[Senate Hearing 118-770]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-770
OVERSIGHT OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 5, 2023
_________
Serial No. J-118-45
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
www.judiciary.senate.gov
www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-796 WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chair
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina,
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota Ranking Member
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey TED CRUZ, Texas
ALEX PADILLA, California JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia TOM COTTON, Arkansas
PETER WELCH, Vermont JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
LAPHONZA BUTLER, California THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Joseph Zogby, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Katherine Nikas, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Durbin, Hon. Richard J........................................... 1
Graham, Hon. Lindsey O........................................... 2
WITNESS
Wray, Hon. Christopher A......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Questions submitted with no response returned................ 74
APPENDIX
Items submitted for the record................................... 115
OVERSIGHT OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2023
United States Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. Durbin,
Chair of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Durbin [presiding], Whitehouse,
Klobuchar, Coons, Blumenthal, Hirono, Booker, Padilla, Ossoff,
Welch, Butler, Graham, Grassley, Cornyn, Lee, Cruz, Hawley,
Cotton, Kennedy, Tillis, and Blackburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Chair Durbin. This meeting of the Senate Judiciary
Committee will come to order. Today we continue our work to
restore the Committee's traditional oversight role, which I
have tried to work on since I've become Chair.
Director Wray, your testimony marks the fourth time you've
appeared before this Committee since January of 2021. I want to
begin by thanking you for the work that you and more than
35,000 FBI employees do to protect America and uphold our
Constitution.
I'm troubled that the FBI is facing baseless claims that
you have been weaponized for political purposes and dangerous
calls to defund the agency. There are people listening to that
sort of rhetoric. This irresponsible charge has real
consequences.
Just last month, a man from Tennessee pled guilty to a
December 2022 plot to attack the Knoxville FBI Office and kill
the agents involved in the investigation of his codefendant's
participation in the January 6th insurrection.
This Committee plays a critical role in holding the FBI
accountable to the American people. But I urge my colleagues to
exercise this oversight in a responsible and respectful manner.
I urge my colleagues, as well, not to engage in bullying or
conduct unbecoming a Member of this Committee.
One of the central concerns that I would like to raise is
the troubling increase in hate crimes in America, including
antisemitic, anti-Arab, and Islamophobic attacks in the wake of
the Middle Eastern conflict. The FBI must continue to respond
swiftly to these threats.
In Illinois, we are still grieving the horrific murder of a
6-year-old Palestinian American, Wadea al-Fayoume, and the
violent attack on his mother by a man who targeted them simply
because of their national origin.
And we send our support to Hisham Awartani, Tahseen Ali
Ahmad, and Kinnan Abdalhamid, as they recover from their
injuries in Vermont. These three young men of Palestinian
descent were shot while walking to dinner. When they were
attacked, two were wearing keffiyehs, a traditional Palestinian
headdress.
The Jewish community has also experienced an historic surge
in threats, vandalism, and attacks. For example, a Las Vegas
man was recently indicted for making threatening calls to our
Jewish colleague, Senator Rosen.
I strongly support the FBI's critical work in combating all
of these threats. But there is a need for continued
improvement, especially ensuring that more hate crimes are
actually reported to law enforcement.
At the same time that the FBI addresses domestic threats,
it must also respond to international actors. Just last week,
the Justice Department unsealed the indictment of an Indian
national accused of conspiring to assassinate a Sikh American
on American soil at the direction of an Indian government
official.
As I've said many times in this Committee, political
violence in all forms is unacceptable. An attack on any
individual based on their race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality,
nationality, religion, or disability is not consistent with the
values of America. Every community deserves to feel safe, and
the FBI plays an important role in guaranteeing that sense of
security.
The threat of violent extremism is heightened by the
proliferation of guns in America. Since the enactment of the
Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, the FBI has conducted more
than 100,000 enhanced background checks for gun purchases under
21, keeping firearms out of the hands of prohibited people.
There is more work to be done.
Director Wray, I want to thank you for hosting me yesterday
at the FBI Headquarters for a demonstration of the FBI's use of
Section 702 of FISA. There is no question that Section 702 is a
critical tool for collecting foreign intelligence and
protecting America. I appreciate the reforms you've put in
place with the FISA Court, to address what the FISA Court
called, ``widespread and persistent violation of 702 rules.''
I still remain concerned, though, about protecting the
communications of innocent Americans from warrantless
surveillance. I look forward to continuing to work with you to
reauthorize 702 with the significant reforms we need to protect
the privacy of innocent Americans.
I now turn to the Ranking Member, Lindsey Graham, for his
opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINDSEY O. GRAHAM,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
Inspector--Director. So, we really appreciate you coming. Now
is a good time to have an honest talk with the American people,
through the Committee, about the dangers we face, what the FBI
is doing every day, and how we can, you know, make you stronger
in the face of a lot of threats.
You'll be asked about the FBI's role in monitoring
religious organizations. The debacle called Crossfire Hurricane
hangs in the air in the conservative world, and so we're going
to move forward. You'll be asked some tough questions, and I
appreciate you being here today.
So, Mr. Chairman, one thing that I will be talking about,
among the list of threats, is a broken Border. Mr. Chairman,
since President Biden has taken office, we've had 6.6 million
encounters with illegal aliens at the Southern Border. That's
larger than 33 States. And we're on pace--the last 7 days,
we've been averaging about 9,500 a day. Play that out. We're
looking at 3.4 million this year, at that rate. That puts us at
10 million, and that doesn't count the got-aways.
So, we're negotiating how to help Ukraine. Count me in for
helping Ukraine. A robust package to help our Allies in Ukraine
makes sense to me. Upping the ability of Taiwan to defend
itself makes sense to me. Helping Israel makes all the sense in
the world.
Border security is the fourth plank of this supplemental.
We're wildly apart. The negotiations by Senators Lankford and
Murphy--I appreciate their efforts. We've made great progress,
I think, on asylum, but the Democratic Party seems to be
unwilling to address the key problem: parole.
This statute is pretty clear. The Secretary at DHS has the
ability to parole an individual--it's supposed to be an
individual----
[Poster is displayed.]
Senator Graham [continuing]. Based on a case-by-case basis,
for urgent humanitarian reasons, or significant public benefit.
Mayorkas and people at DHS have used that provision to give
parole to over 240,000 people from four countries alone: Cuba,
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. It is not meant to be used in
that fashion.
Why are we at an impasse? The Biden administration refuses
to follow the law as written, refuses to give up this concept
of humanitarian parole, because it is their way of managing the
Border.
Why are so many people coming now, compared to before? The
belief is, Mr. Chairman, if you get to America, you've got a
really good chance of never leaving. Catch-and-release is the
policy.
If you apply for asylum, the initial screening test is way
too low, and your case is to be heard years from now. You're
released in the United States. You're paroled in the United
States when we run out of bed space or they just want to parole
people.
The Democratic governors and mayors of large blue cities
are complaining. But their answer is, just more resources to
process illegal immigration. You will not get a deal from the
Republican Party unless we change the policies that are leading
to 9,500--on average, a day--coming to our Border.
What are we looking for? Not H.R. 2. But we're looking for
policy changes that will spread throughout the world and people
will no longer risk their lives, their family's lives, pay
thousands of dollars to human traffickers, to show up at our
Border. That's what we're trying to do. You don't want to do
that.
You clearly, as a party, do not want to change the policies
that are attracting so many people. It's inhumane, I think, to
lure people through this journey. It's not fair to the American
people to be overrun in the fashion we are. Given the threats
that exist in the world, it's exceedingly dangerous to have
lost control of your Border.
I'm often asked at home, well, are they incompetent, or
they want it this way--the Biden administration? I think there
are a lot of smart people in the Biden administration. They
want it this way. They want to be able to have the ability to
use parole, humanitarian parole--and there's no such creature
that allows for blanket admission into the country--as a tool
to control the flow----
[Poster is displayed.]
Senator Graham [continuing]. They're not interested in
deterring the flow. They just want to control the flow, manage
the flow.
We, on this side--there're some Republicans that won't vote
for any aid to Ukraine, but they're in a distinct minority in
the Senate, and I think the House is at least evenly divided.
If we had a Border security proposal as part of the
supplemental that addressed our own national security needs
here at home, I think you'd get a very large vote.
So, I don't need any more lectures about the need for
Ukraine. I got it. I understand. You're right. I understand why
we should help Israel. I understand why we should toughen up
Taiwan. What you clearly don't seem to understand, or you're
not going to accept--the situation at the Border is a national
security nightmare in the making.
It's unfair to the Border communities to have to live like
this. So, I have urged Governor Abbott, who's been on the tip
of the spear, here--now it's moving to Arizona--to make it real
to Senators who seem to object to making the policy changes. I
know Chicago has had a lot of illegal immigrants sent there.
There are a lot of Senators who are refusing to fix the
broken Border whose States are pretty much immune from the
problem--in the sense that they're not having to deal with
hundreds of thousands of people coming across and wreaking
havoc on the Border towns.
Fentanyl is at an all-time high, coming into the country
through our broken Southern Border, made in China for the most
part. We're never going to stop the flow of fentanyl until we
regain control of our Border.
So, to those who are following these negotiations, let me
tell you where they're at. They're stuck. They're not going
forward in a productive fashion until the Biden administration
is willing to change the policies that're leading--last 2 days,
10,200.
Let me say that again. In the last 2 days, 10,200 people
have shown up at the Border--those are the ones that we know
about. The last 7 days, almost 9,500 on average. You're on
track to do 3.6 million.
There will be no deal until you change the policies that
lead to this problem. If that's too far for you, I'm sorry. It
shouldn't be too far for America. The American people are
demanding to regain control of a Border where we have lost
control.
American people want to help Israel, generally speaking.
They're a division on Ukraine, but I think Ukraine would carry
the day with Border security.
There are so many threats that the Director will talk
about, but people ask me in the hallway all the time, where are
we on negotiating the Border? We're stuck. And there will be no
deal until the policy changes that would lead to people not
coming at the levels they're coming today is enacted. That's
where we're at.
You seem to be comfortable, my friends on the Democratic
side, with making small changes to a big problem, nibbling
around the edges of this problem. It'd be like sending guns to
Ukraine without any bullets. You're really robust when it comes
to Ukraine, and I'm with you.
But when it comes to our Border, you're playing a game of
doing the least amount possible to pick 10 or 12 of us off. It
ain't happening.
Now, I've been involved in this issue for 20 years. This is
not about immigration reform, and it needs to happen. It's
about securing a broken Border at a time when the threats to
our Nation are all-time high, and it started with Afghanistan.
The world is on fire, multiple fronts, and getting worse
every day. There will be no assistance to other nations who are
deserving until we assist our own Nation.
So, this attitude of doing the least you can, trying to
pick 10 or 12 of us off, is not going to work. We're united
over here. We're divided on Ukraine, but I would say two-thirds
of our conference would vote for a package including Ukraine
aid if it had real Border security.
And here's the problem you've got. I know what real Border
security looks like. So does Senator Tillis. So does Senator
Cotton. So does Senator Lankford. And so does everybody else
over here. So, you're making a choice. You're putting your
Nation at risk, and the consequence of this is going to be
devastating to the world.
Chair Durbin. Let me lay out the mechanics for today's
hearing. After I swear in Director Wray, he has 5 minutes to
provide an opening statement. Then we'll turn to Members. Each
will have 7 minutes, and please try to remain within your
allotted time. Director, would you please stand to be sworn?
[Witness is sworn in.]
Chair Durbin. Let the record reflect that the Director has
answered in the affirmative, and I now recognize him.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Director Wray. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Durbin,
Ranking Member Graham, Members of the Committee. I'm proud to
be here today representing the FBI.
The threats the Bureau's 38,000 men and women tackle every
day are more complex and evolving more quickly than ever
before. And we continue to work relentlessly to stay ahead of
those threats and to outpace our adversaries.
For example, last year we disrupted over 40 percent more
cyber operations and arrested over 60 percent more cyber
criminals than the year before. Over the past 2 years, we've
seized enough fentanyl to kill 270 million people. That's about
80 percent of all Americans.
We're also focused on other threats that emanate from the
Border and impact communities all over the country: things like
violent gangs and human traffickers.
At the same time, given the steady drumbeat of calls for
attacks by foreign terrorist organizations since October 7th,
we're working around the clock to identify and disrupt
potential attacks by those inspired by Hamas' horrific
terrorist attacks in Israel.
And in recent years, we've seen an increase in hate crimes
investigations, including a particularly big chunk involving
threats to the Jewish community. That is a troubling trend we
were focused on before October 7th--it's only gotten worse in
the months since.
I could go on and on about the important work the FBI's
dedicated professionals are doing across the entire spectrum of
threats, each and every day, to protect their fellow Americans.
But in the time I have here this morning, I want to
emphasize the importance of one tool, in particular, that is
indispensable to our efforts to combat threats posed by foreign
adversaries, one that will expire in just a few short weeks if
Congress does not act. And that is FISA's 702 authorities for
the FBI.
As this Committee knows, 702 allows us to stay a step ahead
of foreign actors located outside the United States who pose a
threat to national security. And the expiration of our 702
authorities would be devastating to the FBI's ability to
protect Americans from those threats.
So, let me explain just a bit about what I mean by that.
When an overseas cyber criminal breaches a transportation hub,
a public utility, or even a children's hospital, 702 is often
the tool we use to find victims and get them what they need to
get their systems back up and running. And just as important,
it helps us identify the next targets so they can defend
themselves against an attack.
In just one recent cyber case, for instance, 702 allowed
the FBI to alert more than 300 victims in every State and
countries around the world. And I should add that many of those
crucial victim notifications were made possible by our ability
to conduct U.S. person queries of our existing 702 collection.
When it comes to foreign adversaries, like Iran--whose
actions across a whole host of threats have grown more brazen,
seeking to assassinate high-level officials, kidnap dissidents,
and conduct cyber attacks here in the United States--or the
People's Republic of China, which poses, in my view, a
generational threat to our economic and national security,
stripping the FBI of its 702 authorities would be a form of
unilateral disarmament.
Or, take the elevated threat of international terrorism--
702 is key to our ability to detect a foreign terrorist
organization overseas directing an operative here to carry out
an attack in our own back yard. And U.S. person queries, in
particular, may provide the critical link that allows us to
identify the intended target or build out the network of
attackers so we can stop them before they strike and kill
Americans.
Given the critical importance of 702, we are committed to
being good stewards of our authorities. And to that end, I have
ordered a whole host of changes to address unacceptable
compliance incidents--reforms, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, that
many Members of this Committee have seen with their own eyes,
in live demonstrations of our systems at FBI Headquarters.
We've improved our systems, enhanced training, added
oversight and approval requirements, adopted new accountability
measures. On top of that, we stood up a brand new Office of
Internal Auditing that's been focused specifically on FISA
compliance.
Most of the declassified reports that have come out over
the past year or so involve compliance errors that predate
those reforms. And I have been encouraged by the more recent
data showing the significant positive impact that those
reforms, those changes, have had.
The most recently declassified opinion from the FISA Court,
for instance, shows a 98 percent compliance rate and observes
that the reforms are--and I'm quoting the Court here--``having
the desired effect.'' And the two most recent Department of
Justice semi-annual reports likewise now show a greater than 98
percent compliance rate.
Now, we're proud of the progress we've made so far, but we
are by no means done. We recognize that this is an ongoing
effort and are determined to work with Congress to get it
right, but--but, as we enter this critical phase of the renewal
process, it is imperative that we not undercut the
effectiveness of this essential tool with a warrant
requirement, or some other restriction, that would paralyze us
and our ability to tackle fast-moving threats like the ones I
just described. Because crucial to our ability to use this
information to actually protect Americans is our ability to
review it promptly and efficiently.
And, to be clear, no court has ever held that a warrant is
required for the FBI to query 702 data already lawfully in our
holdings. In fact--in fact, every court that has considered 702
in its current form--the FISA Court, the FISA Court of Review,
three different courts of appeals--has found 702 to be
constitutional.
So, restricting the FBI's ability to collect under 702 or
to review what's already in our collection, well, that would be
a legislative policy choice.
And if that's the path that's chosen, what are we going to
say to the family whose loved one's care was sabotaged when a
hospital was taken offline by a foreign adversary and the FBI
wasn't able to stop that cyber attack? What's the justification
for not using every lawful tool to stop China from stealing our
technology and undermining our freedoms? Because I can assure
you the PRC is not holding back, and they're not tying their
own hands behind their back.
And what if there were a terrorist attack that we had a
shot to prevent but couldn't take it because the FBI was
deprived of its ability under 702 to actually look at key
information already sitting in our holdings?
Now, I was in FBI Headquarters 22 years ago, on 9/11. And
over the years, I've spoken with families of victims of that
horrific attack. Before that attack, well-intentioned
policymakers had made the choice to build a wall preventing
access to national security information sitting in our and our
partners' holdings.
Well, I bring that up because allowing 702 to lapse or
amending it in a way that undermines its effectiveness would be
akin to laying bricks to rebuild another pre-9/11-style wall.
