    [Senate Hearing 118-770]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 118-770

                                OVERSIGHT OF THE
                        FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 5, 2023
                                   _________

                              Serial No. J-118-45
                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                            www.judiciary.senate.gov
                                www.govinfo.gov
                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    62-796                    WASHINGTON : 2026

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                       RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chair

    SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island     LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina,
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota                     Ranking Member
    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           TED CRUZ, Texas
    ALEX PADILLA, California             JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
    LAPHONZA BUTLER, California          THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
                                         MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

                 Joseph Zogby, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
          Katherine Nikas, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page

    Durbin, Hon. Richard J...........................................     1
    Graham, Hon. Lindsey O...........................................     2

                                    WITNESS

    Wray, Hon. Christopher A.........................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................    59
        Questions submitted with no response returned................    74

                                    APPENDIX

    Items submitted for the record...................................   115

                                OVERSIGHT OF THE
                        FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2023

                                  United States Senate,
                                    Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
    Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. Durbin,
    Chair of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Durbin [presiding], Whitehouse,
    Klobuchar, Coons, Blumenthal, Hirono, Booker, Padilla, Ossoff,
    Welch, Butler, Graham, Grassley, Cornyn, Lee, Cruz, Hawley,
    Cotton, Kennedy, Tillis, and Blackburn.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN,
               A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

        Chair Durbin. This meeting of the Senate Judiciary
    Committee will come to order. Today we continue our work to
    restore the Committee's traditional oversight role, which I
    have tried to work on since I've become Chair.
        Director Wray, your testimony marks the fourth time you've
    appeared before this Committee since January of 2021. I want to
    begin by thanking you for the work that you and more than
    35,000 FBI employees do to protect America and uphold our
    Constitution.
        I'm troubled that the FBI is facing baseless claims that
    you have been weaponized for political purposes and dangerous
    calls to defund the agency. There are people listening to that
    sort of rhetoric. This irresponsible charge has real
    consequences.
        Just last month, a man from Tennessee pled guilty to a
    December 2022 plot to attack the Knoxville FBI Office and kill
    the agents involved in the investigation of his codefendant's
    participation in the January 6th insurrection.
        This Committee plays a critical role in holding the FBI
    accountable to the American people. But I urge my colleagues to
    exercise this oversight in a responsible and respectful manner.
    I urge my colleagues, as well, not to engage in bullying or
    conduct unbecoming a Member of this Committee.
        One of the central concerns that I would like to raise is
    the troubling increase in hate crimes in America, including
    antisemitic, anti-Arab, and Islamophobic attacks in the wake of
    the Middle Eastern conflict. The FBI must continue to respond
    swiftly to these threats.
        In Illinois, we are still grieving the horrific murder of a
    6-year-old Palestinian American, Wadea al-Fayoume, and the
    violent attack on his mother by a man who targeted them simply
    because of their national origin.
        And we send our support to Hisham Awartani, Tahseen Ali
    Ahmad, and Kinnan Abdalhamid, as they recover from their
    injuries in Vermont. These three young men of Palestinian
    descent were shot while walking to dinner. When they were
    attacked, two were wearing keffiyehs, a traditional Palestinian
    headdress.
        The Jewish community has also experienced an historic surge
    in threats, vandalism, and attacks. For example, a Las Vegas
    man was recently indicted for making threatening calls to our
    Jewish colleague, Senator Rosen.
        I strongly support the FBI's critical work in combating all
    of these threats. But there is a need for continued
    improvement, especially ensuring that more hate crimes are
    actually reported to law enforcement.
        At the same time that the FBI addresses domestic threats,
    it must also respond to international actors. Just last week,
    the Justice Department unsealed the indictment of an Indian
    national accused of conspiring to assassinate a Sikh American
    on American soil at the direction of an Indian government
    official.
        As I've said many times in this Committee, political
    violence in all forms is unacceptable. An attack on any
    individual based on their race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality,
    nationality, religion, or disability is not consistent with the
    values of America. Every community deserves to feel safe, and
    the FBI plays an important role in guaranteeing that sense of
    security.
        The threat of violent extremism is heightened by the
    proliferation of guns in America. Since the enactment of the
    Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, the FBI has conducted more
    than 100,000 enhanced background checks for gun purchases under
    21, keeping firearms out of the hands of prohibited people.
    There is more work to be done.
        Director Wray, I want to thank you for hosting me yesterday
    at the FBI Headquarters for a demonstration of the FBI's use of
    Section 702 of FISA. There is no question that Section 702 is a
    critical tool for collecting foreign intelligence and
    protecting America. I appreciate the reforms you've put in
    place with the FISA Court, to address what the FISA Court
    called, ``widespread and persistent violation of 702 rules.''
        I still remain concerned, though, about protecting the
    communications of innocent Americans from warrantless
    surveillance. I look forward to continuing to work with you to
    reauthorize 702 with the significant reforms we need to protect
    the privacy of innocent Americans.
        I now turn to the Ranking Member, Lindsey Graham, for his
    opening remarks.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINDSEY O. GRAHAM,
            A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
    Inspector--Director. So, we really appreciate you coming. Now
    is a good time to have an honest talk with the American people,
    through the Committee, about the dangers we face, what the FBI
    is doing every day, and how we can, you know, make you stronger
    in the face of a lot of threats.
        You'll be asked about the FBI's role in monitoring
    religious organizations. The debacle called Crossfire Hurricane
    hangs in the air in the conservative world, and so we're going
    to move forward. You'll be asked some tough questions, and I
    appreciate you being here today.
        So, Mr. Chairman, one thing that I will be talking about,
    among the list of threats, is a broken Border. Mr. Chairman,
    since President Biden has taken office, we've had 6.6 million
    encounters with illegal aliens at the Southern Border. That's
    larger than 33 States. And we're on pace--the last 7 days,
    we've been averaging about 9,500 a day. Play that out. We're
    looking at 3.4 million this year, at that rate. That puts us at
    10 million, and that doesn't count the got-aways.
        So, we're negotiating how to help Ukraine. Count me in for
    helping Ukraine. A robust package to help our Allies in Ukraine
    makes sense to me. Upping the ability of Taiwan to defend
    itself makes sense to me. Helping Israel makes all the sense in
    the world.
        Border security is the fourth plank of this supplemental.
    We're wildly apart. The negotiations by Senators Lankford and
    Murphy--I appreciate their efforts. We've made great progress,
    I think, on asylum, but the Democratic Party seems to be
    unwilling to address the key problem: parole.
        This statute is pretty clear. The Secretary at DHS has the
    ability to parole an individual--it's supposed to be an
    individual----
        [Poster is displayed.]
        Senator Graham [continuing]. Based on a case-by-case basis,
    for urgent humanitarian reasons, or significant public benefit.
        Mayorkas and people at DHS have used that provision to give
    parole to over 240,000 people from four countries alone: Cuba,
    Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. It is not meant to be used in
    that fashion.
        Why are we at an impasse? The Biden administration refuses
    to follow the law as written, refuses to give up this concept
    of humanitarian parole, because it is their way of managing the
    Border.
        Why are so many people coming now, compared to before? The
    belief is, Mr. Chairman, if you get to America, you've got a
    really good chance of never leaving. Catch-and-release is the
    policy.
        If you apply for asylum, the initial screening test is way
    too low, and your case is to be heard years from now. You're
    released in the United States. You're paroled in the United
    States when we run out of bed space or they just want to parole
    people.
        The Democratic governors and mayors of large blue cities
    are complaining. But their answer is, just more resources to
    process illegal immigration. You will not get a deal from the
    Republican Party unless we change the policies that are leading
    to 9,500--on average, a day--coming to our Border.
        What are we looking for? Not H.R. 2. But we're looking for
    policy changes that will spread throughout the world and people
    will no longer risk their lives, their family's lives, pay
    thousands of dollars to human traffickers, to show up at our
    Border. That's what we're trying to do. You don't want to do
    that.
        You clearly, as a party, do not want to change the policies
    that are attracting so many people. It's inhumane, I think, to
    lure people through this journey. It's not fair to the American
    people to be overrun in the fashion we are. Given the threats
    that exist in the world, it's exceedingly dangerous to have
    lost control of your Border.
        I'm often asked at home, well, are they incompetent, or
    they want it this way--the Biden administration? I think there
    are a lot of smart people in the Biden administration. They
    want it this way. They want to be able to have the ability to
    use parole, humanitarian parole--and there's no such creature
    that allows for blanket admission into the country--as a tool
    to control the flow----
        [Poster is displayed.]
        Senator Graham [continuing]. They're not interested in
    deterring the flow. They just want to control the flow, manage
    the flow.
        We, on this side--there're some Republicans that won't vote
    for any aid to Ukraine, but they're in a distinct minority in
    the Senate, and I think the House is at least evenly divided.
        If we had a Border security proposal as part of the
    supplemental that addressed our own national security needs
    here at home, I think you'd get a very large vote.
        So, I don't need any more lectures about the need for
    Ukraine. I got it. I understand. You're right. I understand why
    we should help Israel. I understand why we should toughen up
    Taiwan. What you clearly don't seem to understand, or you're
    not going to accept--the situation at the Border is a national
    security nightmare in the making.
        It's unfair to the Border communities to have to live like
    this. So, I have urged Governor Abbott, who's been on the tip
    of the spear, here--now it's moving to Arizona--to make it real
    to Senators who seem to object to making the policy changes. I
    know Chicago has had a lot of illegal immigrants sent there.
        There are a lot of Senators who are refusing to fix the
    broken Border whose States are pretty much immune from the
    problem--in the sense that they're not having to deal with
    hundreds of thousands of people coming across and wreaking
    havoc on the Border towns.
        Fentanyl is at an all-time high, coming into the country
    through our broken Southern Border, made in China for the most
    part. We're never going to stop the flow of fentanyl until we
    regain control of our Border.
        So, to those who are following these negotiations, let me
    tell you where they're at. They're stuck. They're not going
    forward in a productive fashion until the Biden administration
    is willing to change the policies that're leading--last 2 days,
    10,200.
        Let me say that again. In the last 2 days, 10,200 people
    have shown up at the Border--those are the ones that we know
    about. The last 7 days, almost 9,500 on average. You're on
    track to do 3.6 million.
        There will be no deal until you change the policies that
    lead to this problem. If that's too far for you, I'm sorry. It
    shouldn't be too far for America. The American people are
    demanding to regain control of a Border where we have lost
    control.
        American people want to help Israel, generally speaking.
    They're a division on Ukraine, but I think Ukraine would carry
    the day with Border security.
        There are so many threats that the Director will talk
    about, but people ask me in the hallway all the time, where are
    we on negotiating the Border? We're stuck. And there will be no
    deal until the policy changes that would lead to people not
    coming at the levels they're coming today is enacted. That's
    where we're at.
        You seem to be comfortable, my friends on the Democratic
    side, with making small changes to a big problem, nibbling
    around the edges of this problem. It'd be like sending guns to
    Ukraine without any bullets. You're really robust when it comes
    to Ukraine, and I'm with you.
        But when it comes to our Border, you're playing a game of
    doing the least amount possible to pick 10 or 12 of us off. It
    ain't happening.
        Now, I've been involved in this issue for 20 years. This is
    not about immigration reform, and it needs to happen. It's
    about securing a broken Border at a time when the threats to
    our Nation are all-time high, and it started with Afghanistan.
        The world is on fire, multiple fronts, and getting worse
    every day. There will be no assistance to other nations who are
    deserving until we assist our own Nation.
        So, this attitude of doing the least you can, trying to
    pick 10 or 12 of us off, is not going to work. We're united
    over here. We're divided on Ukraine, but I would say two-thirds
    of our conference would vote for a package including Ukraine
    aid if it had real Border security.
        And here's the problem you've got. I know what real Border
    security looks like. So does Senator Tillis. So does Senator
    Cotton. So does Senator Lankford. And so does everybody else
    over here. So, you're making a choice. You're putting your
    Nation at risk, and the consequence of this is going to be
    devastating to the world.
        Chair Durbin. Let me lay out the mechanics for today's
    hearing. After I swear in Director Wray, he has 5 minutes to
    provide an opening statement. Then we'll turn to Members. Each
    will have 7 minutes, and please try to remain within your
    allotted time. Director, would you please stand to be sworn?
        [Witness is sworn in.]
        Chair Durbin. Let the record reflect that the Director has
    answered in the affirmative, and I now recognize him.

            STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR,

            FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, DC

        Director Wray. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Durbin,
    Ranking Member Graham, Members of the Committee. I'm proud to
    be here today representing the FBI.
        The threats the Bureau's 38,000 men and women tackle every
    day are more complex and evolving more quickly than ever
    before. And we continue to work relentlessly to stay ahead of
    those threats and to outpace our adversaries.
        For example, last year we disrupted over 40 percent more
    cyber operations and arrested over 60 percent more cyber
    criminals than the year before. Over the past 2 years, we've
    seized enough fentanyl to kill 270 million people. That's about
    80 percent of all Americans.
        We're also focused on other threats that emanate from the
    Border and impact communities all over the country: things like
    violent gangs and human traffickers.
        At the same time, given the steady drumbeat of calls for
    attacks by foreign terrorist organizations since October 7th,
    we're working around the clock to identify and disrupt
    potential attacks by those inspired by Hamas' horrific
    terrorist attacks in Israel.
        And in recent years, we've seen an increase in hate crimes
    investigations, including a particularly big chunk involving
    threats to the Jewish community. That is a troubling trend we
    were focused on before October 7th--it's only gotten worse in
    the months since.
        I could go on and on about the important work the FBI's
    dedicated professionals are doing across the entire spectrum of
    threats, each and every day, to protect their fellow Americans.
        But in the time I have here this morning, I want to
    emphasize the importance of one tool, in particular, that is
    indispensable to our efforts to combat threats posed by foreign
    adversaries, one that will expire in just a few short weeks if
    Congress does not act. And that is FISA's 702 authorities for
    the FBI.
        As this Committee knows, 702 allows us to stay a step ahead
    of foreign actors located outside the United States who pose a
    threat to national security. And the expiration of our 702
    authorities would be devastating to the FBI's ability to
    protect Americans from those threats.
        So, let me explain just a bit about what I mean by that.
    When an overseas cyber criminal breaches a transportation hub,
    a public utility, or even a children's hospital, 702 is often
    the tool we use to find victims and get them what they need to
    get their systems back up and running. And just as important,
    it helps us identify the next targets so they can defend
    themselves against an attack.
        In just one recent cyber case, for instance, 702 allowed
    the FBI to alert more than 300 victims in every State and
    countries around the world. And I should add that many of those
    crucial victim notifications were made possible by our ability
    to conduct U.S. person queries of our existing 702 collection.
        When it comes to foreign adversaries, like Iran--whose
    actions across a whole host of threats have grown more brazen,
    seeking to assassinate high-level officials, kidnap dissidents,
    and conduct cyber attacks here in the United States--or the
    People's Republic of China, which poses, in my view, a
    generational threat to our economic and national security,
    stripping the FBI of its 702 authorities would be a form of
    unilateral disarmament.
        Or, take the elevated threat of international terrorism--
    702 is key to our ability to detect a foreign terrorist
    organization overseas directing an operative here to carry out
    an attack in our own back yard. And U.S. person queries, in
    particular, may provide the critical link that allows us to
    identify the intended target or build out the network of
    attackers so we can stop them before they strike and kill
    Americans.
        Given the critical importance of 702, we are committed to
    being good stewards of our authorities. And to that end, I have
    ordered a whole host of changes to address unacceptable
    compliance incidents--reforms, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, that
    many Members of this Committee have seen with their own eyes,
    in live demonstrations of our systems at FBI Headquarters.
        We've improved our systems, enhanced training, added
    oversight and approval requirements, adopted new accountability
    measures. On top of that, we stood up a brand new Office of
    Internal Auditing that's been focused specifically on FISA
    compliance.
        Most of the declassified reports that have come out over
    the past year or so involve compliance errors that predate
    those reforms. And I have been encouraged by the more recent
    data showing the significant positive impact that those
    reforms, those changes, have had.
        The most recently declassified opinion from the FISA Court,
    for instance, shows a 98 percent compliance rate and observes
    that the reforms are--and I'm quoting the Court here--``having
    the desired effect.'' And the two most recent Department of
    Justice semi-annual reports likewise now show a greater than 98
    percent compliance rate.
        Now, we're proud of the progress we've made so far, but we
    are by no means done. We recognize that this is an ongoing
    effort and are determined to work with Congress to get it
    right, but--but, as we enter this critical phase of the renewal
    process, it is imperative that we not undercut the
    effectiveness of this essential tool with a warrant
    requirement, or some other restriction, that would paralyze us
    and our ability to tackle fast-moving threats like the ones I
    just described. Because crucial to our ability to use this
    information to actually protect Americans is our ability to
    review it promptly and efficiently.
        And, to be clear, no court has ever held that a warrant is
    required for the FBI to query 702 data already lawfully in our
    holdings. In fact--in fact, every court that has considered 702
    in its current form--the FISA Court, the FISA Court of Review,
    three different courts of appeals--has found 702 to be
    constitutional.
        So, restricting the FBI's ability to collect under 702 or
    to review what's already in our collection, well, that would be
    a legislative policy choice.
        And if that's the path that's chosen, what are we going to
    say to the family whose loved one's care was sabotaged when a
    hospital was taken offline by a foreign adversary and the FBI
    wasn't able to stop that cyber attack? What's the justification
    for not using every lawful tool to stop China from stealing our
    technology and undermining our freedoms? Because I can assure
    you the PRC is not holding back, and they're not tying their
    own hands behind their back.
        And what if there were a terrorist attack that we had a
    shot to prevent but couldn't take it because the FBI was
    deprived of its ability under 702 to actually look at key
    information already sitting in our holdings?
        Now, I was in FBI Headquarters 22 years ago, on 9/11. And
    over the years, I've spoken with families of victims of that
    horrific attack. Before that attack, well-intentioned
    policymakers had made the choice to build a wall preventing
    access to national security information sitting in our and our
    partners' holdings.
        Well, I bring that up because allowing 702 to lapse or
    amending it in a way that undermines its effectiveness would be
    akin to laying bricks to rebuild another pre-9/11-style wall.
        What could anybody possibly say to victims' families if
    there was another attack that we could've prevented if we
    hadn't given away the ability to effectively use a tool that
    courts have consistently deemed constitutional? Because let's
    not fool ourselves, that's what's at stake with the
    reauthorization of 702.
        As the threats from foreign adversaries to our Homeland
    continue to evolve, the agility and effectiveness of 702 will
    be essential to the FBI's ability--really, our mandate from the
    American people, to keep them safe for years to come. And we
    owe it to them to make sure we've got the tools that we need to
    do that. So, thank you for having me, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Director Wray appears as a
    submission for the record.]
        Chair Durbin. Thank you very much, Director. I'll start the
    questioning.
        Thank you for the visit yesterday to your Headquarters and
    the demonstration of, I think, true advancements in terms of
    702 to try to avert any concern about constitutional issues.
        I still have some of those concerns, as you might expect,
    and we have proffered an alternative to the current system that
    we think is reasonable. It has an emergency exception to it, as
    it should, because there are issues of grave national security
    that can't wait even for the process to continue.
        And, second, when it came to victimization, we allow
    consent by the victim to go forward with the collection of
    information in those situations, as it should be.
        Since the enactment of the FISA Amendment Reauthorization
    Act of 2018, the FBI has been required to obtain a court order
    for U.S. person searches in a narrow subset of cases involving
    predicated criminal investigations unrelated to national
    security. Has the FBI ever obtained a court order in order to
    perform a U.S. person search of 702 data in this context?
        Director Wray. To the best of my knowledge, we have not.
    And that's partly because that's not the way we use 702.
        Chair Durbin. That's correct. The answer is zero. The
    Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Annual
    Statistical Transparency Report for 2020 revealed that this
    statutory requirement has been triggered approximately 100
    times. Is that true?
        Director Wray. That, I can't speak to the number. I think
    the report in question may involve incidents that all occurred
    before the reforms that we just were talking about, but----
        Chair Durbin. I'd appreciate it if you'd take a look at
    that and answer for the record.
        Let me take you to another topic that has been an issue
    discussed before this Committee and voted on, several different
    occasions, and that's CSAM, child sexual abuse materials.
    Recently, the National Association of Attorneys General sent a
    letter to Congress asking lawmakers to study the means and
    methods of artificial intelligence, or AI, being used to
    exploit children through generation of child sexual abuse
    material, or CSAM.
        In the letter, the attorneys general described how AI could
    be used to create new images of children in sexual positions or
    otherwise overlay photos of unvictimized children on photos of
    abused children, to create CSAM.
        To put this in simple terms, I don't know of any parent or
    grandparent who is knowledgeable in this area who hasn't warned
    their children, grandchildren, please be careful what you
    communicate on the internet and who you communicate it with.
        You've highlighted the FBI's work to ``identify,
    prioritize, investigate, and deter individuals and criminal
    networks from exploiting children,'' and you've noted that the
    proliferation of CSAM on the darknet is threatening. Director
    Wray, can you elaborate on what the FBI is doing to disrupt
    technologies used to exploit children? What obstacles are you
    facing related to this work?
        Director Wray. So, I think there is no mission set, no
    threat, that the FBI's men and women tackle that is more
    righteous and more at the heart of why we do what we do than
    protecting kids. And I know that last year we arrested
    something like 3,000 child predators and rescued something like
    2,000 kids from exploitation, the vast majority of which is
    happening heavily online but then often leads to what's even
    worse, which is the actual hands-on abuse.
        And certainly, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, technologies
    have continued to advance in a way that makes that threat even
    more pernicious, including AI, including the ability to create
    synthetic content, for example.
        When you ask about challenges that we face, one of the
    biggest concerns that we have is that the companies, these
    technology companies, are increasingly moving in a direction
    where they are designing warrant-proof encryption. And what
    that means, to everybody listening at home, is that we're going
    to be in a situation where the abuse that's happening on those
    platforms--law enforcement won't have any ability, no matter
    how rock solid the warrant, to get access to the information we
    need to protect those kids and take down those monsters.
        And the companies themselves are effectively blinding
    themselves to abuse that's happening on their own platforms.
    So, what we really need is for the companies to work with
    Congress, work with the executive branch, work with law
    enforcement to design their encryption in a way that makes sure
    that they maintain the ability to respond to, you know, rock-
    solid legal process, respond to warrants.
        Chair Durbin. So, why aren't they cooperating with us? Why
    are these companies resisting an effort to engage them in
    solving the problem?
        Director Wray. Well, you know, I can't speak for them in
    terms of their motivations. Obviously, these issues get into
    balances of privacy and security, and that's a long-standing
    debate.
        Chair Durbin. But when it comes to children, for goodness
    sakes, what is the privacy concern there?
        Director Wray. You got me. I will tell you that we get,
    from some of these companies, millions of tips we've had,
    historically, about child exploitation, and the idea that we
    would go into a model where those tips just evaporate--let's be
    clear: When the tips evaporate, the kids are still out there
    getting abused. The predators are still out there.
        The only thing that's changed is our ability to do anything
    about it, because of the way in which the companies would be
    designing their encryption. So, it's a way for them to
    essentially--and, again, I can't speak to their motivation, but
    it's a way for them to essentially blind themselves to what's
    happening on their platforms and then, indirectly, then blind
    us to our ability to protect kids and go after predators.
        Chair Durbin. We're going to be bringing some leaders in
    the industry before this Committee next month. I hope we can
    ask these questions directly. But I will tell you, we passed
    overwhelmingly--unanimously, five different bills related to
    this issue, and I thought that was going to be an avenue to
    bring them to the floor.
        The resistance from Big Tech to even pursue this issue,
    despite this overwhelming bipartisan vote, troubles me greatly.
    I want to believe they want to do the right thing. There's very
    little evidence of that. Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, let's pick up on that real
    quickly. Do you agree that social media systems, as they're
    designed today, present dangers to American families?
        Director Wray. Sure.
        Senator Graham. Thanks. All right. I don't know where to
    begin, other than--is now a good time to fund the FBI below
    inflation?
        Director Wray. I think----
        Senator Graham. Just say no.
        Director Wray. No.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. Good.
        Director Wray. I was about to say----
        Senator Graham. Yes, I got a----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Hell, no.
        Senator Graham. Yes, well, yes. No, no. You can say, hell,
    no, if you want to. I'll say it for you.
        Chair Durbin. Leading the witness.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Graham. Yes, that's right. Yes. Yes, I think that's
    pretty dumb, given what you've told us. How long have you been
    associated with the FBI?
        Director Wray. Well, I've been Director a little over 6
    years, but I've been working with the FBI my whole career,
    really.
        Senator Graham. Let's put a fine point on where we're at
    today as America. How would you describe the threat matrix
    against America today, from your point of view, after having
    been at the FBI most of your adult life?
        Director Wray. So, what I would say that is unique about
    the environment that we're in right now, in my career, is that
    while there may have been times over the years where individual
    threats could've been higher, here or there, than where they
    might be right now, I've never seen a time where all the
    threats, or so many of the threats are all elevated, all at
    exactly the same time.
        That's what makes this environment that we're in now so
    fraught and why funding our men and women, who are working
    shoulder to shoulder with State and local law enforcement and
    other partners every day, makes it even more important, not
    less.
        Senator Graham. So, blinking red lights--analogy about 9/
    11. All the lights were blinking red before 9/11, apparently.
    Obviously, all of us missed it. Would you say that there's
    multiple blinking red lights out there?
        Director Wray. I see blinking lights everywhere I turn.
        Senator Graham. Okay. All right. Can't say it any better
    than that. Who's driving all these problems? Let's start with
    Iran. What is Iran trying to do to America?
        Director Wray. So, Iran, which is, of course, the world's
    biggest state sponsor of terrorism--let's start there. Iran,
    just in the last couple years, if you want to bring it home,
    here, to the----
        Senator Graham. I do.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Homeland--in the last couple
    years, Iran has tried to assassinate a former U.S. National
    Security Advisor on U.S. soil; has tried to kidnap and then
    tried to kill a journalist--American journalist and human
    rights activist, right smack in the middle of New York City;
    has conducted a cyber attack on a children's hospital in New
    England; and, for extra credit, as Director Ratcliffe and I
    announced in the fall of 2020, tried to interfere in the last
    Presidential election. So, that's just a start. So, if that's
    not enough to----
        Senator Graham. Other than----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Convince people----
        Senator Graham [continuing]. That, they've been pretty
    good, the--right? Okay. Let's look at--you said we found enough
    fentanyl to kill 80 percent of American people?
        Director Wray. And that's just in the last 2 years.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Do you think we missed some fentanyl?
        Director Wray. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Okay. What role does China play in the
    fentanyl problems America has?
        Director Wray. Well, I'd start with, China supplies most of
    the precursors to the cartels in Mexico, which then leads to
    the fentanyl that comes here. And that's been talked about a
    fair amount, and it's a huge problem. But in addition to that,
    China is also responsible for an awful lot of the pill presses,
    manufacturing of the pill presses, which, of course, are also
    used.
        And, in addition to that, a lot of people don't know this,
    but China is also responsible for an awful lot of the
    precursors for the meth that's manufactured south of the
    Border, as well.
        Senator Graham. Do you see that getting better?
        Director Wray. I do not.
        Senator Graham. Let's talk about Russia. What are they up
    to?
        Director Wray. Well, besides their unconscionable
    aggression in Ukraine, Russia has one of the most advanced,
    most widespread cyber--offensive cyber programs in the world.
    They have invested in it very heavily and have used it in
    different ways against us and our Allies.
        They have intelligence officers here in the United States--
    too many, by any measure.
        They also provide safe haven to cyber criminals who,
    whether they're working for the Russian government or not, are
    conducting cyber attacks against, you know, us and our Allies
    all over the world. So, that's just a start.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Let's go to international terrorist
    organizations. One of my concerns is, after Afghanistan, we
    sort of put international terrorism on steroids. Are you
    concerned that international terrorism threats to the Homeland
    are rising as the Border continues to be broken?
        Director Wray. I am concerned that we are in an elevated
    threat environment, a heightened threat environment from
    foreign terrorist organizations, for a whole host of reasons.
    And, obviously, their ability to exploit any port of entry,
    including our Southwest Border, is a source of concern.
        You know, there's a lot of discussion about numbers, and
    numbers are important, but let's not forget that it didn't take
    a big number of people on 9/11 to kill 3,000 people. So, while
    numbers are important, numbers don't tell the whole story. And
    we have seen an increase in KSTs--so-called KSTs, Known or
    Suspected Terrorists, attempting to cross, you know, over the
    last 5 years.
        Senator Graham. Would you say--kind of putting a fine point
    on this topic--that right now is the largest threat we face as
    a Nation from international terrorist organizations since 9/11?
        Director Wray. Well, it's certainly higher than it's been
    in a long, long time, let me put it that way. Because if you
    just look post-October 7th, and--well, I thought the threat was
    elevated before October 7th, but post-October 7th, you've seen
    a veritable rogues' gallery of foreign terrorist
    organizations----
        Senator Graham. So, let's--let----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Calling for attacks against us.
        Senator Graham. Okay. So, October the 7th was devastating
    to our friends in Israel. So, your testimony before this
    Committee--since October 7th, the urging of foreign terrorist
    organizations to attack America has gone up. Is that fair to
    say?
        Director Wray. Yes. The threat level has gone to a whole
    other level since October 7th.
        Senator Graham. Okay, folks. You're on notice. What are we
    going to do about it? Finally, what should we be doing
    differently, with all these bad actors? I think it's fair to
    say we've lost deterrence. Do you have any idea, quickly, of
    what we could be doing differently?
        Director Wray. Well, certainly deterrence requires
    consequences, and so consequences need to be imposed on bad
    actors in a variety of ways, to ensure deterrence. Consequences
    are also part of disrupting, even without deterrence--
    disrupting and degrading bad actors' abilities to harm us.
        Chair Durbin. Senator Whitehouse.
        Senator Whitehouse. Good morning, Director Wray. How are
    you?
        Director Wray. Fine, thank you.
        Senator Whitehouse. I seem often to have to use our time
    together to go over old business, for which I apologize, but
    such is the responsiveness of the Department. I wanted to talk
    to you about Charles McGonigal today. He's an FBI agent who is
    interesting in two respects.
        First, he's pleading guilty--or has pled guilty to offenses
    regarding his undisclosed receipt of $225,000 from a foreign
    national, and he awaits sentencing for the crimes to which he
    pled, coming up in February.
        The second interesting thing, is that he led the New York
    Counterintelligence Division during the time that it was widely
    reported that New York FBI agents and former New York U.S.
    Attorney Rudy Giuliani were pressuring Director Comey to
