[Senate Hearing 118-741, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-741, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 4638
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
MAY 8, 21, 22, 2024
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 118-741, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 4638
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MAY 8, 21, 22, 2024
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-124 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI K. ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina
MARK KELLY, Arizona ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John P. Keast, Minority Staff Director
________
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine Chairman
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOM COTTON, Arkansas
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
________
May 8, 2024
Page
The Department of Defense Missile Defense Activities............. 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 30
Witness Statements
Hill, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 2
and Missile Defense, Department of Defense.
Guillot, General Gregory M., USAF, Commander, United States 8
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Gainey, Lieutenant General Sean A., USA, Commanding General, 17
United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
Collins, Lieutenant General Heath A., USAF, Director, Missile 23
Defense Agency.
May 21, 2024
Department of Defense Space Activities........................... 45
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 45
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 46
Witness Statements
Hill, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 46
and Missile Defense, Department of Defense.
Calvelli, Hon. Frank, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 52
Space Acquisition and Integration.
Guetlein, General Michael A., USSF, Vice Chief of Space 58
Operations.
Questions for the Record......................................... 83
(iii)
May 22, 2024
Page
The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and 93
Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Program.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Angus King.................................. 93
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 94
Witness Statements
Hruby, Ms. Jill M., Administrator of the Nation Nuclear Security 94
Administration.
Houston, Admiral William J., USN, Deputy Administrator for the 95
Office of Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security
Administration.
White, Mr. William, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, 101
Department of Energy.
Adams, Dr. Marvin L., Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, 113
National Nuclear Security Administration.
Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director for Strategic 124
Systems Programs, Department of the Navy.
Bussiere, General Thomas A., USAF, Commander of Airforce Global 131
Strike Command.
(iv)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2024
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:53 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Angus King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: King, Rosen, Fischer, Cotton,
and Rounds.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King.--[Technical issues.] this hearing before the
Subcommittee. Thank you for your service.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the
President's Budget Request for the Missile Agency and missile
defense policies in preparation for the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. We are working on that
now, and we are hoping the markup on that bill will be at the
end of this month. So now is the time.
In today's open hearing I hope that we can address a number
of issues. First and foremost is the defense against hypersonic
missiles, which we seem woefully unprepared for. Woefully--that
is an understatement. Second is the requirement to protect Guam
against any threats that China may pose, a daunting task that
integrates missile defense from the Army, Navy, and the Missile
Defense Agency.
The third issue is how today's threat landscape has changed
the nature of integrated air and missile defense, given the
conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Ukraine faces all
forms of air threats, from drones to hypersonic missiles.
Likewise, the recent events in the Middle East and Iran's April
14th attack included over 300 drones, cruise, and ballistic
missiles launched toward Israel. I realize much is classified,
but it is important for the public to understand how today's
missile defense landscape has radically changed in the last 5
years.
The Fiscal Year 2025 President's Budget Request for Missile
Defense Agency is $10.4 billion, a decrease from 2024 enacted
budget of $10.8 billion. I would like to know how the fiscal
year 2025 budget request continues your effort for Homeland and
regional missile defense as well as defense against hypersonic
weapons.
I understand that a mainstay of the AEGIS destroyer, the
SM-3 IB missile, was zeroed out this year. I need to understand
the impacts of such a decision and the basis thereof.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for agreeing to appear
today, and we will have rounds of 5-minute questions to the
witnesses.
Senator Rounds, Senator Fisher is on her way. She will be
here shortly. She gave me permission to start.
Senator Rounds. I have no doubt.
Senator King. Yes, but you know that I would not have
without that permission.
Senator Rounds. Of course.
Senator King. So, Mr. Hill, are you lead witness?
Mr. Hill. Certainly. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator King. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Hill. Chairman King and Ranking Member Fischer and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
office of the Secretary of Defense thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the topic of the President's missile
defense budget. You have my full written statement. I ask that
it be included in the record. Thank you.
I want to begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to this
Committee for your bipartisan approach and steadfast support of
the Department's missile defense plans, programs, and posture
to fulfill the Nation's missile defense needs. I also want to
acknowledge and express my appreciation for the crucial role
this Committee played in passing the National Security
Supplemental, including the $60 billion for Ukraine.
Conflicts around the globe continue to demonstrate the
centrality of missiles in modern warfare and global strategy
and the indispensable role of integrated air and missile
defenses in protecting military capabilities, civilian
populations, and national sovereignty. Conflicts in Ukraine and
the Middle East likewise provide daily reminders of the
indispensability of our alliances and the national security
imperative of standing with our allies around the world.
To meet the challenges of missile defense, the President's
Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request includes $28.4 billion for
missile defense and defeat. Key investments include $2.5
billion to develop the next-generation Interceptor for ground-
based, mid-course defense, and to extend the service life of
the current Ground-Based Interceptors; $1.9 billion for
ballistic and hypersonic defense programs; $4.7 billion for
space-based missile warning systems; $1.5 billion for the Army
and Missile Defense Agency for the development and procurement
of the Guam defense system.
These and other investments in missile defenses and
advanced early warning systems will continue to expand decision
space for our military and civilian leaders, preserve our
forces' freedom of maneuver, and strengthen our integrated
deterrence and overall defense posture.
Keeping pace against rapidly evolving threats requires
continued improvement in our active missile defenses as well as
pursuit of comprehensive missile defeat approaches to expand
our response options. The Department is prioritizing efforts
across the entire engagement space to improve the probability
of a successful intercept and improve the efficiency with which
we conduct missile engagements and defeat missile threats. To
achieve these goals we are developing and fielding better
sensors, on earth and in space, that can provide higher
fidelity warning, tracking, discrimination, and kill assessment
data.
The Department is also putting a greater emphasis on non-
kinetic missile defeat capabilities, including options in
directed energy, electronic warfare, and cyber, which expand
both right-of-launch and left-of-launch options against the
evolving threats.
In closing, thank you again to the Committee for your
partnership and for your tireless dedication to the Department
and our servicemembers. Additionally, I want to thank each of
you for your service to your constituents and to the Nation. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. John D. Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement by John D. Hill
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee. On behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the topic of the
President's ``Missile Defense Budget.'' I am honored to join Lieutenant
General Heath Collins from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Lieutenant
General Sean Gainey from the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command (SMDC), and General Gregory M. Guillot from U.S. Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM).
Today, I will review how air and missile threats have evolved over
the last year, provide an update on our progress in policy and strategy
implementation, and explain how the Department's fiscal year 2025
budget request of $28.4 billion for missile defense and missile defeat
programs supports continued efforts.
the evolving threat
As the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR) highlights, missiles are
``a principal means by which adversaries seek to project conventional
or nuclear military power.'' Conflicts around the globe continue to
demonstrate the centrality of missiles in modern warfare and global
strategy, and the indispensable role of integrated air and missile
defenses (IAMD) in protecting military capabilities, civilian
populations, and national sovereignty.
It has been over 2 years since Russia launched its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. In response, Ukraine's employment of a wide array
of air and missile defenses--including legacy fundamental to defending
Ukrainian forces and civilians, protecting critical infrastructure, and
preserving freedom, self-determination, and sovereignty against
ruthless, authoritarian aggression. Innovative solutions and
resourcefulness have embodied these efforts, as seen through the
example of the ``FrankenSAM'' program, wherein the Department of
Defense, working with Ukrainian forces, successfully adapted legacy
Ukrainian launchers to utilize Western-supplied missiles, enabling more
widespread air and missile defense coverage than would otherwise be
achievable. Meanwhile, Russia is adapting by bolstering its production
of missiles and drones and acquiring additional systems from Iran and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
In the Middle East, Iran-backed militant groups have targeted
Israel, U.S. military forces, and maritime commercial shipping
operating in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of
Aden. Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, the Houthis, and Iran-aligned militia
groups (IAMG) in Iraq and Syria accept Iranian military support in many
forms, including capabilities such as uncrewed aerial vehicles,
ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. In the aftermath of the
October 7 attacks, the United States temporarily transferred its two
Iron Dome batteries to Israel and replenished Iron Dome interceptors.
The United States has relied on air and missile defenses, such as the
Navy's AEGIS Weapon System with Standard Missiles and the Phalanx
close-range defense system, to counter threats to our forces,
commercial shipping, and our partners in the region. Additionally, the
United States surged Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and
PATRIOT to the region. Most recently, Israel's successful employment on
April 13 of IAMD, with support from the United States and other
countries, to defend itself against Iran's direct attacks with drones,
cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles underscored the
indispensability of IAMD in modern military posture.
to develop a range of missile capabilities that--combined with
coercive activities--threaten regional stability. As outlined in the
National Defense Strategy, the most comprehensive and serious challenge
to U.S. national security is the PRC's coercive and increasingly
aggressive efforts to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and
international system to suit its authoritarian preferences. The PRC is
also developing and growing its offensive arsenal, including rapid
advancement of ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile capabilities.
As highlighted in the Department's 2023 China Military Power Report,
the PRC is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle that is likely
intended to be capable of striking U.S., allied, and partner military
bases and fleets in the Indo-Pacific region.
The DPRK also continues to diversify its missile and nuclear
programs in line with Kim Jong Un's defense modernization goals. In
2023, the DPRK launched a solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and a purported submarine-launched cruise missile. The
DPRK also continues to diversify its launch platforms. The DPRK also
unveiled a new ballistic missile submarine and tested an underwater
drone that it claimed was nuclear-capable. Finally, in March 2023, Kim
inspected what the DPRK claimed was a tactical nuclear weapon. These
programs both undermine regional stability and expand DPRK missile
threats to the U.S. Homeland.
u.s. missile defense policy
The 2022 MDR describes missile defense as ``a core deterrence-by-
denial component of an integrated deterrence strategy.'' Missile
defenses are integral to achieving the National Defense Strategy's top
priorities of defending the Homeland and deterring strategic attacks
missile use by:
reinforcing U.S. diplomatic and security posture;
reassuring allies and partners that the United States
will not be deterred from fulfilling its global security commitments;
introducing doubt and uncertainty into adversary attack
planning;
raising the threshold for conflict by reducing
adversaries' incentives to conduct small-scale, coercive attacks;
denying the benefits of an uncontested attack by
adversaries; and
mitigating damage should deterrence fail.
In short, missile defenses, paired with advanced early warning systems,
expand the decision space for our military and civilian leaders and
preserve our forces' freedom of maneuver.
As Russia's war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East
demonstrate, kinetic interceptors remain the primary means to defend
against offensive missile, artillery, and rocket attacks. To keep pace
against this rapidly evolving threat requires continued improvement of
our active missile defenses as well as pursuit of comprehensive missile
defeat approaches to expand our response options.
To address these challenges, the Department is prioritizing efforts
across the entire engagement space to improve the probability of a
successful intercept and reduce interceptor salvo size. To achieve
these goals, we are developing and fielding better sensors--on Earth
and in space--that can provide higher fidelity warning, tracking, and
kill assessment data to reduce the number of interceptors required to
defeat each incoming threat missile. These investments will also
deliver improved fire control and discrimination capabilities. Space-
based sensors both homeland and regional missile warning, missile
tracking, and missile defense architectures. The Department is also
putting a greater emphasis on both kinetic and non-kinetic missile
defeat capabilities, which encompass right-of-launch and left-of-launch
capabilities, to expand our options against these threats.
investments
For fiscal year 2025, the President's Budget Request includes $28.4
billion for missile defeat and defense to defend the Homeland, our
deployed forces, allies, and partners against increasingly complex
missile threats. Important missile defense and defeat investments
include:
$2.5 billion to develop the Next Generation Interceptor
(NGI) for ground-based midcourse defense, and to extend the service
life of the current Ground Based Interceptors (GBI).
$1.9 billion for ballistic and hypersonic defense
programs, which includes $175 million for the Glide Phase Interceptor
(MDA), $653 million for SM-6 Block IA (Navy), and $963 million for PAC-
3 Missile Segment Enhancement (Army).
$4.7 billion for Space-Based Missile Warning Systems,
which includes $2.6 billion in resilient low Earth orbit (LEO) and
medium Earth orbit (MEO) missile warning/missile tracking systems, and
$2.1 billion in Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Systems.
$1.5 billion for the Army and MDA for the development and
procurement of the Guam Defense System.
$1.3 billion for Sea-Based Weapons Systems. The
Department will stop procurement of the SM-3 Block IB missile after
fiscal year 2024.
$1.0 billion for Army IAMD.
$1.0 billion for Lower Tier Air Missile Defense Sensor
(LTAMDS) research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).
$384 million for Over-the-Horizon Radar modernization and
Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland.
The Department's fiscal year 2025 missile defense and defeat budget
meets evolving threats head-on as one critical element of the
Department's broader integrated deterrence strategy.
Homeland Missile Defense
As stated in the National Defense Strategy, the Department's top
priority is to defend the U.S. Homeland. The United States relies on
strategic deterrence to address and deter large intercontinental-range
nuclear missile threats to the Homeland from the PRC and Russia. The
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System protects the Homeland--
including Hawaii and Alaska--against ICBM threats from the DPRK and
potentially Iran, if it were to develop an ICBM capability. The most
technically effective, least costly, and rapid approach to staying
ahead of the growing DPRK threat and the potential Iranian threat is to
increase our ability to successfully prosecute a missile defense
engagement and reduce the numbers of interceptors needed to accomplish
an engagement. To this end, in addition to sensor developments and
deployments previously discussed, we are developing the NGI for ground-
based midcourse defense. We plan to emplace the first NGI by 2028, and
to acquire 20 NGIs for deployment at potentially replacing the existing
GBI.
In September 2023, Secretary Austin issued policy guidance for Air
and Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland. The Secretary's action
followed a comprehensive re-assessment of our approach to air defense
of the Homeland as currently reflected in Operation NOBLE EAGLE. The
revised guidance will inform development of future years' budgets for
the investments necessary to pace homeland air and cruise missile
defense activities to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC
while also accounting for the acute threat posed by Russia. In the near
term, to address the emergent threat posed by advanced cruise missiles,
the Department is taking such measures as fielding over-the-horizon
radars and cloud-based command and control systems that will improve
our ability to detect and respond to potential strikes and thereby
decrease the risks from cruise missile strikes against U.S. critical
assets.
Additionally, following the Deputy Secretary's 2022 designation of
a lead Military Department to begin planning for and coordinating the
acquisition of air and cruise missile defenses of the Homeland, the Air
Force, with the support of the Army, is nearing completion of a
comprehensive analysis of alternatives that will inform our investments
in this strategically important capability.
The 2022 MDR is clear that an attack on Guam or any other U.S.
territory by any adversary will be considered a direct attack on the
United States and will be met with an appropriate response. The
architecture for defense of Guam against diverse missile attacks
therefore must be commensurate with its unique status as an unequivocal
part of the United States, its vital geography, and the numerous
operational capabilities it hosts. The Department is developing and
funding a persistent 360-degree layered defense capability to protect
Guam against simultaneous raids of cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and
hypersonic threats. MDA is impacts and required mitigation associated
with an Enhanced IAMD system for the defense of Guam.
The Department's efforts to create a layered IAMD architecture on
Guam are neither simple nor without cost. We have to join together
diverse, Military Service-specific IAMD capabilities with broader
command and control systems into an optimal mix of sensors and
shooters. IAMD systems--with both active and passive features--must
also be linked with other elements of offensive military posture. These
are just a few examples of the challenges that we face as we pursue
this top priority of U.S. Homeland IAMD in the Indo-Pacific region.
Regional Missile Defense
The United States has developed layered, conventionally armed,
multi-domain missile defense architectures to protect our deployed
forces and support our allies and partners against theater-range
threats. For example:
On land, the United States fields THAAD batteries to
counter short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), as
well as PATRIOT battalions for terminal defenses against SRBM and MRBM,
cruise missiles, aircraft, and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS). The
Army will field the first Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC)
battery, designed to defeat cruise missiles, UAS, and rocket,
artillery, and mortars, in fiscal year 2026. IFPC is currently
undergoing developmental testing and is scheduled to move to
operational assessment later this year.
In the maritime domain, the United States continues to
improve AEGIS ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers and cruisers
loaded with a variety of SM-2, and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
(ESSM). Additionally, in conjunction with Japan, MDA is developing the
Glide Phase Interceptor to defend against regional hypersonic threats.
Space Contributions to Homeland and Regional Missile Defense
In the space domain, the U.S. Space Force (USSF) has
commenced launching tranches of LEO satellites every 2 years to provide
robust global coverage for missile warning, missile tracking, and low-
latency, fire-control quality data for weapons engagement within the
Missile Defense System. USSF is leveraging the advances made by MDA's
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) prototype
program to contribute to this roadmap. In February, MDA and the USSF
launched two HBTSS prototype satellites into orbit.
USSF plans include fielding two epochs of MEO satellites
by fiscal year 2031 to perform missile warning and missile tracking. A
full LEO and MEO constellation will have the ability to detect and
track hypersonic weapons, ballistic missiles, and raids in a high-
clutter environment through missile burnout.
USSF also plans to launch two Next-Generation OPIR
geosynchronous Earth orbit satellites by fiscal year 2027, and two
Next-Generation OPIR polar satellites by fiscal year 2031 to perform
missile warning.
allies and partners
NATO
At the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, NATO Allies committed to
further strengthening the commitment, several ongoing NATO IAMD
initiatives are increasing NATO IAMD capability, improving Allied air
surveillance, increasing the Alliance's IAMD readiness and posture, and
enhancing NATO's BMD capability. Likewise, NATO Allies continue to
acquire their own IAMD capabilities through national, bilateral, and
multilateral frameworks, including some that the United States is
directly supporting, and which further strengthen NATO's deterrence and
defense. NATO's announcement earlier this year that the Alliance would
facilitate on behalf of a coalition of Allies the acquisition of up to
1,000 PATRIOT interceptors and support the construction of a PATRIOT
production facility in Germany exemplifies this trend. As a member of
the Alliance, the United States is contributing technical,
programmatic, and policy expertise to inform these initiatives. In
addition, the United States is on track to complete the Aegis Ashore
site in Poland later this spring and transfer command and control of
the capability to NATO this July.
Europe
The Department is working closely with our European Allies and
partners on missile defense initiatives to increase their IAMD
capabilities, improve our collective ability to share data, and
increase integration between our forces. Allies such as Germany,
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and the Netherlands are
acquiring their own IAMD capabilities, and building multinational IAMD
procurement programs such as the European Sky Shield Initiative.
Air and missile defenses remain vitally important in Ukraine.
Recent passage of the National Security Supplemental budget, with broad
bipartisan support, is providing critical support to Ukraine in support
of United States national security interests. Because of U.S. security
assistance, and that of our Allies and partners, Ukraine has been able
to protect its Through the Secretary's Ukraine Defense Contact Group,
and the multinational IAMD Capability Coalition, the United States and
dozens of Allies and partners continue to meet Ukraine's urgent
requirements, including by developing innovative air defense solutions.
This support remains important to U.S. national security, and that of
our Allies and partners. The United States--alongside our Allies--
remains steadfast in our commitment to help Ukraine defeat Russia's
aggression.
Middle East
The Department continues to partner in the Middle East to design
and implement an IAMD architecture. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is
leading these efforts, which include an array of regular workshops,
exercises, and trainings. These efforts, combined with security
cooperation tools, battle management/command, control and
communications systems, and technical assistance, advance the goal of a
shared network capable of coordinated defense. Iran's attack on Israel
on April 13th laid bare the importance of integrated air and missile
defense. The effectiveness of our defensive efforts on April 13th is an
output of USCENTCOM's years-long effort to integrate air and missile
defense and early warning systems. U.S. air and missile defense
deployments to the region bolster deterrence. U.S. capabilities also
support our partners' access to early warning missile data and
information sharing so that they are better able to defend their
territory and citizens and contribute to wider regional security
against Iran-backed air and missile threats.
Through an annual U.S. allocation of $500 million for missile
defense to Israel, the United States continues its longstanding
cooperation on co-development, co-production, testing, and fielding of
the Arrow Weapon System and the David's Sling Weapon System, and co-
additional $1 billion for Iron Dome replenishments and upgrades. Since
the October 7, 2023 attacks, and as vividly demonstrated again on April
13, 2024, Israel's missile defense systems have been vital to
protecting Israel's population against missile attacks from all
directions.
The United States continues to work with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to deliver the combat-proven
THAAD system to defend against short-range, medium-range, and
intermediate-range ballistic missile threats. The Department is
currently executing a $13 billion foreign military sales case to
deliver seven THAAD batteries to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The first
THAAD interceptors were delivered in July 2023 and the first THAAD
battery is on-track to achieve initial operational capability in 2025.
The UAE has been operating two THAAD batteries since 2016 and, in
January 2022, successfully executed its first real-world intercept
against an incoming Houthi ballistic missile. This success has led to
follow-on efforts with the UAE to acquire additional missile defense
capabilities and sustain their current systems, valued at $2.9 billion.
The United States is also currently in the process of delivering to the
Kingdom of Bahrain its first PATRIOT batteries and expects Bahrain to
fully operate them in 2025.
Indo-Pacific Region
As we upgrade U.S. IAMD capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific
region, including Guam, we are simultaneously working closely with key
international partners such as Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and
Australia. This is not simply a force posture issue. Extending
deterrence to allies and partners in the region--which includes pursuit
of a robust IAMD architecture--is an integral aspect of our mission and
provides reassurance that the United States will uphold its
international security commitments.
Our IAMD-related engagement with these allies is robust. Japan--one
of the United States' strongest partners on missile defense--recently
concluded a visit by its Prime Minister to Washington, DC. Given
rapidly increasing Indo-Pacific threats, Japan plans to increase
defense spending to roughly 2 percent of GDP by its fiscal year 2027,
with significant new investments in missile defense, counterstrike,
space, and other capabilities. Prominent among these efforts is the
counter-hypersonic Glide Phase Interceptor cooperative development
project, a top priority to which Japan will allocate $1 billion. Glide
Phase Interceptor cooperative development will build on synergies
accumulated from decades of United States-Japan missile defense
cooperation.
The overall scope of our IAMD cooperation with the ROK has expanded
significantly under President Yoon's Administration. We have improved
the ROK's support for the United States' THAAD posture on the Korean
Peninsula, and we are pursuing additional initiatives aimed at
improving integration and interoperability.
Trilaterally, the Department has been actively involved in
facilitating IAMD cooperation between the ROK and Japan. These efforts
have resulted in new operational arrangements such as the December 2023
activation of a trilateral early missile warning data-sharing mechanism
against DPRK threats.
We are also working closely with Australia to enhance its regional
IAMD capabilities. Australia is investing in joint battle management
systems to improve its interoperability with the United States and
other allies and partners, and we are actively engaged in broad-based,
IAMD-focused discussions with the Australians to help drive future
bilateral collaboration.
Overall, current U.S. efforts in the Indo-Pacific region are aimed
at laying the diplomatic, security and technical foundations needed for
the establishment of a regional IAMD architecture. While this vision of
connectivity will ultimately take years to realize, near-term
achievements.
conclusion
As the current war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East
demonstrate, and as seen in the pacing challenge posed by the PRC and
the destabilizing threats of the DPRK and Iran, in this era of missile
centric warfare, active missile defenses are an essential element of a
credible military force posture and integrated deterrence. The Fiscal
Year 2025 budget request makes crucial investments in missile defenses
to protect the Homeland, our forces abroad, and our allies and partners
around the globe.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify and thank you for
the role this Subcommittee plays in supporting our Homeland and
regional missile defense interests. I look forward to our discussion
and to answering your questions.
Senator King. General, are you going to add to the
testimony or simply take questions. General? I would love to
hear from you.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND
General Guillot. Yes, sir. Chairman King and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, it is a high honor to command and
represent the women and men of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command and United States Central Command, and I thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
I am pleased to appear alongside my friends, Lieutenant
General Collins, Lieutenant General Gainey, and DASD Hill.
NORAD and NORTHCOM work very closely with each of them as we
depend on the robust capabilities they provide that enable and
empower our missile defense and other critical homeland defense
missions.
The United States and Canada face an extraordinarily
complex strategic environment. Our competitors have fielded
advanced ballistic and cruise missile systems designed to
strike civilian and military infrastructure in North America,
both above and below the nuclear threshold.
As an update to my previous testimony earlier this year
before the Armed Services Committee I am increasingly concerned
by the expanded military cooperation and reported technology
transfers between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
Further, Iran's direct attack against Israel on April 13th
marked a strategic shift and clearly illustrates the continued
need for integrated air and missile defense systems to defeat
threats, ranging from ballistic and cruise missiles to unmanned
aerial systems. Layered domain awareness systems that detect
threats from the seabed to space and defensive capabilities
such as the next-generation Interceptor are critical to the
homeland defense mission and remain key NORAD and NORTHCOM
priorities.
In addition to the missile threats, adversaries' cyber
capabilities and emerging technologies such as small unmanned
aerial systems present significant risks to North America's
critical infrastructure. NORTHCOM and CYBERCOM defend the
networks daily from adversaries' cyberattacks, and incidents of
small UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] operating inside the U.S.
and Canada near civilian and military infrastructure are
increasing and require timely and well-coordinated interagency
response.
The United States, in concert with global network of like-
minded allies and partners requires innovation and engagement
across the entire spectrum of military, diplomacy, foreign aid,
and strategic communication to counter our competitors'
maligned influence and increasing capability to threaten North
America.
The Active defense of North America requires NORAD [North
American Aerospace Defense Command] and NORTHCOM [United States
Northern Command] to actively campaign in all domains and
across all avenues of approach. The success of our missions
relies on detecting potential threats far from our shores and
quickly sharing critical information between combatant
commands, conventional and special operations forces, the
intelligence community, and the spectrum of interagency and
international partners.
The importance of that information flow cannot be
overstated, and I strongly support the Department's work to
advance the combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control
concept. The challenges facing our Nation are real, but there
should be no doubt about NORAD and NORTHCOM's resolve to deter
aggression, and, if necessary, defeat threats to our nations
and our citizens.
Again, thank you, sir, for the opportunity to appear this
afternoon, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Gregory M. Guillot
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Gregory M. Guillot
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today and
for the honor of representing the men and women of United States
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). Since assuming command in early February, my initial
actions and priorities have included maintaining our vital homeland
defense mission throughout a seamless leadership transition;
strengthening USNORTHCOM and NORAD's vital network of Department of
Defense (DOD), international, private sector, and interagency mission
partners; and conducting a thorough assessment of the Commands'
personnel, missions, and resourcing. I look forward to establishing
personal relationships with leaders throughout the commands' area of
responsibility and across the U.S. Government as those ties are
critical to the successful execution of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's no-fail
missions.
It is already apparent that the strategic environment facing the
United States and Canada--and our allies and partners--presents
significant risks to our Homeland, our citizens, and our vital national
interests. Across all domains and avenues, competitors are exploiting
conflicts and crises around the world to undermine U.S. global
leadership and our democratic institutions. Our competitors continue to
develop and deploy highly advanced kinetic and non-kinetic weapons
systems capable of disrupting or defeating military and civilian
targets in North America. These threats are difficult to detect and can
strike with limited warning, which reduces the time and response
options available to our national leaders and increases the risk of
miscalculation and escalation during periods of heightened tension,
crisis, and conflict.
As recent events have made clear, overseas crises increasingly
carry significant implications for homeland defense. Regional conflicts
routinely have the potential to expand into broader crises that
directly impact U.S. and allied interests. Russia's unprovoked war
against Ukraine and the horrific October 7th Hamas terrorist attacks
against Israel demonstrate how seemingly isolated events, regardless of
whether the United States and our allies are directly involved, have
the potential to reach our own shores. Those ripple effects can include
competitor information operations directed against the American public
and civil unrest and violence within the United States, or attacks
directly targeting the United States and our interests.
Competitors like the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia
are well aware that the U.S. military is the strongest in the world and
highly capable of deploying forces anywhere on the planet to deter
aggression and de-escalate potential crises. Accordingly, those
competitors have sought to hold defense critical infrastructure in the
United States at risk with kinetic and non-kinetic systems intended to
impede our ability to flow forces overseas. That strategy must be taken
into account in planning for the forward deployment of U.S. forces and
resources, as moving assets overseas has the potential to affect the
availability of assets assigned to homeland defense or force
mobilization missions.
The realities of the 21st Century strategic environment require a
flexible, adaptive global approach that recognizes the fact that our
competitors can hold the U.S. Homeland--and the homelands of our allies
and partners--at risk with conventional, nuclear, and non-kinetic
capabilities as part of a broad effort to force the United States to
accept increased risk when deploying forces in support of overseas
operations. Preserving the full range of options for defending U.S.
national interests requires homeland defense to remain a fundamental
consideration at every stage of DOD planning, policy, and budgeting.
A globally integrated approach to planning and actions must also
extend beyond the Department of Defense and should be embraced by the
whole of the U.S. Government. Success in competition, crisis, or
conflict continues to rely on a ready, modern, and capable joint force
reinforcing the other core elements of our national power. Our
diplomatic corps is essential to shaping the strategic environment and
cultivating the network of alliances and partnerships that provide the
most significant U.S. advantage against isolated and authoritarian
competitors seeking to expand their territory and influence at the
expense of their sovereign neighbors. The successful execution of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's missions relies on cohesive strategies,
integrated planning, and collaboration across the whole of government,
and I look forward to working closely with the members of this
Committee as we work together to meet the formidable challenges facing
our Nation.
the threat environment
The threat to the Homeland continues to grow in complexity. Our
primary competitors are developing new ways to hold North America at
risk, both above and below the nuclear threshold. Designed to constrain
our options in a crisis, the capabilities our potential adversaries are
pursuing will challenge strategic deterrence and erode strategic
stability by limiting our ability to provide actionable warning and
narrowing the decision space available to senior leaders. The conflict
in the Middle East has also amplified the risk that Iran or a foreign
terrorist organization will conduct attacks in the Homeland, either
directly or by inspiring homegrown violent extremists to act in their
stead.
People's Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC remains the Department's pacing challenge as identified in
the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Beijing has embarked on a
wide-ranging military modernization program that is advancing the PRC's
homeland-threatening capabilities at an urgent pace. At the strategic
level, the PRC is pursuing a rapid quantitative and qualitative
expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which now numbers over 500
operational warheads and is on pace to exceed 1,000 by the end of the
decade. The PRC probably intends to place a significant portion of
these weapons--including over 300 newly constructed intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos--in a launch-on-warning posture that
could increase the risk of miscalculation in a crisis or conflict.
Beijing's strategic modernization program includes a variety of
novel weapons designed to bolster the credibility of the PRC's
strategic deterrent by ensuring its ability to overcome U.S. missile
defenses and retaliate following a strike. These weapons include ICBMs
equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, whose high speed, low
trajectory, and maneuvering capabilities challenge our ability to
detect, characterize, and warn of inbound threats. The PRC is also
developing a fractional orbital bombardment system, designed to further
challenge our early warning radars and ballistic missile interceptors.
The Department of Defense's annual report to Congress on PRC
military developments states that the PRC may also be exploring the
development of conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile
systems that could allow Beijing to strike targets in Alaska and the
continental United States without crossing the nuclear threshold. Such
systems, if fielded, would further erode strategic stability by
challenging our ability to characterize an inbound attack and
complicating our decisionmaking about an appropriate response.
Turning to the maritime domain, in the last 2 years, the PRC has
launched the first two hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-
powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN). If the PRC arms the Shang III
with land-attack cruise missiles, the new SSGNs could provide Beijing a
clandestine land-attack option beyond the Indo-Pacific region,
potentially holding at risk critical infrastructure in Alaska and the
U.S. West Coast. While Beijing's intent for employing these long-range
conventional strike capabilities is not fully known, in a future
crisis, the PRC could use these weapons--along with its world-class
offensive cyber capabilities--to threaten or attack our critical
defense infrastructure in an attempt to dissuade or frustrate our force
flows across the Pacific and degrade the effectiveness of our forward
combat operations.
Meanwhile, the PRC continues to expand its influence and activity
in the Arctic. Last summer, Beijing again employed its Xue Long 2 ice-
hardened research vessel to conduct the country's 13th scientific
expedition to the Arctic. During its voyage, the vessel deployed
autonomous underwater vehicles, floating ice stations, and an acoustic
monitoring buoy system in waters off Alaska and Canada to collect data
that could inform future PLA Navy deployments to the region.
Concurrently, the PRC and Russia conducted their second combined naval
patrol to the Bering Sea in as many years. More than 10 vessels--
including cruise missile-capable surface combatants--participated in
the patrol, which included anti-submarine exercises and other combat
training near the Aleutian Islands.
Russia
While the PRC's strategic capabilities are growing quickly, Russia
remains the greatest military threat to the Homeland today. Despite the
degradation of its ground forces resulting from two disastrous years of
combat in Ukraine, Russia seeks to rapidly rearm and retains the
world's largest arsenal of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons
and a still formidable capability to threaten North America with
precision-strike conventional weapons. Russia has gained extensive
operational experience with its most advanced non-nuclear weapons in
Ukraine, and has had the opportunity to refine tactics, techniques, and
procedures that it could employ in a direct conflict with the United
States or our NATO allies. Moreover, Russia's illegal and unprovoked
full-scale invasion of Ukraine and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric have
demonstrated to like-minded autocrats that nuclear coercion remains a
tool of statecraft in the 21st Century.
Russia's leaders regularly exercise strategic conflict with the
West and are investing heavily to develop new weapons to ensure their
ability to hold our Nation at perpetual risk. In the last year, Russia
has expanded its force of ICBMs armed with the Avangard hypersonic
glide vehicle, designed to evade missile defense radars and
interceptors. It is also preparing to deploy the Sarmat heavy ICBM,
which Vladimir Putin has claimed will feature a fractional orbital
bombardment capability that could enable it to approach North America
via a nonstandard trajectory over the South Pole. Russia also continues
to develop and test novel experimental weapon systems, like the
nuclear-armed Poseidon transoceanic weapon and the Burevestnik nuclear-
propelled cruise missile. Russia intends for these systems to challenge
US defenses and guarantee Russia's ability to retaliate after a first
strike.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to hone a wide range of non-nuclear
capabilities--including cyber weapons and conventionally armed air-,
sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles--to provide options below the
nuclear threshold. Russia plans to use these non-nuclear capabilities
to strike Western economic and military infrastructure in an attempt to
degrade our political will and compel negotiations to terminate an
escalating conflict. Russian public statements and military deployments
near North America over the last several years make clear that, in the
event of war with the United States, Moscow's targeting strategy for
these weapons would include critical infrastructure in the Homeland.
Despite the heavy commitment of its aviation forces in Ukraine,
Russia has continued to fly regular out-of-area patrols with its heavy
bombers and other military aircraft in multiple areas around the
globe--including numerous flights into the North American air defense
identification zone since February 2022. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy
has increased its long-range operational deployments of cruise missile-
capable surface and subsurface vessels above pre-February 2022 levels.
In January, Russia deployed a Gorshkov-class frigate to the western
Atlantic, where the Russian Defense Ministry claimed the crew rehearsed
``delivering a missile strike against an enemy surface target'' using
its Tsirkon hypersonic missiles. In September, the Russian Pacific
Fleet conducted its Finval-2023 exercise, which demonstrated Moscow's
ability to control access to the Arctic through the Bering Strait and
included live cruise missile launches by coastal defense units as well
as surface and subsurface vessels operating within the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone off Alaska.
Finally, in late 2022, the Russian Pacific Fleet received its first
Severodvinsk-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN),
introducing a land-attack cruise missile threat to the U.S. West Coast
similar to that faced by the East Coast since the first Severodvinsk
entered service in the Russian Northern Fleet in 2014. Russian media
indicates that Moscow now plans to field a total of 12 Severodvinsk
hulls, split evenly between the Atlantic and Pacific, enabling the
Russian Navy to pose a persistent conventional threat to critical
infrastructure throughout most of North America. The threat will only
become more acute later in the decade when Severodvinsk SSGNs are armed
with the Tsirkon hypersonic missile.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Over the last 2 years, the DPRK has conducted nearly 100 ballistic
missile tests, including 13 ICBM flight tests, as well as three space
launch attempts using ICBM-class boosters. Its most recent space launch
in November successfully placed a rudimentary intelligence satellite
into orbit--capabilities that could advance quickly if Moscow were to
offer space cooperation in exchange for North Korean arms deliveries
for the war in Ukraine. Ballistic missiles that the DPRK has
successfully tested since 2022 include a new and more capable liquid-
propellant ICBM as well as the country's first solid-propellant ICBM,
which will further compound warning challenges due to its smaller
logistical footprint.
Both systems likely have sufficient boost to deliver a nuclear
payload to the entire United States. The DPRK's closed society and
robust security apparatus make it one of our most vexing intelligence
challenges and prevent us from confidently assessing the number of
ICBMs in its inventory. Nonetheless, I am concerned that Kim Jong Un's
growing ICBM stockpile could approach our capacity to defend North
America--a challenge that will only expand in the coming years if Kim
Jong Un looks to add multiple reentry vehicles to his missiles and
transition his ICBM program from research and development to serialized
production and deployment.
Iran
Iran's materiel support to Russia's war in Ukraine and political
support to Hamas before and following its October 7th attack on Israel,
along with Iranian support to Houthi forces challenging commercial
shipping, underscore Tehran's entrenched hostility to the Western-led
international order. Iran remains committed to retaliating for the
January 2020 death of former IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem
Soleimani, potentially with attacks against current and former senior
U.S. officials. Iran also poses a growing cyber threat to U.S. and
allied networks and critical infrastructure. Last November, Iranian
cyber actors targeted several U.S. water and wastewater facilities,
likely in response to U.S. support for Israel. In the last 2 years, the
FBI has disrupted two Iranian plots inside the United States to kill
U.S. citizens of Iranian origin that have criticized the regime's
autocracy and disregard for human rights. Finally, Iran continues to
invest in its nuclear energy and space launch programs, which could
provide a potential breakout option should Iran's leaders decide to
pursue a homeland-threatening ICBM.
Violent Extremist Organizations
The likelihood of a significant terrorist attack in the Homeland
has almost certainly increased since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas
conflict. Multiple terrorist groups--including ISIS and al Qaeda--have
leveraged the crisis to generate propaganda designed to inspire
followers to conduct attacks, including in North America. The
increasingly diffuse nature of the transnational terrorist threat
challenges our law enforcement partners' ability to detect and disrupt
attack plotting against the Homeland and leaves us vulnerable to
surprise. Commercial and general aviation likely persist as preferred
targets due to the disproportionate economic and psychological impact
such attacks would generate. I also continue to watch the Israel-Hamas
conflict for signs that escalation is expanding beyond the region and
remain concerned with the threat from Lebanese Hizballah--a group with
international reach and a history of conducting attacks in the Western
Hemisphere that continues long-term contingency planning in the
Homeland.
Regional Security Threats
Transnational criminal organizations in Mexico and elsewhere in the
Western Hemisphere continue to foster instability and challenge the
rule of law, creating potential opportunities for our State and non-
State adversaries to expand their access and influence along our
southern approaches. Irregular migration through Mexico reached record
levels in the last year, and drug-related violence has escalated as
rival cartels fight for control of lucrative drug and human trafficking
routes. Cartels have also demonstrated a growing willingness to
directly engage Mexican military, security forces, and government
officials, highlighting the need for continued theater security
cooperation with our partners in Mexico.
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS)
We continue to see a rapid proliferation of sUAS technology and
usage in the Homeland, including near our military installations. While
most of this activity can likely be attributed to hobbyists, sUAS could
be exploited by nefarious actors for surveillance, illicit trafficking,
or--in a worst case--attacks on domestic critical infrastructure.
Unauthorized sUAS flights over Government installations and civilian
infrastructure have the potential to disrupt critical services and
threaten force protection and mission assurance. Given the growing
prevalence of sUAS available for military, commercial, and recreational
use, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and our interagency partners face mounting
challenges in early detection and threat characterization, owner and
operator attribution, and--when necessary--mitigation and interdiction.
By all indications, sUAS will present a safety and security risk to
military installations and other critical infrastructure for the
foreseeable future. Mitigating those risks requires a dedicated effort
across all Federal Departments and agencies, State, local, tribal and
territorial communities, and Congress to further develop the
capabilities, coordination, and legal authorities necessary for
detecting, tracking, and addressing potential sUAS threats in the
homeland.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD PRIORITIES
Against the backdrop of expanding and expansive threats, USNORTHCOM
and NORAD remain dedicated to defending the U.S. and Canadian homelands
today and well into the future. My key priority remains improved domain
awareness in the approaches to North America and around the globe. The
ability to detect, classify, and track potential threats to the
homeland from the seafloor to space and in the cyber domain is a
critical need for USNORTHCOM and NORAD--and for my fellow combatant
commanders and international partners. Our core missions, to include
defending critical defense infrastructure, require USNORTHCOM and NORAD
to see and respond to threats through a globally integrated layered
defense extending as far from our shores as possible. That capability
is needed to ensure national leaders have as much time as possible to
decide the best course of action for deterring, de-escalating, or
defeating potential hostile acts.
Investments in capabilities such as Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR)
and the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) will
significantly enhance domain awareness in the air and maritime domains
while limiting competitors' ability to approach North America
undetected. Likewise, USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to track and
defeat inbound DPRK long-range ballistic missiles will be significantly
enhanced with the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), currently
planned for integration into the United States' ballistic missile
defense architecture in the near future. I remain grateful to this
Committee for your support of these important initiatives, and I urge
continued emphasis on improving our Nation's ability to find and
monitor potential aggressors well before they could target our
Homeland.
The rapid pace of change in the strategic environment, to include
advancing kinetic and non-kinetic threats and the increasing
exploitation of the information space, give reason to believe that
successful defense of the homeland tomorrow requires new approaches,
technologies, and perspectives. As competitors increasingly focus on
holding the homeland at risk in an effort to influence U.S. and allied
decisionmaking and limit our options for intervention in overseas
crises, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active measures today to ensure
the ability of the commands to defend the Homelands in the future.
The United States retains the world's most powerful military and a
global network of immensely capable allies and partners. However,
information flow between organizations and commands remains stifled by
technological and institutional barriers, which too often results in
delayed delivery and processing of critical information. Improving
global domain awareness is absolutely necessary, but the Department
must also expedite the processing and sharing of information between
combatant commands, allies, partners, and the interagency community.
The Department's prioritization of the Joint All-Domain Command and
Control concept highlights the increasing importance of quickly sharing
information between sensors, decisionmakers, and effectors. For
USNORTHCOM and NORAD, the ability to detect potential threats, make
well-informed recommendations to leaders, and take appropriate
defensive measures is vital, and I will work closely with the
Department and the Services to develop this critical capability.
Our Nation must also continue to invest wisely in the military and
civilian personnel responsible for planning and executing every one of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's no-fail missions. The demands of defending the
Homeland are significant and require an experienced and innovative
professional workforce from a broad range of experiences and
backgrounds. Our commands continue to prioritize recruiting and
retaining exceptional talent from a broad and deep talent pool. Just as
our Nation makes substantial investments in cutting-edge technology to
outpace our competitors, we must also invest in the dedicated
servicemembers and public servants who stand watch over our Nation.
homeland defense design next
In recognition of the multi-domain threats to North America,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have prioritized operationalizing the commands and
institutionalizing active campaigning in the Homeland. Homeland defense
begins well beyond our shores and relies on a layered, integrated
defense conducted in full cooperation with our fellow combatant
commands and our allies and partners. Rather than simply reacting to
the actions of our competitors, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active
measures to assess the emerging threats and associated requirements of
the near future in to ensure our ability to defend critical assets and
safeguard the Nation's ability to project forces forward.
The actions and ambitions of our competitors require the United
States and Canada to demonstrate the capability to fight in and from
North America, and the commands' Homeland defense design will ensure
our ability to defend the Homeland in the coming decades. USNORTHCOM
and NORAD's focus on campaigning and operationalizing the commands
reflects competitors' growing capability and capacity to hold targets
throughout North America at risk and to force United States and
Canadian leaders to defend the continent while projecting forces
overseas.
It is a near certainty that homeland defense in the coming years
will rely less on point defense and traditional kinetic defeat
mechanisms in favor of area defense and left-of-launch effects that
take full advantage of multi-domain capabilities. While the future of
Homeland defense may look vastly different than the current
architecture, it will continue to depend on the pillars USNORTHCOM and
NORAD use today--all-domain awareness; information dominance; decision
superiority; and global integration. I look forward to working with the
Department and Congress on these pillars.
The necessity of campaigning in and from North America has been
made clear in recent years as competitors have repeatedly demonstrated
the capability, capacity, and intent to hold the Homeland at risk.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD will continue to advance the commands' ability to
conduct globally integrated joint operations in defense of the
homeland. The commands will also benefit from the recent transition
from the legacy USNORTHCOM and NORAD Command and Control Center (N2C2)
to a Joint Operations Center (JOC) that mirrors the capabilities of
fellow geographic combatant commands and allows for real-time, all-
domain communications and coordination with the commands' DOD and
interagency partners.
Finally, the success of homeland and continental defense requires
capability and capacity to conduct sustained multi-domain operations in
the Arctic. The challenges associated with communicating, operating,
and surviving in the Arctic are well documented, and investment by the
U.S. Government, the Department, and the military Services reflect the
need to compete in the region now and well into the future. I am
encouraged by national-level commitments to improving the Port of Nome
and building the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet; both efforts are
visible signs of the U.S. commitment in the region that will support
the economic and national security interests of the United States. The
DOD and Services have readily acknowledged the importance of operating
in far north in their respective Arctic strategies, and further
emphasis and investment is necessary to field the Arctic-capable
platforms, properly trained and equipped forces, and infrastructure
necessary to succeed in a region of enormous strategic consequence.
USNORTHCOM's Special Operations Command-North (SOCNORTH), has
demonstrated both the value and challenges associated with Arctic
operations through Combined and Joint Operations, activities, and
investments in the High North. Most recently, SOCNORTH executed
Exercise ARCTIC EDGE 24, readily integrating over 600 USSOF, Partner
Nation SOF, and LEAs across the entire North American Arctic.
security cooperation
Global alliances and partnerships based on mutual trust and
interoperability provide the United States and our allies with a
distinct advantage over our competitors. Our competitors continue their
relentless efforts to increase presence, economic leverage, and
influence in our region, proving the necessity of security cooperation
with USNORTHCOM's exemplary military partners time and again.
USNORTHCOM's relationships with military partners in Mexico, Canada,
and The Bahamas boost our ability to operate, communicate, and share
information for common benefit and are integral to Homeland defense.
The reputation of the United States and the Department of Defense
as steadfast and reliable partners is critical to each of those
relationships, and USNORTHCOM security cooperation efforts continue to
generate significant benefits for regional security and burden sharing
with our neighbors. As instability and conflict arise overseas, it is
essential to safeguard the security cooperation investments that have
an outsized role in defending our homelands and vital interests,
including through continued attention to the thriving strategic,
economic, social, and defense partnerships close to home.
Mexico
It is already apparent the military-to-military relationship
between the United States and Mexico is robust and expanding as both
nations address the challenges posed by common threats to our citizens
and shared interests. The bonds between USNORTHCOM and our Mexican
military partners are broad, resilient, and focused on expanding our
combined capability to defend and secure North America from myriad
State and non-State threats. Countering competitor influence in the
region remains a key priority for USNORTHCOM and our Mexican military
partners, and as a direct result, the United States and Mexican
militaries are more operationally compatible than at any point in our
shared history.
This burgeoning bilateral defense relationship is a result of
focused, direct, strategic-level defense engagement and confidence
building measures, to include routine senior-leader dialogs such as the
North American Defense Ministers conference, combined training like we
have witnessed at the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center,
exercises such as Exercise Aztec Alligator, and longstanding efforts to
promote shared strategic interests.
Assisting our partners in meeting shared security challenges will
require modernizing Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales
(FMS/DCS) by improving institutional responsiveness to partner requests
and demonstrating greater agility in fulfilling those requests. The
demonstration of timeliness and strategic responsiveness serves to
reinforce lines of effort in my campaigning while simultaneously
presenting opportunity to outcompete revisionist and revanchist powers
present throughout the region.
The growing strength of this vital defense relationship has been
made evident through our collaborative approach to common defense
challenges, and I am extremely proud of USNORTHCOM's bilateral defense
partnership with our Mexican military partners. Those efforts and
investments have simultaneously strengthened our common security while
helping to reduce Mexico's reliance on Russian and PRC equipment and
contracts that often come with costly strings attached.
Canada
As has been made clear by the unique NORAD relationship, Canada has
been a steadfast ally for decades and remains our essential security
partner in the defense of North America. Canadian investments in domain
awareness capabilities, advanced air and maritime platforms, and the
Canadian Armed Forces' routine participation in multinational efforts
such as Operation Noble Eagle and Exercise ARCTIC EDGE provide an
unmatched continental defense architecture. This unique and steadfast
partnership, based on common ideals and interests, continues to gain
strength and will serve both the United States and Canada for
generations to come. Canadian commitment to robust support to NORAD and
meeting shared security challenges with the United States and our
allies, along with investments in a robust continental defense is key
to the success of the bi-national alliance that has successfully
deterred aggression against the United States and Canadian Homelands
for over 65 years.
The Bahamas
The Bahamas is a growing and willing partner in maritime security
and associated intelligence and information sharing, and USNORTHCOM's
programs with The Bahamas improve disaster response and climate
resiliency for both nations. The USNORTHCOM bilateral frameworks with
the Royal Bahamian Defence Force (RBDF), and with other United States
partners such as the United States Coast Guard and the Rhode Island
National Guard are important to advancing mutual defense and security
objectives. USNORTHCOM will continue to work closely with the RBDF to
enhance shared maritime domain awareness and cooperation, and I look
forward to building further on an already strong and beneficial
relationship.
defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
USNORTHCOM's support of lead Federal agencies in the aftermath of a
natural or human-caused disaster remains a core mission that directly
bolsters our Homeland defense enterprise while delivering rapid relief
to American citizens in times of great need. USNORTHCOM works year-
round with our interagency partners to ensure plans, communications,
and interagency relationships are always ready to deliver the right
military-unique capabilities at the right time and place. Whether
providing military personnel to supplement Department of Homeland
Security and Customs and Border Protection's mission along our
southwest border, assisting U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies
efforts to illuminate illicit trafficking networks, or speeding
military-unique capabilities to support Federal Emergency Management
Agency-led disaster relief, USNORTHCOM is always ready to support our
lead Federal agencies. I look forward to establishing and maintaining
partnerships with the National Guard Bureau, State, local, tribal, and
territorial partners in support of vital DSCA roles.
In addition to delivering life-saving capabilities and resolute
support to our fellow Americans and interagency partners in times of
crisis, USNORTHCOM's DSCA mission also routinely demonstrates a degree
of resilience and well-exercised cooperation that should cast serious
doubt in the minds of potential aggressors who may be considering
kinetic or non-kinetic attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure.
Over many years and multiple significant events, USNORTHCOM and our
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial partners have proven the
ability of communities and agencies across the United States to recover
quickly from major disasters. The same lessons learned in those diverse
scenarios would apply following an attack against the United States,
and competitors must know that an attack would be certain to fail and
result in only limited disruption.
As multi-domain threats to critical defense, transportation, and
commercial networks and facilities continue to mount, the United States
and Canada will face a growing need for resilient, defensible
infrastructure. Following the release of the Department's policy
guidance regarding defense of critical infrastructure, USNORTHCOM and
NORAD have worked with a host of intergovernmental and industry
partners to capture the capabilities and relationships necessary to
safeguard national infrastructure from attack. This vital effort will
continue to present a significant challenge that requires a whole-of-
government approach and strong cooperation with Congress and the
interagency community to ensure our national ability to deter, defend,
and, if necessary, recover quickly from attacks against key
infrastructure.
conclusion
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's activities, operations, and investments
directly reflect the reality of the strategic environment and the
threats and challenges that will continue to face our homeland into the
foreseeable future. Based on my ongoing initial assessment of the
commands and the challenges we must face, I am confident in our
Commands' ability to defend North America, but I am extremely mindful
of the mounting threats and challenges presented by determined and
well-resourced competitors.
It is a profound honor to lead the extraordinary United States and
Canadian soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, coast
guardsmen, and civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD in defense of our
great Nations. Those dedicated men and women continue to work
tirelessly to defend our Constitution, our citizens, and our shared
values. In return, our warriors rely on the resources and support
necessary to succeed in their no-fail missions. There should be no
doubt that the United States military is the strongest, most capable
professional force in history, and that our men and women stand ready
today to vigorously defend our Nation against any threat. Thank you for
your support and for the opportunity to serve alongside them. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator King. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SEAN A. GAINEY, USA, COMMANDING
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
Lieutenant General Gainey. Chairman King, Ranking Member
Fischer, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am
honored to testify before you as the Commander of the U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint Force Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, JFFC IMD. In
these roles I am representing an incredible organization of
2,300 soldiers and civilians, spanning 13 time zones and 19
locations worldwide. This one team of professionals tirelessly
provides base, high-altitude, and missile defense forces and
advanced to Army and joint warfighters. I am honored to
represent them, and I thank you for your unwavering support for
this team and their families.
I also serve as the Senior Commander for both Fort Greely,
Alaska, and U.S. Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll, two
strategically important remote sites that are experiencing
challenges with facilities that must be continued to be
addressed as we move forward with more priority.
Additionally, I also serve as the Army's lead enterprise
integrator for air and missile defense, while my role as JFCC
IMD provides operational-level missile defense and expertise
and integrates transregional missile defense functions across
the joint and combined warfighting force.
As the Army's air and missile defense enterprise
integrator, I will continue to use this role to highlight that
the Army's air and missile defense remains the Army's most
heavily deployed force with the highest demand signal amongst
the combatant commands every year. This high optempo continues
to provide a significant strain on our formations and families
as we must continue to address their needs.
As you know, the urgency for multidomain transregional
combat effects continues to increase exponentially. Our
adversaries' air and missile-related threats have rapidly
expanded in recent year in quantity, variety, and complexity.
We see this today in Ukraine and looming on the horizon in the
Pacific. It has never been more imperative that we and our
allies and partners enhance our missile defense and space
capabilities to impose costs on our adversaries, denying them
the benefit of using these weapons and ensuring the safeguard
of our Nation.