What could anybody possibly say to victims' families if
there was another attack that we could've prevented if we
hadn't given away the ability to effectively use a tool that
courts have consistently deemed constitutional? Because let's
not fool ourselves, that's what's at stake with the
reauthorization of 702.
As the threats from foreign adversaries to our Homeland
continue to evolve, the agility and effectiveness of 702 will
be essential to the FBI's ability--really, our mandate from the
American people, to keep them safe for years to come. And we
owe it to them to make sure we've got the tools that we need to
do that. So, thank you for having me, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Wray appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chair Durbin. Thank you very much, Director. I'll start the
questioning.
Thank you for the visit yesterday to your Headquarters and
the demonstration of, I think, true advancements in terms of
702 to try to avert any concern about constitutional issues.
I still have some of those concerns, as you might expect,
and we have proffered an alternative to the current system that
we think is reasonable. It has an emergency exception to it, as
it should, because there are issues of grave national security
that can't wait even for the process to continue.
And, second, when it came to victimization, we allow
consent by the victim to go forward with the collection of
information in those situations, as it should be.
Since the enactment of the FISA Amendment Reauthorization
Act of 2018, the FBI has been required to obtain a court order
for U.S. person searches in a narrow subset of cases involving
predicated criminal investigations unrelated to national
security. Has the FBI ever obtained a court order in order to
perform a U.S. person search of 702 data in this context?
Director Wray. To the best of my knowledge, we have not.
And that's partly because that's not the way we use 702.
Chair Durbin. That's correct. The answer is zero. The
Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Annual
Statistical Transparency Report for 2020 revealed that this
statutory requirement has been triggered approximately 100
times. Is that true?
Director Wray. That, I can't speak to the number. I think
the report in question may involve incidents that all occurred
before the reforms that we just were talking about, but----
Chair Durbin. I'd appreciate it if you'd take a look at
that and answer for the record.
Let me take you to another topic that has been an issue
discussed before this Committee and voted on, several different
occasions, and that's CSAM, child sexual abuse materials.
Recently, the National Association of Attorneys General sent a
letter to Congress asking lawmakers to study the means and
methods of artificial intelligence, or AI, being used to
exploit children through generation of child sexual abuse
material, or CSAM.
In the letter, the attorneys general described how AI could
be used to create new images of children in sexual positions or
otherwise overlay photos of unvictimized children on photos of
abused children, to create CSAM.
To put this in simple terms, I don't know of any parent or
grandparent who is knowledgeable in this area who hasn't warned
their children, grandchildren, please be careful what you
communicate on the internet and who you communicate it with.
You've highlighted the FBI's work to ``identify,
prioritize, investigate, and deter individuals and criminal
networks from exploiting children,'' and you've noted that the
proliferation of CSAM on the darknet is threatening. Director
Wray, can you elaborate on what the FBI is doing to disrupt
technologies used to exploit children? What obstacles are you
facing related to this work?
Director Wray. So, I think there is no mission set, no
threat, that the FBI's men and women tackle that is more
righteous and more at the heart of why we do what we do than
protecting kids. And I know that last year we arrested
something like 3,000 child predators and rescued something like
2,000 kids from exploitation, the vast majority of which is
happening heavily online but then often leads to what's even
worse, which is the actual hands-on abuse.
And certainly, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, technologies
have continued to advance in a way that makes that threat even
more pernicious, including AI, including the ability to create
synthetic content, for example.
When you ask about challenges that we face, one of the
biggest concerns that we have is that the companies, these
technology companies, are increasingly moving in a direction
where they are designing warrant-proof encryption. And what
that means, to everybody listening at home, is that we're going
to be in a situation where the abuse that's happening on those
platforms--law enforcement won't have any ability, no matter
how rock solid the warrant, to get access to the information we
need to protect those kids and take down those monsters.
And the companies themselves are effectively blinding
themselves to abuse that's happening on their own platforms.
So, what we really need is for the companies to work with
Congress, work with the executive branch, work with law
enforcement to design their encryption in a way that makes sure
that they maintain the ability to respond to, you know, rock-
solid legal process, respond to warrants.
Chair Durbin. So, why aren't they cooperating with us? Why
are these companies resisting an effort to engage them in
solving the problem?
Director Wray. Well, you know, I can't speak for them in
terms of their motivations. Obviously, these issues get into
balances of privacy and security, and that's a long-standing
debate.
Chair Durbin. But when it comes to children, for goodness
sakes, what is the privacy concern there?
Director Wray. You got me. I will tell you that we get,
from some of these companies, millions of tips we've had,
historically, about child exploitation, and the idea that we
would go into a model where those tips just evaporate--let's be
clear: When the tips evaporate, the kids are still out there
getting abused. The predators are still out there.
The only thing that's changed is our ability to do anything
about it, because of the way in which the companies would be
designing their encryption. So, it's a way for them to
essentially--and, again, I can't speak to their motivation, but
it's a way for them to essentially blind themselves to what's
happening on their platforms and then, indirectly, then blind
us to our ability to protect kids and go after predators.
Chair Durbin. We're going to be bringing some leaders in
the industry before this Committee next month. I hope we can
ask these questions directly. But I will tell you, we passed
overwhelmingly--unanimously, five different bills related to
this issue, and I thought that was going to be an avenue to
bring them to the floor.
The resistance from Big Tech to even pursue this issue,
despite this overwhelming bipartisan vote, troubles me greatly.
I want to believe they want to do the right thing. There's very
little evidence of that. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, let's pick up on that real
quickly. Do you agree that social media systems, as they're
designed today, present dangers to American families?
Director Wray. Sure.
Senator Graham. Thanks. All right. I don't know where to
begin, other than--is now a good time to fund the FBI below
inflation?
Director Wray. I think----
Senator Graham. Just say no.
Director Wray. No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. Good.
Director Wray. I was about to say----
Senator Graham. Yes, I got a----
Director Wray [continuing]. Hell, no.
Senator Graham. Yes, well, yes. No, no. You can say, hell,
no, if you want to. I'll say it for you.
Chair Durbin. Leading the witness.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. Yes, that's right. Yes. Yes, I think that's
pretty dumb, given what you've told us. How long have you been
associated with the FBI?
Director Wray. Well, I've been Director a little over 6
years, but I've been working with the FBI my whole career,
really.
Senator Graham. Let's put a fine point on where we're at
today as America. How would you describe the threat matrix
against America today, from your point of view, after having
been at the FBI most of your adult life?
Director Wray. So, what I would say that is unique about
the environment that we're in right now, in my career, is that
while there may have been times over the years where individual
threats could've been higher, here or there, than where they
might be right now, I've never seen a time where all the
threats, or so many of the threats are all elevated, all at
exactly the same time.
That's what makes this environment that we're in now so
fraught and why funding our men and women, who are working
shoulder to shoulder with State and local law enforcement and
other partners every day, makes it even more important, not
less.
Senator Graham. So, blinking red lights--analogy about 9/
11. All the lights were blinking red before 9/11, apparently.
Obviously, all of us missed it. Would you say that there's
multiple blinking red lights out there?
Director Wray. I see blinking lights everywhere I turn.
Senator Graham. Okay. All right. Can't say it any better
than that. Who's driving all these problems? Let's start with
Iran. What is Iran trying to do to America?
Director Wray. So, Iran, which is, of course, the world's
biggest state sponsor of terrorism--let's start there. Iran,
just in the last couple years, if you want to bring it home,
here, to the----
Senator Graham. I do.
Director Wray [continuing]. Homeland--in the last couple
years, Iran has tried to assassinate a former U.S. National
Security Advisor on U.S. soil; has tried to kidnap and then
tried to kill a journalist--American journalist and human
rights activist, right smack in the middle of New York City;
has conducted a cyber attack on a children's hospital in New
England; and, for extra credit, as Director Ratcliffe and I
announced in the fall of 2020, tried to interfere in the last
Presidential election. So, that's just a start. So, if that's
not enough to----
Senator Graham. Other than----
Director Wray [continuing]. Convince people----
Senator Graham [continuing]. That, they've been pretty
good, the--right? Okay. Let's look at--you said we found enough
fentanyl to kill 80 percent of American people?
Director Wray. And that's just in the last 2 years.
Senator Graham. Okay. Do you think we missed some fentanyl?
Director Wray. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Okay. What role does China play in the
fentanyl problems America has?
Director Wray. Well, I'd start with, China supplies most of
the precursors to the cartels in Mexico, which then leads to
the fentanyl that comes here. And that's been talked about a
fair amount, and it's a huge problem. But in addition to that,
China is also responsible for an awful lot of the pill presses,
manufacturing of the pill presses, which, of course, are also
used.
And, in addition to that, a lot of people don't know this,
but China is also responsible for an awful lot of the
precursors for the meth that's manufactured south of the
Border, as well.
Senator Graham. Do you see that getting better?
Director Wray. I do not.
Senator Graham. Let's talk about Russia. What are they up
to?
Director Wray. Well, besides their unconscionable
aggression in Ukraine, Russia has one of the most advanced,
most widespread cyber--offensive cyber programs in the world.
They have invested in it very heavily and have used it in
different ways against us and our Allies.
They have intelligence officers here in the United States--
too many, by any measure.
They also provide safe haven to cyber criminals who,
whether they're working for the Russian government or not, are
conducting cyber attacks against, you know, us and our Allies
all over the world. So, that's just a start.
Senator Graham. Okay. Let's go to international terrorist
organizations. One of my concerns is, after Afghanistan, we
sort of put international terrorism on steroids. Are you
concerned that international terrorism threats to the Homeland
are rising as the Border continues to be broken?
Director Wray. I am concerned that we are in an elevated
threat environment, a heightened threat environment from
foreign terrorist organizations, for a whole host of reasons.
And, obviously, their ability to exploit any port of entry,
including our Southwest Border, is a source of concern.
You know, there's a lot of discussion about numbers, and
numbers are important, but let's not forget that it didn't take
a big number of people on 9/11 to kill 3,000 people. So, while
numbers are important, numbers don't tell the whole story. And
we have seen an increase in KSTs--so-called KSTs, Known or
Suspected Terrorists, attempting to cross, you know, over the
last 5 years.
Senator Graham. Would you say--kind of putting a fine point
on this topic--that right now is the largest threat we face as
a Nation from international terrorist organizations since 9/11?
Director Wray. Well, it's certainly higher than it's been
in a long, long time, let me put it that way. Because if you
just look post-October 7th, and--well, I thought the threat was
elevated before October 7th, but post-October 7th, you've seen
a veritable rogues' gallery of foreign terrorist
organizations----
Senator Graham. So, let's--let----
Director Wray [continuing]. Calling for attacks against us.
Senator Graham. Okay. So, October the 7th was devastating
to our friends in Israel. So, your testimony before this
Committee--since October 7th, the urging of foreign terrorist
organizations to attack America has gone up. Is that fair to
say?
Director Wray. Yes. The threat level has gone to a whole
other level since October 7th.
Senator Graham. Okay, folks. You're on notice. What are we
going to do about it? Finally, what should we be doing
differently, with all these bad actors? I think it's fair to
say we've lost deterrence. Do you have any idea, quickly, of
what we could be doing differently?
Director Wray. Well, certainly deterrence requires
consequences, and so consequences need to be imposed on bad
actors in a variety of ways, to ensure deterrence. Consequences
are also part of disrupting, even without deterrence--
disrupting and degrading bad actors' abilities to harm us.
Chair Durbin. Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Good morning, Director Wray. How are
you?
Director Wray. Fine, thank you.
Senator Whitehouse. I seem often to have to use our time
together to go over old business, for which I apologize, but
such is the responsiveness of the Department. I wanted to talk
to you about Charles McGonigal today. He's an FBI agent who is
interesting in two respects.
First, he's pleading guilty--or has pled guilty to offenses
regarding his undisclosed receipt of $225,000 from a foreign
national, and he awaits sentencing for the crimes to which he
pled, coming up in February.
The second interesting thing, is that he led the New York
Counterintelligence Division during the time that it was widely
reported that New York FBI agents and former New York U.S.
Attorney Rudy Giuliani were pressuring Director Comey to
intervene in the Hillary Clinton campaign and do it damage,
which, as we unfortunately know, Director Comey did, with press
conferences that violated DOJ rules and procedures.
So, my experience is that when somebody is in the
presentencing mode of a criminal plea, that's a very good time
to get information from them and cooperation from them. I don't
know what happened in the New York Field Office during that
period, but there's a very good chance that McGonigal does.
I will put into the record three letters.
One is me to Attorney General Garland, February 7, asking
about this.
The second is Office of Legislative Affairs at DOJ, back to
me, giving something of an answer to this.
And the third is a letter off DOJ's website, reflecting the
plea agreement between the Southern District of New York and
the attorneys for Charles McGonigal.
[The information appears as submissions for the record.]
Senator Whitehouse. So, at this point, what I asked in the
letter was that somebody independent of the FBI take a look to
see if there were FBI shenanigans during that period in that
Office.
And I've received no confirmation that anything is going
on. The plea agreement reflects no signal or sign of
cooperation, which as you know is often a feature in plea
agreements and sentencings. So, there's no sign that he was
asked to cooperate outside of the plea.
I have been unable to determine whether or not the
Inspector General is even eyeballing this to see if somebody
independent from the FBI, somebody in the Department, should
take a look.
What do you know of the status of this, and are you--would
it make sense--would it not make sense, let me put it that way,
to have an independent set of eyeballs have a look at what
McGonigal knows about what took place in that Office at that
time, while he is in this helpful position of being subject to
sentencing?
Director Wray. Well, Senator, I appreciate you raising the
topic. So, a couple things. First, our Counterintelligence
Division, of course, are the people who identified McGonigal's
wrongdoing, pursued it, arrested him, and are very focused on
trying to determine, in all the ways you would imagine, what,
if anything, he might've impacted through his misconduct.
That's one.
Second, there are, I think, two U.S. Attorney's Offices
involved, both New York--Southern District of New York--and, I
think, the District of Columbia, as well--so, two cases that
are presentencing and that his cooperation, if you will, could
be potentially relevant to.
And we are--I can tell you I want to be a little bit
careful on how far I can go on this, but I will tell you we
have involved the Inspector General, as well, because we, like
you, want to make sure we understand the full scope of what Mr.
McGonigal did and what he knows.
Senator Whitehouse. So, the DOJ Inspector General is
involved or has been notified?
Director Wray. Has been----
Senator Whitehouse. Engaged with?
Director Wray [continuing]. Engaged, is----
Senator Whitehouse. Yes.
Director Wray [continuing]. Is--yes.
Senator Whitehouse. Okay. Well, that's good to hear. Let's
go back to 702 for a moment. I understand that 702, which was
originally designed, sort of, for a counterterrorism purpose,
has also been deployed against the international fentanyl
trafficking apparatus. Is that correct? And has 702 been
important in combating the international fentanyl trafficking
apparatus?
Director Wray. 702 has been important in the fight against
the scourge of fentanyl, more so, I would say, by our
Intelligence Community partners--the CIA, for example, in their
work overseas to pursue some of the foreign dimensions of the
fentanyl crisis, which, of course, then have massive
ramifications for communities all over the United States.
Senator Whitehouse. So, that's a success of 702?
Director Wray. It is a success of 702.
Senator Whitehouse. You also mentioned the role of 702 in
reaching out to victims of crime, of potential foreign
intelligence operations. Could you elaborate, in our last
minute together, a little bit more on the role of 702 in
supporting the Government's role in letting Americans and
American companies find out that they are the victims or have
been the victims of criminal and intelligence attacks and
helping them work through the consequences as victims?
Director Wray. Well, in the short time we have, what I
would say is, 702, especially the ability to run queries on IP
addresses, email addresses, things like that, is--
statistically, right now, the biggest place in which it's used
is cyber attacks.
So victims, overwhelmingly, victims of Russian, Iranian,
Chinese, others' cyber attacks here in the United States, 702
is what allows us to figure out which company is being
targeted, maybe what the entry point is, where the bad guys are
going, and allows us to then, armed with that information, rush
out to those companies and alert them so that they can take
steps to mitigate it before it gets potentially exponentially
worse.
And we find that there are a lot of instances where we're
coming to companies who didn't even know they'd been breached
yet. And if we hadn't had 702, both they and we would've been
unwitting.
Senator Whitehouse. If you could share with us some actual
instances--make this a question for the record. Obviously, you
have to do some scrubbing to make sure that everybody's
comfortable with the information being released.
But I think the more we can know about actual ways in which
actual individuals, even if they have to be anonymized, were
helped, and we see the factual circumstances, that would be
useful. Thank you. Thanks, Chairman.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. Senator
Grassley.
Senator Grassley. You testified before the Senate
Intelligence Committee that the Richmond Field Office anti-
Catholic memo was, quote, ``a product by one Field Office,''
end of quote. You testified before the House Judiciary
Committee that the memo was ``a single product of a single
Field Office,'' end of quote.