    intervene in the Hillary Clinton campaign and do it damage,
    which, as we unfortunately know, Director Comey did, with press
    conferences that violated DOJ rules and procedures.
        So, my experience is that when somebody is in the
    presentencing mode of a criminal plea, that's a very good time
    to get information from them and cooperation from them. I don't
    know what happened in the New York Field Office during that
    period, but there's a very good chance that McGonigal does.
        I will put into the record three letters.
        One is me to Attorney General Garland, February 7, asking
    about this.
        The second is Office of Legislative Affairs at DOJ, back to
    me, giving something of an answer to this.
        And the third is a letter off DOJ's website, reflecting the
    plea agreement between the Southern District of New York and
    the attorneys for Charles McGonigal.
        [The information appears as submissions for the record.]
        Senator Whitehouse. So, at this point, what I asked in the
    letter was that somebody independent of the FBI take a look to
    see if there were FBI shenanigans during that period in that
    Office.
        And I've received no confirmation that anything is going
    on. The plea agreement reflects no signal or sign of
    cooperation, which as you know is often a feature in plea
    agreements and sentencings. So, there's no sign that he was
    asked to cooperate outside of the plea.
        I have been unable to determine whether or not the
    Inspector General is even eyeballing this to see if somebody
    independent from the FBI, somebody in the Department, should
    take a look.
        What do you know of the status of this, and are you--would
    it make sense--would it not make sense, let me put it that way,
    to have an independent set of eyeballs have a look at what
    McGonigal knows about what took place in that Office at that
    time, while he is in this helpful position of being subject to
    sentencing?
        Director Wray. Well, Senator, I appreciate you raising the
    topic. So, a couple things. First, our Counterintelligence
    Division, of course, are the people who identified McGonigal's
    wrongdoing, pursued it, arrested him, and are very focused on
    trying to determine, in all the ways you would imagine, what,
    if anything, he might've impacted through his misconduct.
    That's one.
        Second, there are, I think, two U.S. Attorney's Offices
    involved, both New York--Southern District of New York--and, I
    think, the District of Columbia, as well--so, two cases that
    are presentencing and that his cooperation, if you will, could
    be potentially relevant to.
        And we are--I can tell you I want to be a little bit
    careful on how far I can go on this, but I will tell you we
    have involved the Inspector General, as well, because we, like
    you, want to make sure we understand the full scope of what Mr.
    McGonigal did and what he knows.
        Senator Whitehouse. So, the DOJ Inspector General is
    involved or has been notified?
        Director Wray. Has been----
        Senator Whitehouse. Engaged with?
        Director Wray [continuing]. Engaged, is----
        Senator Whitehouse. Yes.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Is--yes.
        Senator Whitehouse. Okay. Well, that's good to hear. Let's
    go back to 702 for a moment. I understand that 702, which was
    originally designed, sort of, for a counterterrorism purpose,
    has also been deployed against the international fentanyl
    trafficking apparatus. Is that correct? And has 702 been
    important in combating the international fentanyl trafficking
    apparatus?
        Director Wray. 702 has been important in the fight against
    the scourge of fentanyl, more so, I would say, by our
    Intelligence Community partners--the CIA, for example, in their
    work overseas to pursue some of the foreign dimensions of the
    fentanyl crisis, which, of course, then have massive
    ramifications for communities all over the United States.
        Senator Whitehouse. So, that's a success of 702?
        Director Wray. It is a success of 702.
        Senator Whitehouse. You also mentioned the role of 702 in
    reaching out to victims of crime, of potential foreign
    intelligence operations. Could you elaborate, in our last
    minute together, a little bit more on the role of 702 in
    supporting the Government's role in letting Americans and
    American companies find out that they are the victims or have
    been the victims of criminal and intelligence attacks and
    helping them work through the consequences as victims?
        Director Wray. Well, in the short time we have, what I
    would say is, 702, especially the ability to run queries on IP
    addresses, email addresses, things like that, is--
    statistically, right now, the biggest place in which it's used
    is cyber attacks.
        So victims, overwhelmingly, victims of Russian, Iranian,
    Chinese, others' cyber attacks here in the United States, 702
    is what allows us to figure out which company is being
    targeted, maybe what the entry point is, where the bad guys are
    going, and allows us to then, armed with that information, rush
    out to those companies and alert them so that they can take
    steps to mitigate it before it gets potentially exponentially
    worse.
        And we find that there are a lot of instances where we're
    coming to companies who didn't even know they'd been breached
    yet. And if we hadn't had 702, both they and we would've been
    unwitting.
        Senator Whitehouse. If you could share with us some actual
    instances--make this a question for the record. Obviously, you
    have to do some scrubbing to make sure that everybody's
    comfortable with the information being released.
        But I think the more we can know about actual ways in which
    actual individuals, even if they have to be anonymized, were
    helped, and we see the factual circumstances, that would be
    useful. Thank you. Thanks, Chairman.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. Senator
    Grassley.
        Senator Grassley. You testified before the Senate
    Intelligence Committee that the Richmond Field Office anti-
    Catholic memo was, quote, ``a product by one Field Office,''
    end of quote. You testified before the House Judiciary
    Committee that the memo was ``a single product of a single
    Field Office,'' end of quote.
        But the Richmond memo says two other Field Offices of the
    FBI were involved and that that information had been redacted
    in versions provided to the Congress. Why did the FBI redact
    that critical information? And, second, did you review the
    unredacted version before giving your previous testimony?
        Director Wray. So, Senator, I think that this notion that
    other Field Offices were involved is a garble. And let me
    explain why I say that. The only involvement of the two other
    Field Offices was the Richmond authors of the product included
    two sentences, or something thereabouts, referencing each of
    these other Office's cases. And they sent those sentences about
    the other Offices' cases to them, not the whole product, and
    asked them, hey, did we describe your case right? That's all
    the other Offices had. So, it was a----
        Senator Grassley. Well, then----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Single Field Office's product.
    And I----
        Senator Grassley. Did you----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Stand by that.
        Senator Grassley. Did you review the unredacted memo before
    giving your previous testimony?
        Director Wray. I have reviewed the unredacted memo. Exactly
    when I reviewed it, I can't, as I sit here right now, tell you.
        Senator Grassley. Okay. In July of this year, I made public
    what's now known as the Biden Family 1023 FBI Document. I've
    also written you several letters about the same, most recently,
    I think, October 24. That letter of October said, in part, that
    the confidential human source in the Biden Family 1023 was not
    connected to known sources of Russian disinformation.
        That confidential human source is also reportedly a high-
    paid, long-term, long-running FBI source that the FBI has used
    in many investigative matters, according to former Attorney
    General Bill Barr. Barr said that 1023 was deemed sufficiently
    credible for further investigation.
        On May 31 of this year, Chairman Comer and I had a call
    with you. On that call, you told us that the Biden Family 1023
    is related to an ongoing investigative matter. Now, very
    clearly these data points show indicators of credibility.
    Question for you. This FBI 1023 was serialized on June 30,
    2020, over 3 years ago. When were you first made aware of 1023?
        Director Wray. Well, I don't know that I could give you the
    exact date, but I can tell you that I learned of the 1023 much,
    much, much more recently than anything around 2020, that's for
    sure.
        Senator Grassley. This is a public document. You have an
    obligation to tell this Committee what you knew about it, when
    you knew about it. And if you can't give us that information, I
    guess I'd better go on.
        Are there additional FBI-generated 1023s that reference a
    bribery scheme involving the Biden family? And, if so, how
    many, and what are their dates?
        Director Wray. Well, Senator, now you're asking questions
    that relate directly to Special Counsel Weiss' ongoing
    investigation, and respectfully, I can't really discuss
    anything related to that investigation. I would refer you to
    him for that.
        Senator Grassley. The 1023 references alleged texts,
    financial records, and audiotapes that prove some sort of
    scheme involving money with Biden people. These are discrete
    documents that can be obtained, if they exist.
        When a high-paid, long-used Federal confidential human
    source provides the FBI with evidence that three types--
    different types of records exist that prove a crime involving a
    political official, then standard FBI practice is to take steps
    to obtain that evidence. Would you agree with that, what I've
    said so far about the FBI policy? And if not, why not?
        Director Wray. Well, certainly I would expect people to do
    appropriate follow-up on anything in a 1023. But obviously
    every one of those instances is very fact specific and case
    specific, case----
        Senator Grassley. So----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Dependent.
        Senator Grassley. Okay. That answer's okay. So, then, based
    upon what you just told me, did the FBI seek these records in
    this matter?
        Director Wray. Well, let me separate into two different
    things, here. When it comes to the investigation being led by
    Special Counsel Weiss, which is being supported by our
    Baltimore Field Office, that one I'm not going to be able to
    discuss because it's an ongoing investigation.
        When it comes to the assessment that occurred in--being run
    out of the Office of--our Field Office in Pittsburgh and the
    U.S. Attorney, Mr. Brady, as selected by Attorney General Barr,
    to look at all of this back in the earlier period you're
    talking about, my understanding is that there was agreement
    among the team about what steps needed to be taken and with the
    closing of that assessment.
        Senator Grassley. Have you communicated with White House
    officials or used a third party to do so about anything
    relating to the 1023 as it involves people in the Biden family?
    And, if so, who and when?
        Director Wray. No.
        Senator Grassley. Okay. I want to go to sexual misconduct
    by the FBI. On October the 5th, 2022, I sent you a letter and
    later made FBI records public that showed widespread sexual
    misconduct in FBI against females. The data also showed that
    hundreds of FBI personnel retired to avoid discipline and that
    senior high-level officials received reduced punishment, if any
    at all.
        On October the 6th, the FBI told the Associated Press that
    it intended to respond to me first and declined to provide
    sexual misconduct data to the press at that time.
        It's over one year later, and the FBI has failed to provide
    this data to me. The FBI's blatant lack of action indicates it
    isn't taking misconduct against women in the workplace
    seriously. Why has the FBI failed to provide that very
    important data to this Committee, and when will it finally be
    produced, as you told the--as the FBI told the Associated Press
    you were going to?
        Director Wray. Well, first let me say I could not disagree
    more strongly that we don't take it seriously. I can tell you I
    take misconduct--sexual misconduct against our own employees,
    extremely seriously. And we've put in place all sorts of new
    procedures and policies to deal with that and to communicate in
    no uncertain terms how strongly I feel about that.
        As to the responsiveness to your letter, let me follow up
    with my team and find out where that stands. But I do want to
    make sure that there's not any confusion--none--about how
    seriously I take this topic.
        Senator Grassley. Okay, then, where's the data, if that's
    what you're going to be willing--to take it so seriously? I----
        Director Wray. I will follow up with you about your letter.
        Senator Grassley. Okay.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Grassley. Senator
    Klobuchar.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank
    you so much, Director Wray, for being here.
        I want to start out with hate crimes. And you and I have
    talked about them before. I have, I know, thanked you and your
    agents in Minnesota for their work in solving what was a clear
    hate crime, with a prison sentence, of a bombing of Dar Al-
    Farooq Islamic Center in my home State back in 2017.
        And we know that, since that time, we've seen increases in
    hate crimes. Reports show a 216 percent increase, since October
    7th in requests for help and reported bias incidents against
    Muslims. Another report showed a 388 percent rise in
    antisemitic incidents, since this time last year.
        We know the facts.
        We know what happened in front of that restaurant in
    Philadelphia.
        We know that in Illinois, a 6-year-old Muslim boy was
    targeted and fatally stabbed for being Palestinian American.
        In Los Angeles, a criminal broke into the home of a Jewish
    family, threatened them, and screamed about killing Jews.
        In Vermont, a Palestinian student from Brown University
    whose parents had him stay in the U.S. rather than returning
    home, for safety reasons, was shot, along with two of his
    friends.
        In New York, a woman was assaulted at Grand Central
    terminal, and when confronted, the assailant said it was
    because you are Jewish.
        In Brooklyn, a father and his 18-year-old son were
    allegedly assaulted by another parent for being Palestinian.
        And last week three suspects were arrested for a 40-minute
    spree of attacks on Jewish New Yorkers.
        This is concerning for everyone, should--everyone:
    Democrat, Republican, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, anyone in this
    country. I know that you care about this very much, because I
    saw the work that your agents did in Minnesota.
        And I want to get more details on what the FBI is doing and
    what the Justice Department is doing to detect, deter, and
    investigate these crimes. And then also the effect of social
    media. And I know there are limitations on what we can do. I
    have some strong views on this. But could you also talk about
    that?
        Director Wray. Well, I appreciate your long-standing
    interest in this topic, and I know how important it is to you,
    and not the least of which because of the attacks that have
    occurred in your home State.
        Certainly, we have seen an increase in hate crimes, and
    there're lots of different numbers out there, but I'll just
    give two for this purpose.
        You know, one is, in 2022, we saw the highest increase, I
    think, in hate crimes reported that we'd seen since maybe 2008.
    And we don't have full data for 2023 yet, but we expect it to
    keep going up.
        Second data point: post-October 7th, just since October
    7th, we have--opening, I think, 60 percent more hate crimes
    investigations post-October 7th than compared to the comparable
    period pre-October 7th--and that's on top of that already
    escalating increase that I mentioned.
        As I testified in my opening statement, the biggest chunk
    of those are threats against the Jewish community. But there
    are, of course, attacks--and you've mentioned several of them--
    against others, as well.
        What are we doing about it? A few different things.
        We've elevated civil rights, especially hate crimes, to
    national threat priority, and that's been true for the last
    couple of years. And so that brings with it more investigative
    resources of all shapes and sizes.
        Second, we're trying to do a lot to engage in outreach both
    to law enforcement and the communities, because one thing we
    know about hate crimes is that they're chronically
    underreported. And there are lots of reasons for that, but--so,
    trying to get better data, better fidelity of the data, allows
    us to track the trend better but also to ensure that we're
    finding the cases that need to be pursued.
        Even when a hate crimes charge, a Federal hate crimes
    charge, is not available, the FBI doesn't just walk away from
    the case. We provide forensic support, in some cases, even
    testimony and other things in State prosecutions if State
    charges are being used.
        So, those are a few of the things. In our outreach efforts,
    I would say we also have tried to do things that are targeted
    at specific communities. So, for example, in New York, we tried
    to reach out to parts of the Jewish community in New York with
    outreach both in Yiddish and Hebrew, and not just in English,
    for example. So, that's just a flavor.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I wanted to turn to fentanyl.
    We all know that there is so much work that has to be done at
    the Border and so much work that has to be done in the ports of
    entry, mail--a bill that Senator Portman and I passed a while
    back.
        But we also know that one-third of drug cases have direct
    ties to social media. And we had a kid in Minnesota who died
    after taking a fentanyl-laced pill that he thought was
    Percocet, to help his migraines, purchased on Snapchat.
        And the Judiciary Committee actually voted, with the
    Chairman's leadership, to advance a bipartisan bill, with
    Senators Shaheen and Marshall, to require social media
    companies to report fentanyl and other dangerous drug sales on
    their platforms--it's called the Cooper Davis Act. And could
    you talk about how this could be helpful in taking on these
    cases?
        Director Wray. Well, I think what you've put your finger on
    is the degree to which online activity is inextricably
    intertwined with the fentanyl epidemic. And that's in a variety
    of ways, and I know Administrator Milgram at DEA, for example,
    has a number of initiatives focused on this, as well.
        Certainly, we, on the FBI's end, are focused on, for
    example, darknet marketplaces, and we have a whole--something
    called JCODE, which is focused on dismantling darknet
    marketplaces of fentanyl and other dangerous narcotics.
        Senator Klobuchar. Okay. Thank you. And one other kids'
    issue. You noted the importance of protecting kids. You noted
    in your written testimony that the FBI has recently reported a
    massive increase in sextortion cases, where kids and teens are
    being coerced into sending explicit photos and videos, only to
    be blackmailed or threatened for financial gain. In 2022 alone,
    these scams resulted in at least 20 victims committing suicide.
        And my bill with Senator Cornyn, the SHIELD Act, includes a
    threat provision, and other things, that would update and
    modernize our laws when it comes to revenge porn and sextortion
    cases involving kids.
        While we are advancing this bill, sadly, we have been
    opposed by some Members of this Committee, and I've found it
    incredibly frustrating because they won't meet with me to try
    to make any changes to it, and I'm trying to change that.
        What threats do young people receive? How do you think we
    could make the tools that you have to take on this crime
    better?
        Because I'm going to just start going to the floor and
    taking this on. Our colleagues can object if they would like,
    and I know Senator Cornyn has been very helpful. But I think
    it's just absolutely ridiculous when you look at these numbers.
    Please answer. Thank you.
        Director Wray. Well, I can't speak to specific legislative
    proposals, but what I can tell you is that sextortion is a
    rapidly escalating threat. And, as you say, there've been way
    too many teenagers victimized, and they don't know where to
    turn.
        And so having this discussion in a forum like this--people
    like you and Senator Cornyn raising awareness about it--that by
    itself is hugely valuable.
        As to what we need, I will tell you, I come back to the
    answer I gave earlier to Chairman Durbin about the threat, if
    you will, of the proliferation of warrant-proof encryption. If
    companies are going to take responsibility for what happens on
    their platforms, then part of taking responsibility includes
    the ability to, when presented with a warrant, following all
    the due process that that entails, they will provide the
    information so that law enforcement, not just FBI but other
    agencies, can take action to rescue the kids and take down the
    predators.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator----
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. I'll ask my
    remaining questions on carjacking and 702--which I thank you
    for your work on that, we can't let it lapse--in writing. Thank
    you.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Director Wray, let me start with some basic
    concepts. If you walk into the Supreme Court of the United
    States, over the arches in the entryway there are inscribed the
    words, ``Equal Justice Under Law.'' I think there's a
    perception, unfortunately, that we are not living up to that
    ideal in a number of respects.
        Senator Whitehouse mentioned the shameful treatment of
    Hillary Clinton--somebody who I do not support from a political
    standpoint--but who was subjected to the release of derogatory
    information of an investigation that Director Comey and the FBI
    conducted involving her. And the fact that he usurped the
    authority of the Attorney General when it comes to charging
    decisions and made the statement he did.
        I think there's also a perception that President Trump was
    not treated fairly during his time of office, particularly
    because of the opposition research, things like the Steele
    dossier, the ``Russiagate'' investigation, all of which ended
    up in basically amounting to no charges being filed.
        I want to just say, personally, I appreciate your
    willingness to take on the important task of restoring and
    rebuilding the reputation of the FBI. I believe the FBI is an
    indispensable institution in our Government. But it's also a
    big, unwieldy institution. I think you have about 35,000 people
    who work at the FBI, somewhere like that, right?
        Director Wray. It's actually closer to 38,000.
        Senator Cornyn. Thirty-eight thousand. And I'm personally
    convinced that, overwhelmingly, these are good, patriotic,
    hardworking people, sacrificing, putting themselves in harm's
    way in order to protect the rest of America.
        But, like any other large organization, there're going to
