[Senate Hearing 118-754]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-754
THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
STRATEGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 30, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: //www.govinfo.gov
------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-352 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_____________
July 30, 2024
Page
The Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on the 1
National Defense Strategy.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 1
Statement of Senator Roger Wicker................................ 8
Witness Statements
Harman, Jane M., Chair, Commission on the National Defense 9
Strategy.
Edelman, Eric S., Vice Chair, Commission on the National Defense 11
Strategy.
Questions for the Record......................................... 42
(iii)
THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE STRATEGY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2024
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Hirono, Kaine, King, Manchin, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tuberville, and Schmitt.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
discuss the final report of the Commission on the National
Defense Strategy, or NDS. The NDS Commission was established in
the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act with
the mandate of assessing the 2022 NDS, and the Department's
efforts to successfully implement it.
During today's hearing, the Committee will receive the
Commission's evaluation of the National Security challenges we
face, whether the force planning construct in the 2022 National
Defense Strategy remains valid, and the effectiveness of the
Defense Department's implementation of the NDS. The
Commissioner was shared by Hon. Jane Harman, who served nine
terms in Congress as the U.S. Representative from California's
36 Congressional District and was Ranking Member of the
Intelligence Committee for 4 years after 911.
The Commission's Vice Chair Ambassador Eric Edelman is
currently counselor at the Center for Strategy and Budgetary
Assessments and served previously as undersecretary of defense
for policy from 2005 to 2009, and as United States Ambassador
to Finland and Turkey, and really, I want to commend the
Commission for the extraordinary work you've done. Very, very
proud of your effort, and I know it was intense work over many,
many months, so thank you very, very much.
I'm pleased of course to welcome the Chair and Vice Chair
but I also want to congratulate their fellow Commissioners
General Jack Keane, Thomas Mahnken, Mara Rudman, Mariah
Sixkiller, Alissa Starzak, and Roger Zakheim. Together, you did
a remarkable job. The 2022 National Defense Strategy was
written prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and
the evolution of the strategic partnership between China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Nonetheless, the 2022 NDS provides an important framework
for America's national security. The NDS ranks China as the
most consequential strategic competitor, identifies Russia as
an acute threat, and addresses the persistent challenges from
authoritarian regimes and violent extremists. Indeed, I believe
that we currently face the most dangerous complex security
environment since World War II.
To address these challenges, the NDS proposes four broad
missions for the Department of Defense (DOD), which include
defending the U.S. Homeland, deterring strategic attacks
against the United States and its allies, and partners
deteriorating aggression while being prepared to prevail in a
conflict and building a resilient joint force and defense
ecosystem. The NDS also outlined several priorities of building
joint capabilities, including the concept of integrated
deterrence, campaigning, and actions that will build enduring
advantages.
These are well reasoned priorities. I understand that the
NDS Commission agrees broadly with these objectives but has
concluded that the Department of Defense is not adapting at the
speed or scale necessary to achieve them or meet today's
threats. The Commission recommends a fundamental change in the
way we approach our national defense including an overhaul of
the Defense Department's relationships with the U.S.
interagency and our allies.
A significant investment in the defense industrial base and
a restructuring of Departments acquisition and procurement
process. I look forward to hearing the Commission's specific
recommendations on how to make targeted investments and reforms
in these areas. Notably, the Commission concludes that 2022 NDS
does not provide an adequate force structure to handle
simultaneous conflicts in multiple theaters.
The Commission proposes a multiple theater force construct
that would resize and restructure the joint force to match
regional threats and integrate with regional allies. I would
appreciate our witnesses further explaining this construct in
what challenges the Departments may face in implementing it. At
its core, the 2022 NDS requires all elements of national power,
including military, diplomatic, and economic to maintain a
stable and open international system.
However, the Commission concludes that America's civil
society must also be reinvigorated as a source of national
power. The American public must be educated on the threats we
face and encouraged to engage in national service, whether
through the military or civil service, and I support the
Commission's urgent call to engage more in this area.
Ultimately, the 2022 NDS recognizes that the U.S. must
modernize and strengthen our military.
This will require smart investments in platforms and
equipment, rapid development and integration of cutting-edge
technologies, and steadfast support for our servicemembers and
national security workforce. I will welcome the Commission's
insights on how the Department is adapting to these complicated
issues and the challenges of great power competition.
In light of the wide-ranging global security challenges
presented by Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region,
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the persistent terrorist
threat posed by extremist groups and rogue regimes, the
Committee would appreciate the Commission's assessment of the
resources necessary to prevail in strategic competition, as
well as its recommendations for strengthening United States
global engagement and alliances.
Let me again thank the members and staff of the Commission.
We look forward to your testimony. Before recognizing Senator
Wicker, we have a quorum and I would like to proceed with your
permission. Since the quorum is now present, I ask the
Committee to a consider a list of 3,135 pending military
nominations and two civilian nominations.
First, I ask the Committee to consider a list of 3,135
pending military nominations. All of these nominations have
been before the Committee, the required length of time. Is
there a motion to favor to report this list of 3,135 pending
military nominations to this?
Senator Wicker. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Fischer. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor say aye.
[Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON JULY 30, 2024.
1. MG Duke A. Pirak, ANG to be lieutenant general and Director,
Air National Guard (Reference No. 1503)
2. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Julie N. Marek) (Reference No. 1524)
3. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Matthew J. Vargas) (Reference No. 1669)
4. MG John J. DeGoes, USAF to be lieutenant general and Surgeon
General of the Air Force (Reference No. 1756)
5. MG Brian S. Eifler, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-1, US Army (Reference No. 1758)
6. MG Robert D. Harter, USAR to be lieutenant general and Chief
of Army Reserve/Commanding General, US Army Reserve Command (Reference
No. 1809)
7. MG Mark H. Landes, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, First United States Army (Reference No. 1829)
8. MG Paul T. Stanton, USA to be lieutenant general and
Director, Defense Information Systems Agency/Commander, Joint Forces
Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Network (Reference No.
1830)
9. MG Matthew W. McFarlane, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, I Corps (Reference No. 1831)
10. MG David J. Francis, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command/Commanding
General, US Army Center for Initial Military Training (Reference No.
1832)
11. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Scott D. Hopkins) (Reference No. 1842)
12. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Elizabeth B. Mathias) (Reference No. 1844)
13. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Matthew I. Horner) (Reference No. 1845)
14. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Joshua A. King) (Reference No. 1846)
15. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Matthew D. Fouquier) (Reference No. 1847)
16. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Vegas V. Coleman) (Reference No.
1848)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Hannah E. Choi) (Reference No. 1849)
18. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Steven P. Perry, Jr.) (Reference No. 1850)
19. In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Roy A. George) (Reference No. 1851)
20. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Gary Levy) (Reference No. 1852)
21. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (0003824486) (Reference No. 1853)
22. In the Army there are 61 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jesse J. Adamson) (Reference No. 1854)
23. In the Army there are 17 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Matthew D. Atkins) (Reference No. 1855)
24. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Joseph T. Conley III) (Reference No. 1856)
25. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Richard T. Hill) (Reference No. 1857)
26. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Timothy J. Leone) (Reference No. 1858)
27. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Colton T. Cash) (Reference No. 1859)
28. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Bradley J. Marron) (Reference No. 1860)
29. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Ramon R. Gonzalez Figueroa) (Reference No. 1861)
30. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Ivan J. Serpaperez) (Reference No. 1862)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Adam R. Mann) (Reference No. 1863)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Cody S. Foister) (Reference No. 1864)
33. In the Army there are 291 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michael L. Able) (Reference No. 1865)
34. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Juan J. Barba-Jaume) (Reference No. 1866)
35. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Riccardo S. Hicks, Jr.) (Reference No. 1867)
36. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Nathan K. Magare) (Reference No. 1868)
37. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with James E. Barclay) (Reference No. 1869)
38. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Adam M. Baroni) (Reference No. 1870)
39. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Dennis J. Crump) (Reference No. 1871)
40. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Joseph M. Federico) (Reference No. 1872)
41. In the Navy there are 52 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Christopher M. Andrews) (Reference No.
1873)
42. In the Navy Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Rafal B. Banek) (Reference No. 1874)
43. In the Navy Reserve there are 10 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Thomas P. Byrnes) (Reference No. 1875)
44. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Francis A. Goiran) (Reference No. 1876)
45. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with John F. Landis) (Reference No. 1877)
46. In the Navy Reserve there are 16 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Joseph E. Allen) (Reference No. 1878)
47. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with David F. Bell) (Reference No. 1879)
48. In the Navy there are 17 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Frederick J. Auth) (Reference No. 1880)
49. In the Navy there are 39 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kwadwo S. Agyepong) (Reference No. 1881)
50. In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kelly W. Agha) (Reference No. 1882)
51. In the Navy there are 591 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Nicholas H. Abelein) (Reference No. 1883)
52. In the Navy there are 26 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Garrett L. Adams) (Reference No. 1884)
53. In the Navy there are 29 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Brandon M. Beckler) (Reference No. 1885)
54. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Michael C. Becker II) (Reference No. 1886)
55. In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with James K. Brown) (Reference No. 1887)
56. In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with David M. Gardner) (Reference No. 1888)
57. In the Navy Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Tyler L. Branham) (Reference No. 1889)
58. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Eric A. Gardner) (Reference No. 1890)
59. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Johan Baik) (Reference No. 1891)
60. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Richard A. Barkley) (Reference No. 1892)
61. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Christopher C. Cady) (Reference No. 1893)
62. In the Navy there are 21 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Milton G. Casasola) (Reference No. 1894)
63. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(James F. Sullivan IV) (Reference No. 1895)
64. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Christopher R. Napoli) (Reference No. 1896)
65. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Ross C. Huddleston) (Reference No. 1897)
66. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Lucas M. Malabad) (Reference No. 1898)
67. In the Space Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Davin Mao) (Reference No. 1899)
68. In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Steven G. Behmer) (Reference No. 1906)
69. Col. John M. Schutte, USAF to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1907)
70. Col. Lucas J. Teel, USAF to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1908)
71. MG David Wilson, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-9, US Army (Reference No. 1909)
72. BG Justin W. Osberg, ARNG to be major general (Reference No.
1910)
73. MG Joseph A. Ryan, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, US Army (Reference No. 1911)
74. BG Jonathan M. Stubbs, ARNG to be lieutenant general and
Director, Army National Guard (Reference No. 1912)
75. MG William H. Graham, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, US Army Corps of Engineers
(Reference No. 1914)
76. In the Army Reserve there are 16 appointments to the grade of
major general and below (list begins with Andree G. Carter) (Reference
No. 1915)
77. MG Kevin D. Admiral, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Cavazos (Reference No. 1916)
78. In the Army Reserve there are 82 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Brian R. Abraham) (Reference No.
1917)
79. Col. Eric W. Widmar, USA to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1918)
80. In the Army Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Troy E. Armstrong) (Reference No. 1919)
81. VADM Daniel W. Dwyer, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Plans, Strategy, and Warfighting Development,
N3/N5/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1921)
82. VADM Michael E. Boyle, USN to be vice admiral and Director,
Navy Staff, N09B (Reference No. 1922)
83. In the Air Force there are 123 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Travis P. Abeita) (Reference No.
1923)
84. In the Air Force there are 38 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Andrew Kyle Baldwin) (Reference
No. 1924)
85. In the Air Force there are 71 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Elena A. Amspacher) (Reference No.
1925)
86. In the Air Force there are 47 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Edison I. Abeyta) (Reference No.
1926)
87. In the Air Force there are 279 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Samory Ahmir Abdulraheem)
(Reference No. 1928)
88. In the Air Force there are 547 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Neils J. Abderhalden) (Reference
No. 1929)
89. In the Air Force there are 231 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Chastine R. Abueg) (Reference No.
1930)
90. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Thomas S. Randall) (Reference No. 1931)
91. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Edwin Rodriguez) (Reference No. 1932)
92. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Robert L. Wooten III) (Reference No. 1933)
93. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Jason P. Haggard) (Reference No. 1934)
94. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Mark T. Moore) (Reference No. 1935)
95. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(John A. Temme) (Reference No. 1936)
96. In the Army there are 49 appointments to the grade of colonel
and below (John M. Aguilar, Jr.) (Reference No. 1937)
97. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Ramon L. Dejesusmunoz) (Reference No. 1938)
98. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Blaine C. Pitkin) (Reference No. 1939)
99. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Kalista M. Ming) (Reference No. 1940)
100. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Kevin S. McCormick) (Reference No. 1941)
101. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(James J. Cullen) (Reference No. 1942)
102. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Steven C. McGhan) (Reference No. 1943)
103. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Brenda L. Beegle) (Reference No. 1944)
104. In the Space Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with Clifford V. Sulham) (Reference No.
1945)
105. LTG Ronald P. Clark, USA to be general and Commanding
General, US Army Pacific (Reference No. 1961)
106. In the Army there are 16 appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Stephanie R. Ahern) (Reference No. 1962)
107. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Edward H. Evans, Jr.)
(Reference No. 1963)
108. BG Daniel R. McDonough, ANG to be major general (Reference
No. 1964)
109. In the Air Force Reserve there are 22 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Nathan P. Aysta)
(Reference No. 1965)
110. Col. David R. Chauvin, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 1966)
111. In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with John D. Blackburn)
(Reference No. 1967)
112. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Matthew F. Blue)
(Reference No. 1968)
113. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Patrick D. Chard)
(Reference No. 1969)
114. In the Air Force Reserve there are 10 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Michael W. Bank) (Reference
No. 1970)
115. BG Michael T. Venerdi, ANG to be major general (Reference No.
1971)
116. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Akshai M. Gandhi) (Reference
No. 1972)
117. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Peter G. Bailey) (Reference
No. 1973)
118. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Kevin V. Doyle) (Reference No.
1974)
119. LTG John D. Lamontagne, USAF to be general and Commander, Air
Mobility Command (Reference No. 1985)
120. MG Michael L. Ahmann, ANG to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Continental United States North American Aerospace Defense
Command Region and Commander, First Air Force (Air Forces Northern)
(Reference No. 1987)
121. MG Michael L. Downs, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military
Affairs (Reference No. 1988)
122. MG Evan L. Pettus, USAF to be lieutenant general and Military
Deputy Commander, US Southern Command (Reference No. 1989)
123. MG Rebecca J. Sonkiss, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, Air Mobility Command (Reference No. 1990)
124. MG Joel B. Vowell, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General, US Army Pacific (Reference No. 1991)
125. MG Curtis A. Buzzard, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (Reference No. 1993)
126. MG Edmond M. Brown, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General, US Army Futures Command (Reference No. 1994)
127. RADM Peter A. Garvin, USN to be vice admiral and President,
National Defense University (Reference No. 1997)
128. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Dewee S. Debusk) (Reference No. 1999)
129. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Kyle Y. Tobara) (Reference No. 2000)
130. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Daniel E. Ball) (Reference No. 2001)
131. In the Army Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Shannon D. Huntley) (Reference No. 2002)
132. In the Navy there are 81 appointments to the grade of captain
and below (list begins with Allen M. Agor) (Reference No. 2003)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 3,135
Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Finally, I ask the
Committee to consider the following civilian nominations; Ms.
Tonya P. Wilkerson to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence Security, and Dr. Michael L. Sulmeyer to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy. Is there a
motion to favorably report these two nominations?
Senator Wicker. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Fischer. Second.
Chairman Reed. All in favor say aye.
[Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Reed. The motion carries. Thank you very, very
much. Senator Wicker, please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I want
to congratulate you on a very fine opening statement which I
fully subscribe to. We have two very distinguished witnesses
today and this may possibly be the most important hearing we
will have this year. But I have to say I very much appreciate
the service of Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman.
Let's go back 6 years.
This Committee began holding hearings on the first National
Defense Strategy Commission report which reviewed the 2018
National Defense Strategy. The first NDS report was important,
helped us make significant bipartisan progress toward improving
our national defense. We lost Chairman Jim Inhofe just a few
weeks ago. Many of us will remember that he in particular,
admired that report.
He would often hold the report up and wave it around at
hearings. His enthusiasm proved that the NDS served as a
guiding light for him, and it prompted all of us to consider
the Report's recommendations. The global security environment
has worsened much faster than we expected back in 2018. The
first time that the first line of a new 2024 NDS Commission
Report summarizes the situation in which we find ourselves.
``The threats the United States faces are the most serious
and most challenging the Nation has encountered since 1945 and
include the potential for near term major war.'' A dramatic and
forceful statement. It turns out that the Commission believes
that we are not at all where we need to be and I think Members
of the Committee understand this. We understand clearly there's
no time to waste.
The Commission Report notes that our military capacity and
capabilities are insufficient to meet the current requirements
at acceptable risk. The document details the way in which the
2022 National Defense Strategy and Assessment completed just 2
years ago did not adequately account for the threat of
simultaneous and increasingly coordinated military action by
our four primary adversaries. A group which I have come to call
the axis of aggressors.
The report correctly notes that with the possible exception
of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government is not acting
with alacrity or making so-called whole-of-government
strategies more than simply a buzzword. It amply describes our
hollow brittle defense industrial base and painfully byzantine
bureaucratic process. The report also finds that we cannot fix
these problems without increasing defense spending.
Thankfully, this Committee has added a $25 billion top line
increase for the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA. Even that increase, a
3.8 percent nominal edition would fall short of the
Commission's recommendation fall well short. The report
endorses a 3 to 5 percent real increase this year with
inflation running above 2 percent.
I appreciate the Commission's recommendation that national
security spending must return to late Cold War levels. A goal
which matches my plan to spend 5 percent eventually of GDP
(gross domestic product) on defense. That level of investment
would be temporary, it would be a down payment on the
rebuilding of our national defense tools, for a generation.