But the Richmond memo says two other Field Offices of the
FBI were involved and that that information had been redacted
in versions provided to the Congress. Why did the FBI redact
that critical information? And, second, did you review the
unredacted version before giving your previous testimony?
Director Wray. So, Senator, I think that this notion that
other Field Offices were involved is a garble. And let me
explain why I say that. The only involvement of the two other
Field Offices was the Richmond authors of the product included
two sentences, or something thereabouts, referencing each of
these other Office's cases. And they sent those sentences about
the other Offices' cases to them, not the whole product, and
asked them, hey, did we describe your case right? That's all
the other Offices had. So, it was a----
Senator Grassley. Well, then----
Director Wray [continuing]. Single Field Office's product.
And I----
Senator Grassley. Did you----
Director Wray [continuing]. Stand by that.
Senator Grassley. Did you review the unredacted memo before
giving your previous testimony?
Director Wray. I have reviewed the unredacted memo. Exactly
when I reviewed it, I can't, as I sit here right now, tell you.
Senator Grassley. Okay. In July of this year, I made public
what's now known as the Biden Family 1023 FBI Document. I've
also written you several letters about the same, most recently,
I think, October 24. That letter of October said, in part, that
the confidential human source in the Biden Family 1023 was not
connected to known sources of Russian disinformation.
That confidential human source is also reportedly a high-
paid, long-term, long-running FBI source that the FBI has used
in many investigative matters, according to former Attorney
General Bill Barr. Barr said that 1023 was deemed sufficiently
credible for further investigation.
On May 31 of this year, Chairman Comer and I had a call
with you. On that call, you told us that the Biden Family 1023
is related to an ongoing investigative matter. Now, very
clearly these data points show indicators of credibility.
Question for you. This FBI 1023 was serialized on June 30,
2020, over 3 years ago. When were you first made aware of 1023?
Director Wray. Well, I don't know that I could give you the
exact date, but I can tell you that I learned of the 1023 much,
much, much more recently than anything around 2020, that's for
sure.
Senator Grassley. This is a public document. You have an
obligation to tell this Committee what you knew about it, when
you knew about it. And if you can't give us that information, I
guess I'd better go on.
Are there additional FBI-generated 1023s that reference a
bribery scheme involving the Biden family? And, if so, how
many, and what are their dates?
Director Wray. Well, Senator, now you're asking questions
that relate directly to Special Counsel Weiss' ongoing
investigation, and respectfully, I can't really discuss
anything related to that investigation. I would refer you to
him for that.
Senator Grassley. The 1023 references alleged texts,
financial records, and audiotapes that prove some sort of
scheme involving money with Biden people. These are discrete
documents that can be obtained, if they exist.
When a high-paid, long-used Federal confidential human
source provides the FBI with evidence that three types--
different types of records exist that prove a crime involving a
political official, then standard FBI practice is to take steps
to obtain that evidence. Would you agree with that, what I've
said so far about the FBI policy? And if not, why not?
Director Wray. Well, certainly I would expect people to do
appropriate follow-up on anything in a 1023. But obviously
every one of those instances is very fact specific and case
specific, case----
Senator Grassley. So----
Director Wray [continuing]. Dependent.
Senator Grassley. Okay. That answer's okay. So, then, based
upon what you just told me, did the FBI seek these records in
this matter?
Director Wray. Well, let me separate into two different
things, here. When it comes to the investigation being led by
Special Counsel Weiss, which is being supported by our
Baltimore Field Office, that one I'm not going to be able to
discuss because it's an ongoing investigation.
When it comes to the assessment that occurred in--being run
out of the Office of--our Field Office in Pittsburgh and the
U.S. Attorney, Mr. Brady, as selected by Attorney General Barr,
to look at all of this back in the earlier period you're
talking about, my understanding is that there was agreement
among the team about what steps needed to be taken and with the
closing of that assessment.
Senator Grassley. Have you communicated with White House
officials or used a third party to do so about anything
relating to the 1023 as it involves people in the Biden family?
And, if so, who and when?
Director Wray. No.
Senator Grassley. Okay. I want to go to sexual misconduct
by the FBI. On October the 5th, 2022, I sent you a letter and
later made FBI records public that showed widespread sexual
misconduct in FBI against females. The data also showed that
hundreds of FBI personnel retired to avoid discipline and that
senior high-level officials received reduced punishment, if any
at all.
On October the 6th, the FBI told the Associated Press that
it intended to respond to me first and declined to provide
sexual misconduct data to the press at that time.
It's over one year later, and the FBI has failed to provide
this data to me. The FBI's blatant lack of action indicates it
isn't taking misconduct against women in the workplace
seriously. Why has the FBI failed to provide that very
important data to this Committee, and when will it finally be
produced, as you told the--as the FBI told the Associated Press
you were going to?
Director Wray. Well, first let me say I could not disagree
more strongly that we don't take it seriously. I can tell you I
take misconduct--sexual misconduct against our own employees,
extremely seriously. And we've put in place all sorts of new
procedures and policies to deal with that and to communicate in
no uncertain terms how strongly I feel about that.
As to the responsiveness to your letter, let me follow up
with my team and find out where that stands. But I do want to
make sure that there's not any confusion--none--about how
seriously I take this topic.
Senator Grassley. Okay, then, where's the data, if that's
what you're going to be willing--to take it so seriously? I----
Director Wray. I will follow up with you about your letter.
Senator Grassley. Okay.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Grassley. Senator
Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank
you so much, Director Wray, for being here.
I want to start out with hate crimes. And you and I have
talked about them before. I have, I know, thanked you and your
agents in Minnesota for their work in solving what was a clear
hate crime, with a prison sentence, of a bombing of Dar Al-
Farooq Islamic Center in my home State back in 2017.
And we know that, since that time, we've seen increases in
hate crimes. Reports show a 216 percent increase, since October
7th in requests for help and reported bias incidents against
Muslims. Another report showed a 388 percent rise in
antisemitic incidents, since this time last year.
We know the facts.
We know what happened in front of that restaurant in
Philadelphia.
We know that in Illinois, a 6-year-old Muslim boy was
targeted and fatally stabbed for being Palestinian American.
In Los Angeles, a criminal broke into the home of a Jewish
family, threatened them, and screamed about killing Jews.
In Vermont, a Palestinian student from Brown University
whose parents had him stay in the U.S. rather than returning
home, for safety reasons, was shot, along with two of his
friends.
In New York, a woman was assaulted at Grand Central
terminal, and when confronted, the assailant said it was
because you are Jewish.
In Brooklyn, a father and his 18-year-old son were
allegedly assaulted by another parent for being Palestinian.
And last week three suspects were arrested for a 40-minute
spree of attacks on Jewish New Yorkers.
This is concerning for everyone, should--everyone:
Democrat, Republican, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, anyone in this
country. I know that you care about this very much, because I
saw the work that your agents did in Minnesota.
And I want to get more details on what the FBI is doing and
what the Justice Department is doing to detect, deter, and
investigate these crimes. And then also the effect of social
media. And I know there are limitations on what we can do. I
have some strong views on this. But could you also talk about
that?
Director Wray. Well, I appreciate your long-standing
interest in this topic, and I know how important it is to you,
and not the least of which because of the attacks that have
occurred in your home State.
Certainly, we have seen an increase in hate crimes, and
there're lots of different numbers out there, but I'll just
give two for this purpose.
You know, one is, in 2022, we saw the highest increase, I
think, in hate crimes reported that we'd seen since maybe 2008.
And we don't have full data for 2023 yet, but we expect it to
keep going up.
Second data point: post-October 7th, just since October
7th, we have--opening, I think, 60 percent more hate crimes
investigations post-October 7th than compared to the comparable
period pre-October 7th--and that's on top of that already
escalating increase that I mentioned.
As I testified in my opening statement, the biggest chunk
of those are threats against the Jewish community. But there
are, of course, attacks--and you've mentioned several of them--
against others, as well.
What are we doing about it? A few different things.
We've elevated civil rights, especially hate crimes, to
national threat priority, and that's been true for the last
couple of years. And so that brings with it more investigative
resources of all shapes and sizes.
Second, we're trying to do a lot to engage in outreach both
to law enforcement and the communities, because one thing we
know about hate crimes is that they're chronically
underreported. And there are lots of reasons for that, but--so,
trying to get better data, better fidelity of the data, allows
us to track the trend better but also to ensure that we're
finding the cases that need to be pursued.
Even when a hate crimes charge, a Federal hate crimes
charge, is not available, the FBI doesn't just walk away from
the case. We provide forensic support, in some cases, even
testimony and other things in State prosecutions if State
charges are being used.
So, those are a few of the things. In our outreach efforts,
I would say we also have tried to do things that are targeted
at specific communities. So, for example, in New York, we tried
to reach out to parts of the Jewish community in New York with
outreach both in Yiddish and Hebrew, and not just in English,
for example. So, that's just a flavor.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I wanted to turn to fentanyl.
We all know that there is so much work that has to be done at
the Border and so much work that has to be done in the ports of
entry, mail--a bill that Senator Portman and I passed a while
back.
But we also know that one-third of drug cases have direct
ties to social media. And we had a kid in Minnesota who died
after taking a fentanyl-laced pill that he thought was
Percocet, to help his migraines, purchased on Snapchat.
And the Judiciary Committee actually voted, with the
Chairman's leadership, to advance a bipartisan bill, with
Senators Shaheen and Marshall, to require social media
companies to report fentanyl and other dangerous drug sales on
their platforms--it's called the Cooper Davis Act. And could
you talk about how this could be helpful in taking on these
cases?
Director Wray. Well, I think what you've put your finger on
is the degree to which online activity is inextricably
intertwined with the fentanyl epidemic. And that's in a variety
of ways, and I know Administrator Milgram at DEA, for example,
has a number of initiatives focused on this, as well.
Certainly, we, on the FBI's end, are focused on, for
example, darknet marketplaces, and we have a whole--something
called JCODE, which is focused on dismantling darknet
marketplaces of fentanyl and other dangerous narcotics.
Senator Klobuchar. Okay. Thank you. And one other kids'
issue. You noted the importance of protecting kids. You noted
in your written testimony that the FBI has recently reported a
massive increase in sextortion cases, where kids and teens are
being coerced into sending explicit photos and videos, only to
be blackmailed or threatened for financial gain. In 2022 alone,
these scams resulted in at least 20 victims committing suicide.
And my bill with Senator Cornyn, the SHIELD Act, includes a
threat provision, and other things, that would update and
modernize our laws when it comes to revenge porn and sextortion
cases involving kids.
While we are advancing this bill, sadly, we have been
opposed by some Members of this Committee, and I've found it
incredibly frustrating because they won't meet with me to try
to make any changes to it, and I'm trying to change that.
What threats do young people receive? How do you think we
could make the tools that you have to take on this crime
better?
Because I'm going to just start going to the floor and
taking this on. Our colleagues can object if they would like,
and I know Senator Cornyn has been very helpful. But I think
it's just absolutely ridiculous when you look at these numbers.
Please answer. Thank you.
Director Wray. Well, I can't speak to specific legislative
proposals, but what I can tell you is that sextortion is a
rapidly escalating threat. And, as you say, there've been way
too many teenagers victimized, and they don't know where to
turn.
And so having this discussion in a forum like this--people
like you and Senator Cornyn raising awareness about it--that by
itself is hugely valuable.
As to what we need, I will tell you, I come back to the
answer I gave earlier to Chairman Durbin about the threat, if
you will, of the proliferation of warrant-proof encryption. If
companies are going to take responsibility for what happens on
their platforms, then part of taking responsibility includes
the ability to, when presented with a warrant, following all
the due process that that entails, they will provide the
information so that law enforcement, not just FBI but other
agencies, can take action to rescue the kids and take down the
predators.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator----
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. I'll ask my
remaining questions on carjacking and 702--which I thank you
for your work on that, we can't let it lapse--in writing. Thank
you.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Director Wray, let me start with some basic
concepts. If you walk into the Supreme Court of the United
States, over the arches in the entryway there are inscribed the
words, ``Equal Justice Under Law.'' I think there's a
perception, unfortunately, that we are not living up to that
ideal in a number of respects.
Senator Whitehouse mentioned the shameful treatment of
Hillary Clinton--somebody who I do not support from a political
standpoint--but who was subjected to the release of derogatory
information of an investigation that Director Comey and the FBI
conducted involving her. And the fact that he usurped the
authority of the Attorney General when it comes to charging
decisions and made the statement he did.
I think there's also a perception that President Trump was
not treated fairly during his time of office, particularly
because of the opposition research, things like the Steele
dossier, the ``Russiagate'' investigation, all of which ended
up in basically amounting to no charges being filed.
I want to just say, personally, I appreciate your
willingness to take on the important task of restoring and
rebuilding the reputation of the FBI. I believe the FBI is an
indispensable institution in our Government. But it's also a
big, unwieldy institution. I think you have about 35,000 people
who work at the FBI, somewhere like that, right?
Director Wray. It's actually closer to 38,000.
Senator Cornyn. Thirty-eight thousand. And I'm personally
convinced that, overwhelmingly, these are good, patriotic,
hardworking people, sacrificing, putting themselves in harm's
way in order to protect the rest of America.
But, like any other large organization, there're going to
be some bad apples, people who abuse trust and who misbehave.
Can you just take a minute and describe what steps that you
have undertaken at the FBI to try to restore the FBI's
reputation as an institution that the American people can trust
to pursue equal justice under the law?
Director Wray. Well, I appreciate the question. Let me
start with a statement of principle that I hold near and dear
and then explain a little bit more concretely what that means.
My message from Day One, and probably said every day since
I've been in the job, is that we need to make sure that we're
doing the right thing in the right way in everything we do.
And that means the importance of process and following our
rules. That does not mean--and sometimes this is frustrating to
people of all shapes and stripes--that does not mean we can
guarantee the result or the outcome that somebody would like in
a case.
So, how do I implement that principle? I have directed all
sorts of changes. In relation to the Crossfire Hurricane
matter, for example, in that one matter alone, I directed over
40 corrective measures, went above and beyond anything the
Inspector General recommended, and have implemented dozens of
changes since then.
You mentioned the Hillary Clinton email matter. There, too,
I accepted every recommendation by the Inspector General, then
went above and beyond.
In terms of personnel, I've installed an entirely new
leadership team from when I started.
As far as accountability, which is a topic that, of course,
is important to a lot of people, within the tools that we have
available to us and the circumstances that are available to us,
I have taken action. What can I do?
I can, in the right circumstances, remove somebody from the
chain of command. And I have.
I can, when the circumstances support it, have somebody's
security clearance revoked. And I have.
I can, when the circumstances warrant it, refer somebody to
the Inspector General or the Hatch Act Office of Special
Counsel or others like that. And I have.
What I can't do is prosecute people, and that gets to the
heart of what you referenced at the very beginning in terms of
my predecessor's handling of the Hillary Clinton matter. I'm
very sensitive to the fact that part of the reason I'm in this
job is because of the distinction between the FBI Director's
role and a prosecutor's role.
And a lot of the criticism that the FBI has endured over
the last few years has, if you look closely, revolved around
frustrations about whether this person was prosecuted or not,
and what they were prosecuted for. And that ultimately is not
the FBI Director's or the FBI's choice.
Senator Cornyn. If I can ask you about 702. There's already
been some discussion about that. I've referred to Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as perhaps one of
the most important laws that the American people have never
heard of. And I know we have talked a lot about it.
But there is a concern that the tools, including FISA,
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 702, is--can be abused
and that it can be used to target U.S. citizens. Let me just
ask you directly, is it possible to target, lawfully target an
American citizen under Section 702?
Director Wray. Well, I think so-called reverse targeting,
targeting of Americans through the end run of 702, is expressly
prohibited.
Senator Cornyn. That's my understanding of the law, as
well. As a matter of fact, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act is exactly that. It targets foreigners.
Correct? Outside of the United States?
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. But if a would-be terrorist calls an
American citizen in the United States, then you necessarily
will know who's on both ends of that conversation. Correct?
Director Wray. Well, whether it's telephony or even just,
you know, electronic communication, but--which is more often
where we see it.
Senator Cornyn. It could be an email, it can be a text, it
can----
Director Wray. Correct.
Senator Cornyn [continuing]. Be----
Director Wray. Correct.
Senator Cornyn. And then if, for example, you want to
investigate that American citizen, isn't it true that you have
to go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
demonstrate probable cause to conduct a further investigation
of that American citizen as a target?
Director Wray. Yes. At that point, then that's, of course,
the route that we pursue, which is part of why--to your comment
at the beginning about how little people have heard of 702--is
because, unlike the warrant stage, when you're actually
pursuing somebody for prosecution, for example, 702 is most
used and most useful at the stage when you're at the very
beginning, trying to figure out, what the heck do we have here?
What direction does this need to go? Is this something we need
to pursue?
And so that's why people, including prosecutors, don't even
hear about it that much. Because it's when it's most useful to
protect Americans from threats.
Senator Cornyn. I think you've called it the crown jewels
or perhaps words to that effect?
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. How would you describe the importance of
Section 702? And what would be the consequences of willfully
blinding ourselves to the threats of foreign actors?
