    [Senate Hearing 118-788]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 118-788

                  THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH,
                   USMC FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
                   OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDANT OF
                   THE MARINE CORPS
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 13, 2023

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-636                   WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                  JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts      KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan             RICK SCOTT, Florida
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  TED BUDD, North Carolina
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri

                       Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director

                     John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                               C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 june 13, 2023

                                                                       Page

    The Nomination of General Eric M. Smith, USMC for Reappointment       1
      to the Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine
      Corps.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Wicker, Senator Roger F..........................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Smith, General Eric M., United States Marine Corps...............     9

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    48

      Questions for the Record.......................................    81

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   136

      Biographical Sketch............................................   137

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   140

      Signature Page.................................................   143

                                     (iii)

                  This hearing is printed to include all available
                    information
                    requested or required to be inserted for the
                    record.

                                      (iv)

    THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH, USMC FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
           GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2023

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members
    Present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly,
    Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott,
    Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, and Schmitt.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    consider the nomination of General Eric Smith to be the 39th
    Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. General, I would
    like to welcome your wife, Trish, your daughter, Elise, son in
    law, Matthew, and your son, Travis, Captain Travis, and
    daughter in law, Hadley.
        I know that military service runs deep in Smith family,
    especially service in the United States Marine Corps, and I
    thank each of you for your selfless commitment to the Nation.
    General Smith, you are well qualified to serve as Commandant of
    the Marine Corps.
        As a current Assistant Commandant, you have been
    instrumental in helping to modernize and lead the Corps--past
    years. Prior to this assignment, you led the Marine Corps
    Combat Capability Development Directorate and served as the
    Senior Military Assistant to both the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense and the Secretary of Defense.
        An infantryman by training, you have commanded marines at
    every level and across multiple theaters. Indeed, this
    leadership experience and understanding of the Joint Force will
    be critical for successfully guiding the Marine Corps in
    today's complex global security environment.
        The Marine Corps is in the midst of a substantial
    transformation, focused on competition in the Indo-Pacific, but
    capable of global employment. The service is restructuring
    around two concepts, littoral operations in a contested
    environment and expeditionary advanced base operations. The key
    element of these concepts is a more flexible amphibious force
    that can support a broader naval fight once ashore.
        Rather than simply acting as a landing force, the Marine
    Corps intends to help control the sea and air in support of the
    Joint Force. To achieve this, the Marine Corps is prioritizing
    a number of modernization efforts, including deep sensing, long
    range fires to include anti-surface capabilities, enhanced air
    and missile defense, and improve ground and amphibious combat
    vehicles.
        These platforms will equip the marines with improved force
    protection, lethality, and mobility. I have appreciated the
    Marine Corps' thoughtful approach during this restructuring,
    including its regular communication with Congress.
        Further, I appreciate the marines' willingness to modify
    structural decisions such as increasing the number of cannon
    batteries or the size of fighter attack squadrons, when
    experimenting and wargaming demonstrated the need to do so.
    General, I would like to know your plans for continuing these
    modernization efforts and any concerns you have with the Marine
    Corps ability to operate as envisioned by Force Design 2030.
        As the Corps shifts to become a more tactical force capable
    of operating in forward dispersed environments, it will require
    more seasoned, experienced marines. As such, the service will
    continue to see the average age and retention rate of its
    marines increase. These trends, while generally positive, will
    require the service to reconsider how it manages its enlisted
    force.
        The Marine Corps has not experienced the same level of
    recruiting disruptions as the other services, but it is not
    immune from these challenges, particularly in its Reserve
    Forces. I would ask for your views on the marines' talent
    management strategies and opportunities to succeed in the
    current recruiting environment.
        Considering the challenges facing the United States today,
    it is important for the Marine Corps to operate not just as its
    own service, but as part of a Joint Force. Succeeding against
    our potential adversaries will require all U.S. military
    services to work together, operate faster, and deliver greater
    capabilities from farther distances in contested environments.
    These are significant challenges that will require joint
    experimentation and collaborative research and development to
    overcome.
        I am encouraged by the kind of work underway at the Marine
    Corps Warfighting Laboratory, where in particular technologies
    are being developed to help enable logistics in a contested
    environment. I hope you will share your views on service and
    joint experimentation, and how the Marine Corps can ensure that
    its capabilities are interoperable and complementary across the
    force.
        Finally, your highest priority must be ensuring the
    readiness of marines to perform their missions. If confirmed,
    you will be expected to support a culture of leadership, trust,
    and teamwork throughout the force with no tolerance for
    behavior that erodes that culture.
        General Smith, I would ask that you share how you plan to
    address this responsibility. I am confident that you have the
    requisite skills and experience to provide the Nation's
    marines, their families, and Marine civilian employees with the
    leadership they deserve.
        Thank you again for your continued willingness to serve. I
    look forward to your testimony. Now, let me recognize the
    Ranking Member, Senator Wicker.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a very fine
    opening statement. General Smith, I want to thank you for your
    service and offer my congratulations on your nomination. It
    is--I will join my distinguished chairman in welcoming your
    family. They ought to be awfully proud of your unwavering and
    devoted service to your country. I think you are exceptionally
    well qualified to serve as Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        Marine Corps Modernization Plan, Force Design 2030 is
    geared toward strengthening deterrence against China. I would
    like to hear today your honest assessment of where Force Design
    2030 has succeeded and where work remains to be accomplished.
    The United States is entering a window of maximum danger for
    conflict with the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping intends
    to have a force capable of invading Taiwan by 2027.
        He has told us this. Even in the past month, China has
    shown it is serious about determining our--undermining, about
    undermining our military and diplomatic power. It has harassed
    a U.S. reconnaissance plane and a U.S. Navy warship, disturbed
    WWII wrecks, engaged in espionage at an Alaska military
    installation, and threatened cyber activity in Guam.
        The threats from Russia, North Korea, and Iran are not
    getting any better either. The window in which Congress can
    effect real change in our force posture and hopefully correct
    some of the troubling trends we see in the Western Pacific is
    closing. This is the decisive decade for the 21st century in
    the Indo-Pacific. In my view, the Marine Corps has met the
    challenge with vigor and urgency, even if change at scale is
    always hard and imperfect.
        Throughout the Nation's history, the Marine Corps has
    distinguished itself as flexible, fast, and adaptable. Hence
    its motto, first to fight. The ability for amphibious forces to
    search, target, and sink potential enemy naval and air
    combatants while maintaining a low signature is hard work. It
    requires new capabilities, concepts, and formations.
        General Smith, I would like you to explain to the Committee
    how you intend to continue that work, including unfinished
    business regarding amphibious lift capabilities.
        As Commandant Berger testified repeatedly before this
    Committee, the leading edge of our deterrence is the ability to
    transport marines and materiel across the vast distances in a
    maritime environment. Congress reflected this operational
    demand in the Marine Corps--in the Marine Corps' 31 amphibious
    ship force requirement. I am frustrated by President Biden's
    woefully inadequate defense budget proposal, which would slash
    funding for LPD-33, a critical platform in fulfilling a range
    of the Marine Corps submissions, including disaster response
    and alliance assurance.
        I would appreciate your views, General, regarding the
    amphibious ship requirement LPD-33. If confirmed, you would be
    at the tip of the American spear in observing the Chinese
    military and ensuring the Marine Corps remains trained,
    equipped, and organized to deter conflict in the Western
    Pacific. I look forward to the testimony, and thank you very
    much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker, and
    before we call on General Smith, a quorum is now present, and I
    ask the Committee to consider a list of 4,194 pending military
    nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
    Committee for the required length of time. Is there a motion to
    table report this list of 4,194 pending military nominations?
        Senator Wicker. So, moved.
        Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
        Voice: Second.
        Chairman Reed. All in favor, aye.
        [Chorus of ayes.]

        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    Committee follows:]

     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
     Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on June 13, 2023.
          1.  MG Karl H. Gingrich, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff, G-8, US Army (Reference No. 199)
          2.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    rear admiral (list begins with Kenneth R. Blackmon) (Reference No. 390)
          3.  In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Jeffrey A. Jurgemeyer)
    (Reference No. 391)
          4.  Capt. John E. Byington, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 392)
          5.  Capt. John A. Robinson III, USNR to be rear admiral (lower
    half) (Reference No. 393)
          6  . Capt. David E. Ludwa, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 394)
          7.  Capt. Peter K. Muschinske, USNR to be rear admiral (lower
    half) (Reference No. 395)
          8.  Capt. Marc F. Williams, USNR to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 396)
          9.  In the Army there are 90 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Kyle D. Aemisegger) (Reference No. 472)
         10.  In the Army there are 19 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Aileen R. Cabandalogan) (Reference No. 473)
         11.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Andrew K. Berkey) (Reference No. 503)
         12.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Jacquelyn P. Smith) (Reference No. 504)
         13.  In the Army there are 136 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Harry T. Aubin) (Reference No.
    515)
         14.  In the Army there are 29 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joshua A. Akers) (Reference No.
    516)
         15.  In the Army there are 301 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Alexandra M. Adams) (Reference No. 517)
         16.  In the Army there are 61 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Andrea C. Baeder) (Reference No. 518)
         17.  In the Navy there are 206 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Bryce D. Abbott) (Reference No. 559)
         18.  In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Edward A. Carlton) (Reference No. 560)
         19.  In the Navy there are 6 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Andrea H. Cameron) (Reference No. 561)
         20.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Mylene R. Arvizo) (Reference No. 562)
         21.  In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Sarah E. Abbott) (Reference No. 563)
         22.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Curtis Brown) (Reference No. 564)
         23.  In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Mark K. Corbliss) (Reference No. 565)
         24.  In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Hannah L. Bealon) (Reference No. 566)
         25.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Cameron M. Balma) (Reference No. 567)
         26.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Alan M. Brechbill) (Reference No. 568)
         27.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Ross M. Anderson) (Reference No. 569)
         28.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Homer F. Hensy) (Reference No. 570)
         29.  In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Tommie G. Crawford) (Reference No. 571)
         30.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with John E. Fage) (Reference No. 572)
         31.  In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Gavin H. Clough) (Reference No. 573)
         32.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Jennifer J. Landry) (Reference No. 574)
         33.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Bradley H. Abramowitz) (Reference No. 575)
         34   LTG Andrew M. Rohling, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Chairman, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee
    (Reference No. 593)
         35.  In the Air Force there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with David B. Barker) (Reference No. 596)
         36.  In the Army there are 76 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Heather R. Alsupmorton) (Reference
    No. 602)
         37.  In the Army there are 122 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Boma O. Afiesimama) (Reference No.
    603)
         38.  In the Army there are 31 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jamie D. Bell) (Reference No. 604)
         39.  In the Army there are 13 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Rachel A. Acciacca) (Reference No.
    605)
         40.  In the Army there are 33 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Jamilia M. Adamshenderson) (Reference No. 606)
         41.  In the Army there are 44 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Corebrians A. Abraham) (Reference No. 607)
         42.  In the Army there are 10 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Aaron Crombie) (Reference No. 608)
         43.  In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Charles E. Bane) (Reference No. 609)
         44.  In the Navy Reserve there are 63 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Eric J. Adler) (Reference No. 619)
         45.  In the Navy Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Lucas R. Argobright) (Reference No. 620)
         46.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (Patrick C. Lazzaretti) (Reference No. 621)
         47.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Robert A. Paynter, Jr.) (Reference No. 622)
         48.  In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Stanley J. Benes IV) (Reference No. 623)
         49.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with James P. McDonnell) (Reference No. 624)
         50.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (Donna M. Chuba) (Reference No. 625)
         51.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (Anton B. Allen) (Reference No. 626)
         52.  In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Adam M. Clampitt) (Reference No. 627)
         53.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Christopher P. Cook) (Reference No. 628)
         54.  In the Navy Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Demetrio A. Camua III) (Reference No. 629)
         55.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Loren C. Hoelscher) (Reference No. 630)
         56.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Matthew T. Chatigny) (Reference No. 631)
         57.  In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Joshua C. Gettle) (Reference No. 632)
         58.  In the Navy Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with John J. Bridges) (Reference No. 633)
         59.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (Ryan H. Metzler) (Reference No. 634)
         60.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Thomas A. Summers) (Reference No. 643)
         61.  MG John B. Richardson IV, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Commanding General, First United States Army (Reference No. 650)
         62.  VADM Jeffrey W. Hughes, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy
    Chief of Staff for Capability Development, Supreme Allied Command
    Transformation (Reference No. 651)
         63.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
    of colonel (Daniel J. Wittmer) (Reference No. 653)
         64.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Marina F. Perez) (Reference No. 654)
         65.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Nicholas J. Norton) (Reference No. 655)
         66.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Arteese R. Adams) (Reference No. 656)
         67.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Warren N. Washington) (Reference No. 657)
         68.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Jacob W. Cavender) (Reference No. 658)
         69.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Justin M. Fowler) (Reference No. 659)
         70.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Jason P. Pancoe) (Reference No. 660)
         71.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
    (Benjamin F. Iverson) (Reference No. 661)
         72.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Dustin B. Kosar) (Reference No. 662)
         73.  In the Navy there are 20 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Dennis L. Avery) (Reference No.
    663)
         74.  In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Khristiannoe C. Caindoy) (Reference No.
    664)
         75.  In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Matthew D. Gleason) (Reference No. 665)
         76.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (Jacob S. Tharp) (Reference No. 666)
         77.  LTG Timothy D. Haugh, USAF to be general and Director,
    National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service/Commander, US
    Cyber Command (Reference No. 678)
         78.  LTG Gregory M. Guillot, USAF to be general and Commander, US
    Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command
    (Reference No. 679)
         79.  MG Heath A. Collins, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Director, Missile Defense Agency (Reference No. 680)
         80.  LTG Jeffrey A. Kruse, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (Reference No. 681)
         81.  MG Michael G. Koscheski, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commander, Air Combat Command (Reference No. 682)
         82.  LTG Donna D. Shipton, USAF to be lieutenant general and
    Commander, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Air Force Materiel
    Command (Reference No. 683)
         83.  MG Anthony R. Hale, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff, G-2, US Army (Reference No. 684)
         84.  LTG Laura A. Potter, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Director of Army Staff (Reference No. 685)
         85.  MG William J. Hartman, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commander, US Cyber Command (Reference No. 686)
         86.  LTG John S. Kolasheski, USA to be lieutenant general and
    Deputy Commanding General, US Army Europe-Africa (Reference No. 687)
         87.  Col. Matthew N. Gebhard, USAR to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 689)
         88.  Col. Katherine M. Braun, USAR to be brigadier general
    (Reference No. 690)
         89.  In the Air Force there are 265 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Stephen David Albert) (Reference
    No. 692)
         90.  In the Air Force there are 135 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Robert D. Allen) (Reference No.
    693)
         91.  In the Air Force there are 600 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Christopher K. Adams) (Reference
    No. 694)
         92.  In the Air Force there are 74 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Nicholas F. Aliotta) (Reference No. 695)
         93.  In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Andrew D. Ahn) (Reference No. 697)
         94.  In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Sarah E. Abel) (Reference No. 698)
         95.  In the Air Force there are 20 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Michael J. Alfaro) (Reference No. 699)
         96.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Candice L. Pipes) (Reference No. 700)
         97.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Michael A. Growden) (Reference No. 701)
         98.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Mark G. Kappelmann) (Reference No. 702)
         99.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Leah H. Georgieva) (Reference No. 703)
        100.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Nicholas R. Yetman) (Reference No. 704)
        101.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    colonel (Kevin L. Montgomery, Jr.) (Reference No. 705)
        102.  In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with David J. Bedells) (Reference No. 706)
        103.  In the Army Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    colonel (list begins with Molly E. Keith) (Reference No. 707)
        104.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Steven E. Anderson) (Reference No. 709)
        105.  In the Navy there are 30 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Christopher E. Barnes) (Reference No. 710)
        106.  In the Navy there are 65 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Kenric T. Aban) (Reference No. 711)
        107.  In the Navy there are 20 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Michael R. Andersen) (Reference No. 712)
        108.  In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Dominic J. Antenucci) (Reference No. 713)
        109.  In the Navy there are 550 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with William H. Abbitt) (Reference No. 714)
        110.  In the Navy there are 38 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Joshua M. Anderson) (Reference No. 715)
        111.  In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with David L. Aguilar) (Reference No. 716)
        112.  In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Sean A. Brophy) (Reference No. 717)
        113.  In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Francis G. Coyle) (Reference No. 718)
        114.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Rebecca L. Anderson) (Reference No. 719)
        115.  In the Navy there are 23 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Nick Avila) (Reference No. 720)
        116.  In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Michael K. Beall) (Reference No. 721)
        117.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Forrest N. Bush) (Reference No. 722)
        118.  In the Navy there are 48 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Scott B. Aaron) (Reference No. 723)
        119.  In the Navy there are 32 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Jessica L. Alexander) (Reference No. 724)
        120.  In the Navy there are 46 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Suzanne T. Alford) (Reference No. 725)
        121.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Nicholas D. Chiudioni) (Reference No. 726)
        122.  In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Marvin E. Bartholomew) (Reference No. 727)
        123.  In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Quentin Albea) (Reference No. 728)
        124.  In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Paul M. Allen) (Reference No. 729)
        125.  In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
    commander (list begins with Scott P. Ader) (Reference No. 730)
        126.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    commander (list begins with Erika M. Meszaros) (Reference No. 731)
        127.  In the Navy there are 36 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Mary R. Anker) (Reference No. 732)
        128.  In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with David W. Alexander) (Reference No. 733)
        129.  In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Christopher S. Casne) (Reference No. 734)
        130.  In the Navy there are 28 appointments to the grade of captain
    (list begins with Kevin L. Borkert) (Reference No. 735)
        131.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Craig A. Ambrose) (Reference No. 745)
        132.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Bibek Joshi) (Reference No. 746)
        133.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Adrian K. Williford) (Reference No. 747)
        134.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with Daniel D. Cole) (Reference No. 748)
        135.  In the Army there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel
    (list begins with Steven D. Bryant) (Reference No. 749)
        136.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Joseph A. St Pierre II) (Reference No. 750)
        137.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Jeffrey A. Banks) (Reference No. 751)
        138.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Isaac A. Gutierrez) (Reference No. 752)
        139.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (Rick J. Mata) (Reference No. 753)
        140.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
    (D016094) (Reference No. 754)
        141.  In the Navy Reserve there are 11 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Theodore G. Cavoores, Jr.) (Reference No.
    755)
        142.  In the Navy Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Andrew E. Carmichael) (Reference No. 756)
        143.  In the Navy Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Kirsten M. Betak) (Reference No. 757)
        144.  In the Navy Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Sarah E. Davis) (Reference No. 758)
        145.  In the Navy Reserve there are 28 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Bryan T. Alvarez) (Reference No. 759)
        146.  In the Navy Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Rodney M. Bonner) (Reference No. 760)
        147.  In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    captain (Julie K. Moss) (Reference No. 761)
        148.  In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Luis E. Alderman II) (Reference No. 762)
        149.  In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Timothy W. Gleason) (Reference No. 763)
        150.  In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
    major (Robin J. Glebes) (Reference No. 764)
        151.  In the Space Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Lisa T. Green)
    (Reference No. 765)
        152.  In the Space Force there are 36 appointments to the grade of
    colonel and below (list begins with Phoenix L. Hauser) (Reference No.
    766)

    _______________________________________________________________________

    TOTAL: 4,194

        Chairman Reed. The motion carries. General Smith, please.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL ERIC M. SMITH, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

