    [Senate Hearing 118-786]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-786

                       COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION AND
                    ENFORCEMENT IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, FISHERIES, CLIMATE
                             CHANGE, AND MANUFACTURING

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION
                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 19, 2024
                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    63-616 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2026

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                       MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair

    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
    GARY PETERS, Michigan                DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    JON TESTER, Montana                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              TODD YOUNG, Indiana
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  TED BUDD, North Carolina
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
    JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado          J. D. VANCE, Ohio
    RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia             SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                     Virginia
                                         CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming

                       Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
                     Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
                         Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
                     Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
               Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                         Liam McKenna, General Counsel

                                     ------

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, FISHERIES, CLIMATE CHANGE,
                               AND MANUFACTURING

    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin, Chair      DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Ranking
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         JERRY MORAN, Kansas
    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia             J. D. VANCE, Ohio
    PETER WELCH, Vermont

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on September 19, 2024...............................     1
    Statement of Senator Baldwin.....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................    10
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    28
    Statement of Senator Blackburn...................................    30
    Statement of Senator Budd........................................    32

                                   Witnesses

    Admiral Kevin E. Lunday, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.......     3
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian, Director, Joint Interagency Task
      Force South, U.S. Coast Guard..................................     8
    Rear Admiral Bob Little, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force
      West, U.S. Coast Guard.........................................    12
    Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
      Government Accountability Office...............................    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    15

                                    Appendix

    Hon. Ted Cruz, U.S. Senator from Texas, prepared statement.......    39
    Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Kevin E.
      Lunday by:
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................    40
        Hon. Roger Wicker............................................    41
        Hon. Marsha Blackburn........................................    42
    Response to written questions submitted to Jo-Ann F. Burdian,
      RADM, USCG by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    43
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................    44
        Hon. Ted Cruz................................................    44
        Hon. Roger Wicker............................................    45
        Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................    45
    Response to written questions submitted to RADM Bob Little by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    46
        Hon. Tammy Duckworth.........................................    47
        Hon. Ted Cruz................................................    48
        Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................    48
    Response to written questions submitted to Heather MacLeod by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    49
        Hon. Ted Cruz................................................    51

                       COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION AND
                    ENFORCEMENT IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2024

                                   U.S. Senate,
    Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, Climate Change,
                                     and Manufacturing,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Tammy
    Baldwin, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Baldwin [presiding], Cantwell, Sullivan,
    Wicker, and Blackburn.
        Also present: Senator Budd.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

        Senator Baldwin. Good morning.
        I am calling the Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, Climate
    Change, and Manufacturing hearing to order, and good morning
    and thank you all for your time this morning and for your
    attention to a very important topic.
        I called for this hearing today because I am committed to
    fighting the deadly fentanyl epidemic on all fronts. The United
    States is facing the worst drug crisis in history with a
    majority of overdose deaths caused by fentanyl, and while we
    talk about these drugs in a more global sense, make no mistake
    this has very real impacts on people's lives.
        Too many kitchen tables have an empty chair because of this
    scourge and I will leave no stone unturned to end it. In recent
    years fentanyl has killed thousands of Wisconsinites,
    devastating families and communities in every part of my state.
        I have heard from mothers who lost children, cops and
    paramedics on the front lines, and advocates all demanding that
    we do more to end this crisis, and I know my colleagues hear
    the same resounding message in their states.
        This Congress we took a step in the right direction when we
    passed bipartisan legislation to crack down on precursor
    chemical suppliers in China and drug cartels in Mexico that are
    producing these drugs and fueling this epidemic.
        But there is more work to do. We must make sure we are
    putting every resource possible toward protecting Americans and
    stopping the movement of deadly illicit substances across our
    border.
        In today's threat environment malign actors ship precursor
    chemicals from China to ports in the Western Hemisphere. Upon
    arrival criminal organizations process these chemicals into
    drugs including the synthetic opioid fentanyl that transit
    through the continent and devastate communities.
        We are also increasingly seeing fentanyl-laced cocaine or
    other substances moving through our hemisphere, causing a
    dramatic rise in fatalities. The fentanyl crisis demands a
    whole of government effort.
        The families I work for expect that all law enforcement and
    armed forces are working in lockstep, and today we are
    examining the role of the United States Coast Guard.
        One of the Coast Guard's statutory missions is drug
    interdiction. Historically, this mission has been focused on
    cocaine, the primary illicit narcotic shipped via maritime
    transportation.
        In recent years the Coast Guard has demonstrated the
    ability to play a role in the tracking and removal of fentanyl
    and its precursor chemicals. Given the crisis in our country we
    need to substantially increase this effort and I look forward
    to hearing recommendations from our witnesses.
        The United States Coast Guard gathers intelligence,
    contributes assets, and conducts boardings of vessels of
    interest to identify, seize, or destroy illicit substances,
    primarily consisting of cocaine, methamphetamines or heroin.
        The Coast Guard also contributes sea, air, and personnel
    assets to the joint interagency task forces to assist in
    tracking shipments of precursor chemicals and referring them to
    law enforcement and other partners for action.
        Today I hope to hear about the Coast Guard's role in
    disrupting the fentanyl supply chain and opportunities to
    expand the Coast Guard's operational and intelligence
    capabilities to stop global drug movement.
        Part of improving our approach means ensuring that the
    Coast Guard has the needed resources and tools at their
    disposal. Transnational criminal organizations have
    dramatically increased the quantity of cocaine they are
    smuggling through maritime routes. Yet, we have seen a decline
    in cocaine removals at the same time.
        The Coast Guard is devoting fewer assets to the drug
    interdiction mission due to competing priorities and resource
    constraints.
        We must align sufficient resources to this mission so that
    we can stop cocaine shipments on water where they are shipped
    in bulk quantities before they reach land and become much more
    difficult to interdict.
        At the same time, the Coast Guard is experiencing
    acquisition delays, the most notable of which is the four-year
    delay in the offshore patrol cutter procurement program.
        I am concerned that we are not seizing every opportunity we
    can to stop precursor chemicals while they are being shipped
    from China.
        And, finally, I am concerned about our most valuable asset,
    our people. As a part of my commitment to keeping Americans
    safe from illicit substances I want to identify ways to protect
    our Coast Guard men and women and the maritime public from
    exposure to dangerous drugs or chemicals during the course of
    their regular Coast Guard duties.
        I am, therefore, including in this year's Coast Guard
    Authorization Act a provision that would require all Coast
    Guard teams to carry Naloxone or other opioid antagonists. In
    addition, the Coast Guard is currently 10 percent short of its
    enlisted workforce and has missed recruiting goals from Fiscal
    Year 2019 to Fiscal Year 2023.
        This personnel shortage is felt across the services and
    impacts every mission including causing the closure of three
    seasonal stations in the state of Wisconsin.
        The Coast Guard has laid up ships before their expected
    retirement date because there are not enough people to operate
    them. That means we have fewer ships to execute Coast Guard
    missions including the critical counterdrug mission.
        It is imperative that the Coast Guard addresses workforce
    recruitment and retention challenges and that includes enacting
    reforms to ensure that the Coast Guard is a safe environment to
    work in--an environment that does not allow sexual harassment
    or sexual assault.
        In addition, efforts to improve the culture of the services
    the Coast Guard must do more to keep its commitment to members
    and that commitment includes access to quality and affordable
    housing, medical care, and child care.
        It is important to note that these impacts are particularly
    severe for junior enlisted families, the very ranks we need
    most today. I am working to include provisions in the Coast
    Guard Authorization Act that support these quality of life
    concerns because we want to help the Coast Guard attract and
    retain a qualified and dedicated workforce.
        We owe the American public nothing short of the most
    exhaustive effort to stem the flow of deadly substances into
    our country.
        I am now going to call upon our witnesses today. Ranking
    Member Sullivan is on his way and will be recognized for his
    opening statement when he arrives.
        But we will hear from the witnesses and they will speak in
    order of rank: Admiral Lunday, Rear Admiral Burdian, Rear
    Admiral Little, and then Ms. MacLeod.
        I thank you in advance for your opening statements and
    recognize Admiral Lunday.

                  STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL KEVIN LUNDAY,
                   VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Lunday. Good morning, Chair Baldwin, members of the
    Committee.
        Chair, I request that my written testimony be entered into
    the record.
        Senator Baldwin. Agreed.
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you, Chair Baldwin.
        Thank you for inviting me to appear for you before today to
    discuss Coast Guard drug interdiction and enforcement
    operations, and thank you for your enduring and strong support
    for the Coast Guard and our men and women, these young
    sentinels who have dedicated themselves to serve our Nation.
    They are the best from across our great United States and I am
    incredibly proud to serve with them.
        Today our service is in greater demand than ever before by
    the American people, first for the operations we conduct across
    the United States and in U.S. territories, protecting and
    defending our borders and through counterdrug operations and
    other operations, and our marine transportation system that is
    made up of our ports and waterways that are so vital to U.S.
    economic prosperity and national security, and also for the
    Coast Guard's increasing global presence in Latin America, the
    Arctic, and the Indo-Pacific and in other places where our
    authorities, capabilities, and our operations make us a trusted
    and reliable partner across the interagency and with our allies
    and other nations who share our values.
        The Coast Guard provides a unique and enduring value to the
    American people. Central to the Coast Guard's missions are
    maritime drug interdiction and enforcement operations.
        Transnational criminal organizations are highly
    sophisticated and finance criminal cartels that operate across
    national boundaries smuggling drugs into the United States.
        Cartels operating in Mexico receive the majority of cocaine
    sourced from Colombia and Ecuador and move it on transshipment
    routes through the eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea
    for further transshipment to the United States.
        Cocaine and other plant-based narcotics remain a mainstay
    of these criminal cartels but, as you noted, Chair Baldwin,
    they are also engaged in the manufacture and smuggling of
    deadly fentanyl into the United States, principally across the
    land ports of entry.
        They also engage in human trafficking and weapons
    smuggling. This not only harms the United States, it also
    creates security challenges and destabilizes other nations in
    the region, and that fuels conditions that increase human
    insecurity and it spurs irregular migration that threaten our
    U.S. border.
        The Coast Guard conducts drug interdiction enforcement at
    sea where the cartels are most vulnerable and where we have the
    advantage. We do this at sea present with at-sea presence of
    our major cutters, boats, and aircraft and our specialized law
    enforcement teams.
        We do not do it alone. We work closely with the Department
    of Defense, represented here by Admiral Burdian and Admiral
    Little, with DHS partners like DHS Joint Task Force East,
    Customs and Border Protection, and Homeland Security
    investigations, and along with the Departments of Justice
    including DEA and the Department of State.
        We work with allies and partner nations, sharing threat
    intelligence information and conducting combined operations at
    sea in the eastern Pacific and the Caribbean.
        Over the past decade illicit trade in fentanyl and other
    synthetic drugs has surpassed cocaine as the most dangerous
    threat to the American people and we remain focused on any
    movement of drugs that are coming toward the U.S. and stopping
    that movement.
        Although we have not seen yet significant amounts of
    fentanyl smuggled in noncommercial means by sea we remain
    vigilant for that to change, and because these same cartels
    that smuggle drugs by sea also smuggle fentanyl. Coast Guard
    drug interdiction operations are essential to disrupting their
    revenue stream and also fostering information that we can use
    in criminal investigations to target their activities on
    fentanyl production and smuggling.
        Our continued successful drug interdiction and enforcement
    operations also depend on the readiness of our people and our
    assets. That is both readiness to operate today and future
    readiness.
        Our Coast Guard women and men, conduct these operations in
    a dangerous and unforgiving maritime environment against
    criminal smugglers who would do them harm.
        They place themselves at risk to stop illicit narcotics
    from reaching our streets and harming the American people. We
    owe it to our workforce to provide them the best leadership
    training and tools to enable them to get the mission done and
    safely return.
        I am grateful for your continued support in this effort.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Lunday follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Admiral Kevin E. Lunday, Vice Commandant,
                                U.S. Coast Guard
    Introduction
        Chair Baldwin, Ranking Member Sullivan, and distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify. Thank you
    for your continued support of the United States Coast Guard. I look
    forward to discussing the Coast Guard's maritime drug interdiction
    operations. We have a proud history of protecting and defending our
    Nation by ensuring our economic prosperity and national security in the
    maritime domain since the founding of the Revenue Marine in 1790 and
    our efforts remain focused on guarding our Nation against maritime
    border threats and conducting all of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory
    missions.
        Drug interdiction is a priority Coast Guard mission and one for
    which the Service is uniquely qualified. In Fiscal Year 2023, the Coast
    Guard removed over 96 metric tons of cocaine, bringing our six-year
    total to 977 metric tons removed. While this is a substantial amount,
    it falls short of our annual goals for several reasons, including fewer
    available surface interdiction assets--Coast Guard cutters and Navy
    ships--and increased demands from the Coast Guard's other missions.
    Those competing demands include elevating cutter presence in support of
    Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to counter historic levels of
    irregular maritime migration, increasing support to national priorities
    in the Indo-Pacific, providing critical Coast Guard assets in the
    Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska to meet Russia and People's Republic of
    China presence, and advancing the global effort to counter illegal,
    unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The Coast Guard continuously
    assesses those demands and strategically employs our assets to maximize
    effectiveness and mitigate risk to the Nation. The trafficking of
    illegal narcotics poses a real threat to the American people, and I am
    proud of the work the Coast Guard does to remove cocaine and other
    narcotics before they reach our shores.
        As important as the amount of cocaine removed are the 267 drug
    trafficking smugglers detained for U.S. or foreign prosecution in 2023,
    as these individuals and associated evidence provide critical
    information for Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) investigations into the smuggling networks that present
    a larger threat to U.S. border security. The same transnational
    criminal organizations (TCOs) engaging in cocaine smuggling are also
    responsible for trafficking people and other drugs, including fentanyl
    and its precursors, into the U.S, as well as creating instability in
    source and transit zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, at the
    Southwest Border, and throughout the region. Not only do Coast Guard
    interdictions of incoming cocaine loads impact profit margins, those
    interdictions provide valuable information on the broader smuggling
    networks for our U.S investigative partners to leverage. We know the
    TCOs are most vulnerable when trafficking at sea, where the Coast Guard
    is most effective at disrupting illegal activities.
    Drug Trafficking--Overview
        Mexican TCOs traffic most of the cocaine consumed in the U.S.,
    sourcing it from Colombia, often via transshipment through Central
    America and the Caribbean. The Coast Guard's cutter fleet and versatile
    tactical law enforcement teams, operating from U.S. Navy and allied
    warships, target bulk cocaine movements typically originating from
    Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Two major drug transit corridors
    exist in the Western Hemisphere, the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean.
    In the Eastern Pacific, there are multiple vectors used to move bulk
    cocaine, but traffickers generally land contraband between Costa Rica
    and Mexico for further shipment to the U.S. southwest land border. In
    the western Caribbean Sea, bulk cocaine is typically shipped via
    Honduras or Nicaragua and on to Mexico for shipment across the U.S.
    Southwest Border. In the central and eastern Caribbean, the bulk
    smuggling destination is typically the Dominican Republic or Puerto
    Rico. Approximately 60 to 65 percent of the cocaine destined for the
    United States flows through the Eastern Pacific corridor while 35 to 40
    percent is shipped through the Caribbean Sea.
    National Drug Control Strategy & the Coast Guard's Role
        The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) emphasizes the global
    reach of U.S. enforcement and interdiction efforts and addresses both
    illicit drug supply and demand. The Coast Guard's work falls squarely
    into supply reduction, which we support with our cutters, boarding
    teams, and aircraft, as well as with information and intelligence
    sharing to our task forces that target TCOs. However, our role is much
    bigger than our presence on and over the water.
        The Commandant of the Coast Guard serves as the Chair of The
    Interdiction Committee (TIC), which is the Office of National Drug
    Control Policy's (ONDCP) senior interagency forum attended by drug
    interdiction officials from 26 departments and agencies. Just three
    months ago, our Commandant, Admiral Fagan, convened the TIC principals
    in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to work on issues related to the
    coordination, oversight, and integration of international, border, and
    domestic drug interdiction efforts in support of the President's NDCS.
    It highlighted the unique counter-drug challenges in the U.S.
    territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which are part
    of our southeast U.S. border, as well as broader drug interdiction
    concerns for the Nation as a whole.
        In addition to our role with the TIC, Coast Guard flag Officers
    direct both U.S. Southern Command's Joint Interagency Task Force South
    (JIATF-S) and Indo-Pacific Command's Joint Interagency Task Force West
    (JIATF-W), leading the primary organizations charged with executing the
    Department of Defense's (DoD) Title 10 responsibility for the detection
    and monitoring of illicit aerial and maritime drug trafficking, while
    efficiently coordinating with the Coast Guard, interagency, allies, and
    partner nations for interdiction and related activities.
    Partnerships
        As the Nation's lead maritime law enforcement agency, the Coast
    Guard has a broad range of authorities and a network of interagency and
    international partnerships that enable us to conduct law enforcement
    operations on the high seas, pushing threats far from U.S. borders. The
    Coast Guard conducts drug interdiction operations over a six-million
    square mile transit zone which includes the Caribbean Sea and the
    Eastern Pacific Ocean. However, we cannot cover that massive threat
    area alone. The Coast Guard relies on robust partnerships to conduct
    the drug interdiction mission and drive our whole-of-government effort
    to target TCOs that threaten our Nation.
        The Coast Guard relies on over 40 bilateral and multilateral
    international agreements with allies and partner nations that enable
    seamless, coordinated law enforcement efforts against TCOs. These
    international agreements are critical to Coast Guard drug interdiction
    successes, allowing the Coast Guard to conduct ship boardings of
    foreign-flagged vessels and time-critical operational coordination with
    partner nations during high-seas drug interdiction operations. The
    Department of State (DOS) plays a crucial role in negotiating,
    securing, and managing those agreements, and works closely with the
    Coast Guard on capacity-building efforts to improve the effectiveness
    of partner nations' counter-drug efforts.
        In addition to exercising international agreements, the Coast Guard
    relies on allies and international partners to provide assets,
    collaborate on operations, share intelligence, and work to eradicate
    maritime trafficking. We coordinate operations with, and regularly
    deploy Coast Guard law enforcement teams aboard allied vessels (e.g.,
    United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and France), and work closely
    with partner nations throughout South and Central America and the
    Caribbean to dismantle maritime trafficking networks in the region.
        The Department of Defense (DoD)-Coast Guard partnership is critical
    to the Nation's drug interdiction mission and our collective ability to
    succeed. While DoD is the lead Federal agency for the detection and
    monitoring of aerial and maritime transits of illegal drugs into the
    United States (under Title 10, U.S. Code), the Coast Guard leverages
    unique authorities (under Title 14, U.S. Code) to serve as the lead
    agency for the interdiction and apprehension of vessels suspected of
    engaging in maritime drug trafficking. The Coast Guard's unique role as
    both a law enforcement agency and an armed force allows us to bridge
    these communities and leverage the full suite of authorities across the
    government.
        Similarly, the Coast Guard maintains close connections with the DOJ
    to prosecute cases and investigate TCO networks. Those relationships
    are key to ensuring a prosecution endgame for Coast Guard-initiated
    cases offshore. In addition to engagement on various DOJ-led
    interagency task forces, the Coast Guard assigns judge advocates who
    serve as Special Assistant United States Attorneys to work side-by-side
    with DOJ attorneys in the U.S. Attorney's Offices that prosecute the
    majority of the maritime drug cases. This model is highly successful
    and allows the Coast Guard to bring its maritime counter-drug expertise
    into the courtroom.
        Within DHS, the Coast Guard leads the DHS Joint Task Force East
    (JTF-EAST) which is responsible for coordinating activities and
    operations across DHS components with others to protect the U.S.
    Southeast Border and maritime approaches. For the past two years, JTF-
    EAST has focused on addressing the threat of drug smuggling in the
    eastern Caribbean that is undermining security and stability in a
    region vital to U.S. border security. Working with JIATF-S, allies, and
    international partners, we have improved unified efforts to disrupt
    TCOs in the eastern Caribbean.
    Drug Interdiction Operations
        The Coast Guard works closely with JIATF-S and JIATF-W to target
    Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific illicit narcotics (and precursors)
    flow, respectively. When interdiction assets are available, we
    prioritize U.S. interdictions to support investigations by our DOJ and
    DHS partners. When a U.S. interdiction is not possible, coordinating
    partner nation response is the preferred option. In Fiscal Year 2023,
    partner nations contributed approximately 80 percent of documented
    cocaine disruptions. This was the largest percentage of partner nation
    contributions on record, a promising trend that highlights the
    increasing capability and willingness of our partners to help shoulder
    the load of this important mission. In Fiscal Year 2023, the Coast
    Guard also provided intelligence support to European law enforcement
    partners on trans-Atlantic cocaine movement, accounting for an
    additional 45 metric tons disrupted.
    Fentanyl
        While fentanyl is a top U.S. counterdrug priority and has been the
    leading cause of U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for
    approximately 70 percent of U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2023, it has
    not yet been encountered in significant quantities in the maritime
    domain. Mexican TCOs are the primary source of synthetic opioids flow
    into the U.S., predominantly across our Southwest Border. Presently
    there is no significant Coast Guard nexus to U.S.-bound fentanyl
    shipments, nor to precursor chemicals destined for Mexico. In the
    previous five Fiscal Years (2019-2023), the Coast Guard conducted over
    1,030 drug interdiction events but only three of those events involved
    fentanyl, totaling 26.8 kilograms removed. However, interdiction of
    cocaine shipments directly targets and impacts the same Mexican TCOs
    that produce and smuggle fentanyl. Moreover, cocaine remains a threat
    to the United States public: cocaine-involved overdose deaths increased
    in 2023 by over 5.6 percent, to over 30,000 deaths. Overdose deaths
    involving synthetic opioids other than methadone (e.g., fentanyl),
    meanwhile, decreased by about 1.7 percent. The Coast Guard is postured
    with appropriate authority, capability, and policy to interdict
    fentanyl smuggling in the maritime environment. Our intelligence
    personnel are connected and working with their Intelligence Community
    partners in this important mission.
    Coast Guard Workforce
        Sufficient numbers of modern cutters and aircraft are essential to
    Coast Guard maritime drug interdiction operations; however, it is Coast
    Guard men and women who are the most critical to our success. Our
    people performing drug interdiction operate in a dangerous and
    unforgiving maritime environment, encountering smugglers who would do
    them harm. That is why the Commandant has prioritized investments in
    recruiting, readiness, and retention of our talented workforce to
    ensure our Service remains Semper Paratus--Always Ready, both today and
    into the future.
    Conclusion
        The Coast Guard continues to provide tremendous value to the United
    States in the maritime drug interdiction mission. Despite surface fleet
    reductions and competing mission demands, the Coast Guard remains well
    positioned to contribute to illicit drug supply reduction efforts as
    well as our Nation's overall drug control strategy. Future success of
    Coast Guard counterdrug operations hinge on continued investment in
    recruiting efforts, and the recapitalization of our aging fleet--
    Congress' continued generous support will help the Nation's greatest
    Coast Guard meet these global demands.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your
    continued support of the Coast Guard. I would be pleased to answer your
    questions.

        Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral Burdian.

       STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JO-ANN BURDIAN, DIRECTOR, JOINT
             INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Burdian. Good morning, Chair Baldwin. Thank you for
    the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today. I am
    truly honored to represent the women and men of Joint
    Interagency Task Force South.
        We are a component of U.S. Southern Command and support the
    combatant commander's efforts to strengthen partnerships,
    counter threats, and build the team. According to the Perry
    Center, 40 of the 50 most violent cities in the world are in
    Latin America and the Caribbean.
        Much of that violence is fueled by narcotics smuggling.
    Transnational criminals disrupt governments and destroy
    communities and families throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR.
        Good morning, Ranking Member Sullivan.
        In its 35 years of existence JIATF South has leveraged the
    authority, jurisdiction, and capability of five of the six
    armed services, 13 U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
    agencies, and 20 foreign partners to detect and monitor drug
    flows in the air and maritime domains throughout our 42-
    million-nautical-mile joint operating area.
        Would you like me to pause for Senator Sullivan? OK.
        Senator Baldwin. He will follow--he will follow your
    testimony.
        Admiral Burdian. Thank you, ma'am.
        Our work together enables the disruption of narcotics
    consignments bound for the United States and keeps profit out
    of the pockets of transnational criminals.
        Last year alone, we enabled the disruption of 361 narcotics
    shipments including the interdiction of over 300 metric tons of
    cocaine and 78 metric tons of marijuana valued at more than $7
    billion. This work represents over 25 percent of all known
    interdictions globally.
        In 2023, the CDC reported a decline in drug overdoses in
    the United States for the first time since 2018 but that trend
    did not apply to cocaine.
        Last year more than 29,000 Americans died from cocaine
    overdose, a number that is comparable to losing a small
    American town, one that is just smaller than Manitowoc or just
    about the same size as Juneau every single year.
        Cocaine-related deaths were five times higher than they
    were in 2014 when already--when over 5,000 Americans, which was
    already far too many, lost their lives to cocaine overdose.
    More than 70 percent of cocaine overdose deaths involved
    combining cocaine with an opioid, most often fentanyl.
        Just as American victims mix their drug of choice, TCOs--
    transnational criminal organizations--or poly drug enterprises
    they traffic plant-based drugs like cocaine and marijuana,
    synthetic drugs like fentanyl alongside bulk cash, weapons, and
    people and they are driven by a single goal--profit.
        Although we have not encountered fentanyl in the maritime
    our efforts advance investigations into criminal organizations
    who traffic fentanyl in the U.S. According to the organized
    crime drug enforcement task forces, last year 23 percent of
    their designated investigations that involved maritime
    interdictions in the JIATF South JOA were connected to
    organizations also linked to fentanyl or its precursors.
        Nine percent of the investigations were linked to command
    and control elements of the most prolific international drug
    trafficking organizations.
        I just want to emphasize the work JIATF South does advances
    investigations into organizations who traffic fentanyl into the
    United States.
        Partnerships are at the core of our success. We integrate
    and investigate intelligence data from around the U.S.
    interagency with information provided by our foreign partners
    to develop real time targets that we monitor to turn over to
    our interdiction partners like the Coast Guard.
        The Coast Guard is the largest single provider of U.S. ship
    days and those days are augmented using their law enforcement
    detachments on allied vessels.
        We began to use the ship's special mission, which is a
    repurposed commercial vessel under contract by SOUTHCOM, in
    2017 as a force multiplier to enable partner nation
    interdictions.
        In its time and service the SSM has supported the
    interdiction of over 40 metric tons of cocaine and marijuana
    and, moreover, has provided our partners with the expertise and
    experience to operate far offshore on their own.
        Today, partner nations contributes over 80 percent of JIATF
    South supported interdictions. While we are grateful for the
    commitment of our foreign partners, U.S. law enforcement
    agencies benefit most from U.S. interdictions.
        Simply put, more U.S. interdictions lead to more U.S.
    prosecutions, initiating a virtuous cycle of success.
    Information gathered during these interdictions drive further
    arrests and each arrest can provide witnesses, cooperators, and
    new sources of intelligence.
        This intelligence feeds back into our targeting cycle,
    leading to more interdictions. In short, we can do more with
    more.
        Multiple media outlets have reported a surplus in global
    cocaine supply that has driven prices down, increased
    consumption, and expanded markets into Asia and Europe.
        This shift highlights the global nature of the threat and
    the complexity, maturity, and agility of transnational criminal
    organizations, underscoring the need for an integrated U.S. and
    international approach to narcotics--counter narcotics
    operations.
        No U.S. Government entity is better poised to combat the
    threat than Joint Interagency Task Force South. Together, we
    set the global standard for interagency and international
    cooperation.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
    Subcommittee. I look forward to our discussion.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        Next, I will turn to my Ranking Member Senator Sullivan for
    his opening remarks.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
    holding this hearing today. I think it is a really, really
    important one as it focuses on the maritime drug interdiction
    issues, which is one element of our strategy that we all need
    to deal with.
        An issue that is impacting every state in America and that
    is the unprecedented drug crisis especially with regard to
    fentanyl that is impacting every state. It is interesting and
    sad, from my perspective but my state in many ways is the
    furthest from the southern border and, yet, we are facing an
    unprecedented fentanyl crisis in Alaska.
        In 2023, opioids killed more Alaskans than ever before.
    Drug overdose deaths in Alaska, the vast majority of which were
    fentanyl related, increased by more than 40 percent in Alaska,
    the largest percentage increase of any state in the country.
        And to combat this I recently launched an initiative in my
    state with our Governor called the ``One Pill Can Kill''
    campaign.
        The point of this campaign is to go out to all Alaskans,
    especially our youth, to warn them of the threat of taking
    unprescribed pills. Counterfeit pills are incredibly difficult
    to spot and can contain deadly amounts of fentanyl. We are
    seeing this across every state in the country.
        I do have to say although we are focused on maritime issues
    here, the failed open border policies of the Biden-Harris
    administration have accelerated this disaster. Homeland
    Security investigations estimates that Mexican cartels, some of
    which are actually operating in Alaska--in Alaska villages--
    this notorious Sinaloa cartel is in my state right now.
        They are now making $13 billion a year smuggling illegal
    immigrants into the U.S., 26 times what they made in 2018. Mass
    migration that the Biden-Harris administration has encouraged
    and allowed has caused a humanitarian crisis, a national
    security crisis, a health crisis and drug overdose crisis.
        This crisis is also driven by illegal drug trafficking by
    transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, as was already
    mentioned, some of which is being done by maritime means.
        Last week Vice Admiral Holsey, the military deputy
    commander of Southern Command, testified in front of the Armed
    Services Committee that, quote, ``Transnational criminal
    organizations remain the primary threat to stability in the
    entire region.''
        He also said these TCOs, these cartels, get at least one-
    third of their revenue from drug trafficking. Beyond drug
    smuggling the TCOs are engaged in arms trafficking, money
    laundering, human trafficking, and many other horrific crimes.
        Interdicting drugs on the high seas is a key to combating
    the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and I want to
    thank the Coast Guard again for all their great work, and other
    various law enforcement agencies and partner nations around the
    hemisphere who do this crucial work. It is imperative.
        However, our challenges are evolving and we must adapt
    accordingly. In the 2024 national drug threat assessment the
    DEA Administrator highlighted the Mexican cartels' reliance on
    companies in China to supply the pill presses and precursor
    chemicals needed to manufacture fentanyl that they are using to
    poison Americans.
        I recently co-sponsored in the Senate with Senator Tim
    Scott the ``Fend Off Fentanyl Act,'' which was signed into law.
    This legislation will help stop the flow of deadly fentanyl by
    directing the Department of Treasury to use economic national
    security tools to choke off the profits of the Chinese
    precursor manufacturers and Mexican cartels that push fentanyl
    across the border. It will help, but until we secure the border
    it will not be enough.
        Finally, Madam Chair, I want to mention one other thing.
    The Trump administration, the Biden-Harris administration, have
    all announced agreements that they achieved with the communist
    dictator Xi Jinping that he would reduce the flow of precursor
    chemicals from China into the United States.
        As usual, the Chinese Communist Party does not keep its
    commitments to the United States, whether to the Trump
    administration or the Biden administration.
        This is what some of us call ``promise fatigue'' where the
    Chinese consistently commit at the highest levels of
    government--think about Xi Jinping and President Obama in the
    Rose Garden where Xi Jinping said, ``we are not going to
    militarize the South China Sea.''
        They lie. Great powers do not lie but China does lie all
    the time and particularly when it comes to fentanyl.
        The Congress of the United States in a bipartisan way is
    tired of hearing the Chinese making agreements with Republican
    administrations, Democratic administrations on fentanyl and
    never keeping their word.
        The Chinese--the Chinese Communist Party is engaging in
    chemical warfare against United States. We are tired of it.
    Hear that, Xi Jinping and the rest of you Communist Party
    hacks. We need to hold their feet to the fire.
        Finally, I just want to mention the Coast Guard. Again, you
    have the biggest fans in the world in my state, the great state
    of Alaska, with regard for the Coast Guard. We are committed to
    a recapitalization--a continued recapitalization of the fleet
    to provide you the resources and the ability to undertake this
    and the other numerous missions you undertake every single day
    to save lives in Alaska and Wisconsin and everywhere else
    across the United States.
        So, I want to thank the Coast Guard and I am looking
    forward to hearing what you need from the Congress to be able
    to do this mission--this critical mission--in a more effective
    way than you can be doing it now.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Next we are going to hear from Admiral Little.

         STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL BOB LITTLE, DIRECTOR, JOINT
             INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE WEST, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Little. Good morning, Chair Baldwin, Ranking Member
    Sullivan. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to
    discuss the important work of Joint Interagency Task Force
    West, or JIATF West.
        JIATF West is INDOPACOM's standing counter narcotics task
    force. We utilize Title 10 authorities to provide Department of
    Defense capabilities in support of law enforcement counterdrug
    operations.
        Comprised of members of the joint force, elements of the
    intelligence community and U.S. law enforcement, we identify
    threat networks and share that information with partners to
    reduce the flow of narcotics in the Indo-Pacific.
        We specifically target networks associated with drug
    trafficking including precursor chemicals used to produce
    illicit drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl.
        Our priorities are protecting the homeland, strengthening
    our network of partners, disrupting and degrading threat
    networks, and countering malign influences in the region.
        My highest operational priority is identifying and stemming
    the flow of precursor chemicals and we have been successful in
    providing intelligence to support these efforts.
        Our work has led to the indictment and seizure of illicit
    drugs in large quantities of precursor chemicals. Additional
    efforts have supported sanctions against multiple Chinese
    entities materially contributing to the production of synthetic
    opioids.
        To succeed in our mission we rely on a network of key
    partners. Chief among those are the U.S. Coast Guard and JIATF
    South. We routinely share intelligence and information related
    to transnational threats that transcend geographic boundaries.
        As we speak, JIATF West is sharing regionally derived
    intelligence that is informing active cases in the JIATF South
    area of responsibility and these will likely result in Coast
    Guard interdictions.
        We also partner with Coast Guard training teams to
    facilitate instructional courses for international partners who
    may not have the expertise or resources to effectively fight
    transnational organized crime.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share the important work
    my team at JIATF West does every day and I look forward to your
    questions.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Admiral.
        And next Ms. MacLeod.

                STATEMENT OF HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR,

                     HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE,

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. MacLeod. Chair Baldwin, Ranking Member Sullivan, thank
    you for the opportunity to be here to discuss GAO's recent work
    on Federal efforts to counter illicit drugs.
        Illicit drugs like cocaine and fentanyl and the criminal
    organizations that traffic them pose significant threats to
    national security. As you know, Coast Guard is the lead Federal
    agency for maritime drug interdiction. However, it faces
    significant challenges in carrying out its mission effectively.
        My testimony today will focus on two main areas: first, key
    Federal maritime coordination efforts to counter illicit drugs
    and, second, challenges to the service's ability to carry out
    its missions including drug interdiction.
        Regarding Federal coordination efforts, the Coast Guard
    coordinates with the Department of Defense, other DHS
    components, and participates in joint task forces to enhance
    drug interdiction efforts.
        One key example is JIATF South which coordinates
    interagency counterdrug operations in the Caribbean, Gulf of
    Mexico, and eastern Pacific. Just last week the Coast Guard, in
    coordination with JIATF South, offloaded thousands of pounds of
    cocaine that it seized in the Caribbean.
        Such seizures demonstrate the value of task force efforts,
    but our work in 2019 and 2024 has shown that task forces have
    not consistently assessed their efforts. This is essential for
    making decisions about priority and resource allocations.
        We have nine recommendations to the Coast Guard and others
    pertaining to task forces that remain unaddressed.
        Second, the Coast Guard faces asset and workforce
    challenges that can impact its drug interdiction efforts. The
    Coast Guard's aging fleet of vessels and aircraft face
    maintenance and reliability issues.
        Declining availability of these assets and delays in
    acquisitions of their replacements can affect the Coast Guard's
    ability to conduct its drug interdiction mission.
        Our work has noted that acquisition program delays continue
    to affect the availability of Coast Guard assets. For example,
    the Coast Guard's newest cutters--the offshore patrol cutter
    and the polar security cutter--are intended to support law
    enforcement missions like drug interdiction and prevention of
    illegal fishing.
        But we found that combined these two programs are billions
    of dollars over their initial cost estimates and more than two
    years behind schedule. We have made dozens of recommendations
    in those reports on how Coast Guard can better manage
    acquisition programs for new vessels and aircraft.
        Another challenge I would like to highlight is uncertainty
    around the Coast Guard's workforce needs. In recent years, the
    Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission workload has
    outpaced its workforce levels. Staffing gaps, particularly in
    specialized units like tactical law enforcement teams, can
    hinder drug interdiction efforts.
        Despite these concerns, Coast Guard has conducted limited
    assessments of its workforce needs. Specifically, the service
    reported that it has assessed needs for just 15 percent of its
    workforce, a process that it began 20 years ago.
        The Coast Guard estimates that it is short thousands of
    service members. Without workforce assessments it does not know
    the true magnitude of the shortfall and which units or missions
    are most effective.
        One of our recommendations from our review is that Coast
    Guard update its workforce planning document with timeframes
    and milestones for completing these assessments.
        Finally, our work has identified challenges related to
    quality of life factors in healthcare and housing, among
    others, that may affect the Coast Guard's ability to retain
    personnel.
        For example, many Coast Guard stations are located near
    vacation destinations or in remote areas which can make it
    difficult for service members to find available and affordable
    housing.
        Earlier this year, we found that the Coast Guard has not
    conducted a survey about members' housing challenges since
    2012. We recommended that the Coast Guard do so which would
    allow the service to better respond to members' housing needs.
        In conclusion, while the Coast Guard plays a vital role in
    maritime interdiction it faces significant challenges carrying
    out this mission effectively. Continued coordination with
    partner agencies will be key as the Coast Guard faces declining
    asset availability and workforce shortages.
        Addressing our open recommendations in these areas will
    help ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively and efficiently
    using its limited resources to carry out these critical
    missions.
        Chair Baldwin, Ranking Member Sullivan, this completes my
    prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
    questions you may have.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. MacLeod follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and
            Justice, United States Government Accountability Office

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chair Baldwin, Ranking Member Sullivan, and Members of the
    Subcommittee:

        I am pleased to be here to today to discuss Federal coordination
    efforts to counter illicit drugs and challenges the U.S. Coast Guard
    faces in carrying out its drug interdiction mission. The U.S.
    government has identified transnational and domestic criminal
    organizations trafficking and smuggling illicit drugs as a significant
    threat to the public, law enforcement, and national security.
    Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
    show nearly 100,000 drug overdose deaths during the 12-month period
    ending in March 2024.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
    reported provisional counts for 12-month ending periods are the number
    of deaths received and processed for the 12-month period ending in the
    month indicated. Drug overdose deaths are often initially reported with
    no cause of death (pending investigation) because they require lengthy
    investigation, including toxicology testing. As a result, reported
    provisional counts may not include all deaths that occurred during a
    given time and are subject to change.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As shown in figure 1, many Federal departments and agencies
    coordinate on efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs into the
    U.S. Among them are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is
    responsible for securing U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity while
    facilitating legitimate trade and travel, and the Department of Defense
    (DOD), which is the single lead agency responsible for detecting and
    monitoring the aerial and maritime transport of illegal drugs like
    cocaine and fentanyl into the U.S.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: GAO Summary of information provided by the entities listed.
    | GAO-24-107785.

        a The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is
    a component of the Executive Office of the President. In addition to
    the entities shown, ONDCP coordinates with the Departments of Health
    and Human Services, State, and the Treasury on counternarcotics
    activities.