As our adversaries increase their emphasis on space and
missile capabilities, our U.S. Army must innovate and evolve.
Understanding the challenges in today's threat environment, the
Army released our Space Vision, supporting multidomain
operations, specifying the Army's role in integrating space
capabilities and to join and coalition operations while also
interdicting the space capabilities of our adversaries.
Therefore, we seize opportunities to integrate and exercise
with other commands and coalition partners, remain fixed
together working in dominance in science and technology
development, and persisting in gathering soldier proficiency
and groundbreaking technology.
It is also increasingly apparent that integrating our space
operations and missile defense operations is critical to our
national security. Our integration is essential to effectively
contributing to the strategic deterrence and responding in
crisis. Today we must integrate space and missile defense at
every onset of prototyping, concept development, and
application, as we do this all in concert with Army, joint, and
coalition partners, one voice together around the globe.
Our allies and partners are critical for layered and tiered
options to degrade, disrupt, and defeat adversaries, share
burden, integrate technology, and protect our mutual homelands.
But all of these operational considerations pale in comparison
to the will, determination, and trust of the amazing men and
women that operate and sustain these advanced systems. We ask a
lot of our Army AMD and space formations, and the demand will
only increase in the future.
Our planned force structure growth and modernization is
critical in the coming years. Thank you for your efforts in
supporting them with timely budgets, caring for them and their
families, and building trust with the American people, now and
in the coming years. Caring for our soldiers and their families
is paramount to win in any environment and globe. Thank you for
supporting an incredible mission-ready team.
I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Sean A.
Gainey follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Sean A. Gainey
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support for our
soldiers, civilians, and families and your continued support for the
Army, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), Department of Defense (DoD), and
the space and missile defense community. Thank you also for inviting me
to highlight the importance of space and missile defense capabilities
and ongoing enhancements that enable the defense of our Nation, forward
stationed and deployed forces, allies, and partners.
Since January of this year, I have had the privilege of commanding
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) and Joint
Functional Component Command--Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) and
acting as the Senior Commander (SC) for both Fort Greely, Alaska,
(FGAK) and U.S. Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll (USAG-KA). I also serve
as our Army's lead enterprise integrator for air and missile defense
(IAMD).
It is no secret that our competitors are growing in capability and
capacity, particularly in the areas of nuclear, space and missile
systems, and in the forefront, ballistic missile threats will continue
to increase in complexity. Competitors' ballistic missiles are more
mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate with longer ranges; and
hypersonic glide vehicles delivered by ballistic missiles are a
developing threat that will inevitably challenge current missile
defense systems. They are fielding more advanced missiles in greater
numbers to not only deter the United States from intervening in a
regional conflict but also to target the U.S. Homeland. The National
Defense Strategy (NDS), Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and Missile
Defense Review (MDR) recognized these dynamic changes in the security
environment and the imperative to strengthen our integrated deterrence
using all our strategic capabilities.
Missile prelaunch survivability is also likely to increase as
adversaries strengthen their denial and deception measures and
increasingly base missiles on mobile platforms. Furthermore, increasing
technical and operational countermeasures continue to challenge
defensive systems against ballistic missiles.
The cruise missile threat to U.S. forces is also increasing. While
most current land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) remain subsonic,
supersonic and hypersonic missiles have already been deployed, and
LACMs will also have increased survivability by minimizing radar
signatures and/or using countermeasures.
Europe--and frankly the globe--faces a Russian Federation with
about 1,400 deployed nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Despite arms control limitations and resource constraints, development
of new ICBMs and SLBMs remains a high Russian priority, and they are
expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles
outside of the United States.
In the Indo-Pacific, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has the
most active and diverse ballistic missile development program,
producing technologically advanced systems, selling ballistic missile
technology, and expanding the reach of its ballistic missiles to deter
foreign powers in future conflict.
Similarly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is also
developing long-range ballistic missiles that can threaten the United
States and its allies. They continue testing new ICBMs, intermediate-
range ballistic missiles, solid-propellant short-range ballistic
missiles, an SLBM, and a medium-range ballistic missile while
maintaining a large short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) inventory.
In the Middle East, Iran has ballistic missile and space launch
development programs, which will result in increased ballistic missile
force lethality. Iran's ballistic missile force exercises extensively
hone wartime operational skills and tactics, and their space program
progress could accelerate their path to achieving ICBM capabilities
given the inherently similar technologies.
Our competitors increasingly leverage their space capabilities and
complex missile systems, including unmanned systems, to legitimize
their domestic and international agendas. With lower barriers to entry
than ever, we can see a future that promulgates directed energy,
autonomous systems, machine learning, and a further increase in
distributed operations. Indeed, as demonstrated in the current
conflicts and at the forefront of the next war, missiles will certainly
be employed for increasingly tactical objectives--the missile threat is
growing, and we must continue to build a resilient force and adapt to
deter and defeat it.
As the commander of USASMDC and JFCC IMD, I am advocating for smart
investment in the mission areas of space and IAMD, while also
developing other ways--like missile defeat--to deter our competitors.
Not only must we deny them the benefit of their potential strikes
through resilience and countermeasures as the NDS directs, but we must
also credibly communicate our capabilities and capacity to instill
doubt in crisis and complicate the adversary decision calculus.
At USASMDC, our mission is to develop and provide current and
future global space, missile defense, and high-altitude capabilities to
the Army, the joint force, and our allies and partners. We must enable
multi-domain combat effects and enhance deterrence, assurance, and
detection of strategic attacks to protect the Nation. USASMDC is the
U.S. Army's Service component command (ASCC) for three combatant
commands (CCMDs): U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), U.S. Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM) for ground-based midcourse defense (GMD), and U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). At USASMDC, our vision is that of ``ONE
TEAM,'' achieving our shared objectives via collaboration, feedback,
assessment, and smart adaptation to continue demonstrating value to
warfighters, our Army, our joint interservice and interagency
teammates, our Nation, and our allies and partners.
Of course, we cannot do this alone. We integrate our efforts across
the globe with organizations like the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
U.S. Space Force (USSF), Army Futures Command, Army Rapid Capabilities
and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO), and Program Executive Offices
(PEOs), spanning a myriad of space, missile defense, and high-altitude
requirements of the operational environment.
recent developments
The President's 2023 Unified Command Plan (UCP) seamlessly
transferred the responsibility for missile defense, including JFCC IMD,
from USSTRATCOM to USSPACECOM in April of last year.
In October of last year, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) assigned
the 100th Missile Defense Brigade (MDB) to USNORTHCOM. As a result,
USASMDC became ASCC to USNORTHCOM for the GMD mission.
The Army Space Vision Supporting Multidomain Operations was signed
last December by the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, and the Sergeant Major of the Army. It specifies the Army's role
of integrating joint and coalition space capabilities into our
operations while simultaneously interdicting adversary space
capabilities.
Throughout third and fourth quarters of fiscal year 2023, USASMDC
ensured successful transfer of the Theater Missile Warning mission to
USSF's Space Operations Command (SPoC) Missile Warning--Delta 4.
Official mission transfer occurred on October 1, 2023, with USASMDC
providing residual support and manning to the Joint Tactical Ground
Station (JTAGS) sites through April of this year. The realignment of
theater missile warning to our sister service enabled USASMDC to take
on new mission sets focused on providing close space support to the
tactical warfighter while still meeting our joint and coalition
responsibilities. Four Army companies will officially case their colors
on April 15, 2024, after nearly a quarter century of providing
dedicated theater support to the joint and coalition forces worldwide.
One of the first opportunities occurred to integrate Army space-
cyber-special operation forces (SOF) capabilities in May 2023. This
took place during Army SOF National Training Center Rotation, and
during this rotation, the fusion of Army space elements with SOF units
in support of their missions in an operational environment was
completed successfully. USASMDC supported SOF elements through the
production of space-enabled effects and products, and these elements
were also invaluable in the joint operations center (JOC) targeting
process.
As of September 2023, the USASMDC Force Tracking Mission Management
Center (FT MMC) began executing its joint force tracking (FT) mission
on behalf of USSPACECOM, which provides continuous FT data services to
combatant commanders, U.S. Government agencies, and designated
coalition partners in support of command and control, situational
awareness, and fratricide reduction. The FT MMC receives data from over
70 different tracking device manufacturers, converts that data into a
common message format, and disseminates a tailored data feed out to
authorized end users across the Department of Defense and U.S.
Government. This allows end users to concentrate on their mission sets
while the FT MMC concentrates on force tracking data at an enterprise
level. The FT MMC currently processes friendly force tracking (FFT),
tagging, tracking and locating (TTL), and personnel recovery (PR) data
with over 300,000 devices under management, generating approximately 21
million messages per day.
Pacific Sentry/Space Sentry 23 (PS/SS23), was a tier I exercise
where USASMDC provided support to USINDOPACOM and USSPACECOM. USASMDC
used PS/SS23 to integrate space control planning teams with USSPACECOM
forward elements to provide joint non-kinetic targeting data. USASMDC
also integrated with the Australian Defense Force space component
throughout the exercise. The exercise demonstrated that the methods
used to disseminate intelligence over secure means did not adequately
replicate standard intelligence dissemination and that USASMDC will
work with the Department of the Army to define the requirement,
mitigate risk, and satisfactorily resource USSPACECOM's intelligence
requirements.
Keen Edge 24 (KE24), was a USINDOPACOM lead exercise, with support
from USSPACECOM and capability and planners from USASMDC. Furthermore,
this exercise also supported the coordination of two coalition
partners. One of the lessons learned from this exercise was that the
number of target aim points (NLRPs) were limited for the exercise,
which resulted in the underutilization of space capabilities due to the
lack of NLRPs.
In the near term, USASMDC supports several other events. The
USASMDC Center of Excellence, Technical Center, and 1st Space Brigade
participated in the Project Convergences Capstone 4 (PCC4) experiment
to further explore future space capabilities such as the Theater Strike
Effects Group (TSEG). USASMDC will also provide forces and full staff
participation in Austere Challenge/Global Lightning/Vigilant Shield 24
(AC/GL/VS24). AC/GL/VS24 is USEUCOM's focused Tier I exercise.
USSTRATCOM and USNORTHCOM integrated into USEUCOM's battle rhythm, and
USSPACECOM will provide a response cell. USASMDC will also conduct
external evaluations for the 1st Space Brigade and 100th GMD Brigade
during this event, this will be the first tier I that USASMDC formally
supports USNORTHCOM as an ASCC. The USEUCOM AOR is the backdrop for the
exercise with limited impact to the Homeland to support USNORTHCOM
objectives. Finally, USASMDC continues direct integration with United
Kingdom Space Command to provide space augmentation to USASMDC mission
requirements and possibly provide liaison support in the United
Kingdom.
space operations
As space, cyber, and SOF continue to work together, 1st Space
Brigade capitalized on engagements with U.S. Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC) to experiment with new tactical space control
technology. Over the past 18 months, the brigade task organized to
support a shift toward more expeditionary systems to operate in the
corps' extended deep areas of conflict. Recalibrated formations such as
the Army space control planning team and tactical experimentation team
led these initiatives. The Army space enterprise is considering all
options, including integration of existing commercial and government
off-the-shelf technologies to demonstrate concepts that fulfill the
current demand for a ruggedized, tactical space control system. These
new, small form factor systems fit in just a few man-portable cases and
employ a team of five Army space professionals. Space Soldiers utilized
these systems to provide real-time space effects in a variety of
experimentation exercises to include Project Convergence 22, Command
Overland, USASOC capabilities exercise, two multi-lateral airborne
trainings, and multiple Sage Eagles.
In these venues, Army space operator crews provided on-the-move
support to SOF entities by leveraging smaller, more maneuverable
technology at the ODA level. The 1st Space Brigade's Soldiers
integrated capabilities and space operations into scenarios to
demonstrate how space, cyber, and SOF can work together to support
multi-domain and full-spectrum operations, providing SOF and the joint
force with an enhanced ability to see, sense, stimulate, strike, and
assess across the spectrum. SOF partners enable Space Soldiers to gain
the necessary placement and access to operate tactical Army space
control systems in support of operations within denied, degraded, and
disrupted austere operating environments.
To enable and achieve the Army Space Vision, USASMDC is
investigating the establishment of an Army Space Operations Branch to
deliver specialized, highly trained, and certified soldiers with the
experience and expertise to provide relevant and timely effects on the
battlefield in support of maneuver commanders.
In parallel, USASMDC is championing the Army Space Training
Strategy. This strategy provides a framework to educate and train the
force, not otherwise trained in space operations, to integrate space
knowledge, skills, and tasks into professional military education,
maneuver training centers, and home station training with the requisite
training devices while simultaneously taking an Army enterprise
approach to prepare the force to fight, and win, in a contested multi-
domain environment.
While technological advances can and will disrupt adversary
position, navigation, and timing (PNT) and communications capabilities,
we must also employ technological advances to interdict adversary
space-based capabilities that provide surveillance and reconnaissance.
By collaborating with joint partners, we can further integrate space
and high-altitude capabilities to the tactical edge while our science
and technology (S&T) efforts continue underway to ensure dominance in
space control, deep sensing, and increasing the survivability and
capability of our sensing systems.
Integrating space operations into missile defense operations, and
vice versa, is of utmost importance to our national security.
Increasingly, space and missile defense enterprises depend on and
enhance each other. Given recent trends, it has become apparent we
cannot effectively contribute to strategic deterrence or respond in
crisis if we approach the multi-domain environment with differing
business sectors or phases of an operation. Yesterday's military relied
on space for warning and targeting, and yesterday's military relied on
missile defense to protect the force. Today, space and missile defense
integration must be at the very start of our prototyping, concept
development, and application--across and in concert with our Army,
joint, and coalition partners. This integrated approach is both cost
effective and mission effective.
iamd
S&T investments in high-energy lasers (HEL) executed by USASMDC led
to the fielding of the Palletized High Energy Laser (P-HEL) and the
Directed Energy Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) systems
by the RCCTO. We must continue S&T efforts to increase lethality;
reduce size, weight, power, and costs; increase magazine depth; and
increase the range-to-effect of high-energy laser weapon systems.
USASMDC also continues collaborating with the RCCTO to ensure delivery
of HEL systems that are reliable and affordable.
USASMDC will also continue to provide hypersonic test support to
the RCCTO and Navy Conventional Prompt Strike Program Offices and
develop hypersonic targets for testing of new and existing IAMD
capabilities. USASMDC is prepared to support MDA development of the
Guam Defense System (GDS) by providing military operator doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis and operator requirements
support to MDA's acquisition process, development, and fielding.
Additionally, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided software
and hardware (HW) deployment of version CX4.0 across the fleet of
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) forward-based mode radars
(AN/TPY-2), providing enhancements to initial hypersonic defense
tracking, dynamic discrimination architecture, cybersecurity,
electronic protection, objective debris mitigation, and spurious track
mitigation.
MDA also completed MILCON activities for the construction of
Missile Field 4 at FGAK and is currently installing and testing launch
support equipment in each of the silo interface vaults. These
activities will continue through the end of calendar year 2024.
Furthermore, the additional 20 silos in MF4 will create flexibility for
ground system operations and sustainment and will support the
subsequent fielding of 20 Next Generation Interceptors in the future.
MF4 enhances interceptor capacity to defend the homeland against
long-range ballistic missile attack. The expansion of MF4 increases the
footprint of the Missile Defense Complex (MDC) on FGAK, and this
increased footprint, along with additional assets, will require
increasing physical security assets including personnel and devices.
Security personnel requirements have been historically achieved through
RFF or mobilized National Guard units from the lower 48 states, and
security devices such as cameras, badging, and detection systems will
also need to increase based on the expansion.
And finally, USASMDC also continues to ensure site security at
FGAK, fielding additional C-sUAS systems in defense of the MDC. Several
systems are now employed, and we continue to ensure that we have the
most streamlined legal authorities and reporting practices to showcase
these capabilities. Moreover, the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, 100th
Missile Defense Brigade, and USASMDC continue to coordinate to provide
updated, state-of-the-art technology in the continuous effort to defend
the MDC against C-sUAS threats.
senior commander
The mission of the senior commander is to ``care for soldiers,
families, and Department of the Army Civilians, and to enable unit
readiness.'' Therefore, the senior commander will routinely resolve
installation issues with Army Material Command (AMC) and, as needed,
the associated ASCC or Direct Reporting Unit. The senior commander also
uses the garrison command as the primary organization to provide
services and resources to customers in support of accomplishing this
mission. All applicable commands support the senior commander in the
execution of senior commander responsibilities; therefore, the senior
commander is the commander supported by Army Materiel Command's
Garrison Command and affiliated Installation Management Command (IMCOM)
director, other installation service providers, and tenants.
I routinely work with the IMCOM director in the Pacific region,
regarding concerns and investments at FGAK and USAG-KA. The Fort Greely
Community Activity Center has been modernized and has new services that
include a new coffee cafe and bar area, greatly improving the
community's food and drink options and providing a safe and relaxing
environment. Moreover, ground will be broken this year to add an indoor
playground expansion to the activity center by late 2025. Additionally,
the garrison continues to support 24-hour operations and intends to
improve its aging infrastructure with efforts underway to de-centralize
heating in all the buildings and become more energy resilient and less
dependent on utility providers in the future. This is to combat
projected increased energy costs across Alaska over the next 10 years.
FGAK's and USAG-KA's locations are crucial to our national
security. Fort Greely is ideally situated in Alaska to address security
challenges in Northeast Asia. Kwajalein is home to a U.S. Army garrison
and the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, which is a
vital site in the Pacific Islands region--a strategically crucial part
of the broader Indo-Pacific.
The Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
and Palau facilitate our strategic partnership with each of these
nations. Under these agreements, the United States has the rights of
strategic denial and assured access. In return, we serve as the defense
force for these countries. Kwajalein's Reagan Test Site protects key
space assets, contributes to space domain awareness for USSPACECOM, and
enables mission essential, missile operational and developmental test
capability for USSTRATCOM. However, this unique place and its one-of-a-
kind capabilities require significant investment now and in the future.
In January of this year, for example, one of the U.S. Army Garrison's
islands, Roi-Namur, was inundated by a series of rogue waves. Half of
Roi-Namur, home to most of the Reagan Test Site's radars, was flooded,
causing millions of dollars in damages to an already weakened
infrastructure and leaving its radars inoperable for weeks.
Kwajalein's unique position brings joint value, and joint value
requires joint investment. Therefore, USASMDC is committed to leading
this effort for the Joint Force. We are actively evaluating command
relationships and resourcing processes for efficiencies to revitalize
this important multi-domain operations mission in the Pacific for the
decades ahead.
However, even as I highlight the challenging decades ahead and
USASMDC makes incredible strides in these essential, no-fail missions,
I want to reiterate that our most important assets are the thousands of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and
contractors who deploy and employ our IAMD system--and the families
that sacrifice to make their efforts possible. Our ``ONE TEAM,'' family
mindset at USADMDC has been foundational to our success and empowers
mission accomplishment.
I appreciate the opportunity to address missile defense matters and
look forward to addressing your questions.
Senator King. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HEATH A. COLLINS, USAF,
DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
Lieutenant General Collins. Thank you, Chairman King,
Ranking Member Fischer, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. I am honored for the opportunity today to join my
colleagues on this panel and discuss the missile defense
mission, and I appreciate your continued strong support of the
missile defense mission over the years.
To start I would like to thank the men and women behind the
development, delivery, and sustainment of the missile defense
system that I represent today, our MDA [Missile Defense Agency]
family, and the operators of the system all are key partners in
this no-fail mission.
We are requesting $10.4 billion to develop and deploy
Homeland missile defenses and improve regional defenses against
increasingly diverse and dangerous missile threats, a reality
we all witnessed when Iranian and Houthi forces launched over
100 ballistic missiles in addition to cruise missiles and
unmanned aerial vehicles against Israel last month.
Our prioritization of decisions will maximize missile
defense system capability, capacity, and readiness. We continue
to work closely with the combatant commanders and services to
help prepare them for the fight of today and tomorrow. To
defend our Homeland from ballistic missile attack, the ground-
based mid-course defense system, or GMD, remains our Nation's
sole protection from limited attacks with the primary focus
being the advancing North Korean threat. The ongoing Ground-
Based Interceptor, or GBI, service life extension program will
continue to improve GBI reliability and availability and will
help mitigate risk until the next-generation Interceptor, or
NGI, is fielded by the end of 2028.
After 20 years, GMD stands ready, as shown in December
2023, when we successfully executed a GMD intercept flight test
using the two 3-stage selectable Ground-Based Interceptor in 2-
stage mode, demonstrating increased engagement battle space. We
plan to deploy this capability to the entire fleet by the end
of this year.
The NGI program remains on track, and as this subcommittee
is aware, we recently selected Lockheed Martin to continue as
the prime for NGI development, testing, production, and
fielding.
Soon we plan to add the Long-Range Discrimination Radar
(LRDR) to MDA's operational capability baseline, to enhance
tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment against long-range
missile threats. Today, LRDR is ready to support the space
domain awareness mission.
For regional defense, MDA continues to design improvements
to the Aegis ballistic missile defense capability and procure
the standard Missile 3 Block IIA missiles. We were very pleased
with the performance of the Aegis weapon system and the system
operators on board the USS Arleigh Burke and the USS Carney,
and the role they played in intercepting the ballistic missiles
fired against Israel last month.
In fiscal year 2025, we will also test and deliver SPY-1
radar upgrades and support the Navy in future space domain
awareness demonstrations. We will continue U.S. Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptor procurement,
fielding and training support in collaboration with the U.S.
Army to field the THAAD 4.0 capability to THAAD batteries by
the end of 2025. THAAD 4.0 integrates Patriot capabilities with
THAAD to increase Patriot defended area and engagement
opportunities. We will also begin design work to improve the
THAAD system to take on ever-advancing regional threats.
We will continue development of a 360-degree layered
missile defense capability for Guam. MDA construction on the
Joint Command Center, AN/TPY-6 radar site, and launcher site
will begin in fiscal year 2025. By the end of this year we will
execute a flight experiment against a medium-range ballistic
missile target, using an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, controlled
by the initial Aegis Guam system, using the first TPY-6
transportable array unit.
Today our sea-based terminal defenses protect assets at sea
and forces ashore from hypersonic threats. Working with the
Navy, we anticipate delivering follow-on Increment 3
capabilities in fiscal year 2025. The Glide Phase Interceptor
program, or GPI, weapons system will enable a layered defense
against hypersonic glide threats. By the end of fiscal year
2024, MDA will select a single GPI interceptor design to
complete development. We will continue to develop and mature
the GPI capability and support the planned cooperative
development of the GPI with Japan.
We launched the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor, or HBTSS, prototype satellites in February of this year
to demonstrate fire control solutions generated against
hypersonic maneuvering threats from space. Following successful
demonstration of HBTSS, the responsibility for fielding HBTSS
like fire control capabilities will be taken on by the U.S.
Space Force.
I am honored by this opportunity. I greatly appreciate
everything this Committee does for Missile Defense Agency and
the missile defense mission, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Heath A.
Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins
Chairman King, Vice Chairman Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget request of $10.4 billion for
fiscal year 2025. Our request will enable the continued execution of
the MDA mission to develop, deploy, and support a layered Missile
Defense System to defend the United States and its deployed forces,
allies, and international partners from increasingly diverse and
dangerous missile threats.
As we witnessed on April 13, 2024, when Iranian forces in Yemen
launched over 100 ballistic missiles in addition to cruise missiles and
unmanned aerial vehicles against Israel, our potential adversaries
place a high priority on developing capabilities to defeat U.S. and
allied missile defenses. They are well resourced and are testing and
fielding advanced ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles that are
increasingly accurate, survivable, and capable of achieving longer
ranges and higher levels of maneuverability. Today, many of the newest
systems, including hypersonic and anti-ship ballistic missiles, are
undergoing unprecedented combat evaluation in Ukraine and the Middle
East. This could potentially lead to innovations that challenge missile
defenses and lead to broader proliferation as the battlefield
effectiveness of these systems is demonstrated. The attack last month
against Israel and the ongoing war in Ukraine also highlight the
importance of being prepared to defend against large raid sizes
involving diverse missile threats. We must prepare ourselves to defend
against a level of capability and capacity we have never seen before.
Ensuring our Combatant Commanders and Services have what they need
to fight today and win tomorrow is my top priority. Continuous and
frank collaboration with the Warfighter is essential to delivering
adaptable, affordable capabilities as fast as possible to defeat an
increasingly diverse and unprecedented missile threat set. As part of
the Department's missile defense enterprise, MDA is committed to
collaborating closely with the Warfighter throughout the lifecycle of a
capability. There are proven processes in place to identify,
prioritize, assess, and validate Warfighter requirements and requests
for modifications and upgrades to systems already fielded. MDA works
with the Warfighter early in the technology development and product
development phases to address a requested capability. We also support
Lead Military Department efforts to plan for Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities,
and Policy factors. Once a capability is fielded, close collaboration
with the Services and Combatant Commands is essential to sustaining and
enhancing that capability throughout its service life. Finally, MDA
provides real-time technical support to the warfighter, as demonstrated
during recent real world operations.
urgency of hypersonic missile defense
Initially just focused on ballistic missile defense, MDA today is
developing weapons systems and sensors to defeat the serious threat
posed by hypersonic glide vehicles and maneuvering threats. MDA
continues to develop a layered defense capability to defeat regional
hypersonic threats with the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) development
program. By the end of fiscal year 2024, MDA will select a single GPI
interceptor design with which to complete development. In fiscal year
2025, MDA will continue to develop and mature the GPI capability with a
focus on critical technology maturation and risk reduction activities.
We will also continue to update the Aegis Weapon System to integrate
the GPI interceptor. Our fiscal year 2025 budget request supports the
planned cooperative development of the glide phase interceptor with
Japan. We expect to complete the formal agreement on that project this
spring. Japan will fund and develop key missile components, primarily
propulsion elements.
The GPI weapon system design will provide a layered defense with
currently deployed Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) capabilities. SBT provides
terminal defense of assets at sea and forces ashore. We anticipate
delivering SBT Increment 3 capabilities in fiscal year 2025 to provide
expanded capability. SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement
against an operationally realistic hypersonic glide vehicle target in
fiscal year 2025, and an engagement using a Standard Missile (SM)-6
against a hypersonic glide target in fiscal year 2026.
The Missile Defense System will increasingly leverage the space
domain with our Service partners to gain a strategic edge against
advanced missile threats. MDA already has demonstrated the ability to
generate a fire control solution to track and engage ballistic missile
targets using the Space Tracking and Surveillance System demonstration
satellites, which are now decommissioned. Today, MDA is on-orbit with
the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) and
preparing to demonstrate fire control solutions generated from
satellites against missile threats that glide and maneuver at
hypersonic velocities through the atmosphere. MDA is collaborating with
the U.S. Space Force Space Development Agency to demonstrate a fire-
control capability to track and defeat advanced missile threats.
HBTSS's Launch and Early Orbit Testing period, which began on February
14, 2024, will be followed by testing to characterize and validate
performance of the two HBTSS prototype satellites by leveraging MDA and
cooperative flight test events. Following a successful demonstration of
HBTSS, the responsibility for fielding HBTSS fire-control capabilities
will be transferred to the Space Force. When fully operational, the
fire-control capability developed through MDA's HBTSS program will be
part of the Space Force Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture and
provide a capability to detect hypersonic, ballistic, and other
advanced threats earlier than terrestrial radars and send tracking data
to the Missile Defense System for handover to missile defense weapons
for engagement.
MDA upgraded the Ballistic Missile Defense System Overhead
Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Architecture (BOA) 3 years earlier than
planned to provide expanded hypersonic tracking capability. Ongoing BOA
8.1 development updates the system architecture to integrate increased
raid-handling capability in Increment 8/9. These system architecture
updates enable initial integration of Space Development Agency Low
Earth Orbit and Space Force Space Systems Command Medium Earth Orbit
sensors into BOA for improved tracking and fire control. Fiscal year
2025 funding will continue to develop and test Increment 6C/7 to
deliver expanded support that leverages systems and sensors to track
maneuvering, hypersonic non-ballistic missiles as well as report
maneuvering tracks and impact area predictions to external systems.
Increment 6C/7 will also update Command and Control, Battle Management
and Communications (C2BMC) to prioritize supporting sensors for defense
against hypersonic glide threats.
homeland defense
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system has protected the
U.S. homeland from rogue long-range ballistic missile attacks for
almost 20 years. Today, we are improving the reliability of the in-
service fleet and developing new capabilities to address the limited
but increasingly advanced North Korean long-range ballistic missiles.
We continue the U.S. Northern Command's Ground Based Interceptor (GBI)
Service Life Extension Program to improve reliability and availability,
which we anticipate will extend portions of the existing fleet. These
interceptors will help mitigate risk until the Next Generation
Interceptor (NGI) is fielded no later than the end of 2028. In
parallel, MDA continues to upgrade the ground system infrastructure,
communications network, fire control system, warfighter training
systems, and missile fields to improve the reliability, capability,
cybersecurity, and resiliency of the GMD weapon system.
In December 2023, we successfully executed a GMD intercept flight
test, demonstrating the weapon system's capability to intercept an
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile target using the 2-/3-stage
selectable GBI in 2-Stage mode equipped with a Capability Enhanced-II
Block 1 Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle. This was the first intercept
flight test of a 3-stage GBI operating in 2-stage mode, meaning the
third stage was commanded not to ignite. The earlier release of the
kill vehicle provides increased battlespace to the warfighter to
execute closer range engagements. With a successful Operational
Capability Baseline decision for Increment 6.B in late fiscal year
2024, the software enabling the selectable 2-/3-stage will be deployed
for the GBI fleet.
We are developing the Next Generation Interceptor to improve the
GMD system's ability to defend against future threats. The Next
Generation Interceptor program is currently in its Technology
Development Phase and will transition to its Product Development Phase
in May 2024. Recently, each one of the two competing Prime Contractor
teams successfully completed their Preliminary Design Reviews and
Knowledge Points #1. MDA applied lessons learned from other large-scale
defense programs that faced increasing costs due to extended design
phases involving multiple competitive solution teams which adversely
impacted schedule. Due to accelerated contractor execution schedules,
MDA had an appreciably larger body of technical knowledge and data
available to assess contractor performance ahead of a traditional
systems development at this point in the design maturation process.
Consistent with the down select contract clause, MDA completed a best
value determination using contractor provided objective evidence from
their Preliminary Design Reviews and Knowledge Points #1. Last month,
MDA selected Lockheed Martin to continue development, testing,
production, and fielding of Nation's Next Generation Interceptor.
To support defense of the homeland, MDA is developing, deploying,
and sustaining a robust, cyber-secure and networked ground-and sea-
based radar architecture that includes the Long Range Discrimination
Radar (LRDR) located at Clear Space Force Station, Alaska. LRDR
enhances tracking and discrimination, hit assessment, and space-
intelligence data collection. The LRDR successfully tracked and
discriminated a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) target in
September 2023. When the radar is added to MDA's Operational Capability
Baseline (OCB) in December 2024, LRDR will support the GMD capability
against long-range missile threats. The LRDR completed a Space Domain
Awareness (SDA) data collect event in January 2024 and, subsequently,
MDA confirmed LRDR and C2BMC are ready and available to provide Space
Domain Awareness (SDA) mission capabilities to U.S. Space Command in
March. The U.S. Space Force declaration of LRDR ready for early SDA use
is imminent. In fiscal year 2025, LRDR will continue support of SDA and
will be added to the OCB for the missile defense mission.
The Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar provides a relocatable, precision
midcourse tracking and discrimination capability supporting homeland
defense operations, Missile Defense System testing, data collection,
and SDA. SBX completed a rigorous in-port maintenance and capability
upgrade period in March 2023 and is currently deployed at-sea
conducting homeland defense operations. Fabrication of the SBX
replacement radome continues on schedule for installation in January
2026.
Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and the COBRA DANE radar
support homeland missile defense and improve midcourse Missile Defense
System sensor coverage by providing critical early warning, tracking,
object classification, and cueing data. They also provide critical
missile warning data and space object detection and tracking data for
the Space Surveillance Network. While the Space Force is the overall
UEWR and COBRA DANE sustainment organization, MDA provides sustainment
support for the radars located in California, Massachusetts, Alaska,
United Kingdom, and Greenland.
There are five AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar sites currently
deployed worldwide that augment our capabilities to execute the
homeland defense mission. Operating at forward locations in key
regions, these radars extend detection and early warning capabilities
and enhance our ability to track and discriminate inbound targets
earlier.
The Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) experiment of infrared
sensors continues to demonstrate hit assessment capabilities for
homeland defense. SKA sensors will continue to provide situational
awareness of intercepts to U.S. Northern Command and participate in
flight tests and engineering activities to characterize sensor
capabilities that provide data to support future Post Intercept
Assessment capabilities.
Meeting the current and future ballistic missile threat for
homeland and regional defense requires global persistence and increased
precision and accuracy. The Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS) program,
designed to perform birth-to-death tracking and global coverage for
discrimination against ballistic missile threat targets, is moving into
the next phase of development after successfully completing its ground
concept feasibility phase. The next phase, space demonstration, will
develop the on-orbit demonstrator and follow a similar path as HBTSS
capabilities leading to incorporation into the operational Proliferated
Warfighter Space Architecture.
C2BMC Spiral 8.2-5 will enable homeland defense capabilities by
providing critical LRDR data to GMD. C2BMC conducts command and control
functions for LRDR and executes tasking in direct support of GMD
engagements. C2BMC Spiral 8.2-5 delivers the initial ability to receive
messages from space command and control to generate acquisition tasking
for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and LRDR. C2BMC S8.2-5 also
enables the capability to task Aegis BMD and LRDR to detect, track and
report on resident space objects.
regional defense
Globally deployed ship-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
are critical to the Nation's defense of our deployed forces, allies,
and partners against a wide variety of short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range missile threats. In fiscal year 2025, MDA is
designing improvements to the Aegis BMD capability, improving SBT
defense, advancing weapon system and missile reliability, and enhancing
Aegis BMD engagement capacity and lethality. As the Members of this
Subcommittee are aware, the Aegis Weapon System, the Standard Missile
(SM)-3 Block IB, and the system operators onboard the USS Arleigh Burke
and the USS Carney were highly effective in countering the ballistic
missiles fired against Israel last month. We will continue to develop
Aegis BMD weapon system software to enhance functionality and leverage
more-capable radars and National Technical Means.
MDA continues to support defense of NATO's European territory and
forces against the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-
Atlantic region. Aegis Ashore in Romania is operational, and the Chief
of Naval Operations accepted Aegis Ashore Poland in December 2023,
marking completion of a key MDA contribution to Phase 3 of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach. The Poland site is undergoing a maintenance
period to upgrade the computer networks and communications systems,
which is funded and operated by the U.S. Navy. This will be followed by
U.S. European Command acceptance of the site. Then there will be a
transfer of authority from U.S. European Command to NATO. Both Aegis
Ashore sites are designed to launch the SM-3 Block IBTU and Block IIA
missiles.
In the fiscal year 2025 budget, MDA continues to procure the SM-3
Block IIA missile. Previous and planned procurements are on pace to
meet current Navy Inventory Objective requirements for Block IIA in
fiscal year 2032 as defined by the outcome of the Navy Munitions
Requirement process. The fiscal year 2025 Budget proposes to
discontinue further production of the SM-3 Block IB missile in favor of
SM-3 BLK IIA and continue to evolve the BLK IIA missile within the
Aegis Weapons System. MDA will continue to deliver prior year
procurements of Block IB and sustain the existing inventory. The final
Block IB delivery is currently expected in fiscal year 2028. The SM-3
Block IB has a twelve-year service life and the oldest Block IBs in the
fleet will begin to reach the end of service life in fiscal year 2026.
The combination of demilitarization and termination of new procurements
will result in SM-3 Block IB inventory peaking in fiscal year 2027. The
inventory of all variants of SM-3 missiles is managed through the
Navy's Global Force Management process to address the capacity
requirements for Defense of Guam, European Phased Adaptive Approach,
and other Combatant Commander requirements. We will continue to develop
Aegis BMD weapon system software to enhance functionality and leverage
more-capable radars and National Technical Means.
MDA provides software upgrades to Aegis integrated missile defense
destroyers equipped with the AN/SPY-1 radar to support the Space Force
Space Domain Awareness mission. The Aegis SDA capability is fully
compatible with deployed Navy operations and has appropriate safeguards
supporting full Aegis missile defense warfighting capability. We
transitioned this important capability to the Navy and supported
successful demonstrations on USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) in June 2023
and USS Mason (DDG 87) in October 2023. In fiscal year 2025, we will
continue to test and deliver this upgrade and support the Navy in
future SDA demonstrations.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System is a
globally transportable, ground-based system that is highly effective
against short-, medium-and intermediate-range missile threats inside
and outside the atmosphere in the terminal phase of flight. MDA
currently supports forward-deployment of two batteries stationed in the
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility and an
emergency deployment in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility. In fiscal year 2025, we will continue U.S. THAAD
interceptor procurement, production of battery hardware, obsolescence
mitigation efforts, fielding and training support, the THAAD Stockpile
Reliability Program, and modifications to meet growing cybersecurity
threats. THAAD will continue to demonstrate capability improvements
with rigorous testing throughout the Future Years Defense Program.
THAAD, in conjunction with the U.S. Army, is in the process of
fielding the THAAD 4.0 capability to all THAAD batteries. The upgrade
was completed at the battery located in Guam in November 2023, and we
are in the process of upgrading remaining batteries to be completed by
the end of 2025. TH 4.0 capability enables remote launch, Patriot
Launch-on-Remote, and integration of Army Patriot Missile Segment
Enhancement (MSE) launchers and missiles into the THAAD battery. This
capability increases Patriot defended area and engagement opportunities
by allowing the MSE interceptor to leverage the highly effective THAAD
AN/TPY-2 radar.
THAAD System Build 5.0 is in development and is the largest
hardware refresh to-date with operational availability in July 2026. TH
5.0 includes hardware upgrades that address obsolescence and enhances
the mission assurance and cybersecurity posture of the weapon system.
TH 5.0 incorporates system safety enhancements and engagement
refinements resulting in improved performance against the current THAAD
assessed threat set.
THAAD System Build 6.0 operational availability has been expedited
to 2027 from 2032 and will provide initial capability against
maneuvering threats and increase the threat engagement space. TH 6.0
includes capability enhancements to the THAAD interceptor, increased
integration with Patriot MSE, and improvements to the cybersecurity
risk posture and program protection. Additionally, THAAD will begin
initial systems engineering in fiscal year 2025 to support the Army's
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS)
integration of THAAD.
AN/TPY-2 radars deployed abroad support THAAD batteries for
regional defense. Radar 13, planned for delivery in the second quarter
of fiscal year 2025, will be part of THAAD Battery 8. Radar 13 includes
significant obsolescence redesigns that are leveraged from ongoing
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. As a supplement to each of these
weapon systems in regional defense roles, the AN/TPY-2 forward-based
radars mentioned earlier extend the capabilities of each by expanding
their detection range and enhancing their ability track and
discriminate enemy launches. These radars greatly enhance our ability
to protect our allies and deployed soldiers in a regional defense
mission.
The C2BMC system includes the operation of a global network
enterprise with equipment and personnel in 25 locations across 14 time
zones. Funding in fiscal year 2025 continues to provide situational
awareness, battle management, training, and SDA capabilities to users
within each Combatant Command as well as the global missile defense
network. Over the past year the C2BMC system provided INDOPACOM with
the ability to acquire and exchange missile track data with multiple
partner nations' command and control systems to demonstrate strength in
partnering with allies for collective regional missile defense. Funding
in fiscal year 2025 continues this effort and includes support for
warfighter contingency activities such as those in support of Israel.
MDA's C2BMC system is providing sensor data to cue Aegis ships in the
region from continued attacks on shipping and other partner interests
in the region.
The Department is continuing development of a missile defense
system for the defense of Guam against diverse missile threats. We will
expand capability and capacity as the threat evolves. In collaboration
with the Army and Navy, we are moving toward meeting an INDOPACOM
requirement for a persistent 360-degree layered missile defense
capability on Guam against simultaneous raids of cruise, ballistic,
maneuvering, and hypersonic glide threats. The MDA MILCON designs will
complete this calendar year and the Environmental Impact Study will
complete in Calendar year 2025. MDA construction will begin in fiscal
year 2025, establishing the joint command center, an AN/TPY-6 radar
site, and a Navy Standard Missile Vertical Launch System (VLS) site. We
will execute a flight experiment intercept in first quarter fiscal year
2025 demonstrating the increased Guam protection capabilities the
Department is developing for the western most territories of the
homeland, while the integrated Aegis Guam System continues final design
and testing.
leveraging science and technology innovation
MDA is investing in disruptive technologies to deliver dynamic,
next generation missile defense capabilities. MDA has an integrated,
strategic Science and Technology (S&T) approach that prioritizes
identifying and maturing transformational, leap-ahead technologies to
address the future threat. Additionally, we continue to rapidly develop
near-term technologies to support incremental Missile Defense System
upgrades. MDA is collaborating with OSD, the Services and Warfighters,
National Laboratories, Universities/Academia, International partners,
and Industry (traditional and non-traditional defense partners) to
leverage technology development. We are aligning our S&T roadmap to
maximize cutting-edge technology to close capability gaps and meet
warfighter requirements.
Kinetic capabilities by themselves will not be adequate to keep
pace with threats, which continue to increase in complexity, range, and
quantity. Accordingly, MDA plans to enhance current kinetic kill
capabilities with directed energy and other non-kinetic solutions. MDA
is working with OSD and the Services to develop the technologies to
support the development and integration of directed energy systems. In
2024, a directed energy Independent Assessment Team (IAT) completed an
evaluation to incorporate directed energy into the Missile Defense
System. Based upon recent Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research & Engineering-funded increases in electric laser power levels
and projected increases to 500 kilowatt-class in 2 years, the IAT
recommended that MDA fund a laser technology demonstrator. The Agency
will initiate this effort with our Service partners beginning with
long-range detect and track while technology continues to mature for
the missile defense mission. We are also developing advanced sensors to
improve position accuracy and range estimates of missile threats.
The NanoSat Testbed Initiative (NTI) is a collaborative,
experimental approach leveraging commercial satellite platforms to
mature technology and perform risk reduction for encrypted
communications in a meshed network in space to support Service and
Agency initiatives. Space Edge Experiments and Demonstration (SEED) is
a small form factor, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) processor that
leverages artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML). SEED
will fly on the Space Test Program (STP)-H10 mission to the
International Space Station. The Laser Communications Experiment (LaCE)
will demonstrate the viability of a low-SWaP (increasing the power
while reducing the size and weight) optical inter-satellite-link
between two nodes in LEO as a method for secure and assured space-to-
space communications.
MDA continues with Asymmetric Left Through Right-of-launch
Integration (LTRI) activities to further enhance offensive-defensive
integration and improve overall full spectrum missile defeat
capabilities. Asymmetric LTRI optimizes the efficiency and
effectiveness of situational awareness between intelligence activities,
offensive attack operations, and right-of-launch defenses. MDA has
developed a medium fidelity model to simulate LTRI and is beginning to
apply AI/ML to LTRI. MDA is collaborating with other government
asymmetric multi-domain missile defeat efforts against ever advancing
threats to optimize missile launch operations and provide data to
inform decisionmaking in time critical situations.
MDA is partnering and cost sharing with the Department of Defense
and Services to leverage sounding rockets and experimental hypersonic
platforms to develop and mature key technologies for advancing
hypersonic defense. These activities are the Multi-service Advanced
Capability Hypersonic Test Bed (MACH-TB), High Operational Tempo for
Hypersonics (H4H), and Hypersonic Test Bed efforts, and include
maturation of key technologies such as axial upper stage throttling,
secured meshed communications, survivable and optically optimal seeker
windows, advanced materials characterization, hypersonic wind tunnel
testing, and low cost, high yield thermal protection systems capable of
surviving the harsh hypersonic environment.
MDA is actively engaging with Allies and international partners to
leverage opportunities for collaborative development of missile defense
S&T to advance capabilities in the areas of hypersonic weapons,
integrated air and missile defenses, advanced sensing, battle
management command, control and communications, directed energy, and
AI/ML.
international programs
Close collaboration with our Allies and partners is critical for
addressing today's security challenges. MDA's international cooperation
supports guidance outlined in the Missile Defense Review, Combatant
Command priorities, and partner requirements. MDA actively and closely
engages with multiple partners across the globe to build capability and
interoperability against missile threats.
In the INDOPACOM region, MDA's most robust and wide-ranging
cooperation is with Japan. In addition to the collaboration on glide
phase interceptor development, Japan continues to acquire SM-3 Block IB
and Block IIA interceptors via FMS. MDA is also executing an FMS case
to provide the weapon system components and associated software for two
Japanese-built Aegis System Equipped Vessels. MDA is working with
Australia to support its development of a Joint Air Battle Management
System that will integrate Australia's air and missile defenses and
enable interoperability with U.S. and other allied Integrated Air and
Missile Defense capabilities. Finally, MDA conducts cooperative
research and development projects and studies with Japan, Republic of
Korea, and Australia.
In Europe, MDA is assisting the United Kingdom to develop
requirements for its potential purchase of a persistent discrimination
radar that will complement NATO missile defenses. MDA also has a number
of ongoing cooperative research and development projects and studies
with the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and the UK. Finally, MDA
continues working closely with NATO by providing subject-matter
expertise to the NATO Communication and Information Agency for the
continuous testing and interoperability of BMD systems.
In the Middle East, MDA has a strong, long-standing relationship
with the Israel Missile Defense Organization. Through this cooperation
MDA provides $500 million per year, and additionally any supplemental
funding approved by Congress, for programs including Arrow, David's
Sling, and Iron Dome--all of these systems have proven their value in
Operation Swords of Iron. MDA has worked closely with our Israeli
partners throughout this conflict to identify and assess areas where
increased U.S. support would be beneficial. MDA's THAAD program is also
a major asset for cooperation within U.S. Central Command's Area of
Responsibility. Finally, MDA is leading a project to develop a regional
missile early warning architecture for the Gulf Cooperation Council.
conclusion
Chairman King, Vice Chairman Fischer, Members of the Subcommittee,
we are committed to attracting and building a strong, skilled workforce
that will continue to focus on providing what the warfighter needs to
win today and tomorrow. I would like to recognize and thank the men and
women who serve in our Armed Forces at home and abroad and who operate
the Missile Defense System with the support of our dedicated civilian
and contractor workforce. I appreciate your continued support for MDA
and the missile defense mission, and I look forward to answering the
Committee's questions. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my apologies
for being late to this hearing. I came from another meeting.
Welcome to all of our witnesses. We appreciate you appearing
before us today, and we look forward to hearing from each of
you.
I am pleased to see progress being made on several programs
over the last year, including continued development of the
Missile Defense Agency's Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking
Space Sensor and the Next Generation Interceptor program.
However, I remain concerned that we are moving far too
slowly on developing defenses against hypersonic weapons. In
Section 1666 of last year's NDAA, this Committee directed the
Department to achieve initial operational capability for the
Glide Phase Interceptor Program not later than December 31,
2029. Yet the Missile Defense Agency's budget request included
no funding for accelerating the development of the Glide Phase
Interceptor. Instead, it pushed it out even further, and that
is far too late.
I am also deeply concerned about the slow speed at which
the Department is addressing recovery efforts from the rogue
wave that devastated facilities at the Reagan Test Site in the
Marshall Islands. We cannot allow critical testing capabilities
for our nuclear deterrent and other long-range missile system
to be undermined by a too-slow recovery.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
these issues and about how the fiscal year 2025 request would
impact their mission.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. You all know me as a mild-mannered,
reasonable guy, but I am not going to be mild-mannered today.
The truth is we have no defense for hypersonic missiles. Yes or
no? Mr. Hill, any defense on hypersonic missile? You are the
commander of an aircraft carrier in the Greenland Gap. If a
hypersonic missile launched from Murmansk, 6,000 miles an hour,
what do you do?
Mr. Hill. We have some systems that defend in the terminal
stage but we need more. You are correct, Senator King and
Senator Fischer, that our hypersonic defenses are inadequate,
and we do need--So SM-6 is in the Navy's terminal range.
Patriot, I will let General Gainey speak to the specifics on
that. Those are examples. But no argument--we need focus on
hypersonic defenses.
Senator King. So why are we talking about 2029 and even
stretching that out. This is next year kind of stuff. I do not
get it. I do not get your budget.
Mr. Hill. What we faced in this year, in the budget this
year, it was a very difficult year, particularly with Fiscal
Responsibility Act caps that we had to work with, with the
must-pay bills that had to go in for the personnel, the
salaries, the health care, inflation costs. When you get down
to the point of what was left for the discretionary types of
things, where you can really control your choices, you are
focusing on trades between readiness----
Senator King. That is your mission. Your mission is missile
defense.
Mr. Hill. Yes. The budget decisions at the aggregate level
are made at a higher level, and so you are trading off between
readiness or your future investments.
Senator King. Well, let me put the question in another way.
Let's say what happened on April 14th happened over the Arctic
Ocean, 300 missiles, drones, UAVs came across the Arctic Ocean
toward Canada and North America. Could we do what Israel and we
and other countries did? Could we knock down 99 percent of
those missiles coming in, if that had happened in the northern
part of the world?
Mr. Hill. If I may, that is in the realm of the
responsibility of the Commander of NORTHCOM.
Senator King. Okay. So, could we have done what happened on
April 14th?
General Guillot. No, Chairman.
Senator King. No. That is of concern. What is the gap? Is
the gap interceptors? Is the gap sensors? How come they could
do it over there and we cannot do it here?
General Guillot. Part of the reason, Mr. Chairman, is
because they have the
[inaudible]. Up to the current time we have the capability
in the services but they are not assigned to the NORTHCOM AOR.
Now also just the numbers of assets that we have in the
region right now would not be sufficient to meet the attack of
that size, that the Iranian forces----
Senator King. In fact, our capability in the region is
aimed toward North Korea. Is that not correct?
General Guillot. That is correct.
Senator King. It is not designed to take on Russia or
China, but that is where the threat is.
What is the cost of one GBI?
Lieutenant General Collins. So the GBI is approximately $80
million, $85 million.
Senator King. One missile to intercept an incoming missile
is $80 million. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes, sir. For an
intercontinental ballistic missile class interceptor, yes, sir.
Senator King. Well, in the Red Sea the Houthis are sending
$20,000 drones, and we are shooting them down with missiles
that cost 4.3. The math does not work on that, gentlemen. I
mean, it just does not work. What are we thinking?
Okay, here is what I am getting at. Your budget for
directed energy is 1/1,000ths of your total budget. It has gone
down from $140 million a year to $15 million a year. What in
the hell are you guys thinking? Directed energy is the answer.
It costs 25 cents a shot, and the budget has gone down from
$140 million to $15 million a year. That is scandal. We cannot
possibly defend ourselves with $80 million missiles. There is
not enough money in the whole world for that. Somebody give me
an explanation of why, and I have got the data right here. In
2018, $141.5 million for directed energy, fiscal year 2025,
$15.6.
Mr. Hill. Senator King, that is the portion of directed
energy that is for the Missile Defense Agency. Across----
Senator King. Is that not your business, missile defense?
Mr. Hill. Yes, but they have part of the missile defense
piece. A lot of the air defense, a lot of what the directed
energy supports, is actually done in the Army or in the Navy.
There is a little over $200 million in directed energy
programs, but I take the point that that is----
Senator King. Well, that may not be enough. The budget for
the entire Defense Department for directed energy is also down
by something like two-thirds, and I do not get it, because we
cannot go on hitting bullets with bullets, with very expensive
bullets. Particularly we are talking about very expensive
bullets hitting very cheap drones. Directed energy can do that.
We know it can do that, and I do not understand. That directed
energy budget should be going like this instead of like this.
Mr. Hill. Directed energy is a very important part. It has
to be a very important part of missile defeat.
Senator King. Well, I agree with you. The budgets are
policy, Mr. Secretary, and the policy is directed energy ain't
very important. It goes from $140 million to $15. That does not
tell me the Department is valuing it very much.
So I will look forward to some further response, because
right now we do not have much missile defense. That is the
truth, whether it is to hypersonics, to drones. I would like
you guys to go back and really rethink, what is your mission?
If your mission is missile defense, we need to reorient what it
is you do, and someday you will see me when I really mean it.
Vice Chair, go.
Senator Fischer. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Rosen. He is fired up.
Senator Fischer. Yes, we all are. We all are.
First of all, I would like to thank our military men who
are here today. I thank you for the information you give us,
not just at these open hearings but at our classified
briefings, as well. You are open. You are honest about your
needs. I will not put you on the spot here because you do serve
the commander-in-chief. You serve the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Hill, you are on the spot. I thank you for the work you
do too, but when is this Administration going to listen to you,
and to listen to the expert advice and information that our
military gives them about what we need to defend the Homeland?
We hear from constituents who are angry because we are not
protecting our southern border, that we have chaos at the
border. We just heard we have chaos everywhere when it comes to
the security of our Homeland.
What is it going to take? Do not push it back, well, it is
up to Congress to appropriate the money, it is up to Congress
to set it. Because you are giving us your budget here and now.
You are the ones presenting the budget with the advice of the
military here with you. It is very upsetting knowing what we
need and not being able to discuss it, so I thank you for your
openness in this hearing, and your answers in this hearing, but
what we need to have, and I hope the American people are
listening.
With that, General Collins, as I noted in my opening
statement this Committee has been very clear in our direction
to accelerate the development of the Glide-Phase Interceptor
system. If provided with additional resources, what steps would
you be able to take to meet the congressionally mandated
initial operational capability date of 2029?
Lieutenant General Collins. Thank you, Senator. Thank you,
Vice Chairman. As we talked about just a second ago, the
resource decisions may put us in a tough spot, in a tough
decision on the GPI program.
Senator Fischer. Yes, but if you had what you needed, can
you reach it?
Lieutenant General Collins. With the design of the system
and the way the system is set up and the technology maturation
that we have playing out over the next 4 or 5 years, 2029, with
the existing GPI plan, will be a very hard date to meet as we
move forward. Very, very, very high risk program to do that.