        General Smith. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker----
        Chairman Reed. Bring that closer, please, sir.
        General Smith. Yes, sir. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
    Wicker, and distinguished Members of this Committee, it is a
    privilege to appear before you today. I am humbled to have been
    nominated as the 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        As our 38th Commandant prepares to retire after 42 years of
    service, I want to publicly thank him and his wife, Donna, for
    the countless sacrifices that come with that length of service.
        On behalf of the young marines who will do most of the
    fighting and the dying when our Nation next goes to war, thank
    you for your steadfast support of your Marine Corps. Your work
    ensures that future fights are heavily tilted in their favor. I
    suffer no illusions that I arrived at this hearing myself.
        The young lance corporals, and lieutenants who so gallantly
    served with me in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the sergeants major
    and senior officers who have mentored me, have my enduring
    admiration and gratitude. My family is with me today. They are
    a rare combination of grit, compassion, and patriotism.
        My wife, Tricia, and I will celebrate 36 years of marriage
    this year, and her continued dedication to the youngest of our
    marines and their families remains a benchmark for me to
    emulate. After 22 moves and years apart due to deployments, she
    stands ready to continue to serve, if I am confirmed.
        I am prouder to be called Tricia's husband than I am to be
    called General Smith. Our daughter Elise, who is here with her
    husband Matt, was born while I was deployed to Desert Storm.
    So, her time as a military child started with sacrifice. Her
    willingness to place work on hold to support me today shows
    that she remains willing to play service before self.
        Our son, Travis, a Marine Corps Captain, and his wife,
    Hadley, are here. Travis is currently on recruiting duty but
    took a few days leave to come support his old man. He did not
    get any dispensation for missing his recruiting mission.
        Even though he is here, he has completed deployments to the
    Pacific and the Middle East. Stands ready to fight, if called.
    As a senior officer, I am often greeted warmly by the public.
    They thank me for my service and ask about my very duty
    assignments.
        While I remain grateful for these encounters, I know that
    it is our youngest marines who deserve this recognition and I
    hope to adequately represent them today. If confirmed, I commit
    to you that I will not fail our marines, their families, or the
    civilians who serve with us, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Smith. Before
    we entertain questions from the panel, there are a series of
    standard questions which must be asked of every nominee, and
    you may respond appropriately. Have you adhered to applicable
    laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        General Smith. No, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    Committee when requested?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
    Committee to give your personal views, even if your views
    differ from the Administration?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this Committee, it subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees of Congress and to consult with the requester
    regarding the basis for any good faith, delay, or denial in
    providing such records?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
    of--records and other information, including timely responding
    to hearing questions for the record?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Smith, and once
    again, you and your family, thank you for a lifetime of service
    to the Marine Corps. One of the issues that is concerning to
    all of us I believe is congested logistics.
        We understand that the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
    is currently conducting experimentation on new technologies and
    future capabilities. If confirmed, how would you sharpen the
    Marine Corps' focus on this critical capability?
        You know, it is--if you do not have the ammo, it is tough
    to fight, basically.
        General Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Contested logistics
    in any theater is a significant challenge. I believe that
    contested logistics is an all of the above matter. What I mean
    by that, sir, is you have to conduct pre-staging of certain
    resources.
        Fortunately, we have a lot of allies and friends around the
    regions of the world who will allow us to do so. We have to be
    very innovative as our Warfighting Lab is doing so. We have
    unmanned systems to deliver those supplies that we so
    critically need.
        Also, we have to do some very creative work to do additive
    manufacturing and 3D printing forward. If confirmed, I am
    committed to continuing that effort because I do see 1 day we
    will be printing forward--in forward operating bases, we will
    be printing major end items, aircraft engines, propellers.
        We will be doing that forward as opposed to straining the
    lines that come from the United States through contested
    logistics areas.
        Chairman Reed. I think your vision is accurate. That
    implies that we have to have intellectual property rights and
    many other things which we will work on while you continue to
    develop your approach.
        The other aspect of this is, this would be a joint effort.
    So, what type of complementary approaches are you taking with
    other services, the Navy, Army, Air Force, Space Force?
        General Smith. Mr. Chairman, the logistics piece is in fact
    a joint fight. So as a current Vice Service Chief, we work very
    hard through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
    underneath the leadership of the Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs Staff, Admiral Grady, to ensure that everything we do is
    complementary to each other.
        For example, sir, when the Navy Logistics Command needs to
    move assets for the Marine Corps throughout the Pacific, it is
    incumbent upon us to ensure that what we need is exactly what
    we need.
        We know what we call the Cuban square, the size, the weight
    that we reduce that, and we have been on a significant effort
    to reduce our fighting weight, which quite honestly, over 15
    years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan had grown
    substantially. One of the first things to logistics is need
    less where you can.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you. One of your prime responsibility
    is training and organizing the Corps in order to operate in
    multiple combatant areas. If confirmed, how would you ensure
    your efforts are such that marines can in fact operate from
    CENTCOM, to INDOPACOM, to NORTHCOM, etcetera?
        General Smith. Chairman, if confirmed, I will continue to
    work with our Training and Education Command, and if confirmed,
    would direct them to ensure that our moniker of, in every clime
    and place, remains. We do that now in the high North with
    Norway. We train there repeatedly.
        We still train in the desert at 29 Palms, and we are
    clearly operating across the spectrum in the Pacific, and we
    are operating in the European theater, as we recently did with
    Task Force 612, in support of those operations after the
    reprehensible attacks of Russia into Ukraine.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, and then one additional
    responsibility is to manage the talent you have, and you have
    impressive talent. Your assessment at this point of the
    challenges you face in terms of retention, recruitment, and
    basically just the morale and esprit de corps.
        General Smith. Chairman, the Marine Corps met its
    recruiting mission last year, and they will meet it again this
    year. We have been fortunate because we have treated our
    marines well through Talent Management 2030, that our retention
    goals, which we attempt to meet by October, were met in March
    this year.
        So, marines will vote with their feet, and they are
    choosing to stay. When we keep more--and what we are talking
    about, Chairman, is keeping them from between the 5 and the 10
    year marks. Not every lance corporal becoming a master gunnery
    sergeant. We are talking 5 to 10 years, which is where gap
    historically is.
        Because we are able to keep them, keep that experience and
    that talent, it is hugely beneficial to service. I think the
    reason the Marine Corps has met its recruiting objectives is we
    have not changed. We have not lowered our standards and we will
    not. We are here to do warfighting and lethality, and we will
    not change our standards, because the combat that comes
    tomorrow demands those high standards.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. Senator
    Wicker, please.
        Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very, very much, and I
    appreciate that statement, because I think it is very important
    for us to understand why the Marine Corps members are voting
    with their feet, as you say, and what lessons we might be able
    to learn to apply service wide.
        General Smith, the 2023 NDAA set a floor of 31 traditional
    L-class amphibious ships, LHS, LPDs, and gave the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps explicit requirements authority for amphibious
    ships.
        Many of us are frustrated that the Secretary of Defense has
    not set in motion processes to actually get this done. General
    Smith, is it your understanding, based on the statute, that you
    are--you are going to be explicitly required to have 31
    traditional amphibious ships?
        General Smith. Senator, it is. Thirty one is the minimum.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, and why--is this a sound, necessary
    requirement, in your opinion?
        General Smith. Senator, it is.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, and why is that? Why is that a
    necessary requirement?
        General Smith. Senator, we are, and remain, and must remain
    America's global combined arms crisis response force. When a
    crisis begins to erupt, that is not the time to begin to move
    to appear, to begin to load a ship, and more importantly, sir,
    to begin to train your pilots to land on a pitching rolling
    deck at night.
        Thirty one at a minimum enables us to train and to deploy
    and to stay deployed so we can tamp those crises down and alter
    adversary trajectories on behalf of the Joint Force.
        Senator Wicker. If we do everything necessary, from a
    legislative standpoint right now, how soon can we see that the
    31st L-class amphibious ship?
        General Smith. Sir, there are 31 ships in the inventory
    today. What we seek and have sought for some time is to replace
    the aging LSDs who are approaching 40 years of service life,
    with LPDs, which currently is the best performing ship in the
    production line. That is a one for one swap, sir, so we want
    to----
        Senator Wicker. Thank you for that clarification. How soon
    can that one for one swap be accomplished, if we start today?
        General Smith. The normal production for a ship is 2 years,
    Senator. So, from the time it is put on contract until it is
    complete, it is a 2-year production cycle.
        Senator Wicker. All right. Let's look back at the
    disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. How were two Marine
    Corps battalions able to deploy?
        General Smith. Senator, we had two battalions, second time,
    first marines, first Battalion, and 8th Marines. One was
    forward in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and the second
    was forward on a Marine Expeditionary Unit.
        So, they were forward deployed already. That is what we do.
    That is who we are. So, without that forward deployment, you
    give up time, and time is the one thing that an adversary will
    never allow you to have.
        Senator Wicker. The amphibious ships were absolutely a
    central part of that, is that correct?
        General Smith. Sir, they were, as they were in the initial
    moves into Afghanistan after the attacks on 9/11.
        Senator Wicker. If we could have responded to the powerful
    earthquake in Turkey, resulting in 50,000 or more deaths,
    would--did we respond, and if not, why not?
        General Smith. Senator, we had a small detachment. marines,
    in short, did not. We have marine battalions. We have marine
    squadrons ready to go. But when there are no amphibious ships
    to get on, to train with, then we are unable to execute that
    mission that is lawfully tasked to us as a crisis response
    force.
        Senator Wicker. One final thing. I anticipate that this
    Committee and also our partners in the House of Representatives
    will direct increased attention and increased numbers for the
    Marine Corps junior ROTC detachments. If we direct that this be
    done in the NDAA, will you commit to implementing this and
    increasing the number of junior ROTC units around the country?
        General Smith. Senator, yes. If anything is in the NDAA, of
    course we will comply. I would say that while Marine Corps
    JROTC is not a recruiting tool, my son is a product of Marine
    Corps JROTC, we owe that leadership tool back to the
    institutions.
        We also owe the most updated training materials and the
    best possible screened embedded staff to do that, because
    again, I find them to be highly useful. I have personal
    experience with them. But yes, sir, I do commit to that, if
    confirmed.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I hear what you say
    about recruiting. I think overall, it is a citizenship builder,
    and it is a subset of excellence in almost any school that--
    where we see it. Thank you very much, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker. Senator Shaheen,
    please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    congratulations, General Smith, on your nomination. Thank you
    to you and all of your family for your willingness to continue
    to serve. Both the Chairman and Ranking Member mentioned Force
    Design 2030, which was General Berger's plan to realign the
    Marine Corps to address the challenges presented by the
    Pacific, Indo-Pacific. Can you talk about what the State of
    play is for Force Design 2030 and how the Marine Corps is
    continuing to implement the plan?
        General Smith. Thank you, Senator. Force Design 2030 was an
    effort to modernize--is an effort to modernize the Marine Corps
    after 15 years of being focused on counterinsurgency
    operations. It focuses on State owned State conflict and
    simultaneously retaining our global crisis response force,
    combined arms, global expeditionary capabilities. Force Design
    2030 is in a good place.
        We have stood up, as a couple of examples, ma'am, mindful
    of your time, the third Marine Littoral Regiment, the first of
    three, was stood up in Hawaii. That unit recently exercised in
    Balikatan, the largest exercise we do with our Philippine
    allies and several other allies and was highly sought after and
    highly credited with some of the really exquisite capabilities,
    long range fires, low signature that we have heard the chairman
    referenced.
        So those efforts are on pace and need to go faster, because
    also as referenced from Ranking Member Wicker, whether the year
    is 2027, 2026, 2025, for the marines, we are the fight tonight
    force. We want to be even more ready than we are every single
    day. That is our mission when we wake up.
        So, Force Design is on track. We need to accelerate those
    areas where we can, and that will come with the steady funding
    and the continued experimentation and quick feedback that we
    get from our extremely--excellent Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. You talked with
    Senator Reed about the success that the marines have had with
    retention and with recruiting when for the rest of our military
    those numbers are down over the last year.
        Can you talk--I mean, you suggested that it was maintaining
    the standards in the Marine Corps that was appealing to people.
    I do not--I did not think that meant that you were suggesting
    that the Army, an Air Force, and Navy had lowered their
    standards.
        So what lessons are there that you think the Marine Corps
    can share with the other branches of the military on how we do
    a better job recruiting? Does everybody need to have a show
    like NCIS that encourages people to think about the marines? Or
    what do you think would be helpful?
        General Smith. Ma'am, you are absolutely correct. I would
    never disparage my fellow services because we fight as a Joint
    Force. I have been to three different wars, and they have all
    been with Joint Forces. I think one of our keys to success is
    we do send our very best to recruiting duty and we reward them
    when they go with promotions, with prime duty assignments, when
    they leave recruiting.
        We have the ethos that we are marines, we will accomplish
    the mission, and our objective, and our goal, and our mandate
    is that everyone who seeks to become a U.S. marine has an
    opportunity to become one. You may join some other
    organization, you become a U.S. marine. It is a
    transformational process and people want a challenge.
        Senator Shaheen. So when we had a chance to meet in my
    office, one of the stories that I told you was about meeting
    with former members of the Afghan female tactical platoon who
    are here in the United States and who a number of whom
    expressed an interest in continuing to serve in our military
    and who were very appreciative of the opportunity to be an
    America but really wanted to become full-fledged citizens and
    think about the ability to give back to this country.
        So, should we be doing more to recruit those patriotic
    immigrants who want to serve this country? Do you have thoughts
    about how we would do that?
        General Smith. Ma'am, as a former recruiter, anything that
    enables us to access the totality of talent from which to draw
    so that we get the very best marines, I am in favor of. If
    confirmed, I will continue that effort to make sure we have
    opportunities and access for everyone who wishes to compete to
    become a United States Marine.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and we have a little bit of
    time left, but I did want to ask you about the war in Ukraine
    and what lessons do you think the Chinese and President Xi are
    looking at as they look at what is happening in Ukraine?
        General Smith. Ma'am, I can never say what is in President
    Xi's head. I would say that the individuals' fighting spirit of
    individual soldiers and marines matters most, and what I also
    say is the lesson that should be taken is that those who have
    lots of partners, allies and friends, are very difficult to
    defeat.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
    please.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    General. I certainly appreciate your service to this country,
    the service and sacrifice by your family as well, and look
    forward to this hearing and your answers to many of our
    questions.
        Congress has generally been very supportive of Force Design
    2030. Should we anticipate any shifts in the concept, if you
    are confirmed?
        General Smith. Senator, thank you for that. Force Design
    2030, which I have been a part since the beginning, is on the
    right track. If confirmed, I will continue that. What I would
    say, ma'am, is we have shifted it since the beginning. We are
    marines. We are innovators.
        We have changed--where we found that we shot long at the
    target, so to speak, we will immediately modify when the data
    represents that we need to make a change. We have done that
    several times with significant things like rotary wing assets.
        Senator Fischer. When we met last week, you designed that
    Force Design 2030 as the Marine Corps returning to their normal
    State of being after 20 years of desert warfare. Could you
    expand on that in this setting as well for us, please?
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am. I have served extensively in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, and we were, all those of us who did,
    were proud to do so. But that was a very, very focused fight on
    counterinsurgency. It did not, as previous commandants have
    said, prepare us for peer State on State conflict.
        So, as we got larger, heavier, with more equipment, it
    becomes increasingly difficult to move that equipment in a
    timeframe that matters. When you do not have deep water ports
    and weeks to move equipment, days to offload, you have hours,
    or short days to make the entire move, you have to modernize,
    become more agile, longer range, lower signature.
        This is peer on peer conflict that we have not experienced
    at this level that is possible since 1945.
        Senator Fischer. Chairman Reed touched on this, but could
    you expand on it a little bit about how the Marine Corps needs
    to change their logistic capabilities to be more effective in a
    contested environment?
        General Smith. Ma'am, when I worked for Dr. Carter as
    Secretary of Defense, he had a master's degree in theoretical--
    or doctorate in theoretical physics, and you can not change
    physics. Things that weigh 10 pounds, weigh 10 pounds.
        So, what we seek to do is pre-stage, forward stage, and as
    I said, do additive manufacturing and 3D printing forward. We
    can also use certain technologies that make things lighter,
    polymer ammunition, lighter weight body armor.
        Every pound matters when you are trying to move things
    across the expanse of the Pacific, and our UAVs, or unmanned
    aerial vehicles, surface and subsurface platforms that can
    deliver supplies, key supplies at the critical time. That is
    what we are investing in now. We are trying to accelerate that
    as fast as we can.
        Senator Fischer. You mentioned the technologies that
    continue to be innovative when it comes to warfare. Do you--do
    you see emerging technologies that the Corps will be able to
    access to be able to enhance your operations, your abilities,
    and help you maintain a competitive edge?
        In this setting, can you talk about any of those emerging
    technologies that you think that you will be able to really
    take a hold of and be able to help your force?
        General Smith. Senator, I think one of the keys, and I
    usually hammer on this pretty hard, is 3D printing forward.
    When we own, as was referenced by I believe the chairman, the
    tech data rights to things we procure, I can build and print
    aircraft engines forward.
        When you can do that, ma'am, that is an entire supply chain
    that is relieved of some stress and it gets the engine into the
    hands of the warfighter today, not weeks from now. That is key,
    and you can pre-staged those metals and bring with you the 3D
    printer. That is in our future. I am convinced of that, ma'am,
    if confirmed, and I am focused on that.
        Senator Fischer. To keep you moving quickly as a force.
        General Smith. Ma'am absolutely. As we say, speed is life.
        Senator Fischer. You mentioned the Balikatan exercises in
    the Philippines. Can you briefly tell us how they help you
    inform the future force posture decisions that you are going to
    be faced with?
        General Smith. Ma'am, those assets that are forward with
    very high end intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    tools, in the broad, unclassified setting that we are in, when
    they can sense what the adversary is doing, and make sense of
    their intent and pass it to our allies and partners, that gives
    you the time to move to position and to be in position to
    thwart their efforts. It is called first mover advantage.
        When we provide that to the joint and allied force, it
    does, in fact, exponentially change the power of the force that
    is in the air or on the ground, because you have anticipatory
    moves that you can make vice respond to.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        General Smith. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
    Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Smith,
    congratulations. Welcome to your family. It is wonderful to
    have them here. The Marine Innovation Unit is headquartered in
    Newburgh, New York.
        It is tasked with maintaining our technological advantage
    and will have 270 reservists assigned this year with
    significant expertise from those marines' civilian careers,
    whether it is in AI, whether it is in cyber, whether it is in
    other tech careers. What value do you see MIU bringing to the
    Marine Corps?
        How will the Marine Corps look to balance the competing
    needs of developing these marines professionally through
    deployments and reassignments to other Reserve units and
    retaining valuable expertise in MIU?
        General Smith. Thank you, Senator. That unit at Newburgh is
    exactly where it must be, because that innovation academia
    corridor is really like no other. That is the purpose or the
    reason for its location. Location matters. Lieutenant General
    Dave Bellon, head of Marine Corps Forces Reserve, came up with
    that idea.
        I have spoken to the MIU, Marine Innovation Unit, and they
    are sergeants, three colonels. They are their own business
    owners. They are already in these businesses. They already have
    the connecting to files and tissue. So, if confirmed, I will
    continue to give them tasks.
        As the Assistant Commandant, I gave them the logistics
    tasks. Figure out how to make us more logistically sustainable.
    I would commit to you, ma'am, if confirmed, they will be a
    priority because they already have the tools.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. The Marine Corps submitted a
    legislative proposal to increase the service obligation of
    cyber officers to 8 years after completion of MOS training. Can
    you walk us through the experience in Marine Corps that led to
    this request, and how this change would impact the Marine
    Corps' ability to provide cyber officers to units in the fleet
    and combatant commanders? Do you have any concerns about
    disincentivizing service in this MOS?
        General Smith. Senator, your last first, I do not have any
    concern. We have lots of contracts in 5, 6, 7, 8, even 10
    years. The exquisite credentials that those cyber operators
    will receive are highly valuable in the military and outside.
        So, we think it is a fair trade, and they think it is a
    fair trade, too, because we are doing well in those numbers.
    Lieutenant General Gerry Glavy, who used to be the three at
    U.S. Cyber Command, is now our Director of Information, Deputy
    Commandant for Information. He is one of the driving factors
    behind that.
        We look at our recruiting model. We did some analysis, and
    we thought we can ask that of those individuals to receive
    those exquisite credentials. We were correct, and we will
    continue to do that, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. The Marine Corps current plans include
    incorporating intelligent robots and autonomous system
    specialties throughout the total force. Do you currently have
    enough marines with expertise in this area to extend these
    capabilities across the fleet? If not, how do you anticipate
    developing this capacity?
        General Smith. Senator, we do not. We I do not think anyone
    has the level of robotics experts, AI experts they would like
    to have.
        So, while we are developing our own, we are closely
    coordinating with others, to include Army Futures Command,
    Office of Naval Research, and DARPA to make sure that the Joint
    Force collectively focuses on those two highly important areas
    that you just described, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. In 2021, several Marine
    Corps flight students accused some of their instructors of
    sexual harassment and immediately started to receive
    substandard performance evaluations.
        They were pulled out of flight training. They had to wait
    nearly 2 years, and sometime after their allegations had
    already been substantiated, before they were cleared to return
    to the flight school. These were incredibly accomplished and
    dedicated women who chose to serve their country in the
    marines.
        After being sexually harassed, they were placed in limbo
    for years and told to expect separation. I am glad that they
    are now back in the cockpit. But what lessons has the Marine
    Corps learned about how to handle sexual harassment retaliation
    claims in the future?
        General Smith. Senator, sexual harassment--sexual assault
    is a crime, period, all stop. If confirmed, I am committed to
    working with you and members of this Committee to make sure
    that the standard, which they should expect, is that anyone who
    shows up to flight training, regardless of who they are,
    receives the exact same syllabus and the same opportunities to
    earn their wings and gold. I am committed to that, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. One of the critical aspects of Force
    Design 2030 is wargaming, and these exercises led you to change
    the size and functionality of your infantry battalions. As you
    continue to work out what does or what does or does not work
    best, how can Congress help you and the other Joint Chiefs
    rapidly modernize our force to ensure that we are prepared to
    face our next military challenge?
        General Smith. Senator, our wargaming and analysis team at
    Quantico did in fact--in artillery terms, we always shoot the
    first round long. You want it past the target, so it
    illuminates the target. So, we did that. After three different
    experiments from three different battalions in three different
    divisions, we came back and changed the number of the infantry
    battalion back higher.
        We also made sure we manned that battalion in the 96, 97,
    98 percentiles of manned rate. So, we will continue to innovate
    with that and make sure that we stay up and ahead of the
    patient threat. I think the authorities we have been given in
    terms of personnel management from Congress have been
    extraordinary, and I believe we have what we need.
        If confirmed, ma'am, I am committed to maximizing all those
    tools already provided to us by this Committee and by Congress.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. Senator
    Ernst, please.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you very
    much, General Smith, for being here today. Congratulations on
    your nomination, and to your family as well. Thank you for your
    service and support.
        Truly takes an extraordinary family to get this far, so
    thank you very much. I would like to dive back into the
    amphibious ship requirement because there has been a lot of
    debate. It has already been raised by a number of my colleagues
    here today.
        But, General, how does that requirement square, the
    requirement of 31, how does that square with assumptions about
    building the force for denied environments against enemies
    sensor and strike capabilities? Because there is some behind
    the scenes debate about the class of amphibs and survivability
    in those denied environments. Can you walk us through that,
    please, and what those requirements mean?
        General Smith. Senator, I can. First, survivability is
    never binary. Things are made more survivable, if, more
    survivable, when. As a quick example, no aircraft is inherently
    survivable alone because the enemy makes anti-aircraft
    missiles. No ship is inherently survivable alone because there
    are torpedoes and strike missiles. Infantrymen are not immune
    from machine gunfire.
        So, the totality of the Joint Force moves an asset and
    protects an asset. So, when those capabilities that we have
    discussed in our various office calls, ma'am, our ground air
    task oriented radar, our long range strike capabilities, when
    those are asked for by combatant commanders and sought out by
    operational commanders, they must get to the fight. Those
    amphibious warships, get them to the fight.
        They are there initially, and they also assist us in the
    logistics challenge. Because they carry 15 to 30 days of
    sustainment, if you do not have that initial sustainment
    upfront, then the logistics challenge gets harder.
        If a fleet commander, or Joint Force commander more
    importantly, decides that those assets are key, that Joint
    Force commander will protect those assets with the plethora of
    tools that they have at their disposal.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that, General, because
    what I want to see, and what I want to make sure that we are
    doing is authorizing what you need and so that you have it when
    you need it. What we have seen in the past, and I will give a
    very upfront example, the littoral combat ship.
        We commissioned a number of those a number of years ago,
    and some of those have only been commissioned for five to 6
    years and they are already on a list to be decommissioned.
        So, what I want to make sure is that we are actually
    procuring what you need, and that it will stay in our inventory
    for years to come, and that we are not spending millions and
    billions of dollars on something that we think you need, and
    you are going to turn around and say, no, we do not need that
    in two, 3 years.
        Senator Ernst. Senator, thank you, and what we need is
    what's been provided by Congress, which is a minimum of 31 L-
    class ships, 10 big decks, those are helicopter jet carriers,
    and 21 LPDs at a minimum.
        Those must be in a ready State because marines are in a
    ready State, and crises never wait for you to finish repairs or
    finish training before you go. We need those 31 at a minimum.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that, General, and I
    am going to dive into our Special Operations Command and your
    Marine Raiders. There is--and this, you know, falls a little
    bit outside maybe of your day to day management. But Force
    Design 2030 calls for a smaller footprint, better signature
    management and maneuver deception and tempo on the battlefield.
    So, General, how does the Marine Corps Special Operations
    Command fit into your thinking about littoral operations?
        General Smith. Senator, the some, just under 3,000 Marine
    special operators who are out there in MARSOC, Marine Special
    Operations Command, led by Major General Challenger, have been
    instrumental in assisting us with experimentation. When we talk
    about experimentation, what we mean by that, Senator, is when
    they are already forward deployed, they have been given asks
    and tasks by Marine Corps Warfighting Lab while executing their
    mission. Try this, test this--they give us real world
    operational feedback. They are doing that every time they
    deploy teams around the world, and they have been extremely
    helpful. If I am confirmed, I am committed to continuing that
    with MARSOC.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. I appreciate it. I just want to
    bring this up yet once again. As we are looking at a
    constrained budgetary environment, as we are moving forward, we
    may be asking our forces to downsize. I think it is incredibly
    important that we recognize the role that our marines play,
    that MARSOC plays, and that we are very careful not to undercut
    the defense of our Nation in this constrained environment. I
    know, Chairman, that we will work and do all we can to support
    our warfighter. So, thank you very much, General Smith, and
    congratulations.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Manchin,
    please.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, General,
    thank you so much for your service, and your son, and your
    family's dedication to our country. I appreciate it. I very
    much appreciated our conversation yesterday, and we were
    talking, I think, and I think I told you that in my lifetime,
    going clear back to the Vietnam War, watching, being involved
    very carefully, this is the only just war I have seen us
    involved with for the right purpose is Ukraine, supporting a
    country that is willing to fight and die for their freedom, if
    you will, and democracy that they cherish. Can you tell me what
    you have observed and learned basically from your people out
    front, and that war has changed our perception of how we would
    conduct ourselves?
        General Smith. Thank you, Senator. The war in Ukraine has
    taught us a few things, although I think the final lessons
    learned are yet to be learned. But here is what we have
    assessed thus far. As I said earlier, the individual fighting
    spirit and willingness of an individual soldier, or in our case
    Marine, is paramount on the battlefield. Always has been,
    always will be. If you train and prepare a resilient, tough
    warrior, they are very hard to kill. We have found that over
    and over through history. Low signatures matter. If you are
    observed on a modern battlefield, you will be targeted. You
    have to have mobility and low signature. What has changed over
    the last 15 or 20 years is that the ability of an adversary to
    detect you has become almost off the shelf technology that
    anybody can procure, even your lesser adversaries. Long range
    fires absolutely matter. If you do not have the range to reach
    an adversary, then you are of no real consequence on the
    battlefield.
        Senator Manchin. Are we restricting any of the concerns
    that they have and the type of equipment they have asked for
    and support?
        General Smith. Senator, there is a very rigorous process.
    the Presidential drawdown authority, which we are on number 41,
    the Marine Corps is a part of that. So, we get an assessment of
    what those tools asked for and then authorized, would do is
    provided--would they change our Marine Corps readiness. So, we
    are part of that process and always have a----
        Senator Manchin. Do you think we are supplying--I mean, we
    are supplying them what they need? I know the F-16, they keep
    asking for. The fighters, they want long range missiles. They
    are asking for those types of things. They think that would
    help them in defending themselves but turning the war.
        General Smith. Senator, I would not--as a nominee, I would
    not speculate on what should or should not be provided under
    Presidential drawdown authority. But I can commit to you, sir,
    that if confirmed, any request that is made, we will give that
    a thorough vetting on part of the Marine Corps to ensure that
    those resources that are required are provided.
        Senator Manchin. Also, we talked a little bit about
    basically how we treat our soldiers, and we leave no one
    behind, and the families. Compared to the Russians, what they
    have done, what we have heard, the atrocities going on and
    bodies not even being returned so there can be reparation, or
    basically any payments or any support to the families. Have you
    found that to be accurate?
        General Smith. Senator, the--what I can say is, what we
    provide, as we always take everyone off the battlefield or
    continue looking until we do, we treat our families well, and
    for those who have sacrificed everything, we care for those
    families. That is not true of the Russians. I would not want
    anyone to compare them to us because we are not in the same zip
    code.
        Senator Manchin. Can you also just speak briefly on what
    cost savings would be to the branches of military, and of
    course, what you oversee is our marines, if we did our--and got
    our work done on time and got our budget done by September
    30th, and you had a guaranteed budget, number to work with,
    versus a C.R. Can you tell us the cost savings there?
        General Smith. Senator, I think our rough math is
    approximately 4 of the last 10 years total time has been spent
    in a continuing resolution status. Whether that savings is 5 or
    10 percent, I do not have an exact number, but I can tell you
    that when all your funding comes in four or 5 months out of a
    year, it is impossible to spend it smoothly, correctly.
    Manufacturers can not absorb that. The defense industrial base
    struggles, and I think that is actually where most of our waste
    will come from.
        Senator Manchin. I thought you had it figured out. The
    American Enterprise Institute threw out a rough estimate of
    $200 million per day, per day under the latest continuing
    resolution that covered the start of the Fiscal Year 2023. That
    is a total of $18 billion. That is real money.
        General Smith. Sir, that is real money.
        Senator Manchin. We better do your job, guys. Thank you.
    Thank you, Chairman.
        Senator Kaine. Next up, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to
    see you. I appreciated the office call. I want to thank your
    family sitting behind you. I appreciated your comments about
    your family's sacrifice. It is really important to remember
    that. I heard you had to straighten out Captain Smith's tie
    this morning.
        So, I know as a father and Commandant, you had a duty to do
    that. More seriously, you have not only served your country
    with distinction, you have bled for your country. Not many four
    star generals in the U.S. military can say that, so very much
    appreciate that.
        General, on April 18th, the Commandant, along with
    Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, appeared before this Committee,
    and yet this Committee is still waiting for responses to
    questions for the record. I had 75 QFRs on many of the issues
    today. These would have better informed our questions for you
    today.
        I understand OSD is still reviewing this, but it is
    disappointing for anyone watching from OSD that it takes 2
    months to get responses to this Committee on critical issues,
    particularly as they are going through the nomination period of
    members of the Joint Chiefs. That is not your area, but it is
    something they need to do a better job on.
        This morning, I sent a letter to the Secretary of the Navy,
    a bipartisan letter. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this
    for the record.
        Senator Kaine. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Sullivan. Fourteen U.S. Senators on this Committee
    is about two-thirds of the Committee. Many of the Ranking
    Members and Chairman of the Subcommittees on Seapower and
    Readiness.
        That gives the Secretary of the Navy and the Department of
    Navy a clear indication of how this Committee feels about the
    Department's failure to meet the 31 amphibs ship requirement.
    You have already spoken about this a lot. You can see the
    Committee cares about it. I commend General Berger for sitting
    next to the SECNAV 2 months ago saying 31 amphibs is the
    requirement.
        So, can you expound again, General, because this is really
    important, how critical to the Marine Corps mission is having a
    minimum of 31 amphibs? There has been a couple of stories in
    the press the last couple of months on the 31st MIU having the
    marines, but not the ships, to deploy.
        Maybe you can talk about some real world examples like
    Sudan, where we had marines but not ships to potentially save
    Americans. How critical is it to that mission? Do you fully
    support, in your personal opinion, the need for 31 amphibs as a
    minimum?
        General Smith. Senator, thank you. Yes, sir, 31 is the
    minimum, and that 31 is ready ships, able to deploy. The key--
    --
        Senator Sullivan. By the way, on that point, the Commandant
    in testimony last year, I believe, talked about amphibs, have a
    33 percent readiness rate in terms of maintenance in the fleet.
    So, if you have 31, you divide that by two-thirds and you get
    the number of ships available. Can you comment on that as well?
        General Smith. Senator, again, ready ships. I mean, a ship
    that is ready to receive and train with marines. As you know,
    sir, you do not simply deploy. You prepare to deploy for
    months.
        As I said earlier, a young lance corporal who is operating
    their amphibious combat vehicle in an a wet well at night in
    three foot seas, they should not do that the first time on
    their way to a fight.
        We have to have those amphibious warships to train with and
    to not just deploy, but to remain deployed.
        Senator Sullivan. So, can the Marine Corps do its global
    response mission without 31 amphibs, in your personal opinion?
        General Smith. No, sir, we cannot.
        Senator Sullivan. Will Marine Corps Force Design be a
    success or failure without 31 amphibs at a minimum, in your
    personal opinion?
        General Smith. So, yes, sir. Force Design will continue
    because it will make us more ready to deal with peer threats.
    But, sir, those 31 amphibious warships are a part of it, an
    absolutely vital part. Just as long range fire and signature
    communications are. But those 31 amphibious warships, sir, are
    vital for the Marine Corps, and more importantly, sir, for the
    Nation. They are a national asset.
        Senator Sullivan. Just for the record, Mr. Chairman, both
    chairmen, the letter that we submitted, as you know, Chairman
    Kaine, makes it so the Secretary of the Navy 2 months ago
    committed to come back to this Committee with a plan to get to
    31 amphibs and follow the law. That is what this letter is
    asking him to do soon.
        But I think, General, your testimony is helpful in terms of
    just how important that is to the Marine Corps' overall
    mission. But to your point, the National Security of our
    Nation. Do you believe it is broader than just the Marine
    Corps' mission?
        General Smith. Sir. It is my personal and professional
    opinion, it is broader than the Marine Corps. It is a national
    asset that is the true Swiss Army knife of the Nation, and it
    must be kept forward. It is a national asset. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator
    Blumenthal, please.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    General, for being here today. Thank you to your family. I want
    to join you in thanking General Berger for his service, which
    has been extraordinary in a difficult and challenging time.
        You will meet the same kinds of challenges and
    difficulties. One of them, no doubt will be recruitment. The
    Marine Corps has been an exception in meeting its recruiting
    goals. You and I discussed this issue when we met, and I know
    how focused you are on female recruitment. I wonder if you
    could talk a little bit about female recruitment as a priority
    for you.
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, what I can tell you
    is I am committed to any individual who is qualified and who
    wants to attempt to be a marine, we want you to do that. We
    need access to 100 percent of American talent.
        We have to have access to everyone. As marines, we do not
    care who--where you come from. What we care about is you, the
    individual. We care deeply about each individual having the
    same exact opportunity, male or female.
        I am committed to making sure, if confirmed, that we
    continue to offer that opportunity, to offer young people the
    chance to challenge themselves, to see if they have the metal
    to be a Marine.
        Senator Blumenthal. Female or male.
        General Smith. Female or male, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. I was impressed as well by your
    conversation about the feedback loop, so to speak, and in
    particular about how we all, you and I in particular, can learn
    from our children. I am not going to reveal the contents of our
    conversation in the presence of your children, but I know how
    proud you are of them and how closely you listen to others.
        I know that one of the aspects of the force design that is
    most important has been the campaign, the campaign of learning,
    COL, which provides the kind of analytic underpinning so that
    the Marine Corps learns as it implements and adjusts to the
    feedback that it receives from the folks on the ground, the
    marines who are actually affected in real time.
        I think that listening is tremendously important. I wonder
    if you could talk a little bit about that approach to
    leadership, because I think it informs much of your future
    leadership as commandant.
        General Smith. Senator, thank you, and if confirmed, I am
    committed to that campaign of learning because it is vital. The
    way we do it is, in fact, just basic leadership. It is kneecap
    to kneecap, face to face leadership so that a young lance
    corporal feels comfortable saying, hey, sir, ma'am, this did
    not work. I have a better idea.
        You see this in a well-oiled CH-53 crew, for example. The
    pilot may be flying, but the crew chief is in charge in the
    back, and they will often offer harsh feedback. We do that in
    the ready rooms. We do that around terrain models before and
    after an exercise. We have that going at the lowest level,
    lance corporal through sergeants, lieutenant colonels, all the
    way up to the marines.
        As you know, sir, they are not shy about providing harsh
    feedback. Thanks for not revealing the conversation, because
    one of my harshest critics is sitting over my left shoulder, I
    think, and I get a lot of straight feedback on many things.
        Senator Blumenthal. That is a good thing.
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, I know how sensitive
    you are to the quality of life of your marines. What are the
    needs to improve housing, day care, health care? Is that an
    area where you intend to focus?
        General Smith. If confirmed, I will focus on that. I will
    tell you, sir, the saying is you recruit the marine, but you
    retain the family.
        If you do not take care of marines, and that is a
    warfighting function, take care of their families, they can not
    focus on the mission at hand. So, barracks, chow halls, gyms to
    stay fit to be ready to fight, housing, spousal employment.
        Those are key to keeping marines, and I would argue that
    those are truly warfighting needs, because if an individual
    leaves because of the family needs not being met, you will have
    to recruit a new Marine and you can not replace 12 years. I
    always say time is a gift you cannot give the adversary. They
    are vital to warfighting.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. I agree with the chairman
    that you are eminently qualified, and you have my support.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Tuberville, please.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks,
    General, for being here. Thanks for your service. Thanks for
    your family. I am going to brag about you a little bit, being a
    Texas A&M Aggie. I was there for a short period of time. I know
    some of your family are Aggie fans, some are Longhorn fans. We
    will not bring that up.
        But I do not think many people here know that and
    understand the importance of school like Texas A&M. Being there
    for only a year just brings back patriotism, and many mornings
    I was at 5 a.m. watching these cadets work out and watching the
    band work out, which actually went through a tougher workout
    than our football team did. But it really is patriotism at its
    best.
        So, congratulations on your nomination and look forward to
    supporting you. You know, you said something as we talked
    yesterday that resonated with me and it is the proper mentality
    for a military leader. You said, the focus of the marines is
    warfighting and lethality, as it should be. That focus is what
    we need in our military right now more than anything else.
        We live in a dangerous world, dangerous world, and I would
    hope that some of your colleagues in the Pentagon would catch
    on a little bit of that and get politics out of this. I mean,
    politics is detrimental to a lot of things. It is good for
    something, somethings it is not. Military, it is not. A
    military focused on political agenda loses its effectiveness.
        So, I was glad to hear you talk about, you know, the
    enlisted men and women that do a great job, that are doing it
    for the right reasons. You also discussed the Marine Corps had
    changed its standards--have not changed the standards, and it
    is a privilege to serve.
        You said marines don't make a good product. They attract a
    good product. What a statement. I mean, that is awesome, and I
    can remember all the scenes back in the years growing up on TV
    advertising about the marines--awesome.
        But you foresee any challenges now that you are getting
    ready to take over the reins as the head coach, or run this
    organization which America is so proud of? Do you see any
    changes that you would make in terms of recruiting the best
    young men and women in this country?
        General Smith. Senator, thank you for that. If confirmed, I
    am committed to continuing that ethos, that legacy of
    warfighting excellence, because as you mentioned, sir, we
    attract people who want to be better. They want to return to
    society as better citizens than they come in as.
        So, I am committed to maintaining our high standards of
    warfighting, lethality, global deployment, and making sure
    that--our marines hymn says, we are first to fight for right
    and honor, and to keep our honor clean. We keep our honor
    clean, and that ethos and that moral integrity matters.
        I think people understand that, and if they send their
    children to attempt to become U.S. marines, you know, those
    words have to ring true, and we will hold them true. I am
    committed to that, sir.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you for that. I had the
    opportunity to be on the USS Nassau back during the Iraq war as
    coach. They put a couple of us on there to really see what life
    was about--amazing. We were on the USS Nassau, and we had, I
    think, 1,500 marines on that troop carrier.
        I had the opportunity to walk around and talk to these
    young men and women because they were getting ready to be
    deployed that night at 3 a.m. on shore. I have never seen like
    the organization, and I tell people, organization--I learned
    this from some people worked with, organization is the key to
    winning. I have never seen the evacuation of 1,500 troops in
    such quick time.
        Obviously it is dangerous, but it was awesome to see it,
    and awesome to see men at work, the Navy personnel on the ship,
    and of course, the marines going on shore. You know, we make up
    a boat or a ship, you would call it--in Mobile, it is called
    the TEFP transport.
        Can you talk about its strengths, and what you think about
    that, you know, in general? Tell me the truth. We make it in
    Alabama. Tell me what you think about that as a Marine.
        General Smith. Senator, the TEPF, the fast transport, I
    have used it when I was the Commander of Marine forces in
    Japan. It is just that, is a fast transport. Can move in the
    25, 30 knot range.
        Senator Tuberville. How many people is that?
        General Smith. Several hundred depending on how it is
    configured because it is configurable. It has got a well deck--
    and not a well deck, pardon me. It has got a deck underneath
    where you can haul significant amounts of equipment. It has got
    a ramp so you can put long range fires, you can put personnel,
    and you can move it really fast and really far.
        Senator, if I can. I know it is your time, but because my
    sergeant major would chastise me, sitting in front of this
    Committee can be a little intimidating. I think I said honor
    twice, in our Marine hymn, first to fight for right and
    freedom, and to keep our honor clean. I might have said honor
    twice, but that is never bad to say honor twice.
        Senator Tuberville. Exactly. Thank you very much. Thank
    you, General.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Kaine, please.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Smith, to you
    and your family, congratulations. I note that the marines are
    doing relatively well in recruiting, and you have a son who is
    a Marine recruiter.
        I do not suggest causation, but there is a positive
    correlation there that I just want to bring up. I want to
    extend my thanks to General Berger, Commandant Berger, for his
    long service. Let me associate my comments with those of others
    about the anthem situation.
        The Committee has been puzzled because when we have had
    commandants, CNOs, and SECNAV before us, there is sort of an
    unequivocal 31 amphips and they need to be ready, and yet we
    often get budgetary documents or shipbuilding plans that
    suggest, wait a minute, is this the policy or not?
        I was proud to be on this letter with Senator Sullivan,
    along with many of my colleagues. I have come to believe that
    the issue is not lack of unanimity within the SECNAV, CNO, or
    commandant. I think it is more within the OSD or White House,
    and we need to kind of get to the bottom of that. But I
    appreciate your unequivocal testimony on this. I want to ask
    about Pacific posture.
        One critique that I hear some raise about the Marine
    current focus is that the marines are becoming so focused on
    Pacific challenges, winning the Pacific fight, that in doing
    so, it may be losing ability or degrading ability to be lethal
    in CENTCOM and EUCOM. How would you respond to that concern,
    General?
        General Smith. Senator, thanks. I will give a quick
    anecdote. Trying to be mindful of your time, sir. When I was a
    lieutenant, I trained to fight against the Soviet motorized
    rifle regiment. We continue to train even after the wall came
    down, because that was the most stressing challenge, a peer
    competitor.
        When I went to Liberia and conducted a noncombatant
    evacuation operation, and then later when I went in to conduct
    counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I felt pretty well
    trained because I had paced myself against the fastest runner.
        Our commitment to the Pacific is driven by the National
    Defense Strategy, but we are retaining those same capabilities
    globally, and the things, the long range fires, low signature,
    those are applicable in any battlefield, just as our Task Force
    612 did in support of operations in EUCOM.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you for that. If confirmed, what
    changes or adjustments would you want to see in terms of
    mobility and logistics support in the Pacific theater?
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, the focus, the
    pacing--we talk about China as the pacing challenge. We talk
    about logistics as the pacing function. It is simply a matter
    of time and resources. One must invest in the technology, the
    innovation to be able to move assets, to pre-stage assets.
        So, I am committed, if confirmed, to continuing that, and
    there are some promising technologies which will take a little
    bit of a burden off the joint logistics chain. One small thing,
    Senator, when allies and partners are shooting the same
    munitions, because we are truly interoperable, that takes a
    significant load off. I think that is where we are headed,
    because we have a lot of partners, a lot of friends, a lot of
    allies in the Pacific and globally.
        Senator Kaine. I do think that is the strategic value we
    have that is unmatched and is not likely to be matched by any
    of our adversaries. We have got people. We have got platforms,
    second to none. But our ability to link arms with allies is
    something that others can aspire to, but they are not likely to
    reach.
        On that topic, let me ask you about AUKUS. We are grappling
    with this both on the Armed Services Committee, but also in the
    Foreign Relations Committee because it deals with foreign
    military sales. Much of the focus right now is on pillar one,
    the ability to transfer Virginia class submarines and related
    technology to Australia.
        But this is just a precursor to a broader increased
    presence in the forward deployment of both UK and U.S.
    submarines to build stewardship in the region. If confirmed,
    how do you see the Corps fitting in to the integrated
    deterrence strategy that AUKUS is meant to advance?
        General Smith. Senator, as you know, we keep, for about 6
    months out of the year we keep a Marine Air Ground Task Force
    in Darwin. The Australians are phenomenal partners. So that
    force that is down there at the Southern end of the first
    island chain is absolutely vital to security and to being
    prepared to deter conflict and win, if required.
        Recently, Marine F-35s and Marine CH-53s have communicated
    with and resupplied U.S. submarines. When the transfer of
    submarine technology happens and those Australian submarines
    are out there, we will be able to do the same with them.
        We are committed to being able to do the same with them,
    and that is absolutely vital. Our contribution to AUKUS is
    ensuring that those 2,500 marines continue to be good
    Ambassadors, good warfighters to enhance that already
    exceptional relationship with the Australians. That is all part
    and parcel.
        Senator Kaine. I appreciate it. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Budd,
    please.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, thanks for
    being here. I enjoyed our conversation office last week, and I
    also want to thank your family for being here, and for your
    time in North Carolina as well.
        You know, in our discussion, we talked about an issue that
    is top of mind, I am sure for you, and for many of us as
    Americans, and that is the rising threat of China. So, if
    confirmed, how do you see the Marine Corps contributing to the
    Joint Force in competition and potential conflict in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        General Smith. Senator, I concur with you, and of course,
    as does our National Defense Strategy, that China is the pacing
    challenge. The Marine Corps keeps a Marine expeditionary force
    forward in the Pacific. On any given day, there is 27,000
    marines, roughly West of the International Dateline, several
    thousand more in Hawaii ready to go.
        Of course, our Forces in California are poised and focused
    on the Indo-Pacific, as is required. The Marine Corps as an
    expeditionary crisis response force is first to fight, and we
    must stay forward. We call it standing forces. But those
    marines are already forward.
        We just have to ensure that they are best armed, best
    equipped, best trained and organized to be able to deter and
    change the trajectory of an adversary action before it becomes
    a full blown crisis. That is who we are, what we do, and being
    forward with our allies and partners has immeasurable value. My
    time in the Pacific, and I assume my son's time in the Pacific
    for him, taught me that.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Now, there is no doubt that the
    Marine Corps will play a critical role for the Joint Force, but
    can you talk specifically about how force design is both threat
    informed and budget conscious?
        General Smith. So, sir, I would say on the first part, it
    is threat informed in that the deep analysis that has gone into
    what our adversaries globally can do. China is the pacing
    challenge. Russia is the acute threat, and then, of course,
    violent extremism in Iran and North Korea. What capabilities do
    they have and how do we need to thwart them? It is completely
    threat informed and it moves daily through our intelligence
    estimates.
        Then as far as the budgets, sir, you know, if confirmed, I
    am responsible or would be responsible for balancing the marine
    air ground task force, families, munitions, housing, training,
    all of that. But force design was not a budgetary driven
    process. It was what do we need and what things are less
    important in the fight that we think is coming. So, let's focus
    on the things that are most important.
        As you know, sir, we have done some self-funding to be good
    stewards of the tax money, but that funding, self-funding, we
    have maxed that out, if you will, and we will seek support. If
    confirmed, I will seek support where required, and I will never
    be shy about telling you what our young marines need to have an
    unfair fight in the Pacific or globally.
        Senator Budd. Thank you for that. Since both of us have
    family members serving as marines, I was glad to hear you say
    that you do not ever want them in a fair fight. It seems like
    force design is intended to make sure any future fight is
    definitely in our favor. That being said, there is still
    considerable criticism of the Marine Corps' modernization
    efforts.
        One of the things that stuck from our conversations that
    you said, it is not about being right, it is about winning. So,
    I agree with you, and I am hoping you will commit to continue
    rapid and smart, intelligent experimentation, and reversing
    course when something does not work. General, will you commit
    to that?
        General Smith. Senator, absolutely. When that data becomes
    available, as we have done and made modifications, because as I
    said, sir, I am committed to that because I want to win.
        Senator Budd. Some of the other issues that would be
    critical to any future fight in the Indo-Pacific is the need to
    work with our allies and with our partners. You alluded to that
    earlier, but how is the Marine Corps currently partnering and
    training with allies in the region? Where and how can we be
    doing more or better as a partner?
        General Smith. Senator, your marines--in the Pacific and
    globally. We are in Honduras. We are working in parts of
    Africa. We are in Djibouti. We are up in the high North with
    Norway. We are also in the Pacific, in Thailand, the
    Philippines, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Australia. We are
    globally present.
        The way that we maintain that global presence in many cases
    is to be forward with our amphibious warships, because those
    warships bring with them helicopters, jets, long range fires,
    all in one package. Often when those exercises begin and end on
    certain days, you can not afford to have seven different
    methods to have pieces arrive piece parts.
        We have to show up as a Marine air ground task force. So, I
    think your support for those amphibious warships is vital. If
    confirmed, I will continue to work to earn that support.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, General, and thank your family as
    well. I yield back, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator King,
    please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome to
    the Committee and congratulations on your nomination. A couple
    of quick questions. First, you are the first general officer I
    have seen before the Committee who has grasped aggressively the
    potential of 3D printing, which basically can shorten the
    supply chain from a thousand miles to about ten feet.
        I hope what you will do to make that a reality is to insist
    that the people in procurement procure the intellectual
    property as well as the hardware. Is that something that you
    are going to be attending to?
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, I am 100 percent
    committed to intellectual property and technical data rights.
    They are vital.
        Senator King. Good. Because without it, you can not print
    the part that you need that will hold the whole operation up.
        General Smith. Senator, correct.
        Senator King. Another brief question. You are not only
    being confirmed as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you will be
    a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and giving advice to the
    President of United States, best military advice.
        Will you commit to us that you will indeed stare the
    President of the eye when necessary and give that best military
    advice, even though it may be contrary to the wishes or the
    policy direction of the President?
        That is a tough position in the Oval Office, when the
    President says, come on, General, get on the team. Are you
    willing to be straight forward with your best military advice
    regardless of the circumstances?
        General Smith. Senator, I am. Always have been.
        Senator King. Thank you. As you know, there has been an
    effort or there is an effort to hold up to the approval, the
    confirmation of all general officers. Is that having an effect
    not only on the general officers, but down the line on other
    people who are waiting in line for promotion and filling in of
    vacant seats?
        General Smith. Senator, it will have an effect. I have put
    my focus on our most junior marines first. We are taught
    leaders eat last, and so, when a general is not a colonel who
    has been selected for general, for example, he is not
    confirmed--I am also capped at the number of colonels I can
    have.
        So, there is a lieutenant colonel out there who cannot be
    promoted. While those numbers may be small, word will get out,
    and that is detrimental for those young lieutenant colonels,
    because that is about how far down it will eventually ripple,
    sir.
        Senator King. Would you say that this consistent blocking
    of these nominations is compromising National Security?
        General Smith. Sir, I think it certainly compromises our
    ability to be most ready. I will give you one short example,
    sir. Marine Expeditionary Force, our largest one, has about
    48,000 marines in it. There are supposed to be a three star and
    a one star in charge of that formation.
        The ones star are focused on the Marine Expeditionary
    Units, which remain our crown jewel. When the three star soon
    retires, and he will of for a variety of reasons, he has served
    honorably and well and has endured some family tragedy, he will
    retire. When he does so, there will be a one star, fairly new
    one, in charge of that 48,000 person Marine expeditionary
    force.
        Senator King. That compromises readiness and decisionmaking
    and the effectiveness of that division.
        General Smith. Sir, it does.
        Senator King. Thank you. I think you have answered this
    several times. But as you know, there is criticism of FD 2030.
    One of the fundamental criticisms is that it converts the
    marines from essentially an offensive capable force to a
    defensive force. How do you respond to that criticism?
        General Smith. Yes, sir. Our ethos is offensive. We are
    first to fight. There is a saying that nobody likes to fight,
    but somebody has to know how. It is actually not true of your
    marines. We are an offensively minded force. Defense is a
    part--conduct that as well, but our systems are joined, are
    designed to enable the Marine Corps and the Joint and Allied
    Force.
        We are marines, we want to win. I am less concerned about
    who puts the warhead downrange than that the warhead goes
    downrange. That is an offensive mindset. We teach that from
    boot camp on. We are still teaching knife fighting and bayonet
    fighting. We have not changed that ethos.
        Senator King. There have been some examples, though,
    recently. In February, my understanding is the marines were
    unable to meet a European Command request to surge an MEU to
    the Mediterranean. It took a month before the marines left
    North Carolina. That is one example.
        Turkey again embarked marines were not there at the time of
    the emergency. Two months later, Special Forces were evacuating
    citizens from Sudan, not the marines. Are those indications of
    limitations in the FD 2030 and the philosophy, or are they just
    sui generis, not typical of Marine Corps readiness to respond?
        General Smith. Sir, in instances you describe, we had
    marines ready to go. We do not have the amphibious warships to
    be forward. Those warships are vital. That is who we are. We
    are a naval force as well as a Joint Force. But we have
    marines, but we must have the ships to be forward deployed for
    those instances that you describe, Senator.
        Senator King. I was not intending to ask about amphibs
    because everybody else has. But you just made the point that
    without that capability, you can have the marines, but you do
    not have the ability to get them there.
        I guess finally, and I think you have touched upon this, FD
    2030 is a big vision and a big change, and I hope that you are
    willing to continuously review the effectiveness and the impact
    upon readiness and the mission of the marines so that if there
    are course corrections necessary, you will step up and make
    them.
        General Smith. Senator, I am 100 percent committed to that.
    Any time there is data that says we need to change to be more
    modern, more lethal, more ready, I am in favor of that, and I
    am committed to change wherever change is required.
        Senator King. Thank you, General. Appreciate your service.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Scott,
    please.
        Senator Scott. General, first off, thanks for--thanks for
    your service. Thanks for--and I want to thank you for your
    sacrifice, you and your family. You did a great job, by the
    way. Can you just talk about the importance of Force Design
    2030 and what challenges you are having to implement it?
        General Smith. Senator, Force Design 2030 is our
    modernization effort to move from 15 or so years of being
    focused on counterinsurgencies, to being ready for the next
    fight before the next fight happens, as opposed to waiting for
    the fight and then modernizing on the fly.
        Where we are currently is making rapid progress, but we are
    never satisfied. Senator, we are marines. We want to go faster.
    As the fight tonight force, I am ready, but I want to be more
    ready. I want to be more ready every single day that I can.
    That is our mission.
        So, force design will make us more lethal, more agile, and
    more able to be first to fight, getting down to our fighting
    weight, as we say, because over 15 years we have gotten a
    little bit heavy and reliant on logistics, which were very
    stable. That will not be the case in a State on State conflict,
    Senator.
        Senator Scott. What challenges do you have to get there?
        General Smith. Senator, I think the challenges that we have
    will involve steady funding. We have to make sure that we stay
    on track, and the other piece that is important to us and will
    be a challenge is ensuring, which if confirmed I am committed
    to, that we retain our fight tonight global crisis response
    force while simultaneously modernizing. That is a wicked hard
    task, as I say, Senator. But if confirmed, I am committed to
    doing both because I think the American people require and
    demand us to do both.
        Senator Scott. So, can you talk about your recruiting?
    You--as you know, the military has had some struggles on
    recruiting, but you have not. The Marine Corps is doing a good
    job. So, what are you doing this working and what can you do
    better? You probably do not want to give advice to other
    branches, so I will not ask you to do that. So why don't you
    just talk about what you are doing and why it is working.
        General Smith. Well, Senator, on that last point, we
    actually--I think we are all part of a Joint Force. I was,
    ``birthed under Goldwater-Nichols 1986.'' I started in 1987, so
    I do not know anything else but joint.
        If you were to go to one of the local recruiting stations
    where the joint service was all there, if an applicant comes in
    and wants to do something that maybe can not meet that
    qualification, that recruiter will take him or her to another
    service. They do it all the time. It is a joint fight.
        What we are doing, sir, is it starts with, in my opinion
    and professional assessment, you must put your best and most
    fully qualified out there as recruiters. Almost 70 percent of
    our contracts come from face to face contact.
        A young person, seasoned Marine says, I want to be that.
    You have to make sure that that person who they wish to emulate
    is the best you have to offer, and that you reward that
    individual with a duty station preference or a promotion, and
    then you hold the standard and make sure everybody knows that,
    as we often say, we did not join you, you joined us. These are
    our standards.
        If you wish to become a Marine, step up and take the
    challenge. There is lots of young people who want that
    challenge. We are open to giving it to every single one of them
    who wants to try.
        Senator Scott. Thanks. So, you probably do not want to say
    that the Biden budget is not sufficient. But if you had
    additional resources, what would you want them for, on top of
    what was requested?
        General Smith. Senator, any additional funding that we
    would theoretically receive from Congress, if confirmed, I am
    committed to putting that to things that we are already doing,
    accelerating being more lethal, accelerating being even more
    ready, and obviously toward ensuring that our organic mobility,
    naval amphibious warships, CH-53K helicopters, that our
    platforms are even more ready than they are.
        But mostly toward accelerating what we are doing because we
    do not know when the fight starts, so we must assume it starts
    when the sun goes down tonight.
        Senator Scott. So how important is it that, take Taiwan as
    an example, and they get all the military equipment that they
    have ordered and not received. How important is that to you and
    your ultimate ability to make sure you can help make sure China
    does not take over Taiwan?
        General Smith. Senator, what I can say is that I have dealt
    quite a bit with foreign military sales during my time. Any
    time one of your friends, allies, or partner is better armed
    and better prepared, as we see in the Ukraine, that is a good
    thing for us because that is a more ready partner, is a more
    able partner.
        When crisis comes, you do not have time to begin to
    interoperate. You must be interoperable before the crisis
    starts. If confirmed, I am committed to doing all I can to make
    sure that foreign military sales process is smooth.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you for what you do.
        General Smith. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Hirono,
    please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To ensure the
    fitness of all of the nominees who come before any of the
    Committee's, I ask the following two foundational questions.
    Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
    requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
    harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        General Smith. No, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a treatment--settlement, rather, related to this kind of
    conduct?
        General Smith. No, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Congratulations, General, on your
    nomination, and of course, I join my colleagues in thanking
    General Berger for his years of outstanding service and
    leadership. I want to ask you about--well, I also join my
    colleagues in expressing our support for 31 amphib ships for
    you, and we do not--we do need to get to why, after everyone
    agrees that this is a good idea, and Senator Sullivan there led
    the charge in the latest effort to focus our attention on that
    need for 31 amphibs, so you will continue to pursue that, in
    terms of your readiness.
        The transition of marines off Okinawa and to more dispersed
    locations, including to Hawaii--we already have some of our
    marines in Hawaii, but has been ongoing for a long time, and to
    basically move people out of--our marines out of--and they--I
    do not quite know how we are proceeding with building up in
    Kaneohe, but I hope that is proceeding after such a long time.
    In the meantime, our alliance with Japan has gotten stronger
    and a new Marine Toro regiment like the one already in Hawaii
    will be stood up in Okinawa.
        General, how has the posture's change planned under the
    Defense Policy Review Initiative made the Marine Corps stronger
    in the Pacific?
        General Smith. Thank you, ma'am. That DPRI, as it is known,
    the relocation ensures that we have strategic depth across the
    Pacific, from Japan, specifically the Southern Ryukyus. Then,
    of course, Iwakuni in the home islands, down through Guam and
    back to Hawaii. That gives us some depth and reach across the
    first island chain.
        That 12th Marine Littoral Regiment that you described, that
    was a very significant move. We are very grateful for our own
    State Department and the Government of Japan for allowing that
    to stay when it was designed to go somewhere else. That is very
    significant, and I think it speaks to the need for those kind
    of rapidly deployable long range fires units.
        Senator Hirono. So, the ability for the Marine Corps to do
    its mission in the Pacific, in my view, is predicated on
    something as basic as a strong infrastructure at our major
    installations like those in Hawaii and Guam, as well as
    smaller, dispersed locations throughout the region.
        Yet, as you have testified previously, our infrastructure
    is not where it needs to be. If confirmed, how will you
    prioritize the foundational elements of readiness like water
    and electricity at our installations?
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, a priority, and a
    deep priority, is that infrastructure. Those bases and stations
    are power projection platforms in a modern fight. They are not
    simply bases where we live. It is a power projection platform,
    and the power they are projecting is the people who live on
    them and their families.
        They must be cared for and retained. You only do that
    through quality housing. You do that through child development
    centers. You do that through water treatment facilities. I am
    committed to those, if confirmed.
        Senator Hirono. Well, the thing is that those are
    priorities that have been articulated, and yet when we look at
    the requests, those priorities are not particularly reflected.
        So, one of the areas that I am very much focusing on, and
    the Readiness Committee is our infrastructure, and I will look
    to you for articulation and actual funding that will be
    reflected, because we can not have our water pipes leaking and
    the electricity going off and our major hospitals in the
    Pacific.
        All of that, and I am sure you too are familiar with what
    is going on at Red Hill and the need for billions of dollars to
    safely remove the 100 million gallons of fuel that is there.
    So, I am really looking for a plan, particularly for the Indo-
    Pacific AOR that will reflect a commitment to strong
    infrastructure and not constantly wait until things break down
    for us to pay attention. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Schmitt,
    please.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you,
    General Smith. Appreciate our conversations. Nice to see your
    family here. Should be very proud and thank you for your
    service. As you know, as we talked about, your nomination comes
    at a time where Communist China means business, and I think
    that threat has reached critical levels.
        Also comes at a time where the Marine Corps is at a
    crossroads as far as the force design 2030 priorities. You have
    been asked a lot of these--I am not going to repeat because
    Senator Scott must have stolen my notes because he asked almost
    the exact questions I wanted to ask you.
        But as far as, you know, platforms that are most critical
    for that force design 2030, where do you feel like we are at?
    You know, how can we be most helpful in making sure the Marine
    Corps is positioned?
        Because I think that obviously as our attention, more and
    more focus to the West and the Indo-Pacific theater, the Marine
    Corps has to play a very important role. So, what is it that
    you need by way of weapons systems?
        General Smith. Sir, in terms of weapon systems, it is our
    long range strike, and that is things such as, Senator, naval
    strike missile. It is our aviation ordnance that is being
    delivered from F-35 platforms and currently F-18s. Those
    munitions and those systems are absolutely vital. Our Marine
    air defense systems. We call it MRIC, medium range intercept
    capability. Absolutely vital, sir.
        If confirmed, I am committed to continuing those programs,
    and to your point, sir, mobility, organic. Meaning things, the
    Marine Corps has direct control over. That mobility, be it KC-
    130 transport refueler aircraft, CH-53K heavy haul helicopters,
    and, most importantly, amphibious warships.
        Those are all part of the spectrum of organic mobility that
    enables marines to be first to fight. We absolutely must have
    that to best support the Joint Force and the Nation.
        Senator Schmitt. I know that, again Senator Scott asked us
    a similar question, how do you feel like we are--where are we
    at with this? Your honest assessment of where we are at and
    opportunities and challenges moving forward to reach the goal.
        General Smith. Sir, we are in a good place, but we are
    never satisfied. I mean, that is our goal as marines. As a
    short example, sir, our CH-53K. It reached initial operating
    capability. Just did its first full list of 36,000 pounds and
    had 22 percent power left. That is unheard of. That has
    happened. We have demonstrated naval strike missile repeatedly
    in the Pacific. That is there. The 3d Littoral Regiment stood
    up there.
        Our MQ9 Alpha extended range ISR platform that is an aerial
    gateway to close kill chains for us and the Joint Force, it is
    there. We have been using it in Central Command, moving into
    the Pacific. Those things are there.
        We need to accelerate them to make us most lethal, because
    we are never satisfied, sir, that we move fast enough. There is
    always--just like on a three mile run that we do, sir, you can
    always squeak out another 5 or 10 seconds on your physical
    fitness test if you really want it.
        Senator Schmitt. Well, that kind of leads, it is a great
    Segway, to your success on recruiting. I know you mentioned
    having, you know, you best advocates and recruiters out in
    front, and those are how those connections are made. You know,
    what else would you attribute that to?
        Because I think that we have had this discussion in this
    Committee among ourselves and with other folks who sit before
    us. This is a big challenge, right? We see sort of a declining
    pool. Is it just that? Is it the expectation that you are
    creating that we have a very, very high standard and we want
    you to, you know, join us but we have great expectations? I
    mean, what else is it other than having those, you know, sort
    of the best and the brightest in front of the recruits?
        General Smith. Senator, it is incredibly hard work on
    behalf of our recruiting command. It does not come without the
    resources to advertise, to offer the opportunity to become a
    U.S. marine to those young people that are out there, high
    schools, college graduates.
        So, it is not without the basics of best facilities, best
    recruiting literature, best advertising. That is important. But
    it starts and ends with people, sir. It really is an ethos that
    we can not fail. marines do not fail. We--and we tend to not
    attract people who are sort of interested in the service. They
    are going to be committed and we are going to make them better
    if they show up.
        We are committed and we expect you to be committed, and we
    are not going to change that, sir. Our recruiters do not fail.
    They are working incredibly hard out there Senator, and they
    deserve our gratitude.
        One thing, if I may, Senator, the ability to--if confirmed,
    I would seek additional help with this Committee to ensure that
    we do have access to all the high schools to simply offer an
    opportunity. If students do not want it, that is fine, but we
    want to make sure we offer that because we offer some of the
    best opportunities this country has.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thanks for your service.
        General Smith. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Warren,
    please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations,
    General Smith. It is nice to see you here and have your family
    here. So, our greatest strength as a nation is our people. It
    is clear that you have a strong record of making sure that
    marines have the support they need. You made that very clear in
    our conversations, but it's clear in your record, and one of
    the ways we communicate our priorities as a Nation is through
    our budget.
        So, General Smith, do you agree that your priority should
    be reflected in the budget you submit to Congress?
        General Smith. Senator, absolutely.
        Senator Warren. Good. Other parts of the Federal
    Government--unlike other parts of the Federal Government, the
    military services and combatant commands lobbied Congress by
    sending a second request for billions of dollars on top of
    their annual budgets. They call them unfunded priorities.
        I call them wish lists. Under the recent budget agreement,
    every other part of Government is being asked to do more with
    less. As we discussed in our visit to my office, these wish
    lists are used to game the process and have included essential
    items like spare parts that clearly should have been in the
    base budget request.
        Last year, the Army included funding for military housing
    in its wish list instead of its base budget. Now people are our
    strength, then programs that support them should not be
    relegated to the wish list. General Smith, if you are
    confirmed, it will be your job to advocate for your budget
    priorities and decide what is going to make it onto your wish
    list.
        Will you commit to not including funding for programs that
    support service members and their families in your unfunded
    priorities list, and instead to put those costs into your base
    budget?
        General Smith. Senator, I am committed to making sure, if
    confirmed, that our priorities of people are in fact reflected
    in our budget. What I would offer, ma'am, is in rare
    circumstances, for example, a hurricane just hit Guam--that was
    certainly not something we anticipated months ago when the
    budget was submitted.
        To simply seeking counsel and guidance from this Committee
    and our civilian oversight to ensure those families are still
    taken care of, irrespective of the exact timeline.
        Senator Warren. As you know, we have procedures for dealing
    with emergencies that have come up since the time the budget
    has been submitted. But I think it is really important that we
    back away from this very damaging practice.
        I have a bipartisan bill with Senator King, Senator Lee,
    and Senator Braun in which the Department of Defense supports
    to eliminate the statutory requirement to produce these annual
    wish lists. We can not expect the American people to continue
    to support huge budgets if we can not even implement this kind
    of basic reform and discipline into the system. So, that is one
    issue I wanted to raise, but I want to raise one more.
        I do not have a lot of time left, but I want to touch on
    the impact the across the board holds on military nominations
    have on our National Security. Secretary Austin sent me a
    letter that said, ``the longer that this hold persists, the
    greater the risk the U.S. military runs in every theater, every
    domain, and every service.''
        But you touched on another part of this in your testimony
    last month, noting that 45,000 marines are going to be without
    a three star commander. Those who support these holds say that
    all we are talking about is holds on something that impacts
    senior officers and only senior officers will be affected, and
    so that is all right.
        General Smith, can you just speak for a minute about what
    the downstream effects that you see are, and what it means if
    these holds continue?
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am. To your point, as I referenced a
    little bit earlier, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 3d
    Marine Expeditionary Force, 2d Marine Expeditionary Force, our
    warfighters forward should have a three star and a one star.
        In the cases where those commanders will retire after
    almost 40 years of service, that will leave a one star in
    charge. It is not that those one stars are not capable. But I
    have been doing this for 36 years. So, as I walk a flight line
    or as I walk a firing range or as I walk through a barracks,
    there is a high likelihood there is not much I have not seen,
    and I can fix things before they get started.
        That experience, that leadership that comes only with
    experience is vital because it is about not getting yourself
    into a bad position, not making the decision that a more junior
    officer might make, that then has subsequent second and third
    order effects, which do in fact lead to readiness, which our
    readiness is National Security.
        Senator Warren. In other words, I am hearing you say that
    these holes affect not just those people who are identified as
    having their promotions held up, but they affect the entire
    operation. Is that right?
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Cotton,
    please.
        Senator Cotton. General Smith, welcome and thank you for
    your lifetime of service and your families' service and
    sacrifice as well. Congratulations on your nomination. On force
    design 2030, I feel that we have reached the point that the
    former chairman of the Committee, John McCain, used to say, the
    Senate often reaches where everything has been said, but not
    everyone has said it.
        However, I won't repeat everything I have said. I will
    raise one aspect of it, though. General Berger's force design
    has stirred up quite a hornet's nest among a lot of your
    retired flag officer counterparts, some of whom I know served
    with you and were your mentors.
        Could you explain a little bit why you think some of these
    retired general officers are so opposed to what General Berger
    has proposed and what he has done, and what steps you might
    take, if confirmed, to help mend fences?
        General Smith. Senator, I would never want to speak for
    anyone else. I am not a believer in proxy votes, if you will,
    so I would never speak for another. What I can tell you, sir,
    is, if confirmed, I would do what I have already done, which is
    to continue to speak and listen to our former leaders.
        I have, in the last 2 weeks, spoken to every living former
    commandant, and if confirmed, I am committed to continuing to
    listen to them and all of our veteran marines who have
    experience that matters, and make adjustments as need to be
    made that are based on data. But I am always ears open, sir,
    and always open to being better.
        Senator Cotton. I appreciate you do not want to speak for
    anyone. I know that you have read the criticisms, though, of
    retired flag officers, and others, about Force Design 2030,
    many of which are well-meaning and come from people who are
    generally well informed about these matters. What do you think
    those criticisms might be missing?
        General Smith. Senator, I think the criticisms of force
    design are perhaps missing that we have to be first to fight.
    We must, in fact be mobile. We must be there. We must be light
    enough to get there, and I think also what I would want
    everyone, this Committee and others to know is what has not
    changed.
        What has not changed is we are a Marine air ground task
    force. We are a globally responsive force, provided the
    mobility is there, and our ethos of trained and lethal elite
    warriors, that has not changed. So, it is a matter of how do we
    improve and become more lethal, more mobile. That is the
    intent.
        Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you. General, a second topic on
    which almost everything has been said, but not everyone has
    said it is amphibious ships. I am going to ask a slightly
    different question from the need for that extra ship, though.
        The Marine Corps leadership often and correctly reminds us
    of the need for amphibious lift capacity. Could you explain why
    the Corps is pursuing a new class of ships, the landing ship
    median? My understanding of these won't be filled in until
    2030's.
        So, could you also explain how you can fill the gap for
    this capability in the near term until those ships are fielded?
        General Smith. Yes, sir. So, the landing ship medium is a
    shore to shore transport. What that will enable our littoral
    regiments to do is go anywhere in that first island chain
    because that craft is beachable. That is a key. We used to have
    the thing called an LST, a landing ship tank, but that vessel
    gets onto any beach.
        What that does is that spreads out an adversary's calculus
    because they do not simply target ports, they would have to
    target the entire coastline. Until that is fully fielded, and
    we need 35 of them, approximately 9 per littoral regiment, we
    are using stern landing vessels that we are contracting, and we
    are open to using other surrogates until such time as we get
    those landing ship mediums such as the EPF, which was mentioned
    earlier by Senator Tuberville, as an experiment and as a
    surrogate, as a bridge to those platforms. But the beach
    ability, Senator, that is the key.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I would like to touch now
    finally on a topic I do not think have been addressed yet on
    the expeditionary advanced base operations concept of
    operations. Since any forces operating in the Western Pacific
    will face significant threats from Chinese missiles, could you
    please describe what resources the Corps needs to operate
    successfully under such conditions? Do you have the right
    capabilities and training that you need to execute the new
    EABO?
        General Smith. Senator, we do have the training and it is
    continuing to mature and be better. Things like a marine air
    defense integrated system, MADIS, and things like medium range
    intercept capability provide us with an air defense capability
    that is mobile and expeditionary.
        Then our capabilities that are long range fires and are low
    signature, low probability of intercept, low probability of
    detection and communications. That enables you to shoot, move,
    and communicate in a manner that even hypersonics cannot reach
    you. If you are on your game plan, if your training remains,
    you can move faster than you are targeted to.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly, if
    you are ready.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
    thank you for being here. Good seeing you again. I enjoyed our
    conversation. I think it was last week. Thank you for taking
    the time and look forward to continuing our work together. A
    high priority area of interest for me is ensuring that our
    military has the highest quality and most realistic training
    possible. It is, I am convinced--I mean, it is one of the
    things that makes us stand out among other nations, is our high
    quality of our training.
        The Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma is home to the largest
    F-35 command in the Marine Corps. They also host the weapons
    and tactics instructor course that they do every year. It
    delivers the most advanced fighter pilots in the Marine Corps,
    which, as a Navy guy say, are pretty good, those marine fighter
    pilots, and they go on to train the rest of the forces,
    aviators who are ready to take this fight to the adversaries if
    necessary.
        Across Arizona, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Luke Air
    Force Base Davis-Monthan, they have identified some expanded
    air space as a priority for providing realistic air to air
    training for fourth and fifth generation fighters and for
    preparing our forces for competition with our adversaries.
        So, in your view, General, how important is it to have
    expanded airspace that can support training demands for the
    Marine Corps?
        General Smith. Senator, absolutely vital. I will even do
    one better sir, it is not just the aviation rangers that Yuma
    provides. When I took Regimental Combat Team 8 into
    Afghanistan, ground unit, I trained at Yuma to prepare myself
    and my regiment to go into combat in Afghanistan. It is a vital
    training range.
        Senator Kelly. Yes, so we are looking at trying to stitch
    together some of these--some of this airspace within Arizona in
    different ways. We are looking, you know, at the--and my staff
    and I will be talking more about this. The FAA reauthorization
    bill is a critical component of this. So, General, do I have
    your commitment to work with also the Air Force, and the Army,
    and DOD to move this effort forward?
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, you have my absolute
    commitment to do that.
        Senator Kelly. Well, thank you. Another subject, on mission
    readiness. General, I understand that last week the Marine
    Corps published its annual update to the Force Design 2030
    plan. Can you highlight, you know, some of the changes to this
    plan from the previous version, and specifically address areas
    that will make for a more ready and a more lethal Marine Corps
    as it relates to competition in the Western Pacific?
        General Smith. Senator, I can. That annual update is one of
    many updates. So, if I may, sir, the changes that have been
    made since our first marketing round went down range. We have
    changed the number of B-20 squadrons, added back to. We have
    changed the size of an infantry battalion from 730 back to 811.
        We have changed the number of cannon batteries, but most
    importantly is that people, a very small thing, and I will be
    quick, sir, mindful of your time. We have changed our basic
    infantry training. It used to be 8 weeks, now it is 16. That
    week--pardon me, 14. That training is 70 straight days now and
    it is done as a squad.
        Those same 13 marines start and end training together,
    trained by one sergeant or staff sergeant, and then they go to
    their unit together. We have not done that before. They are, in
    my assessment, having observed it, they are better trained to
    operate in a disaggregated, high threat environment because
    they are focused on working as a team. As you know, sir,
    fighting as a team is key.
        Senator Kelly. So, the young marine goes from boot camp to
    infantry school, and they train 13 squad members together? They
    go to a unit together.
        General Smith. That is correct, sir, and even though at
    that unit, they may be broken into fire teams, but that 13
    Marine unit, they stay together through training, go to the
    same battalion. That is the thing we have always sought. It is
    kind of the Holy Grail, sir, and now we are doing it.
        Senator Kelly. Yes, I was not aware of that, and it does
    certainly make a ton of sense. Last question, in my remaining
    time here, I only have 30 seconds or so. Water treatment plant
    in Yuma. Water quality, you know, it is really a quality of
    life issue for marines and their families there in Yuma.
        Can you provide your views on why we should be prioritizing
    the health and safety projects specifically, like this water
    treatment plant, and can I get your commitment to work with me
    to move this project forward quickly?
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, you absolutely have
    my commitment to do that on that project. What is so vital in
    Yuma--it is the desert, and as I said, speed is life, as you
    know, sir, as is water. Those families have to be well taken
    care of, and those aircraft and other assets that we prepare,
    they do require water and maintenance.
        If we do not have that, it is a direct readiness impactor,
    and obviously we can not afford to lose the environmental piece
    of those ranges either. We have to have those ranges to be able
    to be competitive.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you. Thank you, General.
        General Smith. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Peters,
    please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Smith,
    good to see you. I enjoyed our office call. I recently
    appreciated the opportunity to sit down and talk about a
    variety of issues. Once again, congratulations on your
    nomination here today.
        During that office call, we spoke of the importance of
    electronic warfare and the urgency of the DOD to ramp up
    requirements and locations that are best to replicate the
    heavily congested EW operating environments that we are going
    to be confronting--confronted with.
        Would you mind walking the Committee through some of the
    modernization efforts that the Marine Corps has undertaken to
    advance testing and training for both aerial and ground units
    who will face a heavily contested electromagnetic spectrum in a
    conflict with either a peer or near peer adversaries?
        General Smith. Senator, I can, and after our office call, I
    went back and tasked our Deputy Commandant for Information to
    take a look at what is available, what options, what
    opportunities at Selfridge.
        Because those things are important to us. We are always
    looking for our EW and cyber ranges. What we have done,
    Senator, is a combination of assessments and wargaming in a
    closed environment, meaning inside of a SCIF, if you will,
    because that technology is so classified. We have been working
    in our places, such as 29 Palms, to both reduce our signature
    of our forces forward and then detect those signatures.
        Those pieces of innovation are important. We recently went
    up during Northern Edge, up in Alaska, and we sent our Marine
    Warfighting Lab up there to experiment and confirm some of our
    theories of long range communications that is not detectable
    because that is pretty harsh training environment up there, and
    we were happy to be rained and snowed, and on and be cold.
        Senator Peters. Well, you bring up 29 Palms as a
    possibility, or your current training and possibilities for
    other training as well. But when thinking of Reserve units, of
    Guard units, my question is, are you looking at other
    installations as possibilities?
        I bring that up because as we spoke about in our meeting,
    Camp Grayling in Northern Michigan, I think is the right time--
    right type of place that would offer a mixture of capabilities.
    It is certainly logistically advantageous for many East Coast
    and Midwestern based units. Is that something you are giving
    consideration to?
        General Smith. Senator, it is, and again, if confirmed, I
    will continue to look for those ranges, any ranges that do--
    that are for electronic warfare and cyber capabilities because
    they are few and far between, as you know, sir--especially
    large expanses of space and places where we can exercise the
    entire spectrum.
        Senator Peters. Right. I certainly appreciate the Marine
    Corps? interest in reconfiguring its forces to meet the very
    rapidly changing demands of 21st century battlefield. During
    this process, the Marine Corps has changed the table of
    organization and equipment, including the divestiture of some
    tanks and artillery.
        The force design 2030 recent annual update singled some
    changes from light armored reconnaissance to multi-domain
    reconnaissance, specifically the update costs for maritime
    reconnaissance, waterborne companies, late mobile companies,
    and light armored companies. All of these with the intent to
    have greater reach as well as lethality.
        So, given the attention that has been focused on Force
    Design 2030, as you have gotten a lot of attention from it here
    today of the questions of my colleagues, could you describe for
    the Committee your vision for mobile reconnaissance battalions,
    and specifically, how do you plan to equip them?
        General Smith. Senator, those mobile reconnaissance
    battalions, we have light armored reconnaissance battalions
    now, we have reconnaissance battalions now more foot mobile.
    Mobile reconnaissance means just that, any climb and place. We
    have ground capabilities now and we are looking at an advanced
    reconnaissance vehicle. It is--and I will be mindful here, sir,
    it is still in competition between multiple vendors, so I will
    be mindful not to tip my hat or tilt toward one or the other.
        But those platforms enable us to both thicken and close
    kill chains and kill webs, provide long range intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, bring in cyber fires, bring in
    space operations, which are all part of combined operations, in
    addition to artillery and rifle fire, naval gunfire, you pick
    it.
        Those cyber fires matter on a future battlefield. So that
    vehicle and ship borne or seaborne platforms such as long range
    unmanned surface vessel, which we tested back in 2019 when I
    was in charge at Quantico, those will all combine to give us
    the ability to truly fight in any clime and place and enable
    the Joint Force no matter where it is sent globally.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters. For a second
    round of questioning, Senator, Senator Sullivan is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want
    to dig into the force design issues as well. As you know, it is
    not without its critics. By the way, it is not just retired old
    Vietnam four stars. It is recently retired three stars, four
    stars. Some of the best minds, some of the best experienced
    marines, at least in my experience, and I think in your
    experience as well.
        To Senator Cotton's question, I would sum up some of the
    criticism in kind of a broad category like something like this,
    the divest to invest strategy shed in a rapid amount of time
    very significant, proven Marine Corps combat capability. The
    numbers I have, and maybe they have changed, close to 10,000
    Active Duty marines, 6,000 reservists. By the way, I think we
    need to be a little humble here on the recruiting. You got a
    lot of compliments, so I think you deserve them.
        But it is easy to hit your recruiting targets when you are
    getting rid of a lot of marines, and a reduction of 21 percent
    of Active Duty infantry marines, 16 percent of Reserve Infantry
    marines, 67 percent of canon artillery, 33 percent of AAVs, 100
    percent tanks, 100 percent of bridging three companies, along
    with breaching, clearing, proofing equipment, 100 percent of
    law enforcement.
        I think one of the concerns has been and you have heard it
    a little bit here, that these significant combat divestments
    and the focus on enhancing lethality around maritime choke
    points, particularly the PLA navy, have raised questions about
    whether the Marine Corps is designing a niche, light infantry,
    missile heavy, force focused on one AOR at the expense of the
    Marine Corps' traditional role as a lethal, robust, combined
    arms force ready to respond to any global crisis.
        As you know, General, one of the hallmarks of the--one of
    the hallmarks of the MAGTF is the ability to kick the door in
    anywhere in the world and sustain itself for weeks in heavy
    combat before follow on forces arrive. So how do you respond to
    that criticism? It is coming in from a lot of very well-
    respected marines, that we are undermining our ability to be
    the Nation's 9-1-1 combined arms force.
        General Smith. Senator, I would say that we are not
    undermining that ability. The Marine Expeditionary Unit remains
    coin of the realm. Those Marine expeditionary units, we still
    retain seven headquarters and all the battalions, the air
    combat elements, logistics combat elements needed for them.
        But as you know, sort of the amphibious warship piece is
    key. The ability for us to deploy rapidly and globally depends
    on us being light and lethal. We had for a good number of years
    developed platforms that simply were not movable, unless we
    pulled up to one of a handful of ports in the Pacific for a
    really multiday offload.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask, one of the other elements of
    divestment, which has been confusing--it was in one of the QFRs
    that I sent to General Berger. We still have not gotten it
    back. Is on the Marine Corps divestments in aviation, in the
    wing. Some have said, with the management of these assets, it
    is up to 200 aircraft.
        Others have said, no aircraft. Can you commit to this
    Committee, I am not going to ask you for the numbers now--I
    submitted a very detailed question, question number 44 in the
    QFR on what are the numbers, because that is also very
    important.
        Has nothing to do with heaviness in tanks. These are F-35.
    These are CH-53s. These are Cobras. Can you commit to this
    Committee of giving us the correct number on that? We are still
    waiting on the other QFR from 2 months ago.
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, I will commit to
    always keep you updated on the number of aircraft total and per
    squadron, and how we utilize them.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask two final questions, one very
    quickly. Again, one of the criticisms when the Marine Corps
    talks about force design, they talk about forces focus on
    littoral amphibs ops. But what if the next fight is not in the
    littoral?
        What if it is back in the desert? What if it is a mount
    operation in an urban setting? What if marines need to cross a
    river? Right now, I do not think we can cross a river. Maybe I
    am wrong. What about that? Then I have one final question.
        General Smith. So, Senator, our primary training base
    remains the desert of 29 Palms, and three battalions continue
    to train there. So, we retain desert training expertise. We
    have the largest mount military operations and urban training
    facility in the Marine Corps at 29 Palms, and we use it. We are
    currently working hard to build expeditionary bridging,
    bridging that is built for the vehicles which we have and the
    assets we have that need to be moved across certain gaps. But
    that is key, and we have to work on that and are doing so now.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question. Four years
    ago, General, Alaska was a potential location for a Marine
    Corps UDP program. It has year round, exceptional training--
    year round. Darwin doesn't right now. It has the sea and
    airspace to conduct training for stand in forces, EAOB ops.
        It has the infrastructure in place to support rotational
    and a permanent presence, including the world class JPARC Air
    Training Range. I heard Senator Kelly talk about Yuma, and
    JPARC is maybe ten times bigger than Yuma. It is closer to
    Taiwan, Japan, and Korea than marines located in Hawaii, and I
    believe Darwin.
        It has none of the ABO issues, our allied and partner
    nations will likely have, in my view, whether it is in the
    Philippines or Australia. Has better cold weather training than
    Norway. Provides cost savings compared to other locations where
    you can literally get to anywhere in the world, not just the
    Indo-Pacific.
        If confirmed, will you work with this Committee to once
    again, you were looking at it 4 years ago and then it kind of
    got dropped, to consider Alaska for increased training, best
    training in the world.
        By the way, joint, combined, potential UDPs, and pre-
    positioned storage and materials needed to fight in the
    INDOPACOM or anywhere else in the world. You can get to--you
    can get anywhere in the Northern hemisphere within 78 hours if
    you are based in Alaska, including Ukraine, Russia, China. Can
    I get your commitment on that, General, if confirmed?
        General Smith. Senator, if confirmed, 100 percent
    commitment, because as you describe, sir, phenomenal training,
    as I just experienced myself when I went up there in April and
    this Northern Edge.
        F-35 pilots will tell you, they love going there, because,
    as you said, sir, the massive airspace available to them. So,
    you have my absolute commitment to look at all aspects that
    enhance our lethality, and Alaska, I am committed to it, sir,
    just as I went up there. 100 percent committed to you, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. General Smith,
    thank you for your service and your sacrifice, and that of your
    family. You are eminently qualified to become the Commandant of
    the United States Marine Corps, and we will do our best to
    expedite the confirmation, and we look forward to working with
    you. With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to General Eric M. Smith,
    USMC by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                                     duties
        Question. Section 8043 of title 10, U.S. Code, describes the duties
    and functions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and requires that
    the officer nominated for appointment to the position have had
    significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least
    one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a general officer.
        What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
    the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. Section 8043, Title 10, U.S. code defines the duties and
    responsibilities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Subject to the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Navy, the
    Commandant shall preside over Headquarters, Marine Corps, transmit the
    plans and recommendations of Headquarters, Marine Corps to the
    Secretary, and advises the Secretary regarding such plans and
    recommendations. The Commandant facilitates the recruiting, organizing,
    training, and equipping of the Marine Corps to support military
    operations by the Combatant Commanders. The Commandant will perform
    such other military duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as are
    assigned by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or Secretary of
    the Navy. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant
    shall advise the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
    Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
    assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform
    these duties?
        Answer. I have served in a variety of key service and joint
    assignments in my career spanning more than 36 years. I served as the
    Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
    Secretary of Defense. As a General Officer, I have commanded marines at
    all levels including as the Commanding General, Marine Forces Southern
    Command; Commanding General, 1st Marine Division; Commanding General,
    III Marine Expeditionary Force; and as the Deputy Commandant for Combat
    Development and Integration and as the Assistant Commandant of the
    Marine Corps.
        Question. Do you meet the joint duty requirements for this
    position?
        Answer. Yes
        Question. Do you believe there is any action that you need to take
    to enhance your ability to exercise the responsibilities of the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps, particularly in regard to serving as a
    member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assisting the Secretary of the
    Navy in performing certain acquisition-related functions?
        Answer. No, but I am a lifelong student and seek to improve my
    skills daily.
        Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
    providing to the Secretary of Defense in your role as a member of the
    Armed Forces Policy Council?
        Answer. The Armed Forces Policy Council, as an advisory group to
    the Secretary of Defense, has the ability to shape departmental efforts
    to make our armed forces better. At this time in history, it is
    critical that our innovation efforts are carried out with maximum
    speed. This allows us to stay ahead of the many threats we face. As a
    member of the council, my position would be to remove any and all
    barriers which prevent the most rapid experimentation and fielding of
    concepts, organizations, and equipment which will bring victory on the
    battlefield.
        Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
    providing to the Secretary of the Navy for enhancing the organization,
    training, and equipping of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The Marine Corps, as a part of the Naval Service, must be
    the most agile of any of the armed forces. We are by design smaller,
    lighter, and more lethal than any other organization. Working with the
    Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, I would seek
    to ensure that the Marine Corps is best positioned for rapid and
    seamless transition from competition to crisis and back again. In terms
    of training, I would maximize the technological tools available to make
    each Marine's training more realistic and each unit's training more
    meaningful against a peer threat. Any equipment that I would advise our
    Secretary to pursue would ensure that every Marine enters a completely
    unfair fight against an adversary because of the range, accuracy, and
    lethality of the systems that we procure.
        Question. What are your goals, if confirmed, for the transformation
    of the Marine Corps to meet new and emerging threats?
        Answer. The Marine Corps must continue to lead in terms of
    innovation and rapid movement to organizations, equipment, and concepts
    that produce outsized benefit for our marines and our Nation and which
    place our enemies in a position of disadvantage. The ability to rapidly
    develop concepts for victory, wargame, experiment, and modify those
    concepts is vital to ensure the Marine Corps stays ahead of our
    adversaries. I would ensure that our wargaming and experimentation
    continue at an acerated rate in order to enhance our warfighting
    ability.
        Question. In addition to the duties enumerated in section 8043, the
    law provides that the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall perform such
    other military duties as are assigned to him by the President, the
    Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Navy. In light of the
    lines of effort set forth in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS),
    what other military duties do you anticipate the Secretary of Defense
    or the Secretary of the Navy will assign to you, if confirmed?
        Answer. The Marine Corps, as the Nation's force in readiness, has
    the responsibility to respond to crises outside of existing guidance.
    This responsibility requires force modernization, capability
    development, and organization aimed to deter, campaign, and build
    enduring advantage. Each of these elements require closer integration
    with allies and partners as well as synchronizing broader Department of
    Defense efforts and aligning them with other instruments of national
    power. Similarly, if confirmed, I anticipate being assigned the duty of
    coordinating Marine Corps modernization efforts with those of the Joint
    Force.
        Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities will you
    assign to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, appointed by
    the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, has
    the authorities and duties with respect to the Marine Corps as the
    Commandant may delegate or prescribe, with approval of the Secretary of
    the Navy. If confirmed, the Assistant Commandant will work to manage
    the critical processes of the Marine Corps. The Assistant Commandant
    would serve as my advisor and perform my duties during any period of
    unavailability.
                           marine corps organization
        Question. Section 8063 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Marine
    Corps composition to include not less than three combat divisions and
    three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other
    services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be
    organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of
    combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service
    with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
    for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the
    prosecution of a naval campaign. Do you agree that these requirements
    remain relevant as an organizational and operational employment
    framework? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes, these requirements remain relevant as an
    organizational and operational employment framework that provides the
    necessary flexibility to adapt to the threat environment and needs of
    the Nation. Over the past two decades the Marine Corps contributed to
    an enduring land campaign. Strategic guidance and the threat
    environment have allowed the Marine Corps to reorient as a naval
    expeditionary force in readiness to support fleet commanders within the
    overall naval and joint campaign. Through the help of Congress, the
    Marine Corps continues to maintain operational and tactical relevance
    on the modern battlefield through our modernization efforts. For
    example, over the years the Marine Corps has established Space and
    Cyber commands to meet the changing threat environment. Additionally,
    the Marine Corps has three Marine Littoral Regiments planned to be
    fully established by fiscal year 2027. These modern formations provide
    force structure at the tactical level to remain relevant in the current
    threat environment. This flexibility and the assistance of Congress is
    critical to maintain pace for the necessary operational employment of
    forces.
        Question. How does Force Design 2030 nest within title 10
    requirements?
        Answer. Force Design adheres to the requirements set forth in Title
    10 of the United States Code. The Marine Corps regularly assesses its
    force structure, capabilities, and readiness to ensure that it can
    fulfill its obligations as outlined in Title 10. Force Design seeks to
    optimize the Marine Corps' force structure to meet the demands of
    modern warfare. This plan was informed by the threat environment and
    developed with the direction and oversight of senior civilian and
    military leaders.
        Force Design 2030 aims to create a more agile, flexible, and lethal
    force that is better equipped to operate forward, compete, project
    power, and influence as directed by the National Defense Strategy and
    other strategic guidance documents. This includes enhancing the Marine
    Corps' ability to conduct expeditionary and amphibious operations,
    improving its ability to operate in contested and denied environments,
    and increasing its capacity to conduct distributed operations with
    joint and allied partners.
                           the joint chiefs of staff
        Question. Section 921 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA made changes to
    section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, concerning the service of members
    of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman) as military advisors to
    the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense. What is your assessment of the
    authorities of, and process by which members of the Joint Chiefs (other
    than the Chairman) provide military advice and opinions to the
    President, National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council,
    and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?
        Answer. Whereas the Chairman must provide advice, if confirmed, in
    my role as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I would be permitted to
    provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, the
    Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular
    matter in the capacity as a military advisor. Members of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff may provide such advice after first informing the
    Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. As a member of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff (other than the Chairman), if confirmed, I may submit to the
    Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice, or an
    opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
    President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, or the Secretary of Defense. In instances where a member
    submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice
    or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice
    to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. The Chairman
    is responsible for establishing procedures to ensure that the
    presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security
    Council, the Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is
    not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice
    or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
    confirmed, I would be comfortable that my views would be represented; I
    will be attentive to the process and prepared to offer additional views
    in future engagements with this Committee.
        Question. If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best
    military advice to the President, National Security Council, Homeland
    Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense,
    even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of the
    Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. Yes.
                             use of military force
        Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making
    recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
        Answer. The use of military force is a policy decision made under
    certain domestic or international legal bases. The domestic legal bases
    for the use of military force reside with congressional and
    Presidential powers under Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution,
    respectively. The international legal basis for the use of military
    force falls under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, via Article 42 (U.N.
    Security Council Resolutions) and Article 51 (Self-Defense).
        The decision to use military force will always be informed by the
    facts and circumstances ruling at the time. Factors to be weighed and
    considered are whether a vital national security interest is
    threatened, whether there is a clear and attainable objective, whether
    the use of military force is supported by the American public, and
    whether the United States acts alone or in concert with partners and
    allies.
        As the U.S. military is only one instrument of our national power,
    it is my hope that military force is used as a last resort, when
    diplomatic, informational, and economic measures fall short of national
    objectives.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What is your vision for the Marine Corps of today? For
    the Marine Corps of the future?
        Answer. My vision of the Marine Corps is a force that is ready to
    respond to any crisis tonight while simultaneously preparing itself for
    potential state-on-State warfare. Achieving that goal will require
    ironclad discipline from each individual Marine and each unit. These
    two ideas are complementary, not contradictory. A well-trained Marine
    Corps ready to deal with crises tonight is in fact best positioned to
    transition to conflict tomorrow. While the threats which confront the
    Nation will change, the Marine Corps' unique role as the crisis
    response force and the ``First to Fight'' force for major conflict will
    not change, today or in the future.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you will face if confirmed as the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps?
        Answer. I believe the most significant challenges in the near term
    will be recruiting and retaining the high-quality marines required to
    fight and win the Nation's battles. Our greatest asset is and always
    will be the individual Marine. Our formations and weapons systems
    depend on the very best that America has to offer serving as U.S.
    marines. This is likely to be a long-term strategic challenge that must
    be overcome.
        Additionally, the ability to respond immediately to crisis or
    conflict using organic mobility is a challenge that the Marine Corps
    must face head on. Our unique ability to organically move ourselves is
    vital because it enables time for the remainder of the joint force to
    organize for its own deployment.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. I will continue to place the highest quality marines in our
    recruiting force and reward their exceptional performance. I will
    continue to uphold the Marine Corps' very high standards because it is
    those high standards that attract so many of America's finest to our
    Corps. I will continue to organize and equip our Marine Corps and work
    with our shipmates in the Navy to guarantee that when crisis or
    conflict comes, the organic mobility required to win is present.
        Question. Given the major challenges you identified above, what
    other priorities would you set for your term as Commandant of the
    Marine Corps, if confirmed?
        Answer. I would prioritize the acceleration of our organization,
    training, and equipment developments to meet the demands of the
    operating environment. This will ensure that our highly skilled and
    talented marines are outfitted, trained, and equipped for victory on
    the battlefield. I would further prioritize coordination with our Navy
    shipmates to ensure the inventory of our amphibious warships enables
    marines to continuously train and sustain our abilities and
    capabilities to respond to crises as the ``Fight Tonight'' force.
                         2022 national defense strategy
        Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
    as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
    challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
    threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
    Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``[m]utually beneficial Alliances and
    partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
        In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current
    strategic environment, including prioritization among the most critical
    challenges and enduring threats to the national security of the United
    States and its allies? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, the current strategic environment is characterized by
    an era of great power competition with China and Russia presenting the
    most significant threats. The 2022 NDS assessment of the critical
    challenges in the coming decade is not only supported by the 2023
    Intelligence Community (IC) annual threat assessment, but also by the
    actions of Russia and China. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine
    has demonstrated that the era of nation-State competition and conflict
    is still a defining characteristic of the current threat environment.
    However, China has the intent, capability, and capacity to challenge
    U.S. interests and change the rules-based order.
        Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS correctly specify the
    priority missions of the DOD and the capabilities by which DOD can
    achieve its objectives in the context of the current strategic
    environment? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?
        Answer. Yes, I believe the 2022 NDS identifies the priority mission
    of the DOD and lists appropriate categories of capabilities the joint
    force must have without being overly prescriptive. Among areas of
    highest risk to our forces are cyber threats, threats to space-based
    assets, and the large numbers of adversary surface-to-surface long-
    range weapons. We must maintain a naval power projection capability
    that is expeditionary and sustainable to compete.
        Another area of significant risk is time. The pacing threat is not
    confined to international norms and regulations and, thus, can increase
    their influence in competition and rapidly modernize military
    capabilities with the necessary capacity. The Services must be capable
    of accelerating modernization to get relevant capabilities in the hands
    of warfighters to test, train, and gain proficiency prior to employing
    them in combat.
        Question. Is the Marine Corps adequately sized, structured, and
    resourced to implement the 2022 NDS and the associated operational
    plans? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps is sized, structured, and resourced
    to implement the 2022 NDS. While some of our objectives will still take
    time to fully field or organize, the pathway to so do is clear.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any gaps or shortfalls
    in the ability of the Marine Corps to meet the demands placed on it by
    the 2022 NDS and the operational plans that implement the strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Marine Corps remains
    focused on identifying and then filling gaps in our capabilities. Our
    current robust concepts, wargame, and experiment process is well suited
    to highlight gaps.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you
    advise the Secretary of the Navy to make in the Marine Corps'
    implementation of the 2022 NDS?
        Answer. Going forward, congressionally authorized multi-ship
    procurement must be employed for amphibious warfare ships.
    Affordability is maximized with this procurement strategy and provides
    cost savings through industrial base stability and improves current
    maintenance and readiness levels.
        Currently, amphibious warfare ships are being decommissioned faster
    than they are procured and delivered. Inventory will decrease to an
    average of 28-29 ships over the next 5 years. The current 30-year
    shipbuilding plan projects an amphibious warfare ship inventory that
    drops and stays below the congressionally mandated floor of 31 ships.
    Amphibious warfare ships require a balance between new construction (2-
    year centers for LPDs, and 4-year centers for LHAs) and retention of
    LSDs to maintain no less than 31 ships.
        Question. Does the Marine Corps have the requisite analytic
    capabilities and tools to support you, if confirmed as the Commandant
    of the Marine Corps, in developing and implementing the force
    structure, sizing, and shaping plans required to position the Corps to
    execute the operational plans associated with the 2022 NDS? Please
    explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. The Operations and Analysis Division, along with many
    seasoned experts across the Corps, provide exceptional insights and
    advice to support the force structure, sizing, and shaping plans
    required to execute the operational plans associated with the 2022 NDS.
    Through Force Design modernization initiatives, the Marine Corps has
    developed additional processes and analytic capabilities to speed up
    assessments.
        The Marine Corps modernization strategy has been threat informed,
    concept based, and analyzed throughout our campaign of learning. We
    have complete 25 wargames and 42 integrated planning teams with subject
    matter experts from across the Marine Corps in support of Force Design
    2030. These teams grappled with an immense challenge, as they sought to