Tools that have sharpened can reduce the risk that our
adversaries will use military force against U.S. interests,
peace through strength.
The 2018 and 2022 Defense Strategies both recommended a
vague force sizing requirement. The mandate called for the
United States Military to have sufficient forces to defeat
either China or Russia in a major conflict while simultaneously
deterring other adversaries. That force sizing construct failed
to provide a useful measuring stick by which to determine the
ideal size and capability of the U.S. military.
I would appreciate the Commissioners expanding upon their
new force sizing construct, which proposes that we be able to
lead coalitions that can defeat both China and Russia, while
continuing to maintain deterrence elsewhere. I would also like
our witnesses to explain a claim they make in the report. The
document contends that the American public does not appreciate
the threat environment and therefore does not understand why
strong defense is necessary to ensure a bright future for our
country.
Very perceptive, this is a perspective that echoes concerns
expressed by the recent congressional Strategic Posture
Commission. I'm of the opinion that this is largely the fault
of the U.S. Government, the executive and legislative branches
alike, for failing to make the case to the American people. Mr.
Chairman, I could go on and on. I would simply say that I
appreciate a great deal of the Commission Report.
I'm grateful for the work of all eight bipartisan
Commissioners and their staff. Thank you for calling each and
every name of the Commissioners and I hope their labor can help
guide us as we write a new National Defense Strategy and the
legislation that will follow to allow us to regain our military
edge and avoid wars in the years to come. Again, Mr. Chairman,
I congratulate you on your opening statement and I subscribe to
it and I yield back. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. Now,
let me recognize Chairwoman Harman.
STATEMENT OF JANE M. HARMAN, CHAIR, COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's a pleasure to
appear before you Ranking Member Wicker and so many other
Members of this Committee whom I serve within the House and who
are very good friends. I'm happy to be back, and as you know,
Mr. Chairman, I almost wasn't back today because yesterday
afternoon at Boston Children's Hospital, my youngest child, a
daughter, had very experimental surgery, which has resulted we
hope in her fetus becoming healthy. Hopefully she will give
birth in a few weeks and it's quite a miracle, and obviously, I
was going to stay there if things had not gone well. But I
mentioned this, not only because it's top of mind but also
because it makes clear how amazing this country is, and how
important what we offer in terms of healthcare, and other
services, and benefits to the American people is, and it's
worth fighting for this country.
That's what our report is about. We try to make the case
about how it is worth fighting for our country, and some
pundits have already said, well, it's a good report, but it'll
gather dust on shelves. I sure hope not. Our Commission on a
bipartisan basis was unanimous in our recommendations and we
are dedicated to making sure they get implemented. I just
suggest to you and I listen to your opening statements.
I think you're dedicated on a bipartisan basis to making
that happen too, so, let's not waste a minute. In that vein,
Eric Edelman, our vice chair, who co-chaired the last
Commission is sitting next to me and I will yield to him in
just a moment. But let me make a few points. Our Commissioners
who are sitting on a bipartisan basis right over there have
been introduced Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman, and Roger Zakheim.
But you did not introduce the vaunted staff sitting behind
me on a bipartisan basis. Ably led by David Grannis, whom you
may know was the Chief of Staff to the late Dianne Feinstein
for many years here, and who was originally hired by me, in my
capacity as a Member of the House. You've mentioned when the
NDS was written, you've mentioned when we were created but I
just underscore again that we think and you said it too, that
the threats to U.S. national security and our interests are
greater than any time since World War II.
More complex than any threats during the Cold War.
Significant and urgent action is needed. We recommend
fundamental change in the way the Pentagon and other government
agencies do business, the way they incorporate private sector
technology, and a full embrace of our partners and allies.
Shorthand for this is we recommend using all elements of
national power.
Our report includes actionable recommendations which we
will highlight in just a moment, including one that is being
implemented today, and that is telling the public how grave the
threats are. Sadly, we think, and I'm sure you agree, that the
public has no idea how great the threats are, and is not
mobilized to meet them.
Public support is critical to implement the changes we need
to make leaders on both sides of the aisle and across
Government need to make the case to the public and get their
support. Eric. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ERIC S. EDELMAN, VICE CHAIR, COMMISSION ON THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
Ambassador Edelman. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker,
and Members of the Committee. It's pleasure to be back before
you again. I think this is the 11th time I've testified in
front of this Committee, and I do want to say one thing, which
is we could not have come to a unanimous bipartisan conclusion
of this report without the leadership of our Chair, Jane
Harman, who worked indefatigably to get us there.
These are difficult issues that we wrestled with and which
you wrestle with every day. But I really want to just commend
Jane for the leadership she demonstrated in leading our
Commission. Several of our Commissioners served on the 2018
Commission, and General Jack Keane, who's not able to be with
us today, actually served with me on the 2010 Commission. The
2010 Commission said that we were facing a train wreck because
threats were gathering but defense resources were declining.
In the 2014, National Defense Panel, we said that the
Budget Control Act (BCA) had been a strategic misstep that had
hampered U.S. Defenses and that we needed to go back to threat
based defense budgeting as Secretary Gates had last done before
the BCA and his fiscal year 2011 budget. Last time we raised
the question of whether the United States might find itself in
a conflict that could lose if current trends continued.
Six years later when we came back to this task, the threats
are more serious, and we found that we as a nation have failed
to keep pace. As you said, Chairman Reed, and as Secretary
Gates has said in an important article he wrote in Foreign
Affairs, this is the most challenging global security
environment since the Second World War. There is potential for
near term war and a potential that we might lose such a
conflict.
The partnership that's emerged among China, Russia, Iran,
and North Korea is a major strategic shift that we have not
completely accounted for in our defense planning. It makes each
of those countries potentially stronger militarily,
economically, and diplomatically, and potentially can weaken
the tools we have at our disposal to deal with them. It makes
it more likely that a future conflict, for instance, in the
Indo-Pacific, would expand across other theaters, and that we
would find ourselves in a global war that is on the scale of
the Second World War.
The 2022 NDS identified China as the pacing challenge. We
found that China is in many ways, outpacing the United States,
while we still have the strongest military in the world with
the farthest global reach, when we get to a thousand miles of
China's shore, we start to lose our military dominance and
could find ourselves on the losing end of a conflict. China's
cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces, and
fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep us
from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East China
seas.
China has been testified to before Congress has infiltrated
our critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter United
States action by contesting our logistics, disrupting American
power and water, and otherwise removing the sanctuary of the
Homeland that we have long enjoyed. For its part, Russia has
reconstituted its own defense industrial base after its
invasion of Ukraine, much more rapidly than people anticipated.
Vladimir Putin seeks to reassert Russia as a great power
and is happy to destabilize the world in order to do so. Our
report describes the threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and
terrorism as well. Clearly, Iran and North Korea both feel
emboldened by the current environment and terrorism remains a
potent threat fueled by the proliferation of technology. As the
DNI [Director of National Intelligence] has said, the current
war in the Middle East is likely to have a general generational
impact on terrorism.
We share the goal, I think, as a Commission unanimously, of
the NDS, that our purpose is to deter war. But doing so is
going to require moving with a greater sense of urgency and
determination beyond what we've seen over the last couple of
decades.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Jane M. Harman and
Ambassador Eric S. Edelman follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Ms. Jane M. Harman and Ambassador Eric S.
Edelman
(Chair Harman) Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee--it is good to see former
colleagues with whom I have worked over the years. Your Committee has
enormous responsibility and I commend you for operating in a bipartisan
fashion. I am very pleased to be joined by Vice Chairman Eric Edelman
to present the bipartisan, unanimous report of the Commission on the
National Defense Strategy. He and I will jointly present our opening
statement to summarize our work.
As you know, Congress created our Commission to review the 2022
National Defense Strategy (or NDS) and offer a clear-eyed, independent
view.
Eight Commissioners were appointed by the bipartisan, bicameral
leaders of the Senate, the House, and the two Armed Services
Committees. Commissioners Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman, and Roger Zakheim
are with us today. Commissioners Jack Keane, Mariah Sixkiller, and
Alissa Starzak are unable to join us in person.
The current NDS was written by early 2022 before Russia's invasion
of Ukraine, China and Russia's strategic partnership, and HAMAS'
horrific attack on Israel last October 7.
Our Commission believes unanimously that the threats to U.S.
national security and our interests are greater than at any time since
World War II and are more complex than during the Cold War.
Significant and urgent action is needed. We recommend fundamental
change in the way the Pentagon and other government agencies do
business, the way they incorporate private sector technology, and a
full embrace of our partners and allies.
Our report includes actionable recommendations, including one that
is being implemented in part with today's hearing: educating the
American public on how dire the situation is. Their support is critical
to implement the changes we need to make. Leaders on both sides of the
aisle and across government need to make the case to the public and get
their support.
(Vice Chair Edelman) Several of our Commissioners served on the
2018 NDS Commission, which sounded the alarm that the United States was
losing its decisive military edge. Six years later, the threats are
more serious and we have failed to keep pace.
Our Commission's first finding is that the United States faces the
most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications
since the end of the Cold War. The trends are getting worse, not
better.
There is potential for near-term war, and potential that we might
lose.
The partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a
major strategic shift that we haven't yet accounted for. It makes each
of those countries stronger militarily, economically, and
diplomatically and weakens our tools to deal with them, and it makes it
more likely that a future conflict would expand across theaters and
that we could find ourselves in a global war.
The 2022 NDS identifies China as ``the pacing challenge.'' We find
China is in some ways outpacing the United States. While the U.S. still
has the world's strongest military with the farthest reach, within
1,000 miles of China's shore, we have lost military dominance and could
lose a war.
China's cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces,
and fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep the
United States from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East
China Seas. China has infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks
to prevent or deter U.S. action by contesting our logistics, disrupting
power and water, and otherwise remove the sanctuary that the United
States has long enjoyed at home.
For its part, Russia has reconstituted after its invasion of
Ukraine. Vladimir Putin seeks to re-assert Russia as a great power and
is happy to destabilize the world to do it. Our report describes the
threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and terrorism. Clearly, Iran and
North Korea feel emboldened. Terrorist groups remain a potent threat,
fueled by the proliferation of technology. As DNI Haines has said, the
current war in the Middle East will likely have ``a generational
impact'' on terrorism.
We share the goal of the NDS of deterring major war. Doing so will
require moving with a sense of urgency and determination beyond what we
have seen in the past couple of decades.
(Harman) In the interest of time, we will both describe the rest of
the Commission's main findings and save further discussion for your
questions. They are:
1. DOD cannot, and should not, provide for the national defense by
itself. The NDS calls for an ``integrated deterrence'' that is not
reflected in practice today. A truly ``all elements of national power''
approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DOD,
the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society,
and U.S. allies and partners.
We agree with the NDS on the importance of allies and we commend
the Administration for expanding and strengthening NATO and building up
relationships and capabilities across Asia. We also point out ways for
the United States be better partners ourselves, including by
maintaining a more stable presence globally and in key organizations
like NATO. We call for reducing barriers to intelligence sharing, joint
production, and military exports so we can better support and prepare
to fight with our closest allies.
2. Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require
fundamental change in how DOD functions. This is particularly true of
how DOD works with the tech sector where most of our innovation
happens. DOD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat
is approaching wartime urgency.
DOD's structure is optimized for research and development for
exquisite, irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy, AI, and
large numbers of cheaper, attritable systems. Programs like Replicator
and offices like the Defense Innovation Unit and the Office of
Strategic Capital are great--but they are essentially efforts to work
around the larger Pentagon system.
In addition, since the 2018 report, the Joint Staff has worked to
develop operational concepts to overcome deficits in numbers and
geography. Our Commission finds that there is more work to be done to
truly operate as a joint force with technological and strategic
advantage.
3. The force-sizing construct in the NDS is inadequate for today's
needs and tomorrow's challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force
Construct with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and
partners, sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats
in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. U.S. global
responsibilities require a global military presence--as well as a
diplomatic and economic one.
4. U.S. industrial production is grossly inadequate to provide the
equipment, technology, and munitions that the U.S. military and our
allies need today, let alone given the demands of great power conflict.
5. The DOD workforce and the All-Volunteer Force provide an
unmatched advantage. However, recruiting failures have shrunk the force
and raise serious questions about the All-Volunteer Force in peacetime,
let alone in major combat. We should prepare now for what a wartime
mobilization would entail. The civilian workforce at DOD and in the
private sector also face critical shortfalls.
6. The Joint Force is at the breaking point of maintaining
readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild
readiness will cause it to break.
7. The United States must spend more effectively and more
efficiently to build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one.
We have to cancel legacy programs. Additional resources will also be
necessary. Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation to begin a
multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial
base.
Additionally, Congress should revoke the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility
Act spending caps and provide real growth for fiscal year 2025 defense
and nondefense national security spending that, at bare minimum, falls
within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS Commission. Subsequent
budgets will require spending that puts defense and other components of
national security on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with
the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.
We also agreed unanimously that the national debt is its own
national security challenge. If we want to approach Cold War levels of
spending, we need to increase tax rates and reform entitlement
spending. During the Cold War, top marginal income tax rates were above
70 percent and corporate tax rates averaged 50 percent. We don't call
for those numbers, but today we are spending more on the interest on
our debt than on defense.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker, and Members of the Committee,
thank you again for your role in establishing our Commission and
inviting us to share our report with you. We welcome the opportunity to
answer your questions.
To view The Commission on the National Defense Strategy,
please go to: www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds--
commission--final--report.pdf.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Chairman, we are at 10 minutes and happy to
submit the rest of our testimony, if you prefer, and take
questions. Or we can briefly summarize our findings. Which
would be better?
Chairman Reed. I think the Vice Chair and I would like you
to go ahead.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. Thank you very much. So, we're
sharing this. First finding, DOD cannot and should not provide
for the National Defense by itself. The NDS calls for an
integrated deterrence that is not reflected in practice today.
A truly all elements of national power approach is required to
coordinate and leverage resources across DOD, the rest of the
executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S.
allies and partners.
We agree with the NDS on the importance of allies and we
commend the Administration for expanding and strengthening NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and building up
relationships and capabilities across Asia. We also point out
ways for the United States to be better partners ourselves,
including by maintaining a more stable presence globally, and
in key organizations like NATO, we call for reducing barriers
to intelligence, sharing joint production and military exports.
So, we can better support and prepare to fight with our
closest allies. Second recommendation is fundamental shifts in
threats and technology require fundamental change in how DOD
functions. This is particularly true of how DOD works with the
tech sector, where most of our innovation happens. We say that
DOD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is
approaching wartime urgency.
DOD structure is optimized for research and development for
exquisite irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy,
AI [Artificial Intelligence], and large numbers of cheaper and
attributable systems. I know this because I represented the
Aerospace Center of Los Angeles in Congress for so many years,
where exquisite. irreplaceable satellite platforms were built.
Now we know that there is a plethora of commercial
platforms that can do many of the same things and offer
redundancy. DOD programs like Replicator, and the Defense
Innovation Unit, and the Office of Strategic Capital are great
but they're essentially efforts to work around the larger
Pentagon system. In addition, since the 2018 report, the joint
staff has worked to develop operational concepts to overcome
deficits in numbers in geography.
Our Commission finds that there is more work to be done to
truly operate a joint force with technological and strategic
advantage.
Ambassador Edelman. Mr. Wicker, you raised the issue of the
fore sizing construct in your opening statement, and we, as you
noted, found that it is inadequate. I mean, it was written
actually before the invasion of Ukraine and before the
emergence of this tightening alliance between Russia and China,
and we proposed that the force needs to be sized--the joint
force in conjunction with United States allies and partners to
defend the homeland but simultaneously be able to deal with
threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.
These are not all the same fight, so different elements of
the force would be required in different parts of the globe but
United States global responsibilities require a global military
response as well as a diplomatic and economic one. President
Putin, in some ways has done us a bit of a favor by having
invaded Ukraine and exposed as a result, some of the
limitations of United States defense industrial production.
Shown that it's grossly inadequate to provide the
equipment, technology, and munitions that the U.S. military and
our allies and partners need today, let alone given demands of
a potential future conflict, which might be even more taxing.
The DOD workforce and the All-volunteer Force provide us with a
kind of unmatched advantage, but recruiting failures have
shrunk the force and have raised serious questions about the
sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force in peace time.
Let alone if we had to mobilize for a major conflict or a
protracted conflict. The civilian workforce at DOD and in the
private sector also face critical shortfalls and we can discuss
some of that later in the hearing.
Ms. Harman. A few more findings. We found that the joint
force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today.
Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild
readiness will cause it to break, and second, we found that the
United States must spend more but also spend better. This is a
point we make consistently. It's not just more legacy programs,
it's more spending that gets us to the ability to deter and win
future wars.
Additionally, we think that Congress should revoke the 2023
spending caps and provide real growth. I know Senator Wicker
loves this one, for fiscal year 2025, defense and non-defense,
national security spending, that at a bare minimum, falls
within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS Commission. That
range was never achieved. Subsequent budgets will require
spending, that puts defense in other components of national
security. Other components, jointly across Government, and the
tech sector, and partners, and allies, other components on a
glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S.
national efforts seen during the Cold War. But we agree and let
me underscore this because some of the commentary about our
report has missed this. We agree on a unanimous basis that the
national debt is its own national security challenge.
If we want to approach Cold War levels of spending, we need
to increase resources, and reform entitlement spending. During
the Cold War, top marginal income tax rates, were above 70
percent, and corporate tax rates averaged 50 percent. We don't
call for those numbers, but we are calling for an increase in
resources and point out that interest on the debt is higher
than our total number of our total top line of defense
spending.
So, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker, and many good
friends on this on this important Committee, we thank you for
your role in establishing our Commission, and we're happy to
share our report with you and we welcome the opportunity to
answer questions. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, Chairwoman Harman
and Vice Chair Edelman, for your impressive and sobering
testimony. Just to reiterate, you've said it several times that
it's important to note is that our funding, it can't be
exclusive to the Department of Defense. We have to look at the
Department of Treasury, Department of State. You even indicate
the Department of Education because of the shortfalls we're
seeing in recruitment.
Which can be traced back to very poor education and very
poor public health, obesity. Just again Representative Harman,
Ambassador, in your comments on that.
Ms. Harman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Absolutely, all elements of national power, the
U.S. needs to project power across our Government, leverage the
enormous talent and innovation of the tech sector, connect both
of those to partners and allies, and then we have impressive
deterrence. In the kind of integrated deterrence that the NDS,
the 2022 NDS, calls for that was--has never been achieved.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. When I was in the service a long,
long time ago, the stock phrase was, shoot, move, and
communicate. Now, I believe the phrase is communicate so that
you can shoot and move. One of the key elements, I think, is we
have tried but we're not there yet with a communication system
that reaches every aspect of our military which is
uninterruptible and which is dependable. Ambassador, your
thoughts on that issue?
Ambassador Edelman. No, I very much agree with that, and
that of course, what the joint all domain commanding control
system is meant to address. But as you say, in your as--you
suggested in your question, Chairman Reed, the Department's not
quite there yet, and we're of course, it's complicated by the
fact that the system is being done by all three services and
then has to be brought together and unified.
So, there's a lot of work to be done on that, and it's one
of the areas where we think it--insufficient progress has been
made.
Chairman Reed. In terms of priority, I would think it'd be
very, very high on the list, if not, number one, as I said, if
you can't communicate, you can't do lots of things. Is that
your feeling too?
Ambassador Edelman, Absolutely.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add one thing to that. We call
for interoperability which has not been achieved across the
Pentagon, let alone with other government agencies, let alone
with partners and allies. We make a point, that some of our
classification systems work against each other in terms of
sharing information, and the goal would be to have an effective
communication system across all elements of national power.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. The other--one of the many points
and you've emphasized, and I think importantly so is, we have
to engage the American people, not just in getting out the word
about the threat but also getting them involved. That puts a
big emphasis on public service, not just in the military domain
but in civilian public service.
Can you just elaborate on lows, starting with Chairman
Harman?
Ms. Harman. Well, the notion of public service isn't new as
you know, Mr. Chairman, it's been around for years. It was
around when I served in Congress and Congress did not act on
any of the proposals that I saw. It is still a way to get all
of the public, at the proper age, engaged in understanding the
requirements of citizenship. A lot of our young people have no
earthly idea. Sadly, because they have no civic education what
our Government really is and what are the ways to serve, and
surely one of the most honorable ways to serve is as a member
of the military, you did it, and other Members of this
Committee have done this. I think that is the way to revive a
kind of sense of coherence and patriotism that we are lacking
right now.
Chairman Reed. Adding to this Ambassador Edelman, is the
point you make in the report. The size of our millage force is
too small and our ability to expand it rapidly is probably very
weak. Was that a fair estimate of our situation?
Ambassador Edelman. I think that is a fair estimate, Mr.
Chairman. You know, we have not really as a society talked
about the need for national mobilization but if the worst were
to happen and some of the worst scenarios, we discuss in our
report were to come to pass, and where we to face a global
conflict, it would require mobilization on the scale of what we
did as a Nation during World War II.
We haven't done that in a long time. We haven't thought
about that in a long time. There are a lot of elements to it
including stockpiling strategic materials but being able to
rapidly bring people into the military, et cetera, and I just
don't think we are prepared to do it. I think we have to have a
national discussion about this and I think it goes hand in hand
with the earlier discussion you had with my colleague about
public service and serving the Nation.
Chairman Reed. We had, in World War II, 2 years,
essentially from September 1st, 1939 to December 7th, 1941 to
prepare, and I doubt it, we'll have 2 years to prepare in this
environment. Thank you very much. Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you very much for your
testimony, and again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was a time
when we could sort of count on a rivalry between Russia and
China. We don't see much of that anymore, and of course I've
spoken of this axis of aggressors. How are they cooperating
with each other now and in a real crisis? What do we need to
look out for about increased cooperation?
Among the four countries that I've identified, that
includes of course, Iran and North Korea, Representative
Harman.
Ms. Harman. Well, I think Ambassador Edelman would want to
add to this but I remember being a member of the Defense Policy
Board when Jim Mattis was Secretary of Defense and his piece of
advice to us was let's do everything, we can to keep Russia and
China apart. Well, oops, that has not happened, and there is
a--you know, this close friendship and collaboration between
them.
You asked how is it manifested? Well, we see it most at the
moment in Ukraine, where Russia was the aggressor, violating
international law, and invading Ukraine, and China is a huge
help to Russia in evading our sanctions. By buying Russian gas,
and by its efforts to ship into China, material for the war.
Then you add in, as you mentioned Iran and North Korea which
are suppliers of drones and other lethal material to Russia.
This unholy alliance, or whatever, I think you call it,
alliance of aggression, is extremely dangerous. Let's remember
that both North Korea has nuclear weapons, Iran is at breakout
for nuclear weapons, and the other two countries are nuclear
countries. Where this goes is--it seems to me terrifying, and
that is again, why we need to leverage all elements of national
power to make sure we deter these countries from acting against
us.
Senator Wicker. Ambassador Edelman respond as you'd like,
but also you might also want to take this question as you
speak. Representative Harman mentions Ukraine, why is Ukraine
important to this entire discussion? If Ukraine manages to be
successful and keep their own borders in their own country,
what signal does this send to Xi Jinping?
Ambassador Edelman. Thank you, Senator Wicker. I really
don't want to add very much to what Representative Harman just
said other than to say in short, what we're watching is a war
of premeditated, unprovoked aggression by Russia that is being
financed by China and enabled by its transfer of dual use goods
including precision tooling that's allowed Russia to get its
defense industry up and running despite United States sanctions
and export controls.
Drones provided to Russia, including a factory built in
Russia by Iran, and of course, millions, literally millions of
rounds of 152 ammunition for the Russian military coming from
North Korea. Sure----
Senator Wicker. Some people ask, what's that to us? How
does that affect the United States and our people?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, it affects the outcome, of
course, of the fight in Ukraine, which gets to your second
question. I mean, first, Ukraine offered to give up and I was
involved in some of the diplomacy of this back in the nineties,
the nuclear weapons that were left on its territory after the
end of the Soviet Union. As a result of that, Ukraine gave them
up.
But in exchange for assurances from the United States,
Russia, Great Britain, and France, that its territorial
integrity would be recognized along the borderlines that
existed before the 2014 seizure of Crimea by Putin, which was a
violation of those undertakings. If our assurances in the
nonproliferation realm for, in this instance, are shown to be
hollow, it will raise questions in the minds of all of our
allies about the assurances we've given them.
Our extended deterrent assurances, whether it's for our
allies in Europe, part of our multilateral NATO alliance, or
our bilateral allies in East Asia, or our partners, parts of
special relationships we've developed in Middle East with
Israel, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab
Emirates], and Egypt, and others. So, the whole fabric,
frankly, of the international order is at risk here depending
on the outcome in Ukraine. To your point, if Putin is
successful in Ukraine, the lesson that Xi Jinping is likely to
draw is that he too can be successful in Taiwan, or in the East
China Sea, or the South China Sea.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker, Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for your work on this
report and thank you to the other members of the Commission,
those of you who are here and those who are not. You talked
about the communications, the need for interoperability, and
for communications but I didn't hear you talk about--and also
you talked about an approach that coordinates all elements of
national power, but you really didn't talk about the
information environment.
So, can you--one of the areas where we are not keeping up
with our adversaries is in the information environment, it's
with disinformation misinformation. So, can you talk about what
the report suggests we should do with respect to information?
Ms. Harman. Well, it's a hugely important topic and you're
right, we haven't got there yet but malign influence, foreign
malign influence in our pending election is something that
we're all worried about. It is a security threat, let's go
there. But certainly, across the world, foreign malign
influence and dis and misinformation can alter how we
understand what the threats are against us.
This is a huge focus now of our intelligence community and
I'm glad this Committee is also paying attention to it. We
touch on it, but we really--I'm just looking at Ambassador
Edelman. We don't have a focus on that. We do talk about AI,
cyber and the information environment but we don't specifically
address mis and disinformation. I wish we had paid more
attention to that.
Senator Shaheen. I remember being in this room, I think
after the KLM [Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij] airline was
shot down over Ukraine and General Breedlove, who was then
USEUCOM commander, saying as long as it takes us 2 years to
identify the Russians as being the people responsible for what
happens, we are losing the fight, and I think that's the
problem now. I appreciate everything you're saying about legacy
systems, but the reality is--until we get that information
domain into our discussions, we are not winning the fight.
Ms. Harman. I agree, and we have to attribute where attacks
are coming from in real time. It's tricky, for example, in
responding to cyber-attacks, to know whether if China does
something to United States, or Russia, or some criminal
syndicate, we should respond immediately because tit for tat
can lead to unwise outcomes for us. But nonetheless, we have to
know who did what to us, and you are totally right.
Senator Shaheen. We don't have a strategy, and we are not
working the Global Engagement Center at the State Department,
which has that as its goal, is not integrated with what we're
doing at DOD. So, we----
Ms. Harman. We address that. We do say that the State
Department, Defense Department have to align their regions of
operation with each other, and then add in the Treasury
Department with sanctions, add in all the other agencies of
government, like USAID [United States Agency for International
Development] that have some play here, add in partners and
allies. That's the way to project American Power, and you're
right, that a huge focus needs to be, absolutely needs to be on
finding the source of dis and misinformation and making sure we
correctly understand the threats against us.
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Shaheen, if I just might add to
what Representative Harman said, part of our emphasis on all
elements of National Power is precisely to get at the issue you
raise. Which is that we have disestablished, a number of years
ago, the U.S. Information Agency, we don't really have a
dedicated capability. We, you know, have, in the Department of
Defense, a capability for military information to support
operations, which is an important capability. But we, I think
sometimes in--because there's a default to DOD, they end up
engaged in information operations that are really beyond what
they're capable of executing effectively. I think that is a
problem.
So, we need a better integrated effort across the entire
panoply of national security institutions but also need some
dedicated effort on information. Our adversaries think
information is a hugely important domain. They invest a lot in
it and we just have not matched that investment.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree with that. I'm pleased
to hear both of you say that. Hopefully, that will be more of a
focus going forward and I appreciate the First Amendment
concerns. However, we were able to deal with that during the
Cold War. We ought to be able to deal with it today. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Representative Harman and also Mr. Ambassador, all of the
Commissioners, and good staff for the work you've done here.
Mr. Ambassador. Nuclear deterrence is the foundation. It is the
bedrock on which our national security rests. I understand that
the Commission did not seek to replicate that work that came
out of the Strategic Posture Commission.
But it does highlight the importance of deterrence,
strategic deterrence in view of China's development, Russia's
aggression on and on. As you considered the strategic elements
of the national security policy for us. Can you explain to this
Committee the role that nuclear modernization plays in the NDS
Commission's proposed Multiple Theater Force Construct
Ambassador Edelman. Nuclear deterrence, Senator Fischer, is
the fundament on which everything else is built in terms of our
national security. It's operating every day. You know, it's not
visible to American citizens but the fact of our nuclear
deterrent force, all three legs of the triad being available is
the most powerful deterrent that we have to conflict.
It's not sufficient, but it is the absolute basis, and we
really, I think, agreed with the conclusion our colleagues on
the Strategic Posture Commission reached which is that we have
to move forward with alacrity on all the elements of
modernization of the nuclear triad. That's the GBSD [Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrence] Sentinel Program. That is the the
B-21, that is the Ohio replacement class. All of those things
have to be accomplished.
There are problems in some--one of the reasons we
highlighted education is that some of the problems that GBSD
are running into has to do with lack of skilled workers to be
able to pour the kind of special reinforced concrete that you
need for the new silos for missiles, the new control systems
for missiles. We lack welders in the submarine industrial base
as Senator Wicker knows well.
So, there's a lot that has to be done across the board in
order to move forward with nuclear modernization but it is
absolutely fundamental to our ability to deter aggression
against our allies and of course against the Homeland.
Senator Fischer. Thank you and Representative, I really
appreciated your comments on the workforce and the need we have
for that, for a national strategy, and to be able to work with
Senator King on a bill that we introduced, that we were able to
get some of those important of factors into the NDAA so that we
can address them and hopefully continue to grow what we need,
and meet those needs quickly.
Ambassador, based on the Commission's work, what do you
think are the biggest barriers that we are going to face as a
country to achieving that Multiple Theater Force Construct?
Representative, I'd like to hear your opinion on that as well.
Ambassador Edelman. Well, in the first--Senator Fisher, to
your question, the force right now is too small and so we have
to grow the force, and that's in the face of the recruiting
challenges that we've highlighted in the report, that the Army
in particular but also the Navy and the Air Force have faced--
--
Senator Fischer. Why--and I'm going to interrupt you.
Ambassador Edelman. Please.
Senator Fischer. Why is it too small? Can you explain in
this setting, the threats that we are facing when we look at
the adversaries that we face and how that has changed over the
last decade?
Ambassador Edelman. It's too small in part because the
Department was sizing itself for one conflict. But if you have
to be present in three theaters as we are now, we've got
conflicts in two theaters now. If we have a third conflict in a
third theater, it's going to require a lot more forces. People
talk, for instance, about the Indo-Pacific being largely a Navy
and Air Force fight.
That's correct. But the logistics that support the Navy and
the Air Force will largely be manned by the Army, and so, we
have to have an army that is sufficiently large. That it can
operate in all of these places, potentially simultaneously,
because honestly, it is very hard to imagine today, a conflict
in the Indo-Pacific that doesn't become a global conflict very
quickly.
Someone asked earlier in the hearing about cooperation
between Russia and China. The last time I testified before this
Committee was 2 years ago about the so-called Three Body
Problem, Russia, China being both nuclear peers of the United
States. One of the criticisms that was leveled at my colleague
Frank Miller and me, was that, you know, well, there's no
evidence that Russia and China are collaborating in the nuclear
area.
Well, we just saw them flying strategic bombers together,
up near Alaska. So, I don't know what more evidence you want
that they're beginning to collaborate in that, in that
strategic area.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add a few things. First of all,
on the nuclear triad and the nuclear posture review, Senator
Kyle, as a dear friend of ours, he did great service in the
Senate, and writing that report, and we talked about whether we
should in some ways overlap some of his recommendations but we
decided they were so good they should stand alone. So, it's not
that we don't care, it's just that we recognize good work.
Add to that though, that our nuclear agreements, that were
so important over recent years, especially the heroic work that
president Reagan did, don't include China, and a number of them
have lapsed. That is a truly dangerous situation especially
when rogue states like North Korea and Iran are part of the
nuclear game now, and there could be a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East or in Asia also.
So, just would point that out, in terms of workforce and
why is it small? Well, one thing we have not done, and we
mentioned this, is embrace the tech sector adequately. Future
wars are not going to be fought the old way with vulnerable big
platforms. They're going to be fought with more software, less
hardware, more software. Not to diminish hardware, but we need
both.
In fact, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was at the Aspen
Security Forum last week. Some of us were there. Senator
Sullivan was there and he said DOD is not a hardware
department. Right. It's not, or if it is, it should not be a
hardware department. So, not only do we need more people but we
need different skills, and we need people who understand the
tech base. In fact, we have said that the business model of the
Pentagon ought to move to embrace the business model of the
tech sector. Where failure sometimes is important so that you
can improve things. Just one comment to a prior question. Some
of us were in Ukraine looking at how they produce goods,
including drones, and tanks, and they have been much more
innovative than we have, and there are lessons to learn there.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you very much, Representative Harman
and Ambassador Edelman, and to all of you who worked on this
very important review leading to seven very substantive
recommendations, each of which requires some fundamental
changes. So, as I review your recommendations and I--and noting
that you started off, I believe by saying that we need to
inform the public as to the nature of the dangers that we're
facing with the great power competition. How we're going to do
that, I'm not so sure, I am wondering whether your review
included the fact that Russia, for example, is not only a gear
power competition in the military sector but they are also
engaged in our elections and misinformation when we have
natural disasters. For example, I don't think very many people
know that when Maui had its wildfire that there were
indications that Russia had sent misinformation as to how the
wildfire started, and how to question what FEMA [Federal
Emergency Management Agency] was doing. So, I'm wondering
whether you reviewed the--all of the different ways that Russia
is providing misinformation in a lot of platforms, not just in
the military arena, and what can we do? That's one way to
inform the public, I would say, to the dangers that we face.
Ambassador Edelman. I think the challenge we face, Senator
Hirono, is that we're not--Russia is very active in this space.
You're correct, and it's an important part actually, of their
military doctrine. They see information operations as part of a
suite of activities as opposed to being stove piped between
information and other kinds of military operations.
We still, I think, see it in sort of stove pipes but
Russia's not the only challenge. I mean, Iran has been very
active in this election cycle with a very different agenda than
Russia's but still interfering in our election. China as well
is very active. All of our adversaries are active in this
domain and we need, I think, to take it very, very seriously. I
do think we need to inform the public, that's I think, a
responsibility that the executive branch certainly has, but I
think you and your colleagues have a role to play as well.
Senator Hirono. I think that we are also stove piped in how
we approach the dangers that are presented by China, Russia,
Iran, and the other actors in the cyber space.
Ambassador Edelman. Yes.