    be some bad apples, people who abuse trust and who misbehave.
    Can you just take a minute and describe what steps that you
    have undertaken at the FBI to try to restore the FBI's
    reputation as an institution that the American people can trust
    to pursue equal justice under the law?
        Director Wray. Well, I appreciate the question. Let me
    start with a statement of principle that I hold near and dear
    and then explain a little bit more concretely what that means.
        My message from Day One, and probably said every day since
    I've been in the job, is that we need to make sure that we're
    doing the right thing in the right way in everything we do.
        And that means the importance of process and following our
    rules. That does not mean--and sometimes this is frustrating to
    people of all shapes and stripes--that does not mean we can
    guarantee the result or the outcome that somebody would like in
    a case.
        So, how do I implement that principle? I have directed all
    sorts of changes. In relation to the Crossfire Hurricane
    matter, for example, in that one matter alone, I directed over
    40 corrective measures, went above and beyond anything the
    Inspector General recommended, and have implemented dozens of
    changes since then.
        You mentioned the Hillary Clinton email matter. There, too,
    I accepted every recommendation by the Inspector General, then
    went above and beyond.
        In terms of personnel, I've installed an entirely new
    leadership team from when I started.
        As far as accountability, which is a topic that, of course,
    is important to a lot of people, within the tools that we have
    available to us and the circumstances that are available to us,
    I have taken action. What can I do?
        I can, in the right circumstances, remove somebody from the
    chain of command. And I have.
        I can, when the circumstances support it, have somebody's
    security clearance revoked. And I have.
        I can, when the circumstances warrant it, refer somebody to
    the Inspector General or the Hatch Act Office of Special
    Counsel or others like that. And I have.
        What I can't do is prosecute people, and that gets to the
    heart of what you referenced at the very beginning in terms of
    my predecessor's handling of the Hillary Clinton matter. I'm
    very sensitive to the fact that part of the reason I'm in this
    job is because of the distinction between the FBI Director's
    role and a prosecutor's role.
        And a lot of the criticism that the FBI has endured over
    the last few years has, if you look closely, revolved around
    frustrations about whether this person was prosecuted or not,
    and what they were prosecuted for. And that ultimately is not
    the FBI Director's or the FBI's choice.
        Senator Cornyn. If I can ask you about 702. There's already
    been some discussion about that. I've referred to Section 702
    of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as perhaps one of
    the most important laws that the American people have never
    heard of. And I know we have talked a lot about it.
        But there is a concern that the tools, including FISA,
    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 702, is--can be abused
    and that it can be used to target U.S. citizens. Let me just
    ask you directly, is it possible to target, lawfully target an
    American citizen under Section 702?
        Director Wray. Well, I think so-called reverse targeting,
    targeting of Americans through the end run of 702, is expressly
    prohibited.
        Senator Cornyn. That's my understanding of the law, as
    well. As a matter of fact, the Foreign Intelligence
    Surveillance Act is exactly that. It targets foreigners.
    Correct? Outside of the United States?
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. But if a would-be terrorist calls an
    American citizen in the United States, then you necessarily
    will know who's on both ends of that conversation. Correct?
        Director Wray. Well, whether it's telephony or even just,
    you know, electronic communication, but--which is more often
    where we see it.
        Senator Cornyn. It could be an email, it can be a text, it
    can----
        Director Wray. Correct.
        Senator Cornyn [continuing]. Be----
        Director Wray. Correct.
        Senator Cornyn. And then if, for example, you want to
    investigate that American citizen, isn't it true that you have
    to go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
    demonstrate probable cause to conduct a further investigation
    of that American citizen as a target?
        Director Wray. Yes. At that point, then that's, of course,
    the route that we pursue, which is part of why--to your comment
    at the beginning about how little people have heard of 702--is
    because, unlike the warrant stage, when you're actually
    pursuing somebody for prosecution, for example, 702 is most
    used and most useful at the stage when you're at the very
    beginning, trying to figure out, what the heck do we have here?
    What direction does this need to go? Is this something we need
    to pursue?
        And so that's why people, including prosecutors, don't even
    hear about it that much. Because it's when it's most useful to
    protect Americans from threats.
        Senator Cornyn. I think you've called it the crown jewels
    or perhaps words to that effect?
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. How would you describe the importance of
    Section 702? And what would be the consequences of willfully
    blinding ourselves to the threats of foreign actors?
        Director Wray. I think blinding ourselves through either
    allowing 702 to lapse or amending it in a way that guts its
    effectiveness would be reckless at best, and dangerous and
    irresponsible at worst. The reality is, the whole reason we
    have 702, focused on foreign threats from overseas, is to
    protect America from those threats.
        It's not to admire foreign threats from afar and study them
    and think about them. It's to know what they are and to make
    sure they don't hurt Americans, here--American businesses
    targeted with cyber attacks, American victims targeted for
    assassination or terrorist attacks. That's why we have it.
        The FBI's piece of 702--we are the only intelligence agency
    with the authority to operate domestically, and so where the
    rubber really meets the road--even though our slice of 702 as a
    percentage is quite narrow, that narrow slice, in some ways, is
    the most important slice. Because that's what protects people
    here, that all of us are sworn to protect.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Chair Durbin. Thanks, Senator Cornyn. Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Durbin. Thank you,
    Director Wray. I look forward to continuing that conversation
    about Section 702, a topic on which I have not firmly made up
    my mind how to vote. So, I am open to your input.
        I just wanted to start by thanking you, and the men and
    women of the FBI for your service to our Nation and the
    protection of the rule of law--and specifically thank the FBI
    for your work in my community in the past year. You've worked
    with State and local prosecutors on civil rights violations, on
    robbery, on cyber stalking, on kidnapping cases.
        And as someone who had a decade responsible for a local law
    enforcement entity before coming here to the Senate, I greatly
    respect and appreciate the role the FBI plays: the Academy, the
    resources you provide, and the professionalism in Wilmington,
    Delaware, and throughout our whole country.
        Let me go to that 702 conversation. The proposal put
    forward by Senators Warner and Rubio would prohibit the running
    of U.S. person queries designed to find evidence of a crime
    without first obtaining a court order, but could still perform
    warrantless queries where the search is reasonably likely to
    retrieve foreign intelligence information. What do you think of
    that compromise? Would it head off the significantly negative
    consequences you've laid out if we fail to reauthorize Section
    702?
        Director Wray. I think the bill put forward by Senators
    Warner and Rubio provides a path that we can work together on.
    The reality is that pursuing 702 information for evidence of a
    crime, as has been demonstrated, or evidence of a crime only,
    is extremely rare, because that's not the main purpose for
    which we use it.
        And many of the instances--the very few instances in which
    that has been implicated are actually instances where it was
    used to find Brady information, exculpatory information to turn
    over to the defense. So, it is a path that I think merits
    further exploration.
        Senator Coons. I'm aware of specific examples in my home
    community where FBI agents came and visited a significant
    company that was unaware that they had been hacked and was able
    to take prompt action because of that. And I'm familiar with
    the unique ways in which your domestic authorities complement
    some of the ability we need as a Nation to defend against
    foreign threats.
        You also highlighted in your testimony that there were
    significant past FISA compliance violations at the Bureau and
    that you've been dedicated to taking action to clean house and
    to address those. Talk to me briefly, if you would, about
    holding personnel accountable for past misuse of FISA data and
    how that has unfolded.
        Director Wray. Well, in addition to a whole host of other
    reforms we've put in place, we rolled out new accountability
    measures designed to make sure that we are capturing not just
    intentional or reckless compliance violations, of which there
    have been very, very few, and none since 2018, but even, which
    has been the vast majority of the compliance incidents we've
    had--even negligent or careless errors. We want to make sure
    that we have accountability for that, too.
        Now, that's a different kind of accountability, just
    because the state of mind of the employee is different, and
    that's somebody who is coachable.
        But we have procedures now that, even for that much more
    good-faith noncompliance, they temporarily, at least, lose
    access to FISA information, and there's a whole host of
    remedial training and so forth, that goes--and then there's
    escalating consequences if they don't learn their lesson, and
    it builds from there. That's a short oversimplification, but
    that gives you a flavor of the measures that we've put in
    place.
        Senator Coons. The core concern I have, frankly, is that a
    future administration or Director might still be able to misuse
    authorities in this Section. I have not previously voted to
    extend the authorization of Section 702.
        But the reforms proposed in this legislation, the actions
    you've taken, have me weighing. What, if any, assurances could
    you provide that the rules and the system will hold if we
    reauthorize 702, even if the Bureau happened to be led by an
    appointee who doesn't share your commitment to reform?
        Director Wray. Well, we've put in place a number of things
    that would be extremely challenging to unwind, for one. We
    created--I created a whole new Office of Internal Auditing, for
    example, and brought in a former agent who had gone on to be a
    Big Four accounting firm partner, to try to work with yet
    another Big Four accounting firm to help us build a, what I
    expect to be, a world-class internal auditing program focused
    specifically on FISA compliance.
        In addition, there are external looks and oversights. Most
    of the problems that have been identified over the years have
    been identified by things like the Department of Justice's
    reviews. Of course, there's been Inspector General reviews. The
    Court takes a look.
        And that's part of why I understand why people might say,
    well, gee, Director, you talk a good game, but we've had
    problems in the past. And why should we think it's different
    this time?
        And what I would say to you is, don't just take my word for
    it. Look at what the Court, the same Court that's rightly taken
    us to task in the past, has said. That Court--the same judge,
    in fact, that's been perhaps most scathing is the one that
    found 98 percent compliance and has all sorts of language in
    the opinion about the reforms actually having the impact that
    we're looking for.
        So, why is this time different? Because the Court, the
    Department, others taking a look at this and who have been not
    shy about citing problems in the past, they've found this
    progress.
        Senator Coons. Thank you. Two other issues I'm going to
    raise briefly. First, the importance, the urgency of the
    Nonprofit Security Grant Program. As your testimony highlights,
    antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate crimes have risen sharply in
    the United States following Hamas' October 7th attacks in
    Israel, and I think it's urgent that we add several hundred
    million dollars to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program,
    whether in the supplemental or in our regular appropriations
    process.
        And I'm hoping that my colleagues, many of whom co-sponsor
    the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, will
    recognize that the huge wave, globally, of views of Hamas'
    circulated social media content in the wake of October 7th
    deserves a tough look about whether the algorithms used by
    social media platforms promoted this content, whether it was
    targeted to certain groups.
        A last point I'll make in closing, Director, is that your
    written testimony says that economic espionage and foreign
    intelligence gathering by the PRC ``present,'' and I think I'm
    quoting, ``the greatest long-term threat to our Nation's ideas,
    innovation, and economic security.'' I couldn't agree more. I
    think it's critical that our response to IP theft by the PRC
    and other players be coordinated.
        I'm glad to learn the FBI is leading investigations for the
    DOJ and the Commerce, Disruptive Technology Strike Force, in
    collaboration, and I am urging our Caucus Leader to take up and
    confirm the nominee for the Intellectual Property Enforcement
    Coordinator, Deborah Robinson, a position that has been vacant
    for far too long. Director, thank you for your testimony today,
    and for your service.
        Chair Durbin. Thanks, Senator Coons. Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director
    Wray, for being here.
        In a report issued, declassified in August of 2021, the
    Director of National Intelligence stated, quote, ``FBI
    personnel conducted multiple queries of an individual who had
    the same last name as the FBI personnel conducting the query.''
        And on further investigation, what they learned was that
    this query was made after this analyst at the FBI had a
    conversation with his own mother and his mother expressed
    suspicions about his father having an affair, cheating on her,
    having an affair with another woman.
        And so, as a result of that, they looked into it, and this
    particular analyst admitted that he ran the queries because of
    this tip from his mother that his dad was having an affair. And
    because I've got a lot of material to cover, I'd appreciate it
    if you could give me a yes-or-no answer to this. Was that
    analyst terminated?
        Director Wray. I'm not sure that I can recall the specific
    instance that you're talking about, so I'll have to go look at
    that and follow back up with you on that.
        Senator Lee. And do you know whether the analyst's security
    clearance would've been revoked?
        Director Wray. Again, same answer. But let me check into
    that, and we'll circle back to----
        Senator Lee. Okay. Let me ask it----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Whatever we can share.
        Senator Lee. Let me ask it to you this way. Yes or no,
    would abuse of Section 702 by an FBI employee, would that be
    something that would warrant the revocation of security
    clearance?
        Director Wray. Well, certainly abuse. I think we'd have to
    know what the circumstances were.
        Senator Lee. Misuse of----
        Director Wray. Sometimes people have used terms like abuse
    in this discussion when it's been something other than what I
    would call abuse, but there've been----
        Senator Lee. Yes.
        Director Wray. That's why we have this accountability
    procedures that have cascading----
        Senator Lee. This example----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Consequences.
        Senator Lee [continuing]. That I've given you is abuse. I
    assume you would not disagree with that.
        Now, the September 2023 PCLOB report disclosed two
    additional intentional incidents, intentional wrong searches
    from 2022.
        One instance from 2022 in which two analysts conducted
    queries seeking information about a person who was a potential
    tenant of a rental property owned by one of the analysts.
        And another instance, from 2022, in which an NSA analyst
    conducted queries on two occasions seeking information about
    two individuals that the analyst himself had met through an
    online dating service.
        Were the FBI employees who conducted those two illegal
    searches, were they terminated?
        Director Wray. Well, you lost me there for a minute. You
    referred to an NSA analyst?
        Senator Lee. Yes. Yes. So, an NSA analyst. Do you know
    whether anyone at the NSA was disciplined for that? And if they
    worked at the FBI, would they be subject to discipline?
        Director Wray. Well, I don't want to get into
    hypotheticals, but as far as NSA analysts, I think that would
    be a question for NSA.
        Senator Lee. Now, were FBI employees involved in those? And
    if they had been, would their security clearances have been
    terminated?
        Director Wray. Again, I don't want to get into
    hypotheticals, but we have both a disciplinary process, which
    is separate from the security clearance----
        Senator Lee. Yes.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Process, and somebody who
    takes, who engages in a----
        Senator Lee. I----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Compliance violation related
    to----
        Senator Lee. I--I understand.
        Director Wray [continuing]. 702 could be relevant to both.
        Senator Lee. I understand. I----
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Lee. I would hope that the default answer would be,
    yes, they'd be subject to having their security clearance
    stripped and be subject to dismissal.
        Now, in an April 2022 opinion, the Foreign Intelligence
    Surveillance Court noted the following searches of Americans'
    communications: 19,000 donors to a particular congressional
    campaign; 133 Americans participating in civil unrest and
    protests in the summer of 2020; and Americans who were in the
    vicinity of the Capitol, not necessarily inside the Capitol,
    but in the vicinity of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.
        The DNI's semiannual assessment of Section 702 disclosed
    illegal queries conducted in 2019 to 2020, quote, ``using only
    the name of a U.S. Congressman.''
        The FISA Court disclosed two particularly egregious
    searches from 2022.
        In June of 2022, an analyst conducted four queries of 702
    information using the last names of a U.S. Senator and of a
    State senator, without further limitation.
        On October 25, 2022, a staff's operations specialist ran a
    query using the Social Security number of a State judge who
    had, quote, ``complained to FBI about alleged civil rights
    violations perpetrated by a municipal chief of police,'' closed
    quote.
        Were the FBI employees who conducted those illegal searches
    terminated? Or did they have their security clearances
    stripped? Yes or no?
        Director Wray. Again, I don't know that I can speak to
    specific instances. But what I can tell you--and I think this
    is important to this exchange--is that all of the instances you
    just listed off, all involve conduct that occurred before the
    reforms that we've put in place.
        Senator Lee. Before you reformed--before the reforms you
    put in place, reforms the text of which we don't even have
    access to. Reforms that you've put in place.
        I've been on this Committee for 13 years. During the
    entirety of those 13 years, I've expressed concerns to FBI
    Directors appointed by Presidents of both political parties and
    three different Presidential administrations.
        Every darned one of them has told me the same thing:
    ``Don't worry about it.'' ``We've got this taken care of.''
    ``We've got new procedures.'' ``It's going to be different
    now.''
        It's never different. You haven't changed. And you keep
    referring to these policies, these new procedures. We haven't
    seen that. We're not even allowed to have access to it.
        And we have absolutely no reason to trust you, because you
    haven't behaved in a manner that's trustworthy. You can't even,
    as we sit here, tell me that people who intentionally,
    knowingly, deliberately violated the civil rights of American
    citizens, that they were fired. Or that they had their security
    clearance stripped.
        You know, in 2022, the FBI and other agencies searched
    Americans' communications over 200,000 times--only 16 of which
    were evidence-of-a-crime-only searches that returned
    information. I'd like to ask you to give a yes-or-no answer to
    these questions. Were the three related batch queries,
    consisting of over 23,000 separate queries, relating to the
    events of January 6th. Were those evidence-of-a-crime-only
    queries? Yes or no?
        Director Wray. I don't know the answer to that. What I----
        Senator Lee. The answer----
        Director Wray. What----
        Senator Lee. The answer is no. I----
        Director Wray. What I----
        Senator Lee. I do know the answer. The answer is no. Were
    the 141----
        Director Wray. What I----
        Senator Lee [continuing]. Queries for the activists
    arrested in connection with the George Floyd protests here in
    Washington, DC, evidence-of-a-crime-only queries?
        Director Wray. Those were noncompliant queries, and again,
    they all predate the reforms that we've put in place, which--
    before we----
        Senator Lee. Which echo other reforms that other FBI
    Directors have----
        Director Wray. Which----
        Senator Lee [continuing]. Told me about, every darned year.
        Director Wray. If I may----
        Senator Lee. How about the 19,000 donors to a political
    campaign? The answer there is ``no.''
        What about the query for a sitting Member of Congress? The
    answer there is ``no.''
        What about the query involving a U.S. Senator, which, for
    all we know, could be any one of us? The answer is ``no.''
        And so what does that tell me? Well, what I'm hearing and
    what these data points all point to is that a warrant
    requirement or prohibition relating to, quote, unquote,
    ``evidence-of-a-crime-only queries'' would not have been
    something that would have prevented any of the most egregious
    examples of the abuse that we've seen under Section 702.
        So, the FBI is already required to obtain a court order, in
    some circumstances, before accessing the contents of Americans'
    communications in the context of 702. They're already required
    for that, in some circumstances.
        Since 2018, how many times has that requirement been
    triggered, according to Government reporting? Do you know?
        Director Wray. Are you talking about the so-called (f)(2)?
        Senator Lee. Yes.
        Director Wray. Yes. How many times has it been triggered?
