- THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH, USMC FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

[Senate Hearing 118-788]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 118-788

THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH,
USMC FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDANT OF
THE MARINE CORPS
=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

JUNE 13, 2023

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

__________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-636 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director

John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

_________________________________________________________________

june 13, 2023

Page

The Nomination of General Eric M. Smith, USMC for Reappointment 1
to the Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine
Corps.

Members Statements

Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1

Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 3

Witness Statements

Smith, General Eric M., United States Marine Corps............... 9

Advance Policy Questions....................................... 48

Questions for the Record....................................... 81

Nomination Reference and Report................................ 136

Biographical Sketch............................................ 137

Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 140

Signature Page................................................. 143

(iii)

This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.

(iv)

THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH, USMC FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

----------

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2023

United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members
Present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly,
Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the nomination of General Eric Smith to be the 39th
Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. General, I would
like to welcome your wife, Trish, your daughter, Elise, son in
law, Matthew, and your son, Travis, Captain Travis, and
daughter in law, Hadley.
I know that military service runs deep in Smith family,
especially service in the United States Marine Corps, and I
thank each of you for your selfless commitment to the Nation.
General Smith, you are well qualified to serve as Commandant of
the Marine Corps.
As a current Assistant Commandant, you have been
instrumental in helping to modernize and lead the Corps--past
years. Prior to this assignment, you led the Marine Corps
Combat Capability Development Directorate and served as the
Senior Military Assistant to both the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Defense.
An infantryman by training, you have commanded marines at
every level and across multiple theaters. Indeed, this
leadership experience and understanding of the Joint Force will
be critical for successfully guiding the Marine Corps in
today's complex global security environment.
The Marine Corps is in the midst of a substantial
transformation, focused on competition in the Indo-Pacific, but
capable of global employment. The service is restructuring
around two concepts, littoral operations in a contested
environment and expeditionary advanced base operations. The key
element of these concepts is a more flexible amphibious force
that can support a broader naval fight once ashore.
Rather than simply acting as a landing force, the Marine
Corps intends to help control the sea and air in support of the
Joint Force. To achieve this, the Marine Corps is prioritizing
a number of modernization efforts, including deep sensing, long
range fires to include anti-surface capabilities, enhanced air
and missile defense, and improve ground and amphibious combat
vehicles.
These platforms will equip the marines with improved force
protection, lethality, and mobility. I have appreciated the
Marine Corps' thoughtful approach during this restructuring,
including its regular communication with Congress.
Further, I appreciate the marines' willingness to modify
structural decisions such as increasing the number of cannon
batteries or the size of fighter attack squadrons, when
experimenting and wargaming demonstrated the need to do so.
General, I would like to know your plans for continuing these
modernization efforts and any concerns you have with the Marine
Corps ability to operate as envisioned by Force Design 2030.
As the Corps shifts to become a more tactical force capable
of operating in forward dispersed environments, it will require
more seasoned, experienced marines. As such, the service will
continue to see the average age and retention rate of its
marines increase. These trends, while generally positive, will
require the service to reconsider how it manages its enlisted
force.
The Marine Corps has not experienced the same level of
recruiting disruptions as the other services, but it is not
immune from these challenges, particularly in its Reserve
Forces. I would ask for your views on the marines' talent
management strategies and opportunities to succeed in the
current recruiting environment.
Considering the challenges facing the United States today,
it is important for the Marine Corps to operate not just as its
own service, but as part of a Joint Force. Succeeding against
our potential adversaries will require all U.S. military
services to work together, operate faster, and deliver greater
capabilities from farther distances in contested environments.
These are significant challenges that will require joint
experimentation and collaborative research and development to
overcome.
I am encouraged by the kind of work underway at the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory, where in particular technologies
are being developed to help enable logistics in a contested
environment. I hope you will share your views on service and
joint experimentation, and how the Marine Corps can ensure that
its capabilities are interoperable and complementary across the
force.
Finally, your highest priority must be ensuring the
readiness of marines to perform their missions. If confirmed,
you will be expected to support a culture of leadership, trust,
and teamwork throughout the force with no tolerance for
behavior that erodes that culture.
General Smith, I would ask that you share how you plan to
address this responsibility. I am confident that you have the
requisite skills and experience to provide the Nation's
marines, their families, and Marine civilian employees with the
leadership they deserve.
Thank you again for your continued willingness to serve. I
look forward to your testimony. Now, let me recognize the
Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a very fine
opening statement. General Smith, I want to thank you for your
service and offer my congratulations on your nomination. It
is--I will join my distinguished chairman in welcoming your
family. They ought to be awfully proud of your unwavering and
devoted service to your country. I think you are exceptionally
well qualified to serve as Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Marine Corps Modernization Plan, Force Design 2030 is
geared toward strengthening deterrence against China. I would
like to hear today your honest assessment of where Force Design
2030 has succeeded and where work remains to be accomplished.
The United States is entering a window of maximum danger for
conflict with the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping intends
to have a force capable of invading Taiwan by 2027.
He has told us this. Even in the past month, China has
shown it is serious about determining our--undermining, about
undermining our military and diplomatic power. It has harassed
a U.S. reconnaissance plane and a U.S. Navy warship, disturbed
WWII wrecks, engaged in espionage at an Alaska military
installation, and threatened cyber activity in Guam.
The threats from Russia, North Korea, and Iran are not
getting any better either. The window in which Congress can
effect real change in our force posture and hopefully correct
some of the troubling trends we see in the Western Pacific is
closing. This is the decisive decade for the 21st century in
the Indo-Pacific. In my view, the Marine Corps has met the
challenge with vigor and urgency, even if change at scale is
always hard and imperfect.
Throughout the Nation's history, the Marine Corps has
distinguished itself as flexible, fast, and adaptable. Hence
its motto, first to fight. The ability for amphibious forces to
search, target, and sink potential enemy naval and air
combatants while maintaining a low signature is hard work. It
requires new capabilities, concepts, and formations.
General Smith, I would like you to explain to the Committee
how you intend to continue that work, including unfinished
business regarding amphibious lift capabilities.
As Commandant Berger testified repeatedly before this
Committee, the leading edge of our deterrence is the ability to
transport marines and materiel across the vast distances in a
maritime environment. Congress reflected this operational
demand in the Marine Corps--in the Marine Corps' 31 amphibious
ship force requirement. I am frustrated by President Biden's
woefully inadequate defense budget proposal, which would slash
funding for LPD-33, a critical platform in fulfilling a range
of the Marine Corps submissions, including disaster response
and alliance assurance.
I would appreciate your views, General, regarding the
amphibious ship requirement LPD-33. If confirmed, you would be
at the tip of the American spear in observing the Chinese
military and ensuring the Marine Corps remains trained,
equipped, and organized to deter conflict in the Western
Pacific. I look forward to the testimony, and thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker, and
before we call on General Smith, a quorum is now present, and I
ask the Committee to consider a list of 4,194 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
Committee for the required length of time. Is there a motion to
table report this list of 4,194 pending military nominations?
Senator Wicker. So, moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Voice: Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor, aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]

Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on June 13, 2023.
1. MG Karl H. Gingrich, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-8, US Army (Reference No. 199)
2. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
rear admiral (list begins with Kenneth R. Blackmon) (Reference No. 390)
3. In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Jeffrey A. Jurgemeyer)
(Reference No. 391)
4. Capt. John E. Byington, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 392)
5. Capt. John A. Robinson III, USNR to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 393)
6 . Capt. David E. Ludwa, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 394)
7. Capt. Peter K. Muschinske, USNR to be rear admiral (lower
half) (Reference No. 395)
8. Capt. Marc F. Williams, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 396)
9. In the Army there are 90 appointment to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Kyle D. Aemisegger) (Reference No. 472)
10. In the Army there are 19 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Aileen R. Cabandalogan) (Reference No. 473)
11. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Andrew K. Berkey) (Reference No. 503)
12. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jacquelyn P. Smith) (Reference No. 504)
13. In the Army there are 136 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Harry T. Aubin) (Reference No.
515)
14. In the Army there are 29 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joshua A. Akers) (Reference No.
516)
15. In the Army there are 301 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Alexandra M. Adams) (Reference No. 517)
16. In the Army there are 61 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Andrea C. Baeder) (Reference No. 518)
17. In the Navy there are 206 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Bryce D. Abbott) (Reference No. 559)
18. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Edward A. Carlton) (Reference No. 560)
19. In the Navy there are 6 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Andrea H. Cameron) (Reference No. 561)
20. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Mylene R. Arvizo) (Reference No. 562)
21. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Sarah E. Abbott) (Reference No. 563)
22. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Curtis Brown) (Reference No. 564)
23. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Mark K. Corbliss) (Reference No. 565)
24. In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Hannah L. Bealon) (Reference No. 566)
25. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Cameron M. Balma) (Reference No. 567)
26. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Alan M. Brechbill) (Reference No. 568)
27. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Ross M. Anderson) (Reference No. 569)
28. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Homer F. Hensy) (Reference No. 570)
29. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Tommie G. Crawford) (Reference No. 571)
30. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with John E. Fage) (Reference No. 572)
31. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Gavin H. Clough) (Reference No. 573)
32. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Jennifer J. Landry) (Reference No. 574)
33. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Bradley H. Abramowitz) (Reference No. 575)
34 LTG Andrew M. Rohling, USA to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Chairman, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee
(Reference No. 593)
35. In the Air Force there are 16 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with David B. Barker) (Reference No. 596)
36. In the Army there are 76 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Heather R. Alsupmorton) (Reference
No. 602)
37. In the Army there are 122 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Boma O. Afiesimama) (Reference No.
603)
38. In the Army there are 31 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jamie D. Bell) (Reference No. 604)
39. In the Army there are 13 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Rachel A. Acciacca) (Reference No.
605)
40. In the Army there are 33 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Jamilia M. Adamshenderson) (Reference No. 606)
41. In the Army there are 44 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Corebrians A. Abraham) (Reference No. 607)
42. In the Army there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Aaron Crombie) (Reference No. 608)
43. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Charles E. Bane) (Reference No. 609)
44. In the Navy Reserve there are 63 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Eric J. Adler) (Reference No. 619)
45. In the Navy Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Lucas R. Argobright) (Reference No. 620)
46. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Patrick C. Lazzaretti) (Reference No. 621)
47. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Robert A. Paynter, Jr.) (Reference No. 622)
48. In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Stanley J. Benes IV) (Reference No. 623)
49. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with James P. McDonnell) (Reference No. 624)
50. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Donna M. Chuba) (Reference No. 625)
51. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Anton B. Allen) (Reference No. 626)
52. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Adam M. Clampitt) (Reference No. 627)
53. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Christopher P. Cook) (Reference No. 628)
54. In the Navy Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Demetrio A. Camua III) (Reference No. 629)
55. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (list begins with Loren C. Hoelscher) (Reference No. 630)
56. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Matthew T. Chatigny) (Reference No. 631)
57. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Joshua C. Gettle) (Reference No. 632)
58. In the Navy Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with John J. Bridges) (Reference No. 633)
59. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Ryan H. Metzler) (Reference No. 634)
60. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Thomas A. Summers) (Reference No. 643)
61. MG John B. Richardson IV, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, First United States Army (Reference No. 650)
62. VADM Jeffrey W. Hughes, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy
Chief of Staff for Capability Development, Supreme Allied Command
Transformation (Reference No. 651)
63. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Daniel J. Wittmer) (Reference No. 653)
64. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Marina F. Perez) (Reference No. 654)
65. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Nicholas J. Norton) (Reference No. 655)
66. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Arteese R. Adams) (Reference No. 656)
67. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Warren N. Washington) (Reference No. 657)
68. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jacob W. Cavender) (Reference No. 658)
69. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Justin M. Fowler) (Reference No. 659)
70. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jason P. Pancoe) (Reference No. 660)
71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Benjamin F. Iverson) (Reference No. 661)
72. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Dustin B. Kosar) (Reference No. 662)
73. In the Navy there are 20 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Dennis L. Avery) (Reference No.
663)
74. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Khristiannoe C. Caindoy) (Reference No.
664)
75. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Matthew D. Gleason) (Reference No. 665)
76. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Jacob S. Tharp) (Reference No. 666)
77. LTG Timothy D. Haugh, USAF to be general and Director,
National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service/Commander, US
Cyber Command (Reference No. 678)
78. LTG Gregory M. Guillot, USAF to be general and Commander, US
Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command
(Reference No. 679)
79. MG Heath A. Collins, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Director, Missile Defense Agency (Reference No. 680)
80. LTG Jeffrey A. Kruse, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (Reference No. 681)
81. MG Michael G. Koscheski, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, Air Combat Command (Reference No. 682)
82. LTG Donna D. Shipton, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Air Force Materiel
Command (Reference No. 683)
83. MG Anthony R. Hale, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-2, US Army (Reference No. 684)
84. LTG Laura A. Potter, USA to be lieutenant general and
Director of Army Staff (Reference No. 685)
85. MG William J. Hartman, USA to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, US Cyber Command (Reference No. 686)
86. LTG John S. Kolasheski, USA to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commanding General, US Army Europe-Africa (Reference No. 687)
87. Col. Matthew N. Gebhard, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 689)
88. Col. Katherine M. Braun, USAR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 690)
89. In the Air Force there are 265 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Stephen David Albert) (Reference
No. 692)
90. In the Air Force there are 135 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Robert D. Allen) (Reference No.
693)
91. In the Air Force there are 600 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Christopher K. Adams) (Reference
No. 694)
92. In the Air Force there are 74 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Nicholas F. Aliotta) (Reference No. 695)
93. In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Andrew D. Ahn) (Reference No. 697)
94. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Sarah E. Abel) (Reference No. 698)
95. In the Air Force there are 20 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Michael J. Alfaro) (Reference No. 699)
96. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Candice L. Pipes) (Reference No. 700)
97. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Michael A. Growden) (Reference No. 701)
98. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Mark G. Kappelmann) (Reference No. 702)
99. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Leah H. Georgieva) (Reference No. 703)
100. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Nicholas R. Yetman) (Reference No. 704)
101. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Kevin L. Montgomery, Jr.) (Reference No. 705)
102. In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with David J. Bedells) (Reference No. 706)
103. In the Army Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Molly E. Keith) (Reference No. 707)
104. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Steven E. Anderson) (Reference No. 709)
105. In the Navy there are 30 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Christopher E. Barnes) (Reference No. 710)
106. In the Navy there are 65 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Kenric T. Aban) (Reference No. 711)
107. In the Navy there are 20 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Michael R. Andersen) (Reference No. 712)
108. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Dominic J. Antenucci) (Reference No. 713)
109. In the Navy there are 550 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with William H. Abbitt) (Reference No. 714)
110. In the Navy there are 38 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Joshua M. Anderson) (Reference No. 715)
111. In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with David L. Aguilar) (Reference No. 716)
112. In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Sean A. Brophy) (Reference No. 717)
113. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Francis G. Coyle) (Reference No. 718)
114. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Rebecca L. Anderson) (Reference No. 719)
115. In the Navy there are 23 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Nick Avila) (Reference No. 720)
116. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Michael K. Beall) (Reference No. 721)
117. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Forrest N. Bush) (Reference No. 722)
118. In the Navy there are 48 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Scott B. Aaron) (Reference No. 723)
119. In the Navy there are 32 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jessica L. Alexander) (Reference No. 724)
120. In the Navy there are 46 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Suzanne T. Alford) (Reference No. 725)
121. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Nicholas D. Chiudioni) (Reference No. 726)
122. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Marvin E. Bartholomew) (Reference No. 727)
123. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Quentin Albea) (Reference No. 728)
124. In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Paul M. Allen) (Reference No. 729)
125. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Scott P. Ader) (Reference No. 730)
126. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (list begins with Erika M. Meszaros) (Reference No. 731)
127. In the Navy there are 36 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Mary R. Anker) (Reference No. 732)
128. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with David W. Alexander) (Reference No. 733)
129. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Christopher S. Casne) (Reference No. 734)
130. In the Navy there are 28 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Kevin L. Borkert) (Reference No. 735)
131. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Craig A. Ambrose) (Reference No. 745)
132. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Bibek Joshi) (Reference No. 746)
133. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Adrian K. Williford) (Reference No. 747)
134. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Daniel D. Cole) (Reference No. 748)
135. In the Army there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Steven D. Bryant) (Reference No. 749)
136. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Joseph A. St Pierre II) (Reference No. 750)
137. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jeffrey A. Banks) (Reference No. 751)
138. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Isaac A. Gutierrez) (Reference No. 752)
139. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Rick J. Mata) (Reference No. 753)
140. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(D016094) (Reference No. 754)
141. In the Navy Reserve there are 11 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Theodore G. Cavoores, Jr.) (Reference No.
755)
142. In the Navy Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Andrew E. Carmichael) (Reference No. 756)
143. In the Navy Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Kirsten M. Betak) (Reference No. 757)
144. In the Navy Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Sarah E. Davis) (Reference No. 758)
145. In the Navy Reserve there are 28 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Bryan T. Alvarez) (Reference No. 759)
146. In the Navy Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Rodney M. Bonner) (Reference No. 760)
147. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Julie K. Moss) (Reference No. 761)
148. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Luis E. Alderman II) (Reference No. 762)
149. In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Timothy W. Gleason) (Reference No. 763)
150. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Robin J. Glebes) (Reference No. 764)
151. In the Space Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Lisa T. Green)
(Reference No. 765)
152. In the Space Force there are 36 appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with Phoenix L. Hauser) (Reference No.
766)

_______________________________________________________________________

TOTAL: 4,194

Chairman Reed. The motion carries. General Smith, please.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

