

S. HRG. 118-754

**THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
STRATEGY**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

—————
JULY 30, 2024
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



Available via: <http://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2026

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THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DE- FENSE STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Hirono, Kaine, King, Manchin, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tuberville, and Schmitt.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. Good morning. The Committee meets today to discuss the final report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, or NDS. The NDS Commission was established in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act with the mandate of assessing the 2022 NDS, and the Department's efforts to successfully implement it.

During today's hearing, the Committee will receive the Commission's evaluation of the National Security challenges we face, whether the force planning construct in the 2022 National Defense Strategy remains valid, and the effectiveness of the Defense Department's implementation of the NDS. The Commissioner was shared by Hon. Jane Harman, who served nine terms in Congress as the U.S. Representative from California's 36 Congressional District and was Ranking Member of the Intelligence Committee for 4 years after 9/11.

The Commission's Vice Chair Ambassador Eric Edelman is currently counselor at the Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments and served previously as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2005 to 2009, and as United States Ambassador to Finland and Turkey, and really, I want to commend the Commission for the extraordinary work you've done. Very, very proud of your effort, and I know it was intense work over many, many months, so thank you very, very much.

I'm pleased of course to welcome the Chair and Vice Chair but I also want to congratulate their fellow Commissioners General Jack Keane, Thomas Mahnken, Mara Rudman, Mariah Sixkiller, Alissa Starzak, and Roger Zakheim. Together, you did a remarkable job. The 2022 National Defense Strategy was written prior to

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the evolution of the strategic partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Nonetheless, the 2022 NDS provides an important framework for America's national security. The NDS ranks China as the most consequential strategic competitor, identifies Russia as an acute threat, and addresses the persistent challenges from authoritarian regimes and violent extremists. Indeed, I believe that we currently face the most dangerous complex security environment since World War II.

To address these challenges, the NDS proposes four broad missions for the Department of Defense (DOD), which include defending the U.S. Homeland, deterring strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and partners deteriorating aggression while being prepared to prevail in a conflict and building a resilient joint force and defense ecosystem. The NDS also outlined several priorities of building joint capabilities, including the concept of integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that will build enduring advantages.

These are well reasoned priorities. I understand that the NDS Commission agrees broadly with these objectives but has concluded that the Department of Defense is not adapting at the speed or scale necessary to achieve them or meet today's threats. The Commission recommends a fundamental change in the way we approach our national defense including an overhaul of the Defense Department's relationships with the U.S. interagency and our allies.

A significant investment in the defense industrial base and a restructuring of Departments acquisition and procurement process. I look forward to hearing the Commission's specific recommendations on how to make targeted investments and reforms in these areas. Notably, the Commission concludes that 2022 NDS does not provide an adequate force structure to handle simultaneous conflicts in multiple theaters.

The Commission proposes a multiple theater force construct that would resize and restructure the joint force to match regional threats and integrate with regional allies. I would appreciate our witnesses further explaining this construct in what challenges the Departments may face in implementing it. At its core, the 2022 NDS requires all elements of national power, including military, diplomatic, and economic to maintain a stable and open international system.

However, the Commission concludes that America's civil society must also be reinvigorated as a source of national power. The American public must be educated on the threats we face and encouraged to engage in national service, whether through the military or civil service, and I support the Commission's urgent call to engage more in this area. Ultimately, the 2022 NDS recognizes that the U.S. must modernize and strengthen our military.

This will require smart investments in platforms and equipment, rapid development and integration of cutting-edge technologies, and steadfast support for our servicemembers and national security workforce. I will welcome the Commission's insights on how the

Department is adapting to these complicated issues and the challenges of great power competition.

In light of the wide-ranging global security challenges presented by Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the persistent terrorist threat posed by extremist groups and rogue regimes, the Committee would appreciate the Commission's assessment of the resources necessary to prevail in strategic competition, as well as its recommendations for strengthening United States global engagement and alliances.

Let me again thank the members and staff of the Commission. We look forward to your testimony. Before recognizing Senator Wicker, we have a quorum and I would like to proceed with your permission. Since the quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to consider a list of 3,135 pending military nominations and two civilian nominations.

First, I ask the Committee to consider a list of 3,135 pending military nominations. All of these nominations have been before the Committee, the required length of time. Is there a motion to favor to report this list of 3,135 pending military nominations to this?

Senator WICKER. So moved.

Chairman REED. Is there a second?

Senator FISCHER. Second.

Chairman REED. All in favor say aye.

[Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the Committee follows:]

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON JULY 30, 2024.

1. *MG Duke A. Pirak, ANG to be lieutenant general and Director, Air National Guard* (Reference No. 1503)
2. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Julie N. Marek) (Reference No. 1524)
3. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Matthew J. Vargas) (Reference No. 1669)
4. *MG John J. DeGoes, USAF to be lieutenant general and Surgeon General of the Air Force* (Reference No. 1756)
5. *MG Brian S. Eifler, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, US Army* (Reference No. 1758)
6. *MG Robert D. Harter, USAR to be lieutenant general and Chief of Army Reserve/Commanding General, US Army Reserve Command* (Reference No. 1809)
7. *MG Mark H. Landes, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, First United States Army* (Reference No. 1829)
8. *MG Paul T. Stanton, USA to be lieutenant general and Director, Defense Information Systems Agency/Commander, Joint Forces Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Network* (Reference No. 1830)
9. *MG Matthew W. McFarlane, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, I Corps* (Reference No. 1831)
10. *MG David J. Francis, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command/Commanding General, US Army Center for Initial Military Training* (Reference No. 1832)
11. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Scott D. Hopkins) (Reference No. 1842)

12. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Elizabeth B. Mathias) (Reference No. 1844)
13. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Matthew I. Horner) (Reference No. 1845)
14. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Joshua A. King) (Reference No. 1846)
15. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Matthew D. Fouquier) (Reference No. 1847)
16. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Vegas V. Coleman) (Reference No. 1848)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Hannah E. Choi) (Reference No. 1849)
18. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Steven P. Perry, Jr.) (Reference No. 1850)
19. In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Roy A. George) (Reference No. 1851)
20. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Gary Levy) (Reference No. 1852)
21. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (0003824486) (Reference No. 1853)
22. In the Army there are 61 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Jesse J. Adamson) (Reference No. 1854)
23. In the Army there are 17 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Matthew D. Atkins) (Reference No. 1855)
24. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Joseph T. Conley III) (Reference No. 1856)
25. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Richard T. Hill) (Reference No. 1857)
26. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Timothy J. Leone) (Reference No. 1858)
27. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Colton T. Cash) (Reference No. 1859)
28. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Bradley J. Marron) (Reference No. 1860)
29. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Ramon R. Gonzalez Figueroa) (Reference No. 1861)
30. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Ivan J. Serpapez) (Reference No. 1862)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Adam R. Mann) (Reference No. 1863)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (Cody S. Foister) (Reference No. 1864)
33. In the Army there are 291 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Michael L. Able) (Reference No. 1865)
34. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Juan J. Barba-Jaume) (Reference No. 1866)
35. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Riccardo S. Hicks, Jr.) (Reference No. 1867)
36. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Nathan K. Magare) (Reference No. 1868)
37. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with James E. Barclay) (Reference No. 1869)
38. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Adam M. Baroni) (Reference No. 1870)
39. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Dennis J. Crump) (Reference No. 1871)
40. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Joseph M. Federico) (Reference No. 1872)
41. In the Navy there are 52 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Christopher M. Andrews) (Reference No. 1873)

42. In the Navy Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Rafal B. Banek) (Reference No. 1874)
43. In the Navy Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Thomas P. Byrnes) (Reference No. 1875)
44. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Francis A. Goiran) (Reference No. 1876)
45. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with John F. Landis) (Reference No. 1877)
46. In the Navy Reserve there are 16 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Joseph E. Allen) (Reference No. 1878)
47. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with David F. Bell) (Reference No. 1879)
48. In the Navy there are 17 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Frederick J. Auth) (Reference No. 1880)
49. In the Navy there are 39 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Kwadwo S. Agyepong) (Reference No. 1881)
50. In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Kelly W. Agha) (Reference No. 1882)
51. In the Navy there are 591 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Nicholas H. Abelein) (Reference No. 1883)
52. In the Navy there are 26 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Garrett L. Adams) (Reference No. 1884)
53. In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Brandon M. Beckler) (Reference No. 1885)
54. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Michael C. Becker II) (Reference No. 1886)
55. In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with James K. Brown) (Reference No. 1887)
56. In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with David M. Gardner) (Reference No. 1888)
57. In the Navy Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Tyler L. Branham) (Reference No. 1889)
58. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Eric A. Gardner) (Reference No. 1890)
59. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Johan Baik) (Reference No. 1891)
60. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Richard A. Barkley) (Reference No. 1892)
61. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Christopher C. Cady) (Reference No. 1893)
62. In the Navy there are 21 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Milton G. Casasola) (Reference No. 1894)
63. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander (James F. Sullivan IV) (Reference No. 1895)
64. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander (Christopher R. Napoli) (Reference No. 1896)
65. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Ross C. Huddleston) (Reference No. 1897)
66. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Lucas M. Malabad) (Reference No. 1898)
67. In the Space Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Davin Mao) (Reference No. 1899)
68. *In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Steven G. Behmer)* (Reference No. 1906)
69. *Col. John M. Schutte, USAF to be brigadier general* (Reference No. 1907)
70. *Col. Lucas J. Teel, USAF to be brigadier general* (Reference No. 1908)
71. *MG David Wilson, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9, US Army* (Reference No. 1909)
72. *BG Justin W. Osberg, ARNG to be major general* (Reference No. 1910)

73. MG Joseph A. Ryan, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, US Army (Reference No. 1911)
74. BG Jonathan M. Stubbs, ARNG to be lieutenant general and Director, Army National Guard (Reference No. 1912)
75. MG William H. Graham, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, US Army Corps of Engineers (Reference No. 1914)
76. In the Army Reserve there are 16 appointments to the grade of major general and below (list begins with Andree G. Carter) (Reference No. 1915)
77. MG Kevin D. Admiral, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Cavazos (Reference No. 1916)
78. In the Army Reserve there are 82 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Brian R. Abraham) (Reference No. 1917)
79. Col. Eric W. Widmar, USA to be brigadier general (Reference No. 1918)
80. In the Army Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Troy E. Armstrong) (Reference No. 1919)
81. VADM Daniel W. Dwyer, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Strategy, Operations, and Warfighting Development, N3/N5/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1921)
82. VADM Michael E. Boyle, USN to be vice admiral and Director, Navy Staff, N09B (Reference No. 1922)
83. In the Air Force there are 123 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Travis P. Abeita) (Reference No. 1923)
84. In the Air Force there are 38 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Andrew Kyle Baldwin) (Reference No. 1924)
85. In the Air Force there are 71 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Elena A. Amspacher) (Reference No. 1925)
86. In the Air Force there are 47 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Edison I. Abeyta) (Reference No. 1926)
87. In the Air Force there are 279 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Samory Ahmir Abdurraheem) (Reference No. 1928)
88. In the Air Force there are 547 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Neils J. Abderhalden) (Reference No. 1929)
89. In the Air Force there are 231 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Chastine R. Abueg) (Reference No. 1930)
90. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Thomas S. Randall) (Reference No. 1931)
91. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Edwin Rodriguez) (Reference No. 1932)
92. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Robert L. Wooten III) (Reference No. 1933)
93. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Jason P. Haggard) (Reference No. 1934)
94. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Mark T. Moore) (Reference No. 1935)
95. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John A. Temme) (Reference No. 1936)
96. In the Army there are 49 appointments to the grade of colonel and below (John M. Aguilar, Jr.) (Reference No. 1937)
97. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Ramon L. Dejesusmunoz) (Reference No. 1938)
98. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (Blaine C. Pitkin) (Reference No. 1939)
99. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Kalista M. Ming) (Reference No. 1940)
100. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (Kevin S. McCormick) (Reference No. 1941)
101. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (James J. Cullen) (Reference No. 1942)
102. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Steven C. McGhan) (Reference No. 1943)

103. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Brenda L. Beegle) (Reference No. 1944)
104. In the Space Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list begins with Clifford V. Sulham) (Reference No. 1945)
105. *LTG Ronald P. Clark, USA to be general and Commanding General, US Army Pacific* (Reference No. 1961)
106. *In the Army there are 16 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Stephanie R. Ahern)* (Reference No. 1962)
107. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Edward H. Evans, Jr.)* (Reference No. 1963)
108. *BG Daniel R. McDonough, ANG to be major general* (Reference No. 1964)
109. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Nathan P. Aysta)* (Reference No. 1965)
110. *Col. David R. Chauvin, ANG to be brigadier general* (Reference No. 1966)
111. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with John D. Blackburn)* (Reference No. 1967)
112. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Matthew F. Blue)* (Reference No. 1968)
113. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Patrick D. Chard)* (Reference No. 1969)
114. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Michael W. Bank)* (Reference No. 1970)
115. *BG Michael T. Venerdi, ANG to be major general* (Reference No. 1971)
116. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Akshai M. Gandhi)* (Reference No. 1972)
117. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Peter G. Bailey)* (Reference No. 1973)
118. *In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Kevin V. Doyle)* (Reference No. 1974)
119. *LTG John D. Lamontagne, USAF to be general and Commander, Air Mobility Command* (Reference No. 1985)
120. *MG Michael L. Ahmann, ANG to be lieutenant general and Commander, Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense Command Region and Commander, First Air Force (Air Forces Northern)* (Reference No. 1987)
121. *MG Michael L. Downs, USAF to be lieutenant general and Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs* (Reference No. 1988)
122. *MG Evan L. Pettus, USAF to be lieutenant general and Military Deputy Commander, US Southern Command* (Reference No. 1989)
123. *MG Rebecca J. Sonkiss, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commander, Air Mobility Command* (Reference No. 1990)
124. *MG Joel B. Vowell, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commanding General, US Army Pacific* (Reference No. 1991)
125. *MG Curtis A. Buzzard, USA to be lieutenant general and Commander, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine* (Reference No. 1993)
126. *MG Edmond M. Brown, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commanding General, US Army Futures Command* (Reference No. 1994)
127. *RADM Peter A. Garvin, USN to be vice admiral and President, National Defense University* (Reference No. 1997)
128. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Dewee S. Debusk) (Reference No. 1999)
129. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Kyle Y. Tobar) (Reference No. 2000)
130. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Daniel E. Ball) (Reference No. 2001)
131. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Shannon D. Huntley) (Reference No. 2002)
132. In the Navy there are 81 appointments to the grade of captain and below (list begins with Allen M. Agor) (Reference No. 2003)

TOTAL: 3,135

Chairman REED. The motion carries. Finally, I ask the Committee to consider the following civilian nominations; Ms. Tonya P. Wilkerson to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Security, and Dr. Michael L. Sulmeyer to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy. Is there a motion to favorably report these two nominations?

Senator WICKER. So moved.

Chairman REED. Is there a second?

Senator FISCHER. Second.

Chairman REED. All in favor say aye.

[Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]

Chairman REED. The motion carries. Thank you very, very much. Senator Wicker, please.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on a very fine opening statement which I fully subscribe to. We have two very distinguished witnesses today and this may possibly be the most important hearing we will have this year. But I have to say I very much appreciate the service of Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. Let's go back 6 years.

This Committee began holding hearings on the first National Defense Strategy Commission report which reviewed the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The first NDS report was important, helped us make significant bipartisan progress toward improving our national defense. We lost Chairman Jim Inhofe just a few weeks ago. Many of us will remember that he in particular, admired that report.

He would often hold the report up and wave it around at hearings. His enthusiasm proved that the NDS served as a guiding light for him, and it prompted all of us to consider the Report's recommendations. The global security environment has worsened much faster than we expected back in 2018. The first time that the first line of a new 2024 NDS Commission Report summarizes the situation in which we find ourselves.