        Senator Lee. Yes.
        Director Wray. I think there've been two instances where--I
    think is maybe the number.
        Senator Lee. Hundred----
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Lee. One hundred and three. One hundred and three
    times----
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Lee [continuing]. It's been triggered.
        And out of those 103 identified times the FBI should've
    obtained a court order, how many times did the FBI actually
    obtain one? Do you know?
        Director Wray. That, I think the answer is none.
        Senator Lee. Zero. So, you're telling me that the FBI has
    completely ignored the limited court order requirement that
    it's already subjected to.
        You have the audacity to come here, and you told us that
    getting, adding a warrant requirement to 702--even for queries
    involving U.S. persons on U.S. soil--that that would amount to
    some sort of unilateral disarmament.
        That--you have a lot of gall, sir. This is disgraceful.
        The Fourth Amendment requires more than that, and you know
    it.
        I know every single time, for centuries, even prior to the
    founding of this country, there were similar protections built
    into the laws of the United Kingdom before we became a country.
    Even then, the Government was making the same darned argument
    you're making today. Which is, it's too hard. It's making it
    hard for the Government.
        That's why we have a Constitution, sir, and you must comply
    with it.
        Director Wray. Mr. Chairman, may I respond briefly?
        When you ask, why are things different this time, I would
    point you, again, to the findings of the Court and the
    Department, themselves, both of which have not been shy about
    identifying some of the same instances that you cited in our
    colloquy.
        They, themselves, have observed the effectiveness of the
    reforms, which is why the pre-versus-post date of the reforms
    becomes very significant. So, that's number one.
        Second, as to your claims about constitutionality, I would
    point you back to what the caselaw actually shows on this
    subject, which is that no court has found 702 in its current
    form to be unconstitutional. And every court to have looked at
    it has found it to be constitutional. And----
        Senator Lee. Well----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Last point----
        Senator Lee [continuing]. How lucky for you----
        Director Wray. Last point.
        Senator Lee [continuing]. Because no one has standing to do
    that. No one knows when they're being surveilled. That is--that
    is not an argument, sir.
        Director Wray. Last--last point, Mr. Chairman, is that, in
    some of the instances--and you went through a number, in your
    questions--in some of the instances, in particular that I know
    about, those are instances where the queries were run in order
    to get to a public official, Member of Congress, to warn them
    about foreign influences targeting them----
        Senator Lee. Yes----
        Director Wray [continuing]. And a warrant----
        Senator Lee [continuing]. We call those----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Would not have enabled that----
        Senator Lee [continuing]. We call those consent searches.
    And consent searches do not require a warrant, sir. And you
    know that.
        There is nothing that you have done that is not entirely
    within the FBI's control and supervision. You're asking me to
    believe something that is not believable, because your agency
    has made it unbelievable. And I refuse to accept it.
        Chair Durbin. Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    being here today, and thank you to you, and the thousands of
    FBI agents who are right now out there trying to keep us safe.
        I think we've often failed to express our gratitude to law
    enforcement, and I know how dedicated and hardworking they are.
    So that is something that should go without saying, but it's
    worth saying.
        Mr. Director, I want to focus on election interference,
    which is, in my view, one of the most pressing and important
    threats to our democracy. That election interference threatens,
    particularly, the Presidential election in 2024. There's a lot
    of talk about the dire effects, potentially of the outcome in
    2024, and the countries of China, Russia, other foreign
    adversaries--we're not talking here about Hamas or a terrorist
    organization--nation-states interfering in our election process
    to pick winners that are more favorable to them.
        There's no secret here, no mystery about who would be more
    favorable to Vladimir Putin or to Xi, in Ukraine or Taiwan. And
    I'd like to know from you whether you view election
    interference by these nations as a potential threat in the
    coming Presidential election.
        Director Wray. We're keenly focused on the risk that
    foreign adversaries, whether it's Russia, whether it's China,
    whether it's Iran or others, would seek to interfere in our
    elections.
        Senator Blumenthal. You've said that all threats are
    elevated at exactly the same time. This one seems to me much
    more elevated than we've seen in any recent election. Am I
    right?
        Director Wray. I think it's fair to say that they are
    elevated from where they were before, and just to elaborate
    just slightly on that point, obviously we saw--and it's not
    disputed--that the Russians tried to interfere in the 2016
    election, and then continued.
        But what we've seen since then is other adversaries
    attempting to take a page out of the Russians' playbook.
        Which is why, for example, I point to the press conference
    that Director Ratcliffe and I did, in the fall of 2020, about
    the Iranians' efforts to interfere in that election.
        More recently, we've had an indictment involving the
    Chinese government attempting in a very aggressive way to
    interfere in a particular congressional candidacy. First trying
    to dig up dirt on the candidate. Then, when they couldn't find
    it, to make up dirt on the candidate. And then, when they
    couldn't find that, openly talking about how to inflict
    physical violence on the candidate. That's----
        Senator Blumenthal. So, you----
        Director Wray [continuing]. A pretty stark form of election
    interference.
        Senator Blumenthal. You are focused, rightly, on this
    problem as an urgent and exigent one for the United States of
    America. Correct?
        Director Wray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. And what can we do, in Congress, to
    support this effort? What additional powers do you need? Do you
    need more resources?
        It seems to me that our democracy is on the line here. And
    all of the speech-making, all of the rhetoric that we're
    expressing today go for naught if we lose our democracy because
    China, Russia, Iran, these nation-states have a free field to
    interfere with our election.
        Director Wray. Well, I think there's a couple things.
        There's, on the money side, in terms of appropriations, we
    are not in an environment where any of the threats that we're
    seeing, as part of my exchange with Senator Graham, are going
    backward. They're all elevated and increasing. So, now is not a
    time to go backward in terms of the funding of the FBI across
    cyber counterintelligence and a whole host of other issues.
        But, second, we've talked about 702--702 is, of course,
    focused on foreign adversaries, many of these same intelligence
    services and their ability to engage in malicious foreign
    intelligence operations.
        And that's why reauthorizing 702 in a form where it can be
    used is important to that threat, among a whole host of other
    foreign threats.
        Senator Blumenthal. There are now Fifth Circuit decisions.
    The courts are making decisions that, if upheld, would create
    additional obstacles to your enforcement against foreign
    interference. Are you concerned about the Fifth Circuit saying,
    in effect, that you can't communicate with social media to
    alert them to threats?
        Director Wray. Well, of course, as you know, this is the
    subject of ongoing litigation. The findings of the lower courts
    in that litigation are things that are hotly contested through
    the Department's filings. And as you know, the Department has
    asked the Supreme Court to not only stay that injunction but to
    grant cert, and it has done both.
        I will say, and I think this is important for people to
    know, it is not seriously disputed that our foreign adversaries
    have tried--and are continuing to try to interfere in our
    elections. And it is not seriously disputed that those foreign
    adversaries are using social media, including U.S. social media
    platforms, as part of that effort.
        And historically our work in this space has enjoyed
    widespread, bipartisan support, and, in fact, President Trump
    himself, rightly, in 2018 or 2019, issued an Executive order on
    this very subject, calling it a national emergency.
        SSCI, the Senate Intelligence Committee, on an
    overwhelmingly bipartisan basis, identified much the same and
    called for more engagement--more engagement with social media
    companies, not less. The key, the key, is making sure that it's
    done in the right way. And that's what we're committed to do--
    focus on the hidden hand of the foreign actor, not on the
    content itself posted.
        Senator Blumenthal. But just so everyone is aware, Director
    Wray, Facebook announced, and I'm quoting, ``that the threat
    sharing by the Federal Government in the U.S. related to
    foreign election interference has been paused since July,'' end
    quote.
        That is a profoundly troubling change that threatens our
    national security. The FBI and other law enforcement and
    intelligence agencies are, in effect, handicapped. They are
    straitjacketed by this ruling. And on that score, and on so
    many other areas where election interference is not just
    imminent, it's ongoing, it's real and urgent, a clear and
    present ongoing threat to our democracy.
        And I hope that my colleagues will heed your warning. It's
    expressed in characteristically understated terms, but I think
    it is a profoundly important warning to this Committee and to
    the country.
        Let me ask about, just in the brief time I have left, hate
    crimes, the rising incidents. I am deeply disturbed, as are
    many of my colleagues, about what's happening on college
    campuses. Free speech has a place, obviously, on campuses.
    Intimidation, physical threats, violence do not. Are you
    satisfied that the leadership of our colleges and universities
    are doing enough to stop violence and physical intimidation?
        Director Wray. Well, it's hard to paint with a broad brush.
    I know that we are working more closely than ever with
    leadership of universities, to try to increase their awareness
    and their resolve on this subject.
        And we now have campus liaison responsibilities assigned to
    a specific agent in every Field Office, to try to--as part of
    that effort. And certainly, we have seen transnational
    repression, for example, from some of these same foreign
    adversaries we were just talking about, occurring on campuses
    and not just in other parts of America.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you seen----
        [Gavel is tapped.]
        Senator Blumenthal [continuing]. Hamas do that?
        Director Wray. I'd have to think about that one, whether
    specifically----
        Senator Blumenthal. Maybe you can respond----
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Blumenthal [continuing]. In writing. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray,
    welcome.
        As you know, I am deeply concerned about the conduct of
    both the Department of Justice and the FBI, particularly in the
    last 3 years during the Biden administration. I think the
    Department of Justice has been profoundly politicized under
    Attorney General Merrick Garland, and I think the FBI has, as
    well.
        And, unfortunately, I think you've been unwilling to stand
    up to senior career officials in the FBI who've allowed the FBI
    to be politicized. I'll tell you I regularly speak with FBI
    agents across the country who are unhappy about the integrity
    of the institution being weakened because DOJ is being treated
    as a political weapon.
        I want to talk, in particular, about the investigation into
    multiple allegations of corruption concerning Hunter Biden and
    Joe Biden, because the Department of Justice has, I think, from
    the outset tried at every step to stop investigation into
    corruption from Joe Biden.
        As you're aware, a WhatsApp text message was sent to Henry
    Zhao, a senior Chinese Communist, from Hunter Biden that reads
    as follows: ``I'm sitting here with my father, and we would
    like to understand why the commitment made has not been
    fulfilled. Tell the Director that I would like to resolve this
    now before it gets out of hand. And now means tonight. And, Z,
    if I get a call or text from anyone involved in this other than
    you, Zhang, or the chairman, I will make certain that, between
    the man sitting next to me and every person he knows and my
    ability to hold a grudge, that you will regret not following my
    direction. I am sitting here waiting for the call with my
    father.''
        Now, Democrats and those in the media trying to defend the
    White House repeatedly say, there is no direct evidence of Joe
    Biden's involvement in his son's corruption. Well, this is a
    text that is direct evidence, that is stating that it is his
    father that is going to retaliate.
        Now, an IRS whistleblower, Gary Shapley, testified before
    the House of Representatives that the natural step he wanted to
    follow was to determine whether Joe Biden was, in fact, sitting
    next to his father when this threat was made to extort millions
    of dollars from a Chinese Communist.
        And what the IRS whistleblower testified is that when he
    tried to find out whether Joe Biden was sitting next to Hunter,
    that the DOJ blocked getting the GPS data on Joe Biden's phone.
    Did the FBI try to ascertain where Hunter Biden was and where
    Joe Biden was when this text was sent?
        Director Wray. Well, I think the questions you're asking go
    to the ongoing investigation being led by Special Counsel
    Weiss. And so I'm not going to be able to discuss what is or
    isn't in scope for that.
        Senator Cruz. Look, there's been testimony under oath from
    the IRS whistleblower that you did not seek the GPS data. And
    you're right. David Weiss, the Special Prosecutor, is in charge
    of it. And it is David Weiss and his underlings who, according
    to the IRS whistleblowers, have alleged that they're the ones
    trying to stop the investigation. They allowed the statute of
    limitations to run on many of the most serious violations.
        Not only that, IRS whistleblower Shapley testified that on
    September 3, Assistant U.S. Attorney Lesley Wolf explicitly
    told investigators that, despite having probable cause to
    search, quote, ``there is no way a search warrant would be
    approved when the evidence in question was located inside of
    Vice President Biden's guesthouse.'' Wolf stated that, quote,
    ``the optics prevented such a search.''
        Is the FBI--do they make a routine practice of allowing
    partisan political optics to prevent investigating serious
    evidence of corruption?
        Director Wray. My instructions to our people, on this and
    on every other investigation, are that we are to follow the
    facts wherever they lead, no matter who likes it, no matter
    what political influence there----
        Senator Cruz. Then why didn't you----
        Director Wray [continuing]. May be out there.
        Senator Cruz [continuing]. Get the GPS data on where Hunter
    Biden and Joe Biden were?
        Director Wray. Again, Senator, with respect, I can't
    discuss----
        Senator Cruz. But it's not----
        Director Wray [continuing]. An ongoing investigation.
        Senator Cruz [continuing]. With respect. And, Director
    Wray, you and I have gone round and round on this, because I
    understand, anytime you're asked about this, the answer is,
    it's an ongoing investigation.
        Of course, the investigation isn't ongoing. You're not
    doing the work. You've got whistleblowers pointing out that
    you're not doing the work, and you are hiding behind the skirts
    of the Attorney General.
        Look, the whistleblower also testified that the Attorney
    General, when he came before Congress--go to the next chart--
    came before Congress, lied under oath to this Committee. The
    Attorney General testified to this Committee, in response to my
    questioning, ``I have pledged not to interfere with the Hunter
    Biden investigation. I have carried through on that pledge.''
        The IRS whistleblowers have alleged the Attorney General
    lied under oath--a felony. Was the Attorney General telling the
    truth when he said this? Do we have the chart? We don't have
    the chart.
        Was the Attorney General telling the truth when he said,
    ``I have pledged not to interfere with the Hunter Biden
    investigation and I have carried through on my pledge'' ?
        Director Wray. Again, I can't speak to the Attorney
    General's testimony. I can only tell you what my instructions
    have been to our people, and I expect----
        Senator Cruz. Has there been----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Those to be followed.
        Senator Cruz [continuing]. Political interference in the
    investigation into Hunter Biden and Joe Biden?
        Director Wray. Not that I have experienced.
        Senator Cruz. Were the investigators allowed to investigate
    whether Joe Biden was complicit in the corruption?
        Director Wray. Again, there is an ongoing investigation----
        Senator Cruz. I'm asking you about----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Being led----
        Senator Cruz [continuing]. Corruption from DOJ. Were they
    allowed to investigate Joe Biden? Or is the whistleblower
    telling the truth that DOJ said, Joe Biden's off limits--no
    questions about the ``big guy'' ?
        Director Wray. And as to what is in scope or not in scope
    of the ongoing investigation, I would refer you to Special
    Counsel Weiss. That is not me hiding behind anything, Senator.
    That is a long-standing policy that has been in place----
        Senator Cruz. Director Wray----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Through multiple
    administrations----
        Senator Cruz [continuing]. You have a responsibility.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Going back years and years and
    years.
        Senator Cruz. You have a responsibility to the FBI, not to
    allow it to be a partisan tool and a partisan weapon. The
    testimony--and, by the way, the FBI's done nothing----
        Director Wray. And I have not, and I will not.
        Senator Cruz. Have you opened an investigation into whether
    the Attorney General lied under oath to Congress and whether
    the Attorney General obstructed justice?
        Director Wray. I'm not going to go down that road here.
        Senator Cruz. I know you're not. That's the point.
        Nobody thinks you've opened an investigation, because
    you're not willing to. And the amazing thing is, Director Wray,
    I've known you 30 years. You're not a partisan Democrat. You're
    simply sitting blithely by while career partisans in your
    agency allow it to be weaponized. And you are damaging the FBI,
    and you are damaging the Department of Justice.
        Let me ask you, also--the whistleblower testified that
    investigators wanted to execute a search warrant on a storage
    unit used by Hunter Biden. And instead, they tipped off Hunter
    Biden's lawyer before the search warrant was carried out.
        Is it typical FBI practice to tip off the subject of a
    search warrant before the search warrant, so they can remove
    any evidence that's incriminating?
        Director Wray. What is typical is that when you're dealing
    with an individual who has a protective detail, it is typical
    for agents to be in contact with the subject's----
        Senator Cruz. Does the protective detail----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Protective detail.
        Senator Cruz. Does the protective detail guard the storage
    unit?
        Director Wray. Again, I can't speak to the storage unit
    specifically. But I can tell you, is that----
        Senator Cruz. Why----
        Director Wray [continuing]. When it comes to----
        Senator Cruz. Why would the FBI tip off the subject of a
    search warrant about the storage unit that was going to be
    searched, beforehand? Does that not undermine the very essence
    of an investigation that DOJ is purporting to undertake?
        Director Wray. Again, I'm not going to be able to discuss
    specific investigative steps that were----
        Senator Cruz. But who is?
        Director Wray [continuing]. Taken in this----
        Senator Cruz. If you're not, nobody answers these
    questions. And it's why people are furious with the coverup,
    because you don't believe the FBI is accountable to Congress or
    to the American people.
        Senator Hirono [presiding]. Your time is up. Director Wray
    has requested a 5-minute recess. Five minutes.
        Director Wray. I'll just--let me just, Senator, if I might,
    just quickly respond and then----
        Senator Hirono. Respond.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Go to the break. Thank you.
        I understand why this is frustrating. I do. But it is also
    the case that these policies that I am referring to, about my
    inability to discuss ongoing investigations--and certainly
    internal deliberations related to ongoing investigations--are
    policies that have not only been in place for many, many years,
    through multiple administrations of both parties.
        But--but, in fact, these are policies that were actually
    strengthened under the last administration and that my
    predecessor was faulted, in a fairly scathing Inspector General
    report, for not following. And so I keep that in my mind----
        Senator Cruz. When you see corruption, you have an
    obligation----
        Director Wray [continuing]. When I----
        Senator Cruz [continuing]. To call it out.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Engaged in this job. Thank you.
        Senator Cruz. You have an obligation to call out
    corruption.
        Senator Hirono. The hearing will recess.
        [Whereupon the hearing was recessed and reconvened.]
        Chair Durbin [presiding]. The Committee will resume.
    Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        All I can say is, phew. Good to have you back.
        So, Director Wray, you testified that no court has held
    that the Fourth Amendment applies to 702 searches. But in 2019,
    the Second Circuit explained that 702 U.S. person queries,
    quote, ``does have important Fourth Amendment implications,''
    end quote, and it remanded that case for further review.
        I know that you testified that you have put in place
    various protections and accountability features to prevent the
    misuse or abuse of 702, but my understanding is that, prior to
    your putting in place these kinds of protections, there was
    something in the order of 2 million U.S. citizen inquiries
    under 702, and then that has gone down to some 200,000. That's
    still a lot of queries.
        So, my colleague Chris Coons asked, you know, while you
    have these protocols in place and courts have said you're doing
    a good job with regard to abuse of 702, but really, what is to
    prevent another administration from removing these protocols?