    modernize the Marine Corps as a naval expeditionary force that
    effectively deters our competitors, while remaining read to respond to
    a range of crises. This calendar year, we will conduct another nine
    wargames, primarily focused on reconnaissance and counter-
    reconnaissance, as well as deploying and sustaining a MEF in support of
    major combat operations.
        To support our wargaming efforts, we anticipate the opening of the
    Marine Corps Wargaming and Analysis Center next year. This state-of-
    the-art facility will significantly enhance our capability development,
    concept development, operational plan assessment, training, and
    advanced technology evaluation. Sustained funding will be required to
    support IT services and the necessary personnel to staff the analysis
    center.
                     overall readiness of the marine corps
        Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the Marine
    Corps--across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and
    training--to execute the 2022 NDS and associated operational plans?
        Answer. The Marine Corps is more ready to execute the national
    defense strategy and OPLANS than it has been in the past, and we are
    only getting better.
        Personnel: Our single greatest asset remains the individual Marine;
    Force Design 2030 has allowed the Marine Corps to optimize the force at
    approximately 172,000 while focusing on the retaining the best and
    brightest marines. We met our fiscal year 2022 recruiting and retention
    goals with all indications pointing toward the Service doing so again
    in fiscal year 2023. We have not and will not lower the standard. With
    Talent Management 2030, we fundamentally redesigned our personnel
    system, which was empowered by the new statutory authorities granted by
    Congress. These changes were implemented with a focus on retaining the
    best marines, specifically the NCO and junior officer corps. We have
    been able to build from the inside, mature the force, and capitalize on
    the best talent that America has to offer.
        Training and education have been a focal point of the current CMCs
    tenure and the service has been able to make massive strides. One of
    our greatest improvements has been the expansion of our infantry school
    from 8.5 weeks to 14. We have a 10:1 student to instructor ratio now.
    We have our best NCOs instructing squads and returning to the fleet as
    the best squad leaders in the Corps. These marines now train every day
    for 14 weeks and go to the fleet together. Who you train with is now
    who you fight with, the unit cohesion makes me question why we had not
    started this 30 years ago.
        Materiel and equipment: We are currently fielding systems that will
    enable the Joint force, of today and in the future, to execute the
    tasks set forth in the National Defense Strategy. Under our current
    leadership, we invested heavily in the next generation of future
    systems. We now have the most capable radar in the world, the TPS-80 G/
    ATOR, that can gain and maintain custody of adversary targets and hold
    those targets at risk. With the support of the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering's Joint Capability
    Technology Demonstration Office, we are rapidly developing new systems
    at low cost to further enhance our warfighting capabilities. As
    marines, we will continue to innovate to put our adversaries in complex
    situations and your marines are ready to fight tonight.
        Question. In your view, what are the priority missions for which
    current and future Marine Corps forces should be trained and ready in
    the context of day-to-day activities, as well as for contingencies?
        Answer. The Marine Corps is our Nation's force in readiness, and
    premier crisis response force. As an expeditionary force in readiness
    which is amphibious in character, the Marine Corps must prioritize
    readiness to conduct amphibious operations globally today and into the
    future. The Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit remain
    a flexible, scalable, and multi-role capability for our Combatant
    Commanders. The training, readiness, and deployment of these formations
    support day-to-day activities in critical theaters, as well as provide
    a rapid response capability for contingency operations around the
    globe. The Marine Corps must prioritize training that enables naval
    integration and amphibious operations in order to alter the trajectory
    of any adversaries plans and to win if deterrence fails.
        Question. In what specific ways has the Marine Corps improved or
    not improved its State of readiness across the domains of materiel and
    equipment, personnel, and training?
        Answer. Congress has greatly assisted the Marine Corps readiness
    recovery efforts with increased topline funding over the last 4 years,
    which has allowed us to rebuild readiness and increase lethality in
    support of the National Defense Strategy. We have accelerated aviation
    readiness recovery, which has led to an increase in average monthly
    flight time for our aircrews, an increase in mission capable rates of
    our aircraft, and an improvement of our aggregate aviation Training
    readiness rating. With sustained Operations and Maintenance funding, we
    have made significant gains in ground equipment readiness rates, where
    our aggregated ground equipment and readiness of reportable equipment
    have improved in both availability and serviceability. We have also
    seen moderate gains in materiel and equipment readiness across the
    force from modernization efforts as a result of Force Design 2030 and
    Presidential Drawdown Authority actions which have enabled us to reduce
    and/or replace legacy maintenance-intensive equipment and aging
    munitions. Combined with our focused structural changes, we have made
    enhancements to meet the requirements of the evolving operational
    environment. However, there is risk involved as we rebuild capacity in
    high demand capability areas. Finally, we have invested in Service-
    level, Joint, and Multilateral training exercises and enhancements to
    training ranges and live immersion training capabilities that prepare
    our marines to defeat peer adversaries and ensures the Marine Corps is
    ``most ready when the Nation is least ready.'' A lack of available
    amphibious shipping continues to challenge our ability to attain
    advance training standards in many of our formations and appropriately
    respond to crises.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to restore full spectrum
    Marine Corps readiness, and under what timelines?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure to the extent a budget is
    passed on time, that readiness accounts are maintained at very high
    levels. Sustained and predictable budgetary authority over the last few
    years has enabled the Marine Corps to recruit, retain, equip, and train
    the highest quality people possible, which directly contributes to
    lethality and readiness. We will sustain the gains made in materiel and
    equipment readiness, while increasing efforts in Talent Management, and
    accelerating efforts to modernize our training and warfighting
    capabilities. I would also ensure that our training ranges and service
    exercises challenge our marines for State on State conflict. I will
    also continue to work with the Navy to improve amphibious shipping
    availability to meet training and operational readiness requirements.
    The Marine Corps is ready now, and if confirmed, I will ensure that we
    continue to be ready for missions in any clime and place.
                                     budget
        Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
    adequacy of the Marine Corps budget?
        Answer. The current and future readiness of the Fleet Marine Force
    against the pacing threat is the standard by which I would measure the
    adequacy of the budget. I cannot stress enough that sustained,
    adequate, predictable funding is the single most effective way to
    achieve this and to maintain our critical strategic momentum in
    implementing the National Defense Strategy. This financial stability is
    key to our ability to continue our Force Design modernization efforts,
    while ensuring that forward deployed Marine forces are ready to respond
    to crisis and provide the integrated deterrence and day-to-day
    campaigning necessary to build advantage with our allies and partners.
    A sustained, adequate, and predictable budget will also enable
    continued investment in critical infrastructure and quality of life
    requirements focused on increasing the operational capability and
    capacity of our installations and taking care of our marines and their
    families.
        Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
    later than 10 days after the President's submission of the annual
    defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander
    must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
    lists, in order of priority, the unfunded priorities of the armed force
    or combatant command.
        What are your views of this statutory requirement and the utility
    of unfunded priorities lists?
        Answer. In compliance with 10 U.S.C. 222a, the Marine Corps is
    required to submit a list of unfunded priorities to accompany the
    President's Budget submission. Our budget submission represents the
    most effective mix of forces, equipment, manpower and support
    attainable within fiscal constraints by aligning resources to
    prioritized investments, balancing warfighting capabilities with risk,
    affordability, and effectiveness. Programs prioritized on the Unfunded
    Priority List represent executable items that would help accelerate key
    warfighting investments and other modernization efforts that benefit
    our future force. None of the items on our UPL are of a higher priority
    than those requested in the President's Budget but are provided to
    Congress for consideration should additional funds be made available.
        Question. If confirmed, do you agree to provide your unfunded
    priorities list to Congress in a timely manner?
        Answer. Yes.
                           alliances and partnerships
        Question. The 2022 NDS stresses the importance of U.S. alliances
    and partnerships and considers these relationships a critical strategic
    advantage.
        If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen
    existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and
    leverage opportunities for international cooperation to advance U.S.
    security interests?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work in concert with the Combatant
    Commanders to build senior relationships with key partners and would
    ensure that marines were ready to deploy to meet emerging threats and
    opportunities.
        Question. What are the major challenges for strengthening existing
    alliances and partnerships or building new ones, including for
    improving interoperability and shared operational concepts? What steps
    would you recommend, if confirmed, for overcoming these challenges?
        Answer. Presence is required to strengthen alliances and to build
    new ones. marines must be forward deployed to meet these challenges.
    Addressing ally and partner nation security concerns focusing on the
    relationship between the U.S. and that partner, irrespective of a
    specific adversary, can make inroads. We have very positive military-
    to-military relationships with our Allies and partners, and we need to
    continue making the investments necessary to sustain those unmatched
    relationships. More broadly, we in the DOD must nest our efforts in the
    broader, whole-of-government approach to strengthen and as well as
    build new relationships. The Marine Corps maintains and is developing
    interoperability pathways with several critical allies to ensure
    capabilities and operating concepts evolve together and complement each
    other. Some of these interoperable pathways include orienting on a
    common purpose and supporting local governments. Our Marine
    Expeditionary Units play a vital role in improving out interoperability
    with our Allies and partners, while also providing humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief necessary to support local governments.
    To maximize our interoperability we must be forward deployed aboard L
    Class amphibious warfare ships.
                                joint operations
        Question. The Marine Corps is largely organizing around the concept
    of serving as a Stand-in Force (SIF) for the military. The Marine Corps
    defines the SIF as small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively
    simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the
    competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a
    maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans
    of a potential or actual adversary. As envisioned this concept is
    inherently joint.
        How would you characterize the current State of Navy and Marine
    Corps joint operations? What gaps or shortfalls exist? What changes
    would you advocate to strengthen or expand Navy and Marine Corps joint
    operations best to meet the objectives of the 2022 NDS?
        Answer. The Navy-Marine Corps team continue to enable joint
    operations that enhance the lethality of the Joint Force and provide
    flexibility to combatant commanders. The Navy-Marine Corps team have
    held the enduring TF 51/5 headquarters based in Central Command
    (CENTCOM) that continues to integrate expeditionary naval operations in
    support of combatant commander requirements. This past year, the Navy
    and Marine Corps established two Task Force (TF) headquarters in the
    European Command (EUCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). In
    EUCOM, TF 61/2 was designed to provide a joint task force crisis
    response capability through command and control (C2) of naval forces
    supporting contingencies in Europe and Africa--to include ongoing
    responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In INDOPACOM, TF 76/3
    embarked upon an 18-month-long period of experimentation, conducting
    active campaigning inside a contested space. This integrated task force
    has demonstrated the ability to create robust information webs to
    support maritime domain awareness (MDA) across the theater, especially
    in the western Pacific. Both formations have increased MDA for
    combatant commanders and increased interoperability across the joint
    force.
        The Marine Corps' ability to enable the Joint Force is critical to
    Active deterrence. Marine Corps' modernization efforts are providing
    combatant commanders with credible forces that can conduct
    reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, conduct and enable Joint and
    Combined cross-domain strikes, and support Naval, Joint, and combined
    fires and maneuver. These capabilities have been designed to nest with
    the Combined and Joint Force to create a robust and redundant
    communications architecture between Marine Corps, Naval, Joint, and
    Combined Forces. Shortfalls in organic mobility for Marine units may
    incur joint support requirements if not sufficiently resourced.
        Question. Which other Service doctrines and capabilities offer the
    greatest opportunity for synergy with the Marine Corps in joint
    operations?
        Answer. The Marine Corps and the other services share synergies
    with joint doctrine publications that outline the fundamental
    principles that guide the employment of US military forces. Some
    examples of this are Joint Pub (JP) 3-32 Joint Maritime Operations, JP
    3-04 Information in Joint Operations, JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations,
    and JP 3-07 Joint Stabilization Activities. Furthermore, the Marine
    Corps partners with the other Services in the development of 31 multi-
    service doctrinal publications, via the Air-Land-Sea-Space Application
    Center to effectively employ concepts and capabilities within the Joint
    Force.
        Achieving integration of capabilities in the Joint Force requires
    dependencies and enablers. For example, the Army provides critical
    theater logistics support; the Air Force provides strategic airlift;
    and the Navy provides not only amphibious support, but also an entire
    range of requirements to enable amphibious and littoral operations. In
    terms of enablers, as part of the Stand-in force, marines will be on
    the forward edge of a maritime defense-in depth. We are unique in that
    we possess organic capabilities to persist and remain lethal across
    multiple domains, maneuverable, and survivable inside an adversary's
    weapon engagement zone. Through our campaign of learning we have found
    that our true value proposition is to ``sense and make sense.'' In a
    21st century multi-domain environment, linear kill chains are
    insufficient. Through this concept and approach, Marines will be
    strategically placed to operate with partners and allies during
    competition and will be capable of responding during crises and holding
    adversaries at risk during conflict. Our Stand-in Forces will increase
    maritime domain awareness by maintaining custody of target data and
    will enable the Joint Force to project power back into an anti-access/
    area denial (A2/AD) environment.
        Question. What innovative ideas are you considering to increase
    Service interoperability to accomplish missions and tasks in support of
    Department of Defense objectives in joint operations?
        Answer. To ensure our amphibious operations concepts remain
    current, together with the Navy, we are developing a new concept for
    21st Century Amphibious Operations. It will describe how we will
    execute amphibious operations against future adversaries in this
    evolving and complex operational environment. It will also articulate
    the future role of amphibious operations in support of maritime
    campaigns and will describe new operating methods that incorporate
    agile platforms to supplement traditional amphibious ships.
        Additionally, Stand-in Forces conducting Expeditionary Advanced
    Base Operations have a unique ability to advance interoperability
    across the Combined and Joint Force to enable CJADC2 efforts. The
    forward postured forces operating and persisting inside adversaries'
    weapons engagement zones can sense and make sense of the operating
    environment. While maintaining quality track data and custody of
    targets, stand-in forces provide maritime domain awareness for fleet
    and joint commanders to project power into Anti-Access/Area Denial
    (A2AD) environments when crisis turns to conflict.
        Interoperability extends beyond our U.S. Joint Force and into our
    relationship with partner and allied nations. The Marine Corps' Stand
    in Forces maintain these critical relationships while campaigning with
    their forward presence providing U.S. partners and allies assurances,
    increasing access, and actively deter shared adversaries.
                                  acquisition
        Question. In recent National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs),
    Congress expanded and refined the acquisition-related functions of the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        If confirmed, how would you assist the Secretary of the Navy in the
    performance of certain acquisition-related functions, while ensuring
    compatibility with the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (as
    established in title 10, U.S. Code, sections 8014 and 8016)?
        Answer. I would execute the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    responsibility to determine service requirements and establish their
    relative priority in support of the acquisition process. I would assist
    the Secretary of the Navy in making decisions regarding resources and
    priorities, and associated tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and
    performance on major defense acquisition programs. Further, I would
    manage key acquisition talent inside the Marine Corps to ensure we have
    the right number of program managers with the requisite skills and
    experience to effectively employ tailored acquisition approaches.
    Finally, recognizing the importance of the integral relationship
    between HQMC, OPNAV, and DON staff, I would ensure synchronization of
    effort and alignment of service requirements and resource
    prioritization to the National Defense Strategy as well as Naval,
    Joint, and COCOM requirements.
        Question. What actions would you take to improve all three aspects
    of the acquisition process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue and build on the work
    Commandant Berger initiated, collaboratively with ASN (RD&A), to
    synchronize service chief and service acquisition executive roles and
    authorities to deliver capabilities in support of Naval, Joint, and
    COCOM requirements. Specifically, I would maximize the use of
    wargaming, prototyping, and experimentation to accelerate requirement
    development, inform prioritization of resources, and enable timely
    cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs. I would maintain close
    integration and alignment with the other elements of the Department of
    Navy's acquisition-related decision support system, including ASN(FM&C)
    and ASN(RD&A). As an integrated Naval force, unity of effort in the
    planning and execution of programs across the Department is critical to
    delivering at the speed of relevance. I would maintain awareness of
    acquisition efforts across the Joint Force to leverage joint
    development, defense industrial base optimization, and contractual
    opportunities. I would additionally manage key acquisition talent
    inside the Marine Corps to ensure we have the right number of program
    managers with the requisite skills and experience to effectively employ
    tailored acquisition approaches. In order to ensure the greatest
    affordability, I would encourage the congressional authorized multi-
    ship procurement of Amphibious Warfare Ships.
        Question. What actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that
    requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would maximize the use of wargaming,
    prototyping, and experimentation to accelerate requirement development,
    inform prioritization of resources, and enable timely cost, schedule,
    and performance tradeoffs.
        If confirmed, I would ensure early engagement by the Marine Corps
    Operational Test and Evaluation Activity to provide an independent
    assessment of key performance parameters and key system attributes
    testability and alignment to overall system operational effectiveness/
    suitability.
        Question. What specific measures would you recommend to control
    ``requirements creep'' in the defense acquisition system?
        Answer. We employ the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) to
    tailor our approach to capability development. The AAF allows us to
    increase focus on key requirements and move more effectively through
    the acquisition process. Further, the AAF enables us to take advantage
    of rapid prototyping and fielding of an initial capability that
    reinforces our focus on critical operational requirements.
        Question. How would you utilize your authority to arrest the
    exponential escalation in cost that, in recent history, has marked the
    acquisition life-cycle of Service platforms and weapons systems?
        Answer. I would advocate for the judicious use of rapid prototyping
    and experimentation to inform capability development activities;
    emphasize development of realistic and independent program life cycle
    cost estimates; and leverage my support/advisory role during key
    Defense Acquisition System milestones to assist with cost, schedule,
    and performance trades necessary to achieve service objectives.
    Additionally, I would ensure affordable sustainment cost objectives are
    identified early in the capability development process and included in
    requirements document to guide and inform system performance tradeoff
    decisions.
        Question. In your view, in whom should accountability for large-
    scale acquisition failures and/or extraordinary cost overruns vest?
        Answer. While current statutory and regulatory guidance confer
    acquisitions authorities and accountability to the Under Secretary of
    Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment), Secretary of the Navy (Component
    Head), and Service Acquisition Executive, the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps shares this responsibility. For Marine Corps Programs, the
    Secretary of the Navy has assigned acquisition authorities to both ASN
    (RD&A) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. As such, accountability
    for acquisition failures and cost overruns is shared between ASN (RD&A)
    and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        Question. In your view, are the roles and responsibilities in the
    acquisition process now assigned to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    and the other Service Chiefs appropriate? Are there other acquisition-
    related roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the
    Service Chiefs?
        Answer. Based on my experience assisting the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps with execution of his acquisition related roles and
    responsibilities during my tenure as both the Deputy Commandant, Combat
    Development and Integration and as the Assistant Commandant of the
    Marine Corps, the currently assigned authorities are adequate. If
    confirmed, I would commit to work with the Committee to identify any
    gaps and address them.
        A natural tension exists between the objectives of major defense
    acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and the
    need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--the
    objective of the test and evaluation function.
        Question. Has the Secretary of the Navy assigned to the Commandant
    of the Marine Corps responsibility for those aspects of the function of
    research and development relating to test and evaluation for Marine
    Corps acquisition programs? If so, how would you exercise this
    responsibility, if confirmed?
        Answer. The Secretary of the Navy assigned responsibility for
    Operational Test and Evaluation to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    for all Marine Corps acquisitions except for aviation assets which fall
    under the Navy's Operational Test Authority. If confirmed, I would
    emphasize the need for early involvement of the Marine Corps and Navy
    Operational Test and Evaluation communities in the capabilities
    development process and seek opportunities to bolster Department
    operational test and evaluation capacity and capability.
        Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance
    between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to
    perform adequate test and evaluation?
        Answer. Only under the most pressing situations, e.g., urgent
    requirements supporting marines engaged in peacekeeping or combat
    operations, testing efforts may be reduced but we would more closely
    monitor the system in its fielded environment to re-assess our initial
    evaluation, tactics, techniques, and procedures to minimize the
    operational risks. In all other instances, Program Executive Officers
    and Program Managers must ensure test and evaluation programs that
    provide sufficient test activities to clearly demonstrate the
    operational effectiveness and suitability of capabilities before
    fielding to the Fleet Marine Force.
        Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it
    appropriate to procure weapon systems and equipment that have not been
    demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
    suitable, and survivable?
        Answer. With the means available today to rapidly prototype and
    procure limited quantities for experimentation, rarely, if ever, would
    it be appropriate to procure systems and equipment in support of the
    warfighter without requisite testing and evaluation.
        Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
    operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
    acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition
    processes?
        Answer. The role of developmental and operational test and
    evaluation communities during rapid, spiral or evolutionary
    acquisitions is to develop an efficient and effective test program that
    stresses system performance sufficiently to assess with confidence, its
    safety, reliability and mission effectiveness within cost and schedule
    constraints.
        Question. Are you satisfied with Marine Corps test and evaluation
    capabilities, including the test and evaluation workforce and
    infrastructure?
        Answer. I'm not one to ever be fully satisfied with existing
    capabilities or supporting infrastructure. I consistently look for
    opportunities to drive capability/process efficiencies, implement
    talent management initiatives focused on strengthening workforce
    performance, and enhance supporting infrastructure. While I assess the
    current test and evaluation system as adequate, I will consistently
    seek opportunities to build additional capacity and improve test and
    evaluation capabilities.
        Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Marine Corps
    should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
        Answer. The Marine Corps needs to seek opportunities in T&E
    infrastructure solutions that can adequately represent the future multi
    domain and contested environments. We must also develop tools and
    processes to assess operational and responsible performance of
    Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning capabilities.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you accelerate the development of
    these new capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will clearly identify my intent to
    implement measures, tools, and processes to efficiently evaluate system
    performance around validated mission threads and demonstrate the
    operational performance in multi-domain operations. Our testing
    organizations are already working across DOD and the Services in
    support of DoN T&E initiatives and the Director, Operational Test &
    Evaluation (DOT&E) Implementation Plan, endorsed by all Service
    Secretaries.
        Question. What are your views on the appropriate roles of Office of
    the Secretary of Defense developmental and operational testing
    organizations with respect to testing of Marine Corps systems?
        Answer. The role of DOT&E is to establish Department level
    operational test policy and procedures; review and analyze the results
    of OT&E conducted for each major DOD acquisition program; provide
    independent assessments to SecDef, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and Congress; make budgetary
    and financial recommendations to the SecDef regarding OT&E; and oversee
    major DOD acquisition programs to ensure OT&E is adequate to assess the
    operational effectiveness and suitability of the defense system in
    combat use. The Secretary of the Navy, ASN (RD&A), and the Commandant
    of the Marine Corps share authority and accountability for
    developmental and operational testing and evaluation of Naval
    capabilities. Based on this understanding, the alignment of policy,
    procedure, and independent assessment at the OSD level and execution of
    developmental and operational test and evaluation at the component/
    service level is appropriate and effectively supports checks and
    balances required by Congress.
        Question. Do you think the current operational test and evaluation
    system also provides for the flexibility to assess commercial
    technologies that might be acquired or fields by the Department of
    Defense through means or processes that are not traditional acquisition
    programs of record?
        Answer. Yes--By focusing on the marines' employment of new
    technologies within mission scenarios, the current operational test and
    evaluation system is agnostic to the source of the technologies or
    method of acquisition, and therefore retains the necessary flexibility
    to assess any technology that the marines might acquire.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the ``process'' of
    programs of record do not limit service investment in portfolios of
    capabilities or mission threads?
        Answer. The Marine Corps has structured its investment budget line
    items by capability areas to the maximum extent practical. This
    provides flexibility to address adjustments that may be needed due to
    changes such as technology, supply chain, requirements, etc. from a
    capability versus program of record perspective, while operating within
    reprogramming threshold limitations. If confirmed, I would ensure that
    we continue to manage the Marine Corps budget structure alignment to
    Force Design 2030 capability and mission thread delivery.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you resource enablers, such as
    authorities to operate or data or certification, that Program Managers
    and Program Executive Officers see as outside of their requirements?
        Answer. The Marine Corps has prioritized critical Force Design
    programs in our budget process, while ensuring key enablers are also
    resourced. Program Managers and Program Executive Officers ensure that
    any associated program enablers are identified and considered within
    the Marine Corps Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
    process. The Marine Corps has established Enterprise Programming Teams
    (EPTs) that include a network of subject matter experts from across the
    enterprise who are closely aligned with specific programs. These EPTs
    serve in direct support of DC P&R during the programming phase.
                               joint acquisition
        Question. What are your views regarding the merit and feasibility
    of joint development and acquisition programs, such as the Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle and Future Vertical Lift?
        Answer. The JLTV program has been an exceptional model for use, but
    each service may still have unique usage requirements that must be
    accounted for.
        Question. What additional programs would you consider to be
    candidates for joint development and acquisition?
        Answer. While we currently do not have any candidates for joint
    development, we always look for opportunities for joint development
    with the other Services, our allies, and partners when it is in the
    best interest of the Marine Corps and the joint force. In general,
    munitions are ideal candidates.
        Question. What are your views on joint, enabling or cross-cutting
    capabilities that may not be treated as acquisition programs, such as
    JADC2? Do you have sufficient authority to advocate or manage Marine
    Corps capabilities to ensure there are no seams in planning or
    execution of such efforts?
        Answer. The Marine Corps is committed to executing the network and
    data integration of our programs and architectures with the Joint Force
    necessary to achieve JADC2 goals. Our campaign of learning to deliver
    Force Design led by experimentation by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
    is facilitating our ability to quickly develop prototype capabilities
    that inform requirements and needed JADC2 capabilities upgrades.
    Prototypes developed for experimentation are being provided to selected
    Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units for Limited User Evaluations (LUE) that
    results in rapid JADC2 capability incursions that enhance the force.
        As the Service Chief, I would have sufficient authorities to
    influence the requirements, resourcing, and materiel development to
    ensure there are no seams in the planning and execution of such
    efforts.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you facilitate processes for the
    Marine Corps that empower acquisition professionals and reduce
    institutional policy barriers to enable cross service requirements
    development and capabilities discussions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will foster a culture of innovation,
    balanced with disciplined risk-based execution, throughout the
    acquisition system. I would set conditions to enable capability
    solution delivery for Force Design by aligning HQMC for maximum unity
    of effort, and strict, prioritized focus of resources to capabilities
    of significant Joint, COCOM, and Naval Expeditionary contribution.
    Further I would seek opportunities to streamline acquisition and
    sustainment decision support processes by focusing on maximum
    decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level.
                         modernization of capabilities
        Question. The Marine Corps' current concepts for modernization of
    its amphibious capabilities includes ships, ship to shore connectors
    and armored amphibious combat vehicles. Modernization across these
    systems is complex, technically challenging, and costly.
        What is your assessment of the current capability of amphibious
    maneuver and assault systems in the Navy and Marine Corps?
        Answer. The current capability assessment of amphibious maneuver
    and assault systems to meet the objectives stated in the 2022 NDS as
    well as Combatant Commander requirements is at risk.
        Over the past 14 years, the Navy and Marine Corps have done 11
    studies that show with historical maintenance readiness no fewer than
    (31) Amphibious Warfare Ships (AWS) consisting of (10) LHAs/LHDs and
    (21) LPDs are required to keep two three AWS Amphibious Ready Group
    (ARG) / Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) forward while maintaining a
    sufficient number to train and certify ARG/MEU teams. . If directed,
    the current contingency plans indicate that the Naval force will be
    required to deploy (5) ARG/MEUs in a condensed timeframe.
        The current 30-year shipbuilding plan, when combined with
    decommission plans, does not meet the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA statutory
    requirement of maintaining no less than 31 AWS.
        The Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program will
    provide a modern, fully amphibious armored personnel carrier to enable
    otherwise dismounted ground combat formations with a greater range of
    maneuver options in the littoral operating environment, along with
    significantly improved lethality, protection, and command and control.
    The ACV is in operation now in the Fleet Marine Force and will be fully
    fielded across the force by 2028.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize the
    development and acquisition of capabilities required for sea basing,
    connectors, and armored amphibious assault and tactical mobility ashore
    to achieve a full spectrum capability in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The Marine Corps, more than any other service, has a unique
    nature regarding essential requirements that are subject to the Naval
    Service budgetary process. The Amphibious Warfare Ship (AWS) statutory
    requirement and other critical capabilities including connectors, C4I
    afloat capabilities, preposition and afloat assets, and the Next
    Generation Logistics Ship which are essential to the Stand-in Forces
    and crisis response operations, all fall outside the Marine Corps Total
    Obligation Authority (TOA). Amongst these programs, our top priority is
    to ensure the operational and statutory requirement of (31) Amphibious
    Warfare Ships (AWS) is met.
        Within our own TOA, the Marine Corps has prioritized the
    development and fielding of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). The
    ACV program is in production, has achieved initial operational
    capability (IOC), and is aligned with Force Design. The second highest
    priority within the portfolio remains the replacement of the High
    Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet. The Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program is in production and has achieved IOC.
        Question. In your view, what is necessary to ensure that
    modernization of the amphibious force--ships, connectors, and
    vehicles--is achievable and affordable in the near and long terms?
        Answer. Affordability can be achieved through congressional
    authorized multi-ship procurement of Amphibious Warfare Ships.
    Amphibious ship affordability is maximized with multi-ship buys that
    stabilize the industrial base, improve buying power, and provide
    efficiencies through steady, predictable workloads. This can best be
    achieved by balancing new construction of LPD Flight II at 2-year
    centers and LHA Flight I at 4-year centers.
        The Marine Corps, more than any other service, has a unique nature
    regarding essential requirements that are subject to the Naval Service
    budgetary process. The amphibious warfare ship statutory requirement
    and other critical capabilities including connectors, C4I afloat
    capabilities, preposition afloat assets, and the Next Generation
    Logistics Ship are essential to the Stand-in Forces and crisis response
    operations, yet all fall outside the Marine Corps Total Obligation
    Authority. Our Nation is a maritime nation that requires a modern,
    ready, and forward postured naval force that can deter war and prevail
    in conflict if deterrence fails. I recognize the Marine Corps'
    dependency on the Navy to champion maritime expeditionary warfare
    requirements, but I must also elevate those requirements when these
    critical capabilities are not resourced to levels that enable the
    Marine Corps to accomplish its missions.
        Modernization of the amphibious force requires ensuring our
    amphibious operations concepts remain current. Together with the Navy,
    we are developing a new concept for 21st Century Amphibious Operations.
    It will describe how we will execute amphibious operations against
    future adversaries in this evolving and complex operational
    environment. It will also articulate the future role of amphibious
    operations in support of maritime campaigns and will describe new
    operating methods that incorporate agile platforms to supplement
    traditional amphibious ships. Examples include long-range, unmanned
    systems that infiltrate the adversary's weapon engagement zone;
    dispersed formations of manned and unmanned ships that challenge
    adversary targeting; and the adoption of disruptive technologies.
        Question. Given the future envisioned by the 2022 NDS are current
    Marine Corps modernization plans and budgets adequate?
        Answer. Yes; the fiscal year 2024 budget request delivers the
    resources necessary to continue our Force Design initiatives supporting
    equipment modernization, installations and logistics investments,
    talent management reform, and training and education modernization.
    However, any reduction in topline will challenge our ability to
    modernize commensurate with the pacing threat, while simultaneously
    maintaining current levels of combat ready forces.
        Question. How do you plan to position the Marine Corps to modernize
    its information capabilities for the future warfighting environment--
    not just its networking systems, but how it uses data and information,
    and how it employs information-related capabilities to shape the
    battlespace in peacetime, gray-zone conflict and active hostilities?
        Answer. As the Marine Corps modernizes to stay ahead of the
    National Defense Strategy's identified pacing challenge, it is
    imperative that the Marine Corps pursue artificial intelligence (AI)
    rapidly and strategically to maintain an information and capability
    advantage. To remain relevant as a fighting force, the Marine Corps
    must adopt new practices that enable continuous enhancement in our
    capabilities vice large-scale capability releases. Currently, the
    Marine Corps is in the early stages of investing in AI with an initial
    focus on AI tools that improve our ability to sense and make sense of
    operating environments and which increase remote, uncrewed, and
    autonomous capabilities. These tools will decrease direct risk to
    marines in combat and increase our ability to understand adversary
    actions while disguising our own. Specifically, these tools will help
    create outsized effects for small, distributed forces in a contested
    maritime environment. The Marine Corps also has AI-based initiatives
    underway that will support business operations and improve
    decisionmaking processes in the areas of talent management, equipment
    and supply chain management, and force protection.
                           naval surface fire support
        Question. The DDG-1000 program was initiated to fill the capability
    gap for naval surface fire support. The original requirement for 24 to
    32 DDG-1000 ships, each with two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, was
    reduced to 12 ships, then to 10 ships, then to 7, and finally to 3
    ships. The Navy now plans to dedicate those 3 ships to support theater-
    level fire missions.
        In your view, and given this significant reduction in the number of
    DDG-1000 destroyers and their dedication to other missions, does the
    Navy program meet Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire
    support?
        Answer. Marine Corps fire support requirements are met by a
    combination of organic and joint air and surface delivered fires
    including missile and gunfire support from Navy ships. The operational
    DDG-1000 ships will contribute to fires required by the Marine Corps
    and joint forces.
        Question. What other capabilities would you rely on to help meet
    naval surface fire support requirements? Will the Army's programs in
    Long Range Fires meet the requirements?
        Answer. The Marine Corps requires highly mobile long-range fires.
    The key is the balance between range and weight. As part of a joint
    force, all fires platforms are useful. While the Navy-Marine Corps team
    continues to pursue cost-effective and lethal solutions in support of
    the naval surface fires requirement, the Marine Corps is closely
    monitoring the Army's advancements in long-range precision fires. For
    example, the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is an Army program to
    replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs). Like ATACMs, PrSM
    can be launched from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. The
    current Army plan calls for PrSM being developed in several capability
    increments; Increment II is planned to incorporate a seeker warhead,
    enabling it to engage moving targets at ranges well beyond the rest of
    the Multiple Launch Rock System Family of Munitions. Based on the
    Army's current program schedule, the Marine Corps plans to begin
    procurement of PrSM Increment II in fiscal year 2027 under our High
    Mobility Artillery Rocket System program.
                           amphibious combat vehicle
        Question. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) supports
    expeditionary protected mobility capability and capacity requirements
    with the mission is to land and maneuver the surface assault elements
    of the landing force, utilizing ship-to-shore water mobility during
    amphibious operations to seize inland objectives, and to conduct
    armored vehicle operations in subsequent actions ashore. The Marine
    Corps is procuring the ACV as a modernized platform to replace the
    aging AAV-7 fleet, with intent to procure three supporting mission role
    variants, the ACV-C (Command and Control), the ACV-30 (30mm Gun
    Variant), and the ACV-R (Recovery/Maintenance Variant).
        What is your assessment of this modernization effort?
        Answer. The ACV remains our highest Ground Combat and Tactical
    Vehicle modernization priority, and the capabilities the platform
    provides our marines for protected mobility, maneuver ashore, and
    support to our embarked infantry are unprecedented. The program
    achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in November fiscal year
    2021 and has been in full-rate production of the ACV-P (Personnel)
    variant since then with 201 vehicles delivered to-date. The program
    will begin delivering the next mission-role variant, the ACV-C (Command
    and Control), in mid-fiscal year 2024, which will deliver the latest in
    on-the-move C2. The remaining two mission-role variants, the ACV-30
    (30mm Gun Variant) and ACV-R (Recovery/Maintenance Variant) are on
    track and within program cost and schedule controls. Modernization of
    our assault amphibian capability continues to progress toward a more
    lethal, survivable, and agile platform. During our transition we have
    learned that fielding a new 21st century wheeled assault amphibian
    platform demands more training and proficiency of our operators and
    maintainers to get it right. Based upon this learning, we have
    instituted several initiatives to ensure we are fielding a platform
    that is able to be operated safely. The ACV has had some readiness
    challenges early in its fielding. Our Program Management Office has
    been working hard, in concert with, the Fleet Marine Force units to
    turn this around. I am happy to report ACV readiness has been steadily
    improving over the past 12 months.
        Question. Recent news reports indicate the Marine Corps is seeking
    additional contractors to produce variants of the ACV, but is unable to
    share the technical data packages because it does not have sufficient
    rights to do so. What lessons is this teaching the Marine Corps that it
    needs to consider for future negotiations when considering what
    technical data rights to pursue?
        Answer. The Marine Corps' acquisition strategy for the original
    competitively awarded contract for the initial Amphibious Combat
    Vehicle (ACV) personnel carrier included an option for the complete
    Technical Data Package. However, due to the limited industrial base for
    Assault Amphibian Vehicles, along with a small Approved Acquisition
    Objective, it did not make fiscal sense for the Marine Corps to
    ultimately procure the complete TDP as the initial investment for the
    data coupled with the cost to facilitate a second source could not be
    recouped over the number of quantities planned. I believe every program
    should evaluate the need to procure the TDP for the system in question,
    but this must be weighed against the cost of the TDP and the long-term
    value of the package.
                               f-35b requirements
        Question. The Marine Corps has stated that its F-35B requirement is
    420 aircraft. The total number of F-35s planned for the Department of
    the Navy is currently set at 680.
        Do you believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully
    accommodate the needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps?
        Answer. I believe that the current plan for 680 aircraft can fully
    accommodate the needs of both the Navy and the Marine Corps. For the
    Marine Corps, 420 aircraft consist of 353 F-35B and 67 F-35C. Though
    our analysis will continue as we focus on optimizing our fleet squadron
    structure, 420 total F-35s adequately support primary, backup, and
    attrition Reserve requirements for the Marine Corps. This facilitates
    support to Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), Global Force Management (GFM)
    requirements, and the Marine Corps as a Joint Force enabler in support
    of the National Defense Strategy.
        Question. The F-35B brings new capabilities and operational
    possibilities to the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Such new
    capabilities and operating concepts require investment in shipboard
    infrastructure, including upgraded data links. What is your vision for
    L-class ship connectivity? What are your current plans to achieve that
    vision?
        Answer. One of our desired end states for all amphibious ships is
    they have the capability to downlink and share F-35 data. The Navy has
    already installed the new Capstone Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) on
    several amphibious ships, which brings the Cooperative Engagement
    Capability (CEC) and Link-16 to the platform. Five Landing Helicopter
    Docks (LHDs) are scheduled for similar upgrades over the next 5 years.
    This system provides a critical combat capability that will integrate
    with F-35s over Link-16.
        We have also begun the installation of the Marine Corps Common
    Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) Afloat on amphibious ships.
    CAC2S is a mature capability that we have used in our Marine Air
    Command and Control System (MACCS) for several years and provides our
    MAGTFs with a multi-domain command and control capability able to
    support all six functions of Marine Aviation.
        To date, we have CAC2S Afloat on two amphibs with a funded plan to
    put it on all LHA/LHD and Amphibious Transport Docks (LPDs) class
    ships. CAC2S Afloat is a vital enabler that enhances the Amphibious
    Task Force defenses, conduct long-range strikes and long-range
    precision fires, and integrates the MEU Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
    into Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) functions of Sea Control and
    Denial.
        Question. Follow-on modernization for the F-35 is scheduled to
    bring key warfighting capabilities to the fleet, but the schedule and
    budget remain in flux. Are you concerned about the affordability and
    executability of the Department's plan for Block 4 Continuous
    Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2)?
        Answer. I am always concerned about affordability and executability
    in any program. We continue to see cost growth and schedule challenges
    with delivery of Block 4, which is a priority focus area for the Marine
    Corps. We are exploring areas with the Joint Program Office (JPO)/
    Industry where we can adjust the scope and prioritize efforts.
        It is vital to the Marine Corps for critical capabilities like
    Block 4 to deliver to the fleet when we need them, and at an affordable
    cost. Developmental Test Flight Science aircraft have been identified
    as a ``pacing item'' affecting executability. The Marine Corps is
    currently exploring options, with the other Services, to update the
    Flight Science fleet, which will be critical to F-35 development in the
    coming years.
        Question. What portion of the current Marine Corps F-35B fleet will
    be upgraded to Block 4?
        Answer. Currently, all Marine Corps F-35B and F-35C aircraft from
    Lot-11 on up will be upgraded to a Block 4 configuration. This
    translates to every aircraft delivered since 2021, and it equates to
    approximately 75 percent of our 420 F-35s being Block 4 or higher. The
    lower lot aircraft (Lot-10 and below) are planned to remain in our
    training squadrons.
        Question. There has been much discussion about the importance of
    networking and connecting all Navy and Marine Corps capabilities across
    air, land, and sea platforms. What is the Navy/Marine Corps team doing
    to make machine-to-machine command and control, across multiple
    domains, a reality?
        Answer. The Navy/Marine Corps team recognizes the importance of
    integrated networking capabilities across platforms. As such, the naval
    team is coordinating efforts to modernize to expand networking
    capabilities. In addition to expanding existing capabilities like the
    Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) and the cooperative
    engagement capability, the naval team is also working on developmental
    efforts that will provide fusion sensor feeds from airborne and surface
    platforms and dissemination to naval units in a secure manner.
        Question. Have the Navy and Marine Corps developed and refined the
    joint operational concepts that will govern this integrated fight?
        Answer. In addition to fielding common command and control systems
    across the Naval Force, such as Common Aviation Command and Control
    System (CAC2S), the Marine Corps is participating in the Navy's Project
    Overmatch. Project Overmatch represents the Navy's contribution to
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). We are fully invested in
    developing capabilities that seamlessly connect with the fleet and
    allow the Marine Corps, as the Stand in Force (SIF), to enable kill
    webs and close kill chains for the Joint Force.
        Question. What is being done to ensure that the Navy and Marine
    Corps airborne data links are interoperable and resilient against peer
    competitors--not only with each other--but with the Air Force and Army
    platforms as well?
        Answer. Multiple efforts across the services seek to identify
    datalinks and fusion platforms that will ensure interoperability and
    resiliency of the future Joint Force. When facing peer adversaries, we
    anticipate attacks on our network, which dictates that our systems be
    both protected and resilient.
        Considering the above, we have created a new restricted officer
    Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in the Marine Corps--Interface
    Control Officers. These marines will be our tactical data link experts
    and will be critical for ensuring we build and support resilient and
    interoperable networks.
        Question. Current technologies allow ``low probability of
    intercept/low probability of detection'' datalinks to connect 4th and
    5th generation aircraft. As well, other platforms, operating across
    multiple domains can be networked. Who is leading this effort for the
    Navy, the Marine Corps, and across the joint force, and what progress
    is being made?
        Answer. All the Services are exploring pathways to ensure
    interoperability and information exchange requirements. These efforts
    are tied to unique Service funding lines and priorities. The F-35 Joint
    Program Office (JPO) is quickly becoming a touchpoint for the Services
    to collaborate on datalink efforts, identify interoperability
    requirements, and share information and resources.
                      science, technology, and innovation
        Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
    or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
    military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
    identified 14 critical technology areas in which investment to develop
    next generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics;
    future generation wireless technology; advanced materials; integrated
    network systems-of-systems; directed energy; integrated sensing and
    cyber; space technology; quantum science; trusted artificial
    intelligence (AI) and autonomy; microelectronics; renewable energy
    generation and storage; advanced computing and software; human-machine
    interfaces; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in these
    technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is
    occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.
        What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
    technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of these
    key technologies, or gaining access to such technologies from the
    commercial marketplace?
        Answer. U.S. technology development challenges arise when we
    discuss competition for resources, such as radio frequency spectrum and
    the continued availability of spectrum access. The ability to train
    with the full capability of future systems remains paramount to
    maintain a force in readiness capable of global response.
        Within a DOD context, I view the challenges as primarily cultural/
    organizational. Although we have made progress with new authorities,
    such as the DOD Adaptive Acquisition Pathways (AAP), for increasing
    speed to capability, technology continues to outpace our rules,
    regulatory constructs, and policy.
        Question. How well do you think those Department investments in
    these technologies are appropriately focused, integrated, and
    synchronized across all Military Departments and Agencies?
        Answer. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering (OUSD (R&E)) does a terrific job at identifying and
    coordinating R&D research areas across the Department. Laying the right
    foundation through Force Design 2030 and our data and AI infrastructure
    layer helps facilitate the integration of new technologies in a rapid
    manner. Although DOD has challenges with respect to rapid integration
    into the DOD enterprise architecture, Combined Joint All Domain Command
    and Control (CJADC2) is helping the Department bring together people,
    processes, and capabilities in a more focused manner resulting in
    better alignment.
        Question. How has the Marine Corps prioritized limited R&D funding
    across your technology focus areas? Specifically, where is the Corps
    either increasing or decreasing focus and funding?
        Answer. Marine Corps R&D funding has primarily been focused on
    those capabilities related to Force Design. These are long range fires,
    recon and counter recon capabilities, and C2 transport infrastructure
    to support data exchange requirements. Maintaining and balancing
    investments in both near term and longer-term R&D is necessary to keep
    pace with our adversaries.
        Question. How is the Marine Corps balancing revolutionary
    capability advancements as compared to ``quick win'' incremental
    improvements that can be rapidly fielded?
        Answer. The Marine Corps balances ``quick win'' incremental
    improvements against strategic force design transformations in order to
    be responsive to the strategic environment and threat-informed
    timelines. For instance, the Marine Corps is developing capabilities
    and prototypes such as the Family of Integrated Targeting Cells now
    which enable our forward FMF warfighters along with combined or joint
    targeting architectures in order to afford the service time to enact
    more diverse and advanced solutions that more fully integrate into the
    Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) architecture. As
    another example, we are embracing and leveraging Advana/Jupiter for
    Enterprise data analytics in advance of building out our own data mesh
    environment all the way to the tactical environment.
        Question. What efforts is the Marine Corps making to identify new
    technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply
    them to military and national security purposes? What are the
    challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the
    private sector and Marine Corps?
        Answer. The Marine Corps is constantly engaged with industry to
    evaluate prospective technologies for our needs. Our primary impediment
    to rapid experimentation within our environment is the cybersecurity
    accreditation processes that must be completed prior to executing.
        Question. How can the operational experience of the warfighter
    better be integrated into the research and development process? Are
    there appropriate places to interject warfighters in the interaction
    between the DOD research and engineering community and the private
    sector?
        Answer. The relevance of our technical solutions is directly linked
    to the timeliness of our recent operational experiences when developing
    and acquiring cutting-edge technologies. Leveraging iterative
    development with smaller, more frequent capability deliveries, and
    receiving rapid feedback from end users is a demonstrated recipe for
    success. This should be the standard for all our programs. One example
    on how we're doing this today is with the Marine Corps Software Factory
    (MCSWF). The MCSWF is upskilling warfighters with technical skills and
    actively involving Marine developers who have direct operational
    experience. This model ensures that the technologies being developed
    align closely with the real-world challenges faced by the warfighters.
    These Marine developers bring firsthand knowledge of operational
    environments, tactics, and the needs of the end-users.
        Question. How are you leveraging experimentation and prototyping
    opportunities to look at new technologies and concepts that might be
    beneficial for the Marine Corps, or better support the Corps role in
    joint operations?
        Answer. Our Marine Corps Software Factory (MCSWF) prototype is a
    project where marines are trained to develop software solutions for
    other marines quickly and effectively. It is a collaboration between
    the Marine Corps and the Army Software Factory in Austin, TX. The goal
    is to leverage the expertise and partnerships with industry, academia,
    and other services to maximize resources and create innovative
    solutions. The MCSWF incorporates cutting-edge commercial technology,
    data science, and AI to accelerate the development of technical
    solutions. Once fully implemented, it will give our Commanders the
    capability to rapidly build technical solutions at the speed of
    relevance in ambiguous operating environments.
        Question. In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and
    strengthen our National Security Innovation Base to ensure that
    critical information is protected?
        Answer. In the past, we viewed cybersecurity from a point of view
    where we protect networks and systems. Today, we have no choice but to
    take a data-centric approach with zero trust principles to protect data
    wherever it may reside. The DOD needs to continue encouraging our
    partners to leverage resources provided by the Defense Cyber Crime
    Center's Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity program and the
    National Security Agency's Cybersecurity Collaboration Center.
    Additionally, as DOD implements our zero trust data security approach,
    we must publish standards and incorporate associated contract language.
                              indo-pacific region
        Question. What are the key areas in which the Marine Corps must
    improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint
    Force to prevail in a potential conflict with China?
        Answer. Mobility in the littorals is a challenge. With the Navy, we
    are the naval expeditionary force in readiness and the global crisis
    response force.
        The Marine Corps fights as a Marine Air Ground Task Force and has
    developed a great deal of its own organic aviation mobility. We have 16
    MV-22 squadrons; are standing up a 4th C-130 squadron; and we have
    reached Full Operational Capability with our CH-53K, the only heavy
    lift helicopter in the Joint Force. This is significant but we also
    require the maritime littoral mobility of 31 L Class amphibious ships,
    35 Landing Ship Medium (LSM), and other littoral connectors.
        Question. Do you support the Defense Posture Realignment Initiative
    (DPRI), including the realignment of some U.S. marines from Okinawa to
    Guam and the buildup of facilities at other locations such as MCAS
    Iwakuni, Japan?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. China's anti-access, area denial capabilities (A2/AD)--
    including long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced integrated
    air defenses, electronic warfare, and cyber--pose a significant
    challenge for U.S. forces. How would you assess the threat to Marine
    Corps forces and facilities from Chinese missile forces? Is it fair to
    say that Marine Corps' forces and facilities in the Indo-Pacific--from
    Japan to Guam--could face sustained missile attack from the beginning
    of a contingency? How will the Marine Corps execute its concept of
    operations known as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations in the
    presence of such sustained attacks? In your assessment, have Marine
    Corps investments, concepts of operations, and/or posture shifts to
    date sufficiently addressed this threat?
        Answer. The Marine Corps, along with USINDOPACOM and the Joint
    Force are taking steps to increase missile defense and harden our
    posture in the theater. Additionally, as a Service, we are continually
    updating our organization, training, equipment, and operating concepts,
    to mitigate the threats posed by our adversaries' capabilities.
        Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) is a foundational
    naval concept that creates opportunities for the Service by improving
    our own ability to maneuver and exploit control over key maritime
    terrain, fully integrating Fleet Marine Force and Navy capabilities to
    enable sea denial and sea control, and support sustainment of the
    fleet. EABO is tightly coupled with the Navy's concept for Distributed
    Maritime Operations (DMO) and is aligned to the ideas presented in the
    Joint Warfighting Concept. Together, EABO and DMO advocate for
    integrated yet distributable naval formations to support sea denial and
    sea control in the face of potential adversaries who pose increasing
    challenges to current naval forces
        Question. Do you believe the planned joint force mix of tactical
    aircraft is sufficient to counter current and future threats in
    INDOPACOM, where the ``tyranny of distance'' is such a major factor?
        Answer. The acceleration of the PLA's threat systems is not fully
    known, so if confirmed, I would not be satisfied with anything less
    than sufficient.
        Question. Do you believe DOD has sufficient sealift and airlift
    capabilities to move marines throughout INDOPACOM for both training and
    contingency purposes and to support Marine Corps force conducting
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations?
        Answer. We can do better. The Marine Corps, partnered with the
    Navy, is the Joint Force's naval expeditionary force of readiness and
    our Nation's global crisis response force. Expeditionary means light,
    mobile, flexible, responsive, and lethal. To do this, the Marine Corps
    can not stand by and wait in line for STRATLIFT, it will be too late.
    We need the ability to respond when the indications and warnings
    present themselves. To do this, we need organic mobility. The Marine
    Corps has organic aviation, but the DOD and Congress need to find a way
    to meet the amphibious warfare ship minimum requirement of 31. We also
    need connectors and that is a minimum of 35 Medium Landing Ships. These
    vessels, and the partnership with the Navy and its Sailors, will be the
    force multiplier the Joint Force needs to gain the advantage for both
    training and contingency purposes in INDOPACOM.
        Question. What alternative concepts of operation, platforms, and
    basing opportunities exist to address potential shortfalls in this
    area?
        Answer. The Concept for Stand-in Forces and the updated Tentative
    Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations describe our
    recommended concept of operations in the Pacific. Additionally, we are
    developing and experimenting with numerous ground, sea, and aviation
    platforms that are manned and unmanned for tactical and theater
    mobility. As we strengthen our relations with our allies and partners
    in the region we will develop and learn new alternatives that can fill
    current gaps and shortfalls.
        The Marine Corps is developing bridging solutions to support
    littoral mobility until sufficient Medium Landing Ships (LSM) are
    delivered. The initial bridging plan consists of a combination of
    Expeditionary Fast Transports (T-EPF), charters and landing craft.
                                     europe
        Question. What are the key areas in which the Marine Corps must
    improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint
    Force to meet NDS priorities in the European AOR?
        Answer. The Marine Corps is a global force and a force provider to
    the EUCOM commander. The capabilities we are developing are not only
    applicable in a single theater. Our Stand-In Force concept applies in
    the littorals of Europe just as it does in the Indo-Pacific. We have
    recently done tremendous work in the European AOR with TF-61/2, and our
    2d Marine Aircraft Wing. Just like anywhere else, we provide organized,
    trained, and equipped forces to enable the CCDR to campaign. We can and
    are improving our ability to operate in the High North by strengthening
    our partnership with our NATO Allies and European partners to enable
    Joint Force capacity.
        Question. What is the value of the Marine Rotational Force-Europe?
    Do you support continuing that presence into the future?
        Answer. The Marine Rotational Force-Europe (MRF-E) enables us to
    build on relationships with our NATO partners while maintaining skills
    to operate in extreme cold weather and arctic conditions. MRF-E
    provides a combat credible force to the EUCOM commander, and gives him
    options when dealing with crises and when working with our Allies and
    partners. If confirmed, we will continue to provide combat credible
    forces as required to the EUCOM Commander.
                 marine corps forces special operations command
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress made in evolving
    MARSOC capabilities?
        Answer. The role of MARSOC has changed significantly since its
    inception in 2006, and we continue to make necessary changes that are
    consistent with our Service Force Design initiatives and derived from
    our governing national strategy documents. MARSOC leverages its unique
    placement and access while working closely with key Allies and partners
    to create advantages for decisionmakers. MARSOC's modernization efforts
    are driving the development of multi-domain sensing capabilities that
    can serve to illuminate malign activity and present options in
    competition or accelerate targeting in crisis and conflict.
        Over the last 16+ years, MARSOC has demonstrated a unique ability
    to effectively integrate with Allies and partners, while synchronizing
    collective capabilities that support our Nation's interests and promote
    the sovereignty and security of our partners around the globe. Their
    persistent presence in key areas enables them to serve as a connector
    for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM)
    capabilities, which makes them a critical enabler for the Marine Corps,
    United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the joint force
    as a whole.
        Question. What unique attributes and capabilities do you believe
    MARSOC brings to the joint force?
        Answer. MARSOC provides the joint force a unique capability by
    ensuring the littorals can be leveraged to create advantages for the
    joint force. They have shown they can masterfully employ SOF Peculiar
    activities to conduct multi-domain operations that can be advantageous
    for the joint force. MARSOC is unique from the other SOCOM components
    in that they assess and select experienced marines from a variety of
    occupational specialties from within the service to ultimately generate
    a SOF capability to answer GCC requirements. This diversity of
    background, experiences and skill sets fosters a talented, mature, and
    capable force offering for the demands of a complex operating
    environment.
        MARSOC applies an integrated intelligence and operations approach
    to characterize the environment and enable other governmental agencies
    or partner nations to understand our adversary's malign activities more
    fully. Additionally, MARSOC's development of advanced uncrewed systems,
    their sensors, and their enablement via the use of Artificial
    Intelligence and Machine Learning technologies will expand and thicken
    joint force kill webs and enable joint force targeting capabilities in
    contested space.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be the principal issues you
    would have to address to improve MARSOC operations?
        Answer. As the Marine Corps executes Force Design 2030, MARSOC is
    working in parallel on their own modernization efforts, which includes
    their concept of Strategic Shaping and Reconnaissance (SSR). This
    concept is not only meant to provide the Joint Force unique global
    options for deterrence, but also shapes the environment in the event of
    conflict. MARSOC capabilities already, and will continue to, contribute
    to USSOCOM efforts related to What Winning Looks Like, as well as to
    Service concepts as elements of the forward-deployed Stand in Force
    working alongside and in collaboration with FMF units.
        We must continually assess if MARSOC possesses the correct mix of
    organic capabilities that allow it to operationalize the SSR concept.
                               operational energy
        Question. DOD defines operational energy as the energy required for
    training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms
    for military operations, including the energy used by tactical power
    systems, generators, and weapons platforms. Longer operating distances,
    remote and austere geography, and anti-access/area denial threats are
    challenging DOD's ability to assure the delivery of fuel. As the
    ability to deliver energy is placed at risk, so too is the Department's
    ability to deploy and sustain expeditionary Marine forces around the
    globe.
        What are your ideas for future capabilities that would enable an
    expeditionary Marine Corps through the assured delivery of energy to
    the warfighter?
        Answer. Demand reduction and use of alternative and renewable
    energy sources may be useful to our ability to fight and win in the
    future. We will continually face rising costs in energy and depend on
    supply chains that will be contested. We are experimenting with
    electric and hybrid vehicles, as well as solar and hydrogen energy.
    These alternate energy sources must be sustainable in expeditionary
    environments. As an example, infrastructure challenges associated with
    charging electric vehicles, even at home station, are amplified in a
    deployed and austere operating environment. I am committed to continued
    experimentation of alternate power sources while ensuring warfighting
    capability remains the priority.
        Question. What are your ideas for reducing the risks associated
    with the Corps's dependence on vulnerable supply lines?
        Answer. It is absolutely true that one broken link in a linear
    supply chain can result in an untethered force. Our MAGTF is already
    designed to operate with a degree of self-sufficiency, although this is
    not sustainable indefinitely. We are adjusting our institutional
    mindset from reliance on a vulnerable supply chain toward sustaining
    the force with resilient supply webs that leverage all available
    logistics capabilities with our Navy, joint, coalition, and commercial
    industry partners. I support the investments already in progress to
    reduce demand at the point of need, push advanced manufacturing
    capability down to our tactical units to increase self-sufficiency, and
    building a Global Positioning Network that forward positions equipment,
    supplies, and theater sustainment.
                             information operations
        Question. In January of this year, the Marine Corps established an
    Information Command under a Major General. This Information Command is
    intended to integrate all disciplines that the Marine Corps considers
    to be ``information-related,'' including cyber, space, intelligence,
    and all aspects of information operations, such as Military Deception,
    Psychological Operations, Military Information Support Operations, and
    Electronic Warfare.
        What is your understanding of how this Command is establishing or
    will establish units or teams that are responsible for providing
    integrated capabilities to support the information warfare needs of the
    combatant commands?
        Answer. The Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC) provides unity
    of effort and serves as the operational linkage across five commands
    including: Marine Forces Cyberspace (MARFORCYBER), Marine Forces Space
    (MARFORSPACE), Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber Marines (JFHQ-C(M)) /
    Joint Task Force Ares (JTF-ARES), and the Service Cryptologic Component
    (SCC). The MCIC supports Combatant Commands and Fleet Marine Forces
    (FMF) through traditional Global / Cyber Force Management processes.
        Question. What specific structures and processes are being put in
    place in this Command specifically to integrate across the elements of
    Information Warfare?
        Answer. The MCIC staff is responsible for integrating,
    synchronizing, and enabling elements of Information Warfare (IW)
    leveraging all Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) in support of
    naval, joint, and combined campaigning. The MCIC employs subject matter
    expertise from disciplines to include cyberspace operations, space,
    communications, special access programs (SAP) / special technical
    operations (STO), and information operations (i.e., MISO, MILDEC,
    fires, COMMSTRAT, EMSO, SIGMAN, civil affairs, etc).
        Question. From what source, if any, does this Command receive
    common requirements for joint forces and joint training to support
    joint information operations?
        Answer. The MCIC processes requirements through three established
    mechanisms to include the Global / Cyber Force Management and Military
    Requirements Alignment Processes (GFMAP, CFMAP, and MRAP). Service
    requirements and priorities are captured via GFM and Headquarters
    Marine Corps (HQMC) Deputy Commandant Plans, Policy, and Operations
    (DC, PP&O), force synchronization conference. SIGINT requirements are
    captured through established NSA/CSS processes. USCYBERCOM communicates
    additional requirements for assigned or allocated forces via the CFMAP
    process. The MCIC, and other associated commands, coordinate by with
    and through the MARFORs, sister services, assigned commands,
    interagency partners, and others to identify opportunities or
    requirements that support the Commander's responsibilities and
    functional area alignment.
                                     cyber
        Question. The readiness of the Cyber Mission Forces assigned to
    U.S. Cyber Command is substantially below acceptable levels. This
    shortfall is due primarily to the lack of sufficient numbers of
    personnel in each of the services in three critical work roles that are
    especially demanding: tool developers, exploitation analysts, and
    interactive on-net operators.
        What is your understanding of the causes for the Marine Corps'
    shortfalls in recruiting, training, and retaining personnel qualified
    for these work roles?
        Answer. Retention issues have not impacted our force presentation
    for USCYBERCOM critical and pacing work roles to date.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Marine Corps' plans to
    correct this shortfall?
        Answer. The Marine Corp is committed to 100 percent assignment in
    the Cyber Mission Force and continues close coordination with
    USCYBERCOM to deliver the operational capacity required by GEN Nakasone
    and USCYBERCOM. We have instituted a series of accession and retention
    bonus along with establishing an ``Active Duty Service Obligation for
    IONs''. Our data continues to indicate that marines are staying in the
    Force and on target in cyberspace because they are committed to the
    mission.
        Question. The mission of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is offensive
    and defense warfighting in the cyber domain. However, so far, General
    and Flag Officers selected to serve as Commander of Cyber Command have
    been intelligence specialists rather than line officers. If confirmed,
    you will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an adviser to
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense.
        Do you think that CYBERCOM as a warfighting command could or should
    be led by an officer trained and experienced in commanding joint
    operations?
        Answer. USCYBERCOM could be led by an officer trained and
    experienced in commanding joint operations, as long as the officer has
    significant intelligence experience and understands the US Intelligence
    Community (IC). Full-spectrum cyberspace operations are inextricably
    linked to intelligence. Cyberspace operations are executed by, with,
    and through the information environment and are fully informed by
    intelligence and often yield intelligence. Commander USCYBERCOM is a
    unique position in that it is also the Director of the National
    Security Agency (NSA) and therefore requires unique experiences and
    skillsets. Many previous operational achievements and successes in
    cyberspace and the information environment rest on the alignment of
    USCYBERCOM and NSA.
                                  end strength
        Question. The Marine Corps' Active Duty end strength authorization
    has fallen from 186,200 in fiscal year 2020 to 177,000 in fiscal year
    2023. The President's Budget would cut an additional 4,700 marines for
    fiscal year 2024.
        Do you believe Marine Corps' Active Duty end strength should
    continue to fall?
        Answer. Current plans have end-strength remaining at 172,300
    through fiscal year 2028 and increasing to a floor of 174,600 by fiscal
    year 2030 to achieve modernization initiatives. The Marine Corps
    intends to achieve this floor sooner if possible.
        Question. Is the Marine Corps' current end strength sufficient to
    implement the 2022 NDS and execute the associated operational plans? If
    not, what end strength do you believe is necessary to meet the demands
    placed on the Marine Corps by the 2022 NDS and associated operational
    plans?
        Answer. Yes, the current end-strength of the Marine Corps is
    sufficient to implement the 2022 NDS, the associated operational plans,
    and the Global Force Management requirements. The Marine Corps fiscal
    year 2023 target end strength is 172,300, based on the impacts from
    COVID and our planned reduction to support modernization efforts.
    Current plans have end strength increasing to 174,600 by fiscal year
    2030.
        Question. If recruiting continues to be a challenge, how will you
    ensure the Marine Corps has sufficient personnel to support the 2022
    NDS?
        Answer. The Marine Corps' current plans have end strength
    increasing to 174,600 by fiscal year 2030. This will be accomplished in
    part by increased retention, which has been exceptional. The Marine
    Corps met its retention mission in fiscal year 2022 and will do so in
    fiscal year 2023 as well. We are grateful that, once an individual
    becomes a Marine, they want to remain a Marine. In keeping with the
    tenets of FD2030, the Marine Corps is retaining more of our highest
    performing marines especially within leadership and highly technical
    billets. This will prepare our forces to succeed on dispersed, complex,
    distributed, and high-technology future battlefields.
        Question. What additional force shaping authorities and tools does
    the Marine Corps need, in your view?
        Answer. I would ask that Congress continue to ensure the Marine
    Corps has the predictable funding for us to execute the flexible
    incentive and special pay authorities and non-monetary incentives to
    their greatest effect, particularly in critical, hard-to-fill
    specialties. If confirmed, I will be sure to come to you with any new
    statutory authorities that we may need.
                                 marine reserve
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate relationship
    between the Active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve?
        Answer. Historically, our Reserve component has supported the
    Active component and fought alongside them. Our Reserve component is an
    integral part of the Marine Corps Total Force. The ability of the
    Marine Corps to meet combatant commanders' requirements on a day-to-day
    basis, as well as respond to a major contingency, is absolutely linked
    to the readiness of our Marine Corps Reserve. Similarly, the Active and
    Reserve components must be viewed as having a dynamic, mutually
    supporting relationship, rather than a unidirectional support
    relationship from the Reserve force to the Active component.
        Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the
    Marine Corps Reserve? If confirmed, what new objectives would you seek
    to achieve with respect to the Reserve's organization, force structure,
    and end strength?
        Answer. Our Reserve Force will continue to serve in all domains,
    remaining ready to augment and reinforce our Active Force for both
    preplanned missions and national emergencies. We are continuously
    working to optimize the organization, structure, and end strength of
    our Reserves to meet mission requirements, including increasing the
    permeability of service from Active component to Reserve component, and
    back, as part of our Talent Management 2030 initiative. The right
    Marine for a specific job should not be constrained simply because the
    task is normally associated with an Active or Reserve component billet.
    We must become comfortable with processes that enable us to pair the
    right marines, with the right talent, to the right billets.
        Question. Are you concerned that continued reliance on the Reserve
    components to execute operational missions--both at home and around the
    globe--is adversely affecting the Marine Corp Reserve's ability to meet
    its recruiting and retention missions? Why or why not?
        Answer. Our citizens join the Marine Corps for a reason. They want
    to serve. Our Reserve Force is no different. They seek meaningful
    opportunities to practice their profession. If anything, mission tasks
    to our Reserve helps to boost recruiting as our Reserve marines
        Question. In your view, does the Marine Corps Reserve serve as an
    operational Reserve, a strategic Reserve, or both? In light of your
    answer, should the Marine Corps Reserve be supported by improved
    equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing
    for readiness going forward?
        Answer. Both. As a Total Force, the Marine Corps strives to
    seamlessly integrate the Reserve component with our Active component
    forces. We consistently plan and budget for new equipment and training,
    seeking to maximize AC-RC interoperability and overall readiness at
    every opportunity. We must continue to provide our Reserve component
    the high-quality training opportunities that are afforded our Active
    component to ensure the ]Total Force is uniformly prepared to respond
    to crisis or conflict. At the same time, we remain mindful of the fact
    that the demands of our Reserves must be balanced so as not to
    unreasonably disrupt civilian occupations.
        Question. Do you expect to meet prior service accession goals for
    the Marine Corps Reserve this fiscal year? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps is on pace to meet this fiscal year's
    Reserve component prior service recruiting accession requirement in
    each category for both officer and enlisted accessions.
        Question. What is your understanding and view of the Office of the
    Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness proposal for comprehensive
    Reserve Component Duty Status Reform?
        Answer. I fully support the legislation proposed to update and
    simplify Reserve component duty statuses. It is essential to producing
    real efficiencies and reducing unnecessary complexity. The measure
    would reduce the number of duty statuses and ensure RC Marines
    activated under different authorities are entitled to the same
    benefits. This will increase lethality and readiness of our Total
    Force.
        Question. Does the Marine Corps have the personnel and pay
    information technology systems required to implement effectively this
    Reserve Component Duty Status Reform proposal, if enacted in law?
        Answer. Yes, the Marine Corps is well-equipped to implement the
    Reserve Component Duty Status Reform changes. The Marine Corps Total
    Force System (MCTFS) is a mature, fully integrated pay and personnel
    system that allows our Reserve members to seamlessly transition between
    components. It already handles both Active and Reserve component pay
    and entitlements, allowing reservists to transition between duties
    statuses and receive the pay and entitlements they deserve in a timely
    and accurate fashion.
                            recruiting and retention
        Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission asserted
    unequivocally that the most critical resource required to produce a
    highly capable military is highly capable people, in the quantity
    required, willing to serve. Yet, DOD studies indicate that only about
    23 percent of today's youth population is eligible for military
    service, a decrease of 6 percentage points in the last 5 years.
    Further, only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards
    are interested in serving.
        As rates of physical inactivity among American youth continue to
    rise, what in your view, if anything, could the Marine Corps do to
    prepare potential recruits for military service, and specifically
    service in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The Marine Corps has always prepared American youth for
    success after they are contracted and enter the Delayed Entry Program.
    Beyond that, the best way to prepare the youth of America for service
    is a national effort by all government and educational leaders. The
    President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports is a great example
    of a way to combat the growing youth obesity epidemic.
        Question. What do you consider to be the key to your future
    success, if confirmed, in recruiting the highest caliber American youth
    for service in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The key has and will always be the marines and the
    standards we uphold. The Marine Corps' recruiting force must also be
    manned and resourced to meet the future needs of the Corps. As
    population and technologies shift, we must be agile in bringing the
    story of the Marine Corps--and the opportunities we offer--to the young
    men and women of America.
        Question. What do you consider to be key to your future success, if
    confirmed, in retaining the best qualified personnel for continued
    service in positions of greater responsibility and leadership in the
    Marine Corps?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to expand retention of our
    highest-performing, most committed, and talented marines. We have been
    working hard to provide improved predictability, transparency, and
    certainty to our marines and their families while preserving career
    development and our ethos and culture of the most responsive and
    expeditionary fighting force in the world. Another key to retention
    success is focus on and funding for our Marine & Family Programs.
        Question. In your view, do current accessions standards--
    particularly DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits--accurately
    predict recruit attrition and/or future success in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. Current accessions standards for tier-one recruits have
    been reliable predictors of recruit attrition and future success in the
    Corps. In concert with DOD and the other services, we continue to
    explore evaluation methods to expand a more holistic view of talent as
    indicators of potential.
        Question. Given the historically low numbers for eligibility to
    serve, do you believe a reassessment of accessions standards is in
    order? If so, what accessions standards in your view are outdated or
    worthy of review?
        Answer. Earning the title Marine will always be challenging, but I
    agree that accession standards must continuously be reviewed. Given the
    State of the physical and mental health of the youth of America, I look
    forward to working with you and recruiting stakeholders to ensure we
    have it right.
        Question. In your view, does the Marine Corps have the necessary
    authorities to recruit and retain personnel with critical skills,
    including cyber?
        Answer. Yes. The Marine Corps appreciates all the authorities we
    have received to support improved recruiting and overall talent
    management. We are open to additional initiatives to further improve
    school access. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to
    ensure we continue to retain our top marines, especially those
    requiring critical skills.
        Question. What monetary and non-monetary incentives are the Marine
    Corps employing in an effort to retain Marine aviators? Which
    incentives or combinations thereof have proven most effective?
        Answer. Aviation retention is a challenge that must be viewed
    holistically and cannot be solved by bonuses alone. Availability of
    flight hours, opportunities to train and execute missions, stability in
    assignments, and other non-monetary factors are important. It is a
    challenge to compete with the monetary compensation packages and family
    stability offered by commercial airlines who seem to be increasingly
    aggressive in recruitment of qualified aviators. If confirmed, I will
    work with the other services, DoD, and Congress to study ways to ensure
    we have a sufficient volume of skilled Marine Corps aviators.
        Question. Because the ``all-Volunteer'' military depends on a
    constant flow of volunteers each year, as the number of eligible and
    service-propensed American youth declines, it will become increasingly
    difficult to meet military needs.
        Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of
    American youth eligible and interested in serving in the Armed Forces
    poses a threat to national security?
        Answer. Absolutely. The significant decline in propensity and
    eligibility has concerned the Marine Corps for years. Our country is
    replete with talent and, if confirmed, I commit myself to engaging
    national leadership to revitalize the value of service to our American
    youth. Access to high schools, community colleges, and universities is
    also imperative to reach the highest caliber men and women of our
    country. Addressing these issues is of the utmost importance, and I
    would look forward to being part of that effort.
        Question. What is the role of ``influencers''--parents,
    grandparents, teachers, coaches, and clergy to whom a young person
    turns for advice--in a young person's decision to join, or not to join
    the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The role of influencers is immeasurable. Today, the youth
    of America exist in an environment where influence is inexpensive and
    readily available. Through social media and persistent connectivity,
    the youth of today are constantly bombarded with narratives of service,
    many of which are negative and erroneous. The traditional influencers--
    family, teachers, coaches, and government leaders--are more important
    today than ever.
        Question. Has the integrated DOD recruiting campaign, Their Success
    Tomorrow Begins With Your Support Today, been successful in increasing
    the willingness of youth or their influencers to consider service in
    the Marine Corps?
        Answer. While we do not have data on the specific impact to the
    Marine Corps, any support from the government and DOD to reinforce
    value of service to influencers is vital and appreciated. We know that
    parents and other influencers play an important role in guiding youth
    views on military service. I believe the DOD campaign raises overall
    awareness of the military as an option while allowing each service the
    opportunity to differentiate unique missions and cultures.
                             military compensation
        Question. The Department of Defense has traditionally assessed the
    competitiveness of military pay by comparing Regular Military
    Compensation against salaries earned by a comparable civilian
    demographic.
        Do you agree that the primary purpose of a competitive military pay
    and benefits package is to recruit and retain a military of sufficient
    size and quality to meet the objectives of the 2022 NDS?
        Answer. Yes. Fair compensation is a readiness issue and improves
    quality of life and retention. We are actively participating in the
    DOD's 13th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, to make sure
    our marines are being adequately compensated for their service. If
    confirmed, I will look forward to the results and take all appropriate
    actions on the recommendations.
        Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current
    military pay package in achieving this goal--particularly given the
    ever-tightening recruiting market?
        Answer. The dominant motivation to earn and keep the title Marine
    is the sense of purpose and pride that marines have in service to the
    Nation. With that said, we know that compensation is a dinner table
    issue for many families and competitive pay and compensation are
    essential to our ability to recruit, retain, and provide for the
    overall quality of life for our marines and their families. We are
    actively participating in the DOD's 13th Quadrennial Review of Military
    Compensation, to make sure our marines are being adequately compensated
    for their service. It is important we carefully consider the total
    compensation package pay, allowances, bonuses, housing, healthcare, tax
    advantages, Thrift Savings Plans, etc. If confirmed, I will look
    forward to the results and take all appropriate actions on the
    recommendations.
        Question. Do you believe the largely ``one-size-fits-all'' model
    for military pay adequately rewards individuals for their specialized
    skills and provides an appropriate incentive to scientists, engineers,
    and members of other high-value professions to access into the
    military?
        Answer. Congress has given us many flexible incentive and special
    pay authorities and non-monetary incentives to assist with filling the
    critical, hard to fill specialties that we need. Authorities such as
    special pays and incentives are undeniably factors in retention
    decisions. They are the most direct way we can influence the decision
    that help shape our force. Studies and our own anecdotal experience
    support the belief that special and incentive pays are highly effective
    when combined with a strong sense of purpose, individual agency,
    challenging opportunities for growth, quality of life for Marine
    families, and competitive pay. We are thankful that Congress has given
    us broad and flexible authorities--and funded these authorities--so
    that we can fine tune our incentives to the skills and occupations that
    we need to retain.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current
    military pay and benefits package?
        Answer. I believe the overall compensation and benefit package is
    competitive. However, we are actively participating in the DOD's 13th
    Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, to make sure our marines
    are being adequately compensated for their service. If confirmed, I
    will look forward to the results and take all appropriate actions on
    the recommendations.
        Question. What specific recommendations do you have for controlling
    the rising cost of military personnel?
        Answer. Controlling the rising costs of personnel is a challenge.
    However, we must always keep faith with our marines. As a Nation, we
    are asking our service members to perform more complex tasks on more
    dynamic and fast-paced battlefields with more complicated technologies
    than at any time in human history. In an American society where dual-
    income, dual-career households have become the norm, and perhaps a
    necessity, Marines spouses are frequently disrupted in their career
    progression and earning potential by the instability of the military
    career. We are actively participating in the DOD's 13th Quadrennial
    Review of Military Compensation, to make sure our marines are being
    adequately compensated for their service. If confirmed, I will look
    forward to the results and take all appropriate actions on the
    recommendations.
                         service of transgender persons
        Question. Each of the Service Chiefs has testified before this
    Committee that in their experience, the service of transgender
    individuals in their preferred gender has had no negative impact on
    unit or overall military readiness.
        In your experience, has the service of transgender individuals in
    their preferred gender had any negative impact on unit or overall
    military readiness?
        Answer. No. I am not aware of any negative impact on readiness.
        Question. In your view, what would be the impact on readiness of
    requiring the separation of all transgender soldiers currently serving
    in the military? Please support any assertions with non-anecdotal data.
        Answer. We do not want to lose any high performing marines. We do
    not know the total number of transgender marines in the Marine Corps,
    but we believe the number is small.
        Question. How many marines have sought and been approved for an
    ``in-service transition'' since 2021?
        Answer. In accordance with DOD policy, we do not track medical
    requests for ``in-service transition''.
        Question. How many transgender persons have enlisted or
    commissioned into the Marine Corps since 2021?
        Answer. In accordance with DOD policy, we do not track gender
    marker changes.
        Question. How many marines have changed their gender marker in the
    Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) since 2021?
        Answer. In accordance with DOD policy, we do not track gender
    marker changes.
        Question. How many marines have been referred to the disability
    evaluation system due to complications related to an in-service gender
    transition since 2021?
        Answer. The Department of Navy (BUMED) manages the criteria for
    referral to the disability evaluation system. If confirmed, I would be
    happy to discuss this with BUMED and followup.
                            military quality of life
        Question. The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of
    key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
    advocacy and parenting skills programs; child care; spouse education
    and employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation
    (MWR) services, including Commissary and Military Exchange stores.
        If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
    consider a priority?
        Answer. The Commandant has testified that the highest quality of
    life priorities are health care, housing, and childcare. The Marine
    Corps is committed to caring for our marines and their families and
    always striving to improve their quality of life. If confirmed, I will
    remain committed to ensuring that these and other quality of life
    programs continue to be a priority.
        Question. How would you work across the Marine Corp and with
    Military Service Organizations and Congress, to sustain and enrich
    high-value quality of life and MWR programs for marines and their
    families?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue our goal of creating a
    seamless system of care with multiple stakeholders--both internal and
    external to the Marine Corps, to include service organizations,
    Congress, DOD, other services, and the public/private sector. Through
    these partnerships, we can expand our reach and enhance the programs
    and services our marines and families most need.
                          family readiness and support
        Question. What do you consider to be the most important family
    readiness issues for marines and their families?
        Answer. As we mature our force and seek to retain more marines
    every year, supporting marines and families is critical to recruit and
    retain the right marines. We view family readiness through the
    perspective of each individual Marine and that Marine's family; the
    life events that they will experience together, the challenges they
    will face together, and the elements critical to the quality of life
    for any family. Similarly, I understand that no two families are the
    same, that they will not have the same needs or experiences and that
    their needs may change as their family's circumstances change. The
    Marine Corps must possess a system capable of accommodating the
    broadest range of needs that may exist. However, certain commonalities
    will no doubt exist in the needs of families writ large. Safe and
    sufficient housing, access to childcare, continuity of childcare
    arrangements, access to high quality medical services and specialty
    care, spousal employment opportunities, and co-location of dual-
    military families are all key issues impacting family readiness.
        Three of the Marine Corps' primary family readiness priorities are
    childcare, spouse employment, and PCS flexibility. Our warfighting
    readiness is dependent on a Marine's support structure at home and in
    their communities. I recognize the importance of Marine and family
    stability and support it as a major line-of-effort for successfully
    achieving our talent management goals. If confirmed, I will seek to
    expand high-quality childcare, improve spouse employment opportunities,
    and increase PCS flexibility.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the family
    readiness issues you identified are properly addressed and adequately
    resourced?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will aim to ensure Marine commands have the
    tools required to fully inform their marines of the opportunities that
    exist. Further, I will work with the Department of the Navy to ensure
    that childcare and medical facilities are adequately resourced, both
    through military construction and hiring and retaining a sufficient
    workforce to operate these facilities. If confirmed, I will examine
    personnel assignment processes to better facilitate both the continuity
    of childcare arrangements, housing, and spousal employment that are
    currently affected by the current 36 month Permanent Change of Station
    (PCS) cycle. Outside the contiguous United States (OCONUS) moves are
    challenging for many families in all the above categories, and the
    process to clear a family who volunteers for a OCONUS move is currently
    lengthy and burdensome. If confirmed, I will examine the incentives for
    OCONUS moves, the process for moving a family to an OCONUS location,
    and the support that is available overseas to ensure our Marine
    families have what they need from the initial receipt of orders through
    their return to the United States.
        Ensuring that our marines and their families understand the full
    spectrum of our family readiness capabilities and resources and
    recognize them as part of the Force Preservation construct is critical.
    If confirmed, I will work to increase utilization of these capabilities
    to maintain a Marine's readiness, resiliency, and quality of life,
    balanced with the other needs of the Marine Corps.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that support related
    to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness is provided to Marine
    Corps Reserve families, as well as to Active duty Marine families who
    do not reside near a military installation?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring quality
    of life support programs are designed to effectively assist all marines
    and their families, whether they are deployed, geographically isolated,
    or on the home front. Face-to-face and virtual learning and support
    opportunities will continue to be offered along with toll-free
    telephone and internet resources. Our family readiness programs will
    continue to be flexible and constantly adjusting to meet the needs of
    our geographically dispersed marines and their families.
        Question. The Committee often hears that Active duty families have
    difficulty obtaining child care on base and that there are thousands of
    military families on waitlists to receive infant care.
        If confirmed, what specifically would you do to provide Marine
    Corps families with accessible, high-quality childcare, at an
    appropriate cost?
        Answer. Our primary childcare challenges are staffing related. To
    mitigate these challenges, we have utilized non-competitive childcare
    employee transfers, increased employee salaries, and provided CDC
    employees with childcare discounts. If confirmed, I will continue to
    look for additional solutions, as well as consider recommendations from
    the DOD Child Development Program Recruitment, Retention and
    Compensation Task Force.
                support for military families with special needs
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that a Marine with a
    special needs family member is relocated only to a new duty station at
    which the medical and educational services required by that family
    member are available?
        Answer. Every Marine enrolled in EFMP receives a careful review of
    their proposed PCS orders to ensure the location meets the medical and
    educational needs of family members. EFMP continues to excel in its
    mission to ensure marines are assigned to duty stations where the
    required medical services and educational support are available for
    their family members' needs.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure effective
    administration of the exceptional family member program (EFMP),
    balancing the needs of the Marine Corps, the needs of exceptional
    family members, and the desires of both marines and their dependents to
    have a rewarding experience in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The Marine Corps EFMP ensures continued effectiveness by
    remaining a 'high touch' person-to-person program with quarterly
    engagement with every enrolled family. This allows the staff to build
    meaningful relationships with families to focus our efforts on
    proactive preventive support activities. Our specialized attorneys
    provide free legal counsel and representation to EFMP families, as they
    seek State and Federal disability-related benefits to which they are
    entitled. Our `Warm Hand Off' process that assists EFMP families
    before, during and after a PCS. If confirmed, I will prioritize the
    EFMP.
        Question. If confirmed, what new initiatives might you suggest for
    improving the ability of marines with a special needs family member to
    obtain the medical services and support their family member requires?
        Answer. The Marine Corps EFMP has a strong record of service to our
    marines and families. To continue this success, we must prioritize
    funding, training, and support for our EFMP staff and installation
    commands. If confirmed, I would recommend continued development of
    Defense Health Agency medical case management for highly impacted EFMP
    families prior to a PCS. This will ensure these families have a
    dedicated medical case manager to help them transition their medical
    care within and across TRICARE Regions.
                               suicide prevention
        Question. On May 17, 2022, Secretary Austin established the Suicide
    Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (SPRIRC) to
    conduct a comprehensive review of clinical and non-clinical suicide
    prevention and response programs across the force.
        If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you establish for
    the Marine Corps in implementing the SPRIRC's recommendations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will remain focused on trying to reduce the
    number of suicides. The Marine Corps is working with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense to develop SPRIRC implementation plans and will
    take swift action once guidance is issued.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that sufficient suicide prevention and mental health resources are
    available to deployed marines, as well as to marines and their families
    at home station?
        Answer. The Marine Corps will continue to provide mental and
    behavioral health resources to marines deployed or forward based, and
    to family members in need at home station locations through our vast
    network of prevention stakeholders and workforce. The current provider
    shortage is a challenge. If confirmed, I will advocate for additional
    providers to meet the needs of marines and families. I will also
    continue to ensure that our Operational Stress Control and Readiness
    (OSCAR) marines are trained to identify those within their ranks who
    may be demonstrating signs of distress. For marines not near an
    installation, the Marine Corps has partnerships with the Department of
    Veterans Affairs and the National Guard Bureau to expand marines'
    access to counseling and other resources.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services over
    the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to sexual
    assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants
    accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence
    of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
    service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of
    increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the
    Military Service Academies.
        Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the
    Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps have put in place to
    prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect sailors and
    marines who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If
    not, what else must be done?
        Answer. I appreciate the recent IRC recommendations and increased
    resourcing for sexual assault prevention and response. The Marine Corps
    supports these efforts and is fully engaged in implementing the IRC
    recommendations. I believe they will improve prevention and response,
    so we ask for time to implement these new requirements. The Marine
    Corps will remain steadfast in holding perpetrators accountable for
    their crimes and actions; assisting victims with the care they need;
    and ensuring commanders and senior enlisted are responsible for the
    climate of their unit. If confirmed, I will remain committed to
    preventing incidents of sexual assault.
        Question. The most recent report on the prevalence of sexual
    assault and harassment at the Military Service Academies revealed
    disturbing levels of sexual harassment in particular, placing the
    Service Academies among the poorest performing military units in
    incidents of harassment, suggesting an environment conducive to sexual
    assault and other misconduct. What is your reaction to this report, and
    what actions would you propose to reduce the prevalence of sexual
    harassment at the Service Academies?
        Answer. I defer to the Department of Navy on sexual assault
    prevention and response at the Academy. However, I am sure many of the
    actions needed to combat sexual assault are similar. I appreciate the
    recent IRC recommendations and increased resourcing for sexual assault
    prevention and response. The Marine Corps supports these efforts and is
    fully engaged in implementing the IRC recommendations. Further, the
    Marine Corps will continue to send only the highest caliber officers to
    the United States Naval Academy to ensure they are part of a positive
    command climate.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for
    yourself in preventing sexual harassment in the Marine Corps, including
    within the civilian workforce?
        Answer. Just as unit commanders set priorities and serve as
    personal examples within their units, so does the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps for all marines and civilian marines. If confirmed, I will
    continue to foster a culture of accountability and trust, and to ensure
    the Marine Corps provides the support and care for those in need. I
    remain committed to taking every report seriously while promoting trust
    in the chain of command. This must remain a priority with constant
    vigilance and continuing education for marines of all ranks across our
    Corps.
        Question. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from
    Congress to improve the Marine Corps programs to prevent sexual
    harassment and sexual assault?
        Answer. The Marine Corps is not seeking additional authorities at
    this time. If confirmed, I will notify Congress if I believe we need
    new statutory authorities.
                       mental and behavioral health care
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
    sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to
    deployed and forward-based marines, as well as to marines and families
    at home station locations?
        Answer. In keeping with the response from question 148, the Marine
    Corps will continue to provide mental and behavioral health resources
    to marines deployed or forward based, and to marines and families at
    home station locations through our vast network of prevention
    stakeholders and workforce. The current provider shortage is a
    challenge. If confirmed, I will advocate for additional providers to
    meet the needs of marines and families. I will also continue to ensure
    that our Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) marines are
    trained to identify those within their ranks who may be demonstrating
    signs of distress. For marines not near an installation, the Marine
    Corps has partnerships with the Department of Veterans Affairs and the
    National Guard Bureau to expand marines' access to counseling and other
    resources.
        Question. If confirmed, what specifically would you do to ensure
    that sufficient mental and behavioral health resources are available to
    Reserve Component Marines and their families who do not reside near a
    military base?
        Answer. The Marine Corps ensures that mental and behavioral health
    resources are available to Reserve marines and their families who do
    not reside near a military base. Our Psychological Health Outreach,
    Military OneSource, Vet Center, and Yellow Ribbon Programs are all
    available to Reservists and provide support throughout activation
    cycles and deployments. The Marine Corps also has partnerships with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Guard Bureau to expand
    marines' access to counseling and other resources. If confirmed, I will
    ensue these services remain.
        Question. The Marine Corps has made progress in reducing the stigma
    associated with help-seeking behaviors, but some marines, remain
    concerned that their military careers will be adversely affected should
    their chains of command become aware that they are seeking mental or
    behavioral health care. At the same time, the Marine Corps chain of
    command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical and mental health
    conditions that may affect the readiness of the marines under their
    command.
        In your view, does the Marine Corps effectively bridge the gap
    between a servicemember's desire for confidentiality and the chain of
    command's legitimate need to know about matters that may affect
    individual service member and the unit readiness?
        Answer. Protecting a servicemember's confidentiality is of utmost
    importance to the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps will ensure that
    only those with a need to know about a Marine's private matters will be
    informed. This helps ensure marines seek the help they need. We want
    marines to seek help for their mental and behavioral health--just as if
    they would for a physical injury. Get help, get treated, and get back
    in the fight.
        Question. In your view, do non-medical counseling services provided
    by DOD Military Family Life Counselors have a role in promoting the
    readiness of marines and their families?
        Answer. Yes. DOD Military Family Life Counselors and other non-
    medical counseling services are an important part of the continuum of
    care and services that increase readiness and resiliency in the Force.
    Additionally, we continue to support Military OneSource which provides
    confidential, non-medical counseling, resources and support to our
    marines and their families anywhere in the world.
                                 legal services
        Question. How are responsibilities for legal services allocated
    between the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant and the Counsel for
    the Commandant?
        Answer. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant (SJA to CMC) and
    the Counsel for the Commandant (CL) have two distinctive roles. Title
    10, United States Code, section 8046 dictates the Staff Judge Advocate
    to the Commandant's (SJA to CMC) responsibilities, while Department and
    Service regulations set forth the Counsel for the Commandant's (CL)
    duties.
        By law, like the Service Judge Advocates General, the SJA to CMC is
    the Commandant's legal advisor on all matters arising within the Marine
    Corps and from the Commandant's Joint Chiefs of Staff membership. The
    SJA to CMC advises the Commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps on any
    matter directed, or on any matter the SJA to CMC determines should be
    brought to the Commandant's attention. The SJA to CMC assists the
    Commandant in executing Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train,
    and equip legal support essential to an expeditionary force.
        CL is part of the Office of the General Counsel of the Navy. CL
    advises on acquisition law; arms control and international arms
    regulation; business and commercial law; real and personal property
    law; civilian personnel and labor law; fiscal law; environmental law;
    occupational safety and health law; intellectual property law; Freedom
    of Information Act and Privacy Act law; some legislation; and such
    other areas as may be assigned to support the Navy and Marine Corps.
        SJA to CMC and CL share intelligence law and oversight of
    intelligence activities, intelligence-related activities, special
    access programs, sensitive activities, ethics and standards of conduct,
    and cyber law.
        Question. How would you modify the allocation of these
    responsibilities, if confirmed?
        Answer. No modification of responsibilities is necessary.
        Question. Who has responsibility for providing legal advice on
    military justice matters in the Marine Corps?
        Answer. The SJA to CMC, exclusively. This is by statute: 10 U.S.C.
    8046. Further, like the Service Judge Advocates General, 10 U.S.C. 806
    requires the SJA to CMC to make frequent inspections in the field in
    supervision of the administration of military justice. Marine judge
    advocates advising Commanders at all levels regarding military justice
    do so under the supervision of the SJA to CMC. The SJA to CMC is also
    exclusively responsible for qualifying Special Trial Counsel for
    certain types of offenses (10 USC 824a) and serving on the Joint
    Service Committee on Military Justice (DoDI 5500.17).
        Question. What is the role, if any, of the Counsel for the
    Commandant in making duty assignments for Marine Corps judge advocates?
        Answer. None. Statutory responsibility over the assignment of
    Marine Corps judge advocates rests with the Commandant, who exercises
    that authority through Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve
    Affairs, with the advice of SJA to CMC.
        Question. What is your view of the need for the Staff Judge
    Advocate to the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the
    Commandant of the Marine Corps?
        Indispensable. A Commandant's access to independent legal advice
    from the SJA to CMC is essential to the Marine Corps. It is so
    important that 10 U.S.C. 8046 prohibits any interference with that
    advice by any officer or employee within of DOD.
        Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Marine Corps
    judge advocates to provide independent legal advice to Marine Corps
    commanders?
        Answer. Independent legal advice by Marine Corps judge advocates is
    as important to commanders as it is to the Commandant--it is
    indispensable and protected by statute (10 USC 8046). Marine Corps
    doctrine provides ``The role of a judge advocate within a staff is to
    help generate and maintain tempo for a Commander through the
    application of timely, correct, and complete legal advice.''
    Independent legal advice helps our Commanders make the best decisions
    possible in the fastest time possible.
                  officer personnel management system reforms
        Question. The John S. McCain NDAA for fiscal year 2019 contained
    several provisions to modernize the officer personnel management
    system. These reforms were designed to align officer career management
    with the priorities outlined in the 2018 NDS. How is the Marine Corps
    implementing these authorities today and to what effect?
        Answer. I believe the provisions within the 2019 NDAA have
    benefited the Marine Corps significantly, and the Marine Corps has
    implemented many of these authorities in Talent Management 2030.
    Options such as promotion opt-out and career intermission have
    positively contributed to mid-career retention. The Marine Corps plans
    to enact pilot programs this year for lateral entry and increased
    Active-to-Reserve and Reserve-to-Active permeability.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you lead the Marine Corps in
    further leveraging these new authorities?
        Answer. We appreciate the authorities given to us by Congress is
    fiscal year 2019 and have implemented many of them, most recently as
    part of Talent Management 2030. We believe that promotion opt out and
    career intermission have positively contributed to mid-career
    retention. We have laid the foundations and are enacting pilot programs
    this year for lateral entry and increased Active-to-Reserve and
    Reserve-to-Active permeability. If confirmed, I will continue to expand
    and accelerate these efforts and will not hesitate to ask for
    assistance from this Committee when required.
        Question. Are there other authorities that the Marine Corps needs
    in order to modernize the management of its officer personnel?
        Answer. Not at this time.
                            joint officer management
        Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2017 modified the Joint
    Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act
    in two significant ways. First, it broadened the statutory definition
    of ``joint matters'' to expand the types of positions for which an
    officer can receive joint duty credit. Further, it reduced from 3 years
    to two the minimum tour length required for joint duty credit. What is
    your assessment of the effectiveness of the fiscal year 2017
    modifications to the JQO system?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2017 modifications to the JQO system and
    current updates have been effective and allow for greater flexibility
    in the assignments process. Greater assignment flexibility facilitates
    optimal career progression like key billets in grade, broadening PME,
    and command assignments. Additionally, the flexibility enables the
    fulfillment of service requirements while fully supporting the joint
    force.
        Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
    becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
    eligibility for promotion to Flag officer rank, consistent with the
    operational and professional demands of Marine Corps officers?
        Answer. Yes. We believe that current JQO requirements are well-
    aligned with what it takes to be an effective officer in the Marine
    Corps. Lifelong career development of our officers is essential to
    ensuring that officers serving as general and flag officers have the
    requisite experience and education in joint matters. Joint warfighting
    experience and expertise is a key factor increasing lethality and
    readiness.
        Question. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to
    JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that Marine Corps officers
    are able to attain both meaningful joint and Corps-specific leadership
    experience and adequate professional development?
        Answer. I believe that access to JPME-II officer education
    opportunities is vital to support joint education requirements and
    ensuring the Marine Corps maximizes the number of officers designated
    as joint qualified. I do not have any additional modifications of the
    JQO prerequisites to recommend at this time.
                        professional military education
        Question. The 2022 NDS asserts that Professional Military Education
    (PME) curricula should be refocused to foster critical thinking and
    analytical skills, fluency in critical languages, and integration of
    insights from the social and behavioral sciences.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to update the Marine
    Corps' PME system to ensure that it fosters the skills highlighted in
    the NDS to develop a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners with both
    the intellectual and military leadership acumen to merit promotion to
    General Officer?
        Answer. We have already shifted both officer and enlisted PME to an
    outcomes-based education model to ensure that graduates possess the
    critical and creative thinking skills, decisiveness, and warfighting
    acumen needed to win in today's complex global environment. Programs
    such as the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Commandant's Doctor
    of Philosophy program, which select officers who have demonstrated the
    ability for strategic thinking and planning, directly contribute to the
    cadre of warrior scholars able to serve the Nation now and in the
    future as General Officers. Additionally, the Marine Corps recently
    established the Strategist Management program, which focuses on
    aligning officers with specialized PME to utilization tours that are
    well suited to their advanced education in strategy application. If
    confirmed, I would expand on the initiatives in Training and Education
    2030 to enhance critical thinking and analytical skills through more
    fully integrating wargaming into both resident and distance education
    opportunities to advance a better understanding of the next generation
    capabilities. The Marine Corps must ensure that the distance and
    blended programs are as rigorous and challenging as our resident
    programs, which means the development and execution of virtual wargames
    for distance and blended programs. Nearly 80 percent of Marine officers
    complete PME via our distance and blended programs, so including
    wargaming there as well greatly increases the exposure of our officer
    corps to threat-based problems and solutions.
        Question. In your view, are there opportunities in Marine Corps PME
    to improve STEM cognizance and cyber fluency across the joint force to
    ensure that leaders understand and can effectively employ technologies
    to fight and win our Nation's wars?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to advance the integration of
    emerging technology within the Marine Corps' training and educational
    institutions as an enduring priority. We are in the process of hiring
    talent to support expanded curriculum in the areas of emerging
    technology and cyber and have already begun to integrate these topics,
    along with space, into both officer and enlisted PME curricula. While
    raising overall cognizance in these areas, the Marine Corps will
    continue to partner with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS),
    recognized as a premier STEM school, to produce officers and enlisted
    marines who are trained for, then fill specific technical billets. NPS
    is the main provider for technical graduate programs for the Marine
    Corps, including the Service's technical PhD program, which produces
    PhDs annually in areas like Operations Service's technical PhD program,
    which produces PhDs annually in areas like Operations Service's
    technical PhD program, which produces PhDs annually in areas like
    Operations Service's technical PhD program, which produces PhDs
    annually in areas like Operations Service's technical PhD program,
    which produces PhDs annually in areas like Operations
        Question. In your view, is there a role for Marine Corps PME in
    developing basic product management skills across the joint force to
    ensure that military leaders are proficient in the employment of
    software and automation in warfighting?
        Answer. With the exponential advances in artificial intelligence
    and unmanned systems, there is a requirement to develop proficiency in
    the employment of software and automation in warfighting. While we
    train for speed and accuracy, we educate for creativity and judgment.
    We have only begun to scratch the surface of employing AI, whether it
    be in autonomous weapons systems, developing plans, or adapting cross-
    domain kill-webs. To that end, we are in the process of hiring an
    Emerging Technology Chair to infuse relevant trends into PME as they
    affect our application of technology in a complex and evolving global
    space.
                      the dod civilian personnel workforce
        Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
    civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD civilian personnel
    policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S.
    Code, and corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of
    Personnel Management. Over many years, the annual defense bill has
    included numerous extraordinary hiring and management authorities
    applicable to specific segments of the DOD civilian workforces.
        In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the
    Department of the Navy in effectively and efficiently managing its
    civilian workforce?
        Answer. One of our greatest challenges is the time to hire new
    employees. Delays in hiring can cause us to lose talent to the private
    sector, who can hire faster than we can. We thank Congress for the
    direct hiring authorities you have provided us; they are making a
    positive difference in recruiting talent.
        Question. In your view, do Marine Corps supervisors have adequate
    authorities to divest of a civilian employee whose performance of duty
    fails to meet standards or who engages in misconduct? If so, are Marine
    Corps civilian and military supervisors adequately trained to exercise
    of such authorities? If not, what additional authorities or training do
    Marine Corps supervisors require?
        Yes. I believe there are adequate authorities to address civilian
    employees whose performance is not acceptable or who engage in
    misconduct. I also believe that Marine Corps civilian and military
    supervisors are provided training to take appropriate action in these
    situations. However, because these situations can often be complex, it
    is important to look for ways to improve training to help us adequately
    manage these situations. If confirmed, I would like to work with you on
    possible ways to improve this.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                                     audit
        1. Senator Reed. General Smith, why is it important for the Marine
    Corps to achieve a clean audit opinion?
        General Smith. We owe the U.S. taxpayer and our Congress the
    ability to see and understand the pathway of how, and on what, every
    dollar we are given is spent. Achieving a clean audit opinion will
    demonstrate that we are spending our financial resources as intended,
    expenditures are authorized appropriately, critical needs are being met
    in a timely manner, and that we are keeping the receipts so that we can
    balance the checkbook at the end of each month. Accountability has
    always been a core value in the Marine Corps, but the audit is helping
    to shape what we do and how we do it to enable increased visibility and
    transparency for our leaders. These improvements will help us to make
    faster and smarter decisions in an environment that is increasingly
    time and resource constrained.