General Smith. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker----
Chairman Reed. Bring that closer, please, sir.
General Smith. Yes, sir. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Wicker, and distinguished Members of this Committee, it is a
privilege to appear before you today. I am humbled to have been
nominated as the 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
As our 38th Commandant prepares to retire after 42 years of
service, I want to publicly thank him and his wife, Donna, for
the countless sacrifices that come with that length of service.
On behalf of the young marines who will do most of the
fighting and the dying when our Nation next goes to war, thank
you for your steadfast support of your Marine Corps. Your work
ensures that future fights are heavily tilted in their favor. I
suffer no illusions that I arrived at this hearing myself.
The young lance corporals, and lieutenants who so gallantly
served with me in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the sergeants major
and senior officers who have mentored me, have my enduring
admiration and gratitude. My family is with me today. They are
a rare combination of grit, compassion, and patriotism.
My wife, Tricia, and I will celebrate 36 years of marriage
this year, and her continued dedication to the youngest of our
marines and their families remains a benchmark for me to
emulate. After 22 moves and years apart due to deployments, she
stands ready to continue to serve, if I am confirmed.
I am prouder to be called Tricia's husband than I am to be
called General Smith. Our daughter Elise, who is here with her
husband Matt, was born while I was deployed to Desert Storm.
So, her time as a military child started with sacrifice. Her
willingness to place work on hold to support me today shows
that she remains willing to play service before self.
Our son, Travis, a Marine Corps Captain, and his wife,
Hadley, are here. Travis is currently on recruiting duty but
took a few days leave to come support his old man. He did not
get any dispensation for missing his recruiting mission.
Even though he is here, he has completed deployments to the
Pacific and the Middle East. Stands ready to fight, if called.
As a senior officer, I am often greeted warmly by the public.
They thank me for my service and ask about my very duty
assignments.
While I remain grateful for these encounters, I know that
it is our youngest marines who deserve this recognition and I
hope to adequately represent them today. If confirmed, I commit
to you that I will not fail our marines, their families, or the
civilians who serve with us, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Smith. Before
we entertain questions from the panel, there are a series of
standard questions which must be asked of every nominee, and
you may respond appropriately. Have you adhered to applicable
laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Smith. No, sir.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee when requested?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the Administration?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, it subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requester
regarding the basis for any good faith, delay, or denial in
providing such records?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of--records and other information, including timely responding
to hearing questions for the record?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Smith, and once
again, you and your family, thank you for a lifetime of service
to the Marine Corps. One of the issues that is concerning to
all of us I believe is congested logistics.
We understand that the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
is currently conducting experimentation on new technologies and
future capabilities. If confirmed, how would you sharpen the
Marine Corps' focus on this critical capability?
You know, it is--if you do not have the ammo, it is tough
to fight, basically.
General Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Contested logistics
in any theater is a significant challenge. I believe that
contested logistics is an all of the above matter. What I mean
by that, sir, is you have to conduct pre-staging of certain
resources.
Fortunately, we have a lot of allies and friends around the
regions of the world who will allow us to do so. We have to be
very innovative as our Warfighting Lab is doing so. We have
unmanned systems to deliver those supplies that we so
critically need.
Also, we have to do some very creative work to do additive
manufacturing and 3D printing forward. If confirmed, I am
committed to continuing that effort because I do see 1 day we
will be printing forward--in forward operating bases, we will
be printing major end items, aircraft engines, propellers.
We will be doing that forward as opposed to straining the
lines that come from the United States through contested
logistics areas.
Chairman Reed. I think your vision is accurate. That
implies that we have to have intellectual property rights and
many other things which we will work on while you continue to
develop your approach.
The other aspect of this is, this would be a joint effort.
So, what type of complementary approaches are you taking with
other services, the Navy, Army, Air Force, Space Force?
General Smith. Mr. Chairman, the logistics piece is in fact
a joint fight. So as a current Vice Service Chief, we work very
hard through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
underneath the leadership of the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs Staff, Admiral Grady, to ensure that everything we do is
complementary to each other.
For example, sir, when the Navy Logistics Command needs to
move assets for the Marine Corps throughout the Pacific, it is
incumbent upon us to ensure that what we need is exactly what
we need.
We know what we call the Cuban square, the size, the weight
that we reduce that, and we have been on a significant effort
to reduce our fighting weight, which quite honestly, over 15
years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan had grown
substantially. One of the first things to logistics is need
less where you can.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. One of your prime responsibility
is training and organizing the Corps in order to operate in
multiple combatant areas. If confirmed, how would you ensure
your efforts are such that marines can in fact operate from
CENTCOM, to INDOPACOM, to NORTHCOM, etcetera?
General Smith. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to
work with our Training and Education Command, and if confirmed,
would direct them to ensure that our moniker of, in every clime
and place, remains. We do that now in the high North with
Norway. We train there repeatedly.
We still train in the desert at 29 Palms, and we are
clearly operating across the spectrum in the Pacific, and we
are operating in the European theater, as we recently did with
Task Force 612, in support of those operations after the
reprehensible attacks of Russia into Ukraine.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, and then one additional
responsibility is to manage the talent you have, and you have
impressive talent. Your assessment at this point of the
challenges you face in terms of retention, recruitment, and
basically just the morale and esprit de corps.
General Smith. Chairman, the Marine Corps met its
recruiting mission last year, and they will meet it again this
year. We have been fortunate because we have treated our
marines well through Talent Management 2030, that our retention
goals, which we attempt to meet by October, were met in March
this year.
So, marines will vote with their feet, and they are
choosing to stay. When we keep more--and what we are talking
about, Chairman, is keeping them from between the 5 and the 10
year marks. Not every lance corporal becoming a master gunnery
sergeant. We are talking 5 to 10 years, which is where gap
historically is.
Because we are able to keep them, keep that experience and
that talent, it is hugely beneficial to service. I think the
reason the Marine Corps has met its recruiting objectives is we
have not changed. We have not lowered our standards and we will
not. We are here to do warfighting and lethality, and we will
not change our standards, because the combat that comes
tomorrow demands those high standards.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Senator
Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very, very much, and I
appreciate that statement, because I think it is very important
for us to understand why the Marine Corps members are voting
with their feet, as you say, and what lessons we might be able
to learn to apply service wide.
General Smith, the 2023 NDAA set a floor of 31 traditional
L-class amphibious ships, LHS, LPDs, and gave the Commandant of
the Marine Corps explicit requirements authority for amphibious
ships.
Many of us are frustrated that the Secretary of Defense has
not set in motion processes to actually get this done. General
Smith, is it your understanding, based on the statute, that you
are--you are going to be explicitly required to have 31
traditional amphibious ships?
General Smith. Senator, it is. Thirty one is the minimum.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and why--is this a sound, necessary
requirement, in your opinion?
General Smith. Senator, it is.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and why is that? Why is that a
necessary requirement?
General Smith. Senator, we are, and remain, and must remain
America's global combined arms crisis response force. When a
crisis begins to erupt, that is not the time to begin to move
to appear, to begin to load a ship, and more importantly, sir,
to begin to train your pilots to land on a pitching rolling
deck at night.
Thirty one at a minimum enables us to train and to deploy
and to stay deployed so we can tamp those crises down and alter
adversary trajectories on behalf of the Joint Force.
Senator Wicker. If we do everything necessary, from a
legislative standpoint right now, how soon can we see that the
31st L-class amphibious ship?
General Smith. Sir, there are 31 ships in the inventory
today. What we seek and have sought for some time is to replace
the aging LSDs who are approaching 40 years of service life,
with LPDs, which currently is the best performing ship in the
production line. That is a one for one swap, sir, so we want
to----
Senator Wicker. Thank you for that clarification. How soon
can that one for one swap be accomplished, if we start today?
General Smith. The normal production for a ship is 2 years,
Senator. So, from the time it is put on contract until it is
complete, it is a 2-year production cycle.
Senator Wicker. All right. Let's look back at the
disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. How were two Marine
Corps battalions able to deploy?
General Smith. Senator, we had two battalions, second time,
first marines, first Battalion, and 8th Marines. One was
forward in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and the second
was forward on a Marine Expeditionary Unit.
So, they were forward deployed already. That is what we do.
That is who we are. So, without that forward deployment, you
give up time, and time is the one thing that an adversary will
never allow you to have.
Senator Wicker. The amphibious ships were absolutely a
central part of that, is that correct?
General Smith. Sir, they were, as they were in the initial
moves into Afghanistan after the attacks on 9/11.
Senator Wicker. If we could have responded to the powerful
earthquake in Turkey, resulting in 50,000 or more deaths,
would--did we respond, and if not, why not?
General Smith. Senator, we had a small detachment. marines,
in short, did not. We have marine battalions. We have marine
squadrons ready to go. But when there are no amphibious ships
to get on, to train with, then we are unable to execute that
mission that is lawfully tasked to us as a crisis response
force.
Senator Wicker. One final thing. I anticipate that this
Committee and also our partners in the House of Representatives
will direct increased attention and increased numbers for the
Marine Corps junior ROTC detachments. If we direct that this be
done in the NDAA, will you commit to implementing this and
increasing the number of junior ROTC units around the country?
General Smith. Senator, yes. If anything is in the NDAA, of
course we will comply. I would say that while Marine Corps
JROTC is not a recruiting tool, my son is a product of Marine
Corps JROTC, we owe that leadership tool back to the
institutions.
We also owe the most updated training materials and the
best possible screened embedded staff to do that, because
again, I find them to be highly useful. I have personal
experience with them. But yes, sir, I do commit to that, if
confirmed.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I hear what you say
about recruiting. I think overall, it is a citizenship builder,
and it is a subset of excellence in almost any school that--
where we see it. Thank you very much, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations, General Smith, on your nomination. Thank you
to you and all of your family for your willingness to continue
to serve. Both the Chairman and Ranking Member mentioned Force
Design 2030, which was General Berger's plan to realign the
Marine Corps to address the challenges presented by the
Pacific, Indo-Pacific. Can you talk about what the State of
play is for Force Design 2030 and how the Marine Corps is
continuing to implement the plan?
General Smith. Thank you, Senator. Force Design 2030 was an
effort to modernize--is an effort to modernize the Marine Corps
after 15 years of being focused on counterinsurgency
operations. It focuses on State owned State conflict and
simultaneously retaining our global crisis response force,
combined arms, global expeditionary capabilities. Force Design
2030 is in a good place.
We have stood up, as a couple of examples, ma'am, mindful
of your time, the third Marine Littoral Regiment, the first of
three, was stood up in Hawaii. That unit recently exercised in
Balikatan, the largest exercise we do with our Philippine
allies and several other allies and was highly sought after and
highly credited with some of the really exquisite capabilities,
long range fires, low signature that we have heard the chairman
referenced.
So those efforts are on pace and need to go faster, because
also as referenced from Ranking Member Wicker, whether the year
is 2027, 2026, 2025, for the marines, we are the fight tonight
force. We want to be even more ready than we are every single
day. That is our mission when we wake up.
So, Force Design is on track. We need to accelerate those
areas where we can, and that will come with the steady funding
and the continued experimentation and quick feedback that we
get from our extremely--excellent Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. You talked with
Senator Reed about the success that the marines have had with
retention and with recruiting when for the rest of our military
those numbers are down over the last year.
Can you talk--I mean, you suggested that it was maintaining
the standards in the Marine Corps that was appealing to people.
I do not--I did not think that meant that you were suggesting
that the Army, an Air Force, and Navy had lowered their
standards.
So what lessons are there that you think the Marine Corps
can share with the other branches of the military on how we do
a better job recruiting? Does everybody need to have a show
like NCIS that encourages people to think about the marines? Or
what do you think would be helpful?
General Smith. Ma'am, you are absolutely correct. I would
never disparage my fellow services because we fight as a Joint
Force. I have been to three different wars, and they have all
been with Joint Forces. I think one of our keys to success is
we do send our very best to recruiting duty and we reward them
when they go with promotions, with prime duty assignments, when
they leave recruiting.
We have the ethos that we are marines, we will accomplish
the mission, and our objective, and our goal, and our mandate
is that everyone who seeks to become a U.S. marine has an
opportunity to become one. You may join some other
organization, you become a U.S. marine. It is a
transformational process and people want a challenge.
Senator Shaheen. So when we had a chance to meet in my
office, one of the stories that I told you was about meeting
with former members of the Afghan female tactical platoon who
are here in the United States and who a number of whom
expressed an interest in continuing to serve in our military
and who were very appreciative of the opportunity to be an
America but really wanted to become full-fledged citizens and
think about the ability to give back to this country.
So, should we be doing more to recruit those patriotic
immigrants who want to serve this country? Do you have thoughts
about how we would do that?
General Smith. Ma'am, as a former recruiter, anything that
enables us to access the totality of talent from which to draw
so that we get the very best marines, I am in favor of. If
confirmed, I will continue that effort to make sure we have
opportunities and access for everyone who wishes to compete to
become a United States Marine.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and we have a little bit of
time left, but I did want to ask you about the war in Ukraine
and what lessons do you think the Chinese and President Xi are
looking at as they look at what is happening in Ukraine?
General Smith. Ma'am, I can never say what is in President
Xi's head. I would say that the individuals' fighting spirit of
individual soldiers and marines matters most, and what I also
say is the lesson that should be taken is that those who have
lots of partners, allies and friends, are very difficult to
defeat.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General. I certainly appreciate your service to this country,
the service and sacrifice by your family as well, and look
forward to this hearing and your answers to many of our
questions.
Congress has generally been very supportive of Force Design
2030. Should we anticipate any shifts in the concept, if you
are confirmed?
General Smith. Senator, thank you for that. Force Design
2030, which I have been a part since the beginning, is on the
right track. If confirmed, I will continue that. What I would
say, ma'am, is we have shifted it since the beginning. We are
marines. We are innovators.
We have changed--where we found that we shot long at the
target, so to speak, we will immediately modify when the data
represents that we need to make a change. We have done that
several times with significant things like rotary wing assets.
Senator Fischer. When we met last week, you designed that
Force Design 2030 as the Marine Corps returning to their normal
State of being after 20 years of desert warfare. Could you
expand on that in this setting as well for us, please?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am. I have served extensively in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and we were, all those of us who did,
were proud to do so. But that was a very, very focused fight on
counterinsurgency. It did not, as previous commandants have
said, prepare us for peer State on State conflict.
So, as we got larger, heavier, with more equipment, it
becomes increasingly difficult to move that equipment in a
timeframe that matters. When you do not have deep water ports
and weeks to move equipment, days to offload, you have hours,
or short days to make the entire move, you have to modernize,
become more agile, longer range, lower signature.
This is peer on peer conflict that we have not experienced
at this level that is possible since 1945.
Senator Fischer. Chairman Reed touched on this, but could
you expand on it a little bit about how the Marine Corps needs
to change their logistic capabilities to be more effective in a
contested environment?
General Smith. Ma'am, when I worked for Dr. Carter as
Secretary of Defense, he had a master's degree in theoretical--
or doctorate in theoretical physics, and you can not change
physics. Things that weigh 10 pounds, weigh 10 pounds.
So, what we seek to do is pre-stage, forward stage, and as
I said, do additive manufacturing and 3D printing forward. We
can also use certain technologies that make things lighter,
polymer ammunition, lighter weight body armor.
Every pound matters when you are trying to move things
across the expanse of the Pacific, and our UAVs, or unmanned
aerial vehicles, surface and subsurface platforms that can
deliver supplies, key supplies at the critical time. That is
what we are investing in now. We are trying to accelerate that
as fast as we can.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned the technologies that
continue to be innovative when it comes to warfare. Do you--do
you see emerging technologies that the Corps will be able to
access to be able to enhance your operations, your abilities,
and help you maintain a competitive edge?
In this setting, can you talk about any of those emerging
technologies that you think that you will be able to really
take a hold of and be able to help your force?
General Smith. Senator, I think one of the keys, and I
usually hammer on this pretty hard, is 3D printing forward.
When we own, as was referenced by I believe the chairman, the
tech data rights to things we procure, I can build and print
aircraft engines forward.
When you can do that, ma'am, that is an entire supply chain
that is relieved of some stress and it gets the engine into the
hands of the warfighter today, not weeks from now. That is key,
and you can pre-staged those metals and bring with you the 3D
printer. That is in our future. I am convinced of that, ma'am,
if confirmed, and I am focused on that.
Senator Fischer. To keep you moving quickly as a force.
General Smith. Ma'am absolutely. As we say, speed is life.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned the Balikatan exercises in
the Philippines. Can you briefly tell us how they help you
inform the future force posture decisions that you are going to
be faced with?
General Smith. Ma'am, those assets that are forward with
very high end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
tools, in the broad, unclassified setting that we are in, when
they can sense what the adversary is doing, and make sense of
their intent and pass it to our allies and partners, that gives
you the time to move to position and to be in position to
thwart their efforts. It is called first mover advantage.
When we provide that to the joint and allied force, it
does, in fact, exponentially change the power of the force that
is in the air or on the ground, because you have anticipatory
moves that you can make vice respond to.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
General Smith. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Smith,
congratulations. Welcome to your family. It is wonderful to
have them here. The Marine Innovation Unit is headquartered in
Newburgh, New York.
It is tasked with maintaining our technological advantage
and will have 270 reservists assigned this year with
significant expertise from those marines' civilian careers,
whether it is in AI, whether it is in cyber, whether it is in
other tech careers. What value do you see MIU bringing to the
Marine Corps?
How will the Marine Corps look to balance the competing
needs of developing these marines professionally through
deployments and reassignments to other Reserve units and
retaining valuable expertise in MIU?
General Smith. Thank you, Senator. That unit at Newburgh is
exactly where it must be, because that innovation academia
corridor is really like no other. That is the purpose or the
reason for its location. Location matters. Lieutenant General
Dave Bellon, head of Marine Corps Forces Reserve, came up with
that idea.
I have spoken to the MIU, Marine Innovation Unit, and they
are sergeants, three colonels. They are their own business
owners. They are already in these businesses. They already have
the connecting to files and tissue. So, if confirmed, I will
continue to give them tasks.
As the Assistant Commandant, I gave them the logistics
tasks. Figure out how to make us more logistically sustainable.
I would commit to you, ma'am, if confirmed, they will be a
priority because they already have the tools.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. The Marine Corps submitted a
legislative proposal to increase the service obligation of
cyber officers to 8 years after completion of MOS training. Can
you walk us through the experience in Marine Corps that led to
this request, and how this change would impact the Marine
Corps' ability to provide cyber officers to units in the fleet
and combatant commanders? Do you have any concerns about
disincentivizing service in this MOS?
General Smith. Senator, your last first, I do not have any
concern. We have lots of contracts in 5, 6, 7, 8, even 10
years. The exquisite credentials that those cyber operators
will receive are highly valuable in the military and outside.
So, we think it is a fair trade, and they think it is a
fair trade, too, because we are doing well in those numbers.
Lieutenant General Gerry Glavy, who used to be the three at
U.S. Cyber Command, is now our Director of Information, Deputy
Commandant for Information. He is one of the driving factors
behind that.
We look at our recruiting model. We did some analysis, and
we thought we can ask that of those individuals to receive
those exquisite credentials. We were correct, and we will
continue to do that, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. The Marine Corps current plans include
incorporating intelligent robots and autonomous system
specialties throughout the total force. Do you currently have
enough marines with expertise in this area to extend these
capabilities across the fleet? If not, how do you anticipate
developing this capacity?
General Smith. Senator, we do not. We I do not think anyone
has the level of robotics experts, AI experts they would like
to have.
So, while we are developing our own, we are closely
coordinating with others, to include Army Futures Command,
Office of Naval Research, and DARPA to make sure that the Joint
Force collectively focuses on those two highly important areas
that you just described, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. In 2021, several Marine
Corps flight students accused some of their instructors of
sexual harassment and immediately started to receive
substandard performance evaluations.
They were pulled out of flight training. They had to wait
nearly 2 years, and sometime after their allegations had
already been substantiated, before they were cleared to return
to the flight school. These were incredibly accomplished and
dedicated women who chose to serve their country in the
marines.
After being sexually harassed, they were placed in limbo
for years and told to expect separation. I am glad that they
are now back in the cockpit. But what lessons has the Marine
Corps learned about how to handle sexual harassment retaliation
claims in the future?
General Smith. Senator, sexual harassment--sexual assault
is a crime, period, all stop. If confirmed, I am committed to
working with you and members of this Committee to make sure
that the standard, which they should expect, is that anyone who
shows up to flight training, regardless of who they are,
receives the exact same syllabus and the same opportunities to
earn their wings and gold. I am committed to that, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. One of the critical aspects of Force
Design 2030 is wargaming, and these exercises led you to change
the size and functionality of your infantry battalions. As you
continue to work out what does or what does or does not work
best, how can Congress help you and the other Joint Chiefs
rapidly modernize our force to ensure that we are prepared to
face our next military challenge?
General Smith. Senator, our wargaming and analysis team at
Quantico did in fact--in artillery terms, we always shoot the
first round long. You want it past the target, so it
illuminates the target. So, we did that. After three different
experiments from three different battalions in three different
divisions, we came back and changed the number of the infantry
battalion back higher.
We also made sure we manned that battalion in the 96, 97,
98 percentiles of manned rate. So, we will continue to innovate
with that and make sure that we stay up and ahead of the
patient threat. I think the authorities we have been given in
terms of personnel management from Congress have been
extraordinary, and I believe we have what we need.
If confirmed, ma'am, I am committed to maximizing all those
tools already provided to us by this Committee and by Congress.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very
much, General Smith, for being here today. Congratulations on
your nomination, and to your family as well. Thank you for your
service and support.
Truly takes an extraordinary family to get this far, so
thank you very much. I would like to dive back into the
amphibious ship requirement because there has been a lot of
debate. It has already been raised by a number of my colleagues
here today.
But, General, how does that requirement square, the
requirement of 31, how does that square with assumptions about
building the force for denied environments against enemies
sensor and strike capabilities? Because there is some behind
the scenes debate about the class of amphibs and survivability
in those denied environments. Can you walk us through that,
please, and what those requirements mean?
General Smith. Senator, I can. First, survivability is
never binary. Things are made more survivable, if, more
survivable, when. As a quick example, no aircraft is inherently
survivable alone because the enemy makes anti-aircraft
missiles. No ship is inherently survivable alone because there
are torpedoes and strike missiles. Infantrymen are not immune
from machine gunfire.
So, the totality of the Joint Force moves an asset and
protects an asset. So, when those capabilities that we have
discussed in our various office calls, ma'am, our ground air
task oriented radar, our long range strike capabilities, when
those are asked for by combatant commanders and sought out by
operational commanders, they must get to the fight. Those
amphibious warships, get them to the fight.
They are there initially, and they also assist us in the
logistics challenge. Because they carry 15 to 30 days of
sustainment, if you do not have that initial sustainment
upfront, then the logistics challenge gets harder.
If a fleet commander, or Joint Force commander more
importantly, decides that those assets are key, that Joint
Force commander will protect those assets with the plethora of
tools that they have at their disposal.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that, General, because
what I want to see, and what I want to make sure that we are
doing is authorizing what you need and so that you have it when
you need it. What we have seen in the past, and I will give a
very upfront example, the littoral combat ship.
We commissioned a number of those a number of years ago,
and some of those have only been commissioned for five to 6
years and they are already on a list to be decommissioned.
So, what I want to make sure is that we are actually
procuring what you need, and that it will stay in our inventory
for years to come, and that we are not spending millions and
billions of dollars on something that we think you need, and
you are going to turn around and say, no, we do not need that
in two, 3 years.
Senator Ernst. Senator, thank you, and what we need is
what's been provided by Congress, which is a minimum of 31 L-
class ships, 10 big decks, those are helicopter jet carriers,
and 21 LPDs at a minimum.
Those must be in a ready State because marines are in a
ready State, and crises never wait for you to finish repairs or
finish training before you go. We need those 31 at a minimum.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that, General, and I
am going to dive into our Special Operations Command and your
Marine Raiders. There is--and this, you know, falls a little
bit outside maybe of your day to day management. But Force
Design 2030 calls for a smaller footprint, better signature
management and maneuver deception and tempo on the battlefield.
So, General, how does the Marine Corps Special Operations
Command fit into your thinking about littoral operations?
General Smith. Senator, the some, just under 3,000 Marine
special operators who are out there in MARSOC, Marine Special
Operations Command, led by Major General Challenger, have been
instrumental in assisting us with experimentation. When we talk
about experimentation, what we mean by that, Senator, is when
they are already forward deployed, they have been given asks
and tasks by Marine Corps Warfighting Lab while executing their
mission. Try this, test this--they give us real world
operational feedback. They are doing that every time they
deploy teams around the world, and they have been extremely
helpful. If I am confirmed, I am committed to continuing that
with MARSOC.
Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate it. I just want to
bring this up yet once again. As we are looking at a
constrained budgetary environment, as we are moving forward, we
may be asking our forces to downsize. I think it is incredibly
important that we recognize the role that our marines play,
that MARSOC plays, and that we are very careful not to undercut
the defense of our Nation in this constrained environment. I
know, Chairman, that we will work and do all we can to support
our warfighter. So, thank you very much, General Smith, and
congratulations.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Manchin,
please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, General,
thank you so much for your service, and your son, and your
family's dedication to our country. I appreciate it. I very
much appreciated our conversation yesterday, and we were
talking, I think, and I think I told you that in my lifetime,
going clear back to the Vietnam War, watching, being involved
very carefully, this is the only just war I have seen us
involved with for the right purpose is Ukraine, supporting a
country that is willing to fight and die for their freedom, if
you will, and democracy that they cherish. Can you tell me what
you have observed and learned basically from your people out
front, and that war has changed our perception of how we would
conduct ourselves?
General Smith. Thank you, Senator. The war in Ukraine has
taught us a few things, although I think the final lessons
learned are yet to be learned. But here is what we have
assessed thus far. As I said earlier, the individual fighting
spirit and willingness of an individual soldier, or in our case
Marine, is paramount on the battlefield. Always has been,
always will be. If you train and prepare a resilient, tough
warrior, they are very hard to kill. We have found that over
and over through history. Low signatures matter. If you are
observed on a modern battlefield, you will be targeted. You
have to have mobility and low signature. What has changed over
the last 15 or 20 years is that the ability of an adversary to
detect you has become almost off the shelf technology that
anybody can procure, even your lesser adversaries. Long range
fires absolutely matter. If you do not have the range to reach
an adversary, then you are of no real consequence on the
battlefield.
Senator Manchin. Are we restricting any of the concerns
that they have and the type of equipment they have asked for
and support?
General Smith. Senator, there is a very rigorous process.
the Presidential drawdown authority, which we are on number 41,
the Marine Corps is a part of that. So, we get an assessment of
what those tools asked for and then authorized, would do is
provided--would they change our Marine Corps readiness. So, we
are part of that process and always have a----
Senator Manchin. Do you think we are supplying--I mean, we
are supplying them what they need? I know the F-16, they keep
asking for. The fighters, they want long range missiles. They
are asking for those types of things. They think that would
help them in defending themselves but turning the war.
General Smith. Senator, I would not--as a nominee, I would
not speculate on what should or should not be provided under
Presidential drawdown authority. But I can commit to you, sir,
that if confirmed, any request that is made, we will give that
a thorough vetting on part of the Marine Corps to ensure that
those resources that are required are provided.
Senator Manchin. Also, we talked a little bit about
basically how we treat our soldiers, and we leave no one
behind, and the families. Compared to the Russians, what they
have done, what we have heard, the atrocities going on and
bodies not even being returned so there can be reparation, or
basically any payments or any support to the families. Have you
found that to be accurate?
General Smith. Senator, the--what I can say is, what we
provide, as we always take everyone off the battlefield or
continue looking until we do, we treat our families well, and
for those who have sacrificed everything, we care for those
families. That is not true of the Russians. I would not want
anyone to compare them to us because we are not in the same zip
code.
Senator Manchin. Can you also just speak briefly on what
cost savings would be to the branches of military, and of
course, what you oversee is our marines, if we did our--and got
our work done on time and got our budget done by September
30th, and you had a guaranteed budget, number to work with,
versus a C.R. Can you tell us the cost savings there?
General Smith. Senator, I think our rough math is
approximately 4 of the last 10 years total time has been spent
in a continuing resolution status. Whether that savings is 5 or
10 percent, I do not have an exact number, but I can tell you
that when all your funding comes in four or 5 months out of a
year, it is impossible to spend it smoothly, correctly.
Manufacturers can not absorb that. The defense industrial base
struggles, and I think that is actually where most of our waste
will come from.
Senator Manchin. I thought you had it figured out. The
American Enterprise Institute threw out a rough estimate of
$200 million per day, per day under the latest continuing
resolution that covered the start of the Fiscal Year 2023. That
is a total of $18 billion. That is real money.
General Smith. Sir, that is real money.
Senator Manchin. We better do your job, guys. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Next up, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to
see you. I appreciated the office call. I want to thank your
family sitting behind you. I appreciated your comments about
your family's sacrifice. It is really important to remember
that. I heard you had to straighten out Captain Smith's tie
this morning.
So, I know as a father and Commandant, you had a duty to do
that. More seriously, you have not only served your country
with distinction, you have bled for your country. Not many four
star generals in the U.S. military can say that, so very much
appreciate that.
General, on April 18th, the Commandant, along with
Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, appeared before this Committee,
and yet this Committee is still waiting for responses to
questions for the record. I had 75 QFRs on many of the issues
today. These would have better informed our questions for you
today.
I understand OSD is still reviewing this, but it is
disappointing for anyone watching from OSD that it takes 2
months to get responses to this Committee on critical issues,
particularly as they are going through the nomination period of
members of the Joint Chiefs. That is not your area, but it is
something they need to do a better job on.
This morning, I sent a letter to the Secretary of the Navy,
a bipartisan letter. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this
for the record.
Senator Kaine. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Sullivan. Fourteen U.S. Senators on this Committee
is about two-thirds of the Committee. Many of the Ranking
Members and Chairman of the Subcommittees on Seapower and
Readiness.
That gives the Secretary of the Navy and the Department of
Navy a clear indication of how this Committee feels about the
Department's failure to meet the 31 amphibs ship requirement.
You have already spoken about this a lot. You can see the
Committee cares about it. I commend General Berger for sitting
next to the SECNAV 2 months ago saying 31 amphibs is the
requirement.
So, can you expound again, General, because this is really
important, how critical to the Marine Corps mission is having a
minimum of 31 amphibs? There has been a couple of stories in
the press the last couple of months on the 31st MIU having the
marines, but not the ships, to deploy.
Maybe you can talk about some real world examples like
Sudan, where we had marines but not ships to potentially save
Americans. How critical is it to that mission? Do you fully
support, in your personal opinion, the need for 31 amphibs as a
minimum?
General Smith. Senator, thank you. Yes, sir, 31 is the
minimum, and that 31 is ready ships, able to deploy. The key--
--
Senator Sullivan. By the way, on that point, the Commandant
in testimony last year, I believe, talked about amphibs, have a
33 percent readiness rate in terms of maintenance in the fleet.
So, if you have 31, you divide that by two-thirds and you get
the number of ships available. Can you comment on that as well?
General Smith. Senator, again, ready ships. I mean, a ship
that is ready to receive and train with marines. As you know,
sir, you do not simply deploy. You prepare to deploy for
months.
As I said earlier, a young lance corporal who is operating
their amphibious combat vehicle in an a wet well at night in
three foot seas, they should not do that the first time on
their way to a fight.
We have to have those amphibious warships to train with and
to not just deploy, but to remain deployed.
Senator Sullivan. So, can the Marine Corps do its global
response mission without 31 amphibs, in your personal opinion?
General Smith. No, sir, we cannot.
Senator Sullivan. Will Marine Corps Force Design be a
success or failure without 31 amphibs at a minimum, in your
personal opinion?
General Smith. So, yes, sir. Force Design will continue
because it will make us more ready to deal with peer threats.
But, sir, those 31 amphibious warships are a part of it, an
absolutely vital part. Just as long range fire and signature
communications are. But those 31 amphibious warships, sir, are
vital for the Marine Corps, and more importantly, sir, for the
Nation. They are a national asset.
Senator Sullivan. Just for the record, Mr. Chairman, both
chairmen, the letter that we submitted, as you know, Chairman
Kaine, makes it so the Secretary of the Navy 2 months ago
committed to come back to this Committee with a plan to get to
31 amphibs and follow the law. That is what this letter is
asking him to do soon.
But I think, General, your testimony is helpful in terms of
just how important that is to the Marine Corps' overall
mission. But to your point, the National Security of our
Nation. Do you believe it is broader than just the Marine
Corps' mission?
General Smith. Sir. It is my personal and professional
opinion, it is broader than the Marine Corps. It is a national
asset that is the true Swiss Army knife of the Nation, and it
must be kept forward. It is a national asset. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator
Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
General, for being here today. Thank you to your family. I want
to join you in thanking General Berger for his service, which
has been extraordinary in a difficult and challenging time.
You will meet the same kinds of challenges and
difficulties. One of them, no doubt will be recruitment. The
Marine Corps has been an exception in meeting its recruiting
goals. You and I discussed this issue when we met, and I know
how focused you are on female recruitment. I wonder if you
could talk a little bit about female recruitment as a priority
for you.
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, what I can tell you
is I am committed to any individual who is qualified and who
wants to attempt to be a marine, we want you to do that. We
need access to 100 percent of American talent.
We have to have access to everyone. As marines, we do not
care who--where you come from. What we care about is you, the
individual. We care deeply about each individual having the
same exact opportunity, male or female.
I am committed to making sure, if confirmed, that we
continue to offer that opportunity, to offer young people the
chance to challenge themselves, to see if they have the metal
to be a Marine.
Senator Blumenthal. Female or male.
General Smith. Female or male, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. I was impressed as well by your
conversation about the feedback loop, so to speak, and in
particular about how we all, you and I in particular, can learn
from our children. I am not going to reveal the contents of our
conversation in the presence of your children, but I know how
proud you are of them and how closely you listen to others.
I know that one of the aspects of the force design that is
most important has been the campaign, the campaign of learning,
COL, which provides the kind of analytic underpinning so that
the Marine Corps learns as it implements and adjusts to the
feedback that it receives from the folks on the ground, the
marines who are actually affected in real time.
I think that listening is tremendously important. I wonder
if you could talk a little bit about that approach to
leadership, because I think it informs much of your future
leadership as commandant.
General Smith. Senator, thank you, and if confirmed, I am
committed to that campaign of learning because it is vital. The
way we do it is, in fact, just basic leadership. It is kneecap
to kneecap, face to face leadership so that a young lance
corporal feels comfortable saying, hey, sir, ma'am, this did
not work. I have a better idea.
You see this in a well-oiled CH-53 crew, for example. The
pilot may be flying, but the crew chief is in charge in the
back, and they will often offer harsh feedback. We do that in
the ready rooms. We do that around terrain models before and
after an exercise. We have that going at the lowest level,
lance corporal through sergeants, lieutenant colonels, all the
way up to the marines.
As you know, sir, they are not shy about providing harsh
feedback. Thanks for not revealing the conversation, because
one of my harshest critics is sitting over my left shoulder, I
think, and I get a lot of straight feedback on many things.
Senator Blumenthal. That is a good thing.
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, I know how sensitive
you are to the quality of life of your marines. What are the
needs to improve housing, day care, health care? Is that an
area where you intend to focus?
General Smith. If confirmed, I will focus on that. I will
tell you, sir, the saying is you recruit the marine, but you
retain the family.
If you do not take care of marines, and that is a
warfighting function, take care of their families, they can not
focus on the mission at hand. So, barracks, chow halls, gyms to
stay fit to be ready to fight, housing, spousal employment.
Those are key to keeping marines, and I would argue that
those are truly warfighting needs, because if an individual
leaves because of the family needs not being met, you will have
to recruit a new Marine and you can not replace 12 years. I
always say time is a gift you cannot give the adversary. They
are vital to warfighting.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I agree with the chairman
that you are eminently qualified, and you have my support.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks,
General, for being here. Thanks for your service. Thanks for
your family. I am going to brag about you a little bit, being a
Texas A&M Aggie. I was there for a short period of time. I know
some of your family are Aggie fans, some are Longhorn fans. We
will not bring that up.
But I do not think many people here know that and
understand the importance of school like Texas A&M. Being there
for only a year just brings back patriotism, and many mornings
I was at 5 a.m. watching these cadets work out and watching the
band work out, which actually went through a tougher workout
than our football team did. But it really is patriotism at its
best.
So, congratulations on your nomination and look forward to
supporting you. You know, you said something as we talked
yesterday that resonated with me and it is the proper mentality
for a military leader. You said, the focus of the marines is
warfighting and lethality, as it should be. That focus is what
we need in our military right now more than anything else.
We live in a dangerous world, dangerous world, and I would
hope that some of your colleagues in the Pentagon would catch
on a little bit of that and get politics out of this. I mean,
politics is detrimental to a lot of things. It is good for
something, somethings it is not. Military, it is not. A
military focused on political agenda loses its effectiveness.
So, I was glad to hear you talk about, you know, the
enlisted men and women that do a great job, that are doing it
for the right reasons. You also discussed the Marine Corps had
changed its standards--have not changed the standards, and it
is a privilege to serve.
You said marines don't make a good product. They attract a
good product. What a statement. I mean, that is awesome, and I
can remember all the scenes back in the years growing up on TV
advertising about the marines--awesome.
But you foresee any challenges now that you are getting
ready to take over the reins as the head coach, or run this
organization which America is so proud of? Do you see any
changes that you would make in terms of recruiting the best
young men and women in this country?
General Smith. Senator, thank you for that. If confirmed, I
am committed to continuing that ethos, that legacy of
warfighting excellence, because as you mentioned, sir, we
attract people who want to be better. They want to return to
society as better citizens than they come in as.
So, I am committed to maintaining our high standards of
warfighting, lethality, global deployment, and making sure
that--our marines hymn says, we are first to fight for right
and honor, and to keep our honor clean. We keep our honor
clean, and that ethos and that moral integrity matters.
I think people understand that, and if they send their
children to attempt to become U.S. marines, you know, those
words have to ring true, and we will hold them true. I am
committed to that, sir.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you for that. I had the
opportunity to be on the USS Nassau back during the Iraq war as
coach. They put a couple of us on there to really see what life
was about--amazing. We were on the USS Nassau, and we had, I
think, 1,500 marines on that troop carrier.
I had the opportunity to walk around and talk to these
young men and women because they were getting ready to be
deployed that night at 3 a.m. on shore. I have never seen like
the organization, and I tell people, organization--I learned
this from some people worked with, organization is the key to
winning. I have never seen the evacuation of 1,500 troops in
such quick time.
Obviously it is dangerous, but it was awesome to see it,
and awesome to see men at work, the Navy personnel on the ship,
and of course, the marines going on shore. You know, we make up
a boat or a ship, you would call it--in Mobile, it is called
the TEFP transport.
Can you talk about its strengths, and what you think about
that, you know, in general? Tell me the truth. We make it in
Alabama. Tell me what you think about that as a Marine.
General Smith. Senator, the TEPF, the fast transport, I
have used it when I was the Commander of Marine forces in
Japan. It is just that, is a fast transport. Can move in the
25, 30 knot range.
Senator Tuberville. How many people is that?
General Smith. Several hundred depending on how it is
configured because it is configurable. It has got a well deck--
and not a well deck, pardon me. It has got a deck underneath
where you can haul significant amounts of equipment. It has got
a ramp so you can put long range fires, you can put personnel,
and you can move it really fast and really far.
Senator, if I can. I know it is your time, but because my
sergeant major would chastise me, sitting in front of this
Committee can be a little intimidating. I think I said honor
twice, in our Marine hymn, first to fight for right and
freedom, and to keep our honor clean. I might have said honor
twice, but that is never bad to say honor twice.
Senator Tuberville. Exactly. Thank you very much. Thank
you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Smith, to you
and your family, congratulations. I note that the marines are
doing relatively well in recruiting, and you have a son who is
a Marine recruiter.
I do not suggest causation, but there is a positive
correlation there that I just want to bring up. I want to
extend my thanks to General Berger, Commandant Berger, for his
long service. Let me associate my comments with those of others
about the anthem situation.
The Committee has been puzzled because when we have had
commandants, CNOs, and SECNAV before us, there is sort of an
unequivocal 31 amphips and they need to be ready, and yet we
often get budgetary documents or shipbuilding plans that
suggest, wait a minute, is this the policy or not?
I was proud to be on this letter with Senator Sullivan,
along with many of my colleagues. I have come to believe that
the issue is not lack of unanimity within the SECNAV, CNO, or
commandant. I think it is more within the OSD or White House,
and we need to kind of get to the bottom of that. But I
appreciate your unequivocal testimony on this. I want to ask
about Pacific posture.
One critique that I hear some raise about the Marine
current focus is that the marines are becoming so focused on
Pacific challenges, winning the Pacific fight, that in doing
so, it may be losing ability or degrading ability to be lethal
in CENTCOM and EUCOM. How would you respond to that concern,
General?
General Smith. Senator, thanks. I will give a quick
anecdote. Trying to be mindful of your time, sir. When I was a
lieutenant, I trained to fight against the Soviet motorized
rifle regiment. We continue to train even after the wall came
down, because that was the most stressing challenge, a peer
competitor.
When I went to Liberia and conducted a noncombatant
evacuation operation, and then later when I went in to conduct
counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I felt pretty well
trained because I had paced myself against the fastest runner.
Our commitment to the Pacific is driven by the National
Defense Strategy, but we are retaining those same capabilities
globally, and the things, the long range fires, low signature,
those are applicable in any battlefield, just as our Task Force
612 did in support of operations in EUCOM.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that. If confirmed, what
changes or adjustments would you want to see in terms of
mobility and logistics support in the Pacific theater?
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, the focus, the
pacing--we talk about China as the pacing challenge. We talk
about logistics as the pacing function. It is simply a matter
of time and resources. One must invest in the technology, the
innovation to be able to move assets, to pre-stage assets.
So, I am committed, if confirmed, to continuing that, and
there are some promising technologies which will take a little
bit of a burden off the joint logistics chain. One small thing,
Senator, when allies and partners are shooting the same
munitions, because we are truly interoperable, that takes a
significant load off. I think that is where we are headed,
because we have a lot of partners, a lot of friends, a lot of
allies in the Pacific and globally.
Senator Kaine. I do think that is the strategic value we
have that is unmatched and is not likely to be matched by any
of our adversaries. We have got people. We have got platforms,
second to none. But our ability to link arms with allies is
something that others can aspire to, but they are not likely to
reach.
On that topic, let me ask you about AUKUS. We are grappling
with this both on the Armed Services Committee, but also in the
Foreign Relations Committee because it deals with foreign
military sales. Much of the focus right now is on pillar one,
the ability to transfer Virginia class submarines and related
technology to Australia.
But this is just a precursor to a broader increased
presence in the forward deployment of both UK and U.S.
submarines to build stewardship in the region. If confirmed,
how do you see the Corps fitting in to the integrated
deterrence strategy that AUKUS is meant to advance?
General Smith. Senator, as you know, we keep, for about 6
months out of the year we keep a Marine Air Ground Task Force
in Darwin. The Australians are phenomenal partners. So that
force that is down there at the Southern end of the first
island chain is absolutely vital to security and to being
prepared to deter conflict and win, if required.
Recently, Marine F-35s and Marine CH-53s have communicated
with and resupplied U.S. submarines. When the transfer of
submarine technology happens and those Australian submarines
are out there, we will be able to do the same with them.
We are committed to being able to do the same with them,
and that is absolutely vital. Our contribution to AUKUS is
ensuring that those 2,500 marines continue to be good
Ambassadors, good warfighters to enhance that already
exceptional relationship with the Australians. That is all part
and parcel.
Senator Kaine. I appreciate it. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Budd,
please.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, thanks for
being here. I enjoyed our conversation office last week, and I
also want to thank your family for being here, and for your
time in North Carolina as well.
You know, in our discussion, we talked about an issue that
is top of mind, I am sure for you, and for many of us as
Americans, and that is the rising threat of China. So, if
confirmed, how do you see the Marine Corps contributing to the
Joint Force in competition and potential conflict in the Indo-
Pacific?
General Smith. Senator, I concur with you, and of course,
as does our National Defense Strategy, that China is the pacing
challenge. The Marine Corps keeps a Marine expeditionary force
forward in the Pacific. On any given day, there is 27,000
marines, roughly West of the International Dateline, several
thousand more in Hawaii ready to go.
Of course, our Forces in California are poised and focused
on the Indo-Pacific, as is required. The Marine Corps as an
expeditionary crisis response force is first to fight, and we
must stay forward. We call it standing forces. But those
marines are already forward.
We just have to ensure that they are best armed, best
equipped, best trained and organized to be able to deter and
change the trajectory of an adversary action before it becomes
a full blown crisis. That is who we are, what we do, and being
forward with our allies and partners has immeasurable value. My
time in the Pacific, and I assume my son's time in the Pacific
for him, taught me that.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Now, there is no doubt that the
Marine Corps will play a critical role for the Joint Force, but
can you talk specifically about how force design is both threat
informed and budget conscious?
General Smith. So, sir, I would say on the first part, it
is threat informed in that the deep analysis that has gone into
what our adversaries globally can do. China is the pacing
challenge. Russia is the acute threat, and then, of course,
violent extremism in Iran and North Korea. What capabilities do
they have and how do we need to thwart them? It is completely
threat informed and it moves daily through our intelligence
estimates.
Then as far as the budgets, sir, you know, if confirmed, I
am responsible or would be responsible for balancing the marine
air ground task force, families, munitions, housing, training,
all of that. But force design was not a budgetary driven
process. It was what do we need and what things are less
important in the fight that we think is coming. So, let's focus
on the things that are most important.
As you know, sir, we have done some self-funding to be good
stewards of the tax money, but that funding, self-funding, we
have maxed that out, if you will, and we will seek support. If
confirmed, I will seek support where required, and I will never
be shy about telling you what our young marines need to have an
unfair fight in the Pacific or globally.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. Since both of us have
family members serving as marines, I was glad to hear you say
that you do not ever want them in a fair fight. It seems like
force design is intended to make sure any future fight is
definitely in our favor. That being said, there is still
considerable criticism of the Marine Corps' modernization
efforts.
One of the things that stuck from our conversations that
you said, it is not about being right, it is about winning. So,
I agree with you, and I am hoping you will commit to continue
rapid and smart, intelligent experimentation, and reversing
course when something does not work. General, will you commit
to that?
General Smith. Senator, absolutely. When that data becomes
available, as we have done and made modifications, because as I
said, sir, I am committed to that because I want to win.
Senator Budd. Some of the other issues that would be
critical to any future fight in the Indo-Pacific is the need to
work with our allies and with our partners. You alluded to that
earlier, but how is the Marine Corps currently partnering and
training with allies in the region? Where and how can we be
doing more or better as a partner?
General Smith. Senator, your marines--in the Pacific and
globally. We are in Honduras. We are working in parts of
Africa. We are in Djibouti. We are up in the high North with
Norway. We are also in the Pacific, in Thailand, the
Philippines, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Australia. We are
globally present.
The way that we maintain that global presence in many cases
is to be forward with our amphibious warships, because those
warships bring with them helicopters, jets, long range fires,
all in one package. Often when those exercises begin and end on
certain days, you can not afford to have seven different
methods to have pieces arrive piece parts.
We have to show up as a Marine air ground task force. So, I
think your support for those amphibious warships is vital. If
confirmed, I will continue to work to earn that support.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General, and thank your family as
well. I yield back, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome to
the Committee and congratulations on your nomination. A couple
of quick questions. First, you are the first general officer I
have seen before the Committee who has grasped aggressively the
potential of 3D printing, which basically can shorten the
supply chain from a thousand miles to about ten feet.
I hope what you will do to make that a reality is to insist
that the people in procurement procure the intellectual
property as well as the hardware. Is that something that you
are going to be attending to?
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, I am 100 percent
committed to intellectual property and technical data rights.
They are vital.
Senator King. Good. Because without it, you can not print
the part that you need that will hold the whole operation up.
General Smith. Senator, correct.
Senator King. Another brief question. You are not only
being confirmed as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you will be
a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and giving advice to the
President of United States, best military advice.
Will you commit to us that you will indeed stare the
President of the eye when necessary and give that best military
advice, even though it may be contrary to the wishes or the
policy direction of the President?
That is a tough position in the Oval Office, when the
President says, come on, General, get on the team. Are you
willing to be straight forward with your best military advice
regardless of the circumstances?
General Smith. Senator, I am. Always have been.
Senator King. Thank you. As you know, there has been an
effort or there is an effort to hold up to the approval, the
confirmation of all general officers. Is that having an effect
not only on the general officers, but down the line on other
people who are waiting in line for promotion and filling in of
vacant seats?
General Smith. Senator, it will have an effect. I have put
my focus on our most junior marines first. We are taught
leaders eat last, and so, when a general is not a colonel who
has been selected for general, for example, he is not
confirmed--I am also capped at the number of colonels I can
have.
So, there is a lieutenant colonel out there who cannot be
promoted. While those numbers may be small, word will get out,
and that is detrimental for those young lieutenant colonels,
because that is about how far down it will eventually ripple,
sir.
Senator King. Would you say that this consistent blocking
of these nominations is compromising National Security?
General Smith. Sir, I think it certainly compromises our
ability to be most ready. I will give you one short example,
sir. Marine Expeditionary Force, our largest one, has about
48,000 marines in it. There are supposed to be a three star and
a one star in charge of that formation.
The ones star are focused on the Marine Expeditionary
Units, which remain our crown jewel. When the three star soon
retires, and he will of for a variety of reasons, he has served
honorably and well and has endured some family tragedy, he will
retire. When he does so, there will be a one star, fairly new
one, in charge of that 48,000 person Marine expeditionary
force.
Senator King. That compromises readiness and decisionmaking
and the effectiveness of that division.
General Smith. Sir, it does.
Senator King. Thank you. I think you have answered this
several times. But as you know, there is criticism of FD 2030.
One of the fundamental criticisms is that it converts the
marines from essentially an offensive capable force to a
defensive force. How do you respond to that criticism?
General Smith. Yes, sir. Our ethos is offensive. We are
first to fight. There is a saying that nobody likes to fight,
but somebody has to know how. It is actually not true of your
marines. We are an offensively minded force. Defense is a
part--conduct that as well, but our systems are joined, are
designed to enable the Marine Corps and the Joint and Allied
Force.
We are marines, we want to win. I am less concerned about
who puts the warhead downrange than that the warhead goes
downrange. That is an offensive mindset. We teach that from
boot camp on. We are still teaching knife fighting and bayonet
fighting. We have not changed that ethos.
Senator King. There have been some examples, though,
recently. In February, my understanding is the marines were
unable to meet a European Command request to surge an MEU to
the Mediterranean. It took a month before the marines left
North Carolina. That is one example.
Turkey again embarked marines were not there at the time of
the emergency. Two months later, Special Forces were evacuating
citizens from Sudan, not the marines. Are those indications of
limitations in the FD 2030 and the philosophy, or are they just
sui generis, not typical of Marine Corps readiness to respond?
General Smith. Sir, in instances you describe, we had
marines ready to go. We do not have the amphibious warships to
be forward. Those warships are vital. That is who we are. We
are a naval force as well as a Joint Force. But we have
marines, but we must have the ships to be forward deployed for
those instances that you describe, Senator.
Senator King. I was not intending to ask about amphibs
because everybody else has. But you just made the point that
without that capability, you can have the marines, but you do
not have the ability to get them there.
I guess finally, and I think you have touched upon this, FD
2030 is a big vision and a big change, and I hope that you are
willing to continuously review the effectiveness and the impact
upon readiness and the mission of the marines so that if there
are course corrections necessary, you will step up and make
them.
General Smith. Senator, I am 100 percent committed to that.
Any time there is data that says we need to change to be more
modern, more lethal, more ready, I am in favor of that, and I
am committed to change wherever change is required.
Senator King. Thank you, General. Appreciate your service.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. General, first off, thanks for--thanks for
your service. Thanks for--and I want to thank you for your
sacrifice, you and your family. You did a great job, by the
way. Can you just talk about the importance of Force Design
2030 and what challenges you are having to implement it?
General Smith. Senator, Force Design 2030 is our
modernization effort to move from 15 or so years of being
focused on counterinsurgencies, to being ready for the next
fight before the next fight happens, as opposed to waiting for
the fight and then modernizing on the fly.
Where we are currently is making rapid progress, but we are
never satisfied. Senator, we are marines. We want to go faster.
As the fight tonight force, I am ready, but I want to be more
ready. I want to be more ready every single day that I can.
That is our mission.
So, force design will make us more lethal, more agile, and
more able to be first to fight, getting down to our fighting
weight, as we say, because over 15 years we have gotten a
little bit heavy and reliant on logistics, which were very
stable. That will not be the case in a State on State conflict,
Senator.
Senator Scott. What challenges do you have to get there?
General Smith. Senator, I think the challenges that we have
will involve steady funding. We have to make sure that we stay
on track, and the other piece that is important to us and will
be a challenge is ensuring, which if confirmed I am committed
to, that we retain our fight tonight global crisis response
force while simultaneously modernizing. That is a wicked hard
task, as I say, Senator. But if confirmed, I am committed to
doing both because I think the American people require and
demand us to do both.
Senator Scott. So, can you talk about your recruiting?
You--as you know, the military has had some struggles on
recruiting, but you have not. The Marine Corps is doing a good
job. So, what are you doing this working and what can you do
better? You probably do not want to give advice to other
branches, so I will not ask you to do that. So why don't you
just talk about what you are doing and why it is working.
General Smith. Well, Senator, on that last point, we
actually--I think we are all part of a Joint Force. I was,
``birthed under Goldwater-Nichols 1986.'' I started in 1987, so
I do not know anything else but joint.
If you were to go to one of the local recruiting stations
where the joint service was all there, if an applicant comes in
and wants to do something that maybe can not meet that
qualification, that recruiter will take him or her to another
service. They do it all the time. It is a joint fight.
What we are doing, sir, is it starts with, in my opinion
and professional assessment, you must put your best and most
fully qualified out there as recruiters. Almost 70 percent of
our contracts come from face to face contact.
A young person, seasoned Marine says, I want to be that.
You have to make sure that that person who they wish to emulate
is the best you have to offer, and that you reward that
individual with a duty station preference or a promotion, and
then you hold the standard and make sure everybody knows that,
as we often say, we did not join you, you joined us. These are
our standards.
If you wish to become a Marine, step up and take the
challenge. There is lots of young people who want that
challenge. We are open to giving it to every single one of them
who wants to try.
Senator Scott. Thanks. So, you probably do not want to say
that the Biden budget is not sufficient. But if you had
additional resources, what would you want them for, on top of
what was requested?
General Smith. Senator, any additional funding that we
would theoretically receive from Congress, if confirmed, I am
committed to putting that to things that we are already doing,
accelerating being more lethal, accelerating being even more
ready, and obviously toward ensuring that our organic mobility,
naval amphibious warships, CH-53K helicopters, that our
platforms are even more ready than they are.
But mostly toward accelerating what we are doing because we
do not know when the fight starts, so we must assume it starts
when the sun goes down tonight.
Senator Scott. So how important is it that, take Taiwan as
an example, and they get all the military equipment that they
have ordered and not received. How important is that to you and
your ultimate ability to make sure you can help make sure China
does not take over Taiwan?
General Smith. Senator, what I can say is that I have dealt
quite a bit with foreign military sales during my time. Any
time one of your friends, allies, or partner is better armed
and better prepared, as we see in the Ukraine, that is a good
thing for us because that is a more ready partner, is a more
able partner.
When crisis comes, you do not have time to begin to
interoperate. You must be interoperable before the crisis
starts. If confirmed, I am committed to doing all I can to make
sure that foreign military sales process is smooth.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you for what you do.
General Smith. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To ensure the
fitness of all of the nominees who come before any of the
Committee's, I ask the following two foundational questions.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
General Smith. No, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a treatment--settlement, rather, related to this kind of
conduct?
General Smith. No, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Congratulations, General, on your
nomination, and of course, I join my colleagues in thanking
General Berger for his years of outstanding service and
leadership. I want to ask you about--well, I also join my
colleagues in expressing our support for 31 amphib ships for
you, and we do not--we do need to get to why, after everyone
agrees that this is a good idea, and Senator Sullivan there led
the charge in the latest effort to focus our attention on that
need for 31 amphibs, so you will continue to pursue that, in
terms of your readiness.
The transition of marines off Okinawa and to more dispersed
locations, including to Hawaii--we already have some of our
marines in Hawaii, but has been ongoing for a long time, and to
basically move people out of--our marines out of--and they--I
do not quite know how we are proceeding with building up in
Kaneohe, but I hope that is proceeding after such a long time.
In the meantime, our alliance with Japan has gotten stronger
and a new Marine Toro regiment like the one already in Hawaii
will be stood up in Okinawa.
General, how has the posture's change planned under the
Defense Policy Review Initiative made the Marine Corps stronger
in the Pacific?
General Smith. Thank you, ma'am. That DPRI, as it is known,
the relocation ensures that we have strategic depth across the
Pacific, from Japan, specifically the Southern Ryukyus. Then,
of course, Iwakuni in the home islands, down through Guam and
back to Hawaii. That gives us some depth and reach across the
first island chain.
That 12th Marine Littoral Regiment that you described, that
was a very significant move. We are very grateful for our own
State Department and the Government of Japan for allowing that
to stay when it was designed to go somewhere else. That is very
significant, and I think it speaks to the need for those kind
of rapidly deployable long range fires units.
Senator Hirono. So, the ability for the Marine Corps to do
its mission in the Pacific, in my view, is predicated on
something as basic as a strong infrastructure at our major
installations like those in Hawaii and Guam, as well as
smaller, dispersed locations throughout the region.
Yet, as you have testified previously, our infrastructure
is not where it needs to be. If confirmed, how will you
prioritize the foundational elements of readiness like water
and electricity at our installations?
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, a priority, and a
deep priority, is that infrastructure. Those bases and stations
are power projection platforms in a modern fight. They are not
simply bases where we live. It is a power projection platform,
and the power they are projecting is the people who live on
them and their families.
They must be cared for and retained. You only do that
through quality housing. You do that through child development
centers. You do that through water treatment facilities. I am
committed to those, if confirmed.
Senator Hirono. Well, the thing is that those are
priorities that have been articulated, and yet when we look at
the requests, those priorities are not particularly reflected.
So, one of the areas that I am very much focusing on, and
the Readiness Committee is our infrastructure, and I will look
to you for articulation and actual funding that will be
reflected, because we can not have our water pipes leaking and
the electricity going off and our major hospitals in the
Pacific.
All of that, and I am sure you too are familiar with what
is going on at Red Hill and the need for billions of dollars to
safely remove the 100 million gallons of fuel that is there.
So, I am really looking for a plan, particularly for the Indo-
Pacific AOR that will reflect a commitment to strong
infrastructure and not constantly wait until things break down
for us to pay attention. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Schmitt,
please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you,
General Smith. Appreciate our conversations. Nice to see your
family here. Should be very proud and thank you for your
service. As you know, as we talked about, your nomination comes
at a time where Communist China means business, and I think
that threat has reached critical levels.
Also comes at a time where the Marine Corps is at a
crossroads as far as the force design 2030 priorities. You have
been asked a lot of these--I am not going to repeat because
Senator Scott must have stolen my notes because he asked almost
the exact questions I wanted to ask you.
But as far as, you know, platforms that are most critical
for that force design 2030, where do you feel like we are at?
You know, how can we be most helpful in making sure the Marine
Corps is positioned?
Because I think that obviously as our attention, more and
more focus to the West and the Indo-Pacific theater, the Marine
Corps has to play a very important role. So, what is it that
you need by way of weapons systems?
General Smith. Sir, in terms of weapon systems, it is our
long range strike, and that is things such as, Senator, naval
strike missile. It is our aviation ordnance that is being
delivered from F-35 platforms and currently F-18s. Those
munitions and those systems are absolutely vital. Our Marine
air defense systems. We call it MRIC, medium range intercept
capability. Absolutely vital, sir.
If confirmed, I am committed to continuing those programs,
and to your point, sir, mobility, organic. Meaning things, the
Marine Corps has direct control over. That mobility, be it KC-
130 transport refueler aircraft, CH-53K heavy haul helicopters,
and, most importantly, amphibious warships.
Those are all part of the spectrum of organic mobility that
enables marines to be first to fight. We absolutely must have
that to best support the Joint Force and the Nation.
Senator Schmitt. I know that, again Senator Scott asked us
a similar question, how do you feel like we are--where are we
at with this? Your honest assessment of where we are at and
opportunities and challenges moving forward to reach the goal.
General Smith. Sir, we are in a good place, but we are
never satisfied. I mean, that is our goal as marines. As a
short example, sir, our CH-53K. It reached initial operating
capability. Just did its first full list of 36,000 pounds and
had 22 percent power left. That is unheard of. That has
happened. We have demonstrated naval strike missile repeatedly
in the Pacific. That is there. The 3d Littoral Regiment stood
up there.
Our MQ9 Alpha extended range ISR platform that is an aerial
gateway to close kill chains for us and the Joint Force, it is
there. We have been using it in Central Command, moving into
the Pacific. Those things are there.
We need to accelerate them to make us most lethal, because
we are never satisfied, sir, that we move fast enough. There is
always--just like on a three mile run that we do, sir, you can
always squeak out another 5 or 10 seconds on your physical
fitness test if you really want it.
Senator Schmitt. Well, that kind of leads, it is a great
Segway, to your success on recruiting. I know you mentioned
having, you know, you best advocates and recruiters out in
front, and those are how those connections are made. You know,
what else would you attribute that to?
Because I think that we have had this discussion in this
Committee among ourselves and with other folks who sit before
us. This is a big challenge, right? We see sort of a declining
pool. Is it just that? Is it the expectation that you are
creating that we have a very, very high standard and we want
you to, you know, join us but we have great expectations? I
mean, what else is it other than having those, you know, sort
of the best and the brightest in front of the recruits?
General Smith. Senator, it is incredibly hard work on
behalf of our recruiting command. It does not come without the
resources to advertise, to offer the opportunity to become a
U.S. marine to those young people that are out there, high
schools, college graduates.
So, it is not without the basics of best facilities, best
recruiting literature, best advertising. That is important. But
it starts and ends with people, sir. It really is an ethos that
we can not fail. marines do not fail. We--and we tend to not
attract people who are sort of interested in the service. They
are going to be committed and we are going to make them better
if they show up.
We are committed and we expect you to be committed, and we
are not going to change that, sir. Our recruiters do not fail.
They are working incredibly hard out there Senator, and they
deserve our gratitude.
One thing, if I may, Senator, the ability to--if confirmed,
I would seek additional help with this Committee to ensure that
we do have access to all the high schools to simply offer an
opportunity. If students do not want it, that is fine, but we
want to make sure we offer that because we offer some of the
best opportunities this country has.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thanks for your service.
General Smith. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations,
General Smith. It is nice to see you here and have your family
here. So, our greatest strength as a nation is our people. It
is clear that you have a strong record of making sure that
marines have the support they need. You made that very clear in
our conversations, but it's clear in your record, and one of
the ways we communicate our priorities as a Nation is through
our budget.
So, General Smith, do you agree that your priority should
be reflected in the budget you submit to Congress?
General Smith. Senator, absolutely.
Senator Warren. Good. Other parts of the Federal
Government--unlike other parts of the Federal Government, the
military services and combatant commands lobbied Congress by
sending a second request for billions of dollars on top of
their annual budgets. They call them unfunded priorities.
I call them wish lists. Under the recent budget agreement,
every other part of Government is being asked to do more with
less. As we discussed in our visit to my office, these wish
lists are used to game the process and have included essential
items like spare parts that clearly should have been in the
base budget request.
Last year, the Army included funding for military housing
in its wish list instead of its base budget. Now people are our
strength, then programs that support them should not be
relegated to the wish list. General Smith, if you are
confirmed, it will be your job to advocate for your budget
priorities and decide what is going to make it onto your wish
list.
Will you commit to not including funding for programs that
support service members and their families in your unfunded
priorities list, and instead to put those costs into your base
budget?
General Smith. Senator, I am committed to making sure, if
confirmed, that our priorities of people are in fact reflected
in our budget. What I would offer, ma'am, is in rare
circumstances, for example, a hurricane just hit Guam--that was
certainly not something we anticipated months ago when the
budget was submitted.
To simply seeking counsel and guidance from this Committee
and our civilian oversight to ensure those families are still
taken care of, irrespective of the exact timeline.
Senator Warren. As you know, we have procedures for dealing
with emergencies that have come up since the time the budget
has been submitted. But I think it is really important that we
back away from this very damaging practice.
I have a bipartisan bill with Senator King, Senator Lee,
and Senator Braun in which the Department of Defense supports
to eliminate the statutory requirement to produce these annual
wish lists. We can not expect the American people to continue
to support huge budgets if we can not even implement this kind
of basic reform and discipline into the system. So, that is one
issue I wanted to raise, but I want to raise one more.
I do not have a lot of time left, but I want to touch on
the impact the across the board holds on military nominations
have on our National Security. Secretary Austin sent me a
letter that said, ``the longer that this hold persists, the
greater the risk the U.S. military runs in every theater, every
domain, and every service.''
But you touched on another part of this in your testimony
last month, noting that 45,000 marines are going to be without
a three star commander. Those who support these holds say that
all we are talking about is holds on something that impacts
senior officers and only senior officers will be affected, and
so that is all right.
General Smith, can you just speak for a minute about what
the downstream effects that you see are, and what it means if
these holds continue?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am. To your point, as I referenced a
little bit earlier, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 3d
Marine Expeditionary Force, 2d Marine Expeditionary Force, our
warfighters forward should have a three star and a one star.
In the cases where those commanders will retire after
almost 40 years of service, that will leave a one star in
charge. It is not that those one stars are not capable. But I
have been doing this for 36 years. So, as I walk a flight line
or as I walk a firing range or as I walk through a barracks,
there is a high likelihood there is not much I have not seen,
and I can fix things before they get started.
That experience, that leadership that comes only with
experience is vital because it is about not getting yourself
into a bad position, not making the decision that a more junior
officer might make, that then has subsequent second and third
order effects, which do in fact lead to readiness, which our
readiness is National Security.
Senator Warren. In other words, I am hearing you say that
these holes affect not just those people who are identified as
having their promotions held up, but they affect the entire
operation. Is that right?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. General Smith, welcome and thank you for
your lifetime of service and your families' service and
sacrifice as well. Congratulations on your nomination. On force
design 2030, I feel that we have reached the point that the
former chairman of the Committee, John McCain, used to say, the
Senate often reaches where everything has been said, but not
everyone has said it.
However, I won't repeat everything I have said. I will
raise one aspect of it, though. General Berger's force design
has stirred up quite a hornet's nest among a lot of your
retired flag officer counterparts, some of whom I know served
with you and were your mentors.
Could you explain a little bit why you think some of these
retired general officers are so opposed to what General Berger
has proposed and what he has done, and what steps you might
take, if confirmed, to help mend fences?
General Smith. Senator, I would never want to speak for
anyone else. I am not a believer in proxy votes, if you will,
so I would never speak for another. What I can tell you, sir,
is, if confirmed, I would do what I have already done, which is
to continue to speak and listen to our former leaders.
I have, in the last 2 weeks, spoken to every living former
commandant, and if confirmed, I am committed to continuing to
listen to them and all of our veteran marines who have
experience that matters, and make adjustments as need to be
made that are based on data. But I am always ears open, sir,
and always open to being better.
Senator Cotton. I appreciate you do not want to speak for
anyone. I know that you have read the criticisms, though, of
retired flag officers, and others, about Force Design 2030,
many of which are well-meaning and come from people who are
generally well informed about these matters. What do you think
those criticisms might be missing?
General Smith. Senator, I think the criticisms of force
design are perhaps missing that we have to be first to fight.
We must, in fact be mobile. We must be there. We must be light
enough to get there, and I think also what I would want
everyone, this Committee and others to know is what has not
changed.
What has not changed is we are a Marine air ground task
force. We are a globally responsive force, provided the
mobility is there, and our ethos of trained and lethal elite
warriors, that has not changed. So, it is a matter of how do we
improve and become more lethal, more mobile. That is the
intent.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. General, a second topic on
which almost everything has been said, but not everyone has
said it is amphibious ships. I am going to ask a slightly
different question from the need for that extra ship, though.
The Marine Corps leadership often and correctly reminds us
of the need for amphibious lift capacity. Could you explain why
the Corps is pursuing a new class of ships, the landing ship
median? My understanding of these won't be filled in until
2030's.
So, could you also explain how you can fill the gap for
this capability in the near term until those ships are fielded?
General Smith. Yes, sir. So, the landing ship medium is a
shore to shore transport. What that will enable our littoral
regiments to do is go anywhere in that first island chain
because that craft is beachable. That is a key. We used to have
the thing called an LST, a landing ship tank, but that vessel
gets onto any beach.
What that does is that spreads out an adversary's calculus
because they do not simply target ports, they would have to
target the entire coastline. Until that is fully fielded, and
we need 35 of them, approximately 9 per littoral regiment, we
are using stern landing vessels that we are contracting, and we
are open to using other surrogates until such time as we get
those landing ship mediums such as the EPF, which was mentioned
earlier by Senator Tuberville, as an experiment and as a
surrogate, as a bridge to those platforms. But the beach
ability, Senator, that is the key.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I would like to touch now
finally on a topic I do not think have been addressed yet on
the expeditionary advanced base operations concept of
operations. Since any forces operating in the Western Pacific
will face significant threats from Chinese missiles, could you
please describe what resources the Corps needs to operate
successfully under such conditions? Do you have the right
capabilities and training that you need to execute the new
EABO?
General Smith. Senator, we do have the training and it is
continuing to mature and be better. Things like a marine air
defense integrated system, MADIS, and things like medium range
intercept capability provide us with an air defense capability
that is mobile and expeditionary.
Then our capabilities that are long range fires and are low
signature, low probability of intercept, low probability of
detection and communications. That enables you to shoot, move,
and communicate in a manner that even hypersonics cannot reach
you. If you are on your game plan, if your training remains,
you can move faster than you are targeted to.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly, if
you are ready.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
thank you for being here. Good seeing you again. I enjoyed our
conversation. I think it was last week. Thank you for taking
the time and look forward to continuing our work together. A
high priority area of interest for me is ensuring that our
military has the highest quality and most realistic training
possible. It is, I am convinced--I mean, it is one of the
things that makes us stand out among other nations, is our high
quality of our training.
The Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma is home to the largest
F-35 command in the Marine Corps. They also host the weapons
and tactics instructor course that they do every year. It
delivers the most advanced fighter pilots in the Marine Corps,
which, as a Navy guy say, are pretty good, those marine fighter
pilots, and they go on to train the rest of the forces,
aviators who are ready to take this fight to the adversaries if
necessary.
Across Arizona, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Luke Air
Force Base Davis-Monthan, they have identified some expanded
air space as a priority for providing realistic air to air
training for fourth and fifth generation fighters and for
preparing our forces for competition with our adversaries.
So, in your view, General, how important is it to have
expanded airspace that can support training demands for the
Marine Corps?
General Smith. Senator, absolutely vital. I will even do
one better sir, it is not just the aviation rangers that Yuma
provides. When I took Regimental Combat Team 8 into
Afghanistan, ground unit, I trained at Yuma to prepare myself
and my regiment to go into combat in Afghanistan. It is a vital
training range.
Senator Kelly. Yes, so we are looking at trying to stitch
together some of these--some of this airspace within Arizona in
different ways. We are looking, you know, at the--and my staff
and I will be talking more about this. The FAA reauthorization
bill is a critical component of this. So, General, do I have
your commitment to work with also the Air Force, and the Army,
and DOD to move this effort forward?
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, you have my absolute
commitment to do that.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. Another subject, on mission
readiness. General, I understand that last week the Marine
Corps published its annual update to the Force Design 2030
plan. Can you highlight, you know, some of the changes to this
plan from the previous version, and specifically address areas
that will make for a more ready and a more lethal Marine Corps
as it relates to competition in the Western Pacific?
General Smith. Senator, I can. That annual update is one of
many updates. So, if I may, sir, the changes that have been
made since our first marketing round went down range. We have
changed the number of B-20 squadrons, added back to. We have
changed the size of an infantry battalion from 730 back to 811.
We have changed the number of cannon batteries, but most
importantly is that people, a very small thing, and I will be
quick, sir, mindful of your time. We have changed our basic
infantry training. It used to be 8 weeks, now it is 16. That
week--pardon me, 14. That training is 70 straight days now and
it is done as a squad.
Those same 13 marines start and end training together,
trained by one sergeant or staff sergeant, and then they go to
their unit together. We have not done that before. They are, in
my assessment, having observed it, they are better trained to
operate in a disaggregated, high threat environment because
they are focused on working as a team. As you know, sir,
fighting as a team is key.
Senator Kelly. So, the young marine goes from boot camp to
infantry school, and they train 13 squad members together? They
go to a unit together.
General Smith. That is correct, sir, and even though at
that unit, they may be broken into fire teams, but that 13
Marine unit, they stay together through training, go to the
same battalion. That is the thing we have always sought. It is
kind of the Holy Grail, sir, and now we are doing it.
Senator Kelly. Yes, I was not aware of that, and it does
certainly make a ton of sense. Last question, in my remaining
time here, I only have 30 seconds or so. Water treatment plant
in Yuma. Water quality, you know, it is really a quality of
life issue for marines and their families there in Yuma.
Can you provide your views on why we should be prioritizing
the health and safety projects specifically, like this water
treatment plant, and can I get your commitment to work with me
to move this project forward quickly?
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, you absolutely have
my commitment to do that on that project. What is so vital in
Yuma--it is the desert, and as I said, speed is life, as you
know, sir, as is water. Those families have to be well taken
care of, and those aircraft and other assets that we prepare,
they do require water and maintenance.
If we do not have that, it is a direct readiness impactor,
and obviously we can not afford to lose the environmental piece
of those ranges either. We have to have those ranges to be able
to be competitive.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, General.
General Smith. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Peters,
please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Smith,
good to see you. I enjoyed our office call. I recently
appreciated the opportunity to sit down and talk about a
variety of issues. Once again, congratulations on your
nomination here today.
During that office call, we spoke of the importance of
electronic warfare and the urgency of the DOD to ramp up
requirements and locations that are best to replicate the
heavily congested EW operating environments that we are going
to be confronting--confronted with.
Would you mind walking the Committee through some of the
modernization efforts that the Marine Corps has undertaken to
advance testing and training for both aerial and ground units
who will face a heavily contested electromagnetic spectrum in a
conflict with either a peer or near peer adversaries?
General Smith. Senator, I can, and after our office call, I
went back and tasked our Deputy Commandant for Information to
take a look at what is available, what options, what
opportunities at Selfridge.
Because those things are important to us. We are always
looking for our EW and cyber ranges. What we have done,
Senator, is a combination of assessments and wargaming in a
closed environment, meaning inside of a SCIF, if you will,
because that technology is so classified. We have been working
in our places, such as 29 Palms, to both reduce our signature
of our forces forward and then detect those signatures.
Those pieces of innovation are important. We recently went
up during Northern Edge, up in Alaska, and we sent our Marine
Warfighting Lab up there to experiment and confirm some of our
theories of long range communications that is not detectable
because that is pretty harsh training environment up there, and
we were happy to be rained and snowed, and on and be cold.
Senator Peters. Well, you bring up 29 Palms as a
possibility, or your current training and possibilities for
other training as well. But when thinking of Reserve units, of
Guard units, my question is, are you looking at other
installations as possibilities?
I bring that up because as we spoke about in our meeting,
Camp Grayling in Northern Michigan, I think is the right time--
right type of place that would offer a mixture of capabilities.
It is certainly logistically advantageous for many East Coast
and Midwestern based units. Is that something you are giving
consideration to?
General Smith. Senator, it is, and again, if confirmed, I
will continue to look for those ranges, any ranges that do--
that are for electronic warfare and cyber capabilities because
they are few and far between, as you know, sir--especially
large expanses of space and places where we can exercise the
entire spectrum.
Senator Peters. Right. I certainly appreciate the Marine
Corps? interest in reconfiguring its forces to meet the very
rapidly changing demands of 21st century battlefield. During
this process, the Marine Corps has changed the table of
organization and equipment, including the divestiture of some
tanks and artillery.
The force design 2030 recent annual update singled some
changes from light armored reconnaissance to multi-domain
reconnaissance, specifically the update costs for maritime
reconnaissance, waterborne companies, late mobile companies,
and light armored companies. All of these with the intent to
have greater reach as well as lethality.
So, given the attention that has been focused on Force
Design 2030, as you have gotten a lot of attention from it here
today of the questions of my colleagues, could you describe for
the Committee your vision for mobile reconnaissance battalions,
and specifically, how do you plan to equip them?
General Smith. Senator, those mobile reconnaissance
battalions, we have light armored reconnaissance battalions
now, we have reconnaissance battalions now more foot mobile.
Mobile reconnaissance means just that, any climb and place. We
have ground capabilities now and we are looking at an advanced
reconnaissance vehicle. It is--and I will be mindful here, sir,
it is still in competition between multiple vendors, so I will
be mindful not to tip my hat or tilt toward one or the other.
But those platforms enable us to both thicken and close
kill chains and kill webs, provide long range intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, bring in cyber fires, bring in
space operations, which are all part of combined operations, in
addition to artillery and rifle fire, naval gunfire, you pick
it.
Those cyber fires matter on a future battlefield. So that
vehicle and ship borne or seaborne platforms such as long range
unmanned surface vessel, which we tested back in 2019 when I
was in charge at Quantico, those will all combine to give us
the ability to truly fight in any clime and place and enable
the Joint Force no matter where it is sent globally.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. For a second
round of questioning, Senator, Senator Sullivan is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want
to dig into the force design issues as well. As you know, it is
not without its critics. By the way, it is not just retired old
Vietnam four stars. It is recently retired three stars, four
stars. Some of the best minds, some of the best experienced
marines, at least in my experience, and I think in your
experience as well.
To Senator Cotton's question, I would sum up some of the
criticism in kind of a broad category like something like this,
the divest to invest strategy shed in a rapid amount of time
very significant, proven Marine Corps combat capability. The
numbers I have, and maybe they have changed, close to 10,000
Active Duty marines, 6,000 reservists. By the way, I think we
need to be a little humble here on the recruiting. You got a
lot of compliments, so I think you deserve them.
But it is easy to hit your recruiting targets when you are
getting rid of a lot of marines, and a reduction of 21 percent
of Active Duty infantry marines, 16 percent of Reserve Infantry
marines, 67 percent of canon artillery, 33 percent of AAVs, 100
percent tanks, 100 percent of bridging three companies, along
with breaching, clearing, proofing equipment, 100 percent of
law enforcement.
I think one of the concerns has been and you have heard it
a little bit here, that these significant combat divestments
and the focus on enhancing lethality around maritime choke
points, particularly the PLA navy, have raised questions about
whether the Marine Corps is designing a niche, light infantry,
missile heavy, force focused on one AOR at the expense of the
Marine Corps' traditional role as a lethal, robust, combined
arms force ready to respond to any global crisis.
As you know, General, one of the hallmarks of the--one of
the hallmarks of the MAGTF is the ability to kick the door in
anywhere in the world and sustain itself for weeks in heavy
combat before follow on forces arrive. So how do you respond to
that criticism? It is coming in from a lot of very well-
respected marines, that we are undermining our ability to be
the Nation's 9-1-1 combined arms force.
General Smith. Senator, I would say that we are not
undermining that ability. The Marine Expeditionary Unit remains
coin of the realm. Those Marine expeditionary units, we still
retain seven headquarters and all the battalions, the air
combat elements, logistics combat elements needed for them.
But as you know, sort of the amphibious warship piece is
key. The ability for us to deploy rapidly and globally depends
on us being light and lethal. We had for a good number of years
developed platforms that simply were not movable, unless we
pulled up to one of a handful of ports in the Pacific for a
really multiday offload.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, one of the other elements of
divestment, which has been confusing--it was in one of the QFRs
that I sent to General Berger. We still have not gotten it
back. Is on the Marine Corps divestments in aviation, in the
wing. Some have said, with the management of these assets, it
is up to 200 aircraft.
Others have said, no aircraft. Can you commit to this
Committee, I am not going to ask you for the numbers now--I
submitted a very detailed question, question number 44 in the
QFR on what are the numbers, because that is also very
important.
Has nothing to do with heaviness in tanks. These are F-35.
These are CH-53s. These are Cobras. Can you commit to this
Committee of giving us the correct number on that? We are still
waiting on the other QFR from 2 months ago.
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, I will commit to
always keep you updated on the number of aircraft total and per
squadron, and how we utilize them.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask two final questions, one very
quickly. Again, one of the criticisms when the Marine Corps
talks about force design, they talk about forces focus on
littoral amphibs ops. But what if the next fight is not in the
littoral?
What if it is back in the desert? What if it is a mount
operation in an urban setting? What if marines need to cross a
river? Right now, I do not think we can cross a river. Maybe I
am wrong. What about that? Then I have one final question.
General Smith. So, Senator, our primary training base
remains the desert of 29 Palms, and three battalions continue
to train there. So, we retain desert training expertise. We
have the largest mount military operations and urban training
facility in the Marine Corps at 29 Palms, and we use it. We are
currently working hard to build expeditionary bridging,
bridging that is built for the vehicles which we have and the
assets we have that need to be moved across certain gaps. But
that is key, and we have to work on that and are doing so now.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. Four years
ago, General, Alaska was a potential location for a Marine
Corps UDP program. It has year round, exceptional training--
year round. Darwin doesn't right now. It has the sea and
airspace to conduct training for stand in forces, EAOB ops.
It has the infrastructure in place to support rotational
and a permanent presence, including the world class JPARC Air
Training Range. I heard Senator Kelly talk about Yuma, and
JPARC is maybe ten times bigger than Yuma. It is closer to
Taiwan, Japan, and Korea than marines located in Hawaii, and I
believe Darwin.
It has none of the ABO issues, our allied and partner
nations will likely have, in my view, whether it is in the
Philippines or Australia. Has better cold weather training than
Norway. Provides cost savings compared to other locations where
you can literally get to anywhere in the world, not just the
Indo-Pacific.
If confirmed, will you work with this Committee to once
again, you were looking at it 4 years ago and then it kind of
got dropped, to consider Alaska for increased training, best
training in the world.
By the way, joint, combined, potential UDPs, and pre-
positioned storage and materials needed to fight in the
INDOPACOM or anywhere else in the world. You can get to--you
can get anywhere in the Northern hemisphere within 78 hours if
you are based in Alaska, including Ukraine, Russia, China. Can
I get your commitment on that, General, if confirmed?
General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, 100 percent
commitment, because as you describe, sir, phenomenal training,
as I just experienced myself when I went up there in April and
this Northern Edge.
F-35 pilots will tell you, they love going there, because,
as you said, sir, the massive airspace available to them. So,
you have my absolute commitment to look at all aspects that
enhance our lethality, and Alaska, I am committed to it, sir,
just as I went up there. 100 percent committed to you, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. General Smith,
thank you for your service and your sacrifice, and that of your
family. You are eminently qualified to become the Commandant of
the United States Marine Corps, and we will do our best to
expedite the confirmation, and we look forward to working with
you. With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------