Senator Hirono. One way that I think that the public will
be apprised of the dangers is to inform them of the
misinformation, et cetera, in the--where they can relate, such
as our elections. I don't think we're doing such a great job
with that. One of the other important recommendations you made,
you talked about, Congressman Harman, is that we are not set up
to take risks in our acquisitions and other forms, and that the
culture of not wanting to take risks. How do we even approach
something like that? Because it's not just, we need to maybe
spend more money on our military but how do we change the
culture? So, it's not just about money, it's about attitudes.
It's about risk taking. How do we approach that?
Ms. Harman. Well, let me respond to something you started
with, which is the devastation in Lahar Maui, having been there
just before the fire. It was a glorious place and you lost so
much of your history, and it's tragic that that happened. On
this topic, we had a lot of discussion about risk taking, which
is a core value of the tech sector. How do you learn unless you
take risk?
How does Space X learn? Unless it's prepared to lose a lot
of its assets and then build better based on lessons? Sadly,
both the Pentagon and Congress are pretty risk averse. I'm not
accusing anyone, any Member of this Committee personally
however, the way Congress operates with respect to requirements
of the Pentagon, and not only some of the budget issues here,
we'll get into those, I'm sure.
You know, operating by CR [Continuing Resolution] and
possible, you know, shutdowns is really an expensive way to
proceed. I'm sure you are all aware of that and hopefully we
are in a new era where we don't do that. But if you build to
requirements and then the requirement fails and then you do
oversight and punish the people who have failed, that creates a
risk averse culture. I'm not saying reward people who have
failed.
But understand that if we're going to iterate and build
better models of, pick anything, drones, tanks anything that
you might need in current and future wars, we have to be
prepared to fail. We have to understand that culture and this
Committee by doing multi-year procurements and other things,
which we point out would be very helpful, and allowing the
Pentagon to change some of the details of procurements as a
routine matter, if that will improve the performance of
whatever it's building, would be extremely helpful. So, I'm
glad you pointed that out. We tried to point it out as well.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator. Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
begin by thanking both of you and the members of your
Commission for the work and the service to our country that
this provides. Most recently, when Director Haines and General
Cruz were before this Committee, I think it was in May, they
confirmed that the initial or the initiation of hostilities
between the United States and either Russia or China would
increase the likelihood that hostilities would be initiated by
the other against the United States as well.
It would appear, based on the conversation so far that your
Commission would agree with that assessment. Is the Department
planning for this reality in which conflict with either Russia
or China likely means a conflict with both today? Ambassador
Edelman?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, the Department's plans basically
in the--as embodied in the NDS of 2022, like its predecessor in
2018, essentially is geared toward defeating one adversary
while holding the others harmless essentially by nuclear
deterrence. What I don't think the Department has actually
begun to wrap its arms around is precisely the scenario you
outline. Where to give an example, if we got into some kind of
conflict in the Indo-Pacific, whether it be over Taiwan, or
South China Sea, or East China Sea, what might Russia do? You
know, one thing that comes to mind is, take advantage of the
separatist movement in Moldova to move on Moldova, a country
that's trying to move closer to the European Union, and to the
West. Which would then precipitate additional conflict in in
Europe.
Or take advantage of the ethnic, Russian speaking
minorities in the Baltic states, say Latvia, to initiate a
conflict there. How would we manage that? When you raise that
question with Department leaders, they basically say, well,
that, to go back to the Chairman's point earlier, well, that
would be sort of like World War II or would require national
mobilization, and that's correct. But we haven't really taken
the next steps to really focus on what that and what a
protracted conflict would actually look like. We're optimized
to fight very short wars.
Senator Rounds. Representative Harman, I appreciated your
comments at the very beginning of this discussion in which you
shared that yesterday your family was challenged and that your
daughter was going through some very serious surgery, and this
is something that every family can identify with. You also
talked about the technologies involved and your decisionmaking
was that you would stay there if anything, serious was still
in, in the air. I appreciated that, and believe me, this entire
Committee would've supported you in that decision. You also
indicated the need or what this country represented with regard
to the technology that we have, and that we sometimes don't
take advantage of. We have that opportunity with this report to
talk about those technologies today. There are five different
domains in which our country will be attacked in the future.
Airland and sea, most people would understand, but space
and cyberspace are the new domains, which will precede any
attack on the first three. With regard to cyber, today in the
United States, we just recently came through a time period in
which an accident occurring by one company literally crippled a
significant part of our airline industry. Is it fair to say
that both Russia and China have capabilities to do more than
simply cripple airline capabilities? What exactly would that
look like for the American people? Should we have a contest
with either one of those two adversaries?
Ms. Harman. Well, thank you, Senator Rounds, for your
personal comments. I really appreciate that and I hope everyone
on this Committee is as fortunate as I was with the news that I
got late last night which enabled me to get on the 6 AM plane.
On cyber, it's a huge threat and I don't think we minimize it
in any way.
One of the things we might anticipate, for example, is if
China decides to annex Taiwan or whatever euphemism they might
use. They might engage in a major cyber-attack here first, for
which we are under prepared, cyber-attack of our
infrastructure. When I was in Congress, I represented the Port
of Los Angeles, which with the Port of Long Beach is the
largest container port complex in the country. Fifty percent of
our container traffic enters and exits through those ports.
There are cranes on the port, surprised to move the cargo, and
those cranes have Chinese technology. So, guess what? We
should----
Senator Rounds. All of which are subject to the
possibilities of cyber-attacks?
Ms. Harman. Absolutely. We should anticipate that our ports
could go down.
Senator Rounds. Throughout our entire society we find that
to be the case, don't we?
Ms. Harman. I'm agreeing with you and this is devastating.
Does the American public understand this? No, this is our point
about public awareness. This is something that's happening
right now. If anyone's watching this important hearing, they're
learning things that they might not know otherwise. It's an
opportunity for leadership to try to educate the public and
thanks to your Committee for doing it about the grave threats
we face.
So, cyber is a huge threat. You also mentioned space,
again, something I know something about since I used to call my
district the aerospace center of the universe, where most of
our intelligence satellites were made. We are more dependent on
space as a country and more vulnerable in space because of that
dependency than any other country. Shoring up space, which is
one of the threats we address, is absolutely crucial.
It's not just military space but commercial space. A lot of
how you talked about communication, a lot of how we communicate
is through commercial space and think how inconvenience the
public would be if all of a sudden, their little devices, which
were all dependent on didn't work.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I'm out of time and overtime.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Well said, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our
witnesses. It's good to be back before you, Ambassador Edelman,
11 times testifying here, and Jane probably about the
equivalent. We should give you guys some steak knives or
something. I mean, very helpful report. A couple of thoughts
before I have some questions.
Ambassador Edelman, you mentioned your testimony earlier
when you talked about potential for nuclear collaboration
between China and Russia. You were kind of criticized for that
and I remember that, and frankly, the Pentagon during the
entire time I've been here, beginning in 2013, when we asked
questions about the possibility of cooperation between Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea. They've kind of poo-pooed the
idea as if historical entities, or border disputes, or the past
would block them from being able to work in a collaborative
way. I've always found that dismissive attitude naive, and I
think that the results of today are showing the degree to which
these nations, seeing the United States' strong alliances,
realizing they don't have them, they're drawn closer and closer
together.
There may be barriers to the level of cooperation but we
shouldn't assume those barriers are going to inhibit
significant collaboration. I think that's one of the aspects of
your testimony or joint testimony in the report that's very
powerful. I did chuckle at one of the punchlines, which is that
we need to do a lot more defense spending and bring the deficit
down too. But we hear that punchline at a lot of hearings in a
lot of different committees. But that's why we get elected to
do what we do, and there are tough choices to be made. Here's a
question that I have. If you asked American public, and I do
think educating the public about the challenges is important.
You said, what's the most important national security threat
today? I bet the top one would be fentanyl. I think before just
the American public would cite Ukraine or would cite the
possibility of a war against Taiwan, I bet they would say
fentanyl. The National Defense Strategy in 2022 had one
paragraph about the Western hemisphere. You have a section
dealing with Africa and Latin America.
That is a much longer paragraph. I like that, and yet it's
about Africa and Latin America and it talks about the fact that
China and Russia are making Africa and Latin America real
centers of activity. As the Chairman of the Americas
Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, when I travel in the
Americas again and again and again from governments left, right
center or unpredictable. What I hear, is we'd rather work with
you than with China, for example, but you're not present. Yes,
we appreciate you lecturing us not to accept a free 5G system
from China but what do you have on the table? We appreciate you
telling us not to allow Russia to help with port investments
but what do you have on the table? I think the fact that we
spend so little intellectual energy focusing on our own
hemisphere, and I just match that up against, I think American
public would say fentanyl is like the biggest challenge,
national security challenge that they see every day.
Now, this Committee's done some good work. We have done
significant investments in fentanyl interdiction technology. I
had a chance to see some of it that is being piloted in
Brownsville about 2 weeks ago. That I think will really help
us. Senator Ernst and I, in last year's NDAA, did a provision
that calls for greater mill to mill cooperation between the
United States and Mexican militaries on the fentanyl issue.
But why don't we just spend more energy on the Americas?
What blocks us from more focus in the hemisphere? I just worry,
we can't see it, our own backyard to--especially Chinese
investments and count on our ability to lecture about the
danger of Chinese investments to carry the day.
Ms. Harman. I agree, and I think we all agree. We did meet
the head of SOUTHCOM. We met the head of AFRICOM, both of whom
told us that we're under investing in Latin America and in
Africa, and----
Senator Kaine. Just in Africa, a stat of the 35 youngest
countries in the world, 32 are in Africa.
Ms. Harman. Well, and I----
Senator Kaine. So, in terms of a youth bulge in a growing
population, I mean, this is where the future is.
Ms. Harman. I think the population in Africa is going to
double by 2050 and it will be the most populous continent. I
think in, in the world. I'm not positive that it will exceed
China and India but I think it will, and we're under investing,
and in South America, for example, we heard that there are five
countries with no Ambassadors, no confirmed Ambassadors, and
our military footprint in Africa is decreasing.
I think we all agree on this Commission that investment has
to improve. Again, our whole idea about all elements of
national power has to include partners and allies in those
regions. Not an afterthought, not to say, oh, yes, about
Africa, and South America, and on fentanyl. I believe that
President Biden and President Xi, when they met in San
Francisco, came up with some deal on China policing the
precursors of fentanyl.
Which come into our country, mostly, I think through
Mexico. That deal hasn't been fully implemented but it's a
start. It's absolutely important, given how devastating
fentanyl is to young people in this country who take drugs
unsuspecting, that they have--they're laced with fentanyl. It's
absolutely crucial as a national security threat to us. We do
more.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator
Tuberville, please.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you very much. Following up on
that, is our southern border a national threat? I've only seen
it in your report one time.
Ambassador Edelman. Yes, absolutely. The border security is
a threat. We do call in the report for additional funding
across the agencies of national security, including DHS
[Department of Homeland Security], which has the fundamental
responsibility for the border.
Senator Tuberville. Eighty thousand Chinese coming across
the border in the last 9 months. Is that a threat? That's a
pretty good threat, isn't it?
Ambassador Edelman. Its a potential threat, sir. Yes.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, huge. I don't understand why we're
not talking about it more, fentanyl, I saw a report the other
day where you can order fentanyl from China and make it at your
own house. You can order--be delivered and make millions of
pills without any repercussion. I mean, we've lost our minds.
We're losing our kids. You're talking about education. I spent
35 years in education and your report mentions changing our
military standards. Is that correct? To take more young men and
women in the military?
Ambassador Edelman. Part of what you hear from the services
when you talk about the recruitment challenges they face
Senator Tuberville is that some of the standards are no longer
really relevant. Some of it's an artifact of----
Senator Tuberville. Such as?
Ambassador Edelman. Childhood asthma for instance. You
know, is that something that----
Senator Tuberville. Flat feet----
Ambassador Edelman. You know, that's----
Senator Tuberville. A lot of people got out of Vietnam
because of flat feet, right?
Ambassador Edelman. Yes. So, the question is do you
continue to use those standards which are screening out people
who might otherwise be willing and you know, ready to serve, or
do you change it? Some of it's a function of the changing
tracking that we have in medical records that allow things that
wouldn't have come up 10 or 15 years ago to block somebody from
service.
That's, I think what we were talking about.
Senator Tuberville. Well, you, what's hurting us too is a
lot of our government schools, I call them government schools
because I went in thousands and while I was coaching,
recruiting, and the problem we have is hate. That's being
taught in a lot of our government schools toward our country.
Why would any young man or woman want to fight for a country
that they don't believe in, that they're being taught to hate.
It's absolutely amazing to me the direction this country's
going. So, is there any agreement there even Representative
Harman? I mean----
Ms. Harman. Yes, there is agreement there. Yes. I think
hate on both sides is totally destructive. I think the absence
of civics education and the absence of institutions that help
people understand what patriotism means, that's, we had a
conversation about national service, which might be a way to
get all of our youth back together. I mean, this country,
sadly, is in a point where many people say our biggest enemy is
us fighting each other.
I was just going to talk about standards. One of the
problems is the kind of deployments the military does every 2
years. Moving somewhere where in many cases the spouse works
and having to change his or her job every 2 years is very
burdensome. It's also hard on kids, and so that could change.
We talk about incorporating more of the tech base and the tech
skills into the work that our military does.
I mean, after all, future fights, we were just talking
about this, are in more domains. They're in cyber and space,
not just in air land and sea, and so, if we don't have the
skill sets to fight those wars, we're going to lose.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, because we don't have a middle
class. We're ruining our middle class. Where technical schools,
all these kids, we tell, hey, you got to go to a 4-year school
to get a job. We all knew that, and when we grew up, that's
what we're told. But now that's not true. A lot of these kids
go to school and their way is paid and unfortunately, they get
social--some kind of social justice degree and they can't get a
job at Walmart.
We have got to start training our kids again. We're losing
the ball here. I mean, this is where, that's, to me, that's a
national security threat, where we don't teach kids how to use
their hands and do those things. Let's go to Ukraine real
quick. We got to get out of this, right? I mean, this has got
to be solved. Do we let Ukraine into NATO? Your thoughts?
Ambassador Edelman. NATO has already made the decision back
in 2008, that Ukraine at some point will be in NATO. That's a
decision that was taken under the George W. Bush administration
in which I served. I think the alliance, the just completed
summit of the Alliance has made clear that while there's an
ongoing conflict in in Ukraine, it's probably not appropriate
to have Ukraine be a member.
But the Alliance has undertaken a series of actions and the
United States bilaterally with Ukraine has undertaken a series
of actions to build a bridge toward Ukraine's potential future
membership.
Senator Tuberville. Well, that being said, should we allow,
with the new government in Mexico, Mexico join BRICS [Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa]? Should we allow that?
Because it's coming, it's coming.
Ambassador Edelman. I don't. Senator, I don't know that we
have any ability to, you know, the BRIC is an organization
which the United States not a party to. So, I don't know----
Senator Tuberville. I'm just asking your opinion because
we're doing the National Defense Strategy and we're going to be
looking down the barrel of a gun on this because they're going
to be on our border. You just said that NATO was going to
accept Ukraine. Should Mexico go into BRICS if offered that
position with the new president they have?
Ambassador Edelman. If, well, the BRICS was actually kind
of an invention of Goldman Sachs. It's not really a serious
military organization of any sort----
Senator Tuberville. As we speak, it is coming though with
India joining, with Iran joining, Saudi Arabia joining, it
could be a threat. Thank you, Mr. President.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you. The first country to adapt new
technologies generally wins wars, Genghis Khan, and the
stirrup, the long bow at the Battle of Agincourt, the tank in
World War I, radar in World War II, we are systematically
missing technologies. It's one of the great failures of the
last 10 or 15 years in our defense structure, directed energy,
hyper sonics, AI, cyber information warfare.
We are woefully behind on every one of those hyper sonics.
I'm sorry, directed energy. We are shooting down $20,000 Houthi
missiles with $4.3 million missiles of our own. That's
ridiculous, and the budget for directed energy in the Defense
Department has fallen by half in the last 3 years.
Representative Harman, is it systematic legacy thinking? What's
the problem? Why did we miss these obvious technologies?
Ms. Harman. Well, you heard us say that the Pentagon is
moving at the speed of bureaucracy. I think it is legacy
systems. Old think, I think Congress is somewhat legacy----
Senator King. I think it's legacy thinking.
Ms. Harman. Legacy thinking, fine. But I think that
Congress is somewhat complicit in the way the budget process
doesn't work and this insistence on requirements and oversight
rather than on what is the problem set we are solving for,
which is how the tech sector thinks.
I've been making a comment about DIU, the defense
innovation unit that was set up by the late secretary, Ash
Carter, that maybe we should outsource the Pentagon to DIU,
which is ably headed by someone named Doug Beck, who had 11
years' experience in the private sector because they know how
to think about this, and I couldn't agree with you more. The
budget of DIU is $1 billion out of 850 billion.
Doug Beck says he can leverage that----
Senator King. Yes, these technologies that win wars----
Ms. Harman. Right?
Senator King. New technologies----
Ms. Harman. I'm in violent agreement with you. He says he
can leverage that into 50 billion of commercial investment but
that's still a pittance compared to the kind of change we need
to undergo. Not just at the Pentagon but at the Pentagon lashed
up with other government agencies with the tech sector and with
partners and allies. That is our point about all elements of
national power, which will win the next war.
Senator King. Let's talk about cyber for a minute. I think
it's kind of pathetic that today, just today, this morning, at
the beginning of this meeting, we approve the very first
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber. Cyber has been a
serious threat in this country for 15 or 20 years, and just
today we are finally getting there.
To me, that's emblematic. Let me talk about another point
about cyber. Several of our Members, and you all have talked
about the cornerstone of our defense strategy is deterrence. In
cyber, we have no deterrent strategy. We're trying to patch our
way out of this. People have attacked our country, they've
attacked our elections, they've attacked our infrastructure.