        2. Senator Reed. General Smith, what steps has the Marine Corps
    taken to evaluate unit readiness and commander performance based on
    audit results?
        General Smith. Commanders have always been held accountable for the
    readiness of their equipment and marines. Commands are inspected on
    their training, administration, financial management, maintenance,
    supply, and other areas that measure a unit's readiness. The results of
    these inspections, along with other metrics, contribute to the
    evaluation of a unit, and its commander. Audit results are now another
    measure that can be used to evaluate a unit's readiness. Audit results,
    whether they be good or bad, inform us how we can do our jobs better,
    quicker, and more efficiently. One of the areas of audit that has
    received intense focus has been the accountability of our military
    equipment, ammunition, gear, and real property. The Marine Corps has
    received very positive audit results in this area. These results
    demonstrate that the work our marines do every day to maintain and
    ensure accountability of our property is valuable for both combat
    readiness and good financial stewardship.
                     cost assessment and program evaluation
        3. Senator Reed. General Smith, the Office of Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation (CAPE) was established in the 2009 Weapon Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act to reintroduce an independent cost estimation
    capability to both supplement, as well as provide analytic oversight,
    for the Service cost estimation communities. Do you think that overall
    the Department of Defense (DOD) cost estimates have improved since
    2009, including by providing help to the Service cost estimation shops
    to improve their analyses?
        General Smith. As a result of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform
    Act, cost estimation within the DOD has improved. For example, the
    latest edition of the Cost Guide Book in 2020 provides the detailed
    timeline and process for developing the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE)
    for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). CAPE's statutory
    function to provide the ICE for MDAPs acts as a forcing function for
    the Services to ensure their estimates have multiple reviews prior to
    committing a significant amount of resources to an acquisition program
    as well as to ensure the program will be fully funded in the Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP).