        And, in fact, I know that during the Trump years, that his
    administration, they interpreted the words ``derived from'' in
    a very broad way under FISA.
        So I do think that there are a number of us who are
    concerned about another administration not having--not paying
    as much attention to abuses as you have testified. And even
    now, I also have some concerns relating to the U.S. citizen
    queries under 702.
        But let me turn to another matter. You did note that there
    is a heightened environment for foreign terrorism. In your
    testimony, though, you note that the top domestic terrorism
    threat we face continues to be from racially motivated violent
    extremists and anti-government or anti-authority violent
    extremists.
        Can you explain how the tech companies--and a lot of this
    is people who have been, typically, radicalized online. Can you
    explain how the tech companies could be better partners in
    rooting out domestic violent extremism?
        Director Wray. Well, some of this goes to the exchanges
    that we've already had about the encryption issue. And when
    individuals, we have found historically, move to discussing
    truly operational, actual violent activity, they tend to move
    to encrypted platforms, which if those encrypted platforms are
    not designed in a way to be responsive to a warrant, then that
    activity, just like the child exploitation we talked about
    earlier, would be beyond reach. So, we need companies to work
    with us on that. So, that's one.
        Second, the companies have their own terms of service and
    actions that they can take. And on their own platforms are
    actions that they could take to help reduce abuse.
        But most importantly, I think, on social media platforms,
    we need people who are on those platforms who are Americans who
    see threats of violence--again, this is what this is about,
    threats of violence--to alert law enforcement if they see them.
        Senator Hirono. Certainly we can do that, but as you say,
    just as with the reporting of hate crimes, et cetera, these are
    all very underreported.
        And I think that there are concerns about possibly limiting
    the liability protections under Section 230. Would that be
    another way to get these platforms to pay attention to content
    on their platforms?
        Director Wray. Well, without weighing on a specific
    legislative proposal, what I would say is that these are
    gigantic companies now with all kinds of activity--some very
    positive, some very negative--that happens on their platforms.
        And just like any industry, it makes sense to me that they
    should take responsibility----
        Senator Hirono. Mm-hmm.
        Director Wray [continuing]. For what happens on their
    platforms--their duties, unlike ours, unlike this Committee's--
    their duties are to maximize profit for the shareholders.
    Nothing wrong with that being their duties. But that's a very
    different responsibility than all of us have to protect the
    American people.
        Senator Hirono. It does sound as though we need to make
    some changes to Section 230 liability protections, and I think
    we need to go there.
        Senator Hirono. Let me turn to another important issue, sex
    trafficking. It remains a real issue in Hawaii and to other
    Native peoples.
        And in Hawaii, for example, sex trafficking
    disproportionately impacts the Native Hawaiian community to the
    point where Native Hawaiian women and girls represent 67 to 77
    percent of sex trafficking victims, and 37 percent of child
    trafficking cases in Hawaii.
        And earlier this year, the FBI launched Operation Not
    Forgotten, to help solve cases of missing and murdered
    indigenous people. I think that is a really important step for
    the FBI to take.
        And prior to that, you also have in place Operation Cross
    Country, which is a 13-year program highlighting some of these
    issues. Can you tell us a bit more about what these programs do
    and what you're--what you hope to accomplish through these
    programs?
        Director Wray. Well, so, these programs are designed to
    both rescue victims of human trafficking and to take down the
    predators who engage in the human trafficking. And we take a
    very victim-centered, victim-focused approach.
        So, in addition to rescuing the victims and arresting the
    predators, our Victim Services personnel try to engage with the
    victims to connect them up to social services and things like
    that, so that we recognize that it's a long road of recovery
    for them, even after they're rescued from the trafficking
    itself. And we're trying to help get them on the right path
    that way.
        Part of the reason things like Operation Cross County are
    kind of combined the way they are is to raise awareness for
    victims and witnesses, and deterrence for predators.
        Senator Hirono. I know that Operation Cross Country
    resulted in the finding of some six missing children in Hawaii.
    I've asked you this before, regarding focusing on Native
    Hawaiian women and girls who are trafficked, and--is Operation
    Not Forgotten in Hawaii?
        Director Wray. Is it in Hawaii?
        Senator Hirono. Is it in Hawaii? Does it----
        Director Wray. I think Operation Not Forgotten is a----
        Senator Hirono [continuing]. Is there a presence in Hawaii?
        Director Wray [continuing]. Operation Not Forgotten is--if
    I recall the name correctly, there is very specific operations
    in Hawaii that our Honolulu Field Office and Division are
    conducting. And they do some great work in the human
    trafficking space, and I'm proud of the work they've done for
    your community, in fact, the citizens--your constituents of the
    State of Hawaii.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I appreciate the effort, and I'm
    glad that some of my colleagues have asked you about what more
    we can do regarding the rise in antisemitism in our country,
    especially on our college campuses. Thank you for whatever you
    can do to assist in that regard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chair Durbin. Thanks, Senator Hirono. Senator Hawley.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Wray,
    thank you for being here.
        I noticed with interest in your written testimony that you
    said, and I'm quoting you now, ``The FBI uses all tools
    available at its disposal to combat domestic terrorism''--which
    now apparently includes the crime of being Catholic. Let's talk
    a little bit about the FBI's egregious targeting of Catholic
    Americans.
        You have repeatedly been asked about the memo generated by
    the Richmond Field Office, we now know in collaboration with
    multiple other Field Offices, about recruiting sources in
    Catholic churches.
        You have repeatedly said that no human sources were
    approached. This is you on July the 12th, in the House. You
    were asked directly by Jim Jordan, do you think that priests
    ought to be approached to give information on parishioners? You
    said, ``no,'' sir. No, sir.
        You went on to say, we do not recruit, open, or operate
    human sources. We do not report on religious organizations. You
    went on to say, this product--meaning the Richmond memo--has
    not resulted in any investigative action.
        But now we know that, in fact, FBI agents did approach a
    priest and a choir director, to ask them to inform on
    parishioners. So, were you lied to when you gave this
    testimony? Or were you lying to Congress?
        Director Wray. Neither. So, your question conflates two
    different things. There's the intelligence product itself,
    which the Richmond Field Office created. It was written by, as
    our inspection found, by analysts in Richmond, reviewed by
    people in Richmond, and captioned, ``Richmond Field Office
    Product.''
        Separately from that, there was an investigation of a
    specific individual who was amassing Molotov cocktails and
    posting about killing people.
        And it does not surprise me that there were people who knew
    that subject in that investigation, that is, the guy building
    the Molotov cocktails and trying to kill people--that people
    talked to the witnesses who knew that person.
        And I think the product, the Richmond intelligence product
    which cites that investigation, is actually pretty transparent
    about exactly what I just said.
        Senator Hawley. No, I don't think so at all. In fact, the
    only reason we know this is a whistleblower has come forward
    and told the House, under oath, that the FBI went and
    interviewed priests and choir directors in the Richmond area.
        The House goes on to say that the FBI has repeatedly
    refused to disclose this information. The only reason we know
    it is because a whistleblower came forward with it. Just like
    the only reason we know about this memo is because a
    whistleblower came forward with it.
        How many other parishes around the country have priests or
    choir directors that've been approached? By the way, are
    Catholic choirs now, are they--are they breeding grounds for
    domestic terrorism? Is this your latest theory? How many other
    parishes have FBI agents approached priests and choir directors
    to ask about parishioners?
        Director Wray. Look, Senator, we do not and will not
    conduct investigations based on anybody's exercise of their
    constitutionally protected----
        Senator Hawley. You have done----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Religious----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. So, and your memo----
        Director Wray. No, sir.
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Explicitly asks for it.
        Director Wray. No----
        Senator Hawley. Your memo labels traditional Catholics as
    racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists in need of
    investigation. You have a list of churches--a list in the memo.
    You've repeatedly said, we don't target churches. We don't list
    churches. They're listed in the memo. So, how many other
    parishes have you gone to, to talk to choir directors, for
    heaven's sake?
        Director Wray. As I've----
        Senator Hawley. Do you know the answer to that question?
        Director Wray. No, I don't know the answer to that
    question. But I can tell you that we don't investigate people
    for their exercise of their constitutionally protected--
    constitutionally protected religious expression.
        Senator Hawley. I ask----
        Director Wray [continuing]. That particular intelligence
    product is something that, as soon as I saw it, I was aghast. I
    had it withdrawn.
        Senator Hawley. Really? You were aghast?
        Director Wray. I was.
        Senator Hawley. Oh, really?
        Director Wray. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hawley. And what have you done about it? Did you
    fire the people who wrote it?
        Director Wray. No, I had it withdrawn----
        Senator Hawley. Have you fired anybody involved in it?
        Director Wray. Senator, if you would give me a chance to
    answer----
        Senator Hawley. That's a----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Your question----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Yes or a no. It's not hard.
    Have you fired anyone involved in the writing of that
    outrageous memo, about----
        Director Wray. Senator----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Which, frankly, you've
    repeatedly misled the public? Yes or no?
        Director Wray. The individuals involved in that product----
        Senator Hawley. Have you fired----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Were not----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Anyone?
        Director Wray [continuing]. Just a minute--were not found
    to have engaged in any intentional or bad-faith conduct, and,
    in fact----
        Senator Hawley. Really?
        Director Wray. In fact, Senator, a number of the
    individuals involved----
        Senator Hawley. So, the answer's no.
        Director Wray. A number of the individuals involved in
    writing that product in the Richmond Office were themselves
    Catholic. So, the notion----
        Senator Hawley. Oh, I see. So, therefore----
        Director Wray [continuing]. That they are targeting----
        Senator Hawley. Oh.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Their own faith----
        Senator Hawley. Oh. So, they----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Is nonsense.
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Have a get-out-of-jail-free
    card. I see.
        Director Wray. They----
        Senator Hawley. I see. So, you're----
        Director Wray. I did not say that.
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Immune, and they're immune.
    So, we shouldn't ask questions about it. You haven't done a
    darned thing. You haven't fired anybody.
        In fact, what the House found is--what is it? You
    admonished them. They were admonished, and their respective
    supervisors were told to engage with the Human Resources
    Division to ensure that deficiencies are addressed.
        Oh, I feel much better. They've been sent to bed without
    food. Good heavens, Director. This is one of the most
    outrageous targetings.
        You have mobilized your division, the most powerful law
    enforcement division in the world, against traditionalist
    Catholics--whatever the heck that means--and you just told us
    you have not fired a single person.
        I mean, here, it gets worse. Your Richmond Field Office,
    they thought there was nothing wrong with this. The House
    interviewed the head of the Richmond Field Office. He
    testified. It's all here in the public report. I refer you to
    it--pages 12, 13, 14. He testified he saw no problem with this.
    He said he thought it was fine.
        In fact, we have internal memoranda of the members of the
    Field Office high-fiving. One peer reviewer, another member of
    the Field Office, wrote, ``I think this is a great product. I
    really enjoyed the read.''
        Do you have a problem with systemic bigotry against
    Catholics in the FBI?
        Director Wray. No.
        Senator Hawley. What are you going to do about this? Are
    you going to fire these people or not?
        Director Wray. Those individuals have all been admonished,
    and it is all going into their----
        Senator Hawley. Admonished.
        Director Wray. If you would let me finish my answer. It is
    all going into their annual performance reviews. It has direct
    impact on their compensation, among other things.
        Senator Hawley. Oh, I see. Oh, I see. I see. So, the 60
    million American Catholics who, we now--who now learn that your
    FBI has recommended that priests be recruiters and informants--
    your FBI has gone to priests, choir directors. But we're to
    feel better because you've admonished them for their
    wrongdoing.
        Director Wray. You, again, are conflating two different
    things. When----
        Senator Hawley. No, I'm not.
        Director Wray [continuing]. We are----
        Senator Hawley. I am taking your testimony, where you said
    you do not--you said categorically--categorically, you said, we
    do not--we do not go to priests and ask them about their
    parishioners. You said, we do not. You didn't say, we haven't.
    You didn't say, we won't. You said, we don't.
        As it turns out, you do. And you kept it from the public.
    You deliberately misled Congress about it, and the only reason
    we know about it is because a whistleblower came forward.
        Director Wray. I just fundamentally----
        Senator Hawley. That's the truth.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Disagree with your
    characterization.
        Senator Hawley. Well, there's no characterization. The
    facts are the facts. And I fundamentally resent the fact that
    you have violated--if not the spirit, if not the letter,
    certainly the spirit of the First Amendment, and used your law
    enforcement agency against Catholics in this Nation.
        Let me ask you about one other thing. Last time you were
    here, you had to leave early to take a jet to your vacation in
    the Adirondacks. Now, let me just ask you this. The
    whistleblower tells us that you also maintain a home in
    Atlanta, to which you fly on a regular basis. I'm told by this
    whistleblower from the FBI that you use the FBI jet to make
    that travel. Is that correct?
        Director Wray. All of my travel, personal or work related,
    is required to be done on FBI planes. That is long-standing
    policy. It goes back----
        Senator Hawley. He----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Well over a decade.
        Senator Hawley. I'll take that as a yes. The whistleblower
    also says that you regularly require the jet, which is based in
    Manassas, to be flown to DC because, and I quote now, ``Wray
    doesn't like to sit in traffic.'' Is that accurate?
        Director Wray. No, that's not accurate.
        Senator Hawley. He also says that you pay only the lowest-
    cost commercial ticket for that Atlanta-to-DC trip, which is, I
    don't know, what, 200 bucks or something, when, of course, it
    costs 20--$30,000 to operate the jet. Is that correct?
        Director Wray. The reimbursement that I provide is
    reimbursement that is set by OMB policy, and I----
        Senator Hawley. So, that's a yes?
        Director Wray [continuing]. Follow that policy, which goes
    back over a decade and I think has been chronicled in a GSA
    report from back in, like, 2013.
        Senator Hawley. You'll provide----
        Director Wray. All of these issues----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. All the records to this
    Committee of your travel and relevant use----
        Director Wray. I'll provide----
        Senator Hawley [continuing]. Of the FBI jet?
        Director Wray [continuing]. Whatever information is
    appropriate. Absolutely.
        Senator Hawley. Well, appropriate. I mean, everything that
    we ask for?
        Director Wray. I--we will follow up with you about
    providing information.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chair Durbin. Senator Butler.
        Senator Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Director
    Wray, for returning. I associate myself with the comments of my
    colleagues in appreciating you for your service and those who
    serve under your leadership for doing the work to protect the
    country. I have a couple different topics I'd like to talk with
    you a little bit about.
        One is concerning what it is that your team might be
    learning and/or seeing as trends, now, post the Dobbs decision,
    where, after 50 years of precedent set by Roe v. Wade, we got a
    Dobbs decision where the preliminary data has been showing that
    there's been an increase in attacks against medical clinics
    that provide abortion-related healthcare.
        In my own State of California, this dangerous behavior has
    reared its head as of late, where three men who were involved
    in conspiring to firebomb a reproductive health clinic.
        Talk to me a little bit, Director Wray, and just share with
    the American public what the FBI, your agency, has been doing
    post-Dobbs decision. What trends are you seeing relative to the
    threats facing reproductive health clinics?
        Director Wray. Sure. Happy to take that on. Some things you
    will probably expect. Some things you might not expect.
        In the category of things that you might expect, certainly
    we continue to see violence against a variety of
    establishments, motivated by views on abortion. And you've
    mentioned a few cases in your question, and we pursue those
    cases through--on the criminal side through the FACE Act.
        And in some instances, if there's more of a terrorism
    angle, we might be pursuing explosive charges or what have you,
    through our Joint Terrorism Task Force. That part, you would
    probably expect, and that continues apace.
        What you might not expect, though, is that of the
    investigations that have been opened based on tips and leads
    and activity that we've seen since the leak of the Dobbs
    decision, is that actually we've seen a huge uptick in violence
    against pro-life facilities, not just abortion clinics and so
    forth.
        And we just recently had a case where we had an individual
    who had tried to firebomb a pro-life facility in Madison,
    Wisconsin, and our folks did some great work with DNA off of a
    burrito, to be able to apprehend the suspect. And so, we've
    seen violence on both sides of the issue.
        And the reason I bring that up is because it's important
    for Americans to understand that I don't care--we don't care
    what side of the abortion issue you're on, you don't get to
    engage in violence to express your views. That's where--that's
    where we get involved, and that's where the line gets crossed.
        Senator Butler. Are there--let me move to a different
    topic. There has been a lot of conversation, a lot of questions
    asked of you today that you've responded to relative to the
    increase in hate crimes directed toward the Jewish community,
    directed toward the Muslim community. And I, too, join my
    colleagues in the concern and appreciate the work of the FBI in
    those areas.
        And the last time you were before this Committee, I asked
    you specifically about hate crimes directed toward the LGBT+
    community. There's data that continues to illuminate the fact
    that there's increased hate crimes directed toward the AAPI
    community in the country. And it has, continues to be noted and
    documented--the rise in hate crimes directed toward Black
    Americans in the country.
        Here's my question. What are the--what is the work the FBI
    is doing directed toward hate crimes, generally? What are you
    doing, what can you do, and what can we do as a Congress, as a
    Committee, to better equip you to help to increase both the
    reporting as well as the prevention of these crimes directed,
    motivated, by hate?
        Director Wray. Well, I can speak more to what we can do and
    what we are doing, both on the investigative side--we're making
    a conscious point of trying to work with our law enforcement
    partners to find the cases, to pursue them, even if Federal
    charges, because of the particularities of what the Federal
    statute requires, even if Federal charges are not easily
    prosecutable.
        If State charges are brought, then we don't just check out.
    We, FBI, continue to help our State and local partners to
    ensure that there's accountability and justice brought through
    State charges.
        We have elevated civil rights crimes, including
    specifically hate crimes as the highest priority within those,
    to a national threat priority over the last couple years, and
    that has increased the amount of resources we can devote to it.
    In addition, you mentioned reporting and prevention.
        One of the things we know about hate crimes, really across
    the whole spectrum of victims, is that they are underreported.
    And so one of the things that we're doing, and other public
    figures could do, is to try to reach out to individual
    communities to educate them about hate crimes and where they
    can go to report it.
        So if they're a witness, a victim, they know where to go
    and what to do about it.
        We also engage with local law enforcement, because
    sometimes they don't necessarily recognize what to do with
    individual fact patterns that might become a hate crime.
        So, those are some of the things that we're doing to try to
    increase the fidelity of the statistics on this, because that
    helps us identify trends and figure out how to allocate
    resources and investigative priority. So, it's investigative,
    it's support, it's outreach, it's education, raising awareness.
        Senator Butler. The last question that I have, Director