[Prepared questions submitted to General Eric M. Smith,
USMC by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses
duties
Question. Section 8043 of title 10, U.S. Code, describes the duties
and functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and requires that
the officer nominated for appointment to the position have had
significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least
one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a general officer.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. Section 8043, Title 10, U.S. code defines the duties and
responsibilities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, the
Commandant shall preside over Headquarters, Marine Corps, transmit the
plans and recommendations of Headquarters, Marine Corps to the
Secretary, and advises the Secretary regarding such plans and
recommendations. The Commandant facilitates the recruiting, organizing,
training, and equipping of the Marine Corps to support military
operations by the Combatant Commanders. The Commandant will perform
such other military duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as are
assigned by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or Secretary of
the Navy. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant
shall advise the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform
these duties?
Answer. I have served in a variety of key service and joint
assignments in my career spanning more than 36 years. I served as the
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Defense. As a General Officer, I have commanded marines at
all levels including as the Commanding General, Marine Forces Southern
Command; Commanding General, 1st Marine Division; Commanding General,
III Marine Expeditionary Force; and as the Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration and as the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
Question. Do you meet the joint duty requirements for this
position?
Answer. Yes
Question. Do you believe there is any action that you need to take
to enhance your ability to exercise the responsibilities of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, particularly in regard to serving as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assisting the Secretary of the
Navy in performing certain acquisition-related functions?
Answer. No, but I am a lifelong student and seek to improve my
skills daily.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
providing to the Secretary of Defense in your role as a member of the
Armed Forces Policy Council?
Answer. The Armed Forces Policy Council, as an advisory group to
the Secretary of Defense, has the ability to shape departmental efforts
to make our armed forces better. At this time in history, it is
critical that our innovation efforts are carried out with maximum
speed. This allows us to stay ahead of the many threats we face. As a
member of the council, my position would be to remove any and all
barriers which prevent the most rapid experimentation and fielding of
concepts, organizations, and equipment which will bring victory on the
battlefield.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
providing to the Secretary of the Navy for enhancing the organization,
training, and equipping of the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps, as a part of the Naval Service, must be
the most agile of any of the armed forces. We are by design smaller,
lighter, and more lethal than any other organization. Working with the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, I would seek
to ensure that the Marine Corps is best positioned for rapid and
seamless transition from competition to crisis and back again. In terms
of training, I would maximize the technological tools available to make
each Marine's training more realistic and each unit's training more
meaningful against a peer threat. Any equipment that I would advise our
Secretary to pursue would ensure that every Marine enters a completely
unfair fight against an adversary because of the range, accuracy, and
lethality of the systems that we procure.
Question. What are your goals, if confirmed, for the transformation
of the Marine Corps to meet new and emerging threats?
Answer. The Marine Corps must continue to lead in terms of
innovation and rapid movement to organizations, equipment, and concepts
that produce outsized benefit for our marines and our Nation and which
place our enemies in a position of disadvantage. The ability to rapidly
develop concepts for victory, wargame, experiment, and modify those
concepts is vital to ensure the Marine Corps stays ahead of our
adversaries. I would ensure that our wargaming and experimentation
continue at an acerated rate in order to enhance our warfighting
ability.
Question. In addition to the duties enumerated in section 8043, the
law provides that the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall perform such
other military duties as are assigned to him by the President, the
Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Navy. In light of the
lines of effort set forth in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS),
what other military duties do you anticipate the Secretary of Defense
or the Secretary of the Navy will assign to you, if confirmed?
Answer. The Marine Corps, as the Nation's force in readiness, has
the responsibility to respond to crises outside of existing guidance.
This responsibility requires force modernization, capability
development, and organization aimed to deter, campaign, and build
enduring advantage. Each of these elements require closer integration
with allies and partners as well as synchronizing broader Department of
Defense efforts and aligning them with other instruments of national
power. Similarly, if confirmed, I anticipate being assigned the duty of
coordinating Marine Corps modernization efforts with those of the Joint
Force.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities will you
assign to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, has
the authorities and duties with respect to the Marine Corps as the
Commandant may delegate or prescribe, with approval of the Secretary of
the Navy. If confirmed, the Assistant Commandant will work to manage
the critical processes of the Marine Corps. The Assistant Commandant
would serve as my advisor and perform my duties during any period of
unavailability.
marine corps organization
Question. Section 8063 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Marine
Corps composition to include not less than three combat divisions and
three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other
services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be
organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of
combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service
with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign. Do you agree that these requirements
remain relevant as an organizational and operational employment
framework? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes, these requirements remain relevant as an
organizational and operational employment framework that provides the
necessary flexibility to adapt to the threat environment and needs of
the Nation. Over the past two decades the Marine Corps contributed to
an enduring land campaign. Strategic guidance and the threat
environment have allowed the Marine Corps to reorient as a naval
expeditionary force in readiness to support fleet commanders within the
overall naval and joint campaign. Through the help of Congress, the
Marine Corps continues to maintain operational and tactical relevance
on the modern battlefield through our modernization efforts. For
example, over the years the Marine Corps has established Space and
Cyber commands to meet the changing threat environment. Additionally,
the Marine Corps has three Marine Littoral Regiments planned to be
fully established by fiscal year 2027. These modern formations provide
force structure at the tactical level to remain relevant in the current
threat environment. This flexibility and the assistance of Congress is
critical to maintain pace for the necessary operational employment of
forces.
Question. How does Force Design 2030 nest within title 10
requirements?
Answer. Force Design adheres to the requirements set forth in Title
10 of the United States Code. The Marine Corps regularly assesses its
force structure, capabilities, and readiness to ensure that it can
fulfill its obligations as outlined in Title 10. Force Design seeks to
optimize the Marine Corps' force structure to meet the demands of
modern warfare. This plan was informed by the threat environment and
developed with the direction and oversight of senior civilian and
military leaders.
Force Design 2030 aims to create a more agile, flexible, and lethal
force that is better equipped to operate forward, compete, project
power, and influence as directed by the National Defense Strategy and
other strategic guidance documents. This includes enhancing the Marine
Corps' ability to conduct expeditionary and amphibious operations,
improving its ability to operate in contested and denied environments,
and increasing its capacity to conduct distributed operations with
joint and allied partners.
the joint chiefs of staff
Question. Section 921 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA made changes to
section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, concerning the service of members
of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) as military advisors to
the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. What is your assessment of the
authorities of, and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs (other
than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the
President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council,
and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?
Answer. Whereas the Chairman must provide advice, if confirmed, in
my role as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I would be permitted to
provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular
matter in the capacity as a military advisor. Members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff may provide such advice after first informing the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. As a member of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (other than the Chairman), if confirmed, I may submit to the
Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice, or an
opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense. In instances where a member
submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice
or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice
to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. The Chairman
is responsible for establishing procedures to ensure that the
presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is
not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice
or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
confirmed, I would be comfortable that my views would be represented; I
will be attentive to the process and prepared to offer additional views
in future engagements with this Committee.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best
military advice to the President, National Security Council, Homeland
Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense,
even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of the
Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Yes.
use of military force
Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making
recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
Answer. The use of military force is a policy decision made under
certain domestic or international legal bases. The domestic legal bases
for the use of military force reside with congressional and
Presidential powers under Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution,
respectively. The international legal basis for the use of military
force falls under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, via Article 42 (U.N.
Security Council Resolutions) and Article 51 (Self-Defense).
The decision to use military force will always be informed by the
facts and circumstances ruling at the time. Factors to be weighed and
considered are whether a vital national security interest is
threatened, whether there is a clear and attainable objective, whether
the use of military force is supported by the American public, and
whether the United States acts alone or in concert with partners and
allies.
As the U.S. military is only one instrument of our national power,
it is my hope that military force is used as a last resort, when
diplomatic, informational, and economic measures fall short of national
objectives.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What is your vision for the Marine Corps of today? For
the Marine Corps of the future?
Answer. My vision of the Marine Corps is a force that is ready to
respond to any crisis tonight while simultaneously preparing itself for
potential state-on-State warfare. Achieving that goal will require
ironclad discipline from each individual Marine and each unit. These
two ideas are complementary, not contradictory. A well-trained Marine
Corps ready to deal with crises tonight is in fact best positioned to
transition to conflict tomorrow. While the threats which confront the
Nation will change, the Marine Corps' unique role as the crisis
response force and the ``First to Fight'' force for major conflict will
not change, today or in the future.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as the Commandant of the Marine
Corps?
Answer. I believe the most significant challenges in the near term
will be recruiting and retaining the high-quality marines required to
fight and win the Nation's battles. Our greatest asset is and always
will be the individual Marine. Our formations and weapons systems
depend on the very best that America has to offer serving as U.S.
marines. This is likely to be a long-term strategic challenge that must
be overcome.
Additionally, the ability to respond immediately to crisis or
conflict using organic mobility is a challenge that the Marine Corps
must face head on. Our unique ability to organically move ourselves is
vital because it enables time for the remainder of the joint force to
organize for its own deployment.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. I will continue to place the highest quality marines in our
recruiting force and reward their exceptional performance. I will
continue to uphold the Marine Corps' very high standards because it is
those high standards that attract so many of America's finest to our
Corps. I will continue to organize and equip our Marine Corps and work
with our shipmates in the Navy to guarantee that when crisis or
conflict comes, the organic mobility required to win is present.
Question. Given the major challenges you identified above, what
other priorities would you set for your term as Commandant of the
Marine Corps, if confirmed?
Answer. I would prioritize the acceleration of our organization,
training, and equipment developments to meet the demands of the
operating environment. This will ensure that our highly skilled and
talented marines are outfitted, trained, and equipped for victory on
the battlefield. I would further prioritize coordination with our Navy
shipmates to ensure the inventory of our amphibious warships enables
marines to continuously train and sustain our abilities and
capabilities to respond to crises as the ``Fight Tonight'' force.
2022 national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``[m]utually beneficial Alliances and
partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical
challenges and enduring threats to the national security of the United
States and its allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the current strategic environment is characterized by
an era of great power competition with China and Russia presenting the
most significant threats. The 2022 NDS assessment of the critical
challenges in the coming decade is not only supported by the 2023
Intelligence Community (IC) annual threat assessment, but also by the
actions of Russia and China. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine
has demonstrated that the era of nation-State competition and conflict
is still a defining characteristic of the current threat environment.
However, China has the intent, capability, and capacity to challenge
U.S. interests and change the rules-based order.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS correctly specify the
priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can
achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic
environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?
Answer. Yes, I believe the 2022 NDS identifies the priority mission
of the DOD and lists appropriate categories of capabilities the joint
force must have without being overly prescriptive. Among areas of
highest risk to our forces are cyber threats, threats to space-based
assets, and the large numbers of adversary surface-to-surface long-
range weapons. We must maintain a naval power projection capability
that is expeditionary and sustainable to compete.
Another area of significant risk is time. The pacing threat is not
confined to international norms and regulations and, thus, can increase
their influence in competition and rapidly modernize military
capabilities with the necessary capacity. The Services must be capable
of accelerating modernization to get relevant capabilities in the hands
of warfighters to test, train, and gain proficiency prior to employing
them in combat.
Question. Is the Marine Corps adequately sized, structured, and
resourced to implement the 2022 NDS and the associated operational
plans? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps is sized, structured, and resourced
to implement the 2022 NDS. While some of our objectives will still take
time to fully field or organize, the pathway to so do is clear.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls
in the ability of the Marine Corps to meet the demands placed on it by
the 2022 NDS and the operational plans that implement the strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Marine Corps remains
focused on identifying and then filling gaps in our capabilities. Our
current robust concepts, wargame, and experiment process is well suited
to highlight gaps.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you
advise the Secretary of the Navy to make in the Marine Corps'
implementation of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. Going forward, congressionally authorized multi-ship
procurement must be employed for amphibious warfare ships.
Affordability is maximized with this procurement strategy and provides
cost savings through industrial base stability and improves current
maintenance and readiness levels.
Currently, amphibious warfare ships are being decommissioned faster
than they are procured and delivered. Inventory will decrease to an
average of 28-29 ships over the next 5 years. The current 30-year
shipbuilding plan projects an amphibious warfare ship inventory that
drops and stays below the congressionally mandated floor of 31 ships.
Amphibious warfare ships require a balance between new construction (2-
year centers for LPDs, and 4-year centers for LHAs) and retention of
LSDs to maintain no less than 31 ships.
Question. Does the Marine Corps have the requisite analytic
capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, in developing and implementing the force
structure, sizing, and shaping plans required to position the Corps to
execute the operational plans associated with the 2022 NDS? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. The Operations and Analysis Division, along with many
seasoned experts across the Corps, provide exceptional insights and
advice to support the force structure, sizing, and shaping plans
required to execute the operational plans associated with the 2022 NDS.
Through Force Design modernization initiatives, the Marine Corps has
developed additional processes and analytic capabilities to speed up
assessments.
The Marine Corps modernization strategy has been threat informed,
concept based, and analyzed throughout our campaign of learning. We
have complete 25 wargames and 42 integrated planning teams with subject
matter experts from across the Marine Corps in support of Force Design
2030. These teams grappled with an immense challenge, as they sought to
modernize the Marine Corps as a naval expeditionary force that
effectively deters our competitors, while remaining read to respond to
a range of crises. This calendar year, we will conduct another nine
wargames, primarily focused on reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance, as well as deploying and sustaining a MEF in support of
major combat operations.
To support our wargaming efforts, we anticipate the opening of the
Marine Corps Wargaming and Analysis Center next year. This state-of-
the-art facility will significantly enhance our capability development,
concept development, operational plan assessment, training, and
advanced technology evaluation. Sustained funding will be required to
support IT services and the necessary personnel to staff the analysis
center.
overall readiness of the marine corps
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the Marine
Corps--across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and
training--to execute the 2022 NDS and associated operational plans?
Answer. The Marine Corps is more ready to execute the national
defense strategy and OPLANS than it has been in the past, and we are
only getting better.
Personnel: Our single greatest asset remains the individual Marine;
Force Design 2030 has allowed the Marine Corps to optimize the force at
approximately 172,000 while focusing on the retaining the best and
brightest marines. We met our fiscal year 2022 recruiting and retention
goals with all indications pointing toward the Service doing so again
in fiscal year 2023. We have not and will not lower the standard. With
Talent Management 2030, we fundamentally redesigned our personnel
system, which was empowered by the new statutory authorities granted by
Congress. These changes were implemented with a focus on retaining the
best marines, specifically the NCO and junior officer corps. We have
been able to build from the inside, mature the force, and capitalize on
the best talent that America has to offer.
Training and education have been a focal point of the current CMCs
tenure and the service has been able to make massive strides. One of
our greatest improvements has been the expansion of our infantry school
from 8.5 weeks to 14. We have a 10:1 student to instructor ratio now.
We have our best NCOs instructing squads and returning to the fleet as
the best squad leaders in the Corps. These marines now train every day
for 14 weeks and go to the fleet together. Who you train with is now
who you fight with, the unit cohesion makes me question why we had not
started this 30 years ago.
Materiel and equipment: We are currently fielding systems that will
enable the Joint force, of today and in the future, to execute the
tasks set forth in the National Defense Strategy. Under our current
leadership, we invested heavily in the next generation of future
systems. We now have the most capable radar in the world, the TPS-80 G/
ATOR, that can gain and maintain custody of adversary targets and hold
those targets at risk. With the support of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering's Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration Office, we are rapidly developing new systems
at low cost to further enhance our warfighting capabilities. As
marines, we will continue to innovate to put our adversaries in complex
situations and your marines are ready to fight tonight.
Question. In your view, what are the priority missions for which
current and future Marine Corps forces should be trained and ready in
the context of day-to-day activities, as well as for contingencies?
Answer. The Marine Corps is our Nation's force in readiness, and
premier crisis response force. As an expeditionary force in readiness
which is amphibious in character, the Marine Corps must prioritize
readiness to conduct amphibious operations globally today and into the
future. The Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit remain
a flexible, scalable, and multi-role capability for our Combatant
Commanders. The training, readiness, and deployment of these formations
support day-to-day activities in critical theaters, as well as provide
a rapid response capability for contingency operations around the
globe. The Marine Corps must prioritize training that enables naval
integration and amphibious operations in order to alter the trajectory
of any adversaries plans and to win if deterrence fails.
Question. In what specific ways has the Marine Corps improved or
not improved its State of readiness across the domains of materiel and
equipment, personnel, and training?
Answer. Congress has greatly assisted the Marine Corps readiness
recovery efforts with increased topline funding over the last 4 years,
which has allowed us to rebuild readiness and increase lethality in
support of the National Defense Strategy. We have accelerated aviation
readiness recovery, which has led to an increase in average monthly
flight time for our aircrews, an increase in mission capable rates of
our aircraft, and an improvement of our aggregate aviation Training
readiness rating. With sustained Operations and Maintenance funding, we
have made significant gains in ground equipment readiness rates, where
our aggregated ground equipment and readiness of reportable equipment
have improved in both availability and serviceability. We have also
seen moderate gains in materiel and equipment readiness across the
force from modernization efforts as a result of Force Design 2030 and
Presidential Drawdown Authority actions which have enabled us to reduce
and/or replace legacy maintenance-intensive equipment and aging
munitions. Combined with our focused structural changes, we have made
enhancements to meet the requirements of the evolving operational
environment. However, there is risk involved as we rebuild capacity in
high demand capability areas. Finally, we have invested in Service-
level, Joint, and Multilateral training exercises and enhancements to
training ranges and live immersion training capabilities that prepare
our marines to defeat peer adversaries and ensures the Marine Corps is
``most ready when the Nation is least ready.'' A lack of available
amphibious shipping continues to challenge our ability to attain
advance training standards in many of our formations and appropriately
respond to crises.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to restore full spectrum
Marine Corps readiness, and under what timelines?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure to the extent a budget is
passed on time, that readiness accounts are maintained at very high
levels. Sustained and predictable budgetary authority over the last few
years has enabled the Marine Corps to recruit, retain, equip, and train
the highest quality people possible, which directly contributes to
lethality and readiness. We will sustain the gains made in materiel and
equipment readiness, while increasing efforts in Talent Management, and
accelerating efforts to modernize our training and warfighting
capabilities. I would also ensure that our training ranges and service
exercises challenge our marines for State on State conflict. I will
also continue to work with the Navy to improve amphibious shipping
availability to meet training and operational readiness requirements.
The Marine Corps is ready now, and if confirmed, I will ensure that we
continue to be ready for missions in any clime and place.
budget
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of the Marine Corps budget?
Answer. The current and future readiness of the Fleet Marine Force
against the pacing threat is the standard by which I would measure the
adequacy of the budget. I cannot stress enough that sustained,
adequate, predictable funding is the single most effective way to
achieve this and to maintain our critical strategic momentum in
implementing the National Defense Strategy. This financial stability is
key to our ability to continue our Force Design modernization efforts,
while ensuring that forward deployed Marine forces are ready to respond
to crisis and provide the integrated deterrence and day-to-day
campaigning necessary to build advantage with our allies and partners.
A sustained, adequate, and predictable budget will also enable
continued investment in critical infrastructure and quality of life
requirements focused on increasing the operational capability and
capacity of our installations and taking care of our marines and their
families.
Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
later than 10 days after the President's submission of the annual
defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander
must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
lists, in order of priority, the unfunded priorities of the armed force
or combatant command.
What are your views of this statutory requirement and the utility
of unfunded priorities lists?
Answer. In compliance with 10 U.S.C. 222a, the Marine Corps is
required to submit a list of unfunded priorities to accompany the
President's Budget submission. Our budget submission represents the
most effective mix of forces, equipment, manpower and support
attainable within fiscal constraints by aligning resources to
prioritized investments, balancing warfighting capabilities with risk,
affordability, and effectiveness. Programs prioritized on the Unfunded
Priority List represent executable items that would help accelerate key
warfighting investments and other modernization efforts that benefit
our future force. None of the items on our UPL are of a higher priority
than those requested in the President's Budget but are provided to
Congress for consideration should additional funds be made available.
Question. If confirmed, do you agree to provide your unfunded
priorities list to Congress in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes.
alliances and partnerships
Question. The 2022 NDS stresses the importance of U.S. alliances
and partnerships and considers these relationships a critical strategic
advantage.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen
existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and
leverage opportunities for international cooperation to advance U.S.
security interests?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work in concert with the Combatant
Commanders to build senior relationships with key partners and would
ensure that marines were ready to deploy to meet emerging threats and
opportunities.
Question. What are the major challenges for strengthening existing
alliances and partnerships or building new ones, including for
improving interoperability and shared operational concepts? What steps
would you recommend, if confirmed, for overcoming these challenges?
Answer. Presence is required to strengthen alliances and to build
new ones. marines must be forward deployed to meet these challenges.
Addressing ally and partner nation security concerns focusing on the
relationship between the U.S. and that partner, irrespective of a
specific adversary, can make inroads. We have very positive military-
to-military relationships with our Allies and partners, and we need to
continue making the investments necessary to sustain those unmatched
relationships. More broadly, we in the DOD must nest our efforts in the
broader, whole-of-government approach to strengthen and as well as
build new relationships. The Marine Corps maintains and is developing
interoperability pathways with several critical allies to ensure
capabilities and operating concepts evolve together and complement each
other. Some of these interoperable pathways include orienting on a
common purpose and supporting local governments. Our Marine
Expeditionary Units play a vital role in improving out interoperability
with our Allies and partners, while also providing humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief necessary to support local governments.
To maximize our interoperability we must be forward deployed aboard L
Class amphibious warfare ships.
joint operations
Question. The Marine Corps is largely organizing around the concept
of serving as a Stand-in Force (SIF) for the military. The Marine Corps
defines the SIF as small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively
simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the
competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a
maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans
of a potential or actual adversary. As envisioned this concept is
inherently joint.
How would you characterize the current State of Navy and Marine
Corps joint operations? What gaps or shortfalls exist? What changes
would you advocate to strengthen or expand Navy and Marine Corps joint
operations best to meet the objectives of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. The Navy-Marine Corps team continue to enable joint
operations that enhance the lethality of the Joint Force and provide
flexibility to combatant commanders. The Navy-Marine Corps team have
held the enduring TF 51/5 headquarters based in Central Command
(CENTCOM) that continues to integrate expeditionary naval operations in
support of combatant commander requirements. This past year, the Navy
and Marine Corps established two Task Force (TF) headquarters in the
European Command (EUCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). In
EUCOM, TF 61/2 was designed to provide a joint task force crisis
response capability through command and control (C2) of naval forces
supporting contingencies in Europe and Africa--to include ongoing
responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In INDOPACOM, TF 76/3
embarked upon an 18-month-long period of experimentation, conducting
active campaigning inside a contested space. This integrated task force
has demonstrated the ability to create robust information webs to
support maritime domain awareness (MDA) across the theater, especially
in the western Pacific. Both formations have increased MDA for
combatant commanders and increased interoperability across the joint
force.
The Marine Corps' ability to enable the Joint Force is critical to
Active deterrence. Marine Corps' modernization efforts are providing
combatant commanders with credible forces that can conduct
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, conduct and enable Joint and
Combined cross-domain strikes, and support Naval, Joint, and combined
fires and maneuver. These capabilities have been designed to nest with
the Combined and Joint Force to create a robust and redundant
communications architecture between Marine Corps, Naval, Joint, and
Combined Forces. Shortfalls in organic mobility for Marine units may
incur joint support requirements if not sufficiently resourced.
Question. Which other Service doctrines and capabilities offer the
greatest opportunity for synergy with the Marine Corps in joint
operations?
Answer. The Marine Corps and the other services share synergies
with joint doctrine publications that outline the fundamental
principles that guide the employment of US military forces. Some
examples of this are Joint Pub (JP) 3-32 Joint Maritime Operations, JP
3-04 Information in Joint Operations, JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations,
and JP 3-07 Joint Stabilization Activities. Furthermore, the Marine
Corps partners with the other Services in the development of 31 multi-
service doctrinal publications, via the Air-Land-Sea-Space Application
Center to effectively employ concepts and capabilities within the Joint
Force.
Achieving integration of capabilities in the Joint Force requires
dependencies and enablers. For example, the Army provides critical
theater logistics support; the Air Force provides strategic airlift;
and the Navy provides not only amphibious support, but also an entire
range of requirements to enable amphibious and littoral operations. In
terms of enablers, as part of the Stand-in force, marines will be on
the forward edge of a maritime defense-in depth. We are unique in that
we possess organic capabilities to persist and remain lethal across
multiple domains, maneuverable, and survivable inside an adversary's
weapon engagement zone. Through our campaign of learning we have found
that our true value proposition is to ``sense and make sense.'' In a
21st century multi-domain environment, linear kill chains are
insufficient. Through this concept and approach, Marines will be
strategically placed to operate with partners and allies during
competition and will be capable of responding during crises and holding
adversaries at risk during conflict. Our Stand-in Forces will increase
maritime domain awareness by maintaining custody of target data and
will enable the Joint Force to project power back into an anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) environment.
Question. What innovative ideas are you considering to increase
Service interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of
Department of Defense objectives in joint operations?
Answer. To ensure our amphibious operations concepts remain
current, together with the Navy, we are developing a new concept for
21st Century Amphibious Operations. It will describe how we will
execute amphibious operations against future adversaries in this
evolving and complex operational environment. It will also articulate
the future role of amphibious operations in support of maritime
campaigns and will describe new operating methods that incorporate
agile platforms to supplement traditional amphibious ships.
Additionally, Stand-in Forces conducting Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations have a unique ability to advance interoperability
across the Combined and Joint Force to enable CJADC2 efforts. The
forward postured forces operating and persisting inside adversaries'
weapons engagement zones can sense and make sense of the operating
environment. While maintaining quality track data and custody of
targets, stand-in forces provide maritime domain awareness for fleet
and joint commanders to project power into Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2AD) environments when crisis turns to conflict.
Interoperability extends beyond our U.S. Joint Force and into our
relationship with partner and allied nations. The Marine Corps' Stand
in Forces maintain these critical relationships while campaigning with
their forward presence providing U.S. partners and allies assurances,
increasing access, and actively deter shared adversaries.
acquisition
Question. In recent National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs),
Congress expanded and refined the acquisition-related functions of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
If confirmed, how would you assist the Secretary of the Navy in the
performance of certain acquisition-related functions, while ensuring
compatibility with the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (as
established in title 10, U.S. Code, sections 8014 and 8016)?
Answer. I would execute the Commandant of the Marine Corps
responsibility to determine service requirements and establish their
relative priority in support of the acquisition process. I would assist
the Secretary of the Navy in making decisions regarding resources and
priorities, and associated tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and
performance on major defense acquisition programs. Further, I would
manage key acquisition talent inside the Marine Corps to ensure we have
the right number of program managers with the requisite skills and
experience to effectively employ tailored acquisition approaches.
Finally, recognizing the importance of the integral relationship
between HQMC, OPNAV, and DON staff, I would ensure synchronization of
effort and alignment of service requirements and resource
prioritization to the National Defense Strategy as well as Naval,
Joint, and COCOM requirements.
Question. What actions would you take to improve all three aspects
of the acquisition process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue and build on the work
Commandant Berger initiated, collaboratively with ASN (RD&A), to
synchronize service chief and service acquisition executive roles and
authorities to deliver capabilities in support of Naval, Joint, and
COCOM requirements. Specifically, I would maximize the use of
wargaming, prototyping, and experimentation to accelerate requirement
development, inform prioritization of resources, and enable timely
cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs. I would maintain close
integration and alignment with the other elements of the Department of
Navy's acquisition-related decision support system, including ASN(FM&C)
and ASN(RD&A). As an integrated Naval force, unity of effort in the
planning and execution of programs across the Department is critical to
delivering at the speed of relevance. I would maintain awareness of
acquisition efforts across the Joint Force to leverage joint
development, defense industrial base optimization, and contractual
opportunities. I would additionally manage key acquisition talent
inside the Marine Corps to ensure we have the right number of program
managers with the requisite skills and experience to effectively employ
tailored acquisition approaches. In order to ensure the greatest
affordability, I would encourage the congressional authorized multi-
ship procurement of Amphibious Warfare Ships.
Question. What actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that
requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?
Answer. If confirmed, I would maximize the use of wargaming,
prototyping, and experimentation to accelerate requirement development,
inform prioritization of resources, and enable timely cost, schedule,
and performance tradeoffs.
If confirmed, I would ensure early engagement by the Marine Corps
Operational Test and Evaluation Activity to provide an independent
assessment of key performance parameters and key system attributes
testability and alignment to overall system operational effectiveness/
suitability.
Question. What specific measures would you recommend to control
``requirements creep'' in the defense acquisition system?
Answer. We employ the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) to
tailor our approach to capability development. The AAF allows us to
increase focus on key requirements and move more effectively through
the acquisition process. Further, the AAF enables us to take advantage
of rapid prototyping and fielding of an initial capability that
reinforces our focus on critical operational requirements.
Question. How would you utilize your authority to arrest the
exponential escalation in cost that, in recent history, has marked the
acquisition life-cycle of Service platforms and weapons systems?
Answer. I would advocate for the judicious use of rapid prototyping
and experimentation to inform capability development activities;
emphasize development of realistic and independent program life cycle
cost estimates; and leverage my support/advisory role during key
Defense Acquisition System milestones to assist with cost, schedule,
and performance trades necessary to achieve service objectives.
Additionally, I would ensure affordable sustainment cost objectives are
identified early in the capability development process and included in
requirements document to guide and inform system performance tradeoff
decisions.
Question. In your view, in whom should accountability for large-
scale acquisition failures and/or extraordinary cost overruns vest?
Answer. While current statutory and regulatory guidance confer
acquisitions authorities and accountability to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment), Secretary of the Navy (Component
Head), and Service Acquisition Executive, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps shares this responsibility. For Marine Corps Programs, the
Secretary of the Navy has assigned acquisition authorities to both ASN
(RD&A) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. As such, accountability
for acquisition failures and cost overruns is shared between ASN (RD&A)
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Question. In your view, are the roles and responsibilities in the
acquisition process now assigned to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
and the other Service Chiefs appropriate? Are there other acquisition-
related roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the
Service Chiefs?
Answer. Based on my experience assisting the Commandant of the
Marine Corps with execution of his acquisition related roles and
responsibilities during my tenure as both the Deputy Commandant, Combat
Development and Integration and as the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps, the currently assigned authorities are adequate. If
confirmed, I would commit to work with the Committee to identify any
gaps and address them.
A natural tension exists between the objectives of major defense
acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the
need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--the
objective of the test and evaluation function.
Question. Has the Secretary of the Navy assigned to the Commandant
of the Marine Corps responsibility for those aspects of the function of
research and development relating to test and evaluation for Marine
Corps acquisition programs? If so, how would you exercise this
responsibility, if confirmed?
Answer. The Secretary of the Navy assigned responsibility for
Operational Test and Evaluation to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
for all Marine Corps acquisitions except for aviation assets which fall
under the Navy's Operational Test Authority. If confirmed, I would
emphasize the need for early involvement of the Marine Corps and Navy
Operational Test and Evaluation communities in the capabilities
development process and seek opportunities to bolster Department
operational test and evaluation capacity and capability.
Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance
between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to
perform adequate test and evaluation?
Answer. Only under the most pressing situations, e.g., urgent
requirements supporting marines engaged in peacekeeping or combat
operations, testing efforts may be reduced but we would more closely
monitor the system in its fielded environment to re-assess our initial
evaluation, tactics, techniques, and procedures to minimize the
operational risks. In all other instances, Program Executive Officers
and Program Managers must ensure test and evaluation programs that
provide sufficient test activities to clearly demonstrate the
operational effectiveness and suitability of capabilities before
fielding to the Fleet Marine Force.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it
appropriate to procure weapon systems and equipment that have not been
demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
suitable, and survivable?
Answer. With the means available today to rapidly prototype and
procure limited quantities for experimentation, rarely, if ever, would
it be appropriate to procure systems and equipment in support of the
warfighter without requisite testing and evaluation.
Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition
processes?
Answer. The role of developmental and operational test and
evaluation communities during rapid, spiral or evolutionary
acquisitions is to develop an efficient and effective test program that
stresses system performance sufficiently to assess with confidence, its
safety, reliability and mission effectiveness within cost and schedule
constraints.
Question. Are you satisfied with Marine Corps test and evaluation
capabilities, including the test and evaluation workforce and
infrastructure?
Answer. I'm not one to ever be fully satisfied with existing
capabilities or supporting infrastructure. I consistently look for
opportunities to drive capability/process efficiencies, implement
talent management initiatives focused on strengthening workforce
performance, and enhance supporting infrastructure. While I assess the
current test and evaluation system as adequate, I will consistently
seek opportunities to build additional capacity and improve test and
evaluation capabilities.
Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Marine Corps
should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. The Marine Corps needs to seek opportunities in T&E
infrastructure solutions that can adequately represent the future multi
domain and contested environments. We must also develop tools and
processes to assess operational and responsible performance of
Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you accelerate the development of
these new capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will clearly identify my intent to
implement measures, tools, and processes to efficiently evaluate system
performance around validated mission threads and demonstrate the
operational performance in multi-domain operations. Our testing
organizations are already working across DOD and the Services in
support of DoN T&E initiatives and the Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) Implementation Plan, endorsed by all Service
Secretaries.
Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of Office of
the Secretary of Defense developmental and operational testing
organizations with respect to testing of Marine Corps systems?
Answer. The role of DOT&E is to establish Department level
operational test policy and procedures; review and analyze the results
of OT&E conducted for each major DOD acquisition program; provide
independent assessments to SecDef, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and Congress; make budgetary
and financial recommendations to the SecDef regarding OT&E; and oversee
major DOD acquisition programs to ensure OT&E is adequate to assess the
operational effectiveness and suitability of the defense system in
combat use. The Secretary of the Navy, ASN (RD&A), and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps share authority and accountability for
developmental and operational testing and evaluation of Naval
capabilities. Based on this understanding, the alignment of policy,
procedure, and independent assessment at the OSD level and execution of
developmental and operational test and evaluation at the component/
service level is appropriate and effectively supports checks and
balances required by Congress.
Question. Do you think the current operational test and evaluation
system also provides for the flexibility to assess commercial
technologies that might be acquired or fields by the Department of
Defense through means or processes that are not traditional acquisition
programs of record?
Answer. Yes--By focusing on the marines' employment of new
technologies within mission scenarios, the current operational test and
evaluation system is agnostic to the source of the technologies or
method of acquisition, and therefore retains the necessary flexibility
to assess any technology that the marines might acquire.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the ``process'' of
programs of record do not limit service investment in portfolios of
capabilities or mission threads?
Answer. The Marine Corps has structured its investment budget line
items by capability areas to the maximum extent practical. This
provides flexibility to address adjustments that may be needed due to
changes such as technology, supply chain, requirements, etc. from a
capability versus program of record perspective, while operating within
reprogramming threshold limitations. If confirmed, I would ensure that
we continue to manage the Marine Corps budget structure alignment to
Force Design 2030 capability and mission thread delivery.
Question. If confirmed, how would you resource enablers, such as
authorities to operate or data or certification, that Program Managers
and Program Executive Officers see as outside of their requirements?
Answer. The Marine Corps has prioritized critical Force Design
programs in our budget process, while ensuring key enablers are also
resourced. Program Managers and Program Executive Officers ensure that
any associated program enablers are identified and considered within
the Marine Corps Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
process. The Marine Corps has established Enterprise Programming Teams
(EPTs) that include a network of subject matter experts from across the
enterprise who are closely aligned with specific programs. These EPTs
serve in direct support of DC P&R during the programming phase.
joint acquisition
Question. What are your views regarding the merit and feasibility
of joint development and acquisition programs, such as the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle and Future Vertical Lift?
Answer. The JLTV program has been an exceptional model for use, but
each service may still have unique usage requirements that must be
accounted for.
Question. What additional programs would you consider to be
candidates for joint development and acquisition?
Answer. While we currently do not have any candidates for joint
development, we always look for opportunities for joint development
with the other Services, our allies, and partners when it is in the
best interest of the Marine Corps and the joint force. In general,
munitions are ideal candidates.
Question. What are your views on joint, enabling or cross-cutting
capabilities that may not be treated as acquisition programs, such as
JADC2? Do you have sufficient authority to advocate or manage Marine
Corps capabilities to ensure there are no seams in planning or
execution of such efforts?
Answer. The Marine Corps is committed to executing the network and
data integration of our programs and architectures with the Joint Force
necessary to achieve JADC2 goals. Our campaign of learning to deliver
Force Design led by experimentation by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
is facilitating our ability to quickly develop prototype capabilities
that inform requirements and needed JADC2 capabilities upgrades.
Prototypes developed for experimentation are being provided to selected
Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units for Limited User Evaluations (LUE) that
results in rapid JADC2 capability incursions that enhance the force.
As the Service Chief, I would have sufficient authorities to
influence the requirements, resourcing, and materiel development to
ensure there are no seams in the planning and execution of such
efforts.
Question. If confirmed, how would you facilitate processes for the
Marine Corps that empower acquisition professionals and reduce
institutional policy barriers to enable cross service requirements
development and capabilities discussions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will foster a culture of innovation,
balanced with disciplined risk-based execution, throughout the
acquisition system. I would set conditions to enable capability
solution delivery for Force Design by aligning HQMC for maximum unity
of effort, and strict, prioritized focus of resources to capabilities
of significant Joint, COCOM, and Naval Expeditionary contribution.
Further I would seek opportunities to streamline acquisition and
sustainment decision support processes by focusing on maximum
decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level.
modernization of capabilities
Question. The Marine Corps' current concepts for modernization of
its amphibious capabilities includes ships, ship to shore connectors
and armored amphibious combat vehicles. Modernization across these
systems is complex, technically challenging, and costly.
What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious
maneuver and assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer. The current capability assessment of amphibious maneuver
and assault systems to meet the objectives stated in the 2022 NDS as
well as Combatant Commander requirements is at risk.
Over the past 14 years, the Navy and Marine Corps have done 11
studies that show with historical maintenance readiness no fewer than
(31) Amphibious Warfare Ships (AWS) consisting of (10) LHAs/LHDs and
(21) LPDs are required to keep two three AWS Amphibious Ready Group
(ARG) / Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) forward while maintaining a
sufficient number to train and certify ARG/MEU teams. . If directed,
the current contingency plans indicate that the Naval force will be
required to deploy (5) ARG/MEUs in a condensed timeframe.
The current 30-year shipbuilding plan, when combined with
decommission plans, does not meet the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA statutory
requirement of maintaining no less than 31 AWS.
The Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program will
provide a modern, fully amphibious armored personnel carrier to enable
otherwise dismounted ground combat formations with a greater range of
maneuver options in the littoral operating environment, along with
significantly improved lethality, protection, and command and control.
The ACV is in operation now in the Fleet Marine Force and will be fully
fielded across the force by 2028.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize the
development and acquisition of capabilities required for sea basing,
connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore
to achieve a full spectrum capability in the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps, more than any other service, has a unique
nature regarding essential requirements that are subject to the Naval
Service budgetary process. The Amphibious Warfare Ship (AWS) statutory
requirement and other critical capabilities including connectors, C4I
afloat capabilities, preposition and afloat assets, and the Next
Generation Logistics Ship which are essential to the Stand-in Forces
and crisis response operations, all fall outside the Marine Corps Total
Obligation Authority (TOA). Amongst these programs, our top priority is
to ensure the operational and statutory requirement of (31) Amphibious
Warfare Ships (AWS) is met.
Within our own TOA, the Marine Corps has prioritized the
development and fielding of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). The
ACV program is in production, has achieved initial operational
capability (IOC), and is aligned with Force Design. The second highest
priority within the portfolio remains the replacement of the High
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet. The Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program is in production and has achieved IOC.
Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that
modernization of the amphibious force--ships, connectors, and
vehicles--is achievable and affordable in the near and long terms?
Answer. Affordability can be achieved through congressional
authorized multi-ship procurement of Amphibious Warfare Ships.
Amphibious ship affordability is maximized with multi-ship buys that
stabilize the industrial base, improve buying power, and provide
efficiencies through steady, predictable workloads. This can best be
achieved by balancing new construction of LPD Flight II at 2-year
centers and LHA Flight I at 4-year centers.
The Marine Corps, more than any other service, has a unique nature
regarding essential requirements that are subject to the Naval Service
budgetary process. The amphibious warfare ship statutory requirement
and other critical capabilities including connectors, C4I afloat
capabilities, preposition afloat assets, and the Next Generation
Logistics Ship are essential to the Stand-in Forces and crisis response
operations, yet all fall outside the Marine Corps Total Obligation
Authority. Our Nation is a maritime nation that requires a modern,
ready, and forward postured naval force that can deter war and prevail
in conflict if deterrence fails. I recognize the Marine Corps'
dependency on the Navy to champion maritime expeditionary warfare
requirements, but I must also elevate those requirements when these
critical capabilities are not resourced to levels that enable the
Marine Corps to accomplish its missions.
Modernization of the amphibious force requires ensuring our
amphibious operations concepts remain current. Together with the Navy,
we are developing a new concept for 21st Century Amphibious Operations.
It will describe how we will execute amphibious operations against
future adversaries in this evolving and complex operational
environment. It will also articulate the future role of amphibious
operations in support of maritime campaigns and will describe new
operating methods that incorporate agile platforms to supplement
traditional amphibious ships. Examples include long-range, unmanned
systems that infiltrate the adversary's weapon engagement zone;
dispersed formations of manned and unmanned ships that challenge
adversary targeting; and the adoption of disruptive technologies.
Question. Given the future envisioned by the 2022 NDS are current
Marine Corps modernization plans and budgets adequate?
Answer. Yes; the fiscal year 2024 budget request delivers the
resources necessary to continue our Force Design initiatives supporting
equipment modernization, installations and logistics investments,
talent management reform, and training and education modernization.
However, any reduction in topline will challenge our ability to
modernize commensurate with the pacing threat, while simultaneously
maintaining current levels of combat ready forces.
Question. How do you plan to position the Marine Corps to modernize
its information capabilities for the future warfighting environment--
not just its networking systems, but how it uses data and information,
and how it employs information-related capabilities to shape the
battlespace in peacetime, gray-zone conflict and active hostilities?
Answer. As the Marine Corps modernizes to stay ahead of the
National Defense Strategy's identified pacing challenge, it is
imperative that the Marine Corps pursue artificial intelligence (AI)
rapidly and strategically to maintain an information and capability
advantage. To remain relevant as a fighting force, the Marine Corps
must adopt new practices that enable continuous enhancement in our
capabilities vice large-scale capability releases. Currently, the
Marine Corps is in the early stages of investing in AI with an initial
focus on AI tools that improve our ability to sense and make sense of
operating environments and which increase remote, uncrewed, and
autonomous capabilities. These tools will decrease direct risk to
marines in combat and increase our ability to understand adversary
actions while disguising our own. Specifically, these tools will help
create outsized effects for small, distributed forces in a contested
maritime environment. The Marine Corps also has AI-based initiatives
underway that will support business operations and improve
decisionmaking processes in the areas of talent management, equipment
and supply chain management, and force protection.
naval surface fire support
Question. The DDG-1000 program was initiated to fill the capability
gap for naval surface fire support. The original requirement for 24 to
32 DDG-1000 ships, each with two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, was
reduced to 12 ships, then to 10 ships, then to 7, and finally to 3
ships. The Navy now plans to dedicate those 3 ships to support theater-
level fire missions.
In your view, and given this significant reduction in the number of
DDG-1000 destroyers and their dedication to other missions, does the
Navy program meet Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire
support?
Answer. Marine Corps fire support requirements are met by a
combination of organic and joint air and surface delivered fires
including missile and gunfire support from Navy ships. The operational
DDG-1000 ships will contribute to fires required by the Marine Corps
and joint forces.
Question. What other capabilities would you rely on to help meet
naval surface fire support requirements? Will the Army's programs in
Long Range Fires meet the requirements?
Answer. The Marine Corps requires highly mobile long-range fires.
The key is the balance between range and weight. As part of a joint
force, all fires platforms are useful. While the Navy-Marine Corps team
continues to pursue cost-effective and lethal solutions in support of
the naval surface fires requirement, the Marine Corps is closely
monitoring the Army's advancements in long-range precision fires. For
example, the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is an Army program to
replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs). Like ATACMs, PrSM
can be launched from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. The
current Army plan calls for PrSM being developed in several capability
increments; Increment II is planned to incorporate a seeker warhead,
enabling it to engage moving targets at ranges well beyond the rest of
the Multiple Launch Rock System Family of Munitions. Based on the
Army's current program schedule, the Marine Corps plans to begin
procurement of PrSM Increment II in fiscal year 2027 under our High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System program.
amphibious combat vehicle
Question. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) supports
expeditionary protected mobility capability and capacity requirements
with the mission is to land and maneuver the surface assault elements
of the landing force, utilizing ship-to-shore water mobility during
amphibious operations to seize inland objectives, and to conduct
armored vehicle operations in subsequent actions ashore. The Marine
Corps is procuring the ACV as a modernized platform to replace the
aging AAV-7 fleet, with intent to procure three supporting mission role
variants, the ACV-C (Command and Control), the ACV-30 (30mm Gun
Variant), and the ACV-R (Recovery/Maintenance Variant).
What is your assessment of this modernization effort?
Answer. The ACV remains our highest Ground Combat and Tactical
Vehicle modernization priority, and the capabilities the platform
provides our marines for protected mobility, maneuver ashore, and
support to our embarked infantry are unprecedented. The program
achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in November fiscal year
2021 and has been in full-rate production of the ACV-P (Personnel)
variant since then with 201 vehicles delivered to-date. The program
will begin delivering the next mission-role variant, the ACV-C (Command
and Control), in mid-fiscal year 2024, which will deliver the latest in
on-the-move C2. The remaining two mission-role variants, the ACV-30
(30mm Gun Variant) and ACV-R (Recovery/Maintenance Variant) are on
track and within program cost and schedule controls. Modernization of
our assault amphibian capability continues to progress toward a more
lethal, survivable, and agile platform. During our transition we have
learned that fielding a new 21st century wheeled assault amphibian
platform demands more training and proficiency of our operators and
maintainers to get it right. Based upon this learning, we have
instituted several initiatives to ensure we are fielding a platform
that is able to be operated safely. The ACV has had some readiness
challenges early in its fielding. Our Program Management Office has
been working hard, in concert with, the Fleet Marine Force units to
turn this around. I am happy to report ACV readiness has been steadily
improving over the past 12 months.
Question. Recent news reports indicate the Marine Corps is seeking
additional contractors to produce variants of the ACV, but is unable to
share the technical data packages because it does not have sufficient
rights to do so. What lessons is this teaching the Marine Corps that it
needs to consider for future negotiations when considering what
technical data rights to pursue?
Answer. The Marine Corps' acquisition strategy for the original
competitively awarded contract for the initial Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) personnel carrier included an option for the complete
Technical Data Package. However, due to the limited industrial base for
Assault Amphibian Vehicles, along with a small Approved Acquisition
Objective, it did not make fiscal sense for the Marine Corps to
ultimately procure the complete TDP as the initial investment for the
data coupled with the cost to facilitate a second source could not be
recouped over the number of quantities planned. I believe every program
should evaluate the need to procure the TDP for the system in question,
but this must be weighed against the cost of the TDP and the long-term
value of the package.
f-35b requirements
Question. The Marine Corps has stated that its F-35B requirement is
420 aircraft. The total number of F-35s planned for the Department of
the Navy is currently set at 680.
Do you believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully
accommodate the needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps?
Answer. I believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully
accommodate the needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps. For the
Marine Corps, 420 aircraft consist of 353 F-35B and 67 F-35C. Though
our analysis will continue as we focus on optimizing our fleet squadron
structure, 420 total F-35s adequately support primary, backup, and
attrition Reserve requirements for the Marine Corps. This facilitates
support to Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), Global Force Management (GFM)
requirements, and the Marine Corps as a Joint Force enabler in support
of the National Defense Strategy.
Question. The F-35B brings new capabilities and operational
possibilities to the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Such new
capabilities and operating concepts require investment in shipboard
infrastructure, including upgraded data links. What is your vision for
L-class ship connectivity? What are your current plans to achieve that
vision?
Answer. One of our desired end states for all amphibious ships is
they have the capability to downlink and share F-35 data. The Navy has
already installed the new Capstone Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) on
several amphibious ships, which brings the Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) and Link-16 to the platform. Five Landing Helicopter
Docks (LHDs) are scheduled for similar upgrades over the next 5 years.
This system provides a critical combat capability that will integrate
with F-35s over Link-16.
We have also begun the installation of the Marine Corps Common
Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) Afloat on amphibious ships.
CAC2S is a mature capability that we have used in our Marine Air
Command and Control System (MACCS) for several years and provides our
MAGTFs with a multi-domain command and control capability able to
support all six functions of Marine Aviation.
To date, we have CAC2S Afloat on two amphibs with a funded plan to
put it on all LHA/LHD and Amphibious Transport Docks (LPDs) class
ships. CAC2S Afloat is a vital enabler that enhances the Amphibious
Task Force defenses, conduct long-range strikes and long-range
precision fires, and integrates the MEU Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
into Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) functions of Sea Control and
Denial.
Question. Follow-on modernization for the F-35 is scheduled to
bring key warfighting capabilities to the fleet, but the schedule and
budget remain in flux. Are you concerned about the affordability and
executability of the Department's plan for Block 4 Continuous
Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2)?
Answer. I am always concerned about affordability and executability
in any program. We continue to see cost growth and schedule challenges
with delivery of Block 4, which is a priority focus area for the Marine
Corps. We are exploring areas with the Joint Program Office (JPO)/
Industry where we can adjust the scope and prioritize efforts.
It is vital to the Marine Corps for critical capabilities like
Block 4 to deliver to the fleet when we need them, and at an affordable
cost. Developmental Test Flight Science aircraft have been identified
as a ``pacing item'' affecting executability. The Marine Corps is
currently exploring options, with the other Services, to update the
Flight Science fleet, which will be critical to F-35 development in the
coming years.
Question. What portion of the current Marine Corps F-35B fleet will
be upgraded to Block 4?
Answer. Currently, all Marine Corps F-35B and F-35C aircraft from
Lot-11 on up will be upgraded to a Block 4 configuration. This
translates to every aircraft delivered since 2021, and it equates to
approximately 75 percent of our 420 F-35s being Block 4 or higher. The
lower lot aircraft (Lot-10 and below) are planned to remain in our
training squadrons.
Question. There has been much discussion about the importance of
networking and connecting all Navy and Marine Corps capabilities across
air, land, and sea platforms. What is the Navy/Marine Corps team doing
to make machine-to-machine command and control, across multiple
domains, a reality?
Answer. The Navy/Marine Corps team recognizes the importance of
integrated networking capabilities across platforms. As such, the naval
team is coordinating efforts to modernize to expand networking
capabilities. In addition to expanding existing capabilities like the
Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) and the cooperative
engagement capability, the naval team is also working on developmental
efforts that will provide fusion sensor feeds from airborne and surface
platforms and dissemination to naval units in a secure manner.
Question. Have the Navy and Marine Corps developed and refined the
joint operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?
Answer. In addition to fielding common command and control systems
across the Naval Force, such as Common Aviation Command and Control
System (CAC2S), the Marine Corps is participating in the Navy's Project
Overmatch. Project Overmatch represents the Navy's contribution to
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). We are fully invested in
developing capabilities that seamlessly connect with the fleet and
allow the Marine Corps, as the Stand in Force (SIF), to enable kill
webs and close kill chains for the Joint Force.
Question. What is being done to ensure that the Navy and Marine
Corps airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer
competitors--not only with each other--but with the Air Force and Army
platforms as well?
Answer. Multiple efforts across the services seek to identify
datalinks and fusion platforms that will ensure interoperability and
resiliency of the future Joint Force. When facing peer adversaries, we
anticipate attacks on our network, which dictates that our systems be
both protected and resilient.
Considering the above, we have created a new restricted officer
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in the Marine Corps--Interface
Control Officers. These marines will be our tactical data link experts
and will be critical for ensuring we build and support resilient and
interoperable networks.
Question. Current technologies allow ``low probability of
intercept/low probability of detection'' datalinks to connect 4th and
5th generation aircraft. As well, other platforms, operating across
multiple domains can be networked. Who is leading this effort for the
Navy, the Marine Corps, and across the joint force, and what progress
is being made?
Answer. All the Services are exploring pathways to ensure
interoperability and information exchange requirements. These efforts
are tied to unique Service funding lines and priorities. The F-35 Joint
Program Office (JPO) is quickly becoming a touchpoint for the Services
to collaborate on datalink efforts, identify interoperability
requirements, and share information and resources.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
identified 14 critical technology areas in which investment to develop
next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics;
future generation wireless technology; advanced materials; integrated
network systems-of-systems; directed energy; integrated sensing and
cyber; space technology; quantum science; trusted artificial
intelligence (AI) and autonomy; microelectronics; renewable energy
generation and storage; advanced computing and software; human-machine
interfaces; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these
technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is
occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.
What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these
key technologies, or gaining access to such technologies from the
commercial marketplace?
Answer. U.S. technology development challenges arise when we
discuss competition for resources, such as radio frequency spectrum and
the continued availability of spectrum access. The ability to train
with the full capability of future systems remains paramount to
maintain a force in readiness capable of global response.
Within a DOD context, I view the challenges as primarily cultural/
organizational. Although we have made progress with new authorities,
such as the DOD Adaptive Acquisition Pathways (AAP), for increasing
speed to capability, technology continues to outpace our rules,
regulatory constructs, and policy.
Question. How well do you think those Department investments in
these technologies are appropriately focused, integrated, and
synchronized across all Military Departments and Agencies?
Answer. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (OUSD (R&E)) does a terrific job at identifying and
coordinating R&D research areas across the Department. Laying the right
foundation through Force Design 2030 and our data and AI infrastructure
layer helps facilitate the integration of new technologies in a rapid
manner. Although DOD has challenges with respect to rapid integration
into the DOD enterprise architecture, Combined Joint All Domain Command
and Control (CJADC2) is helping the Department bring together people,
processes, and capabilities in a more focused manner resulting in
better alignment.
Question. How has the Marine Corps prioritized limited R&D funding
across your technology focus areas? Specifically, where is the Corps
either increasing or decreasing focus and funding?
Answer. Marine Corps R&D funding has primarily been focused on
those capabilities related to Force Design. These are long range fires,
recon and counter recon capabilities, and C2 transport infrastructure
to support data exchange requirements. Maintaining and balancing
investments in both near term and longer-term R&D is necessary to keep
pace with our adversaries.
Question. How is the Marine Corps balancing revolutionary
capability advancements as compared to ``quick win'' incremental
improvements that can be rapidly fielded?
Answer. The Marine Corps balances ``quick win'' incremental
improvements against strategic force design transformations in order to
be responsive to the strategic environment and threat-informed
timelines. For instance, the Marine Corps is developing capabilities
and prototypes such as the Family of Integrated Targeting Cells now
which enable our forward FMF warfighters along with combined or joint
targeting architectures in order to afford the service time to enact
more diverse and advanced solutions that more fully integrate into the
Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) architecture. As
another example, we are embracing and leveraging Advana/Jupiter for
Enterprise data analytics in advance of building out our own data mesh
environment all the way to the tactical environment.
Question. What efforts is the Marine Corps making to identify new
technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply
them to military and national security purposes? What are the
challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the
private sector and Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps is constantly engaged with industry to
evaluate prospective technologies for our needs. Our primary impediment
to rapid experimentation within our environment is the cybersecurity
accreditation processes that must be completed prior to executing.
Question. How can the operational experience of the warfighter
better be integrated into the research and development process? Are
there appropriate places to interject warfighters in the interaction
between the DOD research and engineering community and the private
sector?
Answer. The relevance of our technical solutions is directly linked
to the timeliness of our recent operational experiences when developing
and acquiring cutting-edge technologies. Leveraging iterative
development with smaller, more frequent capability deliveries, and
receiving rapid feedback from end users is a demonstrated recipe for
success. This should be the standard for all our programs. One example
on how we're doing this today is with the Marine Corps Software Factory
(MCSWF). The MCSWF is upskilling warfighters with technical skills and
actively involving Marine developers who have direct operational
experience. This model ensures that the technologies being developed
align closely with the real-world challenges faced by the warfighters.
These Marine developers bring firsthand knowledge of operational
environments, tactics, and the needs of the end-users.
Question. How are you leveraging experimentation and prototyping
opportunities to look at new technologies and concepts that might be
beneficial for the Marine Corps, or better support the Corps role in
joint operations?
Answer. Our Marine Corps Software Factory (MCSWF) prototype is a
project where marines are trained to develop software solutions for
other marines quickly and effectively. It is a collaboration between
the Marine Corps and the Army Software Factory in Austin, TX. The goal
is to leverage the expertise and partnerships with industry, academia,
and other services to maximize resources and create innovative
solutions. The MCSWF incorporates cutting-edge commercial technology,
data science, and AI to accelerate the development of technical
solutions. Once fully implemented, it will give our Commanders the
capability to rapidly build technical solutions at the speed of
relevance in ambiguous operating environments.
Question. In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and
strengthen our National Security Innovation Base to ensure that
critical information is protected?
Answer. In the past, we viewed cybersecurity from a point of view
where we protect networks and systems. Today, we have no choice but to
take a data-centric approach with zero trust principles to protect data
wherever it may reside. The DOD needs to continue encouraging our
partners to leverage resources provided by the Defense Cyber Crime
Center's Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity program and the
National Security Agency's Cybersecurity Collaboration Center.
Additionally, as DOD implements our zero trust data security approach,
we must publish standards and incorporate associated contract language.
indo-pacific region
Question. What are the key areas in which the Marine Corps must
improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint
Force to prevail in a potential conflict with China?
Answer. Mobility in the littorals is a challenge. With the Navy, we
are the naval expeditionary force in readiness and the global crisis
response force.
The Marine Corps fights as a Marine Air Ground Task Force and has
developed a great deal of its own organic aviation mobility. We have 16
MV-22 squadrons; are standing up a 4th C-130 squadron; and we have
reached Full Operational Capability with our CH-53K, the only heavy
lift helicopter in the Joint Force. This is significant but we also
require the maritime littoral mobility of 31 L Class amphibious ships,
35 Landing Ship Medium (LSM), and other littoral connectors.
Question. Do you support the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
(DPRI), including the realignment of some U.S. marines from Okinawa to
Guam and the buildup of facilities at other locations such as MCAS
Iwakuni, Japan?
Answer. Yes.
Question. China's anti-access, area denial capabilities (A2/AD)--
including long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced integrated
air defenses, electronic warfare, and cyber--pose a significant
challenge for U.S. forces. How would you assess the threat to Marine
Corps forces and facilities from Chinese missile forces? Is it fair to
say that Marine Corps' forces and facilities in the Indo-Pacific--from
Japan to Guam--could face sustained missile attack from the beginning
of a contingency? How will the Marine Corps execute its concept of
operations known as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations in the
presence of such sustained attacks? In your assessment, have Marine
Corps investments, concepts of operations, and/or posture shifts to
date sufficiently addressed this threat?
Answer. The Marine Corps, along with USINDOPACOM and the Joint
Force are taking steps to increase missile defense and harden our
posture in the theater. Additionally, as a Service, we are continually
updating our organization, training, equipment, and operating concepts,
to mitigate the threats posed by our adversaries' capabilities.
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) is a foundational
naval concept that creates opportunities for the Service by improving
our own ability to maneuver and exploit control over key maritime
terrain, fully integrating Fleet Marine Force and Navy capabilities to
enable sea denial and sea control, and support sustainment of the
fleet. EABO is tightly coupled with the Navy's concept for Distributed
Maritime Operations (DMO) and is aligned to the ideas presented in the
Joint Warfighting Concept. Together, EABO and DMO advocate for
integrated yet distributable naval formations to support sea denial and
sea control in the face of potential adversaries who pose increasing
challenges to current naval forces
Question. Do you believe the planned joint force mix of tactical
aircraft is sufficient to counter current and future threats in
INDOPACOM, where the ``tyranny of distance'' is such a major factor?
Answer. The acceleration of the PLA's threat systems is not fully
known, so if confirmed, I would not be satisfied with anything less
than sufficient.
Question. Do you believe DOD has sufficient sealift and airlift
capabilities to move marines throughout INDOPACOM for both training and
contingency purposes and to support Marine Corps force conducting
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations?
Answer. We can do better. The Marine Corps, partnered with the
Navy, is the Joint Force's naval expeditionary force of readiness and
our Nation's global crisis response force. Expeditionary means light,
mobile, flexible, responsive, and lethal. To do this, the Marine Corps
can not stand by and wait in line for STRATLIFT, it will be too late.
We need the ability to respond when the indications and warnings
present themselves. To do this, we need organic mobility. The Marine
Corps has organic aviation, but the DOD and Congress need to find a way
to meet the amphibious warfare ship minimum requirement of 31. We also
need connectors and that is a minimum of 35 Medium Landing Ships. These
vessels, and the partnership with the Navy and its Sailors, will be the
force multiplier the Joint Force needs to gain the advantage for both
training and contingency purposes in INDOPACOM.
Question. What alternative concepts of operation, platforms, and
basing opportunities exist to address potential shortfalls in this
area?
Answer. The Concept for Stand-in Forces and the updated Tentative
Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations describe our
recommended concept of operations in the Pacific. Additionally, we are
developing and experimenting with numerous ground, sea, and aviation
platforms that are manned and unmanned for tactical and theater
mobility. As we strengthen our relations with our allies and partners
in the region we will develop and learn new alternatives that can fill
current gaps and shortfalls.
The Marine Corps is developing bridging solutions to support
littoral mobility until sufficient Medium Landing Ships (LSM) are
delivered. The initial bridging plan consists of a combination of
Expeditionary Fast Transports (T-EPF), charters and landing craft.
europe
Question. What are the key areas in which the Marine Corps must
improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint
Force to meet NDS priorities in the European AOR?
Answer. The Marine Corps is a global force and a force provider to
the EUCOM commander. The capabilities we are developing are not only
applicable in a single theater. Our Stand-In Force concept applies in
the littorals of Europe just as it does in the Indo-Pacific. We have
recently done tremendous work in the European AOR with TF-61/2, and our
2d Marine Aircraft Wing. Just like anywhere else, we provide organized,
trained, and equipped forces to enable the CCDR to campaign. We can and
are improving our ability to operate in the High North by strengthening
our partnership with our NATO Allies and European partners to enable
Joint Force capacity.
Question. What is the value of the Marine Rotational Force-Europe?
Do you support continuing that presence into the future?
Answer. The Marine Rotational Force-Europe (MRF-E) enables us to
build on relationships with our NATO partners while maintaining skills
to operate in extreme cold weather and arctic conditions. MRF-E
provides a combat credible force to the EUCOM commander, and gives him
options when dealing with crises and when working with our Allies and
partners. If confirmed, we will continue to provide combat credible
forces as required to the EUCOM Commander.
marine corps forces special operations command
Question. What is your assessment of the progress made in evolving
MARSOC capabilities?
Answer. The role of MARSOC has changed significantly since its
inception in 2006, and we continue to make necessary changes that are
consistent with our Service Force Design initiatives and derived from
our governing national strategy documents. MARSOC leverages its unique
placement and access while working closely with key Allies and partners
to create advantages for decisionmakers. MARSOC's modernization efforts
are driving the development of multi-domain sensing capabilities that
can serve to illuminate malign activity and present options in
competition or accelerate targeting in crisis and conflict.
Over the last 16+ years, MARSOC has demonstrated a unique ability
to effectively integrate with Allies and partners, while synchronizing
collective capabilities that support our Nation's interests and promote
the sovereignty and security of our partners around the globe. Their
persistent presence in key areas enables them to serve as a connector
for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM)
capabilities, which makes them a critical enabler for the Marine Corps,
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the joint force
as a whole.
Question. What unique attributes and capabilities do you believe
MARSOC brings to the joint force?
Answer. MARSOC provides the joint force a unique capability by
ensuring the littorals can be leveraged to create advantages for the
joint force. They have shown they can masterfully employ SOF Peculiar
activities to conduct multi-domain operations that can be advantageous
for the joint force. MARSOC is unique from the other SOCOM components
in that they assess and select experienced marines from a variety of
occupational specialties from within the service to ultimately generate
a SOF capability to answer GCC requirements. This diversity of
background, experiences and skill sets fosters a talented, mature, and
capable force offering for the demands of a complex operating
environment.
MARSOC applies an integrated intelligence and operations approach
to characterize the environment and enable other governmental agencies
or partner nations to understand our adversary's malign activities more
fully. Additionally, MARSOC's development of advanced uncrewed systems,
their sensors, and their enablement via the use of Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning technologies will expand and thicken
joint force kill webs and enable joint force targeting capabilities in
contested space.
Question. If confirmed, what would be the principal issues you
would have to address to improve MARSOC operations?
Answer. As the Marine Corps executes Force Design 2030, MARSOC is
working in parallel on their own modernization efforts, which includes
their concept of Strategic Shaping and Reconnaissance (SSR). This
concept is not only meant to provide the Joint Force unique global
options for deterrence, but also shapes the environment in the event of
conflict. MARSOC capabilities already, and will continue to, contribute
to USSOCOM efforts related to What Winning Looks Like, as well as to
Service concepts as elements of the forward-deployed Stand in Force
working alongside and in collaboration with FMF units.
We must continually assess if MARSOC possesses the correct mix of
organic capabilities that allow it to operationalize the SSR concept.
operational energy
Question. DOD defines operational energy as the energy required for
training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms
for military operations, including the energy used by tactical power
systems, generators, and weapons platforms. Longer operating distances,
remote and austere geography, and anti-access/area denial threats are
challenging DOD's ability to assure the delivery of fuel. As the
ability to deliver energy is placed at risk, so too is the Department's
ability to deploy and sustain expeditionary Marine forces around the
globe.
What are your ideas for future capabilities that would enable an
expeditionary Marine Corps through the assured delivery of energy to
the warfighter?
Answer. Demand reduction and use of alternative and renewable
energy sources may be useful to our ability to fight and win in the
future. We will continually face rising costs in energy and depend on
supply chains that will be contested. We are experimenting with
electric and hybrid vehicles, as well as solar and hydrogen energy.
These alternate energy sources must be sustainable in expeditionary
environments. As an example, infrastructure challenges associated with
charging electric vehicles, even at home station, are amplified in a
deployed and austere operating environment. I am committed to continued
experimentation of alternate power sources while ensuring warfighting
capability remains the priority.
Question. What are your ideas for reducing the risks associated
with the Corps's dependence on vulnerable supply lines?
Answer. It is absolutely true that one broken link in a linear
supply chain can result in an untethered force. Our MAGTF is already
designed to operate with a degree of self-sufficiency, although this is
not sustainable indefinitely. We are adjusting our institutional
mindset from reliance on a vulnerable supply chain toward sustaining
the force with resilient supply webs that leverage all available
logistics capabilities with our Navy, joint, coalition, and commercial
industry partners. I support the investments already in progress to
reduce demand at the point of need, push advanced manufacturing
capability down to our tactical units to increase self-sufficiency, and
building a Global Positioning Network that forward positions equipment,
supplies, and theater sustainment.
information operations
Question. In January of this year, the Marine Corps established an
Information Command under a Major General. This Information Command is
intended to integrate all disciplines that the Marine Corps considers
to be ``information-related,'' including cyber, space, intelligence,
and all aspects of information operations, such as Military Deception,
Psychological Operations, Military Information Support Operations, and
Electronic Warfare.
What is your understanding of how this Command is establishing or
will establish units or teams that are responsible for providing
integrated capabilities to support the information warfare needs of the
combatant commands?
Answer. The Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC) provides unity
of effort and serves as the operational linkage across five commands
including: Marine Forces Cyberspace (MARFORCYBER), Marine Forces Space
(MARFORSPACE), Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber Marines (JFHQ-C(M)) /
Joint Task Force Ares (JTF-ARES), and the Service Cryptologic Component
(SCC). The MCIC supports Combatant Commands and Fleet Marine Forces
(FMF) through traditional Global / Cyber Force Management processes.
Question. What specific structures and processes are being put in
place in this Command specifically to integrate across the elements of
Information Warfare?
Answer. The MCIC staff is responsible for integrating,
synchronizing, and enabling elements of Information Warfare (IW)
leveraging all Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) in support of
naval, joint, and combined campaigning. The MCIC employs subject matter
expertise from disciplines to include cyberspace operations, space,
communications, special access programs (SAP) / special technical
operations (STO), and information operations (i.e., MISO, MILDEC,
fires, COMMSTRAT, EMSO, SIGMAN, civil affairs, etc).
Question. From what source, if any, does this Command receive
common requirements for joint forces and joint training to support
joint information operations?
Answer. The MCIC processes requirements through three established
mechanisms to include the Global / Cyber Force Management and Military
Requirements Alignment Processes (GFMAP, CFMAP, and MRAP). Service
requirements and priorities are captured via GFM and Headquarters
Marine Corps (HQMC) Deputy Commandant Plans, Policy, and Operations
(DC, PP&O), force synchronization conference. SIGINT requirements are
captured through established NSA/CSS processes. USCYBERCOM communicates
additional requirements for assigned or allocated forces via the CFMAP
process. The MCIC, and other associated commands, coordinate by with
and through the MARFORs, sister services, assigned commands,
interagency partners, and others to identify opportunities or
requirements that support the Commander's responsibilities and
functional area alignment.
cyber
Question. The readiness of the Cyber Mission Forces assigned to
U.S. Cyber Command is substantially below acceptable levels. This
shortfall is due primarily to the lack of sufficient numbers of
personnel in each of the services in three critical work roles that are
especially demanding: tool developers, exploitation analysts, and
interactive on-net operators.
What is your understanding of the causes for the Marine Corps'
shortfalls in recruiting, training, and retaining personnel qualified
for these work roles?
Answer. Retention issues have not impacted our force presentation
for USCYBERCOM critical and pacing work roles to date.
Question. What is your understanding of the Marine Corps' plans to
correct this shortfall?
Answer. The Marine Corp is committed to 100 percent assignment in
the Cyber Mission Force and continues close coordination with
USCYBERCOM to deliver the operational capacity required by GEN Nakasone
and USCYBERCOM. We have instituted a series of accession and retention
bonus along with establishing an ``Active Duty Service Obligation for
IONs''. Our data continues to indicate that marines are staying in the
Force and on target in cyberspace because they are committed to the
mission.
Question. The mission of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is offensive
and defense warfighting in the cyber domain. However, so far, General
and Flag Officers selected to serve as Commander of Cyber Command have
been intelligence specialists rather than line officers. If confirmed,
you will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an adviser to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense.
Do you think that CYBERCOM as a warfighting command could or should
be led by an officer trained and experienced in commanding joint
operations?
Answer. USCYBERCOM could be led by an officer trained and
experienced in commanding joint operations, as long as the officer has
significant intelligence experience and understands the US Intelligence
Community (IC). Full-spectrum cyberspace operations are inextricably
linked to intelligence. Cyberspace operations are executed by, with,
and through the information environment and are fully informed by
intelligence and often yield intelligence. Commander USCYBERCOM is a
unique position in that it is also the Director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) and therefore requires unique experiences and
skillsets. Many previous operational achievements and successes in
cyberspace and the information environment rest on the alignment of
USCYBERCOM and NSA.
end strength
Question. The Marine Corps' Active Duty end strength authorization
has fallen from 186,200 in fiscal year 2020 to 177,000 in fiscal year
2023. The President's Budget would cut an additional 4,700 marines for
fiscal year 2024.
Do you believe Marine Corps' Active Duty end strength should
continue to fall?
Answer. Current plans have end-strength remaining at 172,300
through fiscal year 2028 and increasing to a floor of 174,600 by fiscal
year 2030 to achieve modernization initiatives. The Marine Corps
intends to achieve this floor sooner if possible.
Question. Is the Marine Corps' current end strength sufficient to
implement the 2022 NDS and execute the associated operational plans? If
not, what end strength do you believe is necessary to meet the demands
placed on the Marine Corps by the 2022 NDS and associated operational
plans?
Answer. Yes, the current end-strength of the Marine Corps is
sufficient to implement the 2022 NDS, the associated operational plans,
and the Global Force Management requirements. The Marine Corps fiscal
year 2023 target end strength is 172,300, based on the impacts from
COVID and our planned reduction to support modernization efforts.
Current plans have end strength increasing to 174,600 by fiscal year
2030.
Question. If recruiting continues to be a challenge, how will you
ensure the Marine Corps has sufficient personnel to support the 2022
NDS?
Answer. The Marine Corps' current plans have end strength
increasing to 174,600 by fiscal year 2030. This will be accomplished in
part by increased retention, which has been exceptional. The Marine
Corps met its retention mission in fiscal year 2022 and will do so in
fiscal year 2023 as well. We are grateful that, once an individual
becomes a Marine, they want to remain a Marine. In keeping with the
tenets of FD2030, the Marine Corps is retaining more of our highest
performing marines especially within leadership and highly technical
billets. This will prepare our forces to succeed on dispersed, complex,
distributed, and high-technology future battlefields.
Question. What additional force shaping authorities and tools does
the Marine Corps need, in your view?
Answer. I would ask that Congress continue to ensure the Marine
Corps has the predictable funding for us to execute the flexible
incentive and special pay authorities and non-monetary incentives to
their greatest effect, particularly in critical, hard-to-fill
specialties. If confirmed, I will be sure to come to you with any new
statutory authorities that we may need.
marine reserve
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate relationship
between the Active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve?
Answer. Historically, our Reserve component has supported the
Active component and fought alongside them. Our Reserve component is an
integral part of the Marine Corps Total Force. The ability of the
Marine Corps to meet combatant commanders' requirements on a day-to-day
basis, as well as respond to a major contingency, is absolutely linked
to the readiness of our Marine Corps Reserve. Similarly, the Active and
Reserve components must be viewed as having a dynamic, mutually
supporting relationship, rather than a unidirectional support
relationship from the Reserve force to the Active component.
Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the
Marine Corps Reserve? If confirmed, what new objectives would you seek
to achieve with respect to the Reserve's organization, force structure,
and end strength?
Answer. Our Reserve Force will continue to serve in all domains,
remaining ready to augment and reinforce our Active Force for both
preplanned missions and national emergencies. We are continuously
working to optimize the organization, structure, and end strength of
our Reserves to meet mission requirements, including increasing the
permeability of service from Active component to Reserve component, and
back, as part of our Talent Management 2030 initiative. The right
Marine for a specific job should not be constrained simply because the
task is normally associated with an Active or Reserve component billet.
We must become comfortable with processes that enable us to pair the
right marines, with the right talent, to the right billets.
Question. Are you concerned that continued reliance on the Reserve
components to execute operational missions--both at home and around the
globe--is adversely affecting the Marine Corp Reserve's ability to meet
its recruiting and retention missions? Why or why not?
Answer. Our citizens join the Marine Corps for a reason. They want
to serve. Our Reserve Force is no different. They seek meaningful
opportunities to practice their profession. If anything, mission tasks
to our Reserve helps to boost recruiting as our Reserve marines
Question. In your view, does the Marine Corps Reserve serve as an
operational Reserve, a strategic Reserve, or both? In light of your
answer, should the Marine Corps Reserve be supported by improved
equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing
for readiness going forward?
Answer. Both. As a Total Force, the Marine Corps strives to
seamlessly integrate the Reserve component with our Active component
forces. We consistently plan and budget for new equipment and training,
seeking to maximize AC-RC interoperability and overall readiness at
every opportunity. We must continue to provide our Reserve component
the high-quality training opportunities that are afforded our Active
component to ensure the ]Total Force is uniformly prepared to respond
to crisis or conflict. At the same time, we remain mindful of the fact
that the demands of our Reserves must be balanced so as not to
unreasonably disrupt civilian occupations.
Question. Do you expect to meet prior service accession goals for
the Marine Corps Reserve this fiscal year? Why or why not?
Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps is on pace to meet this fiscal year's
Reserve component prior service recruiting accession requirement in
each category for both officer and enlisted accessions.
Question. What is your understanding and view of the Office of the
Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness proposal for comprehensive
Reserve Component Duty Status Reform?
Answer. I fully support the legislation proposed to update and
simplify Reserve component duty statuses. It is essential to producing
real efficiencies and reducing unnecessary complexity. The measure
would reduce the number of duty statuses and ensure RC Marines
activated under different authorities are entitled to the same
benefits. This will increase lethality and readiness of our Total
Force.
Question. Does the Marine Corps have the personnel and pay
information technology systems required to implement effectively this
Reserve Component Duty Status Reform proposal, if enacted in law?
Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps is well-equipped to implement the
Reserve Component Duty Status Reform changes. The Marine Corps Total
Force System (MCTFS) is a mature, fully integrated pay and personnel
system that allows our Reserve members to seamlessly transition between
components. It already handles both Active and Reserve component pay
and entitlements, allowing reservists to transition between duties
statuses and receive the pay and entitlements they deserve in a timely
and accurate fashion.
recruiting and retention
Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission asserted
unequivocally that the most critical resource required to produce a
highly capable military is highly capable people, in the quantity
required, willing to serve. Yet, DOD studies indicate that only about
23 percent of today's youth population is eligible for military
service, a decrease of 6 percentage points in the last 5 years.
Further, only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards
are interested in serving.
As rates of physical inactivity among American youth continue to
rise, what in your view, if anything, could the Marine Corps do to
prepare potential recruits for military service, and specifically
service in the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps has always prepared American youth for
success after they are contracted and enter the Delayed Entry Program.
Beyond that, the best way to prepare the youth of America for service
is a national effort by all government and educational leaders. The
President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports is a great example
of a way to combat the growing youth obesity epidemic.
Question. What do you consider to be the key to your future
success, if confirmed, in recruiting the highest caliber American youth
for service in the Marine Corps?
Answer. The key has and will always be the marines and the
standards we uphold. The Marine Corps' recruiting force must also be
manned and resourced to meet the future needs of the Corps. As
population and technologies shift, we must be agile in bringing the
story of the Marine Corps--and the opportunities we offer--to the young
men and women of America.
Question. What do you consider to be key to your future success, if
confirmed, in retaining the best qualified personnel for continued
service in positions of greater responsibility and leadership in the
Marine Corps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to expand retention of our
highest-performing, most committed, and talented marines. We have been
working hard to provide improved predictability, transparency, and
certainty to our marines and their families while preserving career
development and our ethos and culture of the most responsive and
expeditionary fighting force in the world. Another key to retention
success is focus on and funding for our Marine & Family Programs.
Question. In your view, do current accessions standards--
particularly DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits--accurately
predict recruit attrition and/or future success in the Marine Corps?
Answer. Current accessions standards for tier-one recruits have
been reliable predictors of recruit attrition and future success in the
Corps. In concert with DOD and the other services, we continue to
explore evaluation methods to expand a more holistic view of talent as
indicators of potential.
Question. Given the historically low numbers for eligibility to
serve, do you believe a reassessment of accessions standards is in
order? If so, what accessions standards in your view are outdated or
worthy of review?
Answer. Earning the title Marine will always be challenging, but I
agree that accession standards must continuously be reviewed. Given the
State of the physical and mental health of the youth of America, I look
forward to working with you and recruiting stakeholders to ensure we
have it right.
Question. In your view, does the Marine Corps have the necessary
authorities to recruit and retain personnel with critical skills,
including cyber?
Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps appreciates all the authorities we
have received to support improved recruiting and overall talent
management. We are open to additional initiatives to further improve
school access. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to
ensure we continue to retain our top marines, especially those
requiring critical skills.
Question. What monetary and non-monetary incentives are the Marine
Corps employing in an effort to retain Marine aviators? Which
incentives or combinations thereof have proven most effective?
Answer. Aviation retention is a challenge that must be viewed
holistically and cannot be solved by bonuses alone. Availability of
flight hours, opportunities to train and execute missions, stability in
assignments, and other non-monetary factors are important. It is a
challenge to compete with the monetary compensation packages and family
stability offered by commercial airlines who seem to be increasingly
aggressive in recruitment of qualified aviators. If confirmed, I will
work with the other services, DoD, and Congress to study ways to ensure
we have a sufficient volume of skilled Marine Corps aviators.
Question. Because the ``all-Volunteer'' military depends on a
constant flow of volunteers each year, as the number of eligible and
service-propensed American youth declines, it will become increasingly
difficult to meet military needs.
Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of
American youth eligible and interested in serving in the Armed Forces
poses a threat to national security?
Answer. Absolutely. The significant decline in propensity and
eligibility has concerned the Marine Corps for years. Our country is
replete with talent and, if confirmed, I commit myself to engaging
national leadership to revitalize the value of service to our American
youth. Access to high schools, community colleges, and universities is
also imperative to reach the highest caliber men and women of our
country. Addressing these issues is of the utmost importance, and I
would look forward to being part of that effort.
Question. What is the role of ``influencers''--parents,
grandparents, teachers, coaches, and clergy to whom a young person
turns for advice--in a young person's decision to join, or not to join
the Marine Corps?
Answer. The role of influencers is immeasurable. Today, the youth
of America exist in an environment where influence is inexpensive and
readily available. Through social media and persistent connectivity,
the youth of today are constantly bombarded with narratives of service,
many of which are negative and erroneous. The traditional influencers--
family, teachers, coaches, and government leaders--are more important
today than ever.
Question. Has the integrated DOD recruiting campaign, Their Success
Tomorrow Begins With Your Support Today, been successful in increasing
the willingness of youth or their influencers to consider service in
the Marine Corps?
Answer. While we do not have data on the specific impact to the
Marine Corps, any support from the government and DOD to reinforce
value of service to influencers is vital and appreciated. We know that
parents and other influencers play an important role in guiding youth
views on military service. I believe the DOD campaign raises overall
awareness of the military as an option while allowing each service the
opportunity to differentiate unique missions and cultures.
military compensation
Question. The Department of Defense has traditionally assessed the
competitiveness of military pay by comparing Regular Military
Compensation against salaries earned by a comparable civilian
demographic.
Do you agree that the primary purpose of a competitive military pay
and benefits package is to recruit and retain a military of sufficient
size and quality to meet the objectives of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. Yes. Fair compensation is a readiness issue and improves
quality of life and retention. We are actively participating in the
DOD's 13th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, to make sure
our marines are being adequately compensated for their service. If
confirmed, I will look forward to the results and take all appropriate
actions on the recommendations.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current
military pay package in achieving this goal--particularly given the
ever-tightening recruiting market?
Answer. The dominant motivation to earn and keep the title Marine
is the sense of purpose and pride that marines have in service to the
Nation. With that said, we know that compensation is a dinner table
issue for many families and competitive pay and compensation are
essential to our ability to recruit, retain, and provide for the
overall quality of life for our marines and their families. We are
actively participating in the DOD's 13th Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation, to make sure our marines are being adequately compensated
for their service. It is important we carefully consider the total
compensation package pay, allowances, bonuses, housing, healthcare, tax
advantages, Thrift Savings Plans, etc. If confirmed, I will look
forward to the results and take all appropriate actions on the
recommendations.
Question. Do you believe the largely ``one-size-fits-all'' model
for military pay adequately rewards individuals for their specialized
skills and provides an appropriate incentive to scientists, engineers,
and members of other high-value professions to access into the
military?
Answer. Congress has given us many flexible incentive and special
pay authorities and non-monetary incentives to assist with filling the
critical, hard to fill specialties that we need. Authorities such as
special pays and incentives are undeniably factors in retention
decisions. They are the most direct way we can influence the decision
that help shape our force. Studies and our own anecdotal experience
support the belief that special and incentive pays are highly effective
when combined with a strong sense of purpose, individual agency,
challenging opportunities for growth, quality of life for Marine
families, and competitive pay. We are thankful that Congress has given
us broad and flexible authorities--and funded these authorities--so
that we can fine tune our incentives to the skills and occupations that
we need to retain.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current
military pay and benefits package?
Answer. I believe the overall compensation and benefit package is
competitive. However, we are actively participating in the DOD's 13th
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, to make sure our marines
are being adequately compensated for their service. If confirmed, I
will look forward to the results and take all appropriate actions on
the recommendations.
Question. What specific recommendations do you have for controlling
the rising cost of military personnel?
Answer. Controlling the rising costs of personnel is a challenge.
However, we must always keep faith with our marines. As a Nation, we
are asking our service members to perform more complex tasks on more
dynamic and fast-paced battlefields with more complicated technologies
than at any time in human history. In an American society where dual-
income, dual-career households have become the norm, and perhaps a
necessity, Marines spouses are frequently disrupted in their career
progression and earning potential by the instability of the military
career. We are actively participating in the DOD's 13th Quadrennial
Review of Military Compensation, to make sure our marines are being
adequately compensated for their service. If confirmed, I will look
forward to the results and take all appropriate actions on the
recommendations.
service of transgender persons
Question. Each of the Service Chiefs has testified before this
Committee that in their experience, the service of transgender
individuals in their preferred gender has had no negative impact on
unit or overall military readiness.
In your experience, has the service of transgender individuals in
their preferred gender had any negative impact on unit or overall
military readiness?
Answer. No. I am not aware of any negative impact on readiness.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact on readiness of
requiring the separation of all transgender soldiers currently serving
in the military? Please support any assertions with non-anecdotal data.
Answer. We do not want to lose any high performing marines. We do
not know the total number of transgender marines in the Marine Corps,
but we believe the number is small.
Question. How many marines have sought and been approved for an
``in-service transition'' since 2021?
Answer. In accordance with DOD policy, we do not track medical
requests for ``in-service transition''.
Question. How many transgender persons have enlisted or
commissioned into the Marine Corps since 2021?
Answer. In accordance with DOD policy, we do not track gender
marker changes.
Question. How many marines have changed their gender marker in the
Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) since 2021?
Answer. In accordance with DOD policy, we do not track gender
marker changes.
Question. How many marines have been referred to the disability
evaluation system due to complications related to an in-service gender
transition since 2021?
Answer. The Department of Navy (BUMED) manages the criteria for
referral to the disability evaluation system. If confirmed, I would be
happy to discuss this with BUMED and followup.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of
key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
advocacy and parenting skills programs; child care; spouse education
and employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation
(MWR) services, including Commissary and Military Exchange stores.
If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
consider a priority?
Answer. The Commandant has testified that the highest quality of
life priorities are health care, housing, and childcare. The Marine
Corps is committed to caring for our marines and their families and
always striving to improve their quality of life. If confirmed, I will
remain committed to ensuring that these and other quality of life
programs continue to be a priority.
Question. How would you work across the Marine Corp and with
Military Service Organizations and Congress, to sustain and enrich
high-value quality of life and MWR programs for marines and their
families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue our goal of creating a
seamless system of care with multiple stakeholders--both internal and
external to the Marine Corps, to include service organizations,
Congress, DOD, other services, and the public/private sector. Through
these partnerships, we can expand our reach and enhance the programs
and services our marines and families most need.
family readiness and support
Question. What do you consider to be the most important family
readiness issues for marines and their families?
Answer. As we mature our force and seek to retain more marines
every year, supporting marines and families is critical to recruit and
retain the right marines. We view family readiness through the
perspective of each individual Marine and that Marine's family; the
life events that they will experience together, the challenges they
will face together, and the elements critical to the quality of life
for any family. Similarly, I understand that no two families are the
same, that they will not have the same needs or experiences and that
their needs may change as their family's circumstances change. The
Marine Corps must possess a system capable of accommodating the
broadest range of needs that may exist. However, certain commonalities
will no doubt exist in the needs of families writ large. Safe and
sufficient housing, access to childcare, continuity of childcare
arrangements, access to high quality medical services and specialty
care, spousal employment opportunities, and co-location of dual-
military families are all key issues impacting family readiness.
Three of the Marine Corps' primary family readiness priorities are
childcare, spouse employment, and PCS flexibility. Our warfighting
readiness is dependent on a Marine's support structure at home and in
their communities. I recognize the importance of Marine and family
stability and support it as a major line-of-effort for successfully
achieving our talent management goals. If confirmed, I will seek to
expand high-quality childcare, improve spouse employment opportunities,
and increase PCS flexibility.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the family
readiness issues you identified are properly addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I will aim to ensure Marine commands have the
tools required to fully inform their marines of the opportunities that
exist. Further, I will work with the Department of the Navy to ensure
that childcare and medical facilities are adequately resourced, both
through military construction and hiring and retaining a sufficient
workforce to operate these facilities. If confirmed, I will examine
personnel assignment processes to better facilitate both the continuity
of childcare arrangements, housing, and spousal employment that are
currently affected by the current 36 month Permanent Change of Station
(PCS) cycle. Outside the contiguous United States (OCONUS) moves are
challenging for many families in all the above categories, and the
process to clear a family who volunteers for a OCONUS move is currently
lengthy and burdensome. If confirmed, I will examine the incentives for
OCONUS moves, the process for moving a family to an OCONUS location,
and the support that is available overseas to ensure our Marine
families have what they need from the initial receipt of orders through
their return to the United States.
Ensuring that our marines and their families understand the full
spectrum of our family readiness capabilities and resources and
recognize them as part of the Force Preservation construct is critical.
If confirmed, I will work to increase utilization of these capabilities
to maintain a Marine's readiness, resiliency, and quality of life,
balanced with the other needs of the Marine Corps.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that support related
to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness is provided to Marine
Corps Reserve families, as well as to Active duty Marine families who
do not reside near a military installation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring quality
of life support programs are designed to effectively assist all marines
and their families, whether they are deployed, geographically isolated,
or on the home front. Face-to-face and virtual learning and support
opportunities will continue to be offered along with toll-free
telephone and internet resources. Our family readiness programs will
continue to be flexible and constantly adjusting to meet the needs of
our geographically dispersed marines and their families.
Question. The Committee often hears that Active duty families have
difficulty obtaining child care on base and that there are thousands of
military families on waitlists to receive infant care.
If confirmed, what specifically would you do to provide Marine
Corps families with accessible, high-quality childcare, at an
appropriate cost?
Answer. Our primary childcare challenges are staffing related. To
mitigate these challenges, we have utilized non-competitive childcare
employee transfers, increased employee salaries, and provided CDC
employees with childcare discounts. If confirmed, I will continue to
look for additional solutions, as well as consider recommendations from
the DOD Child Development Program Recruitment, Retention and
Compensation Task Force.
support for military families with special needs
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that a Marine with a
special needs family member is relocated only to a new duty station at
which the medical and educational services required by that family
member are available?
Answer. Every Marine enrolled in EFMP receives a careful review of
their proposed PCS orders to ensure the location meets the medical and
educational needs of family members. EFMP continues to excel in its
mission to ensure marines are assigned to duty stations where the
required medical services and educational support are available for
their family members' needs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure effective
administration of the exceptional family member program (EFMP),
balancing the needs of the Marine Corps, the needs of exceptional
family members, and the desires of both marines and their dependents to
have a rewarding experience in the Marine Corps?
Answer. The Marine Corps EFMP ensures continued effectiveness by
remaining a 'high touch' person-to-person program with quarterly
engagement with every enrolled family. This allows the staff to build
meaningful relationships with families to focus our efforts on
proactive preventive support activities. Our specialized attorneys
provide free legal counsel and representation to EFMP families, as they
seek State and Federal disability-related benefits to which they are
entitled. Our `Warm Hand Off' process that assists EFMP families
before, during and after a PCS. If confirmed, I will prioritize the
EFMP.
Question. If confirmed, what new initiatives might you suggest for
improving the ability of marines with a special needs family member to
obtain the medical services and support their family member requires?
Answer. The Marine Corps EFMP has a strong record of service to our
marines and families. To continue this success, we must prioritize
funding, training, and support for our EFMP staff and installation
commands. If confirmed, I would recommend continued development of
Defense Health Agency medical case management for highly impacted EFMP
families prior to a PCS. This will ensure these families have a
dedicated medical case manager to help them transition their medical
care within and across TRICARE Regions.
suicide prevention
Question. On May 17, 2022, Secretary Austin established the Suicide
Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (SPRIRC) to
conduct a comprehensive review of clinical and non-clinical suicide
prevention and response programs across the force.
If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for
the Marine Corps in implementing the SPRIRC's recommendations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain focused on trying to reduce the
number of suicides. The Marine Corps is working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to develop SPRIRC implementation plans and will
take swift action once guidance is issued.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that sufficient suicide prevention and mental health resources are
available to deployed marines, as well as to marines and their families
at home station?
Answer. The Marine Corps will continue to provide mental and
behavioral health resources to marines deployed or forward based, and
to family members in need at home station locations through our vast
network of prevention stakeholders and workforce. The current provider
shortage is a challenge. If confirmed, I will advocate for additional
providers to meet the needs of marines and families. I will also
continue to ensure that our Operational Stress Control and Readiness
(OSCAR) marines are trained to identify those within their ranks who
may be demonstrating signs of distress. For marines not near an
installation, the Marine Corps has partnerships with the Department of
Veterans Affairs and the National Guard Bureau to expand marines'
access to counseling and other resources.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services over
the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to sexual
assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants
accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence
of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of
increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the
Military Service Academies.
Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the
Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps have put in place to
prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect sailors and
marines who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If
not, what else must be done?
Answer. I appreciate the recent IRC recommendations and increased
resourcing for sexual assault prevention and response. The Marine Corps
supports these efforts and is fully engaged in implementing the IRC
recommendations. I believe they will improve prevention and response,
so we ask for time to implement these new requirements. The Marine
Corps will remain steadfast in holding perpetrators accountable for
their crimes and actions; assisting victims with the care they need;
and ensuring commanders and senior enlisted are responsible for the
climate of their unit. If confirmed, I will remain committed to
preventing incidents of sexual assault.
Question. The most recent report on the prevalence of sexual
assault and harassment at the Military Service Academies revealed
disturbing levels of sexual harassment in particular, placing the
Service Academies among the poorest performing military units in
incidents of harassment, suggesting an environment conducive to sexual
assault and other misconduct. What is your reaction to this report, and
what actions would you propose to reduce the prevalence of sexual
harassment at the Service Academies?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Navy on sexual assault
prevention and response at the Academy. However, I am sure many of the
actions needed to combat sexual assault are similar. I appreciate the
recent IRC recommendations and increased resourcing for sexual assault
prevention and response. The Marine Corps supports these efforts and is
fully engaged in implementing the IRC recommendations. Further, the
Marine Corps will continue to send only the highest caliber officers to
the United States Naval Academy to ensure they are part of a positive
command climate.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for
yourself in preventing sexual harassment in the Marine Corps, including
within the civilian workforce?
Answer. Just as unit commanders set priorities and serve as
personal examples within their units, so does the Commandant of the
Marine Corps for all marines and civilian marines. If confirmed, I will
continue to foster a culture of accountability and trust, and to ensure
the Marine Corps provides the support and care for those in need. I
remain committed to taking every report seriously while promoting trust
in the chain of command. This must remain a priority with constant
vigilance and continuing education for marines of all ranks across our
Corps.
Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from
Congress to improve the Marine Corps programs to prevent sexual
harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. The Marine Corps is not seeking additional authorities at
this time. If confirmed, I will notify Congress if I believe we need
new statutory authorities.
mental and behavioral health care
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to
deployed and forward-based marines, as well as to marines and families
at home station locations?
Answer. In keeping with the response from question 148, the Marine
Corps will continue to provide mental and behavioral health resources
to marines deployed or forward based, and to marines and families at
home station locations through our vast network of prevention
stakeholders and workforce. The current provider shortage is a
challenge. If confirmed, I will advocate for additional providers to
meet the needs of marines and families. I will also continue to ensure
that our Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) marines are
trained to identify those within their ranks who may be demonstrating
signs of distress. For marines not near an installation, the Marine
Corps has partnerships with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the
National Guard Bureau to expand marines' access to counseling and other
resources.
Question. If confirmed, what specifically would you do to ensure
that sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to
Reserve Component Marines and their families who do not reside near a
military base?
Answer. The Marine Corps ensures that mental and behavioral health
resources are available to Reserve marines and their families who do
not reside near a military base. Our Psychological Health Outreach,
Military OneSource, Vet Center, and Yellow Ribbon Programs are all
available to Reservists and provide support throughout activation
cycles and deployments. The Marine Corps also has partnerships with the
Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Guard Bureau to expand
marines' access to counseling and other resources. If confirmed, I will
ensue these services remain.
Question. The Marine Corps has made progress in reducing the stigma
associated with help-seeking behaviors, but some marines, remain
concerned that their military careers will be adversely affected should
their chains of command become aware that they are seeking mental or
behavioral health care. At the same time, the Marine Corps chain of
command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical and mental health
conditions that may affect the readiness of the marines under their
command.
In your view, does the Marine Corps effectively bridge the gap
between a servicemember's desire for confidentiality and the chain of
command's legitimate need to know about matters that may affect
individual service member and the unit readiness?
Answer. Protecting a servicemember's confidentiality is of utmost
importance to the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps will ensure that
only those with a need to know about a Marine's private matters will be
informed. This helps ensure marines seek the help they need. We want
marines to seek help for their mental and behavioral health--just as if
they would for a physical injury. Get help, get treated, and get back
in the fight.
Question. In your view, do non-medical counseling services provided
by DOD Military Family Life Counselors have a role in promoting the
readiness of marines and their families?
Answer. Yes. DOD Military Family Life Counselors and other non-
medical counseling services are an important part of the continuum of
care and services that increase readiness and resiliency in the Force.
Additionally, we continue to support Military OneSource which provides
confidential, non-medical counseling, resources and support to our
marines and their families anywhere in the world.
legal services
Question. How are responsibilities for legal services allocated
between the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the Counsel for
the Commandant?
Answer. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant (SJA to CMC) and
the Counsel for the Commandant (CL) have two distinctive roles. Title
10, United States Code, section 8046 dictates the Staff Judge Advocate
to the Commandant's (SJA to CMC) responsibilities, while Department and
Service regulations set forth the Counsel for the Commandant's (CL)
duties.
By law, like the Service Judge Advocates General, the SJA to CMC is
the Commandant's legal advisor on all matters arising within the Marine
Corps and from the Commandant's Joint Chiefs of Staff membership. The
SJA to CMC advises the Commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps on any
matter directed, or on any matter the SJA to CMC determines should be
brought to the Commandant's attention. The SJA to CMC assists the
Commandant in executing Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train,
and equip legal support essential to an expeditionary force.
CL is part of the Office of the General Counsel of the Navy. CL
advises on acquisition law; arms control and international arms
regulation; business and commercial law; real and personal property
law; civilian personnel and labor law; fiscal law; environmental law;
occupational safety and health law; intellectual property law; Freedom
of Information Act and Privacy Act law; some legislation; and such
other areas as may be assigned to support the Navy and Marine Corps.
SJA to CMC and CL share intelligence law and oversight of
intelligence activities, intelligence-related activities, special
access programs, sensitive activities, ethics and standards of conduct,
and cyber law.
Question. How would you modify the allocation of these
responsibilities, if confirmed?
Answer. No modification of responsibilities is necessary.
Question. Who has responsibility for providing legal advice on
military justice matters in the Marine Corps?
Answer. The SJA to CMC, exclusively. This is by statute: 10 U.S.C.
8046. Further, like the Service Judge Advocates General, 10 U.S.C. 806
requires the SJA to CMC to make frequent inspections in the field in
supervision of the administration of military justice. Marine judge
advocates advising Commanders at all levels regarding military justice
do so under the supervision of the SJA to CMC. The SJA to CMC is also
exclusively responsible for qualifying Special Trial Counsel for
certain types of offenses (10 USC 824a) and serving on the Joint
Service Committee on Military Justice (DoDI 5500.17).
Question. What is the role, if any, of the Counsel for the
Commandant in making duty assignments for Marine Corps judge advocates?
Answer. None. Statutory responsibility over the assignment of
Marine Corps judge advocates rests with the Commandant, who exercises
that authority through Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, with the advice of SJA to CMC.
Question. What is your view of the need for the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Indispensable. A Commandant's access to independent legal advice
from the SJA to CMC is essential to the Marine Corps. It is so
important that 10 U.S.C. 8046 prohibits any interference with that
advice by any officer or employee within of DOD.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Marine Corps
judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to Marine Corps
commanders?
Answer. Independent legal advice by Marine Corps judge advocates is
as important to commanders as it is to the Commandant--it is
indispensable and protected by statute (10 USC 8046). Marine Corps
doctrine provides ``The role of a judge advocate within a staff is to
help generate and maintain tempo for a Commander through the
application of timely, correct, and complete legal advice.''
Independent legal advice helps our Commanders make the best decisions
possible in the fastest time possible.
officer personnel management system reforms
Question. The John S. McCain NDAA for fiscal year 2019 contained
several provisions to modernize the officer personnel management
system. These reforms were designed to align officer career management
with the priorities outlined in the 2018 NDS. How is the Marine Corps
implementing these authorities today and to what effect?
Answer. I believe the provisions within the 2019 NDAA have
benefited the Marine Corps significantly, and the Marine Corps has
implemented many of these authorities in Talent Management 2030.
Options such as promotion opt-out and career intermission have
positively contributed to mid-career retention. The Marine Corps plans
to enact pilot programs this year for lateral entry and increased
Active-to-Reserve and Reserve-to-Active permeability.
Question. If confirmed, how would you lead the Marine Corps in
further leveraging these new authorities?
Answer. We appreciate the authorities given to us by Congress is
fiscal year 2019 and have implemented many of them, most recently as
part of Talent Management 2030. We believe that promotion opt out and
career intermission have positively contributed to mid-career
retention. We have laid the foundations and are enacting pilot programs
this year for lateral entry and increased Active-to-Reserve and
Reserve-to-Active permeability. If confirmed, I will continue to expand
and accelerate these efforts and will not hesitate to ask for
assistance from this Committee when required.
Question. Are there other authorities that the Marine Corps needs
in order to modernize the management of its officer personnel?
Answer. Not at this time.
joint officer management
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2017 modified the Joint
Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act
in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition
of ``joint matters'' to expand the types of positions for which an
officer can receive joint duty credit. Further, it reduced from 3 years
to two the minimum tour length required for joint duty credit. What is
your assessment of the effectiveness of the fiscal year 2017
modifications to the JQO system?
Answer. The fiscal year 2017 modifications to the JQO system and
current updates have been effective and allow for greater flexibility
in the assignments process. Greater assignment flexibility facilitates
optimal career progression like key billets in grade, broadening PME,
and command assignments. Additionally, the flexibility enables the
fulfillment of service requirements while fully supporting the joint
force.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
eligibility for promotion to Flag officer rank, consistent with the
operational and professional demands of Marine Corps officers?
Answer. Yes. We believe that current JQO requirements are well-
aligned with what it takes to be an effective officer in the Marine
Corps. Lifelong career development of our officers is essential to
ensuring that officers serving as general and flag officers have the
requisite experience and education in joint matters. Joint warfighting
experience and expertise is a key factor increasing lethality and
readiness.
Question. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to
JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that Marine Corps officers
are able to attain both meaningful joint and Corps-specific leadership
experience and adequate professional development?
Answer. I believe that access to JPME-II officer education
opportunities is vital to support joint education requirements and
ensuring the Marine Corps maximizes the number of officers designated
as joint qualified. I do not have any additional modifications of the
JQO prerequisites to recommend at this time.
professional military education
Question. The 2022 NDS asserts that Professional Military Education
(PME) curricula should be refocused to foster critical thinking and
analytical skills, fluency in critical languages, and integration of
insights from the social and behavioral sciences.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to update the Marine
Corps' PME system to ensure that it fosters the skills highlighted in
the NDS to develop a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with both
the intellectual and military leadership acumen to merit promotion to
General Officer?
Answer. We have already shifted both officer and enlisted PME to an
outcomes-based education model to ensure that graduates possess the
critical and creative thinking skills, decisiveness, and warfighting
acumen needed to win in today's complex global environment. Programs
such as the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Commandant's Doctor
of Philosophy program, which select officers who have demonstrated the
ability for strategic thinking and planning, directly contribute to the
cadre of warrior scholars able to serve the Nation now and in the
future as General Officers. Additionally, the Marine Corps recently
established the Strategist Management program, which focuses on
aligning officers with specialized PME to utilization tours that are
well suited to their advanced education in strategy application. If
confirmed, I would expand on the initiatives in Training and Education
2030 to enhance critical thinking and analytical skills through more
fully integrating wargaming into both resident and distance education
opportunities to advance a better understanding of the next generation
capabilities. The Marine Corps must ensure that the distance and
blended programs are as rigorous and challenging as our resident
programs, which means the development and execution of virtual wargames
for distance and blended programs. Nearly 80 percent of Marine officers
complete PME via our distance and blended programs, so including
wargaming there as well greatly increases the exposure of our officer
corps to threat-based problems and solutions.
Question. In your view, are there opportunities in Marine Corps PME
to improve STEM cognizance and cyber fluency across the joint force to
ensure that leaders understand and can effectively employ technologies
to fight and win our Nation's wars?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advance the integration of
emerging technology within the Marine Corps' training and educational
institutions as an enduring priority. We are in the process of hiring
talent to support expanded curriculum in the areas of emerging
technology and cyber and have already begun to integrate these topics,
along with space, into both officer and enlisted PME curricula. While
raising overall cognizance in these areas, the Marine Corps will
continue to partner with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS),
recognized as a premier STEM school, to produce officers and enlisted
marines who are trained for, then fill specific technical billets. NPS
is the main provider for technical graduate programs for the Marine
Corps, including the Service's technical PhD program, which produces
PhDs annually in areas like Operations Service's technical PhD program,
which produces PhDs annually in areas like Operations Service's
technical PhD program, which produces PhDs annually in areas like
Operations Service's technical PhD program, which produces PhDs
annually in areas like Operations Service's technical PhD program,
which produces PhDs annually in areas like Operations
Question. In your view, is there a role for Marine Corps PME in
developing basic product management skills across the joint force to
ensure that military leaders are proficient in the employment of
software and automation in warfighting?
Answer. With the exponential advances in artificial intelligence
and unmanned systems, there is a requirement to develop proficiency in
the employment of software and automation in warfighting. While we
train for speed and accuracy, we educate for creativity and judgment.
We have only begun to scratch the surface of employing AI, whether it
be in autonomous weapons systems, developing plans, or adapting cross-
domain kill-webs. To that end, we are in the process of hiring an
Emerging Technology Chair to infuse relevant trends into PME as they
affect our application of technology in a complex and evolving global
space.
the dod civilian personnel workforce
Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD civilian personnel
policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S.
Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of
Personnel Management. Over many years, the annual defense bill has
included numerous extraordinary hiring and management authorities
applicable to specific segments of the DOD civilian workforces.
In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the
Department of the Navy in effectively and efficiently managing its
civilian workforce?
Answer. One of our greatest challenges is the time to hire new
employees. Delays in hiring can cause us to lose talent to the private
sector, who can hire faster than we can. We thank Congress for the
direct hiring authorities you have provided us; they are making a
positive difference in recruiting talent.
Question. In your view, do Marine Corps supervisors have adequate
authorities to divest of a civilian employee whose performance of duty
fails to meet standards or who engages in misconduct? If so, are Marine
Corps civilian and military supervisors adequately trained to exercise
of such authorities? If not, what additional authorities or training do
Marine Corps supervisors require?
Yes. I believe there are adequate authorities to address civilian
employees whose performance is not acceptable or who engage in
misconduct. I also believe that Marine Corps civilian and military
supervisors are provided training to take appropriate action in these
situations. However, because these situations can often be complex, it
is important to look for ways to improve training to help us adequately
manage these situations. If confirmed, I would like to work with you on
possible ways to improve this.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
audit
1. Senator Reed. General Smith, why is it important for the Marine
Corps to achieve a clean audit opinion?
General Smith. We owe the U.S. taxpayer and our Congress the
ability to see and understand the pathway of how, and on what, every
dollar we are given is spent. Achieving a clean audit opinion will
demonstrate that we are spending our financial resources as intended,
expenditures are authorized appropriately, critical needs are being met
in a timely manner, and that we are keeping the receipts so that we can
balance the checkbook at the end of each month. Accountability has
always been a core value in the Marine Corps, but the audit is helping
to shape what we do and how we do it to enable increased visibility and
transparency for our leaders. These improvements will help us to make
faster and smarter decisions in an environment that is increasingly
time and resource constrained.