        The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime military service within
    DHS--is the lead Federal agency for maritime drug interdiction. It
    coordinates with DOD in joint task forces to carry out its drug
    interdiction mission.\2\ In particular, the Coast Guard is a major
    contributor of vessels and aircraft deployed to disrupt the flow of
    illicit drugs.\3\ The Coast Guard shares maritime drug interdiction
    responsibility with U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Air and
    Marine Operations and Border Patrol. According to the Coast Guard
    Commandant, in Fiscal Year 2023, the agency intercepted more than
    212,000 pounds of cocaine and 54,000 pounds of marijuana.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 designates DOD as the single lead agency of
    the Federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
    maritime transit of illegal drugs into the U.S. The Coast Guard, within
    DHS, is the lead Federal agency for interdiction of maritime drug
    smugglers in international waters. This is because the Coast Guard may
    make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and
    arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has
    jurisdiction to prevent, detect, and suppress violations of U.S. laws.
    See 14 U.S.C. Sec. 522.
        \3\ Coast Guard aviation and vessel assets include a fleet of about
    200 fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft, about 250 cutters, and more than
    1,600 boats. As of July 2023, the Coast Guard had a workforce of about
    57,000 personnel. GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation
    Workforce Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, D.C.: April 9,
    2024).
        \4\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, The Coast
    Guard's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request, testimony before the House of
    Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
    Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 118th Cong.,
    2nd sess., May 23, 2024.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, the majority of
    the cocaine shipped to the U.S. travels on maritime routes from South
    America and through the eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea.\5\
    Precursor chemicals may be shipped from Asia to Mexico, sometimes as
    legitimate commerce, where they may be combined into fentanyl or other
    controlled substances.\6\ Figure 2 shows maritime and land routes for
    precursor chemical and illicit drug smuggling.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Drug Enforcement Administration, 2020 National Drug Threat
    Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21 (March 2021). The majority of known
    maritime drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial vessels through the
    Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--a 6 million square mile area of routes
    drug smugglers use to transport illicit drugs that includes the eastern
    Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. GAO, Coast
    Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the
    Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-527
    (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2014).
        \6\ Precursor chemicals are chemicals or substances that may be
    intended for illicit drug production.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: U.S. Coast Guard based on the Consolidated Counterdrug
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Database; Map Resources (Map) | GAO-24-107785.

        Note: Precursor chemicals are chemicals or substances that may be
    intended for illicit drug production.

        Given challenges the Federal government faces in responding to the
    drug misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added national efforts to
    prevent, respond to, and recover from drug misuse to our High-Risk
    List. We identified several challenges in the Federal government's
    response to drug misuse, such as the need for more effective
    implementation and monitoring, and related ongoing efforts to address
    the issue, including drug interdiction.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to
    Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2021). We issue an update to the High-Risk
    List every two years at the start of each new session of Congress. The
    most recent update was issued in April 2023. See GAO, High-Risk Series:
    Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to
    Fully Address All Areas, GAO-23-106203 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20,
    2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My statement today discusses (1) key Federal maritime coordination
    efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs to the U.S. and (2)
    challenges we have identified related to the Coast Guard carrying out
    its drug interdiction mission. This statement is based primarily on 36
    reports published from April 2010 to June 2024. For the reports we cite
    in this statement, among other methodologies, we analyzed DOD, DHS, and
    Coast Guard policy, documentation, and data, and interviewed officials
    from agency headquarters and selected field units. More detailed
    information on our scope and methodology can be found in the reports we
    cite in this statement.
        For this statement, we reviewed documentation and met with
    officials to obtain updated information on the status of agency
    implementation of selected recommendations through September 2024. In
    addition, we reviewed Coast Guard budget and performance documents
    since 2018 to determine the extent the service reported meeting its
    drug interdiction performance goals from Fiscal Year 2014 through 2023.
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    Federal Agencies Coordinate to Counter Illicit Drug Flow in the
            Maritime Domain, but Could Better Assess Their Efforts
        Federal agencies coordinate with international partners and each
    other to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S through the
    maritime domain. For example, in 2018 we reported that Federal agencies
    coordinated with foreign governments, such as China, Mexico, and
    Canada, as well as with international organizations, to limit the
    production of illicit synthetic opioids.\8\ They did this by sharing
    information on emerging trends, helping to expand the regulation of
    illicit substances, and building capacity to thwart the distribution of
    illicit drugs. We reported that coordination could also include the
    sharing of international data to analyze vessel movements that may
    indicate illegal activity.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO, Illicit Opioids: While Greater Attention Given to
    Combating Synthetic Opioids, Agencies Need to Better Assess their
    Efforts, GAO-18-205 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2018).
        \9\ GAO, Combating Illegal Fishing: Clear Authority Could Enhance
    U.S. Efforts to Partner with Other Nations at Sea, GAO-22-104234
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2021).

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        In addition, military and Federal law enforcement agencies
    coordinated through several task forces to detect and interdict illicit
    drugs, such as cocaine and fentanyl, and their precursors on maritime
    routes. DOD and DHS lead and operate certain task forces--Joint
    Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and DHS Joint Task
    Force-East.\10\ Each task force is directed by a member of the Coast
    Guard.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ An additional task force--Joint Task Force-North--consists
    solely of DOD personnel and does not generally operate in the maritime
    domain.
        \11\ In 2019, task force officials told us that Coast Guard
    leadership encourages participation from both DOD and DHS because the
    Coast Guard is both a military and a law enforcement agency. GAO, Drug
    Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance Their
    Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities, GAO-19-
    441 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2019, we reported that the task forces generally coordinated
    effectively using mechanisms that aligned with leading practices.\12\
    These mechanisms, such as working groups and liaison officers, helped
    to minimize duplication of missions and activities. Figure 3 shows a
    seizure of more than 12,000 pounds of cocaine in the Caribbean Sea in
    September 2023, which was the result of JIATF-South coordination
    between Coast Guard, CBP Air and Marine Operations, and international
    partners.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO-19-441.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Santiago
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Gomez. | GAO-24-107785

        While such seizures anecdotally demonstrate the value of task force
    efforts, our recent work has shown that these task forces have not
    consistently assessed their efforts.\13\ In 2024, we made four
    recommendations to improve agencies' assessment efforts. Fully
    implementing these recommendations is essential for making decisions
    about priorities, resource allocations, and strategies for
    improvements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ GAO, Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and
    Assessment of Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16,
    2024) and Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to
    Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington,
    D.C.: Feb. 7, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Longstanding Challenges Hinder the Coast Guard's Drug Interdiction
            Mission Efforts
        Challenges have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet drug
    interdiction mission demands. These challenges include (1) declining
    readiness of its vessels and aircraft, (2) acquisition associated
    delays in replacing them, and (3) workforce shortages and retention
    challenges. Notably, the Coast Guard has not met its annual primary
    drug interdiction mission performance target in any of the past 10
    Fiscal Years.\14\ The Coast Guard's challenge of balancing its varied
    mission priorities has grown as it is called on to do more with its
    limited resources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ The Coast Guard's primary drug interdiction performance
    measure is its removal rate for cocaine from noncommercial maritime
    vessels in the maritime transit zone.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Noncommercial maritime smuggling involves the use of various
    vessels, including speedboats, fishing vessels, and submersible
    vessels. This performance measure assesses the percentage of cocaine
    directly seized or observed being jettisoned, scuttled, or destroyed as
    a result of Coast Guard actions relative to the total known flow of
    cocaine through the transit zone.
    Coast Guard Faces Declining Asset Readiness and Challenges Acquiring
            Replacements
    Declining Availability and Readiness of Assets and Infrastructure
        Our work has shown that the Coast Guard's aircraft and vessels have
    faced readiness and availability challenges, while its supporting shore
    infrastructure requires considerable repair. Coast Guard assets have
    been in a state of decline for decades. For example, the Coast Guard
    relies on its Medium Endurance Cutters for its drug interdiction
    mission.\15\ However, we reported in July 2012 that Medium Endurance
    Cutters did not meet operational hours targets from Fiscal Years 2005
    through 2011 and that declining operational capacity hindered mission
    performance.\16\ In June 2023, we reported that Medium Endurance
    Cutters were not consistently meeting operational availability targets,
    and the Coast Guard noted that the declining physical condition of the
    cutters puts them at significant risk of decreased capability for
    meeting mission requirements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ The Coast Guard operates a fleet of 28 Medium Endurance
    Cutters, consisting of 14 210-foot and 13 270-foot Medium Endurance
    Cutters, along with the 282-foot Alex Haley Medium Endurance Cutter.
    These cutters are deployed for a wide range of mission operations,
    including search and rescue; interdicting illegal drugs and migrants;
    enforcing fishing laws; and securing ports, waterways, and coastal
    areas.
        \16\ GAO, Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions
    Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741
    (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We made five recommendations to improve the Offshore Patrol Cutter
    acquisition program to the Coast Guard in June 2023.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
    Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.:
    Jun. 20, 2023) and Coast Guard: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for
    the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program, GAO-21-9 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
    28, 2020). In our June 2023 report, we also reiterated that eight
    recommendations we made in October 2020 to improve the program
    continued to have merit. As of August 2024, eight of these 13
    recommendations were not implemented.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not contained to
    its cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft
    generally did not meet the Coast Guard's 71 percent availability target
    during Fiscal Years 2018 through 2022, as shown in figure 4.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ GAO-24-106374. Coast Guard officials attributed the aircraft
    fleet generally not meeting availability targets to maintenance and
    repair challenges for its aircraft.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. | GAO-24-107785

        In April 2024, we reported the Coast Guard also faces key decisions
    in managing its aging aircraft fleet and implementing an extensive
    modernization program across all of its aircraft types.\19\ In
    particular, the Coast Guard is embarking on a significant operational
    change from a largely short-range helicopter fleet to a medium-range
    fleet. However, we reported that its related planning efforts raised
    serious questions, including how the medium-range helicopters will
    interact with cutters for its drug interdiction operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ GAO-24-106374.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard has not fully assessed whether this transition will
    result in the type and quantity of helicopters needed to meet its
    mission demands--including for drug interdiction--in the coming
    decades. We recommended the Coast Guard assess different helicopters
    and conduct a fleet mix analysis to help ensure it identifies the
    necessary type and number of helicopters it requires to meet its
    mission demands. DHS concurred with this recommendation and we will
    continue to monitor Coast Guard's efforts to address it.
        Notwithstanding the readiness of Coast Guard assets, our work has
    also found that the service faces tradeoffs when making decisions
    regarding its vast, aging portfolio of shore infrastructure. In
    February 2019, we found that the Coast Guard was confronted with a
    costly backlog of shore infrastructure projects related to docks, air
    stations, and other infrastructure from which missions such as drug
    interdiction begin.\20\ This backlog totaled at least $2.6 billion at
    that time. We made six recommendations to address these issues, two of
    which the Coast Guard has implemented.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
    Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of At Least $2.6
    Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Acquisition Program Challenges
        Our work has also found that the Coast Guard's declining asset
    readiness is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing its
    planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and
    aircraft. These challenges include:

        Capability gaps from schedule delays. Delays experienced by the
    Coast Guard's highest priority program--the Offshore Patrol Cutters--
    will exacerbate capability gaps.\21\ The Coast Guard plans to replace
    the aging Medium Endurance Cutters with Offshore Patrol Cutters. The
    Commandant testified in July 2024 that Offshore Patrol Cutters are to
    be essential assets for JIATF-South and its drug interdiction
    mission.\22\ However, in May 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard has
    delayed delivery of the first Offshore Patrol Cutter by 4 years, from
    Fiscal Year 2021 to 2025.\23\ In June 2023, we reported that given the
    delays in delivery of the Offshore Patrol Cutters, the Coast Guard
    projects to have a reduction in asset availability--or a reduction in
    the number of cutters available for operations--starting in 2024 and
    through 2039.\24\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Offshore Patrol Cutters generally conduct the same range of
    missions as Medium Endurance Cutters, including search and rescue and
    interdicting drugs and migrants. Designed for long-distance transit,
    extended on-scene presence, and operations with deployable aircraft and
    small boats, these cutters are intended to provide offshore presence
    for the Coast Guard's cutter fleet.
        \22\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
    testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
    Security, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2024.
        \23\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve
    Shipbuilding Outcomes, GAO-24-107488 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2024).
        \24\ GAO-23-105805. We found that ship design instability
    contributed to Offshore Patrol Cutter schedule delays and made five
    recommendations to address this challenge. Coast Guard agreed with
    three recommendations and as of September 2024, addressed one of them.
    Coast Guard disagreed with the other two recommendations, including a
    priority recommendation. We stand by this recommendation as it aligns
    with our leading practices in shipbuilding. We have ongoing reviews of
    the program and will continue to monitor its progress toward design
    completion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Affordability concerns and difficult tradeoff decisions. As we
    reported in June 2024, the Coast Guard will have to make difficult
    decisions to address the affordability concerns surrounding its
    acquisition portfolio.\25\ These concerns affect how Coast Guard
    prioritizes spending on aging assets, including those currently
    performing the drug interdiction mission.\26\ Specifically, for over a
    decade and most recently in 2024, we have reported that the Coast
    Guard's short-term budget decisions have resulted in a buildup of near-
    term unaffordable acquisitions that have continued to put pressure on
    available resources.\27\ In particular, we reported that the Coast
    Guard made short-term budget decisions that obscure the tradeoffs
    needed to balance the long-term affordability of the portfolio. In
    2014, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a long-term plan to
    manage its highest priority efforts. The Coast Guard agreed, and
    subsequent statute directed it to develop such a plan.\28\ However, as
    of June 2024, it had yet to produce one.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition: Actions Needed to Address
    Affordability Challenges, GAO-24-107584 (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
    2024).
        \26\ The Coast Guard's planned investments for its portfolio of
    major acquisitions increased by $8.2 billion since Fiscal Year 2018.
    The increase is primarily related to cost increases on the Offshore
    Patrol Cutter program and additional investments in medium-range MH-60T
    helicopters--both key assets for the drug interdiction mission.
        \27\ GAO-24-107584; Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to
    Address Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454
    (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2018); Coast Guard Acquisitions: Limited
    Strategic Planning Efforts Pose Risk for Future Acquisitions, GAO-17-
    747T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2017); Coast Guard Recapitalization:
    Matching Needs and Resources Continue to Strain Acquisition Efforts,
    GAO-17-654T (Washington D.C.: June 7, 2017); and Coast Guard
    Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to
    Address Shortfalls, GAO-14-450 (Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014).
        \28\ Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5103(a), a status report on the
    Coast Guard's major acquisition programs is to be submitted to the
    Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate
    and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure every 2
    years. Each report is to include certain information for each major
    acquisition program, as well as a long-term plan for the upcoming
    Fiscal Year, and for each of the 20 Fiscal Years thereafter. 14 U.S.C.
    Sec. 5103(b), (e). In addition, the Commandant of the Coast Guard is to
    submit each long-term major acquisitions plan to the House Committee on
    Homeland Security. 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5110 note.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Coast Guard Faces Workforce Shortages and Retention Challenges
        Our work has shown that staffing shortfalls and poor workforce
    planning have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet its mission
    needs, including for drug interdiction. Since October 2023, the Coast
    Guard has reported a nearly 10 percent shortfall in its enlisted
    personnel, due in part to having missed its recruiting targets in
    recent years, prompting it to reduce operational activities. In
    response, the Coast Guard has implemented plans to take several cutters
    out of active service, including three Medium Endurance Cutters--a
    mainstay of its drug interdiction efforts. Moreover, it has closed boat
    stations around the country due to a lack of personnel needed to staff
    them.
        In May 2023, we reported that the Coast Guard's workforce
    challenges have persisted, and that the service may miss key
    opportunities to tackle these issues unless it implements plans to
    address future workforce needs and sets goals for retaining
    personnel.\29\ In 2010, 2020, 2022, and 2024 we found that the Coast
    Guard had not adequately determined its workforce needs.\30\
    Specifically, in 2020 we found that the Coast Guard had assessed a
    small portion of its workforce needs through the workforce requirements
    determination process it began using in 2003. We recommended that the
    Coast Guard develop a plan for how it will meet its workforce
    assessment goals and this recommendation remained open as of September
    2024.\31\ Further, as of November 2023, the Coast Guard reported that
    it had completed workforce requirements determinations for 15 percent
    of its workforce. Without this information, it does not have a sound
    basis for prioritizing resources effectively.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ GAO, Coast Guard: Recruitment and Retention Challenges
    Persist, GAO-23-106750 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2023).
        \30\ GAO-24-106374; GAO, Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions
    Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands, GAO-22-105208
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2022); Coast Guard: Actions Needed to
    Enhance IT Program Implementation, GAO-22-105092 (Washington, D.C.:
    July 28, 2022); Coast Guard: Increasing Mission Demands Highlight
    Importance of Assessing Its Workforce Needs, GAO-22-106135 (Washington,
    D.C.: July 27, 2022); Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the
    Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs,
    GAO-20-223 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2020); and Coast Guard:
    Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but
    Challenges Remain; GAO-10-433R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2010).
        \31\ GAO-20-223.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More specifically, we have previously reported on Coast Guard
    resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce planning for various units
    the service relies on to support its drug interdiction mission, such as
    its aviation workforce and specialized forces. Specifically, in April
    2024, we reported that the Coast Guard had 387 of 4,134 (9 percent) of
    its authorized military aviation workforce positions vacant, as of July
    2023.\32\ However the Coast Guard had not assessed and determined
    necessary staffing levels and skills for a large portion of its
    aviation workforce, including all 25 of its air stations and its major
    aircraft repair facility.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ GAO-24-106374.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In November 2019, we found that the Coast Guard had not used data
    and evidence to fully assess its Deployable Specialized Forces. These
    are teams that deploy aboard Coast Guard cutters or U.S. Navy or Allied
    vessels to provide specialized capabilities for offshore drug
    interdiction and vessel interception operations, primarily in the
    Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean.\33\ We recommended that Coast
    Guard assess its Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce needs. We
    continue to monitor Coast Guard's efforts to address this
    recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces'
    Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap
    or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Challenges related to quality of life factors in health care and
    housing, among others, may affect the Coast Guard's ability to retain
    personnel. In April 2023, we found that Coast Guard personnel stationed
    in remote areas may experience challenges accessing medical care.\34\
    Specifically, we found that 17 of 43 Coast Guard clinics were located
    in medically underserved areas and 11 of 43 were located in at least
    one type of health provider shortage area. We recommended the Coast
    Guard obtain and monitor heath care access data. Doing so would better
    position the Coast Guard to identify and address potential access
    concerns, which could affect retention.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ GAO, Coast Guard Health Care: Additional Actions Could Help
    Ensure Beneficiaries' Access, GAO-23-105574 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4,
    2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We made 34 recommendations in our workforce reports, 28 of which
    remain unaddressed. We continue to monitor the Coast Guard's progress
    in implementing them.
        In conclusion, Federal interagency collaboration, and Coast Guard's
    drug interdiction efforts in particular, are critical efforts to reduce
    the maritime flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. Defining and measuring
    what success looks like is essential to ensure that Federal efforts
    achieve the desired outcomes and resources are allocated efficiently.
    Further, the Coast Guard's challenge of balancing its varied mission
    priorities has grown as it is called on to do more with its limited
    resources. In this way, it is critical for the Coast Guard to address
    the longstanding challenges facing its drug interdiction mission--
    including better managing its acquisition efforts to replace aging
    assets and infrastructure and assessing its workforce needs.
        Overall, we made 105 recommendations in the reports covered by this
    statement. Agencies generally agreed with the recommendations. As of
    September 2024, agencies had implemented 46 of them. Fully addressing
    our recommendations will help ensure that the service efficiently uses
    its available resources to carry out its drug interdiction and other
    missions. We will continue to monitor the agencies' progress in
    implementing them.
        Chair Baldwin, Ranking Member Sullivan, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
    to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