    Wray--thank you for that.
        Since I've been a Member of this body, you've--this is the
    second time that I've got the opportunity to talk with you, and
    in each time, each instance, you have raised your concern and
    heightened awareness about the potential threat of violence
    directed toward this country from other nation-states.
        I want to talk a little bit about attacks on our electric
    grid. Particularly in the past few years, the U.S. has seen a
    record surge in the number of attacks on the electric grid and
    physical attacks, including two bombings in my State in San
    Jose, California, last winter that left thousands of residents
    without power.
        I know you know the details, and so I'll skip the
    storytelling, but, Director Wray, what updates can you share
    about the FBI's investigation into the recent string of
    physical attacks on our electric grid. And what steps have you
    taken to improve and coordinate the data collection, relative
    to protecting our physical infrastructure?
        Director Wray. Well, of course you're asking about the
    physical attacks on the electric grid. Obviously, there are
    also a whole range of cyber attacks on the electric grid, as
    well. But just focusing on the physical attacks, we have seen
    an increasing number of attacks on substations, and things like
    that, for a variety of motivations.
        So, for example, you know, in Baltimore, we had a fairly
    well-known case not that long ago of a couple of individuals
    who were attempting to cause chaos. These were racially
    motivated violent extremists who wanted to essentially cause
    this cascading power failure, attacking five substations in the
    Baltimore area. And thankfully we were able to disrupt that
    attack.
        But we've also seen people attacking substations for non-
    ideological reasons, including--I think out in the Pacific
    Northwest somewhere, there was a case that individuals were
    trying to facilitate a robbery, and they wanted to bring down
    the power grid to essentially enhance their ability to conduct
    a robbery. So, there was a financial motive in that instance.
    And we've also had, like, just straight-out vandalism.
        So, there's a bunch of different motivations, but what they
    have in common is a targeting of the electric grid, of the
    substations. And so we are working more and more closely not
    just with DHS but the Department of Energy and other regulatory
    partners to try to give them better information so that they
    can figure out how to better harden their infrastructure.
        Senator Butler. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Butler. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Director Wray, in your written statements,
    you mentioned antisemitic attacks, and in your opening
    statement this morning you said that the FBI seeks to mitigate
    them quickly. Has there been an increase in antisemitic attacks
    since the October 7th atrocity against Israel?
        Director Wray. Yes. And what's striking about that is that
    that's coming on the heels of what we were already seeing, even
    before October 7th, as a significant uptick, not just of hate-
    fueled attacks but specifically antisemitic hate-filled attacks
    as a portion of those.
        And by far and away the biggest chunk of the tips and leads
    which are coming in fast and constantly to us, post-October
    7th--the biggest chunk by far involve threats to the Jewish
    community. We've seen bomb threats to synagogues, you know,
    threats to attack the Jewish community on campuses, and other
    places. We've had multiple arrests.
        And so it is a real problem. And as I think I testified
    maybe recently, what's so jarring about those attacks is that
    the Jewish community in this country is, like, 2\1/2\ percent
    of the American public, and yet they represent something close
    to 60 percent of all religiously based hate crimes. And they
    have the unique distinction of being targeted by Sunni
    terrorists, Shi'a terrorists, domestic terrorists, inspired
    terrorists. And so we are acutely focused on the threats to the
    Jewish community, which very much needs our help.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I share your concerns about
    those threats and the disproportionate nature of the threats to
    Jews in America. Federal civil rights laws do protect Jews from
    these antisemitic hate crimes and acts of violence, to include
    their criminal provisions. Is that right?
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. I want to focus on one particularly
    egregious incident of such antisemitism.
        On Thanksgiving Day, a pro-Palestinian mob showed up at the
    home of Michael Tuchin in Los Angeles. Mr. Tuchin is no random
    private citizen. He is the president of the American Israel
    Public Affairs Committee, also known as AIPAC, one of the
    strongest supporters of the American-Israel alliance and
    somewhat--an organization with broad bipartisan support in
    Congress. The--this mob was there for no other reason than that
    Mr. Tuchin is Jewish and that he is the president of AIPAC and
    a supporter of Israel.
        The mob set off smoke bombs with dense black smoke, to make
    him and his family think their house was on fire. They blared
    sirens. They dumped fake blood and infant-sized body bags in
    his driveway. They vandalized cars that were parked in the
    driveway. They distributed flyers around the neighborhood with
    Mr. Tuchin's photo and a message there would be, quote, ``no
    peace,'' end quote, for him as long as AIPAC supports Israel.
        When a neighbor tried to intervene during a lengthy wait
    for the police to arrive, one member of this mob attacked the
    neighbor with a metal pole. Director Wray, has the FBI made any
    arrests in these hate crimes in Los Angeles that have been so
    widely publicized in the media?
        Director Wray. Well, I don't know if it's part of the same
    investigation, but I know, for example, post-October 7th, we
    have had arrests of individuals in L.A., in the L.A. area,
    specifically individuals who were threatening, for example, the
    ADL CEO, and a number of people in the ADL leadership.
        And a lot of the cases that we've been advancing, post-
    October 7th, involve threats that sound very similar to the one
    you're describing. If I----
        Senator Cotton. These go beyond threats. They showed up at
    his home on Thanksgiving Day and vandalized his home and
    attacked a neighbor. The organization is known as the People's
    City Council of Los Angeles, who post videos and photos up on
    their account along with the message, quote, ``No peace for
    these baby killers. F-AIPAC. Hashtag Free Palestine.''
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Cotton. To be clear, they didn't use the PG version
    of the four-letter expletive starting with F, in their social
    media post. So, are you aware of the FBI either conducting
    arrests in this, against this mob at Mr. Tuchin's house--or
    even investigating?
        Director Wray. As I sit here right now, I don't know
    specifically. We've had so many investigations, as I said in
    our earlier exchange, that are focused on threats or more than
    threats against the Jewish community, all around the country.
    Let me follow up and see if we can get more information----
        Senator Cotton. Good.
        Director Wray [continuing]. To you on that specific case.
        Senator Cotton. I would very much appreciate that, because
    it is the case that, you know, the history of our Federal civil
    rights laws, especially the criminal provisions of them, go
    back to a time when local authorities refused to protect the
    civil rights of their people. This is paradigmatically in the
    post-Civil War era, when local Democratic officials in the
    South wouldn't protect the rights of free Black slaves.
        But color me very skeptical that notorious Democrat George
    Gascon, the prosecuting attorney for the County of Los Angeles,
    is going to zealously pursue criminal charges against this mob
    that showed up at Mr. Tuchin's home and assaulted one of his
    neighbors.
        So, I would very much appreciate you following up with me,
    personally, to know that the FBI is, at a minimum,
    investigating this mob and the violent attack on one of Mr.
    Tuchin's neighbors.
        And I hope they'll do so zealously, using some of the many
    techniques that have been used in, for example, the
    prosecutions of Donald Trump, where the Department of Justice
    has gone so far as to subpoena people who retweeted or liked
    Donald Trump's social media posts. Or the investigations into
    the January 6th rioters, where facial recognition technology
    and cell phone location data has been used.
        If these are good enough for those investigations, I think
    they should be good enough for this investigation, as well--
    which, again, I don't think that George Gascon is going to
    zealously pursue.
        Director Wray. Well, as I said, we will follow up with you
    directly about this particular matter. I will tell you, in the
    meantime, that my instructions to our people are very much
    along the lines of my comments here today, which is, the Jewish
    community needs us, and we need to be leaning forward.
        Senator Cotton. Well, thank you for that. And, as I said,
    citing their social media accounts where they post photos and
    videos of it, these are not criminal masterminds. This should
    not be a tough case for anyone to crack. I'm sure the LAPD
    would be happy to investigate and arrest if they thought Mr.
    Gascon would actually pursue charges.
        Absent that, I hope that the FBI and the Department of
    Justice uses the full extent of Federal criminal civil rights
    laws to make sure that this pro-Hamas mob faces legal
    consequences. Thank you.
        Chair Durbin. Senator Ossoff.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Director
    Wray, good to see you, again. And you know I never fail to
    mention that Georgia is proud of you, and we love seeing you
    when you come back home. Hope you will, again, soon.
        You and I have spoken before about the dangerous increase
    in the frequency of sextortion crimes targeting children--young
    children who are lured or targeted to share compromising or
    explicit photos and then blackmailed or bullied or worse on the
    basis of that content. Senator Blackburn and Senator Grassley
    and I have, together, moved legislation through this Committee
    aimed at helping prevent the sexual abuse of children online.
        Your Field Office in Atlanta recently, again, highlighted
    sextortion as a particular concern in Georgia. The Atlanta
    Field Office said that these schemes have increased in
    frequency by 700 percent since 2021. Can you please provide an
    update on the FBI's overall efforts to investigate and prevent
    these crimes targeting children online?
        Director Wray. So, this is a rapidly emerging threat to the
    youth of America. It's not--when I say rapidly emerging, it's
    not that it's brand new, as you and I have discussed. It's been
    emerging for some time.
        But what's newer is that it's really bursting into
    prominence in the last, let's say, year and a half, in
    particular. And that--that's mostly a bad thing, because of how
    prevalent it is. But it is also a reflection of potentially a
    little bit of a good thing, which is growing awareness. And we
    need more awareness of this.
        What is the FBI doing? We're aggressively investigating
    these cases. We just had, recently had a case, for example,
    where a--a very tragic case in Michigan, where a young
    teenager, male, committed suicide because he was basically in
    one of--exactly one of these kinds of cases, was essentially
    egged on when he couldn't pay the money, and he was explaining
    he didn't have the money--egged on to kill himself, and he did.
        And we pursued, in that case, the wrongdoers, who were all
    the way over in Nigeria. We worked with our Nigerian partners,
    got the individuals involved arrested, had them brought back,
    extradited back to the U.S. to face trial here, as a way of
    demonstrating that you are never beyond our reach and that
    we're going to pursue these cases, really, to the far corners
    of the globe.
        But the second thing, and part of the reason I bring up
    that case as an example, is that it's very important to raise
    awareness. Because I think a lot of the kids who are falling
    victim to this, when they get targeted, they don't--they don't
    think they have a choice. They feel like they're trapped and
    stuck and then turn to tragic consequences, like suicide.
        So, raising awareness is not just raising awareness for
    parents but it's raising awareness for teenagers, so that they
    know there's something they can do. So, we're working with
    NCMEC, for example.
        But in that Michigan case, to their great credit, the young
    man's parents sort of embraced the idea of using his case, his
    tragic death, as a way to try to prevent other kids from
    falling victim to the same thing. And it's really deeply moving
    that they would try to find some good that they can achieve
    through the just heartbreaking loss of their son.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray. And that is
    obviously a top concern for parents in Georgia, and so is the
    opioid crisis and how it impacts high school students.
        Several news outlets reported recently that multiple
    students overdosed on fentanyl in one Gwinnett County high
    school, that none of the students knew they were consuming
    fentanyl. One was reportedly using a vape pen.
        Earlier this year, students in Lee County, in Southwest
    Georgia, reportedly hospitalized, again, after using a vape
    that was reportedly laced not just with THC but also with
    fentanyl.
        Thankfully, all of the students survived. Can you lay out
    for my constituents back in Georgia what the FBI is doing to
    protect children and adolescents from opioids, from fentanyl,
    and, increasingly, as we see, the inadvertent overdose by
    students who are either vaping or perhaps think they're taking
    some other drug or a counterfeit prescription drug?
        Director Wray. Well, of course, you're rightly flagging
    that one of the really pernicious parts of the crisis, the
    fentanyl scourge that we're dealing with right now, is that
    it's getting pressed into or incorporated into all sorts of
    other things.
        So, you've got--it's bad enough for the people taking it
    intentionally because they're addicted. But the people who are
    unwittingly taking it, whether it's in their prescriptions or
    something else, is a huge problem.
        So, what is the FBI doing? Well, I'd start with what I said
    in my opening, which is, just in the last 2 years, the FBI has
    seized 200--enough fentanyl to kill 270 million Americans.
    That's essentially 80 percent of the American public. And
    that's just our work--obviously, we have lots of partners doing
    great work, too, in just the last 2 years. So, that's a start.
        A few other things we're doing--we are targeting the
    cartels. We have over 300 investigations focused on the cartel
    leadership and them, as the source of supply. We are focusing
    on the distribution side of it, here in the U.S., violent
    gangs--our Safe Streets Task Forces are focused on those.
        We are targeting the professionals, in effect the
    healthcare profession, where they become part of it, pill mills
    and things like that, that are also part of the problem,
    through our Prescription Drug Initiative.
        We are also targeting the darknet marketplaces, where an
    awful lot of this stuff is being trafficked. We have a whole
    thing called JCODE, with lots of other agencies, that we lead,
    that is dismantling darknet marketplaces of opioids.
        And then, from an awareness perspective, we are doing
    things like we worked with DEA to create a movie called,
    ``Chasing the Dragon,'' that was shown in schools. And we've
    got other sort of outreach, awareness-raising that's focused on
    schools and youth and educators, to try to get at it on the
    demand side, too.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Director Wray. And with my
    remaining time, you've touched on this in response to a number
    of Members. But Georgia's Jewish community, Georgia's Muslim
    community both expressing to me their deep anxiety at this
    moment, the increased level of threat, the increased explicit
    threats, the increased perception of threat and fear.
        Can you please provide some reassurance to my Jewish and
    Muslim constituents about how seriously the FBI is taking
    community protection? And, by the way, thank you to your Field
    Office in Atlanta and Special Agent Farley for the work that
    they've done to help reassure my constituents, as well.
        Director Wray. So, we are working those cases both through
    our Joint Terrorism Task Forces but also on the criminal side,
    through our Civil Rights Program, as hate crimes. So, we've
    got, sort of, both engines, if you will, in the FBI focused on
    it.
        We also have created--I created in 2019 a domestic
    terrorism-hate crimes fusion cell, which brings together
    expertise to try to anticipate where the threats are going.
        We have opened, I think, 60 percent more hate crimes
    investigations, post-October 7th, than we had before October
    7th--and it was escalating pretty fast before October 7th, too.
        And we've got all of our Field Offices, as you mentioned
    with SAC Farley in Atlanta, not just pushing the investigations
    but engaging in a lot of outreach to affected communities in
    their areas--both to reassure them, as you say, but also to
    kind of raise awareness, like, hey, we're here. If you see
    something, we want to know about it, because there are things
    we can do to help.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Ossoff. Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Director, it seems to me that some people should not
    have power. I don't care how smart they are. I don't care how
    experienced they are. They just don't have enough maturity or
    morality or ethics to exercise power.
        And I am talking, of course, about your predecessor. You
    have been a significant improvement. Unlike my experience with
    you, and what I've observed is, and unlike your predecessor,
    you're not egomaniacal, and you're not egocentric, and you're
    not a self-aggrandizer. You don't run around like your
    predecessor, going, look at me, look at me. You don't leak to
    the press like the Titanic. And I know that's a low bar, but I
    appreciate it.
        You talk a lot about 38,000 women and men in the FBI, the
    vast majority of whom do an extraordinary job. And I agree with
    that. Most of those women and men that you're talking about are
    in your Field Offices. I'm not saying there aren't some in the
    Washington Office.
        But the problems we've had with the FBI over the past
    decade--you've alluded to them--have come primarily out of the
    Washington Office.
        I listened carefully to your recitation of your efforts to
    clean that up. But I think most fair-minded Americans still
    wonder if there has been real accountability in all cases. And
    that's the spirit in which I'm going to ask you these
    questions. Who made the decision at the FBI to raid Mar-a-Lago
    for those documents?
        Director Wray. I'm not--I'm not sure there's a specific
    person that made the decision. It was the investigative team
    that was on that investigation, working with the prosecutors on
    the case.
        Senator Kennedy. Why didn't you just do a consent to search
    and avoid all the drama?
        Director Wray. Well----
        Senator Kennedy. Not you, but whoever made the decision.
        Director Wray. Yes. Well, let me try it this way, because
    obviously we are talking now about not just an ongoing
    investigation that's not just an ongoing investigation that's
    being led by a Special Counsel. But an ongoing investigation
    being led by a Special Counsel that's in front of a court with
    likely very strong views about what it is I can say publicly,
    which gets at some of your gracious comments about public
    commentary about cases.
        But I think if you, in that particular instance, if you
    look at the affidavit in support of the search warrant and,
    more importantly, the pleadings that were filed by the
    prosecutors in the case, they lay out, in a very detailed way,
    all the efforts that were made to ensure compliance, short of
    proceeding to a search, as well as, as now has been charged,
    actual obstruction of justice.
        And so, in my experience, again, speaking more generally
    now, both as a line prosecutor and now as FBI Director, when it
    comes to obtaining classified information, retrieving it, we
    typically pursue the least intrusive means possible. But if
    those don't work, and certainly if there's obstruction of
    justice, which in this case has found by a probable cause
    standard by the judge, then it's pretty typical to resort to a
    search warrant.
        Senator Kennedy. Of course, as you know as well as I do,
    the FBI cannot censor Americans' speech--talks about abridging
    speech, that our First Amendment does. At one time, I think it
    was during your tenure, the FBI had 80 FBI agents working with
    social media, encouraging social media to take down accounts
    and remove, quote, ``disinformation and election
    interference.''
        A district court found that the FBI and other agencies
    asked social media platforms to remove content and to change
    their moderations policies in a way that violated the First
    Amendment. And it went up to the Fifth Circuit.
        The Fifth Circuit limited the injunction, but here's what
    the Fifth Circuit said. The FBI, quote, ``likely coerced the
    platforms into moderating content and encouraged them to do so
    by effecting changes in their moderation policies,'' end quote,
    in violation of the First Amendment.
        The FBI agreed with the plaintiffs that, quote--I'm quoting
    the Fifth Circuit,``Federal agencies--Federal agents ran afoul
    of the First Amendment by coercing and significantly
    encouraging social media platforms to censor disfavored speech,
    including by threats of adverse government action like
    antitrust enforcement and legal reforms.'' That's serious. Is
    the Fifth Circuit wrong?
        Director Wray. Well, as you may know, first off, let me
    just say the opinions talk about a whole bunch of other
    executive agencies besides the FBI, and I'm not going to speak
    to what the other agencies entered into, but as far as the----
        Senator Kennedy. Well, you weren't the only one. It was----
        Director Wray. But there----
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. The White House. It was----
        Director Wray. But just----
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Homeland Security. But----
        Director Wray. But----
        Senator Kennedy. But--but your folks were there, too, all
    80 of them--80 agents.
        Director Wray. Well, but----
        Senator Kennedy. Combing social media every day. Calling
    Twitter. Calling Facebook. Take that down. Get rid of that
    account. And it wasn't just on election interference. It was on
    COVID vaccines. It was on lockdowns.
        Director Wray. So, a couple things. And I appreciate the
    opportunity to clarify this. So, first, on things like COVID
    vaccines and stuff like that, the FBI had no role in telling
    anybody to take anything down.
        In fact, as you may know, the FBI was the only agency, back
    at that time--and the only agency in the entire Intelligence
    Community to reach the conclusion, to moderate confidence, that
