and policies that
attract, retain, and advance the best talent our Nation has to offer.
Having the best talent ensures the Department will be able to outthink,
outmaneuver, and outfight any adversary or threat.
60. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, should racial balance or
diversity take precedence over competence in any military unit?
General Brown. No. To tap into talent across our Nation and sustain
our Joint Force, we must expand our reach to show opportunities that
are available to qualified individuals. Individuals, regardless of
demographics, should be given a fair opportunity and be selected based
on their merits and qualifications.
unmanned aerial systems risk mitigation
61. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, key decisionmakers are
grappling with the question of how unmanned aerial systems (UAS) can be
integrated into the National Airspace System (NAS) for beneficial
purposes while mitigating the risk of the nefarious employment of UAS.
The number of reported UAS incidents outside the battlefield has
increased from 63 in 2020 to 115 in 2022. I have seen rogue and
malicious drones stop sporting events, cause airport shutdowns, violate
borders, delivered illegal contraband into prisons, and damaged
critical infrastructure. Is DOD coordinating with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and other key
Federal agencies on the development of these regulations to ensure DOD
is able to not only test counter UAS systems but also employ and deploy
them in the Continental United States (CONUS)?
General Brown. Yes. The Joint Staff coordinates across DOD and with
interagency partners to further our ability to develop and operate
these capabilities within the United States. If confirmed, I will
ensure coordination with our interagency partners to continue
development, testing, and fielding of existing and future Counter
small-UAS technologies.
62. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, has DOD coordinated with these
agencies to have the ability to develop, test and operate directed
energy technologies, to include high power microwave, in CONUS to
support installation and critical infrastructure defense and force
protection missions?
General Brown. Yes, there are ongoing U.S. Government and select
allied government efforts on the use of directed energy systems to
protect critical assets and infrastructure. Coordinating and sharing
key developments with our partners, such as potential operational
concepts, rules of engagement, and command and control structures are
essential to optimizing this potentially revolutionary technological
capability. If confirmed, I will ensure coordination with our
interagency partners to continue development, testing, and fielding of
existing and future Counter small-UAS technologies.
63. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, what barriers is the Department
of Defense facing with testing and fielding of directed energy systems
to include high power microwave systems, in the continental United
States?
General Brown. Maximizing the effectiveness of directed energy
weapons while ensuring the safe operating conditions for our
warfighters is of the utmost importance. In addition to safe and secure
testing grounds, it is critical that our policies allow us to continue
to work closely within the Department, the interagency, and with other
partners to efficiently develop and field these systems. If confirmed,
I will ensure coordination with our interagency partners to continue
development, testing, and fielding of existing and future Counter
small-UAS technologies.
64. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, has the Department of Defense
provided or identified any recommendations for required changes or
modifications to equipment, procedures, regulations, or existing laws
to operationally employ directed energy capabilities, to include high
power microwave, against these threats?
General Brown. As most directed energy weapon systems to date have
been prototypes, the Joint Staff has no specific recommendations to
existing laws or procedures at this time. As the Joint Staff gains more
fidelity on the employment of these weapons, it will consider the
impact to policies such as the Procedures for Management of
Illumination of Objects in Space (CJCSI 3225.01B) and the Directed
Energy Engineering and Directed Energy Weapon Review and Approval
Process (DEW RAP). If confirmed, I will ensure coordination with our
interagency partners continues development, testing, and fielding of
existing and future Counter small-UAS technologies to include any
recommendations for required changes.
65. Senator Schmitt. General Brown, is the Department of Defense
having any issues sharing these types of technologies and capabilities
due to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions?
General Brown. Based on my personal engagements, the Department is
having issues sharing technology and capability due to ITAR
restrictions. Throughout my time in multiple theaters, I have heard our
allies and partners discuss this challenge and its impact to
interoperability. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State to
work through these policy issues.
______
[The nomination reference of General Charles Q. Brown, Jr.,
USAF follows:]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of General Charles Q. Brown, Jr.,
USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General
Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
______
[The nomination of General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on July 20, 2023, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 20, 2023.]
[all]