        Senator Baldwin. Thank you all for your testimony and
    opening statements. Your full statements will be made a part of
    the record.
        I am going to--before we start a round of questioning I am
    going to recognize Chair Cantwell for an opening statement.
        The Chair. Madam Chair, I will put a statement in the
    record and if we can go to questions that would be great.
        Senator Baldwin. Absolutely. Your statement--your opening
    statement will be made a part of the record.
        I want to begin a round of questions. Each member will be
    given 5 minutes in this opening round and I want to begin by
    acknowledging that our Nation's effort to counter global drug
    trafficking requires a whole of government approach.
        While the Office of National Drug Control Policy provides
    overall direction to these efforts each participating agency
    must also have clear goals, partnerships, and resource
    requirements.
        Ms. MacLeod, can you please describe the Coast Guard's role
    in disrupting the flow of drugs and precursor chemicals within
    the national drug control policy and also what it would mean
    for the Coast Guard to have its own policy to prevent the
    smuggling of illicit synthetic drugs such as fentanyl?
        Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard plays an important role in
    this area. There is no doubt about that, and our work has shown
    that the collaboration is very strong in these areas including
    JIATF South and JIATF West and other task forces.
        However, our work has shown that the Coast Guard has
    struggled with foresight and managing toward a future that is
    different from the past, and I think that would be something
    important to look at in such a strategy.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        And, Admiral Lunday, if this committee were to direct the
    Coast Guard to work with its partners and develop such a
    strategy what activities would be prioritized and how would you
    go about putting together that strategy?
        Admiral Lunday. Chair Baldwin, thank you for the question.
        The Coast Guard's existing strategy exists in the Western
    Hemisphere strategy which is about a decade old and is
    principally focused on targeting the transnational criminal
    organization--excuse me, criminal organizations that are
    smuggling into the U.S.
        We currently operate our counter narcotics efforts under
    the three national strategies for the Northern border, the
    Southwest border and the Southeast border, and our efforts are
    targeted in those areas under the national strategy.
        But we are--it is time for us to look at updating that
    strategy for the Western Hemisphere so it fully aligns with the
    evolving threat that now includes fentanyl and other synthetic
    drugs.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        Admiral Little, I am interested in discussing with you the
    challenges of the Indo-Pacific and the work that the Coast
    Guard assets conduct to disrupt the global fentanyl supply
    chain.
        Part of determining how best to allocate resources and
    identifying where gaps remain involves adequately measuring
    performance. I noticed that in 2019 the Government
    Accountability Office recommended your organization establish
    performance measures to track over time.
        This recommendation was implemented and now, Admiral
    Little, can you please discuss what these measures show about
    the efforts to track the global movement of precursor chemicals
    to synthetic drugs and how to improve our approach?
        Admiral Little. Yes. Thank you, Chair Baldwin, for that
    question.
        We did go--we have looked at that 2019 GAO report and
    verified, you know, what we did in 2019 and what I will say is
    I believe our metrics have evolved significantly and improved
    significantly from--even from that time to where we are now.
        What has transpired in the last four or five years is a
    defense wide review. We have had a significant reduction in
    capacity at JIATF West and we have evolved as an organization
    as we have had to reassess where our priorities are--as I
    mentioned in my opening statement, our number-one priority
    being that of chasing the flow of precursor chemicals into the
    Western Hemisphere.
        So we have evolved our evaluation metrics to align with
    four lines of effort to include our number-one priority which
    is getting after the flow of both fentanyl precursors and the
    equipment that supports the supply of those things.
        Underneath that we have measures of effectiveness and
    measures of performance in the neighborhood of about 60
    specific measures that seek to ensure that we are applying our
    efforts on our highest priority work and that we are getting
    the results out of that work to support success and, you know,
    just one example of that--of those results include increasing
    the number of interagency partners that we are working with,
    increasing the amount of cooperation, and significant increases
    in successful interdictions of precursors.
        Senator Baldwin. And on that topic can you describe how you
    are increasing cooperation with Mexican partners, specifically
    to stem the flow of precursor chemicals into Mexico, and how is
    that taking shape?
        Admiral Little. Yes. Thanks, Chair Baldwin.
        Mexico is a critical partner in stemming the flow of
    precursor chemicals, particularly in the maritime environment,
    and as Ranking Member Sullivan mentioned in his opening remarks
    the type of flow and the way those chemicals move in bulk into
    the ports and then into inland Mexico for further production
    into fentanyl, methamphetamines, or other synthetic opioids.
        Our role in that is to provide visibility and transparency
    to U.S. and international law enforcement to understand where
    are the chemicals, where are they coming from, and where are
    they headed.
        When we identify those at risk for diversion we work very
    closely with U.S. law enforcement in Mexico City to get that
    information to SEMAR, the Mexican Navy who controls the ports,
    so that they can detain those chemicals and conduct further
    investigations prior to diversion for illicit use.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Let me follow on that, Admiral Little.
        Do you have concerns about corrupt Mexican officials in
    terms of who we are dealing with? Is that part of our problem
    that we cannot trust our partners?
        Admiral Little. Our role is directly with U.S. law
    enforcement so most of the information that we share will be
    specific to a load and then those relationships take place
    between those partners and the embassy.
        From our observations, we have had good success with vetted
    crews and members of SEMAR and other Mexican organizations that
    we have high trust in.
        Senator Sullivan. OK. And maybe, Ms. MacLeod or Admiral
    Lunday, you can address this, but my opening statement made the
    point that I think is very clear is that the Chinese make these
    commitments on precursor chemicals at the highest levels,
    whether in the Trump administration or with the Biden
    administration, and it just does not seem to go anywhere.
        Do you--has GAO looked at this at all? Do we--would you
    agree with me that the commitments they are making--look, it is
    a dictatorship?
        If Xi Jinping wanted to go to the precursor chemical people
    and say, hey, shut it down or you are going to be thrown in
    jail like he throws his foreign minister and defense minister
    and everybody else in jail he could stop it.
        So what is your sense of what the Chinese are doing? And,
    clearly, they did not abide by the agreement they had with the
    Trump administration and it does not look like they are abiding
    by the agreement they have with the Biden administration. What
    is your assessment on that?
        Ms. MacLeod. GAO recently added drug--the drug crisis to
    our high risk area, which is an area that we continue to look
    at all aspects of how to manage the issues that the Nation
    faces. So through this work we continue to look at the various
    threats that--as they come through. So that that is something
    we have work underway on.
        Senator Sullivan. But have you done an assessment on
    whether or not you think they are abiding by the agreement they
    did with the Biden administration?
        Ms. MacLeod. I do not recall that we have done work on that
    yet.
        Senator Sullivan. Maybe you can take a look at that.
        Ms. MacLeod. I can look into it.
        Senator Sullivan. Admiral, have you assessed that at all at
    your level?
        Admiral Lunday. Ranking Member Sullivan, that is not a
    specific issue that we have looked at in the Coast Guard with
    respect to high level agreements between the U.S. and China.
    But we are, as you know, for the Arctic close to Alaska. We are
    very concerned about China's activities in and around the U.S.
    exclusive economic zone and so we are focused on that
    operational activity.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask the panel as it relates to
    that question or what you just raised.
        Just in my state--you have seen it last summer and
    particularly just in the last two months in Alaska--we have had
    a joint Russian-Chinese naval task force of seven ships last
    summer, or two summers ago, in Alaska waters.
        Last summer, a joint Chinese naval task force, 12 ships in
    our waters--a joint Chinese-Russian strategic bomber task force
    that we--in our ADIZ a few months ago--actually, 6 weeks ago.
        Chinese surface vessels in our Alaska waters four weeks ago
    and this past weekend with this big Russian-Chinese military
    exercise, four ADIZ--three ADIZ incursions that we had to go
    intercept those guys in one week, And naval assets off the
    coast of Alaska, including two nuclear subs from Russia 50
    miles off the coast.
        My question is the Coast Guard has limited assets. You have
    gone and shadowed these big operations. But how do you divide
    that up with the Navy, with INDOPACOM?
        Two summers ago when we sent one 150-foot Coast Guard
    cutter to go shadow that seven-ship Russian naval joint task
    force off the coast of my state.
        I love the Coast Guard, but I let senior military officials
    know that was not sufficient, right. If there was a joint
    Russian naval task force that large off the East Coast we would
    have sent a carrier strike group to go greet it.
        So last summer when they came back--and they are going to
    keep coming, right. This is just--they sent a 12-ship joint
    naval task force. We did send four destroyers, P-8s, and this
    summer we have a destroyer and a national security cutter up in
    Alaska shadowing these aggressive operations.
        But how do you--how do you divvy up the Coast Guard DOD
    assets up in the--up in Alaska where there is so much activity
    going on with great power competition? The one thing we do know
    is if we do not show up with our own force and our own weapon
    capability they are going to keep doing this.
        Would you agree with me on that, Admiral?
        Admiral Lunday. Yes, Ranking Member Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. And then how do we--and then how do we
    do--how do we divvy up those assets between the Coast Guard and
    DOD in what is becoming a really, really competitive sphere of
    competition in the waters and air and subsea off the coast of
    Alaska?
        Admiral Lunday. Ranking Member Sullivan, you mentioned the
    Coast Guard cutter Stratton meeting presence with presence this
    last weekend for the three Russian ships. One was a submarine.
        Now, the Coast Guard is unafraid out there but we are not
    alone. All of our activities are fully coordinated with U.S.
    Northern Command, Indo-Pacific Command and Alaska Command.
        And so how we decide to meet presence with presence is
    fully coordinated even when the Coast Guard is operating under
    our own organic Coast Guard authorities.
        And so we remain in full coordination with them. We also
    coordinate with our Canadian allies on over flights of Chinese
    research vessels that may be operating in that area as well.
        And so this is a sustained operation that we have in place
    to make sure we meet presence with presence and demonstrate the
    importance of U.S. sovereignty not only in our waters but
    ensuring that these Russian Navy vessels and the PLA Navy
    vessels--the Chinese warships--that they are operating
    consistent with customary international law and that they know
    the U.S. is watching.
        Senator Sullivan. Do we need more assets up there, Coast
    Guard or Navy?
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member
    Sullivan. We do.
        As you know, we are working hard to sustain the existing
    assets we have while we also look to modernize the Coast Guard
    fleet by recapitalizing them, not only our national security
    cutters but the new offshore patrol cutter and ensuring its
    presence.
        We have two of the new offshore patrol cutters once they
    are built, which will be home ported--together to be home
    ported in Kodiak, and then also along the West Coast and other
    areas where they will be able to provide that increased
    presence.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        And next I recognize Chair Cantwell.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        The Chair. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to follow
    along Senator Sullivan. I would have gotten to this same
    subject but since you have gone here let us go here first.
        And I am not sure there is much daylight between Senator
    Sullivan and I on this issue. When I think about all the
    attention we give to the South China Sea how about a little bit
    of attention in the Arctic?
        So we are having incursions, correct, by the Russians. Let
    us just get that just----
        Admiral Lunday. We have seen the Russians cross into our
    exclusive economic zone, yes, Chair Cantwell.
        The Chair. OK. So we know it is happening, and I am
    extremely concerned about the fact that President Putin has
    announced that Russia will allow fishermen to fish in these
    international waters which is a direct threat to our seafood
    sector, and the fact that the Coast Guard is the front line,
    and so I think we need to know from the Coast Guard what
    resources you think that we need to have?
        Now, just to throw in the original focus of drug
    interdiction, when I look at it over the past decade the flow
    of cocaine through the maritime environment has doubled while
    the Coast Guard removals have remained flat.
        And so now that cocaine is being cut with the deadly
    fentanyl if the Coast Guard had more ships at its disposal what
    could you do to boost those interdiction rates--now I am
    talking all over--and what else do we need to do to increase
    those interdiction rates?
        And, look, I believe the Coast Guard does many--you have
    five missions and we put a lot on you, but I think we are
    asking let us go and argue for a more focused approach in the
    Arctic and a more focused interdiction approach.
        But you have to tell us what resources you need and what
    you think that we could do in stopping chemical shipments or
    stopping traffickers before they get a chance to turn this into
    deadly narcotics?
        So I was actually going to ask you, Rear Admiral, but
    anybody who wants to answer that question.
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you, Chair Cantwell, and I will
    start. Thank you for the question.
        So we have received great support from the Congress of the
    administration to make key investments in sustaining our
    current readiness and modernizing our assets. But as the
    Commandant has been clear publicly and in testimony, we will
    need more going into the future.
        Today, the Coast Guard's discretionary budget is $12.3
    billion with a capital improvement budget of $1.6 billion.
    Going forward, the Coast Guard is a $20 billion organization.
        We need today a $3 billion capital procurement and
    improvement budget in order to do the modernization necessary,
    and the remainder of that--the $16 billion--is needed to
    sustain our aging assets that we have in place.
        That will enable us to deliver new assets--cutters, boats,
    aircraft, and other systems, along with the people, which are
    our most precious resource, to be able to provide the presence
    needed to do those missions.
        The Chair. Well, I definitely could ask lots of questions
    about Cape D and assets and their future and missions. But in
    this regard what do we--does the Coast Guard have a draft out
    of that $3 billion that would be necessary for a larger Arctic
    presence for both the incursions that are happening by the
    Russians, the threats of the Chinese pretending to be an Arctic
    nation when they are not an Arctic nation, and to help in the
    interdiction? Do you have a proposal within that $3 billion?
        Admiral Lunday. Chair Cantwell, we do have--in addition to
    the Fiscal Year 2025 President's budget request we also have an
    unfunded priority list that identifies items for increased
    purchase of spare parts for our aging cutter fleet, also parts
    for our aviation fleet both fixed wing and helicopters, as well
    as increased funding for the recapitalization of assets to be
    able to accelerate the work that we need to do.
        The Chair. Could we get a plan from the Coast Guard on what
    would increase your interdiction capacity to try to address the
    fact that we have seen this huge increase in supply and not as
    much interdiction?
        So we want to help you get the assets, and then separately
    I would like to see a number--that is, what would a larger--I
    do not know what Senator Sullivan would call it. You know, the
    Russians are going to continue to provoke.
        But what we want to do is to have, as you described it, a
    presence there and to be serious about--I mean, we have
    fishermen up there that the fleet--Russian fleet--are coming up
    next to fishing vessels.
        So we want to know what that plan would look like out of
    the $3 billion, too. So more interdiction writ large and more
    capacity in the Arctic meeting, as you described, presence with
    presence.
        If we could get--what of your $3 billion proposal would be
    addressing either of those and if that is not crisp if you
    could get us something that is crisp because I think Senator
    Sullivan and I plan to continue to communicate about this
    issue.
        So, and Chair Baldwin, thank you for having the hearing to
    begin with and getting all of us here to talk about this. So
    could I get a commitment, Admiral, for that plan?
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. Yes,
    we will follow up with briefings and information for the record
    in response to your questions.
        The Chair. Thank you.
        Senator Baldwin. Next we have Senator Blackburn.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