There have been no consequences, no results.
No one fears us in the cyber realm. Do you agree with me
that we need to develop a cyber deterrent strategy? It doesn't
necessarily have to be cyber for cyber but there has to be a
price to be paid for attacking this country in the realm of
cyber, Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator King, I think one of the
challenges with deterrence and the cyber realm is that first
attribution is frequently a problem. But second, the actions
you take are not necessarily visible, and therefore, it lacks
the kind of visible signs that we have. In other realms----
Senator King. It needs to be visible to the adversary----
Ambassador Edelman. To the adversary.
Senator King. Or deterrence.
Ambassador Edelman. Yes. Well, the problem is it needs to
be visible to the adversary. But you know, the question is, is
it visible to your allies who you're also trying to protect
with your deterrent? I did want to, if you permit me on the
directed energy point because I think it's a very powerful
point that you make. I think directed energy has suffered a bit
from over promising in the past and it's been the next big
thing and a lot of people have felt that it's not been
delivered.
But clearly what you identified is correct, which is we
can't be on the wrong end of the cost imposition curve where
adversaries can use very cheap but tradeables that we're
shooting down with million-dollar missiles, that's just not
sustainable. But there is progress being made on directed
energy, including by our allies, the UK has system Dragon Fire
that looks like it's got some promise.
The Israelis have iron beam. So, there's activity going on,
and I think you're right that we need to invest more time and
effort in it.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add one thing on cyber, I think
you serve on the Intelligence Committee as well. There are
things we're doing that we can't talk about that are deterring
cyber against us, and we are in other networks and I----
Senator King. I'm sorry, but if we can't talk about it,
it's not a deterrent.
Ms. Harman. But it----
Senator King. You got to be able to talk about it----
Ms. Harman. No, but maybe----
Senator King. It's Dr. Strange love.
Ms. Harman. But not all----
Senator King. You can't keep the doomsday machines secret.
Ms. Harman. Not all the time, our adversaries do understand
some of the things we're doing for deterrence. Attribution is
still an evolving art and we can't always identify who's doing
what to us. But I think we're stronger in the cyber realm than
may appear publicly.
Senator King. I think we have capabilities. My time is up.
I commend you for mentioning terrorism. I worry that we've
turned our focus so much to great power competition. One
demented individual almost upset our entire Presidential
process a few weeks ago. I think terrorism is still a very,
very significant threat and I'm afraid we are not attending to
it sufficiently. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. Representative Harman, Ambassador Edelman,
and the rest of the Commission, thank you for your good work
once again. Ambassador Edelman, you spoke with Senator Fischer
about the Multiple Theater Force Construct, basically the kind
of threats we're planning for, and there's a time when this
Nation planned to fight two major wars at time.
I think now we're down to a force that can fight one
conflict, and protect our Homeland, and hopefully scare bad
guys everywhere else around the world, and not starting a war,
is that right?
Ambassador Edelman. That is correct. That's what the 2022
NDS describes.
Senator Cotton. Is our, so that's the, what our National
Defense Strategy says. Is the current force even capable of
doing that, in your opinion? Putting aside what it should be
capable of doing?
Ambassador Edelman. Yes.
Senator Cotton. Which I'll come to momentarily. Can it even
do that?
Ambassador Edelman. I think they're very serious questions
about whether the force in being could actually execute the
strategy.
Senator Cotton. Okay, there's been some talk about this
access of Russia, and China, and North Korea, and Iran. You
might add in a few other ancillary bad actors like Cuba for
instance. Do these countries have to get together in a secret
diplomatic meeting and agree to carve up different parts of the
world or to act in concert Russia, you strike Ukraine, China,
I'm going to hit Taiwan, and then Iran's going to go for the
jugular in Israel.
Do they have to get together like the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Summit and have a pact to act in concert together?
Ambassador Edelman. They could do that, but they don't
necessarily have to do that. I mean, the problem we face is
twofold. We face one problem that you've just described, which
is concerted collaboration in aggression but there's also the
potential of opportunistic aggression if something happens in
one theater, and one of the other actors decides to take
advantage of it to do something in another theater.
Senator Cotton. Representative Harman, I see you nodding
your head. Would you like to add your perspective?
Ms. Harman. I totally agree with that and we see that all
the time, and I'm not sure if you were in the room but one of
the things that Ambassador Edelman said is that China is
watching intently whether Russia can get away with its illegal
invasion of Ukraine, and if it can, that would empower China
without a conversation with Russia to move against Taiwan.
Senator Cotton. That this idea, well found in history, that
these adversary nations don't have to sit down at a secret
summit, that they can just see that for instance, the United
States and its allies are being taxed in Europe and therefore
now is the time to become more aggressive in the Middle East,
if you're Iran, or maybe China goes for the jugular in Taiwan.
It gets back to the point about this force construct as
well. What they also see is what the United States just says
it's capable of doing and the fact that it may not even be
capable of doing that. Is that right?
Ambassador Edelman. I agree.
Ms. Harman. The word pivot probably should be retired. I
don't think we can leave anywhere. I think we have to have an
understanding of the threats against us not just against
regions everywhere. The whole idea of this Multiple Force
Construct is flexibility and having an adequate deterrent so we
don't engage in more wars.
Senator Cotton. Another related point, there's been some
questions about the information environment, misinformation,
disinformation, cyber threats as well. Those are important,
don't get me wrong but are wars going to be won in the
information environment and cyber without things that go boom
in the real world? Ambassador Edelman?
Ambassador Edelman. You have to have both. I mean, one, I
don't think you were in the room, Senator Cotton. I said that
the--our adversaries, particularly the Russians who have
written a lot about this doctrinally see information as part of
a suite of activities including all of their kinetic
activities. Whereas we see it in sort of silos.
But they see it totally differently, and you have to be
able to bring all of those elements together and more.
Senator Cotton. We've learned a lot and we've
technologically seen advances on the battlefield in Ukraine on
both sides. But isn't the case that the most important
technological advances or the advances that enhance the power
of the things that go boom on the battlefield? The munitions,
the aircraft, the drones, the interceptors and so forth, not
things are just done from keyboards sitting back in Washington.
Ambassador Edelman. I want to be careful because I think
part of the answer is that some of what we've done for instance
in arming the Ukrainians with different off the shelf
commercial drones has been undone by Russian electronic
warfare. Which is done from a keyboard, and electronic warfare
is sometimes attributed to ``information warfare'' as well.
So, I, think it's----
Senator Cotton. Keyboard's closer to the battlefield with
big dishes that shoot
Ambassador Edelman. Correct.
Senator Cotton. Shoot invisible things up in the sky,
right?
Ambassador Edelman. Exactly.
Senator Cotton. Not just people sitting at a keyboard
writing a hashtag out.
Ambassador Edelman. Correct. Correct.
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you both, my time's expired.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Cotton. Senator
Manchin, please.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of
you all for very informative discussions this morning. I
appreciate all the hard work you've done. When I first came to
the Senate in 2010, I came leaving the Governor's office of
West Virginia and wasn't really that much in tune on the
national threats that we had. I was worried about the threats
we had in West Virginia.
So, when I came here, I tried to bone up when I was on this
Committee, my first committee, and I'll never forget and it had
to be early February or late January 2011. We had all the joint
chiefs of staff and all the questions were being asked, and
identifying the problems we had around the world, and the
threats we had. The question was asked to Admiral Mullins, Mike
Mullins at that time, what's the greatest threat to the United
States faces?
I thought I'm going to hear about learning about China
more, and about Russia, and always being Russia, and the threat
that they have, and then all of a sudden, without hesitating,
he said, the debt of our Nation is the greatest threat that we
face as Americans. So, I would ask you all, since we just hit
$35 trillion of debt yesterday, what do you all believe is the
greatest threat we face, Jane?
Ms. Harman. Well, let me agree with you that our
hemorrhaging debt is a huge threat, and one of the things we--
one's
Senator Manchin. Who was even talking about on either of
national----
Ms. Harman. We do----
Senator Manchin. Democrat, Republicans, nobody----
Ms. Harman. Senator, we do, in this report, we identify the
national debt as a national security threat, and we say that we
need to spend smarter and spend more on defense and pay for it.
We, on a unanimous basis are not recommending printing more
money. We are recommending finding a way to raise the revenues
and reform entitlements. I know that's a sacred cow, sadly,
these days.
But reform entitlements and we point out that the interest
on the debt is larger than our defense budget.
Senator Manchin. So, you both agree to that, Ambassador?
Ambassador Edelman. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Second, I would say that on your
report, you talked about the current force structure that we
have and I think you had identified that the Marines are only
ones meeting that we agree with, that what you failed to do is
basically identify why we have not or why you all did not take
up women being in selective service or joining selective
service because women make up 74 percent healthcare and
education industry, 52 percent of financial activities.
They're a tremendously strong force, and there's a lot of
women I don't want to go up against. I can tell you that, in so
many ways. But why do you believe, I guess my question is
simple. Does the Commission support women registering for
selective service?
Ms. Harman. Well, I'll speak for myself. I do. I think that
women are a majority of our population, a majority of the
talent pool, many of the most talented women serve on this
Committee. So, yes, they should be--we should be, and----
Senator Manchin. Make it clear that we, it does not--we
talked about this, does not require women to participate in
military draft.
Ms. Harman. I understand.
Senator Manchin. Which will also require----
Ms. Harman. It's registering.
Senator Manchin. Yes, registering, that's all.
Ms. Harman. Yes. My answer to that is yes. Okay.
Senator Manchin. How come you all didn't address it?
Ambassador Edelman. You know, I don't have a good answer
for you, Senator Manchin. It's not something we took up. We
looked at other elements of the recruiting challenges that the
services face.
Senator Manchin. Got you. Well, I hope you all would
revisit that, if you will. So, my last, I have two more
questions. My next question would be Russia. What have we
learned about Russia during the Ukraine war? Do you think it's
basically shown Russia's vulnerability or they've learned
basically where the vulnerabilities were strengthening? What's
your concerns?
Ambassador Edelman. I think we've learned a lot of things.
I mean, at first, I think we've learned that corruption is a
feature, not a bug of the system that Vladimir Putin has
created since he became president of Russia. You know, at the
turn of the century, I think we've learned that Russian
military doctrine is not necessarily going to predict how they
actually will fight when a conflict comes up.
I think we've learned that that we've relearned a lesson
that has been true of Russian military history for hundreds of
years, which is they're willing to sacrifice the lives of their
service folks to gain an objective without regard to the human
costs.
Senator Manchin. If I can, my final question, if I could
real quickly, I commend your report on tension to defense
industrial base especially munitions and supply chain. However,
there was no mention of Solid Rocket Motors. We have a problem,
and the problem is this. We continue to keep pouring money into
Aerojet Rocketdyne that can continually fall short of producing
the quality of rockets in the environment we need. But the
Government is into that, supporting it.
Yet the Federal Government, we own the ABL [Allegany
Ballistics Laboratory] Lab at Rocket City in West Virginia, and
they have been producing unbelievable, and no one's saying a
word about it. No one's basically pushing, why are you shoving
money into a private entity when board changes? Who's buying
stock ownership when you already own one? Have you all looked
at that or would you and basically bring it to a higher level?
Ms. Harman. Sure. Absolutely, and you'll be missed here.
You have been very articulate at identifying things not just
that West Virginia does but the energy needs of this country
and why it matters, that we export more energy.
Senator Manchin. If you would look into it and compare ABL,
at Rocket City, in West Virginia, okay, versus Aerojet
Rocketdyne, and look at the ownership, the production, the
quality of what we're producing there. Because without that as
we've said before, we can't compete. We just can't. So, if you
would do that, I would appreciate it.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you
both so much for being here for your leadership and to the
entire Commission for their great work and support staff as
well. We really do appreciate it. Of course, we've had the
opportunity to hear about this urgent assessment of our
national security landscape and it has changed quite
dramatically since the last NDS. So, thank you for your time
and attention.
The recommendation should be a roadmap to address our
security challenges and restore American leadership on the
world stage. I feel that's very important. It's desperately
needed right now. I know we have talked about force structure,
and Ambassador, we'll start with you. Only recently has the
force planning shifted to a single conflict structure despite
facing the most significant strategic competition our country
has ever faced.
So, the report, I want to draw attention to the quote, and
I, again, I know we've talked about it, but the report includes
a quote from a defense strategist who warns ``a force that can
only wage one conflict is effectively a zero-conflict force
since employing it would require the President to preclude any
other meaningful global engagement.''
In light of this, again, if you can talk a little bit about
the Multi Theater Force Construct, Ambassador, but then I also
want to then lead into what Senator King alluded to with
terrorism. Where does that leave our counter-terrorism forces?
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Ernst, I think the problem we
have is that, to go to your point, if we have a force that's
optimized to fight one war when a crisis erupts and the
President asks the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs for military options to deal with it, the answer
they're likely to get is, Mr. or Madam President, we can fight
this fight but you will be at very high risk in all these other
places.
Against that backdrop, what kind of decisions would come
out of that, it's why I think it's described as a zero-war
force. Our view was that you have to be able to deter and
potentially defeat adversaries in all three of the main
theaters that we have been engaged in since the end of the
Second World War.
Which we repeatedly engaged in. I mean, there's been no
shortage of efforts to try and extricate the United States from
the Middle East. The last NDS in 2018 said we should be willing
to run risk in the Middle East. I think on October 7th, we got
a sense, and then again on April 13th of what running
additional risk means in the Middle East.
So, it's our view that we have to be able to manage to do
all of those things. In that regard, I think we're consistent
with our colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission who
argued something quite similar. But we also have to be able to
deal with the ongoing threat as Senator King said of terrorism,
and to be able to continue to focus on the things that Special
Operations Command has been focused on for a number of years.
Making sure that we don't have terrorists plotting to create
mass casualties either in the Homeland or with our allies.
Ms. Harman. Yes. If I could just add to that, I was in
Congress on 911. Many were, I was a member before that of a
Commission on, I think, the Commission on Terrorism, which
predicted a major attack on U.S. soil. No one was listening,
and then came 911 and we surged everything to the GWAT, the
Global War on Terror. Surging everything is not a good
strategy.
We missed when we did that, the rise of China. We missed
the rise of Russian grievance. We missed the kind of world we
now live in. We have to do all these things at the same time,
walk, and chew gum at the same time. This report tries, by
promoting this all elements of, national power strategy to talk
about how we could do that.
We don't think we, the Commission on a unanimous basis,
that accepting risk in certain parts of the world basically
meaning not projecting U.S. leadership is a successful
strategy. We have to be strong everywhere which doesn't mean we
have to have boots on the ground everywhere but we have to have
an all elements of national power strategy everywhere.
Senator Ernst. Yes. I am in absolute agreement,
Representative Harman and mentioning SOCOM, Special Operations
Command. I do think it's incredibly important and I'm in full
agreement that we need to be able to face multiple fronts. I
think all of us on this Committee would agree with that but we
also have to have those that are nimble, agile, those that can
respond quickly to situations.
Those forces are found in SOCOM. We need to be able to
leverage different tools of power in other regions to create
stability. So, whether it's kinetic action through the military
or just working with friends and allies, we need to create
greater stability all around the world, and I think we can
achieve that but we have to be willing to invest.
Ms. Harman. Diplomacy is one of our tools. So, it's soft
power matters but hard power does too, and we're not talking
about selecting parts of the world for one and other parts for
the other. We're talking about a combination that's greater
than the sum of the parts.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Again, I want to thank you both
for your service and our entire Commission and support staff.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator
Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Congresswoman Harman. Thank
you, Ambassador Edelman. So, grateful for your testimony and
thank you for the great work of this report. One of the things
that you concluded was that the DOD should invest more in cyber
capabilities and capacity over the last two NDAA cycles. We
included a cyber academy to create an ROTC [Reserve Officer
Training Corps]-type program. There's about 600 schools
eligible right now across the country who are already
participating in this program.
It's built on NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration], a smaller, much smaller program. Can you talk
a little bit about how this cyber academy and its thousand
slots a year could help meet DODs future needs?
Ambassador Edelman. I don't doubt that it will help fill
the gap because we need more cyber warriors. I do think that
Cyber Command has actually done a pretty good job at Cyber
Command and NNSA under General Nakasone's leadership and now
his successor at building the force. Which when we looked at
this from the Commission point of view 6 years ago, there were
questions about how well we were doing.
I think we've actually made a lot of progress in the
ensuing years. But obviously the more we can generate young
cyber warriors who are willing to come to work for the
Government, because that's been an issue in the past, that is
going to be a boon.
Ms. Harman. I would just add that and I'm not sure you were
here, when we talked about it, that the two new defense domains
are space and cyber. We now have Space Force, and we have Cyber
Command, and slowly, we are building the skill sets that we
need for our defense capability, not just in the Pentagon to be
robust and effective, and so, a major cyber-attack on United
States soil could pre sage China's annexation of Taiwan. That's
something we mentioned before, that could happen. Are the--is
the American public aware of this and ready? Absolutely not. Is
there Chinese technology all over America, including in our
ports? Absolutely, and so building more capable people who have
the training and having a more focused Government on the
threats is--are both essential things to do.
Senator Gillibrand. So, one of the concerns I have is that
the current recruiting technique for Cybercom, Cyberforce, is
that they're recruiting from the existing services. So, Navy
has to give X number every year, Army, Marines, et cetera, Air
Force, and not all the services can meet the goals. Not all the
services have the senior cyber personnel that a cyber command
actually needs and wants.
When they do leave to cyber command, then there's no cyber
expert left in the service because they just gave those
personnel to cyber command. So, one question I have for space
as well, shouldn't we consider having a west point for cyber or
west point for space, or having one new service academy to
educate and train the military personnel for cyber command and
space command?