        4. Senator Reed. General Smith, could you provide some examples
    where CAPE has supported Marine Corps analyses, and what the outcome
    was as a result of that support?
        General Smith. During the deliberative budget process CAPE has
    supported cross service collaboration and information sharing which has
    led to some optimal program decisions. For example, CAPE's analysis of
    the MQ-9 program identified an opportunity for cost avoidance by
    transferring platforms from the Air Force, that were planned for
    divestment, to the Marine Corps to support a need for similar
    capability. CAPE's analysis resulted in $170 million cost avoidance to
    the Department which, in turn, was reinvested in other Force Design
    programs and readiness.
        Additionally, during the deliberative budget process, Marine Corps
    collaboration with CAPE analysts regarding classified and special
    access programs resulted in $1 billion increase to the planned
    investment in those programs. This increased investment resulted from
    CAPE's assessment of the positive value of the proposed capabilities to
    the joint force and the need to accelerate the development of the
    capabilities against the pacing threat.

        5. Senator Reed. General Smith, in what ways do you think CAPE
    could improve their ability to support the Department, as well as the
    Military Services?
        General Smith. Marine Corps analysts work with CAPE analysts on a
    daily basis. CAPE's team of analysts supplements and supports our
    service analysis through collaboration, information sharing, and
    independent cost estimates. In particular, CAPE's review of service and
    program office assumptions on the cost, schedule, and performance of
    Major Defense Acquisition Programs through evidence-based analysis can
    lead to refined cost estimates and more accurate programming and
    budgeting decisions. The most valuable aspect of an independent cost
    analysis is true independence and disciplined adherence to data-based
    analysis in examining service and joint requirements. This is where
    CAPE provides the most value to the Title 10 responsibilities of the
    Service Chief and the Joint Force.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                           lessons learned in ukraine
        6. Senator Manchin. General Smith, I very much appreciated our
    conversation yesterday in my office. One of the topics we discussed was
    the justification of our support to Ukraine due to the lessons we're
    learning, and fulfilling our duty as the superpower of the world in
    upholding democracy for a nation that is shedding its blood for that
    chance. What lessons has the Marine Corps learned and how do you plan
    to implement them if confirmed as the Commandant?
        General Smith. Though I believe that many of the final lessons from
    this war may only be apparent after its conclusion, we are capturing
    vital data and observations as the Russia's war against Ukraine
    progresses, and we will continue to learn as the war continues. In my
    testimony, I mentioned the importance of mobile, low signature forces
    and the ability to strike from long-range. In addition to those points,
    the use of unmanned systems in many roles informs our Force Design
    modernization and our work with Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous
    Systems. I would also like to underscore the critical importance of
    inspirational leadership and esprit on all levels from the strategic to
    the tactical on the Ukrainian side. The human factors will always be
    predominant in war, and the Ukrainians have over-performed because of
    their indomitable fighting spirit and willingness to make enormous
    sacrifices to defend their country and way of life. Additionally, the
    protraction of the war and the continuing exorbitant rate of munitions
    expenditure on both sides underscore the need for a resilient U.S.
    defense industrial base (DIB). We must assume that any near-peer fight
    in the future will not be resolved in days or weeks. In contrast, it
    will most probably conclude in months if not years or decades.
    Accordingly, we must ensure that our DIB retains excess capacity and
    the ability to rapidly expand if needed. I would also add a critical
    but intangible factor: the value of adaptation. The Russians have
    adapted in response Ukrainian gains, and the Ukrainians have adapted in
    response--and the cycle continues. We will take away new lessons with
    every adaptation, but the broader point is the critical ability of our
    forces to adapt real time to changes on the battlefield. This is
    something marines have been doing throughout our history, and it is a
    core aspect of our Talent Management 2030 and Training and Education
    2030 initiatives. Having the right talent that is trained to operate
    and adapt in a chaotic environment is at the heart of our current and
    future force.
                       funding to take care of our people
        7. Senator Manchin. General Smith, another topic we touched on was
    the stark contrast between Russia's treatment of their troops and the
    treatment of our troops. We leave no one behind and created the Defense
    POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] Accounting Agency to ensure
    anyone that was lost at war is constantly being searched for, but the
    Russians fail to support their troops on the front lines and abandon
    their corpses where they fall instead of returning them to their loved
    ones. I make this point to say that our troops and their families know
    when they put on that uniform that they will be taken care of no matter
    what happens, and that comes at a premium price. Has this been your
    experience over your more than 35 years of military service?
        General Smith. Yes. In my experience, and throughout the history of
    the Marine Corps, we have and will always ``take care of our own.'' Our
    devotion to our marines and their families epitomizes our highest
    ideals of ``Semper Fidelis.''
                   delayed budget and continuing resolutions
        8. Senator Manchin. General Smith, multiple sources, including
    retired general officers, the National Defense Industrial Association,
    the American Enterprise Institute, and the Pentagon itself have all
    recognized the damage failing to pass a budget on time has on both our
    national security and the taxpayer. The American Enterprise Institute
    threw out a rough estimate of $200 million per day under the latest
    continuing resolution that covered the start of fiscal year 2023,
    that's a total of $18 billion. The DOD Comptroller noted that from
    fiscal year 1991 to 2010 the average delay for defense appropriations
    was 29 days, and that has since ballooned out to 118 days, 4 months. I
    have repeatedly asked the Pentagon for as concise a number as possible
    to put a figure on the damage these delays are causing to our national
    security and wasted taxpayer money, but so far I have only received an
    estimate from General C.Q. Brown in the Air Force who told me that a
    continuing resolution would see the Air Force and Space Force lose $9
    billion in purchasing power. Can I have your commitment to identify
    these impacts to the Marine Corps going forward to help hold us in
    Congress accountable to getting the Department funded on time?
        General Smith. Yes.
                       joint all domain training complex
        9. Senator Manchin. General Smith, thank you for coming to West
    Virginia last October to see the training the Marine Corps is already
    doing in my State. I also greatly appreciate your honest assessment of
    the role West Virginia could play in the future if our significant
    amount of mine land was made available for military training.
    Thankfully after working with the Department for nearly 5 years, a
    feasibility study will begin this year to identify precisely what this
    training could look like in a concept I've termed the Joint All Domain
    Training Complex (JAD-TC). What value do you see for East Coast Marine
    Corps units in training in the difficult and dynamic terrain of West
    Virginia?
        General Smith. In 2021, in an effort to improve infantry officer
    training, the Marine Corps researched numerous training venues and
    chose FOLA Mine Complex training area (FMCTA) in West Virginia as a
    suitable location based on the terrain, climate, and ample
    opportunities to meet training outcomes. Since 2022, the Marine Corps'
    Infantry Officer Course has conducted culminating exercises (CULEX)
    designed to simulate 96 hours of force-on-force continuous distributed
    combat operations against a peer adversary in a dynamic environment at
    FMCTA, with over 500 infantry officers completing this training. West
    Virginia offers a reasonably affordable, offsite training venue to
    replicate expeditionary distributed operations. The complex terrain
    presents unique challenges for combat operations and is consistent with
    the global latitudes observed in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Islamic Emirate of
    Afghanistan. Additionally, the challenges presented by the climate and
    vegetation offer a superb opportunity to conduct simulated combat
    operations in an austere environment, that will better prepare our
    marines to fight and win in the future.

        10. Senator Manchin. General Smith, if confirmed, do I have your
    commitment that the Marine Corps will engage in this feasibility study
    moving forward?
        General Smith. If confirmed, you have my commitment to engage in a
    feasibility study moving forward.
                               force design 2030
        11. Senator Manchin. General Smith, the Marine Corps has made many
    necessary divestments from legacy platforms, such as tanks and
    investments in newer technologies and capabilities that will better
    enable the Marine Corps to counter our pacing threat, China.
    Specifically, the Marine Corps has self-funded over $15 billion worth
    of investments in new capabilities. I would say that makes them very
    proactive in their stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars. Can you
    detail to the Committee, how as Commandant of the Marine Corps, you
    would continue the development of Force Design 2030 where General
    Berger will be leaving off?
        General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to the continued
    modernization of the Marine Corps to ensure a ready, capable, and
    postured naval expeditionary force is available to compete on the
    current and future battlefield. Moreover, I remain committed to
    integrating your Marine Corps with the Joint Force and our partners and
    Allies.
        To remain ahead of our adversaries in an operating environment that
    evolves at a faster pace than ever before, I will continue to champion
    adaptive and iterative change within the Service. The Marine Corps'
    Campaign of Learning guides and informs modernization by providing a
    disciplined and structured mechanism for analysis, experimentation, and
    evaluation. This methodology has and will continue to be applied to be
    as efficient and effective as possible.

        12. Senator Manchin. General Smith, we're proud to see the Marine
    Corps making tough decisions as it relates to funding to get after the
    China problem, but what is your estimate for future funding increases
    needed to support Force Design 2030 and what will be your top three
    priorities?
        General Smith. My estimate for future funding requirements needed
    to support Force Design 2030 will be provided in the fiscal year 2025
    budget and in each subsequent budget cycle as we take stock of the
    impacts of inflation and prioritize our modernization efforts across
    the Department.
        The Services must be capable of modernizing faster than the pacing
    threat while accounting for adversary timelines that the Intelligence
    Community and Strategic Guidance have projected. Force Design has made
    significant progress and the Marine Corps is better prepared as a naval
    expeditionary force-in-readiness to operate inside actively contested
    maritime spaces in support of fleet operations and joint campaigns.
    There are several priorities that the Marine Corps is focused on to
    sustain modernization efforts: equipment modernization, talent
    management reform, and training and education modernization. These
    pillars will ensure our force stays focused and on target in developing
    a Marine Corps that is lethal and enables the Joint Force to project
    power forward when directed. If confirmed as Commandant, I will remain
    committed to accelerate these priorities to continue modernization
    efforts across the Marine Corps to remain expeditionary and ready.
                             amphibious ship fleet
        13. Senator Manchin. General Smith, previously referred to
    amphibious warships as the ``Swiss Army knife'' of the Joint Force,
    whether deploying to Europe in the face of Putin's war in Ukraine or
    providing humanitarian aid and disaster response, our sailors' and
    marines' use aboard of amphibious ships does more to project power and
    maintain United States global dominance than any other tool in the
    Joint Force's kit. Put simply, they punch well above their weight
    class. Unfortunately, these ships are placed very low on Navy's
    priority list. Ignoring, for the moment, the failure of the Navy to
    adequately fund the production of amphibs, what is your assessment of
    the importance of and the quantity of amphibs needed for the Marine
    Corps to carry out your mission in an open conflict with China and the
    People's Liberation Army (PLA)?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps has a requirement for no fewer than
    31 amphibious warfare ships: 10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs. Since 2019, three
    Department of the Navy studies have examined amphibious warfare ship
    force structure requirements. The 31-ship requirement was informed by
    combining the findings of those studies, the most recent being the
    Secretary of the Navy directed Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study
    (AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship readiness trends over the
    past 10 years. AFRS was a threat informed, scenario-directed, model
    driven, multiple phase event executed by the analytic arms of the Navy
    and the Marine Corps. The findings of AFRS were briefed to the service
    chiefs and SecNav, and 31 amphibious warfare ships were reported as the
    minimum required. This finding is consistent with 11 amphibious warfare
    ship inventory studies completed over the last 14 years.
        The last Congress recognized this requirement in the James M.
    Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 117-263 (2023).
    Section 1023 requires the Navy maintain ``not fewer than 31 operational
    amphibious warfare ships, of which no fewer than 10 shall be amphibious
    assault ships.'' This law mirrors the needs of the 2022 National
    Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, but it is important to
    note, this requirement is a floor not a ceiling.
           talent management 2030--invest and retain enlisted marines
        14. Senator Manchin. General Smith, in 2021 the Marine Corps
    published Talent Management 2030. This document detailed various
    proposals to ensure that the Marine Corps maintains its lethality by
    investing in its most important weapons system--marines. As you know,
    the Marine Corps discharges 75 percent of first term enlisted marines
    every year and recruits approximately 36,000 new marines every year to
    fill the subsequent gap instead of retaining and investing to build
    experience in these younger marines. Can you comment on the potential
    benefits of a ``retain and invest'' model?
        General Smith. Our success on future battlefields depends on our
    force being more highly trained, cognitively mature, and operationally
    experienced. We always seek to attract and recruit the best and
    brightest that our Nation has to offer. We recognize that the
    investment we make in marines to prepare for the changing character of
    future conflicts needs to grow. This emphasis on the ``retain and
    invest'' model envisions marines staying in uniform longer and enables
    us to invest in their experience, professional development, advanced
    training, and education. This goal is particularly true for those high-
    technology and leadership intensive occupational specialties. By
    changing our paradigm, and through a deliberate targeted maturation of
    our force, we are increasing the proportion of fully trained,
    qualified, experienced, and deployable marines in our ranks to be
    better positioned to dominate on dynamic, complex, and distributed
    future battlefields.

        15. Senator Manchin. General Smith, what are the biggest challenges
    you believe you will face as the Commandant toward affecting this
    reform?
        General Smith. Talent Management 2030 reform consists of processes
    and policies to include modernizing personnel information technology
    (IT) systems and upgrading analytical personnel modeling software. The
    scale and scope of the challenge represented by our disparate, discreet
    data bases are significant. However, we have invested in developing a
    modern personnel IT system that increases transparency to marines,
    commanders, and human resource professionals. We envision that this
    system will soon be able to leverage artificial intelligence to best
    match the aptitudes, skills, and desires of individual marines to the
    warfighting requirements of the Marine Corps. While we have made
    initial gains, we need to increase the pace of progress. This requires
    navigating the current acquisition process that is not conducive to
    rapidly acquiring and fielding IT solutions. We ask for continued
    support from Congress in this vital endeavor.
                              landing ship medium
        16. Senator Manchin. General Smith, under General Berger, the
    Marine Corps recently stood up its first Marine Littoral Regiment,
    which is intended to directly deter China's aggression in the Pacific,
    in Hawaii. However, I am concerned that the Marine Littoral Regiment is
    missing their key piece of equipment--the Landing Ship Medium (LSM).
    This ship is meant to be a low-cost, low-draft, and survivable vessel,
    which is exactly what this Committee has asked for in rapid acquisition
    of equipment, but was not included in the Navy's Fiscal Year 2024
    budget request. In fact, the Navy does not plan to purchase any LSMs
    until Fiscal Year 2025. At a time of increasing tensions in the world,
    especially the Pacific, as the future Commandant how do you believe
    this delay in acquiring the Landing Ship Medium hinder the Marine
    Corps' ability to operate in costal environments?
        General Smith. Operational intra-theater surface maneuver, tactical
    mobility, and sustainment are critical today in the Indo-Pacific to
    assure campaigning activities are achieved for integrated deterrence of
    malign activities. Until the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) is available in
    appreciable numbers (IOC 8fiscal year 2034), the Navy and Marine Corps
    have developed a strategy known as the Littoral Maneuver Bridging
    Solution (LMBS). The LMBS utilizes a mixture of available ships and
    landing craft, as well as chartered platforms with an operational focus
    for use in Indo-Pacific region. The LMBS provides flexible options and
    informs future naval resourcing decisions to ensure the Marine Corps
    can operate throughout the littorals as required until the LSM is
    delivered to the fleet. However, I must emphasize that the LMBS is only
    a stop-gap measure. The Navy cannot postpone any further this
    Committee's direct request to purchase LSMs in the near future.

        17. Senator Manchin. General Smith, will you explain the difference
    in Marine Corps capability against our pacing threat when comparing 18
    LSMs that the Amphibious Force Requirement Study identifies as a
    minimum capability and 36 LSMs, which the Marine Corps considers their
    requirement?
        General Smith. The purpose built, beachable, shore-to-shore LSM
    requirements is derived from multiple studies and wargames that
    highlight a critical gap in capability and capacity between amphibious
    warfare ships and their complementary landing craft. The LSM allows
    shore-to-shore maneuver, mobility and sustainment of task organized
    units of action of stand-in forces (SIF) and enables sustained
    logistics forward in contested environments. The delay in this
    capability hinders our ability to establish key terrain and develop
    relationships required. The LSM inventory objective is 35 ships based
    on the concept of operations (CONOPS) to provide littoral maneuver for
    three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) as the foundational formation of
    the SIF. The near-term inventory requirement is 18 LSM to initiate the
    program. Maturation of the CONOPS and experimentation will inform the
    long-term inventory objective.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Michael Rounds
                                    spectrum
        18. Senator Rounds. General Smith, there is an effort by some in
    Congress to require sharing of all or some of the 3.1-3.45 GHz band of
    the electromagnetic spectrum between the Department of Defense and
    commercial interests in the private sector. As I understand it, the
    3.1-3.45 GHz band is primarily used by Department of Defense ground-,
    air-and sea-based radars and sensors to detect airborne and missile
    threats. For example, the Marine Corps G/ATOR [Ground/Air Task Oriented
    Radar] system uses that band to track cruise missiles, aircraft, and
    remotely piloted vehicles, as well as rocket, artillery, and mortar
    fire. Can you confirm that the Marine Corps relies upon systems that
    reside on this portion of the spectrum to enable their warfighting
    capabilities and protect our marines? If so, can you share any other
    examples of either specific systems that currently operate there or
    some of the missions and capabilities which rely on this portion of the
    spectrum?
        General Smith. Yes, Marine Corps radars exclusively rely upon this
    band to ensure a tactical advantage against our adversaries supporting
    the Marine Corps' detection and tracking range requirements, as well as
    on-the-move detection. Other examples of systems that rely upon this
    spectrum band include Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS); and
    the Installation Counter small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (I-CsUAS)
    fixed-site tower radar. These systems represent 100 percent of our
    Short-range surface-to-air shoot-on-the-move air defense; short range
    electronic warfare C-UAV air defense; and protection for the maneuver
    force capabilities.

        19. Senator Rounds. General Smith, providing this Committee with
    your best military advice, can you characterize the risk to the mission
    and the risk to the Force if action were taken to enable the auction of
    portions of this band prior to the analysis of the results of the
    statutorily required DOD-NTIA [National Telecommunications and
    Information Administration] study, which is required to be completed by
    September 2023?
        General Smith. Proceeding with the auction prior to completing the
    analysis poses critical risks to the Marine Corps' ability to support
    operations and training in support of defense of the homeland and
    strategic deterrence. If the auction were to take place before a full
    analysis of risks, the Marine Corps could lose vital capabilities as
    described in question 18.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                        question for the record overview
        20. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, I am submitting many of the
    same questions for the record (QFR) I asked General Berger following
    the Department of Navy's fiscal year 2024 posture hearing on April 18,
    2023. Two months later I have yet to receive a response. Please answer
    all of these QFRs in your own voice and expressing your personal
    opinion. Avoiding duplicating answers from what the Committee will
    eventually be receiving from General Berger is important in assessing
    your independent views as the new nominee to be Commandant of the
    Marine Corps.
        General Smith. I am grateful for the opportunity to answer your
    questions in my own voice to express my independent views. Many of my
    views of the Marine Corps have been developed through my
    responsibilities as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and
    previous positions, such as the Deputy Commandant for Combat
    Development and Integration. In both positions, I developed a deep
    understanding of the strategic guidance that directs modernization, the
    threat environment that supports strategic assessments, and the
    innovative concepts and analytical underpinnings designed to achieve
    that same guidance. In cases where the questions require me to provide
    responses based on facts my responses will be similar to those provided
    by General Berger. Where applicable, I have provided and highlighted my
    individual views and assessments.
                            marine corps recruiting
        21. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, over the last year the Marine
    Corps has received significant praise for meeting its recruiting goals
    while the other Services have not. However, Force Design 2030 has cut
    more than 12,000 marines since 2019 from the Active Duty component
    alone. Do you believe that personnel reductions in the Active and
    Reserve components made it easier for the Marine Corps to meet its
    recruiting goals?
        General Smith. I do not. The current recruiting environment is
    challenging for all Services and end strength reductions have not made
    it easier. While Active Duty end strength has dropped, current plans
    have end-strength remaining at 172,300 through fiscal year 2028 and
    increasing to a floor of 174,600 by fiscal year 2030 to achieve
    modernization initiatives. This milestone will be accomplished in part
    by increased retention, which has been exceptional. The Marine Corps
    met its retention mission in fiscal year 2022 and will do so in fiscal
    year 2023 as well. We are grateful that, once an individual becomes a
    marine, they want to remain a marine. In keeping with the tenets of
    FD2030, the Marine Corps is retaining more of our highest performing
    marines especially within leadership and highly technical billets. The
    high retention of our best marines will prepare our forces to succeed
    on dispersed, complex, distributed, and high-technology future
    battlefields.
                          force design 2030 divestment
        22. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, militaries around the world
    have long understood combined arms to mean employing a combination of
    infantry, tanks, cannon artillery, engineers, and close support
    aircraft in a coordinated manner. Those same militaries today are
    endeavoring to add these systems to their inventories, and daily we see
    their utility on the battlefields in Ukraine. Yet, the Marine Corps has
    divested or are on the way to divesting all the Marine Corps' tanks,
    two-thirds of its cannon artillery, nearly all its engineering
    equipment that enables breaching of enemy minefields and obstacles, all
    its engineering equipment that enables clearing and proofing
    minefields, all its bridging, and nearly a third of its close support
    rotary and fixed wing aircraft. How is it possible for the Corps to
    have ``the most proficient combined arms teams on the globe'' without
    these needed weapons and items of equipment?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps defines combined arms as ``the
    synchronized and simultaneous application of different arms and
    elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each
    element were used separately or sequentially.''
        At its core, the Marine Corps modernization effort is focused on
    enhancing the ability to conduct combined arms. A key element of Force
    Design 2030 is developing and employing modern capabilities that
    contribute to a multiple joint ``kill webs.'' This approach also
    improves our ability to leverage non-lethal fires that provide the
    combatant commander more options in day-to-day competition and pre-
    conflict deterrence activities. However, we continue to invest in
    modern lethal fire platforms that provide a more effective capability
    than legacy systems. This includes legacy systems such as heavy tanks
    and towed, tubed cannon artillery that lack the precision and range to
    be relevant in the maritime and littoral battlespaces applicable to our
    directed pacing threat. The idea that FD2030 reduces the ability of
    marines to conduct combined arms is an uninformed thought. One of our
    modern rifle companies will be able to destroy most targets on R400
    (combined arms company assault range aboard Marine Corps Air Ground
    Combat Center Twentynine Palms, CA) before even leaving its attack
    position, which is not the case for a pre-FD2030 rifle company.
        Prior to Force Design 2030 initiatives, the Marine Corps focused
    primarily on kinetic combined arms consisting of surface and air assets
    making our combined arms capabilities two dimensional. Today, the
    Marine Corps still maintains the ability to conduct combined arms in
    the surface, air, and sea domains but we have significantly increased
    both the kinetic and non-kinetic combined arms capabilities in the
    cyber and space domains creating a multi-domain capability. Regardless
    of what assets are utilized to employ combined arms, they will only be
    as effective as the Command and Control (C2) architecture that is
    designed to enable the execution of the assets. Therefore, Force Design
    2030 has focused significantly on organizing, training, and resourcing
    the MAGTF to effectively conduct MAGTF C2 at echelon and rapidly
    transition across the competition continuum to enable all-domain joint
    and combined kill webs. To do this we must transition from a legacy,
    air-land battle paradigm to a 21st century, all-domain, joint single
    battle mindset. We can no longer accept multiple, disparate C2 systems
    optimized for single-domain awareness bound by analog/human-speed
    processing. There are a variety of ongoing efforts to evolve the
    Service's C2 capability to conduct all domain operations, enable kill
    webs, and further expand our value to the joint and combined force.

        23. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, do any of the changes to force
    structure in Force Design 2030 violate the title 10 requirement that
    ``[t]he Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so
    organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three
    air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as
    may be organic therein?'' In your answer, please provide specific
    references to MCRP 1-10.1 and the exact number of marines in the three
    divisions and three air wings in 2018 and 2023.
        General Smith. Force Design 2030 adheres to the requirements set
    forth in Title 10 of the United States Code. The Marine Corps regularly
    assesses our force structure, capabilities, and readiness to ensure
    that we can fulfill our obligations as outlined in Title 10. Force
    Design 2030 optimizes Marine Corps force structure to meet the demands
    of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and of modern warfare. This
    plan was developed with the direction and oversight of senior civilian
    and military leaders.
        Force Design 2030 creates a more agile, flexible, and lethal force
    that is better equipped to operate forward, compete, project power and
    influence as directed by the 2022 NSS, NDS, and other strategic
    guidance documents. These robust modernization efforts include
    enhancing the Marine Corps' ability to conduct expeditionary and
    amphibious operations, improving our ability to operate in contested
    and denied environments, and increasing our capacity to conduct
    distributed operations with joint and allied partners. These efforts
    are also directly tied to our Title 10 requirements of:
        ``The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to
    provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting
    air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of
    advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may
    be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.''
        Over the past two decades, the Marine Corps has been involved in a
    land campaign as the Nation directed and required. Force Design 2030
    redirects the Marine Corps to our original mission as a naval
    expeditionary force in readiness that supports the fleet commanders
    within the naval campaign. Overall, Force Design 2030 intends to ensure
    that the Marine Corps remains a highly capable and responsive force
    that can effectively fulfill our obligations under title 10 and other
    statutory and regulatory requirements.

                     Total Force Structure--Active Component
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           2018       2023
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................................     186807     178678
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Change in force structure.........................                 -8129
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    Division
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           2018       2023
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................................      43695      39727
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Share of total force..............................      23.4%      22.2%
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Change in force structure.........................                 -3968
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                      Wings
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           2018       2023
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................................      39343      35931
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Share of total force..............................      21.1%      20.1%
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Change in force structure.........................                 -3412
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        24. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if confirmed as the next
    Commandant it will be your responsibility to organize, train, and equip
    marine forces. It stands to reason that marines would need to have the
    skill and knowledge to operate effectively in conjunction with
    supporting elements from sister Services, which would require training
    with them. Including information on units, dates, and locations, where
    have marines trained with the Army tank units, combat engineers, and
    bridging units in the past year?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps conducted multiple joint exercises
    with U.S. Army units in the previous 12 months at the National Training
    Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center
    at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and during Exercise Northern Strike 23-1 at
    Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan. The purpose of this
    training is to prepare marines to operate effectively in a joint
    environment. Consequently, Marine Corps Operation Plans (OPLANS) are
    being revised in accordance with guidance from combatant commanders,
    and capabilities contained in the Defense Readiness Tables and
    Apportionment Tables in response to Force Design 2030.
        Marine Corps training with Army tank, combat engineer, and bridging
    units in the previous 12 months includes:

        a.  National Training Center 22-10; 3--16 September 2022; Ft Irwin,
    CA.
          i.  3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion trained with 2d Brigade
    Combat Team, 1st Armored Division to increase close-in, low altitude,
    surface-to-air weapons fire proficiency and readiness in support of
    maneuver elements and joint force.

        b.  National Training Center 23-05; 20 February--31 March 2023; Ft
    Irwin, CA.
          i.  1st Anglico trained with 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3d
    Infantry Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack Controller
    proficiency and readiness.

        c.  National Training Center 23-06; 20 March--30 April 2023; Ft
    Irwin, CA.
          i.  3d Anglico trained with 3d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st
    Armored Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack Controller
    proficiency and readiness.

        d.  Northern Strike 23-1; 20--29 January 2023; Selfridge Air
    National Guard Base, MI.
          i.  VMFA-115 trained with 1st Battalion, 120th Field Artillery
    Regiment, 32d Infantry Brigade Combat Team to increase proficiency in
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, cold weather Joint Close Air
    Support, Forward Air Controller-Airborne; Tactical Air Control-
    Airborne, Strike Coordination and Recon, Armed Recon, and Suppression
    of Enemy Air Defenses.

        e.  Joint Readiness Training Center 23-04; 20 February--5 March
    2023; Ft Polk, LA.
          i.  2d Anglico trained with 2d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 10th
    Mountain Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack Controller
    proficiency and readiness.

        f.  Joint Readiness Training Center 23-07; 12 April--13 May 2023;
    Ft Polk, LA.
          i.  6th Anglico trained with 3d Infantry Brigade Combat Team-
    Airborne, 82d Airborne Division to increase Joint Terminal Attack
    Controller proficiency and readiness.

        25. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in General Berger's statement
    to the Committee for the Navy's fiscal year 2023 posture hearing, he
    stated``. . . the Marine Corps is now complete with our major
    divestments. Reducing the approved acquisition objectives (AAO) of
    major programs like the CH-53K or F-35 at this point would not produce
    resources for investment elsewhere and would be premature decisions.''
    Because the Marine Corps has cut squadrons it is unclear where the
    major program aircraft you list will go if the Marine Corps retains the
    numbers of aircraft in the program of record (POR). If you're confirmed
    as the next commandant will you come back to Congress seeking funds for
    the personnel and support equipment required to again stand up the
    needed squadrons?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps Program of Record (POR) for F-35 is
    420, and 200 for CH-53Ks. The number of squadrons (organizational
    construct), and aircraft (composition) within aviation units has always
    evolved inside the POR to ensure the Marine Corps remains the Nation's
    crisis response force, while modernizing to meet the challenges of the
    future operating environment. To provide an example of this evolution,
    between 1990 and 2016;

          F/A-18 squadrons changed organizational construct or
    composition nine times.
          AV-8B squadrons changed organizational construct or
    composition six times.
          H-1 squadrons changed organizational construct or
    composition six times.
          CH-53 squadrons changed organizational construct or
    composition four times.

        No plan remains static. Today, the Marine Corps seeks to optimize
    its force construct to support the Joint Force and meet combatant
    commanders (COCOM) force requirements. Ideally, the Marine Corps can
    staff these organizational construct changes with internal manpower
    structure offsets. For instance, the Commandant made the decision to
    increase two forward based F-35 squadron composition from 10 F-35s to
    12; qualified maintainers from the training squadrons will be used to
    offset the increase in manpower required to maintain more aircraft. The
    training squadrons will be, in turn, backfilled by contract
    maintenance.
        In sum, these decisions must take a holistic approach to the entire
    personnel structure of the Marine Corps, to ensure the service builds
    the most capable Fleet Marine Force to support the Joint Force and meet
    COCOM force requirements. Therefore, if confirmed as the CMC, I would
    seek congressional support for any structure and equipment increase
    required to meet national security objectives.

        26. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps' divestment
    of its tanks and assault breaching, route clearance, and bridging
    assets raises concerns about the Marine Corps' ability to meet its
    title 10 requirement to organize, train and equip fleet Marine Forces
    `` . . . for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to
    the prosecution of a naval campaign.'' The Commandant has stated
    previously that the Marine Corps will get these items from the Army.
    Was an agreement in place with the Army when the Marine Corps began
    Force Design 2030 divestments?
        General Smith. There was no formal agreement with the U.S. Army
    when the Marine Corps began Force Design modernization efforts. After
    multiple iterations of wargaming, analysis, and strategic guidance,
    heavy land-combat capabilities were determined to not be a high
    priority for prosecuting the landward portion of a naval campaign in
    the areas prioritized to the naval Services in the NDS. This is
    especially true in the modern threat environment that is characterized
    by advanced technological capabilities that operate in multi-domain
    formations with long-range precision fires platforms creating an anti-
    access, area-denial (A2/AD) dilemma for the surface naval fleet. The
    Marine Corps divested of tanks, route clearance, assault breaching,
    etc. to invest in new capabilities more readily applicable to the
    future joint maritime operating environment.

        27. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, are there any current
    agreements with the Army or other Services on these divested or reduced
    capabilities?
        General Smith. No. While there are formal joint agreements for
    capabilities such as aerial refueling, theater level logistics, etc.
    there is no formal agreement with the other services concerning these
    capabilities divested of or reduced as a part of Force Design
    modernization efforts. It is worth repeating that any future fight will
    inherently be a joint fight. In that fight, we, as services, are tasked
    with manning, training, and equipping our respective forces to provide
    those forces to a Joint Force Commander who will have the authority to
    employ those forces with mutually supporting joint capability without
    the need for formal agreements or MOUs. Given its modular organization,
    the MAGTF remains tailorable, able to receive attached units from other
    services or nations, such as naval construction battalions, or
    infantry/armor brigades.

        28. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, has the Marine Corps
    formalized any agreement with the Army to provide equipment or
    capabilities since 2019?
        General Smith. No; however, should Marine Corps Forces find
    themselves in a land campaign requiring the use of heavy armor, and if
    said armor is available within the theater of operations, the Joint
    Force Commander has the authority to task organize by pairing Marine
    Corps infantry formations with U.S. Army armored formations.
        The Marine Corps and the U.S. Army regularly train alongside one
    another employing the full spectrum of the respective service's
    capabilities. Once forward deployed in response to crisis or
    contingency, it is the Joint Force Commander's responsibility and
    prerogative to task organize U.S. Army and Marine Corps formations in
    such a way that make sense to accomplish the mission.

        29. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what assurances has the Marine
    Corps received from the Army about the availability of these units or
    assets for training and integrating with Marine formations during
    combat operations?
        General Smith. There have been no assurances. As a general rule,
    services do not provide assurances to other services regarding what
    assets they may or may not make available for training. The Marine
    Corps and the U.S. Army regularly train alongside one another employing
    the full spectrum of the respective service's capabilities. Once
    forward deployed in response to crisis or contingency, it is the Joint
    Force Commander's responsibility and prerogative to task organize U.S.
    Army and Marine Corps formations in such a way that makes sense to
    accomplish the mission.

        30. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, during the May 2022 Department
    of the Navy posture hearing, I asked General Berger to ``provide to
    this Committee a timeline and a chart that anticipates year by year
    between now and 2030, or maybe even looking back when Force Design 2030
    began, to what we are divesting and what we are gaining and how will
    that make sure that the gap in the trough between divestment in combat
    capability is not so big that it poses risk to the force or mission.''
    General Berger answered ``I can absolutely do that. That is the
    rationale that is the reason behind publishing each year, this is where
    we are with Force Design, this is what we have learned today, the
    actions taken, this is the plan ahead, which we published last month
    for this year.'' It has been almost a year since he made that
    commitment. Please provide the information requested in 2022 in a
    detailed format that clearly visualizes when capabilities have been
    divested or reduced since 2019?
        General Smith. The product you are referring to is the Force Design
    2030 Annual Report. Since becoming Commandant in 2019, General Berger
    has published an unclassified report to update the service and our
    various stakeholders about where we are in our modernization. These
    reports capture and provide rationale to all decisions related to
    divestment. The 2022 report was released in May 2022.
        The 2023 Force Design 2030 annual report was released on 5 June.