        Senator Blackburn. Madam Chairman, thank you so much and I
    want to thank you for the hearing today. I think that looking
    at what is happening on the world stage with the cartels and
    the drug trafficking, the human trafficking, is something that
    we are continuing to see more of and the fact that these
    precursor chemicals seem to be coming in by the container load,
    as one of our Tennessee sheriffs said, when they apprehend
    drugs now. They used to apprehend things in grams and now it is
    all in pounds.
        So we appreciate what the Coast Guard does. Admiral, I do
    have a question about the budget justification that states that
    failing to achieve counterdrug performance measures was due to
    a decrease in the number of surface assets due to reallocation
    to migrant interdiction operations, and we know that a decade
    ago that the Coast Guard would interdict 15 percent of
    estimated cocaine maritime drug flows and in 2023 the numbers
    were 3.6 percent.
        So do you continue to see a reduction? Do you expect to
    continue to see a reduction in drug interdiction because of the
    illegal migrant flows?
        Admiral Lunday. Senator Blackburn, thank you for your
    question. So I was the Atlantic area commander for the Coast
    Guard in 2023.
        As I took command in 2022 we were beginning to see an
    uptick in regular maritime migration from Haiti and from Cuba
    moving in the south Florida straits and off the windward pass
    toward south Florida.
        So I made the decision after notifying the Commandant that
    we were going to begin to shift major Coast Guard cutters,
    aircraft, and personnel from the counterdrug mission, which is
    about saving lives and protecting our border, but over to the
    effort to stop the irregular maritime migration toward the
    U.S., which is also about saving lives and protecting our
    border.
        Our mission there, which is conducted in a task force--a
    Department of Homeland Security Task Force--is to prevent a
    maritime mass migration that would it occur, would present a
    national security threat to the U.S.
        The last time that happened was in 1994 from both Haiti and
    Cuba. And so we surged assets starting in August 2022 to
    prevent that from happening, maintaining a higher than 80
    percent at sea interdiction rate and, again, our mission is to
    interdict those ventures--those migrant ventures--as far from
    U.S. shores as possible and then rapidly repatriate them to
    their country of origin.
        So it is a lifesaving and a border control mission, and
    over the last two years we have been successful in preventing a
    maritime mass migration.
        We will always have a presence to prevent that pressure
    against the U.S. southeast border and now we have begun in the
    last several months to shift those major cutters back to the
    drug interdiction mission working for Admiral Burdian at Joint
    Task Force.
        Senator Blackburn. OK. Not to interrupt, but I do want to
    ask you this. Going back to February 2023 when you started to
    see an uptick and a skyrocketing in the numbers of the illegal
    migrants you had two senior members of the Coast Guard that
    wrote an article and they talked about the migrant interdiction
    operations were in a state of emergency.
        So what--tell me where you put the number to say we are now
    in a state of emergency and how many a day, a week, a month, a
    year? What are you facing?
        You have referenced twice when you got to that state of
    emergency. So are we still in what you would classify as state
    of emergency?
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you for the question, Senator
    Blackburn.
        So under our plan, which is a homeland security plan that
    we lead, we entered a surge phase for prevention of a mass
    migration.
        So it is not--emergency was not a term we were using at the
    time but we were seeing a historic surge in a regular maritime
    migration and so we took an urgent approach to address that.
    And so----
        Senator Blackburn. OK. Let me ask you this, because with
    some of the migrants, these illegal aliens that come to the
    southern border or you are interdicting them at sea, we know
    that there are gang members, Tren de Aragua--TDA--the
    Venezuelan gang. You also have MS-13.
        These are dangerous people. So what are you doing to
    protect our men and women in uniform so that they are going to
    be safe as they are handling these instances?
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you, Senator. So, first, we make sure
    that our people, our Coast Guard men and women that are
    conducting this mission and encountering migrants at sea, are
    well trained and that they have the equipment they need to be
    able to process and then repatriate those migrants safely, and
    then continue to treat each person we encounter with dignity
    and respect.
        Until we know their background, and we do collect
    biometrics--that is an expansion of the capability that we
    have. We started that in 2023. So we better understand who we
    are encountering at sea.
        Senator Blackburn. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
    Chairman.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        Next, we have Senator Budd.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED BUDD,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

        Senator Budd. I thank the Chair and I thank the panel for
    being here.
        Admiral Lunday, I would like to ask you for a status
    update. As you know, there is an ongoing environmental
    emergency in Buxton Beach, North Carolina, which is part of the
    Cape Hatteras National Seashore.
        Before 2013 the Navy and Coast Guard they stored fuel at
    the beach and it used to be buried but now oil is washing onto
    the beach and leaking into the ocean. Folks in the area are
    rightly concerned and frustrated because this has gone on for
    more than a year.
        There are three primary Federal agencies with
    responsibility here. It is the National Park Service, the Army
    Corps of Engineers, and the Coast Guard. Now, I know that the
    Coast Guard is working with the other relevant agencies but--
    and then the Army Corps of Engineers recently announced they
    are deploying a team to monitor and take potential actions if
    petroleum releases are observed.
        But is the Coast Guard involved with these efforts?
        Admiral Lunday. Senator Budd, thank you for the question. I
    first became aware of this issue when I was commanding Atlantic
    area last year and I began to receive e-mails directly from
    local residents and community members in the area and in
    Buxton, and so I became familiar with the issue and what we
    were doing working with the National Parks Service, the Army
    Corps of Engineers and the Navy and we continue to be involved
    in those efforts.
        As you noted, Senator, I noted that the Corps of Engineers
    last Friday deployed a team to begin removing potentially
    contaminated soil and they announced that they awarded a
    contract to bring in additional equipment to begin to remediate
    some of the potentially contaminated soil in the area.
        But the Coast Guard remains fully involved in that and in
    coordination with the Corps, with the National Parks Service
    and the Navy.
        Senator Budd. So you do agree that there is an active
    spill? And, first of all, thank you for your efforts through
    the Coast Guard on this, but you do agree there is an active
    spill?
        Admiral Lunday. Senator, we sent Coast Guard pollution
    responders earlier in the year and last year to determine
    whether or not we could take action as if it was an oil spill
    into the water.
        As we arrived on scene we did not detect a level of--or
    detect any spill that we could respond to under our
    authorities. That did not mean there was nothing that could be
    done because there are other authorities that the Army Corps
    and others are using and that we are leaning on to be able to
    address the problem.
        But at the time in our response we have not seen an active
    spill that enabled us to use our organic Coast Guard oil spill
    response authorities.
        Senator Budd. Has the Coast Guard determined whether there
    is an authorized program it can use to remediate the site?
        Admiral Lunday. Well, we are working with the Corps of
    Engineers and the Parks Service to look at that, Senator, and
    so that is part of a Federal team effort to address the
    challenges there.
        Senator Budd. One more question on the authorities. Would
    it be possible for the Coast Guard's oil cleanup authorities to
    be used here since petroleum is washing into the ocean? I just
    want to be clear on this.
        Admiral Lunday. Senator, although we have not seen oil
    washing into the ocean specifically but if we do detect that
    our oil spill authority response authorities could be used.
        So we are continually in communication with, not only the
    Federal partners, but with the local community and if there is
    oil going into the water we will respond under that oil spill
    response authority, yes, sir.
        Senator Budd. Again, I know there is multiple agencies
    involved here. How long, in your best estimation, would it be
    before those that are concerned--all of us in North Carolina
    are concerned about this--how long do you think it can be
    before we expect these are all cleaned up?
        Admiral Lunday. Senator, I would like to get back to you
    with a briefing along with the Corps of Engineers so we can
    fully answer that question and provide that for the record,
    sir.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. I would ask the Coast Guard to
    keep working as you are with every other involved party to end
    this environmental emergency now. This needs to be cleaned up
    without further delay and, again, I want to thank you for your
    efforts through the Coast Guard.
        I want to ask you a question related to what Senator
    Blackburn was talking about with drug trafficking and this is
    regarding trafficking in the Middle East including drugs
    trafficked on the fishing dhows. It has been--they have been
    used to finance Iran's malign activities.
        If the Coast Guard is--if your assets are operating in the
    CENTCOM AOR and you discover illegal narcotics aboard a vessel
    what happens to those narcotics and to the crew that is
    attempting to traffic those illegal narcotics?
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you for the question, Senator Budd.
        Our forces over there--and we have almost 400 Coast Guard
    men and women and six Coast Guard cutters permanently stationed
    there--they operate under the command and control of U.S.
    Central Command and then Fifth Fleet naval central forces under
    the command of Admiral Wikoff. So they are performing a
    Department of Defense mission.
        I do not represent the Department of Defense today,
    Senator, but in my experience as a force provider to them our
    crews typically, when they encounter a dhow--one of these
    vessels that is smuggling drugs--we will destroy the drugs at
    sea, gather information about the master and the crew of the
    vessel, and then we will disembark the vessel.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Admiral.
        Is it--this is a ``yes or no'' question--is it fair to say
    that these would-be drug traffickers face no other punishment
    other than having their drugs seized?
        Admiral Lunday. In my experience in that scenario, that is
    correct, Senator.
        Senator Budd. Thank you.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you. I am going to start a second
    round of questioning and go a little bit out of order to allow
    Senator Sullivan to go first because he has another
    appointment.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I just have
    one final question. It is an important one.
        So, as Senator Cantwell mentioned, the Russians have
    announced that they are going to stop even abiding by EEZ rules
    when they are fishing and they are going to go into other
    people's EEZs.
        This is in line with other dictatorships like the Chinese
    with their IUU fishing. Senator Whitehouse and I have been
    working on a bipartisan bill dealing with IUU fishing that
    would target China primarily with more naval and Coast Guard
    assets.
        My question, Admiral, maybe you can take it or anyone else
    from JIATF West or South because it is--IUU is a giant issue
    all over the world particularly with these Chinese gray
    fleets--is that in addressing the IUU fishing problem in our
    fish bill--that is the name of our bill to address IUU fishing
    which the Coast Guard helped us write--provides assets.
        But tying that problem back to the topic of today's
    hearing, is there overlap in terms of assets and efforts and
    resources that can be used in the counterdrug mission that can
    also be used in combating IUU fishing particularly as it
    relates Chinese use of precursors on the drug issue and the
    Chinese fleets being the biggest violators of IUU fishing in
    the world?
        Admiral, maybe take a crack at that and then anyone else.
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you, Ranking Member Sullivan.
        It is an important question and I thank you for your
    support to strengthen the Coast Guard's tools and the Federal
    Government's tools to address the problem of IUU fishing, a
    global problem but one that actually impacts our seafood
    industry as well, and so I thank you for the additional tools.
        In terms of the--a cross connect between what we may be
    seeing in IUU fishing and drug interdiction or the drug
    problem, we are looking closely at that.
        We see these distant water fishing fleets travel around the
    world, stay persistently at sea, and engage in IUU fishing, and
    that destabilizes maritime nations that are trying but may not
    have the capability to protect their own waters, and that could
    be a connection to challenges to movement of drugs and other
    malign activities.
        So it is an area we are focused on.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Well, we want to work--continue to
    work with you on that because they are both really important
    topics.
        And, again, Madam Chair, thank you for holding this hearing
    and I appreciate you letting me cut in line.
        Senator Baldwin. No problem.
        I want to go back to drill down a little deeper on some of
    the asset and resourcing issues. So as we have heard discussed
    already more cocaine is entering the country now compared to
    five to 10 years ago and, in fact, the flow of known cocaine
    into America has doubled over the last decade while the amount
    interdicted by the Coast Guard has remained flat over the same
    period of time.
        The Coast Guard has not met its mission performance target
    for cocaine interdiction once in the past 10 years. So I want
    to start with you, Admiral Burdian. Cocaine is primarily
    trafficked in your areas of operation and it is now, as we
    know, frequently being cut with fentanyl, leading to tragic
    losses across America.
        I am concerned that we are not resourcing the Coast Guard
    sufficiently to address that threat and so just how much
    additional cocaine could be stopped from reaching this country
    if your organization received additional Coast Guard sea and
    air assets as well as personnel, and is there a specific Coast
    Guard asset whose shortage most affects your mission?
        Admiral Burdian. Thank you for the question, Chair Baldwin.
        I am proud to say that today we do have six Coast Guard
    cutters operating under the tactical control of JIATF operating
    between the eastern Pacific and in the Caribbean, as well as a
    law enforcement detachment on board an allied vessel.
        So we have seen a restoration of those forces in support of
    JIATF South's detection and monitoring mission. While I could
    not speak to how much more is enough, there really is no
    replacement for U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement capabilities
    and authorities in the JIATF South JOA.
        When the Coast Guard conducts an interdiction we not only
    remove those narcotics from the water but the pocket litter,
    the electronics, that intelligence is exploited by those crews
    and the individuals who are involved in the smuggling effort
    are brought back to the United States to the Department of
    Justice for prosecution, and that work really contributes to
    the broader U.S. efforts to dismantle the transnational
    criminal organizations who are conducting the trafficking.
        I would like to mention also we have six partner nations
    contributing their forces in the eastern Pacific and another
    six partner nations and an allied partner operating in the
    Caribbean and they are doing extraordinary work.
        I mentioned they contribute to 80 percent of the 307 metric
    tons that were interdicted, supported by JIATF South last year,
    and they are providing some information. They give us
    biometrics. They exploit the pocket litter, and that goes into
    U.S. databases for our use.
        But more Coast Guard cutters are vital to the effort and
    the best Coast Guard cutters, the national security cutters--we
    have got two of them in the JOA right now--are exceptional
    assets.
        Their ability to deploy law enforcement teams, utilize
    airborne use of force, the stability, the sea keeping of those
    assets, is simply irreplaceable.
        The medium endurance cutters who do come down to the joint
    operating area they do tremendous work. Those crews are working
    so, so hard and I value all of them. But it is difficult. They
    are operating aging assets that break frequently and their
    embarked airborne capability is then not usable.
        We simply--we lose ship days to the need to conduct
    emergency maintenance and repair on those assets. The fast
    response cutters, when we do get them down in the joint
    operating area--those are the newer 154-foot patrol boats--are
    also extraordinary. I think the data would tell you they are
    about 40 percent more effective than medium endurance cutters.
        However, part of the package that is necessary to interdict
    these fast-moving assets is that airborne use of force
    capability from the Coast Guard helicopter interdiction
    squadron.
        So best for us is a functioning, trained crew who comes in
    with an airborne use of force helicopter, a surface use of
    force capability that can deliver that law enforcement with
    those highly trained boarding teams.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
        And, Admiral Lunday, can you describe for the Committee how
    the Coast Guard balances risks and competing priorities when
    allocating assets between the counterdrug mission and other
    missions?
        And you were just describing a little bit about the need to
    do some of that pivoting with regard to Haiti and Cuba and, you
    know, when you described the surge in maritime migration and
    the mission to prevent that?
        Admiral Lunday. Thank you, Chair Baldwin.
        The top mission for the Coast Guard is--that is our North
    Star is search and rescue and then ensuring the operation and
    defense of a marine transportation. That is so vital to our
    economic prosperity and national security.
        And so we have not taken any reduction in the level of
    commitment to forces and operations to ensure we perform those
    missions.
        As you know, we have a 10 percent shortage in our enlisted
    workforce--the backbone of our force--and so because of that we
    have had to take actions to lay up three of our 210-foot
    cutters and seven patrol boats because we did not have enough
    Coast Guard men and women to crew them.
        Now, we are making progress on recruiting and I can talk
    about that, but the cutters we have laid up would have
    otherwise been operating and conducting drug interdiction
    operations or other high-priority operations that we have been
    discussing.
        Senator Baldwin. And, Ms. MacLeod, from your vantage point
    as a subject matter expert can you provide an assessment of
    what new technology or updates to existing platforms would
    yield significant improvements in the Coast Guard's drug
    interdiction mission?
        Ms. MacLeod. Yes, thank you.
        Technology is critical for Coast Guard operations. However,
    the Coast Guard has a long history of problems managing these
    resources. Our work has highlighted many areas.
        We currently have more than 50 open recommendations to the
    Coast Guard to help them manage resources. These include:
    workforce planning, delayed acquisitions, and shore
    infrastructure resources, all of which are key to carrying out
    their missions including drug interdiction.
        Senator Baldwin. Thank you. I look forward to receiving
    progress reports on the Coast Guard's workforce assessments and
    the Government Accountability Office's recommendations, and I
    look forward to working with all of you to train and equip the
    people who defend our shores.
        With that, the hearing record will remain open for two
    weeks. During that time Senators may submit questions for the
    record.
        Upon receipt, witnesses are requested to submit their
    written answers to the Committee as soon as possible, but by no
    later than Thursday October 3.
        I thank the witnesses for appearing today and this hearing
    is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

          Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Cruz, U.S. Senator from Texas
        Chairwoman Baldwin and Ranking Member Sullivan, thank you for
    holding today's hearing. And thank you to Admiral Lunday, Rear Admiral
    Burdian, Rear Admiral Little, and Ms. MacLeod for appearing today.
        You cannot stop illegal drugs when you have an open border. The
    Biden-Harris administration and DHS Secretary Mayorkas have ignored the
    painful connection between their open border policies and the
    devastation wrought by illegally trafficked drugs on our families,
    communities, and country. This administration's radical policies have
    led to an influx of illegal aliens, drug smuggling, sex trafficking,
    and American lives lost.
        Our Nation relies upon the Coast Guard to keep our country safe,
    project national power, and champion the rule of law. The men and women
    of the Coast Guard do this job tremendously well, and we owe them a
    debt of gratitude.
        Yet because of the Biden-Harris administration's actions, and their
    allies in Congress, the Coast Guard finds itself in an increasingly
    impossible position. On the migrant and narcotics fronts alone, the
    Coast Guard has readily acknowledged it has been unable to interdict
    drugs they otherwise could have because the Coast Guard was busy
    catching and releasing illegal aliens instead.
        Last Congress, I inserted a provision into the Coast Guard bill
    during committee markup to study the impacts of the Biden-Harris open
    border policies on the workload of the Coast Guard. But Senate
    Democrats, preferring ignorance to politically inconvenient facts,
    unilaterally stripped it from the final product.
        Though this is bad enough, this Administration has also taken to
    expanding the Coast Guard's responsibilities without increasing
    resources. Most recently, in a clear sop to the environmentalist left,
    Biden-Harris officials at NOAA proposed senseless new whale-related
    rules impacting the waters from South Texas to Northern Maine that, in
    addition to curtailing most oil and gas development, would see the
    Coast Guard play traffic cop for boats going faster than 11.5 miles per
    hour.
        The reality is this: while the Coast Guard does an incredibly
    admirable job, it works with limited resources stemming from an
    administration that is more concerned with advancing woke and
    ineffectual policies than equipping the Coast Guard with the tools and
    support to do dangerous and demanding jobs.
        As just one example this Administration's disastrous vaccine
    mandate kicked coasties out of the service while the Coast Guard was
    struggling to meet recruitment goals. How many more tons of dangerous
    drugs could have been stopped from reaching our shores had the Coast
    Guard been adequately resourced or not had to clean up the Biden-Harris
    border crisis?
        Unfortunately, this Administration's bad policies don't stop at our
    exclusive economic zone. In the Middle East, where maritime drug
    trafficking bankrolls Iran's malign activities, Coast Guard cutters
    recently interdicted advanced weapons originating from Iran bound for
    the Houthis in Yemen, and hundreds of kilograms of methamphetamines,
    heroin, and other narcotics from a dhow in the Arabian Sea.
        Oftentimes, the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies are playing
    catch-and-release with these Iranian drug-runners. That's a horrible
    idea since these vessels face no consequence other than losing their
    cargo. I have put forward language for the upcoming Coast Guard
    reauthorization that empowers the Coast Guard and the Navy to respond
    appropriately to dhows running drugs and weapons to finance Iranian
    terror. There needs to be consequences since catch-and-release is a
    failure.
        Still, there have been incremental gains and improvements in border
    security through the Coast Guard. In the last authorization, I secured
    language to provide a tethered aerostat radar system at Coast Guard
    Station South Padre Island at the Texas-Mexico border to combat
    poachers, human traffickers, and drug runners. I am proud to say that
    system is up and flying in South Texas today and helping to keep
    Americans safe and prosperous.
        Similarly, my provision requiring operational data sharing between
    CBP and the Coast Guard is helping to streamline interdiction efforts
    along the southern maritime border, so that more people illegally
    entering the U.S. are caught.
        But we still have more to accomplish. We need to end the ``catch
    and release'' approach to Middle East drug enforcement, and enact the
    Pay Our Coast Guard Act, which I sponsored along with Senators
    Cantwell, Sullivan, Baldwin, and Wicker to ensure the Coast Guard is no
    longer the only armed service that goes unpaid during a government
    shutdown.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their important
    work and what they could accomplish if properly resourced.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                            Admiral Kevin E. Lunday
    QFR #8
    COAST GUARD--ILLEGAL UNREPORTED & UNREGULATED FISHING (IUUF) OPERATIONS
        BACKGROUND: I would like to express my gratitude to the U.S. Coast
    Guard for your work in combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
    (IUU) fishing. As you know, the global and domestic impacts of IUU
    fishing pose a significant security threat to the U.S. economy.