But in that Section 1666, we were tasked to come up with
options, and we are working with our industry partners, with
our service partners, for options within the GPI program, and
potentially outside the GPI program, to bring capability to
bear against the hypersonic threat. We will incorporate that
into that report and deliver that later this year, with option
space and resource informed, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Gainey, I am concerned
that the Army is not appropriately prioritizing disaster
recovery efforts for the Reagan Test Site. We know that it is
the linchpin of the development and testing of every long-range
missile system of the United States, and we cannot afford
further delays.
So what can we expect to see, or when can we expect to see
a disaster recovery plan from the SMDC [Space and Missile
Defense Command]?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Ma'am, thank you for that
question, and thank you for highlighting Kwajalein Atoll, a
strategic location to our Nation, and specifically in the
Pacific. We have a great team out at Kwajalein. Team Kwajalein
is doing amazing things, tight community, expertise in
engineering and in very important mission.
We have moved significantly forward with the recovery ops.
The challenge is not so much the recovery ops right now,
because we are able to continue testing, and we will be able to
perform our strategic testing. I will personally be out there
in June for one of our testing events that will occur. It is
the long-term infrastructure challenges on Kwajalein that we
have to address. The rogue wave just highlighted a significant
issue that had been building up over years, and now we have to
prioritize and address those infrastructure challenges as we
move forward, so we can provide the community for our soldiers,
civilians, engineers that are out there doing a critical
mission as we move forward.
Senator Fischer. Do you have a plan in place right now to
be able to address that?
Lieutenant General Gainey. We have a plan, and we, in the
Army, are looking at command and control options, restructure
options to more efficiently be able to get after the challenges
on Kwajalein. Also we are looking at how can we do more at
Kwajalein leveraging INDOPACOM and USARPAC as part of that
strategic location, to help us build on that infrastructure out
there to do more for the Pacific than it is doing now. That is
how we are focusing, from an integrated approach.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. Before I call on Senator Rosen I just want to
assure you, my comments were not in any way personal. You all
are doing everything you can. But I think the agency needs to
take a deep look at itself in light of what we have learned
from Ukraine and from Israel and from developments in
technology. Drones have become ubiquitous just in the last 3 or
4 years, and that is what I am hoping to get across in a
somewhat intemperate way. But I wanted to make my point.
Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, that is good because you actually set
me up for my next question, so thank you. You did not even know
that, so thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. I really want
to thank you for serving. I guess all times are challenging,
but we are in an especially challenging time.
I want to talk about some of the lessons that we have
learned from Iran's attack on Israel. General Collins, the
recent Iranian attack on Israel really did demonstrate how
truly effective integrated air and missile defense systems can
function to prevent a large-scale and layered attack. More than
300 missiles and drones we know launched against Israel, and an
integrated system from numerous countries, including air
partners in the region, were able to defeat the threat.
So I have kind of a multipart question. General, what
lessons have we learned from the attack, and really, how
complicated is it to establish a system that is able to foil
the attack? How vulnerable is an integrated air and missile
system to cyberattack? As we talk about being with multiple
countries, and of course, are you budgeting for this in the
future? Because as we said, the budget is the blueprint. We see
what has happened.
How do we have to rethink that? I know I bundled a bunch
there.
Lieutenant General Collins. Thank you, Senator, for that
question, and it is a really important question. Integrated air
and missile defense, as we have seen in Ukraine, as we see in
Israel. The adversaries are throwing integrated air and missile
offenses at us. We really do need to make sure that we have
integrated air and missile defenses in place to defeat those.
It is a combination of a lot of different players. The
Missile Defense Agency's main threat space is ballistic and
hypersonic missiles. The service picks up the integrated AMD
for air and cruise missile threats. Then we do need to bring
all of those together with our coalition partners to bring that
together.
Senator Rosen. Right, because our DEFEND Act we passed a
few years ago, my DEFEND Act, created this air and missile
defense that clearly worked.
Lieutenant General Collins. Absolutely. Absolutely, and it
worked very well. But it takes a long time to make it work
right. General Gainey, in his opening comments, made some
assertions about how much training and exercising and work we
have done across the services and with our international
partners to be able to demonstrate what happened that night.
It will take the architecture, the test and training, and
the partnership to really bring true IMD to the forefront. It
may have looked easy. It was not easy to get there. It took a
long time to get to what we demonstrated that night.
As part of that architecting, as part of that development,
as part of the testing to do that, cyber has to be at the
ground floor of any of these concepts as we move forward.
Within the missile defense system we have a comprehensive cyber
test program from the element up through the system before we
get to the field. As well as looking to do cyber defense while
in the field. That has got to be foundational to everything we
do in the future, because that will be absolutely critical. If
the enemy gets inside IMD, then the IMD is unsuccessful.
I am trying to remember the last part of your question.
Senator Rosen. Are you forward thinking and forward
budgeting? The budget is the blueprint, so we see what everyone
is using, what the Chairman and Ranking Member have been
talking about. How are you thinking about this for future
budgets? What are you letting us know that we can put as a
placeholder, develop? You name it. We have to take care of it.
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes, ma'am. I will answer one
and then hand it to General Gainey. But one this is, at Missile
Defense Agency we have the technical authority for IAMD, the
technical design for the architecture, and we have spent a lot
of time, over a decade, working on a future joint tactical
integrated fire control architecture with the services, and we
are demonstrating the future capability of how----
Senator Rosen. The future is now, I am afraid.
Lieutenant General Collins. We just recently, at Project
Convergence, Capstone 4, with the Army, demonstrated where we
connected many assets from all the services together through a
demonstration of this joint tactical management capability. We
passed measurement-level data between an F-35 to a C-shooter.
The C-shooter took a shot using F-35 threat data.
Senator Rosen. That is great.
Lieutenant General Collins. So we are continuing to move
that forward. That is an effort that is near and dear to me, to
push this integrated forward.
I will hand it over to General Gainey with some thoughts.
Lieutenant General Gainey. Yes, ma'am, and thanks for your
question. Thanks for the opportunity to be able to respond.
From an Army perspective, I wear the Army hat but also wearing
the Joint hat, IAMD, also.
But looking at the lessons learned I wanted to highlight
earlier that we possess the capability to defeat a threat that
we saw on April 14th. The work we have done with our partners
and the work we have done from a joint perspective has helped
us, and that was put on showcase on the 14th.
The way the Army is moving forward, with our modernization,
right now Patriot system is our cornerstone system. However, as
we modernize with IBCS and we have asked for funding, we are
getting funding to be able to do that, we are now going to move
to more of a layered, tailored approach to the threat. So if we
get a threat strike like we saw on the 14th, we will be
tailored to be able to provide tactical ballistic capability or
cruise missile capability or even drone capability within that
tailored force by the way we are budgeting, modernizing our
capability moving forward.
So I am fully comfortable that the Army is taking those
lessons learned and validates our path forward in modernization
as an Army.
Senator Rosen. Thank you very much.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
[Pause.]
Senator Rounds. Let me begin, General Guillot, based on our
approach right now we have moved back into a near-peer
competitor mode where we have two near peers. If you have to
lay out for the American people what you see as the greatest
threats that you have to defend against right now, share with
me the vectors that you see these offensive weapons coming at
us. What are the weapons that we are defending against today
and that you are working on?
General Guillot. Senator, the range of weapons is greater
than it has been at any time in the past, so starting with the
North Korean threat and the intercontinental ballistic missiles
is probably the longest-range threat that I look at each day.
Next would be the cruise missile threats that are not only air-
launched cruise missiles from Soviet bombers but also
submarine-launched ballistic missiles that come from either
coast, if the adversary submarines get close enough.
The cyber threat. The cyber threat is the most present and
persistent threat that we see. We see it on a daily basis,
attacks from nation states and hacktivists trying to get into
our systems, each day.
Senator Rounds. What about drones?
General Guillot. Drones are certainly an increasing threat.
We see them, on average, reported that are detected in the
NORTHCOM AOR is anywhere from two to five a week over
installations, military installations. That is the only
visibility I have; I know there are certainly more over other
parts of critical infrastructure.
Senator Rounds. Fair to say that our defense of the North
American continent really has been based upon having the
equipment to defend against the ICBM, number one, and to a
lesser degree, the cruise missile, but until recently not a lot
on drones because they are new, and not a lot with regard to
cyber, except that which has moved through the system in the
last 3, 4 years.
General Guillot. Senator, I think that is accurate.
Senator Rounds. If you take a look at the systems that we
use to defend against them, these are very expensive weapons
systems, are they not? The ICBM, the cruise missiles, and so
forth are expensive, and really the equipment that we are
using, our ability to shoot them down is with expensive
systems, as the Chairman identified. But what we are really
talking about here, with regard to ICBMs and cruise missiles,
we are probably going to spend an expensive piece of machinery
to catch up with them and take them out.
But what we are seeing coming across in the Middle East
right now, and in the Red Sea area, we are not talking really
about a lot of ICBMs, but we are talking about cruise missiles,
and we are talking about a huge number of drones.
We are using weapons that were never made to take those
out. Is that a fair statement?
General Guillot. Yes, it is, Senator. To characterize what
you said, we are using expensive weapons on UAVs, and to the
cruise missiles. I think that directed energy, I think that
laser, high-powered microwave capabilities, certainly for the
UAVs, and even would have some capability against cruise
missiles.
Senator Rounds. But the problem, as I understand it, is
that we have not made that move yet. We have not moved--and
this is where I am going to move to what the threat is there
over to General Collins here for just a second. The systems
that you work on today are principally equipment that, as the
Chairman has indicated, are going to be some very expensive
responses to take out ICBMs and cruise missiles. Is that an
accurate statement, sir?
Lieutenant General Collins. Sir, our systems are designed
against ballistic missiles, against ICBMs, but also against
medium-range and short-range ballistic missiles. So the Aegis
standard missile fleet, THAAD, those are also designed for
regional area defense against theater ballistic missile class
weapons. We do not cover down on cruise missiles.
Senator Rounds. What is the least expensive missile defense
system aboard an Aegis carrier, or a Patriot system, what is
the least expensive actual targeting material we have got, per
shot?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Senator, if you are talking Army
air and missile defense systems right now, it is probably our
Stinger. But--and this is what I want to clarify here--the
Joint Counter UAS Office is working the counter-UAS threat, and
we have systems specifically developed for the counter-UAS,
specifically the Coyote interceptor. Which is a significantly
cheaper interceptor than a Patriot or an SM-2 type interceptor.
We are using that capability successfully in theater right now,
and that is what we are using to address that threat. That
organization is continuing to develop technology, work with our
industry partners. We have also been successful with directed
energy, and we are also, in the Army, are fielding a platoon of
high-powered microwave capability that will eventually be able
to be deployed, which will continue to bring down the cost
curve.
So the Army is really investing in directed energy, whether
it is laser or high-powered microwave, and actually fielding it
to the formation. So we have a directed energy, 50-kilowatt
Stryker fielded to 4-60th ADA in support of First Armored
Division, and we are fielding a platoon of high-powered
microwave to 151 ADA support in 1st MDTF.
So those systems are real and out information right now,
and some of them deployed.
Senator Rounds. And just to followup, because this is the
part I think the Chairman was trying to make, is do you have
enough in the budget right now to push those particular
systems, and have they been budgeted for, or do you need your
budgets improved to take advantage of those weapons systems?
Lieutenant General Gainey. I would definitely say we need
to have more, based off of the threat and the numbers of
threats that we are seeing. We will definitely have to have
more.
Senator Rounds. How many of those weapons systems do you
have today?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Total numbers?
Senator Rounds. Yep.
Lieutenant General Gainey. I can give you that number
outside of this forum.
Senator Rounds. Classified?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Yes. I can provide you those
numbers.
Senator Rounds. It is still in the development field,
though?
Lieutenant General Gainey. No. That capability, it is a
prototype and it has not gone to a full-rate production program
of record yet, but it is about to in the next 2 fiscal years.
Because what the Army is doing, we are talking that capability
and we are putting it inside of our divisions. So the first
division set with the counter-UAS capability is being fielded
now, first two divisions, and the third division will start
fielding in fiscal year 2026, where we will actually have
Coyote-based Strykers with that capability on Strykers.
So the Army is moving forward as a program of record with
this capability. It is not there now, but we are moving forward
with it.
Senator Rounds. One last question, just directed back to
General Guillot. Are you incorporating those in the North
American Defense Command today?
General Guillot. We have requested to, Senator.
Senator Rounds. When you say you have requested to, what is
the holdup on it?
General Guillot. Well, let me be clear. We have not
requested Coyotes because of the kinetic capability in the
homeland, but we have requested non-kinetic capabilities and
directed energy weapons for counter-UAS.
Senator Rounds. You have requested them.
General Guillot. That is right. So the first one, Senator,
as General Gainey mentioned, were pushed over to the AOR, were
the CENTCOM area of responsibility. So we are watching closely
the effectiveness there, and then as they learn and this system
is proven, that is what I would like to employ here.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your indulgence.
Senator King. Mr. Cotton. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. You know, as I sit here and I listen to all
this conversation about all the threats we face and all the
inadequacies against those threats--it is great to hear all
this talk of interceptors and directed energy systems--I cannot
help but think maybe the easiest way to defend against all
these missiles and drones would be to just blow them up on the
ground before they ever get off, in warehouses or their
assembly lines. I know none of you are in charge of these
decisions. You all have in your title ``missile defense'' and
``air defense'' and ``space defense,'' and all the rest.
But I think under President Biden, the Department of
Defense may take its name a bit too literally, if you look at
what is happening in Yemen, for instance. All we are doing is
shooting down missiles and drones that are in the air, coming
our sailors or on the launchpad, ready to launch. We are not
actually trying to destroy all of their capabilities. I
understand there are reasons for that. That we cannot
necessarily find and fix them all right now, but that is a
problem in its own right. So you might try to get on offense as
a good defense, rather than just have our sailors as sitting
ducks, like so many of our troops around the region are sitting
ducks.
Speaking of sitting ducks, General Gainey, do you believe
that the Army is providing adequate authority in a timely
manner to unit to defend against drone attacks or surveillance?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Senator, thank you for that
question. In CENTCOM AOR, yes. The great work----
Senator Cotton. Worldwide. Everywhere.
Lieutenant General Gainey.--the great work that has been
done inside of CENTCOM has really set the stage to have
globally relook the way we push authorities down. But that is
obviously, Senator, as you know, because it is a conflict area,
and missiles are being shot at our soldiers, so they have to
have that authority delegated down.
Authorities in CONUS are a little bit more challenging,
and----
Senator Cotton. What about PACOM?
Lieutenant General Gainey. That is within the area air
defense commander's purview on how he delegates his authorities
down to the actual operator to be able to shoot his capability,
and he retains that authority based off of the risk analysis
that he is doing.
Senator Cotton. What about----
Lieutenant General Gainey. he has the ability to pass that
authority all the way down to the operator level, but he
chooses to withhold it now, which is in his authority.
Senator Cotton. What about in Guam?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Same thing, because the area air
defense commander inside of INDOPACOM is the PACAF commander,
he also decides the authorities that are delegated to Guam, and
he has the authority to delegate down further, if he chooses
to.
Senator Cotton. It is my understanding that we have got
quite a few drones flying over our installations on Guam, and
there has been no genuine response. Is that the case?
Lieutenant General Gainey. I am not tracking no general
response. It may be a challenge with where the capability is
located on Guam, because most of the counter-UAS capability is
localized, and I am not sure the situation of how it is----
Senator Cotton. Who would have the authority to engage
drones over Guam?
Lieutenant General Gainey. It would be the local commander.
We delegate the authority for drones to the local commander on
that site, just because of the time and space you have to be
able to delegate it too. So any discussions on delegation of
authorities down even further to the operator would reside on
Guam.
Senator Cotton. Okay. While we are on the topic of Guam,
General Gainey and maybe General Collins, as well, if you want
to chime in, what is the status of the environmental impact
statements for the 20 Guam defense system sites?
Lieutenant General Gainey. As far as the impacts I will
pass that to the Missile Defense Agency, who is doing the
impact statements.
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes, sir. We are still in the
middle of the environmental impact survey process. Our very
first set of MILCON, military construction, money is in the
fiscal year 2025, right now that EIS schedule on critical path.
But we are on track to be able to award those MILCON contracts
on schedule at the beginning of 2025.
Senator Cotton. You said you are in process. When did that
process begin?
Lieutenant General Collins. Well before me. Probably over a
1\1/2\, 2 years ago, is when the process starts.
Senator Cotton. So 18 to 24 months ago, and it will not be
finished for another 7 months, at least?
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. That is bad for like a pipeline or a road,
but that seems especially bad for air defense systems on one of
our most critical forward deployed bases in PACOM.
That is all. Bad.
Senator King. You go ahead. We will have a second round.
Yes, we will have a second round.
Gentlemen, here is my problem, and I realize this is not in
your level. This is Secretary of Defense, President, but high
level of essentially allocation of resources. My problem is
that Defense Department generally, research and development and
construction of directed energy has fallen by 50 percent in the
last 3 years, a little over $1.6 billion to a little under $800
million. Each of the services, the Army in those 3 years, has
fallen from $750 million to $150 million. That is a pretty
dramatic decrease.
My point is this is a major policy discussion, and we need
to have it on our Committee, but I believe your agency has to
have it as well. As I said before, what we have seen in the
Middle East and what we have seen in Ukraine, it seems to me
should cause some soul-searching within an agency whose name is
``missile defense.'' Could we have done what the Israelis and
we and the Arab countries did on April 14th? If the answer to
that question is no, then we really have to go back and
rethink.
Again, we are talking about $80 million interceptors for
ICBMs when, in fact, the more likely attack is going to come
from air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched missiles in the
Arctic Ocean. You know, Sir Isaac Newton could tell you where
an ICBM is going to go, but where a cruise missile,
particularly a hypersonic cruise missile, is going to go is a
very different problem that requires a very different solution,
and economics also has to be part of it.
So I really believe that we need to have a Department-wide,
and frankly on this committee we have to have a discussion
about where we are going, because budgets are policy. We can
talk about research and everything else, but if the budget has
been cut in half, that tells me that this is not a priority for
the Administration or for the Department of Defense.
So that is my comment. When a budget is cut in half that
just tells me it is not very important.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Hill, in the
fiscal year 2025 budget request the Missile Defense Agency
requested $1.2 billion for the defense of Guam. How would these
funds be used to build out Guam's integrated air and missile
defense architecture?
Mr. Hill. So we have initially the missile defense funds
complement, as well, with the Army program. The Army is
fielding programs, and General Gainey can comment in more
detail on that, on the missile defense part. In particular,
there is focus on--it is not the same, but using some of the
launchers, the vertical launchers of that type, and you also
have radar systems.
I probably should refer to General Collins for more
specifics on that program, though.
Senator Fischer. So are you coordinating not just with the
Army but with other partners, as well?
Mr. Hill. The overall coordination for Guam, the
acquisition, is actually an Army office that Congress wanted us
to designate. We did. We designated the Army to lead that,
rather than leading it from within an OSD office. Of course,
that office is coordinating what Missile Defense Agency is
doing and what Army, as well as what Navy is doing.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, I had some questions on
Guam, too, so I am just going to kind of make a comment because
we know the Chinese military has been so provocative in their
plans to attack Guam. They have gone as far as releasing that
commercial in September 2020, of their air force using their H-
6 bomber to attack the island and the U.S. Forces.
So along with everyone else, I just want to make sure we
are taking the adequate measures to deter our adversaries like
China to secure Guam against these similar vulnerabilities that
we have seen in the past. Particularly as we even go back to
1941, with Pearl Harbor. So how are you positioning things?
Mr. Hill. Senator Rosen, sometimes Chinese messaging is not
very subtle, is it?
Senator Rosen. No, it is not.
Mr. Hill. What we did in the missile defense review in
2022, was made a very clear statement that we wanted people to
understand, yes, we can see China. You understand Guam is a
very strategically important piece of the region. In the
missile defense review we made a clear statement; it is also
part of the Homeland of the United States.
Senator Rosen. That is right.
Mr. Hill. Those are American citizens on Guam. They have
been since 1950. So want you to understand that you are not
just talking about any rock out in the Pacific. That is the
United States. So that is part of the deterrence message with
respect to China.
We have also always had the challenge that it has been
within range of North Korean missiles, and that is why you have
batteries there today. But as you are looking at that future
larger question of the Indo-Pacific, if we are deterring war in
the Indo-Pacific over time, this is where you are also trying
to say the ability to project power from Guam is part of
integrated deterrence. You will need to assure that power
projection from Guam, because you have missile defense to
defend our projection, as a part of the overall architecture
that is meant to deter really at the conventional level.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, and that brings me to my last
question, which is implementing the National Security
Supplemental because, well, there is the Indo-Pacific and
certainly there is Israel. So I am going to just really focus
on Israel right now. We have $4 billion for Iron Dome, David's
Sling, $1.2 billion for Iron Beam, which is Israel's directed
energy missile defense system.
General Collins, how are we working to get the funds from
the supplemental out the door and spent, with interceptors
ready to be sent over to Israel so that they can defend
themselves, and could you update us on implementation, General?
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes, Senator. Great question,
and something that we have done a lot of homework ahead of time
as the supplemental went through the process. We are going to
follow the same process we followed a couple of years back when
there was the billion-dollar Iron Dome supplemental in 2022,
through a process called exchange of letters. Those letters are
drafted. Those are now with the supplemental approval. Now we
are taking those through final approval through all the
government agencies that need to approve it. I do not have a
timeline exactly yet of when that is expected to happen, but
those are in work. We have had, from all the different
agencies, State, Department of Defense, everybody, they have
all been in and very cooperative, making sure we can get
through this.
Senator Rosen. We will look forward to seeing that. Thank
you.
Senator King. Final question. Why do we not have Iron Dome?
We helped pay for it. We helped design it. Why do we not have
an Iron Dome system throughout the country? It does not seem to
be terribly expensive. It is proven to be fabulously effective.
Why is that not part of our arsenal?
Lieutenant General Collins. Sir, I think I will start just
once before I hand over to General Gainey, sir. In our
cooperative agreements with Israel we did not pay for the co-
development of Iron Dome. We co-produced Iron Dome. So we were
actually not part of the design phase for Iron Dome. We were
for David's Sling and Arrow weapon system as we go forward. I
just wanted to clarify on the background there.
General Gainey, as far as utility?
Lieutenant General Gainey. Yes. Senator, thanks for that
question. Actually, we did have Iron Dome for a period of time
before we provided it back to Israel on loan for the recent
conflict. So it was in one of our formations, 151 ADA, who
actually trained with it, deployed it, and exercised it.
Senator King. But can it be reproduced?
Lieutenant General Gainey. It probably can, but we, in the
Army, our strategy is not so much a system. As I highlighted,
the integrated battle command system, which is a C-2 system
that integrates several launchers with several sensors to
provide the optimal solutions----
Senator King. Is the system you are describing as effective
as Iron Dome?
Lieutenant General Gainey. It tested out just as effective.
So as we implement it and field it in our formations we will
field just launchers and not a complete system, which will
provide the same capability because it will leverage the
sensors that are already in those formations to provide a
tailorable integrated solution for our Army.
Senator King. Well, I want to thank you again. Today we
have talked about a number of issues. I hope to reconvene this
hearing in a classified setting, maybe several months from now,
because I would like to discuss hypersonic defense. Because to
talk about missile defense without realistically talking about
hypersonic defense is not taking cognizance of the world that
we live in.
But again I want to thank you all very much. It has been
very informative. Thank you for the work that you are doing on
behalf of our country.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:56 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2024
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE ACTIVITIES
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members Present: King, Warren, Rosen, Kelly,
Fischer, Rounds, Cramer, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. The hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services is now in
session. I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today,
and I appreciate your service to the country.
The purpose of our hearing today is to examine the fiscal
year 2025 budget of the Space Force. Mr. Hill, I understand
that you are testifying on Space Force policy issues in lieu of
Dr. Plumb, who has recently left us. I will want to know the
actions that your office has taken to help lower the
classification levels of space programs so that the warfighter
can use them more effectively. Many of these programs are so
highly classified that few, if any, can use them, prohibiting
information sharing in a time of conflict.
Mr. Calvelli, you are responsible for the acquisition of
space assets. In October 2022, you issued a memo on space
acquisition tenets that outlined such commonsense objectives as
don't launch satellites before the ground system to use the
data is complete--pretty good advice; thank you--as well as
efforts to hold the industry accountable for the systems that
they build. I would like to know if you believe that those
tenets are having an impact that you hoped that they would back
in October 2022.
General Guetlein, this is year four of the Space Force as a
separate title 10 service. If you look at the wall, your flag
is there, along with the other service flags. Now that you are
a title 10 service I hope that you can share with us how you
are training to defend our assets in space as well as to help
the warfighter on the ground achieve their objectives if called
upon.
For fiscal year 2025, the Space Force is requesting $29.4
billion, which is a $600 million decrease from the fiscal year
2024 request of $30 billion. General Guetlein, it will be
important to explain to the Committee in open session how this
essentially flat budget, actually declining budget, is
impacting your ability to train and equip our guardians to
support the combatant commands.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us, and
after our short opening statements we will have rounds of 5-
minute questions of our witnesses.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Mr. Hill--are you
correcting us?
Senator King. Yes. He was correcting my pronunciation.
GOOT-line. Sorry about that.
General Guetlein. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King. I am sure I am not the first person to ever
mispronounce your name.
General Guetlein. No, sir. I have grown up with that name
and heard it every which way.
Senator King. Thank you, sir.
Senator Fischer. Secretary Calvelli, Mr. Hill, General
Guetlein, thank you for being here today and for sharing your
perspectives with this Subcommittee, and thank each of you for
your service.
As this Subcommittee knows, our capabilities in space
provide our forces with unparalleled communications, targeting,
and intelligence. Every other service relies on Space Force
capabilities to close the kill chain. Our adversaries know
this, and space is no longer a safe haven. It has not been for
years, and it has taken the Department far too long to openly
acknowledge this.
The fact is we need to be investing more in both offensive
and defensive space systems to counter our adversaries and
safeguard our assets on orbit, and we need a space acquisition
system that can do so effectively and quickly. I look forward
to hearing about progress being made in space acquisition and
what more can be done.
However, we cannot maintain space dominance unless we
provide the Space Force with the resources needed to do so. I
was disappointed by the President's Budget Request, but I hope
to work with my colleagues on this Subcommittee and on the
Appropriations Committee to provide funding for additional
space systems, including one on General Whiting's unfunded
priorities list.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Mr. Hill, are you leading off?
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Hill. Thank you Chairman King and Ranking Member
Fischer and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for inviting us to testify on the Department's fiscal year 2025
space budget.
We are clearly in a time of rapid change in the space
strategic environment, one which does not favor the slow or
those resistant to change. China and Russia are rapidly
fielding space and counter-space capabilities to hold the Joint
Force at risk and to deny us the space-based services on which
we rely. The scale and scope of the threats in space present
significant risks to the American people, to our national
interests, to allies, and partners.
To meet these challenges, and working within the
constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, the President's
Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Requests $33.7 billion for space. Some
of the critical investments include $2.4 billion for National
Security Space Launch; $1.5 billion for more resilient
positioning, navigation, and timing; $4.2 billion for more
resilient and protected satellite communications and the Space
Development Agency's proliferated Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
transport layer; $4.7 billion to develop new missile warning
and missile tracking architectures; and $12.3 billion for a
range capabilities to increase the resiliency of our existing
architectures and protect our interests in space during
competition, crisis, and conflict.
In addition to our space investments, the Department has
made significant progress over the last 2 years on four key
space strategy and policy priorities, which I have detailed at
length in my written testimony. These are space control, space
cooperation, space classification, and commercial space
integration.
In short, we have obtained Presidential guidance to assure
our space missions and to protect and defend the Joint Force
from space-enabled attacks. We have significantly expanded our
space cooperation with allies and partners, charting a path
toward true combined operations in space that will strengthen
our collective deterrence and defense. We have overhauled the
Department's space classification policy to remove unnecessary
barriers to information flow throughout the Joint Force and
with our partners and with industry. We have released the
first-ever Department of Defense Commercial Space Integration
Strategy to harness the commercial sector's incredible
innovation and to enhance our capability, capacity, resilience,
and mission assurance.
Going forward, the Department will continue to press on all
four of these lines of effort. I believe the progress we have
already made together will pay dividends for years to come.
In closing, thank you again to the Committee for its
partnership and for its tireless dedication to the Department
and our servicemembers. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. John D. Hill
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fisher, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you on
the Department's fiscal year 2025 space budget. I am honored to appear
alongside Assistant Secretary Calvelli and General Guetlein. This
written testimony closely follows the testimony of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy before the House Armed Services
Committee on April 30, 2024.
The world is clearly in a time of rapid change in the space
strategic environment, one which does not favor the slow or those
resistant to change. As the United States evaluates the current
security environment, both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
Russia are focused on rapidly fielding space and counterspace
capabilities to hold our Joint Force at risk and deny us the space-
based services on which our Joint Force relies. The President's Space
Budget Request of $33.7 billion for fiscal year 2025--including $25.2
billion in investments for procurement and research, development, test,
and evaluation--will advance a wide array of space capabilities
critical for continued access to the space-based services we rely on
and to ensure the space domain remains safe, stable, secure, and
sustainable. These investments will help protect the Joint Force and
ensure our ability to operate in a contested and congested environment.
fiscal year 2025 space budget request
The President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request of $33.7 billion
for space strikes a balance among current warfighting needs,
modernizing our architecture, and developing new capabilities to
outpace our potential adversaries. This request includes approximately
$8.5 billion for military construction, military personnel, and funding
for operations and maintenance. The budget request also identifies
$25.2 billion in investments in resilient architectures, space command
and control, integrated space fires and protection capabilities,
modernized and agile electronic warfare architecture, enhanced
battlespace awareness and space systems defense, and a range of
capabilities designed to enhance our space control. Important
investments for the Department include:
$2.4 billion for National Security Space Launch, which
will procure 11 launch vehicles to provide assured access to space and
will modernize space launch ranges to support increased commercial use.
$1.5 billion for more resilient positioning, navigation,
and timing (PNT) and Global Positioning System (GPS) III Follow-On
satellite support, including procurement of two GPS III Follow-On
satellites and Next-Generation Operational Control System (OCX)
development.
$4.2 billion for a resilient protected tactical,
wideband, and narrowband communications architecture and the Space
Development Agency's proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) transport
layer development.
$4.7 billion to develop new proliferated Resilient
Missile Warning / Missile Tracking architectures and Next-Generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) space and ground architectures.
$12.3 billion for a range of capabilities to increase
resilience of existing architectures and to enable us to protect our
space interests during competition, crisis, and conflict.
While the depth and breadth of space threats continues to rapidly
expand, we can only meet these challenges through strong and sustained
investments in our space capabilities. The Department cannot operate
effectively or efficiently under repeated continuing resolutions. I
urge Congress to ensure the timely passage of appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2025.
security environment
People's Republic of China (PRC)
According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
(ODNI) 2024 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA), China will probably have
achieved ``world-class status in all but a few space technology areas''
by 2030. The PRC views the space domain, and the ability to deny space
to PRC adversaries, as a critical component of modern warfare. The PRC
has made significant investments in space systems to rapidly expand its
ability to monitor forces across the globe, improve its long-range
precision strike capabilities against U.S. and allied forces, and deter
or deny outside regional intervention. To advance its concept of
``informatized'' warfare, the PRC continues to develop and modernize
space capabilities to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) and to enhance communication, data relays, and PNT
for its forces. The PRC also continues to rapidly develop counterspace
capabilities to hold our on-orbit assets at risk. These capabilities
include electronic warfare systems, direct-ascent anti-satellite
missiles, directed-energy systems such as ground-based lasers,
potential space-based kinetic weapons, and orbiting space robots. To
support its increased investment in space, the PRC is modernizing its
launch capabilities and capacity to reconstitute its space capabilities
if needed.
Russia
Russia is seeking to mitigate U.S. spacepower by developing a range
of offensive counterspace capabilities, including electronic warfare,
directed energy weapons, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile systems,
and orbital systems with counterspace applications. Russia's
investments in counterspace systems are designed to exploit what Russia
views as United States overreliance on space for conducting military
operations and to offset perceived United States Military advantages.
As noted in the ODNI 2024 ATA, Russia will be more reliant on
counterspace capabilities as it rebuilds its ground force from
extensive losses in its war against Ukraine. Russian military doctrine
embraces multi-domain attacks, using both reversible and irreversible
capabilities, to target adversary satellites. Russia has conducted
cyber intrusions against commercial satellite communication networks,
and Russia has demonstrated through both public statements and actions
that it views commercial satellites providing space-based services to
Russia's adversaries as potential targets. Russia is also developing a
concerning anti-satellite capability related to a new satellite
carrying a nuclear device. The Department is extremely concerned that
Russia may be considering the incorporation of nuclear weapons into its
counterspace programs, based on information we deem credible. The
United States has been aware of Russia's pursuit of this sort of
capability dating back years, but only recently have we been able to
make a more precise assessment of their progress. This capability could
pose a threat to all satellites operated by countries and companies
around the globe, as well as to the vital communications, scientific,
meteorological, agricultural, commercial, and national security
services humanity depends upon.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The DPRK is a persistent threat and source of continuing
provocations to both the United States and our allies and partners. The
DPRK continues to pursue its space program, conducting several
reconnaissance satellite launch attempts over the last year in
violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions related to DPRK
use of ballistic missile technology. The DPRK also maintains previously
demonstrated non-kinetic counterspace capabilities, including systems
for jamming communications and GPS signals.
Iran
Iran is continuing to develop its space program. In February, Iran
used Russian launch services to place communications and navigation
satellites into orbit. Iran has also publicly acknowledged its
capabilities to jam satellite communications and GPS signals. Its
continued development of space launch vehicles (SLV), such as the
Simorgh, would shorten the timeline to produce an intercontinental
ballistic missile, if it decided to develop one, because the systems
use similar technologies.
Growing Use of Commercial Space Services
The advantages of space-based services are no longer exclusive to
nations with indigenous space programs. Many space services are now
commodities; for instance, satellite communication services and readily
available, highly detailed satellite imagery can be procured by nascent
space-faring nations and non-State actors alike. The Department greatly
benefits from the innovation of our commercial space sector. We also
recognize that our adversaries and competitors will seek to exploit
satellite imagery, data, communications, and other commoditized
services through illicit means and through commercial entities and
avenues beyond U.S. regulatory regimes. In this respect, space-based
services are no different from goods and services in sectors across the
economy.
space strategy and policy investments
The space domain is critical to U.S. national security and
essential to all four of our National Defense Strategy's priorities.
Our Joint Force relies on space-based services every day to conduct
operations and likewise relies on space control capabilities to protect
itself from space-enabled attack.
Our competitors recognize the importance of space to the United
States, and they continue to develop and field counterspace
capabilities designed to deprive us of the advantages of space during
conflict.
Over the last 2 years, in partnership with Congress, the Department
has made significant progress on four key space strategy and policy
priorities: space control, space cooperation, space classification, and
commercial space integration. To maintain our advantage in space, the
Department will continue to press on these four priorities.
Space Control
In 2022, at the request of the President's national security
advisor, the Department worked with the Intelligence Community to
conduct the Space Strategic Review (SSR). This extensive effort
baselined the entire national security space community on our overall
space posture and where we need to head. Our analysis confirmed that
China is the Department's pacing challenge in the space domain, and
that space is in fact an operational domain where we must defend our
national security interests and counter space-enabled threats. In June
2023, the President approved the Space Security Guidance, affirming the
SSR's recommendations.
As we implement that guidance, our primary means of deterring in
space will be through resilience. The Department continues to adopt
resilient-by-design architectures through a range of approaches,
including disaggregation, distribution, diversification, proliferation,
and protection. One way we are increasing the resilience of our space
capabilities is through the Space Development Agency's proliferated
satellite architecture. In April 2023, the Department launched the
first 10 satellites of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,
followed by an additional 13 satellites 5 months later. This was
accomplished in less than 3 years from contract award to launch, an
accelerated timeline made possible by leveraging commercial satellite
bus lines and existing technologies. This architecture will enhance and
support no-fail missions such as networked communications, missile
warning, missile tracking, and missile defense.
But resilience alone is insufficient to provide mission assurance
or to deny adversaries' uncontested use of space in conflict. The Space
Security Guidance made clear that the United States will defend space
systems, and we will protect and defend our men and women in harm's way
from space-enabled threats, just as we do for threats they face in and
from land, sea, and air. This may require the Department to take action
to ensure that our potential adversaries are unable to rely on their
space systems to find and strike U.S. and allied forces. As part of the
U.S. Government's integrated deterrence strategy, the United States may
leverage counterspace options across all operational domains if
necessary. In doing so, the Department will continue to be a leader in
the responsible use of space to ensure that the domain remains safe,
stable, secure, and sustainable.
The Department continues to advance our Tactically Responsive Space
capabilities to support integrated deterrence and warfighting needs.
Last September, the Victus Nox mission successfully launched, with 24-
hour notice, showcasing our ability to rapidly respond to emerging
situations as well as highlighting the benefits of leveraging
commercial systems, capabilities, and services. A new tactically
responsive space mission, Victus Haze, will exercise a realistic threat
response scenario in an on-orbit space domain awareness demonstration.
That launch is planned for late-2025.
In developing and, if necessary, using our capabilities to protect
the Joint Force, we will ensure that space is safe, stable, secure, and
sustainable so that everyone may benefit from using space for peaceful
purposes. We do not make that commitment lightly. The Department is
leading by example and adheres to the Secretary's Tenets of Responsible
Behavior in Space, which include limiting generation of long-lived
debris, operating in a professional manner with due regard to others,
and avoiding the creation of harmful interference.
The Department also supports this Administration's work to advance
national security norms in space through the United Nations (UN),
including our commitment not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent
anti-satellite missile testing. We also supported this year's United
States-Japan co-drafted U.N. Security Council resolution, which would
have reaffirmed the obligation not to place in orbit around the Earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons, or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction. Concerningly, Russia vetoed that resolution.
Our approach is in stark contrast to the behavior of our
competitors. In the past 20 years, both Russia and China have
irresponsibly and destructively conducted debris-generating direct-
ascent anti-satellite missile tests. And even while both countries
continue to develop, test, and deploy weapons on-orbit, they
simultaneously promote at the U.N. hollow, unverifiable treaties
against the weaponization of space. At the same time Russia and the PRC
refuse to join dozens of others in committing to an actual norm of
responsible behavior: not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-
satellite missile tests. No one wins if space is overrun by debris. We
continue to call on our competitors to demonstrate their commitment to
preserving space as a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable domain.
Space Cooperation
The U.S. network of allies and partners is an asymmetric advantage
that our competitors cannot match. Through space cooperation with our
allies and partners, we broaden the number of systems collectively
available for space operations, both on orbit and on the ground;
strengthen resilience; expand our options for diplomatic and military
responses; and complicate an adversary's decisionmaking. The Combined
Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative, a group of defense representatives
from likeminded nations, continues to be the premier forum for civilian
and military national security space leadership to work toward shared
goals. In December 2023, the CspO Initiative Principals Board welcomed
representatives from Italy, Japan, and Norway as new members of the
body, joining representatives from Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Department is also investing in bilateral space cooperation
around the globe. Last year, my team conducted the first bilateral
space cooperation dialog with the Indian Ministry of Defense. We
advanced discussions with our Japanese partners on finalizing our
unique space domain awareness hosted payload partnership. United
States-Norway collaboration enabled the integration of United States
payloads on two Norwegian satellites to provide 24/7 protected
satellite communications for forces operating in the Arctic. The
Department has been, and will continue to be, committed to expanding
space cooperation to enhance information sharing, set standards for
interoperability, promote responsible behavior, and develop combined
operations in space.
But space cooperation is not only about working with allies and
partners. It is also an important tool we use with our competitors to
navigate challenging issues, avoid misunderstandings, and maintain
stability. Since President Biden's summit with President Xi last year,
my team has been part of bilateral exchanges with their Chinese
counterparts on space security. Both the United States and China have a
vested interest in a safe, secure, stable, and sustainable space
domain, and both sides will benefit from continuing to talk. The United
States and China conducted an initial consultation on bilateral arms
control and nonproliferation in November 2023, which included a
discussion of space security issues. Since then, the United States has
sought a substantive response from the PRC on concrete ways to reduce
strategic risk, including instituting bilateral pre-notifications of
strategic ballistic missile test launches or adopting measures to
deconflict activities in space. Unfortunately, the PRC has declined a
follow-on meeting and has not provided a substantive response to our
suggested options.
Space Classification
Our ability to work closely with allies and partners in the space
domain, and our ability to use our space capabilities to protect and
defend the Joint Force, requires the right information getting to the
warfighter at operationally relevant speeds. But that information flow
continues to be significantly hampered by the overclassification of
space activities.
In coordination with Defense and Intelligence Community
stakeholders, my team spent more than a year completely rewriting a 20-
year-old legacy space classification policy, which reflected priorities
of a different time and a different security environment. That legacy
policy limited our ability to share information within the Department,
limited our ability to cooperate with our allies and partners, and
limited the ability of our industry partners to provide cost effective
and timely solutions to difficult problems. Ultimately, it limited our
ability to adequately plan and train for conflict as we must in this
era.
In December 2023, Deputy Secretary Hicks approved our entirely new
space classification policy. Across the Pentagon, there is now a
concerted effort to implement that policy and decrease the siloed
nature of space activities. The Military Services are reviewing
programs to reduce their classification to a level that benefits the
warfighter. And we are leaning forward on how much we can share with
our allies and partners, including industry, to allow more meaningful
cooperation.
Our goals are to enable better integration of space in joint and
combined operations, ensure that classified capabilities are accounted
for in war plans and exercises, and still maintain protections for
information appropriate to today's needs. Over time, the new policy
should dramatically improve information flow and reduce the time and
money required to build future systems.
Commercial Space Integration
Just last month, in April 2024, the Department released its first-
ever Commercial Space Integration Strategy. Shortly after, the U.S.
Space Force released a service-level strategy, nested under the broader
DOD document. This marks a new effort to harness the remarkable
innovation of the commercial space sector to enhance our resilience and
strengthen integrated deterrence.
To protect our men and women in uniform and ensure the space
services they rely on will be available when needed, the Department has
a responsibility to leverage all tools available. That includes
commercial solutions.
From more mature capabilities such as launch, space domain
awareness, and satellite communications, to emerging capabilities such
as on-orbit mobility and logistics, the commercial sector's ability to
innovate, scale production, and rapidly refresh technology is opening
the door to all kinds of possibilities.
Our National Defense Strategy directed the Department to increase
collaboration with the commercial space sector and leverage its
technological advancements and entrepreneurial spirit. The Department's
new Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the U.S. Space Force's
companion Commercial Space Strategy follow through on that directive.
The degree to which commercial space capabilities and services can
benefit U.S. national security will ultimately be measured by how well
the Department can actually integrate commercial solutions into the way
we operate, not just in peacetime, but also in conflict. To accomplish
this, as Secretary Austin wrote in the foreword to the strategy, the
Department needs ``to eliminate the structural, procedural, and
cultural barriers to overcoming legacy practices and preconceived
notions of how the commercial sector can support national security.''
Over the last year, my team engaged directly with space
stakeholders across the Department, with interagency partners, and with
commercial space entities of all sizes. We hosted roundtables, tabletop
exercises, and informational sessions to better understand how
commercial space solutions could support the Department, while also
accounting for the commercial sector's interests. Informed by that body
of work, our new strategy directs the Department to pursue four lines
of effort for commercial space integration: (1) ensure access to
commercial space solutions across the spectrum of conflict; (2) work to
achieve integration prior to crisis; (3) establish the security
conditions necessary to integrate commercial space solutions and help
commercial providers reduce risk; and (4) support the development of
new commercial space capabilities that have the potential to support
the Joint Force.
This is an important new effort that leverages American ingenuity
to enhance the resilience of our national security space architecture
and strengthen deterrence. The strategy is deliberately unclassified to
be transparent about what we need to achieve, and to hold ourselves
accountable for what we have committed. I am confident it will pay
dividends for the Department for years to come.
conclusion
Space capabilities are essential to overall military effectiveness
and central to the Department's integrated deterrence strategy. As we
contend with a dynamic security environment, the Department remains
committed to making critical space investments to deter our competitors
and prevail in conflict should deterrence fail.
Thank you to the Subcommittee for your tireless dedication to the
Department and our servicemembers, and for the opportunity to come and
speak with you today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator King. Mr. Calvelli. Secretary Calvelli.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITION AND INTEGRATION
Mr. Calvelli. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify before you today.
With the growing threats in space we must continue to
transform our space architecture to be more proliferated and
more resilient so that it can always be counted on during times
of peace, crisis, or conflict. As the Service Acquisition
Executive for Space, I am focused on two things: driving speed
in our acquisitions and delivering programs on cost and
schedule. I would like to highlight some of the progress we
have made since I testified before this Committee last year.
Since the spring of 2023, the Space Development Agency has
delivered 27 satellites to orbit, nearly all of them in around
3 years from contract award. This includes 8 new missile
warning/missile tracking satellites and 19 data transport
satellites. With these systems, we have been able to
demonstrate the first-ever Link 16 network connection from
space, a capability that will allow warfighters to extend
beyond-line-of-sight messages.
The Space Rapid Capabilities Office completed and is in the
process of fielding the first 11 of 24 low-cost, transportable,
terrestrial satellite communications jammers. These jammers
went from contact award to fielding in about 18 months.
Additionally, last June, Space RCO completed an on-orbit
testing of its enhanced threat awareness payloads, and
delivering those payloads to the Space Force programs to use.
Meanwhile, the Space Systems Command (SSC) continues to
make outstanding progress toward modernizing both our missile
warning and military satellite communications architectures to
be more resilient. Space Systems Command launched the first
Weather System Follow-on Microwave satellite last month to
support the pivot to a more resilient, disaggregated, hybrid
weather architecture to meet warfighter requirements.
Last September, Space Systems Command's Tactically
Responsive Space mission, known as VICTUS NOX, demonstrating
the ability to go from factory floor to on-orbit operations in
less than 5 days.
Since April 2023, there have been 7 national security space
launches that delivered critical warfighting capabilities to
orbit.
SSC is also adding resilience through allied partnerships.
For example, they delivered two enhanced polar system payloads,
which will be hosted on Space Norway satellites that will be
dual-launched this July, providing protective satellite
communications in the Arctic region. Space Systems Command even
broke ground last summer, in Australia on the Deep Space
Advanced Radar Capability Site 1, and will award design
contract for Site 2 this summer with the United Kingdom. This
partnership with Australia and the U.K. is critical to our
space demand awareness mission.
We are also continuing to take advantage of strong space
industrial base, including awarding contracts to many
nontraditional space companies and implementing our recently
published Commercial Space Strategy.
Simultaneously, we are aggressively tackling challenging
programs to get them over the finish line. We are focused on
delivering the GPS Next-Gen Operational Control Segment, also
known as OCX, and making significant progress toward getting
the system ready to transition to operations in 2025.
Another one of our challenging programs, ATLAS [Advanced
Tracking and Launch Analysis System], has made significant
progress. The program is on schedule to incrementally deliver
space demand awareness command and control capabilities next
year to enable finally the decommissioning of the legacy SPADOC
[Space Defense Operations Center] system.
We have also proven now that we can build small satellites
quickly. However, as we begin to deliver the next tranche of
SDA [Space Development Agency] satellites this fall, getting
the military services to adopt and use these satellites will be
a key success to our systems. Likewise, our ability to maintain
a short access to space for our space capabilities remains
paramount, and launch providers must be ready to scale to meet
the increased demand.
We are also working to move programs out of Special Access
Program stovepipes, thanks to DOD's Space Classification Policy
update this past December. This will improve our ability to
integrate spaces for other domains and enable better sharing
with our allies.
Overall, we are doing a lot by simultaneously transforming
our space architecture to make it more resilient, and at the
same time investing in those protect-and-defend missions that
we need to do to guarantee the advantage we get from space and
protect the Joint Forces.
As we continue to drive speed into our acquisitions, our
job and our top priority as acquisition professionals is
centered around program execution. Simply defined, it means
delivering programs on cost, on schedule, that work. We are
taking a special interest in making sure that up front, when we
develop our action strategies and RFP documents, or request for
proposal documents, that they are realistic and executable,
that we implement source selection strategies that lead us to
awarding contracts with achievable cost and schedule baselines,
and to a contractor with the right expertise, skills, and staff
to do the job, and then once under contract, relentlessly
managing the program based on the daily basis to ensure we
deliver on cost and on schedule. Given the threats and
increased capabilities of our competitors, it is critical that
we deliver programs on cost and schedule, and this is a key
focus area for me.
Thank you to the Subcommittee for all your support. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvelli follows:]
Prepared Statement by Honorable Frank Calvelli
overview
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you
today.
We continue to face an unprecedented strategic competitor in China,
and our space environment continues to become more contested,
congested, and competitive. We have seen exponential growth of in-space
activity, including counterspace threats, and our adversaries would
seek to deny us the advantage we get from space during a potential
conflict.
To counter these threats, we continue to drive resiliency and
transform our space architecture through proliferation, orbit
diversification, disaggregation, utilization of commercial
capabilities, cyber hardening, and collaboration with Allies and
partners. Furthermore, my top initiative remains to drive speed into
our space acquisitions and deliver programs on cost and schedule. The
threat environment demands we deliver capabilities fast enough to
detect threatening behavior in space, deny adversary advantage, deter
aggressive actions, and, if necessary, defeat adversaries during a
conflict.
Today I want to talk to you about how we are transforming the space
architecture, the near-term capabilities we are delivering, the
remaining challenges, and how I am managing the space acquisition
enterprise to drive change and get after the threat with speed.
continuing to transform the space architecture
The Space Force continues to pivot to a proliferated and resilient
missile warning and missile tracking (MW/MT) architecture in low Earth
orbit and medium Earth orbit (MEO) that focuses on tracking advanced
threats by integrating critical missile tracking capabilities that
previously did not exist. As we develop and deliver this new
capability, we are also developing the Next Generation Overhead
Persistent Infrared (OPIR) program, comprised of the Next Generation
OPIR Geosynchronous (Next Gen GEO) and Next Gen OPIR Polar missile
warning systems, as a bridge to enable the eventual transition to the
resilient MW/MT architecture.
We continue to transform our military satellite communications
(SATCOM) by disaggregating our strategic and tactical satellite
architectures and leveraging new proliferated LEO capabilities. This
approach adds resiliency and ensures our systems can operate through
contested and degraded environments.
In collaboration with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), we
are developing a ground moving target indicator (GMTI) solution to meet
Combatant Command requirements. This capability will provide actionable
information on adversary surface targets that the Space Force will
deliver to the Joint Force. We selected this partnership with the NRO
because their concept allows us to go faster, with less technical risk,
and at lower cost. Again, acquisition speed is a top factor in our
decisionmaking, and the partnership with the NRO allows us to develop
space-based GMTI faster. Milestone B for this program will take place
later this year.
Maintaining constant awareness of the battlespace, supplemented by
the capability to accurately produce indications and warnings for
malign behavior, is critical to the Space Force avoiding operational
surprise. To that end, our space domain awareness architecture
leverages partnerships and data across the national security space
enterprise and commercial sources to ensure we have a resilient,
integrated, and diverse sensor architecture. We continue to invest in
SILENTBARKER and the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC).
The DARC program exemplifies international collaboration within the
trilateral partnership agreement between the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia, known as AUKUS. Earlier this year, we broke
ground on DARC Site 1 at Harold E. Holt Naval Station, Australia.
DARC extends the Space Force's umbrella of awareness in the space
domain by establishing a clear picture of the operating environment and
denying adversaries the ability to strike U.S. assets without warning.
This summer, the DARC Site 2 design contract will be awarded for the
planned United Kingdom location.
While awareness of the battlespace is critical, the ability to deny
or defeat threats in, from, and to space is paramount. We are investing
in classified programs that include capabilities to counter an
adversary from using space to attack the U.S. Homeland or the Joint
Force. These investments, which cannot be discussed in detail in an
unclassified setting, are fundamental to ensuring space superiority.
Maintaining assured access to space is vital to delivering
capabilities to orbit when needed. With the growing launch demand and
number of emerging launch providers, we designed the National Security
Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 strategy to pursue, for the first time, a
dual-lane hybrid contracting approach to maximize access to commercial
launch partners.
Lane 1 in NSSL Phase 3 allows an unlimited number of launch service
providers to compete for our less complex missions that have higher
risk tolerance. Lane 1 enables us to tap into new technologies as
emerging providers and capabilities are ready. Lane 2 maintains our
full mission assurance posture to support our toughest missions. While
Lane 2 closely mirrors the current procurement approach in NSSL Phase
2, we added a third launch provider to promote the necessary resiliency
in launching our most challenging and critical payloads.
delivering capability
In February 2024, the Space Force's Space Development Agency (SDA),
in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), successfully
launched the final four Tranche 0 Tracking Layer satellites of the
Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) together with MDA's
two Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor satellites. This
collaboration will enable simultaneous testing of SDA's MW/MT sensors
with MDA's fire control sensors on the same exercise targets, from the
same orbit, and deliver the quality data required to analyze and defeat
advanced missile threats. Furthermore, this launch marked the final
delivery of SDA's Tranche 0 constellation, culminating 27 total
satellites delivered to orbit in nearly 3 years from contract award.
Later this year, SDA will start delivering roughly 160 Tranche 1
satellites over 10 launches in 11 months. SDA's vendors are currently
building all Tranche 1 satellites and the accompanying ground
infrastructure, including two new network operations centers that are
on track for delivery later this year.
Not only are we demonstrating our ability to develop and
proliferate with speed, but we are also introducing non-traditional
prime vendors in Tranche 2. Incorporating new industry partners
enhances our resiliency and increases our advantage against strategic
competitors. These new vendors also demonstrate an encouraging
industrial base response to our spiral development model of competing
new tranches every 2 years.
We also kicked off this year with the successful first
certification flight of United Launch Alliance's (ULA) Vulcan Centaur
launch vehicle. This marks an important milestone on our path toward
ending United States reliance on the Russian-made RD-180 engines that
are used on Atlas V launch vehicles. The last Department of Defense
(DOD) Atlas V launch is scheduled for this fall.
Fiscal year 2024 marked the final order year of NSSL Phase 2 and
supports launches through 2027. We will award our NSSL Phase 3
contracts this year for launch service orders beginning in fiscal year
2025.