Director Wray. I think blinding ourselves through either
allowing 702 to lapse or amending it in a way that guts its
effectiveness would be reckless at best, and dangerous and
irresponsible at worst. The reality is, the whole reason we
have 702, focused on foreign threats from overseas, is to
protect America from those threats.
It's not to admire foreign threats from afar and study them
and think about them. It's to know what they are and to make
sure they don't hurt Americans, here--American businesses
targeted with cyber attacks, American victims targeted for
assassination or terrorist attacks. That's why we have it.
The FBI's piece of 702--we are the only intelligence agency
with the authority to operate domestically, and so where the
rubber really meets the road--even though our slice of 702 as a
percentage is quite narrow, that narrow slice, in some ways, is
the most important slice. Because that's what protects people
here, that all of us are sworn to protect.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Chair Durbin. Thanks, Senator Cornyn. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Durbin. Thank you,
Director Wray. I look forward to continuing that conversation
about Section 702, a topic on which I have not firmly made up
my mind how to vote. So, I am open to your input.
I just wanted to start by thanking you, and the men and
women of the FBI for your service to our Nation and the
protection of the rule of law--and specifically thank the FBI
for your work in my community in the past year. You've worked
with State and local prosecutors on civil rights violations, on
robbery, on cyber stalking, on kidnapping cases.
And as someone who had a decade responsible for a local law
enforcement entity before coming here to the Senate, I greatly
respect and appreciate the role the FBI plays: the Academy, the
resources you provide, and the professionalism in Wilmington,
Delaware, and throughout our whole country.
Let me go to that 702 conversation. The proposal put
forward by Senators Warner and Rubio would prohibit the running
of U.S. person queries designed to find evidence of a crime
without first obtaining a court order, but could still perform
warrantless queries where the search is reasonably likely to
retrieve foreign intelligence information. What do you think of
that compromise? Would it head off the significantly negative
consequences you've laid out if we fail to reauthorize Section
702?
Director Wray. I think the bill put forward by Senators
Warner and Rubio provides a path that we can work together on.
The reality is that pursuing 702 information for evidence of a
crime, as has been demonstrated, or evidence of a crime only,
is extremely rare, because that's not the main purpose for
which we use it.
And many of the instances--the very few instances in which
that has been implicated are actually instances where it was
used to find Brady information, exculpatory information to turn
over to the defense. So, it is a path that I think merits
further exploration.
Senator Coons. I'm aware of specific examples in my home
community where FBI agents came and visited a significant
company that was unaware that they had been hacked and was able
to take prompt action because of that. And I'm familiar with
the unique ways in which your domestic authorities complement
some of the ability we need as a Nation to defend against
foreign threats.
You also highlighted in your testimony that there were
significant past FISA compliance violations at the Bureau and
that you've been dedicated to taking action to clean house and
to address those. Talk to me briefly, if you would, about
holding personnel accountable for past misuse of FISA data and
how that has unfolded.
Director Wray. Well, in addition to a whole host of other
reforms we've put in place, we rolled out new accountability
measures designed to make sure that we are capturing not just
intentional or reckless compliance violations, of which there
have been very, very few, and none since 2018, but even, which
has been the vast majority of the compliance incidents we've
had--even negligent or careless errors. We want to make sure
that we have accountability for that, too.
Now, that's a different kind of accountability, just
because the state of mind of the employee is different, and
that's somebody who is coachable.
But we have procedures now that, even for that much more
good-faith noncompliance, they temporarily, at least, lose
access to FISA information, and there's a whole host of
remedial training and so forth, that goes--and then there's
escalating consequences if they don't learn their lesson, and
it builds from there. That's a short oversimplification, but
that gives you a flavor of the measures that we've put in
place.
Senator Coons. The core concern I have, frankly, is that a
future administration or Director might still be able to misuse
authorities in this Section. I have not previously voted to
extend the authorization of Section 702.
But the reforms proposed in this legislation, the actions
you've taken, have me weighing. What, if any, assurances could
you provide that the rules and the system will hold if we
reauthorize 702, even if the Bureau happened to be led by an
appointee who doesn't share your commitment to reform?
Director Wray. Well, we've put in place a number of things
that would be extremely challenging to unwind, for one. We
created--I created a whole new Office of Internal Auditing, for
example, and brought in a former agent who had gone on to be a
Big Four accounting firm partner, to try to work with yet
another Big Four accounting firm to help us build a, what I
expect to be, a world-class internal auditing program focused
specifically on FISA compliance.
In addition, there are external looks and oversights. Most
of the problems that have been identified over the years have
been identified by things like the Department of Justice's
reviews. Of course, there's been Inspector General reviews. The
Court takes a look.
And that's part of why I understand why people might say,
well, gee, Director, you talk a good game, but we've had
problems in the past. And why should we think it's different
this time?
And what I would say to you is, don't just take my word for
it. Look at what the Court, the same Court that's rightly taken
us to task in the past, has said. That Court--the same judge,
in fact, that's been perhaps most scathing is the one that
found 98 percent compliance and has all sorts of language in
the opinion about the reforms actually having the impact that
we're looking for.
So, why is this time different? Because the Court, the
Department, others taking a look at this and who have been not
shy about citing problems in the past, they've found this
progress.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Two other issues I'm going to
raise briefly. First, the importance, the urgency of the
Nonprofit Security Grant Program. As your testimony highlights,
antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate crimes have risen sharply in
the United States following Hamas' October 7th attacks in
Israel, and I think it's urgent that we add several hundred
million dollars to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program,
whether in the supplemental or in our regular appropriations
process.
And I'm hoping that my colleagues, many of whom co-sponsor
the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, will
recognize that the huge wave, globally, of views of Hamas'
circulated social media content in the wake of October 7th
deserves a tough look about whether the algorithms used by
social media platforms promoted this content, whether it was
targeted to certain groups.
A last point I'll make in closing, Director, is that your
written testimony says that economic espionage and foreign
intelligence gathering by the PRC ``present,'' and I think I'm
quoting, ``the greatest long-term threat to our Nation's ideas,
innovation, and economic security.'' I couldn't agree more. I
think it's critical that our response to IP theft by the PRC
and other players be coordinated.
I'm glad to learn the FBI is leading investigations for the
DOJ and the Commerce, Disruptive Technology Strike Force, in
collaboration, and I am urging our Caucus Leader to take up and
confirm the nominee for the Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator, Deborah Robinson, a position that has been vacant
for far too long. Director, thank you for your testimony today,
and for your service.
Chair Durbin. Thanks, Senator Coons. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director
Wray, for being here.
In a report issued, declassified in August of 2021, the
Director of National Intelligence stated, quote, ``FBI
personnel conducted multiple queries of an individual who had
the same last name as the FBI personnel conducting the query.''
And on further investigation, what they learned was that
this query was made after this analyst at the FBI had a
conversation with his own mother and his mother expressed
suspicions about his father having an affair, cheating on her,
having an affair with another woman.
And so, as a result of that, they looked into it, and this
particular analyst admitted that he ran the queries because of
this tip from his mother that his dad was having an affair. And
because I've got a lot of material to cover, I'd appreciate it
if you could give me a yes-or-no answer to this. Was that
analyst terminated?
Director Wray. I'm not sure that I can recall the specific
instance that you're talking about, so I'll have to go look at
that and follow back up with you on that.
Senator Lee. And do you know whether the analyst's security
clearance would've been revoked?
Director Wray. Again, same answer. But let me check into
that, and we'll circle back to----
Senator Lee. Okay. Let me ask it----
Director Wray [continuing]. Whatever we can share.
Senator Lee. Let me ask it to you this way. Yes or no,
would abuse of Section 702 by an FBI employee, would that be
something that would warrant the revocation of security
clearance?
Director Wray. Well, certainly abuse. I think we'd have to
know what the circumstances were.
Senator Lee. Misuse of----
Director Wray. Sometimes people have used terms like abuse
in this discussion when it's been something other than what I
would call abuse, but there've been----
Senator Lee. Yes.
Director Wray. That's why we have this accountability
procedures that have cascading----
Senator Lee. This example----
Director Wray [continuing]. Consequences.
Senator Lee [continuing]. That I've given you is abuse. I
assume you would not disagree with that.
Now, the September 2023 PCLOB report disclosed two
additional intentional incidents, intentional wrong searches
from 2022.
One instance from 2022 in which two analysts conducted
queries seeking information about a person who was a potential
tenant of a rental property owned by one of the analysts.
And another instance, from 2022, in which an NSA analyst
conducted queries on two occasions seeking information about
two individuals that the analyst himself had met through an
online dating service.
Were the FBI employees who conducted those two illegal
searches, were they terminated?
Director Wray. Well, you lost me there for a minute. You
referred to an NSA analyst?
Senator Lee. Yes. Yes. So, an NSA analyst. Do you know
whether anyone at the NSA was disciplined for that? And if they
worked at the FBI, would they be subject to discipline?
Director Wray. Well, I don't want to get into
hypotheticals, but as far as NSA analysts, I think that would
be a question for NSA.
Senator Lee. Now, were FBI employees involved in those? And
if they had been, would their security clearances have been
terminated?
Director Wray. Again, I don't want to get into
hypotheticals, but we have both a disciplinary process, which
is separate from the security clearance----
Senator Lee. Yes.
Director Wray [continuing]. Process, and somebody who
takes, who engages in a----
Senator Lee. I----
Director Wray [continuing]. Compliance violation related
to----
Senator Lee. I--I understand.
Director Wray [continuing]. 702 could be relevant to both.
Senator Lee. I understand. I----
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Lee. I would hope that the default answer would be,
yes, they'd be subject to having their security clearance
stripped and be subject to dismissal.
Now, in an April 2022 opinion, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court noted the following searches of Americans'
communications: 19,000 donors to a particular congressional
campaign; 133 Americans participating in civil unrest and
protests in the summer of 2020; and Americans who were in the
vicinity of the Capitol, not necessarily inside the Capitol,
but in the vicinity of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
The DNI's semiannual assessment of Section 702 disclosed
illegal queries conducted in 2019 to 2020, quote, ``using only
the name of a U.S. Congressman.''
The FISA Court disclosed two particularly egregious
searches from 2022.
In June of 2022, an analyst conducted four queries of 702
information using the last names of a U.S. Senator and of a
State senator, without further limitation.
On October 25, 2022, a staff's operations specialist ran a
query using the Social Security number of a State judge who
had, quote, ``complained to FBI about alleged civil rights
violations perpetrated by a municipal chief of police,'' closed
quote.
Were the FBI employees who conducted those illegal searches
terminated? Or did they have their security clearances
stripped? Yes or no?
Director Wray. Again, I don't know that I can speak to
specific instances. But what I can tell you--and I think this
is important to this exchange--is that all of the instances you
just listed off, all involve conduct that occurred before the
reforms that we've put in place.
Senator Lee. Before you reformed--before the reforms you
put in place, reforms the text of which we don't even have
access to. Reforms that you've put in place.
I've been on this Committee for 13 years. During the
entirety of those 13 years, I've expressed concerns to FBI
Directors appointed by Presidents of both political parties and
three different Presidential administrations.
Every darned one of them has told me the same thing:
``Don't worry about it.'' ``We've got this taken care of.''
``We've got new procedures.'' ``It's going to be different
now.''
It's never different. You haven't changed. And you keep
referring to these policies, these new procedures. We haven't
seen that. We're not even allowed to have access to it.
And we have absolutely no reason to trust you, because you
haven't behaved in a manner that's trustworthy. You can't even,
as we sit here, tell me that people who intentionally,
knowingly, deliberately violated the civil rights of American
citizens, that they were fired. Or that they had their security
clearance stripped.
You know, in 2022, the FBI and other agencies searched
Americans' communications over 200,000 times--only 16 of which
were evidence-of-a-crime-only searches that returned
information. I'd like to ask you to give a yes-or-no answer to
these questions. Were the three related batch queries,
consisting of over 23,000 separate queries, relating to the
events of January 6th. Were those evidence-of-a-crime-only
queries? Yes or no?
Director Wray. I don't know the answer to that. What I----
Senator Lee. The answer----
Director Wray. What----
Senator Lee. The answer is no. I----
Director Wray. What I----
Senator Lee. I do know the answer. The answer is no. Were
the 141----
Director Wray. What I----
Senator Lee [continuing]. Queries for the activists
arrested in connection with the George Floyd protests here in
Washington, DC, evidence-of-a-crime-only queries?
Director Wray. Those were noncompliant queries, and again,
they all predate the reforms that we've put in place, which--
before we----
Senator Lee. Which echo other reforms that other FBI
Directors have----
Director Wray. Which----
Senator Lee [continuing]. Told me about, every darned year.
Director Wray. If I may----
Senator Lee. How about the 19,000 donors to a political
campaign? The answer there is ``no.''
What about the query for a sitting Member of Congress? The
answer there is ``no.''
What about the query involving a U.S. Senator, which, for
all we know, could be any one of us? The answer is ``no.''
And so what does that tell me? Well, what I'm hearing and
what these data points all point to is that a warrant
requirement or prohibition relating to, quote, unquote,
``evidence-of-a-crime-only queries'' would not have been
something that would have prevented any of the most egregious
examples of the abuse that we've seen under Section 702.
So, the FBI is already required to obtain a court order, in
some circumstances, before accessing the contents of Americans'
communications in the context of 702. They're already required
for that, in some circumstances.
Since 2018, how many times has that requirement been
triggered, according to Government reporting? Do you know?
Director Wray. Are you talking about the so-called (f)(2)?
Senator Lee. Yes.
Director Wray. Yes. How many times has it been triggered?
Senator Lee. Yes.
Director Wray. I think there've been two instances where--I
think is maybe the number.
Senator Lee. Hundred----
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Lee. One hundred and three. One hundred and three
times----
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Lee [continuing]. It's been triggered.
And out of those 103 identified times the FBI should've
obtained a court order, how many times did the FBI actually
obtain one? Do you know?
Director Wray. That, I think the answer is none.
Senator Lee. Zero. So, you're telling me that the FBI has
completely ignored the limited court order requirement that
it's already subjected to.
You have the audacity to come here, and you told us that
getting, adding a warrant requirement to 702--even for queries
involving U.S. persons on U.S. soil--that that would amount to
some sort of unilateral disarmament.
That--you have a lot of gall, sir. This is disgraceful.
The Fourth Amendment requires more than that, and you know
it.
I know every single time, for centuries, even prior to the
founding of this country, there were similar protections built
into the laws of the United Kingdom before we became a country.
Even then, the Government was making the same darned argument
you're making today. Which is, it's too hard. It's making it
hard for the Government.
That's why we have a Constitution, sir, and you must comply
with it.
Director Wray. Mr. Chairman, may I respond briefly?
When you ask, why are things different this time, I would
point you, again, to the findings of the Court and the
Department, themselves, both of which have not been shy about
identifying some of the same instances that you cited in our
colloquy.
They, themselves, have observed the effectiveness of the
reforms, which is why the pre-versus-post date of the reforms
becomes very significant. So, that's number one.
Second, as to your claims about constitutionality, I would
point you back to what the caselaw actually shows on this
subject, which is that no court has found 702 in its current
form to be unconstitutional. And every court to have looked at
it has found it to be constitutional. And----
Senator Lee. Well----
Director Wray [continuing]. Last point----
Senator Lee [continuing]. How lucky for you----
Director Wray. Last point.
Senator Lee [continuing]. Because no one has standing to do
that. No one knows when they're being surveilled. That is--that
is not an argument, sir.
Director Wray. Last--last point, Mr. Chairman, is that, in
some of the instances--and you went through a number, in your
questions--in some of the instances, in particular that I know
about, those are instances where the queries were run in order
to get to a public official, Member of Congress, to warn them
about foreign influences targeting them----
Senator Lee. Yes----
Director Wray [continuing]. And a warrant----
Senator Lee [continuing]. We call those----
Director Wray [continuing]. Would not have enabled that----
Senator Lee [continuing]. We call those consent searches.
And consent searches do not require a warrant, sir. And you
know that.
There is nothing that you have done that is not entirely
within the FBI's control and supervision. You're asking me to
believe something that is not believable, because your agency
has made it unbelievable. And I refuse to accept it.
Chair Durbin. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
being here today, and thank you to you, and the thousands of
FBI agents who are right now out there trying to keep us safe.
I think we've often failed to express our gratitude to law
enforcement, and I know how dedicated and hardworking they are.
So that is something that should go without saying, but it's
worth saying.
Mr. Director, I want to focus on election interference,
which is, in my view, one of the most pressing and important
threats to our democracy. That election interference threatens,
particularly, the Presidential election in 2024. There's a lot
of talk about the dire effects, potentially of the outcome in
2024, and the countries of China, Russia, other foreign
adversaries--we're not talking here about Hamas or a terrorist
organization--nation-states interfering in our election process
to pick winners that are more favorable to them.
There's no secret here, no mystery about who would be more
favorable to Vladimir Putin or to Xi, in Ukraine or Taiwan. And
I'd like to know from you whether you view election
interference by these nations as a potential threat in the
coming Presidential election.