        QUESTION PART-1: How is the Coast Guard planning to meet
    operational demands of combatting IUU fishing in the Indo-Pacific while
    facing current limitations with the number of available ships and an
    aging fleet?
        Answer. Operations in the Indo-Pacific are inherently challenging
    as we work to reach and support remote partners and sustain our own
    personnel and assets across the vast region. The Coast Guard plans to
    continue engagement across the Indo-Pacific; resource needs to do so
    are reflected in the President's Budget and our Unfunded Priorities
    List. The Coast Guard continues to leverage interagency and
    international partnerships to combat illegal, unreported and
    unregulated fishing throughout the Indo-Pacific.

        QUESTION PART-2: During the Coast Guard's interruption of IUU
    fishing operations, to what extent do you observe those malign actors
    engaging in other unlawful activity concurrently?
        Answer. Based on historical data and observation, the Coast Guard
    rarely sees other unlawful activities concurrently taking place during
    counter-IUU fishing operations. Additionally, Coast Guard presence
    often changes the behavior of both domestic and foreign fishing fleets.

        QUESTION PART-3: How would you characterize the Coast Guard's
    effective interoperability with allies and partners as you conduct IUU
    fishing operations, and what resources or authorities would provide the
    greatest positive impact to improve this interoperability?
        Answer. The Coast Guard leverages 12 bilateral agreements
    throughout the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility. In 2024, the Coast
    Guard executed all 12 of these agreements to assist our Pacific Island
    partners in combatting IUU fishing. The Coast Guard leverages DoD's
    Oceania Maritime Security Initiative to conduct bilateral boardings
    with U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) embarked
    onboard U.S. naval vessels. Joint Coast Guard operations throughout the
    Indo-Pacific ensure continued interoperability with our allies to
    maintain rules-based order throughout the region. Continuing to enhance
    Coast Guard capacity and capability, through the acquisition of new
    cutters and aircraft, is critical to improving mission effectiveness
    for counter IUU fishing operations.
    QFR #9
              COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT/DRUG INTERDICTION DEMAND
        BACKGROUND: Data shows a significant decline in U.S. Coast Guard
    cocaine seizures over the last three years, despite a steady flow of
    cocaine across the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean AORs.

        QUESTION PART-1: Is there a way in which the Coast Guard could
    increase its Law Enforcement presence in known drug trafficking areas,
    such as the use of Law Enforcement Detachments with Title 14 authority
    onboard allied vessels, without diverting Coast Guard ships away from
    the maritime migration flow?
        Answer. In FY 2024, LEDETs conducted three deployments aboard U.S.
    Navy and eight deployments aboard Allied surface assets. Planned LEDET
    deployments in FY 2025 are expected to maintain this level of
    commitment.

        QUESTION PART-2: What additional resources could the Coast Guard
    utilize to meet the Service's Law Enforcement/Drug Interdiction
    operational demand?
        Answer. The best way to bolster the Coast Guard's counter-drug
    capacity is to support ongoing fleet recapitalization efforts, which
    will enable force packages consisting of major cutters, with a
    deployable Airborne Use of Force capable rotary-wing aircraft and
    onboard tactical intelligence capabilities.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
                            Admiral Kevin E. Lunday
    QFR #14
             (U) COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION IN EASTERN PACIFIC
                              & WESTERN CARIBBEAN
        BACKGROUND: (U) Because of the vast increase of illegal maritime
    migration, the Coast Guard has been forced to focus resources on
    migrant interdiction at the expense of other missions.

        QUESTION PART-1: (U) How has this increase of migration impacted
    your readiness and deterrence efforts in other places, such as working
    to stop the drug flow in the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean?
        Answer.(U) In August 2022, in response to a significant increase in
    the levels of irregular maritime migration in the Caribbean region, DHS
    elevated Operation Vigilant Sentry from Phase 1a to Phase 1b. At this
    time, the Coast Guard surged assets and personnel to deter and prevent
    a maritime mass migration amid the ongoing civil unrest in Haiti and
    deteriorating conditions in Cuba. While the Coast Guard strategically
    reallocates personnel and resources to these efforts, missions such as
    drug interdiction will continue to be impacted.

        QUESTION PART-2: (U) In the last year, what percentage of illegal
    narcotics bound for the U.S. actually made it ashore?
        Answer. (U//FOUO) The Coast Guard estimates roughly 82 percent of
    the documented 2,655 metric tons of cocaine moving towards the United
    States across all vectors was not intercepted and thus potentially
    available to cross the U.S. border in Fiscal Year 2023. The Service
    cannot verify the amount that actually made it ashore. (U//FOUO)

        QUESTION PART-3: (U) Is that more or less than it was five years
    ago?
        Answer. (U//FOUO) The Coast Guard is unable to verify the amount of
    illegal narcotics that actually made it to shore in 2019. the estimates
    for the amount of cocaine available to cross into the United States
    remained consistent at 82 percent. (U//FOUO)

        QUESTION PART-4: (U) What resources does the Coast Guard need to
    stop more of the illicit flow of drugs and migrants?
        Answer. (U) The best way to bolster the Coast Guard's counter-drug
    capacity is to support ongoing fleet recapitalization efforts.

        QUESTION PART-5: (U) How can Congress support the Coast Guard to
    carry out these statutory missions?
        Answer. (U) The Coast Guard remains responsive to all maritime
    threats. However, the Service needs investment and funding to sustain
    vital operations, modernize aging assets, and overcome shore
    maintenance deficiencies and personnel shortfalls. The Coast Guard's
    annual budget is $12.3 billion--that equates to about 1.4 percent of
    the DoD budget or 6 percent of the Navy budget. With all of the value
    that the Coast Guard provides to the Nation, that is a tremendous
    return on investment for the taxpayer.
    QFR #15
      U.S. COAST GUARD & PARTNER NATION COOPERATION IN EASTERN PACIFIC &
                    WESTERN CARIBBEAN FOR DRUG INTERDICTION
        BACKGROUND: These questions are regarding the U.S. Coast Guard's
    Partnerships with countries bordering the Eastern Pacific/Western
    Caribbean and how these partnerships impact drug interdiction in the
    region.

        QUESTION PART-1: How important are the relationships and agreements
    the U.S. Coast Guard has with partner nations in the region?
        Answer. The relationships and agreements that the U.S. Coast Guard
    has with partner nations to counter the flow of illicit drugs are
    critical to our ability to address mission demands in the Eastern
    Pacific and Western Caribbean region. The Coast Guard maintains over 40
    country-specific counter-drug agreements, covering a range of subjects
    from shiprider procedures to overflight of national airspace. The Coast
    Guard's network of multilateral and bilateral agreements are unlike
    those of any other armed service or government agency.
        These agreements increase the operational reach of U.S. assets and
    support integration with our international partners, enabling them to
    enforce their laws on vessels subject to their jurisdiction. These
    agreements are critical to supporting our national security objectives.

        QUESTION PART-2: Do these relationships and agreements help the
    Coast Guard better understand where the drugs are coming from and where
    they are headed?
        Answer. Yes, the relationships between the U.S. Coast Guard and
    partner nations in the region help the information flow to better
    understand illicit drug activities. The depth and continuity of
    relationships with countries where the Coast Guard has permanently
    assigned members (liaison, attache, etc.), help foster more
    collaboration and joint efforts to counter illicit drug activities.
    Information sharing agreements with partner nations also help identify
    specific drug movements in the region allowing for better targeting and
    interdiction by Coast Guard or partner assets.

        QUESTION PART-3: Would the Coast Guard's partners in the region
    benefit from more Coast Guard and SOUTHCOM resources in theater?
        Answer. The Coast Guard footprint strengthens and develops partner
    nation capabilities. Bilateral agreements greatly increase the
    operational reach of U.S. assets and also support integration with our
    international partners by providing support to enable their assets to
    better patrol and respond to maritime threats in their sovereign
    waters. During key leader engagements throughout the region, our
    partners have expressed a desire for more U.S. Coast Guard, SOUTHCOM,
    and other U.S. resources and partnership. If the United States does not
    foster relationships, these countries will have limited choices and may
    turn to our rivals and adversaries for support.

        QUESTION PART-4: How has the U.S. Coast Guard's relationships with
    those countries helped stem the flow of drugs?
        Answer. The Coast Guard contributes aircraft, cutters, and
    personnel for the detection and monitoring of illicit drugs. The strong
    relationships fostered by the Coast Guard enable information sharing
    and facilitate operations and data analysis critical for targeting the
    primary flow of illicit traffic, directly degrading TCO networks. The
    expertise obtained by partner nations facilitates independent
    operations and coordination with JIATF-S for counter-drug operations at
    sea without the need for Coast Guard personnel or assets. In FY 2023,
    partner nations carried out approximately 80 percent of JIATF-S
    interdictions. Coast Guard presence and support in the region has
    enabled essential training, modeling, and process improvements that
    empower partner nations to battle TCOs.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marsha Blackburn to
                            Admiral Kevin E. Lunday
    QFR #17
                COAST GUARD ICEBREAKER ACQUISITION/CONSTRUCTION
        BACKGROUND: The Coast Guard's law enforcement mission on the Great
    Lakes can only be carried out with icebreakers during the winter
    months, protecting our northern border. The Coast Guard requested $55
    million in FY24 to start the construction process on a new heavy
    icebreaker for the Great Lakes yet received only $20 million.
        The Coast Guard's icebreaking mission, whether in the Arctic,
    Antarctic or on the Great Lakes is suffering. The HEALY was sent back
    to Seattle after a casualty leaving the Arctic uncovered. The 40-year-
    old 140-foot icebreaking tugs are suffering astounding failure rates
    causing significant impacts to our winter supply chain on the Great
    Lakes.

        QUESTION PART-1: How is the lack of funding impacting the
    acquisition timeline for this critical new multi-mission asset, the
    heavy Great Lakes Icebreaker?
        Answer. The reduction from the $55 million requested in the FY 2024
    President's Budget to the $20 million provided for the Great Lakes
    Icebreaker in the FY 2024 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act
    partially funds the Analyze/Select phase of the acquisition. The
    appropriated funds are sufficient to initiate that phase, but the
    Service will need the balance of the requested $55 million in order to
    complete the Analyze/Select phase.

        QUESTION PART-2: Why did the Coast Guard not ask for funding for
    the new heavy Great Lakes Icebreaker in the FY25 Presidents Budget?
        Answer. The timing of the three-year process to build the FY 2025
    President's Budget request and the delayed enactment of the FY 2024
    Further Consolidated Appropriations Act did not afford the Coast Guard
    any flexibility to adjust for the reduction below the amount included
    in the FY 2024 President's Budget. After nearly two-and-a-half years of
    development, the FY 2025 President's Budget was transmitted to Congress
    on March 11, 2024; the FY 2024 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act
    was signed into law on March 23, 2024.

        QUESTION PART-3: What can this committee do to help expedite
    icebreaker construction now?
        Answer. Two actions could help expedite icebreaker contruction.
    First, Congress could provide the remaining $35 million dollars that is
    needed to complete the Analyze/Select phase--without additional
    funding, the Coast Guard expects to exhaust available funding in the
    early part of FY 2026. Additionally, Congress could fund the $25
    million request on the Coast Guard's FY 2025 Unfunded Priorities List
    for Long-Lead Time Material. This would expedite icebreaker
    construction; however, the Service cannot begin construction until
    after the Analyze/Select phase is complete.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                         Jo-Ann F. Burdian, RADM, USCG
        Question 1. Over the past decade, the known flow of cocaine through
    the maritime environment has more than doubled, while Coast Guard
    removals have remained flat. At the same time that we have more cocaine
    entering America, this cocaine is now often being cut with fentanyl and
    turned into a far deadlier narcotic.

        a. How can the Coast Guard and JIATFS better deter, interdict, and
    stop this surging flow of cocaine coming into the United States?
        Answer. The greatest operational challenge JIATFS faces in
    deterring and interdicting the surging flow of cocaine is the
    availability of U.S. assets. To better deter and stop these shipments,
    we need to increase the number of maritime and air platforms assigned
    to our Detection and Monitoring (D&M) missions. Enhancing intelligence-
    sharing and fostering deeper partnerships with our Latin American and
    Caribbean allies is also essential, as over 80 percent of JIATFS
    interdictions are conducted by partner nations. Additionally,
    modernizing our infrastructure--particularly the consolidation into a
    single Command and Control Facility (C2F)--will significantly improve
    our coordination and operational effectiveness.

        b. If Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS) was assigned
    additional Coast Guard ships, planes, and other assets, could your team
    boost interdiction rates? Please describe.
        Answer. Yes, additional ships, planes, and assets would
    significantly increase JIATFS's interdiction rates. For each additional
    force package, which includes a long-range surface asset, an over-the-
    horizon interceptor, and a maritime patrol aircraft, we can disrupt
    approximately 50 metric tons of cocaine per year. These assets would
    allow us to cover more of the 42 million square mile Joint Operating
    Area (JOA), detect more targets, and support U.S. law enforcement
    agencies and partner nations in conducting more interdictions.

        c. Please provide a detailed breakdown of how many additional
    assets, such as ships, planes, and other assets, or asset hours, that
    JIATFS could effectively employ to prosecute the large volume of
    tactical intelligence coming into the taskforce?
        Answer. JIATFS could immediately employ additional Coast Guard
    cutters and Navy ships with embarked Law Enforcement Detachments
    (LEDETs) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). Based on FY24 Global Force
    Management (GFM) requirements and allocations, JIATFS requires 5,475
    ship days annually to effectively meet operational demand, yet only
    1,825 ship days were allocated. Similarly, we requested 12,700 hours
    for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) maritime patrol aircraft, but
    only 5,500 hours were allocated. These shortages limit our ability to
    fully act on the large volume of tactical intelligence we receive.
    Additional surface assets and MPA would allow us to significantly
    increase interdiction rates and reduce the flow of cocaine toward U.S.
    shores.

        d. What other actions does the Federal government need take to
    increase narcotic interdiction rates?
        Answer. The most impactful action the Federal government can take
    is to increase the number of U.S. surface and air assets available for
    interdiction operations in the JIATFS region. Enhancing intelligence-
    sharing agreements with partner nations and improving real-time data
    exchange will allow for more effective interdictions. Additionally, a
    second Ship Special Mission (SSM) would also expand our capacity to
    support partner nations in conducting interdictions on the high seas,
    further reducing the volume of cocaine reaching U.S. shores.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                         Jo-Ann F. Burdian, RADM, USCG
    Increasing Law Enforcement Presence Despite Competing CG Migrant
            Demands
        Data shows a significant decline in U.S. Coast Guard cocaine
    seizures over the last three years, despite a steady flow of cocaine
    across the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean AORs.

        Question 1. Is there a way in which the U.S. Coast Guard could
    increase its Law Enforcement presence in known drug trafficking areas,
    such as the use of Law Enforcement Detachments with Title 14 authority
    onboard allied vessels, without diverting U.S. Coast Guard ships away
    from the maritime migration flow?
        Answer. Yes, one way to increase U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement
    presence in known drug trafficking areas without diverting Coast Guard
    ships from the maritime migration mission is through the use of LEDETs.
    These teams can embark on allied and Partner Nation vessels with
    appropriate shiprider agreements, leveraging their authority under
    Title 14 to conduct interdictions. This approach has proven effective
    and allows us to multiply our law enforcement presence by utilizing
    partner nation platforms in areas where trafficking is heaviest.

        Question 2. What additional resources or authorities could be
    utilized by JIATFS to meet this operational demand?
        Answer. To meet the growing operational demand, additional
    resources are essential. First, increasing the availability of LEDETs,
    surface assets, and maritime patrol aircraft would significantly
    enhance JIATFS's capacity to detect and monitor illicit drug shipments.
    These resources are critical for maintaining a strong presence across
    the vast area of operations.
        Additionally, continued funding for the construction of a new
    Command and Control Facility (C2F) is crucial to improving real-time
    intelligence sharing and operational coordination with our interagency
    and international partners. Furthermore, funding for military family
    housing in Key West would directly support the JIATFS team, ensuring
    that we can retain top talent and maintain our operational tempo.
        In terms of authorities, we appreciate Congress' efforts to expand
    JIATFS authority to conduct D&M of the transit of illegal drugs
    regardless of their destination within the JOA, as provided in the
    SASC's FY25 NDAA section 351. This authority would enable JIATFS to
    intercept drugs that are not only bound for the United States but also
    for other regions, giving us a broader reach to disrupt the global drug
    trade.
                                     ______

          Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
                         Jo-Ann F. Burdian, RADM, USCG
    Drug Trafficking
        Question 1. What does the Coast Guard need to increase the amount
    of intelligence on drug trafficking that it is able to act on?
        Answer. JIATFS respectfully defers to the U.S. Coast Guard to
    provide information on their specific intelligence needs.

        Question 2. Have Joint Interagency Task Force South assets
    interdicted fentanyl or fentanyl precursor chemicals in the maritime
    environment in the past few years? If so, how much fentanyl was
    interdicted in comparison with other drugs?
        Answer. To date, JIATFS has not intercepted finished fentanyl in
    the maritime domain. Fentanyl or precursor chemicals from China or
    India are typically trafficked into major ports in the region, not via
    the typical conveyances used by cocaine trafficking (go-fasts, etc.).
        Nevertheless, our efforts advance investigations into criminal
    organizations who traffic fentanyl into the United States. According to
    the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, last year, 23 percent
    of their designated investigations that involved U.S. maritime
    interdictions in the JIATFS JOA were connected to organizations also
    linked to fentanyl or its precursors.

        Question 3. When Joint Interagency Task Force South assets
    interdict criminals attempting to bring deadly narcotics into the
    United States, are they prosecuted in the United States? Are any simply
    sent back to their own country?
        Answer. When JIATFS supports an interdiction of narcotics, and the
    interdiction is conducted by a U.S. platform (USCG or DoD with LEDET),
    the traffickers involved are typically prosecuted in the United States
    under U.S. Federal law. If a partner nation conducts the interdiction
    using its own assets, those individuals are often prosecuted in the
    partner nation's judicial system. While we welcome the growing
    involvement of partner nations in conducting interdictions, there is an
    advantage when the United States conducts an interdiction, as the
    criminals are brought to justice in the United States and we gain
    valuable intelligence that furthers U.S. investigations into larger
    transnational criminal organizations (TCO) networks.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roger Wicker to
                         Jo-Ann F. Burdian, RADM, USCG
        Question 1. How important are the relationships and agreements that
    we have with partner nations in the region? Do these relationships and
    agreements help you to better understand where the drugs are coming
    from and where they are headed?
        Answer. The relationships and agreements with our partner nations
    are critical to the success of JIATFS operations. The U.S. benefits
    most from U.S.-led interdictions, as they result in prosecutions within
    the U.S. legal system, leading to the dismantling of TCOs. Increased
    U.S. assets in the region would bolster these efforts, enabling us to
    act on intelligence more quickly and intercept more shipments before
    they reach U.S. shores.
        However, the close partnerships we have with Latin American and
    Caribbean nations significantly enhance our ability to track the flow
    of drugs. These relationships provide invaluable insights into drug
    trafficking routes and allow us to monitor, track, and interdict
    narcotics before they reach U.S. shores. Additionally, bilateral
    agreements with countries like Colombia, Peru, and Panama enable
    seamless cooperation and law enforcement actions, further enhancing our
    understanding of the source and transit zones of these narcotics.