"The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the Nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near term major war." A dramatic and forceful statement. It turns out that the Commission believes that we are not at all where we need to be and I think Members of the Committee understand this. We understand clearly there's no time to waste.

The Commission Report notes that our military capacity and capabilities are insufficient to meet the current requirements at acceptable risk. The document details the way in which the 2022 National Defense Strategy and Assessment completed just 2 years ago did not adequately account for the threat of simultaneous and increasingly coordinated military action by our four primary adversaries. A group which I have come to call the axis of aggressors.

The report correctly notes that with the possible exception of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government is not acting with alacrity or making so-called whole-of-government strategies more than simply a buzzword. It amply describes our hollow brittle de-

fense industrial base and painfully byzantine bureaucratic process. The report also finds that we cannot fix these problems without increasing defense spending.

Thankfully, this Committee has added a \$25 billion top line increase for the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA. Even that increase, a 3.8 percent nominal edition would fall short of the Commission's recommendation fall well short. The report endorses a 3 to 5 percent real increase this year with inflation running above 2 percent.

I appreciate the Commission's recommendation that national security spending must return to late Cold War levels. A goal which matches my plan to spend 5 percent eventually of GDP (gross domestic product) on defense. That level of investment would be temporary, it would be a down payment on the rebuilding of our national defense tools, for a generation. Tools that have sharpened can reduce the risk that our adversaries will use military force against U.S. interests, peace through strength.

The 2018 and 2022 Defense Strategies both recommended a vague force sizing requirement. The mandate called for the United States Military to have sufficient forces to defeat either China or Russia in a major conflict while simultaneously deterring other adversaries. That force sizing construct failed to provide a useful measuring stick by which to determine the ideal size and capability of the U.S. military.

I would appreciate the Commissioners expanding upon their new force sizing construct, which proposes that we be able to lead coalitions that can defeat both China and Russia, while continuing to maintain deterrence elsewhere. I would also like our witnesses to explain a claim they make in the report. The document contends that the American public does not appreciate the threat environment and therefore does not understand why strong defense is necessary to ensure a bright future for our country.

Very perceptive, this is a perspective that echoes concerns expressed by the recent congressional Strategic Posture Commission. I'm of the opinion that this is largely the fault of the U.S. Government, the executive and legislative branches alike, for failing to make the case to the American people. Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on. I would simply say that I appreciate a great deal of the Commission Report.

I'm grateful for the work of all eight bipartisan Commissioners and their staff. Thank you for calling each and every name of the Commissioners and I hope their labor can help guide us as we write a new National Defense Strategy and the legislation that will follow to allow us to regain our military edge and avoid wars in the years to come. Again, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on your opening statement and I subscribe to it and I yield back. Thank you, sir.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Now, let me recognize Chairwoman Harman.

**STATEMENT OF JANE M. HARMAN, CHAIR, COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's a pleasure to appear before you Ranking Member Wicker and so many other Members of this Committee whom I serve within the House and

who are very good friends. I'm happy to be back, and as you know, Mr. Chairman, I almost wasn't back today because yesterday afternoon at Boston Children's Hospital, my youngest child, a daughter, had very experimental surgery, which has resulted we hope in her fetus becoming healthy. Hopefully she will give birth in a few weeks and it's quite a miracle, and obviously, I was going to stay there if things had not gone well. But I mentioned this, not only because it's top of mind but also because it makes clear how amazing this country is, and how important what we offer in terms of healthcare, and other services, and benefits to the American people is, and it's worth fighting for this country.

That's what our report is about. We try to make the case about how it is worth fighting for our country, and some pundits have already said, well, it's a good report, but it'll gather dust on shelves. I sure hope not. Our Commission on a bipartisan basis was unanimous in our recommendations and we are dedicated to making sure they get implemented. I just suggest to you and I listen to your opening statements.

I think you're dedicated on a bipartisan basis to making that happen too, so, let's not waste a minute. In that vein, Eric Edelman, our vice chair, who co-chaired the last Commission is sitting next to me and I will yield to him in just a moment. But let me make a few points. Our Commissioners who are sitting on a bipartisan basis right over there have been introduced Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman, and Roger Zakheim.

But you did not introduce the vaunted staff sitting behind me on a bipartisan basis. Aply led by David Grannis, whom you may know was the Chief of Staff to the late Dianne Feinstein for many years here, and who was originally hired by me, in my capacity as a Member of the House. You've mentioned when the NDS was written, you've mentioned when we were created but I just underscore again that we think and you said it too, that the threats to U.S. national security and our interests are greater than any time since World War II.

More complex than any threats during the Cold War. Significant and urgent action is needed. We recommend fundamental change in the way the Pentagon and other government agencies do business, the way they incorporate private sector technology, and a full embrace of our partners and allies. Shorthand for this is we recommend using all elements of national power.

Our report includes actionable recommendations which we will highlight in just a moment, including one that is being implemented today, and that is telling the public how grave the threats are. Sadly, we think, and I'm sure you agree, that the public has no idea how great the threats are, and is not mobilized to meet them.

Public support is critical to implement the changes we need to make leaders on both sides of the aisle and across Government need to make the case to the public and get their support. Eric. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF ERIC S. EDELMAN, VICE CHAIR, COMMISSION
ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

Ambassador EDELMAN. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of the Committee. It's pleasure to be back before you again. I think this is the 11th time I've testified in front of this Committee, and I do want to say one thing, which is we could not have come to a unanimous bipartisan conclusion of this report without the leadership of our Chair, Jane Harman, who worked indefatigably to get us there.

These are difficult issues that we wrestled with and which you wrestle with every day. But I really want to just commend Jane for the leadership she demonstrated in leading our Commission. Several of our Commissioners served on the 2018 Commission, and General Jack Keane, who's not able to be with us today, actually served with me on the 2010 Commission. The 2010 Commission said that we were facing a train wreck because threats were gathering but defense resources were declining.

In the 2014, National Defense Panel, we said that the Budget Control Act (BCA) had been a strategic misstep that had hampered U.S. Defenses and that we needed to go back to threat based defense budgeting as Secretary Gates had last done before the BCA and his fiscal year 2011 budget. Last time we raised the question of whether the United States might find itself in a conflict that could lose if current trends continued.

Six years later when we came back to this task, the threats are more serious, and we found that we as a nation have failed to keep pace. As you said, Chairman Reed, and as Secretary Gates has said in an important article he wrote in Foreign Affairs, this is the most challenging global security environment since the Second World War. There is potential for near term war and a potential that we might lose such a conflict.

The partnership that's emerged among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a major strategic shift that we have not completely accounted for in our defense planning. It makes each of those countries potentially stronger militarily, economically, and diplomatically, and potentially can weaken the tools we have at our disposal to deal with them. It makes it more likely that a future conflict, for instance, in the Indo-Pacific, would expand across other theaters, and that we would find ourselves in a global war that is on the scale of the Second World War.

The 2022 NDS identified China as the pacing challenge. We found that China is in many ways, outpacing the United States, while we still have the strongest military in the world with the farthest global reach, when we get to a thousand miles of China's shore, we start to lose our military dominance and could find ourselves on the losing end of a conflict. China's cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces, and fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep us from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East China seas.

China has been testified to before Congress has infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter United States action by contesting our logistics, disrupting American power and water, and otherwise removing the sanctuary of the Homeland that we have long enjoyed. For its part, Russia has reconstituted its

own defense industrial base after its invasion of Ukraine, much more rapidly than people anticipated.

Vladimir Putin seeks to reassert Russia as a great power and is happy to destabilize the world in order to do so. Our report describes the threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and terrorism as well. Clearly, Iran and North Korea both feel emboldened by the current environment and terrorism remains a potent threat fueled by the proliferation of technology. As the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] has said, the current war in the Middle East is likely to have a general generational impact on terrorism.

We share the goal, I think, as a Commission unanimously, of the NDS, that our purpose is to deter war. But doing so is going to require moving with a greater sense of urgency and determination beyond what we've seen over the last couple of decades.

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Jane M. Harman and Ambassador Eric S. Edelman follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY MS. JANE M. HARMAN AND AMBASSADOR ERIC S. EDELMAN

(Chair Harman) Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee—it is good to see former colleagues with whom I have worked over the years. Your Committee has enormous responsibility and I commend you for operating in a bipartisan fashion. I am very pleased to be joined by Vice Chairman Eric Edelman to present the bipartisan, unanimous report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. He and I will jointly present our opening statement to summarize our work.

As you know, Congress created our Commission to review the 2022 National Defense Strategy (or NDS) and offer a clear-eyed, independent view.

Eight Commissioners were appointed by the bipartisan, bicameral leaders of the Senate, the House, and the two Armed Services Committees. Commissioners Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman, and Roger Zakheim are with us today. Commissioners Jack Keane, Mariah Sixkiller, and Alissa Starzak are unable to join us in person.

The current NDS was written by early 2022 before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia's strategic partnership, and HAMAS' horrific attack on Israel last October 7.

Our Commission believes unanimously that the threats to U.S. national security and our interests are greater than at any time since World War II and are more complex than during the Cold War.

Significant and urgent action is needed. We recommend fundamental change in the way the Pentagon and other government agencies do business, the way they incorporate private sector technology, and a full embrace of our partners and allies.

Our report includes actionable recommendations, including one that is being implemented in part with today's hearing: educating the American public on how dire the situation is. Their support is critical to implement the changes we need to make. Leaders on both sides of the aisle and across government need to make the case to the public and get their support.

(Vice Chair Edelman) Several of our Commissioners served on the 2018 NDS Commission, which sounded the alarm that the United States was losing its decisive military edge. Six years later, the threats are more serious and we have failed to keep pace.

Our Commission's first finding is that the United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War. The trends are getting worse, not better.

There is potential for near-term war, and potential that we might lose.

The partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a major strategic shift that we haven't yet accounted for. It makes each of those countries stronger militarily, economically, and diplomatically and weakens our tools to deal with them, and it makes it more likely that a future conflict would expand across theaters and that we could find ourselves in a global war.

The 2022 NDS identifies China as "the pacing challenge." We find China is in some ways outpacing the United States. While the U.S. still has the world's strongest military with the farthest reach, within 1,000 miles of China's shore, we have lost military dominance and could lose a war.

China's cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces, and fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep the United States from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East China Seas. China has infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter U.S. action by contesting our logistics, disrupting power and water, and otherwise remove the sanctuary that the United States has long enjoyed at home.

For its part, Russia has reconstituted after its invasion of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin seeks to re-assert Russia as a great power and is happy to destabilize the world to do it. Our report describes the threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. Clearly, Iran and North Korea feel emboldened. Terrorist groups remain a potent threat, fueled by the proliferation of technology. As DNI Haines has said, the current war in the Middle East will likely have "a generational impact" on terrorism.

We share the goal of the NDS of deterring major war. Doing so will require moving with a sense of urgency and determination beyond what we have seen in the past couple of decades.

(Harman) In the interest of time, we will both describe the rest of the Commission's main findings and save further discussion for your questions. They are:

1. DOD cannot, and should not, provide for the national defense by itself. The NDS calls for an "integrated deterrence" that is not reflected in practice today. A truly "all elements of national power" approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DOD, the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.

We agree with the NDS on the importance of allies and we commend the Administration for expanding and strengthening NATO and building up relationships and capabilities across Asia. We also point out ways for the United States be better partners ourselves, including by maintaining a more stable presence globally and in key organizations like NATO. We call for reducing barriers to intelligence sharing, joint production, and military exports so we can better support and prepare to fight with our closest allies.

2. Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental change in how DOD functions. This is particularly true of how DOD works with the tech sector where most of our innovation happens. DOD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency.

DOD's structure is optimized for research and development for exquisite, irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy, AI, and large numbers of cheaper, attritable systems. Programs like Replicator and offices like the Defense Innovation Unit and the Office of Strategic Capital are great—but they are essentially efforts to work around the larger Pentagon system.

In addition, since the 2018 report, the Joint Staff has worked to develop operational concepts to overcome deficits in numbers and geography. Our Commission finds that there is more work to be done to truly operate as a joint force with technological and strategic advantage.

3. The force-sizing construct in the NDS is inadequate for today's needs and tomorrow's challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force Construct with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners, sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. U.S. global responsibilities require a global military presence—as well as a diplomatic and economic one.
4. U.S. industrial production is grossly inadequate to provide the equipment, technology, and munitions that the U.S. military and our allies need today, let alone given the demands of great power conflict.
5. The DOD workforce and the All-Volunteer Force provide an unmatched advantage. However, recruiting failures have shrunk the force and raise serious questions about the All-Volunteer Force in peacetime, let alone in major combat. We should prepare now for what a wartime mobilization would entail. The civilian workforce at DOD and in the private sector also face critical shortfalls.
6. The Joint Force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break.
7. The United States must spend more effectively and more efficiently to build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one. We have to cancel legacy programs. Additional resources will also be necessary. Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base.

Additionally, Congress should revoke the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act spending caps and provide real growth for fiscal year 2025 defense and nondefense national security spending that, at bare minimum, falls within the range recommended by

the 2018 NDS Commission. Subsequent budgets will require spending that puts defense and other components of national security on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.

We also agreed unanimously that the national debt is its own national security challenge. If we want to approach Cold War levels of spending, we need to increase tax rates and reform entitlement spending. During the Cold War, top marginal income tax rates were above 70 percent and corporate tax rates averaged 50 percent. We don't call for those numbers, but today we are spending more on the interest on our debt than on defense.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of the Committee, thank you again for your role in establishing our Commission and inviting us to share our report with you. We welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.

To view The Commission on the National Defense Strategy, please go to: www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds-commission-final-report.pdf.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, we are at 10 minutes and happy to submit the rest of our testimony, if you prefer, and take questions. Or we can briefly summarize our findings. Which would be better?

Chairman REED. I think the Vice Chair and I would like you to go ahead.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. So, we're sharing this. First finding, DOD cannot and should not provide for the National Defense by itself. The NDS calls for an integrated deterrence that is not reflected in practice today. A truly all elements of national power approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DOD, the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.

We agree with the NDS on the importance of allies and we commend the Administration for expanding and strengthening NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and building up relationships and capabilities across Asia. We also point out ways for the United States to be better partners ourselves, including by maintaining a more stable presence globally, and in key organizations like NATO, we call for reducing barriers to intelligence, sharing joint production and military exports.

So, we can better support and prepare to fight with our closest allies. Second recommendation is fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental change in how DOD functions. This is particularly true of how DOD works with the tech sector, where most of our innovation happens. We say that DOD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency.

DOD structure is optimized for research and development for exquisite irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy, AI [Artificial Intelligence], and large numbers of cheaper and attributable systems. I know this because I represented the Aerospace Center of Los Angeles in Congress for so many years, where exquisite, irreplaceable satellite platforms were built.

Now we know that there is a plethora of commercial platforms that can do many of the same things and offer redundancy. DOD programs like Replicator, and the Defense Innovation Unit, and the Office of Strategic Capital are great but they're essentially efforts to work around the larger Pentagon system. In addition, since the 2018 report, the joint staff has worked to develop operational concepts to overcome deficits in numbers in geography.

Our Commission finds that there is more work to be done to truly operate a joint force with technological and strategic advantage.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Wicker, you raised the issue of the force sizing construct in your opening statement, and we, as you noted, found that it is inadequate. I mean, it was written actually before the invasion of Ukraine and before the emergence of this tightening alliance between Russia and China, and we proposed that the force needs to be sized—the joint force in conjunction with United States allies and partners to defend the homeland but simultaneously be able to deal with threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.