The reason I say this is because the cyber academy that we
have created is just civilian jobs because 50 percent of all
cyber jobs are civilian. So, let's at least recruit from the
entire country in an ROTC type program for non-military
personnel, and so, that arguably can be a thousand kids a year
graduating with that capability. So, let me push the next
question. A thousand of civilian personnel is great, not going
to meet all our needs.
Do you think we should think about or at least do a study
on the importance of perhaps having a service academy to
directly train military personnel and commanders in cyber and
space?
Ambassador Edelman. It's not something we examined, Senator
Gillibrand, but I certainly think it's something worth some
study, to see whether that would generate the kind of flow
through that you would want to staff those skill sets, as my
colleague just said.
Ms. Harman. We also talk about integrating the tech base
with the DOD base and make a recommendation that the business
model of the tech base may be much more successful than the
business model. You know, Government at the pace of bureaucracy
of the Pentagon and the tech base produces a lot of highly
trained cyber folks through our national university system and
private universities.
So, I think the study is still a good idea but I also think
there are resources we're not leveraging that we could.
Senator Gillibrand. So, even a more serious question, you
conclude, that given that much of the critical infrastructure
that the United States relies on for the power projection
overseas falls outside of the DODs remit, the Department needs
to further its integration with and increase the capability of
the other parts of the U.S. Government, including DHS and CISA
[Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency].
Intelligence community, FBI and State and local
governments. This finding, I find to be the most troubling
because it's entirely outside the DODs mission. It's outside
their authority, it's outside the job they want, the job
they're willing to do but in actuality we don't therefore have
domestic cyber defense. FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]
is the best cyber response organization to the globe.
CISA can literally only offer best practices, and their
best practices are the best practices. They are doing great
outreach and all the things, but there's no one to stop, and
this goes to Senator Angus King's questions, there's no one to
stop a significant cyber-attack. Let's just say, on military
bases. Taking out all of our capabilities domestically to have
an electric grid, a water supply, food supply emergency
services, stock exchanges. There's no one to stop that as if
we'd want that in a war scenario, and we stop a bombing that's
going to happen on our subway system, but we don't stop a
cyber-attack that's on our subway system.
We'll do response, we do offensive. So, with the zero
seconds I have left, could you please talk a little bit about
what we should be doing from a cyber defense for the Homeland?
This year's NDAA has a requirement for a plan, for how to
protect at least our military bases but I think we should be
protecting all of critical infrastructure.
Ambassador Edelman. Look, I agree, and I think the
Department is just beginning to wrap its arms around this
problem that, as I'm not sure if you were in the room, Senator
Gerald Brandt, when we said earlier. The Homeland, if there's a
conflict, is not going to be a sanctuary anymore. The first
attacks will likely be in the cyber domain and they will be
incredibly disabling for our society but also for the
Department.
But getting all the agencies of Government that would have
a role in all this, because it goes beyond just DOD, it goes
beyond just DHS, I mean, it goes to the Department of
Transportation, it goes to Commerce. I mean, there's just, it's
an unbelievably complex issue, and we're only, I think now,
kind of wrapping our minds around it, and it needs a lot more
work and attention from the Department.
Ms. Harman. I think that Senator King mentioned that this
Committee just confirmed an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Cyber today. It's way too late. It's way too slow. You're
absolutely right that all of this stuff has to be accelerated.
I do think some of our capabilities that we can't talk about
publicly are more extensive than people may believe but the
public is essentially clueless about the massive cyber-attacks
that could be launched any day by our adversaries. Not just
nation states but rogue actors as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank, thank you. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Schmitt, please.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your work, both of you. I want to ask a few questions about
sort of this our pivot to China which I think, you know, in
this place, in this town, there's hard to find bipartisan
agreement on much. I think most people agree that China is our,
however you want to call it, chief adversary, pacing threat,
pacing challenge, however you want to wordsmith it.
I think that's real, and I think there's recognition, I
think in your work and others that we have a capacity problem
in effectively doing that. So, I've wanted to ask, maybe Dr.
Edelman, as relates to this sort of like priorities, how would
you, if we, I guess for either one of you, what would you say?
I mean, I think I have an idea of what the number is. The
amount of money that we spend in Europe, how much of our
defense budget, what--give me a ballpark of a dollar amount.
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Schmitt, it's a little hard to
disaggregate it because, you've got command and control that
covers a variety of sins. But if you're getting at the question
of do we need to spend less on defense of Europe and more in
the Indo-Pacific, I think we've got to be able to do both.
We've got----
Senator Schmitt. Well, but, I'm--here is this point. We're
not doing both.
Ambassador Edelman. Right.
Senator Schmitt. My argument isn't the withdrawal
necessarily. My argument is some estimates would be 150 billion
to 300 billion a year. Let's just, let's just use that as a
number and people could debate what that actually is. I think
for me and I want to get your thoughts on this, if Canada and
Europe went from--so they're a combined total of 2 percent
right now, if they went to 3.4 percent of spending on defense
per--you know, as it relates to their GDP.
Like we do, that's another $300 billion, and I'm just, how
have you guys grappled with this? Because to me, $300 billion
allows us to continue to be an important ally for a European
allies, but also allows us to do the things that we need to do
for the Homeland in China. So how do you guys view that?
Ambassador Edelman. I think, look, our allies need to spend
more on defense. That's clear. At the latest NATO summit,
there's clearly a lot of talk of allies moving beyond 2 percent
of GDP, which now I think about two thirds of them are hitting
to beyond 2 percent to 2.5 percent. I think, honestly, a cynic
went on of them doing that is also seeing us make the
investment.
Which is why in increasing our top line, which is one of
the reasons we came to the conclusions we did about the U.S.
top line, obviously we need our allies to be producing more.
Our defense industrial base is in very bad shape as we've
discussed in our report. The European defense industrial base
is in even worse shape. So, we need their industrial base, we
need our industrial base. We need our allies in the Indo-
Pacific Australia, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Taiwan. All
need to be stepping up because to match what Russia, China,
North Korea, and Iran are doing is going to beyond our ability
to do it ourselves. We're going to have to do it with allies.
So, there's going to have to be broad investment across all of
the regions, by the way, Middle East as well. We've got
partners in the Middle East who could also be doing more in
that regard.
Ms. Harman. I would just add that I think Europe is waking
up to this and I think there's a robust conversation in Europe
about doing more and even possibly setting up. I don't think
this idea will ever take, you know, become a reality, some kind
of a European force. But the point is spending more, leading,
more, fighting Europe's fight in Europe. I would add that we
embrace in this all elements of national power strategy. That's
the core of our report, doing more with partners and allies.
Think about the Indo-Pacific. The Secretary of Defense is there
now, I think with Secretary Blinken, talking about how to turn
the--enhance the command that we have in Japan into a more
robust command. It shouldn't just be----
Senator Schmitt. I have limited time. I want to get to one
more question. So, I appreciate--I think that's true. I think
that $300 billion would go a long way in allowing us to sort
of, as we talk about priorities, and just to run through a
couple, $320 million for the Gaza Pier would've gone a long way
and almost fully funded. You know, the Guam Missile Defense
Project that we're not spending money on.
So, there, you could go over, you could go through this
list about things of us being spread too thin, and missing what
our real priorities are. I don't have time to go through them
all, but they're significant. I guess the final question of the
time that I have is, this question of the industrial base. I
mean there's--to me, there's no question Europe needs to step
up and that's the part of a lot of conversations we have here.
But as it relates to our industrial base, I supported the
plus up. I think we should be spending more. What is the, if
there's a couple of things that could be done to actually
produce the things that we need, we're not, we don't have
enough of what we need. What are a couple of those top line
suggestions that you would have that when people ask me back
home when I talk about this challenge. What are the things that
can be done differently?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, I mean, Members of this Committee
have done their job for sure in providing, for instance,
authority for multi-year procurement, which is, I think one of
the most important things because industry responds to the
notion that they're going to have a, long timeline to produce
this not just a spike and then go down. It would be helpful if
the appropriators would on their side, make sure their dollars
appropriated against that, to do that for the Department.
That I know is one of the problems that's held up the
Department until recently.
Ms. Harman. I just add that we're not only talking about
the defense in industrial base, we're talking about the
industrial base and embracing fully the tech sector, which has
much more to contribute to the defense of our country than it
is able to contribute.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. I want to thank
Representative Harman, Ambassador Edelman, excellent testimony
based on a superb report. I also want to shout out to General
Keane, and Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman, Mariah Sixkiller, Alissa
Starzak, and Roger Zakheim, the great group.
But I have to give a special kudos to David Grannis, Ralph
Cohen, Amy Hopkins, Travis Sharp, Dustin Walker, and Becca
Wasser, because we all know you get the credit, they did the
work. So, thank you very much. But this has been an
extraordinarily useful hearing and it's got us both informed
and I think energized to move forward. With that, I thank you
all and I will adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
adoption of advanced commercial technologies
1. Senator Hirono. Representative Harman, the war in Ukraine has
underscored the need for the Department of Defense (DOD) to prepare for
new forms of conflict and more rapidly integrate autonomous systems
like drones that are cheaper and can be procured in greater numbers
than many of the legacy systems currently being operated by the
Department. While DOD's Replicator Initiative is a start, what specific
actions can Congress take to accelerate the procurement of these
systems to deter our adversaries, especially in the Indo-Pacific?
Representative Harman. The Commission strongly agrees that the war
in Ukraine as well as other potential conflicts will require large
numbers of inexpensive systems that are autonomous or able to be
controlled remotely. This includes inexpensive drones like the ones
produced in Ukraine as well as the more complicated systems envisioned
by the Replicator Initiative and like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft
program. Congress can accelerate this transformation in three ways:
By ensuring DOD has the flexibility to use funds
efficiently. This includes the ability to shift money across project
lines so that program managers can allocate funds across different
types of equipment and munitions that meet common characteristics
(e.g., Army autonomous or remotely piloted short-range unmanned
vehicles) rather than managing each system separately. It also includes
expanding ``Quick Start'' authorities to begin early and long-lead
acquisitions before final approval, including during Continuing
Resolutions.
By addressing barriers, whether legal or in DOD
acquisition regulations, to procurement of commercial systems, parts,
or technology. Commissioners in Ukraine observed drones, drone parts,
and 3D manufacturing systems that companies purchased online and
modified as needed. Given the low cost, high number needed, and low
risk in the event of failure of these systems, we believe that
commercial technology is ``good enough'' and facilitating its use would
increase the speed of procurement, keep downward pressure on costs,
reduce risk, create more resilient supply chains, and broaden the
defense industrial base. We also support updated production methods,
including 3D printing, modular production, etc.
Through its oversight and legislative activities, the
Committee can encourage and force DOD to remake its force structure and
acquire cheaper systems in greater number where possible instead of its
traditional reliance on a smaller number of more expensive systems, and
take advantage of software upgrades for faster adaptation and adding
functionality.
We also note that procurement of these systems is necessary but not
sufficient for deterrence. The U.S. military will also need to
demonstrate its ability to employ these systems in ways that prevent,
complicate, and respond to unwanted actions by our adversaries.
2. Senator Hirono. Representative Harman, your Commission spoke
with many senior leaders at DOD--do you think the Pentagon is doing
enough to capture lessons learned from the various ongoing conflicts
around the world and integrate them into real-world exercises to ensure
our forces are prepared for the modern battlefield?
Representative Harman. The Commission saw instances of lessons
being learned and implemented, as well as innovative concepts through
testing, exercises, and operations. Examples include tactics and
operations in freedom of navigation exercises in Operation Prosperity
Guardian in the Red Sea where GEN Kurilla is welcoming testing and
incorporation of new ideas and new technology. While the Commission is
highly supportive of United States support to Ukraine, including the
provision of intelligence, equipment, training, and advice through SAG-
U, we believe that the United States military would benefit from having
people in non-combat roles in Ukraine to better understand Ukraine's
very dynamic industrial innovation and lessons from the battlefield.
This problem is magnified as Russia is learning from the combat and,
reportedly, shares insights with its partners China, Iran, and North
Korea.
More broadly, the Commission found that the Department as a whole
is not changing its practices at the speed needed in light of ongoing
conflicts and other changes to the strategic environment. The
Department remains committed to the 2022 NDS that, we believe, is out
of date. The existing force planning concept, for instance, does not
reflect the growing military-industrial alignment and cooperation among
adversaries seen in today's conflicts. The Commission's report noted
that the Joint Warfighting Concept 3.0 was intended to position the
military for the modern battlefield but that more work is needed to
incorporate lessons learned from current conflicts into future concepts
and implement new technologies in future force structure.
strengthening partnerships in asia
3. Senator Hirono. Ambassador Edelman, in your findings, you
discuss the diplomatic and defense efforts to strengthen partnerships
in Asia. Over the weekend, Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin met
with their Korean and Japanese counterparts. The United States and
Japan agreed to reconstitute United States Forces Japan as a Joint
Force Headquarters with operational responsibilities and also enhance
coordination on the co-production of missile systems to bolster
deterrence in the region. Can you provide any recommendations on what
the new Joint Force Headquarters should look like?
Ambassador Edelman. The Commission specifically recommended
converting United States Force Japan (USFJ) into an operational (four-
star) command and we commend the Department for its recent decision to
convert it into a joint force headquarters. We recognize the need to
properly align USFJ under INDOPACOM but note that a similar challenge
has been done successfully for years at United States Forces Korea.
Our recommendation on USFJ was based on the need for closer
operational planning with our key ally, Japan, and to forge closer
operational relationships in theater. We don't make specific
recommendations on how the new headquarters should be structured but
believe it should be optimized to assess, recommend, exercise, and
maintain operational control over the assets and operational planning
necessary to deter aggressive action in East Asia and intervene if
necessary. We note other relevant Commission recommendations relevant
to this new headquarters, including the need for better intelligence
sharing beyond the Five Eyes and supporting the technological means for
allied personnel to have a shared operating picture.
4. Senator Hirono. Ambassador Edelman, how significant is the
announcement of joint production of important missile systems like the
Patriot air defense system?
Ambassador Edelman. The Commission recommends joint production and
co-production generally as a way to increase production rates, share
costs, bolster supply chains, ensure the supply of key equipment and
munitions in relevant theaters, and to increase interoperability with
allies.
The wars in Ukraine and Israel have compounded existing needs for
more air defense systems around the globe. As air defense systems are
high demand, low density assets, increased rates of production are
sorely needed particularly for air defense missiles. The reports of
expanded production through joint production with Japan are very
promising.
5. Senator Hirono. Ambassador Edelman, hat types of military
technology sharing with our allies should the U.S. prioritize?
Ambassador Edelman. The Commission's report draws a parallel in
sharing military technology to the ``small yard and high fence''
approach to United States export control policy with regard to China.
Generally, we ought to identify the relatively small number of core
technologies (e.g., nuclear weapon designs, high-end AI functionality,
etc.) that we need to protect to enable U.S. military advantage. Other
technologies, particularly those developed in the commercial sector and
those for which we lack industrial capacity to manufacture or develop
at scale, ought to be shared more broadly with allies and with fewer
restrictions. Two trends--the loss of decisive technological advantage
and increased technological sharing among our adversaries--both favor
increasing U.S. technology sharing with our allies.
The Commission found that the United States will be unable to deter
or win wars by itself and that we need to help strengthen our allies
and integrate more closely with them. Sharing military technology is a
critical way to achieve both goals--and for the United States to
benefit from advances in other countries. We praise both pillars of
AUKUS as an innovative and strategically important example of such
sharing.
acquisition authority for u.s. indo-pacific command
6. Senator Hirono. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
your report acknowledges the bureaucracy of the existing DOD
acquisition structure and how smaller commands and Services are able to
change faster, such as Special Operations Command, Space Force, and the
Marine Corps. Given the significant threat posed by China in the Indo-
Pacific, do you think the United States Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) Commander should be given some acquisition authority to
allow him to keep up with rapidly changing technology and tactics?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission did
not consider this question specifically, though we did recognize the
benefits of SOCOM's acquisition authorities. We recommend steps that
would streamline acquisition across the Department, to include reduced
barriers to entry for non-traditional defense companies, reforming the
overly scripted requirements process, and allowing increased
flexibility for services to move money across programs. Given the
importance of the INDOPACOM theater, we support DIU's placement of a
senior official at the Command headquarters and would welcome other
ways to increase connectivity between the Command and the R&D and
acquisition structures at the Pentagon.
defense industrial base
7. Senator Hirono. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, in
January, DOD released its inaugural National Defense Industrial
Strategy to coordinate and prioritize actions to build a modernized
defense industrial ecosystem. I want to talk about two recommendations
in your report to bolster the defense industrial base: fundamentally
shifting from defense-led production to commercialization and investing
more heavily in advanced manufacturing techniques like 3-D printing.
Should DOD do a full-scale review to reduce barriers to using
commercial products and software for defense purposes?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. Yes. Specifically,
our report cites numerous other studies, strategies, and reports on
this topic and states:
Overcoming the cultural and institutional barriers to innovation at
speed and scale is a critical requirement for achieving the goals of
the NDS. It will require the concerted attention of senior DOD leaders
and Congress to replace legal, regulatory, and cultural barriers with
the mindset and exhortation to solicit, identify, test, procure, and
adapt new technology. Several government and external organizations
have provided useful recommendations to improve adoption of technical
innovation; we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a
team, with congressional involvement, dedicated to developing an
implementation plan for this transformation. (p. 30)
8. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, how would
investments in advanced manufacturing techniques like 3-D printing save
the Department time and money?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. According to the
January 2021 Department of Defense Additive Manufacturing Strategy (see
https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/dod-additive-
manufacturing-strategy.pdf), 3D printing ``improves production speed
and flexibility . . .'' and ``can be used to: build parts that cannot
be made any other way; uniquely combine materials; produce obsolete
parts; rapidly prototype; create tools and specialized job aids.''