        Question 2. Would your partners in the region benefit from more
    Coast Guard and SOUTHCOM resources in theater?
        Answer. Yes. Our partner nations rely heavily on the resources and
    support provided by the U.S. Coast Guard and SOUTHCOM to conduct
    effective interdictions. Increased availability of U.S. assets--
    particularly interdiction assets and LEDETs--would allow our partners
    to engage in more operations and interdict greater quantities of
    cocaine. Additionally, expanded training programs and investments in
    their interdiction platforms would enhance their operational
    capabilities and further support the shared mission of disrupting TCOs.
    JIATFS can do more . . . with more.

        How has our relationships with those countries helped stem the flow
    of drugs?
        Answer. Our relationships with partner nations have been
    instrumental in stemming the flow of drugs. Joint exercises and
    operations have led to increased interoperability and experience,
    positively impacting day-to-day operations. Over 80 percent of JIATFS
    interdictions are now conducted by partner nations, demonstrating the
    critical role they play in countering drug trafficking. These
    partnerships allow us to disrupt shipments at multiple points along the
    supply chain, significantly reducing the volume of drugs entering the
    United States.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
                         Jo-Ann F. Burdian, RADM, USCG
    Unmanned Systems
        Question 1. How do JIATF South & JIATF-West employ unmanned
    systems? Does JIATFS have something like a Task Force 59?
        Answer. JIATFS employs unmanned systems through partnerships with
    various force providers and interagency collaborations. We leverage
    unmanned aerial systems like the CBP MQ-9 Predator, as well as smaller
    drones, to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    in support of our detection and monitoring missions. While we do not
    have a dedicated entity like Task Force 59, we are working closely with
    U.S. Navy 4th Fleet to incorporate unmanned technologies as part of
    their Hybrid Fleet concept, which will further strengthen our maritime
    and air domain awareness across our vast area of operations. Finally,
    JIATFS continues to prioritize efforts to optimize software, sensors,
    and unmanned systems to rapidly improve operational effectiveness. By
    integrating these technologies, we are increasing our ability to detect
    and monitor drug trafficking activities across the vast region we
    cover.
    IUU Fishing
        Question 1. Is there an overlap of efforts, assets, and resources
    used in the counterdrug mission that could also be used to help combat
    IUU fishing?
        Answer. There is some overlap in terms of the intelligence-sharing
    mechanisms and assets used for both the counterdrug mission and
    illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. JIATFS authorities
    are specifically for the D&M of narcotics transiting via air and
    maritime domains. However, during the course of our counter-narcotics
    D&M missions, our maritime patrol aircraft and surface assets may
    detect vessels engaged in IUU fishing. In such cases, we follow
    established IUU fishing business rules with the U.S. Coast Guard, which
    allow us to pass any incidental intelligence gathered during our
    operations to the appropriate organizations with IUU fishing authority.
        While there is overlap in these capabilities, the primary focus of
    JIATFS remains on the counterdrug mission. Diverting assets to address
    IUU fishing would require additional resources to avoid compromising
    our effectiveness in interdicting narcotics. Expanding our authority or
    creating a dedicated JIATF-like organization focused on IUU fishing may
    provide a more structured and efficient approach to combating these
    activities.

        Would additional authorities without additional resources be
    helpful?
        Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for
    conducting counter-IUU fishing operations, and many of the same
    approaches--such as intelligence fusion, detection, and monitoring--
    apply to both counterdrug and IUU fishing missions. However, additional
    authorities without corresponding resources would offer only limited
    benefits. The key to addressing both counterdrug and IUU fishing
    threats lies in increasing the availability of resources--such as
    surface assets and patrol aircraft--to support the expanded mission
    scope. Without sufficient resources, additional authorities alone would
    not enable JIATFS to maintain the necessary operational tempo to meet
    the growing challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations
    (TCOs) and illegal fishing operations.

        Question 2. IF NOT, do you think a JIATF-like organization that is
    focused on IUU fishing instead of drug trafficking is needed?
        Answer. JIATFS is recognized as the ``gold standard'' in
    interagency cooperation, a model that could enhance many different
    missions. Given the USCG's status as the lead Federal agency to
    counter-IUU fishing, JIATFS respectfully defers to the USCG on the
    utility of a JIATF-like organization focused on this activity.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                RADM Bob Little
        Question 1. You stated that Joint Interagency Task Force-West
    (JIATF-W) has ``had a significant reduction in capacity'' and has had
    to evolve ``as an organization as we have had to reassess where our
    priorities.'' Please specifically identify what capacity has been
    reduced, how JIATF-W's priorities have changed as a result, and what
    effect this has had on JIATF-W's ability to identify and interdict the
    flow of fentanyl and fentanyl precursor chemicals?
        Answer. The FY19 Defense-Wide Review (DWR) directed the Department
    to ``deactivate JIATF-W operations center/systems'' and transfer
    residual functions to USINDOPACOM and USNORTHCOM no later than FY 2023.
    In April 2022, the Secretary of Defense approved the decision to retain
    JIATF-W, but as a smaller, more focused organization that would
    concentrate on programs and activities directly supporting counterdrug
    and counter transnational organized crime operations. In accordance
    with the Secretary's decision, the Task Force's budget and manpower was
    reduced.
        In response to the reduced funding, JIATF-W formed a Mission
    Refinement Working Group to determine how best to structure the
    organization while maximizing efficiencies and more effectively manage
    our available resources. Based on the Working Group findings, JIATF-W
    reorganized into a Cross Functional Team (CFT) structure integrating
    intelligence and operations functions across four geographical regions
    (Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania) to optimize
    mission effectiveness. JIATF-W's four separate CFTs leverage our
    diverse expertise and perspectives to regionally integrate
    intelligence, planning, and operational functions. Each CFT is
    supported by the Operations Support Directorate who provides
    centralized planning, evaluation, and coordination. JIATF-W's
    Intelligence Directorate established a Fusion Cell and a Targeting
    Cell. The Fusion Cell weaves the CFT's regional threat pictures into
    the overarching strategic intelligence picture while the Targeting Cell
    contributes to the intelligence fusion process by diving into specific
    targets to build actionable intelligence products for use by U.S. law
    enforcement and/or other U.S. partners.
        In 2023, we updated our Lines of Effort (LOE) to better align with
    new USINDOPACOM and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy priorities. JIATF-W's four
    specific Lines of Effort are:

        LOE 1: Provide Intelligence Analysis to U.S. LEAs and partners in
    support of Investigations and Operations

        LOE 2: Identify, Monitor, and Target Threat Networks associated
    with Precursor Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Equipment from the Indo-
    Pacific to the Western Hemisphere

        LOE 3: Identify, Monitor, and Target Threat Networks associated
    with Mexican drug trafficking organizations operating in the Indo-
    Pacific

        LOE 4: Strengthen Allies and Partners

        JIATF-W's highest priority remains countering the fentanyl threat
    to the homeland which spans across all four LOEs. The Department of
    Defense Appropriations Act, 2024, provided JIATF-W with a one-time $10
    million increase in counterdrug funding to counter the smuggling of
    chemical precursors from Asia into the Western Hemisphere.
        With the funding, JIATF-W increased its intelligence capabilities
    by procuring improved technology and hiring additional contracted
    intelligence analysts to improve the capacity to conduct deeper supply
    chain analysis. This enabled the production of more intelligence on
    illicit companies and their fentanyl precursor shipments. The current
    draft of the Fiscal Year 2025 House defense appropriation has a similar
    addition of four million dollars for the same purpose.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to
                                RADM Bob Little
    International Coordination
        Members from my staff had the pleasure of visiting JIATF-W earlier
    this year and I'm grateful for you hosting them to answer questions
    regarding how JIATF-W is working with our international and interagency
    partners to combat the flow of illicit narcotics and IUU fishing in the
    Indo-Pacific.

        Question 1. If provided with the necessary resources, can you
    identify new or existing partners in the Indo-Pacific that JIATF-W
    could engage to strengthen regional cooperation and advance these
    missions, especially where opportunity may be untapped?
        Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for
    conducting counter-IUU fishing operations. JIATF-W is funded from
    counterdrug operations and operates under counterdrug authorities.
        USINDOPACOM's FY25 unfunded priority list has requested 4.2 million
    dollars in non-counter narcotics funds for JIATF-West to provide the
    capacity to support our regional partners' priority needs by taking a
    more comprehensive approach to counter illicit and malign activity. As
    this money would not be limited to only counterdrug operations, we
    would be able to work with additional partners to illuminate criminal
    activity such as financial crimes and illegal, unreported, and
    unregulated fishing (IUUF).
        Additional engagement would be particularly helpful in Oceania and
    support cooperation with the Pacific Islands countries. Moreover,
    JIATF-W could expand its limited work with the Pacific Islands Forum's
    Fisheries Agency supporting the 17 member states as they sustainably
    manage and enforce their fishing resources. The group also works with
    the Oceania Customs Organization, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police,
    and the Pacific Immigration Development Community to jointly combat
    transnational organized crime.

        Question 2. How would you characterize the U.S. Coast Guard's
    effective interoperability with allies and partners as you conduct IUU
    fishing and counter-narcotics operations, and what resources or
    authorities would provide the greatest positive impact to improve this
    interoperability?
        Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is best postured to respond to this
    question.
                                     ______

          Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
                                RADM Bob Little
    Drug Trafficking
        Question 1. It has been well documented that fentanyl precursors
    originating in China are shipped to Mexico, where illicit fentanyl is
    being produced. As illicit fentanyl trafficking increases along the
    land border, what is Joint Interagency Task Force West doing to improve
    capabilities to locate, detect, and interdict fentanyl and fentanyl
    precursors at sea?
        Answer. Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) does not have
    strong indications that finished fentanyl is trafficked via the
    maritime as a primary means of conveyance; however, precursor chemicals
    used to produce other synthetic opioids, such as methamphetamine, are
    often shipped via maritime cargo and then diverted for illicit use
    after arrival in ports. To address this threat, JIATF-W provides
    intelligence analysis to U.S. law enforcement agencies to help
    identify, monitor, and target threat networks associated with these
    shipments.
        JIATF-W's highest priority remains countering the fentanyl threat
    to the homeland. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024,
    provided JIATF-W with a one-time $10 million increase in counterdrug
    funding to counter the smuggling of chemical precursors from Asia into
    the Western Hemisphere. With the funding JIATF-W increased its
    intelligence capabilities by procuring improved technology and hiring
    additional contracted intelligence analysts to improve the capacity to
    conduct deeper supply chain analysis. This enabled the production of
    more intelligence on illicit companies and fentanyl precursors.
        The current draft of the Fiscal Year 2025 House defense
    appropriation has a similar addition of $4 million dollars for the same
    purpose which would allow us to continue many of these efforts.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to
                                RADM Bob Little
    Unmanned Systems
        Question 1. How do JIATF-South & JIATF-West employ unmanned
    systems? Does JIATF-S have something like a Task Force 59?
        Answer, JIATF-W does not have assigned ships and aircraft to
    include unmanned systems. However, JIATF-W submits collection
    requirements to USINDOPACOM, which may use a variety of DoD assets to
    fulfill valid requirements. Additionally, through support to U.S. law
    enforcement, JIATF-W helps coordinate end-game operations that may
    include USCG and DoD assets.
    IUU Fishing
        Question 1.Is there an overlap of efforts, assets, and resources
    used in the counterdrug mission that could also be used to help combat
    IUU fishing? Would additional authorities without additional resources
    be helpful?
        Answer. Through USINDOPACOM, JIATF-W has the authorities it
    requires to help combat IUU fishing as evidenced by its leadership of
    the USINDOPACOM-funded Blue Pacific Cooperative initiative which aims
    to expand maritime domain awareness and information sharing
    capabilities in support of counter IUUF operations for the Pacific
    Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).
        The FFA is primarily focused on countering IUUF, but in November
    2023 it partnered with the Oceania Customs Organization, Pacific
    Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) and the Pacific Immigration Development
    Community to jointly combat transnational organized crime. According to
    the PICP, this new partnership formed in response to the rising threats
    of drug trafficking, human trafficking, and other transnational crimes
    that exploit the vulnerabilities of the region.
        In September 2024, JIATF-W supported a U.S. Coast Guard-led
    operation in Palau. This operation focused on enhancing maritime domain
    awareness and Palau's ability to identify and act on illicit maritime
    activity in their sovereign waters. JIATF-W also supported a similar
    operation in Fiji that resulted in a maritime drug seizure. The Pacific
    Island's new focus on transnational organized crime uniquely positions
    JIATF-W to expand its support to the PICP and other regional partners.
        To this end, USINDOPACOM's FY25 unfunded priority list has
    requested 4.2 million dollars in non-CN funds for JIATF-West which
    would provide the capacity to support our regional partners' priority
    needs by taking a more comprehensive approach to counter illicit and
    malign activity. As this money would not be limited to only counter
    narcotics operations, we would be able to work with additional partners
    to illuminate criminal activity such as financial crimes, human
    trafficking, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

        Question 2. IF NOT, do you think a JIATF-like organization that is
    focused on IUU fishing instead of drug trafficking is needed?
        Answer. A JIATF-like organization that supports U.S. and regional
    law enforcement in addressing a wider range of transnational crimes and
    malign influences could more effectively illuminate interconnected
    criminal enterprises and bolster regional security. This would also be
    a more efficient application of resources, providing better integration
    of whole of government efforts to strengthen regional security. We
    defer to the Department of Defense and Congress regarding the need to
    establish such an organization.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                Heather MacLeod
        Question 1. GAO has done extensive work documenting the delays in
    Coast Guard acquisition programs, including the Coast Guard's top two
    acquisition priorities--the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Polar
    Security Cutter. Both new cutter classes are vitally needed to help
    provide for the security and safety of our Nation.

        a. What does the Coast Guard need to do to ensure the timeline for
    these critical acquisition programs does not slip further?
        Answer. The Coast Guard needs to focus on achieving a stable design
    in accordance with GAO's shipbuilding leading practices (GAO-24-
    105503). As we have previously reported, the shipbuilders for the
    Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) have
    yet to stabilize their design, which has contributed to schedule delays
    and cost growth for both programs (GAO-23-105805, GAO-23-105949). For
    example, the OPC program began ship construction without a matured
    critical technology, which led to redesign of portions of the ship and
    contributed to delays of the lead ship by almost four years. The PSC
    program is more than four years late delivering a capability because
    designing the polar icebreaker has taken much longer than planned. A
    stable design will help ensure the shipbuilders and the Coast Guard
    have the knowledge needed to support timely, predictable outcomes for
    both programs.

        b. How can the Coast Guard expedite the delivery of these and other
    new assets to ensure they are operational and executing missions as
    soon as possible?
        Answer. In addition to ensuring a design is sufficiently stable as
    outlined above, the Coast Guard needs to work with the shipbuilders to
    set realistic schedules. We previously reported that the Coast Guard
    adopted unrealistic schedules from the outset of both the OPC and PSC
    programs. The programs' schedule challenges have been exacerbated by a
    lack of reliable schedule data from the shipbuilders that could be used
    to anchor projections of remaining work to complete the ships. For
    example, the PSC program can use the knowledge gained from building up
    to eight sections (of 85 on the total ship) and apply it to the planned
    production time to create more realistic schedules for each PSC.
    Additionally, as we found in May 2024, commercial ship buyers and
    builders use leading design practices that enable shorter, predictable
    cycles for designing and delivering new ships (GAO-24-105503). These
    practices include leveraging existing ship designs, prioritizing timely
    vendor decisions, and using ship design tools to shorten cycle time. By
    leveraging such practices, the Coast Guard could achieve more
    consistent, predictable outcomes and help expedite delivery for its
    shipbuilding programs.

        c. How are these delays specifically impacting Coast Guard mission
    performance?
        Answer. In the absence of new cutters, the Coast Guard is relying
    on its aged fleet of existing ships. While these ships have generally
    maintained operations, continued use increases the risk they will fail
    before they are replaced. For example, the Coast Guard is annually
    accomplishing its Antarctic mission with its existing heavy polar
    icebreaker, the Polar Star, which is over 47 years old and well beyond
    its 30-year service life. However, there is no backup if the Polar Star
    becomes inoperable before PSCs are delivered.

        Question 2. The Coast Guard is currently short 10 percent of its
    enlisted workforce. As a result, 10 cutters were removed from service
    this year, and there is now reduced staffing at numerous boat stations
    nationwide. In 2025, the Service plans to lay up another 5 ships.

        a. With all the Coast Guard's workforce and retention challenges,
    what does the Coast Guard need to do to increase recruitment,
    retention, and become a more competitive employer?
        Answer. We have made more than 29 recommendations since 2022 which
    relate to these issues, including workforce issues involving critical
    areas of expertise such as cybersecurity and marine inspections, and
    housing challenges that can affect the Coast Guard's workforce.\2\ The
    Coast Guard needs to fully implement these recommendations in a timely
    manner, which will help position the it to address workforce
    challenges. Competition with higher paying jobs in the private sector,
    limited opportunities for promotion, and long work hours have made it
    challenging for the Coast Guard to recruit personnel. While some
    challenges, such as higher paying jobs in the private sector, are
    largely outside its control,\3\ the Coast Guard needs to address
    quality-of-life factors within its authority that affect its ability to
    retain personnel. This includes access to childcare,\4\ health care,\5\
    housing,\6\ and education.\7\ For example:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Coast Guard: Recruitment and Retention Challenges Persist,
    GAO-23-106750 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2023).
        \3\ Like other military departments, the Coast Guard is authorized
    to pay special bonus or incentive pay for certain professional
    expertise, such as for aviation officers and officers in health
    professions. 37 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 334, 335.
        \4\ GAO, Military Child Care: Coast Guard is Taking Steps to
    Increase Access for Families, GAO-22-105262 (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
    2022).
        \5\ GAO, Coast Guard Health Care: Additional Actions Could Help
    Ensure Beneficiaries' Access, GAO-23-105574 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4,
    2023).
        \6\ GAO, Coast Guard: Better Feedback Collection and Information
    Could Enhance Housing Program, GAO-24-106388 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5,
    2024.
        \7\ GAO, K-12 Education: U.S. Military Families Generally Have the
    Same Schooling Options as Other Families and Consider Multiple Factors
    When Selecting Schools, GAO-21-80 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2021).

       In September 2022, we made six recommendations aimed at
            improving the Coast Guard's workforce planning process for
            cybersecurity personnel, including assessing needs, collecting
            data, and developing a strategy and metrics that could better
            inform efforts to recruit these personnel.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO, Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address
    Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands, GAO-22-105208 (Washington, D.C.:
    Sept. 27, 2022).

       In April 2023, we made six recommendations that the Coast
            Guard, among other things, obtain, share, and monitor several
            types of data, including information on health care access and
            the reasons for medical provider recruitment and retention
            challenges.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ GAO, Coast Guard Health Care: Additional Actions Could Help
    Ensure Beneficiaries' Access, GAO-23-105574 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4,
    2023).