This April, Space Systems Command launched the first Weather System
Follow-on Microwave (WSF-M) satellite. WSF-M is designed to replace the
critical microwave capabilities of our legacy Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program satellites which will reach end of life in 2026. WSF-
M is equipped with a microwave imager to collect weather data such as
ocean surface vector winds and tropical cyclone intensity, as well as
snow depth, soil moisture, and sea ice characterization. This launch
marks a critical step toward improving the collection of weather data
in support of warfighter requirements.
In the same month, the Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS) program
released its request for proposals (RFP) for the constellation's
initial four satellites. ESS is the future backbone for Joint All-
Domain Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications, and will replace
Advanced Extremely High Frequency system services to provide global,
integrated, survivable, resilient, and dynamic ground and satellite
communications for assured strategic endurance. Contract award is
targeted in fiscal year 2025 to achieve Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) by 2032.
We continue our commitment to provide highly accurate timing,
three-dimensional positioning, and navigation information, in any
weather, to an unlimited number of military and civilian users,
anywhere on or above the surface of the Earth. In fiscal year 2025, we
are procuring two additional Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIF
vehicles. Currently, there are 31 GPS satellites in operation, and
another four in storage. Simultaneously, we are researching additional
resilient positioning, navigation, and timing options, which may become
a transformational effort in the future.
Another critical capability launching this year is Geosynchronous
Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP). GSSAP remains our hallmark
program for space domain awareness. It is imperative we get this
capability on orbit to support our warfighters by the end of the year.
Additionally, the Ground-Based Optical Sensor System program is on
track to deliver upgrades to the Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep
Space Surveillance system at the White Sands Missile Range and Maui
sites in fiscal year 2025 and fiscal year 2026, respectively. These
upgrades, which include replacement of legacy optics, camera hardware,
and software, are projected to allow the sites to make valuable space
domain awareness contributions for the next 20 years, and will enable
increased sensitivity and improved search rate, accuracy, and
throughput.
To ensure our warfighters can count on space capabilities
throughout the spectrum of conflict, we must maintain robust
cybersecurity and cyber defense. As an example of cyber defense, we
recently awarded a new task order for Defensive Cyber Operations--
Space, consolidating and centralizing the current contracting vehicles
to provide improved terms and cost control, and enhancing our
cybersecurity posture and resilience.
challenges
Transforming the space architecture to combat the threat requires
us to deliver warfighter capabilities on cost and schedule. Some
challenging legacy programs remain, but we are aggressively managing
these programs to ensure they deliver.
The three long-standing troubled programs, GPS Next Generation
Operational Control Segment (OCX), Advanced Tracking and Launch
Analysis System (ATLAS), and Military GPS User Equipment Increment 1
(MGUE Inc 1), need to get over the finish line.
OCX continues to be a challenging program. OCX is a prime example
of the difficulty in tackling complex satellite command and control
(C2) systems and extremely large software development all at once, a
practice I am working to ensure is not repeated in the future. We are
anticipating government acceptance of OCX later this year and
completing the final Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) milestone of
Ready to Transition to Operations in spring 2025. We are getting close
to completing the baseline effort and need Congress' support with
stable funding to ensure OCX can deliver.
ATLAS has made significant progress since we broke the program into
more manageable deliverables. The program is now on schedule to deliver
capability by September 2025 that, when coupled with existing Space
Force C2 systems, will provide sufficient capability to enable the
decommissioning of the legacy Space Defense Operations Center system.
MGUE Inc 1 is improving. Since the January 2021 re-baseline, MGUE
Inc 1 has successfully completed several major milestones in line with
the APB. The final milestone for the ground system circuit card was
completed in March 2021, and that card is in production. The aviation/
maritime card completed Manufacturing Readiness Assessment in May 2023,
enabling it to enter Low-Rate Initial Production. MGUE Inc 1 remains on
track to meet its two remaining APB milestones: Program Executive
Officer (PEO) Certification for the U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class
Destroyer and the U.S. Air Force B-2 Bomber. The program will work
through follow-on developmental and operational testing in fiscal year
2025, which is expected to result in formal delivery and close-out of
MGUE Inc 1.
In addition to these legacy troubled programs, another program I am
watching closely is Next Gen GEO. The Next Gen GEO program must deliver
the primary mission payload this spring and continue to make progress
and stay on schedule for Vehicle 1. The payload is in test, but over a
year late. We cannot afford delays, and I am engaging with this program
frequently to mitigate further slips.
Furthermore, launch is foundational to our ability to deliver
critical capabilities to orbit, and we need the commercial launch
industry ready to meet the growing demand. Over the last 5 years, ULA
averaged only six to seven launches per year, and now, with the growth
in demand, needs to significantly increase its cadence to around twice
a month. ULA's ability to ramp up starts with the successful completion
of the second Vulcan certification flight. Failure to complete the
second certification flight will delay the launch of critical national
security payloads this year, including GPS III-7, USSF-106, and USSF-
87. In parallel, Blue Origin needs to scale its production of BE-4
engines. We are keeping an eye on whether these two companies can scale
to meet our needs.
We have proven we can build small satellites quickly. As we start
to deliver PWSA operational ground and 126 Tranche 1 Transport Layer
satellites this fall, adoption and use of Tranche 1 next year will be
key.
Finally, thanks to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy's efforts in rewriting DOD's Space Classification Policy in
December 2023, we are working on recommendations for the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to move large amounts of critical program
information out of Special Access Program stovepipes. Reducing
classification barriers will significantly improve our ability to
integrate space with other domains and enable better sharing with our
Allies and partners.
managing the space acquisition enterprise
I have issued three sets of guidance to the space acquisition
workforce since my confirmation in April 2022 that define our space
acquisition tenets, the formula for going fast in space acquisition,
and a list of essential program management skills. This guidance is key
to improving the space acquisition enterprise.
In October 2022, I established strategic acquisition guidance
outlining nine Space Acquisition Tenets (Appendix A) that formed the
basis of a new direction to transform our space acquisition enterprise.
These nine tenets strike at the core issues that slow us down. To
emphasize how the tenets enable speed, last year I shared a simple
formula for going fast in space acquisition (Appendix B), which now
serves as the cornerstone of our approach to build resilient
architectures faster. The tenets and formula provide the vision for how
our space acquisition workforce will deliver space capabilities to
outpace the threats. Aligned with this vision, our space acquisition
workforce is adopting a culture of speed and must hone the essential
program management skills outlined in the guidance I issued in December
2023 (Appendix C) to be successful.
When the tenets, formula, and essential skills are applied, our
space acquisition enterprise will transform the space architecture
while continuing to provide crucial capabilities for our Nation. This
approach is all about speed in space acquisitions and can be applied to
all systems in all orbits to get capabilities to the warfighter on
operationally relevant timelines.
While designed to focus on speed, the formula yields additional
benefits, including enhanced workforce satisfaction and faster
technology refresh. First, the workforce can participate in an entire
acquisition from start to launch in just 3 years. With a traditional 7-
to 10-year large development effort, we see significant personnel
turnover during that timeframe. Typically, the government would have at
least three different program managers over the course of a program--
generally one program manager gets the program started, the next one
gets the program through Critical Design Review, and the next one may
get to IOC. By doing shorter development cycles, a single program
manager and their team will be able to see the entire acquisition
through and will be accountable for the entire end-to-end effort.
Therefore, the team will have more ownership, which has positive
implications for both the government and industry workforces.
Second, we have the opportunity for significantly faster technology
refresh. Using the formula, technology refresh occurs every 3 years.
Compare that with larger traditional space acquisitions where
technology insertion and refresh are measured in 10, 15, or even more
years depending on the program. The formula inherently drives faster
modernization of our space assets, by allowing the on-ramp of new
technologies every 3 years.
So now that we have the tools, we need to execute. Our job and our
top priority as acquisition professionals is centered around execution.
Simply defined, this means we must deliver programs on cost and
schedule that work.
My focus is on ensuring that our acquisition strategy and RFP
documents are realistic and executable. This means that our source
selection plans must lead to awarding executable contracts. These are
contracts with realistic and achievable cost and schedule baselines,
performed by contractors with the right expertise, skills, and staff to
do the job. Once under contract, we must proactively manage program
baselines to deliver systems that work on cost and schedule.
Delivering on schedule is important because we must be ready to
secure U.S. interests in, from, and to space, which includes supporting
the Joint Force. Given the threats and increased capabilities of our
competitors, and with our relatively flat funding, delivering on cost
is more critical than ever. Every time we overrun a program, we
basically rob our future efforts to modernize or do anything new, which
does not allow us to stay ahead of threats to U.S. interests. We also
stifle future innovation by limiting investment dollars to cover
schedule slips and cost overruns. We simply cannot afford to do this
anymore.
To maintain focus on execution, I remain committed to a battle
rhythm of proactive, frequent engagement and periodic strategic reviews
of our programs with my portfolio managers and PEOs. I continue to
conduct status reviews with each of my PEOs every 2 weeks to discuss
the status of programs within their purview. I also hold Quarterly
Program Reviews for a deeper program analysis. During these quarterly
reviews, the government program managers present the technical,
schedule, cost, and staffing status, open risks and issues, upcoming
activities, and an overall assessment of program health. Troubled
programs continue to receive deliberate attention and targeted
intervention to return them to a healthy status. Holistically, these
reviews enable my workforce and me to ensure all our programs remain
focused on delivering rapid, resilient, and integrated capabilities to
our warfighters, on cost and on schedule.
I also continue to use the Space Acquisition Council (SAC) as a
mechanism for fostering integration. Thanks to Congress, the SAC
continues to be an integration forum among key leaders in the national
security space community. Monthly meetings have covered a wide range of
key topics with all major space stakeholders. The SAC remains a
valuable tool to ensure coordination and synchronization of the
national security space enterprise.
conclusion
We continue to transform the space architecture to be more
resilient and provide additional capabilities for the Joint Force. Our
focus is on speed in our acquisitions and delivering programs on cost
and schedule.
Thank you to the Subcommittee for all your support to the Space
Force and space acquisition. I look forward to your questions.
Senator King. General Guetlein.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL A. GUETLEIN, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
SPACE OPERATIONS
General Guetlein. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
your continued support and for the opportunity to testify on
the Space Force's posture for fiscal year 2025.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Frank
Kendall, and the Chief of Space Operations, General B. Chance
Saltzman, I am honored to share that we are wholly dedicated to
forging a new service, purpose built for great power
competition. Space has never been more critical to the security
of our Nation, and the success or failure of the Joint Force
depends heavily on the capabilities that we present.
Repeated actions by both the Russian Federation and the
People's Republic of China underscore the urgency for action.
Although we still may control the space over our competitors,
they are working hard to close the gap and assert their
dominance in space. We cannot afford to let this happen.
Space is the foundation for the Joint Force, and it is
fundamental to our peaceful way of life. GPS [Global
Positioning System] alone is an essential part of every aspect
of our daily lives, from our cellphones to our banking systems,
and even to our ability to get crops out of the field and
groceries to the shelves. We cannot let our near peer
competitors overtake us or we will lose what we hold dear. If
we fail to keep pace and ultimately surrender our lead in
space, every space-enabled benefit we enjoy today will be at
risk, and the world will become a far more dangerous place.
We must maintain control of the domain in order to defend
the United States and to protect the Joint Force from space-
enabled attack. With only 3 percent of the DOD's budget, the
Space Force offers a tremendous value proposition to the
Nation. Every dollar invested in space brings asymmetric
returns. But that also means that every dollar cut creates
asymmetric risk.
Make no mistake. If we are to deter, and if necessary,
defeat aggression in space and across the globe, we must
continue to invest in the United States Space Force. Against a
near peer adversary, control of space is the linchpin. Without
it we cannot deter conflict, without it we cannot provide vital
effects, without it we cannot protect the Joint Force, and
without it, we cannot win.
The Space Force's theory of success includes three parts:
avoid operational surprise, deny first mover advantage, and
conduct responsible operations in space. The Space Force's
budget request aligns with these priorities and is designed to
support the National Defense Strategy by building training and
equipping the Forces the Nation needs to preserve freedom of
action in space while deterring and denying adversarial
objectives.
Avoiding operational surprise requires us to maintain an
accurate understanding of the space domain at all times. 8.3
percent of our budget is dedicated to the same. Operating
across disaggregated sensor frameworks, the Space Force
provides the maximum information possible to decisionmakers
from the tactical to the strategic level.
Denying first mover advantage demands that we make an
unwarranted attack against the United States impractical and
self-defeating, 43.4 percent of our budget is devoted to this
objective, investing in resiliency from missile warning and
tracking, satellite communications, and position navigation and
timing.
Finally, responsible operations in space describes a
mechanism by which the Space Force contests and controls the
space domain, 24.7 percent of the fiscal year 2025 Space Force
budget is dedicated to this effort. Within the constraints of
the Fiscal Responsibility Act, the fiscal year 2025 Space Force
budget reflects hard choices, and as a result, slows the pace
of transformation and modernization. Addressing these
challenges depends on guardians that are trained and ready to
meet the high-tech demands of space operations. For that reason
I would like to personally thank this Committee for its support
of the Space Force Personnel Management Act. This will be a
major force multiplier in the Space Force's efforts to
modernize the way we recruit, build, and retain talent.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Space Force's
fiscal year 2025 budget and posture. In the face of
accelerating threats, the guardians have clearly demonstrated
the capability, the resolve, and the expertise necessary to
face the challenges posed by our near peer competitors, but
there is more to do. The support of this Committee enables our
guardians to continue to preserve and expand our strategic
advantage and outperform any pacing challenge.
I look forward to working with you as we defeat tomorrow's
challenges together, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Guetlein follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael A. Guetlein
introduction
Chair Hirono; Ranking Member Sullivan; distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
body, and the American public, on the military readiness of the Space
Force and our continued efforts to sustain such readiness into the
future. On behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Frank
Kendall, and the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), General B. Chance
Saltzman, I am honored to share the Space Force's readiness vision for
fiscal year 2025.
Space superiority is the foundation of the Joint Force, and we
cannot achieve joint success without it. The demand for space forces
outpaces resources by a significant margin. If we want to remain on
top, the Nation must continue to invest in the United States Space
Force and develop the capabilities to deter and if necessary, defeat
aggression in space and around the globe. The Space Force must be
resourced to protect our critical space-based services from adversary
attacks, and to deny an adversary the hostile use of its space
capabilities against our personnel.
Since its creation, the Space Force has pushed the boundaries of
what it means to be a Military Service. Our guardians demonstrate the
unique capability, resolve, and experience necessary to effectively
secure and control the space domain in support of our Nation's defense.
Even so, our competitors continue to mature their counterspace
capabilities, both publicly and covertly, which is why the Space Force
must remain vigilant to retain its readiness and capability advantages.
Recent actions by both the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China, including space-related cyber-attacks, direct ascent
anti-satellite demonstrations, and counterspace weapons development,
demonstrate they do not seek peaceful access to space; but rather
intend to conduct aggressive actions that could deny the United States
the free use and benefits of space. Reports concerning specific
counterspace capabilities exhibit the extent these threats pose to our
Service members, the American public, and our very way of life. The
United States Space Force will continue to significantly contribute to
our Nation's integrated deterrence and resolve to maintain the most
effective space forces in the world.
As Secretary Kendall and General Saltzman recently unveiled in
February 2024, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) is undergoing a
Department-wide effort to optimize the way both the Air Force and Space
Force organize, train, and equip to meet the PRC pacing challenge. In
the face of rising threats and dangerous shifts in the strategic
environment, the DAF designed this effort to enhance our ability to
effectively deter our competitors, and ultimately, prevail in conflict
should such deterrence fail. We have seen these threats emerge rapidly,
particularly in space as it has transformed from a benign environment
to a contested domain. To address these challenges, the Space Force
will reoptimize its readiness to meet the pacing challenge. At the
direction of Secretary Kendall and General Saltzman, the Space Force
is:
Establishing Space Futures Command as a fourth Field
Command to develop and validate concepts, conduct experimentation and
wargames, and perform mission area design;
Formalizing Space Force Combat Squadrons as our Units of
Action and accelerating implementation of the Space Force Generation
model (SPAFORGEN);
Delivering an Operational Test and Training
Infrastructure (OTTI) to provide our guardians with the most realistic,
dynamic, and effective training solutions available anywhere.
Implementing readiness standards that reflect operations
under contested conditions rather than those of a permissive
environment;
Conducting a series of nested and synchronized exercises
in the Space Force that increase inscope and complexity, fit within a
broader DAF-level framework, and progress through a Service-level,
data-driven process to measure readiness;
Activating service components within Combatant Commands,
providing commanders with space integration and synchronization assets
they need to conduct all domain operations; and
Redesigning career paths to produce guardians that meet
our high-tech operational demands.
Meeting the pacing challenge, while also managing acute and
persistent threats, requires the Space Force to retain both agility and
expertise; one without the other risks unacceptable tradeoffs to our
strategic interests, the safety of our people and assets, and continued
peaceful access to space. Underpinning our success in, from, and to the
space domain is the Space Force's ability to field combat-ready forces
and ensure our guardians have the tools, training, and equipment
required to prevail in a modern, all-domain fight. Continuing to fund
Space Force readiness will remain essential to our Nation's defense now
and in the future. The President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request
appropriately balances our readiness requirements to deter aggression
and be prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary.
evolving space force readiness in fiscal year 2025
Future Force Design
Since its inception, the Space Force has taken steps to improve its
force design structure and ``right-size'' its acquisition, talent
management, and organizational strategies to best serve its organize,
train, and equip mission set. Through the Space Warfighting Analysis
Center (SWAC), we initiated a methodical process to produce the most
ideal set of future capabilities required for existing and emerging
operational needs, threats, and costs.
Recognizing the need to effectively implement future force designs,
we are prioritizing efforts to be forward-looking and maintain long-
term readiness advantages in both capability and posture. As such, the
CSO [Chief of Space Operations] ordered the establishment of a Space
Futures Command aimed at providing better-defined structure, processes,
and integration of our force design efforts. This new Field Command
will develop and validate concepts, conduct experimentation and
wargames, and perform mission area design.
Joint operations require extensive inclusion of space capabilities.
A Space Futures Command will ensure the Space Force force design is
comprehensive with technically sound capabilities, innovative doctrinal
approaches to force employment, force structures organized for
resilience and effectiveness, and training practices designed to retain
competitive advantages in the face of the pacing challenge. We must
have greater awareness of the materiel and assets our force requires,
and the corresponding facilities and personnel needed to accomplish our
missions. We must incorporate more proactive and applicable leadership
and educational opportunities for our service members, and we must
strengthen our people and facilities for the challenges ahead. This is
a Department of Defense (DOD)-wide effort, but as the newest service,
the Space Force has both the most ground to cover and the most agility
to deliver operationally effective warfighting capabilities.
Effective force design analysis and recommendations are essential
to delivering well-equipped, combat ready space forces, and the Space
Force will leverage Space Futures Command to ensure high-fidelity
modeling and analysis that balances fulfilling current operational
requirements while transitioning to the force we need today.
Commercial Space Strategy
The pacing challenge requires that the United States, and the Space
Force in particular, leverage the full breadth and depth of our
commercial sector. The United States retains a significant advantage in
commercial activities, which offer us key opportunities to bolster our
space capabilities and sustain our readiness posture, while
simultaneously stimulating the space economy and enabling competition,
rapid innovation, and cost-effectiveness. Our commercial partners
afford us the ability to exploit what we have, buy what we can, and
build only what we must; particularly as space has become an
increasingly competitive and contested domain.
The commercial sector of the United States space enterprise
provides us with an immense body of knowledge and innovative capability
from which to draw upon. We have the most robust space enterprise in
the world, and the partnerships the Space Force has fostered with
private industry, academia, and allied nations empower us to act faster
and with greater effect than we could alone. This is a critical line of
effort for the Space Force, not only because of our fiscal
responsibility to the American people, but also for the vast knowledge
base we can draw upon to succeed in our mission. Commercial products
that can be utilized to meet military needs will provide for a more
cost-effective and timely acquisition, which supports the DOD and
industry. Further, these partnerships free the DOD to prioritize
dedicated products when capability gaps are identified, saving time,
resources, and testing for those needs that are not commercially
available or are inherently governmental missions.
Consequently, the Space Force developed a Commercial Space Strategy
aligned with a broader DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy,
intended to further harness our strategic advantages in the United
States commercial sector. This strategy guides our approach in building
out a hybrid architecture designed to enhance resiliency and capacity
in times of need. The Space Force's Commercial Space Strategy informs
methods of integrating critical goods, services, and other activities
already validated and tested by the private sector; improving access to
existing and emerging technologies; and meeting our near-, mid-, and
long-term architecture goals.
The Space Force Commercial Space Strategy is a new way of
approaching industry partnerships, designed to propel our acquisition
and operational practices and thinking into the future. As the
technology available to and from private industry has advanced, the
armed services must adjust our approach. This adjustment must allow the
flexibility to onboard innovative and game-changing technologies; this
is especially true of space systems. Integrating the products and
capabilities found throughout American companies and the research and
development community will streamline space operations, fortify our
hybrid architecture, and ensure we take a proactive posture against
threats.
By utilizing commercial capabilities and systems along with
informed requirements, the Space Force will undoubtably realize an even
greater competitive advantage.
International Partnerships
With the increasing inclusion of allied nations in our space
activities, we develop stronger coalitions, able to conduct coordinated
operations in the space domain. This inclusion will allow us to deliver
more resilient capabilities supporting space operations across the
conflict continuum. We continue to reduce information sharing and
classification barriers with allies to enable combined understanding of
the threats, and the needed capabilities to prevail in a conflict,
should the need arise.
As our service refines mechanisms to share understanding of the
domain, and continues to develop interoperable capabilities through
traditional acquisition, we also look to work with allies and partners
to collectively harness the power of the international commercial space
sector. Our allies have great interest in working with the Space Force
to more effectively utilize commercial innovation and capabilities in a
coordinated manner. They see the same benefit in the commercial space
sector, and we hope to grow opportunities to leverage their innovation
to support combined operations with increasingly diverse nations.
Space Force Generation
As an independent military service, the Space Force maintains its
own readiness standards, reporting, and development through the
SPAFORGEN model. This model affords us the ability to ensure a combat-
ready force for all guardians, whether Employed-in-Place or otherwise.
SPAFORGEN ensures that the Space Force can effectively present combat
ready space forces to Combatant Commanders and provides Guardians with
the time and resources necessary to develop and train to remain agile
and effective.
The Space Force measures its readiness based upon the necessary
tools, training, and manpower needed to achieve our strategic and
tactical requirements. Ultimately, the Space Force must ensure that all
our Guardians can effectively rise to the challenge through rigorous
development and capability deployment. The Space Force is redefining
our readiness reporting to portray our current posture and the
presentation of space operators to the Joint Force. To that end, in
February 2024, the Space Force transitioned from the Air Force Input
Tool to the new Space Force Input Tool to support our service-specific,
employed-in-place readiness inputs for the Defense Readiness Reporting
System.
In accordance with law, the Space Force presents forces and
capabilities that underpin all instruments of our military power, and
as mandated by Congress, the Space Force is responsible for organizing,
training, and equipping those forces. The Space Force provides ready
and capable operators to commanders worldwide, enabling these
commanders to deter threats and, if necessary, prevail in conflict.
Once presented, our Space Force Combat Squadrons will serve as unique
Units of Action that undertake day-to-day missions for combatant
commanders, while retaining our capacity to prepare and ready for high-
end fights.
SPAFORGEN ensures that forces presented to Combatant Commanders can
execute missions and tasks and are equipped to make appropriate
recommendations on the effective employment, task organization,
operational synchronization, and command relationships of space forces.
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure
OTTI is an overarching concept describing a collection of programs
and capabilities, both live and synthetic, that enable high-end testing
and training of Space Force systems and operators against a thinking
adversary. The Space Force relies on OTTI investments as a critical
component of SPAFORGEN's success, and our overall ability to deliver
combat-ready forces throughout readiness cycles. Generally, Space
Force's ability to effectively develop, test, and train tactics will
create greater and hugely positive impact on operational outcomes. OTTI
provides the means to execute those core activities and is a critical
component to generating Space Force readiness.
More specifically, OTTI provides Guardians unique and realistic
training against simulated adversaries, providing dynamic scenario
issues which will prepare Guardians for the most diverse and
challenging environments available. Our goal is for Guardians to
receive training which prepares them for the threats they may face,
therefore, these scenarios will be challenging and hyper-realistic.
Producing this capability requires that we create an intelligence-
informed accounting of adversary capabilities and invest in high-
fidelity, mission-specific simulators. Such testing and training are
invaluable to our Guardians and serves to establish a greater, combat-
ready force posture.
It is imperative that we adequately invest in our test and training
infrastructure so we can better prepare for the ``fight tonight'', and
the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request appropriately
prioritizes Space Force OTTI as a critical function of Space Force
readiness.
Service Component Activation
The mechanism by which the Space Force ensures full integration and
synchronization of space activities throughout the combatant commands
is via Space Force Service Components. The Space Force established its
first three service components in 2022 at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command via
U.S. Space Forces for USINDOPACOM (USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC), U.S. Forces
Korea via USSPACEFOR-KOR as a subordinate unit to USSPACEFOR-INDOPAC,
and U.S. Central Command via USSPACEFOR-CENT.
In 2023, we established USSPACEFOR-SPACE as the Space Force Service
Component to U.S. Space Command and USSPACEFOR-EUCOM/AFRICOM
(USSPACEFOR-EUR/AF) as the component to U.S. European Command / U.S.
Africa Command and will continue standing up component and sub-
component commands as needs may require. The Secretary of the Air Force
directed the activation of the remaining Service Components no later
than 1 October 2025 and we are on track to achieve that goal.
Facilities and Infrastructure
Space Force Facility, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
(FSRM) and Military Construction (MILCON) funding enables the Service
to prioritize requirements which reduce risk to mission and the force.
Structural, electrical, and power improvements to operational
facilities reduce risk to mission and enable our joint and coalition
partners in the fight, while quality of life infrastructure and
facility improvements reduce risk to the force by improving resiliency
amongst our Guardians and their families.
Facilities and infrastructure are crucial to Space Force missions
which are predominantly employed-in-place from facilities that are
often inseparable from the weapon systems employed. While the Space
Force does partner with the Air Force for significant logistics,
security, medical services, and human resources support, the Space
Force's ability to prioritize its unique FSRM and MILCON at our
specific installations ensures we appropriately optimize our funding
requests and maintain a sufficient, stable, and predictable funding
strategy to execute its assigned missions as an independent service.
Moving forward, the Space Force will continue to prioritize projects
that increase facility and infrastructure resiliency and Service
readiness, while balancing the requirements of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) and future projects.
Weapon System Sustainment
Space Force Weapon System Sustainment directly supports the Space
Force's ability to sustain the day-to-day readiness of weapon systems
performing space missions, including combat power; missile warning/
missile tracking; positioning; navigation and timing; satellite
communications; space domain awareness; and environment monitoring.
Maintaining operations for these systems is critical to ensure Homeland
and allied defense, and funding for these priorities must be continued
for each to not risk opening capability gaps which will increase our
vulnerability to adversary systems.
From fiscal year 2024 to fiscal year 2025, the President's Budget
Request prioritizes programmatic and operational readiness in support
of the NDS, to include obsolescence mitigation and software maintenance
for Upgraded Early Warning Radar and North American Aerospace Defense
Command Cheyenne Mountain Complex systems. Moving forward, the Space
Force is developing a necessary methodology to identify quantifiable
solutions to balance sustainment support and future readiness needs.
Assured Access to Space
The United States requires the capabilities, infrastructure,
expertise, and tools necessary to access space on-demand throughout our
military, civil, and private enterprises. To support the growing demand
to leverage our launch capabilities, the Space Force established
Assured Access to Space as the largest organization within Space
Systems Command, comprised of Space Launch Delta 45, Space Launch Delta
30, and the Program Executive Office for National Security Space
Launch; Rocket System Launch Program; Launch and Test Range System; and
Servicing, Mobility, and Logistics.
Assured Access to Space is ultimately responsible for procuring
launch services and delivering on-orbit capabilities for the entire
National Security Space enterprise. This critical organization manages
range sustainment programs in support of the DOD and commercial launch
customers and supports three primary objectives: space access; rapid
delivery; and orbital resiliency. Assured Access to Space will also
transform today's launch sites into modern spaceports, with the
capacity and resiliency necessary to ensure our Nation's ability to
deliver capabilities into space when they are needed.
Assured Access to Space is leading the Nation's planning for a new
space mobility mission area to deliver space access, maneuver, and
logistics capabilities needed to tackle growth in commercial satellite
launch cadence and prepare for new operational concepts for mobility in
orbit. It includes investment in on-orbit servicing and maneuver
prototyping with the Air Force Research Laboratory, the Defense
Innovation Unit, and other mission partners.
Spaceport of the Future
For decades, the United States has continuously maintained its
space launch infrastructure to meet limited demand from a small
customer base. However, as demand for national security, civil, and
commercial space capabilities continue to grow, our launch range
infrastructure has not modernized sufficiently to meet the significant
increase in launch demand. Accordingly, the Space Force undertook a
broad effort to analyze our launch infrastructure enterprise and assess
range modernization efforts to maximize our ability to support U.S.
launch requirements.
The Space Force's Spaceport of the Future is taking a comprehensive
approach to look at all factors contributing to range costs and launch
throughput. Launch rates rose approximately 30 percent each of the last
2 years, and we expect rates to continue to rise through the Future
Years Defense Plan. Therefore, the Space Force is prioritizing
enhancements so that we have the infrastructure needed to meet these
launch demands.
To support the demand, the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget
Request asks Congress to fund our Spaceport of the Future activities to
allow for increased launch throughput, enhanced capability, and assured
access to space capabilities for the warfighter. Without this critical
funding, we will see significant degradation in our infrastructure and
our ability to provide launch services for our national security,
civil, and commercial partners.
We are thankful that Congress is providing the requisite
reimbursement authorities necessary to collect direct and indirect
costs incurred by the Space Force associated with launch activities.
These authorities will facilitate commercial participation and
investment into the United States' launch infrastructure and further
our ability to meet growing range demand.
Agile Talent Management
The Space Force sustains its readiness through its most important
asset: our people. We need to enable our Guardians to succeed in an
agile, adaptable manner to field the greatest space Force in the world.
As a result, the Space Force is creating an innovative talent
management system, establishing flexible service options and advanced
training programs to establish opportunities for all guardians,
including specialized credentialing, academics, experiences with
industry partners, and tailored duty experiences to name a few.
The Space Force is also participating in piloting DOD's Defense
Civilian Training Corps program, designed to identify university
talent, provide scholarships for accepted students, and prepare
students for a career in DOD acquisition-related fields. This pilot
program's goal is to create a sustainable pipeline of civilian talent
into the service and motivate university students to serve their
country as civilian members of the DOD. Additionally, Space Force's
existing University Partnership Program further deepens our talent pool
and improves enterprise-wide skill set development. Moreover, the Space
Force is expanding its space-centered curriculum offerings within DAF
educational programs, including Basic Military Training, Non-
Commissioned Officer Academy, United States Air Force Academy, Officer
Training School, and Reserve Officer Training Corps.
Even though we are the smallest military service, the Space Force
places significant emphasis on our recruiting and retention efforts.
Given the Space Force's highly technical mission set, we must remain
diligent in meeting our recruiting goals and maximize guardians'
flexibility to retain the talent we need to maintain our readiness
advantages. While we have not experienced the recruiting challenges
other military services have experienced to date, the Space Force needs
to sustain its efforts, particularly as we expect to grow in Fiscal
Year 2025.
I especially appreciate Congress' support and enactment of the
Space Force Personnel Management Act (SFPMA), which creates significant
flexibility in how we manage our Service members to augment their
skills and increase efficiency in workforce management. In accordance
with the SFPMA, the Space Force is quickly moving to integrate its
existing Active component guardians with Reserve Airmen in space-
focused career fields into one service. This critical authorization
allows the Space Force to not only invest in and grow our talent pool,
but also to retain such talent by offering guardians greater
flexibility in their professional experiences.
The Space Force will always look to identify more innovative,
adaptable, and cutting-edge opportunities in talent management to
ensure our guardians are able to rise to the challenge. Moving forward,
the Space Force will refine and expand the ways we provide guardians
with the tools, training, and resources they need to succeed
operationally, professionally, and personally.
the way ahead
The United States has approached our space activities with a desire
to benefit not only Americans, but all people. It remains our goal that
space remains open and accessible to all nations and space faring
actors for peaceful use.
We must continue to ensure this domain is not controlled or
threatened by an adversary who does not seek the peaceful use of space.
The United States is uniquely capable of maintaining an open
environment for all nations in space. Just as we have ensured open
access to maritime trade and sea routes, so too will we in space.
Yet, our near-peer competitors are watching our efforts and
attempting to preempt, deny, circumvent, and counter our space
capabilities. While we are the most recent military service, we are
not--and never have been--a new military service. We are built on
decades of advances and contributions by dedicated Service members,
civil servants, and industry partners who devoted themselves to their
country and continue to do so.
These guardians are stationed around the world in our deltas,
combatant commands, and the intelligence community, ready to provide
the combat capabilities we need. Our Units of Action will contribute to
every combat mission the DOD undertakes. The training exercises and
assessments will evolve to simulate warfare of the 21st century. At the
center of it all is our readiness posture and our force-wide endeavor
to provide combat decision makers with the most capable guardians we
can, along with the training and equipment needed to succeed.
Our ability to guarantee access to space is reliant upon our
guardians, our technologies, and our commitment to push ourselves
further, faster, and higher. Readiness does not mean purely standing
alert; it is a mind set and a quality which requires investment in the
mission, in oneself, and in each other. It is ultimately our people who
empower us to do what we do; the technology and the tactics only enable
our greatest assets to accomplish our Nation's needs. The DAF re-
optimization effort is as much an investment in our people as it is a
restructuring of combat capabilities.
There has never been a more important time for the Space Force to
secure our Nation's interests, and we must ensure that we are properly
resourcing the Space Force to guarantee the ability to achieve space
superiority into the future. I truly appreciate this committee's
continued support for our guardians and their mission; and look forward
to working with you.
Senator King. Thank you all three. That was excellent
testimony, and I appreciate it.
First I want to make a confession. I noticed my colleague,
Senator Cramer, is in the room. When the Space Force was first
proposed, I was a skeptic. I ultimately supported it, but I
just was not sure that this was a direction we needed to move
in.
I am now a convert. I think the Space Force is absolutely
in the right place at the right time, taking the right actions,
and I am glad that we have an organization that is dedicated
strictly to that mission. I do not know how often you hear
Senators admit mistakes, but I wanted to get that on the
record.
The other thing I had to note, somewhat humorously, several
years ago I visited Pine Gap in Australia with members of the
Intelligence Committee, which of course is one of the world's
major ground stations for space assets. We were with the
Intelligence Committee. I was sure that this was highly
classified. I came home, did not talk about it to anyone. They
did not even tell them where I went until I noticed there was a
Netflix series called ``Pine Gap,'' which was set at Pine Gap.
So I guess it was not all that classified.
Mr. Hill, classification. Are you making any progress on
the declassification? Having information that cannot be used by
the people that need it is not very useful information. Talk to
me about where you are in the declassification process.
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman King. Yes, we are making
progress. With the Deputy Secretary having signed out the new
policy, that took us a good year to rewrite the policy. It was
replacing a policy that was 20 years old. That policy was
clearly out of date. It provides an updated framework for the
program developers and operators to understand what is the
minimum classification, if any classification, is necessary for
a particular type of activity or program.
We then turned that over to the services, and Secretary
Calvelli is taking it very actively to them, rewrite the
classification guides that they own for the particular systems
that they develop. One important thing to understand----
Senator King. Human nature is to overclassify.
Mr. Hill. Yes.
Senator King. Is there some systematic way to say does this
really need to be classified at this level? Is there a
mechanism?
Mr. Hill. Yes, that policy very clearly provides that, and
the direction Space Force and Secretary Calvelli have taken to
heart is to move as fast as they can to update to that policy,
which I expect will result in many things being removed from
Special Access Programs. That will enable better planning and
integration across the Joint Force.
So what I could offer is maybe Secretary Calvelli could
talk specifically----
Senator King. Secretary Calvelli, your views?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes. There was a 2004 policy that threw most
space activities into the SAP world. I mean, it was actually a
written policy. Thanks to John, and before him John Plumb, they
actually got that policy updated for the first time in 20 years
this past December. So now that frees us the ability to
actually take programs out of Special Access channels. Because
Special Access channels, all they do is cause stovepipes.
So now we actively have a team in place that has put
together a plan, a strategy. Instead of doing it program by
program, we are doing it all at once. So we are doing one
entire strategy up front. We will have it in place this fall to
actually remove the vast majority of all of our space programs
and reclassify them into TS, Top Secret, and Secret. They will
not become unclassified but they will become Secret and TS,
which will allow a lot more sharing as well as the ability to
get rid of all those stovepipes.
Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that and hope that
project will continue.
A big question and not much time left. Commercial
integration. All of you talked about resiliency. One of the
keys to resiliency is proliferation--lots of smaller
satellites, fewer single targets. What have we learned from
Ukraine about the use of commercial satellites, particularly
Starlink? Has the theory of proliferation worked?
Mr. Hill. I think we are seeing that the innovation that
came out of the commercial sector, which we are also adopting
in many of the DOD architectures, that proliferation is
absolutely one of the key elements of a resiliency strategy
that supports mission assurance. Ukraine is proof of that.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you all very much. Senator
Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
followup on the commercial side a little bit and how that ties
in. First of all, thank you to the Department for issuing some
good strategy in driving that forward with some goals and
requirements and focus. Mr. Calvelli and General Guetlein,
especially, I believe you both need to be thanked for this. We
continue to need to harness that.
Mr. Secretary, one of those hard problems is achieving
space domain awareness and finding and characterizing our
adversaries' activities in space. Can you speak to commercial
capabilities that exist today in this area, both in tracking
algorithms and in capturing commercial imagery of objects in
space as well as any work you are doing in the private sector
with this mission.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes. So space domain awareness, as you know,
is probably key to any kind of activity we would ever counter
in space, understanding what is in the domain and keeping track
of it. It is high on our list and I know it is high on General
Whiting's list, as well.
We are taking advantage of commercial where we can. There
are some amazing companies out there that actually have ground-
based telescopes today as well as other commercial data that
they are able to give and that we purchased through multiple
avenues, to use that.
We are also updating several of our radar sites, actually
building new radar sites. A program called Deep Advanced Space
Radar, or DARC, is actually a new set of radars we are putting
in three locations--Australia, in the Outback; Texas; and then
United Kingdom--and that is going to give us space domain
awareness capabilities to track really small objects in
geosynchronous orbit.
We are also upgrading some of our internal Space Force
antennas that we have, or telescopes, to do space-based
tracking. But a combination of upgrades that we are making on
our systems as well as continuing purchasing of commercial, and
as more and more commercial companies start to take on space
domain awareness mission, taking advantage of that, I think
over time we will grow the capabilities that we need for space
domain awareness.
Senator Fischer. Do you need any more authorities or
funding to make sure that this is going to happen, or are we on
the right track now, do you think?
Mr. Calvelli. Never say no to funding.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Calvelli. But I think we are making progress against
our plan right now. I mean, we could always accelerate things
with additional dollars.
Senator Fischer. What about authorities?
Mr. Calvelli. For buying space domain awareness data? I do
not see any show-stoppers with authorities. I do not know of
General Guetlein would like to comment.
General Guetlein. Ma'am, we are not challenged by
authorities. We are challenged by resources. We have the Joint
Commercial Office today that is a partnership with industry and
15 of our allied partners. We have locations in Shriever here
in the United States. We have locations in Australia and
locations in Europe, where we are buying space domain awareness
data from all the providers and then sharing it openly between
all members. That did not require any additional authorities,
but we are spending on orders of about $25 million a year to
buy that data and distribute that data.
Senator Fischer. That brings me to my second point about
the budget request. We have seen, throughout the first 4 years,
a lot of ramping up for Space Force, the budget increased, and
that is not the case this year. General, we are looking at flat
budget growth, which really amounts to a cut when we consider
inflation into this, and it does limit Space Force's ability to
meet the current threats that we face. You alluded to that.
Would you like to expound on that a little bit more?
General Guetlein. Yes, ma'am. I would put it into context
with two things. One, right now there is a capability gap
between us and our near peer competitors. That capability gap
is rapidly narrowing. Given the resources we have today, we had
to make some very tough decisions between balancing today's
readiness and investing in tomorrow. Then balancing also within
the Fiscal Responsibility Act. That really constrained what we
were able to invest in the future. If we are able to either
maintain that capability gap that we currently enjoy today or
to widen that capability gap, we are going to have to expand
the amount of resources that we are spending in space.
Senator Fischer. How can we make that point clear? Senator
King and I speak often about looking at classification of
information that is out there so that, first of all, many of
our colleagues, I think, would pay more attention to that if
their constituents or the media is paying attention to what
would be declassified and the information put out. So how do we
get it to the public?
General Guetlein. Ma'am, we have got to talk about, if you
look at that Space Force was stood up in 2019, prior to 2019,
we did not talk about this. It was too highly classified, we
did not share data with our allies, et cetera. Since 2019, we
have changed that dialog. We have a long way to catch up,
though, in this information environment, of educating both the
public as well as our Members on the Hill of what the
challenges in space are.
But more importantly the dependencies that we have as a
Nation, as a free society on space, outside of the military, on
a day-to-day basis, are immense, and we have got to get that
message across.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. I have often thought of the Fiscal
Responsibility Act as a straitjacket we put on ourselves, and
now we are dealing with the consequences, not only in your
budget but across the board.
Senator Cramer, the godfather of the Space Force.
Senator Cramer. Thanks, and your confession was very
heartwarming. I bet it was really good for your soul. Anyway,
that said, thank you, gentlemen--and frankly, thank you for
your candor too. I think this is really important.
I want to start with the disruptor side of things.
Secretary Calvelli, you referenced nontraditional partners.
Space is so interesting because the Air Force has these
wonderful prime contractors that respond to whatever they are
asked of. Space, it seems to me, seems be responding to the
private sector itself, the commercial side, which has been so
active, and that is good.
I remember one of my very first discussions with General
Raymond was, ``You have a white sheet of paper. Please utilize
the freedom that provides and don't adapt to the culture that
you are coming from.'' So whether it is a disruptor in the
private sector, you talked about fixed price as a contributor
to competition, when I think of the Space Development Agency I
always think of SDA as the disruptor within the service itself.
I am sure that creates a lot of tensions, and I recall several
conversations in the last few years, particularly the early
couple of years.
So with the spiral development concept that you all use and
that SDA uses, help me understand the role of SDA as the
acquisition part of the shop, and then their role in providing,
whether it is maintenance or management, participating, or do
you just go to them and say, ``We need 100 more of these
things. Buy them''?
I ask that question, honestly, with some concern that SDA
could end up getting a little bit handcuffed and not be the
disruptor we need them to be within the larger Space Force, if
that makes sense, and you can elaborate and correct me where I
am wrong.
Mr. Calvelli. No, I think you are right.
Senator Cramer. Thank you.
Mr. Calvelli. So SDA has been doing a magnificent job in
terms of getting capabilities to orbit. So their first spiral,
what they call Tranche 0, got 27 satellites in orbit, 8 missile
warning/missile tracking satellites, and 19 transport
satellites, and we are demonstrating those capabilities now.
Tranche 1 will start launching again. December will be the
first set of launches for there, again more transport
satellites, and then next spring more tracking satellites.
So from where they fit in, all things proliferated at low
Earth orbit that relate to missile warning, missile tracking,
as well as data transport, SDA is our go-to. That is their
strength. Their strength is small sats proliferation, low Earth
orbit, hundreds of miles above the Earth.
We tend to go to Space Systems Command for the more
traditional missions, such as military satellite communications
at higher altitudes, higher altitudes for missile warning for
launch, for space domain awareness. Then we tend to go to Space
RCO for things that are related to, I will say, protect and
defend kind of missions that are unique, that would go directly
to support Space Command.
But overall it is working out pretty good. SDA is part of
the Space Force. They are part of the family. They fit in. Even
though they are a little bit disruptive, they fit in pretty
nicely, actually. I think they are showing the way to the other
parts of the organization that, by building smaller and by
using fixed price you actually can go faster. I am really
impressed with them bringing in new space companies like Sea
Air Space and Rocket Lab and York Systems, and using commercial
bus lines, like we see at Airbus and at Terran Orbital. I think
those are all really healthy things for the country.
So under my watch I expect to continue to see SDA keep
doing their great work. I think the biggest thing we will see
down the road is we need to make sure, as we launch Tranche 1,
which is operational systems next year----
Senator Cramer. Yes.
Mr. Calvelli.--that people use it. It does not matter how
fast we build them if no one uses them, and we need to get the
services to ramp on it and adopt it.
Senator Cramer. General, just elaborating a little bit on
that, then is there a handoff, or does SDA continue to sort of
operate in that space after the assets are launched? As the
Secretary said, if no one uses them, but if no one is using
them, does SDA continue--so do using them and helping develop
new and spiral as they operating what they have done already?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator. So as Secretary Calvelli
said, we have integrated Space Development Agency fully into
the United States Space Force----
Senator Cramer. I understand that.
General Guetlein.--so they are a part of the team. Their
capabilities are being detail planned into our wargames, our
exercises going forward, and into our war plans. So we are
already counting on that capability and starting to test it.
Like Secretary Calvelli said, we already proved Link 16 from
space. We are now taking that capability and playing it into
the exercises to see how it plays, understanding how it is
going to support in a contested environment, and how do we
continue to take advantage of it.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, and if there is another round I
may get into some of the budget stuff. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. We recently had a discussion with
General Saltzman about refueling, and he wanted $20 million, I
think, in the 2025 budget. How far are we behind China in
refueling? This $20 million was only for a study. Can you
explain that? I mean, $20 million for a study, other than $20
million more for learning how to refuel, and why we need to
refuel, and how far behind we are. Anybody want to answer.
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator, that is a good question,
and I do recall you asking the CSO about that question. Right
now we are doing the exploration of refueling in space to
understand what does it actually contribute to the fight,
because there is a balance between building refueling
capability into a satellite, which is semi-expensive, and
buying proliferated, lower-cost constellations. So we are going
to need a combination of both. We are not sure what orbits are
going to be which. We are not sure how we are going to do
refueling as a service yet. So the $20 million is to actually
study those effects.
Senator Tuberville. Anybody else?
Mr. Calvelli. Some of that fund actually goes to some
demonstrations, as well, not on space but on the ground side,
actually, looking at what it takes to go build the refueling
unit and some demonstrations that we are doing on the ground
side in terms of just the concept of two space vehicles docking
and being able to actually put a refueling module in and how
the refueling works.
Some of the money is going to study work to see where the
bigger picture is, and other some of that money is also going
to actually design work and demonstration work.
Senator Tuberville. Going back to commercial capabilities,
are we leveraging those the right way, General?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator, we are. Secretary Hill just
talked about publishing of the DOD's Commercial Space Strategy.
On the heels of that we published the Space Force Commercial
Space Strategy, which is all about how do I take advantage of
space to start filling in resiliency, capacity, and redundancy
into our capabilities.
What we do know today is I cannot build all the kit that I
am going to need. We are going to rely on partnerships,
partnerships with allies and partnerships with our industrial
partners. If you go back to the history of the United States,
we have always relied on our industrial base during times of
crisis or conflict, and this is going to be no different.
So we are currently designing in how to take maximal
advantage of those capabilities and innovation that is coming
out of commercial to build out what we call hybrid
architectures, which are a combination of DOD, civil, allied,
and commercial platforms altogether, to get us to that capacity
and that resiliency that we need in the future.
Senator Tuberville. There is not a week goes by that I do
not have somebody coming from Huntsville that is building new
satellites. I mean, it seems like it is a growing trend, and
whether it is building or refueling or using nuclear energy in
satellites or offensive and defensive satellites.
Do you all see the same thing? I mean, are you all
overwhelmed with people that are getting in the satellite
business, Secretary?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, it is amazing. We are very fortunate--
knock on wood, and I hope it keeps up--the space economy is
starting to boom, and we are seeing amazing entrepreneurship
from across the United States and companies come in.
A week does not go by that a new company does not come in
and tell me about some great concept that they are pursuing and
doing. What is really wonderful is that they are also getting
great investment dollars, as well, to be able to start
themselves off. We are excited about the new space economy that
is booming.
Senator Tuberville. Seems like they have got a lot of money
they want to invest, which is fine with us, right?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Tuberville. It helps us all.
General, what about recruiting and retention in the Space
Force? Could you talk a little bit about that?
General Guetlein. Thank you, Senator. We have the highest
recruiting and retention in the United States Space Force
today. We continuously exceeded our recruiting goals by several
hundred. We have more people beating on our door to come into
the Space Force than we can possibly take efficiently today, so
that is a great problem.
From the retention side of the question we are also doing
great. We are in the high 90's on both enlisted and civilians,
and we are able to retain that technical talent that we need
for a complicated domain.
Senator Tuberville. It seems like that would be one of your
most important things is retention, experience. A lot of money
out there in the private sector, as we just talked about,
building satellites. So you do not see any problem in
retention? We have not had that problem?
General Guetlein. No, sir. We have not had that retention
today in the United States Space Force. We are constantly
watching for it. We are constantly trying to make sure that we
are giving our guardians an experience and that we are giving
them the tools that they need to be successful. But like I
said, right now we are in the high 90's for both our enlisted
and our officers for retention.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me just
say thanks to all of you for your service to our country. We
appreciate the opportunity to have this open briefing.
I want to focus on just a couple of items that I think we
sometimes miss in the discussion when we are in a classified
session, and part of it is the budget itself. On May 1st of
this year, in front of the SASC [Senate Armed Services
Committee] hearing on the Space Force posture, it was reported
that we have got basically a decrease in the Space Force budget
for 2025 from 2024. The request in the fiscal year 2025 is
$29.4 billion, which is a decrease of $600 million from fiscal
year 2024--$18.7 billion for research, development, and
testing, and the fiscal year 2024 request was $19.2 billion,
the enacted was $18.6. That is almost $600 million less.
We are talking an additional $650 million less with regard
to procurement, and we are talking $122 million less with
regard to operations and maintenance, and we are looking at
about $9 million, almost $10 million less with regard to
military personnel.
Look, that does not bode well for the fact that out of the
five domains we have got--air, land, sea, space, and
cyberspace--to walk in and suggest that while China and Russia
are both expanding their operations in space it would appear
from the budget numbers themselves that we are suggesting a
decrease in our operational capacity.
Mr. Hill, your thoughts.
Mr. Hill. Senator Rounds, that hits the nail on the head of
a problem we face this year. We have all mentioned it. I
mentioned it. I think the Chairman or the Ranking Member
mentioned the constraints of the Fiscal Responsibility Act,
one. That was one of the factors we had to deal with this year.
Two is something that General Guetlein spoke to, the different
nature of the Space Force budget. So when you get through
putting together all the must-pay bills, and the Department of
Defense has must-pay bills of salary and support to families,
and operations, and so forth, of the forces, and you get down
to what is left of discretionary, you come down to areas like
readiness, research, development, testing, and evaluation----
Senator Rounds. We are cutting it, are we not?
Mr. Hill.--and procurement, and so where are you going to
make those cuts? The cuts focused more, maintain the readiness,
sacrifice some of the future, and those investment accounts are
very--the Space Force has a high concentration of them.
Senator Rounds. Let me go on. General Guetlein, I think you
wear and uniform, and it is always your professional opinion
that we are looking for, and that is how much do you need in
order to do your job. Right now I am looking at this saying we
are reducing what you have and expecting you to get the job
done. The bottom line is we are expecting more out of Space
Force in the next couple of years than we have ever expected in
the past, as we remove some of our air-based capabilities, ISRs
[Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] specifically.
What is the number that is appropriate as opposed to what we
are seeing in the proposed budget?
General Guetlein. Senator, I cannot give you a number. I
can tell you that the threat is increasing daily. They are
intent on not only denying our ability to use space, they are
actually proving extremely capable at denying our ability to
use space. They are trying to narrow that gap of capability
down to zero or even negative, and we have got to increase that
gap.
Senator Rounds. General, if we were in a classified session
and we asked you which programs, which products, which plans
you proposed were denied in this budget, would you be able to
give us a straight answer at that time?
General Guetlein. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Look, and let me go on a little
bit. Right now we have got guys in the Gulf sitting on
destroyers and other equipment that we have got that are in
harm's way. Part of what we expect is to be able to provide
them with accurate information, intel, ISR, to be able to
identify the guys that are shooting at them, the Houthis. Today
in the Gulf we have reduced numbers of those types of assets
available, and yet we have got guys still sitting there. Now,
they are knocking off the actual weapons that are being shot at
them, but I think it is about time that we start using the
assets that we have got to find the guys that are making the
decisions on when to shoot them and take them out before they
are attacking our people.
The ISR that we have got right now is air-based and space-
based. Are we in a position to provide the type of ISR
necessary today in space to actually provide these folks with
real-time information about who the bad guys are and where they
are at and how we get at them?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator, we can provide that
information from space, and we do it every single day. But as
this threat continues to mature we are going to need additional
ISR capabilities, both in air as well as in space.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I think that is a very
straightforward answer. We need both, do we not?
General Guetlein. Correct.
Senator Rounds. In the air-based and space-based.
General Guetlein. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Right now we are short on both.
General Guetlein. The closer in that we get to the actual
threat itself, we need to start going more toward space to
become resilient and to get around the anti-access/aerial
denial capabilities of our adversaries. But the standoff
capability very much needs to be airborne and into other types
of conflict also needs to be airborne.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When Russia
invaded Ukraine it destroyed Ukraine's internet and its
telephone access, and to help get Ukraine back online, SpaceX,
one of our defense contractors, donated satellite internal
terminals, called Starlink, and this allowed Ukrainian soldiers
to run apps to target Russian forces and to be able to
communicate with loved ones back home.
Earlier this month, I wrote to DOD about Russia's use of
Starlink terminals. Reports indicate that Russia has been able
to buy Starlink terminals on the black market and that SpaceX
has not cutoff their access, and that provides a major
advantage to Russia on the battlefield.