Director Wray. We're keenly focused on the risk that
foreign adversaries, whether it's Russia, whether it's China,
whether it's Iran or others, would seek to interfere in our
elections.
Senator Blumenthal. You've said that all threats are
elevated at exactly the same time. This one seems to me much
more elevated than we've seen in any recent election. Am I
right?
Director Wray. I think it's fair to say that they are
elevated from where they were before, and just to elaborate
just slightly on that point, obviously we saw--and it's not
disputed--that the Russians tried to interfere in the 2016
election, and then continued.
But what we've seen since then is other adversaries
attempting to take a page out of the Russians' playbook.
Which is why, for example, I point to the press conference
that Director Ratcliffe and I did, in the fall of 2020, about
the Iranians' efforts to interfere in that election.
More recently, we've had an indictment involving the
Chinese government attempting in a very aggressive way to
interfere in a particular congressional candidacy. First trying
to dig up dirt on the candidate. Then, when they couldn't find
it, to make up dirt on the candidate. And then, when they
couldn't find that, openly talking about how to inflict
physical violence on the candidate. That's----
Senator Blumenthal. So, you----
Director Wray [continuing]. A pretty stark form of election
interference.
Senator Blumenthal. You are focused, rightly, on this
problem as an urgent and exigent one for the United States of
America. Correct?
Director Wray. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. And what can we do, in Congress, to
support this effort? What additional powers do you need? Do you
need more resources?
It seems to me that our democracy is on the line here. And
all of the speech-making, all of the rhetoric that we're
expressing today go for naught if we lose our democracy because
China, Russia, Iran, these nation-states have a free field to
interfere with our election.
Director Wray. Well, I think there's a couple things.
There's, on the money side, in terms of appropriations, we
are not in an environment where any of the threats that we're
seeing, as part of my exchange with Senator Graham, are going
backward. They're all elevated and increasing. So, now is not a
time to go backward in terms of the funding of the FBI across
cyber counterintelligence and a whole host of other issues.
But, second, we've talked about 702--702 is, of course,
focused on foreign adversaries, many of these same intelligence
services and their ability to engage in malicious foreign
intelligence operations.
And that's why reauthorizing 702 in a form where it can be
used is important to that threat, among a whole host of other
foreign threats.
Senator Blumenthal. There are now Fifth Circuit decisions.
The courts are making decisions that, if upheld, would create
additional obstacles to your enforcement against foreign
interference. Are you concerned about the Fifth Circuit saying,
in effect, that you can't communicate with social media to
alert them to threats?
Director Wray. Well, of course, as you know, this is the
subject of ongoing litigation. The findings of the lower courts
in that litigation are things that are hotly contested through
the Department's filings. And as you know, the Department has
asked the Supreme Court to not only stay that injunction but to
grant cert, and it has done both.
I will say, and I think this is important for people to
know, it is not seriously disputed that our foreign adversaries
have tried--and are continuing to try to interfere in our
elections. And it is not seriously disputed that those foreign
adversaries are using social media, including U.S. social media
platforms, as part of that effort.
And historically our work in this space has enjoyed
widespread, bipartisan support, and, in fact, President Trump
himself, rightly, in 2018 or 2019, issued an Executive order on
this very subject, calling it a national emergency.
SSCI, the Senate Intelligence Committee, on an
overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, identified much the same and
called for more engagement--more engagement with social media
companies, not less. The key, the key, is making sure that it's
done in the right way. And that's what we're committed to do--
focus on the hidden hand of the foreign actor, not on the
content itself posted.
Senator Blumenthal. But just so everyone is aware, Director
Wray, Facebook announced, and I'm quoting, ``that the threat
sharing by the Federal Government in the U.S. related to
foreign election interference has been paused since July,'' end
quote.
That is a profoundly troubling change that threatens our
national security. The FBI and other law enforcement and
intelligence agencies are, in effect, handicapped. They are
straitjacketed by this ruling. And on that score, and on so
many other areas where election interference is not just
imminent, it's ongoing, it's real and urgent, a clear and
present ongoing threat to our democracy.
And I hope that my colleagues will heed your warning. It's
expressed in characteristically understated terms, but I think
it is a profoundly important warning to this Committee and to
the country.
Let me ask about, just in the brief time I have left, hate
crimes, the rising incidents. I am deeply disturbed, as are
many of my colleagues, about what's happening on college
campuses. Free speech has a place, obviously, on campuses.
Intimidation, physical threats, violence do not. Are you
satisfied that the leadership of our colleges and universities
are doing enough to stop violence and physical intimidation?
Director Wray. Well, it's hard to paint with a broad brush.
I know that we are working more closely than ever with
leadership of universities, to try to increase their awareness
and their resolve on this subject.
And we now have campus liaison responsibilities assigned to
a specific agent in every Field Office, to try to--as part of
that effort. And certainly, we have seen transnational
repression, for example, from some of these same foreign
adversaries we were just talking about, occurring on campuses
and not just in other parts of America.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you seen----
[Gavel is tapped.]
Senator Blumenthal [continuing]. Hamas do that?
Director Wray. I'd have to think about that one, whether
specifically----
Senator Blumenthal. Maybe you can respond----
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal [continuing]. In writing. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray,
welcome.
As you know, I am deeply concerned about the conduct of
both the Department of Justice and the FBI, particularly in the
last 3 years during the Biden administration. I think the
Department of Justice has been profoundly politicized under
Attorney General Merrick Garland, and I think the FBI has, as
well.
And, unfortunately, I think you've been unwilling to stand
up to senior career officials in the FBI who've allowed the FBI
to be politicized. I'll tell you I regularly speak with FBI
agents across the country who are unhappy about the integrity
of the institution being weakened because DOJ is being treated
as a political weapon.
I want to talk, in particular, about the investigation into
multiple allegations of corruption concerning Hunter Biden and
Joe Biden, because the Department of Justice has, I think, from
the outset tried at every step to stop investigation into
corruption from Joe Biden.
As you're aware, a WhatsApp text message was sent to Henry
Zhao, a senior Chinese Communist, from Hunter Biden that reads
as follows: ``I'm sitting here with my father, and we would
like to understand why the commitment made has not been
fulfilled. Tell the Director that I would like to resolve this
now before it gets out of hand. And now means tonight. And, Z,
if I get a call or text from anyone involved in this other than
you, Zhang, or the chairman, I will make certain that, between
the man sitting next to me and every person he knows and my
ability to hold a grudge, that you will regret not following my
direction. I am sitting here waiting for the call with my
father.''
Now, Democrats and those in the media trying to defend the
White House repeatedly say, there is no direct evidence of Joe
Biden's involvement in his son's corruption. Well, this is a
text that is direct evidence, that is stating that it is his
father that is going to retaliate.
Now, an IRS whistleblower, Gary Shapley, testified before
the House of Representatives that the natural step he wanted to
follow was to determine whether Joe Biden was, in fact, sitting
next to his father when this threat was made to extort millions
of dollars from a Chinese Communist.
And what the IRS whistleblower testified is that when he
tried to find out whether Joe Biden was sitting next to Hunter,
that the DOJ blocked getting the GPS data on Joe Biden's phone.
Did the FBI try to ascertain where Hunter Biden was and where
Joe Biden was when this text was sent?
Director Wray. Well, I think the questions you're asking go
to the ongoing investigation being led by Special Counsel
Weiss. And so I'm not going to be able to discuss what is or
isn't in scope for that.
Senator Cruz. Look, there's been testimony under oath from
the IRS whistleblower that you did not seek the GPS data. And
you're right. David Weiss, the Special Prosecutor, is in charge
of it. And it is David Weiss and his underlings who, according
to the IRS whistleblowers, have alleged that they're the ones
trying to stop the investigation. They allowed the statute of
limitations to run on many of the most serious violations.
Not only that, IRS whistleblower Shapley testified that on
September 3, Assistant U.S. Attorney Lesley Wolf explicitly
told investigators that, despite having probable cause to
search, quote, ``there is no way a search warrant would be
approved when the evidence in question was located inside of
Vice President Biden's guesthouse.'' Wolf stated that, quote,
``the optics prevented such a search.''
Is the FBI--do they make a routine practice of allowing
partisan political optics to prevent investigating serious
evidence of corruption?
Director Wray. My instructions to our people, on this and
on every other investigation, are that we are to follow the
facts wherever they lead, no matter who likes it, no matter
what political influence there----
Senator Cruz. Then why didn't you----
Director Wray [continuing]. May be out there.
Senator Cruz [continuing]. Get the GPS data on where Hunter
Biden and Joe Biden were?
Director Wray. Again, Senator, with respect, I can't
discuss----
Senator Cruz. But it's not----
Director Wray [continuing]. An ongoing investigation.
Senator Cruz [continuing]. With respect. And, Director
Wray, you and I have gone round and round on this, because I
understand, anytime you're asked about this, the answer is,
it's an ongoing investigation.
Of course, the investigation isn't ongoing. You're not
doing the work. You've got whistleblowers pointing out that
you're not doing the work, and you are hiding behind the skirts
of the Attorney General.
Look, the whistleblower also testified that the Attorney
General, when he came before Congress--go to the next chart--
came before Congress, lied under oath to this Committee. The
Attorney General testified to this Committee, in response to my
questioning, ``I have pledged not to interfere with the Hunter
Biden investigation. I have carried through on that pledge.''
The IRS whistleblowers have alleged the Attorney General
lied under oath--a felony. Was the Attorney General telling the
truth when he said this? Do we have the chart? We don't have
the chart.
Was the Attorney General telling the truth when he said,
``I have pledged not to interfere with the Hunter Biden
investigation and I have carried through on my pledge'' ?
Director Wray. Again, I can't speak to the Attorney
General's testimony. I can only tell you what my instructions
have been to our people, and I expect----
Senator Cruz. Has there been----
Director Wray [continuing]. Those to be followed.
Senator Cruz [continuing]. Political interference in the
investigation into Hunter Biden and Joe Biden?
Director Wray. Not that I have experienced.
Senator Cruz. Were the investigators allowed to investigate
whether Joe Biden was complicit in the corruption?
Director Wray. Again, there is an ongoing investigation----
Senator Cruz. I'm asking you about----
Director Wray [continuing]. Being led----
Senator Cruz [continuing]. Corruption from DOJ. Were they
allowed to investigate Joe Biden? Or is the whistleblower
telling the truth that DOJ said, Joe Biden's off limits--no
questions about the ``big guy'' ?
Director Wray. And as to what is in scope or not in scope
of the ongoing investigation, I would refer you to Special
Counsel Weiss. That is not me hiding behind anything, Senator.
That is a long-standing policy that has been in place----
Senator Cruz. Director Wray----
Director Wray [continuing]. Through multiple
administrations----
Senator Cruz [continuing]. You have a responsibility.
Director Wray [continuing]. Going back years and years and
years.
Senator Cruz. You have a responsibility to the FBI, not to
allow it to be a partisan tool and a partisan weapon. The
testimony--and, by the way, the FBI's done nothing----
Director Wray. And I have not, and I will not.
Senator Cruz. Have you opened an investigation into whether
the Attorney General lied under oath to Congress and whether
the Attorney General obstructed justice?
Director Wray. I'm not going to go down that road here.
Senator Cruz. I know you're not. That's the point.
Nobody thinks you've opened an investigation, because
you're not willing to. And the amazing thing is, Director Wray,
I've known you 30 years. You're not a partisan Democrat. You're
simply sitting blithely by while career partisans in your
agency allow it to be weaponized. And you are damaging the FBI,
and you are damaging the Department of Justice.
Let me ask you, also--the whistleblower testified that
investigators wanted to execute a search warrant on a storage
unit used by Hunter Biden. And instead, they tipped off Hunter
Biden's lawyer before the search warrant was carried out.
Is it typical FBI practice to tip off the subject of a
search warrant before the search warrant, so they can remove
any evidence that's incriminating?
Director Wray. What is typical is that when you're dealing
with an individual who has a protective detail, it is typical
for agents to be in contact with the subject's----
Senator Cruz. Does the protective detail----
Director Wray [continuing]. Protective detail.
Senator Cruz. Does the protective detail guard the storage
unit?
Director Wray. Again, I can't speak to the storage unit
specifically. But I can tell you, is that----
Senator Cruz. Why----
Director Wray [continuing]. When it comes to----
Senator Cruz. Why would the FBI tip off the subject of a
search warrant about the storage unit that was going to be
searched, beforehand? Does that not undermine the very essence
of an investigation that DOJ is purporting to undertake?
Director Wray. Again, I'm not going to be able to discuss
specific investigative steps that were----
Senator Cruz. But who is?
Director Wray [continuing]. Taken in this----
Senator Cruz. If you're not, nobody answers these
questions. And it's why people are furious with the coverup,
because you don't believe the FBI is accountable to Congress or
to the American people.
Senator Hirono [presiding]. Your time is up. Director Wray
has requested a 5-minute recess. Five minutes.
Director Wray. I'll just--let me just, Senator, if I might,
just quickly respond and then----
Senator Hirono. Respond.
Director Wray [continuing]. Go to the break. Thank you.
I understand why this is frustrating. I do. But it is also
the case that these policies that I am referring to, about my
inability to discuss ongoing investigations--and certainly
internal deliberations related to ongoing investigations--are
policies that have not only been in place for many, many years,
through multiple administrations of both parties.
But--but, in fact, these are policies that were actually
strengthened under the last administration and that my
predecessor was faulted, in a fairly scathing Inspector General
report, for not following. And so I keep that in my mind----
Senator Cruz. When you see corruption, you have an
obligation----
Director Wray [continuing]. When I----
Senator Cruz [continuing]. To call it out.
Director Wray [continuing]. Engaged in this job. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. You have an obligation to call out
corruption.
Senator Hirono. The hearing will recess.
[Whereupon the hearing was recessed and reconvened.]
Chair Durbin [presiding]. The Committee will resume.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All I can say is, phew. Good to have you back.
So, Director Wray, you testified that no court has held
that the Fourth Amendment applies to 702 searches. But in 2019,
the Second Circuit explained that 702 U.S. person queries,
quote, ``does have important Fourth Amendment implications,''
end quote, and it remanded that case for further review.
I know that you testified that you have put in place
various protections and accountability features to prevent the
misuse or abuse of 702, but my understanding is that, prior to
your putting in place these kinds of protections, there was
something in the order of 2 million U.S. citizen inquiries
under 702, and then that has gone down to some 200,000. That's
still a lot of queries.
So, my colleague Chris Coons asked, you know, while you
have these protocols in place and courts have said you're doing
a good job with regard to abuse of 702, but really, what is to
prevent another administration from removing these protocols?
And, in fact, I know that during the Trump years, that his
administration, they interpreted the words ``derived from'' in
a very broad way under FISA.
So I do think that there are a number of us who are
concerned about another administration not having--not paying
as much attention to abuses as you have testified. And even
now, I also have some concerns relating to the U.S. citizen
queries under 702.
But let me turn to another matter. You did note that there
is a heightened environment for foreign terrorism. In your
testimony, though, you note that the top domestic terrorism
threat we face continues to be from racially motivated violent
extremists and anti-government or anti-authority violent
extremists.
Can you explain how the tech companies--and a lot of this
is people who have been, typically, radicalized online. Can you
explain how the tech companies could be better partners in
rooting out domestic violent extremism?
Director Wray. Well, some of this goes to the exchanges
that we've already had about the encryption issue. And when
individuals, we have found historically, move to discussing
truly operational, actual violent activity, they tend to move
to encrypted platforms, which if those encrypted platforms are
not designed in a way to be responsive to a warrant, then that
activity, just like the child exploitation we talked about
earlier, would be beyond reach. So, we need companies to work
with us on that. So, that's one.
Second, the companies have their own terms of service and
actions that they can take. And on their own platforms are
actions that they could take to help reduce abuse.
But most importantly, I think, on social media platforms,
we need people who are on those platforms who are Americans who
see threats of violence--again, this is what this is about,
threats of violence--to alert law enforcement if they see them.
Senator Hirono. Certainly we can do that, but as you say,
just as with the reporting of hate crimes, et cetera, these are
all very underreported.
And I think that there are concerns about possibly limiting
the liability protections under Section 230. Would that be
another way to get these platforms to pay attention to content
on their platforms?
Director Wray. Well, without weighing on a specific
legislative proposal, what I would say is that these are
gigantic companies now with all kinds of activity--some very
positive, some very negative--that happens on their platforms.
And just like any industry, it makes sense to me that they
should take responsibility----
Senator Hirono. Mm-hmm.
Director Wray [continuing]. For what happens on their
platforms--their duties, unlike ours, unlike this Committee's--
their duties are to maximize profit for the shareholders.
Nothing wrong with that being their duties. But that's a very
different responsibility than all of us have to protect the
American people.
Senator Hirono. It does sound as though we need to make
some changes to Section 230 liability protections, and I think
we need to go there.
Senator Hirono. Let me turn to another important issue, sex
trafficking. It remains a real issue in Hawaii and to other
Native peoples.