These are not all the same fight, so different elements of the force would be required in different parts of the globe but United States global responsibilities require a global military response as well as a diplomatic and economic one. President Putin, in some ways has done us a bit of a favor by having invaded Ukraine and exposed as a result, some of the limitations of United States defense industrial production.

Shown that it's grossly inadequate to provide the equipment, technology, and munitions that the U.S. military and our allies and partners need today, let alone given demands of a potential future conflict, which might be even more taxing. The DOD workforce and the All-volunteer Force provide us with a kind of unmatched advantage, but recruiting failures have shrunk the force and have raised serious questions about the sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force in peace time.

Let alone if we had to mobilize for a major conflict or a protracted conflict. The civilian workforce at DOD and in the private sector also face critical shortfalls and we can discuss some of that later in the hearing.

Ms. HARMAN. A few more findings. We found that the joint force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break, and second, we found that the United States must spend more but also spend better. This is a point we make consistently. It's not just more legacy programs, it's more spending that gets us to the ability to deter and win future wars.

Additionally, we think that Congress should revoke the 2023 spending caps and provide real growth. I know Senator Wicker loves this one, for fiscal year 2025, defense and non-defense, national security spending, that at a bare minimum, falls within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS Commission. That range was never achieved. Subsequent budgets will require spending, that puts defense in other components of national security. Other components, jointly across Government, and the tech sector, and partners, and allies, other components on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national efforts seen during the Cold War. But we agree and let me underscore this because some of the commentary about our report has missed this. We agree on a unanimous basis that the national debt is its own national security challenge.

If we want to approach Cold War levels of spending, we need to increase resources, and reform entitlement spending. During the

Cold War, top marginal income tax rates, were above 70 percent, and corporate tax rates averaged 50 percent. We don't call for those numbers, but we are calling for an increase in resources and point out that interest on the debt is higher than our total number of our total top line of defense spending.

So, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker, and many good friends on this on this important Committee, we thank you for your role in establishing our Commission, and we're happy to share our report with you and we welcome the opportunity to answer questions. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Well, thank you very much, Chairwoman Harman and Vice Chair Edelman, for your impressive and sobering testimony. Just to reiterate, you've said it several times that it's important to note is that our funding, it can't be exclusive to the Department of Defense. We have to look at the Department of Treasury, Department of State. You even indicate the Department of Education because of the shortfalls we're seeing in recruitment.

Which can be traced back to very poor education and very poor public health, obesity. Just again Representative Harman, Ambassador, in your comments on that.

Ms. HARMAN. Yes.

Chairman REED. Thank you.

Ms. HARMAN. Absolutely, all elements of national power, the U.S. needs to project power across our Government, leverage the enormous talent and innovation of the tech sector, connect both of those to partners and allies, and then we have impressive deterrence. In the kind of integrated deterrence that the NDS, the 2022 NDS, calls for that was—has never been achieved.

Chairman REED. Thank you. When I was in the service a long, long time ago, the stock phrase was, shoot, move, and communicate. Now, I believe the phrase is communicate so that you can shoot and move. One of the key elements, I think, is we have tried but we're not there yet with a communication system that reaches every aspect of our military which is uninterrupted and which is dependable. Ambassador, your thoughts on that issue?

Ambassador EDELMAN. No, I very much agree with that, and that of course, what the joint all domain commanding control system is meant to address. But as you say, in your as—you suggested in your question, Chairman Reed, the Department's not quite there yet, and we're of course, it's complicated by the fact that the system is being done by all three services and then has to be brought together and unified.

So, there's a lot of work to be done on that, and it's one of the areas where we think it—insufficient progress has been made.

Chairman REED. In terms of priority, I would think it'd be very, very high on the list, if not, number one, as I said, if you can't communicate, you can't do lots of things. Is that your feeling too?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Absolutely.

Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add one thing to that. We call for interoperability which has not been achieved across the Pentagon, let alone with other government agencies, let alone with partners and allies. We make a point, that some of our classification systems work against each other in terms of sharing information, and the

goal would be to have an effective communication system across all elements of national power.

Chairman REED. Thank you. The other—one of the many points and you've emphasized, and I think importantly so is, we have to engage the American people, not just in getting out the word about the threat but also getting them involved. That puts a big emphasis on public service, not just in the military domain but in civilian public service.

Can you just elaborate on lows, starting with Chairman Harman?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, the notion of public service isn't new as you know, Mr. Chairman, it's been around for years. It was around when I served in Congress and Congress did not act on any of the proposals that I saw. It is still a way to get all of the public, at the proper age, engaged in understanding the requirements of citizenship. A lot of our young people have no earthly idea. Sadly, because they have no civic education what our Government really is and what are the ways to serve, and surely one of the most honorable ways to serve is as a member of the military, you did it, and other Members of this Committee have done this. I think that is the way to revive a kind of sense of coherence and patriotism that we are lacking right now.

Chairman REED. Adding to this Ambassador Edelman, is the point you make in the report. The size of our millage force is too small and our ability to expand it rapidly is probably very weak. Was that a fair estimate of our situation?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think that is a fair estimate, Mr. Chairman. You know, we have not really as a society talked about the need for national mobilization but if the worst were to happen and some of the worst scenarios, we discuss in our report were to come to pass, and where we to face a global conflict, it would require mobilization on the scale of what we did as a Nation during World War II.

We haven't done that in a long time. We haven't thought about that in a long time. There are a lot of elements to it including stockpiling strategic materials but being able to rapidly bring people into the military, et cetera, and I just don't think we are prepared to do it. I think we have to have a national discussion about this and I think it goes hand in hand with the earlier discussion you had with my colleague about public service and serving the Nation.

Chairman REED. We had, in World War II, 2 years, essentially from September 1st, 1939 to December 7th, 1941 to prepare, and I doubt it, we'll have 2 years to prepare in this environment. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.

Senator WICKER. Well, thank you very much for your testimony, and again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was a time when we could sort of count on a rivalry between Russia and China. We don't see much of that anymore, and of course I've spoken of this axis of aggressors. How are they cooperating with each other now and in a real crisis? What do we need to look out for about increased cooperation?

Among the four countries that I've identified, that includes of course, Iran and North Korea, Representative Harman.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think Ambassador Edelman would want to add to this but I remember being a member of the Defense Policy Board when Jim Mattis was Secretary of Defense and his piece of advice to us was let's do everything, we can to keep Russia and China apart. Well, oops, that has not happened, and there is a—you know, this close friendship and collaboration between them.

You asked how is it manifested? Well, we see it most at the moment in Ukraine, where Russia was the aggressor, violating international law, and invading Ukraine, and China is a huge help to Russia in evading our sanctions. By buying Russian gas, and by its efforts to ship into China, material for the war. Then you add in, as you mentioned Iran and North Korea which are suppliers of drones and other lethal material to Russia.

This unholy alliance, or whatever, I think you call it, alliance of aggression, is extremely dangerous. Let's remember that both North Korea has nuclear weapons, Iran is at breakout for nuclear weapons, and the other two countries are nuclear countries. Where this goes is—it seems to me terrifying, and that is again, why we need to leverage all elements of national power to make sure we deter these countries from acting against us.

Senator WICKER. Ambassador Edelman respond as you'd like, but also you might also want to take this question as you speak. Representative Harman mentions Ukraine, why is Ukraine important to this entire discussion? If Ukraine manages to be successful and keep their own borders in their own country, what signal does this send to Xi Jinping?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I really don't want to add very much to what Representative Harman just said other than to say in short, what we're watching is a war of premeditated, unprovoked aggression by Russia that is being financed by China and enabled by its transfer of dual use goods including precision tooling that's allowed Russia to get its defense industry up and running despite United States sanctions and export controls.

Drones provided to Russia, including a factory built in Russia by Iran, and of course, millions, literally millions of rounds of 152 ammunition for the Russian military coming from North Korea. Sure—

Senator WICKER. Some people ask, what's that to us? How does that affect the United States and our people?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, it affects the outcome, of course, of the fight in Ukraine, which gets to your second question. I mean, first, Ukraine offered to give up and I was involved in some of the diplomacy of this back in the nineties, the nuclear weapons that were left on its territory after the end of the Soviet Union. As a result of that, Ukraine gave them up.

But in exchange for assurances from the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France, that its territorial integrity would be recognized along the borderlines that existed before the 2014 seizure of Crimea by Putin, which was a violation of those undertakings. If our assurances in the nonproliferation realm for, in this instance, are shown to be hollow, it will raise questions in the minds of all of our allies about the assurances we've given them.

Our extended deterrent assurances, whether it's for our allies in Europe, part of our multilateral NATO alliance, or our bilateral allies in East Asia, or our partners, parts of special relationships we've developed in Middle East with Israel, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], and Egypt, and others. So, the whole fabric, frankly, of the international order is at risk here depending on the outcome in Ukraine. To your point, if Putin is successful in Ukraine, the lesson that Xi Jinping is likely to draw is that he too can be successful in Taiwan, or in the East China Sea, or the South China Sea.

Senator WICKER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker, Senator Shaheen, please.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you both for your work on this report and thank you to the other members of the Commission, those of you who are here and those who are not. You talked about the communications, the need for interoperability, and for communications but I didn't hear you talk about—and also you talked about an approach that coordinates all elements of national power, but you really didn't talk about the information environment.

So, can you—one of the areas where we are not keeping up with our adversaries is in the information environment, it's with disinformation misinformation. So, can you talk about what the report suggests we should do with respect to information?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, it's a hugely important topic and you're right, we haven't got there yet but malign influence, foreign malign influence in our pending election is something that we're all worried about. It is a security threat, let's go there. But certainly, across the world, foreign malign influence and dis and misinformation can alter how we understand what the threats are against us.

This is a huge focus now of our intelligence community and I'm glad this Committee is also paying attention to it. We touch on it, but we really—I'm just looking at Ambassador Edelman. We don't have a focus on that. We do talk about AI, cyber and the information environment but we don't specifically address mis and disinformation. I wish we had paid more attention to that.

Senator SHAHEEN. I remember being in this room, I think after the KLM [Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij] airline was shot down over Ukraine and General Breedlove, who was then USEUCOM commander, saying as long as it takes us 2 years to identify the Russians as being the people responsible for what happens, we are losing the fight, and I think that's the problem now. I appreciate everything you're saying about legacy systems, but the reality is—until we get that information domain into our discussions, we are not winning the fight.

Ms. HARMAN. I agree, and we have to attribute where attacks are coming from in real time. It's tricky, for example, in responding to cyber-attacks, to know whether if China does something to United States, or Russia, or some criminal syndicate, we should respond immediately because tit for tat can lead to unwise outcomes for us. But nonetheless, we have to know who did what to us, and you are totally right.

Senator SHAHEEN. We don't have a strategy, and we are not working the Global Engagement Center at the State Department,

which has that as its goal, is not integrated with what we're doing at DOD. So, we—

Ms. HARMAN. We address that. We do say that the State Department, Defense Department have to align their regions of operation with each other, and then add in the Treasury Department with sanctions, add in all the other agencies of government, like USAID [United States Agency for International Development] that have some play here, add in partners and allies. That's the way to project American Power, and you're right, that a huge focus needs to be, absolutely needs to be on finding the source of dis and misinformation and making sure we correctly understand the threats against us.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Shaheen, if I just might add to what Representative Harman said, part of our emphasis on all elements of National Power is precisely to get at the issue you raise. Which is that we have disestablished, a number of years ago, the U.S. Information Agency, we don't really have a dedicated capability. We, you know, have, in the Department of Defense, a capability for military information to support operations, which is an important capability. But we, I think sometimes in—because there's a default to DOD, they end up engaged in information operations that are really beyond what they're capable of executing effectively. I think that is a problem.

So, we need a better integrated effort across the entire panoply of national security institutions but also need some dedicated effort on information. Our adversaries think information is a hugely important domain. They invest a lot in it and we just have not matched that investment.

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree with that. I'm pleased to hear both of you say that. Hopefully, that will be more of a focus going forward and I appreciate the First Amendment concerns. However, we were able to deal with that during the Cold War. We ought to be able to deal with it today. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer, please.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Representative Harman and also Mr. Ambassador, all of the Commissioners, and good staff for the work you've done here. Mr. Ambassador. Nuclear deterrence is the foundation. It is the bedrock on which our national security rests. I understand that the Commission did not seek to replicate that work that came out of the Strategic Posture Commission.

But it does highlight the importance of deterrence, strategic deterrence in view of China's development, Russia's aggression on and on. As you considered the strategic elements of the national security policy for us. Can you explain to this Committee the role that nuclear modernization plays in the NDS Commission's proposed Multiple Theater Force Construct

Ambassador EDELMAN. Nuclear deterrence, Senator Fischer, is the fundament on which everything else is built in terms of our national security. It's operating every day. You know, it's not visible to American citizens but the fact of our nuclear deterrent force, all

three legs of the triad being available is the most powerful deterrent that we have to conflict.

It's not sufficient, but it is the absolute basis, and we really, I think, agreed with the conclusion our colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission reached which is that we have to move forward with alacrity on all the elements of modernization of the nuclear triad. That's the GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence] Sentinel Program. That is the the B-21, that is the *Ohio* replacement class. All of those things have to be accomplished.

There are problems in some—one of the reasons we highlighted education is that some of the problems that GBSD are running into has to do with lack of skilled workers to be able to pour the kind of special reinforced concrete that you need for the new silos for missiles, the new control systems for missiles. We lack welders in the submarine industrial base as Senator Wicker knows well.

So, there's a lot that has to be done across the board in order to move forward with nuclear modernization but it is absolutely fundamental to our ability to deter aggression against our allies and of course against the Homeland.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you and Representative, I really appreciated your comments on the workforce and the need we have for that, for a national strategy, and to be able to work with Senator King on a bill that we introduced, that we were able to get some of those important of factors into the NDAA so that we can address them and hopefully continue to grow what we need, and meet those needs quickly.

Ambassador, based on the Commission's work, what do you think are the biggest barriers that we are going to face as a country to achieving that Multiple Theater Force Construct? Representative, I'd like to hear your opinion on that as well.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, in the first—Senator Fisher, to your question, the force right now is too small and so we have to grow the force, and that's in the face of the recruiting challenges that we've highlighted in the report, that the Army in particular but also the Navy and the Air Force have faced—

Senator FISCHER. Why—and I'm going to interrupt you.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Please.

Senator FISCHER. Why is it too small? Can you explain in this setting, the threats that we are facing when we look at the adversaries that we face and how that has changed over the last decade?

Ambassador EDELMAN. It's too small in part because the Department was sizing itself for one conflict. But if you have to be present in three theaters as we are now, we've got conflicts in two theaters now. If we have a third conflict in a third theater, it's going to require a lot more forces. People talk, for instance, about the Indo-Pacific being largely a Navy and Air Force fight.

That's correct. But the logistics that support the Navy and the Air Force will largely be manned by the Army, and so, we have to have an army that is sufficiently large. That it can operate in all of these places, potentially simultaneously, because honestly, it is very hard to imagine today, a conflict in the Indo-Pacific that doesn't become a global conflict very quickly.

Someone asked earlier in the hearing about cooperation between Russia and China. The last time I testified before this Committee

was 2 years ago about the so-called Three Body Problem, Russia, China being both nuclear peers of the United States. One of the criticisms that was leveled at my colleague Frank Miller and me, was that, you know, well, there's no evidence that Russia and China are collaborating in the nuclear area.

Well, we just saw them flying strategic bombers together, up near Alaska. So, I don't know what more evidence you want that they're beginning to collaborate in that, in that strategic area.

Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add a few things. First of all, on the nuclear triad and the nuclear posture review, Senator Kyle, as a dear friend of ours, he did great service in the Senate, and writing that report, and we talked about whether we should in some ways overlap some of his recommendations but we decided they were so good they should stand alone. So, it's not that we don't care, it's just that we recognize good work.