Now SpaceX is owned by Elon Musk, who has advocated for,
quote, ``a peace plan,'' close quote, that reports suggest may
have been developed after speaking with Vladimir Putin.
Congress has a constitutional responsibility to make sure
that taxpayer money does not go to companies that undermine
U.S. national security goals. So I think it is critical that we
get to the bottom of this.
Mr. Hill, you oversee our space and missile defense and you
have been working with SpaceX to counter illicit use of
Starlink terminals. Let me start by asking, was SpaceX
completely cooperative with DOD in its efforts to address the
use of Starlink terminals by Russian forces?
Mr. Hill. Senator, not only has SpaceX been very
cooperative with the entire United States Government and the
government of Ukraine, they have been forward leaning in
identifying and bringing information to us.
Senator Warren. Okay. Good. Good. I am glad to hear it
because it is obviously critical that DOD contractors are not
undermining U.S. foreign policy.
So Russia's outdated communications have been a major
contributor to their failures in Ukraine. Starlink obviously
would be enormously valuable to the Russians. It would provide
Russia with secure communications that they sorely need, which
would significantly erode Ukraine's advantage on the
battlefield. I understand this is an unclassified environment
so I do not want to go anywhere where we should not. But I
think there is a compelling public interest to conduct this
oversight and to understand how DOD is plugging leaks here.
Mr. Hill, in the broadest terms, can you describe how you
worked with SpaceX to address this illicit use?
Mr. Hill. So in broadest terms, recognizing that Russia has
long-standing experience operating black markets----
Senator Warren. Yes.
Mr. Hill.--and is now leveraging black markets on their
own. We have, one point, the Commercial Integration Cell. This
is a cell that combines Space Operations Center where
commercial companies and the U.S. Government can work together
and can share information, including company proprietary
information and classified information. That is one point where
we can learn what is going on. They can share with us what they
are seeing, and we can share what we are seeing.
Broader across the Government, we can then develop
strategies. Is it better to identify all the terminals which
should be left on, or should we identify terminals that should
be turned off? Different types of approach to list. We have
done that with them.
Senator Warren. Okay. So let me ask this maybe a little
more pointedly. Do you have confidence that moving forward DOD
can identify illicit Russian use of Starlink services and
completely shut them off?
Mr. Hill. I think this will be a continuous problem.
Senator Warren. I take that as a no.
Mr. Hill. I think we can continue to identify them and turn
them off, but I think Russia will not stop at----
Senator Warren. Okay. So you think it is going to be an
ongoing process.
You know, war obviously is an unpredictable unfolding, but
we should not have to worry about whether or not U.S.
contractors are supporting our adversaries or giving access to
our adversaries, and my understanding is that Space Force is
negotiating an extension of its Starlink contract with SpaceX.
Mr. Hill, can you assure me that as you renegotiate this
contract that you will have provisions in place that will
require SpaceX to do everything within its ability to prevent
illicit use by Russia and other forces?
Mr. Hill. Our contracts, in conjunction with the licenses
that regulatory agencies provide--DOD does not control those--
together they ensure what you are looking for, in terms of if
SpaceX complies with our contracts and they comply with the
licenses that they have from regulatory agencies, who can
enforce those licenses, and the various civil and criminal----
Senator Warren. Okay. I just want to make sure I am
understanding it, and I get it, we are in an unclassified
setting here. The devil is always in the details. I taught
contract law for many years. I would ask you to submit to the
Committee the conditions that give you confidence that SpaceX
is bound contractually so that it will prevent illicit use of
those terminals by Russia.
I just think it is critically important that DOD hold its
contractors accountable for any mismanagement or any illegal
acquisition of its hardware and services by bad actors, and we
just want to make sure that Russia is not getting an advantage
here.
Mr. Hill. In responding to the letter that you mentioned at
the outset, we will be addressing those kinds of things for
you.
Senator Warren. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator King.
[Inaudible.]
Senator Rosen.--Senator Cramer was next. Thank you. Well,
thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here, for the
work that you do. Really appreciate it.
I am just going to right into it and talk about Iran,
Russia, and we are going to stay on this topic a little bit
about Russia, but now Iran, Russia, and their space
collaboration, because they are both driven by a shared
interest in countering United States superiority in space, Iran
and Russia. They are deepening their cooperation in space. We
know, just this past February, Russia launched an Iranian
satellite into orbit, and the two countries have signed an
agreement for their space industries to cooperate. Iran's 10-
year space program relies on Russian assistance for its
operations, from launching their high payload satellites to the
ultimate goal of sending an Iranian into space.
Mr. Hill, what are the security, and I am not sure if you
can speak to the threat implications, but maybe the general
can, knowing that we are in an open session, of the joint
Iranian-Russian space cooperation, and how is the United States
addressing and navigating this emerging State partnership that
I think we might be worried about.
Mr. Hill. I would add it does not stop at Iran. It also
involves North Korea, as we have seen with Iran and North Korea
providing Russia missile to support Russia's operations in
Ukraine, and then Russia likely providing them technology
assistance in their programs to expand the threats that they
present to us and to others.
The responses of controlling transfers of technology have
their limitations. We certainly are watching what they are
doing, but the ability to continue cutting off Russia, Iran and
North Korea is fundamentally at the crux of it, but they are
going to keep pressing on those.
Senator Rosen. We probably need a closed session to talk
about what this really entails. If you can speak to it at all.
Otherwise we will wait for the closed session.
General Guetlein. Senator, I cannot go into the specific
details. I can tell you it is troubling. We are seeing
proliferation of technology. We are seeing support of launch
technology, which can quickly lead to something larger like an
intercontinental ballistic missile. Russia is a nuclear-armed
nation. We definitely do not want that technology to
proliferate. Then it also opens up additional fronts of concern
during conflict.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. We will look
forward to the closed session.
I am going to build on this because we have international
partnerships, like they have international partnership. We have
our own international partnerships, and so we work with our
partners and allies. It is crucial to providing this layered,
comprehensive approach that we are going to need to combat
this.
The success of international cooperation was actually seen
in the recent unsuccessful attack on Israel carried out by Iran
and the successful shoot-down of over 300 inbound threats. That
defensive action relied on sharing space capabilities with our
partners in the region.
So General, can you discuss the importance of these
international partnerships, as much as you can, in response to
what we just asked, and really about what happened just
recently. We thwarted that attack, helped to thwart that on
Israel by Iran.
General Guetlein. Yes, ma'am. I would say our partnership,
both with industry and with our allies, is one of our
competitive advantages that we continue to nurture and to
expand.
It is hard to be everywhere at all times. As you saw in the
Middle East, there were threats coming from multiple different
directions. Luckily we have spent many years working with our
allies to integrate our capabilities, so that we see, they see,
and that we can actually do handoffs of threats from one nation
to another, and that actually paid a lot of dividends.
So going forward I would expect to see greater partnerships
with our allies, not less.
Senator Rosen. A lot of our strengths is in our
partnerships and our allies and friends around the world, and
that continued training and investing in that.
Speaking of investing in what you need to do all this, it
relies on technology. So we have to have the technology
workforce, and we have a huge shortage. There is, not just in
this area but in every area of technology, it is a vital part
of ensuring that every bit of our armed services is capable and
prepared for the threats that are coming toward us, especially
space.
So I am going to keep going back to you, General. As the
newest branch of the armed services, do you currently possess
and have access to the skilled workforce you need to complete
your mission, and what are the challenges that you are facing
recruiting? What do we need to do to help you invest in that
kind of workforce that you are going to need to enter into, to
keep us safe in space?
General Guetlein. Thank you, Senator. As I stated a little
bit earlier, our retention and our recruiting are extremely
high. We are exceeding our recruiting numbers every year by
several hundred.
But what is more important is the quality and the
experience level of those recruits is off the charts. Most of
them are a little older than their normal peers that are coming
in recruiting. Fifty-three percent of them have at least a
bachelor's degree or 14 hours-plus toward it. Fourteen percent
of our recruits actually have a bachelor's degree or higher
when we recruit them. It is a very technical workforce.
So today we are meeting those numbers. The challenge going
forward is how do I grow efficiently. I cannot just accept
everybody that wants to come in today and get them trained. So
we are trying to balance our training resources with how many
people we can recruit going forward and what is an efficient
way to grow forward in the future.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I yield back.
Senator King. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to start
with the Secretary here. China and Russia are continuously
developing anti-satellite systems, and that really concerns, I
think, all of us. I want to talk specifically about one
capability we have on orbit, and that is the Space Based
Infrared System that we use. It is on orbit today, that we use
to detect launches from the surface, often strategic ballistic
missiles that could be heading in our direction, and they could
be vulnerable.
I want to understand from you, Mr. Secretary, have we been
thinking about the degradation and maybe denial of use of that
system and what that would mean overall to our missile warning
capability?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes. Yes, we have. In fact, we are re-
architecting that system and building a proliferated layer at
medium Earth orbit (MEO) and a proliferated layer at low Earth
orbit. In fact, it was eight satellites that we launched
already for the LEO option, just against that threat. We will
maintain, through orbit diversity and through proliferation, so
we will maintain the geo-orbit for the near term, we will have
the MEO orbit coming of age, starting in 2026, and we will have
the LEO orbit starting to get populated now.
So because--you are totally correct--because of the threat
against capabilities like missile warning that the Nation
relies on and needs, we are fundamentally changing the
architecture to build a proliferated layer at LEO and MEO that
is much more highly resilient than the few big targets at GEO
[Geostationary Earth Orbit].
Senator Kelly. Beyond that--we have a system that looks
over the horizon with radar--beyond that, other than the orbit
capability, the infrared capability we have from space, there
is probably not many other ways to detect the first launch of a
ballistic missile. Is that correct?
Mr. Calvelli. I am not as familiar with our terrestrial
based systems. I know from space that we rely really heavily on
the old DSPs [Defense Satellite Program] as well as what is
known as SBIRS [Space-based Infrared System], like you
mentioned, for missile warning from space.
Senator Kelly. Yes, I am really concerned about this,
because if we were to lose the Space-Based Infrared System it
makes us very vulnerable to a first strike without being able
to detect it.
Mr. Calvelli. You are right. But, I mean, on the good side,
sir, the Space Force has been very proactive in this area. We
are funded, and we are building, and we are already starting to
launch more proliferated systems that do missile warning, and
add capability to also help track.
Senator Kelly. To the extent that we can talk about it in
this setting, can you give us an idea of when this MEO and LEO
system will be complete?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes. So there are 8 demo satellites on orbit
in LEO today that are being tested. There is another 32 that
will go up over the 2025 to 2026 timeframe in LEO. That will be
what we call our Tranche 1, and on the MEO side, right now we
planned 9 satellites in the 2026 to 2027 timeframe.
Senator Kelly. What level of redundancy does that provide
us? So what I am getting at is how many of those could we use
in LEO and MEO and still retain the full capability to detect a
launch from Russia or China?
Mr. Calvelli. The system is really interesting. I think our
space warfighting analysis did a great job designing it. What
it is, is that they are basically independent layers. So you
could take out all of one and still do the mission with the
other, as an example.
Senator Kelly. You could take out the LEO constellation and
you could get everything from MEO, or vice versa.
Mr. Calvelli. Yes.
Senator Kelly. Could you take out half of the MEO
satellites, as well, and get the coverage you need?
Mr. Calvelli. You know, the beauty of proliferation is you
get the coverage through having more assets. I think the more
you take out, the more capability you lose, right. But building
smaller systems you could replenish much quicker, as well. But
obviously, sir, you are right. The more you take out, the more
it hurts.
Senator Kelly. Yes. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator King. Thank you. We will have a second round for
those who are interested.
Mr. Hill, just to clarify in your exchanges with Senator
Warren, is there any evidence that Starlink or SpaceX is
willingly or knowingly allowing the Russians to utilize those
black market terminals that they have acquired?
Mr. Hill. To the contrary. There is every evidence that
when SpaceX becomes aware of things they try to work with U.S.
Government to come up with the best solution for how to turn
them off. To confirm, those terminals should be turned off and
that they are not getting like a false positive.
Senator King. Yes. So there is no evidence that SpaceX is,
as I say, willingly trying to utilize those.
Mr. Hill. You are correct.
Senator King. Thank you. General, you have talked several
times about working with allies. It strikes me that that is one
of our really asymmetric advantages. Are we working with allies
also--and I suppose this could go to either of you--in terms of
the development of these technologies? In other words, all
wisdom on technology does not necessarily reside here, and we
have got allies like Japan, the EU, Scandinavia, that we could
get more out of our dollars if we are working jointly with
these close allies.
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator, we are. We are building
collaborative projects, for example, SATCOM with Luxembourg,
SATCOM with Norway, PNT with Japan. So we are broadening out
those partnerships on a daily basis, building ground-based
radars in Australia as well as in the U.K., collaborating on
launch with New Zealand.
So we are, across the board, trying to embrace our allies.
I will give kudos to our folks in policy that were able to
break down the classification barriers, that once we put those
into place will also allow us to have broader conversations
with our allies.
Senator King. In my discussions with some of our allies,
ITAR [Information Technology Acquisition Review] keeps coming
up as a possible barrier. How are we dealing with that?
General Guetlein. I would pass that to Secretary Calvelli.
Mr. Calvelli. Passing to John Hill. That is a State
Department issue.
Mr. Hill. ITAR is always a concern allies will have if they
are worried about having to incorporate U.S. technologies into
systems they are developing. They worry that somehow our
licensing system will prevent them doing what they want to do.
I think with respect to the question, though, of just
general collaboration between the Defense Department and
allies, as they grow their defense budgets to meet, for
example, NATO targets, ITAR is not really a factor in that
situation. We can develop the collaborative program and then
work with the allies.
Senator King. All of what we have been talking about today
in terms of defense has largely been about resiliency,
proliferation, many systems. The cornerstone of our defense
strategy for 70 years, however, has been deterrence, that is,
the adversary fears the consequences of an aggressive action
against this country. Is deterrence part of our strategy in
space, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Calvelli. I think absolutely yes, but I think one of
the challenges is the classification levels.
Senator King. Well, it is not deterrence if the adversary
does not know about it.
Mr. Calvelli. You are correct, and I will defer to General
Guetlein on the Space Force on deterrence.
Senator King. That is Dr. Strangelove 101. General?
General Guetlein. Senator, integrated deterrence is a
foundation of our strategy. We do balance, on a day-to-day
basis, what capabilities we decide to reveal and conceal, to
make sure that the adversary knows that we are intent on
maintaining that capability gap and protecting and defending
our capabilities on a day-to-day basis.
So deterrence is the cornerstone of everything that we are
trying to do. If you think back to General Saltzman, one of his
core themes is Competitive Endurance. Under Competitive
Endurance we would rather be in a State of constant competition
and to deter aggression rather than be into a State of
conflict.
Senator King. Thank you. I have to go to another hearing.
Vice Chair Fischer is going to preside, and it is over to her
for a second round of questions.
Senator Fischer. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, again to followup with what the Chairman was talking
about and tying it into the budget, I know there is a robust
unfunded priorities list both from General Whiting and from
General Saltzman. In this setting can you discuss some of the
general capabilities that Space Force could move ahead with if
you were provided with those additional resources? When we talk
about deterrence that is the point of this.
General Guetlein. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator. General
Saltzman, earlier last month, submitted our unfunded priorities
list to the tune of about $1.15 billion. In that list was
resiliency for our ground systems, power upgrades, HVAC
[heating, ventilation, and air conditioning] systems what have
you, because the Space Force fights from in place, so in our
facilities our power and cooling is really our JPA, our fuel if
you will. That is our weapons system. So he is asking for money
to invest in resiliency.
He asked for money in the Working Capital Fund to move it
from DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency] over to the
Space Force, so that we have a business model to actually
procure additional commercial capacity for our warfighters and
for our Nation.
He asked for $19 million for National Space Test and
Training Center, which is building out our ability to do
advanced tests and advanced training in a live, virtual,
constructive environment.
He asked for $60 million to restore the Small Launch
Program so that we can provide ride shares to our industry
partners and to our academic partners.
He asked for $786 million in classified space control
capabilities to ensure that we can protect and defend our
capabilities on space.
He asked for $43 million to allow the Space Development
Agency to do experimentation.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, very much. Hopefully we
can start to deliver on some of those.
Senator Cramer, do you have additional questions?
Senator Cramer. I don't because
[inaudible].
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator Rounds, any other
questions?
Senator Rounds. I do. Thank you, Madam Chair, or Vice
Chair. For Mr. Hill and General Guetlein, are you aware of the
20-month EMBRSS [Emerging Mid-Band Radar Spectrum Sharing]
study that was authorized to explore the sharing of the
electromagnetic spectrum in the critical 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz
band?
Mr. Hill. I am. General?
Senator Rounds. Are you aware that this was a study that
included the whole-of-government as well as representatives of
defense contractors and the telecommunications industry?
Mr. Hill. Yes, Senator.
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Are you aware of the finding of this
interagency study group that sharing in this band between
Federal and commercial systems is not feasible unless, and I
quote, ``certain regulatory, technological, and resourcing
conditions are met and implemented''?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator.
Mr. Hill. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Are you also aware that the estimate of
this interagency study was that implementing the conditions
could take 30 years and $260 billion in this portion of the
electromagnetic band alone, even if the very stringent
conditions were able to be met?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator.
Mr. Hill. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Are you also aware of the legislative
proposals in the Commerce Committee calling for the use of the
728 gigahertz band to the spectrum, where the Space Force and
other services maintain similarly critical systems for the
defense of our country?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator.
Mr. Hill. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Can you tell this Subcommittee where you
stand on these efforts, if they proceed forward without the
most stringent conditions, such as the development and
implementation of the Dynamic Spectrum Sharing, the
interference safeguards, and a massive influx of Federal
resources to maintain the defense of this country?
General Guetlein. Senator, spectrum is vital to our way of
life. It is actually a natural resource just like water or air,
and just like water or air, we need to protect that vital
resource. We need to make sure it is not contested, we need to
make sure it is not polluted, and we need to make sure it is
not controlled.
If you look at the 7 to 8 gigahertz spectrum band that you
are talking about, that is where most of our NC3, so our
nuclear command and control capabilities, lie. Those systems
have been purposely designed for that spectrum, and if we were
pushed outside of that spectrum, those systems that took us
decades to develop and billions of dollars to develop would
have to be reconstituted in some sort of fashion.
If you look at just the wideband gapfiller system, we have
10 of those on orbit today, they cost about $600 million
apiece. Each one of those takes 4 years to develop. Just
looking at just that one piece of the architecture for wideband
gapfiller, that is $6 billion and at least a decade to
reconstitute, to assume that we could even find another
spectrum that it could operate. You amplify that across all of
our capabilities and you start to see the large numbers that
you just talked about in that study. So it would be detrimental
to us to lose that spectrum.
Senator Rounds. Mr. Hill, anything to add to that?
Mr. Hill. That was an excellent summary of how we use it.
The national security community, Defense Department,
intelligence community, when we have been allocated spectrum we
have invested heavily to utilize that spectrum. The Nation has
tremendous investments that are put at risk if we carelessly
start reallocating spectrum. The national security community
needs to be at the table whenever this conversation comes up.
Senator Rounds. Would you suspect that our adversaries
would love to see us try to disrupt our ability to use those
specific bands?
General Guetlein. Absolutely.
Mr. Hill. Our adversaries always like to see us disrupt
ourselves.
Senator Rounds. We have met the enemy, and sometimes the
enemy is us.
One other thought. I note also that in the 3.1 to 3.4
gigahertz area the LRDR, or the long range discriminating
radar, actually sits in that band, as well, does it not?
General Guetlein. It does, and that is our last line of
defense to protect the Homeland from a nuclear launch from
North Korea.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds, for opening up
that line of discussion, I would just follow that up, as a
member of the Commerce Committee, that there are some bills out
there that look at spectrum auctions. There are deep concerns
by many Members, obviously on Armed Services Committee, but on
Commerce Committee, as well.
Do you believe wise, in fact, it would be vital for
Senators before moving on any kind of legislation to have
auction in the bands that were discussed previously by Senator
Rounds, that they would at least contact DOD for technical
advise?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator.
Mr. Hill. Yes. The Defense Department needs to be part of
the conversation.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. As you said, this is a national
security issue, and it would be detrimental for us to lose
access of that spectrum for our security. Am I restating that
correctly?
General Guetlein. Yes, Senator. It would be detrimental for
us to lose access to that natural resource.
Mr. Hill. Correctly and more succinctly than I usually do.
Senator Fischer. You did a nice job, Mr. Hill. Thank you
very much. Anything else from Senators that are present?
Thank you very much, and with that I thank our panel for
being here. I look forward to continuing our discussions, and
the hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus King
space acquisition tenets
1. Senator King. Secretary Calvelli, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, in October 2022, you issued your ``Space Acquisition
Tenets,'' which contains nine tenets to guide your acquisition
professionals. A long-standing issue has been putting satellites up in
space before the ground systems are complete to use the data. Can you
give us an example of what ground systems you are talking about and why
this is important?
Secretary Calvelli. One of my priorities is to ensure that the
space and ground segments come together as a system. We need to
proactively drive ground systems to be ready before launch. Not having
ground systems ready delays our ability to use new satellite
capabilities. One way to reduce risk and drive timely deliveries is to
avoid building large complex monolithic ground software systems.
Instead, as we architect future ground systems, they must be broken up
into smaller less complex software development systems to reduce risk
and add speed.
The Global Positioning System Next-Generation Operational Control
System (GPS OCX) program is a prime example of how difficult it is to
tackle a single complex command and control system and large monolithic
software development projects at the same time. This single acquisition
of multi-million lines of software code is years late and overrun.
The Space Development Agency (SDA) is working to ensure their
ground infrastructure, including two new network operations centers, is
on track for delivery to support all their Tranche 1 tracking
satellites. Space Systems Command architected their Future
Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE) missile warning ground
systems into more manageable smaller contracting elements, to include a
mission framework, mission processing, mission scheduling. Similarly,
the ground for the new Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS) program has also
broken their ground software into smaller elements.
space force training
2. Senator King. General Guetlein, training is essential for any
warfighting service. It develops competency and projects deterrence to
our adversaries. How does the Space Force train? Is it a mix of actual
training in space and simulations here on the ground?
General Guetlein. The Space Force (USSF) conducts a mixture of
training in both the space and ground segments of our systems.
Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI), a critical
component to the USSF's ability to generate readiness for Great Power
Competition, provides an integrated system of systems architecture
enabling guardians to test and train in an operationally relevant
manner to achieve and sustain combat readiness. OTTI was formally
established within the USSF in 2023 and includes: 1) high-fidelity
mission-specific simulators, 2) live and synthetic ``ranges'' which are
part of the National Space Test and Training Complex (NSTTC), 3) live
and synthetic aggressor forces, and 4) interoperability with other
joint, federated capabilities such as the Joint Simulation Environment
(JSE).
For example, the NSTTC unifies operations of the Electromagnetic
Range, Orbital Warfare Range, Cyber Warfare Range, and the Digital
Warfare Environment for a broad range of integrated test and training
activities. Each of the ranges and the digital environments are
operated by units dedicated to providing customers with a safe and
secure environment supporting test, training, exercise, and
experimentation activities in the varied space and cyber domains.
In addition, Space Operations Command (SpOC) has implemented
scenarios via Table Top Seminars that enable us to quickly identify and
close qualitative gaps in operational readiness with respect to
Doctrine, Concepts, Training; OTTI capability needs; Concepts of
Operations (CONOPS); Concepts of Employment (CONEMPs); Command &
Control; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs); and crossField
Command dependencies. The use of scenarios has improved the Space
Force's ability to present fully burdened, combat credible space forces
to the Joint Force commander. These scenarios, called FLASHPOINT, are
based upon the environment established in the Space Force's Space Flag
exercise--the training event proposed by Congress in the Fiscal Year
2018 NDAA (Sec. 1615). In 2017, the Air Force (USAF) held the first
Space Flag. USSF now holds Space Flag exercises executed by Space
Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM). Space Flag validates the
environment, scenario, and operator responses, and enables SpOC to meet
Space Force Generation (SPAFORGEN) certification requirements.
space based tactical intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
3. Senator King. General Guetlein, the Air Force is phasing out our
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) radar aircraft,
which performed Ground Moving Indication (GMTI) as well as our E-3
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which perform Air
Moving Target Indication (AMTI). The Space Force will be taking on this
mission with space-based platforms. This has traditionally been a title
10 mission for the Air Force now this will be the Space Force. Last
year's National Defense Authorization Act gave the tasking authority
for tactical space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
to the Air Force and hence the Space Force. What issues do you see in
this transition from air to space in terms of mission?
General Guetlein. The transition of Moving Target Indication (MTI)
capabilities from airborne to space assets involves the following
considerations:
Integration into Joint processes and systems: The Space
Force is collaborating with the Services, Combatant Commands, Defense
Agencies, and the Intelligence Community (IC), in a complementary way
to design, develop, and deploy Space-Based Ground Moving Target
Indicator (SB-GMTI) systems that meet validated requirements and inform
future budget considerations, with a primary focus on the ground
architecture necessary to enable orchestration, Department of Defense
(DOD) tasking & target custody, and doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)
requirements. SB-GMTI will provide actionable information on potential
adversary targets to the warfighter through the Department of the Air
Force (DAF) Battle Network, DAF's primary contribution to Combined
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2).
Facilitating a shift in thinking that SB-GMTI
capabilities are not intelligence collection-oriented but are instead
tactical and operationally intended for direct tactical and operational
support to the Combatant Commands. The core function of SB-GMTI is to
close kill chains and facilitate beyond line-of-sight battle management
within Joint Long-Range Kill-Chain time requirements. SB-GMTI will aid
Combatant Commands in the ability to Find, Fix, Track, Target, support
Engagement through In Flight Target Updates (IFTUs), and Assess F2T2EA
potential threats through competition, crisis, and conflict.
Deconfliction of Combatant Command collection operations
authorities; the USSF is not creating a new process or advocating to be
the Collection Management Authority for the Combatant Command. The USSF
will assign forces to the Combatant Commands to manage, plan, execute,
and task systems, just as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander
(JFACC) would for theater airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR). SB-GMTI forces will integrate into Combatant
Command collection working groups, boards, and development processes to
effectively integrate, synchronize, and dynamically manage the
Combatant Command's SB-GMTI allocation in support of Joint Force
objectives.
Reorganization of United States Space Force (USSF) forces
to fulfill new mission areas; the USSF's force presentation, at Full
Operational Capability, will focus on Global and Regional Operations.
Global Operations, conducted by a Global Combat Squadron assigned to
the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), via the United States
Space Forces - Space (S4S), will be responsible for: 1) global mission
management (including managing vehicle duty cycles and interfacing with
IC partners); 2) execution of the global allocation plan (including
coordination of the plan in accordance with (IAW) Secretary of Defense
priorities and monitoring of regional capacity allocations); and 3)
global reach back (in support of dynamic reallocation between Combatant
Commands where needed and to provide notifications of anomalous
constellation conditions). Regional Operations will be conducted by the
Regional Elements within the Space Force Service Component Commands
assigned to each Combatant Command. Teams of guardians will facilitate
constellation tasking IAW Combatant Command J2/J3 direction, develop
intra-theater strategies, verify data to command-and-control nodes, and
provide sensor feasibility assessments and usage recommendations.
4. Senator King. General Guetlein, how will this legislation ensure
the combatant commander has the same military tasking ability today
that he will have with space?
General Guetlein. In accordance with Section 1684 of the Fiscal
Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of the Air
Force has the responsibility for presenting ground and airborne moving
target indication systems that are funded by the Department of Defense
(DOD) and provide near real-time support to combatant commands. Space-
Based Ground Moving Target Indicator (SB-GMTI) systems meet this
responsibility as military surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
that will be presented by the USSF to the combatant commands to close
kill chains and facilitate beyond line-of-sight battle management
within Joint Long-Range Kill-Chain time requirements. SB-GMTI is not a
one-for-one swap for the retired E-8C JSTARS's sensing capabilities;
rather it is an evolved weapon system that serves as the next
generation moving target indicator for the warfighter, raising a large
majority of that capability to space. SB-GMTI will facilitate access
and persistence in highly contested environments.
The intent of SB-GMTI is to enhance and expedite near real-time
support to Combatant Commands. The best way to enhance that support is
to integrate to the greatest extent possible into Combatant Command
processes. We need to bring the system tasking and requirements
validation capabilities directly under the purview and control of the
Combatant Commands. The DOD's method for doing this, in doctrine and
practice, is via Service presentation of capabilities and personnel via
Service components. Combatant Commands will receive trained,
experienced, and knowledgeable forces to integrate directly at all
levels of operations. This integration enables requirements and tasks
to be more responsive to and more aligned with warfighter needs on a
deliberate and dynamic basis.
5. Senator King. Secretary Calvelli, you served many years in the
National Reconnaissance Office and the intelligence community has
capabilities in this area. From an acquisition and tasking stand point
what is most important to you to ensure the capabilities you will
develop remain title 10 capabilities?
Secretary Calvelli. I am in constant communication with my
Intelligence Community partners to ensure we are mutually adhering to
the policies governing the acquisition and tasking of title 10 and
title 50 space capabilities. Given the threats to national security
posed by our competitors, it is imperative that we avoid duplication of
effort while simultaneously leveraging capabilities to efficiently and
affordably meet the full range of national security requirements.
Space-based Ground Moving Target Indicator (SB-GMTI), a joint
venture between the United States Space Force and National
Reconnaissance Office, benefits and reinforces collaboration between
the Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community. The
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
have agreed that 100 percent of the SB-GMTI is allocated and tasked by
the DOD.
6. Senator King. Mr. Hill, the JSTARS and the E-3 AWACS are used by
NATO and other allies, as their aircraft also age out will they use our
space based assets without deploying their own?
Mr. Hill. NATO Allies and non-NATO Allies are increasing
investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
and other space-based defense systems. They desire to invest in ways
that maximize interoperability with U.S. space systems.
For NATO Allies, this approach advances objectives of NATO's
overarching Space Policy, which recognizes that, ``[i]ntelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance requires space capabilities for
strategic, operational and tactical assessment, situational awareness
and to support decisionmaking and planning.'' NATO's policy also states
that, ``NATO will identify and, if necessary, develop appropriate
mechanisms, based on voluntary participation, to fulfil and sustain
requirements for space support in NATO operations, missions and other
activities in the above functional areas. Allies' capabilities, and, if
necessary, trusted commercial service providers should be leveraged to
meet these requirements in the most secure, efficient, effective and
transparent manner.''
I see these trends in allied investments, and the establishment of
the NATO space policy, as providing the foundation for coordinating
space domain investments in ISR and other space capabilities in ways
that are analogous to what has been done in the air domain.
space force arctic bases
7. Senator King. General Guetlein, my understanding is you have
installations in pretty austere conditions, let me zero in on ones that
are in arctic areas--the one that comes to mind is Pittufik Space Force
Base, formerly Thule Space Force Base. Others are in my home State in
Prospect Harbor and as well as large radar at Clear Space Force Base
Alaska. At Pittufik my understanding is the extreme cold is impacting
your ability to generate power and have adequate housing for your
guardians. Can you describe what you are doing at Pittufik to ensure
the infrastructure is maintained?
General Guetlein. Pituffik Space Base, Greenland is an
unaccompanied assignment and guardians and airmen live in dorms where
there is a surplus of bed spaces. All dorms meet the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD)-required facility condition index.
The Space Force prioritizes requirements through our own
governance. Specifically, at Pituffik Space Base, a $310 million
project was awarded in fiscal year 2024 to repair the power plant that
directly supports the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR).
Additionally, a $225 million project to replace the main power plant at
Pituffik is programmed for fiscal year 2030. Furthermore, in fiscal
year 2024 we will complete a $2.5 million arctic foundation repair on
the mission control building that supports UEWR and a $24 million
repair to a high-rise dormitory that houses permanent party personnel.
The Department of the Air Force (DAF) Climate Action Plan drives
the Space Force's climate and resilience strategy. We have the unique
goal of employing a holistic approach to enterprise-wide solutions
based on specific locations. Our strategy defines climate resilience as
the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to hazardous
events, trends, or disturbances related to climate. To combat these
growing threats, planners take into consideration the effects of
climate and severe weather when planning for infrastructure resiliency
in accordance with the DAF's Severe Weather and Climate Hazard
Screening and Risk Assessment Playbook. To take full advantage of
climate-informed decisions, the Space Force continually acquires
improved extreme weather sensing solutions and develops expertise in
the analysis of authoritative climate and extreme weather data. The
department also continues to develop secure, digitally integrated
infrastructure to minimize vulnerabilities and interruptions to our
facility control systems, including power distribution. Our strategy
maximizes the use of existing and future technology to improve our use
of information to better protect our installations. By addressing
challenges using a holistic enterprise approach we are better postured
to leverage experience as we mature as a service. Because of the
geographical separation between our installations, the Space Force must
create customized climate and severe weather solutions based on
specific locations. Space Force takes advantage of the planning process
and standards set up by the DAF's severe weather playbook to help
customize solutions to each threat based on location.
8. Senator King. General Guetlein, can you describe what you are
doing at Space Force installations and assets located in Alaska to
ensure the infrastructure is maintained?
General Guetlein. Because of the geographical separation between
our installations, the Space Force must create customized climate and
severe weather solutions based on specific locations. The Space Force
takes advantage of the planning process and standards set up by the
Department of the Air Force's (DAF's) severe weather playbook to help
customize solutions to each threat based on location.
At Clear Space Force Station, Alaska, a $72 million project was
awarded in fiscal year 2023 to construct a new dormitory to support the
new Long Range Discrimination Radar mission. Additionally, a $22
million project was awarded in fiscal year 2024 to repair the utility
piping in utilidors and in fiscal year 2028 we plan to construct a $6
million new composite steam plant. All requirements will include
climate informed decisions to make our installations more resilient.
Furthermore, the DAF conducted an Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise
(ERRE) at Clear SFS in fiscal year 2023 and plans to conduct another
ERRE in fiscal year 2027. The ERREs are critical to aiding the DAF in
determining infrastructure improvement opportunities to ensure
operational mission readiness.
9. Senator King. General Guetlein, what challenges do you have with
maintaining infrastructure in the high north?
General Guetlein. Base infrastructure across the northern tier is a
central component to Space Forces' power projection. The climate of the
High North region presents challenges to maintaining the service's
infrastructure. To survive in the High North region, materials need to
meet standards including high thermal efficiency, long-term durability,
tolerance to repeated freeze and thaw cycles, and resistance to
permafrost degradation.
At Clear Space Force Station (SFS), a $72 million project was
awarded in fiscal year 2023 to construct a new dormitory to support the
new Long Range Discrimination Radar mission. Additionally, a $22
million project was awarded in fiscal year 2024 to repair the utility
piping in utilidors and in fiscal year 2028 we plan to construct a $6
million new composite steam plant. All requirements will include
climate informed decisions to make our installations more resilient.
Furthermore, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) conducted an Energy
Resilience Readiness Exercise (ERRE) at Clear SFS in fiscal year 2023
and plans to conduct another ERRE in fiscal year 2027. The ERREs are
critical to aiding the Department in determining infrastructure
improvement opportunities to ensure operational mission readiness.
At Pituffik Space Base, a $310 million project using Operations &
Maintenance (O&M) funds was awarded in fiscal year 2024 to repair the
power plant that directly supports the Upgraded Early Warning Radar
(UEWR). Furthermore, in fiscal year 2024 we will complete a $2.5
million arctic foundation repair on the mission control building that
supports UEWR and a $24 million repair to a high-rise dormitory that
houses permanent party personnel.
By addressing challenges using a holistic enterprise approach we
are better postured to leverage experience as we mature as a service.
Because of the geographical separation between our installations, Space
Force must create customized climate and severe weather solutions based
on specific locations. Space Force takes advantage of the planning
process and standards set up by the DAF's severe weather playbook to
help customize solutions to each threat based on location.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
national security space launch phase iii
10. Senator Reed. Secretary Calvelli, in an October 5, 2023 Space
Systems Command (SSC) press release regarding National Security Space
Launch Phase 3, you stated ``As we continue to drive speed in our
acquisitions, National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 is critical
to our ability to put new space capabilities on orbit quickly. I am
extremely proud of the SSC team and the innovative work they have done
to define a new dual-lane approach to launch, and the addition of a
third launch service provider in Lane 2. This next phase of the NSSL
acquisition will serve the Nation well and allow us to further
transform our space capabilities to outpace our competitors.'' Can you
further explain how this will this launch strategy, which includes a
third launch provider for higher energy orbits, will help the United
States maintain our competitive advantage over our near peer
adversaries?
Secretary Calvelli. My number one priority is to put space
capability in the hands of the warfighter when and where it is needed.
To maintain a competitive advantage over our adversaries, we need
launch resiliency. We structured the Phase 3 launch strategy to
increase resiliency by giving us access to a diverse portfolio of
launch providers and launch systems.
The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 program is using
an innovative dual-lane acquisition approach to fulfill NSSL program
needs by competitively awarding two separate contract types. Lane 1
provides access to diverse emerging commercial offerings for the more
risk-tolerant missions using tailored mission assurance levels. Lane 2
ensures assured access to space for the hardest, ``no-fail'' missions
by placing a priority on meeting all NSSL requirements, including full
government mission assurance with NSSL-certified launch vehicles.
Having three providers in Lane 2 also secures national security launch
capacity in the face of a growing commercial market.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
starlink
11. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, in response to my questions about
strategies to end illicit use of Starlink, you testified that ``Broader
across the government, we can then develop strategies. Is it better to
identify all the terminals that should be left on or should we identify
terminals that should be turned off? Different types of approaches. We
have done that with them.'' Specifically, which approach have you
taken?
Mr. Hill. We understand that SpaceX, in coordination with the
United States Government, uses a hybrid approach that combines factors
for which terminals should be ``left on'' and which terminals should be
``turned off'' in seeking to prevent illicit use of Starlink terminals
in Ukraine.
12. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, does Starlink use a strategy in which
they identify all terminals that should be left on, or do they identify
terminals that should be turned off?
Mr. Hill. We understand that SpaceX uses a hybrid approach to
address illicit use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine. SpaceX has
coordinated its approach with the United States Government, which
includes routine monitoring in an effort to thwart suspected illicit
users.
13. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, does SpaceX have the capacity to
identify if one of its Starlink terminals is being used in an illicit
manner?
Mr. Hill. We understand that SpaceX, in coordination with the U.S.
Government, uses a hybrid approach that combines factors for which
terminals should be ``left on'' and which terminals should be ``turned
off'' in an effort to prevent illicit use of Starlink terminals. SpaceX
performs these activities on a recurring basis without requiring
consultation with the U.S. Government.
14. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, has SpaceX shut off illicitly used
Starlink terminals when identified and requested by the Department of
Defense? If yes, how quickly have they done so?
Mr. Hill. From our perspective, SpaceX has fully cooperated with
the United States Government and the Government of Ukraine to support
investigations and to deny service to suspected illicit users. SpaceX
has a record of taking prompt action when illicit use is identified.
15. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, is SpaceX identifying if its
terminals are being used illicitly? How quickly are they disabling
terminals once that illicit use is identified?
Mr. Hill. We understand that SpaceX, in coordination with the U.S.
Government, uses a hybrid approach that combines factors for which
terminals should be ``left on'' and which terminals should be ``turned
off'' in an effort to prevent illicit use of Starlink terminals. SpaceX
has a record of taking prompt action when illicit use is identified.
16. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, does the Department of Defense
believe illicit use of Starlink terminals has helped any foreign
adversaries identify vulnerabilities in those terminals or other
commercial capabilities?
Mr. Hill. Yes.
17. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, does the Department of Defense
believe illicit use of Starlink terminals has helped any foreign
adversaries compromise or intercept NATO partner or Ukrainian
communications?
Mr. Hill. We have no evidence to suggest that illicit use of
Starlink terminals has helped any foreign adversaries compromise or
intercept NATO partner or Ukrainian communications.
18. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, the Washington Post reported that
Russian electronic jamming cutoff video feeds for Ukraine's 125th
Territorial Defense Brigade. Who does the Department of Defense assess
to be responsible for the jamming?
Mr. Hill. We assess that Russian electronic jamming was responsible
for the reported effects.
19. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, is the Department of Defense able to
share all of the information it receives about Starlink vulnerabilities
or jamming with SpaceX?
Mr. Hill. The Department of Defense works with the Intelligence
Community to share with SpaceX, as appropriate, information received
about Starlink vulnerabilities or jamming.
20. Senator Warren. Mr. Hill, has the Department of Defense or
SpaceX identified how to prevent future jamming of Starlink terminals?
Has that fix been implemented?
Mr. Hill. Russian electronic warfare techniques and capabilities
will continue to evolve and adapt. The Department of Defense and its
suppliers of commercial satellite communications services, including
Starlink services, likewise are continuously identifying and
implementing ways to operate through jamming environments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
space launch capabilities
21. Senator Cotton. General Guetlein, I am glad to see from your
testimony that the number of commercial space launches on Federal
ranges continues to increase, why is it important that the Department
of the Air Force facilitate private-sector investment in our Nation's
Federal launch ranges and how does the Department ensure that the
commercial deployment of national security infrastructure on Federal
ranges is not delayed by environmental approvals?
General Guetlein. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) promotes
partnerships with private sector companies, providing them access to
develop and operate launch sites on Federal ranges to facilitate the
expansion of launch technology, commercial sector development, and
increased launch provider diversity. This collaboration allows industry
to utilize government expertise and maximize the use of common
infrastructure. The DAF ensures appropriate consideration of
environmental protection as we grow and execute our missions largely
through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) planning process,
ensuring collaborative decisionmaking with launch service providers and
regulatory and permitting/licensing agencies, and obtaining public
input. Environmental analyses and varying degrees of regulatory
permitting are required for any new launch site operation regardless of
location. For example, the DAF and Department of Defense must follow
the procedural requirements under NEPA, preparing, managing, and
documenting the appropriate analyses (such as Environmental Assessments
and Environmental Impact Statements) to meet timelines to the greatest
extent practicable. Public participation is a critical element of this
process. The DAF makes every reasonable effort to collaborate and
utilize its expertise as well as that of regulatory and permitting/
licensing agencies and launch service providers so that its
environmental reviews are timely, efficient, thorough, and informed.
22. Senator Cotton. General Guetlein, how does the Department of
Air Force ensure that commercial operators can access accelerated
environmental approvals for privately funded infrastructure
improvements on Federal ranges that are in support of national security
space launch capacity, and how can we ensure that environmental
approval timelines for these activities are aligned with the threats we
face from foreign adversaries?
General Guetlein. There is an escalating demand for national
security space launch capacity amid growing international threats.
Compliance with mandatory Federal, State, and local environmental
regulations limits the pace of completing environmental reviews for
launch site development. The regulations often pose challenges for
commercial operators in accessing accelerated environmental approvals
for privately funded infrastructure improvements on Federal ranges.
While some Federal environmental laws provide exemptions for national
security needs, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not,
and the Department of the Air Force (DAF) must therefore abide by its
requirements.
The DAF remains committed to ensuring environmental review
processes can meet the demands of launch activities while preserving
necessary environmental protections. Although the DAF is typically the
lead agency for environmental review of Space Force spaceport
developments, we lack direct authority to change or remove other
agencies' environmental requirements including State, regional, and
local requirements authorized by Federal legislation. DAF resources
necessary to support coordination with other agencies, particularly for
commercial (Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-licensed) launch
activity, become increasingly complex and time-consuming due to
increasing launch demand.
tactical datalinks from space between air, land, and sea platforms
23. Senator Cotton. General Guetlein, do you have the spectrum
authority today you need to develop, test, and operationally use on-
orbit tactical datalinks, such as Link-16, in congested parts of the
spectrum for daily and regular training with other Department of
Defense land, air, sea platforms?
General Guetlein. The Department of Defense (DOD) does not have the
spectrum authority needed to test and operate space-based Link-16. The
DOD is currently limited to testing and operating the Link-16 systems
it has on orbit in international waters and over some parts of
Australia via International Telecommunication Union (ITU) waivers
granted by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA). This authorization is set to expire at the end
of Calendar Year 2024. As testing and operational use are restricted to
these test sites, it limits the ability of the DOD to test, evaluate,
and integrate space-based Link-16 into training events reducing the
``training-as-we-fight'' concept.
24. Senator Cotton. General Guetlein, in your best military advice,
what policies today slow down your ability to rapidly certify and use
tactical datalinks or communication systems?
General Guetlein. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
requires all Link-16 equipped systems to complete Electromagnetic
Compatibility Features (EMCF) validation before any testing over the
United States. The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration has the authority to allow testing, but it has deferred
to the FAA. This FAA requirement for full EMCF validation by the
Department of Defense (DOD), often a multi-year process, ahead of
testing extends the timeline to field all Link-16 equipped weapon
systems. The requirement to complete EMCF validation before conducting
on-orbit testing over the United States add at least a year to fielding
these tactical space-based systems. With no authorities to test and
operationalize space-based Link-16, development of Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures (TTPs) has been restricted and available DOD combat
power has been reduced. The FAA has previously granted a Temporary
Frequency Assignment (TFA) for the purpose of testing terrestrial Link-
16 systems without EMCF validation. The Department would welcome
similar opportunities to test space-based Link-16 systems domestically.
Another policy impediment is the lack of a national or
international allocation for space-based Link-16. Lack of an allocation
for space-based Link-16 complicates all spectrum allocation efforts for
these systems even if the radios are nearly identical to Link-16 radios
fielded on airframes. The first step is for the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to provide
space-based Link-16 an allocation in their Manual of Regulations and
Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Spectrum Management. Then the
United States could pursue an international allocation for space-based
Link-16 through the World Radiocommunications Conference.
25. Senator Cotton. Secretary Calvelli, you mentioned in your
opening statement that the Space Development Agency demonstrated Link-
16 from space, but is this a just demo or is it a capability with a
clear path to fielding; and if the later, what is the plan to fully
certify transmit and receive of Link-16 over the United States National
Airspace System and field it as soon as possible so that all joint
platforms can benefit?
Secretary Calvelli. The Space Development Agency (SDA)'s
Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) Tranche 0
constellation is designed to serve as a warfighter immersion layer to
expose the operational community to the tremendous value of space-based
Link-16 and develop a path to full fielding of the capability. Link-16
demonstrations conducted overseas using Tranche 0 satellites will lead
to the operational deployment of Link-16 as part of Tranche 1, which
will field 126 Link-16 equipped satellites in 2025 to support
persistent regional access to space-based Link-16. This operational
access will be further expanded in 2027 with the deployment of Tranche
2 which will provide global access to space-based Link-16. Current
analysis and on orbit testing of Tranche 0 Link-16 assets has shown no
harmful interference to aeronautical systems. SDA is working with the
military Services and Combatant Commands to develop the doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities (DOTMLPF) for operationalizing space-based Link-16.
26. Senator Cotton. Secretary Calvelli, I am led to believe that
the Space Development Agency tranche 0 and tranche 1 communication
satellites were required to test their Link-16 tactical datalink
capability in Australia because the Federal Aviation Administration
would not work with the Space Force; is this true?
Secretary Calvelli. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is
working with the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), Department of Transportation, and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) to meet the various requirements to gain
authorization for the Space Development Agency (SDA) to test space-
based Link-16 systems in the United States. SDA obtained approval to
perform the Tranche 0 tests in Australia and in international waters
after the FAA denied a temporary authorization for very limited testing
over a United States military test range without first successfully
completing the Electromagnetic Compatibility Features (EMCF)
validation. SDA asked the FAA to waive this requirement by proposing
restricted domestic tests during times when civil air traffic is
limited, but FAA sees the EMCF validation as essential. SDA currently
plans to test all Tranche 0 and Tranche 1 Link-16 systems outside of
the U.S. National Airspace System.
27. Senator Cotton. Secretary Hill, what is the Department of
Defense leadership doing to advocate for the full certification of
Link-16 transmit and receive from space given the ongoing roadblocks
from the Federal Aviation Administration and outdated policies not in
compliance with Section 228 of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act?
Mr. Hill. The requirements and methodologies to meet the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) Electromagnetic Compatibility Features
(EMCF) validation were unchanged by Section 228 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. The FAA continues to require
full EMCF validation of each Link-16 system before it will provide
authorization for domestic testing or operation.
The Department of Defense (DOD) requires FAA authorization to test
and operate space-based Link-16 within the United States. Due to FAA
restrictions that prevent broadcasting Link-16 from space into the U.S.
National Airspace System, the DOD is limited to testing and operating
the Link-16 systems it has on orbit in international waters and over
approved areas of partner nations via International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) waivers granted by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA). Using one such waiver, the Space
Development Agency (SDA) successfully demonstrated the first-ever Link
16 network entry through space to ground connection from low Earth
orbit (LEO) to a series of receivers using terrestrial radios during
three demonstrations held November 21-27, 2023. However, restricting
testing and operational use to these sites limits the ability of the
DOD to test, evaluate, and integrate space-based Link-16 into training
events. Further, the current test waiver is set to expire at the end of
2024.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
multiyear block buys
28. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Calvelli, according to the April
2022 Department of Defense (DOD)--Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
that was sent to Congress: ``The Phase 2 competitive acquisition award
adds to the considerable savings the NNSL [National Security Space
Launch] program has achieved since the 2013 Phase 1 Block Buy contract
award. The NSSL program garnered these savings by creating new
acquisition strategies, procuring launch services in economic order
quantities, and fostering robust competition precipitated by
investments in new commercial launch systems that also meet more
stressing NSSL needs.'' Moreover, the NSSL program has returned
approximately $7 billion to the warfighter, allowing the Air Force,
Space Force, and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to fund
additional, much-needed capabilities. During the House Armed Services
Hearing hearing couple weeks ago, Mr. Calvelli noted that the Space
Force utilized multi-year Block Buys in Phase 2 and lane 2 for Phase 3,
but stopped short of commenting on whether multi-year block buys will
be the standard in future procurements. Given the success they have had
in the past and the benefits they have brought to the industrial base,
can you confirm that multi-year block buys will continue to be utilized
in all future procurements for NSSL beyond Phase 3?
Secretary Calvelli. Block buy contracting strategies, coupled with
re-introducing competition into National Security Space Launch (NSSL),
has yielded tremendous savings and other benefits. We awarded the first
NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 On-Ramp in June 2024, and we anticipate awarding
Lane 2 contracts by this fall. After Lane 2 is awarded, the Space Force
will continue to assess the commercial market, NSSL future needs, and
lessons learned/best practices from Phase 3 to shape future acquisition
strategies.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2025 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 22, 2024
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:50 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Angus King
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators King, Rosen, Kelly,
and Fischer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS KING
Senator King. This hearing on the Department of Energy
Atomic Energy Defense Programs, and Department of Defense
Nuclear Weapons Programs of the Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. I want to
thank our witnesses for appearing here today and for their
service to our Nation.
I first want to welcome Admiral Houston, our eighth
director of Naval Reactors to the subcommittee, and we look
forward to hearing from you over the next 8 years. Thank you,
Admiral. Congratulations.
Today's hearing consists of two panels to review the budget
request for Defense nuclear activities at the Department of
Energy and the Department of Defense. We're undertaking now our
third era of nuclear modernization. The first two were
conducted in 1960, and 1980, mainly in a situation of
competition with the Soviet Union. However, now we face two
heavily nuclear armed near peer competitors, Russia and China.
More than ever, we're relying on modernizing our triad to
perform the deterrence mission, the deterrence mission which is
the bedrock of our National Security Strategy. This year, we
were informed that there is a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the
Sentinel ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] replacement
program.
General Bussiere, I will want to know how your command is
investigating this issue. Administrator Hruby, pit production
cost continues to climb at the Savannah River Plant and I look
forward to your telling us how you're tracking and working on
containing them. Mr. White, you perhaps have the toughest job
of all managing the largest liability of the Federal Government
which in 2023 was estimated at $531 billion.
I want to know what you are doing to work your way through
this backlog of cleanup and whether there are less costly
methods to dispose of some of the tank waste at Hanford while
still meeting our commitments to the State and to the
environment.
Because we have two panels, I would appreciate if you could
make short 2- to 3-minute opening statements. We'll have 5-
minute rounds of questions. Again, welcome to the Committee,
and thank you for your service.
Senator Fischer.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all of our witnesses for being here today.
Our nuclear deterrent underpins our entire National
Security Strategy and it must remain safe, reliable, effective,
and credible. We face two peer nuclear adversaries for the
first time in history. While our current nuclear weapons and
delivery systems meet the threats of today. I'm increasingly
concerned that our planned force posture for the 2030's and
beyond will be insufficient. We need to start laying the
groundwork today to set the conditions for success in the
future.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on both panels
on the progress being made with current programs of record and
what additional resources or authorities are needed to
accelerate that progress.
I would also like to note that last year's report from the
Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission included 81
recommendations that I believe laid out an excellent framework
for this Nation to revitalize our entire nuclear enterprise.
Senator King and I worked together on a bill, the Restoring
American Deterrence Act that encapsulates many of these
recommendations.
I look forward to working with all of our panelists over
the coming months as we seek to implement some of those
changes.
Thank you again for joining us today, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator King. Administrator Hruby.
STATEMENT OF MS. JILL M. HRUBY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATION
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Administrator Hruby. Well, thank you. Chairman King,
Ranking Member Fischer, it's a pleasure to be here to present
the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request for the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
[NNSA].
In today's complex and dynamic security environment, NNSA
is delivering. Last year we provided the Department of Defense
over 200 modernized weapons on schedule. Our nuclear non-
proliferation and counter-terrorism programs are advancing
technologies and partnerships that are responsive to today's
global environment. We are preparing for the future by
revitalizing our infrastructure and staying at the cutting edge
in select science and technology.
NNSA's fiscal year 2025 budget request of $25 billion
reflects these priorities. The nuclear weapons program of
record has grown from five to seven systems to be delivered or
in active production within the next decade. This request
supports all those systems with the exception of SLCM-N [Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear] just due to the timing of the
2025 budget request and the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA.