And in Hawaii, for example, sex trafficking
disproportionately impacts the Native Hawaiian community to the
point where Native Hawaiian women and girls represent 67 to 77
percent of sex trafficking victims, and 37 percent of child
trafficking cases in Hawaii.
And earlier this year, the FBI launched Operation Not
Forgotten, to help solve cases of missing and murdered
indigenous people. I think that is a really important step for
the FBI to take.
And prior to that, you also have in place Operation Cross
Country, which is a 13-year program highlighting some of these
issues. Can you tell us a bit more about what these programs do
and what you're--what you hope to accomplish through these
programs?
Director Wray. Well, so, these programs are designed to
both rescue victims of human trafficking and to take down the
predators who engage in the human trafficking. And we take a
very victim-centered, victim-focused approach.
So, in addition to rescuing the victims and arresting the
predators, our Victim Services personnel try to engage with the
victims to connect them up to social services and things like
that, so that we recognize that it's a long road of recovery
for them, even after they're rescued from the trafficking
itself. And we're trying to help get them on the right path
that way.
Part of the reason things like Operation Cross County are
kind of combined the way they are is to raise awareness for
victims and witnesses, and deterrence for predators.
Senator Hirono. I know that Operation Cross Country
resulted in the finding of some six missing children in Hawaii.
I've asked you this before, regarding focusing on Native
Hawaiian women and girls who are trafficked, and--is Operation
Not Forgotten in Hawaii?
Director Wray. Is it in Hawaii?
Senator Hirono. Is it in Hawaii? Does it----
Director Wray. I think Operation Not Forgotten is a----
Senator Hirono [continuing]. Is there a presence in Hawaii?
Director Wray [continuing]. Operation Not Forgotten is--if
I recall the name correctly, there is very specific operations
in Hawaii that our Honolulu Field Office and Division are
conducting. And they do some great work in the human
trafficking space, and I'm proud of the work they've done for
your community, in fact, the citizens--your constituents of the
State of Hawaii.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I appreciate the effort, and I'm
glad that some of my colleagues have asked you about what more
we can do regarding the rise in antisemitism in our country,
especially on our college campuses. Thank you for whatever you
can do to assist in that regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Durbin. Thanks, Senator Hirono. Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray,
thank you for being here.
I noticed with interest in your written testimony that you
said, and I'm quoting you now, ``The FBI uses all tools
available at its disposal to combat domestic terrorism''--which
now apparently includes the crime of being Catholic. Let's talk
a little bit about the FBI's egregious targeting of Catholic
Americans.
You have repeatedly been asked about the memo generated by
the Richmond Field Office, we now know in collaboration with
multiple other Field Offices, about recruiting sources in
Catholic churches.
You have repeatedly said that no human sources were
approached. This is you on July the 12th, in the House. You
were asked directly by Jim Jordan, do you think that priests
ought to be approached to give information on parishioners? You
said, ``no,'' sir. No, sir.
You went on to say, we do not recruit, open, or operate
human sources. We do not report on religious organizations. You
went on to say, this product--meaning the Richmond memo--has
not resulted in any investigative action.
But now we know that, in fact, FBI agents did approach a
priest and a choir director, to ask them to inform on
parishioners. So, were you lied to when you gave this
testimony? Or were you lying to Congress?
Director Wray. Neither. So, your question conflates two
different things. There's the intelligence product itself,
which the Richmond Field Office created. It was written by, as
our inspection found, by analysts in Richmond, reviewed by
people in Richmond, and captioned, ``Richmond Field Office
Product.''
Separately from that, there was an investigation of a
specific individual who was amassing Molotov cocktails and
posting about killing people.
And it does not surprise me that there were people who knew
that subject in that investigation, that is, the guy building
the Molotov cocktails and trying to kill people--that people
talked to the witnesses who knew that person.
And I think the product, the Richmond intelligence product
which cites that investigation, is actually pretty transparent
about exactly what I just said.
Senator Hawley. No, I don't think so at all. In fact, the
only reason we know this is a whistleblower has come forward
and told the House, under oath, that the FBI went and
interviewed priests and choir directors in the Richmond area.
The House goes on to say that the FBI has repeatedly
refused to disclose this information. The only reason we know
it is because a whistleblower came forward with it. Just like
the only reason we know about this memo is because a
whistleblower came forward with it.
How many other parishes around the country have priests or
choir directors that've been approached? By the way, are
Catholic choirs now, are they--are they breeding grounds for
domestic terrorism? Is this your latest theory? How many other
parishes have FBI agents approached priests and choir directors
to ask about parishioners?
Director Wray. Look, Senator, we do not and will not
conduct investigations based on anybody's exercise of their
constitutionally protected----
Senator Hawley. You have done----
Director Wray [continuing]. Religious----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. So, and your memo----
Director Wray. No, sir.
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Explicitly asks for it.
Director Wray. No----
Senator Hawley. Your memo labels traditional Catholics as
racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists in need of
investigation. You have a list of churches--a list in the memo.
You've repeatedly said, we don't target churches. We don't list
churches. They're listed in the memo. So, how many other
parishes have you gone to, to talk to choir directors, for
heaven's sake?
Director Wray. As I've----
Senator Hawley. Do you know the answer to that question?
Director Wray. No, I don't know the answer to that
question. But I can tell you that we don't investigate people
for their exercise of their constitutionally protected--
constitutionally protected religious expression.
Senator Hawley. I ask----
Director Wray [continuing]. That particular intelligence
product is something that, as soon as I saw it, I was aghast. I
had it withdrawn.
Senator Hawley. Really? You were aghast?
Director Wray. I was.
Senator Hawley. Oh, really?
Director Wray. Yes, sir.
Senator Hawley. And what have you done about it? Did you
fire the people who wrote it?
Director Wray. No, I had it withdrawn----
Senator Hawley. Have you fired anybody involved in it?
Director Wray. Senator, if you would give me a chance to
answer----
Senator Hawley. That's a----
Director Wray [continuing]. Your question----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Yes or a no. It's not hard.
Have you fired anyone involved in the writing of that
outrageous memo, about----
Director Wray. Senator----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Which, frankly, you've
repeatedly misled the public? Yes or no?
Director Wray. The individuals involved in that product----
Senator Hawley. Have you fired----
Director Wray [continuing]. Were not----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Anyone?
Director Wray [continuing]. Just a minute--were not found
to have engaged in any intentional or bad-faith conduct, and,
in fact----
Senator Hawley. Really?
Director Wray. In fact, Senator, a number of the
individuals involved----
Senator Hawley. So, the answer's no.
Director Wray. A number of the individuals involved in
writing that product in the Richmond Office were themselves
Catholic. So, the notion----
Senator Hawley. Oh, I see. So, therefore----
Director Wray [continuing]. That they are targeting----
Senator Hawley. Oh.
Director Wray [continuing]. Their own faith----
Senator Hawley. Oh. So, they----
Director Wray [continuing]. Is nonsense.
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Have a get-out-of-jail-free
card. I see.
Director Wray. They----
Senator Hawley. I see. So, you're----
Director Wray. I did not say that.
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Immune, and they're immune.
So, we shouldn't ask questions about it. You haven't done a
darned thing. You haven't fired anybody.
In fact, what the House found is--what is it? You
admonished them. They were admonished, and their respective
supervisors were told to engage with the Human Resources
Division to ensure that deficiencies are addressed.
Oh, I feel much better. They've been sent to bed without
food. Good heavens, Director. This is one of the most
outrageous targetings.
You have mobilized your division, the most powerful law
enforcement division in the world, against traditionalist
Catholics--whatever the heck that means--and you just told us
you have not fired a single person.
I mean, here, it gets worse. Your Richmond Field Office,
they thought there was nothing wrong with this. The House
interviewed the head of the Richmond Field Office. He
testified. It's all here in the public report. I refer you to
it--pages 12, 13, 14. He testified he saw no problem with this.
He said he thought it was fine.
In fact, we have internal memoranda of the members of the
Field Office high-fiving. One peer reviewer, another member of
the Field Office, wrote, ``I think this is a great product. I
really enjoyed the read.''
Do you have a problem with systemic bigotry against
Catholics in the FBI?
Director Wray. No.
Senator Hawley. What are you going to do about this? Are
you going to fire these people or not?
Director Wray. Those individuals have all been admonished,
and it is all going into their----
Senator Hawley. Admonished.
Director Wray. If you would let me finish my answer. It is
all going into their annual performance reviews. It has direct
impact on their compensation, among other things.
Senator Hawley. Oh, I see. Oh, I see. I see. So, the 60
million American Catholics who, we now--who now learn that your
FBI has recommended that priests be recruiters and informants--
your FBI has gone to priests, choir directors. But we're to
feel better because you've admonished them for their
wrongdoing.
Director Wray. You, again, are conflating two different
things. When----
Senator Hawley. No, I'm not.
Director Wray [continuing]. We are----
Senator Hawley. I am taking your testimony, where you said
you do not--you said categorically--categorically, you said, we
do not--we do not go to priests and ask them about their
parishioners. You said, we do not. You didn't say, we haven't.
You didn't say, we won't. You said, we don't.
As it turns out, you do. And you kept it from the public.
You deliberately misled Congress about it, and the only reason
we know about it is because a whistleblower came forward.
Director Wray. I just fundamentally----
Senator Hawley. That's the truth.
Director Wray [continuing]. Disagree with your
characterization.
Senator Hawley. Well, there's no characterization. The
facts are the facts. And I fundamentally resent the fact that
you have violated--if not the spirit, if not the letter,
certainly the spirit of the First Amendment, and used your law
enforcement agency against Catholics in this Nation.
Let me ask you about one other thing. Last time you were
here, you had to leave early to take a jet to your vacation in
the Adirondacks. Now, let me just ask you this. The
whistleblower tells us that you also maintain a home in
Atlanta, to which you fly on a regular basis. I'm told by this
whistleblower from the FBI that you use the FBI jet to make
that travel. Is that correct?
Director Wray. All of my travel, personal or work related,
is required to be done on FBI planes. That is long-standing
policy. It goes back----
Senator Hawley. He----
Director Wray [continuing]. Well over a decade.
Senator Hawley. I'll take that as a yes. The whistleblower
also says that you regularly require the jet, which is based in
Manassas, to be flown to DC because, and I quote now, ``Wray
doesn't like to sit in traffic.'' Is that accurate?
Director Wray. No, that's not accurate.
Senator Hawley. He also says that you pay only the lowest-
cost commercial ticket for that Atlanta-to-DC trip, which is, I
don't know, what, 200 bucks or something, when, of course, it
costs 20--$30,000 to operate the jet. Is that correct?
Director Wray. The reimbursement that I provide is
reimbursement that is set by OMB policy, and I----
Senator Hawley. So, that's a yes?
Director Wray [continuing]. Follow that policy, which goes
back over a decade and I think has been chronicled in a GSA
report from back in, like, 2013.
Senator Hawley. You'll provide----
Director Wray. All of these issues----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. All the records to this
Committee of your travel and relevant use----
Director Wray. I'll provide----
Senator Hawley [continuing]. Of the FBI jet?
Director Wray [continuing]. Whatever information is
appropriate. Absolutely.
Senator Hawley. Well, appropriate. I mean, everything that
we ask for?
Director Wray. I--we will follow up with you about
providing information.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chair Durbin. Senator Butler.
Senator Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Director
Wray, for returning. I associate myself with the comments of my
colleagues in appreciating you for your service and those who
serve under your leadership for doing the work to protect the
country. I have a couple different topics I'd like to talk with
you a little bit about.
One is concerning what it is that your team might be
learning and/or seeing as trends, now, post the Dobbs decision,
where, after 50 years of precedent set by Roe v. Wade, we got a
Dobbs decision where the preliminary data has been showing that
there's been an increase in attacks against medical clinics
that provide abortion-related healthcare.
In my own State of California, this dangerous behavior has
reared its head as of late, where three men who were involved
in conspiring to firebomb a reproductive health clinic.
Talk to me a little bit, Director Wray, and just share with
the American public what the FBI, your agency, has been doing
post-Dobbs decision. What trends are you seeing relative to the
threats facing reproductive health clinics?
Director Wray. Sure. Happy to take that on. Some things you
will probably expect. Some things you might not expect.
In the category of things that you might expect, certainly
we continue to see violence against a variety of
establishments, motivated by views on abortion. And you've
mentioned a few cases in your question, and we pursue those
cases through--on the criminal side through the FACE Act.
And in some instances, if there's more of a terrorism
angle, we might be pursuing explosive charges or what have you,
through our Joint Terrorism Task Force. That part, you would
probably expect, and that continues apace.
What you might not expect, though, is that of the
investigations that have been opened based on tips and leads
and activity that we've seen since the leak of the Dobbs
decision, is that actually we've seen a huge uptick in violence
against pro-life facilities, not just abortion clinics and so
forth.
And we just recently had a case where we had an individual
who had tried to firebomb a pro-life facility in Madison,
Wisconsin, and our folks did some great work with DNA off of a
burrito, to be able to apprehend the suspect. And so, we've
seen violence on both sides of the issue.
And the reason I bring that up is because it's important
for Americans to understand that I don't care--we don't care
what side of the abortion issue you're on, you don't get to
engage in violence to express your views. That's where--that's
where we get involved, and that's where the line gets crossed.
Senator Butler. Are there--let me move to a different
topic. There has been a lot of conversation, a lot of questions
asked of you today that you've responded to relative to the
increase in hate crimes directed toward the Jewish community,
directed toward the Muslim community. And I, too, join my
colleagues in the concern and appreciate the work of the FBI in
those areas.
And the last time you were before this Committee, I asked
you specifically about hate crimes directed toward the LGBT+
community. There's data that continues to illuminate the fact
that there's increased hate crimes directed toward the AAPI
community in the country. And it has, continues to be noted and
documented--the rise in hate crimes directed toward Black
Americans in the country.
Here's my question. What are the--what is the work the FBI
is doing directed toward hate crimes, generally? What are you
doing, what can you do, and what can we do as a Congress, as a
Committee, to better equip you to help to increase both the
reporting as well as the prevention of these crimes directed,
motivated, by hate?
Director Wray. Well, I can speak more to what we can do and
what we are doing, both on the investigative side--we're making
a conscious point of trying to work with our law enforcement
partners to find the cases, to pursue them, even if Federal
charges, because of the particularities of what the Federal
statute requires, even if Federal charges are not easily
prosecutable.
If State charges are brought, then we don't just check out.
We, FBI, continue to help our State and local partners to
ensure that there's accountability and justice brought through
State charges.
We have elevated civil rights crimes, including
specifically hate crimes as the highest priority within those,
to a national threat priority over the last couple years, and
that has increased the amount of resources we can devote to it.
In addition, you mentioned reporting and prevention.
One of the things we know about hate crimes, really across
the whole spectrum of victims, is that they are underreported.
And so one of the things that we're doing, and other public
figures could do, is to try to reach out to individual
communities to educate them about hate crimes and where they
can go to report it.
So if they're a witness, a victim, they know where to go
and what to do about it.
We also engage with local law enforcement, because
sometimes they don't necessarily recognize what to do with
individual fact patterns that might become a hate crime.
So, those are some of the things that we're doing to try to
increase the fidelity of the statistics on this, because that
helps us identify trends and figure out how to allocate
resources and investigative priority. So, it's investigative,
it's support, it's outreach, it's education, raising awareness.
Senator Butler. The last question that I have, Director
Wray--thank you for that.
Since I've been a Member of this body, you've--this is the
second time that I've got the opportunity to talk with you, and
in each time, each instance, you have raised your concern and
heightened awareness about the potential threat of violence
directed toward this country from other nation-states.
I want to talk a little bit about attacks on our electric
grid. Particularly in the past few years, the U.S. has seen a
record surge in the number of attacks on the electric grid and
physical attacks, including two bombings in my State in San
Jose, California, last winter that left thousands of residents
without power.
I know you know the details, and so I'll skip the
storytelling, but, Director Wray, what updates can you share
about the FBI's investigation into the recent string of
physical attacks on our electric grid. And what steps have you
taken to improve and coordinate the data collection, relative
to protecting our physical infrastructure?
Director Wray. Well, of course you're asking about the
physical attacks on the electric grid. Obviously, there are
also a whole range of cyber attacks on the electric grid, as
well. But just focusing on the physical attacks, we have seen
an increasing number of attacks on substations, and things like
that, for a variety of motivations.
So, for example, you know, in Baltimore, we had a fairly
well-known case not that long ago of a couple of individuals
who were attempting to cause chaos. These were racially
motivated violent extremists who wanted to essentially cause
this cascading power failure, attacking five substations in the
Baltimore area. And thankfully we were able to disrupt that
attack.
But we've also seen people attacking substations for non-
ideological reasons, including--I think out in the Pacific
Northwest somewhere, there was a case that individuals were
trying to facilitate a robbery, and they wanted to bring down
the power grid to essentially enhance their ability to conduct
a robbery. So, there was a financial motive in that instance.