Add to that though, that our nuclear agreements, that were so important over recent years, especially the heroic work that president Reagan did, don't include China, and a number of them have lapsed. That is a truly dangerous situation especially when rogue states like North Korea and Iran are part of the nuclear game now, and there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or in Asia also.

So, just would point that out, in terms of workforce and why is it small? Well, one thing we have not done, and we mentioned this, is embrace the tech sector adequately. Future wars are not going to be fought the old way with vulnerable big platforms. They're going to be fought with more software, less hardware, more software. Not to diminish hardware, but we need both.

In fact, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was at the Aspen Security Forum last week. Some of us were there. Senator Sullivan was there and he said DOD is not a hardware department. Right. It's not, or if it is, it should not be a hardware department. So, not only do we need more people but we need different skills, and we need people who understand the tech base. In fact, we have said that the business model of the Pentagon ought to move to embrace the business model of the tech sector. Where failure sometimes is important so that you can improve things. Just one comment to a prior question. Some of us were in Ukraine looking at how they produce goods, including drones, and tanks, and they have been much more innovative than we have, and there are lessons to learn there.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Hirono, please.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much, Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, and to all of you who worked on this very important review leading to seven very substantive recommendations, each of which requires some fundamental changes. So, as I review your recommendations and I—and noting that you started off, I believe by saying that we need to inform the public as to the nature of the dangers that we're facing with the great power competition. How we're going to do that, I'm not so sure, I am wondering whether your review included the fact that Russia, for example, is not only a gear power competition in the military sector but they are also engaged in our elections and misinforma-

tion when we have natural disasters. For example, I don't think very many people know that when Maui had its wildfire that there were indications that Russia had sent misinformation as to how the wildfire started, and how to question what FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] was doing. So, I'm wondering whether you reviewed the—all of the different ways that Russia is providing misinformation in a lot of platforms, not just in the military arena, and what can we do? That's one way to inform the public, I would say, to the dangers that we face.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think the challenge we face, Senator Hirono, is that we're not—Russia is very active in this space. You're correct, and it's an important part actually, of their military doctrine. They see information operations as part of a suite of activities as opposed to being stove piped between information and other kinds of military operations.

We still, I think, see it in sort of stove pipes but Russia's not the only challenge. I mean, Iran has been very active in this election cycle with a very different agenda than Russia's but still interfering in our election. China as well is very active. All of our adversaries are active in this domain and we need, I think, to take it very, very seriously. I do think we need to inform the public, that's I think, a responsibility that the executive branch certainly has, but I think you and your colleagues have a role to play as well.

Senator HIRONO. I think that we are also stove piped in how we approach the dangers that are presented by China, Russia, Iran, and the other actors in the cyber space.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes.

Senator HIRONO. One way that I think that the public will be apprised of the dangers is to inform them of the misinformation, et cetera, in the—where they can relate, such as our elections. I don't think we're doing such a great job with that. One of the other important recommendations you made, you talked about, Congressman Harman, is that we are not set up to take risks in our acquisitions and other forms, and that the culture of not wanting to take risks. How do we even approach something like that? Because it's not just, we need to maybe spend more money on our military but how do we change the culture? So, it's not just about money, it's about attitudes. It's about risk taking. How do we approach that?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me respond to something you started with, which is the devastation in Lahar Maui, having been there just before the fire. It was a glorious place and you lost so much of your history, and it's tragic that that happened. On this topic, we had a lot of discussion about risk taking, which is a core value of the tech sector. How do you learn unless you take risk?

How does Space X learn? Unless it's prepared to lose a lot of its assets and then build better based on lessons? Sadly, both the Pentagon and Congress are pretty risk averse. I'm not accusing anyone, any Member of this Committee personally however, the way Congress operates with respect to requirements of the Pentagon, and not only some of the budget issues here, we'll get into those, I'm sure.

You know, operating by CR [Continuing Resolution] and possible, you know, shutdowns is really an expensive way to proceed. I'm sure you are all aware of that and hopefully we are in a new era

where we don't do that. But if you build to requirements and then the requirement fails and then you do oversight and punish the people who have failed, that creates a risk averse culture. I'm not saying reward people who have failed.

But understand that if we're going to iterate and build better models of, pick anything, drones, tanks anything that you might need in current and future wars, we have to be prepared to fail. We have to understand that culture and this Committee by doing multi-year procurements and other things, which we point out would be very helpful, and allowing the Pentagon to change some of the details of procurements as a routine matter, if that will improve the performance of whatever it's building, would be extremely helpful. So, I'm glad you pointed that out. We tried to point it out as well.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rounds, please.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me begin by thanking both of you and the members of your Commission for the work and the service to our country that this provides. Most recently, when Director Haines and General Cruz were before this Committee, I think it was in May, they confirmed that the initial or the initiation of hostilities between the United States and either Russia or China would increase the likelihood that hostilities would be initiated by the other against the United States as well.

It would appear, based on the conversation so far that your Commission would agree with that assessment. Is the Department planning for this reality in which conflict with either Russia or China likely means a conflict with both today? Ambassador Edelman?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, the Department's plans basically in the—as embodied in the NDS of 2022, like its predecessor in 2018, essentially is geared toward defeating one adversary while holding the others harmless essentially by nuclear deterrence. What I don't think the Department has actually begun to wrap its arms around is precisely the scenario you outline. Where to give an example, if we got into some kind of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, whether it be over Taiwan, or South China Sea, or East China Sea, what might Russia do? You know, one thing that comes to mind is, take advantage of the separatist movement in Moldova to move on Moldova, a country that's trying to move closer to the European Union, and to the West. Which would then precipitate additional conflict in in Europe.

Or take advantage of the ethnic, Russian speaking minorities in the Baltic states, say Latvia, to initiate a conflict there. How would we manage that? When you raise that question with Department leaders, they basically say, well, that, to go back to the Chairman's point earlier, well, that would be sort of like World War II or would require national mobilization, and that's correct. But we haven't really taken the next steps to really focus on what that and what a protracted conflict would actually look like. We're optimized to fight very short wars.

Senator ROUNDS. Representative Harman, I appreciated your comments at the very beginning of this discussion in which you shared that yesterday your family was challenged and that your

daughter was going through some very serious surgery, and this is something that every family can identify with. You also talked about the technologies involved and your decisionmaking was that you would stay there if anything, serious was still in, in the air. I appreciated that, and believe me, this entire Committee would've supported you in that decision. You also indicated the need or what this country represented with regard to the technology that we have, and that we sometimes don't take advantage of. We have that opportunity with this report to talk about those technologies today. There are five different domains in which our country will be attacked in the future.

Airland and sea, most people would understand, but space and cyberspace are the new domains, which will precede any attack on the first three. With regard to cyber, today in the United States, we just recently came through a time period in which an accident occurring by one company literally crippled a significant part of our airline industry. Is it fair to say that both Russia and China have capabilities to do more than simply cripple airline capabilities? What exactly would that look like for the American people? Should we have a contest with either one of those two adversaries?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Rounds, for your personal comments. I really appreciate that and I hope everyone on this Committee is as fortunate as I was with the news that I got late last night which enabled me to get on the 6 AM plane. On cyber, it's a huge threat and I don't think we minimize it in any way.

One of the things we might anticipate, for example, is if China decides to annex Taiwan or whatever euphemism they might use. They might engage in a major cyber-attack here first, for which we are under prepared, cyber-attack of our infrastructure. When I was in Congress, I represented the Port of Los Angeles, which with the Port of Long Beach is the largest container port complex in the country. Fifty percent of our container traffic enters and exits through those ports. There are cranes on the port, surprised to move the cargo, and those cranes have Chinese technology. So, guess what? We should—

Senator ROUNDS. All of which are subject to the possibilities of cyber-attacks?

Ms. HARMAN. Absolutely. We should anticipate that our ports could go down.

Senator ROUNDS. Throughout our entire society we find that to be the case, don't we?

Ms. HARMAN. I'm agreeing with you and this is devastating. Does the American public understand this? No, this is our point about public awareness. This is something that's happening right now. If anyone's watching this important hearing, they're learning things that they might not know otherwise. It's an opportunity for leadership to try to educate the public and thanks to your Committee for doing it about the grave threats we face.

So, cyber is a huge threat. You also mentioned space, again, something I know something about since I used to call my district the aerospace center of the universe, where most of our intelligence satellites were made. We are more dependent on space as a country and more vulnerable in space because of that dependency than any

other country. Shoring up space, which is one of the threats we address, is absolutely crucial.

It's not just military space but commercial space. A lot of how you talked about communication, a lot of how we communicate is through commercial space and think how inconvenience the public would be if all of a sudden, their little devices, which were all dependent on didn't work.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. I'm out of time and overtime. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Well said, Senator.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Senator Kaine, please.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our witnesses. It's good to be back before you, Ambassador Edelman, 11 times testifying here, and Jane probably about the equivalent. We should give you guys some steak knives or something. I mean, very helpful report. A couple of thoughts before I have some questions.

Ambassador Edelman, you mentioned your testimony earlier when you talked about potential for nuclear collaboration between China and Russia. You were kind of criticized for that and I remember that, and frankly, the Pentagon during the entire time I've been here, beginning in 2013, when we asked questions about the possibility of cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. They've kind of poo-pooed the idea as if historical entities, or border disputes, or the past would block them from being able to work in a collaborative way. I've always found that dismissive attitude naive, and I think that the results of today are showing the degree to which these nations, seeing the United States' strong alliances, realizing they don't have them, they're drawn closer and closer together.

There may be barriers to the level of cooperation but we shouldn't assume those barriers are going to inhibit significant collaboration. I think that's one of the aspects of your testimony or joint testimony in the report that's very powerful. I did chuckle at one of the punchlines, which is that we need to do a lot more defense spending and bring the deficit down too. But we hear that punchline at a lot of hearings in a lot of different committees. But that's why we get elected to do what we do, and there are tough choices to be made. Here's a question that I have. If you asked American public, and I do think educating the public about the challenges is important. You said, what's the most important national security threat today? I bet the top one would be fentanyl. I think before just the American public would cite Ukraine or would cite the possibility of a war against Taiwan, I bet they would say fentanyl. The National Defense Strategy in 2022 had one paragraph about the Western hemisphere. You have a section dealing with Africa and Latin America.

That is a much longer paragraph. I like that, and yet it's about Africa and Latin America and it talks about the fact that China and Russia are making Africa and Latin America real centers of activity. As the Chairman of the Americas Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, when I travel in the Americas again and again and again from governments left, right center or unpredictable. What I hear, is we'd rather work with you than with China, for example,

but you're not present. Yes, we appreciate you lecturing us not to accept a free 5G system from China but what do you have on the table? We appreciate you telling us not to allow Russia to help with port investments but what do you have on the table? I think the fact that we spend so little intellectual energy focusing on our own hemisphere, and I just match that up against, I think American public would say fentanyl is like the biggest challenge, national security challenge that they see every day.

Now, this Committee's done some good work. We have done significant investments in fentanyl interdiction technology. I had a chance to see some of it that is being piloted in Brownsville about 2 weeks ago. That I think will really help us. Senator Ernst and I, in last year's NDAA, did a provision that calls for greater mill to mill cooperation between the United States and Mexican militaries on the fentanyl issue.

But why don't we just spend more energy on the Americas? What blocks us from more focus in the hemisphere? I just worry, we can't see it, our own backyard to—especially Chinese investments and count on our ability to lecture about the danger of Chinese investments to carry the day.

Ms. HARMAN. I agree, and I think we all agree. We did meet the head of SOUTHCOM. We met the head of AFRICOM, both of whom told us that we're under investing in Latin America and in Africa, and—

Senator Kaine. Just in Africa, a stat of the 35 youngest countries in the world, 32 are in Africa.

Ms. HARMAN. Well, and I—

Senator Kaine. So, in terms of a youth bulge in a growing population, I mean, this is where the future is.

Ms. HARMAN. I think the population in Africa is going to double by 2050 and it will be the most populous continent. I think in, in the world. I'm not positive that it will exceed China and India but I think it will, and we're under investing, and in South America, for example, we heard that there are five countries with no Ambassadors, no confirmed Ambassadors, and our military footprint in Africa is decreasing.

I think we all agree on this Commission that investment has to improve. Again, our whole idea about all elements of national power has to include partners and allies in those regions. Not an afterthought, not to say, oh, yes, about Africa, and South America, and on fentanyl. I believe that President Biden and President Xi, when they met in San Francisco, came up with some deal on China policing the precursors of fentanyl.

Which come into our country, mostly, I think through Mexico. That deal hasn't been fully implemented but it's a start. It's absolutely important, given how devastating fentanyl is to young people in this country who take drugs unsuspecting, that they have—they're laced with fentanyl. It's absolutely crucial as a national security threat to us. We do more.

Senator Kaine. Thank you. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Tuberville, please.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Thank you very much. Following up on that, is our southern border a national threat? I've only seen it in your report one time.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes, absolutely. The border security is a threat. We do call in the report for additional funding across the agencies of national security, including DHS [Department of Homeland Security], which has the fundamental responsibility for the border.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Eighty thousand Chinese coming across the border in the last 9 months. Is that a threat? That's a pretty good threat, isn't it?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Its a potential threat, sir. Yes.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Yes, huge. I don't understand why we're not talking about it more, fentanyl, I saw a report the other day where you can order fentanyl from China and make it at your own house. You can order—be delivered and make millions of pills without any repercussion. I mean, we've lost our minds. We're losing our kids. You're talking about education. I spent 35 years in education and your report mentions changing our military standards. Is that correct? To take more young men and women in the military?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Part of what you hear from the services when you talk about the recruitment challenges they face Senator Tuberville is that some of the standards are no longer really relevant. Some of it's an artifact of—

Senator TUBERVILLE. Such as?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Childhood asthma for instance. You know, is that something that—

Senator TUBERVILLE. Flat feet—

Ambassador EDELMAN. You know, that's—

Senator TUBERVILLE. A lot of people got out of Vietnam because of flat feet, right?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes. So, the question is do you continue to use those standards which are screening out people who might otherwise be willing and you know, ready to serve, or do you change it? Some of it's a function of the changing tracking that we have in medical records that allow things that wouldn't have come up 10 or 15 years ago to block somebody from service.

That's, I think what we were talking about.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Well, you, what's hurting us too is a lot of our government schools, I call them government schools because I went in thousands and while I was coaching, recruiting, and the problem we have is hate. That's being taught in a lot of our government schools toward our country. Why would any young man or woman want to fight for a country that they don't believe in, that they're being taught to hate.

It's absolutely amazing to me the direction this country's going. So, is there any agreement there even Representative Harman? I mean—

Ms. HARMAN. Yes, there is agreement there. Yes. I think hate on both sides is totally destructive. I think the absence of civics education and the absence of institutions that help people understand what patriotism means, that's, we had a conversation about national service, which might be a way to get all of our youth back

together. I mean, this country, sadly, is in a point where many people say our biggest enemy is us fighting each other.

I was just going to talk about standards. One of the problems is the kind of deployments the military does every 2 years. Moving somewhere where in many cases the spouse works and having to change his or her job every 2 years is very burdensome. It's also hard on kids, and so that could change. We talk about incorporating more of the tech base and the tech skills into the work that our military does.

I mean, after all, future fights, we were just talking about this, are in more domains. They're in cyber and space, not just in air land and sea, and so, if we don't have the skill sets to fight those wars, we're going to lose.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Yes, because we don't have a middle class. We're ruining our middle class. Where technical schools, all these kids, we tell, hey, you got to go to a 4-year school to get a job. We all knew that, and when we grew up, that's what we're told. But now that's not true. A lot of these kids go to school and their way is paid and unfortunately, they get social—some kind of social justice degree and they can't get a job at Walmart.