        31. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide a timeline
    that indicates which Marine Corps capabilities, including equipment,
    Military Occupational Specialties, and number of personnel, have been
    divested or reduced because of Force Design 2030, as requested in
    section 1023 of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA)?
        General Smith. Over the past five President's Budget (PB) cycles
    from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024, the Marine Corps
    divested $18.2 billion of legacy equipment and invested $15.8 billion
    in modernization.

                        USMC DIVEST TO INVESTP(PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 220 TO PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 2024)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          President's  President's  President's  President's  President's
                    ($B)                  Budget 2020  Budget 2021  Budget 2022  Budget 2023  Budget 2024    Total*
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Divestment..........................         0.7          1.8          5.9          8.7          1.1        18.2
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Investment..........................         0.7          1.2          5.9          7.0          1.1        15.8
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

        With the drawdown of forces supporting operations in CENTCOM in
    2014, the Marine Corps identified the necessity to transition from
    sustaining a land campaign to modernizing the force in support of
    maritime campaigning inherent in our Title 10 requirements. To maintain
    operational and tactical relevance on a modern battlefield due to the
    evolution of technology, the Marine Corps divested of legacy force
    structures that were of lesser relevance for a naval expeditionary
    service. Additionally, budget constraints were identified by 2018 NDS
    architects and Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 planners with the
    underlying assumption that the Department's topline budget would grow
    modestly at a 2 percent inflation rate. Furthermore, the Marine Corps'
    divestment strategy followed the 2018 and 2022 NDS and the associated
    Defense Planning Guidance that directed the divestment of legacy
    capabilities and modernization at the speed of the pacing threat.
        In the President's Budget 2020 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
    $0.7 billion by divesting of the AN/TPS-59 Air Defense Radar, AAV7A1
    Project Improvement Program, and the MV-22 Aerial Refueling System
    (VARS). These funds were used to invest in such programs as Ground
    Based Air Defense (GBAD), F-35 spares and Block 4 modification, nascent
    Command-and-Control systems, sensors, and communications platforms.
        In the President's Budget 2021 cycle, we reallocated $1.8 billion
    by divesting of certain ground programs such as the Light Armored
    Vehicle Program Improvement Project (LAV PIP) and M1A1 Weapons and
    Combat Vehicle Modification Kits. The Marine Corps also made a 2,300
    Active component reduction in end-strength, and unit modifications of
    Fleet Anti-terrorism teams and Combat Logistics Battalion. The Marine
    Corps used $1.2 billion of these funds to invest in Strike/Anti-surface
    warfare capabilities, network, sensors, intelligence platforms, Air
    Defense, Ground Combat lethality modernization, and S&T programs.
        In the President's Budget 2022 cycle, as part of the overall Force
    Design 2030 investment strategy, the Marine Corps made our second
    largest divestment of $5.9 billion by reducing the Active component
    end-strength by 5,100, completing our divestments in legacy force
    structure such as Tanks, Bridging Companies, and Law Enforcement
    Battalions in addition to reducing Active and Reserve Infantry
    Battalions, Cannon Artillery Batteries, and Aviation Squadrons. One
    hundred percent of these divestments were directly used to invest in
    critical ground-based fires programs such as
        Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)
    and Organic Precision Fires Family of Systems (OPF FoS). Advanced
    sensor investments included the MAGTF Unmanned Aircraft System
    Expeditionary (MUX)/Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)--MQ9A,
    Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and MAGTF Electronic Warfare
    Ground Family of Systems (MEGFoS). Furthermore, critical ground
    networking investments were made in our Network on The Move (NOTM) and
    Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN).
        In the President's Budget 2023 cycle, the Marine Corps made our
    largest divestment of $8.7 billion with a 744 reduction in Active
    component end-strength, as well as further reduction to legacy
    capabilities such as the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
    (MCSCG) and Marine Augmentation Program-Korea (MAP-K) programs and
    delayed procurement of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), F-35B
    Joint Strike Fighters, CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters. We also took
    unique approaches to save resources by reducing capacity during Marine
    Week, made a 10 percent reduction to Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
    moves, and a 15 percent reduction to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)
    staff positions to include Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORES) and the
    supporting establishment. Nearly all these divestments, over $7.0
    billion, were directly used to modernize critical areas that enable
    Force Design 2030 by investing in multi-domain areas such as Command
    and Control (Big Data Platform), Counter Air, Counter C5ISR-T, MQ-9A
    Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) sensors and enablers, and Anti-Surface
    Warfare capabilities.
        In the President's Budget 2024 cycle, the Marine Corps reallocated
    over $1.1 billion from such programs as Organic Precision Fires,
    Amphibious Combat Vehicles, and Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicles, as
    well as a 15 percent reduction in the Marine Corps Bands program to
    eight field bands. All divested funds were directly utilized to invest
    in critical warfighting capabilities such as Signature Management
    (YETI), Secure Expeditionary Resilient Position, Navigation and Timing
    (SERPNT), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS), and
    Tactical Communication Modernization. Aviation investments were
    utilized to increase Flight Hour Program and the MV-22 nacelle
    improvement program. Additionally, several Talent Management
    investments were made, including increased funding for Sexual Assault
    Prevention and Response programs and the Marine Corps Embassy Security
    Guard.
        After completing five budget cycles with this approach, the Marine
    Corps does not plan to divest any more capacity or legacy programs.
        The two charts below identify specific military occupation
    specialties (MOS) (Graph 1) and platforms (Graph 3) that the Marine
    Corps reduced in capacity, divested completed of, or transitioned due
    to modernization efforts tied to strategic guidance.

                           MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CHANGES RELATED TO FD2030 (GRAPH 1)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     STR       2018     2023   Difference   Relative
                                                          Change  Growth or ------------------ in Percent  Growth OR
     OccFld          OccFld Name           2018    2023     STR              % Total  % Total   of Total    Relative
                                                                  Reduction    STR      STR        STR     Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        01   Manpower and Administration    7670    7029    -641  Reduction     4.1%     3.9%     -0.172%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        03   Infantry                      26014   23172   -2842  Reduction    13.9%    13.0%     -0.957%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        04   Logistics                      5797    5466    -331  Reduction     3.1%     3.1%     -0.044%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        13   Engineer, Construction,        8399    7442    -957  Reduction     4.5%     4.2%     -0.331%  Reduction
              Facilities, and Equipment
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        18   Tank, AAV, and ACV             2115    1426    -689  Reduction     1.1%     0.8%     -0.334%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        21   Ground Ordnance Maintenance    3921    3522    -399  Reduction     2.1%     2.0%     -0.128%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        27   Linguist                        620     479    -141  Reduction     0.3%     0.3%     -0.064%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        28   Ground Electronic              4435    3774    -661  Reduction     2.4%     2.1%     -0.262%  Reduction
              Maintenance
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        30   Supply Administration and      6454    5723    -731  Reduction     3.5%     3.2%     -0.252%  Reduction
              Operations
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        33   Food Service                   1981    1639    -342  Reduction     1.1%     0.9%     -0.143%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        34   Financial Management           1414    1338     -76  Reduction     0.8%     0.7%     -0.008%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        35   Motor Transport               13835   12051   -1784  Reduction     7.4%     6.7%     -0.662%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        41   Marine Corps Community          123     105     -18  Reduction     0.1%     0.1%     -0.007%  Reduction
              Services
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        43   Public Affairs                  584  ......    -584  Reduction     0.3%     0.0%     -0.313%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        46   Combat Camera                   474  ......    -474  Reduction     0.3%     0.0%     -0.254%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        57   CBRN                            933     886     -47  Reduction     0.5%     0.5%     -0.004%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        58   Military Police                4050    3477    -573  Reduction     2.2%     1.9%     -0.222%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        60   Aircraft Maintenance           5604    4692    -912  Reduction     3.0%     2.6%     -0.374%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        61   Aircraft Maintenance (RW)      5830    4875    -955  Reduction     3.1%     2.7%     -0.392%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        63   Organizational Avionics        4076    3386    -690  Reduction     2.2%     1.9%     -0.287%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        64   Intermediate Avionics          2538    2054    -484  Reduction     1.4%     1.1%     -0.209%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        65   Aviation Ordnance              2658    2462    -196  Reduction     1.4%     1.4%     -0.045%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        66   Aviation Logistics             2243    2052    -191  Reduction     1.2%     1.1%     -0.052%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        70   Airfield Services              2338    2080    -258  Reduction     1.3%     1.2%     -0.087%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        73   Navigators and Unmanned         462     428     -34  Reduction     0.2%     0.2%     -0.008%  Reduction
              Aircraft System Officers/
              Operators
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        75   Pilots                         4852    4121    -731  Reduction     2.6%     2.3%     -0.291%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        81   MISC                           4250    3925    -325  Reduction     2.3%     2.2%     -0.078%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        86   Small UAS Specialist            251     237     -14  Reduction     0.1%     0.1%     -0.002%  Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        With the reduction in capacity in specific Military Occupation
    Specialties (MOS), Force Design 2030 acted on the necessity to train
    and equip critical enablers that enable the Marine Corps and forward
    deployed formations to operate in multi-domain environments. As a
    result, the Marine Corps invested in critical MOS that were either non-
    existent pre-Force Design 2030 or in need of acceleration. The
    increased investment in critical enablers such as intelligence,
    networks, communications, space, and cyber have accelerated the ability
    of the Marine Corps to operate in multi-domain operations at the
    tactical level.

                       REDUCTIONS OF LEGACY PLATFORMS BY YEAR (FISCAL YEAR 2024 TO 2028) (GRAPH 2)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year
         System        Total Fielded       2024            2025            2026            2027            2028
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             M1A1               452                                 Divestment Complete
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             AVLB                28                                 Divestment Complete
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              LAV             1,055          840-50          840-50            No further reductions planned
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             MRAP              3391             176             174                 Divestment Complete
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            HMMWV             11043            1220             572             715             817             920
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             MTVR              6582            1050             431              29              53               0
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             LVSR              1681             181             304              46              13               0
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              AAV             1,074              79             106             116              46   ..............
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        An important aspect to distinguish in the Marine Corps'
    modernization is the distinct difference between a divestment in a
    platform compared to a transition or modernization in a platform. Based
    on analysis, wargaming, and experimentation the Commandant concluded in
    2020 that the Marine Corps' inventory of bridging platforms--Armored
    Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder Bridges (MGB), and
    Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB), were best suited for land operations
    ashore. For reference, the AVLBs, MGBs, and IRBs all require large
    black-bottom commercial sealift or Maritime Prepositioning Ships to get
    to the fight, requiring permissive offload at seaports and significant
    preparation time to prepare for onward movement to support maneuver.
    Even when permissive offloads are conducted, mobility mismatch between
    maneuver forces and engineering and breaching capabilities can pose
    tactical challenges. During the opening land conflict of the 2003
    invasion of Iraq, maneuver forces routinely outpaced supporting assets
    such as heavy logistical assets, bridging, and breaching capabilities.
    The tempo and threat environment of the future operating environment
    makes these heavy capabilities irrelevant, particularly considering the
    limited quantity of systems and the significant requirements for large
    shipping and aircraft to move these capabilities into position across a
    maritime theater.
        However, many of the above platforms are currently being
    transitioned to modernized platforms. The Amphibious Assault Vehicle
    (AAV) is transitioning to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). The
    Marine Corps will have 139 ACVs fielded by June 2023. This equates to
    21.9 percent of the 632-vehicle acquisition objective. These ACVs will
    equip seven Fleet Marine Force ACV Platoons, a training allocation at
    the Assault Amphibian School, and a test set at the Amphibious Vehicle
    Test Branch. Additionally, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
    Vehicles (HMMWV) have begun a programmatic sunset synched with the
    fielding and complete service transition to the Joint Light Tactical
    Vehicles (JLTV). The Marine Corps has 3,488 JLTVs and 187 JLTV trailers
    fielded as of 5 June 2023. This equates to 27.9 percent of the 12,500
    vehicle fiscal year 2030 acquisition objective and 4.7 percent of the
    4,000 JLTV trailer fiscal year 2030 acquisition objective. 84 percent
    of these vehicles are fielded to I, II, and III Marine Expeditionary
    Forces. The remaining vehicles are allocated to Marine Special
    Operations Command, Training and Education Command, and supported
    specialty truck programs (e.g., the Network on the Move and Marine Air
    Defense Integrated System programs).

        32. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, which of the capabilities
    being divested or reduced under Force Design 2030 will be provided by
    other Services?
        General Smith. One of the more notable capabilities divested by the
    Marine Corps as part of Force Design 2030 is the M1A1 main battle tank.
    Given that the Marine Corps has historically and by US Code been
    responsible for the ``conduct of such land operations as may be
    essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign'' and informed by
    warfare trends, the Marine Corps divested tanks with the understanding
    that the Army possesses adequate armor capacity to respond to the
    demands of the joint force.
        Through detailed operational planning, historical analysis, and a
    rigorous Campaign of Learning, we made some hard decisions regarding
    engineering and breaching capabilities. Consequently, the Marine Corps
    divested its inventory of bridging platforms to include the Armored
    Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), Medium Girder Bridges (MGB), and
    Improved Ribbon Bridges (IRB) which are too heavy and slow to be
    relevant in modern operations. The Marine Corps and Army are working
    collectively with industry to develop a more suitable lightweight,
    scalable tactical bridging platform that can be transported on current
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). The Marine Corps is currently
    awaiting delivery of three test vehicles for experimentation within our
    engineer formations. In the meantime, the Marine Corps retains its
    capability to do nonstandard bridging. On a frequent basis Marine
    engineers are used for theater security cooperation and for support to
    other government agencies to construct non-standard bridges, which
    continues to build their experience with the use of local materials.
        The Marine Corps also divested of its Active component law
    enforcement (LE) battalions; the Marine Corps retains one Reserve
    component LE battalion, 4th LE Battalion, additionally almost 600
    Marine Military Police Officers were transferred from those LE
    battalions to fill a decade-long gap in base security. In the future
    fight our bases are power projection platforms making this transfer
    critical for success in the next fight. The Marine Corps is confident
    that most LE battalion mission sets and requirements can be fulfilled
    by other Marine Corps formations during the conduct of a naval
    campaign. Any additional requirement for law enforcement exceeding what
    might be handled by organic Marine Corps units or by activating
    components of 4th LE Battalion will have to be handled by the Army.

        33. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, does the Marine Corps have any
    formal agreement or plan with other Services to provide capabilities
    being divested or reduced under Force Design 2030 such as bridging or
    assault breaching?
        General Smith. No, but while there are no formalized agreements for
    other services to provide capabilities divested or reduced under Force
    Design 2030, it is important to note that any future fight will be a
    joint fight. In such a joint fight, we, as a service, are tasked with
    manning, training, and equipping our respective forces provided to a
    Joint Force Commander who will have the authority to employ those
    forces with mutually supporting joint capability without the need for
    formal agreements. It is highly unlikely that the Marine Corps will
    deploy as a stand-alone force to fight against a peer adversary for any
    extended periods absent support from the other services or the
    militaries of allied and partner nations.

        34. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, would you bring back any of
    the capabilities the Marine Corps has divested since 2019?
        General Smith. Force design is an ongoing and iterative process.
    Design changes are driven by evolutionary and revolutionary
    improvements in U.S. capabilities and in reaction to changing threat
    capabilities and capacity. Given the constant interplay between
    friendly and adversary warfighting systems, it is impossible to predict
    with certainty if any specific combat, combat support, or combat
    service support capability or capacity would need to be reversed or
    substantially altered. That said, I am confident that the FD2030
    choices that we have planned or are executing are the most appropriate
    ones to the present and foreseeable operational conditions as described
    in recent national security and defense strategies.
        If confirmed, I am open to bringing back any capability that I am
    convinced by data and facts is required to accomplish the missions
    assigned to the Marine Corps.
                          force design 2030 investment
        35. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide a timeline
    that indicates which Marine Corps capabilities, including equipment and
    Military Occupational Specialties, have been added because of Force
    Design 2030, including when they will achieve Initial Operational
    Capability and Full Operational Capability?
        General Smith. With the reduction in capacity in specific Military
    Occupation Specialties (MOS), Force Design 2030 acted on the necessity
    to train and equip critical enablers that enable the Marine Corps and
    forward deployed formations to operate in multi-domain environments. As
    a result, the Marine Corps invested in critical MOSs that were either
    non-existent pre-Force Design 2030 or in need of acceleration. The
    increased investment in critical enablers such as intelligence,
    networks, communications, space, and cyber have accelerated the ability
    of the Marine Corps to operate in multi-domain operations at the
    tactical level.

                           MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY CHANGES RELATED TO FD2030 (GRAPH 1)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     STR       2018     2023   Difference   Relative
                                                          Change  Growth or ------------------ in Percent  Growth OR
     OccFld          OccFld Name           2018    2023     STR              % Total  % Total   of Total    Relative
                                                                  Reduction    STR      STR        STR     Reduction
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        02   Intelligence                   4898    4936      38     Growth     2.6%     2.8%      0.141%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        05   MAGTF Planners                  707     751      44     Growth     0.4%     0.4%      0.042%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        08   Field Artillery                4611    4617       6     Growth     2.5%     2.6%      0.116%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        09   Instructor                     2823    5173    2350     Growth     1.5%     2.9%      1.384%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        17   Cyberspace Operations        ......    1936    1936     Growth     0.0%     1.1%      0.084%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        23   Ammunition and EOD             2272    2341      69     Growth     1.2%     1.3%      0.094%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        26   Signals Intelligence/Ground    2308    2765     457     Growth     1.2%     1.5%      0.312%     Growth
              Electronic Warfare
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        31   Distributed Management          588     808     220     Growth     0.3%     0.5%      0.137%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        44   Legal Support                  1033    1131      98     Growth     0.6%     0.6%      0.080%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        45   COMSTRAT                     ......    1271    1271     Growth     0.0%     0.7%      0.711%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        48   Recruiting and Retention        446     475      29     Growth     0.2%     0.3%      0.027%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        55   Music                           862     867       5     Growth     0.5%     0.5%      0.024%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        59   C2 Electronics Maintenance     1512    1798     286     Growth     0.8%     1.0%      0.197%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        62   Aircraft Maintenance (FW)      3530    3539       9     Growth     1.9%     2.0%      0.091%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        68   Meteoroloy and Oceanography     414     438      24     Growth     0.2%     0.2%      0.024%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        72   Air Control/Air Support/       2824    3523     699     Growth     1.5%     2.0%      0.460%     Growth
              Anti-Air Warfare/Air
              Traffic Control
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        80   MISC MOS                      10764   11237     473     Growth     5.8%     6.3%      0.527%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        82   Regional/Foreign Affairs        137     145       8     Growth     0.1%     0.1%      0.008%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        87   Ground Operations               126     274     148     Growth     0.1%     0.2%      0.086%     Growth
              Specialist
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        88   Special Education Program       313     336      23     Growth     0.2%     0.2%      0.020%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        89   Sergeant Maj/1st Sgt           1356    1407      51     Growth     0.7%     0.8%      0.062%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        06   Communications                14804   14617    -187  Reduction     7.9%     8.2%      0.256%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        11   Utilities                      2793    2687    -106  Reduction     1.5%     1.5%      0.009%     Growth
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Military Occupational Specialty Changes Related to FD2030 (Graph 1)

        In the President's Budget 2020 cycle, funds saved from divestments
    were used to invest in such programs as Ground Based Air Defense
    (GBAD), F-35 spares and Block 4 modification, nascent Command-and-
    Control systems, sensors, and communications platforms.
        In the President's Budget 2021 cycle, $1.2 billion saved from
    divestments were used to invest in Strike/Anti-surface warfare
    capabilities, network, sensors, intelligence platforms, Air Defense,
    Ground Combat lethality modernization, and S&T programs.
        In the President's Budget 2022 cycle, funds from divestments were
    directly used to invest in critical ground-based fires programs such as
    Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)and
    Organic Precision Fires Family of Systems (OPF FoS). Advanced sensor
    investments included the MAGTF Unmanned Aircraft System Expeditionary
    (MUX)/Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE)--MQ9A, Ground/Air Task
    Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and MAGTF Electronic Warfare Ground Family of
    Systems (MEGFoS). Furthermore, critical ground networking investments
    were made in our Network on The Move (NOTM) and Marine Corps Enterprise
    Network (MCEN).
        Nearly all these divestments from President's Budget 2023 cycle,
    over $7.0 billion, were directly used to modernize critical areas that
    enable Force Design 2030 by investing in multi-domain areas such as
    Command and Control (Big Data Platform), Counter Air, Counter C5ISR-T,
    MQ-9A Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) sensors and enablers, and Anti-
    Surface Warfare capabilities.
        All divested funds from President's Budget 2024 cycle were directed
    utilized to invest in critical warfighting capabilities such as
    Signature Management (YETI), Secure Expeditionary Resilient Position,
    Navigation and Timing (SERPNT), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated
    System (L-MADIS), and Tactical Communication Modernization. Aviation
    investments were utilized to increase Flight Hour Program and the MV-22
    nacelle improvement program. Additionally, several Talent Management
    investments were made, including increased funding for Sexual Assault
    Prevention and Response programs and the Marine Corps Embassy Security
    Guard.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              IOC (Y/
          IOC & FOC Projections Program          N)        Projected FOC
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MAGTF Unmanned Aerial System                   Y       Fiscal Year 2025
     Expeditionary / Medium Altitude Long
     Endurance Increment I..................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MAGTF Unmanned Aerial System                   N       Fiscal Year 2027
     Expeditionary / Medium Altitude Long
     Endurance Increment II.................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Long Range/Long Endurance Small UAS.....       N       Fiscal Year 2030
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Medium Range/Medium Endurance Small UAS.       Y       Fiscal Year 2030
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Short Range/Short Endurance Small UAS...       Y       Fiscal Year 2030
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CH-53K..................................       Y       Fiscal Year 2029
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    KC-130J.................................       Y       Fiscal Year 2027
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    F-35....................................       Y       Fiscal Year 2030
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Common Aviation Command and Control            N       Fiscal Year 2029
     Small Form Factor......................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Medium Range Intercept Capability.......       N       Fiscal Year 2028
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Marine Air Defense Integrated System....       N       Fiscal Year 2028
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Light-Marine Air Defense Integrated            N       Fiscal Year 2028
     System.................................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Installation Counter Small UAS..........       N       Fiscal Year 2034
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ground/Aviation Task Oriented Radar.....       Y       Fiscal Year 2025
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Medium Range Air Defense Radar..........       N                    TBD
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cryptologic Technician Networks.........       Y       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    High Mobility Artillery Rocket System...       Y       Fiscal Year 2024
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship           N       Fiscal Year 2030
     Interdiction System....................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel......       N       Fiscal Year 2031
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicle............       Y       Fiscal Year 2030
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amphibious Combat Vehicle Family of            Y       Fiscal Year 2028
     Vehicles...............................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Littoral Explosive Ordinance                   N       Fiscal Year 2027
     Neutralization Family of Systems.......
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    EOD Robotics............................       N       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ordinance Exploitation Modernization....       N       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Render Safe/Access Tool Modernization...       N       Fiscal Year 2027
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mounted Explosive Hazard Defeat.........       N       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operational Command Post................       N       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MAGTF Common Handheld--Dismounted.......       Y       Fiscal Year 2025
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Network on the Move-Ground..............       Y       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mounted Military-Code Receivers (Defense       Y       Fiscal Year 2030
     Advanced Global Positioning System
     Replacement)...........................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Advanced Electronic Warfare Digital            N       Fiscal Year 2026
     Payload................................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Constructive Electromagnetic Spectrum          N       Fiscal Year 2025
     Operational Environment System.........
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Spectrum Services Framework.............       Y       Fiscal Year 2027
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Multi-Function Electromagnetic Warfare         N       Fiscal Year 2029
     Ground Family of Systems...............
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Signature Management....................       Y       Fiscal Year 2026
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Maritime Targeting Cell Expeditionary...       Y       Fiscal Year 2025
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    UH-1Y...................................       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AH-1Z...................................       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MV-22B..................................       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Full-sized Common Aviation Command &           Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
     Control System.........................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Communication Emitter Sensing and              Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
     Attacking System II....................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Engineer Reconnaissance.................       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Family of Medium/Heavy Tactical Trailers       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
     & Ancillary Equipment..................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Joint Battle Command Platform...........       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Network on the Move-Air.................       Y                     FOC ACHIEVED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   responding across the spectrum of conflict
        36. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps you may
    inherit in 2023 looks significantly different than the Marine Corps
    General Berger inherited in 2019. In responses provided to my office by
    the Marine Corps following an April 14, 2023 briefing on section 1023
    of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the Marine Corps reported:
          A 56 percent reduction in the number of 155mm howitzers
          Pre-Force Design: 126 howitzers (21 x 6-gun batteries)
          Force Design: 56 howitzers (7 x 8-gun batteries)
          A 100 percent reduction in armor and associated assault
    bridging
          A 100 percent reduction in assault breaching with the
    total divestment of the M1150 Assault Breaching Vehicle fleet
          A 12 percent reduction in the number of infantry
    battalions (24 to 21) and a 9 percent reduction in the number of
    marines in each infantry battalion for a total of a 21 percent
    reduction of infantry marines which corresponds to 1 out of 5 in the
    marines Corps.
        Are these numbers accurate?
        General Smith. The accuracy of the above numbers varies between
    topics. The most current information pertaining to each topic is listed
    below:
          A 56 percent reduction in the number of 155mm howitzers
           o  Pre-Force Design 2030: 126 howitzers (21 x 6-gun batteries)
           o  Force Design 2030: 56 howitzers (7 x 8-gun batteries)
          o  Both are accurate. Pre-Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps
    maintained 21 cannon artillery batteries organized with 6 howitzers for
    a total of 126 howitzers. In fiscal year 2027, the Marine Corps will
    retain 7 batteries organized with 8 howitzers for a total of 56
    howitzers, a roughly 56 percent reduction. Those batteries are being
    replaced with different fire support systems.
          o  The Marine Corps is transitioning 14 cannon artillery
    batteries to 14 Medium-Range Missile (MMSL) Batteries, which will be
    capable of employing multiple precision fire missiles, including Naval
    Strike Missiles and the MLRS Family of Munitions.
          o  Additionally, the Marine Corps will retain 6 Reserve component
    batteries, which will also increase to 8 howitzer batteries in fiscal
    year 2025.
          o  Since 2019, the lethal capacity of the Marine Divisions has
    increased. As measured by crew served weapons to include artillery
    firing systems, combat vehicles, and infantry weapons systems, the
    Marine Corps possesses more combat power. By 2030 towed artillery,
    rockets, and missiles more than double (132 percent) since 2019.
          A 100 percent reduction in armor and associated assault
    bridging
          o  Both are accurate. The divestment of M1A1 Main Battle Tanks
    also nullified the requirement for the 85-ton load capacity of the
    Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge (AVLB). The subsequent divestment of
    all AVLBs and associated force structure removed an assault bridging
    capability to accommodate the Marine Corps ground combat and tactical
    vehicle inventory. As a result, Marine Corps combat developers are now
    working with Army researchers and industry to develop a lightweight,
    scalable tactical bridging solution to accommodate all current (and
    planned) Marine Corps ground combat and tactical vehicles. That is, the
    Marine Corps has divested of non-expeditionary armor and associated
    assault bridging, capabilities that that are not optimized for maritime
    campaigning and instead seeks to generate expeditionary solutions to
    existing and emerging capability gaps.
          A 100 percent reduction in assault breaching with the
    total divestment of the M1150 Assault Breaching Vehicle fleet.
          o  Mostly accurate. The weight and size of the M1150 Assault
    Breaching Vehicle (ABV) makes it incompatible for amphibious landings
    and littoral operations. However, the divestment of this armored
    breaching system including its twin M58 Mine Clearing Line Charges
    (MICLIC), remote firing machine gun, heavy armor protection, proofing
    and clearing attachments (i.e., mine plow, rake, and blade), and
    associated force structure does limit the Marine Ground Combat
    Element's ability to conduct protected and in-stride assault breaching.
    Dismounted marines continue to train with and utilize the Anti-
    Personnel Obstacle Breaching Systems (APOBS) to blast 45-meter-long
    paths through anti-personnel mine and wire obstacles to enable foot-
    mobile movement. Marine Combat Engineers also continue to train with
    and employ the trailer-mounted MICLIC for mounted operations for
    breaching 100-meter-long vehicle lanes through mines and other
    obstacles, though the follow-on lane proofing relies on dismounted
    combat engineers using hand-held detectors.
          A 12 percent reduction in the number of infantry
    battalions (24 to 21) and a 9 percent reduction in the number of
    marines in each infantry battalion for a total of a 21 percent
    reduction of infantry marines which corresponds to one out of five in
    the Marines Corps.
          o  Total force structure allocated to infantry battalions reduces
    until 2029, when the IBX-30 reorganization is complete. Force Structure
    reductions occur in two phases. Phase 1 included divestment of three
    infantry battalions; 3d Battalion 8th Marines in Camp Lejeune, 2d
    Battalion 3d Marines, and 3d Battalion 3d Marines in Hawaii along with
    the reorganization of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines into 3d Littoral Combat
    Team (LCT). Phase 2 of reductions is IBX-30 reorganization, which
    reduced the size of each infantry battalion by 9.4 percent, from 894 to
    811 Marines (Marine Structure only--Does not include Navy structure
    within infantry battalions). The combination of reducing from 24 to 21
    Infantry Battalions and the IBX-30 reorganizations result in a 19.4
    percent reduction in infantry Battalion structure due to FD2030.
          o  However, both the Littoral Combat Team and the modernized IBX-
    30 infantry reduction of marines within infantry battalions do not
    provide the necessary context to understand the increased lethality
    these formations have gained by investments in capabilities such as
    precision fires, advanced sensor assets, and critical communications
    equipment to synthesize targeting. There are more killing assets per
    infantry Marine in 2030 than in 2019. Infantry battalion lethality, as
    measured by share of crew-served weapons per Marine assigned to
    infantry battalion, increased by 28 percent from 2019 to 2030. These
    smaller formations support Marine Corps concepts of Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Stand-in Forces (SIF) that are
    capable of persisting inside an adversaries' weapons engagements zone
    during competition, responding to crises, and seizing and defending key
    maritime terrain during conflict.
          o  Inaccurate Combining the 12 percent reduction of infantry
    battalions and 9 percent reduction of marines within infantry
    battalions to equate to a 21 percent total loss does not provide the
    accurate context for the gain in capabilities. The manning percentage
    has increased substantially (89 percent to 97 percent).
          o  The 21 marine infantry battalions are still sufficient to meet
    operational commitments while maintaining a 1:3 deployment to dwell
    ratio. These smaller formations support Marine Corps concepts of
    Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Stand-in Forces (SIF)
    that are capable of persisting inside an adversaries' weapons
    engagements zone during competition, responding to crises, and seizing
    and defending key maritime terrain during conflict.
          o  As noted above these raw numbers do not provide the necessary
    context to understand the increased lethality these formations have
    gained by investments in capabilities such as precision fires, advanced
    sensor assets, and critical communications equipment to synthesize
    targeting. Moreover, as a combined arms force, the Marine Corps will
    retain 7 Active component and 6 Reserve component tube-artillery
    batteries and 14 Medium Range Missile (MMSL) batteries and 3 Long Range
    Missile (LMSL) batteries. While initially fielded with an anti-ship
    missile, the MMSL will incorporate the MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM)
    allowing a wider array of effects. In aggregate, we have increased our
    ground indirect fires capability.
        Overall, the increased lethality of the core infantry battalion is
    improved through increased manning. From 1995 until now, Battalion T/Os
    have gotten smaller, but the manning percentage has increased, and the
    unit-to-unit variances have decreased. The higher manning level allows
    commanders to train as they will fight.'' For Infantry battalions, the
    manning as a percent of T/O is 97 percent now; up from 89 percent in
    1995 (all battalions aggregated). In 1995 only 5 of 24 battalions were
    manned above 100 percent of T/O while 12 were below 90 percent of T/O,
    compared to that to 2023 where 10 battalions are above 100 percent and
    only 5 are below 90 percent.

        37. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the new Marine Littoral
    Regiments (MLR), three of which will be established within III Marine
    Expeditionary Force (MEF), will not have the minimum number of LSMs
    they need to execute Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations/ Stand-in
    Forces (EABO/SIF) for at least 5 years according to the Navy's
    shipbuilding plan, robbing them of intra-theater mobility. Will the
    MLRs be able to execute combat operations in the intervening years
    before they receive LSMs?
        General Smith. All forces are dependent on Joint, Naval, and
    organic mobility assets to maneuver throughout the battlespace.
    However, the current programmatic timeline for Medium Landing Ships
    (LSMs) does not support delivery to support (1) Marine Regiment until
    fiscal year 2033. Until the LSM becomes fully operational, the service
    has explored other interim solutions to support SIF. The interim
    planned composition is (2) T-EPFs, (5) stern landing vessels (SLVs),
    and (5) LCUs until the LSM becomes available in fiscal year 2033. These
    provide options for moving the SIF, but are limited and should not be
    seen as a substitute for the LSM requirement.
        Although III MEF demonstrates the ability to operate as a SIF
    without the Medium Landing Ship (LSM), the service and III MEF have
    registered the requirement for both inter-(operational) and intra-
    (tactical) mobility.

        38. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, last year during your posture
    hearing General Berger and I discussed a risk trough, the time between
    when existing Marine Corps combined capabilities are divested or
    reduced and new capabilities come on line to replace them. The world is
    a dangerous place and the Marine Corps seems to be firmly in the risk
    trough. This seems like the period of maximum danger. We are no longer
    the legacy Marine Corps yet the new capabilities promised with Force
    Design 2030 are not arrived. If you are confirmed as the next
    Commandant will you be better positioned to respond to contingencies
    across the conflict spectrum than the Marine Corps your predecessor
    inherited?
        General Smith. Today, the Marine Corps is better prepared to serve
    as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and to operate inside
    actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations and
    joint campaigns. The Marine Corps is already standing-in alongside
    allies and partners within reach of enemy weapon systems during
    competition. During crisis the Marine Corps also continues to be the
    premiere global crisis response force. Critical to this is maintaining
    no less than 31 L-Class amphibious warfare ships and delivering 35
    Medium Landing Ships (LSMs) to posture forces forward to provide the
    Marine Corps the required maritime maneuver and mobility. During
    conflict the SIF is prepared to seize and defend key maritime terrain,
    support sea control and denial operations, and maintain custody of
    maritime targets in support of projecting combat power from the Joint
    Force back into an anti-access, area denial environment.
        Additionally, while there is work that needs to be done, our
    initial investments in lethality are already bearing fruit. With the
    support of congress, III Marine Expeditionary Force will be receiving
    the first delivery of the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
    Interdiction System (NMESIS). This is a significant milestone, as
    within 3 years since Force Design 2030 started, we will be
    operationalizing a new capability we did not have before--a ground-
    based anti-ship capability.

        39. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in answers provided by the
    Marine Corps staff to questions from my office, the Marine Corps
    frequently stated that divested combat capabilities were ``incompatible
    for amphibious shipping and littoral operations.'' But not all future
    Marine Corps missions will be focused on littoral operations. How does
    Force Design 2030 support operations outside the littorals?
        General Smith. The plan for light, lethal, and distributed forces
    would be successful in operations outside of the littorals. On 16 March
    2022, TF 61/2, led by a Marine General Officer with a task-organized
    staff was integrated into the U.S. 6th Fleet Headquarters in Naples,
    Italy, and executed a combined joint exercise, planned operations for
    various ARG/MEU teams in multiple locations throughout the theater, and
    improved Maritime Domain Awareness for the Fleet Commander and partners
    and allies. Task Force 61/2 executed a proof of concept during 2022 in
    which they provided 6th Fleet Headquarters with real-time Maritime
    Domain Awareness (MDA). In that effort, Marine forces tested, refined,
    and validated concepts of employment for MDA and closing kill webs,
    while also conducting real-world, time sensitive reconnaissance-counter
    reconnaissance missions. These efforts continue to support 6th Fleet
    operations as well as nested within EUCOM and Africa Command (AFRICOM)
    priorities and have since turned into a rotational force.

        40. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, for decades the Marine Corps
    has provided the hedge the U.S. military needs for unexpected
    contingencies. As the other Services focused on the Soviet military the
    Marine Corps honed its capabilities as the Nation's rapid global
    response force. One criticism of Marine Corps Force Design is that in
    reorienting on the ``pacing threat''--the Chinese PLA--the Marine Corps
    has given up much of its 9-1-1 capabilities. Does Force Design 2030
    retain the weapons and equipment that enabled the Marine Corps to hedge
    as the other Services turn their attention to China?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps has not divested any equipment or
    structure that prevent the service from still being the premier global
    crisis response force. The Marine Corps still maintains seven MEUs. The
    structural organization of our MEUs will also remain the same and will
    be comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Battalion Landing Team (BLT)
    as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Composite Aviation Squadron as
    the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Logistics Battalion
    (CLB) as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE)
        The Marine Corps continues to have capacity for seven MEUs. Force
    Design 2030 has not changed the number of MEUs the Marine Corps can
    field; in fact, Force Design 2030 reinforces the need for the continued
    global employment of this versatile and highly capable unit.
        Multiple Administrations, multiple National Defense Strategies, and
    a half-dozen sets of associated Defense Planning Guidance, as informed
    by the broader Intelligence Community (IC), direct the Marine Corps to
    pace to the principal threat and focus on the principal theater. The
    Marine Corps does not have the authority--nor a differing understanding
    of the threat environment--to deviate from those threat-informed sets
    of strategy. The Marine Corps has complied with political leadership's
    overarching guidance and decisions--while retaining its ability to
    respond to crisis globally--as that same guidance charges the Navy and
    Marine Corps to retain response capabilities. In fact, a forward and
    credible, lethal and resilient, Stand-in Force does just that--it
    creates Flexible Deterrence Options and Flexible Response Options to
    combatant commanders in the face of emerging crises.

        41. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, General Berger and Lieutenant
    General Heckl have testified that the Marine Corps is fully capable of
    meeting all global commitments. Nearly 60 percent of the Maritime
    Prepositioning Forces required to sustain marines have been cut, the
    Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Augmentation Program-Kuwait has been
    eliminated, and prepositioned equipment in Norway has been reduced. Do
    these reductions or eliminations or pre-positioned equipment impact the
    Marine Corps' ability to meet global commitments?
        General Smith. The Service's elimination of the MEU Augmentation
    Program--Kuwait supporting CENTCOM was due to it being purpose built to
    support marines deployed to and engaged in that region, and with the
    strategic guidance focusing the Marine Corps on the INDOPACOM theater,
    that purpose was no longer a priority based on available resources. The
    reduction in Marine Corps Prepositioning--Norway was of legacy
    equipment and said equipment is no longer needed for a crisis response
    in EUCOM. The Service remains fully capable of meeting all global
    commitments; however, with 5 additional Maritime Prepositioning Ships
    (MPS) in Reduced Operating Status (ROS) it will take longer for
    combatant commands to close the force. This increase in time to close
    the force highlights the need to fully fund our prepositioning program.
        Current Impact: The Navy decision to place 5 additional MPS in ROS
    will not only diminish the ability to forward position and sustain
    these additional forces required to counter aggressive People's
    Republic of China (PRC) actions, but also increase the strain on III
    MEF forces, allies, and partners in the FIC, and limited organic and
    joint air and maritime transportation assets.
        Future Impact: This impact will be felt most acutely in a crisis
    where the ability to close forces will be diminished by the requirement
    to use other assets to sustain already forward-postured forces.
        Additionally, MPF is tied to every Operation Plan (OPLAN), not just
    those in the Indo-Pacific. Placing Maritime Prepositioning Ships in a
    Reduced Operating Status delays the U.S. Marine Corps' responses in all
    OPLANs.
        Due to placing the 5 MPS in ROS, for MARFORPAC Crisis Response, MPS
    arriving in theater went from C+25 to now between C+60 and C+75.
    Sustainment will be late to the need, resulting in critical risk to
    mission and force.
        The Service is developing a Global Positioning Network (GPN) as a
    recognition that we need to think differently about how to preposition
    assets around the globe to support our Stand-in Forces across the full
    range of military operations.

        42. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, has the Marine Corps'
    capability to meet all global commitments been exacerbated by the
    admitted shortage of amphibious shipping?
        General Smith. Yes. A shortage of amphibious shipping has
    exacerbated the Marine Corps capability to meet global commitments.
        The decrease in the overall Amphibious Warfare Ships (AWS)
    inventory, combined with consistent/constant Global Force Management
    (GFM) demand and longer than planned maintenance availabilities have
    resulted in an overworked AWS fleet with no ``ready bench'' and
    insufficient numbers to fulfill Secretary of Defense-directed GFM
    requirements, delayed ARG/MEU deployments (slower response), and
    reductions in amphibious training & certification periods (warfighting
    proficiency).
                                   war games
        43. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, were the studies, war games,
    or analysis that informed General Berger's decision on the Marine Corps
    force structure briefed to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the
    Navy, combatant commanders, or Members of the Senate and House Armed
    Services Committees?
        General Smith. Yes.
        No one wargame, study, or live-force experimentation event was
    sufficient to prompt the service to undergo significant service-level
    changes to force structure. Instead, the body of evidence resulting
    from many wargames and experiments over the course of several years,
    which when aggregated, illuminated for the service that change was
    necessary and thus provoked action. The studies, war games, and
    analysis listed below informed the modernization decisions and
    investments that enacted Force Design 2030.
        Once developed, the Commandant briefs and seeks approval of his
    plans from both the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense.
    If approved, they become a part of an overall defense program assembled
    by the Secretary of Defense. The program is then sent to the Office of
    Management and Budget to be incorporated into the President's budget
    estimate for submission to Congress. In essence, OMB's delivery of the
    administration's submission to Congress signals the President's
    endorsement of anything included therein. Once delivered, the House and
    Senate Armed Services Committees unpack Department of Defense plans,
    study them, and decide whether to authorize and fund them.
        Force Design 2030 was included in the Marine Corps' Fiscal Year
    2021 Presidential Budget. It was approved by then-Secretary of the Navy
    Richard Spencer and briefed directly to then-Deputy Secretary of
    Defense David Norquist at the Deputy's Management Action Group. Per
    standard practice, it was then considered by the Director of Cost
    Analysis and Program Evaluation and endorsed. Based on supportive
    recommendations from both that director and the Deputy Secretary,
    Secretary of Defense Mark Esper approved Force Design 2030.
        A collection of the most significant influencing events is included
    below. There are currently unclassified and secret wargame reports and
    experimentation reports that have been produced that either identified
    the need for Force Design 2030 or have resulted from wargames conducted
    to aid Force Design 2030 decisions.
        Reports are available for the following wargames and
    experimentation events which pre-dated FD2030:

        Advanced Naval Technology Exercise 2017, April 2017
          Purpose: Examine ship to shore maneuver, amphibious fire
    support and effects, amphibious C4, clearing amphibious assault lanes,
    and information warfare.
          Reports available: unclassified final report

        MAGTF Warrior 17 Wargame, 12-16 June 2017
          Purpose: Define Marine Corps capabilities required to
    conduct sea control and power projection within a joint campaign
    against a peer adversary.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        Dawn Blitz 2017, October 2017
          Purpose: Examine EAB concepts such as naval integration,
    maritime strike, sea control, EAB development, and F-35 integration
    with Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
          Reports available: unclassified report

        Expeditionary Warrior 18 Wargame, 2-6 April 2018
          Purpose: Examine operational level logistics support to
    Marine expeditionary forces in the western Pacific in an anti-access/
    area denial environment.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        Naval Services Game 18, 9-12 July 2018
          Purpose: Explore command relationships, tasking,
    capabilities, and employment implications of Marine Corps and Navy
    forces task-organized for littoral combat across the full range of
    naval missions.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        MAGTF Warrior 18 Wargame, 17-21 September 2018
          Purpose: Inform future logistics operating concepts of
    support and how the MEF will be organized, trained, and equipped to
    support and sustain operations as part of an inside force.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        Within Sea Dragon Phase II initiative, Trident Juncture 2018,
    October-November 2018
          Purpose: To test hybrid logistics, particularly data-
    driven logistics systems and additive manufacturing with CLB-2 as the
    assigned experiment force
          Reports available: unclassified final report

        After the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) was released in the
    summer of 2019 and Force Design 2030 modernization began, the Marine
    Corps has conducted over 400 congressional engagements with Members,
    Professional Staff Members, and staff from personal offices. We
    received extensive feedback from these engagements that helped inform
    follow-on experimentation. Marine Corps leadership values and honors
    the need for congressional oversight and has actively supported that
    lawful requirement.
        From January 2020 to April 2023, Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat
    Development and Integration (CD&I), alone has conducted 221 of those
    engagements. Of those 221 engagements roughly 30 percent were
    classified briefs at the secret level and above. The remaining 70
    percent of those engagements were at the unclassified level to be as
    transparent as possible in our modernization efforts.
        Marine Corps component commanders routinely brief their supported
    combatant commander on changes to Marine Corps capabilities.

        44. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, when did the Marine Corps
    determine its current amphibious shipping requirement of 31 ships?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps has a requirement for no fewer than
    31 amphibious warfare ships 10 LHA/LHD and 21 LPDs. Since 2019, three
    DoN studies have examined amphibious warfare ship force structure
    requirements. The requirement was informed by combining the findings of
    those studies, the most recent being the SecNav directed Amphibious
    Fleet Requirement Study (AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship
    readiness trends over the past 10 years. AFRS was a threat informed,
    scenario directed, model driven, multiple phase event executed by the
    analytic arms of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The findings of AFRS
    were briefed to the Service Chiefs and Secretary of the Navy. This
    finding is consistent with 11 amphibious warfare ship inventory studies
    completed over the last 14 years.

        45. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in what documents was 31
    amphibious shipping requirement communicated to the Office of the Chief
    of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of
    Defense, and Members of Congress?
        General Smith. Since 2019, three DoN studies have examined
    amphibious warfare ship force structure requirements. The requirement
    was informed by combining the findings of those studies, the most
    recent being the SecNav directed Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study
    (AFRS) in 2022, with amphibious warfare ship readiness trends over the
    past 10 years. The findings of AFRS were briefed to the Service chiefs,
    SecNav, and components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
    Congressional interest in the AFRS prompted OSD to submit a Report to
    Congress. On 27 December 2022, findings were submitted to Members of
    Congress.

        46. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies' (CSIS) recent war game ``First Battle of the
    Next War'' found MLRs could contribute to the fight on a limited basis
    but were largely nonfactors as political assumptions and China's
    defensive capabilities prevented them from being close enough to the
    fight. In fact, in several instances of the game, United States players
    tried to move an MLR onto Taiwan by air or sea, but in all cases the
    unit and transportation assets were destroyed trying to do so.
    Ultimately, the CSIS war game found one squadron of bombers alone had
    more impact on the battlespace than an MLR. What is your assessment of
    this war game and its conclusions?
        General Smith. The CSIS war game report on ``First Battle of the
    Next War'' provides an in-depth analysis of the challenge, the methods
    utilized, and key results. With additional context in the level of
    planning that went into the war game to include the players that were
    involved and the extent to which they were making decisions, based on
    operational contingency plans, more substantial feedback on the
    wargames report can be provided. The CSIS emphasized:
        First, the criticality of employing a whole-of-government approach
    to prioritizing the deepening of diplomatic and military ties with
    regional allies and partners, especially Japan. The MLR placement and
    access to key maritime terrain enables joint force maneuver and is the
    conceptual framework of the Stand-in Force. The placement and access
    necessary to assure allies and partners, to deter adversaries, and to
    pose a credible threat in the event of armed conflict is contingent
    upon strong international ties developed through application of all the
    instruments of national power.
        The second point is that the United States cannot wait when
    deciding what to do in the event of a crisis. Should the PRC give
    indications and warnings of a cross-channel invasion of Taiwan and
    thereby escalate from competition to crisis, it is crucial for US
    political leadership to act quickly to provide the Marine Corps with
    the time necessary to reposition forces on key maritime terrain where
    they can be optimally employed in support of the Joint Force.
        While there are multiple points of agreement with the CSIS study
    and the Marine Corps' vision for the anticipated future operating
    environment, there were two areas of disagreement that must be
    highlighted:
        First, regarding the difficulties associated with resupplying
    missiles to an MLR while engaged in conflict, it is important to
    emphasize the MLR's kinetic fires capability is a secondary function.
    While the MLR certainly maintains a robust fires capability, its
    primary role is to function as part of an integrated and redundant
    network of expeditionary sensors at key battlespace chokepoints,
    providing situational awareness, targeting data, and Command & Control
    (C2) for the naval, joint, and coalition force. By combining Marine
    Corps sensors with joint kinetic and non-kinetic fires and effects, the
    stand-in force can hold key adversary assets at risk and disrupt
    adversary decisionmaking, thereby enabling the rapid deployment of
    naval, joint, and coalition forces in theater. The MLR provides
    combatant commanders with both options and improved information upon
    which to interpret and manage their decisionmaking space.
        Second, the MLR is also designed to deter and defeat strategic
    competitors through strengthening crucial relationships with allies and
    partners, reassuring them of U.S. security commitments, and to foster
    access in times of crisis or conflict. The MLR is designed to be
    capable of interoperability with joint or coalition forces in the
    contact and blunt layers. In crisis, the MLR's forward posture and
    access enable it, in coordination with coalition forces, to hold
    adversary assets at risk, contribute to coalition forces' sea denial
    and sea control operations via organic lethality, and to close
    coalition kill webs and provide other critical enabling actions. The
    MLR is purpose-built and designed to rapidly transition from
    competition, to conflict, and back to competition as escalatory
    dynamics dictate in support of either a joint or coalition force.

        47. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, was the Marine Corps involved
    in the execution of this CSIS war game?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps did not participate in the planning
    or execution of this event. Additionally, no personnel from the Marine
    Corps Warfighting Lab's Wargaming Division, which is responsible for
    our force design wargaming, were asked to participate or were otherwise
    involved.

        48. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, has the Marine Corps discussed
    this war game with CSIS?
        General Smith. No personnel from the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's
    Wargaming Division, which is responsible for our force design
    wargaming, were asked to participate or were otherwise involved.

        49. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, how does the Marine Corps
    respond to this CSIS assessment of the MLR's effectiveness? Please do
    not contend that the Marine Corps has access to classified information
    and CSIS does not.
        General Smith. The CSIS assessment of the MLR is largely based on
    using it to provide kinetic fires. While the MLR has the capability to
    provide these fires, its strongest contribution to the Joint Force is
    its ability to find, fix, and track adversary ships and aircraft, make
    sense of what will likely be a confusing and cluttered operating
    environment, and provide targeting information to other elements of the
    Joint Force to increase their effectiveness, efficiency, and
    survivability. At the same time, the MLR will contribute to denying or
    degrading an opponent's ability to do the same.
        The MLR's small operational footprint and mobility will allow it to
    survive in this highly contested and information saturated environment.
    If the enemy wants to expend an exquisite munition on a small number of
    marines--only to find they moved in the time it took the missile to
    arrive at its planned target--then that is one less exquisite missile
    bound for an aircraft carrier or key base. These forces will provide
    targeting-level information to the rest of the Joint Force, so that the
    200 missiles a bomber squadron can carry are directed against the right
    targets in the right place, even though those targets may have moved
    hundreds of miles during the interval between launch of the
    aforementioned bombers and their arrival at their weapons release
    points.
        The CSIS report notes the difficulty associated with deploying an
    MLR to Taiwan after the start of hostilities. While an MLR could
    certainly be employed on the island of Taiwan, in the context of a
    western Pacific conflict it provides more value to the Joint Force by
    positioning on key pieces of maritime terrain and limiting an
    opponent's freedom of maneuver, east of the first island chain. When
    other targeting systems are degraded or denied, the MLR will leverage
    multi-domain communications pathways to provide targeting information
    to the Joint Force. In turn, this will limit other critical asset's
    exposure to threats while leveraging their larger weapons magazines and
    capabilities to attrite enemy forces. The MLR further supports the
    Joint Force by conducting sea denial operations through the prosecution
    of enemy forces with their own organic fires capabilities.
        Additionally, the MLR is intended to be partially deployed at all
    times, conducting exercises with allied and partner nations, bolstering
    their capabilities and interoperability. This creates uncertainty for
    potential adversaries as they will not know what they will be forced to
    contend with, should they choose to engage in armed conflict. Further,
    the MLR's partial deployment reduces the portion of the MLR that will
    need to be re-positioned in the event armed conflict commences. The
    Marine Corps recognizes that strategic lift is a vulnerable resource,
    and that it will be heavily employed by other Services in the event of
    significant U.S. force deployments. This is a large part of the reason
    the Marine Corps is seeking a light amphibious ship capability to
    deploy and sustain portions of the stand in force.
        It is also worth noting that the MLR tends to be perceived as a
    unit that is only useful in a western Pacific conflict. This is not the
    case. The capabilities of the MLR have proven useful in the Baltic
    during multi-lateral exercises, tracking real-world unfriendly contacts
    in multiple domains and providing that information to combined forces.
    There are numerous other maritime chokepoints around the world where
    the MLR can provide utility in ensuring friendly freedom of maneuver,
    while denying the opponents ability to maneuver. Mindful of your
    request to not reference classified information, it is critical to
    point out that the systems which the joint force commander would use to
    enhance MLR survivability are classified and were not available to CSIS
    for their use.