2. Senator Reed. General Smith, what steps has the Marine Corps
taken to evaluate unit readiness and commander performance based on
audit results?
General Smith. Commanders have always been held accountable for the
readiness of their equipment and marines. Commands are inspected on
their training, administration, financial management, maintenance,
supply, and other areas that measure a unit's readiness. The results of
these inspections, along with other metrics, contribute to the
evaluation of a unit, and its commander. Audit results are now another
measure that can be used to evaluate a unit's readiness. Audit results,
whether they be good or bad, inform us how we can do our jobs better,
quicker, and more efficiently. One of the areas of audit that has
received intense focus has been the accountability of our military
equipment, ammunition, gear, and real property. The Marine Corps has
received very positive audit results in this area. These results
demonstrate that the work our marines do every day to maintain and
ensure accountability of our property is valuable for both combat
readiness and good financial stewardship.
cost assessment and program evaluation
3. Senator Reed. General Smith, the Office of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) was established in the 2009 Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act to reintroduce an independent cost estimation
capability to both supplement, as well as provide analytic oversight,
for the Service cost estimation communities. Do you think that overall
the Department of Defense (DOD) cost estimates have improved since
2009, including by providing help to the Service cost estimation shops
to improve their analyses?
General Smith. As a result of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform
Act, cost estimation within the DOD has improved. For example, the
latest edition of the Cost Guide Book in 2020 provides the detailed
timeline and process for developing the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE)
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). CAPE's statutory
function to provide the ICE for MDAPs acts as a forcing function for
the Services to ensure their estimates have multiple reviews prior to
committing a significant amount of resources to an acquisition program
as well as to ensure the program will be fully funded in the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP).