We have got to start training our kids again. We're losing the ball here. I mean, this is where, that's, to me, that's a national security threat, where we don't teach kids how to use their hands and do those things. Let's go to Ukraine real quick. We got to get out of this, right? I mean, this has got to be solved. Do we let Ukraine into NATO? Your thoughts?

Ambassador EDELMAN. NATO has already made the decision back in 2008, that Ukraine at some point will be in NATO. That's a decision that was taken under the George W. Bush administration in which I served. I think the alliance, the just completed summit of the Alliance has made clear that while there's an ongoing conflict in in Ukraine, it's probably not appropriate to have Ukraine be a member.

But the Alliance has undertaken a series of actions and the United States bilaterally with Ukraine has undertaken a series of actions to build a bridge toward Ukraine's potential future membership.

Senator TUBERVILLE. Well, that being said, should we allow, with the new government in Mexico, Mexico join BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa]? Should we allow that? Because it's coming, it's coming.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I don't. Senator, I don't know that we have any ability to, you know, the BRIC is an organization which the United States not a party to. So, I don't know—

Senator TUBERVILLE. I'm just asking your opinion because we're doing the National Defense Strategy and we're going to be looking down the barrel of a gun on this because they're going to be on our border. You just said that NATO was going to accept Ukraine. Should Mexico go into BRICS if offered that position with the new president they have?

Ambassador EDELMAN. If, well, the BRICS was actually kind of an invention of Goldman Sachs. It's not really a serious military organization of any sort—

Senator TUBERVILLE. As we speak, it is coming though with India joining, with Iran joining, Saudi Arabia joining, it could be a threat. Thank you, Mr. President.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville. Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Thank you. The first country to adapt new technologies generally wins wars, Genghis Khan, and the stirrup, the long bow at the Battle of Agincourt, the tank in World War I, radar in World War II, we are systematically missing technologies. It's one of the great failures of the last 10 or 15 years in our defense structure, directed energy, hyper sonics, AI, cyber information warfare.

We are woefully behind on every one of those hyper sonics. I'm sorry, directed energy. We are shooting down \$20,000 Houthi missiles with \$4.3 million missiles of our own. That's ridiculous, and the budget for directed energy in the Defense Department has fallen by half in the last 3 years. Representative Harman, is it systematic legacy thinking? What's the problem? Why did we miss these obvious technologies?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, you heard us say that the Pentagon is moving at the speed of bureaucracy. I think it is legacy systems. Old think, I think Congress is somewhat legacy—

Senator KING. I think it's legacy thinking.

Ms. HARMAN. Legacy thinking, fine. But I think that Congress is somewhat complicit in the way the budget process doesn't work and this insistence on requirements and oversight rather than on what is the problem set we are solving for, which is how the tech sector thinks.

I've been making a comment about DIU, the defense innovation unit that was set up by the late secretary, Ash Carter, that maybe we should outsource the Pentagon to DIU, which is ably headed by someone named Doug Beck, who had 11 years' experience in the private sector because they know how to think about this, and I couldn't agree with you more. The budget of DIU is \$1 billion out of 850 billion.

Doug Beck says he can leverage that—

Senator KING. Yes, these technologies that win wars—

Ms. HARMAN. Right?

Senator KING. New technologies—

Ms. HARMAN. I'm in violent agreement with you. He says he can leverage that into 50 billion of commercial investment but that's still a pittance compared to the kind of change we need to undergo. Not just at the Pentagon but at the Pentagon lashed up with other government agencies with the tech sector and with partners and allies. That is our point about all elements of national power, which will win the next war.

Senator KING. Let's talk about cyber for a minute. I think it's kind of pathetic that today, just today, this morning, at the beginning of this meeting, we approve the very first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber. Cyber has been a serious threat in this country for 15 or 20 years, and just today we are finally getting there.

To me, that's emblematic. Let me talk about another point about cyber. Several of our Members, and you all have talked about the cornerstone of our defense strategy is deterrence. In cyber, we have

no deterrent strategy. We're trying to patch our way out of this. People have attacked our country, they've attacked our elections, they've attacked our infrastructure. There have been no consequences, no results.

No one fears us in the cyber realm. Do you agree with me that we need to develop a cyber deterrent strategy? It doesn't necessarily have to be cyber for cyber but there has to be a price to be paid for attacking this country in the realm of cyber, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator King, I think one of the challenges with deterrence and the cyber realm is that first attribution is frequently a problem. But second, the actions you take are not necessarily visible, and therefore, it lacks the kind of visible signs that we have. In other realms——

Senator KING. It needs to be visible to the adversary——

Ambassador EDELMAN. To the adversary.

Senator KING. Or deterrence.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes. Well, the problem is it needs to be visible to the adversary. But you know, the question is, is it visible to your allies who you're also trying to protect with your deterrent? I did want to, if you permit me on the directed energy point because I think it's a very powerful point that you make. I think directed energy has suffered a bit from over promising in the past and it's been the next big thing and a lot of people have felt that it's not been delivered.

But clearly what you identified is correct, which is we can't be on the wrong end of the cost imposition curve where adversaries can use very cheap but tradeables that we're shooting down with million-dollar missiles, that's just not sustainable. But there is progress being made on directed energy, including by our allies, the UK has system Dragon Fire that looks like it's got some promise.

The Israelis have iron beam. So, there's activity going on, and I think you're right that we need to invest more time and effort in it.

Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add one thing on cyber, I think you serve on the Intelligence Committee as well. There are things we're doing that we can't talk about that are deterring cyber against us, and we are in other networks and I——

Senator KING. I'm sorry, but if we can't talk about it, it's not a deterrent.

Ms. HARMAN. But it——

Senator KING. You got to be able to talk about it——

Ms. HARMAN. No, but maybe——

Senator KING. It's Dr. Strange love.

Ms. HARMAN. But not all——

Senator KING. You can't keep the doomsday machines secret.

Ms. HARMAN. Not all the time, our adversaries do understand some of the things we're doing for deterrence. Attribution is still an evolving art and we can't always identify who's doing what to us. But I think we're stronger in the cyber realm than may appear publicly.

Senator KING. I think we have capabilities. My time is up. I commend you for mentioning terrorism. I worry that we've turned our focus so much to great power competition. One demented individual

almost upset our entire Presidential process a few weeks ago. I think terrorism is still a very, very significant threat and I'm afraid we are not attending to it sufficiently. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Cotton, please.

Senator COTTON. Representative Harman, Ambassador Edelman, and the rest of the Commission, thank you for your good work once again. Ambassador Edelman, you spoke with Senator Fischer about the Multiple Theater Force Construct, basically the kind of threats we're planning for, and there's a time when this Nation planned to fight two major wars at time.

I think now we're down to a force that can fight one conflict, and protect our Homeland, and hopefully scare bad guys everywhere else around the world, and not starting a war, is that right?

Ambassador EDELMAN. That is correct. That's what the 2022 NDS describes.

Senator COTTON. Is our, so that's the, what our National Defense Strategy says. Is the current force even capable of doing that, in your opinion? Putting aside what it should be capable of doing?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes.

Senator COTTON. Which I'll come to momentarily. Can it even do that?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think they're very serious questions about whether the force in being could actually execute the strategy.

Senator COTTON. Okay, there's been some talk about this access of Russia, and China, and North Korea, and Iran. You might add in a few other ancillary bad actors like Cuba for instance. Do these countries have to get together in a secret diplomatic meeting and agree to carve up different parts of the world or to act in concert Russia, you strike Ukraine, China, I'm going to hit Taiwan, and then Iran's going to go for the jugular in Israel.

Do they have to get together like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Summit and have a pact to act in concert together?

Ambassador EDELMAN. They could do that, but they don't necessarily have to do that. I mean, the problem we face is twofold. We face one problem that you've just described, which is concerted collaboration in aggression but there's also the potential of opportunistic aggression if something happens in one theater, and one of the other actors decides to take advantage of it to do something in another theater.

Senator COTTON. Representative Harman, I see you nodding your head. Would you like to add your perspective?

Ms. HARMAN. I totally agree with that and we see that all the time, and I'm not sure if you were in the room but one of the things that Ambassador Edelman said is that China is watching intently whether Russia can get away with its illegal invasion of Ukraine, and if it can, that would empower China without a conversation with Russia to move against Taiwan.

Senator COTTON. That this idea, well found in history, that these adversary nations don't have to sit down at a secret summit, that they can just see that for instance, the United States and its allies are being taxed in Europe and therefore now is the time to become

more aggressive in the Middle East, if you're Iran, or maybe China goes for the jugular in Taiwan.

It gets back to the point about this force construct as well. What they also see is what the United States just says it's capable of doing and the fact that it may not even be capable of doing that. Is that right?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree.

Ms. HARMAN. The word pivot probably should be retired. I don't think we can leave anywhere. I think we have to have an understanding of the threats against us not just against regions everywhere. The whole idea of this Multiple Force Construct is flexibility and having an adequate deterrent so we don't engage in more wars.

Senator COTTON. Another related point, there's been some questions about the information environment, misinformation, disinformation, cyber threats as well. Those are important, don't get me wrong but are wars going to be won in the information environment and cyber without things that go boom in the real world? Ambassador Edelman?

Ambassador EDELMAN. You have to have both. I mean, one, I don't think you were in the room, Senator Cotton. I said that the—our adversaries, particularly the Russians who have written a lot about this doctrinally see information as part of a suite of activities including all of their kinetic activities. Whereas we see it in sort of silos.

But they see it totally differently, and you have to be able to bring all of those elements together and more.

Senator COTTON. We've learned a lot and we've technologically seen advances on the battlefield in Ukraine on both sides. But isn't the case that the most important technological advances or the advances that enhance the power of the things that go boom on the battlefield? The munitions, the aircraft, the drones, the interceptors and so forth, not things are just done from keyboards sitting back in Washington.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I want to be careful because I think part of the answer is that some of what we've done for instance in arming the Ukrainians with different off the shelf commercial drones has been undone by Russian electronic warfare. Which is done from a keyboard, and electronic warfare is sometimes attributed to "information warfare" as well.

So, I, think it's—

Senator COTTON. Keyboard's closer to the battlefield with big dishes that shoot

Ambassador EDELMAN. Correct.

Senator COTTON. Shoot invisible things up in the sky, right?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Exactly.

Senator COTTON. Not just people sitting at a keyboard writing a hashtag out.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Correct. Correct.

Senator COTTON. Okay, thank you both, my time's expired.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton. Senator Manchin, please.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of you all for very informative discussions this morning. I appreciate

all the hard work you've done. When I first came to the Senate in 2010, I came leaving the Governor's office of West Virginia and wasn't really that much in tune on the national threats that we had. I was worried about the threats we had in West Virginia.

So, when I came here, I tried to bone up when I was on this Committee, my first committee, and I'll never forget and it had to be early February or late January 2011. We had all the joint chiefs of staff and all the questions were being asked, and identifying the problems we had around the world, and the threats we had. The question was asked to Admiral Mullins, Mike Mullins at that time, what's the greatest threat to the United States faces?

I thought I'm going to hear about learning about China more, and about Russia, and always being Russia, and the threat that they have, and then all of a sudden, without hesitating, he said, the debt of our Nation is the greatest threat that we face as Americans. So, I would ask you all, since we just hit \$35 trillion of debt yesterday, what do you all believe is the greatest threat we face, Jane?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, let me agree with you that our hemorrhaging debt is a huge threat, and one of the things we—one's

Senator MANCHIN. Who was even talking about on either of national—

Ms. HARMAN. We do—

Senator MANCHIN. Democrat, Republicans, nobody—

Ms. HARMAN. Senator, we do, in this report, we identify the national debt as a national security threat, and we say that we need to spend smarter and spend more on defense and pay for it. We, on a unanimous basis are not recommending printing more money. We are recommending finding a way to raise the revenues and reform entitlements. I know that's a sacred cow, sadly, these days.

But reform entitlements and we point out that the interest on the debt is larger than our defense budget.

Senator MANCHIN. So, you both agree to that, Ambassador?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. Second, I would say that on your report, you talked about the current force structure that we have and I think you had identified that the Marines are only ones meeting that we agree with, that what you failed to do is basically identify why we have not or why you all did not take up women being in selective service or joining selective service because women make up 74 percent healthcare and education industry, 52 percent of financial activities.

They're a tremendously strong force, and there's a lot of women I don't want to go up against. I can tell you that, in so many ways. But why do you believe, I guess my question is simple. Does the Commission support women registering for selective service?

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I'll speak for myself. I do. I think that women are a majority of our population, a majority of the talent pool, many of the most talented women serve on this Committee. So, yes, they should be—we should be, and—

Senator MANCHIN. Make it clear that we, it does not—we talked about this, does not require women to participate in military draft.

Ms. HARMAN. I understand.

Senator MANCHIN. Which will also require—

Ms. HARMAN. It's registering.

Senator MANCHIN. Yes, registering, that's all.

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. My answer to that is yes. Okay.

Senator MANCHIN. How come you all didn't address it?

Ambassador EDELMAN. You know, I don't have a good answer for you, Senator Manchin. It's not something we took up. We looked at other elements of the recruiting challenges that the services face.

Senator MANCHIN. Got you. Well, I hope you all would revisit that, if you will. So, my last, I have two more questions. My next question would be Russia. What have we learned about Russia during the Ukraine war? Do you think it's basically shown Russia's vulnerability or they've learned basically where the vulnerabilities were strengthening? What's your concerns?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think we've learned a lot of things. I mean, at first, I think we've learned that corruption is a feature, not a bug of the system that Vladimir Putin has created since he became president of Russia. You know, at the turn of the century, I think we've learned that Russian military doctrine is not necessarily going to predict how they actually will fight when a conflict comes up.

I think we've learned that that we've relearned a lesson that has been true of Russian military history for hundreds of years, which is they're willing to sacrifice the lives of their service folks to gain an objective without regard to the human costs.

Senator MANCHIN. If I can, my final question, if I could real quickly, I commend your report on tension to defense industrial base especially munitions and supply chain. However, there was no mention of Solid Rocket Motors. We have a problem, and the problem is this. We continue to keep pouring money into Aerojet Rocketdyne that can continually fall short of producing the quality of rockets in the environment we need. But the Government is into that, supporting it.

Yet the Federal Government, we own the ABL [Allegany Ballistics Laboratory] Lab at Rocket City in West Virginia, and they have been producing unbelievable, and no one's saying a word about it. No one's basically pushing, why are you shoving money into a private entity when board changes? Who's buying stock ownership when you already own one? Have you all looked at that or would you and basically bring it to a higher level?

Ms. HARMAN. Sure. Absolutely, and you'll be missed here. You have been very articulate at identifying things not just that West Virginia does but the energy needs of this country and why it matters, that we export more energy.

Senator MANCHIN. If you would look into it and compare ABL, at Rocket City, in West Virginia, okay, versus Aerojet Rocketdyne, and look at the ownership, the production, the quality of what we're producing there. Because without that as we've said before, we can't compete. We just can't. So, if you would do that, I would appreciate it.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Ernst, please.

Senator ERNST. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you both so much for being here for your leadership and to the entire Com-

mission for their great work and support staff as well. We really do appreciate it. Of course, we've had the opportunity to hear about this urgent assessment of our national security landscape and it has changed quite dramatically since the last NDS. So, thank you for your time and attention.

The recommendation should be a roadmap to address our security challenges and restore American leadership on the world stage. I feel that's very important. It's desperately needed right now. I know we have talked about force structure, and Ambassador, we'll start with you. Only recently has the force planning shifted to a single conflict structure despite facing the most significant strategic competition our country has ever faced.

So, the report, I want to draw attention to the quote, and I, again, I know we've talked about it, but the report includes a quote from a defense strategist who warns "a force that can only wage one conflict is effectively a zero-conflict force since employing it would require the President to preclude any other meaningful global engagement."