However, NNSA is fully committed to fulfilling the SLCM-N
requirement. These seven systems represent modernized weapons
for all three legs of the Triad and the new capabilities
responsive to today's security environment. Additionally, the
request supports two phase one studies to prepare to meet
future deterrent needs.
To deliver this demanding schedule, NNSA is prioritizing
infrastructure investments to get needed capabilities completed
on time while also pursuing a longer-term strategy of a
responsive, flexible, and resilient enterprise. High priority
projects include the pit production facilities at Los Alamos
and Savannah River.The uranium and lithium processing
facilities at Y-12. Our defense nuclear nonproliferation
activities are also responding to today's global dynamic and
anticipating the future.
In summary, NNSA's is holistically supporting nuclear
deterrence and strengthening relationships with our allies and
partners. There's a lot of work ahead and we appreciate your
support. Thank you.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman King. Thank you, Administrator Hruby.
Admiral Houston.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. HOUSTON, USN, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE OFFICE OF NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Houston. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. Your support for the Naval
Reactors enables my team to design, operate, and maintain a
globally deployed force of submarines and aircraft carriers
that reliably and consistently carry out our national security
missions around the world.
Today, the U.S. Navy's nuclear power warships are operating
alongside our allies and partners in hostile regions, providing
forward presence, and safeguarding stability in a world that is
increasingly tense. Our global presence continues to be
supported by strong allies and relationships through the AUKUS
[Australia, United Kingdom, United States] agreement.
The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have
demonstrated a trilateral commitment to free and open Indo-
Pacific region while expanding the region of effectiveness of
all three nations' military forces. Naval Reactors has
delivered the advanced technology that provides our fleet
competitive edge in the maritime environment through investment
in research and development in the past decades.
Our talented people, our peerless technology, and our
state-of-the-art facilities give us the ability to operate
submarines and carriers wherever and whenever we choose. We
must step up this investment if we want to sustain and exploit
that advantage. My budget request for fiscal year 2025 is $2.12
billion and invest in each of the following three areas, and
two priority projects.
First, my request supports our most important resource, our
people. The talented and dedicated people within the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Enterprise are essential to the management
and oversight of the important work we perform for our Nation.
Second, the budget reflects continued investment in R&D
[research and development] of technology to support our current
and future fleet, to substantially lower costs, reduce
construction timelines, and add fleet capability. Finally, my
request focus on investment to modernize the critical
infrastructure throughout our 70-plus-year Department of Energy
Laboratories and address our legacy environmental liabilities.
I'm also seeking your continued support for two national
priority projects. The first continued development of the
reactor plan for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine
directly supporting the Navy's number one acquisition priority.
The second project is continued construction of the naval spent
fuel handling facility in Idaho which enables long-term
reliable processing and packaging of spent fuel from the Navy's
nuclear fleet.
In closing, your strong and enduring support enables Naval
Reactors to provide the Nation and nuclear power fleet that is
unrivaled. I respectfully urge your endorsement of our fiscal
year 2025 budget request. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral William Houston
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral William Houston
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget for Naval
Reactors. Your continued, strong support for the unique mission and
successful execution of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program enables
our nuclear Navy to carry out vital missions around the world, at any
time, in response to global events.
In my first year of an 8-year tenure as Director of Naval Reactors,
the program continues to celebrate the 75th anniversary of delivering
naval nuclear propulsion for the Nation and powering maritime
dominance. I have spent the first several months meeting our experts
and touring the laboratories, nuclear capable shipyards, and facilities
that ensure safe and effective operation of the Program's cradle to
grave responsibilities. I look forward to continuing improve upon the
solid foundation that Admiral Rickover and my predecessors have built
and maintained.
With identification of the formal requirement for a nuclear powered
submarine in 1948, the Nation embarked on a path that continues today.
We train nuclear operators, rely on and shepherd the nuclear industrial
base, and employ nuclear shipyards with the same rigor and passion as
those early days. The Program began with no certainty of success, but
under the leadership of Admiral Rickover and with tremendous
congressional support, we, alongside our most capable allies, remain
the dominant force in naval nuclear propulsion. Today, Naval Reactors
is engaged in a tireless pursuit of new technologies, new materials,
innovative designs and adaptive approaches toward keeping our nuclear-
powered submarines and aircraft carriers at sea longer, with enhanced
warfighting capabilities. Our potential adversaries are also dedicated
in their pursuits. Your partnership and leadership together with the
Department of Energy and the Navy is needed now, more than ever, as we
work on naval nuclear propulsion that will power our fleet and protect
the national security of the United States throughout the remainder of
this century.
Today's strategic environment is rapidly changing and complex. The
global balance of military capabilities is evolving, but the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program is in place and answering the challenge. Our
actions today will impact the security and prosperity of our Nation for
generations. As I enter my tenure at Naval Reactors, I will ensure that
we sustain and improve our principal naval warfighting advantage and
maintain our supremacy in the maritime battlespace. That supremacy
cannot be taken for granted and it is not the sole purview of the
United States.
Consistent with the National Security Strategy and the National
Defense Strategy, it is vital for the Navy to maintain and expand our
competitive advantage by aggressively investing in emerging
technologies. The principal strategic issues driving the need for
urgent technological advancements are embedded in the growing security
threat from China and Russia. China continues to advance and establish
an expanding naval presence, projecting power and challenging United
States maritime superiority in new arenas. Meanwhile, Russia poses an
immediate threat to free and open international systems and sovereign
rights, relying on coercive practices to pursue an edge over the United
States and our allies. To properly defend against these threats,
nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers with greater
capability, firepower, and endurance will be required. Technology for
the next generation of nuclear propulsion must be developed today in
order to be ready to deliver the increased speed, improved stealth, and
enhanced warfighting capabilities needed to retain our advantage. From
concept to production, our focus on technologies and processes that can
reduce the build span times and costs of these platforms is essential
to delivering more ships, faster. In addition to our own efforts,
leveraging the technical expertise and resources of our allies and
partners remains a key advantage and greatly complicates our
adversaries planning.
For the last several years, diplomatic, and congressional leaders
have been developing, coordinating, and planning to execute the
Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) tri-lateral
security partnership. The AUKUS partnership bolsters our own
shipbuilding capability through uplift of our industrial and vendor
base capacity, and builds upon over a half century of collaboration
with the United Kingdom on naval nuclear propulsion. Operational,
rotational deployments of US Navy submarines through the Submarine
Rotational Force--West and ultimately the operation of Australian
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines throughout the Indo-
Pacific region, are efforts supported fully through the United States
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Given the global threats we face, it
is imperative that we work with our closest allies to improve their
capabilities and expand their reach in the undersea domain. Development
and planning for AUKUS is resulting in tangible outputs this year,
enabled by necessary investments from our foreign partners, but
supported by Naval Reactors' core mission and activities funded in our
DOE budget. We remain concentrated on providing nuclear propulsion to
retain the US Navy's maritime dominance, while also leveraging our 75
years of preeminence in naval nuclear propulsion to support U.S.
commitments under AUKUS. Our continued success rests on the foundation
of prior efforts but is only sustained in what we build and prioritize
today.
naval reactors overview
Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal year 2025 is $2.12
billion, an 8.9 percent increase over the fiscal year 2024 enacted
level. \1\ Your support has also facilitated the continued safe
operation of the nuclear fleet, along with the unmatched protection of
the Sailors operating our ships, the workers maintaining our ships, and
the public and environment through our continued, focused, regulatory
oversight of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, documented in our
annual performance reports available via the Department of Energy
webpage. Previous congressional support has allowed significant
progress on three major Department of Energy funded projects--Columbia-
class propulsion plant development and production, construction of the
Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho, and completion of the
refueling overhaul of our research and training reactor in New York. In
the coming years, Naval Reactors will complete these projects and I
look forward to keeping the committee updated as we move through each.
For example, we have made substantial progress with Columbia-class
propulsion plants in support of the lead ship construction and are
entering serial production of the life-of-ship cores. The Program also
continues to make progress amid challenges during construction of the
incredibly important Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility, and I will
provide a full update later in my statement. Finally, the refueling
overhaul of our research and training reactor will complete later this
year, and nuclear operator training will resume in New York early next
year.
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\1\ Fiscal year 2024 Enacted amounts throughout this testimony do
not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.8 million from Naval Reactors
to the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test
Reactor.
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While we are staying focused on completing these near term efforts,
we also continue to invest and plan for the long-term future of naval
nuclear propulsion. Naval Reactors remains engaged under DOE and NNSA's
leadership to ensure a future uranium enrichment capability to support
national security requirements, including naval nuclear propulsion into
the next century. Through the support of Congress, we continue to
develop and pursue advanced technologies and recapitalize
infrastructure across all four of our Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites.
Notably, at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho, the Expended Core
Facility continues to provide our Program the capability to manage
spent nuclear fuel, and perform core and post-irradiation examinations.
However, this facility is over 60 years old and Naval Reactors is
executing a plan to exit the facility by transitioning capabilities out
in stages, the first being spent fuel management, which will transition
to the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility in the late 2020's. This
budget request initiates the next stage in that exit strategy by
requesting funding to begin the second infrastructure project that will
transition core examinations out of the Expended Core Facility. Even
further out, a future irradiation testing capability will be vital to
the Naval Reactors program. DOE, NNSA and NR are working on a long-
range plan for such a capability beyond 2040.
major projects
Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
number one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is delivering the life-
of-ship reactor core and the electric drive propulsion system for the
Columbia-class. To date, lead ship reactor plant components have been
delivered on time and the reactor core is on track to support lead ship
delivery. The fiscal year 2025 budget includes $45.6 million to
continue reactor plant design, fabrication, and safety analysis work
required for lead ship reactor testing. Additionally, Naval Reactors
will soon commence lead ship motor module testing of the electric drive
propulsion system at the compatibility test facility in Philadelphia,
PA.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
Naval Reactors is continuing construction of the Naval Spent Fuel
Handling Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. The Naval
Spent Fuel Handling Facility is essential to our mission to manage
naval spent nuclear fuel in support of aircraft carrier and submarine
fleet requirements. The fiscal year 2025 budget request includes $292
million for continuation of this project through near-term milestones
including erection of structural steel for the main process building,
construction of the reinforced concrete spent fuel pools, and
installation of utility systems. During the last several years, the
project has encountered a number of challenges. Specifically, the
COVID-19 pandemic introduced work delays and additional costs for the
Project's active and planned construction subcontracts due to volatile
market conditions. Most recently, we worked through subcontractor
performance issues and the effects of limited competition for
construction subcontracts in Idaho resulting in a revised acquisition
plan for a major construction subcontract and additional funding
requirements. Funding in fiscal year 2025 will be vital to continuing
the construction sequence and achieving the Project's milestones. Naval
Reactors remains committed to keeping the Committee informed of
progress on this complex and large-scale infrastructure project.
Naval Examination Acquisition Project (NEAP)
The fiscal year 2025 budget request represents the first year of
Major Construction Project construction funding to begin the detailed
design phase for the Naval Examination Acquisition Project, which will
recapitalize and transition the core examinations capability out of the
Expended Core Facility. Core examinations are critical to current fleet
operations as they allow scientists and engineers to compare actual,
measured core performance data to expected performance predicted by
models and various testing programs during design and manufacture. More
specifically, these examinations provide feedback to validate and
deliver safe and unrestricted fleet operations throughout the decades-
long lifespans for which we have designed the cores. Without these
examinations, current fleet operations may be conservatively restricted
or reduced when issues arise so that sufficient conservatism is
maintained to protect the crew, the core and the environment. In
addition to directly informing current fleet operations, core
examinations provide critical feedback for future designs to improve
performance, manufacturability, and efficiency of our cores. Funding in
fiscal year 2025 enables the Program to begin the several-year detailed
design phase to prepare for construction. We are incorporating lessons
learned from the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project and are
engaged with the NNSA and DOE on the outlook of infrastructure,
especially in Idaho, to ensure the project is best positioned for
success. I look forward to providing an update as we come through the
design phase of the project.
technical base funding
In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
maintains a world-class, high-performing workforce across the technical
base providing 24/7 year-round support of the cradle-to-grave
operations of our naval nuclear enterprise. The technical base is the
set of fundamental skills and capabilities necessary to safely and
effectively support the nuclear Navy. It includes a foundation of
specialists in nuclear materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulics
testing, acoustics, electronics, software development, systems
integration, and other specialized skills, along with the associated
facilities and laboratories to conduct our work.
The people and activities that make up our technical base perform
essential work to support the operating fleet and set the foundations
for our Navy to retain its technological advantages over our
competitors. Specifically, the technical base: 1) addresses emergent,
daily needs and challenges of our globally deployed nuclear fleet, 2)
executes cutting edge technology research and development that supports
improving today's nuclear fleet and assessing future naval nuclear
propulsion capabilities, and 3) modernizes critical infrastructure and
equipment while reducing the Program's legacy environmental
liabilities.
Attracting and retaining top talent in our government civilian and
contract workforce is critical to our ability to fulfill and mature our
mission amidst a wide array of challenges and new demands. The broad
range of talent in our organization is in high demand from all areas of
our economy. We remain focused on recruiting and retaining a well-
trained, highly qualified workforce and continue to work with the
leadership of our laboratories, private shipyards, Navy, and DOE to
stay competitive in this aggressive talent market.
Program Direction
Our lean and highly skilled Federal workforce is critical to the
execution of our responsibilities. With the fiscal year 2025 Program
Direction request of $62.8 million, we remain dedicated to attracting,
developing, and retaining a talented and diverse workforce to oversee
and manage work across the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The
talented and dedicated people at our Washington, DC headquarters and
field offices around the world report directly to me and are essential
to our strong, centralized management model and oversight of the
important work we perform every single day.
Supporting the life-cycles of several classes of nuclear-powered
ships whose lifetimes can extend over half a century requires staffing
continuity and longevity to ensure the Nation has a workforce with the
deep technical knowledge to execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave
responsibilities. I must have sufficient Federal staffing to meet the
demands of sustaining and improving today's fleet while simultaneously
growing our future capabilities. Diverse, complex systems, new and
innovative research efforts, and growing cyber and other
vulnerabilities require maintaining and then developing additional
workforce expertise within our human capital strategy. Recruiting,
rewarding, and retaining our workforce at our full personnel
requirements is the fundamental enabler of all aspects of naval nuclear
propulsion.
The market demand for our highly skilled and experienced workforce
introduces challenges to recruit and retain a top-tier workforce that
values its contribution to national defense. In concert with our
ongoing focus on research and development, we are implementing new ways
to bring in and retain the Nation's top talent at Naval Reactors and
give them resources to introduce technical innovations into our
submarines and aircraft carriers. I respectfully request Congress'
support of the fiscal year 2025 Program Direction budget request, which
will allow me to recruit, select, develop, and retain a highly skilled
workforce to support mission requirements.
Research and Development
Our research and development strategy remains focused on
strengthening a vulnerable competitive advantage over strategic
adversaries like China and Russia. Technology investment must be
prioritized and sustained today to develop new technologies that
deliver increased capability, and reduce costs, lead times and
construction spans for both the current and future nuclear powered
fleet. Throughout the United States, important research and development
is conducted by the dedicated and talented teams of people at our Naval
Nuclear Laboratory sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
greater Albany, and the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho.
Our first priority is to support today's fleet of nuclear powered
forces. Our labs perform thousands of technical evaluations annually
that enable Naval Reactors to assess and respond to emergent issues,
keep our ships mission-ready, safe to operate, and deployable anywhere,
any time.
Several years ago Naval Reactors began an effort to reinvigorate
investment in advanced technology development for the next generation
of nuclear powered ships and submarines. Today, we are pursuing
advanced reactor core and fuel systems, advanced manufacturing and
inspection techniques, next-generation propulsion plant equipment,
including instrumentation and control systems and sensors and
asymmetrical applications of emerging technologies. These advancements
take time to materialize but today's strategic environment requires a
renewed sense of urgency in leveraging exploratory methods to shorten
development timelines, lower acquisition and lifecycle costs and
improve adaptability. I invite you to visit our facilities with your
staffs, talk with our onsite experts and enhance your understanding of
how we are delivering nuclear propulsion capability.
I want to assure the committee that our investments are supported
by a comprehensive and rigorous planning effort we undertake with our
partners at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory. This year's budget request
has been meticulously developed and prioritized to meet our required
investment needs to stay ahead of our adversaries.
Facilities and Infrastructure
Our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and infrastructure are
essential in carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. This year's budget
request supports recapitalization of Naval Nuclear Laboratory
facilities and infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the
Program since its inception, 75 years ago.
Decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older facilities that
have been in existence since the early 1950's is also part of our
facilities and infrastructure request. We have approximately $6.4
billion in environmental liabilities requiring D&D efforts. A
significant portion of this estimate is associated with the cost to
remediate and demolish inactive facilities and infrastructure at the
Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites.
We continue to retire liabilities in an environmentally responsible
and cost-effective manner to support best use of our funding. Through
our established partnership with the Department of Energy Office of
Environmental Management (DOE-EM), we are leveraging their experience
in efficient, safe, and cost-effective remediation of environmental
liabilities across the enterprise. DOE-EM is active on all four of our
sites with impressive efforts taking place, such as the D&D of our
legacy prototypes at the Naval Reactors Facility, including the S1W
prototype that supported development of the USS Nautilus (SSN 571),
which will complete dismantlement in fiscal year 2025.
aukus
In September 2021, President Biden announced an enhanced trilateral
security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (AUKUS). Concrete steps are underway to support Australia
acquiring conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) and
Naval Reactors remains integral in informing discussions to ensure that
our Nation's preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-powered
submarine initiative.
Efforts are focused on ensuring Australia acquires full scope of
capabilities necessary to build, operate, and maintain a nuclear navy.
Additionally, we are concurrently executing the process of providing a
generational uplift in technology to the United Kingdom in support of
delivering SSN-AUKUS. We will increasingly utilize the trilateral
partners' existing and evolving regulatory frameworks, educational,
industrial, and technical capabilities and capacities to collectively
strengthen each nation's defense. Naval Reactors is fully committed to
supporting Australia in the development of its stewardship and
technical capabilities. Going forward, all three of our naval nuclear
propulsion programs will be inextricably linked, and remain committed
to ensuring the highest standards of stewardship for this complex and
unforgiving technology.
AUKUS is a significant addition to Naval Reactors' existing
mission, with activities funded through reimbursable agreements with
Australia and the U.K. I am committed to work productively with our
partner nations, the Administration and Congress to ensure the
necessary and enduring investment is made for this critical endeavor to
succeed. Naval Reactors must continue to deliver its primary mission to
the United States Navy without compromise, as it is foundational to
being able to support the AUKUS objectives
conclusion
The United States .Navy's ability to maintain our 75-year dominance
of the maritime domain and sustain a formidable forward presence is not
guaranteed; every day we are being actively challenged on a global
scale. Naval nuclear propulsion is an incredible but unforgiving
technology, and must be harnessed with a constant focus on safe
operation across the cradle-to-grave responsibilities the Nation
entrusts to Naval Reactors. The Program is dedicated to balancing
investments in today's fleet with future fleet requirements, while
delivering effective naval nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy. I
appreciate the strong support of Congress for this program and
respectfully urge your full support for our fiscal year 2025 budget
request.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. White, you must have one of the toughest jobs in
Federal Government. Give us an update.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM WHITE, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. White. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer. It's an honor to
appear before you. The EM [Environmental Management] mission
reflects the United States' commitment to cleaning up the
environmental legacy of national defense programs that helped
in World War II and the cold war. While our mission is rooted
in the past, we're very much focused on the future.
Cleanup progress at the Savannah Riverside in South
Carolina, for example, is leading to a greater role for NNSA
there. Cleanup accomplishments are boosting the clean energy
economy in Tennessee and helping the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security complex prepare for
expanding national security and research missions.
As buildings like the Biology Complex have come down,
national security and science missions have the space to be
built up. The budget request positions EM to deliver on these
and other priorities that drive risk reduction, progress
skyline changes, and help us ramp up tank waste treatment which
is the largest part of the environmental liability that you
mentioned earlier.
In Washington, 800,000 gallons of tank waste have been
treated at Hanford and will ultimately be stabilized in glass.
The waste treatment plant melters have reached operational
temperature and have been used to pour the first containers of
test glass from both melters. The Test Bed Initiative is
advancing as another potential option to accelerate the Hanford
Tank Waste mission through commercial grouting and disposal.
In parallel, we've reached a breakthrough agreement with
the State of Washington and the EPA [Environmental Protection
Agency] that charts the safe and achievable path for the
Hanford Tank Waste mission. The fiscal year 2025 request is
consistent with this agreement which will enable us to begin
addressing Hanford's high-level tank waste and achieve risk
reduction while exploring alternative treatment technologies to
accelerate our work on EM's largest environmental liability.
By turning this corner with our regulatory partners, we
hope to aggressively move forward with our mission at Hanford,
honoring our responsibility to the environment and our
commitment to the communities and the tribal nations around the
site. Demolition efforts across EM are also moving forward.
After bringing down four buildings at the Nevada National
Security site last year, we'll continue reducing our footprint
as we work to complete the legacy cleanup there within a
decade. Demolition work at West Valley in New York will advance
as well as cleanup of the highest risk excess facilities in
Tennessee.
This request also enables continued shipments to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant as we modernize the facility to meet the
needs of both cleanup and national security programs. While
significant progress has been made, we're always looking at
opportunities to improve. The budget request allows for
continued improvement to the rigor of program and project
management as well as opportunities to progress cleanup safely
and more efficiently.
This includes technology development, targeted R&D
investments, evaluation of cost-effective treatment options,
and investment in building future workforce pipelines. I thank
the Subcommittee for its historical support of our program and
our mission and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. William White follows:]
Prepared Statement by William ``Ike'' White
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to represent
the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
(EM).
EM's mission represents the government's strong commitment to
cleaning up the environmental legacy of the national defense programs
that helped end World War II and the cold war. EM's vital mission does
not just address past legacy; it also helps support and enable DOE's
ongoing national security and scientific research missions.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $8.2 billion for EM reflects
the Biden Administration's strong commitment to advancing the cleanup
mission and preparing for sustained success, maintaining national
security priorities, and supporting communities most impacted by the
environmental legacy of the past.
35 years of progress
For nearly 35 years EM has been entrusted with the largest
environmental cleanup effort in the world--addressing the substantial
environmental liability from decades of nuclear weapons production and
nuclear energy research. From an original 107 sites, some dating back
to the Manhattan Project Era and the birth of the Atomic Age, EM has
cleaned up 92 sites, leaving just 15 to go.
EM's significant accomplishments just in the past few years have
included completing demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, a
facility that produced two-thirds of the Nation's cold war-era
plutonium at the Hanford Site in Washington State; completing the
removal of the former uranium enrichment complex at Oak Ridge in
Tennessee; and completing construction of the entire tank waste
treatment system at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, enabling
significant progress in how the Department tackles one of its largest
environmental and financial liabilities at that site.
transformational results
Enabled by the significant investments Congress has made in the
program, EM has delivered accomplishments and capabilities that have
transformed the environmental cleanup mission. Game-changing tank waste
treatment capabilities are in place to address EM's largest
environmental liability. With startup of the Salt Waste Processing
Facility, a full suite of tank waste treatment capabilities is in place
at the Savannah River Site. Since 2020, EM has more than doubled tank
waste treatment capability at the Site. The Integrated Waste Treatment
Unit has treated over 68,000 gallons of tank waste in Idaho since the
start of operations in 2023. EM has also treated over 800,000 gallons
of radioactive and chemical waste from large underground tanks at the
Hanford Site where work is progressing toward initiation of the Direct
Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW) project that will convert this waste
into glass for disposal. Both Waste Treatment Plant melters have been
heated to operational temperature and the first containers of Activity
Waste (DFLAW) project that will convert this waste into glass for
disposal. Both Waste Treatment Plant melters have been heated to
operational temperature and the first containers of
EM progress extends well beyond the tank waste mission. Demolition
efforts across the EM enterprise have resulted in risk reduction and
have opened up opportunities for conservation, economic development,
scientific research, and national security priorities. Removing an
entire enrichment complex at the Oak Ridge Site has led to a
significant increase in ongoing demolition work at the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and Y-12 that is freeing up future mission
capabilities for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
and the Office of Science. The Nevada National Security Sites has
completed demolition of four buildings that supported development and
testing of nuclear rocket engines during the cold war Era. This year,
EM plans to complete demolition of Building 3901 and four ancillary
structures at the Engine, Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly
Facility and will continue to reduce the overall cleanup footprint in
Nevada in Fiscal Year 2025. In addition, work at the West Valley
Demonstration Project's Main Plant Process Building has progressed with
more than 9,000 tons of debris from the demolition disposed in 2023.
This priority will continue this year and will further advance under
the Fiscal Year 2025 budget request.
Shipments and waste emplacement doubled at WIPP in Fiscal Year
2023. This includes shipments from the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
where the EM team certified and completed 59 shipments to WIPP,
surpassing the Fiscal Year 2023 goal of 40 shipments.
steady progress planned for fiscal year 2025
The Fiscal Year 2025 budget request reflects the Administration's
strong commitment to cleaning up the environment in communities that
supported or continue to support weapons programs and government-
sponsored nuclear research. Key investments position EM for sustained
achievement as the program continues to drive risk reduction, progress
skyline changes, and ramp up efforts to tackle tank waste while
enabling DOE's vital national security and scientific research
missions.
Protecting the environment by addressing radioactive waste stored
in underground tanks at Hanford, Savannah River, and the Idaho National
Laboratory is a top priority for EM. The budget request advances
commissioning and startup of Hanford's Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
system. After decades of support from the local community, Congress,
and the workforce, this transformational accomplishment is within
sight.
As we prepare to begin operating Hanford's low-activity tank waste
vitrification capabilities, the budget request also invests in work on
the Waste Treatment Plant's High Level Waste facility to be able to
tackle that portion of Hanford's tank waste inventory. In parallel, EM
continues to identify safe, effective, and viable options for the
treatment of all Hanford's tank waste.
EM is focused on moving the entire Hanford tank waste mission
forward, recognizing that additional delays bring greater environmental
risks, exacerbate the impacts of already aging infrastructure, and
increase costs. DOE, the Washington State Department of Ecology, and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently announced a landmark
agreement that proposes a realistic and achievable holistic path for
advancing the Hanford tank waste mission. The fiscal year 2025 budget
request is consistent with the agreement which will enable EM to
progress Hanford's high level tank waste mission via a direct-feed
approach and achieve risk reduction while continuing to explore
alternative treatment technologies for low-activity waste, including
grout. Through the agreement and pursuit of an EPA variance, DOE will
have a stronger path forward for out-of-State grout disposal through at
least 2040. Enabling a path to offsite grout is responsive to
recommendations from the National Academies of Science, the General
Accountability Office, Congress, and others. EM has also developed a
Research and Development Roadmap to guide investments in additional
technology options to accelerate the Hanford tank waste mission. This
year, EM is planning to initiate installation of equipment for the Test
Bed Initiative Demonstration project, which has the potential to safely
pretreat low-activity waste from Hanford tanks, solidify the waste, and
dispose of it offsite in a manner that is protective of the workers,
the public, and the environment.
In addition to helping solve the challenges of tank waste, the
request will enable EM to continue meaningful cleanup progress across
the Hanford Site, including transferring radioactive capsules to safer
dry storage, advancing work in and around the 324 Building, and
treating another 2 billion gallons of contaminated groundwater.
In South Carolina, the Fiscal Year 2025 budget request supports
continued efforts to fully utilize Savannah River Site capabilities to
continue waste processing and tank closure activities. The budget
request also supports continued progress in disposition of nuclear
materials stored at the Savannah River Site, storage and disposition of
site-generated waste, cleanup of contaminated soils, groundwater,
streams and associated wetlands, and the deactivation and
decommissioning of legacy facilities.
At the Idaho National Laboratory, the request supports continued
operations of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit which will ultimately
treat about 900,000 gallons of liquid waste by turning it into a
granular solid. The request also supports progress toward key cleanup
priorities, including continued treatment and shipping of transuranic
waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, decontamination and
demolition of facilities at the Subsurface Disposal Area (SDA),
initiation of construction of an engineered cap over the SDA, and
further evaluation of the treatment options for calcine waste.
support for national security missions
In addition to reducing environmental risks at these and other
sites across the complex, EM progress is supporting national security
priorities, enabling scientific research, establishing opportunities
for conservation and clean energy development, and boosting community
efforts to build strong economies and create jobs.
In recognition of the role the Savannah River Site will play in the
National Nuclear Security Administration's pit production mission, EM
will transfer site management responsibilities to NNSA in fiscal year
2025, while remaining focused on completing the remaining legacy
cleanup activities at the site. EM and NNSA are committed to a
successful transition that keeps national security priorities, as well
as the long-term outlook for the site and community at the forefront.
Perhaps nowhere are the opportunities to support national security
and research priorities more evident than in Tennessee where large-
scale cleanup operations are firmly underway at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) and the Y-12 National Security Complex. Building on
previous demolition work, EM transferred the 18-acre Biology Complex at
the Y-12 National Security Complex to the NNSA, which is using it to
build a new Lithium Processing Facility. In 2023, EM tore down the Low
Intensity Test Reactor located in ORNL's central campus, marking the
second reactor demolition within the span of a year. Oak Ridge is
continuing deactivation at numerous high-risk facilities, including
multiple former enrichment facilities at Y-12 and former reactors and
isotope labs at ORNL. This year, EM will initiate demolition of the
Alpha 2 Building at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Once completed,
this will mark the first demolition of a former enrichment facility at
Y-12. This steady progress is a part of a broader vision focused not
only on cleaning up the past, but also advancing the ORNL and Y-12
research and national security missions.
The budget request supports additional cleanup of high-risk excess
facilities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 National
Security Complex. It also supports work to advance the Mercury
Treatment Facility and a second onsite waste disposal facility, both of
which are pivotal to future efforts to reduce risks, stabilize
facilities, advance cleanup, and ultimately provide land for research
and national security missions.
While significant progress has been made in the deactivation and
decommissioning of excess facilities, EM is continuously looking at
opportunities to further improve. As strategies for the removal of
these facilities are refined, EM is collaborating with NNSA and the
Office of Science to plan, prioritize, and achieve optimal sequencing
of work to best meet both environmental cleanup commitments, as well as
other overarching DOE priorities.
EM is in the midst of a significant infrastructure and
modernization campaign at WIPP, a facility that just marked its 25th
anniversary as the lynchpin of EM's transuranic waste mission. The
utility shaft that is critical for ventilation upgrades has reached its
final depth and commissioning of the new Safety Significant Containment
Ventilation System is underway. Along with providing for continued WIPP
operations, as well as waste characterization and transportation
programs, the budget request supports continued infrastructure
recapitalization projects, as well as mine modernization activities and
safety upgrades in Fiscal Year 2025. Taken together, these projects
will help ensure EM has the infrastructure in place to support disposal
operations for years to come.
investing in the future
Recognizing the EM mission will span several decades at some sites,
the budget request also supports efforts to foster, build, and maintain
a next-generation workforce that promotes diversity, equity, inclusion,
and accessibility.
Across the program, EM is ensuring resources are focused on the
most urgent risks and taking an integrated and corporate approach to
prioritizing all work at remaining sites. In addition, EM is constantly
looking for new opportunities to drive down the overall lifecycle costs
at these sites. Across mission areas, EM utilizes science-based
advancements that provide opportunities to meet cleanup commitments
safely and more efficiently. EM is leveraging the expertise of the
Savannah River National Laboratory and the Network of National
Laboratories for Environmental Management and Stewardship to develop
innovative solutions that will benefit EM, the NNSA, and other DOE
missions. The budget request supports a more integrated approach to EM
technology development, targeted R&D investments, the continued
evaluation of additional treatment and disposal options, and
partnerships with regulators to apply effective solutions. The budget
request also supports ongoing efforts to actively engage with local
communities, consult with Tribal Nations, and prioritize stakeholder
engagement to ensure inclusive and transparent communication. These
efforts are helping to achieve a greater degree of alignment to enable
continued progress.
As the world's largest environmental remediation program, EM also
has a responsibility to accomplish the mission in a way that is
sustainable and that supports the future of our planet. EM aims to lead
by example in areas like clean energy utilization and climate
resiliency.
Whether it is boosting sustainability, building a workforce for
tomorrow, investing in R&D, analyzing disposal options, reaching
decisions about remaining waste streams, achieving regulatory
alignment, or upgrading infrastructure, EM is preparing for the future.
These multi-faceted activities are laid out in EM's annual priorities
list and 10-year strategic vision as part of EM's ongoing efforts to
improve prioritization, planning, and mission execution.
conclusion
The fiscal year 2025 budget request is the latest sign of this
Administration's strong support for EM's vital mission. As the mission
is carried out, EM is committed to continuous improvement and making
further advancements to ensure that cleanup activities are conducted in
a safe, efficient, and cost-effective manner.
Senator King. Thank you.
You'll notice the vice chair and I are the only ones here,
and I want to explain that. We are hoping that someone with an
AI [artificial intelligence] capacity will figure out how to
schedule the Senate. It's not uncommon for us to have three
hearings scheduled at the same time, and I think that's
happened this afternoon. On top of that is a vote on the Senate
floor. But be assured we all know these people and they're
keenly interested in what you're doing.
Administrator Hruby, is Savannah River a practical project?
Is it going to be able to be brought in at a reasonable time at
a reasonable cost? The numbers keep going up and the date keeps
moving out. Give me an update on Savannah River.
Administrator Hruby. Yes, thank you, Senator King. I'd be
happy to. In short, I would just say absolutely. It's a
practical project and real progress is being made. We've done a
lot of things to make this project more realizable. But the
costs have gone up. I have much more confidence in the cost.
I think we all have much more confidence in the cost and
the time estimate to complete the SAR goal now is to complete
construction of Savannah River in 2032. Then to start the
process to do rate production and have that complete in 2030,
2035, or 2036.
Senator King. Is Los Alamos going to be able to meet the
demand that we have for pits in the meantime?
Administrator Hruby. They are. So, Los Alamos will be
producing 30 pits per year in 2028 for the W-87-----
Senator King. One's been already produced this year. Is
that correct?
Administrator Hruby. We've made pits at Los Alamos. We're
going to make our first fully WR, certified War Reserve
certified diamond stamped, as we call it, pit, this year. But
we made 9 complete pits last year plus five developmental pits
last year at Los Alamos.
So, we're feeling a lot more confidence in our ability to
make pits there repeatedly. We'll get our certification, we'll
be on our path. We have a very detailed schedule path for 30
pits per year at Los Alamos.
Senator King. Let me change the subject. One of your areas
that you mentioned is non-proliferation. One of my biggest
concerns is nuclear material falling into the hands of
terrorists. In an open setting, what can you tell us about what
steps are underway in order to prevent that from happening?
We have nuclear states, some of which are rather unstable.
We have a nuclear State that seems inclined to sell things.
That's the nightmare because we've all talked about deterrence.
Deterrence doesn't work with a terrorist.
Administrator Hruby. Yes.
Senator King. They don't have a capital city that is at
risk and they don't care about dying. So, we're going to have
to rely on non-proliferation and intelligence. But what can you
tell us in an open setting about dealing with that issue?
Administrator Hruby. Well, we work with everybody that we
can to get rid of weapon usable material or materials that
would make dirty bombs. Terrorists are usually not in that
group. So, what we do is we work with our allies and partners
to make sure we have very strong border protection and
crossing.
So, any illicit movement of materials and we have
fortunately or depends on how you think about it but in this
case, fortunately we have allies that live in bad neighborhoods
around these places where terrorist cells exist and we have
strong collaborations with them to make sure we can detect----
Senator King. Do we have technology that can detect the
movement of nuclear material?
Administrator Hruby. Somewhat----
Senator King. We're in an open setting, but in so far as
you can answer that question.
Administrator Hruby. Yes, somewhat. It depends on the
amount and it depends on whether or not they shield it. There's
lots of details that matter but we certainly work on those
technologies and we deploy them, you know, frequently when we
think they'll be effective and where we think they'll be
effective.
Senator King. I'm going to start with you, Admiral, but
we'll come back in a second round. I worry about the submarine
industrial base. We're barely building a submarine a year and
if you add AUKUS, I just don't know who's going to build those
submarines. Is that a concern of yours? What do we do to
address it?
Admiral Houston. Chairman, obviously construction of
submarines, carrier submarine or it's near and dear to my
heart. With the Columbia-and the Virginia-class, the ``1 + 2'',
we have invested heavily as a Navy in the submarine industrial
base to build that cadence, and really helping those sub-tier
suppliers that actually feed our prime shipyards to build those
submarines is really key.
We are fully committed to that, and your investment on the
Navy is significant----
Senator King. Do your current 5-year plan indicate that
we're going to have the capacity to build the submarines that
we that we hope to?
Admiral Houston. For my naval reactors hat on my DOE
[Department of Energy] side, absolutely, and for the Navy side
right now, we are progressing on a plan to get to 2.0 by 2028
and 2.33 by 2032, which corresponds to the time that we would
be delivering the first submarine purchase by Australia.
Senator King. That's going to take some serious workforce
development.
Admiral Houston. It's significant work. If you look at what
we have done in 2014, we're building a single Virginia and in
2024 we're building two Virginias that are 25 percent bigger
than the Virginias we we're building in 2014. We've added on
top of that the Columbia-class which is two and a half times
that original Virginia.
So, we have increased by fivefold the tonnage we're
building on submarines in the middle of COVID, in the middle of
supply chain issues, and we are progressing on that. That is
why the Navy is so invested in the submarine industrial base to
improve that cadence on submarine construction which is
absolutely critical to the roles submarines play for our
strategic deterrence and also in the Western Pacific.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Members of this Subcommittee are acutely aware, NNSA has
extensive infrastructure needs. Some of your facilities date
back to the Manhattan Project and budget constraints and uneven
performance on past recapitalization efforts have increased the
level of risk to the nuclear enterprise.
Administrator, can you provide this Committee with an
update on the ongoing capital asset projects particularly the
new facilities planned for the processing of the critical
minerals?
Administrator Hruby. Okay. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
We do have a lot of infrastructure projects underway. Our
strategy is to finish, is to try--is to start getting them done
and then start new ones as opposed to start them all at the
same time, and so, we've been very stringent on our
prioritization of these facilities and we're doing this for
reasons.
One, we need them. So, we need them to get our weapons
done. The second thing is it's cheaper if you can get them done
than if you just continue to drag them out, we've seen cost
increase as a result of that just by keeping people on roll
that might not be at their full capacity. So, we have a plan to
get projects finished. Now, with respect to critical minerals--
--
Senator Fischer. Can I ask you what the priority is on the
facilities? Which one you're prioritizing, some do similar
minerals obviously, but most of them are doing different ones.
Administrator Hruby. Right. So, our highest priority is pit
production. So, the two facilities, one at Los Alamos and one
at Savannah River. The other facility that we're pushing toward
completion is the uranium processing facility at Y-12. The next
most crucial facility from a single point of failure
perspective is our lithium processing facility at Y-12.
In addition, we have high explosive facilities underway
which are also critical to be able to produce the weapons that
we have lined up.
Senator Fischer. Did you want to finish your first comment
when I interrupted?
Administrator Hruby. Well, I just think that with three--I
wanted to say more--newer to our discussions the fact that we
broke ground on the lithium processing facility and this
facility----
Senator Fischer. Is that at Y-12?
Administrator Hruby. That is at Y-12. It replaces a very
old facility that has some serious both safety and structural
issues, and so, we'll be talking about that in the years ahead.
I think it's also to the point that Senator King made earlier,
to get these pit production facilities done is going to require
fast--it's going to require higher investments over shorter
periods of time.
So, you're going to--you don't see that in the Fiscal Year
2025 request too much but I will--I think it's coming in your
request.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Administrator and Admiral, between the AUKUS agreement and
the possibility that we're going to need to increase the number
of planned hulls for Columbia-class, Virginia-class or SSNX
submarines, how are we managing the increased demand for the
highly enriched uranium for the Naval Reactors? Do we need to
put plans forward for any new enrichment facilities?
Admiral Houston. The highly enriched uranium supply is
projected to last to the 2050's. Even with these increased
demands, we are well aware of it. Naval Reactors is working
very closely with NNSA and DOE because, as you know, we're
currently getting our highly enriched uranium from older
nuclear weapons that we're reprocessing.
So, it's something that has our attention. We have to
develop a plan to do that, and we're watching that very
closely. The increased demands from AUKUS, we've looked at
that. It's very very small in the overall scheme. The bigger
thing is that we have to get the capability in time to support
about two to three metric ton delivery to support our fleet
needs in the 2050's, and we're working very close.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator King. Admiral, I visit the Portsmouth shipyard
fairly regularly and always climb down in a submarine that's
under overhaul. By the way, I flunk the virtual welding test
every time. I keep trying but it's very difficult. Anyway, are
you doing any thought in your design to accelerating the
overhaul process?
I'm concerned about availability of these very expensive
assets and how much time they have to spend in dry dock. Are
there, for example, Senator Fischer and I were in Maine, North
Dakota and we went down into the missile field and the old
missiles you've had to practically take them all apart to get
to some of the pieces that needed maintenance.
Is this something that you think about in the design of the
submarines in order to get them in and out of overhaul on a
more accelerated timetable?
Admiral Houston. Yes, Senator, that was my first time I met
you, you're a Governor and we commissioned the Maine up in the
Portsmouth shipyard. So, it's an incredible shipyard. It's one
of our leading submarine shipyards there. It's a tremendous
site, and I will tell you, we from the nuclear propulsionsite
are doing everything we can to expedite those.
We play a part in the submarine overhaul, a large, large
portion of it. We are working with our INC to do a once in the
life of the ship upgrade on that. We have a very robust design
on that. We are looking at maintenance activities such as our
media discharges to do a once in life, and we are pushing
technology.
We have invested heavily in additive manufacturing because
from a Naval Reactor standpoint, I own both the technical
requirements and I also own the financial levers to pull. I'm
actually leading the way for NAFC and I have components now
that are being additively manufactured that are going into our
primary plants, our reactor plants, to lead the way.
So, we are trying to accelerate that because I see the same
thing. It's more than just ship building. It's that ship repair
and ship sustainment.
Senator King. Exactly. Well, I'm glad to hear about the
additive manufacturing. My belief is that there should be a 3D-
printer on every ship and in every hangar and that we should be
buying the IP when we buy a platform so that we can maintain
and build parts in a much more efficient way.
Admiral Houston. I absolutely agree. The carriers do have
printers on them. Some of our submarines have actually deployed
with printers and they've actually additively manufactured some
components already for that. We need to expand that, and it's
more about speed now than it is so much about the process you
use.
We find with additive manufacturing that--it's faster than
some of the just pure casting, pouring molten metal into sand,
and then removing all that excess metal. It is all that work
that you have to do is taking away from actual production time
that you could be using for other things.
So, I absolutely see it the same way as you do and we just
have to keep on leaving the way.
Senator King. I appreciate that and I can't resist
mentioning that the University of Maine has the largest 3D-
printer in the world and last year they printed a house. So,
it's an amazing technology that I think is going to change
everything but it could also help us with maintenance of our
naval and in fact air and armed forces assets.
Mr. White, I mentioned in my opening the cost of the
estimated cost of half a trillion dollars. You mentioned in
your comments, looking at different technologies and
techniques, is there any hope of finding technologies that will
enable us to meet our obligations at the same time? Maybe chip
away at that $500 billion?
Mr. White. Senator, thank you for that question. I
absolutely think so, and I think some of them we're doing
currently and we're working with our State regulators and
partners on the agreement we just signed. I mentioned earlier
with the State of Washington will allow us to explore
alternative treatment technologies for the bulk of our tank
waste there, the low activity portion of that.
This Committee supported our Test Bed Initiative in the
past which looks at commercial disposable and grouting options.
I think just that ability alone to do with the low activity
piece of the tank waste in that fashion would save hundreds of
billions of dollars beyond just simply vitrifying the waste.
There are other things we can do that this committee has
supported, our R&D efforts, looking long range at our tank
waste mission. One of the things folks don't always think about
in terms of our tank is we have about 50 million gallons at
Hanford. but over time because of the way we have to retrieve
the waste. We use water to retrieve it, you end up having to
treat about 150 million gallons of waste because you have to
create more waste as you retrieve what's there to be able to
treat it. Part of our R&D effort that we just awarded this past
year, for example, is going to our laboratories to look at
alternative retrieval technologies so that we can reduce the
amount of water that we have to use in retrieval to ultimately
be able to reduce the amount of tank waste that we have to
treat.
So, I think there are opportunities like that across the
enterprise, and we're trying to take advantage of those.
Senator King. Could you hazard an estimate as to when
Hanford will be done?
Mr. White. I can give you an estimate, Senator, but I can
almost guarantee you that I would be wrong. I think our best
case for getting done if we can work through our technical
challenges and use alternative treatment technologies could be
as early as the 2060-ish timeframe. I think if we----
Senator King. 2060?
Mr. White. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Wow.
Mr. White. It could otherwise be much longer.
Senator King. Keith Richards might be dead by then.
Senator King. I doubt.
Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for holding
this hearing.
It's really important. Thank you all for the work that you
do. It's so important to us in Nevada as you know and because
the Nevada National Security site, it has been called the
Battlefield of the cold war and what was then known as the
Nevada Test Site.
Those of us in Nevada still call it the Nevada Test Site,
it was ground zero for the majority of our Nation's nuclear
tests where 100 atmospheric and 828 underground tests were
conducted from 1951 to 1992. We know these tests contaminated
our soil, our groundwater, the facilities in the area, and
cleanup is still ongoing.
Mr. White, can you please provide us an update on the
cleanup projects within the security site? Do you have the
adequate resources to complete the task?
Mr. White. Thank you for that, Senator, and I very much
appreciate the support from Congress over the last couple of
years and adding additional funds to our cleanup budget in
Nevada. I think that's helped us in a couple of cases. We've
been able to install more robust inspection capabilities for
our disposal activities there, and we've been able to optimize
some of our D&D [design & development] efforts.
Right now, we're very much focused on what I think is a
historically interesting part of the site where some of the
nuclear rocket work was done. So, the test cells and the old
facilities that were being D&D'd within our current approach.
We should be able to get that work done by the 2030 timeframe.
Senator Rosen. Wonderful. Thank you.
Administrator Hruby, today the site conducts the
subcritical experiments to verify the reliability, the
effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile so that we never ever
have to return to the days of above or below ground testing,
explosive testing. So last week, this first subcritical
experiment in roughly 3 years was conducted in the principal
underground laboratory for subcritical experimentation. Much
easier to say pulse facility, and so, can you discuss the
importance of that experiment?
Why subcritical experiments and other experiments taking
place as Nevada National Security Site are vital to our
stockpile stewardship and ensuring that we can continue to
certify the stockpile without again, ever returning to
underground explosive nuclear testing?
Administrator Hruby. Yes. Thank you, Senator Rosen, it's
good to see you again, and we're very proud of the fact that we
had a successful subcritical experiment just last week. These
experiments are so important because they allow us to study
actual plutonium without creating a chain reaction.
So, that's why we call them subcritical, and so, we can
actually look at the real material under conditions that are
important to us under very dynamic conditions. As a result of
these tests, we can make sure the aged material still behaving
as we would expect it to. We can look at newly produced
materials and see if it behaves the same.
We can learn new things by our high-fidelity experimental
data collection. So, we anticipate this is the best way to
maintain our stockpile without returning to nuclear testing.
Especially with the demands that we have right now in our
production enterprise, as well as perhaps new weapons that we
need in the future to meet these changing global conditions.
Senator Rosen. Yes, it's important that we do these and we
talk about all of our missions and particularly our counter-
terrorism mission. We have another thing, not besides having
the test site. We have the amazing remote sensing laboratory. I
love to go out there. They're doing just wonderful things.
Of course, they're both at Nevada's Nellis Air Force Base
and Joint Base Andrews. They provide that emergency response
capability and crisis support teams and they are ready to
deploy anywhere around the world. The personnel at these bases,
I said, I've been out there many times and those of the
national security site, They're the Nation's experts in
locating dirty bombs, loose nukes, sources of radiation in
addition to determining origin and attribution through nuclear
forensics.
Madam Administrator, given the critical role that both our
facilities play, and remote sensing lab in particular in our
national defense architecture, can you speak a little bit about
how important our remote sensing lab is and the safety and
security that they provide to the American people?
Administrator Hruby. Yes, absolutely. It is fun to talk to
the people who work at these labs. They do amazing things at
amazingly short timeframes because everything they do is
usually associated with emergency response, and I would just
like to say that it's been--it's not only for the American
people when a source goes missing or something unexpected
happens in the U.S. It's also for the international community,
and they've been critical in our work.
Senator Rosen. Do they have everything they need to
continue their mission? I wanted to ask you.
Administrator Hruby. I do think so. to be honest, they've
had a boost because of the supplemental funding for Ukraine.
They've done a lot of work for Ukraine.
Senator Rosen. Oh, I know.
Administrator Hruby. So that's not in our base budget, of
course that's in our supplemental budget. But as a result of
that, we've been able to really exercise all the muscles with
that team.
Senator Rosen. Well, we have remote sensing lab and the
test site. Amazing teams work out there and I'm proud to go
visit them and see the good work they're doing. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Administrator, I just have one more
comment and question. First of all, I want to thank you for
submitting your unfunded priorities list to the committee
earlier this year. I agree with the programs that you listed
and I do believe that they warrant this committee's attention
and additional funding.
Would you speak to the three programs that are listed SLCM-
N, the analytic gas laboratory mission enabling construction
project, and then we've kind of talked in the past about the
need for the binder, the production and qualification efforts
for that, for the insensitive high explosives. Why do you need
more resources for those?
Administrator Hruby. Yes. As I mentioned in my opening
comments SLCM-N is a very unique case in this regard that you
know, it wasn't in our program of record until the Fiscal Year
2024 NDAA was passed. At that time, we had already submitted
our fiscal year 2025 budget request. So, the SLCM-N budget
requests when the unfunded requirements is for $70 million.
That's an amount that we think is reasonable to do what we
anticipate needing to do in that program. We're still working
very closely with the DOD and the Navy to define the details of
that program. But we are going to need some budget to do it. I
went through the binder, let me address this binder issue.
Emerging issue has come up as a result of changing
environmental regulations concerning forever chemicals that we
have a binder material on our explosives that falls into this
category of materials that are now being regulated very closely
by the EPA. So, we need a new binder material and we're going
to work on a new binder material.
But meanwhile, we also have to figure out how to get
through the program of record that we have with a limited
supply of those particular material and or finding another
supplier. So, that's an issue that emerged after the budget was
formulated. That's why it's in, and the analytical lab is,
again, just to make sure that we have all the facilities we
need to make sure that we can analyze what we need to do to
produce the pits that we need to produce.
Senator Rosen. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator King. Okay. Thank you all very much. We'll have our
second panel come forward. Thank you. Dr. Adams, are you
leaning off?
Dr. Adams. Yes.
Senator King. You are now.
Dr. Adams. Some short opening remarks?
Senator King. Sorry?
Dr. Adams. Are you requesting short opening remarks?
Senator King. Yes, please.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARVIN L. ADAMS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Adams. Okay, thank you. Yes. So, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to
be here before you to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2025
Budget Request for the weapons activities portion of DOE and
NNSA's activities.
Thanks to support from this Subcommittee and the full
Committee and Congress in general and the efforts of our
outstanding dedicated workers across the nuclear security
enterprise. We are steadily improving our infrastructure and
our capabilities while we are also taking on new challenges as
they arise from a worsening global security situation.
The fiscal year 2025 weapons activities budget request of
about $19.8 billion will support our continued commitment to
design, manufacture, certify, transport, maintain, and assess
the safe, secure and reliable warheads that are needed to keep
our deterrent credible and effective.
Toward that end, we have added programs for the B61-13
gravity bomb and the Nuclear Sea Launch Cruise Missile to the
other five warhead programs that have been and continue to be
in our program of record. We have accepted the challenge of
delivering the two new warheads within the same timeframe
spanned by the other five.
In fiscal year 2023 as Administrator Hruby mentioned, we
delivered more than 200 modernized warheads to the military
with all deliveries on schedule. The fiscal year 2025 budget
request supports our commitment to continuing on-time
deliveries into the future. It reflects time phasing of many
efforts including construction projects to ensure that
capabilities are ready by the time they are needed for warhead
delivery.
In closing, I would like to thank again, the subcommittee,
the full Committee and Congress for the support that has
enabled NNSA to deliver on its important national security
missions to date, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Jill Hruby
and Dr. Marvin L. Adams follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Jill Hruby and Dr. Marvin L. Adams
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the
Subcommittee's ongoing support.
Over the last year, NNSA has met urgent and demanding needs in all
three of our missions: nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and
naval reactors. These accomplishments, enabled by support from the
Administration and Congress, took dedication, innovation, and
collaboration by the members of our talented nuclear security
enterprise workforce.
I am proud to report that NNSA delivered over 200 modernized
nuclear weapons to the Department of Defense (DOD) this past year--the
most since the end of the cold war. Using the world's most
sophisticated tools for nuclear stockpile stewardship and a rigorous
surveillance process, we once again certified the U.S. nuclear
deterrent is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear explosive
testing. Our extensive infrastructure efforts continue to advance to
meet today's needs and, over the longer term, provide a flexible and
resilient enterprise for an uncertain future global security
environment. Our science is used every day to design, certify, and
assess our stockpile and we continue to create newsworthy
breakthroughs. The exceptional science in the nuclear security
enterprise is foundational to our Nation's nuclear deterrence. NNSA
collaborates closely and continuously with DOD and the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) to synchronize and plan the modernization of our nuclear
deterrent, adapt to an evolving environment, and assure our allies and
partners.
NNSA also continues advancing our nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and emergency response efforts. We are actively
improving our space-based nuclear detonation sensors, advancing tools
for enrichment monitoring, expanding nuclear smuggling detection to new
relevant global regions, enhancing and enforcing export controls, and
red teaming artificial intelligence models for proliferation risks.
Importantly, we are now regularly removing surplus plutonium from South
Carolina and have implemented a practical strategy for surplus
plutonium disposition over the long term. Using previously enacted
supplemental funding, our DOE and NNSA teams support Ukraine with
emergency preparedness tools and exercises, radiation and nuclear
sensors, and equipment for nuclear power plant resilience. Our
nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts increasingly require
close collaboration across other NNSA mission areas and the
interagency, and this collaboration is critical to our development and
deployment of high impact solutions.