4. Senator Reed. General Smith, could you provide some examples
where CAPE has supported Marine Corps analyses, and what the outcome
was as a result of that support?
General Smith. During the deliberative budget process CAPE has
supported cross service collaboration and information sharing which has
led to some optimal program decisions. For example, CAPE's analysis of
the MQ-9 program identified an opportunity for cost avoidance by
transferring platforms from the Air Force, that were planned for
divestment, to the Marine Corps to support a need for similar
capability. CAPE's analysis resulted in $170 million cost avoidance to
the Department which, in turn, was reinvested in other Force Design
programs and readiness.
Additionally, during the deliberative budget process, Marine Corps
collaboration with CAPE analysts regarding classified and special
access programs resulted in $1 billion increase to the planned
investment in those programs. This increased investment resulted from
CAPE's assessment of the positive value of the proposed capabilities to
the joint force and the need to accelerate the development of the
capabilities against the pacing threat.

5. Senator Reed. General Smith, in what ways do you think CAPE
could improve their ability to support the Department, as well as the
Military Services?
General Smith. Marine Corps analysts work with CAPE analysts on a
daily basis. CAPE's team of analysts supplements and supports our
service analysis through collaboration, information sharing, and
independent cost estimates. In particular, CAPE's review of service and
program office assumptions on the cost, schedule, and performance of
Major Defense Acquisition Programs through evidence-based analysis can
lead to refined cost estimates and more accurate programming and
budgeting decisions. The most valuable aspect of an independent cost
analysis is true independence and disciplined adherence to data-based
analysis in examining service and joint requirements. This is where
CAPE provides the most value to the Title 10 responsibilities of the
Service Chief and the Joint Force.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
lessons learned in ukraine
6. Senator Manchin. General Smith, I very much appreciated our
conversation yesterday in my office. One of the topics we discussed was
the justification of our support to Ukraine due to the lessons we're
learning, and fulfilling our duty as the superpower of the world in
upholding democracy for a nation that is shedding its blood for that
chance. What lessons has the Marine Corps learned and how do you plan
to implement them if confirmed as the Commandant?
General Smith. Though I believe that many of the final lessons from
this war may only be apparent after its conclusion, we are capturing
vital data and observations as the Russia's war against Ukraine
progresses, and we will continue to learn as the war continues. In my
testimony, I mentioned the importance of mobile, low signature forces
and the ability to strike from long-range. In addition to those points,
the use of unmanned systems in many roles informs our Force Design
modernization and our work with Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous
Systems. I would also like to underscore the critical importance of
inspirational leadership and esprit on all levels from the strategic to
the tactical on the Ukrainian side. The human factors will always be
predominant in war, and the Ukrainians have over-performed because of
their indomitable fighting spirit and willingness to make enormous
sacrifices to defend their country and way of life. Additionally, the
protraction of the war and the continuing exorbitant rate of munitions
expenditure on both sides underscore the need for a resilient U.S.
defense industrial base (DIB). We must assume that any near-peer fight
in the future will not be resolved in days or weeks. In contrast, it
will most probably conclude in months if not years or decades.
Accordingly, we must ensure that our DIB retains excess capacity and
the ability to rapidly expand if needed. I would also add a critical
but intangible factor: the value of adaptation. The Russians have
adapted in response Ukrainian gains, and the Ukrainians have adapted in
response--and the cycle continues. We will take away new lessons with
every adaptation, but the broader point is the critical ability of our
forces to adapt real time to changes on the battlefield. This is
something marines have been doing throughout our history, and it is a
core aspect of our Talent Management 2030 and Training and Education
2030 initiatives. Having the right talent that is trained to operate
and adapt in a chaotic environment is at the heart of our current and
future force.
funding to take care of our people
7. Senator Manchin. General Smith, another topic we touched on was
the stark contrast between Russia's treatment of their troops and the
treatment of our troops. We leave no one behind and created the Defense
POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] Accounting Agency to ensure
anyone that was lost at war is constantly being searched for, but the
Russians fail to support their troops on the front lines and abandon
their corpses where they fall instead of returning them to their loved
ones. I make this point to say that our troops and their families know
when they put on that uniform that they will be taken care of no matter
what happens, and that comes at a premium price. Has this been your
experience over your more than 35 years of military service?
General Smith. Yes. In my experience, and throughout the history of
the Marine Corps, we have and will always ``take care of our own.'' Our
devotion to our marines and their families epitomizes our highest
ideals of ``Semper Fidelis.''
delayed budget and continuing resolutions
8. Senator Manchin. General Smith, multiple sources, including
retired general officers, the National Defense Industrial Association,
the American Enterprise Institute, and the Pentagon itself have all
recognized the damage failing to pass a budget on time has on both our
national security and the taxpayer. The American Enterprise Institute
threw out a rough estimate of $200 million per day under the latest
continuing resolution that covered the start of fiscal year 2023,
that's a total of $18 billion. The DOD Comptroller noted that from
fiscal year 1991 to 2010 the average delay for defense appropriations
was 29 days, and that has since ballooned out to 118 days, 4 months. I
have repeatedly asked the Pentagon for as concise a number as possible
to put a figure on the damage these delays are causing to our national
security and wasted taxpayer money, but so far I have only received an
estimate from General C.Q. Brown in the Air Force who told me that a
continuing resolution would see the Air Force and Space Force lose $9
billion in purchasing power. Can I have your commitment to identify
these impacts to the Marine Corps going forward to help hold us in
Congress accountable to getting the Department funded on time?
General Smith. Yes.
joint all domain training complex
9. Senator Manchin. General Smith, thank you for coming to West
Virginia last October to see the training the Marine Corps is already
doing in my State. I also greatly appreciate your honest assessment of
the role West Virginia could play in the future if our significant
amount of mine land was made available for military training.
Thankfully after working with the Department for nearly 5 years, a
feasibility study will begin this year to identify precisely what this
training could look like in a concept I've termed the Joint All Domain
Training Complex (JAD-TC). What value do you see for East Coast Marine
Corps units in training in the difficult and dynamic terrain of West
Virginia?
General Smith. In 2021, in an effort to improve infantry officer
training, the Marine Corps researched numerous training venues and
chose FOLA Mine Complex training area (FMCTA) in West Virginia as a
suitable location based on the terrain, climate, and ample
opportunities to meet training outcomes. Since 2022, the Marine Corps'
Infantry Officer Course has conducted culminating exercises (CULEX)
designed to simulate 96 hours of force-on-force continuous distributed
combat operations against a peer adversary in a dynamic environment at
FMCTA, with over 500 infantry officers completing this training. West
Virginia offers a reasonably affordable, offsite training venue to
replicate expeditionary distributed operations. The complex terrain
presents unique challenges for combat operations and is consistent with
the global latitudes observed in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. Additionally, the challenges presented by the climate and
vegetation offer a superb opportunity to conduct simulated combat
operations in an austere environment, that will better prepare our
marines to fight and win in the future.

10. Senator Manchin. General Smith, if confirmed, do I have your
commitment that the Marine Corps will engage in this feasibility study
moving forward?
General Smith. If confirmed, you have my commitment to engage in a
feasibility study moving forward.
force design 2030
11. Senator Manchin. General Smith, the Marine Corps has made many
necessary divestments from legacy platforms, such as tanks and
investments in newer technologies and capabilities that will better
enable the Marine Corps to counter our pacing threat, China.
Specifically, the Marine Corps has self-funded over $15 billion worth
of investments in new capabilities. I would say that makes them very
proactive in their stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars. Can you
detail to the Committee, how as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you
would continue the development of Force Design 2030 where General
Berger will be leaving off?
General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to the continued
modernization of the Marine Corps to ensure a ready, capable, and
postured naval expeditionary force is available to compete on the
current and future battlefield. Moreover, I remain committed to
integrating your Marine Corps with the Joint Force and our partners and
Allies.
To remain ahead of our adversaries in an operating environment that
evolves at a faster pace than ever before, I will continue to champion
adaptive and iterative change within the Service. The Marine Corps'
Campaign of Learning guides and informs modernization by providing a
disciplined and structured mechanism for analysis, experimentation, and
evaluation. This methodology has and will continue to be applied to be
as efficient and effective as possible.

12. Senator Manchin. General Smith, we're proud to see the Marine
Corps making tough decisions as it relates to funding to get after the
China problem, but what is your estimate for future funding increases
needed to support Force Design 2030 and what will be your top three
priorities?
General Smith. My estimate for future funding requirements needed
to support Force Design 2030 will be provided in the fiscal year 2025
budget and in each subsequent budget cycle as we take stock of the
impacts of inflation and prioritize our modernization efforts across
the Department.
The Services must be capable of modernizing faster than the pacing
threat while accounting for adversary timelines that the Intelligence
Community and Strategic Guidance have projected. Force Design has made
significant progress and the Marine Corps is better prepared as a naval
expeditionary force-in-readiness to operate inside actively contested
maritime spaces in support of fleet operations and joint campaigns.
There are several priorities that the Marine Corps is focused on to
sustain modernization efforts: equipment modernization, talent
management reform, and training and education modernization. These
pillars will ensure our force stays focused and on target in developing
a Marine Corps that is lethal and enables the Joint Force to project
power forward when directed. If confirmed as Commandant, I will remain
committed to accelerate these priorities to continue modernization
efforts across the Marine Corps to remain expeditionary and ready.
amphibious ship fleet
13. Senator Manchin. General Smith, previously referred to
amphibious warships as the ``Swiss Army knife'' of the Joint Force,
whether deploying to Europe in the face of Putin's war in Ukraine or
providing humanitarian aid and disaster response, our sailors' and
marines' use aboard of amphibious ships does more to project power and
maintain United States global dominance than any other tool in the
Joint Force's kit. Put simply, they punch well above their weight
class. Unfortunately, these ships are placed very low on Navy's
priority list. Ignoring, for the moment, the failure of the Navy to
adequately fund the production of amphibs, what is your assessment of
the importance of and the quantity of amphibs needed for the Marine
Corps to carry out your mission in an open conflict with China and the
People's Liberation Army (PLA)?
General Smith. The Marine Corps has a requirement for no fewer than
31 amphibious warfare ships: 10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs. Since 2019, three
Department of the Navy studies have examined amphibious warfare ship
force structure requirements. The 31-ship requirement was informed by
combining the findings of those studies, the most recent being the
Secretary of the Navy directed Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study
(AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship readiness trends over the
past 10 years. AFRS was a threat informed, scenario-directed, model
driven, multiple phase event executed by the analytic arms of the Navy
and the Marine Corps. The findings of AFRS were briefed to the service
chiefs and SecNav, and 31 amphibious warfare ships were reported as the
minimum required. This finding is consistent with 11 amphibious warfare
ship inventory studies completed over the last 14 years.
The last Congress recognized this requirement in the James M.
Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 117-263 (2023).
Section 1023 requires the Navy maintain ``not fewer than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships, of which no fewer than 10 shall be amphibious
assault ships.'' This law mirrors the needs of the 2022 National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, but it is important to
note, this requirement is a floor not a ceiling.
talent management 2030--invest and retain enlisted marines
14. Senator Manchin. General Smith, in 2021 the Marine Corps
published Talent Management 2030. This document detailed various
proposals to ensure that the Marine Corps maintains its lethality by
investing in its most important weapons system--marines. As you know,
the Marine Corps discharges 75 percent of first term enlisted marines
every year and recruits approximately 36,000 new marines every year to
fill the subsequent gap instead of retaining and investing to build
experience in these younger marines. Can you comment on the potential
benefits of a ``retain and invest'' model?
General Smith. Our success on future battlefields depends on our
force being more highly trained, cognitively mature, and operationally
experienced. We always seek to attract and recruit the best and
brightest that our Nation has to offer. We recognize that the
investment we make in marines to prepare for the changing character of
future conflicts needs to grow. This emphasis on the ``retain and
invest'' model envisions marines staying in uniform longer and enables
us to invest in their experience, professional development, advanced
training, and education. This goal is particularly true for those high-
technology and leadership intensive occupational specialties. By
changing our paradigm, and through a deliberate targeted maturation of
our force, we are increasing the proportion of fully trained,
qualified, experienced, and deployable marines in our ranks to be
better positioned to dominate on dynamic, complex, and distributed
future battlefields.

15. Senator Manchin. General Smith, what are the biggest challenges
you believe you will face as the Commandant toward affecting this
reform?
General Smith. Talent Management 2030 reform consists of processes
and policies to include modernizing personnel information technology
(IT) systems and upgrading analytical personnel modeling software. The
scale and scope of the challenge represented by our disparate, discreet
data bases are significant. However, we have invested in developing a
modern personnel IT system that increases transparency to marines,
commanders, and human resource professionals. We envision that this
system will soon be able to leverage artificial intelligence to best
match the aptitudes, skills, and desires of individual marines to the
warfighting requirements of the Marine Corps. While we have made
initial gains, we need to increase the pace of progress. This requires
navigating the current acquisition process that is not conducive to
rapidly acquiring and fielding IT solutions. We ask for continued
support from Congress in this vital endeavor.
landing ship medium
16. Senator Manchin. General Smith, under General Berger, the
Marine Corps recently stood up its first Marine Littoral Regiment,
which is intended to directly deter China's aggression in the Pacific,
in Hawaii. However, I am concerned that the Marine Littoral Regiment is
missing their key piece of equipment--the Landing Ship Medium (LSM).
This ship is meant to be a low-cost, low-draft, and survivable vessel,
which is exactly what this Committee has asked for in rapid acquisition
of equipment, but was not included in the Navy's Fiscal Year 2024
budget request. In fact, the Navy does not plan to purchase any LSMs
until Fiscal Year 2025. At a time of increasing tensions in the world,
especially the Pacific, as the future Commandant how do you believe
this delay in acquiring the Landing Ship Medium hinder the Marine
Corps' ability to operate in costal environments?
General Smith. Operational intra-theater surface maneuver, tactical
mobility, and sustainment are critical today in the Indo-Pacific to
assure campaigning activities are achieved for integrated deterrence of
malign activities. Until the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) is available in
appreciable numbers (IOC 8fiscal year 2034), the Navy and Marine Corps
have developed a strategy known as the Littoral Maneuver Bridging
Solution (LMBS). The LMBS utilizes a mixture of available ships and
landing craft, as well as chartered platforms with an operational focus
for use in Indo-Pacific region. The LMBS provides flexible options and
informs future naval resourcing decisions to ensure the Marine Corps
can operate throughout the littorals as required until the LSM is
delivered to the fleet. However, I must emphasize that the LMBS is only
a stop-gap measure. The Navy cannot postpone any further this
Committee's direct request to purchase LSMs in the near future.

17. Senator Manchin. General Smith, will you explain the difference
in Marine Corps capability against our pacing threat when comparing 18
LSMs that the Amphibious Force Requirement Study identifies as a
minimum capability and 36 LSMs, which the Marine Corps considers their
requirement?
General Smith. The purpose built, beachable, shore-to-shore LSM
requirements is derived from multiple studies and wargames that
highlight a critical gap in capability and capacity between amphibious
warfare ships and their complementary landing craft. The LSM allows
shore-to-shore maneuver, mobility and sustainment of task organized
units of action of stand-in forces (SIF) and enables sustained
logistics forward in contested environments. The delay in this
capability hinders our ability to establish key terrain and develop
relationships required. The LSM inventory objective is 35 ships based
on the concept of operations (CONOPS) to provide littoral maneuver for
three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) as the foundational formation of
the SIF. The near-term inventory requirement is 18 LSM to initiate the
program. Maturation of the CONOPS and experimentation will inform the
long-term inventory objective.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
spectrum
18. Senator Rounds. General Smith, there is an effort by some in
Congress to require sharing of all or some of the 3.1-3.45 GHz band of
the electromagnetic spectrum between the Department of Defense and
commercial interests in the private sector. As I understand it, the
3.1-3.45 GHz band is primarily used by Department of Defense ground-,
air-and sea-based radars and sensors to detect airborne and missile
threats. For example, the Marine Corps G/ATOR [Ground/Air Task Oriented
Radar] system uses that band to track cruise missiles, aircraft, and
remotely piloted vehicles, as well as rocket, artillery, and mortar
fire. Can you confirm that the Marine Corps relies upon systems that
reside on this portion of the spectrum to enable their warfighting
capabilities and protect our marines? If so, can you share any other
examples of either specific systems that currently operate there or
some of the missions and capabilities which rely on this portion of the
spectrum?
General Smith. Yes, Marine Corps radars exclusively rely upon this
band to ensure a tactical advantage against our adversaries supporting
the Marine Corps' detection and tracking range requirements, as well as
on-the-move detection. Other examples of systems that rely upon this
spectrum band include Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS); and
the Installation Counter small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (I-CsUAS)
fixed-site tower radar. These systems represent 100 percent of our
Short-range surface-to-air shoot-on-the-move air defense; short range
electronic warfare C-UAV air defense; and protection for the maneuver
force capabilities.

19. Senator Rounds. General Smith, providing this Committee with
your best military advice, can you characterize the risk to the mission
and the risk to the Force if action were taken to enable the auction of
portions of this band prior to the analysis of the results of the
statutorily required DOD-NTIA [National Telecommunications and
Information Administration] study, which is required to be completed by
September 2023?
General Smith. Proceeding with the auction prior to completing the
analysis poses critical risks to the Marine Corps' ability to support
operations and training in support of defense of the homeland and
strategic deterrence. If the auction were to take place before a full
analysis of risks, the Marine Corps could lose vital capabilities as
described in question 18.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
question for the record overview
20. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, I am submitting many of the
same questions for the record (QFR) I asked General Berger following
the Department of Navy's fiscal year 2024 posture hearing on April 18,
2023. Two months later I have yet to receive a response. Please answer
all of these QFRs in your own voice and expressing your personal
opinion. Avoiding duplicating answers from what the Committee will
eventually be receiving from General Berger is important in assessing
your independent views as the new nominee to be Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
General Smith. I am grateful for the opportunity to answer your
questions in my own voice to express my independent views. Many of my
views of the Marine Corps have been developed through my
responsibilities as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and
previous positions, such as the Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration. In both positions, I developed a deep
understanding of the strategic guidance that directs modernization, the
threat environment that supports strategic assessments, and the
innovative concepts and analytical underpinnings designed to achieve
that same guidance. In cases where the questions require me to provide
responses based on facts my responses will be similar to those provided
by General Berger. Where applicable, I have provided and highlighted my
individual views and assessments.
marine corps recruiting
21. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, over the last year the Marine
Corps has received significant praise for meeting its recruiting goals
while the other Services have not. However, Force Design 2030 has cut
more than 12,000 marines since 2019 from the Active Duty component
alone. Do you believe that personnel reductions in the Active and
Reserve components made it easier for the Marine Corps to meet its
recruiting goals?
General Smith. I do not. The current recruiting environment is
challenging for all Services and end strength reductions have not made
it easier. While Active Duty end strength has dropped, current plans
have end-strength remaining at 172,300 through fiscal year 2028 and
increasing to a floor of 174,600 by fiscal year 2030 to achieve
modernization initiatives. This milestone will be accomplished in part
by increased retention, which has been exceptional. The Marine Corps
met its retention mission in fiscal year 2022 and will do so in fiscal
year 2023 as well. We are grateful that, once an individual becomes a
marine, they want to remain a marine. In keeping with the tenets of
FD2030, the Marine Corps is retaining more of our highest performing
marines especially within leadership and highly technical billets. The
high retention of our best marines will prepare our forces to succeed
on dispersed, complex, distributed, and high-technology future
battlefields.
force design 2030 divestment
22. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, militaries around the world
have long understood combined arms to mean employing a combination of
infantry, tanks, cannon artillery, engineers, and close support
aircraft in a coordinated manner. Those same militaries today are
endeavoring to add these systems to their inventories, and daily we see
their utility on the battlefields in Ukraine. Yet, the Marine Corps has
divested or are on the way to divesting all the Marine Corps' tanks,
two-thirds of its cannon artillery, nearly all its engineering
equipment that enables breaching of enemy minefields and obstacles, all
its engineering equipment that enables clearing and proofing
minefields, all its bridging, and nearly a third of its close support
rotary and fixed wing aircraft. How is it possible for the Corps to
have ``the most proficient combined arms teams on the globe'' without
these needed weapons and items of equipment?
General Smith. The Marine Corps defines combined arms as ``the
synchronized and simultaneous application of different arms and
elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each
element were used separately or sequentially.''
At its core, the Marine Corps modernization effort is focused on
enhancing the ability to conduct combined arms. A key element of Force
Design 2030 is developing and employing modern capabilities that
contribute to a multiple joint ``kill webs.'' This approach also
improves our ability to leverage non-lethal fires that provide the
combatant commander more options in day-to-day competition and pre-
conflict deterrence activities. However, we continue to invest in
modern lethal fire platforms that provide a more effective capability
than legacy systems. This includes legacy systems such as heavy tanks
and towed, tubed cannon artillery that lack the precision and range to
be relevant in the maritime and littoral battlespaces applicable to our
directed pacing threat. The idea that FD2030 reduces the ability of
marines to conduct combined arms is an uninformed thought. One of our
modern rifle companies will be able to destroy most targets on R400
(combined arms company assault range aboard Marine Corps Air Ground
Combat Center Twentynine Palms, CA) before even leaving its attack
position, which is not the case for a pre-FD2030 rifle company.
Prior to Force Design 2030 initiatives, the Marine Corps focused
primarily on kinetic combined arms consisting of surface and air assets
making our combined arms capabilities two dimensional. Today, the
Marine Corps still maintains the ability to conduct combined arms in
the surface, air, and sea domains but we have significantly increased
both the kinetic and non-kinetic combined arms capabilities in the
cyber and space domains creating a multi-domain capability. Regardless
of what assets are utilized to employ combined arms, they will only be
as effective as the Command and Control (C2) architecture that is
designed to enable the execution of the assets. Therefore, Force Design
2030 has focused significantly on organizing, training, and resourcing
the MAGTF to effectively conduct MAGTF C2 at echelon and rapidly
transition across the competition continuum to enable all-domain joint
and combined kill webs. To do this we must transition from a legacy,
air-land battle paradigm to a 21st century, all-domain, joint single
battle mindset. We can no longer accept multiple, disparate C2 systems
optimized for single-domain awareness bound by analog/human-speed
processing. There are a variety of ongoing efforts to evolve the
Service's C2 capability to conduct all domain operations, enable kill
webs, and further expand our value to the joint and combined force.

23. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, do any of the changes to force
structure in Force Design 2030 violate the title 10 requirement that
``[t]he Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so
organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three
air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as
may be organic therein?'' In your answer, please provide specific
references to MCRP 1-10.1 and the exact number of marines in the three
divisions and three air wings in 2018 and 2023.
General Smith. Force Design 2030 adheres to the requirements set
forth in Title 10 of the United States Code. The Marine Corps regularly
assesses our force structure, capabilities, and readiness to ensure
that we can fulfill our obligations as outlined in Title 10. Force
Design 2030 optimizes Marine Corps force structure to meet the demands
of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and of modern warfare. This
plan was developed with the direction and oversight of senior civilian
and military leaders.
Force Design 2030 creates a more agile, flexible, and lethal force
that is better equipped to operate forward, compete, project power and
influence as directed by the 2022 NSS, NDS, and other strategic
guidance documents. These robust modernization efforts include
enhancing the Marine Corps' ability to conduct expeditionary and
amphibious operations, improving our ability to operate in contested
and denied environments, and increasing our capacity to conduct
distributed operations with joint and allied partners. These efforts
are also directly tied to our Title 10 requirements of:
``The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to
provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting
air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of
advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.''
Over the past two decades, the Marine Corps has been involved in a
land campaign as the Nation directed and required. Force Design 2030
redirects the Marine Corps to our original mission as a naval
expeditionary force in readiness that supports the fleet commanders
within the naval campaign. Overall, Force Design 2030 intends to ensure
that the Marine Corps remains a highly capable and responsive force
that can effectively fulfill our obligations under title 10 and other
statutory and regulatory requirements.

Total Force Structure--Active Component
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................. 186807 178678
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change in force structure......................... -8129
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Division
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................. 43695 39727
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share of total force.............................. 23.4% 22.2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change in force structure......................... -3968
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................. 39343 35931
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share of total force.............................. 21.1% 20.1%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Change in force structure......................... -3412
------------------------------------------------------------------------

24. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if confirmed as the next
Commandant it will be your responsibility to organize, train, and equip
marine forces. It stands to reason that marines would need to have the
skill and knowledge to operate effectively in conjunction with
supporting elements from sister Services, which would require training
with them. Including information on units, dates, and locations, where
have marines trained with the Army tank units, combat engineers, and
bridging units in the past year?
General Smith. The Marine Corps conducted multiple joint exercises
with U.S. Army units in the previous 12 months at the National Training
Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center
at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and during Exercise Northern Strike 23-1 at
Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan. The purpose of this
training is to prepare marines to operate effectively in a joint
environment. Consequently, Marine Corps Operation Plans (OPLANS) are
being revised in accordance with guidance from combatant commanders,
and capabilities contained in the Defense Readiness Tables and
Apportionment Tables in response to Force Design 2030.
Marine Corps training with Army tank, combat engineer, and bridging
units in the previous 12 months includes:

a. National Training Center 22-10; 3--16 September 2022; Ft Irwin,
CA.
i. 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion trained with 2d Brigade
Combat Team, 1st Armored Division to increase close-in, low altitude,
surface-to-air weapons fire proficiency and readiness in support of
maneuver elements and joint force.

b. National Training Center 23-05; 20 February--31 March 2023; Ft
Irwin, CA.
i. 1st Anglico trained with 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3d
Infantry Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack Controller
proficiency and readiness.

c. National Training Center 23-06; 20 March--30 April 2023; Ft
Irwin, CA.
i. 3d Anglico trained with 3d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st
Armored Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack Controller
proficiency and readiness.

d. Northern Strike 23-1; 20--29 January 2023; Selfridge Air
National Guard Base, MI.
i. VMFA-115 trained with 1st Battalion, 120th Field Artillery
Regiment, 32d Infantry Brigade Combat Team to increase proficiency in
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, cold weather Joint Close Air
Support, Forward Air Controller-Airborne; Tactical Air Control-
Airborne, Strike Coordination and Recon, Armed Recon, and Suppression
of Enemy Air Defenses.

e. Joint Readiness Training Center 23-04; 20 February--5 March
2023; Ft Polk, LA.
i. 2d Anglico trained with 2d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack Controller
proficiency and readiness.

f. Joint Readiness Training Center 23-07; 12 April--13 May 2023;
Ft Polk, LA.
i. 6th Anglico trained with 3d Infantry Brigade Combat Team-
Airborne, 82d Airborne Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack
Controller proficiency and readiness.

25. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in General Berger's statement
to the Committee for the Navy's fiscal year 2023 posture hearing, he
stated``. . . the Marine Corps is now complete with our major
divestments. Reducing the approved acquisition objectives (AAO) of
major programs like the CH-53K or F-35 at this point would not produce
resources for investment elsewhere and would be premature decisions.''
Because the Marine Corps has cut squadrons it is unclear where the
major program aircraft you list will go if the Marine Corps retains the
numbers of aircraft in the program of record (POR). If you're confirmed
as the next commandant will you come back to Congress seeking funds for
the personnel and support equipment required to again stand up the
needed squadrons?
General Smith. The Marine Corps Program of Record (POR) for F-35 is
420, and 200 for CH-53Ks. The number of squadrons (organizational
construct), and aircraft (composition) within aviation units has always
evolved inside the POR to ensure the Marine Corps remains the Nation's
crisis response force, while modernizing to meet the challenges of the
future operating environment. To provide an example of this evolution,
between 1990 and 2016;

F/A-18 squadrons changed organizational construct or
composition nine times.
AV-8B squadrons changed organizational construct or
composition six times.
H-1 squadrons changed organizational construct or
composition six times.
CH-53 squadrons changed organizational construct or
composition four times.

No plan remains static. Today, the Marine Corps seeks to optimize
its force construct to support the Joint Force and meet combatant
commanders (COCOM) force requirements. Ideally, the Marine Corps can
staff these organizational construct changes with internal manpower
structure offsets. For instance, the Commandant made the decision to
increase two forward based F-35 squadron composition from 10 F-35s to
12; qualified maintainers from the training squadrons will be used to
offset the increase in manpower required to maintain more aircraft. The
training squadrons will be, in turn, backfilled by contract
maintenance.
In sum, these decisions must take a holistic approach to the entire
personnel structure of the Marine Corps, to ensure the service builds
the most capable Fleet Marine Force to support the Joint Force and meet
COCOM force requirements. Therefore, if confirmed as the CMC, I would
seek congressional support for any structure and equipment increase
required to meet national security objectives.

26. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps' divestment
of its tanks and assault breaching, route clearance, and bridging
assets raises concerns about the Marine Corps' ability to meet its
title 10 requirement to organize, train and equip fleet Marine Forces
`` . . . for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to
the prosecution of a naval campaign.'' The Commandant has stated
previously that the Marine Corps will get these items from the Army.
Was an agreement in place with the Army when the Marine Corps began
Force Design 2030 divestments?
General Smith. There was no formal agreement with the U.S. Army
when the Marine Corps began Force Design modernization efforts. After
multiple iterations of wargaming, analysis, and strategic guidance,
heavy land-combat capabilities were determined to not be a high
priority for prosecuting the landward portion of a naval campaign in
the areas prioritized to the naval Services in the NDS. This is
especially true in the modern threat environment that is characterized
by advanced technological capabilities that operate in multi-domain
formations with long-range precision fires platforms creating an anti-
access, area-denial (A2/AD) dilemma for the surface naval fleet. The
Marine Corps divested of tanks, route clearance, assault breaching,
etc. to invest in new capabilities more readily applicable to the
future joint maritime operating environment.

27. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, are there any current
agreements with the Army or other Services on these divested or reduced
capabilities?
General Smith. No. While there are formal joint agreements for
capabilities such as aerial refueling, theater level logistics, etc.
there is no formal agreement with the other services concerning these
capabilities divested of or reduced as a part of Force Design
modernization efforts. It is worth repeating that any future fight will
inherently be a joint fight. In that fight, we, as services, are tasked
with manning, training, and equipping our respective forces to provide
those forces to a Joint Force Commander who will have the authority to
employ those forces with mutually supporting joint capability without
the need for formal agreements or MOUs. Given its modular organization,
the MAGTF remains tailorable, able to receive attached units from other
services or nations, such as naval construction battalions, or
infantry/armor brigades.

28. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, has the Marine Corps
formalized any agreement with the Army to provide equipment or
capabilities since 2019?
General Smith. No; however, should Marine Corps Forces find
themselves in a land campaign requiring the use of heavy armor, and if
said armor is available within the theater of operations, the Joint
Force Commander has the authority to task organize by pairing Marine
Corps infantry formations with U.S. Army armored formations.
The Marine Corps and the U.S. Army regularly train alongside one
another employing the full spectrum of the respective service's
capabilities. Once forward deployed in response to crisis or
contingency, it is the Joint Force Commander's responsibility and
prerogative to task organize U.S. Army and Marine Corps formations in
such a way that make sense to accomplish the mission.

29. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what assurances has the Marine
Corps received from the Army about the availability of these units or
assets for training and integrating with Marine formations during
combat operations?
General Smith. There have been no assurances. As a general rule,
services do not provide assurances to other services regarding what
assets they may or may not make available for training. The Marine
Corps and the U.S. Army regularly train alongside one another employing
the full spectrum of the respective service's capabilities. Once
forward deployed in response to crisis or contingency, it is the Joint
Force Commander's responsibility and prerogative to task organize U.S.
Army and Marine Corps formations in such a way that makes sense to
accomplish the mission.

30. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, during the May 2022 Department
of the Navy posture hearing, I asked General Berger to ``provide to
this Committee a timeline and a chart that anticipates year by year
between now and 2030, or maybe even looking back when Force Design 2030
began, to what we are divesting and what we are gaining and how will
that make sure that the gap in the trough between divestment in combat
capability is not so big that it poses risk to the force or mission.''
General Berger answered ``I can absolutely do that. That is the
rationale that is the reason behind publishing each year, this is where
we are with Force Design, this is what we have learned today, the
actions taken, this is the plan ahead, which we published last month
for this year.'' It has been almost a year since he made that
commitment. Please provide the information requested in 2022 in a
detailed format that clearly visualizes when capabilities have been
divested or reduced since 2019?
General Smith. The product you are referring to is the Force Design
2030 Annual Report. Since becoming Commandant in 2019, General Berger
has published an unclassified report to update the service and our
various stakeholders about where we are in our modernization. These
reports capture and provide rationale to all decisions related to
divestment. The 2022 report was released in May 2022.
The 2023 Force Design 2030 annual report was released on 5 June.

31. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide a timeline
that indicates which Marine Corps capabilities, including equipment,
Military Occupational Specialties, and number of personnel, have been
divested or reduced because of Force Design 2030, as requested in
section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA)?
General Smith. Over the past five President's Budget (PB) cycles
from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024, the Marine Corps
divested $18.2 billion of legacy equipment and invested $15.8 billion
in modernization.