And we've also had, like, just straight-out vandalism.
So, there's a bunch of different motivations, but what they
have in common is a targeting of the electric grid, of the
substations. And so we are working more and more closely not
just with DHS but the Department of Energy and other regulatory
partners to try to give them better information so that they
can figure out how to better harden their infrastructure.
Senator Butler. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Butler. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Director Wray, in your written statements,
you mentioned antisemitic attacks, and in your opening
statement this morning you said that the FBI seeks to mitigate
them quickly. Has there been an increase in antisemitic attacks
since the October 7th atrocity against Israel?
Director Wray. Yes. And what's striking about that is that
that's coming on the heels of what we were already seeing, even
before October 7th, as a significant uptick, not just of hate-
fueled attacks but specifically antisemitic hate-filled attacks
as a portion of those.
And by far and away the biggest chunk of the tips and leads
which are coming in fast and constantly to us, post-October
7th--the biggest chunk by far involve threats to the Jewish
community. We've seen bomb threats to synagogues, you know,
threats to attack the Jewish community on campuses, and other
places. We've had multiple arrests.
And so it is a real problem. And as I think I testified
maybe recently, what's so jarring about those attacks is that
the Jewish community in this country is, like, 2\1/2\ percent
of the American public, and yet they represent something close
to 60 percent of all religiously based hate crimes. And they
have the unique distinction of being targeted by Sunni
terrorists, Shi'a terrorists, domestic terrorists, inspired
terrorists. And so we are acutely focused on the threats to the
Jewish community, which very much needs our help.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I share your concerns about
those threats and the disproportionate nature of the threats to
Jews in America. Federal civil rights laws do protect Jews from
these antisemitic hate crimes and acts of violence, to include
their criminal provisions. Is that right?
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Cotton. I want to focus on one particularly
egregious incident of such antisemitism.
On Thanksgiving Day, a pro-Palestinian mob showed up at the
home of Michael Tuchin in Los Angeles. Mr. Tuchin is no random
private citizen. He is the president of the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee, also known as AIPAC, one of the
strongest supporters of the American-Israel alliance and
somewhat--an organization with broad bipartisan support in
Congress. The--this mob was there for no other reason than that
Mr. Tuchin is Jewish and that he is the president of AIPAC and
a supporter of Israel.
The mob set off smoke bombs with dense black smoke, to make
him and his family think their house was on fire. They blared
sirens. They dumped fake blood and infant-sized body bags in
his driveway. They vandalized cars that were parked in the
driveway. They distributed flyers around the neighborhood with
Mr. Tuchin's photo and a message there would be, quote, ``no
peace,'' end quote, for him as long as AIPAC supports Israel.
When a neighbor tried to intervene during a lengthy wait
for the police to arrive, one member of this mob attacked the
neighbor with a metal pole. Director Wray, has the FBI made any
arrests in these hate crimes in Los Angeles that have been so
widely publicized in the media?
Director Wray. Well, I don't know if it's part of the same
investigation, but I know, for example, post-October 7th, we
have had arrests of individuals in L.A., in the L.A. area,
specifically individuals who were threatening, for example, the
ADL CEO, and a number of people in the ADL leadership.
And a lot of the cases that we've been advancing, post-
October 7th, involve threats that sound very similar to the one
you're describing. If I----
Senator Cotton. These go beyond threats. They showed up at
his home on Thanksgiving Day and vandalized his home and
attacked a neighbor. The organization is known as the People's
City Council of Los Angeles, who post videos and photos up on
their account along with the message, quote, ``No peace for
these baby killers. F-AIPAC. Hashtag Free Palestine.''
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Cotton. To be clear, they didn't use the PG version
of the four-letter expletive starting with F, in their social
media post. So, are you aware of the FBI either conducting
arrests in this, against this mob at Mr. Tuchin's house--or
even investigating?
Director Wray. As I sit here right now, I don't know
specifically. We've had so many investigations, as I said in
our earlier exchange, that are focused on threats or more than
threats against the Jewish community, all around the country.
Let me follow up and see if we can get more information----
Senator Cotton. Good.
Director Wray [continuing]. To you on that specific case.
Senator Cotton. I would very much appreciate that, because
it is the case that, you know, the history of our Federal civil
rights laws, especially the criminal provisions of them, go
back to a time when local authorities refused to protect the
civil rights of their people. This is paradigmatically in the
post-Civil War era, when local Democratic officials in the
South wouldn't protect the rights of free Black slaves.
But color me very skeptical that notorious Democrat George
Gascon, the prosecuting attorney for the County of Los Angeles,
is going to zealously pursue criminal charges against this mob
that showed up at Mr. Tuchin's home and assaulted one of his
neighbors.
So, I would very much appreciate you following up with me,
personally, to know that the FBI is, at a minimum,
investigating this mob and the violent attack on one of Mr.
Tuchin's neighbors.
And I hope they'll do so zealously, using some of the many
techniques that have been used in, for example, the
prosecutions of Donald Trump, where the Department of Justice
has gone so far as to subpoena people who retweeted or liked
Donald Trump's social media posts. Or the investigations into
the January 6th rioters, where facial recognition technology
and cell phone location data has been used.
If these are good enough for those investigations, I think
they should be good enough for this investigation, as well--
which, again, I don't think that George Gascon is going to
zealously pursue.
Director Wray. Well, as I said, we will follow up with you
directly about this particular matter. I will tell you, in the
meantime, that my instructions to our people are very much
along the lines of my comments here today, which is, the Jewish
community needs us, and we need to be leaning forward.
Senator Cotton. Well, thank you for that. And, as I said,
citing their social media accounts where they post photos and
videos of it, these are not criminal masterminds. This should
not be a tough case for anyone to crack. I'm sure the LAPD
would be happy to investigate and arrest if they thought Mr.
Gascon would actually pursue charges.
Absent that, I hope that the FBI and the Department of
Justice uses the full extent of Federal criminal civil rights
laws to make sure that this pro-Hamas mob faces legal
consequences. Thank you.
Chair Durbin. Senator Ossoff.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Director
Wray, good to see you, again. And you know I never fail to
mention that Georgia is proud of you, and we love seeing you
when you come back home. Hope you will, again, soon.
You and I have spoken before about the dangerous increase
in the frequency of sextortion crimes targeting children--young
children who are lured or targeted to share compromising or
explicit photos and then blackmailed or bullied or worse on the
basis of that content. Senator Blackburn and Senator Grassley
and I have, together, moved legislation through this Committee
aimed at helping prevent the sexual abuse of children online.
Your Field Office in Atlanta recently, again, highlighted
sextortion as a particular concern in Georgia. The Atlanta
Field Office said that these schemes have increased in
frequency by 700 percent since 2021. Can you please provide an
update on the FBI's overall efforts to investigate and prevent
these crimes targeting children online?
Director Wray. So, this is a rapidly emerging threat to the
youth of America. It's not--when I say rapidly emerging, it's
not that it's brand new, as you and I have discussed. It's been
emerging for some time.
But what's newer is that it's really bursting into
prominence in the last, let's say, year and a half, in
particular. And that--that's mostly a bad thing, because of how
prevalent it is. But it is also a reflection of potentially a
little bit of a good thing, which is growing awareness. And we
need more awareness of this.
What is the FBI doing? We're aggressively investigating
these cases. We just had, recently had a case, for example,
where a--a very tragic case in Michigan, where a young
teenager, male, committed suicide because he was basically in
one of--exactly one of these kinds of cases, was essentially
egged on when he couldn't pay the money, and he was explaining
he didn't have the money--egged on to kill himself, and he did.
And we pursued, in that case, the wrongdoers, who were all
the way over in Nigeria. We worked with our Nigerian partners,
got the individuals involved arrested, had them brought back,
extradited back to the U.S. to face trial here, as a way of
demonstrating that you are never beyond our reach and that
we're going to pursue these cases, really, to the far corners
of the globe.
But the second thing, and part of the reason I bring up
that case as an example, is that it's very important to raise
awareness. Because I think a lot of the kids who are falling
victim to this, when they get targeted, they don't--they don't
think they have a choice. They feel like they're trapped and
stuck and then turn to tragic consequences, like suicide.
So, raising awareness is not just raising awareness for
parents but it's raising awareness for teenagers, so that they
know there's something they can do. So, we're working with
NCMEC, for example.
But in that Michigan case, to their great credit, the young
man's parents sort of embraced the idea of using his case, his
tragic death, as a way to try to prevent other kids from
falling victim to the same thing. And it's really deeply moving
that they would try to find some good that they can achieve
through the just heartbreaking loss of their son.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray. And that is
obviously a top concern for parents in Georgia, and so is the
opioid crisis and how it impacts high school students.
Several news outlets reported recently that multiple
students overdosed on fentanyl in one Gwinnett County high
school, that none of the students knew they were consuming
fentanyl. One was reportedly using a vape pen.
Earlier this year, students in Lee County, in Southwest
Georgia, reportedly hospitalized, again, after using a vape
that was reportedly laced not just with THC but also with
fentanyl.
Thankfully, all of the students survived. Can you lay out
for my constituents back in Georgia what the FBI is doing to
protect children and adolescents from opioids, from fentanyl,
and, increasingly, as we see, the inadvertent overdose by
students who are either vaping or perhaps think they're taking
some other drug or a counterfeit prescription drug?
Director Wray. Well, of course, you're rightly flagging
that one of the really pernicious parts of the crisis, the
fentanyl scourge that we're dealing with right now, is that
it's getting pressed into or incorporated into all sorts of
other things.
So, you've got--it's bad enough for the people taking it
intentionally because they're addicted. But the people who are
unwittingly taking it, whether it's in their prescriptions or
something else, is a huge problem.
So, what is the FBI doing? Well, I'd start with what I said
in my opening, which is, just in the last 2 years, the FBI has
seized 200--enough fentanyl to kill 270 million Americans.
That's essentially 80 percent of the American public. And
that's just our work--obviously, we have lots of partners doing
great work, too, in just the last 2 years. So, that's a start.
A few other things we're doing--we are targeting the
cartels. We have over 300 investigations focused on the cartel
leadership and them, as the source of supply. We are focusing
on the distribution side of it, here in the U.S., violent
gangs--our Safe Streets Task Forces are focused on those.
We are targeting the professionals, in effect the
healthcare profession, where they become part of it, pill mills
and things like that, that are also part of the problem,
through our Prescription Drug Initiative.
We are also targeting the darknet marketplaces, where an
awful lot of this stuff is being trafficked. We have a whole
thing called JCODE, with lots of other agencies, that we lead,
that is dismantling darknet marketplaces of opioids.
And then, from an awareness perspective, we are doing
things like we worked with DEA to create a movie called,
``Chasing the Dragon,'' that was shown in schools. And we've
got other sort of outreach, awareness-raising that's focused on
schools and youth and educators, to try to get at it on the
demand side, too.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray. And with my
remaining time, you've touched on this in response to a number
of Members. But Georgia's Jewish community, Georgia's Muslim
community both expressing to me their deep anxiety at this
moment, the increased level of threat, the increased explicit
threats, the increased perception of threat and fear.
Can you please provide some reassurance to my Jewish and
Muslim constituents about how seriously the FBI is taking
community protection? And, by the way, thank you to your Field
Office in Atlanta and Special Agent Farley for the work that
they've done to help reassure my constituents, as well.
Director Wray. So, we are working those cases both through
our Joint Terrorism Task Forces but also on the criminal side,
through our Civil Rights Program, as hate crimes. So, we've
got, sort of, both engines, if you will, in the FBI focused on
it.
We also have created--I created in 2019 a domestic
terrorism-hate crimes fusion cell, which brings together
expertise to try to anticipate where the threats are going.
We have opened, I think, 60 percent more hate crimes
investigations, post-October 7th, than we had before October
7th--and it was escalating pretty fast before October 7th, too.
And we've got all of our Field Offices, as you mentioned
with SAC Farley in Atlanta, not just pushing the investigations
but engaging in a lot of outreach to affected communities in
their areas--both to reassure them, as you say, but also to
kind of raise awareness, like, hey, we're here. If you see
something, we want to know about it, because there are things
we can do to help.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, it seems to me that some people should not
have power. I don't care how smart they are. I don't care how
experienced they are. They just don't have enough maturity or
morality or ethics to exercise power.
And I am talking, of course, about your predecessor. You
have been a significant improvement. Unlike my experience with
you, and what I've observed is, and unlike your predecessor,
you're not egomaniacal, and you're not egocentric, and you're
not a self-aggrandizer. You don't run around like your
predecessor, going, look at me, look at me. You don't leak to
the press like the Titanic. And I know that's a low bar, but I
appreciate it.
You talk a lot about 38,000 women and men in the FBI, the
vast majority of whom do an extraordinary job. And I agree with
that. Most of those women and men that you're talking about are
in your Field Offices. I'm not saying there aren't some in the
Washington Office.
But the problems we've had with the FBI over the past
decade--you've alluded to them--have come primarily out of the
Washington Office.
I listened carefully to your recitation of your efforts to
clean that up. But I think most fair-minded Americans still
wonder if there has been real accountability in all cases. And
that's the spirit in which I'm going to ask you these
questions. Who made the decision at the FBI to raid Mar-a-Lago
for those documents?
Director Wray. I'm not--I'm not sure there's a specific
person that made the decision. It was the investigative team
that was on that investigation, working with the prosecutors on
the case.
Senator Kennedy. Why didn't you just do a consent to search
and avoid all the drama?
Director Wray. Well----
Senator Kennedy. Not you, but whoever made the decision.
Director Wray. Yes. Well, let me try it this way, because
obviously we are talking now about not just an ongoing
investigation that's not just an ongoing investigation that's
being led by a Special Counsel. But an ongoing investigation
being led by a Special Counsel that's in front of a court with
likely very strong views about what it is I can say publicly,
which gets at some of your gracious comments about public
commentary about cases.
But I think if you, in that particular instance, if you
look at the affidavit in support of the search warrant and,
more importantly, the pleadings that were filed by the
prosecutors in the case, they lay out, in a very detailed way,
all the efforts that were made to ensure compliance, short of
proceeding to a search, as well as, as now has been charged,
actual obstruction of justice.
And so, in my experience, again, speaking more generally
now, both as a line prosecutor and now as FBI Director, when it
comes to obtaining classified information, retrieving it, we
typically pursue the least intrusive means possible. But if
those don't work, and certainly if there's obstruction of
justice, which in this case has found by a probable cause
standard by the judge, then it's pretty typical to resort to a
search warrant.
Senator Kennedy. Of course, as you know as well as I do,
the FBI cannot censor Americans' speech--talks about abridging
speech, that our First Amendment does. At one time, I think it
was during your tenure, the FBI had 80 FBI agents working with
social media, encouraging social media to take down accounts
and remove, quote, ``disinformation and election
interference.''
A district court found that the FBI and other agencies
asked social media platforms to remove content and to change
their moderations policies in a way that violated the First
Amendment. And it went up to the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit limited the injunction, but here's what
the Fifth Circuit said. The FBI, quote, ``likely coerced the
platforms into moderating content and encouraged them to do so
by effecting changes in their moderation policies,'' end quote,
in violation of the First Amendment.
The FBI agreed with the plaintiffs that, quote--I'm quoting
the Fifth Circuit,``Federal agencies--Federal agents ran afoul
of the First Amendment by coercing and significantly
encouraging social media platforms to censor disfavored speech,
including by threats of adverse government action like
antitrust enforcement and legal reforms.'' That's serious. Is
the Fifth Circuit wrong?
Director Wray. Well, as you may know, first off, let me
just say the opinions talk about a whole bunch of other
executive agencies besides the FBI, and I'm not going to speak
to what the other agencies entered into, but as far as the----
Senator Kennedy. Well, you weren't the only one. It was----
Director Wray. But there----
Senator Kennedy [continuing]. The White House. It was----
Director Wray. But just----
Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Homeland Security. But----
Director Wray. But----
Senator Kennedy. But--but your folks were there, too, all
80 of them--80 agents.
Director Wray. Well, but----
Senator Kennedy. Combing social media every day. Calling
Twitter. Calling Facebook. Take that down. Get rid of that
account. And it wasn't just on election interference. It was on
COVID vaccines. It was on lockdowns.
Director Wray. So, a couple things. And I appreciate the
opportunity to clarify this. So, first, on things like COVID
vaccines and stuff like that, the FBI had no role in telling
anybody to take anything down.
In fact, as you may know, the FBI was the only agency, back
at that time--and the only agency in the entire Intelligence
Community to reach the conclusion, to moderate confidence, that
the origins of the pandemic were most likely a lab leak in
China. We were the only agency.
So, we most certainly were not encouraging anybody to
communicate differently on that.
Second, even on the topics we did communicate with social
media companies about, from everything I've seen, we, in fact,
did not instruct anybody to take that information down.
As to the Fifth Circuit's opinion--as to the Fifth
Circuit's opinion, as you may also know, we actually hotly
contest a lot of the findings, and not just the legal
conclusions but the actual factual findings.