We agree with this description. Commissioners also saw in the
Ukraine context how 3D printing can be used to produce spare parts and
needed equipment closer to the front lines.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
climate change
9. Senator Warren. Representative Harman, the Commission's report
notes the Department of Defense ``has a responsibility and an important
role to play to mitigate and respond'' to a number of threats,
including climate change. How does climate change affect military
readiness?
Representative Harman. Climate change is already affecting military
readiness by complicating existing operations and adding new missions.
A few examples are listed below; DOD has compiled additional resources
at https://www.climate.mil/:
Rising sea levels, increased heat, drought, wildfire,
major storms, and other effects of climate change threaten military
bases, especially seaports and bases in coastal areas, and non-military
infrastructure on which the military depends.
Loss of sea ice in the Arctic presents opportunities and
threats from increased posture and tempo of operations above the Arctic
Circle.
Excessive heat has an impact on training and health of
the force and would affect how troops operate in large swaths of the
world and would complicate logistics, especially during extended
deployments.
The effects of climate change may also affect our allies'
ability to provide access to ports and other facilities and to
contribute to joint operations.
Climate change also adds missions, which impacts readiness.
Examples include added requirements for support to civilian authorities
at home, to include preparing and responding to wildfire, major weather
events, increased potential for pandemics, and other climate-driven
events; humanitarian assistance/disaster response missions to assist
other nations dealing with natural disasters; and instability driven by
loss of habitable and arable land, lack of water, and increased levels
of disease. Moreover, climate change may drive changes in force
structure as both specialized cold-weather equipment or heat-resistant
gear may be required to operate in extreme temperatures.
As the largest organization in the U.S. Government, we believe that
the Department of Defense has a responsibility and a national security
interest in reducing its contributions to climate change.
10. Senator Warren. Representative Harman, if the U.S. fails to
lead a global response to mitigate and respond to climate change, what
impact would this have on international security?
Representative Harman. Climate change poses several critical
threats to U.S. and international security, as well as U.S. and
international economic systems and the well-being of billions of people
and the planet. Among the many impacts on national and international
security are the increased instability through drought, famine, and
natural disaster across the world; increased competition for natural
resources; weakening control of governments; increased likelihood of
pandemic; and degradation of military infrastructure and related
facilities.
As a wealthy nation with unparalleled capacity for global
leadership and a major role in climate change emissions, many nations
believe that the United States has a unique responsibility to lead a
global response to mitigate and respond to climate change. Failure to
do so would likely weaken U.S. relationships with key allies and
partners as well as with non-aligned countries that would see the
United States as an unreliable and irresponsible nation. Conversely, if
the United States plays a leadership role in combating climate change,
it stands to gain access, influence, and cooperation especially from
nations for which climate change poses an existential crisis.
We note that many measures to combat global climate change are
outside of the Department of Defense's responsibilities but should be
seen as part of the ``all elements of national power'' approach
recommended in the Commission's report.
military housing
11. Senator Warren. Representative Harman, your report notes that
failures to provide safe military housing are harming recruiting and
retention. Would increasing the supply of affordable housing for
military families help or hurt recruitment and retention?
Representative Harman. We believe that better, more affordable
housing for military families would aid recruitment and retention. In
addition to affordability, housing should be free from mold and other
health concerns and take into consideration problems with sexual
assault in the military. The Commission heard numerous times from
service secretaries and service chiefs that recruiting and retention
depend on caring for military personnel and their families; providing
acceptable housing is an important part of this approach.
We also note that the availability of affordable housing can also
be important to recruiting and retaining defense civilians and
employees in the industrial base as well.
competition
12. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
your report notes the need for increased investment in the industrial
base and the need to foster national security innovation. To what
extent does reduced competition in the defense industrial base present
a threat to innovation and the development of a robust defense
industrial base?
Representative Harman. and Ambassador Edelman. In addition to the
response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically
on ``Technology and Technology Adoption'' (pp. 29-32) and ``The Defense
Industrial Base and Defense Production'' (pp. 51-57). We also note that
the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions
to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the
National Defense Industrial Strategy.
Consolidation in the defense industrial base, combined with the
large size and complexity of many DOD contracts, means that a very
small number companies can compete effectively as the prime contractor
and receive a large percentage of the money on DOD contracts. The
limited number of companies and the relatively high barriers to entry
into the contract competition place limits on innovative approaches. It
also limits the Department's ability to seek alternate product or
service providers in the case of cost or schedule overruns. The
consolidation of the defense industrial base has also contributed to
brittle supply chains that hinder production rates, limit surge
capacity, and result in higher costs.
Moreover, we believe that DOD's operating procedures and culture
have the effect of rewarding well-established, larger defense companies
to the detriment of smaller and non-traditional companies that could
otherwise compete effectively. This serves to disincentivize
innovation.
We should note that the small number of large defense contractors
play a critical role in providing equipment and services to the
Department, often at lower margins of return than exist in non-defense
industries. They have some important capabilities that smaller or
nontraditional companies may not have, such as large numbers of cleared
employees, facilities and infrastructure, more surge capacity, and the
ability to integrate work across large numbers of subsystems into large
platforms.
13. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
has the consolidation of the defense industrial base increased the cost
of new weapons and technology for DOD?
Representative Harman. and Ambassador Edelman. In addition to the
response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically
on ``Technology and Technology Adoption'' (pp. 29-32) and ``The Defense
Industrial Base and Defense Production'' (pp. 51-57). We also note that
the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions
to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the
National Defense Industrial Strategy.
Consolidation in the defense industrial base, combined with the
large size and complexity of many DOD contracts, means that a very
small number companies can compete effectively as the prime contractor
and receive a large percentage of the money on DOD contracts. The
limited number of companies and the relatively high barriers to entry
into the contract competition place limits on innovative approaches. It
also limits the Department's ability to seek alternate product or
service providers in the case of cost or schedule overruns. The
consolidation of the defense industrial base has also contributed to
brittle supply chains that hinder production rates, limit surge
capacity, and result in higher costs.
Moreover, we believe that DOD's operating procedures and culture
have the effect of rewarding well-established, larger defense companies
to the detriment of smaller and non-traditional companies that could
otherwise compete effectively. This serves to disincentivize
innovation.
We should note that the small number of large defense contractors
play a critical role in providing equipment and services to the
Department, often at lower margins of return than exist in non-defense
industries. They have some important capabilities that smaller or
nontraditional companies may not have, such as large numbers of cleared
employees, facilities and infrastructure, more surge capacity, and the
ability to integrate work across large numbers of subsystems into large
platforms.
14. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
has the consolidation of the defense industrial base limited national
security innovation?
Representative Harman. and Ambassador Edelman. In addition to the
response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically
on ``Technology and Technology Adoption'' (pp. 29-32) and ``The Defense
Industrial Base and Defense Production'' (pp. 51-57). We also note that
the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions
to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the
National Defense Industrial Strategy.
Consolidation in the defense industrial base, combined with the
large size and complexity of many DOD contracts, means that a very
small number companies can compete effectively as the prime contractor
and receive a large percentage of the money on DOD contracts. The
limited number of companies and the relatively high barriers to entry
into the contract competition place limits on innovative approaches. It
also limits the Department's ability to seek alternate product or
service providers in the case of cost or schedule overruns. The
consolidation of the defense industrial base has also contributed to
brittle supply chains that hinder production rates, limit surge
capacity, and result in higher costs.
Moreover, we believe that DOD's operating procedures and culture
have the effect of rewarding well-established, larger defense companies
to the detriment of smaller and non-traditional companies that could
otherwise compete effectively. This serves to disincentivize
innovation.
We should note that the small number of large defense contractors
play a critical role in providing equipment and services to the
Department, often at lower margins of return than exist in non-defense
industries. They have some important capabilities that smaller or
nontraditional companies may not have, such as large numbers of cleared
employees, facilities and infrastructure, more surge capacity, and the
ability to integrate work across large numbers of subsystems into large
platforms.
15. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
has the consolidation of the defense industrial base limited the
robustness and flexibility of the defense industrial base?
Representative Harman. and Ambassador Edelman. In addition to the
response below, we refer you to the Commission's report, specifically
on ``Technology and Technology Adoption'' (pp. 29-32) and ``The Defense
Industrial Base and Defense Production'' (pp. 51-57). We also note that
the Department has acknowledged but has not yet implemented solutions
to many of the problems implicit in these questions, including in the
National Defense Industrial Strategy.
Consolidation in the defense industrial base, combined with the
large size and complexity of many DOD contracts, means that a very
small number companies can compete effectively as the prime contractor
and receive a large percentage of the money on DOD contracts. The
limited number of companies and the relatively high barriers to entry
into the contract competition place limits on innovative approaches. It
also limits the Department's ability to seek alternate product or
service providers in the case of cost or schedule overruns. The
consolidation of the defense industrial base has also contributed to
brittle supply chains that hinder production rates, limit surge
capacity, and result in higher costs.
Moreover, we believe that DOD's operating procedures and culture
have the effect of rewarding well-established, larger defense companies
to the detriment of smaller and non-traditional companies that could
otherwise compete effectively. This serves to disincentivize
innovation.
We should note that the small number of large defense contractors
play a critical role in providing equipment and services to the
Department, often at lower margins of return than exist in non-defense
industries. They have some important capabilities that smaller or
nontraditional companies may not have, such as large numbers of cleared
employees, facilities and infrastructure, more surge capacity, and the
ability to integrate work across large numbers of subsystems into large
platforms.
entitlements and tax increases
16. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
the Commission calls for ``increased security spending . . .
accompanied by additional taxes and reforms to entitlement spending.''
How should Congress balance the need for tax increases vs. reforms to
entitlement spending?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission
unanimously agreed that increases in spending on defense and other
elements of national security should not be placed on the national debt
and instead should be offset by additional revenues and reforms to
entitlement spending. We did not specify the balance between the two.
The Commission also recommends ways to spend smarter--both through
focusing resources where they will provide the best deterrence and
warfighting capability and by spending funds more efficiently.
The Commission's report compares the level of threat to U.S.
national security and global stability to that of the Cold War and
recommends increasing spending on national security efforts as a
percent of GDP to levels comparable to that time. The Commission notes
that during the Cold War, the United States paid for that spending
through higher individual and corporate tax rates. Due to the changes
in entitlement programs over time, we did not find applicable
benchmarks for comparing entitlement spending then and now.
17. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
what specific reforms to entitlement spending does the Commission
recommend to Congress?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission did
not make specific recommendations in this regard.
18. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
which Americans will face the greatest hardships as a result of these
entitlement reforms?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. While the Commission
didn't address this question specifically, we believe that changes to
entitlement programs are more likely to affect Americans who receive a
larger share of their income and livelihood from these programs.
Conversely, we would expect that the Commission's recommendation to
increase revenue measures would be borne more heavily by corporations
and wealthier individuals.
19. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
given your call for tax increases, would it be unwise for Congress to
extend expiring tax cuts, particularly tax cuts that primarily benefit
the wealthiest Americans and the largest corporations?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission did
not address specifically how to increase tax revenues other than to
recommend that Congress does so.
20. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
would extending expiring tax cuts, particularly tax cuts that primarily
benefit the wealthiest Americans and the largest corporations, pose
national security risks?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission states
that ``[t]he ballooning U.S. deficit also poses national security
risks.'' (p. xii) Legislation that increased the deficit would increase
national security risks.
financial disclosure
21. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
please list all entities for which you work, consult, lobby, or
otherwise provide services.
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We are both retired
from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do
either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial
interest in the Commission's work. We both serve on government advisory
boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in
our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).
We have each filed financial disclosure reports for prior
government service and responded to questions relating to conflicts of
interest for security clearances and work on government advisory
boards.
The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee
on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied
with all applicable laws and regulations.
22. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
please list the amounts of any government contracts the entities you
work for have received in the past 3 years.
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We are both retired
from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do
either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial
interest in the Commission's work. We both serve on government advisory
boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in
our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).
We have each filed financial disclosure reports for prior
government service and responded to questions relating to conflicts of
interest for security clearances and work on government advisory
boards.
The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee
on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied
with all applicable laws and regulations.
23. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
are you a fiduciary--including, but not limited to, a director,
officer, advisor, or resident agent--of any organization or entity that
has an interest in the Commission's work?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We are both retired
from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do
either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial
interest in the Commission's work. We both serve on government advisory
boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in
our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).
We have each filed financial disclosure reports for prior
government service and responded to questions relating to conflicts of
interest for security clearances and work on government advisory
boards.
The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee
on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied
with all applicable laws and regulations.
24. Senator Warren. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
please list any contracts, grants, or payments originating with a
foreign government or Federal Government contractor related to the
hearing's subject that you or the organization(s) you work for have
received in the past 3 years from the date of the hearing.
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We are both retired
from Federal Government service and have no full-time employer, nor do
either of us serve as a fiduciary for any organization with a financial
interest in the Commission's work. We both serve on government advisory
boards and have affiliations with non-profit organizations as listed in
our biographies (see Appendix A of the Commission report).
We have each filed financial disclosure reports for prior
government service and responded to questions relating to conflicts of
interest for security clearances and work on government advisory
boards.
The Commission received a briefing from the Senate Ethics Committee
on rules governing legislative branch commissions and have complied
with all applicable laws and regulations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
shrinking defense budget
25. Senator Sullivan. Ambassador Edelman, our defense spending is
on track to drop below 3 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP) at
the most dangerous period since the end of the Cold War. Defense
spending has only been below 4 percent of GDP 22 times in the last 85
years: 1940, 1948, 1994--1997, 2002--2007, 2013--2021, and 2024. During
the Cold War, including the Korean War and Vietnam War, DOD spending
ranged from 4.9 percent to 16.9 percent of GDP. Now, for the fourth
consecutive year, President Biden has submitted a budget that does not
achieve 3 percent real growth. Meanwhile, your report notes, ``the
Chinese government in March 2024 announced an increase in annual
defense spending of 7.2 percent. Russia will devote 29 percent of its
Federal budget this year on national defense.'' What is the danger if
U.S. defense spending drops below 3 percent?
Ambassador Edelman. The threats are the greatest we have faced
since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war for which
we are not prepared. Additional spending, along with other measures
recommended in our report, is needed to deter and if necessary win such
a war.
As the Commission's report notes, the threats to national security
require additional, as well as smarter, defense spending combined with
other elements of U.S. power. We recommend immediate increases in
spending--defense and other elements of national security--consistent
with the 2018 Commission's recommendation of 3-5 percent real growth
(i.e., above inflation) this year. We also recommend targeted
investments in capabilities through a supplemental appropriation and
increases starting in fiscal year 2027 to levels ``on a glide path to
support efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during
the Cold War.''
26. Senator Sullivan. Ambassador Edelman, what is the danger if
U.S. defense spending remains at the Biden administration's current set
level?
Ambassador Edelman. The threats are the greatest we have faced
since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war for which
we are not prepared. Additional spending, along with other measures
recommended in our report, is needed to deter and if necessary win such
a war.
As the Commission's report notes, the threats to national security
require additional, as well as smarter, defense spending combined with
other elements of U.S. power. We recommend immediate increases in
spending--defense and other elements of national security--consistent
with the 2018 Commission's recommendation of 3-5 percent real growth
(i.e., above inflation) this year. We also recommend targeted
investments in capabilities through a supplemental appropriation and
increases starting in FY2027 to levels ``on a glide path to support
efforts commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold
War.''
implications of failure to achieve persistent basing in areas of
contention in the arctic
27. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
Russia and China have increased military cooperation in the last
several years including by conducting joint naval patrols in the United
States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and now through a Russia-China
joint bomber incursion in the Alaska Air Identification Zone (AK ADIZ)
in July 2024. What do you believe the implications are for the United
States National Defense Strategy if we do not maintain a credible
deterrent against these incursions in the Arctic in peacetime or a
future conflict against China and/or Russia?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The 2022 National
Defense Strategy lists as its first priority ``defending the Homeland,
paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC.'' We agree
with that priority.
The United States Homeland is no longer a sanctuary and is
vulnerable to non-kinetic and kinetic threats alike. We agree with the
2022 NDS that Chinese and Russian ``gray zone'' activities already
include penetration of United States computer networks and critical
infrastructure and that China in particular would include cyber attack
against domestic United States networks in advance of and as part of
military conflict.
As the Commission's report notes, however, DOD and the 2022 NDS do
not account for the partnership between China and Russia, the benefits
each receive from their partnership, and the added likelihood of multi-
theater conflict. For example, public reports (see https://
www.nytimes.com/2024/08/13/world/asia/china-russia-military-
patrols.html) indicate that China would not have been able to
participate in the July 2024 joint incursion into the AK ADIZ without
departing from a Russian airbase closer to the United States. DNI
Haines has publicly testified that Russia might well assist China in a
Taiwan invasion. The United States is not prepared for this level of
joint or interoperable military action, nor has it effectively tailored
its deterrence strategies with it mind.
Both China and Russia have the means to attack the United States
and its territories and United States Northern Command lacks the
resources to defend against such an attack. The patrols and incursions
you cite are part of a growing pattern of aggressive and irresponsible
actions by China and Russia designed to intimidate, deter, understand
United States responses, and in some cases establish new norms without
provoking a serious response.
It is critical that the United States establish and maintain a
credible deterrent to Chinese or Russian aggression against the United
States or against our allies.
28. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
do you believe that the current force posture we have in the Arctic
region near Alaska will be sufficient to protect our vital military,
civilian, and economic interests there that are in support of the
National Defense Strategy?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Arctic is an
increasingly contested region, especially due to the effects of climate
change, in which the United States has key security and economic
interests. Our report did not address United States military posture in
the region specifically, but we would include the Arctic in the list of
theaters where China and Russia are increasing their military,
diplomatic, and economic presence. We believe that the United States
should maintain a presence itself, to include military (including the
military and non-military roles of the Coast Guard), diplomatic, and
otherwise. In the case of the Arctic, we should continue to coordinate
with our allies to protect our shared interests. We would note that the
entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO provides greater ability for the
Alliance as a whole to compete with Russia and China in the Arctic now
that it has access to the region through the High North and we welcome
the trilateral Ice Breaker Cooperation Effort (ICE Pact) among the US,
Canada and Finland announced during the NATO Summit.
The 2022 NDS briefly discusses the Arctic, saying that the
Department will `` . . . deter threats to the U.S. Homeland from and
through the Arctic region by improving early warning and ISR
capabilities'' and by partnering with Canada and other allies. (p. 16)
The Commission report notes the increased threat and potential for
military conflict in NORTHCOM's AOR, which includes the Arctic, but is
concerned that there has not been a corresponding increase in
capability in this Command. We share the concerns voiced in recent
testimony on this matter by former Commander VanHerck (see https://
www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VanHerck percent20Written
percent20Testimony percent20-percent2005.09.23 percent20SASC-SF
percent20Missile percent20Defense percent20Hearing.pdf).
countering information operations and offensive information operations
capability
29. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
your report notes several times that our adversaries--particularly
China and Russia--have included in their national strategies increased
efforts to dominate the information space including with targeted
information and disinformation operations in our own Homeland. Do these
efforts include PRC [People's Republic of China] plans (including in
conjunction with other adversaries like Russia, North Korea, or Iran)
to interfere in the United States elections?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We found that the
United States does not compete effectively in information operations
and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S.
elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.
At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is
shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for
election security, the intelligence community plays a role in
identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State
Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the
United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part
of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject
to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds
necessary.
We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations,
including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States
elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee's July 30
hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S.
Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign
interference have not been successful.
The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for
great information advantage ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in
2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less
effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter
misinformation about Israel's actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS
and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information
about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption,
contributions to climate change, control over access to critical
minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military
action in East Asia.
The Commission's report recommends rebuilding the capability we had
through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working
Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should
set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and
then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.
We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of
statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese
Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified
information.
30. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
can you elaborate on what defensive and offensive information
operations and messaging the U.S. and its allies can use to counter and
deter adversary information and disinformation operations?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We found that the
United States does not compete effectively in information operations
and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S.
elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.
At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is
shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for
election security, the intelligence community plays a role in
identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State
Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the
United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part
of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject
to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds
necessary.
We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations,
including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States
elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee's July 30
hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S.
Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign
interference have not been successful.
The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for
great information advantage ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in
2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less
effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter
misinformation about Israel's actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS
and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information
about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption,
contributions to climate change, control over access to critical
minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military
action in East Asia.
The Commission's report recommends rebuilding the capability we had
through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working
Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should
set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and
then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.
We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of
statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese
Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified
information.
31. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
do any such offensive information operations and messaging envisage
releasing information about Chinese Communist Party leader corruption
that the United States Government (USG) is privy to?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We found that the
United States does not compete effectively in information operations
and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S.
elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.
At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is
shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for
election security, the intelligence community plays a role in
identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State
Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the
United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part
of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject
to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds
necessary.
We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations,
including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States
elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee's July 30
hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S.
Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign
interference have not been successful.
The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for
great information advantage ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in
2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less
effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter
misinformation about Israel's actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS
and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information
about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption,
contributions to climate change, control over access to critical
minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military
action in East Asia.
The Commission's report recommends rebuilding the capability we had
through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working
Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should
set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and
then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.
We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of
statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese
Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified
information.
32. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
are there statutory constraints to such release of information about
the Chinese Communist Party's leadership?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We found that the
United States does not compete effectively in information operations
and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S.
elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.
At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is
shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for
election security, the intelligence community plays a role in
identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State
Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the
United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part
of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject
to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds
necessary.
We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations,
including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States
elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee's July 30
hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S.
Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign
interference have not been successful.
The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for
great information advantage ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in
2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less
effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter
misinformation about Israel's actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS
and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information
about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption,
contributions to climate change, control over access to critical
minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military
action in East Asia.
The Commission's report recommends rebuilding the capability we had
through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working
Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should
set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and
then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.
We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of
statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese
Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified
information.
33. Senator Sullivan. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
if there are statutory constraints to releasing information about the
Chinese Communist Party leadership's corruption, what additional
authorities are necessary and advisable in your opinion to conduct
information operations effectively targeting PRC corruption?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We found that the
United States does not compete effectively in information operations
and that efforts to counter such operations, including around U.S.
elections, lack the levels of coordination and attention needed.
At the Federal level, responsibility for information operations is
shared: DHS and the FBI are the Federal entities responsible for
election security, the intelligence community plays a role in
identifying foreign actor information operations against us, the State
Department leads the strategic effort to promote information about the
United States, and DOD is in charge of information operations as part
of warfare. These lines of effort are often under-resourced and subject
to tight internal controls that prevent operating in the speeds
necessary.
We strongly share the concern about efforts by several nations,
including Iran, Russia, and China, to interfere with United States
elections, including in ways highlighted since the Committee's July 30
hearing. These efforts are underway for the third straight U.S.
Presidential election; clearly efforts to deter such malign
interference have not been successful.
The Intelligence Community used strategic declassification for
great information advantage ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in
2022. The United States Government has been less aggressive and less
effective at using information for other purposes, including to counter
misinformation about Israel's actions in Gaza, to the benefit of HAMAS
and Houthis. The United States has an opportunity to use information
about Chinese duplicity and hypocrisy, to include CCP corruption,
contributions to climate change, control over access to critical
minerals, unfavorable terms attached to loans, and aggressive military
action in East Asia.
The Commission's report recommends rebuilding the capability we had
through the U.S. Information Agency and the Active Measures Working
Group during the Cold War. We believe that senior policymakers should
set broad parameters for strategic and tactical use of information and
then empower agencies to engage with the speed required.
We have not studied the question in detail but are not aware of
statutory limitations to the release of information about the Chinese
Communist Party other than those involving protection of classified
information.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
defense spending
34. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission proposes a Multiple Theater Force Construct and real growth
in the defense spending of at least 3-5 percent annually, in keeping
with the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission's recommendations.
Assuming Congress agrees with a Multiple Theater Force Construct, is a
3-5 perecent real growth enough to achieve that goal in the near term
and what are the variables Congress should consider?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. With regard to
resources, the Commission recommends:
Increasing defense spending, as well as non-defense
national security spending, by at least 3-5 percent real growth in the
current (FY25) year, allocated to emphasize near-term readiness demands
to restore and reinforce deterrence;
Passing a supplemental appropriations bill this year to
begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and
industrial base; and
Increasing national security spending starting in FY27,
if not sooner, on a glide path to the levels of spending during the
Cold War. (see p. xvii)
The Commission also recommends several measures to spend more
effectively, to include changes on how we spend money and what we spend
it on (see pp. 72-74). We do not believe that an increase in defense
spending (only) of 3-5 percent real annual growth would be sufficient.
35. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, in
the event the President does not request and/or Congress does not agree
on significantly increased defense spending, how would you recommend
Congress prioritize and allocate resources given the threats we face?
For instance, should Congress prioritize investment and increase force
posture west of the International Date Line relative to other regions?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. With regard to
resources, the Commission recommends:
Increasing defense spending, as well as non-defense
national security spending, by at least 3-5 percent real growth in the
current (fiscal year 2025) year, allocated to emphasize near-term
readiness demands to restore and reinforce deterrence;
Passing a supplemental appropriations bill this year to
begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and
industrial base; and
Increasing national security spending starting in FY27,
if not sooner, on a glide path to the levels of spending during the
Cold War. (see p. xvii)
The Commission also recommends several measures to spend more
effectively, to include changes on how we spend money and what we spend
it on (see pp. 72-74). We do not believe that an increase in defense
spending (only) of 3-5 percent real annual growth would be sufficient.
special operations force structure
36. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission recommends preserving special operations force (SOF)
structure and funding as well as shifting resources from
counterterrorism and direct action to unconventional warfare, special
reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense. Can you explain the
Commission's reasoning and explain SOF's value proposition in great
power competition and potential conflict?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. Over much of the past
two decades, the emphasis for special operations forces was necessarily
on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. As the counterterrorism
mission has shifted away from large-scale direct action and the threat
of great power competition has increased, we believe that the posture
for special forces should also change. In particular, SOF plays a role
in training allied forces, preparation of the environment, and crisis
response--the requirements for all of which have increased
significantly in recent years. The importance and need for these
missions was described well in recent testimony for the SASC by
Assistant Secretary Maier and General Fenton (see https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2024.pdf).
The Commission also found that SOCOM, with its unique structure and
authorities, displays the kind of rapid technological innovation and
ability to adapt quickly that we recommend broadly for the Joint Force
and the Department. We don't recommend increasing the size of the
Command but believe it can serve as a model and testbed for
transformational changes needed.
personnel
37. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
reversing the decline in the percentage of graduating American high
school students able to meet educational and/or physical standards for
entering military service must be a top priority. Do you see a role for
Government agencies other than DOD in working to reverse the decline in
percentage of graduating American high school students able to meet
educational and/or physical standards for entering military service?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. In calling for a
strategy that embraces all elements of national power, we specifically
call out the role of the Departments of Education and Labor in helping
produce a population able and interested in serving in the military, as
well as in civilian national security roles elsewhere in government,
industry, or other areas. We also recommend a new National Defense
Education Act along the lines of the 1958 law. The services have
recently begun running their own schools and programs to help potential
enlistees meet the academic or physical requirements for service, but
the need for these efforts is an indictment of the broader secondary
school system.
We commend the Committee for its hearing on February 28, 2024 to
discuss broader education and workforce issues but believe that these
must be ``whole of society'' issues and not ones that the national
security community is addressing by itself. Given the severity of the
threats our Nation faces, all parts of government need to be part of
the solution.
We see a role for elected leaders, civic groups, and the private
sector to promote national service, whether military, government, or
other forms of service. Too many people do not see military service as
a worthwhile or productive option, in part due to lack of familiarity
with what it entails. The high levels of military retention show that
once in, people want to remain in service.
38. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman,
where should Congress put additional emphasis or resources to achieve
the goal of reversing the decline in percentage of graduating American
high school students able to meet educational and/or physical standards
for entering military service?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. In calling for a
strategy that embraces all elements of national power, we specifically
call out the role of the Departments of Education and Labor in helping
produce a population able and interested in serving in the military, as
well as in civilian national security roles elsewhere in government,
industry, or other areas. We also recommend a new National Defense
Education Act along the lines of the 1958 law. The services have
recently begun running their own schools and programs to help potential
enlistees meet the academic or physical requirements for service, but
the need for these efforts is an indictment of the broader secondary
school system.
We commend the Committee for its hearing on February 28, 2024 to
discuss broader education and workforce issues but believe that these
must be ``whole of society'' issues and not ones that the national
security community is addressing by itself. Given the severity of the
threats our Nation faces, all parts of government need to be part of
the solution.
We see a role for elected leaders, civic groups, and the private
sector to promote national service, whether military, government, or
other forms of service. Too many people do not see military service as
a worthwhile or productive option, in part due to lack of familiarity
with what it entails. The high levels of military retention show that
once in, people want to remain in service.
39. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission indicates an ``all elements of national power'' approach
should be established for defense. It recommends increasing resources
and political will for international engagement. The report highlights
a significant decline in American public trust in the military,
particularly among younger Americans. What strategies could be explored
to address this decline in trust?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission's
report states that the ``U.S. public is largely unaware of the dangers
the United States faces or the costs (financial and otherwise) required
to adequately prepare.'' (p. viii) The first step in building support
for international engagement and a sense of service is to better inform
the public about the threats we face and the consequences of not
addressing them.
We believe that restoring faith in the military and support for
international engagement begins with leadership on a bipartisan basis
from elected officials. In our meetings, retired senior officials
serving in administrations of both parties decried the lack of public
engagement and service as well as the lack of communication from the
government on why it is important.
40. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission recommends that the DOD should seek to create a
noncontinuous option for service, whereby personnel can and are
encouraged to cycle out of government service, gain critical skills in
the private sector, and come back to public service. How can the DOD
work to encourage former employees to return to public service after
receiving further skills/education in the private sector?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. Select disincentives
to such flexible personnel systems include: lack of recognition in
military rank or civil service (GS system) for experience and time in
the private sector; lower rates of pay in government and benefit
systems tied to time in service; slow and difficult hiring and security
clearance processes; frequent changes in duty station (primarily for
military work); and real and perceived preferences in hiring and
promotion for internal candidates. Some of these characteristics of
military and civilian governmental service are necessary but many of
them do not need to be applied in every instance.
The need to attract talent from the private sector is particularly
important in those fields where companies are innovating faster than
the government, to include those related to space, software
development, cybersecurity, and supply chain management. Congress has
provided some legislative flexibilities for some of these areas and
newer organizations like Space Force have built collaboration with the
private sector into their operations. We believe more of this is
necessary to maintain and develop skills needed for warfighting and DOD
operations.
We also believe that the Department of Defense can provide
professional opportunities that the private sector can't match--
including conducting offensive operations against our adversaries,
access to classified information, and work on behalf of one's country.
We believe these can be important recruiting tools and may be
particularly effective with former employees of the U.S. Government.
interagency coordination
41. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission found that Congress should require the State Department to
develop and implement a national security-focused diplomatic strategy
that incorporates United States Agency for International Development's
(USAID) foreign assistance tools. How can the State Department shift
its tools to better align with national defense?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The State Department
and USAID, along with other investment agencies, have very important
national security missions to play in addition to humanitarian and
other work. We found, however, that the culture of both organizations
has shifted away from a national security focus over time. While the
seniormost leadership at State is integrally involved in every major
national security issue, the Department lacks the institutional ability
needed.
We encourage the authors of the next State and USAID strategy to
clearly articulate the very real security threats we face as the top
priority and organize around that. State and USAID should play a global
role in checking Chinese and Russian aggression and ability to project
force and influence.
The Commission's review did not look into the relationship between
State and USAID and Congress but from an outsider's view, it appears
much more contentious and less transparent than the relationship
between DOD and the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees and
defense appropriators. State and USAID should provide insight into
their strategies, plans, and implementation at similar levels to DOD.
Congressional committees, in turn, can contribute to a more productive
relationship through constructive oversight, promptly considering and
acting on nominees, and supporting responsible budgets for diplomatic
and aid work.
42. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, how
can State Department and USAID improve their transparency with Congress
and the DOD as it works to implement this goal?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The State Department
and USAID, along with other investment agencies, have very important
national security missions to play in addition to humanitarian and
other work. We found, however, that the culture of both organizations
has shifted away from a national security focus over time. While the
seniormost leadership at State is integrally involved in every major
national security issue, the Department lacks the institutional ability
needed.
We encourage the authors of the next State and USAID strategy to
clearly articulate the very real security threats we face as the top
priority and organize around that. State and USAID should play a global
role in checking Chinese and Russian aggression and ability to project
force and influence.
The Commission's review did not look into the relationship between
State and USAID and Congress but from an outsider's view, it appears
much more contentious and less transparent than the relationship
between DOD and the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees and
defense appropriators. State and USAID should provide insight into
their strategies, plans, and implementation at similar levels to DOD.
Congressional committees, in turn, can contribute to a more productive
relationship through constructive oversight, promptly considering and
acting on nominees, and supporting responsible budgets for diplomatic
and aid work.
43. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission recommends that the Department of State, USAID, and DOD
review their differing ways of dividing the world into regions and
commands and align their respective areas of responsibility to improve
coordination across the Departments and make it easier for other
nations to engage the United States. What type of information does the
Commission recommend be included in this review?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. The Commission
believes that U.S. operations and relations with other countries would
benefit if geographic Combatant Commanders, regional Assistant
Secretaries of State, and Assistant Administrators at USAID had the
same areas of responsibility. Reviewing the differences in geographic
responsibilities and determining a common approach should not require
significant effort beyond the will to change organizational lines for a
small number of country assignments.
44. Senator Budd. Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman, the
Commission states that they've heard examples of the Pentagon not
coordinating and integrating its operations effectively with the State
Department and others. How can the Pentagon coordinate more effectively
with the State Department or vice versa?
Representative Harman and Ambassador Edelman. We don't want to
overState the case. However, DOD is by far the largest Federal
Department with personnel and resources that other Departments and
Agencies lack. This gives it the capacity to move faster and put more
people and resources on an issue than others. The Department also has
well-established processes, relationships, and networks around the
world to implement decisions that others lack. This is especially
noteworthy in theaters like SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM where State and other
Departments lack a sizable presence (and often have no confirmed
Ambassadors) so diplomatic and business functions that should be
performed to others fall to combatant commanders. We heard that, at
times, the capacity to move faster led to DOD moving out on an
initiative or proposal before properly coordinating with other
agencies.
The Department, and the U.S. military, has been the first choice
for policymakers to deal with national security and international
issues for decades. The Department's culture is to accomplish its
missions and not necessarily work with other Departments and Agencies
in doing so. The Commission's report calls on the National Security
Council to provide the leadership and direction for an ``all elements
of national power'' approach. It also notes that other Departments and
Agencies lack the culture, prioritization, and often the resources to
play a larger role in national security policymaking and
implementation.
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