        50. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what is the Marine Corps doing
    to assure access to terrain where MLRs are likely to operate in a
    contingency involving China or Russia?
        General Smith. During competition, crisis, and conflict, the
    ability for the Joint Force to gain and maintain access, basing, and
    overflight from our partners and allies is critical to projecting
    combat power in support of the combatant commanders. This is one of the
    significant advantages that the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (MEU) provides to combatant commanders in terms of
    Flexible Response Options (FROs) and Flexible Deterrence Options
    (FDOs). However, it is necessary to build and sustain our key
    relationships during competition.
        The Marine Corps, as part of a Stand-In Force (SIF), supports the
    National Defense Strategy by being forward postured with our partners
    and allies. With the latest change to the international agreement with
    the Government of Japan, 12th MLR will provide a ready and capable
    formation in the First Island Chain. The combination of presence and
    capability reassures our allies and ensures the Marine Corps' ability
    to respond to regional crisis, further reinforcing our future access.
        Access for unit employment is largely within the purview of
    combatant commanders. However, the Marine Corps works with those
    combatant commanders and our allies and partners to establish
    relationships that are the foundation for future access. Some examples
    of this include bilateral and multilateral exercises like Balikatan and
    Nordic Response (formerly Cold Response), key leader engagements, and
    humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) support. Security
    agreements also play an important role in providing the legal and
    administrative framework for Marine Corps presence, while respecting
    the sovereignty and interests of U.S. allies and partners.

        51. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps has
    previously conducted its own war games as part of the Force Design 2030
    development effort. Will the Marine Corps release classified or
    unclassified versions of these war game conclusions to my office?
        General Smith. Below is a list of the reports available for those
    with the appropriate clearances. Future results may also be made
    available to those with appropriate clearances.

        MAGTF Warrior 17, 12-16 June 2017 (pre-FD 2030)
          Purpose: Define Marine Corps capabilities required to
    conduct sea control and power projection within a joint campaign
    against a peer adversary.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        Expeditionary Warrior 18, 2-6 April 2018 (pre-FD 2030)
          Purpose: Examine operational level logistics support to
    Marine expeditionary forces in the western Pacific in an anti-access/
    area denial environment.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        Naval Services Game 18, 9-12 July 2018 (pre-FD 2030)
          Purpose: Explore command relationships, tasking,
    capabilities, and employment implications of Marine Corps and Navy
    forces task-organized for littoral combat across the full range of
    naval missions.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        MAGTF Warrior 18, 17-21 September 2018 (pre-FD 2030)
          Purpose: Inform future logistics operating concepts of
    support and how the MEF will be organized, trained, and equipped to
    support and sustain operations as part of an inside force.
          Reports available: Secret final report.

        POM22, 7-11 October 2019
          Purpose: Identify capability roadmap changes required to
    support Force Design 2030.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary.

        Strategy 2030, 16-17 October 2019
          Purpose: Inform CMC Force Design 2030 construct and
    identify potential service-level risks associated with directed force
    reductions and reorganizations.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary.

        Pacific Surprise, 21-31 October 2019 (MLR-focused)
          Purpose: Operational level test of Force Design 2030
    force in context of extended joint, maritime campaign against the
    pacing threat.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Ghost Fleet 1, 14-17 January 2020 (MLR-focused)
          Purpose: Examine the extent to which proposed FD 2030 MLR
    and MEU can support a given sea denial mission within the context of
    JFOS 2.2
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Black Sheep Squadron, 31 December 2019-28 January 2020
          Purpose: Explore concepts of employment and capabilities
    for manned and unmanned Marine Corps aviation assets to inform future
    force design and development.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary.

        Ender's Shadow, 15 April and 21 August 2020 (MLR-focused)
          Purpose: Inform FD 2030 decisions and the development of
    the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (TM-
    EABO) through tactical employment of and MLR capabilities as part of a
    joint maritime campaign conducted in the SCS.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, two Secret final
    reports.

        Ghost Fleet 2, 20-24 July 2020
          Purpose: Examine the value of proposed sustainment
    vessels and existing Military Sealift Command ships in sustaining the
    Joint Force during a joint maritime campaign.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary.

        Provident Forge, 23 September-6 October 2020
          Purpose: Evaluate the FD 2030 infantry battalion against
    selected mission requirements to assess capability when executing
    global crisis response and contingency missions.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Naval Services Game 20, 18-23 October 2020
          Purpose: Explore fleet integration of Navy and Marine
    Corps force design initiatives to inform command and control
    relationships to fight effectively.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Crown Jewel, 2 February-23 April 2021
          Purpose: Evaluate proposed FD2030 MEU construct and
    concept of employment against selected missions to gauge the
    formation's ability to execute proposed mission essential tasks.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        ENIGMA, 21 February-18 April 2021
          Purpose: Explore design and development considerations of
    Marine Information Detachments in support of forces operating in the
    information environment.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Stand-in Force, 29 March-2 April 2021 (MLR-focused)
          Purpose: Inform design of a Stand-in Force that is
    optimized to conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance as part
    of a Joint Force campaign in SCS that can transition seamlessly between
    competition and conflict.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary.

        Ender's Rise, three-game series between Feb-25 July 2021 (MLR-
    focused)
          Purpose: Inform revisions and enhancements to the TM-EABO
    and recommend DOTMLPF-P actions to support organizing, training, and
    equipping Marine Littoral Regiments and Littoral Maneuver Squadrons in
    preparation in competition.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret
    ``quicklook'' report.

        Littoral Logistics (Expeditionary Warrior 21), 9-13 August 2021
          Purpose: Inform the development of concepts required to
    posture and sustain a naval force-in-readiness executing theater-level
    expeditionary advanced base operations in a contested environment.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Littoral Maneuver, 30 August-3 September 2021
          Purpose: Develop and assess boat capabilities and
    concepts of employment in order to inform requirements documents.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret final
    report.

        Ground Warrior 22, 7 October 2021-17 February 2022
          Purpose: Refine and clarify the concept of employment
    for, and examine the composition of, the FD 2030 infantry battalion set
    against global mission requirements.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, secret
    ``quicklook'' report.

        Aviation Wargame, 13-17 December 2021
          Purpose: Review and refine Marine aviation requirements
    in support of the Stand-in Force of 2030 and beyond.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, TS/SCI final
    report.

        Expeditionary Warrior 22.1, 7-11 March 2022 (MLR-related)
          Purpose: Explore Marine Corps means of contributing to
    naval, joint, and national objectives in competition below the
    threshold of major armed combat.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, Secret
    ``quicklook'' report.

        Expeditionary Warrior 22.2 / Global 15, 16-20 May 2022 (MLR-
    related)
          Purpose: Examine Navy and Marine Corps afloat and ashore
    integration opportunities which enable a Joint Task Force scheme of
    maneuver and scheme of fires in a high-end conflict against a peer
    threat.
          Reports available: Unclassified summary, TS/SCI report
    (under classification review)

        MLR Game 2022 Agile Competition/Agile Response (collaboration w/
    SAW), 23-27 May 2022 (MLR-focused)
          Purpose: Assess concepts related to the employment of
    Stand-in Forces and the Marine Littoral Regiment at the operational
    level of war during transition from competition to conflict.
          Reports available: Unclassified final report published in
    US Naval Institute journal Proceedings

        MLR Game 2023 (collaboration w/Krulak Center), 17 January and 24
    March 2023, (MLR-focused)
          Purpose: Identify alternative COAs to the current
    Littoral Combat Team construct.
          Reports available: Secret

        Azure Dragon, 9-13 January 2023 (MLR-related)
          Purpose: Explore III MEF ability to transition from day-
    to-day operations to major armed combat operations and explore MEF
    Major Subordinate Commands' ability to serve as Naval Task Group
    Headquarters.
          Reports available: Secret ``quicklook'' report, Secret
    final report (final review).

        Ground Warrior 23, 13 December 22-6 January 23
          Purpose: Explore employment of the FD2030 infantry
    battalion in offensive operations and assess the sufficiency of the
    battalion's composition.
          Reports available: Secret final report (in review).

        Reconnaissance/Counter-reconnaissance (RXR), 8-12 May 2023
          Purpose: Examine Maritime RXR functional concept, inform
    other related concepts, and examine critical technologies that enable
    successful naval task group operations.
          Reports available: Secret ``quicklook'' report.
                     marine expeditionary unit capabilities
        52. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the most visible component of
    the Marine Corps' crisis response capability is the MEU. The 2,200
    marines on a MEU, divided between a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a
    Composite Helicopter Squadron, and a Combat Logistics Battalion, bring
    organic capabilities that a combatant commander can employ. Force
    Design 2030 changes the type and amount of equipment available to the
    MEU as well as the structure and composition of units assigned to the
    command element (CE), the ground combat element (GCE), the aviation
    combat element (ACE) and the logistics combat element (LCE). Can you
    provide a detailed breakdown of the composition of the 31st MEU and the
    13th MEU in 2018 and 2023, including any changes to their mission
    essential tasks and the number of marines assigned to the CE, GCE, ACE,
    and LCE?
        General Smith. Force Design 2030 has not changed the number of
    Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) the Marine Corps can field; in fact,
    Force Design 2030 reinforces the need for the continued global
    employment of this versatile and highly capable unit. The Marine Corps
    continues to have capacity for seven MEUs
        13th MEU Summary. The Service has increased its number of F-35s
    from 6 to 10. This is only feasible in a 2x LPD class ship composition
    as executed in 2023 unless other aviation assets are reduced. The
    divestment of heavy main battle tanks has resulted in an increase in
    ashore mobility of personnel and cargo via additional All-Terrain
    Vehicles (ATVs), 7-tons, and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). The
    temporary reduction in AAVs has allowed additional engineer equipment
    and containerized cargo to be embarked. The vertical takeoff and
    landing--unmanned aerial system (V-BATs) have begun fielding, placing
    an additional aviation capability with the medium deck ships during
    disaggregated operations. Personnel composition remains similar across
    the MAGTF.
        31st MEU Summary. F-35s were slated to deploy in 2018, however were
    land-based for operational considerations. The homeport shift of LHA-6
    USS AMERICA replacing LHD-1 USS WASP in Forward Deployed Naval Forces--
    Japan (FDNF-J) has brought an F-35 certified flight deck into 7th Fleet
    resulting in regular 5th Gen TACAIR presence with the MEU. Some
    traditional towed artillery has been replaced with HIMARS rocket
    artillery. As with 13th MEU, V-BATs have begun fielding with very
    positive feedback from our commanders, and personnel composition
    remains consistent.
        Detailed composition of MEU capabilities in 2018 and 2023 is
    provided below and is displayed in two columns (column 1 represents
    2018 and column 2 represents 2023).

        13th MEU Aircraft and UAS: MV-22:
          10/10. CH-53: 4/4. AH-1: 4/4. UH-1: 3/3. F-35: 6/10. V-
    BAT: 0/3.

        13th MEU Vehicles and Equipment:
          M777: 6/4. M1A1 Main Battle Tank: 4/0. M88 Tank
    Retriever: 1/0. AAV: 15/0. LAV: 20/20. 7-Ton: 41/45. HMMWV/JLTV: 84/94.
    ATV: 7/17. Engineering equipment: 5/7. Containerized cargo: 468/548.

        31st MEU Aircraft and UAS:
          MV-22: 10/10. CH-53: 4/4. AH-1: 4/4. UH-1: 3/3. F-35: 0/
    6. V-BAT: 0/3.

        31st MEU Vehicles and Equipment:
          M777: 6/4. HIMARS: 0/2. AAV: 15/0. LAV: 5/11. 7-Ton: 37/
    30. LVSR: 3/0. HMMWVs/JLTV: 85/49. ATV: 11/15. Engineering equipment:
    5/2. Containerized cargo: 367/357.

        The Mission Essential Task List (METL) for both the 31st and 13th
    Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) have experienced some changes between
    2018 and 2023. These changes included the removal of four METs:
          Conducting Theater Security Cooperation Activities
          Conducting Aviation Operations from Expeditionary Shore-
    Based Sites
          Performing Enabling Operations
          Conducting Airfield Seizure Operations

        While adding one new MET: Establishing and Operating Expeditionary
    Advanced Bases.

        Now, both MEUs are expected to be capable of the following:
          Establishing an expeditionary site to support naval
    operations, which may include ports, airfields, Forward Arming and
    Refueling Points (FARPs), forward operating bases, and firing areas
          Conducting enabling operations as required for naval
    operations
          Establishing and maintaining operations at a site until
    it is either disestablished or control is transferred to another entity
          Reducing pockets of resistance, securing the area, and
    defending the site against company-level threats.

        While the METL for the 31st and 13th MEUs are identical, there is a
    minor difference in the baseline and advanced standards for Maritime
    Interception Operations (MIO). The primary difference is the specified
    ability to conduct daytime bottom-up entry, which is a baseline
    standard for the 13th MEU, but is an advanced standard for the 31st
    MEU.
        It is important to note that each MEU commander in coordination
    with the MEF Commander, determines this specific load out of their MEU
    based on current conditions and threat assessments. Multiple MEUs over
    the past two decades have chosen not to take main battle tanks due to
    their size and relatively low utilization rate. As an example: the 22d
    MEU in 1996 chose not to take tanks but rather other vehicles in their
    place. This MEU conducted multiple allied and partner exercises and
    conducted two real world NEO's in Liberia and the Central African
    Republic, while still providing a TRAP force for operations in Bosnia
    Herzegovina.

        53. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the MEU GCE is based on a BLT
    with three rifle companies. The standard attachments to form the BLT
    have been an artillery battery (6 x M777 lightweight howitzers), an
    assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) platoon (18-21 AAVs), a light armored
    reconnaissance platoon or company (6-25 LAV variants), and engineer
    platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. The composite squadron in the
    ACE traditionally deploys with the following mix of airframes and
    detachments: medium tiltrotor (VMM) squadron (10-12 x MV-22s), heavy
    helicopter squadron (HMH) detachment (4 x CH-53E/K), light attack
    helicopter squadron (HMLA) detachment (4 x AH-1Z and 3 x UH-1Y), Marine
    attack squadron (VMA or VMFA) detachment (6 x AV-8B or F-35B), aerial
    refueler transport squadron (VMGR) detachment (2 x KC-130's), Marine
    Air Control Group (MACG) detachment, Marine Wing Support Squadron
    (MWSS) detachment, and a Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)
    detachment. Typical MEU LCE equipment includes 15 MTVR, 18 HMMWVs, 2
    M36 wreckers, 2 D-7 bulldozers, 3 forklifts/front-loaders, 4 bulk fuel
    vehicles, 2 water vehicles, 1 recovery AAV, and 1 noncombatant
    evacuation operations (NEO) tracking system. Are MEUs deploying in 2023
    deploying with organizational structures like that described above?
        General Smith. The organizational structure described above remains
    similar across all Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), except for the
    use of assault amphibious vehicles (AAV), and HIMARS. Currently, the
    force is transitioning to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and
    divesting of AAVs. The Service is currently on track to deploy the
    first ACV platoon via an ARG/MEU in fiscal year 2024 to fiscal year
    2025, which is a change to the above organizational structure as
    described. MEUs will task organize based off assessments conducted by
    the MEF Commanders and the MARFORs. In some cases, a MEU may deploy
    with HIMARS (MEU HIMARS Platoon has 2x Launchers) versus deploying with
    an artillery battery (6x M777 lightweight Howitzers). In this case, the
    Service's 31st MEU deploys with HIMARS as opposed to East and West
    Coast MEUs. Task Organization is driven by many factors such as the
    deployment schedule, forces available, pre-planned partnered exercises,
    and adversarial actions. The stated changes to Task Organization (T/O)
    and Table of Equipment (T/E) do not prevent the execution of any
    assigned Mission Essential Tasks (METs).

        54. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if MEUs deploying in 2023 will
    be organized differently that described above, please provide a
    detailed comparison of how they deviate from the standard MEU load out,
    including the number of personnel assigned to each unit within the CE,
    GCE, ACE, and LCE.
        General Smith. The structural organization of our MEUs also remains
    the same and will be comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Battalion
    Landing Team (BLT) as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), a Composite
    Aviation Squadron as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat
    Logistics Battalion (CLB) as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE)
        The composition of how the MEU is spread across the three ship
    Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and what capabilities are within it will
    be tailored to the threat environment and historical trends of
    combatant commander mission assignments to the ARG/MEU team. Prior to
    deployments, the ARG/MEU will conduct a 9-month pre-deployment training
    period (PTP) with various at sea exercises that allow the two commands
    to build and work on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for assigned
    Mission Essential Tasks (METs). During at sea periods the ARG/MEU
    commanders, staff, and major subordinate commands will execute a
    variety of full mission profile exercises such as amphibious raids,
    amphibious assaults, non-combat evacuation operations (NEO). The two
    commands will also coordinate with Fleet and Joint headquarters in the
    combatant commands that the ARG/MEU is expected to be assigned to
    during the deployment to coordinate Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC)
    exercises and receive intelligence briefs to understand the threat
    environment. Through the combination of the at sea training periods,
    development of SOPs, understanding of anticipated assigned missions,
    and the threat environment, the ARG/MEU team tailors what assets are
    assigned to each amphibious warfare ship within the ARG to be
    appropriately organized for operational deployment. As such, MAGTFs can
    and will vary in size and capability according to their assigned or
    likely missions.
        Currently, the 26th MEU is conducting their Pre-Deployment Training
    Period (PTP) with the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in
    preparation for their upcoming deployment this Summer. The Artillery
    Battery within the BLT for the MEU will be organized with a traditional
    M777 Howitzers platoon and a Force Design 2030 incorporated High
    Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platoon. Prior to the 26th
    MEU, HIMARS platoons have deployed with the 31st MEU and with West
    Coast MEUs beginning in 2019.
                         force design 2030 transparency
        55. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, it has been reported that
    senior Marine officers were required to sign non-disclosure agreements
    after working on Force Design 2030. Is this accurate?
        General Smith. Yes.

        56. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if senior Marine officers were
    required to sign non-disclosure agreements after working on Force
    Design 2030, why was that necessary?
        General Smith. Prior to the public release of information and
    decisions made, regarding Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps provided
    Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) to a select number of officers and
    staff. These NDAs were provided in an effort to minimize incorrect
    information and guidance from being publicly shared while Force Design
    2030 was in its developmental stage. These officers and staff were
    members of a select, core group who were instrumental in the
    decisionmaking process. The NDAs were provided and signed on a
    voluntary basis, whereby if a member of the group did not desire to
    sign the NDA, they were not forced to sign and participate. NDAs have
    been commonplace for any force structure review groups and force level
    structure reviews over the past two decades.

        57. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, you indicated that the Marine
    Corps has conducted over 400 engagements with Congress to discuss Force
    Design 2030. Can you provide a list of those engagements specifying
    whether they were meetings, briefs, or hearings with Members of
    Congress to discuss Force Design 2030 or other issues within the Marine
    Corps?
        General Smith. When General Berger stated at the April 2023 Senate
    Armed Services Committee Department of Navy posture hearing that the
    Marine Corps had conducted over 400 engagements with Congress regarding
    Force Design 2030, he had summarized nearly 4 years of consistent
    general officer and staff engagements with personal offices and
    committees. I am committed to continuing this open and regular
    communication if confirmed as the 39th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        When the Marine Corps first undertook Force Design 2030, we sought
    congressional oversight from the start to capitalize on the invaluable
    perspective of Congress. We assessed that the Congress would be a key
    partner in the development and execution of our modernization. They
    were an essential source of information on our Campaign of Learning--
    where we sought to rapidly inject lessons learned, wargaming and
    experimentation into our decisions.
        In 2019, General Berger released the Commandant's Planning
    Guidance, setting forth the Marine Corps' intent and direction for the
    Force Design 2030 initiative. The document emphasized the need to
    reallocate resources and shift the Marine Corps' focus toward future
    conflict scenarios, such as great power competition and naval
    integration. Marine Corps leadership recognized the need to provide
    regular updates, engage in briefings, and seek congressional feedback
    to ensure that the Force Design 2030 aligned with national security
    objectives and received appropriate oversight.
        Following the release of the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance,
    the Marine Corps actively engaged with Congress to facilitate a robust
    and ongoing dialog. Marine Corps leaders conducted multiple office
    calls and briefings to provide in-depth insights into Force Design
    2030, be available to address any concerns, and solicit feedback from
    Members of Congress, as well as personal and professional staff. As the
    Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration at the time, I
    personally attended several of these briefs and office calls. From 2019
    until the release of Force Design 2030 in March 2020, the staff
    conducted 31 engagements (office calls, breakfasts, briefings, phone
    calls, and events) with Members of Congress, committee personnel, and
    personal.
        During these interactions, marines executed a wide range of
    presentations that encompassed both classified and unclassified
    information. The topics covered various aspects such as alterations in
    force structure, plans for acquisitions, projected budgets, and
    expected timelines. The program briefs were especially detailed to
    ensure projected investments remained on cost, on schedule, and within
    performance parameters. Throughout the interactions, Marine briefers
    welcomed rigorous scrutiny and worked closely with congressional
    committees, so as to take full advantage of their experience.
        As the Marine Corps moved into implementation, the Service remained
    committed to transparency by sharing progress reports, conducting site
    visits, and facilitating access to classified and unclassified
    information related to the Force Design 2030. Regular updates and
    consultations with relevant committees were established to maintain a
    continuous flow of information, enabling Congress to effectively
    exercise its oversight responsibilities. We were also diligent in
    providing Congress with physical and electronic copies of Force Design
    2030 Updates and other Force Design concepts as they became available
    to the public.
        Since 2020, the Service has increased congressional engagements
    upon the release of Force Design 2030 and in subsequent years.
        *Each items listed reflects a separate, distinct engagement.

        2020
        Office Calls with Members: 35
        Briefings to Members: 13
        Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 37
        Other (breakfasts, etc.): 6
        Total Engagements: 91

        2021
        Office Calls with Members: 56
        Briefings to Members: 19
        Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 39
        Other (breakfasts, etc.): 13
        Total Engagements: 127

        2022
        Office Calls with Members: 69
        Briefings to Members: 19
        Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 64
        Other (breakfasts, etc.): 29
        Total Engagements: 181

        2023
        Office Calls with Members: 32
        Briefings to Members: 10
        Briefings to Professional or Personal Staff: 26
        Other (breakfasts, etc.): 6
        Total Engagements: over 70 to date

        Hearings and QFRs: Separately (and not counted in the above
    totals), the Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 concept was addressed on
    the record (either during testimony or questions for the record) in
    over 41 hearings from March 2020 until February 2023 and responding to
    Questions for the Record from all defense committees.

        58. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Goldwater-Nichols
    Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provides Service
    Chiefs the responsibility to man, train, and equip personnel for the
    unified commands. Did you consult with any combatant commander prior to
    embarking on Force Design 2030 in 2019 or during initial Force Design
    efforts in 2020?
        General Smith. The overarching Force Design 2030 modernization
    effort was communicated to a wide audience of potentially affected
    commanders, specifically in the Indo-Pacific region. However, due to my
    assignment CD&I, I did not have access to the executive level
    communications between service leadership and the combatant commanders
    during the initial planning and implementation of Force Design.

        59. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if you did consult with
    combatant commanders, can you provide details about which combatant
    commanders and when you consulted with them?
        General Smith. As stated in response to question 58, I was not in a
    billet designed for direct communication with combatant commanders. If
    confirmed, I will ensure robust communications with all combatant
    commanders. Combatant commanders are a part of all Joint Chiefs of
    Staff meetings where service capabilities are discussed in detail.
    Their integrating priority lists are always considered as services
    develop capabilities. Combatant commanders' needs are also addressed in
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Deputy's Management
    Action Group and various other departmental level meetings. Senior
    Marine representatives attend each of these events and relay pertinent
    information on combatant commander needs to Headquarters Marine Corps.
        Marine Corps service component commanders regularly brief combatant
    commanders and engage in extensive dialog about future Marine Corps
    capabilities.

        60. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, General Berger and Lieutenant
    General Heckl have testified that the Marine Corps is fully capable of
    meeting all global commitments. Were Force Design 2030 related
    divestments coordinated with the Commander, United States Forces--Korea
    before they were implemented? Please provide the documentation in
    support of your answers.
        General Smith. The Commander, United States Forces--Korea is
    subordinate to the Commander, United States INDOPACOM. As stated above,
    engagement with United States INDOPACOM has been robust and if
    confirmed, I will continue to have those robust conversations.
                        marine corps as a stand in force
        61. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, it will be many years before
    the Marine Corps has sufficient missiles to engage in a prolonged fight
    with the PLA. How will Stand-in Forces operate after they have
    exhausted their missile inventories?
        General Smith. The magazine depth of different elements within the
    SIF will vary depending on element size, location, munition, and
    mission. Numerous studies have identified that, for a prolonged fight
    with the PLA and depending on the scope of such a conflict, missile
    inventories will be a cause for concern across the entirety of the
    joint and combined force.
        However, the employment of kinetic fires is not the sole function
    of Marine elements of the Stand-in Force (SIF). By combining Marine
    Corps sensors with joint kinetic and non-kinetic fires and effects,
    stand-in forces can hold key adversary assets at risk and disrupt
    adversary decisionmaking, thereby enabling the rapid deployment of
    naval, joint, and coalition forces in theater. The Marine Corps'
    forward presence within a potential adversary's weapons engagement zone
    enables the service to emplace an integrated and redundant network of
    expeditionary sensors on key maritime terrain to provide situational
    awareness, targeting data, and Command & Control (C2) for naval, joint,
    and coalition forces.

        62. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, why is the Marine Corps
    redesigning and restructuring itself to conduct sea denial operations
    that can already be performed by other Services, for example, Navy
    attack submarines, Air Force long-range missiles, and Army Multi-Domain
    Task Forces?
        General Smith. Part of the Marine Corps' Title 10 responsibilities
    are to ``provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with
    supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or
    defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land
    operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
    campaign.'' It is inherent in the Marine Corps' Title 10
    responsibilities to provide an expeditionary force in readiness that
    can provide combat credible forces that can operate across the conflict
    continuum in support of naval campaigns. We are modernizing the force
    to enhance the Marine Corps' ability to support naval campaigns and
    fleet commanders by equipping formations with the necessary
    capabilities to enable sea control and denial operations as required to
    seize or defend advanced naval bases.
        Furthermore, the Force Design process is not seeking to restructure
    the Marine Corps to be solely responsible for sea denial and control
    operations. These capabilities will be inherent in our Marine Littoral
    Regiments (MLRs) and other elements of the Stand-in Force, and are
    complementary to other Service's capabilities, within the joint
    warfighting construct. Moreover, the Marine Corps' sea-denial
    capabilities are not redundant to joint and coalition force
    capabilities but are a complementary collection of combined arms
    capability options for combatant commanders.

        63. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps has stated
    that the key to sustaining Stand-in Forces is the Landing Ship Medium
    augmented by aviation support, buying from local inhabitants, and
    ``foraging'' for food. The decision to divest critical logistics
    capabilities was made several years ago, but testimony by Marine
    leaders has also admitted that the logistics support concept has not
    been solved. If marines are deployed today under the SIF concept, how
    would they be sustained with all classes of supply, medical/casualty
    evacuation, and required maintenance capabilities?
        General Smith. As stated in our recently released I&L 2030, we
    clearly recognize that ``the Marine Corps Installations and Logistics
    Enterprise is not yet organized, trained, or equipped to sustain
    expeditionary forces across all domains as envisioned by A Concept for
    Stand-In Forces (SIF), Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment,
    and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations, nor in traditional crisis
    response scenarios.'' I concur with this assessment. Exercises,
    wargames, and experiments have similarly demonstrated and validated
    this assessment. Until modernization progresses, Stand-In Forces will
    rely on a mix of legacy and new capabilities.
        The Marine Corps understands that enabling flexible and responsive
    sustainment in a contested environment requires a broad mix of ashore
    and afloat platforms and an integrated logistics network to support the
    SIF. Through modernization, we intend to transition our logistics from
    a capability optimized for supporting sustained operations ashore to a
    maritime capability capable of supporting operations in austere,
    expeditionary, and littoral environments that are contested across all
    domains. The centerpiece of this concept of support is the development
    of an integrated ashore and afloat sustainment network that can support
    Marine forces globally. This network would be capable of generating
    multiple logistics webs that provide options to commanders, creates
    resiliency, contributes to deterrence, and overcomes the precision
    lethality of the modern battlefield. To do this, this network would
    seek to integrate naval, joint, Allied and Partner capability based on
    the operational requirement.
        From a resourcing perspective, this network requires four critical
    capabilities: multi-capable distribution platforms, increased and
    diversified forward positioning of sustainment, installations that are
    prepared for operations in a contested environment, and improved
    logistics command and control. As noted previously and as seen in the
    activation of the new Marine Aerial Refueler/Transport Squadron in
    Hawaii, the Marine Corps is working to establish multi-capable
    distribution platforms to enable our modernized logistics efforts. As
    for increasing and diversifying the forward positioning of
    sustainment--we will achieve this through the Global
        Positioning Network (GPN) which consists of a dynamic, integrated,
    afloat and ashore networks, to support the Stand-in-Force and global
    crisis response.
        The Marine Corps will make our installations ready for the
    contested environment by transforming our Indo-Pacific installations
    into advanced bases capable of serving as vital nodes in the logistics
    network, while our CONUS-based installations are made more efficient,
    resilient, and capable. Last, the Marine Corps will enhance its
    logistics command and control to enable better logistics
    decisionmaking.
                 marine corps aviation under force design 2030
        64. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, approximately 2 months ago
    Lieutenant General Heckl affirmed that the Marine Corps was not
    diminishing a single aviation program of record (POR). That just means
    that the Marine Corps is going to buy the amount of aircraft it planned
    on buying. There is a delta between the number of aircraft the Marine
    Corps will require in each POR and the number of operational aircraft
    in the Total Force based on the number of squadrons and the number of
    aircraft per squadron. Can you provide a detailed accounting of this
    delta, including any aircraft that will be in storage, inventory
    management, available for foreign military sales, or otherwise divested
    from the Marine Corps inventory?
        General Smith. When the service determines a Program of Record
    (POR), they need to solve for three primary variables to ensure the
    service precisely procures the exact number of aircraft needed to
    support the operational forces for the program's lifetime. This number
    provides a full complement of aircraft for operational, training,
    testing, and Reserve squadrons on a day-to-day basis (Primary Aircraft
    Authorization, PAA), scheduled and unscheduled maintenance,
    modification, inspection, and repair (Backup Aircraft Authorization,
    BAA), and loss of aircraft due to a mishap or damage (Attrition
    Reserve, ATT).
        The Services determine how many squadrons, training, testing, and
    Reserve squadrons they require to determine PAA. This is done through
    analysis of assigned missions (done by review of congressional statutes
    and mandates as detailed in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and
    National Defense Strategy (NDS)).
        Aircraft inventory management for the Marine Corps is defined by
    SECNAVINST 5442.3, which provides the framework for how the service
    determines the appropriate quantities of BAA and ATT aircraft. Each
    airframe type uses different percentages based on historical data to
    calculate BAA and ATT. In a fiscally constrained environment,
    leadership can make a decision to accept risk in BAA and ATT numbers,
    not typically realized until late in the procurement lifecycle, to free
    up resources for competing priorities.
        The following answers the implied question relating to `operational
    aircraft' (or PAA) changes as the result of Force Design (FD), as well
    as a detailed accounting of any aircraft that will be in storage,
    inventory management, or available for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
    The Marine
        Corps POR for F35 is 420; the POR for CH-53K is 200; the POR for
    MV-22 is 360 (final procurement in fiscal year 2023); the POR for H-1s
    is 389 (procurement completed in fiscal year 2019).
        While this answer will focus on the four platforms listed above, it
    does not include the additional one KC-130J squadron being stood up in
    the Pacific, as well as the additional three squadrons of UAS. As a
    point of fact, prior to FD, the Marine Corps planned to have 81,415
    aircraft in the mid-2030's; post FD changes, the Marine Corps plans to
    have 1,453 aircraft, an additional 38 aircraft in support of the Marine
    Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
    (JFMCC), and Joint Force.
    F-35 Inventory Management:
        The POR for F-35 is 420 (353xB / 67xC). Pre-FD, there were three
    organizational constructs for the number of squadrons over the past 15
    years. The last of those three constructs called for 9 squadrons of 16
    aircraft and 9 squadrons of 10 aircraft. Utilizing DoN approved models
    for BAA and ATT, the correct POR should have been 510 for that
    construct. A 90-plane deficit (510 requirement--420 POR) is high risk
    and would manifest itself over 2-3 decades. Specifically, if the Pre-FD
    construct was followed, the Marine Corps would begin losing a squadron
    every 5 years beginning in 2040, and the Marine Corps would be unable
    to fly the F-35B out to 2067.
        Post-FD TACAIR Transition Plans call for a PAA for 18 squadrons of
    10 aircraft. When you combine the PAA, BAA, and ATT for 18 squadrons of
    10 aircraft, the POR should be 425. Five aircraft short (420 vice 425)
    is low risk and manageable. To say ``changing to 18 squadrons of 10
    aircraft reduces ``operationally available aircraft'' by 54 aircraft
    (Pre-FD PAA total is 324 and post-FD PAA is 270) is misleading. An
    organizational construct change was required because the old construct
    was high risk and unsustainable for the following reasons:

          1.  All pre-FD organizational constructs centered around 16 plane
    F-35B squadrons supporting the MEU (6 to the MEU, 10 Remain Behind).
    THIS IS NO LONGER A CONSTRAINT. Through the Campaign of Learning we
    discovered we can--and are--deploying 10 F-35Bs aboard our MEUs. The
    post-FD construct allows us to deploy the entire squadron aboard our
    MEUs (compared to the old 6 x AV-8B contingent) and provides COCOMs a
    66 percent INCREASE in 5th GEN TACAIR aircraft with our MEUs forward
    deployed and globally engaged all the way out to 2067.

          2.  The Marine Corps did not plan to flush out the pre-FD PAA in
    squadrons to 16 aircraft until around 2030. We will have less than the
    required PAA aircraft from 2040 to 2067. Under the old construct,
    because the organizational construct called for a POR of 510, that
    means we begin to lose a SQUADRON of F-35s every 5 years beginning in
    2040. It reduces the lifespan of the F-35 by about 15 to 20 years. The
    post-FD organizational construct allows the Marine Corps to maximize
    the service life of the F-35, thereby maximizing its availability to
    the MAGTF, JFMCC, and Joint Force.
    F-35 Storage and Preservation:
        The Marine Corps F-35 POR has been steady at 420 aircraft for
    almost two decades. How many, and where we place our BAA and AR F-35
    aircraft is yet to be determined since we have not finished buying out
    the POR. Until then, thoughtful inventory management is the key to
    Marine Corps TACAIR readiness and capability, and we are very good at
    doing that.
        The Marine Corps has no intention of placing F-35s into FMS, or of
    divesting of any F-35s. The 18 squadron by 10 F-35 aircraft supports
    all MEU, UDP, TAI and COCOM GFM requirements at a 1:3 deployment to
    dwell. The post-FD construct is unquestionably the swiftest, most
    lethal, fiscally responsible, and long-term sustainable construct of
    the three constructs the Marine Corps has had over the past 15 years.
    CH-53K:
        The CH-53K POR is 200. This is reflected in our President's Budget
    2024 submission and is supported throughout the FYDP. Pre-FD, the
    Marine Corps planned to field 8 squadrons of 16 aircraft; POR should
    have been 220.
        Post-FD, we plan to field 5.25 squadrons of 16 aircraft; POR could
    be 168; however, a January 2022 Marine Requirements Oversight Council
    (MROC) reaffirmed our POR remains at 200. for reasons listed below:
        Changing the Approved Acquisition Objective (AAO) of major programs
    like the CH-53K and F-35B today will not produce resources for
    investment elsewhere and would be premature decision.
        Maintaining the POR provides the Marine Corps and opportunity to
    assess the arrival timeline for other connectors and mobility assets
    (LSM, AMPHIBS, ship to shore connectors, etc.), and determine if we
    need additional squadrons or to increase the PAA of our squadrons. If
    we did determine we needed additional squadrons, we offer two
    possibilities:
        1.  The Marine Corps could increase our CH-53K squadrons to 6,
    calling for a POR of 8190+.
        2.  Or we could place 20 CH-53Ks in our 5.25 squadrons, leading to
    a POR of 8190+.
        The Marine Corps POR remains 200. It will be determined later how
    we manage the BAA and ATT aircraft.
        MV-22: POR is 360 aircraft. As of 1 May 2023, the Marine Corps
    plans to have a total of 48 MV-22 in an inventory management between
    fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2026. The inventory management program
    is designed to provide aircraft capability modernization, manage the
    lifecycle and airframe flight hours, and ensure enough aircraft with
    the required capability are available to satisfy PAA requirements at
    all times. Aircraft may be inducted and reconstituted at any time, with
    the total inventory management quantity fluctuating periodically.
        H-1: POR is 349 (189 AH-1, 160 UH-1) aircraft. With reduction of 2
    Active Duty squadrons, current requirement is 284 (158 AH-1, 126 UH-
    1Y). Of the remaining 65 aircraft, 15 aircraft that have been
    attritted, 8 aircraft have been offered to support Czech Republic FMS
    Excess Defense Article (EDA) case; 11 aircraft have been deemed
    `delayed Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG)
    inductions' to be utilized in support of flight line modifications, 29
    aircraft are preserved in AMARG section two (future uncertainty, FMS
    and Security Assistance Program (SAP)--19 aircraft) and section five
    (stricken aircraft awaiting final reclamation and disposition--10
    aircraft), and 2 aircraft remain in the Fleet for final disposition.
    Aircraft transferred to inactive inventory were selected after analysis
    of utilization, poor readiness, higher Cost Per Flight Hours, and total
    flight hour metrics to ensure the healthiest aircraft remained in
    active inventory.
        In sum, FD has expanded, optimized, and enhanced Marine Aviation's
    ability to continue to deliver more lethal, effective, and survivable
    capabilities to enable naval and joint campaigning in all domains
    across the continuum of conflict.

        65. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in responses to requests for
    information from my office, the Marine Corps indicated that varying
    numbers of aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory would go into storage
    or inventory management extend the service life of MV-22s, AH-1Zs, UH-
    1Ys, CH-53Ks, and F-35s. In fact, according to the information the
    Marine Corps provided me, a significant amount of aircraft--as many as
    60 MV-22s, 30 AH-1Zs, 24 UH-1Ys, 48 CH-53Ks, and 54 F-35Bs will go into
    storage, or inventory management as the Marine Corps calls it, by 2030.
    When I read you these numbers at a closed session following the April
    18, 2023 hearing, you said they were not accurate even though they had
    been provided to my office by the Marine Corps. What are the accurate
    numbers of aircraft the Marine Corps is putting into storage or
    inventory management?
        General Smith. When the Service determines a POR, three primary
    categories are calculated to ensure the Service procures the exact
    number of aircraft needed to support the operational forces over the
    aircraft's lifetime. The three primary categories are:
          Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI). PAI ensures
    operational, training, testing, and Reserve squadrons maintain their
    full complement of aircraft (defined as Primary Aircraft Authorization
    (PAA)) on a day-to-day basis.
          Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI). BAI are backup aircraft
    that ensure when operational, training, testing, and Reserve squadrons
    aircraft undergo long-term planned maintenance or modification
    pipelines; there is no degradation in readiness on our flightlines
    (defined as Backup Aircraft Authorization (BAA)).
          Attrition Reserve (ATT). ATT aircraft ensure that if an
    operational, training, testing, or Reserve squadron loses an aircraft
    due to a mishap or damage, we can immediately replace it to ensure
    there is no degradation in readiness of the Marine Corps' ability to
    respond to crises.
        Aircraft inventory management for the Marine Corps is defined by
    SECNAVINST 5442.3, which provides the framework for how the Service
    determines the appropriate quantities of BAI and ATT aircraft. Each
    airframe type uses different percentages based on historical data to
    calculate BAI and ATT. The Marine Corps, like every other Service,
    manages aircraft inventory through a variety of means; we place BAI and
    ATT aircraft in our Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS), into storage at
    the Aerospace Maintenance Aircraft Regeneration Group (AMARG), or into
    preservation on the flight line, depots, or contracted facilities. For
    the purposes of answering this question, we will cover storage and
    preservation.
    Storage:
        Aircraft storage occurs primarily at the 309th AMARG and at the
    Depots. In 1964, the Secretary of Defense designated AMARG as the sole
    storage, reclamation, and disposal manager for the DOD. Naval aircraft
    stored at 309th AMARG fall under six sections.
          Section 1--War Reserve and Force Level Assurance Storage.
    Aircraft designated for retention in Section 1 shall not have any
    components removed from them without HQMC/OPNAV approval. Aircraft in
    section 1 are not stricken from the inventory and are counted in TII.
          Section 2--CNO Special Program Storage. Stricken aircraft
    held in storage as a hedge against future force structure and
    procurement uncertainties. Aircraft designated for retention in this
    section may be re-preserved every 4 years as determined by the strike
    board.
          Section 3--FMS. Stricken aircraft are on hold for FMS and
    SAP are CNO inviolate.
          Section 4--Museum. Stricken aircraft identified for
    donation to service museums. The ``maintain-in'' storage fees for these
    aircraft are borne by the museums.
          Section 5--Reclamation and Disposition. Stricken aircraft
    awaiting final reclamation and disposition.
          Section 6--Identified for Disposal. Stricken aircraft,
    fully reclaimed, and being prepared for final disposal.
    Preservation:
        There are four levels of preservation in inventory management.
          Level I. Conducted at the organizational level of
    maintenance. Aircraft may be maintained in Level I preservation for a
    maximum of 90 days.
          Level II. Conducted at the depot level of maintenance.
    Level II is similar to Level I. Level II preservation provides minimum
    protection for up to 1 year.
          Level III. Conducted at the depot level of maintenance
    requiring dehumidification. Level III preservation provides optimum
    protection for an indefinite period of time.
          Level IV. Level IV preservation is used as an umbrella
    term to designate the partial preservation of aircraft undergoing
    depot-level maintenance actions. The aircraft systems and components
    are preserved to the maximum extent possible; however, systems and
    components may be in various levels (Level I, II, or III) of
    preservation.
        MV-22, H-1, CH-53K, and F-35 preservation numbers, along with a
    review of those same platforms in storage, as follows:
        MV-22: POR is 360 aircraft. There are no MV-22Bs entering inactive
    inventory. The Inventory Management program is designed to provide
    aircraft capability modernization, manage the lifecycle and airframe
    flight hours, and ensure enough aircraft with the required capability
    are available to always satisfy Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI)
    requirements. The aircraft in the Inventory Management program is
    contracted to be reconstituted within 30 days of notification,
    providing a rapid response capability to adjust to changing fleet
    needs. Beginning in fiscal year 2025, the MV-22 Inventory Management
    program will be resourced for the induction and maintenance activity
    requirements of 48 planned aircraft. The anticipated annual cost for
    the program is approximately $600,000 per aircraft.
        H-1: POR is 349 (189 AH-1, 160 UH-1) aircraft. There are 37
    aircraft that have been transferred to inactive inventory, including 19
    aircraft for future uncertainty (section 2), eight aircraft for Foreign
    Military Sales (FMS) and Security Assistance Program (SAP), and ten
    stricken aircraft awaiting final reclamation and disposition. Section 2
    storage is planned to increase from 19 aircraft to a total of 32
    aircraft, which would result in a total of 50 aircraft in storage. The
    cost to store the H-1 aircraft is less than $125,000 per aircraft every
    4 years. There are no reoccurring costs until the aircraft is removed
    from inactive inventory.
        CH-53K: POR is 200 aircraft. During the transition from CH-53E to
    CH-53K between now and 2030, there are no plans to place any CH-53Ks
    into preservation and storage.
        F-35: POR is 420 aircraft. The Marine Corps F-35 POR has been
    steady at 420 aircraft for more than two decades. How many and where we
    place our BAI and ATT F-35 aircraft is yet to be determined since we
    have not finished buying out the POR. Until then, thoughtful inventory
    management is the key to Marine Corps TACAIR readiness and capability.
        In sum, the Marine Corps is not ``divesting'' of any aircraft. The
    Marine Corps has historically made changes in organizational construct
    and composition to meet mandates. Without appropriate inventory
    management and a backup inventory, our operational squadrons would
    consistently operate with fewer ready aircraft for training and
    tasking.

        66. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps is reportedly
    buying new aircraft and putting them directly in storage. Is it a good
    use of tax payer dollars for the Marine Corps to have a plan to
    purchase dozens of aircraft that it has no intention of using and will
    immediately put into storage?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps is not buying new aircraft and
    putting them into storage or preservation.

        67. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in responses provided to my
    office by the Marine Corps following an April 14, 2023 brief on section
    1023 of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the Marine Corps reported that 50
    aircraft will be transferred into the inactive inventory, along with an
    unknown number of MV-22s. What is the cost associated with the
    procurement and storage of these aircraft?
        General Smith. H-1: There are 37 aircraft that have been
    transferred to inactive inventory, including 19 aircraft for future
    uncertainty (section 2), eight aircraft for Foreign Miliary Sales (FMS)
    and Security Assistance Program (SAP), and ten stricken aircraft
    awaiting final reclamation and disposition. Section 2 storage is
    planned to increase from 19 aircraft to a total of 32 aircraft, which
    would result in a total of 50 aircraft in storage. The cost to store
    the H-1 aircraft is less than $125,000 per aircraft every 4 years.
    There are no reoccurring costs until the aircraft is removed from
    inactive inventory.
        MV-22: There are no MV-22Bs entering inactive inventory. The
    Inventory Management program is designed to provide aircraft capability
    modernization, manage the lifecycle and airframe flight hours, and
    ensure enough aircraft with the required capability are available to
    always satisfy Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) requirements. Further,
    an aircraft in the Inventory Management program is contracted to be
    reconstituted within 30 days of notification, providing a rapid
    response capability to adjust to changing fleet needs. Beginning in
    fiscal year 2025, the MV-22 Inventory Management program will be
    resourced for the induction and maintenance activity requirements of 48
    planned aircraft. The anticipated annual cost for the program is
    approximately $600,000 per aircraft.

        68. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide any after
    action reports, war game analysis, or other evaluation or assessment
    mechanism that informed assault support requirements for infantry units
    under the Force Design 2030 force structure?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps assault support requirements are
    based on current and forecasted Global Force Management tasking to
    include Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), maintaining a Crisis Response
    Force, sustained service level training exercises, Marine Air Ground
    Task Force training, and Weapons and Tactics Instructor support, at a
    minimum. As the Marine Corps continues to assess the future operating
    environment, further adjustments in line with our campaign of learning
    may be necessary. We have already seen this with our MV-22 squadrons.
    An analysis of airframe lifecycles combined with an assessment of
    training and operational requirements resulted in the determination
    that our MV-22 squadrons needed to be restructured from 14 squadrons of
    consisting of 12 aircraft to 16 squadrons consisting of 10 aircraft.
        The addition of two MV-22 squadrons allows the Marine Corps to
    maintain its desired deployment-to-dwell ratio for pilots and crews,
    while simultaneously optimizing a given squadron's Primary Aircraft
    Authorization for deployment as the MEU Aviation Combat Element. We
    will continue to assess our assault support posture to determine the
    most effective construct to deliver capability and capacity through
    wargames, service level exercises, and other analytical initiatives.
        While the Force Design process has laid the foundation for a
    modernized roadmap for Marine Aviation, it also sets Marine Aviation on
    the path to look to the future. For example, as part of a broader
    effort with the United States Navy, Marine Aviation is developing the
    Marine Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Expeditionary family of systems
    (FOS). These efforts include acceleration of prototyping and
    experimentation of TACAIR Collaborative Combat Aircraft and building a
    common interoperable system control architecture for control of joint
    assets. In parallel, Marine Aviation is also exploring the Vertical
    Takeoff and Landing FOS, where the logistics connector is the first
    major effort to support the execution of the stand-in force through
    airborne logistics in a contested environment. This portfolio also
    includes air loitering munitions and a future assault support
    capability to replace our extant platforms.