The NNSA Naval Reactors program continues to advance reactor
technology to provide a competitive edge to the United States military.
Reactors that will never need refueling will be delivered on time for
the new Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines, reactor designs
for the next generation of fast-attack submarines are in progress, and
the construction of the Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho is
underway. Additionally, using other funding, Naval Reactors continues
to support the trilateral Australia-U.K.-United States (AUKUS) program
in close coordination with the Department of the Navy.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request reflects the urgent demands on
the nuclear security enterprise to deliver and adapt while exercising
fiscal restraint and increasing efficiency. NNSA's fiscal year 2025
budget request is $25B, an increase of $862 million, or 3.6 percent,
over the fiscal year 2024 enacted level.\1\ The fiscal year 2025 budget
request prioritizes executing the nuclear weapon program of record
including the development of the B61-13, responding to a deteriorating
security environment, advancing naval nuclear propulsion systems, all
while simultaneously revitalizing the infrastructure across the
enterprise. In addition, our requested budget supports development and
application of emerging technologies such as digital engineering and
artificial intelligence (AI) that will increase our efficiency and
innovation. The fiscal year 2025 budget request affirms the
Administration's steadfast commitment to a strong national defense and
NNSA's critical and evolving missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2024 Enacted amounts throughout this testimony do
not reflect the mandated transfer of $92.8 million from Naval Reactors
to the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test
Reactor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
weapons activities
The Weapons Activities fiscal year 2025 budget request of $19.8
billion, a 3.9 percent increase over the fiscal year 2024 enacted,
supports stockpile management; production modernization; stockpile
research, technology, and engineering; infrastructure and operations;
defense nuclear security and secure transportation; and information
management and cyber security.
Stockpile Management
The Stockpile Management budget request of $5.14B, a decrease of
3.5 percent from the fiscal year 2024 enacted, supports stockpile
modernization, stockpile sustainment, weapons dismantlement, production
operations, and nuclear enterprise assurance. The lower request for
fiscal year 2025 compared to the fiscal year 2024 enacted is the result
of smaller requests for the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370, which reflects
these modernization programs approaching the end of component
production, as well as the absence of funding for the Sea Launched
Cruise Missile Nuclear (SLCM-N).
Stockpile Modernization
The stockpile modernization program budget request of $2.84B
supports six systems in the expanded program of record: B61-12 Life
Extension Program (LEP), B61-13, W88 Alt 370, W87-1, W80-4, and W93.
Although SLCM-N is not in the budget request due to the timing of the
fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (fiscal year 2024
NDAA) and fiscal year 2024 budget enactment compared to the development
and submittal of the fiscal year 2025 budget request, NNSA will
continue to work with DOD and Congress to assure accordance with fiscal
year 2024 NDAA Section 1640.
NNSA has achieved 100 percent on-time delivery of the W88
Alteration (Alt) 370 Program and B61-12 LEP to DOD. This represents
consistent production progress since our announcement of First
Production Units (FPU) in fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022,
respectively.
Starting with the fiscal year 2024 budget enactment, NNSA began the
B61-13 program in response to the decision to strengthen deterrence and
assurance by providing the President with additional options against
certain harder and large-area military targets. In coordination with
DOD, NNSA will decrease the number of B61-12s built by the number of
B61-13s manufactured, resulting in no change to the number of weapons
in the stockpile. NNSA appreciates Congress' authorization and
appropriation of $52 million in fiscal year 2024 for the B61-13,
allowing us to take advantage of active B61 production capabilities. In
fiscal year 2025, the B61-13 program will progress into Phase 6.4,
Production Engineering, with FPU expected in fiscal year 2026.
The W80-4 warhead for the long-range standoff missile entered Phase
6.4, Production Engineering, in fiscal year 2023 and remains on track
for FPU in September 2027, aligned with the Air Force schedule for
initial and final operational capability dates.
In fiscal year 2023, the W87-1 entered Phase 6.3, Development
Engineering, a major milestone. The W87-1 will replace the aging W78
warhead, one of the oldest in the stockpile. The FPU for the W87-1 is
currently scheduled for fiscal year 2031 to 2032. The W87-1 is the
first modernized weapon that will have a newly manufactured pit, which
will be built at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and certified by
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
In May 2022, the W93 entered Phase 2, Feasibility Study and Design
Options, and remains on track for production starting in the mid-
2030's. The NWC has directed effort to accelerate the W93 FPU and the
fiscal year 2025 budget request supports this effort. The W93 is a new
warhead program based on existing designs that will not require new
underground nuclear explosive testing. The W93 will meet DOD
requirements to enhance operational effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic
missile submarine force. The W93 will have new pits produced at the
Savannah River Site (SRS). The W93 program is being undertaken in
parallel with the U.K. Replacement Warhead program continuing our
coordination through the United States-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement.
The fiscal year 2024 NDAA requires a SLCM-N as part of NNSA's
program of record. As mentioned earlier, NNSA is coordinating with DOD
to determine warhead requirements and meet congressional direction for
this new program. We will continue to keep Congress informed as program
offices in NNSA and the Navy are stood up and requirements are better
defined.
In addition to the seven modernization programs mentioned here,
NNSA has also requested $69 million in the Stockpile Research,
Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) program to support two Phase 1
system studies for early exploration of hard and deeply buried target
defeat and non-ballistic reentry systems. During these Phase 1 studies,
NNSA will evaluate potential weapon design concepts that could meet
anticipated deterrence requirements.
To continue to increase efficiency and enable future on-time
delivery of weapons, NNSA has initiated two efforts: digital
engineering and agile product realization. It is our intent to lower
the time and cost to deliver a new weapon as we improve our processes
and increase the experience level within the enterprise.
With this budget request, NNSA will continue to deliver modernized
nuclear weapons on schedule and at pace and will be positioned to do so
through the next decade and beyond.
Other Stockpile Management Activities
The Stockpile Management budget request includes an increase of 10
percent over the fiscal year 2024 enacted to Stockpile Sustainment and
Production Operations combined, reflecting the increased demands of the
existing and modernized stockpile efforts. The Nuclear Enterprise
Assurance increased budget request reflects a response to growing
threats associated with cyber and digital advances. NNSA has requested
over a 50 percent increase since fiscal year 2023 to respond to this
new reality. Last, the fiscal year 25 budget request for Weapons
Dismantlement is decreased slightly as we balance the needs of the
enterprise.
Production Modernization
NNSA's $5.9B budget request for production modernization is an
increase of $11.7 million, or 0.2 percent, higher than the fiscal year
2024 enacted budget. The increase in Production Modernization reflects
disciplined priority decisions in the portfolio and the overall Weapons
Activities budget, as well as the availability of carryover balances to
address fiscal year 2025 requirements. The FYNSP includes production
modernization budget requests that grow at a faster pace in future
years to meet stockpile modernization demands as the program spends
down carryover balances, particularly in major projects.
Plutonium Pit Production
NNSA's highest production modernization priority is re-establishing
the capability to produce new plutonium pits that was lost in 1989 when
production at Rocky Flats was halted. The pit production plan includes
a redesign and refurbishment of Los Alamos plutonium facilities to
support a production capacity of 30 pits per year (ppy) while
simultaneously establishing the processes to achieve war reserve (WR)
qualified pits for the W87-1.
As work continues at Los Alamos, the building designed and
constructed to house the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at
Savannah River is being modified and re-purposed to manufacture at
least 50 ppy. The W93 pits will be the first manufactured at Savannah
River. Although the W87-1 and W93 programs are setting the quantity and
schedule of pit production now, other future weapons will also require
newly produced pits. Pit production will be needed to support the
stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for plutonium modernization is
$2.89B, essentially flat from fiscal year 2024. The decreased budget
request for Los Alamos reflects the use of carryover funding to support
increased activity in fiscal year 2025. The increased budget request
for Savannah River offsets the decreased request for Los Alamos.
Additionally, the request for Infrastructure and Operations is higher
than the fiscal year 2024 enacted level by $715 million, or 28 percent,
in large part to support the pit production mission.
The completion of pit production capabilities is arguably the
largest and most complex undertaking at NNSA since the Manhattan
Project. NNSA is working closely with DOD to assure the stockpile will
remain safe, secure, reliable, and effective at all times while pit
production capabilities are being established.
Los Alamos Pit Production
The fiscal year 2025 $1.5 billion budget request for Los Alamos pit
production and the associated line-item projects is $266 million lower
than fiscal year 2024. The decrease includes a reduction in line-item
projects of $417 million reflecting the use of carryover balances and
consistent with projected execution rates of the line-item projects.
In fiscal year 2023, more development pits were produced at Los
Alamos than ever before--nine full W87-1 development pit builds, with
five more partial builds. Los Alamos is on track to ``diamond stamp''
the first fully qualified WR pit in the second half of 2024. The budget
request supports the increased pace of manufacturing work associated
with the ramp from FPU to rate production, as well as the increased
pace planned for equipment installation. It is expected that Los Alamos
will achieve the minimum capability needed to produce 30 ppy in or near
2028 with increasingly dependable capability attained each year through
2032.
Savannah River Pit Production
The requests for Savannah River Pit Production and Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) sum to $1.28 billion, a total of
$212 million, or 20.0 percent, above the fiscal year 2024 enacted
level.
The requested increase for SRPPF supports the increasing pace of
work to support completion of construction and turnover to operations
in 2032. We thank Congress for the strong support of this critical
project. NNSA used funding provided in fiscal year 2023 to contract
awards for the first set of gloveboxes on the critical path for
construction, as well as significant early site and building
preparation work. fiscal year 2024 funding will be used for award
contracts for additional long-lead critical-path procurements and
preparations. SRPPF's Process Design is now 90 percent complete with
the 60 percent overall project Preliminary Design completion
anticipated before the first quarter of fiscal year 2025.
Last year we committed to generating an updated SRPPF cost and
schedule estimate, recognizing that there would be large uncertainties
because the 60 percent design is not yet complete. Savannah River
Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) has produced a ``bottom-up'' cost and schedule
estimate based on information that was available near the end of fiscal
year 2023. SRNS estimates turnover to operations will occur in late
2032 or early 2033, with a total project cost of $18.5B. NNSA's cost
range for Savannah River based on the SRNS estimate, an independent
estimate from our Cost Estimating Savannah River based on the SRNS
estimate, an independent estimate from our Cost Estimating Savannah
River based on the SRNS estimate, an independent estimate from our Cost
Estimating Savannah River based on the SRNS estimate, an independent
estimate from our Cost Estimating
NNSA historical data on cost and schedule, from a very limited set
of large projects at a similar stage of development, suggest that SRPPF
cost and schedule will increase from today's estimates. We are studying
lessons learned from past projects and are implementing new practices
to significantly reduce cost and schedule overruns. Examples include
early procurement of long-lead items, early site and building work, and
construction of the High Fidelity Training and Operations Center. We
will continue to identify activities that will effect cost and schedule
so the W93 pits can be delivered on time.
Finally, the successful transition of SRS management to NNSA is
important to our efforts on SRPPF. NNSA is working closely with our
colleagues at DOE's Office of Environmental Management, the Savannah
River Field Office, the SRNS leadership team, and local stakeholders to
ensure a smooth transition.
Pit Production Integrated Master Schedule and Total Acquisition
Cost
The NNSA Integrated Master Schedule (NIMS) has been updated and
improved as requested by Congress. Additional logic and linkages are
included for the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4),
schedules between LAP4 and SRPPF are better integrated, and the paths
to FPU and rate production at SRPPF are incorporated. The NIMS contains
integrated detailed site schedule logic from Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore, and the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC) for
program scope focused on pit manufacturing and production efforts to
attain FPU at Los Alamos. There is less detail in the schedule for
SRPPF projects and the later phases of equipment installation at LAP4
since equipment and system designs for this work are less mature. NIMS
will continue to integrate higher fidelity schedule logic for those
programs and projects as their designs and schedules mature. The
current NIMS is an effective management tool for the program and
continuous updates will make it an effective tool in the long-term.
Additionally, NNSA has directed an external review of our Plutonium
program by the Advisory Committee for Nuclear Security, a Federal
Advisory Committee Act group reporting to the Administrator. The
initial report from this committee is expected in May 2024.
Uranium
Alongside pit production, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at
Y-12 is a top priority. The fiscal year 2025 budget request for UPF is
$800 million, an 122 percent increase from the fiscal year 2023 enacted
budget and a 5.2 percent increase from the fiscal year 2024 request. We
greatly appreciate congressional actions to support the reprogramming
of funds in fiscal year 2023.
The construction of the overall UPF project is now over 60 percent
complete. Gloveboxes are installed in the Main Process Building, and
over 97 percent of all procurements have been delivered. The current
focus of work is bulk electrical installation, with over 60 miles of
electrical conduit and cable installed in the last half of 2023.
However, due to a variety of issues, including direct and indirect
impacts from COVID-19, deficiencies in contractor performance and
planning, overly optimistic assumptions on productivity, repeated
delays on procurements, and funding uncertainties, the most current UPF
project cost estimate is $10.3 billion and the estimated date for
construction completion is late fiscal year 2027 with beginning of
operations expected in October 2031.
In addition to making progress on UPF, NNSA is advancing its
development of centrifuges and cascades for domestic uranium enrichment
and its production of tritium with a fiscal year 2025 budget request of
$662 million, an increase of nearly 12 percent over the fiscal year
2024 enacted.
Other Production Modernization Programs
Other large-scale projects are either starting or moving forward in
line with NNSA's weapon modernization and/or safety and security needs.
In late 2023, NNSA broke ground on the Lithium Processing Facility
(LPF) at Y-12 with construction expected to start in fiscal year 2026
and a fiscal year 2025 budget request of $260 million. The High
Explosives Science and Engineering Facility (HESE) at Pantex continues
construction with a fiscal year 2025 budget request of $15 million, and
the Power Sources Capability at Sandia has a budget request of $50
million. The Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation (KCNExT),
a new real eState acquisition approach to meet NNSA's space needs that
will break ground in Summer 2024. KCNExT is critical to increase
capacity of the non-nuclear components. Each of these projects is key
to modernizing facilities to avoid infrastructure failure and to
increase capacity. As a reference point, KCNSC delivered components
containing more than 300,000 parts in the past year.
NNSA recognizes the fiscal year 2024 NDAA statutory language for
completion the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production
Facility (HESFP) at the Pantex Plant, and the Tritium Finishing
Facility (TFF) at Savannah River. Funding for these project schedules
was not factored into the fiscal year 2025 request as NNSA's strategy
was to prioritize funding of a reduced number of critical projects, and
both HESFP and TFF are of a lower priority.
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
The SRT&E portfolio develops and delivers the tools used every day
for design, certification, and assessment of the stockpile without
underground nuclear explosive testing; evaluates and accelerates future
concepts; improves understanding of weapon response to environmental
conditions; and matures technologies for warheads and manufacturing
processes. The SRT&E budget supports the infrastructure and workforce
to deliver scientific and engineering advances, including both
experimental and computational capabilities. The fiscal year 2025
budget request for SRT&E is $3.17 billion, a 3.2 percent decrease from
the fiscal year 2024 enacted and an increase of 7.6 percent from the
fiscal year 2023 enacted.
In fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024, Lawrence Livermore
repeated its 2022 fusion ignition breakthrough at the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) four times, improving gains and achieving a yield of 5.2
MJ in February 2024. We were excited to have the first NNSA Ignition
result highlighted by Google as the ``most searched breakthrough'' in
the past 25 years. Also, in fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024, NNSA
started significant efforts to mature technologies to manufacture
radiation cases, evaluate new explosives formulations, implement
artificial intelligence (AI) in science and engineering programs, and
establish AI models and testbeds for unclassified and classified work.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $890 million for Advanced
Scientific Computing, a 6 percent increase from the fiscal year 2024
enacted budget, enables transitioning LANL's Crossroads system to
classified service for weapons assessment and certification, bringing
online the first exaflop computer, El Capitan, at Lawrence Livermore.
Additionally, the request includes $50 million to expand the
application of AI to assist in maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable
nuclear stockpile while reducing cost and schedule by enhancing
scientific and material discovery, design optimization, manufacturing
and certification, and expediting the deployment and surveillance
phases of a nuclear warhead system.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $683 million for Inertial
Confinement Fusion (ICF) will allow NNSA to address near-term weapons
physics challenges and build on its repeated success of reaching fusion
ignition in the laboratory. The ICF program gives NNSA experimental
access to extreme temperature and pressure regimes characteristic of
nuclear weapons to support design, certification, and assessment of the
stockpile without resuming underground nuclear explosive testing. NNSA
is currently recapitalizing and sustaining existing facilities in line
with the ICF 10-Year Facility and Infrastructure Plan delivered to
Congress in March 2023. The highly visible successes of the ICF program
enhance the deterrent by demonstrating world-leading expertise in high
energy density science and technology and providing experimental access
to weapons-relevant physical conditions previously unattainable in the
laboratory.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Enhanced Capabilities for
Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) of $240 million coupled with the $73
million U1a Complex Enhancements Project (UCEP) request will support
expansion, construction, and system installations at the Principal
Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation (PULSE) at the
Nevada National Security Site. ECSE includes development of the Z-Pinch
Experimental Underground System (ZEUS) and Advanced Sources Detectors
(ASD) Scorpius instruments. Experiments with these tools at PULSE will
provide capabilities for system-level plutonium aging experiments at
the end of the decade and will provide an important capability to
assess system designs for ongoing modernization programs.
Academic Programs and Community Support
The budget request for Academic Programs and Community support is
$128 million, an increase of 5 percent over fiscal year 2024 enacted.
It is critical for NNSA to support external mission-relevant research,
generate a talent pipeline in key areas of science and engineering, and
support our communities. This funding is targeted at workforce needs
projected to be the most critical.
Infrastructure and Operations
The NNSA budget request for Infrastructure and Operations is $3.3
billion, including $3.16 billion for operations and $144 million for a
portfolio of smaller infrastructure projects. The Operations request is
26 percent above the fiscal year 2024 enacted level. This includes
increases for operations of facilities, safety and environmental
operations, maintenance and repair of facilities, and recapitalization.
To deliver our stockpile program from our legacy infrastructure base,
especially while revitalization and new construction are underway, this
increase is essential. As noted above, increases to both operations of
facilities and maintenance and repair of facilities are largely tied to
increased requirements associated with plutonium pit production. The
other main contributor for the increases is the transition of
management of the Savannah River Site from Environmental Management to
NNSA. Funding throughout operations of facilities, maintenance and
repair of facilities, and recapitalization is critical to ensure that
NNSA can transition SRS to an enduring missionsite to support pit
production and the broader nuclear modernization program. Additionally,
$240 million of the $778 million requested for Recapitalization will
fund the second phase of KCNExT, including real eState acquisition of
the first manufacturing facility in the KCNExT portfolio.
NNSA continues to innovate on mission-enabling construction of
commercial-like projects to save time and taxpayer dollars while
upgrading key capabilities. In 2023, NNSA successfully completed the
final three projects initiated under the 2019 Enhanced Minor
Construction and Commercial Standards (EMC2) pilot project: new
emergency operations centers at Y-12 and Sandia National Laboratories
and a new fire station at Y-12. NNSA experienced up to a 30 percent
cost avoidance on these pilot projects. In August 2023, NNSA
established a new policy institutionalizing the streamlined oversight
and management practices from EMC2 for line-item construction projects
up to $100 million, opening the door for future cost and time savings
in smaller-scale non-nuclear construction.
Enterprise Blueprint
To better understand, synchronize, and communicate the enterprise's
infrastructure needs, NNSA is developing an Enterprise Blueprint. The
Blueprint will describe a 2050 vision, including facilities needed
across the enterprise and their ties to mission needs. This will help
reinforce NNSA's underlying philosophy of responsiveness, flexibility,
and resiliency required to meet dynamic demands. A fully developed
Enterprise Blueprint is expected in the latter half of 2024. The
Blueprint will guide future investment priorities and budget requests.
Defense Nuclear Security and Secure Transportation
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $1.18 billion for Defense
Nuclear Security, an increase of 14 percent over the fiscal year 2024
enacted, reflects both the transition of responsibility for safeguards
and security at the Savannah River Site from EM to NNSA, and the need
to keep pace with new threats, particularly uncrewed aircraft systems.
The budget request also includes an 8 percent increase for the West End
Protected Area Reduction (WEPAR) project.
NNSA is transitioning to a next-generation counter uncrewed
aircraft system (CUAS) that will employ an open architecture systems-
based approach to address the evolving threat uncrewed aircraft systems
present to NNSA facilities and personnel. Open architecture provides
the data fusion and integration of open and proprietary sensors to
allow NNSA to select the best available mitigation capabilities: radio
frequency, directed energy, kinetic, and radar. Combining these
approaches will prevent NNSA from relying on a single capability and
allows for swift adjustments to incorporate advanced technology. The
flexibility gained by this approach allows security planners to
customize systems for each management and operating contract mission
partner lab, plant, or site, based on unique location conditions. In
fiscal year 2025, NNSA will finalize the development of a permanent
facility at the Idaho National Laboratory for CUAS testing and
evaluation to help security planners identify possible next-generation
solutions, outline continuous testing requirements, and improve NNSA's
existing CUAS platform.
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $371M for Secure
Transportation is increased by 4 percent from the fiscal year 2024
enacted. NNSA's Secure Transportation is essential to assure the
security of weapons during delivery and return from the DOD and to meet
our schedule commitments.
Information Technology and Cyber Security
The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $646 million for Information
Technology (IT) and Cyber Security is 12 percent higher than the fiscal
year 2024 enacted in recognition of the increasing threats to cyber
security and the ever increasing needs to improve information
technology, including technology to support our digital engineering
initiative. This request is 45 percent above the fiscal year 2023
enacted to provide increased protection to our high security
enterprise.
NNSA faces an increasingly sophisticated and targeted cyber threat
environment. We are recapitalizing our information technology (IT) and
cybersecurity environments to provide a more resilient and flexible set
of capabilities. The fiscal year 2025 budget request prioritizes
investments in the IT and cybersecurity workforce, enterprise-scale
cyber infrastructure, implementation of zero trust architecture,
digital transformation, classified and unclassified commercial cloud-
based technologies, and classified wireless systems to improve mission
outcomes across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is also
conducting cyber exercises, including red teaming, to stress test
NNSA's cybersecurity posture. We are making these investments to remain
poised to address cyber threat and respond to cyber incidents.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request of $2.46
billion continues critical investment for our nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and emergency response programs at this difficult
time in global strategic stability. The fiscal year 2025 request is
$116 million below the fiscal year 2024 enacted level. These changes
reflect realistic planning for the pit disassembly and processing
element of the surplus plutonium disposition program, responsible use
of prior year funds, a one-time $50 million increase for molybdenum-99
(Mo-99) production in fiscal year 2024, and lower legacy pension costs.
The new investments are aimed at responding to the current and
anticipated security environment.
NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), Emergency
Management, and Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Programs
(CTCP) are working in lockstep with our allies and partners,
interagency counterparts, and international organizations like the IAEA
to maintain and advance U.S. global nuclear threat reduction leadership
in a shifting international landscape. This work includes cooperation
on countering malign State and non-State capabilities, advancing the
peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy and nuclear technology while
managing proliferation and security risks, minimizing global stocks of
excess weapons-usable nuclear material, advancing national technical
capabilities in arms control and proliferation detection, and reducing
nuclear risks in Ukraine.
Material Management and Minimization
The core objective of the Material Management and Minimization
portfolio is eliminating weapons-usable materials or replacing them
with less attractive material both domestically and internationally.
The Material Management and Minimization fiscal year 2025 budget
request is $377 million, a decrease of $119 million, or 24 percent,
from the fiscal year 2024 enacted level. The primary reason for the
decrease is the decision to delay the design and construction of a Pit
Disassembly and Processing (PDP) Facility as part of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition (SPD) program. The PDP delay, to be re-evaluated
in 10 years, allows us to prioritize the removal of material from South
Carolina. Part of the rationale for this decision involves the need to
prioritize pit production construction and rate production during the
same 10-year period that would be needed to stand up PDP capability.
This would stress the construction, operational and human resources
beyond reasonable capacity at Los Alamos and Savannah River. Although
we are delaying PDP, real progress in SPD has been made. We are
especially pleased that, following years of extensive planning and
coordination, last year the first shipment of down-blended surplus
plutonium was transported from K-Area at SRS in South Carolina to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico for final disposition
and shipments have continued on a planned schedule. A total of 111.6
kgs of NNSA surplus plutonium was dispositioned during fiscal year
2023.
Another key activity over the past several years has been assisting
the final major global producer of the medical isotope Mo-99 to convert
from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium,
helping to ensure a stable supply of a critical medical isotope while
eliminating an associated proliferation risk. A related effort to
establish a reliable supply of domestically produced Mo-99 in the
United States received a one-time increase in fiscal year 2024 as
mentioned earlier, and a plan to utilize this increase is being
established in consultation with Congress. NNSA continues to work with
partners who have converted research reactors and medical isotope
production processes by supplying the high-assay, low-enriched uranium
(HALEU) they need to operate. This increasingly includes countries that
are looking to alternatives to Russian supplies of HALEU.
In fiscal year 2025, we plan to use the Mobile-Melt-Consolidate
system developed by NNSA to begin to eliminate inventories of excess
HEU in Norway that previously lacked a disposition pathway. To date,
NNSA has eliminated over 7,340 kg of HEU and plutonium globally; the
material equivalent to eliminating hundreds of nuclear weapons.
Global Material Security
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Global Material Security is
$544 million, a 3.8 percent increase over the fiscal year 2024 enacted.
Much of the requested growth is in the nuclear smuggling detection and
deterrence portfolio. The fiscal year 2025 request is $196 million, an
increase of $15 million, or 8.3 percent, over the fiscal year 2024
enacted level. NNSA has increased focus on Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa to counter Russian and Chinese activity and influence
in those regions. NNSA began cooperation with 16 new partners in the
past 2 years, and by the end of fiscal year 2025, NNSA will deploy 78
new counter nuclear smuggling systems.
In addition to the requested growth in nuclear smuggling detection,
Global Material Security had a smaller requested increase of
approximately $3 million in International Nuclear Security to expand
the nuclear power plant initiative to address sabotage and energy
security. This program is taking the lessons from Ukraine to examine
vulnerabilities of large nuclear power plants and mitigating risk posed
by malign actors who might seek to disrupt or damage these facilities.
NNSA also remains on track to meet the congressionally mandated
deadline to replace all cesium-based blood irradiators in the United
States by 2027. NNSA's success here goes beyond just cesium-based blood
irradiators, in fact, NNSA eliminated over 100 blood and other types of
radioactive-source-based devices in fiscal year 2023 in the United
States and abroad and expects another 85 removals by the end of fiscal
year 2024. NNSA has expanded its work to find technical capable tools
to replace those materials posing the greatest risk of radiological
terrorism with a greater focus on alternatives to cobalt-60
replacements.
Nonproliferation and Arms Control
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Nonproliferation and Arms
Control is $225 million, an increase of 6 percent or $13 million over
the fiscal year 2024 enacted. The increased budget request will support
new activities to improve safeguarding uranium enrichment plants and
develop policy and technical solutions to address risks associated with
the global expansion of nuclear energy. The growth is offset by a one-
time fiscal year 2024 plus up of $12 million to accelerate the scope of
nuclear verification efforts.
The budget includes funding for Project Carousel, a unique
multilateral capability that will allow the IAEA to test and validate
technologies and train safeguards inspectors. This facility will come
on-line at a critical time to help IAEA explore techniques for
monitoring the large growth in civil nuclear energy.
NNSA personnel have been closely involved in efforts to counter
Russian and Chinese disinformation and illegal actions while promoting
United States and allied interests. This includes working with the
Department of State (DOS) and other interagency partners to counter
Chinese disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining the AUKUS
security partnership. NNSA will continue collaborating with DOS and DOD
to advance the goals of the partnership while adhering to our
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and as a
responsible nuclear power. NNSA has also lent its expertise to the
Global Export Control Coalition to improve the detection of Russia's
attempted sanctions evasion to acquire material to support its ongoing
invasion against Ukraine.
NNSA supports the expansion of civil nuclear energy to responsible
partners globally. Last year, NNSA was instrumental in forging a civil
nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and the
Philippines. We provide support to DOS on the negotiation and
implementation of nuclear cooperation agreements. NNSA also helps U.S.
companies manage their international engagements without sharing
sensitive technology. Importantly, NNSA is working directly with
nuclear reactor developers to build in international safeguards
concepts from the beginning, lowering the longer term deployment costs,
increasing safeguards effectiveness, and improving the competitiveness
of American industry for foreign deployment.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
The fiscal year 2025 budget request for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Research and Development is $803 million, an increase of 4.8 percent or
$37 million over the fiscal year 2024 enacted.
The fiscal year 2025 request will continue to support the
Nonproliferation Stewardship Program at about the same level as in
fiscal year 2024. The Forensics Research and Development (R&D) budget
request is reduced by $7 million while maintaining existing research
life cycle plans and making use of available carryover.
The fiscal year 2025 request for Nuclear Detonation Detection (NDD)
is $323 million, an increase of $37.5 million, or 13.1 percent, over
the fiscal year 2024 enacted level. NNSA delivered to the U.S. Space
Force (USSF) the first newly completed next-generation Global Burst
Detector (GBD IIIF) payload for space-based nuclear detonation
monitoring. This new sensor will provide an order of magnitude increase
in capabilities at reduced size, weight, and power. The USSF will
integrate the GBD IIIF onto the first GPS Block IIIF satellite as part
of the United States Nuclear Detonation Sensor (USNDS). These improved
capabilities are increasingly important as tactical nuclear weapons
proliferate and the threat of regional nuclear wars increase.
Building from this sensor capability, the R&D budget in fiscal year
2025 request includes increased support for monitoring and verification
capabilities for space situational awareness to reinforce arms control
and verification missions in support of current treaties, like the
Outer Space Treaty. This work protects our national interests and
assets, providing information on activities all the way to the lunar
surface and beyond.
While Russia routinely violates its arms control commitments and
exhibits norm-violating behavior and China has been unwilling to engage
in meaningful bilateral or multilateral arms control, NNSA continues to
invest in developing infrastructure, human capital, and advanced
technologies to meet current and future monitoring and verification
needs and prepare for potential future arms control negotiations. Last
year, NNSA reached an important scientific and engineering milestone by
successfully conducting a chemical explosive test in P Tunnel at the
Nevada National Security Site. This experiment advanced our ability to
detect very low-yield underground nuclear explosive tests around the
world.
The R&D request also includes $15 million for developing
capabilities to produce assessments of how AI models may present
nuclear and nonproliferation risks and provide recommendations for
mitigating the potential AI threats to national security in light of
the rapid pace of rapid technological advancement and innovation.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation's (CTCP) core
capabilities are to counter nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation
and respond to any nuclear or radiological incident or accident
worldwide. The fiscal year 2025 budget request of $536 million for the
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program, an increase of
6.6 percent, supports planned investments for the second phase of the
Capability Forward initiative by developing a standardized Nuclear
Emergency Support Team technical training program focused on actions to
secure and defeat weapon of mass destruction (WMD) devices for Federal
Bureau of Investigation field office responders. The fiscal year 2025
request also supports technical and policy solutions to counter nuclear
proliferation, capability enhancements to counter nuclear and
radiological threats--including improved tools to locate, characterize,
defeat and conduct forensics on these threats--and training delivery
and capacity building for domestic and international partnerships on
nuclear counterterrorism and emergency preparedness and response.
NNSA is advancing the Administration's Executive Order on the Safe,
Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.
As outlined in the Executive Order, NNSA is working with our colleagues
across DOE to develop tools to better understand and mitigate the risk
of AI being misused to assist in the development or use of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats
The fiscal year 2025 request for CTCP's efforts in this area is $15
million for developing the capabilities to provide recurring
assessments of how AI models may present nuclear risks and provide
recommendations for mitigating the potential AI threats to national
security in light of the rapid pace of rapid technological advancement
and innovation.
As Russia's full-scale invasion against Ukraine enters its third
year, DOE/NNSA's Ukraine Task Force is working to reduce nuclear risks
in Ukraine. This includes providing equipment, training, and technical
guidance to enable the safe and secure operation of Ukraine's nuclear
power plants remaining under its control, protect its critical
infrastructure, particularly the electric grid, provide situational
awareness of any nuclear emergency that occurs in the country, and
enhance the emergency preparedness and response capacity of our
Ukrainian partners to respond to a nuclear event.
naval reactors
The Naval Reactors budget request of $2.1 billion, an increase of
$173 million, or 8.9 percent over the fiscal year 2024 enacted level,
supports NNSA's close partnership with the U.S. Navy in key areas. The
agency is advancing naval nuclear propulsion capabilities to keep the
U.S. nuclear fleet on the cutting edge of warfighting capability,
maintaining the assured second-strike capability of the sea-based leg
of the nuclear triad, and building the next generation of
infrastructure to enable continued operational success.
The fiscal year 2025 request supports technology development work
critical to delivering improvements in reactor performance and
reliability, and to support in-service and future submarines and
aircraft carriers' obsolescence and capability needs. The fiscal year
2025 request for Naval Reactors Development is $868.4 million, an
increase of $48 million, or 5.9 percent over the fiscal year 2024
enacted level.
The fiscal year 2025 request supports the continued safe and
reliable operations, maintenance, and oversight at Naval Reactors' four
Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites and the associated contractor workforce.
The fiscal year 2025 request for Naval Reactors Operations and
Infrastructure is $763.3 million, an increase of $51 million, or 7.2
percent, over the fiscal year 2024 enacted level.
The funding request also supports requirements for major
initiatives: Columbia-class reactor systems development; development of
future advanced submarine technology to support next generation
designs; and continued progress on base technology development,
infrastructure recapitalization at program sites, and decontamination
and decommissioning efforts.
Finally, Naval Reactors continues to support the AUKUS partnership
through reimbursable work with Australia and the U.K. NNSA will
continue its collaboration with DOS and DOD to advance the goals of the
agreement while adhering to our obligations as a responsible nuclear
power and a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
federal salaries and expenses
The Federal Salaries and Expenses budget request of $565 million,
an increase of 13 percent over fiscal year 2024 enacted, supports the
recruiting, retention, and development of high-quality Federal staff
required to meet NNSA's growing mission requirements and commitments,
maintain the overall health of the Federal workforce, and ensure NNSA
is able to provide effective oversight, which is essential to
controlling costs and schedule. The increased request helps address the
perennially lowest score that NNSA receives in the Federal Employee
Viewpoint Survey question that states ``my workload is manageable.''
A portion of the increased request is associated with the SRS
landlord transition from DOE Environmental Management (EM) to NNSA. We
anticipate the SRS transition will include a transfer of 85 FTEs.
NNSA aims to recruit and retain a highly skilled workforce by
offering a compelling mission, collaborative work environment, and
incentives to compete with the private sector for a limited pool of in-
demand talents. NNSA is adjusting its hiring practices to be more
proactive to get the right people in the right timeframe.
NNSA appreciates Congress's support to raise the Excepted Service
cap in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA.
conclusion
Not since the Manhattan Project has there been a more challenging
moment for the nuclear security enterprise. As the only U.S. Government
organization capable of designing and manufacturing nuclear weapons,
developing technical solutions to nonproliferation, and delivering
naval reactors to the fleet, NNSA has a unique role in protecting our
Nation and our allies and partners. The fiscal year 2025 budget request
recognizes the significantly expanded scope of work in NNSA along with
expected increases in efficiencies and fiscal responsibility. NNSA is
determined to be proactive rather than reactive in promoting
deterrence, strategic stability, and domestic and global security. We
appreciate your continued support for the mission and people of NNSA.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator King. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Wolfe.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR
FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Wolfe. Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department
of the Navy's budget priorities for nuclear forces. As Director
of Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), my mission is to provide
credible and affordable strategic solutions to our war fighter.
For nearly 7 decades, and with Congress's steadfast
support, the Navy submarine force has served as the foundation
for the U.S. strategic posture, operating on continuous patrol
and providing assured second-strike capability.
Since I testified before this panel last year, we have
built on this remarkable history of deterrence marking such
milestones as: the final demonstration and shakedown operation
for our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines; establishment
of a new nuclear office for the sea launched cruise missile
SLCM-N.
Additionally, in coordination with our NNSA partners, we
are initiating a nuclear weapon project to adapt a nuclear
warhead for this new capability. This work has not been without
its challenges. Long periods of nuclear sustainment have
atrophied the domestic industrial base and its critical skills.
Significant investments are required to build back capacity
to handle multiple concurrent nuclear modernization programs.
Furthermore, we are seeing exceptional inflation-based cost
growth due to the aging industrial base, associated supply
chain challenges and material obsolescence.
Nevertheless, we must continue to sustain today's deterrent
while modernizing for the future. First and foremost, we must
maintain the current D5LE missile inventory and provide the
necessary operational support to sustain Ohio-class submarines
through the end of their life in the early 2040's.
Second, along with PEOSSBN, we must continue to ensure a
seamless transition between Ohio-class and Columbia-class
submarines. For my command, SSP, this requires a seamless
transition of the current Trident II D5LE weapon system onto
the new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine.
Finally, one of the greatest advantages the United States
has is its alliances and partnerships. For decades, United
States policy has recognized the contribution of an independent
British nuclear deterrent adds to NATO and indeed global
stability. SSP will continue to support and sustain this most
important relationship.
Execution of these priorities is only possible through
investment in our people, our infrastructure and our industrial
base. Nuclear modernization will take time and I echo the
Strategic Posture Commission's findings that urgent and
comprehensive resourcing and whole of enterprise effort is
absolutely essential.
It is only through your continued support that the
department's highest modernization priorities can be achieved
and the Navy can deliver a reliable sea based strategic
deterrent capability. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on behalf of the dedicated Americans that make strategic
deterrents their life's work.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnny Wolfe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
sustainment and recapitalization of the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad. It is an honor to represent the Navy's Strategic Systems
Programs (SSP) and the contributions the Navy provides to our national
and global security through Sea Based Strategic Deterrence (SBSD).
The Mission Priorities of SSP are to:
1. Sustain the Trident II D5 and Trident II Life Extension (D5LE)
Strategic Weapons System (SWS) and ensure Nuclear Weapons Surety on the
Ohio-class Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) and in
supporting shore facilities through 2042 while providing Naval Nuclear
Weapons Program Technical Authority for Nuclear Weapon (NW) systems and
Regulatory Oversight of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM). SSP
will install and sustain the D5LE SWS onto the initial Columbia and
United Kingdom (UK) Dreadnought SSBNs.
2. Develop the Columbia and UK Dreadnought SWS and advanced weapon
capabilities in the Trident II D5 Life Extended (D5LE2) missile and
W93/Mk7 warhead and reentry body assembly.
3. Consistent with congressional direction, SSP will develop and
deliver the U.S. Navy's sea-launched cruise missile nuclear (SLCM-N)
and non-nuclear, Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile
capability to provide the Nation with additional tailored options to
deter strategic attacks.
4. Safeguard the special relationship between the United States
and UK through the Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) and Mutual Defense
Agreement (MDA), benefiting both nations and supporting the UK's
Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD).
SSP's core mission comprises two fundamental lines of
accountability: the safety and security of our Nation's strategic
assets entrusted to the Navy; and the design, development, production,
and sustainment of the Navy's SWS. We strive to maintain a culture of
excellence, underpinned by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the
highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
the strategic deterrent mission. We focus unremittingly on our
tremendous responsibility for the custody and accountability of our
Nation's nuclear assets. The SSP family--our Sailors, Marines, Navy
Masters at Arms, Coast Guardsmen, and our industry partners--remain
dedicated to supporting the strategic deterrence mission; ready to
respond to the emerging needs of our Warfighter, and to protect and
safeguard our Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. We certainly
could not do this without the support from this Committee.
state of the program
The Nation's nuclear triad is the bedrock of U.S. national defense
and consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles, globally
deployable heavy bombers, and SSBNs equipped with submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM). These platforms and their associated weapons
systems are essential to the very foundation of our Nation's security
and survival. The Administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
affirms the following roles for nuclear weapons: deter strategic
attacks, assure allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if
deterrence fails. While the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure
and effective, most U.S. nuclear deterrent systems--including the SSBN
fleet--are operating far beyond their original design life. Replacement
programs are ongoing, but there is no margin between the end of useful
life of existing programs and the fielding of their replacements. As
noted by the 2022 NPR, we need to fully fund the Columbia-class SSBN
program to deliver a minimum of 12 boats on time, as the Ohio-class
SSBNs begin to retire. We also need to continue to prioritize near term
investments in the submarine industrial base, Ohio-class sustainment
and the second life extension of the Trident II D5 SWS.
The U.S. Navy provides the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
with the interdependent Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II D5 SWS. The
SSBN fleet is responsible for more than 70 percent of the Nation's
deployed nuclear warheads as defined by the New START Treaty. As the
Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of Ohio-class SSBNs,
addressing the viability of the SWS throughout the life of the
Columbia-class SSBNs remains our top priority. Columbia-class SSBNs
will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the Nation's Sea
Based Strategic Deterrent through the 2080's. The currently deployed
Trident II D5LE missiles will support initial load-outs on Columbia,
but modernization of the D5LE SWS, via D5LE2, is required to support
later Columbia-class missile inventory and seamlessly sustain
USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2 will ensure the SWS will be flexible and
adaptable in order to maintain demonstrated performance and
survivability despite the dynamic threat environment. The expanding
nuclear capability and diversity of two near-peer nuclear armed
adversaries, as described by the STRATCOM Commander in his testimony,
has placed an even greater demand on the current SSBN fleet. The fleet
in the past year has provided strategic messaging with port calls with
key allies while still requiring the SSBN to operate even more covertly
and maintain a high operational tempo.
sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
ssbn
The Ohio-class SSBN began a new phase of Sea Based Strategic
Deterrence (SBSD) when it started relieving the 41 for Freedom SSBNs in
the 1980's, initially employing the Trident I C4 SLBM and leveraging
the nuclear warheads and missile production infrastructure of the
original Fleet Ballistic Missile Program. As the U.S. sought to
increase the range, accuracy, reliability, and lethality of its SLBM
program, in 1988, USS Tennessee (SSBN734) dawned a new age of SBSD as
she ushered in the advanced Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System
(SWS) in the newly built Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, specifically
designed to support this new weapon system. Over the following decade,
as new Ohio-class SSBNs were brought online (SSBN 735 through SSBN 743)
with the D5 missile system, the early Ohio-class SSBNs were also
converted from a C4 system to align with the rest of the D5 fleet.
Originally composed of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs, the SSBN fleet settled on a
14-ship class carrying the Trident II D5 missile system executing SBSD,
while the first four Ohio-class SSBNs were converted to conventional
guided missile and special operations forces submarines (SSGN 726
through SSGN 729). The 14 ship Ohio-class SSBN fleet remains the
backbone of U.S. strategic deterrence. Originally designed for a 30-
year service life, the Ohio-class submarines were called upon to extend
this service to 42 years, supporting a delay in investment in the next
generation of SSBNs. To account for this extension in service life, SSP
embarked on a life extension program for the D5 missiles to update
critical but aging missile electronics systems. SSP introduced the
Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) program to the fleet in 2017 and
will continue through 2025 to convert D5 missiles to D5LE when they are
pulled off the SSBNs during normal missile maintenance times.
The final Ohio-class SSBN, USS Louisiana (SSBN 743), which
completed her mid-life Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) last year
has returned to support the sea-based strategic deterrent until her
scheduled retirement in 2042. SSP must ensure the ``no fail'' SBSD
mission is supported on the Ohio-class through 2042, providing a
reliable Trident II D5/D5LE weapons systems with W76 and W88 warheads
until this final ship of the class is decommissioned. In parallel,
SSP's program efforts and collaboration with the UK through the PSA
will support the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrence through Vanguard-
class life and the transition to a Dreadnought-class SSBN fleet.
In support of USSTRATCOM, we have recognized the challenges
presented by an unprecedented strategic landscape of two nuclear peers
who are actively seeking to undermine the rules-based international
order. In order to meet emerging threats posed by this environment, SSP
has made an effort to ensure greater flexibility to execute our
mission, both today and in the future. These investments seek to expand
operating environments for the SSBN. As stated by USSTRATCOM Commander,
``These long-term investments are critical to ensure a safe, secure,
effective and credible strategic force that can defend our national
interests.''
trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
The Trident II D5 SWS capability has been deployed on the Ohio-
class SSBN for more than three decades and is planned to be deployed
more than 55 years. This demand to maintain demonstrated high
performance while extending the service life past initial design
requirements required a missile life extension effort, D5LE. The
current Trident D5 Life Extension (D5LE) remains an effective and
credible Strategic Weapon System on both the Ohio-class and Columbia-
class SSBNs into the 2040's, supporting the Ohio-class submarine
through end of service life and serving as the initial Strategic Weapon
System for the Columbia and UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
Ohio-class SSBNs, we must address the viability of the SWS throughout
the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of 12 Columbia-class
SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio SSBNs and beginning in fiscal year
2030, D5LE missiles will support initial loadouts on Columbia (Hulls 1-
8). Production of additional D5LE missiles is not practical due to
obsolete parts and the lack of a robust industrial base. In order to
meet inventory requirements and maintain a credible strategic deterrent
in the face of evolving threats, a second life extension of the Trident
II Strategic Weapons System (D5LE2) is required to be designed,
engineered, produced and deployed by Columbia Hull #9's strategic
outload. It will be incorporated on UK Dreadnought class SSBNs, all
follow on Columbia hulls, as well as Columbia hulls 1-8 during their
Extended Refit Period from fiscal year 2039 to 2049 to continue to meet
USSTRATCOM requirements. D5LE2's architecture will ensure the weapon
system maintains demonstrated performance and remains survivable while
facing a dynamic threat environment driven by two near peer competitors
until Columbia and UK Dreadnought end of life.
D5LE2 is a hybrid of pull-through cost-effective technology (e.g.,
solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
(e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture). D5LE2 is structured to
maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance,
while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
emerging needs and to maintain a credible Sea Based Strategic
Deterrent. Fiscal year 2025 activities continue critical Missile and
Guidance technology work, commencing multiple subsystem redesigns,
industrial base development activities and definitization of system
level requirements for the D5LE2 program. The D5LE2 subprogram will
achieve Milestone B in 2025.
Unlike SLBM programs of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit
of a healthy defense industrial base that comes from maintaining
production and continuous development. The 2022 NPR reiterated the need
for D5LE2 and stated that the United States will prioritize near-term
investments to ``ensure that D5LE2 is effective in the expected threat
environment and delivers on time.'' The 2022 bi-partisan,
congressionally mandated Strategic Posture Committee Report recommended
fully supporting development and deployment of D5LE2 ``to ensure U.S.
nuclear strategy remains effective in a two-nuclear-peer environment.''
In short, full support of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving 2039
Initial Fleet Introduction and to embarking on a path that maintains an
SLBM deterrent capability through the service life of the Columbia and
UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
The Navy must also recapitalize infrastructure across the breadth
of the Navy's Nuclear Enterprise. The Strategic Weapons Facilities and
the Naval Ordinance Test Unit support current SSBN operations in
addition to their missions to develop and produce D5LE2; these
facilities require modernization. Consistent and timely resourcing is
required to maintain our continuous presence at sea in accordance with
USSTRATCOM requirements.
sea-launched cruise missile, nuclear (slcm-n)
The Congress, in Section 1640 of the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA (Public
Law 118-31), directed establishment of a Major Defense Acquisition
Program for a sea-launched cruise missile nuclear (SLCM-N). The weapon
will contribute a supplemental capability to reinforce theater regional
deterrence, a key objective of the 2022 NPR.
In accordance with Section 1640, the Navy has begun efforts to
enable a program start, leading to an initial operating capability
(IOC) in 2034, as directed by the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. In March 2024,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment LaPlante,
signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum directing the Navy to
establish a program office and begin the analysis phase. SSP is also
supporting ongoing discussions between the Administration and Congress
on options to execute the SLCM-N program in a manner that balances
cost, deterrence value, and risk to the program of record and the Joint
Force. Executing this program successfully will require careful
balancing of SLCM-N programmatic manning with on-going Navy programs,
which draw from a limited pool of experienced government personnel and
the same nuclear weapons industrial base.
Research and development funding appropriated to the Navy in fiscal
year 2023 enabled initial development of a Concept of Operations
(CONOPS), assessment of the impact to the current attack submarine
mission, development of an acquisition strategy, initiation of cost and
financial management, systems engineering, requirements development,
and logistics planning to prepare for the upcoming Milestone A. The
Navy is ready to execute fiscal year 2024 funding as appropriated to
complete Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) concept and feasibility
studies, to meet the requirements for a successful Milestone A
decision.
warhead and reentry body activities
The Navy is also working in partnership with the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish
our existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in
response to USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment the
nuclear enterprise faces continues to evolve, it is critical that the
Navy designs, develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the
Warfighter. The Trident II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
of warhead families today, the W76 and the W88. The W93/Mk7 warhead and
reentry body system will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2
missiles and, through the Polaris Sales Agreement and Mutual Defense
Agreement (as amended), will support the United Kingdom's sovereign
Replacement Warhead program. In 2019, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life
Extension Program (W76-1/Mk4A), marking the U.S. stockpile's first
full-scale warhead refurbishment program. The Navy continues to work on
modernizing integrated aeroshells that house these warheads through the
Mk4B program with the inclusion of a Shape Stable Nose Tip, which
reduces reentry variability and improves performance margins.
The W88/Mk5 warhead continues to undergo a refurbishment program.
The Navy and NNSA coordinated on tightly coupled schedules for the
fleet, the nuclear enterprise weapons complex, and production of
affected non-nuclear components. This program reached the First
Production Unit milestone in 2021 and achieved Initial Operational
Capability in January 2022. I am confident that our teams will continue
to work together to manage and deliver this program, as we have
historically addressed refurbishment challenges with a mission-focused
attitude and rigor. The Navy will continue to prioritize meeting our
Warfighters' requirements and minimizing disruption to the operational
fleet to ensure that the sea-based leg of the triad continues to
fulfill its deterrence mission. However, these critical programs will
continue to suffer schedule challenges and experience compounding
technical and programmatic risk without consistent and timely funding.
W93/Mk7 will provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future
warfighter needs. With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed
stockpile in the 2040's, the W93/Mk7 will help address production
concerns in the weapons complex and ensure an uninterrupted at-sea
deterrent for the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. In 2021, the Navy
entered Phase 1 of the joint Department of Defense-Department of Energy
Nuclear Weapons Lifecycle Process with NNSA for the W93. This effort
will address evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization
requirements; improve operational effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and
mitigate technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-based
leg of the nuclear triad while simultaneously reinvigorating the
atrophied industrial base. In fiscal year 2022, the W93 program
received NWC authorization to proceed into Phase 2, Feasibility Study
and Design Options, which will further refine and mature the design of
the W93/Mk7 program in a manner that provides an affordable, credible,
safe, and secure weapon to the Warfighter. The W93/Mk7 will not
increase the size of the deployed stockpile and will not require
nuclear explosive testing. The Navy will work in close coordination
with the DOD, NNSA, the NWC, and the Congress as this effort matures.
industrial base and infrastructure
The nation requires a fully modernized nuclear force and supporting
infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Our modernization
needs cannot succeed without investing in the research and development
(R&D), critical skills, and facilities needed to produce, sustain, and
certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and aerospace
industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-hardened electronics,
strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket motors--remains an
important priority in conjunction with R&D investment. SSP has placed
particular emphasis on the solid rocket motor industry and its sub-tier
suppliers and appreciates the support of Congress to allow for the
sustained production of these vital components. Essential to the
nuclear deterrent is a national aeroshell production capability. The
Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980's and
needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a
small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche
industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-
effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force--and also our
strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their
independent warhead program endeavors. Finally, R&D investment is
critical to today's nuclear modernization needs to ensure that we
advance necessary technology ahead of design needs and to train our
workforce during the early years of development. If the Nation does not
continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able to
adequately mitigate the risks associated with key stockpile and
infrastructure losses.
Regarding the program's infrastructure, existing facilities are
reaching their 30-year recapitalization windows as we enter into a
once-in-a-generation transition of both the weapons system and
platform. The Navy relies on a limited footprint to process missiles
and outfit the SSBNs. Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical
to meeting USSTRATCOM and Fleet mission requirements. We must continue
to make smart investments to address capability gaps, through-put
constraints, and build in surge capacity to address requirements
presented by new and emerging threats. The Administration has shown its
commitment to investment in our strategic infrastructure with the
funding of multiple MILCON projects in fiscal year 2024 that are
required for the on-time delivery of the D5LE2 SWS. We are re-
establishing pad launch capabilities on Florida's Space Coast over four
decades after the final Trident II D5 X-Flight in January 1989, as well
as modernizing and sustaining our Strategic Weapons Facilities that
will produce and deliver D5LE2 missiles to the Fleet. Our Nation and
the Navy will continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and
modernization of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an
effective and flexible deterrent now and into the future.
As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and NNSA's
infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
needs of the Nation. Of utmost importance, we must have an effective,
resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This
capability can address age-related risks, support planned
refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty.
Additionally, tritium, lithium, and uranium, and high explosives and
energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the
Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements. Efforts
to sustain and modernize deterrent forces must continue. Our strategic
forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we
cannot afford to delay given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
The return on investment in our strategic deterrent capabilities is
considerable. Not only do our strategic nuclear capabilities underpin
every military operation around the world, but they also assure our
allies and partners incentivizing them to work with us, and most
importantly provide the ultimate insurance policy against strategic
attack on the American people. Today, the national security components
of the Federal budget represent less than 15 percent of total Federal
outlays. The nuclear component itself is an even smaller portion of
these outlays. In fact, if the entire planned procurement cost of the
Columbia SSBN force were obligated in a single year, it would only
account for less than 2 percent of the entire Federal budget. This 2
percent represents a once in a generation recapitalization of the sea-
based deterrent leg and will carry our deterrent force out to 2080--a
fifty-year return on investment.
workforce
History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's was
truly a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a
cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational
leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated
predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners alike--
responded to the national need with focused determination and drove
this program with a vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear
deterrent as the SWS itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are
focused on inspiring, growing, and retaining a generation of workforce
that did not live through the darkest days of the cold war. Connecting
a new workforce to this fundamental global security mission remains an
important task shared among the entire nuclear enterprise. A capable,
credible, and affordable strategic deterrent for our Nation for the
next 60 years requires not only technical, policy, management, and
financial acumen--it requires passion and a commitment to making this
our life's work.