    the origins of the pandemic were most likely a lab leak in
    China. We were the only agency.
        So, we most certainly were not encouraging anybody to
    communicate differently on that.
        Second, even on the topics we did communicate with social
    media companies about, from everything I've seen, we, in fact,
    did not instruct anybody to take that information down.
        As to the Fifth Circuit's opinion--as to the Fifth
    Circuit's opinion, as you may also know, we actually hotly
    contest a lot of the findings, and not just the legal
    conclusions but the actual factual findings.
        And the Department has sought Supreme Court review, asked
    them to vacate the injunction. The Supreme Court's not only
    vacated the injunction but granted cert, so I probably should--
    --
        Senator Kennedy. Let me----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Leave it at that.
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Stop you a second. I've gone
    way over. I want to ask you one last question. We had a--we had
    a controversy during the election about Mr. Hunter Biden's
    laptop. And at that time, you had 80 agents interfacing with
    social media, doing whatever they were doing.
        The FBI had the Hunter Biden laptop, got it on December 9,
    2019. The New York Post story, which a lot of the social media
    companies, at the suggestion of Government, took down--the
    story came out on 10/14/2020. Why didn't the FBI just say,
    ``Hey, the laptop's real'' ? Why didn't you just tell
    everybody, ``The laptop's real. We're not vouching for what's
    on it, but it's real. This isn't a fiction'' ?
        Director Wray. Well, as you might imagine, the FBI cannot,
    especially at a time like that, be talking about an ongoing
    investigation.
        Second, I would tell you that at least my understanding is
    that both the FBI folks involved in the conversations and the
    Twitter folks involved in the conversations, both say that the
    FBI did not direct Twitter to suppress that----
        Senator Kennedy. But others----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Particular story.
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Were, in Government.
        Director Wray. Well I can't, again, I can't speak to others
    in Government. That's part of the point that I was trying to
    make. Because the Fifth Circuit's opinion----
        Senator Kennedy. Yes, sir, but you're the FBI. You're not
    part of the White House and part of Homeland Security. You're
    not supposed to be political. You see all this controversy
    going on. Why didn't the FBI say, time out, folks. We're not--
    --
        [Gavel is tapped.]
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Getting in the middle of
    this, but the laptop's real?
        Director Wray. Again, we have to be very careful about what
    we can say, especially in the middle of an election season.
    Because that's precisely some of the problems that led to my
    predecessor's negative findings from the Inspector General.
        Senator Kennedy. Did you hear a gavel?
        Chair Durbin. Thank you----
        Senator Kennedy. I heard a gavel.
        Chair Durbin [continuing]. Senator Kennedy--thank you,
    Senator Kennedy. Senator Booker.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that
    Senator Kennedy is Santa Claus of spirit. But he is the Grinch
    when it comes to stealing my time. But it's good to see him, as
    always.
        Senator Kennedy. I'm sorry.
        Senator Booker. Director Wray, it's good to see you again.
        I just want to say at the top, it's often--I don't get
    often enough to say it to you, but having years and years of
    working with FBI agents, especially in New Jersey, I just know
    that you represent an organization of extraordinarily noble
    people who do things on a daily basis to protect us and to keep
    us safe that most Americans don't know about. And in this time
    of year especially, just that heroism, I just want to recognize
    it at the top.
        I listened in my office to a lot of the earlier
    questioning, and I'm just really grateful for how much of an
    emphasis you've been putting on the safety and security of
    Americans to racist and religious hate.
        It was literally hours after the October 7th attacks--I was
    in Israel, that I reached out to my colleagues in the
    Democratic caucus and said that we have to get more money for
    the Nonprofit Security Grants. And I'm glad that there seems to
    be bipartisan movement to that.
        I appreciate the comments of a lot of my colleagues,
    especially Tom Cotton. Michael Tuchin, I know him well, and
    what happened at his house is galling. But as you said, it's
    indicative of a lot of the violence. In fact, when it comes to
    antisemitism, it's the top form of religious hate and the hate
    violence we see.
        I want to drill down a little bit about the violence that
    we're seeing and the threats on the Muslim community, because
    there's a lot of issues with trust when it comes to the FBI and
    the Muslim community.
        And having seen, when I was mayor of the City of Newark,
    unjust surveillance and the erosion of a lot of that trust, not
    of the FBI, in particular, but of law enforcement in general, I
    just want to know from you, what are you doing? What steps are
    you taking to try to be restorative of trust, to make sure, at
    a time of vulnerability, where Muslims are being targeted with
    hate, and the Arab community in the larger context is, what are
    you doing to especially build that trust, to know that you, as
    an agency, can be relied upon for their safety?
        Director Wray. Well, I appreciate your comments and your
    focus on the issue. Certainly, we, through every one of our
    Field Offices, have as a point of emphasis community outreach.
    And within community outreach, there are specific communities
    that they make a conscious point of trying to build bridges
    with. The Muslim community, the Arab-American community, are
    specific parts of that.
        The good news is that it didn't take October 7th and the
    aftermath for us to start doing that. I've been to all 56 Field
    Offices twice, each of them--many of them three times. And I've
    seen with my own two eyes the relationships that they've built
    with the Muslim and Arab-American communities in their areas.
    And so we've just continued to try to double down on that,
    post-October 7th, to make sure that they know we're there for
    them if they experience threats or violence.
        There have been tips and leads, reports of threats that
    have come in. The Chairman mentioned the attack--unconscionable
    attack against the 6-year-old boy in his area. But we've had
    other attacks, as well.
        So, we're trying to make sure that they know we're there
    for them. I will tell you, on a personal level, as somebody who
    was in FBI Headquarters on 9/11, I have never forgotten, as a
    young leader in the Justice Department at the time, couldn't
    have been more than 4 days, maybe, after 9/11--President Bush,
    in the middle of all the tension that existed at the time,
    making a conscious point of speaking, I believe it was at a
    mosque, and making clear that we're at war with terrorism.
    We're not at war with Islam.
        Senator Booker. Thank you.
        Director Wray. And that really always kind of moved me,
    that he had made that step at that time. Because it would've
    been the easy thing to do, not to do that.
        Senator Booker. I'm grateful for that, as well. And
    grateful for your visits. I imagine Newark was a three-visit
    place, not a two-visit place.
        Director Wray. I think my third visit is imminent.
        Senator Booker. Okay. That's good to know.
        The Executive Order 14110 directed Federal law enforcement
    agencies to produce a report on the use of AI in the criminal
    justice system and recommend best practices for law
    enforcement.
        The report builds on Executive Order 14074, which directed
    the Attorney General to issue best practices, policy changes,
    and procurement guidelines for advanced law enforcement
    technologies, including facial recognition, other biometric
    technology, and predictive algorithms.
        Can you provide the Committee with an update on the
    reporting requirements, including an estimate for when you
    expect to release the guidance on advanced law enforcement
    technologies in light of the fact that the deadline set in the
    EO has passed?
        Director Wray. Let me circle back with you on that. I know
    we have an entire team of people working very closely with the
    Department and others on this issue. And I wasn't aware that
    there was a deadline that we'd missed, so let me see if there's
    some garble in the process. But I will make sure we circle back
    to you on it.
        Senator Booker. Yes. And, finally, I have found every
    interaction I've had with you directly or your office, on 702,
    really compelling. I--from sitting in classified briefings to
    talking to administration officials, and your comments at the
    top of the hearing were, again, very, very compelling. I think
    you heard that this is an issue that is, in both parties, there
    are a lot of concerns.
        And, you know, when Mike Lee was speaking, he talked about
    a lot of the violations of what we would both agree is just
    egregious violations of what 702 should be about--the reforms
    that have been put forward and the work that's been done to
    correct for them.
        But I'm concerned. You know, I trust you. But I learned
    when it comes to leadership, there's a difference between time
    tellers and clock builders. Time tellers are those people that
    their leadership is so powerful, everybody knows the time, and
    it goes accordingly.
        But the best leaders are those that help to build
    mechanisms that, no matter who's the leader, the protections,
    the security, the knowledge is there.
        And so, when you hear some of these egregious mistakes, can
    you tell us in testimony now that you're pretty confident that
    the abuses that were talked about so openly here in this
    hearing, that those abuses cannot and will not happen, going
    forward?
        Director Wray. I can pledge to you and to this Committee
    that we have put in place new measures that exceed anything
    that's ever been in place before, that we are focused on a goal
    of getting to 100 percent compliance.
        But I can also tell you that--and I understand why we've,
    we've brought this on ourselves, to some extent. And I hear
    that. I hear that in Senator Lee's comments. I understand why
    that is there.
        But that's why I point to the Court itself, and the
    Department itself, looking hard at our compliance, post all
    these reforms, because these are the same people and the same
    kinds of documents that have discussed all these problems of
    the past. They're the ones now saying they're seeing 98 percent
    compliance, and these are reforms that we've had in place since
    really only just the middle of 2021.
        So, it's not just, take my word for it. I get that. It's,
    you know, trust but verify. And there's a verification piece
    that's occurred here, and we think that, to the extent that
    there's a desire to cement those reforms for the long run----
        Senator Booker. My time----
        Director Wray [continuing]. That's what----
        Senator Booker. My time is----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Legislation could do. Yes.
        Senator Booker. Yes. My time is expired. And I'll just say,
    in conclusion--and I know you know this intellectually, but I
    actually know you feel this in your heart.
        My lived tradition is the African-American experience. And
    clearly the FBI has a very bad history with the Black community
    in the 50s, 60s, before that.
        The assurances are critical, and I still have, like the
    Chairman said in his opening remarks, some concerns about, how
    do we ensure that the most sacred ideals of our country aren't
    violated by law enforcement, especially for communities that
    have seen historic targeting? So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chair Durbin. Thank you, Senator Booker. Senator Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
    for being here.
        The last few weeks, I've been demanding some answers on
    Jeffrey Epstein's crimes and trying to get these flight
    records--I've offered amendments to a subpoena, trying to get
    that--and kind of been stonewalled on it.
        But I think having transparency around Jeffrey Epstein's
    conduct and this massive sex trafficking ring that he built is
    important. And, of course, you've had the Chairman, Senator
    Hirono, Senator Ossoff--all who have mentioned our concerns
    with what is happening with CSAM, what is happening with sex
    trafficking.
        But in light of this, I, in looking at some of the
    survivors from the Epstein issues, there are disturbing
    allegations that the FBI failed to investigate the sex
    trafficking allegations.
        And, indeed, one survivor says that the FBI, even after she
    brought forward, repeatedly, content about his conduct, that
    the FBI refused to investigate her claims, even though she said
    the allegations were there on both the sex trafficking and the
    child sexual abuse material.
        And I want to know why, or what awareness you have of the
    FBI's failure to investigate these claims, and I want to get
    you on the record, since numerous survivors have said the FBI
    did not show up to help them. What, specifically, has the FBI
    done to investigate the claims that Epstein's--and others,
    participated in, produced, possessed, and distributed CSAM?
        Director Wray. Well, first let me say I recall very well
    that you have a very specific and long-standing interest not
    just in child sexual exploitation but in human trafficking, as
    a cousin of that. And we appreciate your focus on it and your
    support of the importance of that part of our mission.
        As to the Epstein case, specifically, I will tell you it's
    been a while since I looked at that case. Obviously, we worked
    together with prosecutors to bring charges----
        Senator Blackburn. Yes.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Before he----
        Senator Blackburn. I realize----
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. That.
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn. But what we need from you is a complete
    investigation of why the FBI did not take this up, and then
    getting to the bottom of what is appearing to be an enormous
    sex trafficking ring and listening to these survivors.
        You know, and as I said, I've tried to get a subpoena on
    the flight logs, which I think is important to this. I think
    people need to know who was on those planes and how often they
    were on those planes. I think people who invest in companies
    would want to know if they're people from their C-suite. And as
    we go through this, should those logs be made public? They've
    been heavily redacted.
        Director Wray. Well, as I said, it's been a while since
    I've looked at the specific case. I can tell you that we've
    been increasing, year over year, both the number of agents
    focused on these kinds of cases, the number of----
        Senator Blackburn. Well, we need to----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Victims we've rescued, and
    the----
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Look at this--yes.
        Director Wray. And so on to this----
        Senator Blackburn. Yes.
        Director Wray [continuing]. Specific case, let me offer to
    have my--let me get with----
        Senator Blackburn. Okay.
        Director Wray [continuing]. My team and figure out if
    there's more information we can provide to you.
        Senator Blackburn. That would be great.
        Director Wray. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn. We have never--even through the
    Ghislaine Maxwell trial--we never got to the bottom of this.
    And we have these survivors who say, oh, there is so much more.
    They swept it under the rug. And that is wrong, and you need to
    right that wrong.
        Let me ask you about some of the disturbing allegations
    that have come out of Special Counsel Jack Smith's political
    crusade against President Trump. And we've seen a heavily
    redacted search warrant.
        Here you go with the first page. Here you've got a page
    that's in print, another in print, another in print, Attachment
    B, in print, all about the subject account, page 3 that I'm
    going to come back to in a minute, and then look at the rest--
    redactions, redactions, redacted, fully redacted, fully
    redacted, fully redacted, there, and there.
        So, that's not very helpful--when things are so heavily
    redacted you can't get to the information.
        Now, Tennesseans are very concerned about two tiers of
    justice and weaponizing of the government.
        But what we see from this search warrant--and here it is,
    on page--let me go to page 2, first. That gives you what
    they're getting from the subject account, which is Trump's
    account. And you're going to see that on page 1 and page 2, and
    the information that is there. They're wanting to get at his
    Twitter account, everybody that had access to it and all the
    information.
        Well, then when you go to page 3, they are going to
    subpoena all data and information that is associated with this,
    and anybody that reposted information on this, that favorited
    or retweeted posts by the account, as well as all tweets that
    include the user name associated, all synced, all contacts, and
    this covers October 2020 to January 2021. Are you aware of
    this?
        Director Wray. I've seen some of the media reporting about
    it. But obviously this is a matter that's being led by the----
        Senator Blackburn. Do you agree with this?
        Director Wray. Well, again, this is an ongoing
    investigation being led by a Special Counsel, and there are all
    kinds of court restrictions that apply.
        Senator Blackburn. Has somebody approved a search warrant
    for everybody that was retweeting or reposting from the
    Ayatollah's account? Have they gone to his account, prior to
    October 7th, and looked at that? This is such an invasion of
    Free Speech. And as we talk with you about social media and
    what is going on with social media, we're concerned about this.
        You know, if I liked a tweet from President Trump--if
    anybody on this side of the dais retweeted a tweet from
    President Trump, according to this, Jack Smith could go pull
    everything affiliated with our Twitter account, if anything
    that came from @realDonaldTrump showed up in our feed. Do you
    think that this is an infringement of my Free Speech?
        Director Wray. Well, let me say this. I certainly
    understand the concern, but what I would tell you----
        Senator Blackburn. I would hope so.
        Director Wray. All right. But what I would tell you is that
    this investigation is being led by the Special Counsel. It's
    not appropriate for me to comment on that ongoing
    investigation. It's also under the supervision of a court,
    which includes the----
        Senator Blackburn. Ongoing investigation----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Includes the search warrant----
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Is code word for, we are
    stonewalling. And we hear this from you all repeatedly, and
    it's really quite frustrating.
        Director Wray. No, ma'am, and I understand why it's
    frustrating, but that policy about not commenting on ongoing
    investigations is one that goes back decades, Republican and
    Democratic administrations----
        Senator Blackburn. Yes----
        Director Wray [continuing]. It's not something that's----
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. These investigations----
        Director Wray [continuing]. Just invented.
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Are not coming to
    completion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chair Durbin. Senator Blackburn, before you leave, I want
    to make a point for the record, since I understand you made
    some statements about the Jeffrey Epstein flight logs.
        There's a Fox reporter in the hallway who asked me about
    this, and I said I had not spoken to you one time about this
    issue. I think you'll back me up on that, I'm not mistaken--I
    didn't know that this was even a subject of your amendments,
    which, if you'll recall, you were the first on the list until
    the 2-hour rule was invoked.
        I don't know anything about this request on your part. I'll
    be happy to discuss it with you. But I haven't done any
    discussion with you, to this point. Correct?
        Senator Blackburn. Mr. Chairman, I know, and I think you're
    fully aware that I had two amendments, one----
        Chair Durbin. I wasn't----
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Dealing with Epstein and
    Sotomayor. I brought it up previously. We have----
        Chair Durbin. You do----
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. Such an issue in this
    Nation with the sex traffic and human trafficking rings that
    have proliferated across this country, and it is damaging the
    lives of women and girls.
        We have got to step up and help them. Getting to the bottom
    of what happened with this Jeffrey Epstein case is going to be
    an important thing to do. And it should be at the top of this
    Committee's to-do list, as we fight some of this proliferation
    of CSAM.
        Chair Durbin. There were 122 amendments, I believe, filed.
    I did not know that you had----
        Senator Blackburn. A hundred and seventy-seven.
        Chair Durbin. Hundred and seventy-seven amendments filed.
        So, I have to confess I didn't know that you offered that
    amendment. Happy to discuss it with you. But I want a point on
    the record. You and I have never personally discussed this.
    Have we?
        Senator Blackburn. We talked briefly on the floor at the
    conclusion.
        Chair Durbin. You never mentioned what the subject matter
    of your amendment was. You said you wanted to offer your
    amendment----
        Senator Blackburn. In Committee, I brought up the subject
    matter of my amendments.
        Chair Durbin. Not in my presence.
        Senator Blackburn. Three weeks prior. Yes, sir. It was--
    I'll pull the transcript for you.
        Chair Durbin. I wish you would.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you.
        Chair Durbin. I wish you would.
        Thank you, Mr. Wray, for being with us today. And you have,
    perhaps, some questions in writing coming your way very
    shortly. Hope you can respond to them promptly. Thank you
    again.
        [Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
        [Additional material submitted for the record follows.]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                A P P E N D I X

    The following submissions are available at:

      https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-118shrg62796/pdf/CHRG-118shrg
        62796-add1.pdf

    Submitted by Senator Whitehouse:

     Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, February 7, 2023, letter to Hon.
        Merrick Garland, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice.     2

     Zdeb, Sara, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
        Justice, April 4, 2023, letter to Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse.....     4

     United States v. Charles McGonigal, United States Department of
        Justice, July 14, 2023, guilty plea agreement between the
        Southern District of New York and the attorneys for Charles
        McGonigal.....................................................     5

                                     [all]