        69. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can you provide any after
    action reports, war game analysis, or other evaluation or assessment
    mechanism that informed close air support requirements for infantry
    units under the Force Design 2030 force structure?
        General Smith. Force Design efforts have modernized Marine aviation
    capabilities, increased readiness, and enhanced lethality across all
    platforms to meet current and future demands of global force management
    (GFM) requirements in support the joint force and combatant commanders
    (CCDRs), rapidly changing technology, and the ever-changing operating
    environment. One of the many mission essential tasks that Marine
    aviation performs is offensive air support. As part of force
    modernization, Marine aviation conducts significant integrated analysis
    of both weapon systems and aircraft employment techniques to ensure
    Marine aviation meets sortie requirements with appropriate munitions
    for the best weapon-to-target match.
        This analysis is captured in virtual, simulated, and live wargames
    and exercises throughout Headquarters Marine Corps as well as the
    operational fleet not only to inform and develop capabilities, but to
    capture and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for current and
    emerging weapon systems. As the Marine Corps continues to assess the
    operating environment, further adjustments in line with our campaign of
    learning will occur to gain and maintain the edge in lethality,
    readiness, while simultaneously optimizing our F-35 and H-1 fleet to
    support the joint force and combatant commanders (CCDRs).
        As we have always done, we will continue to assess and evolve our
    organizational construct and composition through wargames, service
    level exercises, and analytical initiatives to ensure the Marine Corps
    continues to deliver lethal capability to support the Joint Force and
    CCDR demands now and into the future.
                marine air-ground task force self-sustainability
        70. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF) enables marines to deliver rapid, powerful, and
    sustainable response on a global scale. Sea-to-shore, air-to-ground,
    door-to-door, there is not an organizational model more capable of
    quickly putting marines where they need to be in order to fight and win
    for our country. From the MEU to the MEF, marines are capable of self-
    sustaining for 15-60 days, operating without ports, airfields, or
    civilian infrastructure. Force Design 2030 changes the equipment and
    personnel available to the MAGTF, particularly the ACE. Using specific
    references to types and numbers of equipment and personnel, describe
    how the MAGTF's ability to sustain itself at the MEU, Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and MEF level differs between 2018 and
    2023.
        General Smith. The sustainment characteristics of our scalable and
    task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) remain the same:
    Marine Expeditionary Unit (15 days), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (30
    days), and Marine Expeditionary Force (60 days) today as they were in
    2018. But while the characteristics have remained the same, it is
    important to note that our force has evolved to face the challenges of
    the modern, operational environment. The following are notable
    differences in sustainment capabilities that have been fielded or are
    in the process of being fielded:
          Our MEUs are going out with 10 F-35Bs compared to 6 AV-
    8Bs. This is a significant increase in capability to support not only
    contingency operations but also enable the sustainment of our forces.
    The F-35B provides enhanced situational awareness by sensing and making
    sense of the operational environment ensuring freedom of movement and
    flexibility for sustainment operations.
          Reduction in the numbers of MV-22s per squadron from 12
    to 10 has increased the number of operational aircraft from 57 percent
    to 66 percent since 2018. While we are deploying fewer MV-22s, we are
    increasing the number of aircraft available to sustain and support
    expeditionary forces.
          We are now transitioning from the CH-53E to the new CH-
    53K. The CH-53K will provide greater payload capacity than any current
    or emerging rotorcraft. Achieving Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
    in April 2022, the CH-53K was approved for full rate production in
    December 2022. We plan to deploy the first CH-53K MEU detachment in
    fiscal year 2025.
          To sustain our equipment readiness, we are now using
    additive manufacturing at the battalion level to enable the
    manufacturing of critical parts when and where they are needed most.
    Marine Corps Logistics Command now has an industrial additive
    manufacturing capability and is manufacturing critical parts to meet
    needs across the Navy and Marine Corps.
                                 a niche force?
        71. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps divested
    significant components of its traditional combined-arms capability to
    develop capabilities specifically designed to counter China in the
    United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility
    (AOR). Does tailoring III MEF to fight China in the INDOPACOM AOR
    reduce the Marine Corps' ability to respond to contingencies around the
    globe? Provide specific examples in your response.
        General Smith. From the outset of our current modernization
    efforts, we directed the Marine Corps to design and develop a force
    focused on our pacing threat. Through these efforts and changes we must
    also retain the flexibility to adapt to changes in the operating
    environment. Where feasible, we are constantly looking for
    opportunities to sustain or expand existing strategic competitive
    advantages over our adversaries. There are constraints and restraints
    associated with modernization. Specifically, our assumption is we must
    continue to modernize under the existing topline budget. Additionally,
    we are beholden to industry's capacity to manufacture equipment as well
    as the maturation of certain technologies. In the case of the latter,
    regardless of how many resources you align to a new technology, it
    won't necessarily speed up its development.
        There is a misperception by some that Force Design efforts will
    result in a gap in Marine Corps capabilities because of the time needed
    for the divestment and fielding of new capabilities. The reality is
    that the fielding and employment of new capabilities associated with
    Force Design is already well underway. Six examples from 2022 are
    highlighted below:
        TF 61.2 and Reconnaissance and Counter-reconnaissance: In March
    2022, United States Sixth Fleet partnered with II MEF to create Task
    Force (TF) 61.2. The purpose of TF 61.2 was to command and control
    naval forces supporting contingencies in Europe and Africa. This force
    was delegated tactical control of amphibious forces (ARG/MEU) in
    theater, allocated Marine forces (Marine Rotational Force--Europe), and
    a task organized reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance force.
    Simultaneously, II MEF and 2d Marine Division were tasked with
    ``accelerating experimentation with maritime, multi-domain
    reconnaissance constructs and activities to enhance the ability of the
    stand-in force to dominate the information environment, sense and make
    sense of the situation, and win the reconnaissance vs. counter-
    reconnaissance competition.'' Commander, Sixth Fleet, immediately
    volunteered TF 61.2 to support these broader, service-level
    experimentation efforts.
        Over the course of several weeks, TF 61.2 conducted training aboard
    both the USS Woody Williams (ESB-4) and USS Georgia (SSGN-729), and
    engaged in combined-arms training in both Greece and Turkey. Those
    initial exercises demonstrated that maritime expeditionary forces could
    increase surface, subsurface, and aerial domain awareness for the fleet
    commander--regardless of theater--and allowed us to focus on the
    information web required to create domain awareness in a contested
    space. TF 61.2 then transitioned these experimental capabilities to the
    Baltics, where it participated in bilateral training on maritime domain
    awareness with the Estonian Navy in the Gulf of Finland. During this
    period, TF 61.2 and 16 NATO allies participated in an amphibious
    landing in Estonia and Exercise BALTOPS with 47 ships and 7,000
    personnel. This new organization has been so successful the previous
    Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) chose to highlight
    the value of the task force during his spring 2022 annual testimony.
    The bottom line is that your marines' ability to conduct reconnaissance
    and counter-reconnaissance is a current force capability that directly
    contributes to competition and deterrence in any environment.
        Multifunction Air Operations Center (MAOC): In March 2022, 2d
    Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) conducted the service's first operational
    deployment of a MAOC. In Lithuania, under the command of United States
    Air Forces Europe, the MAOC conducted air surveillance and multi-domain
    awareness in support of NATO operations. This is a transformational,
    expeditionary capability that can serve as a hub for Marine Corps,
    naval, and joint kill webs. The MAOC enables the control of aircraft
    and missiles and expedites decisionmaking. It also offers the ability
    to gain and maintain custody of adversary targets and hold those
    targets at risk via fires with its organic TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-
    Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), Common Aviation Command and Control System
    (CAC2S), and highly proficient aviation C2 marines. The MAOC is
    scalable to units small enough to support distributed teams or large
    enough to support a MEF or Corps-level fight. The 3d MAW MAOC employed
    this capability as part of Marine Rotational Force--Darwin (MRF-D),
    integrating C2 and sensor services for 16 allied and partner nations
    during Exercise PITCH BLACK. From these initial efforts, 3d MAW has
    matured the MAOC, creating a persistent hub to enhance the common
    tactical picture for I and III MEF.
        Marine Corps Information Command (MCIC): In October 2022, we
    streamlined and simplified much of the coordination required for space
    and cyberspace operations at the headquarters level by realigning
    current relationships and structure at Headquarters, Marine Corps
    (HQMC) from a staff officer to an operational commander, to create the
    MCIC. The MCIC is a service-retained command designed to integrate
    global Marine Corps capabilities in information, intelligence,
    cyberspace, and space to support Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) resulting in
    decision advantage. This two-star command operates under Marine Forces
    Command (MARFORCOM) and provides critical linkages across operational
    level planning. It also provides task organized detachments to support
    the FMF commander's campaigning objectives. This allows the commander
    to leverage the authorities needed to synchronize global cyber, space,
    influence, and intelligence effects and generate multi-domain
    advantages in support of the commander's objectives. The MCIC achieved
    initial operational capability (IOC) in January 2023.
        VMGR-153 and HMH-461: In January 2023, we activated Marine Aerial
    Refueler Transport Squadron 153 (VMGR-153) in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. By
    2026, VMGR-153 will bring 15 KC-130J aircraft to the region, building
    on the organic mobility available to marines responding to crisis or
    conflict in the region. We are also approaching 1 year since the CH-53K
    program achieved IOC and are well underway transitioning Marine Heavy
    Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461) into our first fully operational CH-
    53K squadron.
                           marine littoral regiments
        72. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, have any combatant commanders
    asked for an MLR to deploy to their theater?
        General Smith. Yes. In testimony before Congress, the former and
    current EUCOM commanders have expressed a desire for an MLR in EUCOM.
    The current INDOPACOM commander has testified that he desires
    accelerated fielding of MLRs and other Stand in Forces.
        The first of three planned Marine Littoral Regiments, 3d MLR was
    activated on 3 March 2022, on Marine Corps Base Hawaii. This MLR (and
    the other 2) will be assigned forces to
        INDOPACOM and will be registered as an INDOPACOM assigned force
    demand in the Global Force Management process.

        73. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, can MLRs conduct amphibious
    assaults, raids, or other missions that a MEU would conduct?
        General Smith. While highly capable, the MLR is not optimized for
    amphibious assaults, raids, or other missions, more common to a MEU.
    The MLR does not operate from or train with an ARG comprised of three
    Amphibious Warfare Ships, which allow it to conduct said operations. It
    is designed to disrupt the adversary in a contested littoral
    environment through reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and sea
    denial operations to support the Naval Expeditionary Force's maritime
    campaign. Its tasks are below:
          Conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
          Support Maritime Domain Awareness
          Conduct Reconnaissance in the Maritime Domain
          Support Littoral Targeting
          Conduct Littoral Transportation Operations
          Conduct Air Direction in Support of Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations
          Command and Control Distributed Maritime Operations
          Plan and Direct Littoral Maneuver
          Plan and Direct Sea Denial Operations
          Support Sea Denial Operations

        74. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in General Berger's first two
    directives upon assuming the position of the 38th Commandant of the
    Marine Corps he stated in the 38th Commandant's Intent and the 38th
    Commandant's Planning Guidance, ``the Marine Corps will be trained and
    equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to
    operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet
    operations.'' This guidance in part served as the foundation for the
    creation of MLRs under Force Design 2030. The Army currently possesses
    a similar capability to the MLRs through its Multi-Domain Task Forces
    (MDTF). What is your reaction to the contention of some that the MDTFs
    exist to support the Joint Force and the MLRs to support the Navy?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps' Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and
    the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) represent innovative and
    thoughtful approaches to compete and win on the modern battlefield,
    against peer adversaries. Both formations offer unique, yet
    complementary, capabilities that present multiple dilemmas for
    adversaries and generate options for the Joint Force commander in both
    competition and conflict.
        The MLR is distinguished by its forward posture, its ability to
    rapidly deploy with organic Marine Corps and Navy assets, and its
    capabilities to persist within an adversary's weapons engagement zone.
    These capabilities are underpinned by naval concepts to include
    Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, Distributed Maritime
    Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and the Concept for
    Stand-In Forces.
        The MDTF provides complementary theater-level maneuver elements
    focused on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks through the conduct
    of multi-domain operations (MDO). The MDTF does not possess organic
    mobility, rather it relies on strategic lift and commercial vessels for
    inter-theater mobility within a distributed maritime environment, such
    as the Indo-Pacific region.
        In the expansive Indo-Pacific region, a clear necessity exists for
    the MLR and the MDTF, particularly in time of conflict. Both units
    leverage a similar multi-domain approach, in some cases using like
    systems. However, the MLR has a unique mission requirement to operate
    forward postured in the Indo-Pacific region within a contested area

        75. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, as so much of the success of
    MLRs depend on the prepositioning of forces, what steps is the Marines
    Corps currently taking to ensure partner nations will allow these units
    to operate in their territory?
        General Smith. Security cooperation is a key means of enhancing
    access and increasing the likelihood that this access will be permitted
    during a crisis. Key vehicles that facilitate our security cooperation
    include visits by deployed Marine Corps forces, key leader engagements,
    bilateral and multilateral exercises, and humanitarian assistance/
    disaster relief (HA/DR) support.

        Examples of key engagements the Marine Corps supports includes:
        Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI): In the post-2001 era, both
    the United States and Japan recognized the need to adjust United States
    force posture to effectively fulfill the requirements of the Alliance.
    The DPRI laid out a future path to realign United States forces across
    the Indo-Pacific to meet the challenges of the future and included
    significant repositioning of forces from Okinawa to Guam and other
    locations. As a result of the 2021 Global Posture Review, the
    Department of Defense is engaged with our A&P across the region to
    advance initiatives that contribute to regional stability. Posture
    changes announced on January 11, 2023, by the United States and the
    Government of Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) ensures that
    the Marine Corps remains ready to address evolving regional and global
    security challenges. Specifically, a mutual agreement was reached that
    the 12th Marine Regiment will remain on Okinawa and will be reorganized
    into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) by 2025 in accordance with
    Marine Corps modernization efforts. The 12th MLR will provide a ready
    and capable Stand-In-Force within the first island chain, prepared to
    support the U.S-Japan Alliance, bolstering our ability to support
    deterrence efforts, and respond to contingencies.
        Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the
    Philippines: In 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the
    EDCA, which bolsters the bilateral alliance by allowing extended
    rotational presence of United States Forces and the establishment of
    facilities for joint use--these facilities are known as ``EDCA sites.''
    Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC) and the Philippine Marine
    Corps (PMC) signed the 5-Year Integrated Readiness and Deterrence Plan
    2022-2026 to advance integrated deterrence and enable the maintenance
    and sustainment of combat readiness. The goal is to integrate and
    posture PMC-MARFORPAC forces and capabilities by 2026, including
    persistent MLR engagement. The United States-Philippine joint
    development and investment within EDCA locations exemplify the
    necessity of the Marine Corps and United States Forces in the
    Philippines in order to develop Philippine bases and locations to
    bilaterally respond to HA/DR situations and enable combined training
    through scheduled exercises, like Balikatan, and other engagements.
        Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) in Australia: Per the 2023
    Australian Defence Strategic Review, the Australian Army is developing
    a highly capable, modern amphibious fighting force. The Marine Corps
    and the Australian Army maximize integration, capability development,
    and training with MRF-D, the rotational Marine Corps presence in
    Australia. MRF-D, supported by the Ground Equipment Staging Program
    (GESP) participates in recurrent multilateral exercises like Talisman
    Sabre and bilateral engagement opportunities like Pitch Black.
    Additionally, Marine Corps support for the Australian Army's amphibious
    capability development which bolsters the second pillar of the enhanced
    trilateral security partnership ``AUKUS.'' This continual support to
    Australia's defense development and modernization strengthens
    longstanding bilateral ties thus enhancing ongoing operational access.
        Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia (MRF-SEA): Since 2022,
    MARFORPAC has forward-deployed forces to Southeast Asia to achieve
    maritime security objectives with A&P in the region. MRF-SEA reassures
    A&P in region by consistently and reliably executing agreed-upon
    security cooperation activities. This contributes to regional stability
    by increasing MARFORPAC's responsiveness to crises and contingences.
    MRF-SEA conducts bilateral and multilateral security cooperation
    engagements with partners such as Singapore and Indonesia. This modular
    rotational force exercises distributed command, control, logistics, and
    transportation nodes supporting multiple, sometimes simultaneous,
    regional engagements. The exact composition of the force, locations,
    and schedules vary each year according to agreed-upon security
    cooperation engagements with host countries. This concept also operates
    within existing access, basing, and overflight agreements with
    Southeast Asian partners and allies to mutually support posture
    initiatives and reduce inter-theater transportation requirements for
    not only the Marine Corps but also partner and allied forces.
        Task Force Koa Moana (TF KM): TF KM is the primary Marine Corps
    force to counter the People's Republic of China (PRC) influence and
    access in Oceania. Through TF KM's modest investments, the Marine Corps
    obtains excellent access to key sea lines of communication and achieves
    outsized effects that are mutually beneficial to A&P and the U.S. In
    fiscal year 2022 TF KM primarily engaged in Palau and the Commonwealth
    of Northern Marianas Islands due to pandemic-induced travel
    restrictions. In fiscal year 2023, TF KM has returned to contested
    terrain such as the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Fiji, and
    Tonga. These engagements supported maritime security and maritime
    domain awareness, as well as reinforce combined logistics hubs within
    contested environments. The development of multilateral maritime law
    enforcement, HA/DR response exercises, and climate change resilience
    continues to enhance multilateral security cooperation and
    accessibility throughout Oceania.
        Marine Rotational Force-Europe (MRF-E) in Norway: The Marine Corps
    maintains a very close relationship with Norway that facilitates
    setting the theater--
    developing a profound understanding of the region and establishing
    conditions for Marine Corps success--through an exercise schedule that
    provides near-persistent presence of USMC forces in Norway and the High
    North. The United States--Norway Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
    Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway provides USMC access
    to the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in Norway (MCPP-N). MCPP-N
    facilitates prepositioned stocks, which are available for global
    operational requirements in support of any geographic combatant
    commander. In addition to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which
    allows USMC forces to move into, through, and transit out of Norway,
    the United States and Norway share a Defense Cooperation Agreement and
    Supplemental Defense Cooperation Agreement, assure United States Forces
    additional access to Norwegian and United States-built infrastructure
    in Norway.
                         iii marine expeditionary force
        76. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, title 10 states that, ``[t]he
    Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized
    as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings,
    and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be
    organic therein.'' Can you explain the difference in III MEF's
    structure pre-Force Design 2030 and once Force Design is complete?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps still possesses three combat
    divisions, three air wings, three logistics groups, and three
    information groups.
        Historically, the Marine Corps relies on supplying approximately
    one-fifth of III Marine Expeditionary Force's (III MEF) combat power
    via the Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Pre-Force Design, III MEF's
    structure consisted of just over 27,000 marines. At the conclusion of
    Force Design 2030, III MEF's structure will consist of just over 22,100
    marines, however 89 percent of III MEF's combat power will be organic,
    reducing the requirement to source unit deployment-based marines to the
    MEF. This reduction in constant troop rotations adds to unit readiness
    as units spend less time transiting back and forth to CONUNS and more
    time training and staying prepared to fight.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Pre-FD              2030 (4th/
                    III MEF                    (2019)      2023    12th MLR)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MEF CE.................................       3218       3174       3207
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1st MAW................................       6418       7072       7281
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3d MARDIV..............................       6334       4358       4759
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3D MLG.................................       5288       4705       4517
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Wing UDP...............................        663        663        663
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Div UDP................................       3732       3743        339
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MEF CE UDP.............................        120        120        120
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    31st MEU UDP...........................       1235       1235       1235
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total UDP..............................       5750       5761       2357
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................      27008      25070      22121
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Share UDP..............................        21%        23%        11%
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Share non-UDP..........................        79%        77%        89%
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        77. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, what was the structure of the
    3d Marine Division pre-Force Design 2030 and what will it be in 2030?
        General Smith. Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 1-10.1
    Organization of the United States Marine Corps defines the composition
    of a division. As the MCRP provides the high-level overview of the
    current structure of the Marine Corps at the time of publication, it is
    not a prescribed document. Thus, the three MEFs and the subordinate
    divisions, wings, and logistics elements will not be identical across
    the service. 3d Marine Division has always been organized differently
    than the other divisions (pages 5-2 through 5-4 of the 2015
    publication). In this document, 3d Marine Division is composed of only
    two infantry regiments, one of which is filled by units throughout the
    Marine Corps under the unit deployment program (UDP).
        This reference publication is currently in the final stages of
    update. At the completion of Force Design 2030 modernization efforts,
    3d Marine Division will have three operational MLRs, the 3d, 4th, and
    12th MLRs. Going forward, 3d Marine Division will retain a similar
    structure but with a different organization of the units within it.

        78. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, by table of organization, how
    many infantry marines were in the 3d Marine Division pre-Force Design
    2030?
        General Smith. 4,548.

        79. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, how many infantry marines will
    be in 3d Marine Division when Force Design 2030 is fully implemented?
        General Smith. 2,403.
        The planned 2030 force includes the infantry marines from the 31st
    MEU, 3d, 4th, and 12th MLR. 3d and 12th MLR have permanently stationed
    littoral combat teams consisting of 572 infantry marines, while 4th MLR
    and the 31st MEU will rotate infantry battalions in through the Unit
    Deployment Program
        The raw data depicted above does not provide the necessary context
    to understand the increased lethality these infantry formations have
    gained by investments in capabilities such as precision fires, advanced
    sensor assets, and critical communications equipment to synthesize
    targeting. There are more killing assets per infantry marine in 2030
    than in 2019. Infantry battalion lethality, as measured by share of
    crew-served weapons per marine assigned to infantry battalion,
    increased by 28 percent from 2019 to 2030.
        The increased lethality of the core infantry battalion is improved
    through increased staffing. From 1995 until now, Battalion T/Os have
    gotten slightly smaller, but the staffing percentage has increased, and
    the unit-to-unit variances have decreased. The higher staffing level
    allows commanders to train as they will fight.'' For Infantry
    battalions, the staffing as a percent of T/O is 97 percent now; up from
    89 percent in 1995 (all battalions aggregated). In 1995, 5 of 24
    battalions were staffed above 100 percent of T/O while 12 were below 90
    percent of T/O; compared to 2023, where 10 battalions are above 100
    percent and only 5 are below 90 percent.

        80. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in 2030, will III MEF be able
    to conduct humanitarian/disaster relief operations on the scale that it
    did during Operation Unified Assistance, the response to the tsunami in
    Southeast Asia in 2004?
        General Smith. Yes.
        While our operations are dependent on amphibious fleet size, the
    Marine Corps will be able to conduct humanitarian/disaster relief
    operations on a scale heretofore achieved.
        However, in the next two to 5 years, many of our amphibious ships
    will reach the end of their service life and will cause delays in ARG/
    MEU deployments. These platforms are critical to providing HA/DR. When
    there are gaps in global ARG/MEU coverage, the Nation risks not having
    the right assets capable of getting to the crisis in time.

        81. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, beyond its role to operate in
    the contested littorals, is III MEF today currently capable of meeting
    its requirements for other regional war plans?
        General Smith. Yes, III MEF can meet its requirements for other
    regional war plans.
                          marine corps mine clearance
        82. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in responses provided to my
    office by the Marine Corps following an April 14, 2023 brief on section
    1023 of the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, the Marine Corps reported that the
    anti-personnel obstacle breaching system (APOBS) and M58 Mine Clearing
    Line Charge (MICLIC) enabled the clearance for a 100m-long path through
    minefields for foot-mobile and vehicle movement. When either of these
    capabilities are employed, how will the minefields be ``proofed'' to
    ensure it supports foot-mobile or vehicular movement?
        General Smith. Breaching consists of four sequential activities:
    detect, reduce, mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. The Marine
    Corps can detect and mark explosive hazards by hand and still
    explosively create lanes through minefields and mark those lanes.
    Marine engineer battalions remain equipped with the man-portable Anti-
    Personnel Obstacle Breaching Systems (APOBS) for clearing 45m lanes for
    foot-traffic, as well as with the trailer mounted M58 Mine Clearing
    Line Charge (MICLIC) for clearing up to 100m vehicle-capable lanes.
        Currently, the Marine Corps is investing in the development of
    lighter route clearance capabilities; using unmanned air, littoral and
    ground platforms intended to detect and neutralize landmines and IEDs
    from safe distances (i.e., outside the serious injury zone around the
    mine/IED). Between fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2028, $80 million
    will be invested into these emerging capabilities. One of these
    capabilities is the Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON)
    program of record designed to provide an initial organic Marine Corps
    counter-mine capability from shallow water through the beach zone.
    Derived from a 2019 Rapid Statement of Need (RSON), the program fields
    a family of systems (FoS) that enables Explosive Ordnance Disposal
    (EOD) marines to detect and neutralize underwater explosive hazards
    from standoff distances with robotic and autonomous platforms. When
    fully operationally capable, this FoS complements Navy Mine
    Countermeasure (MCM) capability and capacity, enhances multi-domain
    awareness, and ensures the maneuver, protection, and sustainment of the
    Naval expeditionary force. In the interim, Marine engineers will
    continue to use hand-held detectors and sickle sticks to execute route
    sweeping operations and use combinations of emplaced charges and remote
    detonation techniques to sympathetically detonate explosive hazards to
    clear routes for smaller, light maneuver forces.
                             marine corps artillery
        83. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, senior Ukrainian military
    leaders have praised the addition of the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket
    System (HIMARS) rocket system to their forces, but also add that the
    most important fire support system for their forces has been cannon
    artillery. How does the present, real world example comport with the
    significant reductions in marines' cannon artillery?
        General Smith. We have retained two cannon artillery battalions in
    the Active component, which provides capacity to support MEU
    deployments and to provide close support fires for a Marine Brigade-
    sized unit. Two additional cannon artillery battalions are available in
    the Reserve component to support surge requirements.
        Ukraine is heavily dependent on 155 cannon artillery and mortar
    systems due to the nature of warfare being conducted across the forward
    line of troops. When Ukraine wants to prosecute long range, high value
    targets with precision, they rely on the HIMARS. Currently, the vast
    majority of Ukrainian and Russian forces fighting inside Ukraine are in
    close contact; oftentimes the distance between Russian and Ukrainian
    lines are a few hundred meters. Further, small pockets of territory are
    captured and recaptured by Ukrainian and Russian forces accentuating
    the war's relative closeness. From the Ukrainian perspective, the
    closeness of combat operations suggests that cannon artillery is the
    optimum fires required to support Ukrainian forces in contact with the
    Russians.
        How the Ukrainian military is defending its homeland is a different
    problem set as to how the Marine Corps will integrate with the joint
    force in a future conflict and fulfill its Title 10 responsibilities of
    conducting ``land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of
    a naval campaign'' against a near peer adversary.
        Cannons and rockets are complementary fire support systems, but
    provide unique advantages and disadvantages depending on mission,
    enemy, targets, and terrain. The Ukrainians have effectively employed
    both cannons and rockets to defend and retake territory with a lack of
    aviation fires. As a part of our combined arms doctrine, the Marine
    Corps integrates artillery, aviation, naval, and non-kinetic fires to
    achieve effects that enable maneuver. We have carefully assessed the
    current and future capabilities of our peer adversaries, as well as the
    capabilities required to support naval maneuver. Through that analysis,
    we are retaining some cannon artillery for land-based contingency
    operations while transitioning to precision fires platforms with
    extended ranges (e.g., rockets and missiles) and further development of
    loitering munitions technology. In addition to providing greater range
    and accuracy, these new systems provide an anti-ship capability that is
    critical to supporting naval campaigns. We will continue to assess the
    right mix of artillery systems to compliment the other fires components
    within the MAGTF.
                   marine corps law enforcement capabilities
        84. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps is divesting
    of three law enforcement (LE) battalions and consequently capabilities
    like policing, crime scene processing, mobility/route security,
    detention operations and enemy prisoner of war (EPW)/detainee handling,
    biometrics and evidence handling, military working dogs, sensitive site
    exploitation, and police advising and training. Have combatant
    commanders been made aware that assigned or allocated Marine Corps
    forces will no longer possess these operational units and their
    associated capabilities?
        General Smith. Yes, combatant commands are informed via the annual
    Global Force Management Allocation Plan process. During this process,
    the Joint Staff validates combatant command requirements and determines
    which Services have the necessary capabilities to fulfill these
    requirements. The Joint Staff then determines a sourcing solution for
    such requirements based on the Services' capability and capacity.

        85. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, does the Marine Corps intend
    to retain law enforcement capabilities in other units, and if so, which
    specific units and in what capacities?
        General Smith. With the divestment of the Active component Law
    Enforcement Battalions (LE Bn), the USMC continues to retain law
    enforcement capabilities within the installation and the Marine Corps
    Reserves within 4th LE Bn. Installation Law Enforcement capabilities
    reside within Marine Corps Installation Command (MCICOM), Training and
    Education Command (TECOM), and Marine Corps Reserve Headquarters, New
    Orleans LA. Installation Law Enforcement is comprised of Provost
    Marshal Offices and Marine Corps Police Departments (PMO / MCPD). These
    formations provide Law Enforcement capabilities to installation
    commanders that include, but are not limited to, Incident Response,
    Criminal Investigation, Special Reaction Teams (SRT), Military Working
    Dogs, Accident Investigation, Corrections, Physical Security, and
    Administrative Services. 4th LE Bn is organized to support operational
    requirements, by training to standards such as maneuver and mobility
    support, policing, and detainee operations.

    Installation PMO/MCPD Locations:

          MCICOM

           o  MCLB Albany, GA
           o  MCSF Blount Island, FL
           o  MCB Camp Lejeune
           o  MCAS Cherry Point
           o  MCB Cam Pendleton
           o  MCAS Miramar
           o  MCAS Yuma
           o  MCLB Barstow
           o  MCB Quantico
           o  MCAF (HMX-1
           o  MCB Camp Butler
           o  MCAS Futenma
           o  Camp Fiji
           o  Camp Mujuk
           o  MCAS Iwakuni
           o  MCB Hawaii
           o  MCAS Hawaii

    TECOM:

          MCAGCC 29 Palms, CA
          MCMWTC Bridgeport
          MCRD San Diego
          MCRD Parris Island

    Marine Forces Reserve:

          NOLA HQ
          4th Law Enforcement Battalion Units/Location o Military
    Police Company A
           o  Lexington, KY
           o  Military Police Company B
           o  North Versailles, PA
           o  Military Police Company C
           o  Dayton, OH
           o  Military Police Company D
           o  Billings, MT
           o  Anchorage, AK
           o  Headquarters Support Company
           o  Albuquerque, NM
                                 scout snipers
        86. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in late February 2023, the
    Marine Corps issued a memo announcing the immediate transition of scout
    sniper platoons to scout platoons. The reason given was that scout
    sniper platoons did not provide battalion commanders with sufficient
    ``continuous all-weather information gathering.'' These new scout
    platoons of 26 marines, which is larger than the traditional scout
    sniper platoon size of 18, will ``provide the commander with relevant,
    reliable, accurate and prompt information.'' While Marine Forces
    Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and reconnaissance battalions will
    continue to train their own snipers, infantry battalions will no longer
    have an organic sniper capability. Instead they will rely on some type
    of less capable and specialized designated marksman for precision
    shooting. I believe efforts to increase the information available to a
    battalion commander are worthwhile but I am concerned about the
    tradeoff. What exercises and experiments informed this decision?
        General Smith. In Spring 2020, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
    approved the Force Design 2030 plan, divesting the preponderance of
    weapon-specific military occupational specialties within the infantry
    battalions in favor of highly trained marines more capable of employing
    a variety of weapons and equipment. Included in this decision was
    divesting Scout Sniper Platoon structure, believing that rifle squads
    with advanced equipment and training could provide suitable ground-
    based sensing in support of the infantry battalion. (Today's basic
    infantry rifle with integrated scope is considerably more accurate than
    earlier versions, and infantry company ``arms rooms'' also include
    precision rifles for designated marines to employ as directed for
    specific missions.)
        Infantry Battalion Experimentation (IBX) Phase I determined the
    redesigned infantry battalions lacked sufficient all-weather
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
    Based on these findings, the Commandant approved establishing a Scout
    Platoon in each infantry battalion, providing timely, organic ISR
    capability in support of the battalion commander's Priority
    Intelligence and Commander's Critical Information Requirements.
        Infantry companies retain their precision rifle capability, and the
    Marine Corps will maintain school-trained snipers within Reconnaissance
    and Marine Special Operations units. Reconnaissance Marines will attend
    the Service-run Reconnaissance Sniper Course, training in precision
    marksmanship and weapons employment standards in multiple environments,
    focusing on distributed small unit operations. Marine Raiders attend
    the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command-run special
    operations sniper courses.
        The Marine Corps no longer awards the 0317 (Scout Sniper) MOS.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2024, all infantry battalions will add a Scout
    Platoon, divest of the sniper platoon, and move the precision rifles to
    the infantry companies' arms rooms.
        Experimentation is a core component of Force Design 2030, and the
    Service will continue testing concepts and equipment to ensure infantry
    battalions are properly structured, trained, and equipped to meet
    Joint, naval, and service requirements. In this spirit, experimentation
    is currently underway (IBX Phase II) to study how the new Scout Platoon
    best supports battalion-level organic all-weather ISR requirements and
    the Service's enduring requirements for precision marksmanship
    capabilities.

        87. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will recon snipers be employed
    and assigned differently to provide the missing sniper capability if a
    battalion commander wants it?
        General Smith. No.
        Reconnaissance snipers will be employed to meet the missions
    assigned to their units. Within the restructured infantry battalions,
    the precision rifle capability now resides within an ``arms room'' in
    the infantry companies to be employed by infantry marines as deemed
    necessary for specific missions. Infantry marines designated by their
    commanders will attend the additional training necessary to become
    proficient in the employment of precision rifles. Marines in the Scout
    Platoon will provide an organic ISR capability.
             lift capability in united states indo-pacific command
        88. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, maintenance issues and
    amphibious ship retirements have prevented the Navy from deploying
    Amphibious Ready Groups when MEUs have been ready to deploy. The Navy's
    30-year shipbuilding plan never achieves the legal requirement to have
    at least 31 amphibious ships in the fleet. The Landing Ship Medium,
    which is critical to realizing the full capability of the MLR, will not
    be fielded in sufficient numbers to satisfy the requirements for even
    one MLR in the next 5 years. With these significant challenges in
    amphibious lift, the Marine Corps is posed to reduce the organic
    aviation lift available to the MAGTF over the next several years,
    including putting MV-22s and CH-53Ks into storage. Please explain how
    the changes to Marine Corps aviation with Force Design 2030 do not
    decrease the Marine Corps' organic lift capability in the INDOPACOM
    AOR.
        General Smith. The Marine Corps is not reducing organic aviation
    lift through the storage or preservation of aircraft; however, we are
    conducting active inventory management, a proven concept used since the
    beginning of Marine Aviation. Inventory management is designed to
    provide aircraft capability modernization, manage the lifecycle and
    airframe flight hours, and ensure enough aircraft with the required
    capability are always available to our operational forces.
                            marine corps innovation
        89. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in your answers to the
    congressional advance policy questions you stated ``the ability to
    rapidly develop concepts for victory, wargame, experiment, and modify
    those concepts is vital to ensure the Marine Corps stays ahead of our
    adversaries.'' Do you intend to change the way the Marine Corps
    develops new doctrine and concepts?
        General Smith. The Marine Corps has a process to harmonize capstone
    and subordinate operating concepts, functional concepts,
    experimentation, and legacy and new Marine Corps doctrine and training
    publications. While the process to rapidly develop doctrine based on
    concepts, wargames, and experiments is in place, it requires constant
    collaboration between stakeholders to maintain a common focus on the
    goals of concepts and experiments and socialization of what is being
    learned during the efforts. If confirmed as Commandant, I do not intend
    to change the way the Marine Corps develops new doctrine and concepts.
                       navy and marine corps cooperation
        90. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, you stated in your answers to
    the congressional advance policy questions, that ``[i]f confirmed, I
    anticipate being assigned the duty of coordinating Marine Corps
    modernization efforts with those of the Joint Force.'' The Navy's 30-
    year shipbuilding plan fails to meet the 31 amphibious warfare ship
    requirement and does not meet the requirement for 35 Landing Ship
    Mediums. How will you work with the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and
    Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to ensure the Marine Corps and Navy's
    modernization efforts are synchronized?
        General Smith. I want to thank Congress for providing these
    statutory requirements that strengthen the relationship between the
    Navy and the Marine Corps team. The Marine Corps is a naval
    expeditionary force committed to supporting the Navy and combatant
    commanders with maritime forces capable of contributing to naval and
    Joint campaigns.
        If confirmed as Commandant, I remain committed to exercising these
    authorities to further strengthen the relationship between the Marine
    Corps and Navy within the Department of the Navy. Together, we are
    working to establish the formal procedures in which the Marine Corps
    will integrate amphibious warfare ship requirements into the 30-year
    shipbuilding plan. We must also develop a plan that achieves an
    inventory of no fewer than 31 amphibious warfare ships, consisting of
    at least 10 LHDs/LHAs and 21 LPDs and provides the necessary funding
    for 35 Medium Landing Ships. The Navy and Marine Corps are in unique
    positions regarding the amphibious fleet as one service chief owns the
    requirement, while the other owns the resources. Notwithstanding, I
    commit that, if confirmed, I will cooperate and work tirelessly with
    the SECNAV, CNO, and their staffs to ensure the Nation possesses the
    most capable amphibious fleet in the world in line with statutory
    requirements.
        I will also creatively work with the Secretary of the Navy and the
    Chief of Naval Operations to pursue acquisition authorities granted in
    the fiscal year 2023 NDAA to maintain the required number of amphibious
    warfare ships in the future. Multi-ship procurement can achieve cost
    savings of 10 percent, or greater if maximized by procuring five ships
    or more. Moreover, amphibious warfare ship affordability is maximized
    with multi-ship buys that stabilize the industrial base and improve
    buying power. If confirmed, I am fully committed to working closely
    with the Navy and this Committee to champion the necessity of providing
    shipyards with sustained and predictable funding lines to create
    industrial stability.

        91. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Marine Corps has publicly
    commented on supporting the Navy in Force Design 2030; however, the
    Navy appears not to have reciprocated, most notably in the 30-year ship
    building plan which never gets to 31 amphibious ships or 35 LSMs. What
    is your plan to work with the SECNAV and CNO to ensure that Navy
    publications and senior leader statements reflect support for Marine
    Corps modernization efforts, specifically 31 amphibious ships and 35
    LSMs?
        General Smith. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the
    Navy (SECNAV) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to establish formal
    procedures in which the Marine Corps will integrate amphibious warfare
    ship requirements into the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Additionally, I
    commit to working with the SECNAV and CNO to develop a shipbuilding
    plan that achieves and maintains an inventory of no fewer than 31
    amphibious warfare ships, consisting of at least 10 LHDs/LHAs and 21
    LPDs and provides the necessary funding for 35 Medium Landing Ships.
        As a naval expeditionary force in readiness, it is critical that
    the Navy and Marine Corps leadership continue to maintain maritime
    dominance. To effectively achieve this goal and adhere to the 2022
    National Defense Strategy (NDS), we must prioritize maritime mobility
    and maneuver. As a part of the naval, joint, and combined force, the
    Marine Corps generates value by its ability to respond to crises, seize
    and hold key maritime terrain, and effectively campaign. Amphibious
    warfare ships (AWS) have historically played a major role in
    maintaining an Active forward presence with credible combat power,
    providing combatant commanders flexible response and deterrence
    options, which contribute directly to integrated deterrence.
                              allies and partners
        92. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, in your answers to the
    congressional advance policy questions you said the Marine Corps'
    responsibility to respond to crises outside of existing guidance will
    ``require closer integration with Allies and partners.'' What ideas do
    you have to strengthen relationships and deepen integration with Allies
    and partners?
        General Smith. The best way to build trust, strengthen alliances,
    and develop new partnerships is to maintain a forward presence, thereby
    enabling substantive interactions with our Allies and partners. Marines
    must be forward deployed--particularly in the INDOPACOM Command's Area
    of Responsibility to strengthen relationships and counter adversary
    malign influence in the region. We maintain positive military-to-
    military relationships with many countries throughout this region, and
    we need to continue making the investments necessary to sustain and
    improve those relationships. In addition to increasing our forward
    presence, we should expand our participation in various shared
    activities to include the international professional military education
    program in which dozens of senior military leaders from allied and
    partner nations attend our military schools and war colleges. We also
    send more of our officers to foreign professional military education
    programs. Through the personnel exchange program, United States marines
    integrate into billets in select foreign militaries, and select foreign
    officers integrate into Marine Corps billets. If confirmed, I pledge to
    continue, and where appropriate, expand these valuable programs.
                        access and basing and overflight
        93. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, MLR employment in the Indo-
    Pacific and SIF execution rely on access, basing, and overflight (ABO)
    access from allies and partners. From the Marines Corps perspective,
    can you prioritize the countries in the Indo-Pacific where ABO rights
    are required to employ MLRs and conduct SIF and EABO operations?
        General Smith. ABO is a critical requirement for any Stand-in
    Force. However, all Joint Forces are dependent on ABO from our allies
    and partners to maneuver throughout the battlespace. Each of our allies
    and partners in the Indo-Pacific is crucial to ability of the Marine
    Corps and joint force to succeed in competition and conflict. The
    Commander, USINDOPACOM has prioritized country engagements in keeping
    with his authorities.

        94. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, is the Marine Corps currently
    working on a strategy to mitigate any challenges stemming from
    countries not allowing access and basing in the event of a conflict
    with the PRC?
        General Smith. Yes. Accessing, basing, or overflight (ABO) during
    conflict is never guaranteed. However, steps can be taken prior to
    conflict in order to increase the likelihood of ABO. The Marine Corps
    actively participates in joint and interagency efforts to increase the
    likelihood for access. These efforts include frequent interactions with
    Allied and partner senior military leaders, forward positioning of
    forces, robust and regular engagements with combined forces, and our
    continuous rotational presence in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the
    Marine Corps has and will continue to mitigate the challenges of not
    having ABO. We remain uniquely postured with agile amphibious forces,
    capable of freely maneuvering through the commons, and if necessary,
    capable of limited-scale forcible entry. Marine forces afloat provide
    immense flexibility and optionality that mitigate the risks stemming
    from limited ABO. This is why it is so vital to maintain a minimum of
    31 amphibious warships.
                       unit deployment program in alaska
        95. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, the Stand-in Forces concept,
    designed to deter China by keeping Marine Littoral Regiments within the
    First Island Chain, where they can conduct sea denial operations and
    provide the joint force with targeting and intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance (ISR) data, is a component of Expeditionary Advanced
    Base Operations. In the Indo-Pacific, SIF and EABO rely on access to
    land, sea, and airspace of allied and partner nations. In the event of
    a conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC), access, basing,
    and overflight (ABO) rights from allied and partner nations are not
    guaranteed. If such access is denied by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
    Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, the Philippines, Japan, or South Korea,
    flowing forces into a fight against the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
    in INDOPACOM will be incredibly difficult. The PRC knows this and has
    the economic, political, and military tools to leverage neutrality from
    these countries. Prepositioned equipment in places like Australia, the
    Philippines, Japan, and South Korea may be inaccessible or have to be
    relocated to United States territory like Guam for distribution. United
    States Forces in Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, Japan, and
    South Korea may all be prohibited from deploying into combat from those
    locations. Our Forces on Guam, more densely packed by the day on an
    island that offers limited training opportunities for the Marine Corps,
    are almost certain to be targeted by the PLA early and often as they
    seek to neutralize or degrade that power projection platform.
        General Smith. Four years ago, the Marine Corps was poised to alter
    its Indo-Pacific force laydown to account for the inherent risk of ABO
    denial and limited training opportunities on Marine Corps bases across
    the Indo-Pacific. The 37th Commandant, General Robert Neller, sent
    several teams to Alaska to assess infrastructure and training
    opportunities to support a Unit Deployment Program (UDP) and
    prepositioned assets the Marine Corps would need to surge forward in
    the event of conflict with the PLA. Alaska's benefits were as obvious
    then as they are now: year-round, cost-effective training in almost
    every climate and terrain; the Nation's best sea, air, and land ranges
    necessary to train SIF and execute EABO; access to the largest and most
    advanced Air Force-Army training complex in the United States at the
    Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC); proximity to potential
    conflict areas in the Indo-Pacific like the Korean peninsula, Japan,
    and Taiwan (not to mentioned access to EUCOM); and, incredibly
    supportive American citizens and local governments whose decision to
    continue to support the training of American military forces would not
    be impacted by Contingency Command Post (CCP) pressure campaigns as
    they are in other parts of the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.
        Unlike Darwin, where marines deploy for 6 months each year, Alaska
    provides year round training for the MAGTF in nearly every clime and
    place found on the globe. This training comes at a reduced cost
    compared to the expensive rotations through Darwin, which are reported
    to cost $50 million, with the added benefit of also being in theater.
    Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER)-based military forces are closer
    than Darwin to South Korea (2,274 vice 3,467 miles), and Japan (2,063
    vice 3,395 miles).
        While Guam does not have Darwin's temporal restrictions, it
    provides such limited access to training ranges that marines will have
    to go off-island to conduct SIF and EABO operations, despite the $8.6
    billion investment to activate the facility. For example, the current
    Jungle Warfare School on Okinawa, which is 8,900 acres, will relocate
    to Camp Blaz on Guam, where it will shrink to 2,031 acres. Access to
    training in nearby countries is constantly threatened by PRC economic
    coercion. Should it be successful, we will have 5,000 marines on an
    island where they cannot train to the standard necessary to win that
    will surely be targeted early and often in a fight, especially if
    Chinese coercion against allies and partners is successful and United
    States Forces have to redeploy to Guam because of ABO restrictions
    before they get into the fight.
        Alaska's cold weather training opportunities are cheaper than
    Norway and permit significantly larger forces to train simultaneously
    than at Bridgeport. Alaska is the only place on the planet where
    marines can conduct large-scale, combined arms training in winter/
    mountainous conditions that is also joint and combined. Army and Air
    Force units stationed in Alaska provide a ready force to train with and
    against.
        Perhaps most importantly, Alaska is in the INDOPACOM AOR. The
    strategic port of Anchorage provides deep-water access and railheads
    that connect to nearby Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, where the Air
    Force maintains two runways between 7,500 and 10,000 feet. The
    advantages for naval and air transport of prepositioned material and
    equipment are obvious. Further, the Aleutian Islands and the Bering
    Strait present the exact type of key maritime terrain that Marine
    Littoral Regiments are designed to dominate. China and Russia operate
    naval and air forces off the coast of Alaska regularly, giving marines
    the opportunity to practice the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance
    techniques SIF requires and gauge the Chinese and Russian reactions.
        Given the rationale outlined above, do you agree that the Marine
    Corps will expand its permanent and rotational presence in Alaska?
        Senator, I concur with the benefits Alaska brings as outlined
    above. Exercise Northern Edge provides some of the best high-end,
    realistic training available with a focus on Joint, multi-national, and
    multi-domain operations. The Marine Corps is always looking for multi-
    domain training ranges where we can exercise the entire spectrum, and
    we will continue to utilize the vast training capabilities in Alaska.
    If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to expand our
    permanent and rotational presence in Alaska.

        96. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, given the rationale outlined
    in question #95, can you explain what the Marine Corps is doing to
    preposition material and equipment in Alaska?
        General Smith. As captured in our recently released I&L 2030, our
    current supply chains prioritize efficiency--not effectiveness. One
    broken link in the supply chain can result in an untethered force. Our
    MAGTFs remain designed to be self-sufficient, although not
    indefinitely. Instead of relying on a singular, vulnerable chain, we
    must build a more resilient supply web that can adapt to temporary
    broken links or obstructions. By generating a logistics web, we seek to
    provide options to commanders, create resiliency, contribute to
    deterrence, and overcome the precision lethality of the modern
    battlefield.
        Consequently, the Marine Corps is developing the Global Positioning
    Network (GPN) as a recognition that we need to think differently about
    how to preposition equipment, materiel, and capabilities around the
    globe to support our Stand-in Forces across the full range of military
    operations. The centerpiece of this concept of support is the
    development of an integrated ashore and afloat sustainment network that
    is globally responsive, yet regionally aligned with a focus toward our
    pacing threat.
        As you point out, the GPN requires us to consider access, basing,
    and overflight across the spectrum from competition to conflict; its
    strategic impacts in strengthening our relationships with partners and
    allies: and the return on investment in terms of responsiveness with
    the right capability at the time and place of need. We are actively
    assessing the opportunities and risks with multiple sites particularly
    in the INDOPACOM AOR, and we are certainly considering the
    opportunities available in Alaska. The vast multi-domain training
    opportunities of Alaska are outstanding, and we will continue to seek
    opportunities to leverage them. As we build and expand our new GPN, the
    strategic positioning of our equipment and supplies in INDOPACOM and
    ensuring access, availability, and responsiveness of theater lift for
    our Stand-In Force remain our highest priority. If confirmed, I am
    committed to working with you and the Committee to explore further
    prepositioning opportunities to ensure the Marine Corps is remains our
    Nation's most ready force. My recent trip to Alaska demonstrated to me
    that Alaska remains a critical staging base for sustainment flowing to
    certain areas of the Indo-Pacific.

        97. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will you commit to brief me
    within 60 days of confirmation on your plan to increase the numbers of
    marines stationed in and rotating through Alaska?
        General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to brief you within 60 days.

        98. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will you commit to brief me
    within 60 days of confirmation on your plan to establish a Unit
    Deployment Program (UDP) in Alaska like the Marine Corps was looking at
    under General Neller's leadership?
        General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to brief you within 60 days.

        99. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, will you commit to brief me
    within 60 days of confirmation on your plan to expand the Marine Corps'
    participation in the Red Flag Alaska, Northern Edge, and Arctic Edge
    exercises, particularly with Marine Corps aviation?
        General Smith. If confirmed, I commit to brief you within 60 days.
                         reserve manpower end strength
        100. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, since 2019 the total Marine
    Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) end strength has decreased from 38,000 to
    33,000. At the same time, MARFORRES has joined II Marine Expeditionary
    Force (MEF) as the non-INDOPACOM global response force. Is this end
    strength the optimal number given this new responsibility?
        General Smith. MARFORRES provides augmentation to the Active
    component of the Marine Corps, not a specific combatant commander. In
    the last 5 years, MARFORRES units have deployed in support of global
    missions to include missions in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM,
    and EUCOM.
        The total Selected Reserve (SelRes) end strength is 33,000 for
    fiscal year 2023 and will reduce to an achievable 32,000 in fiscal year
    2024. The MARFORRES portion of the SelRes was disproportionately
    affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, the associated vaccine mandate and
    recruiting challenges faced by all the Services.
        We are requesting an authorized Selected Reserve end strength of
    32,000 in fiscal year 2024 as it meets projected mission requirements
    while enabling modernization. This is consistent with our current
    Active Duty force, the realities of modernizing the capabilities of
    units, the recruiting environment, and comes with a plan for deliberate
    growth toward a 36,800 objective Reserve component force in the
    following years.

        101. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, if the previously reference
    number of an end strength of 33,000 is not optimal, what is your plan
    to increase if you're confirmed as the next Commandant?
        General Smith. The service is undertaking multiple efforts
    regarding its Reserve strength.
          First is a shift from a recruit and replace model to an
    invest and retain model. The Direct Affiliation Program seeks to ensure
    marines ``stay Marine'' after the end of their Active service contract
    by providing opportunities to transition directly to the SMCR.
          We are also aggressively exploring Active/Reserve
    permeability to provide service options that better conform to 21st
    century career patterns.
          Acknowledging population shifts, we are adapting
    recruiting and unit geography.
          Last, we have a employed a robust Reserve incentives
    program that is designed to incentivize continued Reserve service.
        If confirmed, I will ensure the service continually evaluates
    Reserve structure and measures it against requirements of the future
    operating environment.
                     balancing future global contingencies
        102. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, under Marine Corps Force
    Design 2030, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and III MEF focus
    solely on INDOPACOM while II MEF and MARFORRES assume the crisis
    response mission for the rest of the globe. Aside from Marine Littoral
    Regiments under III MEF, will there be any differences in manning and
    capabilities across the MEFs and MARFORRES?
        General Smith. All three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and
    Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) are organized, trained, equipped, and
    postured to conduct a variety of missions in support of Marine Corps
    Title 10 responsibilities. The Marine Corps maintains all organic
    crisis response capabilities that enable the forward posture and rapid
    deployment of flexible and tailorable forces to the needs of the
    Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and
    Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) are the most common Navy-Marine Corps
    tactical units that are forward deployed at the operational level and
    can accomplish strategic level engagements--these MEUs are resident in
    all MEFs. At the direction and request of COCOMs, units, such as the
    Marine Littoral Regiment, can be organized, trained, and equipped to
    conduct missions not normally assigned as core task.
        The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and
    Stand-in Forces (SIF) concepts meet the 2022 National Defense Strategy
    (NDS) intent and are theater agnostic. The plan for light, lethal, and
    distributed forces would be successful in other Combatant Commands
    (COCOMs), such as European Command (EUCOM) or Central Command
    (CENTCOM)--and have shown to be successful. For example, Task Force 61/
    2--led by II MEF--executed a proof of concept during 2022 in which they
    provided 6th Fleet Headquarters with real-time Maritime Domain
    Awareness (MDA). TF 61.2 was designed as a joint task force crisis
    response capability to command and control naval forces supporting
    contingencies in Europe and Africa. In that effort, Marine forces
    tested, refined, and validated concepts of employment for MDA and
    closing kill webs, while also conducting real-world, time sensitive
    reconnaissance-counter reconnaissance missions. These efforts continue
    to support 6th Fleet operations as nested within EUCOM and Africa
    Command (AFRICOM) priorities and have sense turned into a rotational
    force.
        The service will continue to organize, modernize, and equip
    MARFORRES using II MEF as a baseline. The overall modernization will be
    complementary with II MEF to seamlessly integrate Reserve and Active
    Forces. We will seek to retain or build critical, congruent Reserve-
    unique capabilities while also fielding capacity that fully enables the
    USMC Service Retained Forces (SRF) to be the global crisis response
    force of choice. At the unit of employment level, we will modernize
    similar AC/RC units to maintain parity across the SRF. Furthermore,
    parity across the SRF maximizes operational flexibility and continues
    the Reserve component's long history of augmenting, reinforcing, and
    sustaining the Active component.

        103. Senator Sullivan. General Smith, do you believe the
    responsibilities outlined in question #102 are the appropriate balance?
        General Smith. Yes, at this time we are striking an effective
    balance. As we experiment and learn, we will refine and adjust our
    approach to deliver the optimal mix of total force capability and
    capacity.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of General Eric M. Smith, USMC
    follows:]
       [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of General Eric M. Smith, USMC,
    which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by General Eric
    M. Smith, USMC in connection with his nomination follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                         ______

        [The nomination of General Eric M. Smith, USMC was reported
    to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 21, 2023, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on September 21, 2023.]

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