In light of this, again, if you can talk a little bit about the Multi Theater Force Construct, Ambassador, but then I also want to then lead into what Senator King alluded to with terrorism. Where does that leave our counter-terrorism forces?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Ernst, I think the problem we have is that, to go to your point, if we have a force that's optimized to fight one war when a crisis erupts and the President asks the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for military options to deal with it, the answer they're likely to get is, Mr. or Madam President, we can fight this fight but you will be at very high risk in all these other places.

Against that backdrop, what kind of decisions would come out of that, it's why I think it's described as a zero-war force. Our view was that you have to be able to deter and potentially defeat adversaries in all three of the main theaters that we have been engaged in since the end of the Second World War.

Which we repeatedly engaged in. I mean, there's been no shortage of efforts to try and extricate the United States from the Middle East. The last NDS in 2018 said we should be willing to run risk in the Middle East. I think on October 7th, we got a sense, and then again on April 13th of what running additional risk means in the Middle East.

So, it's our view that we have to be able to manage to do all of those things. In that regard, I think we're consistent with our colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission who argued something quite similar. But we also have to be able to deal with the ongoing threat as Senator King said of terrorism, and to be able to continue to focus on the things that Special Operations Command has been focused on for a number of years. Making sure that we don't have terrorists plotting to create mass casualties either in the Homeland or with our allies.

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. If I could just add to that, I was in Congress on 9/11. Many were, I was a member before that of a Commission on, I think, the Commission on Terrorism, which predicted a major attack on U.S. soil. No one was listening, and then came 9/11 and

we surged everything to the GWAT, the Global War on Terror. Surging everything is not a good strategy.

We missed when we did that, the rise of China. We missed the rise of Russian grievance. We missed the kind of world we now live in. We have to do all these things at the same time, walk, and chew gum at the same time. This report tries, by promoting this all elements of, national power strategy to talk about how we could do that.

We don't think we, the Commission on a unanimous basis, that accepting risk in certain parts of the world basically meaning not projecting U.S. leadership is a successful strategy. We have to be strong everywhere which doesn't mean we have to have boots on the ground everywhere but we have to have an all elements of national power strategy everywhere.

Senator ERNST. Yes. I am in absolute agreement, Representative Harman and mentioning SOCOM, Special Operations Command. I do think it's incredibly important and I'm in full agreement that we need to be able to face multiple fronts. I think all of us on this Committee would agree with that but we also have to have those that are nimble, agile, those that can respond quickly to situations.

Those forces are found in SOCOM. We need to be able to leverage different tools of power in other regions to create stability. So, whether it's kinetic action through the military or just working with friends and allies, we need to create greater stability all around the world, and I think we can achieve that but we have to be willing to invest.

Ms. HARMAN. Diplomacy is one of our tools. So, it's soft power matters but hard power does too, and we're not talking about selecting parts of the world for one and other parts for the other. We're talking about a combination that's greater than the sum of the parts.

Senator ERNST. Absolutely. Again, I want to thank you both for your service and our entire Commission and support staff. Thank you very much.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Gillibrand, please.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Congresswoman Harman. Thank you, Ambassador Edelman. So, grateful for your testimony and thank you for the great work of this report. One of the things that you concluded was that the DOD should invest more in cyber capabilities and capacity over the last two NDAA cycles. We included a cyber academy to create an ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps]-type program. There's about 600 schools eligible right now across the country who are already participating in this program.

It's built on NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], a smaller, much smaller program. Can you talk a little bit about how this cyber academy and its thousand slots a year could help meet DOD's future needs?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I don't doubt that it will help fill the gap because we need more cyber warriors. I do think that Cyber Command has actually done a pretty good job at Cyber Command and NNSA under General Nakasone's leadership and now his successor at building the force. Which when we looked at this from the Com-

mission point of view 6 years ago, there were questions about how well we were doing.

I think we've actually made a lot of progress in the ensuing years. But obviously the more we can generate young cyber warriors who are willing to come to work for the Government, because that's been an issue in the past, that is going to be a boon.

Ms. HARMAN. I would just add that and I'm not sure you were here, when we talked about it, that the two new defense domains are space and cyber. We now have Space Force, and we have Cyber Command, and slowly, we are building the skill sets that we need for our defense capability, not just in the Pentagon to be robust and effective, and so, a major cyber-attack on United States soil could pre-empt China's annexation of Taiwan. That's something we mentioned before, that could happen. Are the—is the American public aware of this and ready? Absolutely not. Is there Chinese technology all over America, including in our ports? Absolutely, and so building more capable people who have the training and having a more focused Government on the threats is—are both essential things to do.

Senator GILLIBRAND. So, one of the concerns I have is that the current recruiting technique for Cybercom, Cyberforce, is that they're recruiting from the existing services. So, Navy has to give X number every year, Army, Marines, et cetera, Air Force, and not all the services can meet the goals. Not all the services have the senior cyber personnel that a cyber command actually needs and wants.

When they do leave to cyber command, then there's no cyber expert left in the service because they just gave those personnel to cyber command. So, one question I have for space as well, shouldn't we consider having a west point for cyber or west point for space, or having one new service academy to educate and train the military personnel for cyber command and space command?

The reason I say this is because the cyber academy that we have created is just civilian jobs because 50 percent of all cyber jobs are civilian. So, let's at least recruit from the entire country in an ROTC type program for non-military personnel, and so, that arguably can be a thousand kids a year graduating with that capability. So, let me push the next question. A thousand of civilian personnel is great, not going to meet all our needs.

Do you think we should think about or at least do a study on the importance of perhaps having a service academy to directly train military personnel and commanders in cyber and space?

Ambassador EDELMAN. It's not something we examined, Senator Gillibrand, but I certainly think it's something worth some study, to see whether that would generate the kind of flow through that you would want to staff those skill sets, as my colleague just said.

Ms. HARMAN. We also talk about integrating the tech base with the DOD base and make a recommendation that the business model of the tech base may be much more successful than the business model. You know, Government at the pace of bureaucracy of the Pentagon and the tech base produces a lot of highly trained cyber folks through our national university system and private universities.

So, I think the study is still a good idea but I also think there are resources we're not leveraging that we could.

Senator GILLIBRAND. So, even a more serious question, you conclude, that given that much of the critical infrastructure that the United States relies on for the power projection overseas falls outside of the DODs remit, the Department needs to further its integration with and increase the capability of the other parts of the U.S. Government, including DHS and CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency].

Intelligence community, FBI and State and local governments. This finding, I find to be the most troubling because it's entirely outside the DODs mission. It's outside their authority, it's outside the job they want, the job they're willing to do but in actuality we don't therefore have domestic cyber defense. FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] is the best cyber response organization to the globe.

CISA can literally only offer best practices, and their best practices are the best practices. They are doing great outreach and all the things, but there's no one to stop, and this goes to Senator Angus King's questions, there's no one to stop a significant cyber-attack. Let's just say, on military bases. Taking out all of our capabilities domestically to have an electric grid, a water supply, food supply emergency services, stock exchanges. There's no one to stop that as if we'd want that in a war scenario, and we stop a bombing that's going to happen on our subway system, but we don't stop a cyber-attack that's on our subway system.

We'll do response, we do offensive. So, with the zero seconds I have left, could you please talk a little bit about what we should be doing from a cyber defense for the Homeland? This year's NDAA has a requirement for a plan, for how to protect at least our military bases but I think we should be protecting all of critical infrastructure.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Look, I agree, and I think the Department is just beginning to wrap its arms around this problem that, as I'm not sure if you were in the room, Senator Gerald Brandt, when we said earlier. The Homeland, if there's a conflict, is not going to be a sanctuary anymore. The first attacks will likely be in the cyber domain and they will be incredibly disabling for our society but also for the Department.

But getting all the agencies of Government that would have a role in all this, because it goes beyond just DOD, it goes beyond just DHS, I mean, it goes to the Department of Transportation, it goes to Commerce. I mean, there's just, it's an unbelievably complex issue, and we're only, I think now, kind of wrapping our minds around it, and it needs a lot more work and attention from the Department.

Ms. HARMAN. I think that Senator King mentioned that this Committee just confirmed an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber today. It's way too late. It's way too slow. You're absolutely right that all of this stuff has to be accelerated. I do think some of our capabilities that we can't talk about publicly are more extensive than people may believe but the public is essentially clueless about the massive cyber-attacks that could be launched any day by our adversaries. Not just nation states but rogue actors as well.

Chairman REED. Thank, thank you. Senator Gillibrand. Senator Schmitt, please.

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your work, both of you. I want to ask a few questions about sort of this our pivot to China which I think, you know, in this place, in this town, there's hard to find bipartisan agreement on much. I think most people agree that China is our, however you want to call it, chief adversary, pacing threat, pacing challenge, however you want to wordsmith it.

I think that's real, and I think there's recognition, I think in your work and others that we have a capacity problem in effectively doing that. So, I've wanted to ask, maybe Dr. Edelman, as relates to this sort of like priorities, how would you, if we, I guess for either one of you, what would you say? I mean, I think I have an idea of what the number is. The amount of money that we spend in Europe, how much of our defense budget, what—give me a ballpark of a dollar amount.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Schmitt, it's a little hard to disaggregate it because, you've got command and control that covers a variety of sins. But if you're getting at the question of do we need to spend less on defense of Europe and more in the Indo-Pacific, I think we've got to be able to do both. We've got—

Senator SCHMITT. Well, I'm—here is this point. We're not doing both.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Right.

Senator SCHMITT. My argument isn't the withdrawal necessarily. My argument is some estimates would be 150 billion to 300 billion a year. Let's just, let's just use that as a number and people could debate what that actually is. I think for me and I want to get your thoughts on this, if Canada and Europe went from—so they're a combined total of 2 percent right now, if they went to 3.4 percent of spending on defense per—you know, as it relates to their GDP.

Like we do, that's another \$300 billion, and I'm just, how have you guys grappled with this? Because to me, \$300 billion allows us to continue to be an important ally for a European allies, but also allows us to do the things that we need to do for the Homeland in China. So how do you guys view that?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think, look, our allies need to spend more on defense. That's clear. At the latest NATO summit, there's clearly a lot of talk of allies moving beyond 2 percent of GDP, which now I think about two thirds of them are hitting to beyond 2 percent to 2.5 percent. I think, honestly, a cynic went on of them doing that is also seeing us make the investment.

Which is why in increasing our top line, which is one of the reasons we came to the conclusions we did about the U.S. top line, obviously we need our allies to be producing more. Our defense industrial base is in very bad shape as we've discussed in our report. The European defense industrial base is in even worse shape. So, we need their industrial base, we need our industrial base. We need our allies in the Indo-Pacific Australia, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Taiwan. All need to be stepping up because to match what Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are doing is going to beyond our ability to do it ourselves. We're going to have to do it with allies. So, there's going to have to be broad investment across

all of the regions, by the way, Middle East as well. We've got partners in the Middle East who could also be doing more in that regard.

Ms. HARMAN. I would just add that I think Europe is waking up to this and I think there's a robust conversation in Europe about doing more and even possibly setting up. I don't think this idea will ever take, you know, become a reality, some kind of a European force. But the point is spending more, leading, more, fighting Europe's fight in Europe. I would add that we embrace in this all elements of national power strategy. That's the core of our report, doing more with partners and allies. Think about the Indo-Pacific. The Secretary of Defense is there now, I think with Secretary Blinken, talking about how to turn the—enhance the command that we have in Japan into a more robust command. It shouldn't just be—

Senator SCHMITT. I have limited time. I want to get to one more question. So, I appreciate—I think that's true. I think that \$300 billion would go a long way in allowing us to sort of, as we talk about priorities, and just to run through a couple, \$320 million for the Gaza Pier would've gone a long way and almost fully funded. You know, the Guam Missile Defense Project that we're not spending money on.

So, there, you could go over, you could go through this list about things of us being spread too thin, and missing what our real priorities are. I don't have time to go through them all, but they're significant. I guess the final question of the time that I have is, this question of the industrial base. I mean there's—to me, there's no question Europe needs to step up and that's the part of a lot of conversations we have here.

But as it relates to our industrial base, I supported the plus up. I think we should be spending more. What is the, if there's a couple of things that could be done to actually produce the things that we need, we're not, we don't have enough of what we need. What are a couple of those top line suggestions that you would have that when people ask me back home when I talk about this challenge. What are the things that can be done differently?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, I mean, Members of this Committee have done their job for sure in providing, for instance, authority for multi-year procurement, which is, I think one of the most important things because industry responds to the notion that they're going to have a, long timeline to produce this not just a spike and then go down. It would be helpful if the appropriators would on their side, make sure their dollars appropriated against that, to do that for the Department.

That I know is one of the problems that's held up the Department until recently.

Ms. HARMAN. I just add that we're not only talking about the defense in industrial base, we're talking about the industrial base and embracing fully the tech sector, which has much more to contribute to the defense of our country than it is able to contribute.

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. I want to thank Representative Harman, Ambassador Edelman, excellent testimony based on a superb report. I also want to shout out to General

Keane, and Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman, Mariah Sixkiller, Alissa Starzak, and Roger Zakheim, the great group.

But I have to give a special kudos to David Grannis, Ralph Cohen, Amy Hopkins, Travis Sharp, Dustin Walker, and Becca Wasser, because we all know you get the credit, they did the work. So, thank you very much. But this has been an extraordinarily useful hearing and it's got us both informed and I think energized to move forward. With that, I thank you all and I will adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

ADOPTION OF ADVANCED COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGIES

1. Senator HIRONO. Representative Harman, the war in Ukraine has underscored the need for the Department of Defense (DOD) to prepare for new forms of conflict and more rapidly integrate autonomous systems like drones that are cheaper and can be procured in greater numbers than many of the legacy systems currently being operated by the Department. While DOD's Replicator Initiative is a start, what specific actions can Congress take to accelerate the procurement of these systems to deter our adversaries, especially in the Indo-Pacific?

Representative HARMAN. The Commission strongly agrees that the war in Ukraine as well as other potential conflicts will require large numbers of inexpensive systems that are autonomous or able to be controlled remotely. This includes inexpensive drones like the ones produced in Ukraine as well as the more complicated systems envisioned by the Replicator Initiative and like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft program. Congress can accelerate this transformation in three ways:

- By ensuring DOD has the flexibility to use funds efficiently. This includes the ability to shift money across project lines so that program managers can allocate funds across different types of equipment and munitions that meet common characteristics (e.g., Army autonomous or remotely piloted short-range unmanned vehicles) rather than managing each system separately. It also includes expanding "Quick Start" authorities to begin early and long-lead acquisitions before final approval, including during Continuing Resolutions.
- By addressing barriers, whether legal or in DOD acquisition regulations, to procurement of commercial systems, parts, or technology. Commissioners in Ukraine observed drones, drone parts, and 3D manufacturing systems that companies purchased online and modified as needed. Given the low cost, high number needed, and low risk in the event of failure of these systems, we believe that commercial technology is "good enough" and facilitating its use would increase the speed of procurement, keep downward pressure on costs, reduce risk, create more resilient supply chains, and broaden the defense industrial base. We also support updated production methods, including 3D printing, modular production, etc.
- Through its oversight and legislative activities, the Committee can encourage and force DOD to remake its force structure and acquire cheaper systems in greater number where possible instead of its traditional reliance on a smaller number of more expensive systems, and take advantage of software upgrades for faster adaptation and adding functionality.

We also note that procurement of these systems is necessary but not sufficient for deterrence. The U.S. military will also need to demonstrate its ability to employ these systems in ways that prevent, complicate, and respond to unwanted actions by our adversaries.

2. Senator HIRONO. Representative Harman, your Commission spoke with many senior leaders at DOD—do you think the Pentagon is doing enough to capture lessons learned from the various ongoing conflicts around the world and integrate them into real-world exercises to ensure our forces are prepared for the modern battlefield?