USMC DIVEST TO INVESTP(PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 220 TO PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 2024)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's President's President's President's President's
($B) Budget 2020 Budget 2021 Budget 2022 Budget 2023 Budget 2024 Total*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Divestment.......................... 0.7 1.8 5.9 8.7 1.1 18.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investment.......................... 0.7 1.2 5.9 7.0 1.1 15.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

With the drawdown of forces supporting operations in CENTCOM in
2014, the Marine Corps identified the necessity to transition from
sustaining a land campaign to modernizing the force in support of
maritime campaigning inherent in our Title 10 requirements. To maintain
operational and tactical relevance on a modern battlefield due to the
evolution of technology, the Marine Corps divested of legacy force
structures that were of lesser relevance for a naval expeditionary
service. Additionally, budget constraints were identified by 2018 NDS
architects and Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 planners with the
underlying assumption that the Department's topline budget would grow
modestly at a 2 percent inflation rate. Furthermore, the Marine Corps'
divestment strategy followed the 2018 and 2022 NDS and the associated
Defense Planning Guidance that directed the divestment of legacy
capabilities and modernization at the speed of the pacing threat.
In the President's Budget 2020 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
$0.7 billion by divesting of the AN/TPS-59 Air Defense Radar, AAV7A1
Project Improvement Program, and the MV-22 Aerial Refueling System
(VARS). These funds were used to invest in such programs as Ground
Based Air Defense (GBAD), F-35 spares and Block 4 modification, nascent
Command-and-Control systems, sensors, and communications platforms.
In the President's Budget 2021 cycle, we reallocated $1.8 billion
by divesting of certain ground programs such as the Light Armored
Vehicle Program Improvement Project (LAV PIP) and M1A1 Weapons and
Combat Vehicle Modification Kits. The Marine Corps also made a 2,300
Active component reduction in end-strength, and unit modifications of
Fleet Anti-terrorism teams and Combat Logistics Battalion. The Marine
Corps used $1.2 billion of these funds to invest in Strike/Anti-surface
warfare capabilities, network, sensors, intelligence platforms, Air
Defense, Ground Combat lethality modernization, and S&T programs.
In the President's Budget 2022 cycle, as part of the overall Force
Design 2030 investment strategy, the Marine Corps made our second
largest divestment of $5.9 billion by reducing the Active component
end-strength by 5,100, completing our divestments in legacy force
structure such as Tanks, Bridging Companies, and Law Enforcement
Battalions in addition to reducing Active and Reserve Infantry
Battalions, Cannon Artillery Batteries, and Aviation Squadrons. One
hundred percent of these divestments were directly used to invest in
critical ground-based fires programs such as
Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)
and Organic Precision Fires Family of Systems (OPF FoS). Advanced
sensor investments included the MAGTF Unmanned Aircraft System
Expeditionary (MUX)/Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)--MQ9A,
Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and MAGTF Electronic Warfare
Ground Family of Systems (MEGFoS). Furthermore, critical ground
networking investments were made in our Network on The Move (NOTM) and
Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN).
In the President's Budget 2023 cycle, the Marine Corps made our
largest divestment of $8.7 billion with a 744 reduction in Active
component end-strength, as well as further reduction to legacy
capabilities such as the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
(MCSCG) and Marine Augmentation Program-Korea (MAP-K) programs and
delayed procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), F-35B
Joint Strike Fighters, CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters. We also took
unique approaches to save resources by reducing capacity during Marine
Week, made a 10 percent reduction to Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
moves, and a 15 percent reduction to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
staff positions to include Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORES) and the
supporting establishment. Nearly all these divestments, over $7.0
billion, were directly used to modernize critical areas that enable
Force Design 2030 by investing in multi-domain areas such as Command
and Control (Big Data Platform), Counter Air, Counter C5ISR-T, MQ-9A
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) sensors and enablers, and Anti-Surface
Warfare capabilities.
In the President's Budget 2024 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
over $1.1 billion from such programs as Organic Precision Fires,
Amphibious Combat Vehicles, and Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicles, as
well as a 15 percent reduction in the Marine Corps Bands program to
eight field bands. All divested funds were directly utilized to invest
in critical warfighting capabilities such as Signature Management
(YETI), Secure Expeditionary Resilient Position, Navigation and Timing
(SERPNT), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS), and
Tactical Communication Modernization. Aviation investments were
utilized to increase Flight Hour Program and the MV-22 nacelle
improvement program. Additionally, several Talent Management
investments were made, including increased funding for Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response programs and the Marine Corps Embassy Security
Guard.
After completing five budget cycles with this approach, the Marine
Corps does not plan to divest any more capacity or legacy programs.
The two charts below identify specific military occupation
specialties (MOS) (Graph 1) and platforms (Graph 3) that the Marine
Corps reduced in capacity, divested completed of, or transitioned due
to modernization efforts tied to strategic guidance.

MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CHANGES RELATED TO FD2030 (GRAPH 1)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STR 2018 2023 Difference Relative
Change Growth or ------------------ in Percent Growth OR
OccFld OccFld Name 2018 2023 STR % Total % Total of Total Relative
Reduction STR STR STR Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
01 Manpower and Administration 7670 7029 -641 Reduction 4.1% 3.9% -0.172% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
03 Infantry 26014 23172 -2842 Reduction 13.9% 13.0% -0.957% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
04 Logistics 5797 5466 -331 Reduction 3.1% 3.1% -0.044% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
13 Engineer, Construction, 8399 7442 -957 Reduction 4.5% 4.2% -0.331% Reduction
Facilities, and Equipment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 Tank, AAV, and ACV 2115 1426 -689 Reduction 1.1% 0.8% -0.334% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21 Ground Ordnance Maintenance 3921 3522 -399 Reduction 2.1% 2.0% -0.128% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 Linguist 620 479 -141 Reduction 0.3% 0.3% -0.064% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 Ground Electronic 4435 3774 -661 Reduction 2.4% 2.1% -0.262% Reduction
Maintenance
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 Supply Administration and 6454 5723 -731 Reduction 3.5% 3.2% -0.252% Reduction
Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 Food Service 1981 1639 -342 Reduction 1.1% 0.9% -0.143% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
34 Financial Management 1414 1338 -76 Reduction 0.8% 0.7% -0.008% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
35 Motor Transport 13835 12051 -1784 Reduction 7.4% 6.7% -0.662% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
41 Marine Corps Community 123 105 -18 Reduction 0.1% 0.1% -0.007% Reduction
Services
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
43 Public Affairs 584 ...... -584 Reduction 0.3% 0.0% -0.313% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
46 Combat Camera 474 ...... -474 Reduction 0.3% 0.0% -0.254% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
57 CBRN 933 886 -47 Reduction 0.5% 0.5% -0.004% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58 Military Police 4050 3477 -573 Reduction 2.2% 1.9% -0.222% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
60 Aircraft Maintenance 5604 4692 -912 Reduction 3.0% 2.6% -0.374% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
61 Aircraft Maintenance (RW) 5830 4875 -955 Reduction 3.1% 2.7% -0.392% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63 Organizational Avionics 4076 3386 -690 Reduction 2.2% 1.9% -0.287% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
64 Intermediate Avionics 2538 2054 -484 Reduction 1.4% 1.1% -0.209% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
65 Aviation Ordnance 2658 2462 -196 Reduction 1.4% 1.4% -0.045% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
66 Aviation Logistics 2243 2052 -191 Reduction 1.2% 1.1% -0.052% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
70 Airfield Services 2338 2080 -258 Reduction 1.3% 1.2% -0.087% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
73 Navigators and Unmanned 462 428 -34 Reduction 0.2% 0.2% -0.008% Reduction
Aircraft System Officers/
Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
75 Pilots 4852 4121 -731 Reduction 2.6% 2.3% -0.291% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
81 MISC 4250 3925 -325 Reduction 2.3% 2.2% -0.078% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
86 Small UAS Specialist 251 237 -14 Reduction 0.1% 0.1% -0.002% Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

With the reduction in capacity in specific Military Occupation
Specialties (MOS), Force Design 2030 acted on the necessity to train
and equip critical enablers that enable the Marine Corps and forward
deployed formations to operate in multi-domain environments. As a
result, the Marine Corps invested in critical MOS that were either non-
existent pre-Force Design 2030 or in need of acceleration. The
increased investment in critical enablers such as intelligence,
networks, communications, space, and cyber have accelerated the ability
of the Marine Corps to operate in multi-domain operations at the
tactical level.

REDUCTIONS OF LEGACY PLATFORMS BY YEAR (FISCAL YEAR 2024 TO 2028) (GRAPH 2)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
System Total Fielded 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
M1A1 452 Divestment Complete
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVLB 28 Divestment Complete
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAV 1,055 840-50 840-50 No further reductions planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MRAP 3391 176 174 Divestment Complete
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HMMWV 11043 1220 572 715 817 920
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MTVR 6582 1050 431 29 53 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LVSR 1681 181 304 46 13 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AAV 1,074 79 106 116 46 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An important aspect to distinguish in the Marine Corps'
modernization is the distinct difference between a divestment in a
platform compared to a transition or modernization in a platform. Based
on analysis, wargaming, and experimentation the Commandant concluded in
2020 that the Marine Corps' inventory of bridging platforms--Armored
Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder Bridges (MGB), and
Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB), were best suited for land operations
ashore. For reference, the AVLBs, MGBs, and IRBs all require large
black-bottom commercial sealift or Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get
to the fight, requiring permissive offload at seaports and significant
preparation time to prepare for onward movement to support maneuver.
Even when permissive offloads are conducted, mobility mismatch between
maneuver forces and engineering and breaching capabilities can pose
tactical challenges. During the opening land conflict of the 2003
invasion of Iraq, maneuver forces routinely outpaced supporting assets
such as heavy logistical assets, bridging, and breaching capabilities.
The tempo and threat environment of the future operating environment
makes these heavy capabilities irrelevant, particularly considering the
limited quantity of systems and the significant requirements for large
shipping and aircraft to move these capabilities into position across a
maritime theater.
However, many of the above platforms are currently being
transitioned to modernized platforms. The Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAV) is transitioning to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). The
Marine Corps will have 139 ACVs fielded by June 2023. This equates to
21.9 percent of the 632-vehicle acquisition objective. These ACVs will
equip seven Fleet Marine Force ACV Platoons, a training allocation at
the Assault Amphibian School, and a test set at the Amphibious Vehicle
Test Branch. Additionally, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV) have begun a programmatic sunset synched with the
fielding and complete service transition to the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles (JLTV). The Marine Corps has 3,488 JLTVs and 187 JLTV trailers
fielded as of 5 June 2023. This equates to 27.9 percent of the 12,500
vehicle fiscal year 2030 acquisition objective and 4.7 percent of the
4,000 JLTV trailer fiscal year 2030 acquisition objective. 84 percent
of these vehicles are fielded to I, II, and III Marine Expeditionary
Forces. The remaining vehicles are allocated to Marine Special
Operations Command, Training and Education Command, and supported
specialty truck programs (e.g., the Network on the Move and Marine Air
Defense Integrated System programs).

32. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, which of the capabilities
being divested or reduced under Force Design 2030 will be provided by
other Services?
General Smith. One of the more notable capabilities divested by the
Marine Corps as part of Force Design 2030 is the M1A1 main battle tank.
Given that the Marine Corps has historically and by US Code been
responsible for the ``conduct of such land operations as may be
essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign'' and informed by
warfare trends, the Marine Corps divested tanks with the understanding
that the Army possesses adequate armor capacity to respond to the
demands of the joint force.
Through detailed operational planning, historical analysis, and a
rigorous Campaign of Learning, we made some hard decisions regarding
engineering and breaching capabilities. Consequently, the Marine Corps
divested its inventory of bridging platforms to include the Armored
Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder Bridges (MGB), and
Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB) which are too heavy and slow to be
relevant in modern operations. The Marine Corps and Army are working
collectively with industry to develop a more suitable lightweight,
scalable tactical bridging platform that can be transported on current
Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). The Marine Corps is currently
awaiting delivery of three test vehicles for experimentation within our
engineer formations. In the meantime, the Marine Corps retains its
capability to do nonstandard bridging. On a frequent basis Marine
engineers are used for theater security cooperation and for support to
other government agencies to construct non-standard bridges, which
continues to build their experience with the use of local materials.
The Marine Corps also divested of its Active component law
enforcement (LE) battalions; the Marine Corps retains one Reserve
component LE battalion, 4th LE Battalion, additionally almost 600
Marine Military Police Officers were transferred from those LE
battalions to fill a decade-long gap in base security. In the future
fight our bases are power projection platforms making this transfer
critical for success in the next fight. The Marine Corps is confident
that most LE battalion mission sets and requirements can be fulfilled
by other Marine Corps formations during the conduct of a naval
campaign. Any additional requirement for law enforcement exceeding what
might be handled by organic Marine Corps units or by activating
components of 4th LE Battalion will have to be handled by the Army.

33. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, does the Marine Corps have any
formal agreement or plan with other Services to provide capabilities
being divested or reduced under Force Design 2030 such as bridging or
assault breaching?
General Smith. No, but while there are no formalized agreements for
other services to provide capabilities divested or reduced under Force
Design 2030, it is important to note that any future fight will be a
joint fight. In such a joint fight, we, as a service, are tasked with
manning, training, and equipping our respective forces provided to a
Joint Force Commander who will have the authority to employ those
forces with mutually supporting joint capability without the need for
formal agreements. It is highly unlikely that the Marine Corps will
deploy as a stand-alone force to fight against a peer adversary for any
extended periods absent support from the other services or the
militaries of allied and partner nations.

34. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, would you bring back any of
the capabilities the Marine Corps has divested since 2019?
General Smith. Force design is an ongoing and iterative process.
Design changes are driven by evolutionary and revolutionary
improvements in U.S. capabilities and in reaction to changing threat
capabilities and capacity. Given the constant interplay between
friendly and adversary warfighting systems, it is impossible to predict
with certainty if any specific combat, combat support, or combat
service support capability or capacity would need to be reversed or
substantially altered. That said, I am confident that the FD2030
choices that we have planned or are executing are the most appropriate
ones to the present and foreseeable operational conditions as described
in recent national security and defense strategies.
If confirmed, I am open to bringing back any capability that I am
convinced by data and facts is required to accomplish the missions
assigned to the Marine Corps.
force design 2030 investment
35. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide a timeline
that indicates which Marine Corps capabilities, including equipment and
Military Occupational Specialties, have been added because of Force
Design 2030, including when they will achieve Initial Operational
Capability and Full Operational Capability?
General Smith. With the reduction in capacity in specific Military
Occupation Specialties (MOS), Force Design 2030 acted on the necessity
to train and equip critical enablers that enable the Marine Corps and
forward deployed formations to operate in multi-domain environments. As
a result, the Marine Corps invested in critical MOSs that were either
non-existent pre-Force Design 2030 or in need of acceleration. The
increased investment in critical enablers such as intelligence,
networks, communications, space, and cyber have accelerated the ability
of the Marine Corps to operate in multi-domain operations at the
tactical level.

MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CHANGES RELATED TO FD2030 (GRAPH 1)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STR 2018 2023 Difference Relative
Change Growth or ------------------ in Percent Growth OR
OccFld OccFld Name 2018 2023 STR % Total % Total of Total Relative
Reduction STR STR STR Reduction
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
02 Intelligence 4898 4936 38 Growth 2.6% 2.8% 0.141% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
05 MAGTF Planners 707 751 44 Growth 0.4% 0.4% 0.042% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
08 Field Artillery 4611 4617 6 Growth 2.5% 2.6% 0.116% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
09 Instructor 2823 5173 2350 Growth 1.5% 2.9% 1.384% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 Cyberspace Operations ...... 1936 1936 Growth 0.0% 1.1% 0.084% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
23 Ammunition and EOD 2272 2341 69 Growth 1.2% 1.3% 0.094% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26 Signals Intelligence/Ground 2308 2765 457 Growth 1.2% 1.5% 0.312% Growth
Electronic Warfare
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 Distributed Management 588 808 220 Growth 0.3% 0.5% 0.137% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
44 Legal Support 1033 1131 98 Growth 0.6% 0.6% 0.080% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
45 COMSTRAT ...... 1271 1271 Growth 0.0% 0.7% 0.711% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Recruiting and Retention 446 475 29 Growth 0.2% 0.3% 0.027% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
55 Music 862 867 5 Growth 0.5% 0.5% 0.024% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
59 C2 Electronics Maintenance 1512 1798 286 Growth 0.8% 1.0% 0.197% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
62 Aircraft Maintenance (FW) 3530 3539 9 Growth 1.9% 2.0% 0.091% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
68 Meteoroloy and Oceanography 414 438 24 Growth 0.2% 0.2% 0.024% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72 Air Control/Air Support/ 2824 3523 699 Growth 1.5% 2.0% 0.460% Growth
Anti-Air Warfare/Air
Traffic Control
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
80 MISC MOS 10764 11237 473 Growth 5.8% 6.3% 0.527% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
82 Regional/Foreign Affairs 137 145 8 Growth 0.1% 0.1% 0.008% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
87 Ground Operations 126 274 148 Growth 0.1% 0.2% 0.086% Growth
Specialist
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
88 Special Education Program 313 336 23 Growth 0.2% 0.2% 0.020% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
89 Sergeant Maj/1st Sgt 1356 1407 51 Growth 0.7% 0.8% 0.062% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
06 Communications 14804 14617 -187 Reduction 7.9% 8.2% 0.256% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Utilities 2793 2687 -106 Reduction 1.5% 1.5% 0.009% Growth
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Military Occupational Specialty Changes Related to FD2030 (Graph 1)

In the President's Budget 2020 cycle, funds saved from divestments
were used to invest in such programs as Ground Based Air Defense
(GBAD), F-35 spares and Block 4 modification, nascent Command-and-
Control systems, sensors, and communications platforms.
In the President's Budget 2021 cycle, $1.2 billion saved from
divestments were used to invest in Strike/Anti-surface warfare
capabilities, network, sensors, intelligence platforms, Air Defense,
Ground Combat lethality modernization, and S&T programs.
In the President's Budget 2022 cycle, funds from divestments were
directly used to invest in critical ground-based fires programs such as
Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)and
Organic Precision Fires Family of Systems (OPF FoS). Advanced sensor
investments included the MAGTF Unmanned Aircraft System Expeditionary
(MUX)/Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)--MQ9A, Ground/Air Task
Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and MAGTF Electronic Warfare Ground Family of
Systems (MEGFoS). Furthermore, critical ground networking investments
were made in our Network on The Move (NOTM) and Marine Corps Enterprise
Network (MCEN).
Nearly all these divestments from President's Budget 2023 cycle,
over $7.0 billion, were directly used to modernize critical areas that
enable Force Design 2030 by investing in multi-domain areas such as
Command and Control (Big Data Platform), Counter Air, Counter C5ISR-T,
MQ-9A Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) sensors and enablers, and Anti-
Surface Warfare capabilities.
All divested funds from President's Budget 2024 cycle were directed
utilized to invest in critical warfighting capabilities such as
Signature Management (YETI), Secure Expeditionary Resilient Position,
Navigation and Timing (SERPNT), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated
System (L-MADIS), and Tactical Communication Modernization. Aviation
investments were utilized to increase Flight Hour Program and the MV-22
nacelle improvement program. Additionally, several Talent Management
investments were made, including increased funding for Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response programs and the Marine Corps Embassy Security
Guard.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
IOC (Y/
IOC & FOC Projections Program N) Projected FOC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAGTF Unmanned Aerial System Y Fiscal Year 2025
Expeditionary / Medium Altitude Long
Endurance Increment I..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAGTF Unmanned Aerial System N Fiscal Year 2027
Expeditionary / Medium Altitude Long
Endurance Increment II.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long Range/Long Endurance Small UAS..... N Fiscal Year 2030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium Range/Medium Endurance Small UAS. Y Fiscal Year 2030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short Range/Short Endurance Small UAS... Y Fiscal Year 2030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CH-53K.................................. Y Fiscal Year 2029
------------------------------------------------------------------------
KC-130J................................. Y Fiscal Year 2027
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-35.................................... Y Fiscal Year 2030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Common Aviation Command and Control N Fiscal Year 2029
Small Form Factor......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium Range Intercept Capability....... N Fiscal Year 2028
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Air Defense Integrated System.... N Fiscal Year 2028
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light-Marine Air Defense Integrated N Fiscal Year 2028
System.................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installation Counter Small UAS.......... N Fiscal Year 2034
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground/Aviation Task Oriented Radar..... Y Fiscal Year 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium Range Air Defense Radar.......... N TBD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cryptologic Technician Networks......... Y Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System... Y Fiscal Year 2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship N Fiscal Year 2030
Interdiction System....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel...... N Fiscal Year 2031
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle............ Y Fiscal Year 2030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amphibious Combat Vehicle Family of Y Fiscal Year 2028
Vehicles...............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Littoral Explosive Ordinance N Fiscal Year 2027
Neutralization Family of Systems.......
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EOD Robotics............................ N Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ordinance Exploitation Modernization.... N Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Render Safe/Access Tool Modernization... N Fiscal Year 2027
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mounted Explosive Hazard Defeat......... N Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Command Post................ N Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAGTF Common Handheld--Dismounted....... Y Fiscal Year 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network on the Move-Ground.............. Y Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mounted Military-Code Receivers (Defense Y Fiscal Year 2030
Advanced Global Positioning System
Replacement)...........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Electronic Warfare Digital N Fiscal Year 2026
Payload................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constructive Electromagnetic Spectrum N Fiscal Year 2025
Operational Environment System.........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spectrum Services Framework............. Y Fiscal Year 2027
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multi-Function Electromagnetic Warfare N Fiscal Year 2029
Ground Family of Systems...............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Signature Management.................... Y Fiscal Year 2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime Targeting Cell Expeditionary... Y Fiscal Year 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UH-1Y................................... Y FOC ACHIEVED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AH-1Z................................... Y FOC ACHIEVED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MV-22B.................................. Y FOC ACHIEVED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full-sized Common Aviation Command & Y FOC ACHIEVED
Control System.........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Communication Emitter Sensing and Y FOC ACHIEVED
Attacking System II....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engineer Reconnaissance................. Y FOC ACHIEVED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Family of Medium/Heavy Tactical Trailers Y FOC ACHIEVED
& Ancillary Equipment..................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Battle Command Platform........... Y FOC ACHIEVED
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network on the Move-Air................. Y FOC ACHIEVED
------------------------------------------------------------------------

responding across the spectrum of conflict
36. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps you may
inherit in 2023 looks significantly different than the Marine Corps
General Berger inherited in 2019. In responses provided to my office by
the Marine Corps following an April 14, 2023 briefing on section 1023
of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the Marine Corps reported:
A 56 percent reduction in the number of 155mm howitzers
Pre-Force Design: 126 howitzers (21 x 6-gun batteries)
Force Design: 56 howitzers (7 x 8-gun batteries)
A 100 percent reduction in armor and associated assault
bridging
A 100 percent reduction in assault breaching with the
total divestment of the M1150 Assault Breaching Vehicle fleet
A 12 percent reduction in the number of infantry
battalions (24 to 21) and a 9 percent reduction in the number of
marines in each infantry battalion for a total of a 21 percent
reduction of infantry marines which corresponds to 1 out of 5 in the
marines Corps.
Are these numbers accurate?
General Smith. The accuracy of the above numbers varies between
topics. The most current information pertaining to each topic is listed
below:
A 56 percent reduction in the number of 155mm howitzers
o Pre-Force Design 2030: 126 howitzers (21 x 6-gun batteries)
o Force Design 2030: 56 howitzers (7 x 8-gun batteries)
o Both are accurate. Pre-Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps
maintained 21 cannon artillery batteries organized with 6 howitzers for
a total of 126 howitzers. In fiscal year 2027, the Marine Corps will
retain 7 batteries organized with 8 howitzers for a total of 56
howitzers, a roughly 56 percent reduction. Those batteries are being
replaced with different fire support systems.
o The Marine Corps is transitioning 14 cannon artillery
batteries to 14 Medium-Range Missile (MMSL) Batteries, which will be
capable of employing multiple precision fire missiles, including Naval
Strike Missiles and the MLRS Family of Munitions.
o Additionally, the Marine Corps will retain 6 Reserve component
batteries, which will also increase to 8 howitzer batteries in fiscal
year 2025.
o Since 2019, the lethal capacity of the Marine Divisions has
increased. As measured by crew served weapons to include artillery
firing systems, combat vehicles, and infantry weapons systems, the
Marine Corps possesses more combat power. By 2030 towed artillery,
rockets, and missiles more than double (132 percent) since 2019.
A 100 percent reduction in armor and associated assault
bridging
o Both are accurate. The divestment of M1A1 Main Battle Tanks
also nullified the requirement for the 85-ton load capacity of the
Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge (AVLB). The subsequent divestment of
all AVLBs and associated force structure removed an assault bridging
capability to accommodate the Marine Corps ground combat and tactical
vehicle inventory. As a result, Marine Corps combat developers are now
working with Army researchers and industry to develop a lightweight,
scalable tactical bridging solution to accommodate all current (and
planned) Marine Corps ground combat and tactical vehicles. That is, the
Marine Corps has divested of non-expeditionary armor and associated
assault bridging, capabilities that that are not optimized for maritime
campaigning and instead seeks to generate expeditionary solutions to
existing and emerging capability gaps.
A 100 percent reduction in assault breaching with the
total divestment of the M1150 Assault Breaching Vehicle fleet.
o Mostly accurate. The weight and size of the M1150 Assault
Breaching Vehicle (ABV) makes it incompatible for amphibious landings
and littoral operations. However, the divestment of this armored
breaching system including its twin M58 Mine Clearing Line Charges
(MICLIC), remote firing machine gun, heavy armor protection, proofing
and clearing attachments (i.e., mine plow, rake, and blade), and
associated force structure does limit the Marine Ground Combat
Element's ability to conduct protected and in-stride assault breaching.
Dismounted marines continue to train with and utilize the Anti-
Personnel Obstacle Breaching Systems (APOBS) to blast 45-meter-long
paths through anti-personnel mine and wire obstacles to enable foot-
mobile movement. Marine Combat Engineers also continue to train with
and employ the trailer-mounted MICLIC for mounted operations for
breaching 100-meter-long vehicle lanes through mines and other
obstacles, though the follow-on lane proofing relies on dismounted
combat engineers using hand-held detectors.
A 12 percent reduction in the number of infantry
battalions (24 to 21) and a 9 percent reduction in the number of
marines in each infantry battalion for a total of a 21 percent
reduction of infantry marines which corresponds to one out of five in
the Marines Corps.
o Total force structure allocated to infantry battalions reduces
until 2029, when the IBX-30 reorganization is complete. Force Structure
reductions occur in two phases. Phase 1 included divestment of three
infantry battalions; 3d Battalion 8th Marines in Camp Lejeune, 2d
Battalion 3d Marines, and 3d Battalion 3d Marines in Hawaii along with
the reorganization of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines into 3d Littoral Combat
Team (LCT). Phase 2 of reductions is IBX-30 reorganization, which
reduced the size of each infantry battalion by 9.4 percent, from 894 to
811 Marines (Marine Structure only--Does not include Navy structure
within infantry battalions). The combination of reducing from 24 to 21
Infantry Battalions and the IBX-30 reorganizations result in a 19.4
percent reduction in infantry Battalion structure due to FD2030.
o However, both the Littoral Combat Team and the modernized IBX-
30 infantry reduction of marines within infantry battalions do not
provide the necessary context to understand the increased lethality
these formations have gained by investments in capabilities such as
precision fires, advanced sensor assets, and critical communications
equipment to synthesize targeting. There are more killing assets per
infantry Marine in 2030 than in 2019. Infantry battalion lethality, as
measured by share of crew-served weapons per Marine assigned to
infantry battalion, increased by 28 percent from 2019 to 2030. These
smaller formations support Marine Corps concepts of Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Stand-in Forces (SIF) that are
capable of persisting inside an adversaries' weapons engagements zone
during competition, responding to crises, and seizing and defending key
maritime terrain during conflict.
o Inaccurate Combining the 12 percent reduction of infantry
battalions and 9 percent reduction of marines within infantry
battalions to equate to a 21 percent total loss does not provide the
accurate context for the gain in capabilities. The manning percentage
has increased substantially (89 percent to 97 percent).
o The 21 marine infantry battalions are still sufficient to meet
operational commitments while maintaining a 1:3 deployment to dwell
ratio. These smaller formations support Marine Corps concepts of
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Stand-in Forces (SIF)
that are capable of persisting inside an adversaries' weapons
engagements zone during competition, responding to crises, and seizing
and defending key maritime terrain during conflict.
o As noted above these raw numbers do not provide the necessary
context to understand the increased lethality these formations have
gained by investments in capabilities such as precision fires, advanced
sensor assets, and critical communications equipment to synthesize
targeting. Moreover, as a combined arms force, the Marine Corps will
retain 7 Active component and 6 Reserve component tube-artillery
batteries and 14 Medium Range Missile (MMSL) batteries and 3 Long Range
Missile (LMSL) batteries. While initially fielded with an anti-ship
missile, the MMSL will incorporate the MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM)
allowing a wider array of effects. In aggregate, we have increased our
ground indirect fires capability.
Overall, the increased lethality of the core infantry battalion is
improved through increased manning. From 1995 until now, Battalion T/Os
have gotten smaller, but the manning percentage has increased, and the
unit-to-unit variances have decreased. The higher manning level allows
commanders to train as they will fight.'' For Infantry battalions, the
manning as a percent of T/O is 97 percent now; up from 89 percent in
1995 (all battalions aggregated). In 1995 only 5 of 24 battalions were
manned above 100 percent of T/O while 12 were below 90 percent of T/O,
compared to that to 2023 where 10 battalions are above 100 percent and
only 5 are below 90 percent.

37. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the new Marine Littoral
Regiments (MLR), three of which will be established within III Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF), will not have the minimum number of LSMs
they need to execute Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations/ Stand-in
Forces (EABO/SIF) for at least 5 years according to the Navy's
shipbuilding plan, robbing them of intra-theater mobility. Will the
MLRs be able to execute combat operations in the intervening years
before they receive LSMs?
General Smith. All forces are dependent on Joint, Naval, and
organic mobility assets to maneuver throughout the battlespace.
However, the current programmatic timeline for Medium Landing Ships
(LSMs) does not support delivery to support (1) Marine Regiment until
fiscal year 2033. Until the LSM becomes fully operational, the service
has explored other interim solutions to support SIF. The interim
planned composition is (2) T-EPFs, (5) stern landing vessels (SLVs),
and (5) LCUs until the LSM becomes available in fiscal year 2033. These
provide options for moving the SIF, but are limited and should not be
seen as a substitute for the LSM requirement.
Although III MEF demonstrates the ability to operate as a SIF
without the Medium Landing Ship (LSM), the service and III MEF have
registered the requirement for both inter-(operational) and intra-
(tactical) mobility.

38. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, last year during your posture
hearing General Berger and I discussed a risk trough, the time between
when existing Marine Corps combined capabilities are divested or
reduced and new capabilities come on line to replace them. The world is
a dangerous place and the Marine Corps seems to be firmly in the risk
trough. This seems like the period of maximum danger. We are no longer
the legacy Marine Corps yet the new capabilities promised with Force
Design 2030 are not arrived. If you are confirmed as the next
Commandant will you be better positioned to respond to contingencies
across the conflict spectrum than the Marine Corps your predecessor
inherited?
General Smith. Today, the Marine Corps is better prepared to serve
as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and to operate inside
actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations and
joint campaigns. The Marine Corps is already standing-in alongside
allies and partners within reach of enemy weapon systems during
competition. During crisis the Marine Corps also continues to be the
premiere global crisis response force. Critical to this is maintaining
no less than 31 L-Class amphibious warfare ships and delivering 35
Medium Landing Ships (LSMs) to posture forces forward to provide the
Marine Corps the required maritime maneuver and mobility. During
conflict the SIF is prepared to seize and defend key maritime terrain,
support sea control and denial operations, and maintain custody of
maritime targets in support of projecting combat power from the Joint
Force back into an anti-access, area denial environment.
Additionally, while there is work that needs to be done, our
initial investments in lethality are already bearing fruit. With the
support of congress, III Marine Expeditionary Force will be receiving
the first delivery of the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
Interdiction System (NMESIS). This is a significant milestone, as
within 3 years since Force Design 2030 started, we will be
operationalizing a new capability we did not have before--a ground-
based anti-ship capability.

39. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in answers provided by the
Marine Corps staff to questions from my office, the Marine Corps
frequently stated that divested combat capabilities were ``incompatible
for amphibious shipping and littoral operations.'' But not all future
Marine Corps missions will be focused on littoral operations. How does
Force Design 2030 support operations outside the littorals?
General Smith. The plan for light, lethal, and distributed forces
would be successful in operations outside of the littorals. On 16 March
2022, TF 61/2, led by a Marine General Officer with a task-organized
staff was integrated into the U.S. 6th Fleet Headquarters in Naples,
Italy, and executed a combined joint exercise, planned operations for
various ARG/MEU teams in multiple locations throughout the theater, and
improved Maritime Domain Awareness for the Fleet Commander and partners
and allies. Task Force 61/2 executed a proof of concept during 2022 in
which they provided 6th Fleet Headquarters with real-time Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA). In that effort, Marine forces tested, refined,
and validated concepts of employment for MDA and closing kill webs,
while also conducting real-world, time sensitive reconnaissance-counter
reconnaissance missions. These efforts continue to support 6th Fleet
operations as well as nested within EUCOM and Africa Command (AFRICOM)
priorities and have since turned into a rotational force.

40. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, for decades the Marine Corps
has provided the hedge the U.S. military needs for unexpected
contingencies. As the other Services focused on the Soviet military the
Marine Corps honed its capabilities as the Nation's rapid global
response force. One criticism of Marine Corps Force Design is that in
reorienting on the ``pacing threat''--the Chinese PLA--the Marine Corps
has given up much of its 9-1-1 capabilities. Does Force Design 2030
retain the weapons and equipment that enabled the Marine Corps to hedge
as the other Services turn their attention to China?
General Smith. The Marine Corps has not divested any equipment or
structure that prevent the service from still being the premier global
crisis response force. The Marine Corps still maintains seven MEUs. The
structural organization of our MEUs will also remain the same and will
be comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Battalion Landing Team (BLT)
as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Composite Aviation Squadron as
the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Logistics Battalion
(CLB) as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE)
The Marine Corps continues to have capacity for seven MEUs. Force
Design 2030 has not changed the number of MEUs the Marine Corps can
field; in fact, Force Design 2030 reinforces the need for the continued
global employment of this versatile and highly capable unit.
Multiple Administrations, multiple National Defense Strategies, and
a half-dozen sets of associated Defense Planning Guidance, as informed
by the broader Intelligence Community (IC), direct the Marine Corps to
pace to the principal threat and focus on the principal theater. The
Marine Corps does not have the authority--nor a differing understanding
of the threat environment--to deviate from those threat-informed sets
of strategy. The Marine Corps has complied with political leadership's
overarching guidance and decisions--while retaining its ability to
respond to crisis globally--as that same guidance charges the Navy and
Marine Corps to retain response capabilities. In fact, a forward and
credible, lethal and resilient, Stand-in Force does just that--it
creates Flexible Deterrence Options and Flexible Response Options to
combatant commanders in the face of emerging crises.

41. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, General Berger and Lieutenant
General Heckl have testified that the Marine Corps is fully capable of
meeting all global commitments. Nearly 60 percent of the Maritime
Prepositioning Forces required to sustain marines have been cut, the
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Augmentation Program-Kuwait has been
eliminated, and prepositioned equipment in Norway has been reduced. Do
these reductions or eliminations or pre-positioned equipment impact the
Marine Corps' ability to meet global commitments?
General Smith. The Service's elimination of the MEU Augmentation
Program--Kuwait supporting CENTCOM was due to it being purpose built to
support marines deployed to and engaged in that region, and with the
strategic guidance focusing the Marine Corps on the INDOPACOM theater,
that purpose was no longer a priority based on available resources. The
reduction in Marine Corps Prepositioning--Norway was of legacy
equipment and said equipment is no longer needed for a crisis response
in EUCOM. The Service remains fully capable of meeting all global
commitments; however, with 5 additional Maritime Prepositioning Ships
(MPS) in Reduced Operating Status (ROS) it will take longer for
combatant commands to close the force. This increase in time to close
the force highlights the need to fully fund our prepositioning program.
Current Impact: The Navy decision to place 5 additional MPS in ROS
will not only diminish the ability to forward position and sustain
these additional forces required to counter aggressive People's
Republic of China (PRC) actions, but also increase the strain on III
MEF forces, allies, and partners in the FIC, and limited organic and
joint air and maritime transportation assets.
Future Impact: This impact will be felt most acutely in a crisis
where the ability to close forces will be diminished by the requirement
to use other assets to sustain already forward-postured forces.
Additionally, MPF is tied to every Operation Plan (OPLAN), not just
those in the Indo-Pacific. Placing Maritime Prepositioning Ships in a
Reduced Operating Status delays the U.S. Marine Corps' responses in all
OPLANs.
Due to placing the 5 MPS in ROS, for MARFORPAC Crisis Response, MPS
arriving in theater went from C+25 to now between C+60 and C+75.
Sustainment will be late to the need, resulting in critical risk to
mission and force.
The Service is developing a Global Positioning Network (GPN) as a
recognition that we need to think differently about how to preposition
assets around the globe to support our Stand-in Forces across the full
range of military operations.

42. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, has the Marine Corps'
capability to meet all global commitments been exacerbated by the
admitted shortage of amphibious shipping?
General Smith. Yes. A shortage of amphibious shipping has
exacerbated the Marine Corps capability to meet global commitments.
The decrease in the overall Amphibious Warfare Ships (AWS)
inventory, combined with consistent/constant Global Force Management
(GFM) demand and longer than planned maintenance availabilities have
resulted in an overworked AWS fleet with no ``ready bench'' and
insufficient numbers to fulfill Secretary of Defense-directed GFM
requirements, delayed ARG/MEU deployments (slower response), and
reductions in amphibious training & certification periods (warfighting
proficiency).
war games
43. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, were the studies, war games,
or analysis that informed General Berger's decision on the Marine Corps
force structure briefed to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the
Navy, combatant commanders, or Members of the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees?
General Smith. Yes.
No one wargame, study, or live-force experimentation event was
sufficient to prompt the service to undergo significant service-level
changes to force structure. Instead, the body of evidence resulting
from many wargames and experiments over the course of several years,
which when aggregated, illuminated for the service that change was
necessary and thus provoked action. The studies, war games, and
analysis listed below informed the modernization decisions and
investments that enacted Force Design 2030.
Once developed, the Commandant briefs and seeks approval of his
plans from both the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense.
If approved, they become a part of an overall defense program assembled
by the Secretary of Defense. The program is then sent to the Office of
Management and Budget to be incorporated into the President's budget
estimate for submission to Congress. In essence, OMB's delivery of the
administration's submission to Congress signals the President's
endorsement of anything included therein. Once delivered, the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees unpack Department of Defense plans,
study them, and decide whether to authorize and fund them.
Force Design 2030 was included in the Marine Corps' Fiscal Year
2021 Presidential Budget. It was approved by then-Secretary of the Navy
Richard Spencer and briefed directly to then-Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Norquist at the Deputy's Management Action Group. Per
standard practice, it was then considered by the Director of Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation and endorsed. Based on supportive
recommendations from both that director and the Deputy Secretary,
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper approved Force Design 2030.
A collection of the most significant influencing events is included
below. There are currently unclassified and secret wargame reports and
experimentation reports that have been produced that either identified
the need for Force Design 2030 or have resulted from wargames conducted
to aid Force Design 2030 decisions.
Reports are available for the following wargames and
experimentation events which pre-dated FD2030:

Advanced Naval Technology Exercise 2017, April 2017
Purpose: Examine ship to shore maneuver, amphibious fire
support and effects, amphibious C4, clearing amphibious assault lanes,
and information warfare.
Reports available: unclassified final report

MAGTF Warrior 17 Wargame, 12-16 June 2017
Purpose: Define Marine Corps capabilities required to
conduct sea control and power projection within a joint campaign
against a peer adversary.
Reports available: Secret final report.

Dawn Blitz 2017, October 2017
Purpose: Examine EAB concepts such as naval integration,
maritime strike, sea control, EAB development, and F-35 integration
with Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
Reports available: unclassified report

Expeditionary Warrior 18 Wargame, 2-6 April 2018
Purpose: Examine operational level logistics support to
Marine expeditionary forces in the western Pacific in an anti-access/
area denial environment.
Reports available: Secret final report.

Naval Services Game 18, 9-12 July 2018
Purpose: Explore command relationships, tasking,
capabilities, and employment implications of Marine Corps and Navy
forces task-organized for littoral combat across the full range of
naval missions.
Reports available: Secret final report.

MAGTF Warrior 18 Wargame, 17-21 September 2018
Purpose: Inform future logistics operating concepts of
support and how the MEF will be organized, trained, and equipped to
support and sustain operations as part of an inside force.
Reports available: Secret final report.

Within Sea Dragon Phase II initiative, Trident Juncture 2018,
October-November 2018
Purpose: To test hybrid logistics, particularly data-
driven logistics systems and additive manufacturing with CLB-2 as the
assigned experiment force
Reports available: unclassified final report

After the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) was released in the
summer of 2019 and Force Design 2030 modernization began, the Marine
Corps has conducted over 400 congressional engagements with Members,
Professional Staff Members, and staff from personal offices. We
received extensive feedback from these engagements that helped inform
follow-on experimentation. Marine Corps leadership values and honors
the need for congressional oversight and has actively supported that
lawful requirement.
From January 2020 to April 2023, Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat
Development and Integration (CD&I), alone has conducted 221 of those
engagements. Of those 221 engagements roughly 30 percent were
classified briefs at the secret level and above. The remaining 70
percent of those engagements were at the unclassified level to be as
transparent as possible in our modernization efforts.
Marine Corps component commanders routinely brief their supported
combatant commander on changes to Marine Corps capabilities.

44. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, when did the Marine Corps
determine its current amphibious shipping requirement of 31 ships?
General Smith. The Marine Corps has a requirement for no fewer than
31 amphibious warfare ships 10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs. Since 2019, three
DoN studies have examined amphibious warfare ship force structure
requirements. The requirement was informed by combining the findings of
those studies, the most recent being the SecNav directed Amphibious
Fleet Requirement Study (AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship
readiness trends over the past 10 years. AFRS was a threat informed,
scenario directed, model driven, multiple phase event executed by the
analytic arms of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The findings of AFRS
were briefed to the Service Chiefs and Secretary of the Navy. This
finding is consistent with 11 amphibious warfare ship inventory studies
completed over the last 14 years.

45. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in what documents was 31
amphibious shipping requirement communicated to the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of
Defense, and Members of Congress?
General Smith. Since 2019, three DoN studies have examined
amphibious warfare ship force structure requirements. The requirement
was informed by combining the findings of those studies, the most
recent being the SecNav directed Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study
(AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship readiness trends over the
past 10 years. The findings of AFRS were briefed to the Service chiefs,
SecNav, and components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Congressional interest in the AFRS prompted OSD to submit a Report to
Congress. On 27 December 2022, findings were submitted to Members of
Congress.

46. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies' (CSIS) recent war game ``First Battle of the
Next War'' found MLRs could contribute to the fight on a limited basis
but were largely nonfactors as political assumptions and China's
defensive capabilities prevented them from being close enough to the
fight. In fact, in several instances of the game, United States players
tried to move an MLR onto Taiwan by air or sea, but in all cases the
unit and transportation assets were destroyed trying to do so.
Ultimately, the CSIS war game found one squadron of bombers alone had
more impact on the battlespace than an MLR. What is your assessment of
this war game and its conclusions?
General Smith. The CSIS war game report on ``First Battle of the
Next War'' provides an in-depth analysis of the challenge, the methods
utilized, and key results. With additional context in the level of
planning that went into the war game to include the players that were
involved and the extent to which they were making decisions, based on
operational contingency plans, more substantial feedback on the
wargames report can be provided. The CSIS emphasized:
First, the criticality of employing a whole-of-government approach
to prioritizing the deepening of diplomatic and military ties with
regional allies and partners, especially Japan. The MLR placement and
access to key maritime terrain enables joint force maneuver and is the
conceptual framework of the Stand-in Force. The placement and access
necessary to assure allies and partners, to deter adversaries, and to
pose a credible threat in the event of armed conflict is contingent
upon strong international ties developed through application of all the
instruments of national power.
The second point is that the United States cannot wait when
deciding what to do in the event of a crisis. Should the PRC give
indications and warnings of a cross-channel invasion of Taiwan and
thereby escalate from competition to crisis, it is crucial for US
political leadership to act quickly to provide the Marine Corps with
the time necessary to reposition forces on key maritime terrain where
they can be optimally employed in support of the Joint Force.
While there are multiple points of agreement with the CSIS study
and the Marine Corps' vision for the anticipated future operating
environment, there were two areas of disagreement that must be
highlighted:
First, regarding the difficulties associated with resupplying
missiles to an MLR while engaged in conflict, it is important to
emphasize the MLR's kinetic fires capability is a secondary function.
While the MLR certainly maintains a robust fires capability, its
primary role is to function as part of an integrated and redundant
network of expeditionary sensors at key battlespace chokepoints,
providing situational awareness, targeting data, and Command & Control
(C2) for the naval, joint, and coalition force. By combining Marine
Corps sensors with joint kinetic and non-kinetic fires and effects, the
stand-in force can hold key adversary assets at risk and disrupt
adversary decisionmaking, thereby enabling the rapid deployment of
naval, joint, and coalition forces in theater. The MLR provides
combatant commanders with both options and improved information upon
which to interpret and manage their decisionmaking space.
Second, the MLR is also designed to deter and defeat strategic
competitors through strengthening crucial relationships with allies and
partners, reassuring them of U.S. security commitments, and to foster
access in times of crisis or conflict. The MLR is designed to be
capable of interoperability with joint or coalition forces in the
contact and blunt layers. In crisis, the MLR's forward posture and
access enable it, in coordination with coalition forces, to hold
adversary assets at risk, contribute to coalition forces' sea denial
and sea control operations via organic lethality, and to close
coalition kill webs and provide other critical enabling actions. The
MLR is purpose-built and designed to rapidly transition from
competition, to conflict, and back to competition as escalatory
dynamics dictate in support of either a joint or coalition force.

47. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, was the Marine Corps involved
in the execution of this CSIS war game?
General Smith. The Marine Corps did not participate in the planning
or execution of this event. Additionally, no personnel from the Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab's Wargaming Division, which is responsible for
our force design wargaming, were asked to participate or were otherwise
involved.

48. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, has the Marine Corps discussed
this war game with CSIS?
General Smith. No personnel from the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's
Wargaming Division, which is responsible for our force design
wargaming, were asked to participate or were otherwise involved.

49. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, how does the Marine Corps
respond to this CSIS assessment of the MLR's effectiveness? Please do
not contend that the Marine Corps has access to classified information
and CSIS does not.
General Smith. The CSIS assessment of the MLR is largely based on
using it to provide kinetic fires. While the MLR has the capability to
provide these fires, its strongest contribution to the Joint Force is
its ability to find, fix, and track adversary ships and aircraft, make
sense of what will likely be a confusing and cluttered operating
environment, and provide targeting information to other elements of the
Joint Force to increase their effectiveness, efficiency, and
survivability. At the same time, the MLR will contribute to denying or
degrading an opponent's ability to do the same.
The MLR's small operational footprint and mobility will allow it to
survive in this highly contested and information saturated environment.
If the enemy wants to expend an exquisite munition on a small number of
marines--only to find they moved in the time it took the missile to
arrive at its planned target--then that is one less exquisite missile
bound for an aircraft carrier or key base. These forces will provide
targeting-level information to the rest of the Joint Force, so that the
200 missiles a bomber squadron can carry are directed against the right
targets in the right place, even though those targets may have moved
hundreds of miles during the interval between launch of the
aforementioned bombers and their arrival at their weapons release
points.
The CSIS report notes the difficulty associated with deploying an
MLR to Taiwan after the start of hostilities. While an MLR could
certainly be employed on the island of Taiwan, in the context of a
western Pacific conflict it provides more value to the Joint Force by
positioning on key pieces of maritime terrain and limiting an
opponent's freedom of maneuver, east of the first island chain. When
other targeting systems are degraded or denied, the MLR will leverage
multi-domain communications pathways to provide targeting information
to the Joint Force. In turn, this will limit other critical asset's
exposure to threats while leveraging their larger weapons magazines and
capabilities to attrite enemy forces. The MLR further supports the
Joint Force by conducting sea denial operations through the prosecution
of enemy forces with their own organic fires capabilities.
Additionally, the MLR is intended to be partially deployed at all
times, conducting exercises with allied and partner nations, bolstering
their capabilities and interoperability. This creates uncertainty for
potential adversaries as they will not know what they will be forced to
contend with, should they choose to engage in armed conflict. Further,
the MLR's partial deployment reduces the portion of the MLR that will
need to be re-positioned in the event armed conflict commences. The
Marine Corps recognizes that strategic lift is a vulnerable resource,
and that it will be heavily employed by other Services in the event of
significant U.S. force deployments. This is a large part of the reason
the Marine Corps is seeking a light amphibious ship capability to
deploy and sustain portions of the stand in force.
It is also worth noting that the MLR tends to be perceived as a
unit that is only useful in a western Pacific conflict. This is not the
case. The capabilities of the MLR have proven useful in the Baltic
during multi-lateral exercises, tracking real-world unfriendly contacts
in multiple domains and providing that information to combined forces.
There are numerous other maritime chokepoints around the world where
the MLR can provide utility in ensuring friendly freedom of maneuver,
while denying the opponents ability to maneuver. Mindful of your
request to not reference classified information, it is critical to
point out that the systems which the joint force commander would use to
enhance MLR survivability are classified and were not available to CSIS
for their use.

50. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what is the Marine Corps doing
to assure access to terrain where MLRs are likely to operate in a
contingency involving China or Russia?
General Smith. During competition, crisis, and conflict, the
ability for the Joint Force to gain and maintain access, basing, and
overflight from our partners and allies is critical to projecting
combat power in support of the combatant commanders. This is one of the
significant advantages that the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) provides to combatant commanders in terms of
Flexible Response Options (FROs) and Flexible Deterrence Options
(FDOs). However, it is necessary to build and sustain our key
relationships during competition.
The Marine Corps, as part of a Stand-In Force (SIF), supports the
National Defense Strategy by being forward postured with our partners
and allies. With the latest change to the international agreement with
the Government of Japan, 12th MLR will provide a ready and capable
formation in the First Island Chain. The combination of presence and
capability reassures our allies and ensures the Marine Corps' ability
to respond to regional crisis, further reinforcing our future access.
Access for unit employment is largely within the purview of
combatant commanders. However, the Marine Corps works with those
combatant commanders and our allies and partners to establish
relationships that are the foundation for future access. Some examples
of this include bilateral and multilateral exercises like Balikatan and
Nordic Response (formerly Cold Response), key leader engagements, and
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) support. Security
agreements also play an important role in providing the legal and
administrative framework for Marine Corps presence, while respecting
the sovereignty and interests of U.S. allies and partners.

51. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps has
previously conducted its own war games as part of the Force Design 2030
development effort. Will the Marine Corps release classified or
unclassified versions of these war game conclusions to my office?
General Smith. Below is a list of the reports available for those
with the appropriate clearances. Future results may also be made
available to those with appropriate clearances.

MAGTF Warrior 17, 12-16 June 2017 (pre-FD 2030)
Purpose: Define Marine Corps capabilities required to
conduct sea control and power projection within a joint campaign
against a peer adversary.
Reports available: Secret final report.

Expeditionary Warrior 18, 2-6 April 2018 (pre-FD 2030)
Purpose: Examine operational level logistics support to
Marine expeditionary forces in the western Pacific in an anti-access/
area denial environment.
Reports available: Secret final report.

Naval Services Game 18, 9-12 July 2018 (pre-FD 2030)
Purpose: Explore command relationships, tasking,
capabilities, and employment implications of Marine Corps and Navy
forces task-organized for littoral combat across the full range of
naval missions.
Reports available: Secret final report.

MAGTF Warrior 18, 17-21 September 2018 (pre-FD 2030)
Purpose: Inform future logistics operating concepts of
support and how the MEF will be organized, trained, and equipped to
support and sustain operations as part of an inside force.
Reports available: Secret final report.

POM22, 7-11 October 2019
Purpose: Identify capability roadmap changes required to
support Force Design 2030.
Reports available: Unclassified summary.

Strategy 2030, 16-17 October 2019
Purpose: Inform CMC Force Design 2030 construct and
identify potential service-level risks associated with directed force
reductions and reorganizations.
Reports available: Unclassified summary.

Pacific Surprise, 21-31 October 2019 (MLR-focused)
Purpose: Operational level test of Force Design 2030
force in context of extended joint, maritime campaign against the
pacing threat.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Ghost Fleet 1, 14-17 January 2020 (MLR-focused)
Purpose: Examine the extent to which proposed FD 2030 MLR
and MEU can support a given sea denial mission within the context of
JFOS 2.2
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Black Sheep Squadron, 31 December 2019-28 January 2020
Purpose: Explore concepts of employment and capabilities
for manned and unmanned Marine Corps aviation assets to inform future
force design and development.
Reports available: Unclassified summary.

Ender's Shadow, 15 April and 21 August 2020 (MLR-focused)
Purpose: Inform FD 2030 decisions and the development of
the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (TM-
EABO) through tactical employment of and MLR capabilities as part of a
joint maritime campaign conducted in the SCS.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, two Secret final
reports.

Ghost Fleet 2, 20-24 July 2020
Purpose: Examine the value of proposed sustainment
vessels and existing Military Sealift Command ships in sustaining the
Joint Force during a joint maritime campaign.
Reports available: Unclassified summary.

Provident Forge, 23 September-6 October 2020
Purpose: Evaluate the FD 2030 infantry battalion against
selected mission requirements to assess capability when executing
global crisis response and contingency missions.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Naval Services Game 20, 18-23 October 2020
Purpose: Explore fleet integration of Navy and Marine
Corps force design initiatives to inform command and control
relationships to fight effectively.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Crown Jewel, 2 February-23 April 2021
Purpose: Evaluate proposed FD2030 MEU construct and
concept of employment against selected missions to gauge the
formation's ability to execute proposed mission essential tasks.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

ENIGMA, 21 February-18 April 2021
Purpose: Explore design and development considerations of
Marine Information Detachments in support of forces operating in the
information environment.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Stand-in Force, 29 March-2 April 2021 (MLR-focused)
Purpose: Inform design of a Stand-in Force that is
optimized to conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance as part
of a Joint Force campaign in SCS that can transition seamlessly between
competition and conflict.
Reports available: Unclassified summary.

Ender's Rise, three-game series between Feb-25 July 2021 (MLR-
focused)
Purpose: Inform revisions and enhancements to the TM-EABO
and recommend DOTMLPF-P actions to support organizing, training, and
equipping Marine Littoral Regiments and Littoral Maneuver Squadrons in
preparation in competition.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret
``quicklook'' report.

Littoral Logistics (Expeditionary Warrior 21), 9-13 August 2021
Purpose: Inform the development of concepts required to
posture and sustain a naval force-in-readiness executing theater-level
expeditionary advanced base operations in a contested environment.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Littoral Maneuver, 30 August-3 September 2021
Purpose: Develop and assess boat capabilities and
concepts of employment in order to inform requirements documents.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
report.

Ground Warrior 22, 7 October 2021-17 February 2022
Purpose: Refine and clarify the concept of employment
for, and examine the composition of, the FD 2030 infantry battalion set
against global mission requirements.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, secret
``quicklook'' report.

Aviation Wargame, 13-17 December 2021
Purpose: Review and refine Marine aviation requirements
in support of the Stand-in Force of 2030 and beyond.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, TS/SCI final
report.

Expeditionary Warrior 22.1, 7-11 March 2022 (MLR-related)
Purpose: Explore Marine Corps means of contributing to
naval, joint, and national objectives in competition below the
threshold of major armed combat.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret
``quicklook'' report.

Expeditionary Warrior 22.2 / Global 15, 16-20 May 2022 (MLR-
related)
Purpose: Examine Navy and Marine Corps afloat and ashore
integration opportunities which enable a Joint Task Force scheme of
maneuver and scheme of fires in a high-end conflict against a peer
threat.
Reports available: Unclassified summary, TS/SCI report
(under classification review)

MLR Game 2022 Agile Competition/Agile Response (collaboration w/
SAW), 23-27 May 2022 (MLR-focused)
Purpose: Assess concepts related to the employment of
Stand-in Forces and the Marine Littoral Regiment at the operational
level of war during transition from competition to conflict.
Reports available: Unclassified final report published in
US Naval Institute journal Proceedings

MLR Game 2023 (collaboration w/Krulak Center), 17 January and 24
March 2023, (MLR-focused)
Purpose: Identify alternative COAs to the current
Littoral Combat Team construct.
Reports available: Secret

Azure Dragon, 9-13 January 2023 (MLR-related)
Purpose: Explore III MEF ability to transition from day-
to-day operations to major armed combat operations and explore MEF
Major Subordinate Commands' ability to serve as Naval Task Group
Headquarters.
Reports available: Secret ``quicklook'' report, Secret
final report (final review).

Ground Warrior 23, 13 December 22-6 January 23
Purpose: Explore employment of the FD2030 infantry
battalion in offensive operations and assess the sufficiency of the
battalion's composition.
Reports available: Secret final report (in review).

Reconnaissance/Counter-reconnaissance (RXR), 8-12 May 2023
Purpose: Examine Maritime RXR functional concept, inform
other related concepts, and examine critical technologies that enable
successful naval task group operations.
Reports available: Secret ``quicklook'' report.
marine expeditionary unit capabilities
52. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the most visible component of
the Marine Corps' crisis response capability is the MEU. The 2,200
marines on a MEU, divided between a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a
Composite Helicopter Squadron, and a Combat Logistics Battalion, bring
organic capabilities that a combatant commander can employ. Force
Design 2030 changes the type and amount of equipment available to the
MEU as well as the structure and composition of units assigned to the
command element (CE), the ground combat element (GCE), the aviation
combat element (ACE) and the logistics combat element (LCE). Can you
provide a detailed breakdown of the composition of the 31st MEU and the
13th MEU in 2018 and 2023, including any changes to their mission
essential tasks and the number of marines assigned to the CE, GCE, ACE,
and LCE?
General Smith. Force Design 2030 has not changed the number of
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) the Marine Corps can field; in fact,
Force Design 2030 reinforces the need for the continued global
employment of this versatile and highly capable unit. The Marine Corps
continues to have capacity for seven MEUs
13th MEU Summary. The Service has increased its number of F-35s
from 6 to 10. This is only feasible in a 2x LPD class ship composition
as executed in 2023 unless other aviation assets are reduced. The
divestment of heavy main battle tanks has resulted in an increase in
ashore mobility of personnel and cargo via additional All-Terrain
Vehicles (ATVs), 7-tons, and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). The
temporary reduction in AAVs has allowed additional engineer equipment
and containerized cargo to be embarked. The vertical takeoff and
landing--unmanned aerial system (V-BATs) have begun fielding, placing
an additional aviation capability with the medium deck ships during
disaggregated operations. Personnel composition remains similar across
the MAGTF.
31st MEU Summary. F-35s were slated to deploy in 2018, however were
land-based for operational considerations. The homeport shift of LHA-6
USS AMERICA replacing LHD-1 USS WASP in Forward Deployed Naval Forces--
Japan (FDNF-J) has brought an F-35 certified flight deck into 7th Fleet
resulting in regular 5th Gen TACAIR presence with the MEU. Some
traditional towed artillery has been replaced with HIMARS rocket
artillery. As with 13th MEU, V-BATs have begun fielding with very
positive feedback from our commanders, and personnel composition
remains consistent.
Detailed composition of MEU capabilities in 2018 and 2023 is
provided below and is displayed in two columns (column 1 represents
2018 and column 2 represents 2023).

13th MEU Aircraft and UAS: MV-22:
10/10. CH-53: 4/4. AH-1: 4/4. UH-1: 3/3. F-35: 6/10. V-
BAT: 0/3.

13th MEU Vehicles and Equipment:
M777: 6/4. M1A1 Main Battle Tank: 4/0. M88 Tank
Retriever: 1/0. AAV: 15/0. LAV: 20/20. 7-Ton: 41/45. HMMWV/JLTV: 84/94.
ATV: 7/17. Engineering equipment: 5/7. Containerized cargo: 468/548.

31st MEU Aircraft and UAS:
MV-22: 10/10. CH-53: 4/4. AH-1: 4/4. UH-1: 3/3. F-35: 0/
6. V-BAT: 0/3.

31st MEU Vehicles and Equipment:
M777: 6/4. HIMARS: 0/2. AAV: 15/0. LAV: 5/11. 7-Ton: 37/
30. LVSR: 3/0. HMMWVs/JLTV: 85/49. ATV: 11/15. Engineering equipment:
5/2. Containerized cargo: 367/357.

The Mission Essential Task List (METL) for both the 31st and 13th
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) have experienced some changes between
2018 and 2023. These changes included the removal of four METs:
Conducting Theater Security Cooperation Activities
Conducting Aviation Operations from Expeditionary Shore-
Based Sites
Performing Enabling Operations
Conducting Airfield Seizure Operations

While adding one new MET: Establishing and Operating Expeditionary
Advanced Bases.

Now, both MEUs are expected to be capable of the following:
Establishing an expeditionary site to support naval
operations, which may include ports, airfields, Forward Arming and
Refueling Points (FARPs), forward operating bases, and firing areas
Conducting enabling operations as required for naval
operations
Establishing and maintaining operations at a site until
it is either disestablished or control is transferred to another entity
Reducing pockets of resistance, securing the area, and
defending the site against company-level threats.

While the METL for the 31st and 13th MEUs are identical, there is a
minor difference in the baseline and advanced standards for Maritime
Interception Operations (MIO). The primary difference is the specified
ability to conduct daytime bottom-up entry, which is a baseline
standard for the 13th MEU, but is an advanced standard for the 31st
MEU.
It is important to note that each MEU commander in coordination
with the MEF Commander, determines this specific load out of their MEU
based on current conditions and threat assessments. Multiple MEUs over
the past two decades have chosen not to take main battle tanks due to
their size and relatively low utilization rate. As an example: the 22d
MEU in 1996 chose not to take tanks but rather other vehicles in their
place. This MEU conducted multiple allied and partner exercises and
conducted two real world NEO's in Liberia and the Central African
Republic, while still providing a TRAP force for operations in Bosnia
Herzegovina.

53. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the MEU GCE is based on a BLT
with three rifle companies. The standard attachments to form the BLT
have been an artillery battery (6 x M777 lightweight howitzers), an
assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) platoon (18-21 AAVs), a light armored
reconnaissance platoon or company (6-25 LAV variants), and engineer
platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. The composite squadron in the
ACE traditionally deploys with the following mix of airframes and
detachments: medium tiltrotor (VMM) squadron (10-12 x MV-22s), heavy
helicopter squadron (HMH) detachment (4 x CH-53E/K), light attack
helicopter squadron (HMLA) detachment (4 x AH-1Z and 3 x UH-1Y), Marine
attack squadron (VMA or VMFA) detachment (6 x AV-8B or F-35B), aerial
refueler transport squadron (VMGR) detachment (2 x KC-130's), Marine
Air Control Group (MACG) detachment, Marine Wing Support Squadron
(MWSS) detachment, and a Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)
detachment. Typical MEU LCE equipment includes 15 MTVR, 18 HMMWVs, 2
M36 wreckers, 2 D-7 bulldozers, 3 forklifts/front-loaders, 4 bulk fuel
vehicles, 2 water vehicles, 1 recovery AAV, and 1 noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO) tracking system. Are MEUs deploying in 2023
deploying with organizational structures like that described above?
General Smith. The organizational structure described above remains
similar across all Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), except for the
use of assault amphibious vehicles (AAV), and HIMARS. Currently, the
force is transitioning to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and
divesting of AAVs. The Service is currently on track to deploy the
first ACV platoon via an ARG/MEU in fiscal year 2024 to fiscal year
2025, which is a change to the above organizational structure as
described. MEUs will task organize based off assessments conducted by
the MEF Commanders and the MARFORs. In some cases, a MEU may deploy
with HIMARS (MEU HIMARS Platoon has 2x Launchers) versus deploying with
an artillery battery (6x M777 lightweight Howitzers). In this case, the
Service's 31st MEU deploys with HIMARS as opposed to East and West
Coast MEUs. Task Organization is driven by many factors such as the
deployment schedule, forces available, pre-planned partnered exercises,
and adversarial actions. The stated changes to Task Organization (T/O)
and Table of Equipment (T/E) do not prevent the execution of any
assigned Mission Essential Tasks (METs).

54. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if MEUs deploying in 2023 will
be organized differently that described above, please provide a
detailed comparison of how they deviate from the standard MEU load out,
including the number of personnel assigned to each unit within the CE,
GCE, ACE, and LCE.
General Smith. The structural organization of our MEUs also remains
the same and will be comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Battalion
Landing Team (BLT) as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Composite
Aviation Squadron as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat
Logistics Battalion (CLB) as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE)
The composition of how the MEU is spread across the three ship
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and what capabilities are within it will
be tailored to the threat environment and historical trends of
combatant commander mission assignments to the ARG/MEU team. Prior to
deployments, the ARG/MEU will conduct a 9-month pre-deployment training
period (PTP) with various at sea exercises that allow the two commands
to build and work on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for assigned
Mission Essential Tasks (METs). During at sea periods the ARG/MEU
commanders, staff, and major subordinate commands will execute a
variety of full mission profile exercises such as amphibious raids,
amphibious assaults, non-combat evacuation operations (NEO). The two
commands will also coordinate with Fleet and Joint headquarters in the
combatant commands that the ARG/MEU is expected to be assigned to
during the deployment to coordinate Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC)
exercises and receive intelligence briefs to understand the threat
environment. Through the combination of the at sea training periods,
development of SOPs, understanding of anticipated assigned missions,
and the threat environment, the ARG/MEU team tailors what assets are
assigned to each amphibious warfare ship within the ARG to be
appropriately organized for operational deployment. As such, MAGTFs can
and will vary in size and capability according to their assigned or
likely missions.
Currently, the 26th MEU is conducting their Pre-Deployment Training
Period (PTP) with the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in
preparation for their upcoming deployment this Summer. The Artillery
Battery within the BLT for the MEU will be organized with a traditional
M777 Howitzers platoon and a Force Design 2030 incorporated High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platoon. Prior to the 26th
MEU, HIMARS platoons have deployed with the 31st MEU and with West
Coast MEUs beginning in 2019.
force design 2030 transparency
55. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, it has been reported that
senior Marine officers were required to sign non-disclosure agreements
after working on Force Design 2030. Is this accurate?
General Smith. Yes.

56. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if senior Marine officers were
required to sign non-disclosure agreements after working on Force
Design 2030, why was that necessary?
General Smith. Prior to the public release of information and
decisions made, regarding Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps provided
Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) to a select number of officers and
staff. These NDAs were provided in an effort to minimize incorrect
information and guidance from being publicly shared while Force Design
2030 was in its developmental stage. These officers and staff were
members of a select, core group who were instrumental in the
decisionmaking process. The NDAs were provided and signed on a
voluntary basis, whereby if a member of the group did not desire to
sign the NDA, they were not forced to sign and participate. NDAs have
been commonplace for any force structure review groups and force level
structure reviews over the past two decades.

57. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, you indicated that the Marine
Corps has conducted over 400 engagements with Congress to discuss Force
Design 2030. Can you provide a list of those engagements specifying
whether they were meetings, briefs, or hearings with Members of
Congress to discuss Force Design 2030 or other issues within the Marine
Corps?
General Smith. When General Berger stated at the April 2023 Senate
Armed Services Committee Department of Navy posture hearing that the
Marine Corps had conducted over 400 engagements with Congress regarding
Force Design 2030, he had summarized nearly 4 years of consistent
general officer and staff engagements with personal offices and
committees. I am committed to continuing this open and regular
communication if confirmed as the 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
When the Marine Corps first undertook Force Design 2030, we sought
congressional oversight from the start to capitalize on the invaluable
perspective of Congress. We assessed that the Congress would be a key
partner in the development and execution of our modernization. They
were an essential source of information on our Campaign of Learning--
where we sought to rapidly inject lessons learned, wargaming and
experimentation into our decisions.
In 2019, General Berger released the Commandant's Planning
Guidance, setting forth the Marine Corps' intent and direction for the
Force Design 2030 initiative. The document emphasized the need to
reallocate resources and shift the Marine Corps' focus toward future
conflict scenarios, such as great power competition and naval
integration. Marine Corps leadership recognized the need to provide
regular updates, engage in briefings, and seek congressional feedback
to ensure that the Force Design 2030 aligned with national security
objectives and received appropriate oversight.
Following the release of the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance,
the Marine Corps actively engaged with Congress to facilitate a robust
and ongoing dialog. Marine Corps leaders conducted multiple office
calls and briefings to provide in-depth insights into Force Design
2030, be available to address any concerns, and solicit feedback from
Members of Congress, as well as personal and professional staff. As the
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration at the time, I
personally attended several of these briefs and office calls. From 2019
until the release of Force Design 2030 in March 2020, the staff
conducted 31 engagements (office calls, breakfasts, briefings, phone
calls, and events) with Members of Congress, committee personnel, and
personal.
During these interactions, marines executed a wide range of
presentations that encompassed both classified and unclassified
information. The topics covered various aspects such as alterations in
force structure, plans for acquisitions, projected budgets, and
expected timelines. The program briefs were especially detailed to
ensure projected investments remained on cost, on schedule, and within
performance parameters. Throughout the interactions, Marine briefers
welcomed rigorous scrutiny and worked closely with congressional
committees, so as to take full advantage of their experience.
As the Marine Corps moved into implementation, the Service remained
committed to transparency by sharing progress reports, conducting site
visits, and facilitating access to classified and unclassified
information related to the Force Design 2030. Regular updates and
consultations with relevant committees were established to maintain a
continuous flow of information, enabling Congress to effectively
exercise its oversight responsibilities. We were also diligent in
providing Congress with physical and electronic copies of Force Design
2030 Updates and other Force Design concepts as they became available
to the public.
Since 2020, the Service has increased congressional engagements
upon the release of Force Design 2030 and in subsequent years.
*Each items listed reflects a separate, distinct engagement.

2020
Office Calls with Members: 35
Briefings to Members: 13
Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 37
Other (breakfasts, etc.): 6
Total Engagements: 91

2021
Office Calls with Members: 56
Briefings to Members: 19
Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 39
Other (breakfasts, etc.): 13
Total Engagements: 127

2022
Office Calls with Members: 69
Briefings to Members: 19
Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 64
Other (breakfasts, etc.): 29
Total Engagements: 181

2023
Office Calls with Members: 32
Briefings to Members: 10
Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 26
Other (breakfasts, etc.): 6
Total Engagements: over 70 to date

Hearings and QFRs: Separately (and not counted in the above
totals), the Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 concept was addressed on
the record (either during testimony or questions for the record) in
over 41 hearings from March 2020 until February 2023 and responding to
Questions for the Record from all defense committees.

58. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provides Service
Chiefs the responsibility to man, train, and equip personnel for the
unified commands. Did you consult with any combatant commander prior to
embarking on Force Design 2030 in 2019 or during initial Force Design
efforts in 2020?
General Smith. The overarching Force Design 2030 modernization
effort was communicated to a wide audience of potentially affected
commanders, specifically in the Indo-Pacific region. However, due to my
assignment CD&I, I did not have access to the executive level
communications between service leadership and the combatant commanders
during the initial planning and implementation of Force Design.

59. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if you did consult with
combatant commanders, can you provide details about which combatant
commanders and when you consulted with them?
General Smith. As stated in response to question 58, I was not in a
billet designed for direct communication with combatant commanders. If
confirmed, I will ensure robust communications with all combatant
commanders. Combatant commanders are a part of all Joint Chiefs of
Staff meetings where service capabilities are discussed in detail.
Their integrating priority lists are always considered as services
develop capabilities. Combatant commanders' needs are also addressed in
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Deputy's Management
Action Group and various other departmental level meetings. Senior
Marine representatives attend each of these events and relay pertinent
information on combatant commander needs to Headquarters Marine Corps.
Marine Corps service component commanders regularly brief combatant
commanders and engage in extensive dialog about future Marine Corps
capabilities.

60. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, General Berger and Lieutenant
General Heckl have testified that the Marine Corps is fully capable of
meeting all global commitments. Were Force Design 2030 related
divestments coordinated with the Commander, United States Forces--Korea
before they were implemented? Please provide the documentation in
support of your answers.
General Smith. The Commander, United States Forces--Korea is
subordinate to the Commander, United States INDOPACOM. As stated above,
engagement with United States INDOPACOM has been robust and if
confirmed, I will continue to have those robust conversations.
marine corps as a stand in force
61. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, it will be many years before
the Marine Corps has sufficient missiles to engage in a prolonged fight
with the PLA. How will Stand-in Forces operate after they have
exhausted their missile inventories?
General Smith. The magazine depth of different elements within the
SIF will vary depending on element size, location, munition, and
mission. Numerous studies have identified that, for a prolonged fight
with the PLA and depending on the scope of such a conflict, missile
inventories will be a cause for concern across the entirety of the
joint and combined force.
However, the employment of kinetic fires is not the sole function
of Marine elements of the Stand-in Force (SIF). By combining Marine
Corps sensors with joint kinetic and non-kinetic fires and effects,
stand-in forces can hold key adversary assets at risk and disrupt
adversary decisionmaking, thereby enabling the rapid deployment of
naval, joint, and coalition forces in theater. The Marine Corps'
forward presence within a potential adversary's weapons engagement zone
enables the service to emplace an integrated and redundant network of
expeditionary sensors on key maritime terrain to provide situational
awareness, targeting data, and Command & Control (C2) for naval, joint,
and coalition forces.

62. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, why is the Marine Corps
redesigning and restructuring itself to conduct sea denial operations
that can already be performed by other Services, for example, Navy
attack submarines, Air Force long-range missiles, and Army Multi-Domain
Task Forces?
General Smith. Part of the Marine Corps' Title 10 responsibilities
are to ``provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with
supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or
defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign.'' It is inherent in the Marine Corps' Title 10
responsibilities to provide an expeditionary force in readiness that
can provide combat credible forces that can operate across the conflict
continuum in support of naval campaigns. We are modernizing the force
to enhance the Marine Corps' ability to support naval campaigns and
fleet commanders by equipping formations with the necessary
capabilities to enable sea control and denial operations as required to
seize or defend advanced naval bases.
Furthermore, the Force Design process is not seeking to restructure
the Marine Corps to be solely responsible for sea denial and control
operations. These capabilities will be inherent in our Marine Littoral
Regiments (MLRs) and other elements of the Stand-in Force, and are
complementary to other Service's capabilities, within the joint
warfighting construct. Moreover, the Marine Corps' sea-denial
capabilities are not redundant to joint and coalition force
capabilities but are a complementary collection of combined arms
capability options for combatant commanders.

63. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps has stated
that the key to sustaining Stand-in Forces is the Landing Ship Medium
augmented by aviation support, buying from local inhabitants, and
``foraging'' for food. The decision to divest critical logistics
capabilities was made several years ago, but testimony by Marine
leaders has also admitted that the logistics support concept has not
been solved. If marines are deployed today under the SIF concept, how
would they be sustained with all classes of supply, medical/casualty
evacuation, and required maintenance capabilities?
General Smith. As stated in our recently released I&L 2030, we
clearly recognize that ``the Marine Corps Installations and Logistics
Enterprise is not yet organized, trained, or equipped to sustain
expeditionary forces across all domains as envisioned by A Concept for
Stand-In Forces (SIF), Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment,
and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations, nor in traditional crisis
response scenarios.'' I concur with this assessment. Exercises,
wargames, and experiments have similarly demonstrated and validated
this assessment. Until modernization progresses, Stand-In Forces will
rely on a mix of legacy and new capabilities.
The Marine Corps understands that enabling flexible and responsive
sustainment in a contested environment requires a broad mix of ashore
and afloat platforms and an integrated logistics network to support the
SIF. Through modernization, we intend to transition our logistics from
a capability optimized for supporting sustained operations ashore to a
maritime capability capable of supporting operations in austere,
expeditionary, and littoral environments that are contested across all
domains. The centerpiece of this concept of support is the development
of an integrated ashore and afloat sustainment network that can support
Marine forces globally. This network would be capable of generating
multiple logistics webs that provide options to commanders, creates
resiliency, contributes to deterrence, and overcomes the precision
lethality of the modern battlefield. To do this, this network would
seek to integrate naval, joint, Allied and Partner capability based on
the operational requirement.
From a resourcing perspective, this network requires four critical
capabilities: multi-capable distribution platforms, increased and
diversified forward positioning of sustainment, installations that are
prepared for operations in a contested environment, and improved
logistics command and control. As noted previously and as seen in the
activation of the new Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadron in
Hawaii, the Marine Corps is working to establish multi-capable
distribution platforms to enable our modernized logistics efforts. As
for increasing and diversifying the forward positioning of
sustainment--we will achieve this through the Global
Positioning Network (GPN) which consists of a dynamic, integrated,
afloat and ashore networks, to support the Stand-in-Force and global
crisis response.
The Marine Corps will make our installations ready for the
contested environment by transforming our Indo-Pacific installations
into advanced bases capable of serving as vital nodes in the logistics
network, while our CONUS-based installations are made more efficient,
resilient, and capable. Last, the Marine Corps will enhance its
logistics command and control to enable better logistics
decisionmaking.
marine corps aviation under force design 2030
64. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, approximately 2 months ago
Lieutenant General Heckl affirmed that the Marine Corps was not
diminishing a single aviation program of record (POR). That just means
that the Marine Corps is going to buy the amount of aircraft it planned
on buying. There is a delta between the number of aircraft the Marine
Corps will require in each POR and the number of operational aircraft
in the Total Force based on the number of squadrons and the number of
aircraft per squadron. Can you provide a detailed accounting of this
delta, including any aircraft that will be in storage, inventory
management, available for foreign military sales, or otherwise divested
from the Marine Corps inventory?
General Smith. When the service determines a Program of Record
(POR), they need to solve for three primary variables to ensure the
service precisely procures the exact number of aircraft needed to
support the operational forces for the program's lifetime. This number
provides a full complement of aircraft for operational, training,
testing, and Reserve squadrons on a day-to-day basis (Primary Aircraft
Authorization, PAA), scheduled and unscheduled maintenance,
modification, inspection, and repair (Backup Aircraft Authorization,
BAA), and loss of aircraft due to a mishap or damage (Attrition
Reserve, ATT).
The Services determine how many squadrons, training, testing, and
Reserve squadrons they require to determine PAA. This is done through
analysis of assigned missions (done by review of congressional statutes
and mandates as detailed in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and
National Defense Strategy (NDS)).
Aircraft inventory management for the Marine Corps is defined by
SECNAVINST 5442.3, which provides the framework for how the service
determines the appropriate quantities of BAA and ATT aircraft. Each
airframe type uses different percentages based on historical data to
calculate BAA and ATT. In a fiscally constrained environment,
leadership can make a decision to accept risk in BAA and ATT numbers,
not typically realized until late in the procurement lifecycle, to free
up resources for competing priorities.
The following answers the implied question relating to `operational
aircraft' (or PAA) changes as the result of Force Design (FD), as well
as a detailed accounting of any aircraft that will be in storage,
inventory management, or available for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
The Marine
Corps POR for F35 is 420; the POR for CH-53K is 200; the POR for
MV-22 is 360 (final procurement in fiscal year 2023); the POR for H-1s
is 389 (procurement completed in fiscal year 2019).
While this answer will focus on the four platforms listed above, it
does not include the additional one KC-130J squadron being stood up in
the Pacific, as well as the additional three squadrons of UAS. As a
point of fact, prior to FD, the Marine Corps planned to have 81,415
aircraft in the mid-2030's; post FD changes, the Marine Corps plans to
have 1,453 aircraft, an additional 38 aircraft in support of the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
(JFMCC), and Joint Force.
F-35 Inventory Management:
The POR for F-35 is 420 (353xB / 67xC). Pre-FD, there were three
organizational constructs for the number of squadrons over the past 15
years. The last of those three constructs called for 9 squadrons of 16
aircraft and 9 squadrons of 10 aircraft. Utilizing DoN approved models
for BAA and ATT, the correct POR should have been 510 for that
construct. A 90-plane deficit (510 requirement--420 POR) is high risk
and would manifest itself over 2-3 decades. Specifically, if the Pre-FD
construct was followed, the Marine Corps would begin losing a squadron
every 5 years beginning in 2040, and the Marine Corps would be unable
to fly the F-35B out to 2067.
Post-FD TACAIR Transition Plans call for a PAA for 18 squadrons of
10 aircraft. When you combine the PAA, BAA, and ATT for 18 squadrons of
10 aircraft, the POR should be 425. Five aircraft short (420 vice 425)
is low risk and manageable. To say ``changing to 18 squadrons of 10
aircraft reduces ``operationally available aircraft'' by 54 aircraft
(Pre-FD PAA total is 324 and post-FD PAA is 270) is misleading. An
organizational construct change was required because the old construct
was high risk and unsustainable for the following reasons:

1. All pre-FD organizational constructs centered around 16 plane
F-35B squadrons supporting the MEU (6 to the MEU, 10 Remain Behind).
THIS IS NO LONGER A CONSTRAINT. Through the Campaign of Learning we
discovered we can--and are--deploying 10 F-35Bs aboard our MEUs. The
post-FD construct allows us to deploy the entire squadron aboard our
MEUs (compared to the old 6 x AV-8B contingent) and provides COCOMs a
66 percent INCREASE in 5th GEN TACAIR aircraft with our MEUs forward
deployed and globally engaged all the way out to 2067.

2. The Marine Corps did not plan to flush out the pre-FD PAA in
squadrons to 16 aircraft until around 2030. We will have less than the
required PAA aircraft from 2040 to 2067. Under the old construct,
because the organizational construct called for a POR of 510, that
means we begin to lose a SQUADRON of F-35s every 5 years beginning in
2040. It reduces the lifespan of the F-35 by about 15 to 20 years. The
post-FD organizational construct allows the Marine Corps to maximize
the service life of the F-35, thereby maximizing its availability to
the MAGTF, JFMCC, and Joint Force.
F-35 Storage and Preservation:
The Marine Corps F-35 POR has been steady at 420 aircraft for
almost two decades. How many, and where we place our BAA and AR F-35
aircraft is yet to be determined since we have not finished buying out
the POR. Until then, thoughtful inventory management is the key to
Marine Corps TACAIR readiness and capability, and we are very good at
doing that.
The Marine Corps has no intention of placing F-35s into FMS, or of
divesting of any F-35s. The 18 squadron by 10 F-35 aircraft supports
all MEU, UDP, TAI and COCOM GFM requirements at a 1:3 deployment to
dwell. The post-FD construct is unquestionably the swiftest, most
lethal, fiscally responsible, and long-term sustainable construct of
the three constructs the Marine Corps has had over the past 15 years.
CH-53K:
The CH-53K POR is 200. This is reflected in our President's Budget
2024 submission and is supported throughout the FYDP. Pre-FD, the
Marine Corps planned to field 8 squadrons of 16 aircraft; POR should
have been 220.
Post-FD, we plan to field 5.25 squadrons of 16 aircraft; POR could
be 168; however, a January 2022 Marine Requirements Oversight Council
(MROC) reaffirmed our POR remains at 200. for reasons listed below:
Changing the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) of major programs
like the CH-53K and F-35B today will not produce resources for
investment elsewhere and would be premature decision.
Maintaining the POR provides the Marine Corps and opportunity to
assess the arrival timeline for other connectors and mobility assets
(LSM, AMPHIBS, ship to shore connectors, etc.), and determine if we
need additional squadrons or to increase the PAA of our squadrons. If
we did determine we needed additional squadrons, we offer two
possibilities:
1. The Marine Corps could increase our CH-53K squadrons to 6,
calling for a POR of 8190+.
2. Or we could place 20 CH-53Ks in our 5.25 squadrons, leading to
a POR of 8190+.
The Marine Corps POR remains 200. It will be determined later how
we manage the BAA and ATT aircraft.
MV-22: POR is 360 aircraft. As of 1 May 2023, the Marine Corps
plans to have a total of 48 MV-22 in an inventory management between
fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2026. The inventory management program
is designed to provide aircraft capability modernization, manage the
lifecycle and airframe flight hours, and ensure enough aircraft with
the required capability are available to satisfy PAA requirements at
all times. Aircraft may be inducted and reconstituted at any time, with
the total inventory management quantity fluctuating periodically.
H-1: POR is 349 (189 AH-1, 160 UH-1) aircraft. With reduction of 2
Active Duty squadrons, current requirement is 284 (158 AH-1, 126 UH-
1Y). Of the remaining 65 aircraft, 15 aircraft that have been
attritted, 8 aircraft have been offered to support Czech Republic FMS
Excess Defense Article (EDA) case; 11 aircraft have been deemed
`delayed Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG)
inductions' to be utilized in support of flight line modifications, 29
aircraft are preserved in AMARG section two (future uncertainty, FMS
and Security Assistance Program (SAP)--19 aircraft) and section five
(stricken aircraft awaiting final reclamation and disposition--10
aircraft), and 2 aircraft remain in the Fleet for final disposition.
Aircraft transferred to inactive inventory were selected after analysis
of utilization, poor readiness, higher Cost Per Flight Hours, and total
flight hour metrics to ensure the healthiest aircraft remained in
active inventory.
In sum, FD has expanded, optimized, and enhanced Marine Aviation's
ability to continue to deliver more lethal, effective, and survivable
capabilities to enable naval and joint campaigning in all domains
across the continuum of conflict.

65. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in responses to requests for
information from my office, the Marine Corps indicated that varying
numbers of aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory would go into storage
or inventory management extend the service life of MV-22s, AH-1Zs, UH-
1Ys, CH-53Ks, and F-35s. In fact, according to the information the
Marine Corps provided me, a significant amount of aircraft--as many as
60 MV-22s, 30 AH-1Zs, 24 UH-1Ys, 48 CH-53Ks, and 54 F-35Bs will go into
storage, or inventory management as the Marine Corps calls it, by 2030.
When I read you these numbers at a closed session following the April
18, 2023 hearing, you said they were not accurate even though they had
been provided to my office by the Marine Corps. What are the accurate
numbers of aircraft the Marine Corps is putting into storage or
inventory management?
General Smith. When the Service determines a POR, three primary
categories are calculated to ensure the Service procures the exact
number of aircraft needed to support the operational forces over the
aircraft's lifetime. The three primary categories are:
Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI). PAI ensures
operational, training, testing, and Reserve squadrons maintain their
full complement of aircraft (defined as Primary Aircraft Authorization
(PAA)) on a day-to-day basis.
Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI). BAI are backup aircraft
that ensure when operational, training, testing, and Reserve squadrons
aircraft undergo long-term planned maintenance or modification
pipelines; there is no degradation in readiness on our flightlines
(defined as Backup Aircraft Authorization (BAA)).
Attrition Reserve (ATT). ATT aircraft ensure that if an
operational, training, testing, or Reserve squadron loses an aircraft
due to a mishap or damage, we can immediately replace it to ensure
there is no degradation in readiness of the Marine Corps' ability to
respond to crises.
Aircraft inventory management for the Marine Corps is defined by
SECNAVINST 5442.3, which provides the framework for how the Service
determines the appropriate quantities of BAI and ATT aircraft. Each
airframe type uses different percentages based on historical data to
calculate BAI and ATT. The Marine Corps, like every other Service,
manages aircraft inventory through a variety of means; we place BAI and
ATT aircraft in our Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS), into storage at
the Aerospace Maintenance Aircraft Regeneration Group (AMARG), or into
preservation on the flight line, depots, or contracted facilities. For
the purposes of answering this question, we will cover storage and
preservation.
Storage:
Aircraft storage occurs primarily at the 309th AMARG and at the
Depots. In 1964, the Secretary of Defense designated AMARG as the sole
storage, reclamation, and disposal manager for the DOD. Naval aircraft
stored at 309th AMARG fall under six sections.
Section 1--War Reserve and Force Level Assurance Storage.
Aircraft designated for retention in Section 1 shall not have any
components removed from them without HQMC/OPNAV approval. Aircraft in
section 1 are not stricken from the inventory and are counted in TII.
Section 2--CNO Special Program Storage. Stricken aircraft
held in storage as a hedge against future force structure and
procurement uncertainties. Aircraft designated for retention in this
section may be re-preserved every 4 years as determined by the strike
board.
Section 3--FMS. Stricken aircraft are on hold for FMS and
SAP are CNO inviolate.
Section 4--Museum. Stricken aircraft identified for
donation to service museums. The ``maintain-in'' storage fees for these
aircraft are borne by the museums.
Section 5--Reclamation and Disposition. Stricken aircraft
awaiting final reclamation and disposition.
Section 6--Identified for Disposal. Stricken aircraft,
fully reclaimed, and being prepared for final disposal.
Preservation:
There are four levels of preservation in inventory management.
Level I. Conducted at the organizational level of
maintenance. Aircraft may be maintained in Level I preservation for a
maximum of 90 days.
Level II. Conducted at the depot level of maintenance.
Level II is similar to Level I. Level II preservation provides minimum
protection for up to 1 year.
Level III. Conducted at the depot level of maintenance
requiring dehumidification. Level III preservation provides optimum
protection for an indefinite period of time.
Level IV. Level IV preservation is used as an umbrella
term to designate the partial preservation of aircraft undergoing
depot-level maintenance actions. The aircraft systems and components
are preserved to the maximum extent possible; however, systems and
components may be in various levels (Level I, II, or III) of
preservation.
MV-22, H-1, CH-53K, and F-35 preservation numbers, along with a
review of those same platforms in storage, as follows:
MV-22: POR is 360 aircraft. There are no MV-22Bs entering inactive
inventory. The Inventory Management program is designed to provide
aircraft capability modernization, manage the lifecycle and airframe
flight hours, and ensure enough aircraft with the required capability
are available to always satisfy Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI)
requirements. The aircraft in the Inventory Management program is
contracted to be reconstituted within 30 days of notification,
providing a rapid response capability to adjust to changing fleet
needs. Beginning in fiscal year 2025, the MV-22 Inventory Management
program will be resourced for the induction and maintenance activity
requirements of 48 planned aircraft. The anticipated annual cost for
the program is approximately $600,000 per aircraft.
H-1: POR is 349 (189 AH-1, 160 UH-1) aircraft. There are 37
aircraft that have been transferred to inactive inventory, including 19
aircraft for future uncertainty (section 2), eight aircraft for Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and Security Assistance Program (SAP), and ten
stricken aircraft awaiting final reclamation and disposition. Section 2
storage is planned to increase from 19 aircraft to a total of 32
aircraft, which would result in a total of 50 aircraft in storage. The
cost to store the H-1 aircraft is less than $125,000 per aircraft every
4 years. There are no reoccurring costs until the aircraft is removed
from inactive inventory.
CH-53K: POR is 200 aircraft. During the transition from CH-53E to
CH-53K between now and 2030, there are no plans to place any CH-53Ks
into preservation and storage.
F-35: POR is 420 aircraft. The Marine Corps F-35 POR has been
steady at 420 aircraft for more than two decades. How many and where we
place our BAI and ATT F-35 aircraft is yet to be determined since we
have not finished buying out the POR. Until then, thoughtful inventory
management is the key to Marine Corps TACAIR readiness and capability.
In sum, the Marine Corps is not ``divesting'' of any aircraft. The
Marine Corps has historically made changes in organizational construct
and composition to meet mandates. Without appropriate inventory
management and a backup inventory, our operational squadrons would
consistently operate with fewer ready aircraft for training and
tasking.

66. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps is reportedly
buying new aircraft and putting them directly in storage. Is it a good
use of tax payer dollars for the Marine Corps to have a plan to
purchase dozens of aircraft that it has no intention of using and will
immediately put into storage?
General Smith. The Marine Corps is not buying new aircraft and
putting them into storage or preservation.

67. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in responses provided to my
office by the Marine Corps following an April 14, 2023 brief on section
1023 of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the Marine Corps reported that 50
aircraft will be transferred into the inactive inventory, along with an
unknown number of MV-22s. What is the cost associated with the
procurement and storage of these aircraft?
General Smith. H-1: There are 37 aircraft that have been
transferred to inactive inventory, including 19 aircraft for future
uncertainty (section 2), eight aircraft for Foreign Miliary Sales (FMS)
and Security Assistance Program (SAP), and ten stricken aircraft
awaiting final reclamation and disposition. Section 2 storage is
planned to increase from 19 aircraft to a total of 32 aircraft, which
would result in a total of 50 aircraft in storage. The cost to store
the H-1 aircraft is less than $125,000 per aircraft every 4 years.
There are no reoccurring costs until the aircraft is removed from
inactive inventory.
MV-22: There are no MV-22Bs entering inactive inventory. The
Inventory Management program is designed to provide aircraft capability
modernization, manage the lifecycle and airframe flight hours, and
ensure enough aircraft with the required capability are available to
always satisfy Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) requirements. Further,
an aircraft in the Inventory Management program is contracted to be
reconstituted within 30 days of notification, providing a rapid
response capability to adjust to changing fleet needs. Beginning in
fiscal year 2025, the MV-22 Inventory Management program will be
resourced for the induction and maintenance activity requirements of 48
planned aircraft. The anticipated annual cost for the program is
approximately $600,000 per aircraft.

68. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide any after
action reports, war game analysis, or other evaluation or assessment
mechanism that informed assault support requirements for infantry units
under the Force Design 2030 force structure?
General Smith. The Marine Corps assault support requirements are
based on current and forecasted Global Force Management tasking to
include Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), maintaining a Crisis Response
Force, sustained service level training exercises, Marine Air Ground
Task Force training, and Weapons and Tactics Instructor support, at a
minimum. As the Marine Corps continues to assess the future operating
environment, further adjustments in line with our campaign of learning
may be necessary. We have already seen this with our MV-22 squadrons.
An analysis of airframe lifecycles combined with an assessment of
training and operational requirements resulted in the determination
that our MV-22 squadrons needed to be restructured from 14 squadrons of
consisting of 12 aircraft to 16 squadrons consisting of 10 aircraft.
The addition of two MV-22 squadrons allows the Marine Corps to
maintain its desired deployment-to-dwell ratio for pilots and crews,
while simultaneously optimizing a given squadron's Primary Aircraft
Authorization for deployment as the MEU Aviation Combat Element. We
will continue to assess our assault support posture to determine the
most effective construct to deliver capability and capacity through
wargames, service level exercises, and other analytical initiatives.
While the Force Design process has laid the foundation for a
modernized roadmap for Marine Aviation, it also sets Marine Aviation on
the path to look to the future. For example, as part of a broader
effort with the United States Navy, Marine Aviation is developing the
Marine Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Expeditionary family of systems
(FOS). These efforts include acceleration of prototyping and
experimentation of TACAIR Collaborative Combat Aircraft and building a
common interoperable system control architecture for control of joint
assets. In parallel, Marine Aviation is also exploring the Vertical
Takeoff and Landing FOS, where the logistics connector is the first
major effort to support the execution of the stand-in force through
airborne logistics in a contested environment. This portfolio also
includes air loitering munitions and a future assault support
capability to replace our extant platforms.

69. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide any after
action reports, war game analysis, or other evaluation or assessment
mechanism that informed close air support requirements for infantry
units under the Force Design 2030 force structure?
General Smith. Force Design efforts have modernized Marine aviation
capabilities, increased readiness, and enhanced lethality across all
platforms to meet current and future demands of global force management
(GFM) requirements in support the joint force and combatant commanders
(CCDRs), rapidly changing technology, and the ever-changing operating
environment. One of the many mission essential tasks that Marine
aviation performs is offensive air support. As part of force
modernization, Marine aviation conducts significant integrated analysis
of both weapon systems and aircraft employment techniques to ensure
Marine aviation meets sortie requirements with appropriate munitions
for the best weapon-to-target match.
This analysis is captured in virtual, simulated, and live wargames
and exercises throughout Headquarters Marine Corps as well as the
operational fleet not only to inform and develop capabilities, but to
capture and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for current and
emerging weapon systems. As the Marine Corps continues to assess the
operating environment, further adjustments in line with our campaign of
learning will occur to gain and maintain the edge in lethality,
readiness, while simultaneously optimizing our F-35 and H-1 fleet to
support the joint force and combatant commanders (CCDRs).
As we have always done, we will continue to assess and evolve our
organizational construct and composition through wargames, service
level exercises, and analytical initiatives to ensure the Marine Corps
continues to deliver lethal capability to support the Joint Force and
CCDR demands now and into the future.
marine air-ground task force self-sustainability
70. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) enables marines to deliver rapid, powerful, and
sustainable response on a global scale. Sea-to-shore, air-to-ground,
door-to-door, there is not an organizational model more capable of
quickly putting marines where they need to be in order to fight and win
for our country. From the MEU to the MEF, marines are capable of self-
sustaining for 15-60 days, operating without ports, airfields, or
civilian infrastructure. Force Design 2030 changes the equipment and
personnel available to the MAGTF, particularly the ACE. Using specific
references to types and numbers of equipment and personnel, describe
how the MAGTF's ability to sustain itself at the MEU, Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and MEF level differs between 2018 and
2023.
General Smith. The sustainment characteristics of our scalable and
task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) remain the same:
Marine Expeditionary Unit (15 days), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (30
days), and Marine Expeditionary Force (60 days) today as they were in
2018. But while the characteristics have remained the same, it is
important to note that our force has evolved to face the challenges of
the modern, operational environment. The following are notable
differences in sustainment capabilities that have been fielded or are
in the process of being fielded:
Our MEUs are going out with 10 F-35Bs compared to 6 AV-
8Bs. This is a significant increase in capability to support not only
contingency operations but also enable the sustainment of our forces.
The F-35B provides enhanced situational awareness by sensing and making
sense of the operational environment ensuring freedom of movement and
flexibility for sustainment operations.
Reduction in the numbers of MV-22s per squadron from 12
to 10 has increased the number of operational aircraft from 57 percent
to 66 percent since 2018. While we are deploying fewer MV-22s, we are
increasing the number of aircraft available to sustain and support
expeditionary forces.
We are now transitioning from the CH-53E to the new CH-
53K. The CH-53K will provide greater payload capacity than any current
or emerging rotorcraft. Achieving Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
in April 2022, the CH-53K was approved for full rate production in
December 2022. We plan to deploy the first CH-53K MEU detachment in
fiscal year 2025.
To sustain our equipment readiness, we are now using
additive manufacturing at the battalion level to enable the
manufacturing of critical parts when and where they are needed most.
Marine Corps Logistics Command now has an industrial additive
manufacturing capability and is manufacturing critical parts to meet
needs across the Navy and Marine Corps.
a niche force?
71. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps divested
significant components of its traditional combined-arms capability to
develop capabilities specifically designed to counter China in the
United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility
(AOR). Does tailoring III MEF to fight China in the INDOPACOM AOR
reduce the Marine Corps' ability to respond to contingencies around the
globe? Provide specific examples in your response.
General Smith. From the outset of our current modernization
efforts, we directed the Marine Corps to design and develop a force
focused on our pacing threat. Through these efforts and changes we must
also retain the flexibility to adapt to changes in the operating
environment. Where feasible, we are constantly looking for
opportunities to sustain or expand existing strategic competitive
advantages over our adversaries. There are constraints and restraints
associated with modernization. Specifically, our assumption is we must
continue to modernize under the existing topline budget. Additionally,
we are beholden to industry's capacity to manufacture equipment as well
as the maturation of certain technologies. In the case of the latter,
regardless of how many resources you align to a new technology, it
won't necessarily speed up its development.
There is a misperception by some that Force Design efforts will
result in a gap in Marine Corps capabilities because of the time needed
for the divestment and fielding of new capabilities. The reality is
that the fielding and employment of new capabilities associated with
Force Design is already well underway. Six examples from 2022 are
highlighted below:
TF 61.2 and Reconnaissance and Counter-reconnaissance: In March
2022, United States Sixth Fleet partnered with II MEF to create Task
Force (TF) 61.2. The purpose of TF 61.2 was to command and control
naval forces supporting contingencies in Europe and Africa. This force
was delegated tactical control of amphibious forces (ARG/MEU) in
theater, allocated Marine forces (Marine Rotational Force--Europe), and
a task organized reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance force.
Simultaneously, II MEF and 2d Marine Division were tasked with
``accelerating experimentation with maritime, multi-domain
reconnaissance constructs and activities to enhance the ability of the
stand-in force to dominate the information environment, sense and make
sense of the situation, and win the reconnaissance vs. counter-
reconnaissance competition.'' Commander, Sixth Fleet, immediately
volunteered TF 61.2 to support these broader, service-level
experimentation efforts.
Over the course of several weeks, TF 61.2 conducted training aboard
both the USS Woody Williams (ESB-4) and USS Georgia (SSGN-729), and
engaged in combined-arms training in both Greece and Turkey. Those
initial exercises demonstrated that maritime expeditionary forces could
increase surface, subsurface, and aerial domain awareness for the fleet
commander--regardless of theater--and allowed us to focus on the
information web required to create domain awareness in a contested
space. TF 61.2 then transitioned these experimental capabilities to the
Baltics, where it participated in bilateral training on maritime domain
awareness with the Estonian Navy in the Gulf of Finland. During this
period, TF 61.2 and 16 NATO allies participated in an amphibious
landing in Estonia and Exercise BALTOPS with 47 ships and 7,000
personnel. This new organization has been so successful the previous
Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) chose to highlight
the value of the task force during his spring 2022 annual testimony.
The bottom line is that your marines' ability to conduct reconnaissance
and counter-reconnaissance is a current force capability that directly
contributes to competition and deterrence in any environment.
Multifunction Air Operations Center (MAOC): In March 2022, 2d
Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) conducted the service's first operational
deployment of a MAOC. In Lithuania, under the command of United States
Air Forces Europe, the MAOC conducted air surveillance and multi-domain
awareness in support of NATO operations. This is a transformational,
expeditionary capability that can serve as a hub for Marine Corps,
naval, and joint kill webs. The MAOC enables the control of aircraft
and missiles and expedites decisionmaking. It also offers the ability
to gain and maintain custody of adversary targets and hold those
targets at risk via fires with its organic TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-
Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), Common Aviation Command and Control System
(CAC2S), and highly proficient aviation C2 marines. The MAOC is
scalable to units small enough to support distributed teams or large
enough to support a MEF or Corps-level fight. The 3d MAW MAOC employed
this capability as part of Marine Rotational Force--Darwin (MRF-D),
integrating C2 and sensor services for 16 allied and partner nations
during Exercise PITCH BLACK. From these initial efforts, 3d MAW has
matured the MAOC, creating a persistent hub to enhance the common
tactical picture for I and III MEF.
Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC): In October 2022, we
streamlined and simplified much of the coordination required for space
and cyberspace operations at the headquarters level by realigning
current relationships and structure at Headquarters, Marine Corps
(HQMC) from a staff officer to an operational commander, to create the
MCIC. The MCIC is a service-retained command designed to integrate
global Marine Corps capabilities in information, intelligence,
cyberspace, and space to support Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) resulting in
decision advantage. This two-star command operates under Marine Forces
Command (MARFORCOM) and provides critical linkages across operational
level planning. It also provides task organized detachments to support
the FMF commander's campaigning objectives. This allows the commander
to leverage the authorities needed to synchronize global cyber, space,
influence, and intelligence effects and generate multi-domain
advantages in support of the commander's objectives. The MCIC achieved
initial operational capability (IOC) in January 2023.
VMGR-153 and HMH-461: In January 2023, we activated Marine Aerial
Refueler Transport Squadron 153 (VMGR-153) in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. By
2026, VMGR-153 will bring 15 KC-130J aircraft to the region, building
on the organic mobility available to marines responding to crisis or
conflict in the region. We are also approaching 1 year since the CH-53K
program achieved IOC and are well underway transitioning Marine Heavy
Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461) into our first fully operational CH-
53K squadron.
marine littoral regiments
72. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, have any combatant commanders
asked for an MLR to deploy to their theater?
General Smith. Yes. In testimony before Congress, the former and
current EUCOM commanders have expressed a desire for an MLR in EUCOM.
The current INDOPACOM commander has testified that he desires
accelerated fielding of MLRs and other Stand in Forces.
The first of three planned Marine Littoral Regiments, 3d MLR was
activated on 3 March 2022, on Marine Corps Base Hawaii. This MLR (and
the other 2) will be assigned forces to
INDOPACOM and will be registered as an INDOPACOM assigned force
demand in the Global Force Management process.

73. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can MLRs conduct amphibious
assaults, raids, or other missions that a MEU would conduct?
General Smith. While highly capable, the MLR is not optimized for
amphibious assaults, raids, or other missions, more common to a MEU.
The MLR does not operate from or train with an ARG comprised of three
Amphibious Warfare Ships, which allow it to conduct said operations. It
is designed to disrupt the adversary in a contested littoral
environment through reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and sea
denial operations to support the Naval Expeditionary Force's maritime
campaign. Its tasks are below:
Conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
Support Maritime Domain Awareness
Conduct Reconnaissance in the Maritime Domain
Support Littoral Targeting
Conduct Littoral Transportation Operations
Conduct Air Direction in Support of Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations
Command and Control Distributed Maritime Operations
Plan and Direct Littoral Maneuver
Plan and Direct Sea Denial Operations
Support Sea Denial Operations

74. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in General Berger's first two
directives upon assuming the position of the 38th Commandant of the
Marine Corps he stated in the 38th Commandant's Intent and the 38th
Commandant's Planning Guidance, ``the Marine Corps will be trained and
equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to
operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet
operations.'' This guidance in part served as the foundation for the
creation of MLRs under Force Design 2030. The Army currently possesses
a similar capability to the MLRs through its Multi-Domain Task Forces
(MDTF). What is your reaction to the contention of some that the MDTFs
exist to support the Joint Force and the MLRs to support the Navy?
General Smith. The Marine Corps' Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and
the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) represent innovative and
thoughtful approaches to compete and win on the modern battlefield,
against peer adversaries. Both formations offer unique, yet
complementary, capabilities that present multiple dilemmas for
adversaries and generate options for the Joint Force commander in both
competition and conflict.
The MLR is distinguished by its forward posture, its ability to
rapidly deploy with organic Marine Corps and Navy assets, and its
capabilities to persist within an adversary's weapons engagement zone.
These capabilities are underpinned by naval concepts to include
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, Distributed Maritime
Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and the Concept for
Stand-In Forces.
The MDTF provides complementary theater-level maneuver elements
focused on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks through the conduct
of multi-domain operations (MDO). The MDTF does not possess organic
mobility, rather it relies on strategic lift and commercial vessels for
inter-theater mobility within a distributed maritime environment, such
as the Indo-Pacific region.
In the expansive Indo-Pacific region, a clear necessity exists for
the MLR and the MDTF, particularly in time of conflict. Both units
leverage a similar multi-domain approach, in some cases using like
systems. However, the MLR has a unique mission requirement to operate
forward postured in the Indo-Pacific region within a contested area

75. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, as so much of the success of
MLRs depend on the prepositioning of forces, what steps is the Marines
Corps currently taking to ensure partner nations will allow these units
to operate in their territory?
General Smith. Security cooperation is a key means of enhancing
access and increasing the likelihood that this access will be permitted
during a crisis. Key vehicles that facilitate our security cooperation
include visits by deployed Marine Corps forces, key leader engagements,
bilateral and multilateral exercises, and humanitarian assistance/
disaster relief (HA/DR) support.

Examples of key engagements the Marine Corps supports includes:
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): In the post-2001 era, both
the United States and Japan recognized the need to adjust United States
force posture to effectively fulfill the requirements of the Alliance.
The DPRI laid out a future path to realign United States forces across
the Indo-Pacific to meet the challenges of the future and included
significant repositioning of forces from Okinawa to Guam and other
locations. As a result of the 2021 Global Posture Review, the
Department of Defense is engaged with our A&P across the region to
advance initiatives that contribute to regional stability. Posture
changes announced on January 11, 2023, by the United States and the
Government of Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) ensures that
the Marine Corps remains ready to address evolving regional and global
security challenges. Specifically, a mutual agreement was reached that
the 12th Marine Regiment will remain on Okinawa and will be reorganized
into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) by 2025 in accordance with
Marine Corps modernization efforts. The 12th MLR will provide a ready
and capable Stand-In-Force within the first island chain, prepared to
support the U.S-Japan Alliance, bolstering our ability to support
deterrence efforts, and respond to contingencies.
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the
Philippines: In 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the
EDCA, which bolsters the bilateral alliance by allowing extended
rotational presence of United States Forces and the establishment of
facilities for joint use--these facilities are known as ``EDCA sites.''
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC) and the Philippine Marine
Corps (PMC) signed the 5-Year Integrated Readiness and Deterrence Plan
2022-2026 to advance integrated deterrence and enable the maintenance
and sustainment of combat readiness. The goal is to integrate and
posture PMC-MARFORPAC forces and capabilities by 2026, including
persistent MLR engagement. The United States-Philippine joint
development and investment within EDCA locations exemplify the
necessity of the Marine Corps and United States Forces in the
Philippines in order to develop Philippine bases and locations to
bilaterally respond to HA/DR situations and enable combined training
through scheduled exercises, like Balikatan, and other engagements.
Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) in Australia: Per the 2023
Australian Defence Strategic Review, the Australian Army is developing
a highly capable, modern amphibious fighting force. The Marine Corps
and the Australian Army maximize integration, capability development,
and training with MRF-D, the rotational Marine Corps presence in
Australia. MRF-D, supported by the Ground Equipment Staging Program
(GESP) participates in recurrent multilateral exercises like Talisman
Sabre and bilateral engagement opportunities like Pitch Black.
Additionally, Marine Corps support for the Australian Army's amphibious
capability development which bolsters the second pillar of the enhanced
trilateral security partnership ``AUKUS.'' This continual support to
Australia's defense development and modernization strengthens
longstanding bilateral ties thus enhancing ongoing operational access.
Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia (MRF-SEA): Since 2022,
MARFORPAC has forward-deployed forces to Southeast Asia to achieve
maritime security objectives with A&P in the region. MRF-SEA reassures
A&P in region by consistently and reliably executing agreed-upon
security cooperation activities. This contributes to regional stability
by increasing MARFORPAC's responsiveness to crises and contingences.
MRF-SEA conducts bilateral and multilateral security cooperation
engagements with partners such as Singapore and Indonesia. This modular
rotational force exercises distributed command, control, logistics, and
transportation nodes supporting multiple, sometimes simultaneous,
regional engagements. The exact composition of the force, locations,
and schedules vary each year according to agreed-upon security
cooperation engagements with host countries. This concept also operates
within existing access, basing, and overflight agreements with
Southeast Asian partners and allies to mutually support posture
initiatives and reduce inter-theater transportation requirements for
not only the Marine Corps but also partner and allied forces.
Task Force Koa Moana (TF KM): TF KM is the primary Marine Corps
force to counter the People's Republic of China (PRC) influence and
access in Oceania. Through TF KM's modest investments, the Marine Corps
obtains excellent access to key sea lines of communication and achieves
outsized effects that are mutually beneficial to A&P and the U.S. In
fiscal year 2022 TF KM primarily engaged in Palau and the Commonwealth
of Northern Marianas Islands due to pandemic-induced travel
restrictions. In fiscal year 2023, TF KM has returned to contested
terrain such as the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Fiji, and
Tonga. These engagements supported maritime security and maritime
domain awareness, as well as reinforce combined logistics hubs within
contested environments. The development of multilateral maritime law
enforcement, HA/DR response exercises, and climate change resilience
continues to enhance multilateral security cooperation and
accessibility throughout Oceania.
Marine Rotational Force-Europe (MRF-E) in Norway: The Marine Corps
maintains a very close relationship with Norway that facilitates
setting the theater--
developing a profound understanding of the region and establishing
conditions for Marine Corps success--through an exercise schedule that
provides near-persistent presence of USMC forces in Norway and the High
North. The United States--Norway Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway provides USMC access
to the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in Norway (MCPP-N). MCPP-N
facilitates prepositioned stocks, which are available for global
operational requirements in support of any geographic combatant
commander. In addition to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which
allows USMC forces to move into, through, and transit out of Norway,
the United States and Norway share a Defense Cooperation Agreement and
Supplemental Defense Cooperation Agreement, assure United States Forces
additional access to Norwegian and United States-built infrastructure
in Norway.
iii marine expeditionary force
76. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, title 10 states that, ``[t]he
Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized
as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings,
and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be
organic therein.'' Can you explain the difference in III MEF's
structure pre-Force Design 2030 and once Force Design is complete?
General Smith. The Marine Corps still possesses three combat
divisions, three air wings, three logistics groups, and three
information groups.
Historically, the Marine Corps relies on supplying approximately
one-fifth of III Marine Expeditionary Force's (III MEF) combat power
via the Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Pre-Force Design, III MEF's
structure consisted of just over 27,000 marines. At the conclusion of
Force Design 2030, III MEF's structure will consist of just over 22,100
marines, however 89 percent of III MEF's combat power will be organic,
reducing the requirement to source unit deployment-based marines to the
MEF. This reduction in constant troop rotations adds to unit readiness
as units spend less time transiting back and forth to CONUNS and more
time training and staying prepared to fight.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre-FD 2030 (4th/
III MEF (2019) 2023 12th MLR)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEF CE................................. 3218 3174 3207
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st MAW................................ 6418 7072 7281
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3d MARDIV.............................. 6334 4358 4759
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3D MLG................................. 5288 4705 4517
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wing UDP............................... 663 663 663
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Div UDP................................ 3732 3743 339
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEF CE UDP............................. 120 120 120
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31st MEU UDP........................... 1235 1235 1235
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total UDP.............................. 5750 5761 2357
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................. 27008 25070 22121
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share UDP.............................. 21% 23% 11%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share non-UDP.......................... 79% 77% 89%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

77. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what was the structure of the
3d Marine Division pre-Force Design 2030 and what will it be in 2030?
General Smith. Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 1-10.1
Organization of the United States Marine Corps defines the composition
of a division. As the MCRP provides the high-level overview of the
current structure of the Marine Corps at the time of publication, it is
not a prescribed document. Thus, the three MEFs and the subordinate
divisions, wings, and logistics elements will not be identical across
the service. 3d Marine Division has always been organized differently
than the other divisions (pages 5-2 through 5-4 of the 2015
publication). In this document, 3d Marine Division is composed of only
two infantry regiments, one of which is filled by units throughout the
Marine Corps under the unit deployment program (UDP).
This reference publication is currently in the final stages of
update. At the completion of Force Design 2030 modernization efforts,
3d Marine Division will have three operational MLRs, the 3d, 4th, and
12th MLRs. Going forward, 3d Marine Division will retain a similar
structure but with a different organization of the units within it.

78. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, by table of organization, how
many infantry marines were in the 3d Marine Division pre-Force Design
2030?
General Smith. 4,548.

79. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, how many infantry marines will
be in 3d Marine Division when Force Design 2030 is fully implemented?
General Smith. 2,403.
The planned 2030 force includes the infantry marines from the 31st
MEU, 3d, 4th, and 12th MLR. 3d and 12th MLR have permanently stationed
littoral combat teams consisting of 572 infantry marines, while 4th MLR
and the 31st MEU will rotate infantry battalions in through the Unit
Deployment Program
The raw data depicted above does not provide the necessary context
to understand the increased lethality these infantry formations have
gained by investments in capabilities such as precision fires, advanced
sensor assets, and critical communications equipment to synthesize
targeting. There are more killing assets per infantry marine in 2030
than in 2019. Infantry battalion lethality, as measured by share of
crew-served weapons per marine assigned to infantry battalion,
increased by 28 percent from 2019 to 2030.
The increased lethality of the core infantry battalion is improved
through increased staffing. From 1995 until now, Battalion T/Os have
gotten slightly smaller, but the staffing percentage has increased, and
the unit-to-unit variances have decreased. The higher staffing level
allows commanders to train as they will fight.'' For Infantry
battalions, the staffing as a percent of T/O is 97 percent now; up from
89 percent in 1995 (all battalions aggregated). In 1995, 5 of 24
battalions were staffed above 100 percent of T/O while 12 were below 90
percent of T/O; compared to 2023, where 10 battalions are above 100
percent and only 5 are below 90 percent.

80. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in 2030, will III MEF be able
to conduct humanitarian/disaster relief operations on the scale that it
did during Operation Unified Assistance, the response to the tsunami in
Southeast Asia in 2004?
General Smith. Yes.
While our operations are dependent on amphibious fleet size, the
Marine Corps will be able to conduct humanitarian/disaster relief
operations on a scale heretofore achieved.
However, in the next two to 5 years, many of our amphibious ships
will reach the end of their service life and will cause delays in ARG/
MEU deployments. These platforms are critical to providing HA/DR. When
there are gaps in global ARG/MEU coverage, the Nation risks not having
the right assets capable of getting to the crisis in time.

81. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, beyond its role to operate in
the contested littorals, is III MEF today currently capable of meeting
its requirements for other regional war plans?
General Smith. Yes, III MEF can meet its requirements for other
regional war plans.
marine corps mine clearance
82. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in responses provided to my
office by the Marine Corps following an April 14, 2023 brief on section
1023 of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the Marine Corps reported that the
anti-personnel obstacle breaching system (APOBS) and M58 Mine Clearing
Line Charge (MICLIC) enabled the clearance for a 100m-long path through
minefields for foot-mobile and vehicle movement. When either of these
capabilities are employed, how will the minefields be ``proofed'' to
ensure it supports foot-mobile or vehicular movement?
General Smith. Breaching consists of four sequential activities:
detect, reduce, mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. The Marine
Corps can detect and mark explosive hazards by hand and still
explosively create lanes through minefields and mark those lanes.
Marine engineer battalions remain equipped with the man-portable Anti-
Personnel Obstacle Breaching Systems (APOBS) for clearing 45m lanes for
foot-traffic, as well as with the trailer mounted M58 Mine Clearing
Line Charge (MICLIC) for clearing up to 100m vehicle-capable lanes.
Currently, the Marine Corps is investing in the development of
lighter route clearance capabilities; using unmanned air, littoral and
ground platforms intended to detect and neutralize landmines and IEDs
from safe distances (i.e., outside the serious injury zone around the
mine/IED). Between fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2028, $80 million
will be invested into these emerging capabilities. One of these
capabilities is the Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON)
program of record designed to provide an initial organic Marine Corps
counter-mine capability from shallow water through the beach zone.
Derived from a 2019 Rapid Statement of Need (RSON), the program fields
a family of systems (FoS) that enables Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) marines to detect and neutralize underwater explosive hazards
from standoff distances with robotic and autonomous platforms. When
fully operationally capable, this FoS complements Navy Mine
Countermeasure (MCM) capability and capacity, enhances multi-domain
awareness, and ensures the maneuver, protection, and sustainment of the
Naval expeditionary force. In the interim, Marine engineers will
continue to use hand-held detectors and sickle sticks to execute route
sweeping operations and use combinations of emplaced charges and remote
detonation techniques to sympathetically detonate explosive hazards to
clear routes for smaller, light maneuver forces.
marine corps artillery
83. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, senior Ukrainian military
leaders have praised the addition of the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS) rocket system to their forces, but also add that the
most important fire support system for their forces has been cannon
artillery. How does the present, real world example comport with the
significant reductions in marines' cannon artillery?
General Smith. We have retained two cannon artillery battalions in
the Active component, which provides capacity to support MEU
deployments and to provide close support fires for a Marine Brigade-
sized unit. Two additional cannon artillery battalions are available in
the Reserve component to support surge requirements.
Ukraine is heavily dependent on 155 cannon artillery and mortar
systems due to the nature of warfare being conducted across the forward
line of troops. When Ukraine wants to prosecute long range, high value
targets with precision, they rely on the HIMARS. Currently, the vast
majority of Ukrainian and Russian forces fighting inside Ukraine are in
close contact; oftentimes the distance between Russian and Ukrainian
lines are a few hundred meters. Further, small pockets of territory are
captured and recaptured by Ukrainian and Russian forces accentuating
the war's relative closeness. From the Ukrainian perspective, the
closeness of combat operations suggests that cannon artillery is the
optimum fires required to support Ukrainian forces in contact with the
Russians.
How the Ukrainian military is defending its homeland is a different
problem set as to how the Marine Corps will integrate with the joint
force in a future conflict and fulfill its Title 10 responsibilities of
conducting ``land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of
a naval campaign'' against a near peer adversary.
Cannons and rockets are complementary fire support systems, but
provide unique advantages and disadvantages depending on mission,
enemy, targets, and terrain. The Ukrainians have effectively employed
both cannons and rockets to defend and retake territory with a lack of
aviation fires. As a part of our combined arms doctrine, the Marine
Corps integrates artillery, aviation, naval, and non-kinetic fires to
achieve effects that enable maneuver. We have carefully assessed the
current and future capabilities of our peer adversaries, as well as the
capabilities required to support naval maneuver. Through that analysis,
we are retaining some cannon artillery for land-based contingency
operations while transitioning to precision fires platforms with
extended ranges (e.g., rockets and missiles) and further development of
loitering munitions technology. In addition to providing greater range
and accuracy, these new systems provide an anti-ship capability that is
critical to supporting naval campaigns. We will continue to assess the
right mix of artillery systems to compliment the other fires components
within the MAGTF.
marine corps law enforcement capabilities
84. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps is divesting
of three law enforcement (LE) battalions and consequently capabilities
like policing, crime scene processing, mobility/route security,
detention operations and enemy prisoner of war (EPW)/detainee handling,
biometrics and evidence handling, military working dogs, sensitive site
exploitation, and police advising and training. Have combatant
commanders been made aware that assigned or allocated Marine Corps
forces will no longer possess these operational units and their
associated capabilities?
General Smith. Yes, combatant commands are informed via the annual
Global Force Management Allocation Plan process. During this process,
the Joint Staff validates combatant command requirements and determines
which Services have the necessary capabilities to fulfill these
requirements. The Joint Staff then determines a sourcing solution for
such requirements based on the Services' capability and capacity.

85. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, does the Marine Corps intend
to retain law enforcement capabilities in other units, and if so, which
specific units and in what capacities?
General Smith. With the divestment of the Active component Law
Enforcement Battalions (LE Bn), the USMC continues to retain law
enforcement capabilities within the installation and the Marine Corps
Reserves within 4th LE Bn. Installation Law Enforcement capabilities
reside within Marine Corps Installation Command (MCICOM), Training and
Education Command (TECOM), and Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters, New
Orleans LA. Installation Law Enforcement is comprised of Provost
Marshal Offices and Marine Corps Police Departments (PMO / MCPD). These
formations provide Law Enforcement capabilities to installation
commanders that include, but are not limited to, Incident Response,
Criminal Investigation, Special Reaction Teams (SRT), Military Working
Dogs, Accident Investigation, Corrections, Physical Security, and
Administrative Services. 4th LE Bn is organized to support operational
requirements, by training to standards such as maneuver and mobility
support, policing, and detainee operations.

Installation PMO/MCPD Locations:

MCICOM

o MCLB Albany, GA
o MCSF Blount Island, FL
o MCB Camp Lejeune
o MCAS Cherry Point
o MCB Cam Pendleton
o MCAS Miramar
o MCAS Yuma
o MCLB Barstow
o MCB Quantico
o MCAF (HMX-1
o MCB Camp Butler
o MCAS Futenma
o Camp Fiji
o Camp Mujuk
o MCAS Iwakuni
o MCB Hawaii
o MCAS Hawaii

TECOM:

MCAGCC 29 Palms, CA
MCMWTC Bridgeport
MCRD San Diego
MCRD Parris Island

Marine Forces Reserve:

NOLA HQ
4th Law Enforcement Battalion Units/Location o Military
Police Company A
o Lexington, KY
o Military Police Company B
o North Versailles, PA
o Military Police Company C
o Dayton, OH
o Military Police Company D
o Billings, MT
o Anchorage, AK
o Headquarters Support Company
o Albuquerque, NM
scout snipers
86. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in late February 2023, the
Marine Corps issued a memo announcing the immediate transition of scout
sniper platoons to scout platoons. The reason given was that scout
sniper platoons did not provide battalion commanders with sufficient
``continuous all-weather information gathering.'' These new scout
platoons of 26 marines, which is larger than the traditional scout
sniper platoon size of 18, will ``provide the commander with relevant,
reliable, accurate and prompt information.'' While Marine Forces
Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and reconnaissance battalions will
continue to train their own snipers, infantry battalions will no longer
have an organic sniper capability. Instead they will rely on some type
of less capable and specialized designated marksman for precision
shooting. I believe efforts to increase the information available to a
battalion commander are worthwhile but I am concerned about the
tradeoff. What exercises and experiments informed this decision?
General Smith. In Spring 2020, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
approved the Force Design 2030 plan, divesting the preponderance of
weapon-specific military occupational specialties within the infantry
battalions in favor of highly trained marines more capable of employing
a variety of weapons and equipment. Included in this decision was
divesting Scout Sniper Platoon structure, believing that rifle squads
with advanced equipment and training could provide suitable ground-
based sensing in support of the infantry battalion. (Today's basic
infantry rifle with integrated scope is considerably more accurate than
earlier versions, and infantry company ``arms rooms'' also include
precision rifles for designated marines to employ as directed for
specific missions.)
Infantry Battalion Experimentation (IBX) Phase I determined the
redesigned infantry battalions lacked sufficient all-weather
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Based on these findings, the Commandant approved establishing a Scout
Platoon in each infantry battalion, providing timely, organic ISR
capability in support of the battalion commander's Priority
Intelligence and Commander's Critical Information Requirements.
Infantry companies retain their precision rifle capability, and the
Marine Corps will maintain school-trained snipers within Reconnaissance
and Marine Special Operations units. Reconnaissance Marines will attend
the Service-run Reconnaissance Sniper Course, training in precision
marksmanship and weapons employment standards in multiple environments,
focusing on distributed small unit operations. Marine Raiders attend
the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command-run special
operations sniper courses.
The Marine Corps no longer awards the 0317 (Scout Sniper) MOS.
Beginning in fiscal year 2024, all infantry battalions will add a Scout
Platoon, divest of the sniper platoon, and move the precision rifles to
the infantry companies' arms rooms.
Experimentation is a core component of Force Design 2030, and the
Service will continue testing concepts and equipment to ensure infantry
battalions are properly structured, trained, and equipped to meet
Joint, naval, and service requirements. In this spirit, experimentation
is currently underway (IBX Phase II) to study how the new Scout Platoon
best supports battalion-level organic all-weather ISR requirements and
the Service's enduring requirements for precision marksmanship
capabilities.

87. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will recon snipers be employed
and assigned differently to provide the missing sniper capability if a
battalion commander wants it?
General Smith. No.
Reconnaissance snipers will be employed to meet the missions
assigned to their units. Within the restructured infantry battalions,
the precision rifle capability now resides within an ``arms room'' in
the infantry companies to be employed by infantry marines as deemed
necessary for specific missions. Infantry marines designated by their
commanders will attend the additional training necessary to become
proficient in the employment of precision rifles. Marines in the Scout
Platoon will provide an organic ISR capability.
lift capability in united states indo-pacific command
88. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, maintenance issues and
amphibious ship retirements have prevented the Navy from deploying
Amphibious Ready Groups when MEUs have been ready to deploy. The Navy's
30-year shipbuilding plan never achieves the legal requirement to have
at least 31 amphibious ships in the fleet. The Landing Ship Medium,
which is critical to realizing the full capability of the MLR, will not
be fielded in sufficient numbers to satisfy the requirements for even
one MLR in the next 5 years. With these significant challenges in
amphibious lift, the Marine Corps is posed to reduce the organic
aviation lift available to the MAGTF over the next several years,
including putting MV-22s and CH-53Ks into storage. Please explain how
the changes to Marine Corps aviation with Force Design 2030 do not
decrease the Marine Corps' organic lift capability in the INDOPACOM
AOR.
General Smith. The Marine Corps is not reducing organic aviation
lift through the storage or preservation of aircraft; however, we are
conducting active inventory management, a proven concept used since the
beginning of Marine Aviation. Inventory management is designed to
provide aircraft capability modernization, manage the lifecycle and
airframe flight hours, and ensure enough aircraft with the required
capability are always available to our operational forces.
marine corps innovation
89. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in your answers to the
congressional advance policy questions you stated ``the ability to
rapidly develop concepts for victory, wargame, experiment, and modify
those concepts is vital to ensure the Marine Corps stays ahead of our
adversaries.'' Do you intend to change the way the Marine Corps
develops new doctrine and concepts?
General Smith. The Marine Corps has a process to harmonize capstone
and subordinate operating concepts, functional concepts,
experimentation, and legacy and new Marine Corps doctrine and training
publications. While the process to rapidly develop doctrine based on
concepts, wargames, and experiments is in place, it requires constant
collaboration between stakeholders to maintain a common focus on the
goals of concepts and experiments and socialization of what is being
learned during the efforts. If confirmed as Commandant, I do not intend
to change the way the Marine Corps develops new doctrine and concepts.
navy and marine corps cooperation
90. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, you stated in your answers to
the congressional advance policy questions, that ``[i]f confirmed, I
anticipate being assigned the duty of coordinating Marine Corps
modernization efforts with those of the Joint Force.'' The Navy's 30-
year shipbuilding plan fails to meet the 31 amphibious warfare ship
requirement and does not meet the requirement for 35 Landing Ship
Mediums. How will you work with the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to ensure the Marine Corps and Navy's
modernization efforts are synchronized?
General Smith. I want to thank Congress for providing these
statutory requirements that strengthen the relationship between the
Navy and the Marine Corps team. The Marine Corps is a naval
expeditionary force committed to supporting the Navy and combatant
commanders with maritime forces capable of contributing to naval and
Joint campaigns.
If confirmed as Commandant, I remain committed to exercising these
authorities to further strengthen the relationship between the Marine
Corps and Navy within the Department of the Navy. Together, we are
working to establish the formal procedures in which the Marine Corps
will integrate amphibious warfare ship requirements into the 30-year
shipbuilding plan. We must also develop a plan that achieves an
inventory of no fewer than 31 amphibious warfare ships, consisting of
at least 10 LHDs/LHAs and 21 LPDs and provides the necessary funding
for 35 Medium Landing Ships. The Navy and Marine Corps are in unique
positions regarding the amphibious fleet as one service chief owns the
requirement, while the other owns the resources. Notwithstanding, I
commit that, if confirmed, I will cooperate and work tirelessly with
the SECNAV, CNO, and their staffs to ensure the Nation possesses the
most capable amphibious fleet in the world in line with statutory
requirements.
I will also creatively work with the Secretary of the Navy and the
Chief of Naval Operations to pursue acquisition authorities granted in
the fiscal year 2023 NDAA to maintain the required number of amphibious
warfare ships in the future. Multi-ship procurement can achieve cost
savings of 10 percent, or greater if maximized by procuring five ships
or more. Moreover, amphibious warfare ship affordability is maximized
with multi-ship buys that stabilize the industrial base and improve
buying power. If confirmed, I am fully committed to working closely
with the Navy and this Committee to champion the necessity of providing
shipyards with sustained and predictable funding lines to create
industrial stability.

91. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps has publicly
commented on supporting the Navy in Force Design 2030; however, the
Navy appears not to have reciprocated, most notably in the 30-year ship
building plan which never gets to 31 amphibious ships or 35 LSMs. What
is your plan to work with the SECNAV and CNO to ensure that Navy
publications and senior leader statements reflect support for Marine
Corps modernization efforts, specifically 31 amphibious ships and 35
LSMs?
General Smith. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to establish formal
procedures in which the Marine Corps will integrate amphibious warfare
ship requirements into the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Additionally, I
commit to working with the SECNAV and CNO to develop a shipbuilding
plan that achieves and maintains an inventory of no fewer than 31
amphibious warfare ships, consisting of at least 10 LHDs/LHAs and 21
LPDs and provides the necessary funding for 35 Medium Landing Ships.
As a naval expeditionary force in readiness, it is critical that
the Navy and Marine Corps leadership continue to maintain maritime
dominance. To effectively achieve this goal and adhere to the 2022
National Defense Strategy (NDS), we must prioritize maritime mobility
and maneuver. As a part of the naval, joint, and combined force, the
Marine Corps generates value by its ability to respond to crises, seize
and hold key maritime terrain, and effectively campaign. Amphibious
warfare ships (AWS) have historically played a major role in
maintaining an Active forward presence with credible combat power,
providing combatant commanders flexible response and deterrence
options, which contribute directly to integrated deterrence.
allies and partners
92. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in your answers to the
congressional advance policy questions you said the Marine Corps'
responsibility to respond to crises outside of existing guidance will
``require closer integration with Allies and partners.'' What ideas do
you have to strengthen relationships and deepen integration with Allies
and partners?
General Smith. The best way to build trust, strengthen alliances,
and develop new partnerships is to maintain a forward presence, thereby
enabling substantive interactions with our Allies and partners. Marines
must be forward deployed--particularly in the INDOPACOM Command's Area
of Responsibility to strengthen relationships and counter adversary
malign influence in the region. We maintain positive military-to-
military relationships with many countries throughout this region, and
we need to continue making the investments necessary to sustain and
improve those relationships. In addition to increasing our forward
presence, we should expand our participation in various shared
activities to include the international professional military education
program in which dozens of senior military leaders from allied and
partner nations attend our military schools and war colleges. We also
send more of our officers to foreign professional military education
programs. Through the personnel exchange program, United States marines
integrate into billets in select foreign militaries, and select foreign
officers integrate into Marine Corps billets. If confirmed, I pledge to
continue, and where appropriate, expand these valuable programs.
access and basing and overflight
93. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, MLR employment in the Indo-
Pacific and SIF execution rely on access, basing, and overflight (ABO)
access from allies and partners. From the Marines Corps perspective,
can you prioritize the countries in the Indo-Pacific where ABO rights
are required to employ MLRs and conduct SIF and EABO operations?
General Smith. ABO is a critical requirement for any Stand-in
Force. However, all Joint Forces are dependent on ABO from our allies
and partners to maneuver throughout the battlespace. Each of our allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific is crucial to ability of the Marine
Corps and joint force to succeed in competition and conflict. The
Commander, USINDOPACOM has prioritized country engagements in keeping
with his authorities.

94. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, is the Marine Corps currently
working on a strategy to mitigate any challenges stemming from
countries not allowing access and basing in the event of a conflict
with the PRC?
General Smith. Yes. Accessing, basing, or overflight (ABO) during
conflict is never guaranteed. However, steps can be taken prior to
conflict in order to increase the likelihood of ABO. The Marine Corps
actively participates in joint and interagency efforts to increase the
likelihood for access. These efforts include frequent interactions with
Allied and partner senior military leaders, forward positioning of
forces, robust and regular engagements with combined forces, and our
continuous rotational presence in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the
Marine Corps has and will continue to mitigate the challenges of not
having ABO. We remain uniquely postured with agile amphibious forces,
capable of freely maneuvering through the commons, and if necessary,
capable of limited-scale forcible entry. Marine forces afloat provide
immense flexibility and optionality that mitigate the risks stemming
from limited ABO. This is why it is so vital to maintain a minimum of
31 amphibious warships.
unit deployment program in alaska
95. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Stand-in Forces concept,
designed to deter China by keeping Marine Littoral Regiments within the
First Island Chain, where they can conduct sea denial operations and
provide the joint force with targeting and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) data, is a component of Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations. In the Indo-Pacific, SIF and EABO rely on access to
land, sea, and airspace of allied and partner nations. In the event of
a conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC), access, basing,
and overflight (ABO) rights from allied and partner nations are not
guaranteed. If such access is denied by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, the Philippines, Japan, or South Korea,
flowing forces into a fight against the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
in INDOPACOM will be incredibly difficult. The PRC knows this and has
the economic, political, and military tools to leverage neutrality from
these countries. Prepositioned equipment in places like Australia, the
Philippines, Japan, and South Korea may be inaccessible or have to be
relocated to United States territory like Guam for distribution. United
States Forces in Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, Japan, and
South Korea may all be prohibited from deploying into combat from those
locations. Our Forces on Guam, more densely packed by the day on an
island that offers limited training opportunities for the Marine Corps,
are almost certain to be targeted by the PLA early and often as they
seek to neutralize or degrade that power projection platform.
General Smith. Four years ago, the Marine Corps was poised to alter
its Indo-Pacific force laydown to account for the inherent risk of ABO
denial and limited training opportunities on Marine Corps bases across
the Indo-Pacific. The 37th Commandant, General Robert Neller, sent
several teams to Alaska to assess infrastructure and training
opportunities to support a Unit Deployment Program (UDP) and
prepositioned assets the Marine Corps would need to surge forward in
the event of conflict with the PLA. Alaska's benefits were as obvious
then as they are now: year-round, cost-effective training in almost
every climate and terrain; the Nation's best sea, air, and land ranges
necessary to train SIF and execute EABO; access to the largest and most
advanced Air Force-Army training complex in the United States at the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC); proximity to potential
conflict areas in the Indo-Pacific like the Korean peninsula, Japan,
and Taiwan (not to mentioned access to EUCOM); and, incredibly
supportive American citizens and local governments whose decision to
continue to support the training of American military forces would not
be impacted by Contingency Command Post (CCP) pressure campaigns as
they are in other parts of the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.
Unlike Darwin, where marines deploy for 6 months each year, Alaska
provides year round training for the MAGTF in nearly every clime and
place found on the globe. This training comes at a reduced cost
compared to the expensive rotations through Darwin, which are reported
to cost $50 million, with the added benefit of also being in theater.
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER)-based military forces are closer
than Darwin to South Korea (2,274 vice 3,467 miles), and Japan (2,063
vice 3,395 miles).
While Guam does not have Darwin's temporal restrictions, it
provides such limited access to training ranges that marines will have
to go off-island to conduct SIF and EABO operations, despite the $8.6
billion investment to activate the facility. For example, the current
Jungle Warfare School on Okinawa, which is 8,900 acres, will relocate
to Camp Blaz on Guam, where it will shrink to 2,031 acres. Access to
training in nearby countries is constantly threatened by PRC economic
coercion. Should it be successful, we will have 5,000 marines on an
island where they cannot train to the standard necessary to win that
will surely be targeted early and often in a fight, especially if
Chinese coercion against allies and partners is successful and United
States Forces have to redeploy to Guam because of ABO restrictions
before they get into the fight.
Alaska's cold weather training opportunities are cheaper than
Norway and permit significantly larger forces to train simultaneously
than at Bridgeport. Alaska is the only place on the planet where
marines can conduct large-scale, combined arms training in winter/
mountainous conditions that is also joint and combined. Army and Air
Force units stationed in Alaska provide a ready force to train with and
against.
Perhaps most importantly, Alaska is in the INDOPACOM AOR. The
strategic port of Anchorage provides deep-water access and railheads
that connect to nearby Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, where the Air
Force maintains two runways between 7,500 and 10,000 feet. The
advantages for naval and air transport of prepositioned material and
equipment are obvious. Further, the Aleutian Islands and the Bering
Strait present the exact type of key maritime terrain that Marine
Littoral Regiments are designed to dominate. China and Russia operate
naval and air forces off the coast of Alaska regularly, giving marines
the opportunity to practice the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance
techniques SIF requires and gauge the Chinese and Russian reactions.
Given the rationale outlined above, do you agree that the Marine
Corps will expand its permanent and rotational presence in Alaska?
Senator, I concur with the benefits Alaska brings as outlined
above. Exercise Northern Edge provides some of the best high-end,
realistic training available with a focus on Joint, multi-national, and
multi-domain operations. The Marine Corps is always looking for multi-
domain training ranges where we can exercise the entire spectrum, and
we will continue to utilize the vast training capabilities in Alaska.
If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to expand our
permanent and rotational presence in Alaska.

96. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, given the rationale outlined
in question #95, can you explain what the Marine Corps is doing to
preposition material and equipment in Alaska?
General Smith. As captured in our recently released I&L 2030, our
current supply chains prioritize efficiency--not effectiveness. One
broken link in the supply chain can result in an untethered force. Our
MAGTFs remain designed to be self-sufficient, although not
indefinitely. Instead of relying on a singular, vulnerable chain, we
must build a more resilient supply web that can adapt to temporary
broken links or obstructions. By generating a logistics web, we seek to
provide options to commanders, create resiliency, contribute to
deterrence, and overcome the precision lethality of the modern
battlefield.
Consequently, the Marine Corps is developing the Global Positioning
Network (GPN) as a recognition that we need to think differently about
how to preposition equipment, materiel, and capabilities around the
globe to support our Stand-in Forces across the full range of military
operations. The centerpiece of this concept of support is the
development of an integrated ashore and afloat sustainment network that
is globally responsive, yet regionally aligned with a focus toward our
pacing threat.
As you point out, the GPN requires us to consider access, basing,
and overflight across the spectrum from competition to conflict; its
strategic impacts in strengthening our relationships with partners and
allies: and the return on investment in terms of responsiveness with
the right capability at the time and place of need. We are actively
assessing the opportunities and risks with multiple sites particularly
in the INDOPACOM AOR, and we are certainly considering the
opportunities available in Alaska. The vast multi-domain training
opportunities of Alaska are outstanding, and we will continue to seek
opportunities to leverage them. As we build and expand our new GPN, the
strategic positioning of our equipment and supplies in INDOPACOM and
ensuring access, availability, and responsiveness of theater lift for
our Stand-In Force remain our highest priority. If confirmed, I am
committed to working with you and the Committee to explore further
prepositioning opportunities to ensure the Marine Corps is remains our
Nation's most ready force. My recent trip to Alaska demonstrated to me
that Alaska remains a critical staging base for sustainment flowing to
certain areas of the Indo-Pacific.

97. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will you commit to brief me
within 60 days of confirmation on your plan to increase the numbers of
marines stationed in and rotating through Alaska?
General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to brief you within 60 days.

98. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will you commit to brief me
within 60 days of confirmation on your plan to establish a Unit
Deployment Program (UDP) in Alaska like the Marine Corps was looking at
under General Neller's leadership?
General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to brief you within 60 days.

99. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will you commit to brief me
within 60 days of confirmation on your plan to expand the Marine Corps'
participation in the Red Flag Alaska, Northern Edge, and Arctic Edge
exercises, particularly with Marine Corps aviation?
General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to brief you within 60 days.
reserve manpower end strength
100. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, since 2019 the total Marine
Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) end strength has decreased from 38,000 to
33,000. At the same time, MARFORRES has joined II Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) as the non-INDOPACOM global response force. Is this end
strength the optimal number given this new responsibility?
General Smith. MARFORRES provides augmentation to the Active
component of the Marine Corps, not a specific combatant commander. In
the last 5 years, MARFORRES units have deployed in support of global
missions to include missions in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM,
and EUCOM.
The total Selected Reserve (SelRes) end strength is 33,000 for
fiscal year 2023 and will reduce to an achievable 32,000 in fiscal year
2024. The MARFORRES portion of the SelRes was disproportionately
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, the associated vaccine mandate and
recruiting challenges faced by all the Services.
We are requesting an authorized Selected Reserve end strength of
32,000 in fiscal year 2024 as it meets projected mission requirements
while enabling modernization. This is consistent with our current
Active Duty force, the realities of modernizing the capabilities of
units, the recruiting environment, and comes with a plan for deliberate
growth toward a 36,800 objective Reserve component force in the
following years.

101. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if the previously reference
number of an end strength of 33,000 is not optimal, what is your plan
to increase if you're confirmed as the next Commandant?
General Smith. The service is undertaking multiple efforts
regarding its Reserve strength.
First is a shift from a recruit and replace model to an
invest and retain model. The Direct Affiliation Program seeks to ensure
marines ``stay Marine'' after the end of their Active service contract
by providing opportunities to transition directly to the SMCR.
We are also aggressively exploring Active/Reserve
permeability to provide service options that better conform to 21st
century career patterns.
Acknowledging population shifts, we are adapting
recruiting and unit geography.
Last, we have a employed a robust Reserve incentives
program that is designed to incentivize continued Reserve service.
If confirmed, I will ensure the service continually evaluates
Reserve structure and measures it against requirements of the future
operating environment.
balancing future global contingencies
102. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, under Marine Corps Force
Design 2030, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and III MEF focus
solely on INDOPACOM while II MEF and MARFORRES assume the crisis
response mission for the rest of the globe. Aside from Marine Littoral
Regiments under III MEF, will there be any differences in manning and
capabilities across the MEFs and MARFORRES?
General Smith. All three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and
Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) are organized, trained, equipped, and
postured to conduct a variety of missions in support of Marine Corps
Title 10 responsibilities. The Marine Corps maintains all organic
crisis response capabilities that enable the forward posture and rapid
deployment of flexible and tailorable forces to the needs of the
Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) are the most common Navy-Marine Corps
tactical units that are forward deployed at the operational level and
can accomplish strategic level engagements--these MEUs are resident in
all MEFs. At the direction and request of COCOMs, units, such as the
Marine Littoral Regiment, can be organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct missions not normally assigned as core task.
The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and
Stand-in Forces (SIF) concepts meet the 2022 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) intent and are theater agnostic. The plan for light, lethal, and
distributed forces would be successful in other Combatant Commands
(COCOMs), such as European Command (EUCOM) or Central Command
(CENTCOM)--and have shown to be successful. For example, Task Force 61/
2--led by II MEF--executed a proof of concept during 2022 in which they
provided 6th Fleet Headquarters with real-time Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA). TF 61.2 was designed as a joint task force crisis
response capability to command and control naval forces supporting
contingencies in Europe and Africa. In that effort, Marine forces
tested, refined, and validated concepts of employment for MDA and
closing kill webs, while also conducting real-world, time sensitive
reconnaissance-counter reconnaissance missions. These efforts continue
to support 6th Fleet operations as nested within EUCOM and Africa
Command (AFRICOM) priorities and have sense turned into a rotational
force.
The service will continue to organize, modernize, and equip
MARFORRES using II MEF as a baseline. The overall modernization will be
complementary with II MEF to seamlessly integrate Reserve and Active
Forces. We will seek to retain or build critical, congruent Reserve-
unique capabilities while also fielding capacity that fully enables the
USMC Service Retained Forces (SRF) to be the global crisis response
force of choice. At the unit of employment level, we will modernize
similar AC/RC units to maintain parity across the SRF. Furthermore,
parity across the SRF maximizes operational flexibility and continues
the Reserve component's long history of augmenting, reinforcing, and
sustaining the Active component.

103. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, do you believe the
responsibilities outlined in question #102 are the appropriate balance?
General Smith. Yes, at this time we are striking an effective
balance. As we experiment and learn, we will refine and adjust our
approach to deliver the optimal mix of total force capability and
capacity.
______

[The nomination reference of General Eric M. Smith, USMC
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

______

[The biographical sketch of General Eric M. Smith, USMC,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General Eric
M. Smith, USMC in connection with his nomination follows:]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

______

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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[The nomination of General Eric M. Smith, USMC was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 21, 2023, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on September 21, 2023.]

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