       In February 2024, we made three recommendations that the
            Coast Guard collect and use service-wide housing feedback and
            assess 10 DOD housing authorities for potential benefits. If
            implemented, these actions could help with the Coast Guard's
            retention of service members and competitiveness as an employer
            and improve awareness of the extent of challenges experienced
            by service members that utilize either government-owned or
            private sector housing, which could affect morale and
            retention.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Better Feedback Collection and Information
    Could Enhance Housing Program, GAO-24-106388 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5,
    2024). In addition, in March 2023 we reported on recruitment and
    retention challenges for active-duty personnel facing the Department of
    Defense (DOD). See GAO, National Security Snapshot: DOD Active-Duty
    Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-23-106551 (Washington, D.C.:
    Mar. 28, 2023).

        b. What resources does the Coast Guard need to boost recruitment
    and retention?
        Answer. The Coast Guard needs to fully assess its workforce needs
    in a timely, comprehensive manner, including requesting and deploying
    adequate resources to do so. Such assessments could help inform its
    recruiting goals. As of March 2023, the service reported completing
    workforce requirement determinations for 15 percent of its units. In
    May 2023 we testified regarding 29 related recommendations, including
    to improve workforce planning processes and data monitoring and
    collection, of which 24 remain open that could affect specific
    resources.\11\ For example, while the Coast Guard says that determining
    actual workforce needs is a priority, as of September 2024 the service
    had not adequately staffed the offices responsible for assessing actual
    workforce needs.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ GAO, Coast Guard: Recruitment and Retention Challenges
    Persist, GAO-23-106750 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2023).
        \12\ We have two additional ongoing audits addressing Coast Guard
    recruitment and retention efforts that are planned for issuance in
    Spring 2025.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nevertheless, in October 2024, Coast Guard officials reported the
    service exceeded its FY 2024 recruitment goals for enlisted and reserve
    personnel. The number of enlisted recruits was 4,422 (with a goal of
    4,200); reserve recruits totaled 737 (with a goal of 725). However, our
    work has found that the Coast Guard has a culture of ``making do'' with
    the resources it has, which makes it difficult to determine the
    resources needed to boost recruitment and retention. For example, in
    2019 we found that Coast Guard budget requests did not provide accurate
    information about its needs.\13\ Without such information about the
    Coast Guard's realistic budgetary needs, Congress will lack critical
    information that could help prioritize funding. We have previously
    reported on Coast Guard resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce
    planning for its drug interdiction mission, such as its aviation
    workforce and specialized forces. We continue to believe that budget
    transparency will aid decision-makers and the Coast Guard in making
    better trade-off decisions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
    Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at least $2.6
    Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     ______

          Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
                                Heather MacLeod
    Drug Trafficking
        Your statement notes that the Coast Guard has not met its cocaine
    interdiction target in a decade.
        Question 1. What major resources or acquisitions are necessary for
    the Coast Guard to improve in this area?
        Answer. For its drug interdiction mission, the Coast Guard relies
    on its vessels and aircraft in a layered approach to address the
    transport of illicit drugs from the source zone, through maritime
    corridors off Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, and into the
    United States. According to the Coast Guard, this approach confronts
    the threat beyond U.S. land borders where traffickers are most exposed
    and drugs are most vulnerable to interdiction by law enforcement
    assets.
        However, our work has shown that asset readiness and availability
    challenges have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet these drug
    interdiction mission demands. These challenges include (1) declining
    readiness of its vessels and aircraft and (2) acquisition associated
    delays in replacing them. We have made several recommendations for the
    Coast Guard to better support these efforts. For example, certain Coast
    Guard assets have been in a state of decline for decades.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
    Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.:
    June 20, 2023) and Coast Guard: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for
    the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program, GAO-21-9 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
    28, 2020). In our June 2023 report, we also reiterated that eight of
    the recommendations we made in the October 2020 report to improve the
    program continued to have merit. As of August 2024, eight of the 13
    recommendations in these two reports were not implemented.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our work has also found that the Coast Guard's declining asset
    readiness is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing its
    planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and
    aircraft. These challenges include:

       Capability gaps from schedule delays. Delays experienced by
            the Coast Guard's highest priority program--the Offshore Patrol
            Cutters--will exacerbate capability gaps.\15\ The Coast Guard
            plans to replace the aging Medium Endurance Cutters with
            Offshore Patrol Cutters. The Commandant testified in July 2024
            that Offshore Patrol Cutters are to be essential assets for
            Coast Guard's drug interdiction mission.\16\ However, in May
            2024, we reported that the Coast Guard has delayed delivery of
            the first Offshore Patrol Cutter by 4 years, from Fiscal Year
            2021 to 2025.\17\ In June 2023, we reported that given the
            delays in delivery of the Offshore Patrol Cutters, the Coast
            Guard projects to have a reduction in asset availability--or a
            reduction in the number of cutters available for operations--
            starting in 2024 and through 2039.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Offshore Patrol Cutters generally conduct the same range of
    missions as Medium Endurance Cutters, such as conducting search and
    rescue and interdicting drugs and migrants. Designed for long-distance
    transit, extended on-scene presence, and operations with deployable
    aircraft and small boats, these cutters are intended to provide
    offshore presence for the Coast Guard's cutter fleet.
        \16\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, From
    Drug Interdictions in the Caribbean to National Security Patrols in the
    Arctic: Examining U.S. Coast Guard's Role in Securing the Homeland,
    testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
    Security, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2024.
        \17\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve
    Shipbuilding Outcomes, GAO-24-107488 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2024).

       Affordability concerns and difficult tradeoff decisions. As
            we reported in June 2024, the Coast Guard will have to make
            difficult decisions to address the affordability concerns
            surrounding its acquisition portfolio.\18\ These concerns
            affect how the Coast Guard prioritizes spending on aging
            assets, including those currently performing the drug
            interdiction mission. Specifically, for over a decade and most
            recently in 2024, we have reported that the Coast Guard's
            short-term budget decisions have resulted in a buildup of near-
            term unaffordable acquisitions that have continued to put
            pressure on available resources.\19\ In particular, we reported
            that the Coast Guard made short-term budget decisions that
            obscure the tradeoffs needed to balance the long-term
            affordability of the portfolio. To that end, the Coast Guard
            has yet to produce a long-term acquisitions plan, which
            Congress directed them to do nearly 10 years ago.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition: Actions Needed to Address
    Affordability Challenges, GAO-24-107584 (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
    2024).
        \19\ GAO-24-107584; Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to
    Address Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454
    (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2018); Coast Guard Acquisitions: Limited
    Strategic Planning Efforts Pose Risk for Future Acquisitions, GAO-17-
    747T (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2017); Coast Guard Recapitalization:
    Matching Needs and Resources Continue to Strain Acquisition Efforts,
    GAO-17-654T (Washington D.C.: June 7, 2017); and Coast Guard
    Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to
    Address Shortfalls, GAO-14-450 (Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014).
        \20\ Since 2016, the Coast Guard has been required to develop a 20-
    year long-term major acquisitions plan, to be submitted to
    congressional committees as part of a biennial report on the status of
    the Coast Guard's major acquisition programs. Coast Guard Authorization
    Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-120, Sec. 204(e), 130 Stat. 27, 35-36
    (2016) (codified at 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5103(e), formerly numbered
    Sec. 2903, adding the long-term major acquisitions plan).

        Question 2. In what ways do the Coast Guard's workforce and
    retention challenges impact its counter-drug mission? Is the Coast
    Guard making progress towards meeting its recruiting and retention
    goals?
        Answer. In October 2024, Coast Guard officials reported the service
    exceeded its Fiscal Year 2024 recruitment goals for enlisted and
    reserve personnel. The number of enlisted recruits was 4,422 (with a
    goal of 4,200); reserve recruits totaled 737 (with a goal of 725). We
    have two additional ongoing audits addressing Coast Guard recruitment
    and retention efforts that are planned for issuance in Spring 2025.
        Our work has shown that staffing shortfalls have affected the Coast
    Guard's ability to meet its mission needs, including for drug
    interdiction. Since October 2023, the Coast Guard has reported a nearly
    10 percent shortfall in its enlisted personnel, due in part to having
    missed its recruiting targets in recent years with the exception of
    2024, prompting it to reduce operational activities. In response, the
    Coast Guard has implemented plans to take several cutters out of active
    service, including three Medium Endurance Cutters--a mainstay of its
    drug interdiction efforts. Moreover, it has closed boat stations around
    the country due to a lack of personnel needed to staff them.
        The service may miss key opportunities to tackle these issues
    unless it implements plans to address future workforce needs and sets
    goals for retaining personnel. Notably, we found the service does not
    have a complete picture of the workforce necessary to meet its mission
    demands or whether its existing mix of personnel is efficiently and
    effectively allocated across units. Specifically:

       In February 2020, we found that the Coast Guard had assessed
            a small portion of its workforce needs through the requirements
            determination process it began using in 2003.\21\ We
            recommended that the Coast Guard develop a plan for how it will
            meet its workforce assessment goals. As of September 2024, this
            recommendation remained open, and Coast Guard's last update,
            which was in November 2023, reported that it had assessed only
            15 percent of its workforce.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ As of November 2023, the Coast Guard reported that it had
    completed workforce requirements determinations for 15 percent of its
    workforce. Without this information, it does not have a sound basis for
    prioritizing resources effectively.
        \22\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the Effectiveness
    of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs, GAO-20-223
    (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2020).

       In April 2024, we reported on Coast Guard resource
            shortfalls and incomplete workforce planning for various units
            the service relies on to support its drug interdiction mission,
            such as its aviation workforce and specialized forces.
            Specifically, we reported that the Coast Guard had 9 percent of
            its authorized military aviation workforce positions vacant, as
            of July 2023. However, the Coast Guard had not assessed and
            determined necessary staffing levels and skills for a large
            portion of its aviation workforce, including for the workforce
            at its 25 air stations and its major aircraft repair facility.
            We recommended the Coast Guard assess and determine the
            aviation workforce levels required to meet its mission
            needs.\23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce
    Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2024).

        Growth in the Coast Guard's mission demands, and resource
    challenges underscore the importance of ensuring the right number of
    people with the right set of skills conduct its missions. In doing so,
    the Coast Guard will be better positioned to manage risks and inform
    Congress of its workforce and associated resource needs.
    Gas Carrier Vessels
        In January 2022, GAO released its report, entitled Assessment of a
    Risk-based Approach for Conducting Gas Carrier Exams Is Needed. That
    report noted that the Coast Guard has an overall shortage of
    approximately 400 marine inspectors.

        Question 1. What role would the Coast Guard's adoption of a risk-
    based approach to conducting gas carrier and tank vessel compliance
    exams have in optimizing the Coast Guard's marine inspection workforce
    and addressing its marine inspection workforce challenges?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's adoption of a risk-based approach to
    conducting gas carrier and tank vessel exams could help the Coast Guard
    more efficiently and effectively use its marine inspection workforce.
    In January 2022, we reported that from 2016 through 2020 the Coast
    Guard staffed the key operational field units that conduct gas carrier
    exams at below 70 percent of their estimated need.\24\ The Coast Guard
    is required by statute to conduct gas carrier compliance exams
    annually,\25\ and officials told us during our review that they
    complete all required exams. However, representatives from six of nine
    industry stakeholders told us they sometimes experienced costly delays
    because marine inspectors were not available.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed to Strengthen Marine
    Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts, GAO-22-104465 (Washington, D.C.:
    Jan. 12, 2022).
        \25\ See 46 U.S.C. Sec. 3714(a)(1).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard inspects other vessels based on risk but has not
    assessed the effects of adopting this approach for gas carriers'
    compliance exams. Doing so could free up resources to focus inspections
    on riskier vessels. We recommended the Coast Guard conduct an
    assessment of adopting a risk-based approach to conducting gas carrier
    compliance exams and take actions, as appropriate and feasible. In July
    2022, the Coast Guard contracted with the National Academy of Sciences
    to conduct such an assessment.
        In April 2024 the National Academy of Sciences published its study
    related to the Coast Guard's certificate of compliance program for
    liquefied gas carriers.\26\ The study reported that gas carrier
    arrivals are expected to grow by more than 50 percent during the next
    decade based on current and forecasted growth in liquefied natural gas
    and liquefied petroleum gas exports. It also reported that unless
    changes are made to the compliance program requirements or size, to its
    management, and to the deployment of the gas-qualified marine
    inspection workforce, the Coast Guard will have a difficult time
    meeting the demand for more exams efficiently.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ See, National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
    2024. Reforming the Coast Guard's Certificate of Compliance Program for
    Liquefied Gas Carriers: Promoting Efficient Implementation and Safety
    Effectiveness. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://
    doi.org/10.17226/27803.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The National Academy of Sciences study noted that certain statutory
    changes would be required in order for the Coast Guard to adopt a risk-
    informed approach to its certificate of compliance program for
    liquefied natural gas carriers. It also identified several advantages
    and challenges related to the Coast Guard's adoption of such an
    approach, if authorized by statute. The study evaluated the advantages
    and challenges of several modifications to the compliance program and
    staffing allocation.
        Regarding adoption of a risk-based approach to conducting gas
    carrier and tank vessel compliance exams, if allowed by changes to
    statute, the study recognized that other high-hazard industries use
    risk-informed approaches for their regulatory and safety oversight
    programs, such as the nuclear industry. Advantages included giving the
    Coast Guard flexibility to focus its limited resources on the highest-
    risk vessels, components, operations, and companies. Challenges for the
    Coast Guard included the collection, maintenance, and analysis of data
    needed to identify and assess risk factors. Additionally, the study
    noted that due to the marine industry's competitive nature, operator
    cooperation could be limited and prevent the Coast Guard from
    collecting the data needed to develop risk-based performance
    indicators.
        The staffing shortage for conducting gas carrier exams that we
    reported on is part of a larger workforce planning challenge for the
    Coast Guard. In January 2022, we reported on steps taken by the Coast
    Guard intended to address its marine inspection workforce needs, which
    could help reduce gas carrier compliance exam delays.\27\ For example,
    the Coast Guard added 65 new marine inspector positions between Fiscal
    Years 2020 and 2021 to help address a shortfall of over 400 marine
    inspectors. However, we also found that some of the Coast Guard
    initiatives were ongoing and faced implementation challenges. In that
    report, we made five recommendations to help improve the Coast Guard's
    workforce planning efforts, and the Coast Guard has implemented one of
    those recommendations.\28\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed to Strengthen Marine
    Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts, GAO-22-104465 (Washington, D.C.:
    Jan. 12, 2022).
        \28\ In April 2023, the Coast Guard updated performance and
    training guidance that outlined responsibilities for individuals to
    submit recently acquired training or education into the individual's
    record prior to the first of July of each year. By taking this step,
    the Coast Guard will better ensure that it has the information needed
    to make annual staffing decisions for its marine inspection workforce
    and identify and address possible competency gaps.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In your January 2022 report entitled Assessment of a Risk-based
    Approach for Conducting Gas Carrier Exams Is Needed, you stated that
    ``GAO analysis of Coast Guard data shows that marine inspectors
    identified low instances of more serious deficiencies that pose a risk
    to the cargo, vessel, or crew during gas carrier compliance exams.''
    You also noted that ``Coast Guard officials stated that gas carriers
    are generally well run.''

        Question 2. In light of GAO's analysis of this Coast Guard data,
    are gas carrier vessels a better candidate for a risk-based approach to
    examinations and inspections, as compared to non-gas carrier vessels of
    a similar size?
        Answer. We have not conducted analysis of Coast Guard data to allow
    for comparison of deficiencies by size of vessels. However, we did
    report in January 2022 that Coast Guard data from Fiscal Years 2016
    through 2020 showed that 29 percent (238 of 831) of examined gas
    carrier vessels participated in the Coast Guard's quality ship
    (Qualship 21) program as of November 2020. This program requires
    participating ships to be lower risk cargo ships.
        Our 2022 report on gas carrier exams noted that, according to Coast
    Guard officials, gas carriers were generally well run.\29\ The report
    also noted that Congress has taken legislative action to strengthen
    vessel safety since the early 1970s and that gas carriers are
    statutorily required to receive an annual compliance exam.\30\ We
    recommended that the Coast Guard conduct an assessment of adopting a
    risk-based approach for gas carrier compliance exams. The intent of
    this recommendation was to explore the appropriateness and feasibility
    of changing the frequency of exams.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessment of a Risk-Based Approach for
    Conducting Gas Carrier Exams Is Needed, GAO-22-105432 (Washington,
    D.C.: Jan. 12, 2022).
        \30\ Id. at 18, 18 n.39 (citing Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
    1972, Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, and 46 U.S.C. Sec. 3714).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In your January 2022 report entitled Assessment of a Risk-based
    Approach for Conducting Gas Carrier Exams Is Needed, you noted in
    figure 3 that approximately 77 percent of Gas Carrier Compliance Exams
    are completed by Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston and Coast Guard
    Sector Corpus Christi, Texas.

        Question 3. In what ways would the Coast Guard's adoption of a
    risk-based approach to gas carrier examinations relieve the
    disproportionately large marine inspection burden that is placed on
    Coast Guard units in Texas?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's adoption of a risk-based approach to gas
    carrier compliance exams could help it better manage marine inspections
    in Texas. For example, during our review, marine inspectors in Sector
    Houston-Galveston told us that, like the overall marine inspection
    workforce, there was an insufficient number of marine inspectors
    qualified to conduct gas carrier examinations. These officials also
    told us many gas carrier vessels are well run, and conducting gas
    carrier examinations based on risk could free up limited resources to
    inspect riskier oil, chemical, or other vessels. This change could make
    the marine inspections in the sector more efficient and effective.
        However, according to the 2024 National Academy of Sciences report
    discussed above, gas carrier exams represent a relatively small portion
    of the Coast Guard's total workload and responsibility. The report
    noted that in 2022, gas carrier exams accounted for less than 8 percent
    of all Port State Control exams completed by the Coast Guard.
        Additionally, in 2022, we reported that the staffing shortage that
    affects gas carrier exams is part of a larger workforce planning
    challenge for the Coast Guard. For example, we found that although the
    Coast Guard developed a tool to estimate the number and type of field
    personnel needed at specific sectors and subordinate field units, it
    collected limited data to forecast future workforce and industry trends
    that could affect the supply and demand for marine inspectors.
        We also found that there was no requirement for marine inspectors
    to input newly earned competency information in the Coast Guard's human
    resources database, which it uses to assess whether certain marine
    safety positions are staffed with personnel who have the needed skills.
    The Coast Guard requires that inspectors that perform gas carrier exams
    take extensive training and gain requisite experience before they can
    conduct exams.
        We recommended that the Coast Guard require military and civilian
    marine inspectors to update their competency information in the Coast
    Guard's human resources database. In 2023, the Coast Guard implemented
    this recommendation by updating its guidance to require individuals to
    submit recently acquired training or education into the individual's
    record prior to the first of July of each year. Our recommendation for
    the Coast Guard to collect additional data on the marine inspection
    workforce and maritime industry to forecast future workforce needs has
    not yet been implemented, but the Coast Guard is taking steps to
    address it.

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