Representative HARMAN. The Commission saw instances of lessons being learned and implemented, as well as innovative concepts through testing, exercises, and op-

erations. Examples include tactics and operations in freedom of navigation exercises in Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea where GEN Kurilla is welcoming testing and incorporation of new ideas and new technology. While the Commission is highly supportive of United States support to Ukraine, including the provision of intelligence, equipment, training, and advice through SAG-U, we believe that the United States military would benefit from having people in non-combat roles in Ukraine to better understand Ukraine's very dynamic industrial innovation and lessons from the battlefield. This problem is magnified as Russia is learning from the combat and, reportedly, shares insights with its partners China, Iran, and North Korea.

More broadly, the Commission found that the Department as a whole is not changing its practices at the speed needed in light of ongoing conflicts and other changes to the strategic environment. The Department remains committed to the 2022 NDS that, we believe, is out of date. The existing force planning concept, for instance, does not reflect the growing military-industrial alignment and cooperation among adversaries seen in today's conflicts. The Commission's report noted that the Joint Warfighting Concept 3.0 was intended to position the military for the modern battlefield but that more work is needed to incorporate lessons learned from current conflicts into future concepts and implement new technologies in future force structure.

STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIPS IN ASIA

3. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Edelman, in your findings, you discuss the diplomatic and defense efforts to strengthen partnerships in Asia. Over the weekend, Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin met with their Korean and Japanese counterparts. The United States and Japan agreed to reconstitute United States Forces Japan as a Joint Force Headquarters with operational responsibilities and also enhance coordination on the co-production of missile systems to bolster deterrence in the region. Can you provide any recommendations on what the new Joint Force Headquarters should look like?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission specifically recommended converting United States Force Japan (USFJ) into an operational (four-star) command and we commend the Department for its recent decision to convert it into a joint force headquarters. We recognize the need to properly align USFJ under INDOPACOM but note that a similar challenge has been done successfully for years at United States Forces Korea.

Our recommendation on USFJ was based on the need for closer operational planning with our key ally, Japan, and to forge closer operational relationships in theater. We don't make specific recommendations on how the new headquarters should be structured but believe it should be optimized to assess, recommend, exercise, and maintain operational control over the assets and operational planning necessary to deter aggressive action in East Asia and intervene if necessary. We note other relevant Commission recommendations relevant to this new headquarters, including the need for better intelligence sharing beyond the Five Eyes and supporting the technological means for allied personnel to have a shared operating picture.

4. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Edelman, how significant is the announcement of joint production of important missile systems like the Patriot air defense system?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission recommends joint production and co-production generally as a way to increase production rates, share costs, bolster supply chains, ensure the supply of key equipment and munitions in relevant theaters, and to increase interoperability with allies.

The wars in Ukraine and Israel have compounded existing needs for more air defense systems around the globe. As air defense systems are high demand, low density assets, increased rates of production are sorely needed particularly for air defense missiles. The reports of expanded production through joint production with Japan are very promising.

5. Senator HIRONO. Ambassador Edelman, what types of military technology sharing with our allies should the U.S. prioritize?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission's report draws a parallel in sharing military technology to the "small yard and high fence" approach to United States export control policy with regard to China. Generally, we ought to identify the relatively small number of core technologies (e.g., nuclear weapon designs, high-end AI functionality, etc.) that we need to protect to enable U.S. military advantage. Other technologies, particularly those developed in the commercial sector and those for which we lack industrial capacity to manufacture or develop at scale, ought to be

shared more broadly with allies and with fewer restrictions. Two trends—the loss of decisive technological advantage and increased technological sharing among our adversaries—both favor increasing U.S. technology sharing with our allies.

The Commission found that the United States will be unable to deter or win wars by itself and that we need to help strengthen our allies and integrate more closely with them. Sharing military technology is a critical way to achieve both goals—and for the United States to benefit from advances in other countries. We praise both pillars of AUKUS as an innovative and strategically important example of such sharing.

ACQUISITION AUTHORITY FOR U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

6. Senator HIRONO. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, your report acknowledges the bureaucracy of the existing DOD acquisition structure and how smaller commands and Services are able to change faster, such as Special Operations Command, Space Force, and the Marine Corps. Given the significant threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific, do you think the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Commander should be given some acquisition authority to allow him to keep up with rapidly changing technology and tactics?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission did not consider this question specifically, though we did recognize the benefits of SOCOM's acquisition authorities. We recommend steps that would streamline acquisition across the Department, to include reduced barriers to entry for non-traditional defense companies, reforming the overly scripted requirements process, and allowing increased flexibility for services to move money across programs. Given the importance of the INDOPACOM theater, we support DIU's placement of a senior official at the Command headquarters and would welcome other ways to increase connectivity between the Command and the R&D and acquisition structures at the Pentagon.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

7. Senator HIRONO. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, in January, DOD released its inaugural National Defense Industrial Strategy to coordinate and prioritize actions to build a modernized defense industrial ecosystem. I want to talk about two recommendations in your report to bolster the defense industrial base: fundamentally shifting from defense-led production to commercialization and investing more heavily in advanced manufacturing techniques like 3-D printing. Should DOD do a full-scale review to reduce barriers to using commercial products and software for defense purposes?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes. Specifically, our report cites numerous other studies, strategies, and reports on this topic and states:

Overcoming the cultural and institutional barriers to innovation at speed and scale is a critical requirement for achieving the goals of the NDS. It will require the concerted attention of senior DOD leaders and Congress to replace legal, regulatory, and cultural barriers with the mindset and exhortation to solicit, identify, test, procure, and adapt new technology. Several government and external organizations have provided useful recommendations to improve adoption of technical innovation; we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a team, with congressional involvement, dedicated to developing an implementation plan for this transformation. (p. 30)

8. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, how would investments in advanced manufacturing techniques like 3-D printing save the Department time and money?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. According to the January 2021 Department of Defense Additive Manufacturing Strategy (see <https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/dod-additive-manufacturing-strategy.pdf>), 3D printing “improves production speed and flexibility ...” and “can be used to: build parts that cannot be made any other way; uniquely combine materials; produce obsolete parts; rapidly prototype; create tools and specialized job aids.”

We agree with this description. Commissioners also saw in the Ukraine context how 3D printing can be used to produce spare parts and needed equipment closer to the front lines.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN

CLIMATE CHANGE

9. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman, the Commission's report notes the Department of Defense "has a responsibility and an important role to play to mitigate and respond" to a number of threats, including climate change. How does climate change affect military readiness?

Representative HARMAN. Climate change is already affecting military readiness by complicating existing operations and adding new missions. A few examples are listed below; DOD has compiled additional resources at <https://www.climate.mil/>:

- Rising sea levels, increased heat, drought, wildfire, major storms, and other effects of climate change threaten military bases, especially seaports and bases in coastal areas, and non-military infrastructure on which the military depends.
- Loss of sea ice in the Arctic presents opportunities and threats from increased posture and tempo of operations above the Arctic Circle.
- Excessive heat has an impact on training and health of the force and would affect how troops operate in large swaths of the world and would complicate logistics, especially during extended deployments.
- The effects of climate change may also affect our allies' ability to provide access to ports and other facilities and to contribute to joint operations.

Climate change also adds missions, which impacts readiness. Examples include added requirements for support to civilian authorities at home, to include preparing and responding to wildfire, major weather events, increased potential for pandemics, and other climate-driven events; humanitarian assistance/disaster response missions to assist other nations dealing with natural disasters; and instability driven by loss of habitable and arable land, lack of water, and increased levels of disease. Moreover, climate change may drive changes in force structure as both specialized cold-weather equipment or heat-resistant gear may be required to operate in extreme temperatures.

As the largest organization in the U.S. Government, we believe that the Department of Defense has a responsibility and a national security interest in reducing its contributions to climate change.

10. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman, if the U.S. fails to lead a global response to mitigate and respond to climate change, what impact would this have on international security?

Representative HARMAN. Climate change poses several critical threats to U.S. and international security, as well as U.S. and international economic systems and the well-being of billions of people and the planet. Among the many impacts on national and international security are the increased instability through drought, famine, and natural disaster across the world; increased competition for natural resources; weakening control of governments; increased likelihood of pandemic; and degradation of military infrastructure and related facilities.

As a wealthy nation with unparalleled capacity for global leadership and a major role in climate change emissions, many nations believe that the United States has a unique responsibility to lead a global response to mitigate and respond to climate change. Failure to do so would likely weaken U.S. relationships with key allies and partners as well as with non-aligned countries that would see the United States as an unreliable and irresponsible nation. Conversely, if the United States plays a leadership role in combating climate change, it stands to gain access, influence, and cooperation especially from nations for which climate change poses an existential crisis.

We note that many measures to combat global climate change are outside of the Department of Defense's responsibilities but should be seen as part of the "all elements of national power" approach recommended in the Commission's report.

MILITARY HOUSING

11. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman, your report notes that failures to provide safe military housing are harming recruiting and retention. Would increasing the supply of affordable housing for military families help or hurt recruitment and retention?

Representative HARMAN. We believe that better, more affordable housing for military families would aid recruitment and retention. In addition to affordability, housing should be free from mold and other health concerns and take into consideration problems with sexual assault in the military. The Commission heard numerous times from service secretaries and service chiefs that recruiting and retention de-

pend on caring for military personnel and their families; providing acceptable housing is an important part of this approach.

We also note that the availability of affordable housing can also be important to recruiting and retaining defense civilians and employees in the industrial base as well.

COMPETITION

12. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, your report notes the need for increased investment in the industrial base and the need to foster national security innovation. To what extent does reduced competition in the defense industrial base present a threat to innovation and the development of a robust defense industrial base?

Representative HARMAN. and Ambassador EDELMAN. In addition to the response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically on "Technology and Technology Adoption" (pp. 29–32) and "The Defense Industrial Base and Defense Production" (pp. 51–57). We also note that the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the National Defense Industrial Strategy.

Consolidation in the defense industrial base, combined with the large size and complexity of many DOD contracts, means that a very small number of companies can compete effectively as the prime contractor and receive a large percentage of the money on DOD contracts. The limited number of companies and the relatively high barriers to entry into the contract competition place limits on innovative approaches. It also limits the Department's ability to seek alternate product or service providers in the case of cost or schedule overruns. The consolidation of the defense industrial base has also contributed to brittle supply chains that hinder production rates, limit surge capacity, and result in higher costs.

Moreover, we believe that DOD's operating procedures and culture have the effect of rewarding well-established, larger defense companies to the detriment of smaller and non-traditional companies that could otherwise compete effectively. This serves to disincentivize innovation.

We should note that the small number of large defense contractors play a critical role in providing equipment and services to the Department, often at lower margins of return than exist in non-defense industries. They have some important capabilities that smaller or nontraditional companies may not have, such as large numbers of cleared employees, facilities and infrastructure, more surge capacity, and the ability to integrate work across large numbers of subsystems into large platforms.

13. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, has the consolidation of the defense industrial base increased the cost of new weapons and technology for DOD?

Representative HARMAN. and Ambassador EDELMAN. In addition to the response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically on "Technology and Technology Adoption" (pp. 29–32) and "The Defense Industrial Base and Defense Production" (pp. 51–57). We also note that the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the National Defense Industrial Strategy.

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14. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, has the consolidation of the defense industrial base limited national security innovation?

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15. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, has the consolidation of the defense industrial base limited the robustness and flexibility of the defense industrial base?

Representative HARMAN. and Ambassador EDELMAN. In addition to the response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically on "Technology and Technology Adoption" (pp. 29–32) and "The Defense Industrial Base and Defense Production" (pp. 51–57). We also note that the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the National Defense Industrial Strategy.

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ENTITLEMENTS AND TAX INCREASES

16. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission calls for "increased security spending ... accompanied by additional taxes and reforms to entitlement spending." How should Congress balance the need for tax increases vs. reforms to entitlement spending?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission unanimously agreed that increases in spending on defense and other elements of national security should not be placed on the national debt and instead should be offset by additional revenues and reforms to entitlement spending. We did not specify the balance between the two. The Commission also recommends ways to spend smart-

er—both through focusing resources where they will provide the best deterrence and warfighting capability and by spending funds more efficiently.

The Commission's report compares the level of threat to U.S. national security and global stability to that of the Cold War and recommends increasing spending on national security efforts as a percent of GDP to levels comparable to that time. The Commission notes that during the Cold War, the United States paid for that spending through higher individual and corporate tax rates. Due to the changes in entitlement programs over time, we did not find applicable benchmarks for comparing entitlement spending then and now.

17. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, what specific reforms to entitlement spending does the Commission recommend to Congress?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission did not make specific recommendations in this regard.

18. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, which Americans will face the greatest hardships as a result of these entitlement reforms?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. While the Commission didn't address this question specifically, we believe that changes to entitlement programs are more likely to affect Americans who receive a larger share of their income and livelihood from these programs. Conversely, we would expect that the Commission's recommendation to increase revenue measures would be borne more heavily by corporations and wealthier individuals.

19. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, given your call for tax increases, would it be unwise for Congress to extend expiring tax cuts, particularly tax cuts that primarily benefit the wealthiest Americans and the largest corporations?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission did not address specifically how to increase tax revenues other than to recommend that Congress does so.

20. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, would extending expiring tax cuts, particularly tax cuts that primarily benefit the wealthiest Americans and the largest corporations, pose national security risks?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission states that "[t]he ballooning U.S. deficit also poses national security risks." (p. xii) Legislation that increased the deficit would increase national security risks.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

21. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, please list all entities for which you work, consult, lobby, or otherwise provide services.

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We are both retired from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial interest in the Commission's work. We both serve on government advisory boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).

We have each filed financial disclosure reports for prior government service and responded to questions relating to conflicts of interest for security clearances and work on government advisory boards.

The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied with all applicable laws and regulations.

22. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, please list the amounts of any government contracts the entities you work for have received in the past 3 years.

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We are both retired from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial interest in the Commission's work. We both serve on government advisory boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).

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The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied with all applicable laws and regulations.

23. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, are you a fiduciary—including, but not limited to, a director, officer, advisor, or resident agent—of any organization or entity that has an interest in the Commission’s work?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We are both retired from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial interest in the Commission’s work. We both serve on government advisory boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).

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The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied with all applicable laws and regulations.

24. Senator WARREN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, please list any contracts, grants, or payments originating with a foreign government or Federal Government contractor related to the hearing’s subject that you or the organization(s) you work for have received in the past 3 years from the date of the hearing.

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We are both retired from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial interest in the Commission’s work. We both serve on government advisory boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

SHRINKING DEFENSE BUDGET

25. Senator SULLIVAN. Ambassador Edelman, our defense spending is on track to drop below 3 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP) at the most dangerous period since the end of the Cold War. Defense spending has only been below 4 percent of GDP 22 times in the last 85 years: 1940, 1948, 1994–1997, 2002–2007, 2013–2021, and 2024. During the Cold War, including the Korean War and Vietnam War, DOD spending ranged from 4.9 percent to 16.9 percent of GDP. Now, for the fourth consecutive year, President Biden has submitted a budget that does not achieve 3 percent real growth. Meanwhile, your report notes, “the Chinese government in March 2024 announced an increase in annual defense spending of 7.2 percent. Russia will devote 29 percent of its Federal budget this year on national defense.” What is the danger if U.S. defense spending drops below 3 percent?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The threats are the greatest we have faced since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war for which we are not prepared. Additional spending, along with other measures recommended in our report, is needed to deter and if necessary win such a war.