And the Department has sought Supreme Court review, asked
them to vacate the injunction. The Supreme Court's not only
vacated the injunction but granted cert, so I probably should--
--
Senator Kennedy. Let me----
Director Wray [continuing]. Leave it at that.
Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Stop you a second. I've gone
way over. I want to ask you one last question. We had a--we had
a controversy during the election about Mr. Hunter Biden's
laptop. And at that time, you had 80 agents interfacing with
social media, doing whatever they were doing.
The FBI had the Hunter Biden laptop, got it on December 9,
2019. The New York Post story, which a lot of the social media
companies, at the suggestion of Government, took down--the
story came out on 10/14/2020. Why didn't the FBI just say,
``Hey, the laptop's real'' ? Why didn't you just tell
everybody, ``The laptop's real. We're not vouching for what's
on it, but it's real. This isn't a fiction'' ?
Director Wray. Well, as you might imagine, the FBI cannot,
especially at a time like that, be talking about an ongoing
investigation.
Second, I would tell you that at least my understanding is
that both the FBI folks involved in the conversations and the
Twitter folks involved in the conversations, both say that the
FBI did not direct Twitter to suppress that----
Senator Kennedy. But others----
Director Wray [continuing]. Particular story.
Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Were, in Government.
Director Wray. Well I can't, again, I can't speak to others
in Government. That's part of the point that I was trying to
make. Because the Fifth Circuit's opinion----
Senator Kennedy. Yes, sir, but you're the FBI. You're not
part of the White House and part of Homeland Security. You're
not supposed to be political. You see all this controversy
going on. Why didn't the FBI say, time out, folks. We're not--
--
[Gavel is tapped.]
Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Getting in the middle of
this, but the laptop's real?
Director Wray. Again, we have to be very careful about what
we can say, especially in the middle of an election season.
Because that's precisely some of the problems that led to my
predecessor's negative findings from the Inspector General.
Senator Kennedy. Did you hear a gavel?
Chair Durbin. Thank you----
Senator Kennedy. I heard a gavel.
Chair Durbin [continuing]. Senator Kennedy--thank you,
Senator Kennedy. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that
Senator Kennedy is Santa Claus of spirit. But he is the Grinch
when it comes to stealing my time. But it's good to see him, as
always.
Senator Kennedy. I'm sorry.
Senator Booker. Director Wray, it's good to see you again.
I just want to say at the top, it's often--I don't get
often enough to say it to you, but having years and years of
working with FBI agents, especially in New Jersey, I just know
that you represent an organization of extraordinarily noble
people who do things on a daily basis to protect us and to keep
us safe that most Americans don't know about. And in this time
of year especially, just that heroism, I just want to recognize
it at the top.
I listened in my office to a lot of the earlier
questioning, and I'm just really grateful for how much of an
emphasis you've been putting on the safety and security of
Americans to racist and religious hate.
It was literally hours after the October 7th attacks--I was
in Israel, that I reached out to my colleagues in the
Democratic caucus and said that we have to get more money for
the Nonprofit Security Grants. And I'm glad that there seems to
be bipartisan movement to that.
I appreciate the comments of a lot of my colleagues,
especially Tom Cotton. Michael Tuchin, I know him well, and
what happened at his house is galling. But as you said, it's
indicative of a lot of the violence. In fact, when it comes to
antisemitism, it's the top form of religious hate and the hate
violence we see.
I want to drill down a little bit about the violence that
we're seeing and the threats on the Muslim community, because
there's a lot of issues with trust when it comes to the FBI and
the Muslim community.
And having seen, when I was mayor of the City of Newark,
unjust surveillance and the erosion of a lot of that trust, not
of the FBI, in particular, but of law enforcement in general, I
just want to know from you, what are you doing? What steps are
you taking to try to be restorative of trust, to make sure, at
a time of vulnerability, where Muslims are being targeted with
hate, and the Arab community in the larger context is, what are
you doing to especially build that trust, to know that you, as
an agency, can be relied upon for their safety?
Director Wray. Well, I appreciate your comments and your
focus on the issue. Certainly, we, through every one of our
Field Offices, have as a point of emphasis community outreach.
And within community outreach, there are specific communities
that they make a conscious point of trying to build bridges
with. The Muslim community, the Arab-American community, are
specific parts of that.
The good news is that it didn't take October 7th and the
aftermath for us to start doing that. I've been to all 56 Field
Offices twice, each of them--many of them three times. And I've
seen with my own two eyes the relationships that they've built
with the Muslim and Arab-American communities in their areas.
And so we've just continued to try to double down on that,
post-October 7th, to make sure that they know we're there for
them if they experience threats or violence.
There have been tips and leads, reports of threats that
have come in. The Chairman mentioned the attack--unconscionable
attack against the 6-year-old boy in his area. But we've had
other attacks, as well.
So, we're trying to make sure that they know we're there
for them. I will tell you, on a personal level, as somebody who
was in FBI Headquarters on 9/11, I have never forgotten, as a
young leader in the Justice Department at the time, couldn't
have been more than 4 days, maybe, after 9/11--President Bush,
in the middle of all the tension that existed at the time,
making a conscious point of speaking, I believe it was at a
mosque, and making clear that we're at war with terrorism.
We're not at war with Islam.
Senator Booker. Thank you.
Director Wray. And that really always kind of moved me,
that he had made that step at that time. Because it would've
been the easy thing to do, not to do that.
Senator Booker. I'm grateful for that, as well. And
grateful for your visits. I imagine Newark was a three-visit
place, not a two-visit place.
Director Wray. I think my third visit is imminent.
Senator Booker. Okay. That's good to know.
The Executive Order 14110 directed Federal law enforcement
agencies to produce a report on the use of AI in the criminal
justice system and recommend best practices for law
enforcement.
The report builds on Executive Order 14074, which directed
the Attorney General to issue best practices, policy changes,
and procurement guidelines for advanced law enforcement
technologies, including facial recognition, other biometric
technology, and predictive algorithms.
Can you provide the Committee with an update on the
reporting requirements, including an estimate for when you
expect to release the guidance on advanced law enforcement
technologies in light of the fact that the deadline set in the
EO has passed?
Director Wray. Let me circle back with you on that. I know
we have an entire team of people working very closely with the
Department and others on this issue. And I wasn't aware that
there was a deadline that we'd missed, so let me see if there's
some garble in the process. But I will make sure we circle back
to you on it.
Senator Booker. Yes. And, finally, I have found every
interaction I've had with you directly or your office, on 702,
really compelling. I--from sitting in classified briefings to
talking to administration officials, and your comments at the
top of the hearing were, again, very, very compelling. I think
you heard that this is an issue that is, in both parties, there
are a lot of concerns.
And, you know, when Mike Lee was speaking, he talked about
a lot of the violations of what we would both agree is just
egregious violations of what 702 should be about--the reforms
that have been put forward and the work that's been done to
correct for them.
But I'm concerned. You know, I trust you. But I learned
when it comes to leadership, there's a difference between time
tellers and clock builders. Time tellers are those people that
their leadership is so powerful, everybody knows the time, and
it goes accordingly.
But the best leaders are those that help to build
mechanisms that, no matter who's the leader, the protections,
the security, the knowledge is there.
And so, when you hear some of these egregious mistakes, can
you tell us in testimony now that you're pretty confident that
the abuses that were talked about so openly here in this
hearing, that those abuses cannot and will not happen, going
forward?
Director Wray. I can pledge to you and to this Committee
that we have put in place new measures that exceed anything
that's ever been in place before, that we are focused on a goal
of getting to 100 percent compliance.
But I can also tell you that--and I understand why we've,
we've brought this on ourselves, to some extent. And I hear
that. I hear that in Senator Lee's comments. I understand why
that is there.
But that's why I point to the Court itself, and the
Department itself, looking hard at our compliance, post all
these reforms, because these are the same people and the same
kinds of documents that have discussed all these problems of
the past. They're the ones now saying they're seeing 98 percent
compliance, and these are reforms that we've had in place since
really only just the middle of 2021.
So, it's not just, take my word for it. I get that. It's,
you know, trust but verify. And there's a verification piece
that's occurred here, and we think that, to the extent that
there's a desire to cement those reforms for the long run----
Senator Booker. My time----
Director Wray [continuing]. That's what----
Senator Booker. My time is----
Director Wray [continuing]. Legislation could do. Yes.
Senator Booker. Yes. My time is expired. And I'll just say,
in conclusion--and I know you know this intellectually, but I
actually know you feel this in your heart.
My lived tradition is the African-American experience. And
clearly the FBI has a very bad history with the Black community
in the 50s, 60s, before that.
The assurances are critical, and I still have, like the
Chairman said in his opening remarks, some concerns about, how
do we ensure that the most sacred ideals of our country aren't
violated by law enforcement, especially for communities that
have seen historic targeting? So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Booker. Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for being here.
The last few weeks, I've been demanding some answers on
Jeffrey Epstein's crimes and trying to get these flight
records--I've offered amendments to a subpoena, trying to get
that--and kind of been stonewalled on it.
But I think having transparency around Jeffrey Epstein's
conduct and this massive sex trafficking ring that he built is
important. And, of course, you've had the Chairman, Senator
Hirono, Senator Ossoff--all who have mentioned our concerns
with what is happening with CSAM, what is happening with sex
trafficking.
But in light of this, I, in looking at some of the
survivors from the Epstein issues, there are disturbing
allegations that the FBI failed to investigate the sex
trafficking allegations.
And, indeed, one survivor says that the FBI, even after she
brought forward, repeatedly, content about his conduct, that
the FBI refused to investigate her claims, even though she said
the allegations were there on both the sex trafficking and the
child sexual abuse material.
And I want to know why, or what awareness you have of the
FBI's failure to investigate these claims, and I want to get
you on the record, since numerous survivors have said the FBI
did not show up to help them. What, specifically, has the FBI
done to investigate the claims that Epstein's--and others,
participated in, produced, possessed, and distributed CSAM?
Director Wray. Well, first let me say I recall very well
that you have a very specific and long-standing interest not
just in child sexual exploitation but in human trafficking, as
a cousin of that. And we appreciate your focus on it and your
support of the importance of that part of our mission.
As to the Epstein case, specifically, I will tell you it's
been a while since I looked at that case. Obviously, we worked
together with prosecutors to bring charges----
Senator Blackburn. Yes.
Director Wray [continuing]. Before he----
Senator Blackburn. I realize----
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. That.
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Blackburn. But what we need from you is a complete
investigation of why the FBI did not take this up, and then
getting to the bottom of what is appearing to be an enormous
sex trafficking ring and listening to these survivors.
You know, and as I said, I've tried to get a subpoena on
the flight logs, which I think is important to this. I think
people need to know who was on those planes and how often they
were on those planes. I think people who invest in companies
would want to know if they're people from their C-suite. And as
we go through this, should those logs be made public? They've
been heavily redacted.
Director Wray. Well, as I said, it's been a while since
I've looked at the specific case. I can tell you that we've
been increasing, year over year, both the number of agents
focused on these kinds of cases, the number of----
Senator Blackburn. Well, we need to----
Director Wray [continuing]. Victims we've rescued, and
the----
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Look at this--yes.
Director Wray. And so on to this----
Senator Blackburn. Yes.
Director Wray [continuing]. Specific case, let me offer to
have my--let me get with----
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
Director Wray [continuing]. My team and figure out if
there's more information we can provide to you.
Senator Blackburn. That would be great.
Director Wray. Yes.
Senator Blackburn. We have never--even through the
Ghislaine Maxwell trial--we never got to the bottom of this.
And we have these survivors who say, oh, there is so much more.
They swept it under the rug. And that is wrong, and you need to
right that wrong.
Let me ask you about some of the disturbing allegations
that have come out of Special Counsel Jack Smith's political
crusade against President Trump. And we've seen a heavily
redacted search warrant.
Here you go with the first page. Here you've got a page
that's in print, another in print, another in print, Attachment
B, in print, all about the subject account, page 3 that I'm
going to come back to in a minute, and then look at the rest--
redactions, redactions, redacted, fully redacted, fully
redacted, fully redacted, there, and there.
So, that's not very helpful--when things are so heavily
redacted you can't get to the information.
Now, Tennesseans are very concerned about two tiers of
justice and weaponizing of the government.
But what we see from this search warrant--and here it is,
on page--let me go to page 2, first. That gives you what
they're getting from the subject account, which is Trump's
account. And you're going to see that on page 1 and page 2, and
the information that is there. They're wanting to get at his
Twitter account, everybody that had access to it and all the
information.
Well, then when you go to page 3, they are going to
subpoena all data and information that is associated with this,
and anybody that reposted information on this, that favorited
or retweeted posts by the account, as well as all tweets that
include the user name associated, all synced, all contacts, and
this covers October 2020 to January 2021. Are you aware of
this?
Director Wray. I've seen some of the media reporting about
it. But obviously this is a matter that's being led by the----
Senator Blackburn. Do you agree with this?
Director Wray. Well, again, this is an ongoing
investigation being led by a Special Counsel, and there are all
kinds of court restrictions that apply.
Senator Blackburn. Has somebody approved a search warrant
for everybody that was retweeting or reposting from the
Ayatollah's account? Have they gone to his account, prior to
October 7th, and looked at that? This is such an invasion of
Free Speech. And as we talk with you about social media and
what is going on with social media, we're concerned about this.
You know, if I liked a tweet from President Trump--if
anybody on this side of the dais retweeted a tweet from
President Trump, according to this, Jack Smith could go pull
everything affiliated with our Twitter account, if anything
that came from @realDonaldTrump showed up in our feed. Do you
think that this is an infringement of my Free Speech?
Director Wray. Well, let me say this. I certainly
understand the concern, but what I would tell you----
Senator Blackburn. I would hope so.
Director Wray. All right. But what I would tell you is that
this investigation is being led by the Special Counsel. It's
not appropriate for me to comment on that ongoing
investigation. It's also under the supervision of a court,
which includes the----
Senator Blackburn. Ongoing investigation----
Director Wray [continuing]. Includes the search warrant----
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Is code word for, we are
stonewalling. And we hear this from you all repeatedly, and
it's really quite frustrating.
Director Wray. No, ma'am, and I understand why it's
frustrating, but that policy about not commenting on ongoing
investigations is one that goes back decades, Republican and
Democratic administrations----
Senator Blackburn. Yes----
Director Wray [continuing]. It's not something that's----
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. These investigations----
Director Wray [continuing]. Just invented.
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Are not coming to
completion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Durbin. Senator Blackburn, before you leave, I want
to make a point for the record, since I understand you made
some statements about the Jeffrey Epstein flight logs.
There's a Fox reporter in the hallway who asked me about
this, and I said I had not spoken to you one time about this
issue. I think you'll back me up on that, I'm not mistaken--I
didn't know that this was even a subject of your amendments,
which, if you'll recall, you were the first on the list until
the 2-hour rule was invoked.
I don't know anything about this request on your part. I'll
be happy to discuss it with you. But I haven't done any
discussion with you, to this point. Correct?
Senator Blackburn. Mr. Chairman, I know, and I think you're
fully aware that I had two amendments, one----
Chair Durbin. I wasn't----
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Dealing with Epstein and
Sotomayor. I brought it up previously. We have----
Chair Durbin. You do----
Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Such an issue in this
Nation with the sex traffic and human trafficking rings that
have proliferated across this country, and it is damaging the
lives of women and girls.
We have got to step up and help them. Getting to the bottom
of what happened with this Jeffrey Epstein case is going to be
an important thing to do. And it should be at the top of this
Committee's to-do list, as we fight some of this proliferation
of CSAM.
Chair Durbin. There were 122 amendments, I believe, filed.
I did not know that you had----
Senator Blackburn. A hundred and seventy-seven.
Chair Durbin. Hundred and seventy-seven amendments filed.
So, I have to confess I didn't know that you offered that
amendment. Happy to discuss it with you. But I want a point on
the record. You and I have never personally discussed this.
Have we?
Senator Blackburn. We talked briefly on the floor at the
conclusion.
Chair Durbin. You never mentioned what the subject matter
of your amendment was. You said you wanted to offer your
amendment----
Senator Blackburn. In Committee, I brought up the subject
matter of my amendments.
Chair Durbin. Not in my presence.
Senator Blackburn. Three weeks prior. Yes, sir. It was--
I'll pull the transcript for you.
Chair Durbin. I wish you would.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
Chair Durbin. I wish you would.
Thank you, Mr. Wray, for being with us today. And you have,
perhaps, some questions in writing coming your way very
shortly. Hope you can respond to them promptly. Thank you
again.
[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A P P E N D I X
The following submissions are available at:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-118shrg62796/pdf/CHRG-118shrg
62796-add1.pdf
Submitted by Senator Whitehouse:
Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, February 7, 2023, letter to Hon.
Merrick Garland, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice. 2
Zdeb, Sara, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, April 4, 2023, letter to Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse..... 4
United States v. Charles McGonigal, United States Department of
Justice, July 14, 2023, guilty plea agreement between the
Southern District of New York and the attorneys for Charles
McGonigal..................................................... 5
[all]