SSP has made significant strides in recent years to honor our past,
innovate our present, and ensure our future workforce is connected to
the fundamental global security mission. In order to create the ideal
workforce and workplace, SSP developed its first SSP Human Capital
Operating Plan (HCOP) in fiscal year 2019. The HCOP is a 5-year plan
aligning human capital initiatives to SSP's strategic goals. Through
the HCOP, SSP introduced a variety of initiatives to attract, develop,
and retain a premier workforce. Building on the success of the previous
HCOP, SSP recently issued a new HCOP in fiscal year 2023 with refined
strategies to support mission readiness. The three goals and associated
successes are outlined below.
Goal 1--Recruitment: continue to implement and elevate creative
strategies to recruit highly qualified candidates to meet SSP's current
and future demands in support of SBSD 2084. Accomplishments toward this
end include: increasing entry-level developmental positions to build a
pipeline of talent; implementing the SSP Newcomer Onboarding Workshop
to better acclimate new employees to SSP via a cohort structure;
developing workforce dashboards to increase the accuracy and
transparency of human capital and manpower data; and streamlining
hiring and onboarding processes;
Goal 2--Development: buildupon SSP's talent base by empowering
individuals with technical and professional opportunities to execute
the Nation's premier weapons system through a robust portfolio of
developmental tools and leadership programs. Accomplishments toward
this end include: redefining supervisor expectations; offering
supervisor and soft skill training; hosting supervisor luncheons to
share resources and best practices; expanding coaching, mentoring, and
cross-training opportunities; and developing career path roadmaps;
Goal 3--Retention: communicate and buildupon SSP's collaborative
culture that strives for technical excellence by implementing effective
strategies including fulfilling SSP career paths while fostering a
diverse and inclusive workplace where all individuals perform to their
full potential. Accomplishments toward this end include: expanding
employee recognition to include development of a new award for
supervisors; increasing leadership involvement in health and wellness
events; and executing a communication strategy to promote
participation, communicate results, and develop action plans in
response to the Defense Organizational Climate Survey and Federal
Employee Viewpoint Survey.
polaris sales agreement: support to the uk
Fundamental to U.S. strategic and extended deterrence policies is
the special relationship between the U.S. and the UK through the 1963
Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended (PSA) and the 1958 Mutual Defense
Agreement, as amended (MDA). Under the PSA, the U.S. sells the Trident
II SWS to the UK along with associated defense services. Under the MDA,
the U.S. cooperates with the UK on the uses of atomic energy for mutual
defense purposes. The two agreements are complementary, and together
enable the U.S. Navy to sell SWS delivery system and reentry body
equipment to the UK, as well as to exchange classified information,
including atomic information, with the UK. This framework has ensured
the United States' ability to support the UK with capabilities to
ensure a robust nuclear deterrent. The Common Missile Compartment (CMC)
represents the most recent example of the PSA partnership, in which the
two nations are designing, developing, and producing common shipboard
infrastructure which improves the ease of comingling the D5 missile
inventory and sets the stage to improve maintenance system consistency
across the two fleets. SSP will support PEO SSBN throughout the 2020's
as they oversee U.S. industry delivery of CMC components to both navies
for installation into their new SSBNs. As with Columbia, the
Dreadnought-class SSBNs will initially carry the D5LE missile. The
development of the Mk7 reentry system to support the U.S. W93 warhead
program is also critical to the development of a next generation
nuclear warhead and reentry system for the UK. The two nations are
working separate but parallel warhead programs with collaboration
between the two.
Last year marked sixty years since our two governments signed the
PSA. With sixty years behind us, SSP will continue to nurture and
safeguard this special relationship with the UK to sustain the SBSD and
support UK Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) of today while
modernizing and building flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency into
SBSD 2084 and the UK's future CASD.
conclusion
Our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical
component of our national security since the 1950's and must continue
to assure our allies and partners and to deter potential adversaries
well into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible,
and tailorable strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the
proper stewardship, custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets
entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based
strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security
requirement. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as
we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the
committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
of the nuclear triad and the vital role it plays in our national and
global security.
Senator King. Thank you, Admiral.
General Bussiere.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. BUSSIERE, USAF, COMMANDER OF
AIRFORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
General Bussiere. Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Fischer, and distinguished Members of this Committee.
I'm honored to represent the men and women of Air Force
Global Strike Command and provide you an update on our mission,
our airmen, and our ongoing modernization efforts, and the
challenges in sustaining our legacy weapon systems.
I'd like to thank Congress for its support not only to
national defense, but the Air Force's long-range strike and
nuclear deterrence missions. My full statement has been
submitted for the record.
Air Force Global Strike Command was established in 2009 to
ensure focused leadership and oversight of the Air Force's
Nuclear mission. I am grateful to the Members of this Committee
for your steadfast support as we continue to move forward with
the modernization of our weapon systems.
The timely modernization of our nuclear triad which Global
Strike is responsible for two-thirds, remains the commands'
paramount focus. With our current modernization efforts,
including our land-based ICBMs, Bomber Force, Helicopter Force,
nuclear command and control platforms, weapons generation
facilities and nuclear weapons.
This Committee is keenly aware of the threats facing our
Nation today and in the foreseeable future. We currently face
the challenge of deterring two major nuclear armed competitors,
the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Both
armed with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities.
Additionally, we are aware of the escalating nuclear threat
presented by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),
and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Not only is the command leading the charge in sustaining
current forces in deploying future long-range strike weapon
systems, Global Strike Command is acutely aware that the
nuclear deterrence mission is the bedrock of our National
Defense Strategy and foundational to our Nation's defense and
essential to that of our allies and partners.
The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise is at a critical juncture.
Our operational margin is razor thin. Our resources are
stretched to their limits. Today, I request your continued
support as we confront these pressing challenges while
upholding our Nation's security.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Thomas A. Bussiere
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Thomas A. Bussiere
introduction
Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) provides strategic
deterrence and long-range strike, anytime, anywhere, as mandated by the
President and the Commander of United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM). Not only is the command leading the charge in sustaining
current forces and deploying future long-range strike weapon systems,
the command also remains the cornerstone of our National Defense
Strategy. However, our command is at a critical juncture. Our
operational margin is razor-thin, our resources are stretched to their
utmost limits, and the demand for our capabilities remains relentless
while our adversaries are increasing and diversifying their nuclear
capabilities at an alarming rate. Today, I urgently appeal for your
immediate support as we confront these pressing challenges while
safeguarding our Nation's security.
AFGSC forces are continuously deployed worldwide, supporting all
Combatant Commands (CCMDs). Our missile and bomber forces are deterring
every day, ready to execute nuclear taskings and conduct long-range
strikes anywhere on the globe at any given moment as part of the
Department's integrated deterrence approach. Simultaneously, AFGSC
embarked on an historical, crucial nuclear modernization and
recapitalization effort, replacing and refurbishing aging bombers,
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), helicopters, command and
control aircraft, and standoff weapons. This strategic imperative to
modernize is not just important; it is long overdue. The nation cannot
afford a lapse or decline in our force posture as we introduce new
capabilities, as part of the Department's broader integrated deterrence
approach. We must maintain an unbroken nuclear backstop to underpin all
other elements of national power.
As the Commander of AFGSC, my priority is ensuring mission
readiness, excellence, and pride in our service to the Nation; service
with an amazing history and a boundless future among our ``Strikers.''
These priorities are not just words but the pillars of integrated
deterrence, providing crucial long-range conventional and nuclear
strike capabilities for our Allies and partners. Despite a shifting and
challenging geopolitical landscape, we maintain our ability to execute
nuclear options, when directed by the President of the United States,
safely and reliably while ensuring conventional strike. Our daily
efforts are the bedrock of national defense, a privilege we execute
with unwavering dedication. However, dedication is not enough. We need
your continued support and stable funding to equip our airmen to
compete effectively in this ever-changing and challenging strategic
environment.
global security environment
Currently, the United States, along with Allies and partners, faces
the challenge of deterring two major nuclear-armed competitors
possessing modern and diverse nuclear capabilities: the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation--who openly stated
it is moving nuclear weapons to neighboring Belarus. Additionally, we
confront the escalating nuclear threat presented by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the possibility of nuclear
armament by the Islamic Republic of Iran if it decides to pursue a
nuclear weapon.
The PRC continues to be the pacing challenge for the United States
as Beijing continues to expand, modernize, and diversify its nuclear
and conventional forces. The PRC's growing stockpile of deliverable
air-, ground-, and sea-launched weapon systems pose a challenge to
current United States and Allied missile defense systems beyond the
Second Island Chain. Beijing remains on an accelerated pace to possess
at least 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by the end of the decade,
complicating the requirements for United States deterrence globally.
The PRC's establishment of new silo fields and new ICBMs will only
enhance the degree of survivability, reliability, and effectiveness of
PRC nuclear forces. Consequently, Beijing will possess new options for
coercive purposes before and during a crisis or conflict. The PRC is
also rapidly modernizing air and sea conventional capabilities with
next-generation aircraft and enhanced naval strike weapons to keep
United States and Allied forces outside of optimum employment
parameters in a regional conflict. Thus, the PRC raises the risk to
United States and allied forces in the region.
Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its overall
security strategy, even more so as Moscow faces significant
conventional losses during its on-going war against Ukraine. It is
estimated that as of the end of 2023, Russian forces had suffered
315,000 casualties since the beginning of its full-scale and illegal
invasion of Ukraine. By the end of 2024, if the current casualty rate
continues, Russian forces will have lost over half a million personnel
in Ukraine. While the conventional threat to NATO appears to have
waned, Russia maintains a robust nuclear force with modernized systems
and a growing arsenal of novel asymmetric weapons. The end of this
conflict remains unclear. However, it is evident that President Putin
has no intention of halting the fight and losing face. Russia's nuclear
rhetoric and signaling continue and remain unresponsive to
international messaging and pressure.
While the DPRK is not a rival on the same scale as the PRC and
Russia, it presents deterrence dilemmas for the United States and our
Allies and partners. The DPRK poses a persistent threat and growing
danger to the United States homeland and the Indo-Pacific region. The
DPRK continues to expand, diversify, and improve both conventional and
nuclear strike capabilities. The development of liquid-and solid-fueled
missile systems will further complicate our ability to monitor and
react to ballistic missile threats. The DPRK has expanded partnerships
with both the PRC and Russia which provides political cover for the Kim
regime's nuclear weapons expansion. The DPRK rhetoric also continues to
become more confrontational as the United States and the Republic of
Korea conduct strategic exercises and bring strategic assets into the
theater. The situation remains tense on the Peninsula. A conflict on
the Peninsula could involve multiple nuclear-armed actors, raising the
risk of escalation and nuclear employment.
Iran does not today possess a nuclear weapon. However, Iran does
continue to expand its nuclear program in concerning ways, including by
producing highly enriched uranium. Tehran continues to enhance military
capabilities, holding the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in
the region and funds militia groups and terrorist organizations
throughout the Middle East. Iran also continues to pursue destabilizing
policies across the region, providing material and lethal support to a
range of United States designated terrorist organizations and militia
groups. Indeed, Iran's longstanding support to Hamas enabled the
October 7th terrorist attack against Israel and its continued support
to the Houthis has enabled the ongoing attacks on commercial shipping
in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and numerous attacks on United States
forces across the region. Should Iran decide to pursue a nuclear
weapon, Iran would further challenge United States deterrence and
assurance, which is why United States policy is to ensure Iran cannot
acquire a nuclear weapon.
operations
ICBM Operations
As the nuclear triad's land-based component, the Minuteman III
(MMIII) ICBM system is our most responsive strategic deterrent option
and maintains the highest degree of nuclear command and control among
the triad. Geographically dispersed, reliable, and highly responsive,
the MMIII force denies adversaries a perceived first-strike benefit.
The MMIII was introduced 50 years ago with a planned 10-year service
life. The robust design of MMIII, along with the dedication of our
airmen who support ICBM operations and Air Force investments, ensure a
high availability rate even as end-of-life margins collapse.
The MMIII weapon system evaluation program evaluates CCMD
reliability models and strategic planning factors. There are, however,
limitations in test architecture that will impact testing capability as
the MMIII moves closer to end of life:
1. Operational Test Launch (OTL) requirements will encounter test
assembly scarcity and challenges with fielded missile components.
2. Starting in Fiscal Year 2030 (FY30), the United States Space
Force (USSF) Autonomous Flight Safety System Implementation requirement
will inhibit MMIII from being launched outside the Western Range.
Without a waiver, MMIII testing cannot continue beyond 2030.
3. AFGSC anticipates a rise in range requirements due to MMIII OTL
and other Department of Defense (DoD) weapons systems.
Sentinel, the LGM-35A Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, is intended
to replace the MMIII weapons system. The Sentinel program requires the
replacement of every facet of the MMIII weapon system, including flight
systems, command and control, launch systems, missile silos, control
centers, and other ground infrastructure. It's important to stress much
of the infrastructure has been in place for over 50 years requiring a
substantial replacement effort. In January 2024, the Sentinel program
triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach. AFGSC has partnered with Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
leadership to support the DOD review of the Sentinel program, as
required by the Nunn-McCurdy statute.
As we continue to modernize the land-based leg of the nuclear
triad, balancing current operations with modernization will present
many challenges--none insurmountable with coordinated, disciplined
execution and teamwork. To prioritize these challenges, with the
assistance of Congress, I have established the AFGSC ICBM Modernization
Directorate. The directorate comprises current and new personnel to
ensure a graceful retirement of MMIII. The new directorate is currently
operational and anticipates Full Operational Capability (FOC) in fiscal
year 2025.
Security Response Forces
Steadfast and highly trained, our nuclear security teams stand
ready to defend our Nation's nuclear deterrent. However, leaders face a
multitude of new challenges associated with organizing, training, and
equipping a substantial force of dedicated professionals in the context
of today's threats. Across AFGSC bomber and missile bases, our airmen
continue to defend critical assets in extreme environments and traverse
vast expanses of the northern-tier missile fields. AFGSC Security
Forces manning requirements will continue to increase due to nuclear
modernization and transition.
In 2015, the Up Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(UAHMMWV) was flagged as a safety concern in the USAF Hazard Report
submitted to Congress. AFGSC responded to these safety issues by
implementing a strategy involving the procurement and deployment of a
diversified fleet comprised of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs).
The Security Forces enterprise embarked on a modernization initiative
for its armored vehicle fleet by introducing the JLTV. The first
nuclear security mission with JLTVs was completed in 2023. Headquarters
Air Force opted to centralize procurement of the JLTVs, with funding
allocated through Air Force Material Command (AFMC). Each JLTV, priced
at approximately $1.2 million, includes essential mission support
equipment crucial for Security Forces Airmen engaged in nuclear
security. AFGSC anticipates the incremental delivery of 208 JLTVs
through fiscal year 2030, enhancing operational safety and
effectiveness.
In 2021, AFGSC conducted a Limited User Evaluation of the JLTV
which identified the necessity for a mixed fleet of armored vehicles to
sufficiently support the unique operating environments and diverse
capabilities required for varying AFGSC mission sets. In collaboration
with the Pentagon, AFGSC pursued the Armored Utility Vehicle (AUV) as a
Level-1 armored vehicle, weighing 12,000 pounds, as opposed to the
22,500-pound JLTV. Following rigorous source selection procedures, the
AUV has now entered an open Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity
contract for 303 units, contingent upon funding availability.
To mitigate safety concerns, AFGSC enacted a tactical pause for
UAHMMWV use while seeking to rapidly replace the vehicles with the more
capable JLTVs and AUVs. The commander-directed UAHMMWV pause enabled a
deliberate training and certification relook. Additionally, the pause
enabled the restructuring of the vehicle's use in the demanding missile
field environments. Today, UAHMMWVs remain available for limited use in
the missile fields to ensure operational warfighter readiness.
To complement JLTVs and provide a more effective and safer patrol
vehicle, AFGSC seeks to urgently procure AUVs. Any delay in purchasing
the AUVs poses a significant risk to our Security Forces Airmen who
travel 3.5 million miles a year across ICBM fields. It is imperative
that adequate funding and accelerated fielding be utilized to mitigate
risk to our Defenders. We need your support for an $84 million
reprogramming action. The reprogramming action will allow AFGSC to
secure 301 modified Ford F-350's for the safe movement of Security
Forces Airmen conducting nuclear security missions throughout our
Global Strike missile field complexes, and ultimately reducing the risk
of future mishaps and unnecessary loss of life. I request congressional
support to field the AUV.
The fielding of the MH-139 ``Grey Wolf'' represents a generational
leap forward in nuclear security capability for AFGSC, as the
replacement for the Vietnam era UH-1N. The capability of the Grey Wolf
advances tactical ICBM operations and is essential to securing the
ground-based leg of the nuclear triad. In March 2024, the MH-139
program transitioned from the Developmental Testing phase to the
Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E) phase. IOT&E is
scheduled to conclude in early 2025. The provisional 550th Helicopter
Squadron (550 HS) will conduct IOT&E under AFOTEC supervision at
Malmstrom AFB, MT. Once IOT&E is complete, the 550 HS will focus on
training UH-1N aircrew on the MH-139 platform. The MH-139 program is
scheduled to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in late Spring
of 2025. Following Malmstrom AFB's UH-1N transition to the MH-139, F.E.
Warren AFB will begin transitioning to the MH-139 in 2026. Minot AFB is
scheduled to begin transitioning in 2027. Simultaneous to Malmstrom
AFB's IOT&E, Air Force Reserve Command's 703 Helicopter Squadron (703d
HS) will prepare to take over Flying Training Unit (FTU) duties at
Maxwell AFB. The 703 HS expects FTU execution in late 2026.
Bomber Operations
Like the ICBM force, the bomber force is engaged daily. AFGSC
bomber forces stand ready to execute nuclear taskings and are poised to
conduct long-range strike anywhere in the world. A clear example
occurred in February 2024 when two B-1B bombers flew non-stop from the
United States, struck Iran-aligned militia group supported targets in
Syria, and returned to land at home station, in the United States.
AFGSC provides direct support to each CCMD via Bomber Task Force and
CONUS to CONUS missions. Our forces consistently operate at maximum
capacity, leaving minimal room for operational flexibility or
additional surge capacity.
As AFGSC continues to modernize the B-52H and develop the B-21, we
must also sustain B-1B and B-2A aircraft until the B-21 is operational
at each main operating base. A fully funded and sustained bomber force
ensures we have a credible conventional and nuclear deterrent and also
the immediate capability to meet Combatant Commanders' operational
requirements. AFGSC will work with the Secretary of the Air Force's
staff to obtain waivers of the 5-year ``sunset'' prohibition on
modernizing aircraft scheduled to retire, which is codified at Section
2244a of Title 10, as doing so is clearly in the national security
interest of the United States. Leveraging this statutory authority for
the B-1B and B-2A is essential to maintaining AFGSC's nuclear deterrent
capabilities while completing modernization programs impacting all Air
Force bombers.
Until the B-21 Raider fleet is fully fielded, the B-1B will
continue to play a prominent role in USAF global power projection. To
prepare for emerging threats from peer competitors, modernization and
sustainment must continue. Today, the B-1B backstops global operations
through Bomber Task Forces missions that display the aircraft's ability
to operate from decentralized locations like Lulea-Kallax Air Base,
Sweden and Bengaluru, India.
The B-2A Spirit is the only penetrating bomber in the USAF. The
platform and crews remain the cornerstone of the bomber force and our
nuclear deterrent. However, sustainment challenges have limited the
ability of B-2A crews to conduct in-aircraft training. The B-2A is the
only penetrating bomber and must remain fully operational, until
replaced by the B-21 Raider.
Since the B-21's inception, top-level key system attributes and
performance parameters have remained unchanged. Similarly, since the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract was awarded in 2016,
the B-21 program has remained within its Acquisition Program Baseline
for both cost and schedule targets. The Fiscal Year 2025 President's
Budget includes funding to continue development and procurement of the
program's planned Low-Rate Initial Production. Significant remaining
milestones for the program include executing the flight test campaign
and the start of low-rate initial production. The Fiscal Year 2025
President's Budget also encompasses modernization activities continuing
across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). These activities include
conventional weapon integration, air vehicle provisioning, sensors, and
continued nuclear certification activities, as well as Long Range
Standoff (LRSO) mission integration.
The B-52H Stratofortress continues to be the enduring backbone of
United States strategic deterrence. However, the B-52 faces sustainment
challenges. Parts obsolescence also increases aircraft down time and
leads to higher cannibalization rates of parts from other aircraft.
Upcoming engine, radar, and crew interface modifications will present
training and simulation challenges for the next generation of aviators
and maintainers. To meet mission requirements, available training
sorties will continue to decrease. A lack of training sorties leads to
a lack of current aircrew to fly mission lines and an inability to
absorb the number of crews required. AFGSC continues to pursue a medium
fidelity weapon system trainer to maintain aircrew readiness and
increase training quality.
The B-52H Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) and Radar
Modernization Program (RMP) are vital upgrades addressing critical
sustainment issues, ensuring combat readiness through 2050. The Air
Force Life Cycle Management Center's Propulsion Directorate flagged the
current B-52H TF-33 engines as unsustainable beyond 2030. Rolls Royce's
F130 turbofan was chosen as a replacement for the TF-33.
Simultaneously, the B-52H radar faces sustainability challenges due to
parts obsolescence. The RMP proposes installing a modified off-the-
shelf radar to enhance reliability, reduce operational costs, and allow
for future expansion. With RMP planned for IOC at the start of fiscal
year 2028 and CERP projected for IOC in fiscal year 2033, any delays or
cuts directly impact the B-52H force size. Until engine replacement
begins in fiscal year 2031, AFGSC may face periods without enough
engines for all B-52Hs. Funding delays or shortages will immediately
and severely affect aircraft availability. Prioritizing funding,
ensuring parts availability, and optimizing industry partner efficiency
are critical measures to maintain program momentum.
Our Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is also in need of
replacement. LRSO is a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) to
design, develop, produce, and deploy a weapon system replacement for
the current ALCM. LRSO will replace ALCM on a sortie-by-sortie basis.
In March 2023, a successful Critical Design Review (CDR) was
accomplished. The LRSO total life-cycle cost is $29 billion with an
Average Procurement Unit Cost set at $7.85 million base year fiscal
year 2021. The planned purchase of the 1,020 missiles includes post-
Milestone C production to support fielding with associated weapon
system life cycle sustainment and surveillance requirements. Margin and
timing with Department of Energy is assessed as a moderate risk to meet
the warhead first production unit timeline. The LRSO program remains on
track for IOC in 2030.
AFGSC also continues to make progress replacing aging Weapon
Storage Areas (WSAs) with single facilities known as Weapons Generation
Facilities (WGFs). Nuclear security is a key function of our mission,
and these facilities are a major security initiative for the command.
The facilities significantly reduce operational, logistical, and
aircraft and vulnerability. AFGSC cannot overemphasize enough the
appreciation and continued need for congressional support to stay the
course in this critical effort. The timing and need for the WGFs are
driven by operational requirements and outdated WSA conditions.
Currently, five WGFs are in the FYDP. Three are bomber WGFs with one in
design planning and two in construction while two are ICBM WGFs with
both in construction. Two remaining WGFs are outside the FYDP. The
methodical and deliberate process to build these facilities is paying
off. F.E. Warren AFB will see the first complete WGF construction this
year and is scheduled to reach FOC in fiscal year 2025. The timing and
sequencing of the modernization endeavor are critical to sustaining
credible deterrence while ensuring deconfliction and support to new
mission weapon systems.
Cyber and Unmanned Aircraft Systems
AFGSC faces many challenges due to the changing cybersecurity
environment. These challenges have driven new information protection
and security standards for all systems, including the Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications (NC3) enterprise. NC3 programs often fail
to gain the notoriety of larger acquisition programs. However, the Air
Force NC3 weapon system is a vitally important weapons system for
AFGSC, the Air Force, and the DOD. NC3 consists of thousands of items
spread across multiple platforms and mission areas to include our
Airborne, ICBM, Command Posts, and Primary Command Centers
collectively.
Built during the cold war, many of our NC3 systems require
modernization now to meet the demands of modern cybersecurity. AFGSC
continues to work with the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration to map out the NC3 cyber
terrain and partner with 16th Air Force and AFMC to increase NC3 system
security and monitoring. These efforts require dedicated funding to be
successful. With sustainment support and funding spread across multiple
Program Executive Officers, Program Elements, and Program Offices, the
ability for AFGSC to effectively drive consensus and prioritize funding
is extremely difficult. We need better alignment, accountability, and
transparency of the management of these programs and a clearer answer
to who oversees each system and the associated funding streams. NC3 is
a no-fail mission. We must elevate the importance of NC3. AFGSC will
continue working closely with USSTRATCOM, Headquarters Air Force, Space
Force, OSD, and industry partners to generate the NC3 Next
modernization plan.
AFGSC long-range strike forces, both nuclear and conventional,
provide the foundation for the security of our Nation. AFGSC continues
to incrementally modernize systems for the fight of tomorrow while
balancing sustainment efforts for today's force. Soon we will field an
Advanced Extremely High Frequency compatible system to support ICBMs
and nuclear command posts. We will also field a Senior Leader Network
providing critical line of sight communication capabilities supporting
senior leaders in times of crisis. Simultaneously, we are developing a
modernized very low frequency receiver that will support future
waveform and cryptographic modernization upgrades, along with advanced
aircrew alert systems and non-satellite based beyond line-of-sight
communications systems. We must ensure modernization executes with
speed and agility to guarantee seamless fielding all in a cyber
contested environment.
Cyber is not the only threat facing our command. The conflict in
Ukraine along with the recent increase in unmanned aircraft attacks on
shipping in the Red Sea highlight the ever-increasing threat posed by
unmanned aircraft, both in number and complexity. AFGSC, with the
direct support of USSTRATCOM, has been at the forefront of the Air
Force's counter-unmanned aircraft efforts since 2016. Our team of
trained Defenders employ equipment that was developed 5 years ago,
while the adversary continues to evolve and adapt at the speed of
technology. Additionally, our teams operate within the United States
and therefore must act in accordance with domestic law and published
Rules for Use of Force. While the DOD's Joint Counter-small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Office is leading the overall DOD effort, our AFGSC
team is leveraging internal innovation efforts to seek solutions for
the specific challenges our forces face from unmanned aircraft,
especially as they relate to operations in the ICBM missile fields and
defense of our WSAs and WGFs.
Airborne Operations Center
The Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) weapon system is
the replacement for the legacy E-4B National Airborne Operations Center
system. The SAOC will provide an advanced command and control
capability that is survivable and enduring. Replacement of the E-4B
fleet is necessary due to the aircraft approaching end of service life
and Air Force sustainment challenges. Diminished manufacturing sources
and obsolescence have led to aircraft availability concerns. As the E-
4B gets closer to SAOC transition and subsequent end-of-life, AFGSC
will need to balance modernization efforts and aircraft availability.
To satisfy operational requirements, SAOC will be comprised of a
Commercial Derivative Aircraft (CDA), mission system, and ground
support systems. The CDA will be hardened to protect against nuclear
and electromagnetic effects and modified with an aerial refueling
capability, to enable sustained airborne operations. The mission system
will integrate secure communications and planning capabilities on
modern information technology infrastructure.
airmen and families
While our weapons systems and modernization efforts garner the
attention of Allies and adversaries across the world, our Striker
Airmen are the reason AFGSC stands ready to face any challenge or
threat, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Across various units within AFGSC, our airmen have demonstrated
exceptional performance and dedication. Airman-driven innovation is key
to advancing mission effectiveness. Our STRIKEWERX innovation team has
worked to develop cost-effective solutions to mission obstacles with
excellent results in multiple areas, to include platform operations,
maintenance, and aircrew training. STRIKEWERX Design Sprints have
paired airmen with industry and academia to produce prototypes
including B-52 engine pod covers and rapidly deployable shelters.
Additionally, our STRIKE Tank Airman innovation competition led to
initiating a mobile shielded enclosure prototype for nuclear mission
support and an artificial intelligence solution to consolidate
disaggregated B-52 aircrew training material into a single accessible
mobile application.
Deterrence is grounded in safe, secure, credible, and reliable
weapons, operated by reliable Strikers, every day. The maintenance of
our legacy weapon systems, while simultaneously modernizing the nuclear
force, requires consistent funding, and a supported and sustainable
force. To that end, the command is actively reviewing the personnel
reliability program to ensure policy guidance, processes, and
resourcing aid in the delivery of a credible defense. Part of an
airmen's reliability is the knowledge that they and their families are
supported medically. AFGSC has partnered with the Defense Health Agency
to improve the electronic health record to meet reliability program
requirements and improve access to care in our rural communities.
However, we can and must do more.
In 2023, concerns were raised about a potential correlation between
missile field service and cancer. AFGSC partnered with the USAF School
of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) to lead a comprehensive two-pronged
study to examine risks to the safety of our airmen. One arm is
evaluating the environment through three rounds of over 2,400 samples,
at each of the three Missile Wings and Vandenberg Space Force Base. We
have successfully completed two rounds of sampling. In the first round,
out of 900 total surface swipes, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) over
the EPA threshold were detected on four low-touch surfaces at three
Missile Alert facilities (MAFs). The three MAFs were immediately shut
down until mitigation was complete. All three MAFs are now operational.
All air, drinking water, and soil samples have returned below
regulatory levels for chemicals or hazards in both rounds of testing.
Radon levels at all three missile wings were below the intervention
threshold. To account for seasonal variation, the third round of
sampling will occur this spring.
The epidemiology arm of the study is comparing the rates of 14
common cancers in the general population to missile-related career
fields using large Government data bases. AFGSC and USAFSAM released
the initial set of results from the epidemiology review in February
2024. From the very limited data set of electronic military medical
records, the researchers found no increased incidence of non-Hodgkin
Lymphoma, and cancer rates within the missile community were consistent
with national military rates at the time of the study. The clinical
review is now moving to the next phase, which includes the DOD Cancer
Registry and Department of Veterans Affairs data. These additional data
sets could provide additional insights on potential risks.
Getting results for our airmen, families, and veterans coupled with
transparency remains our priority throughout this effort. For our
veterans we are communicating and sharing our progress with the
Department of Veterans Affairs Military Environmental Exposure Sub-
Council. This council reviews potential cases of toxic exposure. We are
also conducting a complete review and validation of the hazard
assessments and occupational health surveillance for the missile
community. The safety and care of our airmen is paramount. AFGSC has
hosted five Town Halls with airmen and guardians to keep the missile
community updated on results as they come in, followed by immediate
notifications to senior leaders and Congress. The safety and care of
our airmen is paramount.
Ensuring the retention of our Strikers is critical to maintaining a
proficient and ready nuclear force. With specialized training and
experience, retaining talent is essential. Recognizing the potential
transition of many Strikers to the private sector, AFGSC is conducting
a comprehensive analysis focusing on nuclear maintenance, command and
control, and security forces Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs). These
frontline AFSCs are vital for the security and operation of the
Nation's nuclear triad. We are evaluating human resource strategies
geared toward crafting a distinct and customized plan tailored
specifically for the Nuclear Enterprise. Furthermore, we have
collaborated with RAND-Project Air Force to undertake an impartial
study of our mission, leaving no aspect unexamined in our pursuit of
enhancing command excellence.
AFGSC's Force Development Division is the command lead for the
deliberate development of AFGSC leaders and nuclear mission
professionals. The team plans, develops,
organizes, and executes the Command's deliberate nuclear deterrence
and assurance education efforts. Our team specializes in integration of
Air Force and command-level programs to address issues related to
deterrence education and development to ensure applicability and
relevance for specific mission area needs. We leverage the best
available commercial technologies to field education programs that
develop nuclear mission focused leaders while building an enduring
leadership culture across the AFGSC staff, Numbered Air Forces (NAF),
and Wings.
As part of its steadfast commitment to airmen development, AFGSC
has forged a partnership with Air University to pilot a base-level
Professional Military Education (PME) initiative, targeting
Intermediate Developmental Education for Majors, Major selects, and
their civilian counterparts. The groundbreaking program enables
officers and civilians to blend the flexible distance learning elements
of Air Command and Staff College with the interactive in-person seminar
format provided by in-residence PME. Concurrently, AFGSC has revamped
its course curriculum for command teams' pre-command education, which
involved a comprehensive redesign of the Squadron Leadership Course and
the introduction of a first-ever Nuclear Stewardship Executive Course.
The initiative aims to furnish Squadron, Group, and Wing Commanders, as
well as their Senior Enlisted Leaders, with a profound understanding of
their roles, responsibilities, and authorities in relation to the
nuclear mission of the DOD, USSTRATCOM, and the United States Air
Force. Moreover, AFGSC offers highly coveted internships tailored for
exceptional officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian Strikers. These
year-long programs immerse participants in a diverse array of
educational and developmental experiences, including exposure to
strategic and national level leadership, academic forums, and
international partnerships, all aimed at cultivating future ``Strategic
Thought Leaders'' for the Nuclear Enterprise. Upon successful
completion, graduates are selectively placed in assignments designed to
maximize their unique skill sets. Furthermore, AFGSC spearheads
Aviation Inspiration Mentor outreach efforts through Project Tuskegee,
a community engagement initiative aimed at informing, influencing,
inspiring, and attracting the next generation of rated and non-rated
operators. Since inception in 2022, Project Tuskegee has reached
hundreds of thousands across various communities, showcasing
opportunities within AFGSC. Through strategic partnerships and
engagements at national-level events, Project Tuskegee aims to recruit
talented individuals from diverse backgrounds to contribute to key
modernization efforts such as the MH-139A, B-21 Raider, and B-52J, thus
shaping the future landscape of AFGSC operations.
Caring for airmen and families remains a sacred duty. We are
falling short at our Child Development Centers (CDCs). Hiring
challenges are the primary driver of shortfalls at installation CDCs.
The Department of the Air Force (DAF) implemented various hiring and
retention incentives which has increased the CDC staffing levels from
72.6 percent in February 2023 to 82.4 percent in February 2024,
reducing the unmet childcare need by 222 children. There are limited
options within the local community at some locations. DAF works to
support those families through subsidized childcare programs. Wings are
also implementing initiatives to combat these gaps. The Malmstrom AFB
school liaison officer championed a pilot ``Transitional-K'' program
for military children. This on-base CDC early childhood development
program intends to address childcare issues and enhance academic
performance. The pilot program includes 18 military families with
support from local high schools and the local university to help
children transition between pre-K and a kindergarten educational
environment. The program helps offset childcare needs and allows
military families access to early childhood development resources.
Minot AFB has received top priority from Air Force Installation and
Mission Support Center to plan, design, and construct two additional
classrooms and renovate an existing classroom into two separate rooms.
This initiative will enable the care of 30 more children. Furthermore,
Minot AFB has implemented a $5,000 hiring incentive for an 18-month
commitment as part of recruiting and retention initiatives. A healthy
CDC is critical to the readiness of an individual and should be looked
at as a no-fail mission. Support from Congress that improves hiring,
facility upgrades, and other efforts will not only help AFGSC but will
benefit the entire Air Force. Simply put, our command needs
congressional support to fund initiatives geared toward bettering the
lives of our airmen and families.
Despite efforts by many, military spouses continue to face
employment challenges; in fact, military spouses experience an
unemployment rate among the highest in the country at approximately 21
percent--around seven times the national average. Montana took the
challenge head-on and Malmstrom Air Force Base spouses have been
positively impacted by the Montana Board of Public Education voting to
adopt Montana Superintendent Arntzen's recommended changes to teacher
licensing. These revisions allow for flexible approaches to help
address the retention and recruitment of teachers. Additionally, the
changes specifically allow for licensure reciprocity for military
spouses and dependents. We expect other State legislatures will follow
to support the remainder of our installations.
AFGSC actively addresses violence prevention and response across
its installations, focusing on filling Integrated Primary Prevention
Workforce and True North provider positions. However, the nationwide
shortage of mental health providers presents challenges in attracting
and retaining qualified candidates, particularly in rural areas.
Efforts to incentivize service in difficult-to-fill locations aim to
position AFGSC as a premier command. AFGSC anticipates participating in
pilot programs to enhance airmen and their families' resilience and
response capabilities. Recently, a Resiliency Response Concept of
Operations was developed to augment Disaster Mental Health guidance,
ensuring coordinated support at installation, NAF, and Major Command
levels. While the primary goal is prevention, the workforce remains
prepared to respond swiftly and effectively, providing necessary
support as situations demand.
AFGSC Strikers undertake the daunting task of executing two-thirds
of the Nation's nuclear triad mission, a responsibility demanding
unparalleled complexity and resilience in the face of rigorous
conditions. The mission unfolds against the backdrop of a monumental
40-year, $290 billion recapitalization effort, comparable in scale to
the Eisenhower InterState System. Recognizing the distinct challenges
posed by the command's diverse locations, extreme climates, and mission
demands, my team is diligently exploring various retention tools and
strategies. These initiatives are aimed at aligning the priority of our
talent management programs with the paramount importance of the
Strategic Nuclear Deterrence mission. By advocating for transparency,
flexibility in assignment selection, and financial incentives to retain
seasoned talent through enhanced quality-of-life measures, we strive to
foster a supportive environment conducive to mission success. However,
the realization of these enhancements hinges on crucial congressional
support, necessitating continued funding to address outdated facilities
and sustain our vital mission capabilities.
conclusion
AFGSC is acutely aware of the need to sustain our current force and
modernize rapidly. We are prepared, yet we are close to being outpaced
to meet the demands we find in today's world. Despite having a robust
plan that paves the way for our future force, we have no operational
margin. The preservation of our legacy force remains a vital national
security objective.
Unparalleled operational parameters and an uncertain world confront
the command daily. Our imperative is to uphold FOC to fulfill national
security mandates, even as we integrate cutting-edge weapon systems.
The presence of legacy systems mandates ongoing funding until full
divestment can be achieved. Ensuring the execution of modernization
efforts is imperative to maintaining credible deterrence.
We cannot slow down. AFGSC is building the force to face an
uncertain future. Every portfolio is being modernized, from new sixth-
generation aircraft to more capable Grey Wolf helicopters. However, the
military-industrial complex is not keeping pace. Already, delays,
inflation, and expanding overhead are chipping away at time margins and
resources. Simply put, we need continued advocacy and bipartisan effort
to field new capabilities and divest the old.
Our airmen and their families are the bedrock of AFGSC, enabling
sustainment, modernization, and deterrence. AFGSC and the Nation have a
duty to address the challenges our airmen and families face. We are
obligated to provide our airmen with solutions to health concerns,
access to necessary medical care, adequate childcare, and opportunities
for education and personal growth. By taking care of them, they will
take care of the mission.
AFGSC thanks Congress for its commitment to our command's national
defense mission through strategic deterrence and long-range strike. The
success of our efforts to develop and maintain these vital capabilities
for our Nation relies on coordination with Congress and the support you
provide.
Senator King. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral Wolfe, we who work in this area so frequently
sometimes things just go by and we take them for granted. You
said something very important in your opening statement about a
secure second-strike capability. Why is that so important to
deterrence?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I mean, obviously if you think
about it from the adversary's perspective, anything that they
may think they could do as an initial strike, the SSB enforce
is always out there on alert, on patrol, unknown where they're
at.
But certainly, if ever called upon, they are survivable and
could ensure that a second strike from our Nation could be
performed. So, that is absolutely critical as you look at
deterrence and what it means.
Senator King. So, the idea is that the adversary can't
think that they can knock us out entirely with one strike. If
you've got the survivable at sea capability, that must give
them pause. That's the theory?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. That's absolutely correct.
Senator King. Thank you.
Dr. Adams, many of the production lines and I think you
touched on this in your testimony for the components have been
dormant for many years. Do we have the physical assets and the
people to be able to bring those lines back in order to meet
the demand that we're seeing in our modernization?
Dr. Adams. Yes, sir. We do. Thank you for that question.
Yes, thank you. I'll repeat my answer. Thank you for the
question, Senator King. The short answer is yes, sir, we do. We
don't have a lot of margin. We have to time phase things
carefully so that we deploy the needed capabilities in time for
when they're needed for given warheads.
As I think you know, as we progress through our program of
record, successive warheads will require more and more of the
components to be newly manufactured, as opposed to reused.
That's an integral part of what goes into our planning and our
budget requests that support that planning. But the answer is
yes, we can do it.
Senator King. Is there an end date to a nuclear warhead? In
other words, I've seen in New Mexico, those rows and rows and
rows. Is there some point where they're deemed useless and we
have to reprocess? What's, what's the estimated lifespan of a
nuclear warhead?
Dr. Adams. The answer is different for different warheads
and it's different for different components. We are
conservative bunch by our nature and by the importance of our
mission. We don't certify things to be out in the stockpile
unless we are highly confident that they can still meet all the
military requirements.
If there's an exception to that, we duly note it and work
with the services and DOD to accommodate those exceptions. But
we do retire our warheads and we dismantle them and we do
recycle that material.
Senator King. That's when that material can go to Admiral
Houston for Naval Reactors.
Dr. Adams. It goes various places. We recycle the material
that goes into our newly manufactured warheads. For example,
the plutonium we will use for pit production will be recycled.
The highly enriched uranium that we use for our warheads is
recycled and of course, yes, it's older secondaries that are
the source of material for Naval Reactors and also for some
other defense related and NNSA related uses.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Bussiere, you're engaged in the overseeing and in
many ways managing the Sentinel rebuilding. Are you satisfied
that we have the organizational structure to manage that
process? Because as you know, we're facing a Nunn-McCurdy
breach? I think it's important to note that the problem is not
the missiles, but the civil works.
Do we have the structure and the people in charge that are
necessary to make sure we can get beyond that and get that
project moving forward?
General Bussiere. Senator King, that's an excellent
question as it relates to how we're rebuilding the management
team that oversees the Sentinel Weapon System.
Senator King. Is your mic on? I'm having a little trouble--
could you get a little closer to your mic, please?
General Bussiere. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Bussiere. So, as you know, in NDAA 2023 we were
directed at Global Strike Command Stand Up. A site activation
task force relating to the transition from Minuteman III to the
Sentinel Weapon System. That director had stood up last August
and General Connor is the General Officer I put in charge of
that.
As you know, the 2024 NDAA requires the Department to look
at those various different authorities within the Department of
Defense that should be delegated to that task force to oversee
the transition from Minute Man III to the Sentinel Program.
Senator King. Do we have the structure that we need?
General Bussiere. We haven't returned back to Congress with
our recommendations on those responsibilities primarily because
of the pause with the Nunn-McCurdy process going through right
now. So, we still owe that answer from the 2024 NDAA back to
Congress.
Senator King. So, we'll look forward to having that because
this is one of the most important and frankly expensive
projects that we have underway and we really--I'll sleep better
at night if I know somebody's in charge. My philosophy of
management is you want one throat to choke. I think we need to
be sure that there's somebody who's ultimately responsible for
this.
General Bussiere. Yes, Senator, and I think you're looking
at him.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you for volunteering,
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen for being here today and thank you for your service.
Admiral Wolfe, one of the recommendations of the Strategic
Posture Commission's report was to, ``accelerate development
and deployment of D5LE2.'' How is your organization evaluating
different avenues to ensure that this critical update is
available as soon as possible?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. So,
where we're currently at right now. We are within a year of
getting to what we call milestone B, which is really where we
will settle in on what the trade studies have told us the right
architecture's going to be.
Then where we start to get the entire program in alignment
to move forward to understand what the schedule will really be
to first meet where we know we need to get which is in the late
thirties when we run out of current assets. But then once we
anchor that, that will give us the opportunity to look to see
if there are any opportunities to accelerate.
We are certainly aware of what the Strategic Posture
Commission recommended, and as we go through this, that will be
taken into account as we start to lock in that program.
Senator Fischer. You have a really important responsibility
just to manage the transition from the Ohio-class to Columbia
to make sure that we have the warheads necessary to put on
those boats that are out there. How are you managing all of
that? What input do you have there? Because that's what 60, 70
percent of warheads that are, that are deployed?
How are you able to control the timeline and make sure we
can meet it by getting all these--all of the factions together?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. So----
Senator Fischer. Administrator, Dr. Adams, you know, how's
this going to----
Admiral Wolfe. So, I think it's a whole-of-Navy effort with
the way we originally structured the way we would transition
between Ohio and Columbia, and that's why if you look at the
decision that was made when we said we were going to have a
replacement for Ohio.
We made the decision that ostensibly the weapon system that
I'm responsible for and the warheads that go on that weapon
system, we are ostensibly picking that up and moving it to
Columbia. So, from a design development perspective although
there are a few differences it's essentially the same system.
As we manage this transition the way we've done it is as an
Ohio will come offline, we take those assets and then we'll
load those onto a Columbia. So that's how we guarantee that
when we are asked to meet Operation Global Citadel requirements
for U.S. strategic command, we have the assets, we have the
timing because we will not download anything before we know
we've got the new platform to upload.
So, I'm able to manage all of that with the assets we have
so that as the timing works, we control when that will occur.
Senator Fischer. There will not be a gap?
Admiral Wolfe. No, ma'am. As a matter of fact, as you are
very aware to ensure that there's not a gap although not in my
portfolio, the Navy has decided we are looking at a certain
number of Ohio-class that we could potentially extend in the
event that a Columbia may show up late. So, we can always meet
the STRATCOM requirements of Operation Global Citadel. Yes,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. General Bussiere,
nice to see you, sir. I am pleased to see that the Air Force
has moved forward with SAOC. Can you provide us with an update
on the program and how fiscal year 2025, the budget request is
going to support that specific part of our NC3 architecture?
General Bussiere. Yes, Senator Fischer. We're really
excited about the decision and the announcement of the industry
partner that was selected for the Strategic Airborne Operations
Center, Sierra Nevada Corporation was selected by the
Department. The threshold number of the platform is six
aircraft with the objective number of the platform is eight
aircraft.
The 2025 budget, I think like we previously had talked
about briefly is primarily for research and development. As
well as starting to look at some of the construction projects
required for the additional aircraft, they'll be based it off
in Air Force Base in Omaha.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
all of our witnesses for being here today.
I'd like to talk a little bit about the submarine launched
cruise missile, the nuclear version SLCM-N. Development of
SLCM-N has been driven by a perceived need for deterrence
against the growing Russia and China nuclear threat. Russia, as
we all know, maintains a stockpile of maybe about 2,000 low
yield tactical warheads, and has an employment doctrine that
envisions some limited nuclear use.
The SLCM-N is theoretically meant to ensure that our
adversaries know that we have the ability to respond in kind.
In short, it should give us more flexibility, but I'm concerned
that we are spending money in taxing our manufacturing capacity
for a redundant capability.
With the addition of the B61-13 and the SLCM-N, the
National Nuclear Security Administration has a lot on it plate.
We're also developing a W76-2 low yield warhead and the Air
Force is soon going to have the long-range standoff missile on
a B-21.
It's W80 warhead has a low yield option with it. I'm also
concerned about the changes we would have to make to Virginia-
class subs to accommodate SLCM-N. So, Vice Admiral Wolfe what
would it cost the Navy in time, funds, long-term limitations to
take conventional torpedoes off of our attack submarines to
accommodate a low yield nuclear weapon, SLCM-N.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, Senator. Thanks for the question. So,
certainly we've started to look at that and actually there is a
report out already to Congress at the classified level for some
of those initial impacts but based on where the NDAA this past
year asked us to go look and with support from this Committee
and others, we've asked for flexibility because we absolutely
recognize, yes, there will be some impact to our SSN force.
But if you look at the options that it provides to the
President and if we're allowed to go look at how to not impact
anything else to your point with the nuclear modernization that
we're already doing for the triad which is absolutely
fundamental, we are looking at what options we can provide that
will give us that capability with minimum impact for both the
Navy and for NNSA to go make this happen.
So, we are in the process of looking at all that right now
with the added flexibility that we've asked for today.
Senator Kelly. I read the report yesterday and you say
limited impact and I don't want to get into details of a
classified report, but some of it did not seem like the
different options that were given were not limited impact.
I want you to go into a little bit about what would we need
to do to a Virginia-class sub in terms of modifications and
cost to the sub itself, and to the extent you can do it here, a
little bit about how the operations could change for--in order
to put that capability onto a Virginia-class attacks up.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So, certainly from a cost
perspective it would be premature to give you an exact cost of
what we think a program like that would cost. That's why part
of what we're going to look at in this next year is to your
point. What solutions are out there that would minimize the
number of modifications we would have to make to one of our
SSNs?
You particularly pointed out Virginia, there is no doubt
that based on the solution, the impacts could be great, greater
or they could be less depending on which is why we've asked for
the flexibility to be able to go look at multiple solutions to
try and weigh that. That's from an impact to the actual
platform.
We believe that there's other things out there and and I
can't talk about them here that might get us to a capability
that would actually and I do believe, minimize the impact of
modifications we would have to make to our SSNs. We're going to
understand that. Now, from an operational perspective, you're
absolutely right.
Anytime you have a conventional mission with a nuclear
mission, you have to be very careful to segregate those and
make sure that our war fighters understand how that operates.
Again, as we come through material solutions impacts to the
fleet will also be taken into account as we get through what a
solution would look like.
Then it's just going to be a matter of what would the cost
of that solution be as we lock in and what support do we need
to go make that happen?
Senator Kelly. One big concern I have is when you look at a
conflict between the United States and a near peer adversary
that has maybe in some cases could have a bigger fleet both in
naval and merchant vessels, our submarine capability is
substantial. It's significant. It would, it would weigh heavily
in that kind of conflict.
When I think about the probability of firing a conventional
torpedo, you know, out of a submarine, you know, out of a
torpedo tube and the likelihood of having to do that multiple
times and just the rather shallow depth of a magazine and not a
lot of rounds you have aboard the sub. Sure, certainly you
could--re reload but that takes some time and there's risk
involved in doing that.
Weighing that with the very unlikely event that we would
deploy a tactical nuclear weapon in combat, one of my biggest
concerns is that we would be giving up something we really need
for something we are unlikely to use.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I appreciate that, and certainly,
all of those discussions will take place as we look at what--
how do you weigh options available to the P0resident for a
deterrent capability as opposed to a conventional capability.
Certainly, the next year will inform us a lot more on how we're
going to get at being able to balance all of that.
Senator Kelly. Alright, thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator King. To followup, Admiral, the theory is that if
all we have is massive retaliation, that's not credible in
response to a tactical use by an adversary. Isn't that really
what we're talking about here?
Admiral Wolfe. Certainly, in a regional conflict,
absolutely, sir. There is no doubt, to Senator Kelly's point,
although we have deployed a 76-2 and we're done with that. So,
we've gotten that impact out of NNSA. You know, you ask
yourself again, is that a credible scenario?
If you're trying to deter a regional contract, all of those
things are being taken----
Senator King. The Russians are talking all the time about
using the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Senator Kelly
points out part of their doctrine; escalate to deescalate.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir, and it really is a matter of as
you talked again earlier about a second-strike capability.
Anything that we can do to cause China or Russia to have pause
on whether they would even consider any type of nuclear
response. That's really what we're trying to get after with all
these systems.
Senator King. Thank you. I want to ask a very basic
question. The idea of the Ohio-class and then the Columbia-
class with the ICBMs goes back, I don't, with ballistic
missiles, sorry, goes back many years. That decision was made,
I don't know, 30, 40 years ago when this was first being
discussed.
Are we making a mistake by sticking with ballistic missiles
and not moving toward hypersonic cruise missiles or some--in
other words, the problem with--we had a hearing last week with
the Missile Defense Agency, a ballistic missile, Sir Isaac
Newton can tell you where it's going to land.
I wouldn't say it's easy to intercept but it's much easier
to intercept than a maneuverable cruise missile. Should we be
thinking fundamentally about are we putting a seventies or
eighties weapon on this modern submarine? Maybe we should be
thinking about what these submarines are going to be armed
with.
Is that an off the wall idea or is that something that
you're thinking about?
Admiral Wolfe. Sir, that's a difficult question to answer
in an unclassified scenario. I'd be more than happy to have
that discussion in a classified setting. But here's what I
would tell you. Based on technology and the things that we're
all experiencing, there is no one solution that fits every
scenario where we could think about how we would credibly deter
our adversaries.
So, I think certainly the triad that we have today still
remains the bedrock and the foundation of our nuclear deterrent
capability. There is no doubt when we talk about things like
sea launch cruise missile or we talk about some of these other
things, there is a place for them and those discussions need to
be had in the future.
Senator King. I just want to be sure those discussions are
happening and that we're not just doing what we've done. You
know, we've never done it that way before, I hate that
attitude. So, I just want to be sure there are those
discussions.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. We do have those discussions all
the time.
Senator King. Thank you. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't have any more questions, but I appreciate your
answer to Senator Kelly about SLCM-N, and I think it's
extremely important that not only do we look at what our
adversaries are doing and their comments that they--their
public comments that they make that we have to be able to have
different options.
I really appreciate the work that that you do on that and
to make sure that a president would have options that would
only add to the deterrence to make sure we would never have to
use them. So, thank you.
Senator King. I want to conclude the hearing but General
Bussiere, you mentioned the new NAOC and a group of us, almost
10 years ago went on one of the NAOC's around the country on a
flight with a simulated attack. It was one of the most sobering
experiences of my life.
I would urge you to think about inviting Members of the
Committee, Members of Congress to take that trip because it
takes it out of the hearing room and becomes much more real as
you think about what challenges this country might face, what
challenges the President might face in a situation. That was
what came through to me was that clock on the wall that told
you how long you had to make a decision.
I want to thank you all for the work that you do, it's some
of the most important work that this Government is doing.
Deterrence is the bedrock of our strategy, and you're on the
front line of deterrence. Thank you very much.
I appreciate your testimony. We'll hold the record open for
additional thoughts and testimony, and questions from our
Members. But for today, thank you so much for joining us. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:59 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[all]