As the Commission’s report notes, the threats to national security require additional, as well as smarter, defense spending combined with other elements of U.S. power. We recommend immediate increases in spending—defense and other elements of national security—consistent with the 2018 Commission’s recommendation of 3–5 percent real growth (i.e., above inflation) this year. We also recommend targeted investments in capabilities through a supplemental appropriation and in-

increases starting in fiscal year 2027 to levels “on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

26. Senator SULLIVAN. Ambassador Edelman, what is the danger if U.S. defense spending remains at the Biden administration’s current set level?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The threats are the greatest we have faced since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war for which we are not prepared. Additional spending, along with other measures recommended in our report, is needed to deter and if necessary win such a war.

As the Commission’s report notes, the threats to national security require additional, as well as smarter, defense spending combined with other elements of U.S. power. We recommend immediate increases in spending—defense and other elements of national security—consistent with the 2018 Commission’s recommendation of 3–5 percent real growth (i.e., above inflation) this year. We also recommend targeted investments in capabilities through a supplemental appropriation and increases starting in FY2027 to levels “on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PERSISTENT BASING IN AREAS OF CONTENTION
IN THE ARCTIC

27. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, Russia and China have increased military cooperation in the last several years including by conducting joint naval patrols in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and now through a Russia-China joint bomber incursion in the Alaska Air Identification Zone (AK ADIZ) in July 2024. What do you believe the implications are for the United States National Defense Strategy if we do not maintain a credible deterrent against these incursions in the Arctic in peacetime or a future conflict against China and/or Russia?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The 2022 National Defense Strategy lists as its first priority “defending the Homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC.” We agree with that priority.

The United States Homeland is no longer a sanctuary and is vulnerable to non-kinetic and kinetic threats alike. We agree with the 2022 NDS that Chinese and Russian “gray zone” activities already include penetration of United States computer networks and critical infrastructure and that China in particular would include cyber attack against domestic United States networks in advance of and as part of military conflict.

As the Commission’s report notes, however, DOD and the 2022 NDS do not account for the partnership between China and Russia, the benefits each receive from their partnership, and the added likelihood of multi-theater conflict. For example, public reports (see <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/13/world/asia/china-russia-military-patrols.html>) indicate that China would not have been able to participate in the July 2024 joint incursion into the AK ADIZ without departing from a Russian airbase closer to the United States. DNI Haines has publicly testified that Russia might well assist China in a Taiwan invasion. The United States is not prepared for this level of joint or interoperable military action, nor has it effectively tailored its deterrence strategies with it mind.

Both China and Russia have the means to attack the United States and its territories and United States Northern Command lacks the resources to defend against such an attack. The patrols and incursions you cite are part of a growing pattern of aggressive and irresponsible actions by China and Russia designed to intimidate, deter, understand United States responses, and in some cases establish new norms without provoking a serious response.

It is critical that the United States establish and maintain a credible deterrent to Chinese or Russian aggression against the United States or against our allies.

28. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, do you believe that the current force posture we have in the Arctic region near Alaska will be sufficient to protect our vital military, civilian, and economic interests there that are in support of the National Defense Strategy?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Arctic is an increasingly contested region, especially due to the effects of climate change, in which the United States has key security and economic interests. Our report did not address United States military posture in the region specifically, but we would include the Arctic in the list of theaters where China and Russia are increasing their military, diplomatic, and economic presence. We believe that the United States should maintain a presence itself, to include military (including the military and non-military roles

of the Coast Guard), diplomatic, and otherwise. In the case of the Arctic, we should continue to coordinate with our allies to protect our shared interests. We would note that the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO provides greater ability for the Alliance as a whole to compete with Russia and China in the Arctic now that it has access to the region through the High North and we welcome the trilateral Ice Breaker Cooperation Effort (ICE Pact) among the US, Canada and Finland announced during the NATO Summit.

The 2022 NDS briefly discusses the Arctic, saying that the Department will “... deter threats to the U.S. Homeland from and through the Arctic region by improving early warning and ISR capabilities” and by partnering with Canada and other allies. (p. 16) The Commission report notes the increased threat and potential for military conflict in NORTHCOM’s AOR, which includes the Arctic, but is concerned that there has not been a corresponding increase in capability in this Command. We share the concerns voiced in recent testimony on this matter by former Commander VanHerck (see [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VanHerck percent20Written percent20Testimony percent20-%202005.09.23 percent20SASC-SF percent20Missile percent20Defense percent20Hearing.pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VanHerck%20Written%20Testimony%20-%202005.09.23%20SASC-SF%20Missile%20Defense%20Hearing.pdf)).

COUNTERING INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS
CAPABILITY

29. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, your report notes several times that our adversaries—particularly China and Russia—have included in their national strategies increased efforts to dominate the information space including with targeted information and disinformation operations in our own Homeland. Do these efforts include PRC [People’s Republic of China] plans (including in conjunction with other adversaries like Russia, North Korea, or Iran) to interfere in the United States elections?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We found that the United States does not compete effectively in information operations and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S. elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.

At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for election security, the intelligence community plays a role in identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds necessary.

We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations, including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee’s July 30 hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S. Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign interference have not been successful.

The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for great information advantage ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter misinformation about Israel’s actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption, contributions to climate change, control over access to critical minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military action in East Asia.

The Commission’s report recommends rebuilding the capability we had through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.

We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified information.

30. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, can you elaborate on what defensive and offensive information operations and messaging the U.S. and its allies can use to counter and deter adversary information and disinformation operations?

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31. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, do any such offensive information operations and messaging envisage releasing information about Chinese Communist Party leader corruption that the United States Government (USG) is privy to?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We found that the United States does not compete effectively in information operations and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S. elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.

At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for election security, the intelligence community plays a role in identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds necessary.

We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations, including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee's July 30 hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S. Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign interference have not been successful.

The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for great information advantage ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter misinformation about Israel's actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption, contributions to climate change, control over access to critical minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military action in East Asia.

The Commission's report recommends rebuilding the capability we had through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.

We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified information.

32. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, are there statutory constraints to such release of information about the Chinese Communist Party's leadership?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We found that the United States does not compete effectively in information operations and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S. elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.

At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for election security, the intelligence community plays a role in identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds necessary.

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We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified information.

33. Senator SULLIVAN. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, if there are statutory constraints to releasing information about the Chinese Communist Party leadership's corruption, what additional authorities are necessary and advisable in your opinion to conduct information operations effectively targeting PRC corruption?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We found that the United States does not compete effectively in information operations and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S. elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.

At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for election security, the intelligence community plays a role in identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds necessary.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED BUDD

DEFENSE SPENDING

34. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission proposes a Multiple Theater Force Construct and real growth in the defense spending of at least 3–5 percent annually, in keeping with the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission’s recommendations. Assuming Congress agrees with a Multiple Theater Force Construct, is a 3–5 percent real growth enough to achieve that goal in the near term and what are the variables Congress should consider?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. With regard to resources, the Commission recommends:

- Increasing defense spending, as well as non-defense national security spending, by at least 3–5 percent real growth in the current (FY25) year, allocated to emphasize near-term readiness demands to restore and reinforce deterrence;
- Passing a supplemental appropriations bill this year to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base; and
- Increasing national security spending starting in FY27, if not sooner, on a glide path to the levels of spending during the Cold War. (see p. xvii)

The Commission also recommends several measures to spend more effectively, to include changes on how we spend money and what we spend it on (see pp. 72–74). We do not believe that an increase in defense spending (only) of 3–5 percent real annual growth would be sufficient.

35. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, in the event the President does not request and/or Congress does not agree on significantly increased defense spending, how would you recommend Congress prioritize and allocate resources given the threats we face? For instance, should Congress prioritize investment and increase force posture west of the International Date Line relative to other regions?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. With regard to resources, the Commission recommends:

- Increasing defense spending, as well as non-defense national security spending, by at least 3–5 percent real growth in the current (fiscal year 2025) year, allocated to emphasize near-term readiness demands to restore and reinforce deterrence;
- Passing a supplemental appropriations bill this year to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base; and
- Increasing national security spending starting in FY27, if not sooner, on a glide path to the levels of spending during the Cold War. (see p. xvii)

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE STRUCTURE

36. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission recommends preserving special operations force (SOF) structure and funding as well as shifting resources from counterterrorism and direct action to unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense. Can you explain the Commission’s reasoning and explain SOF’s value proposition in great power competition and potential conflict?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. Over much of the past two decades, the emphasis for special operations forces was necessarily on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. As the counterterrorism mission has shifted away from large-scale direct action and the threat of great power competition has increased, we believe that the posture for special forces should also change. In particular, SOF plays a role in training allied forces, preparation of the environment, and crisis response—the requirements for all of which have increased significantly

in recent years. The importance and need for these missions was described well in recent testimony for the SASC by Assistant Secretary Maier and General Fenton (see <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2024.pdf>).

The Commission also found that SOCOM, with its unique structure and authorities, displays the kind of rapid technological innovation and ability to adapt quickly that we recommend broadly for the Joint Force and the Department. We don't recommend increasing the size of the Command but believe it can serve as a model and testbed for transformational changes needed.

PERSONNEL

37. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, reversing the decline in the percentage of graduating American high school students able to meet educational and/or physical standards for entering military service must be a top priority. Do you see a role for Government agencies other than DOD in working to reverse the decline in percentage of graduating American high school students able to meet educational and/or physical standards for entering military service?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. In calling for a strategy that embraces all elements of national power, we specifically call out the role of the Departments of Education and Labor in helping produce a population able and interested in serving in the military, as well as in civilian national security roles elsewhere in government, industry, or other areas. We also recommend a new National Defense Education Act along the lines of the 1958 law. The services have recently begun running their own schools and programs to help potential enlistees meet the academic or physical requirements for service, but the need for these efforts is an indictment of the broader secondary school system.

We commend the Committee for its hearing on February 28, 2024 to discuss broader education and workforce issues but believe that these must be "whole of society" issues and not ones that the national security community is addressing by itself. Given the severity of the threats our Nation faces, all parts of government need to be part of the solution.

We see a role for elected leaders, civic groups, and the private sector to promote national service, whether military, government, or other forms of service. Too many people do not see military service as a worthwhile or productive option, in part due to lack of familiarity with what it entails. The high levels of military retention show that once in, people want to remain in service.

38. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, where should Congress put additional emphasis or resources to achieve the goal of reversing the decline in percentage of graduating American high school students able to meet educational and/or physical standards for entering military service?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. In calling for a strategy that embraces all elements of national power, we specifically call out the role of the Departments of Education and Labor in helping produce a population able and interested in serving in the military, as well as in civilian national security roles elsewhere in government, industry, or other areas. We also recommend a new National Defense Education Act along the lines of the 1958 law. The services have recently begun running their own schools and programs to help potential enlistees meet the academic or physical requirements for service, but the need for these efforts is an indictment of the broader secondary school system.

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39. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission indicates an "all elements of national power" approach should be established for defense. It recommends increasing resources and political will for international engagement. The report highlights a significant decline in American public trust in the military, particularly among younger Americans. What strategies could be explored to address this decline in trust?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission's report states that the "U.S. public is largely unaware of the dangers the United States faces or the costs (financial and otherwise) required to adequately prepare." (p. viii) The first step in building support for international engagement and a sense of service is to better inform the public about the threats we face and the consequences of not addressing them.

We believe that restoring faith in the military and support for international engagement begins with leadership on a bipartisan basis from elected officials. In our meetings, retired senior officials serving in administrations of both parties decried the lack of public engagement and service as well as the lack of communication from the government on why it is important.

40. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission recommends that the DOD should seek to create a noncontinuous option for service, whereby personnel can and are encouraged to cycle out of government service, gain critical skills in the private sector, and come back to public service. How can the DOD work to encourage former employees to return to public service after receiving further skills/education in the private sector?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. Select disincentives to such flexible personnel systems include: lack of recognition in military rank or civil service (GS system) for experience and time in the private sector; lower rates of pay in government and benefit systems tied to time in service; slow and difficult hiring and security clearance processes; frequent changes in duty station (primarily for military work); and real and perceived preferences in hiring and promotion for internal candidates. Some of these characteristics of military and civilian governmental service are necessary but many of them do not need to be applied in every instance.

The need to attract talent from the private sector is particularly important in those fields where companies are innovating faster than the government, to include those related to space, software development, cybersecurity, and supply chain management. Congress has provided some legislative flexibilities for some of these areas and newer organizations like Space Force have built collaboration with the private sector into their operations. We believe more of this is necessary to maintain and develop skills needed for warfighting and DOD operations.

We also believe that the Department of Defense can provide professional opportunities that the private sector can't match—including conducting offensive operations against our adversaries, access to classified information, and work on behalf of one's country. We believe these can be important recruiting tools and may be particularly effective with former employees of the U.S. Government.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

41. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission found that Congress should require the State Department to develop and implement a national security-focused diplomatic strategy that incorporates United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) foreign assistance tools. How can the State Department shift its tools to better align with national defense?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The State Department and USAID, along with other investment agencies, have very important national security missions to play in addition to humanitarian and other work. We found, however, that the culture of both organizations has shifted away from a national security focus over time. While the seniormost leadership at State is integrally involved in every major national security issue, the Department lacks the institutional ability needed.

We encourage the authors of the next State and USAID strategy to clearly articulate the very real security threats we face as the top priority and organize around that. State and USAID should play a global role in checking Chinese and Russian aggression and ability to project force and influence.

The Commission's review did not look into the relationship between State and USAID and Congress but from an outsider's view, it appears much more contentious and less transparent than the relationship between DOD and the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees and defense appropriators. State and USAID should provide insight into their strategies, plans, and implementation at similar levels to DOD. Congressional committees, in turn, can contribute to a more productive relationship through constructive oversight, promptly considering and acting on nominees, and supporting responsible budgets for diplomatic and aid work.

42. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, how can State Department and USAID improve their transparency with Congress and the DOD as it works to implement this goal?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The State Department and USAID, along with other investment agencies, have very important national security missions to play in addition to humanitarian and other work. We found, however, that the culture of both organizations has shifted away from a national security focus over time. While the seniormost leadership at State is integrally involved in every major national security issue, the Department lacks the institutional ability needed.

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43. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission recommends that the Department of State, USAID, and DOD review their differing ways of dividing the world into regions and commands and align their respective areas of responsibility to improve coordination across the Departments and make it easier for other nations to engage the United States. What type of information does the Commission recommend be included in this review?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. The Commission believes that U.S. operations and relations with other countries would benefit if geographic Combatant Commanders, regional Assistant Secretaries of State, and Assistant Administrators at USAID had the same areas of responsibility. Reviewing the differences in geographic responsibilities and determining a common approach should not require significant effort beyond the will to change organizational lines for a small number of country assignments.

44. Senator BUDD. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the Commission states that they've heard examples of the Pentagon not coordinating and integrating its operations effectively with the State Department and others. How can the Pentagon coordinate more effectively with the State Department or vice versa?

Representative HARMAN and Ambassador EDELMAN. We don't want to overstate the case. However, DOD is by far the largest Federal Department with personnel and resources that other Departments and Agencies lack. This gives it the capacity to move faster and put more people and resources on an issue than others. The Department also has well-established processes, relationships, and networks around the world to implement decisions that others lack. This is especially noteworthy in theaters like SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM where State and other Departments lack a sizable presence (and often have no confirmed Ambassadors) so diplomatic and business functions that should be performed to others fall to combatant commanders. We heard that, at times, the capacity to move faster led to DOD moving out on an initiative or proposal before properly coordinating with other agencies.

The Department, and the U.S. military, has been the first choice for policymakers to deal with national security and international issues for decades. The Department's culture is to accomplish its missions and not necessarily work with other Departments and Agencies in doing so. The Commission's report calls on the National Security Council to provide the leadership and direction for an "all elements of national power" approach. It also notes that other Departments and Agencies lack the culture, prioritization, and often the resources to play a larger role in national security policymaking and implementation.